New Edge Activity and Anomaly Detection in Computer Networks

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2nd IMA and OR Society Conference on Mathematics of Operational Research, 25-26 April 2019 - Birmingham


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Overview

Motivation: Increasingly sophisticated, multi-stage cyber-attacks e.g. WannaCry 2017: 230,000 computers in 150 countries



(UK, 2018: 7407 breaches in businesses \rightarrow GOV UK invested \sim 1.9b)

Goals: Monitor the computer network by modelling new edge formation at scale & identifying latent network structure

Challenges: Computational speed and scalability



Intrusion Detection Approach


Anomaly-based: deviation from a model of the normal state (can detect new attacks in contrast to signature-based methods, Patcha et al., 2007)

Modelling approach to the evolution of new edges in the computer network:


New Edges: connections between a client and server pair not previously observed

Given a bipartite graph G(t) and a history H(t) of all connections at time t

interest in P(new edges at t+1 | H(t))



Modelling New Edges



- ▶ we need to understand the rate of occurrence of new edges
- ▶ we need to predict the identity of new edges (also identifying latent structure)

Why latent structure?


Do similar clients connect to similar servers? If so, it can be predictive of similar future interactions \Rightarrow build a model for new edges which also considers latent structure

New Edge Intensity

We propose a model for the conditional intensity of observing a new edge (x,y), $x\in X$, $y\in Y$:

$$\lambda_{xy}(t) = r(t) \exp\{\alpha \cdot (N_x^+(t), N_y^-(t), I_{x,1}(t), I_{x,2}(t)) + \beta_{xy} \cdot (Z_{xy}(t))\} \times \mathbb{1}_{(X \times Y) \setminus G_t} \{(x, y)\}$$

- r(t): 'seasonal' baseline hazard
- $N_x^+(t), N_y^-(t)$: time-varying in-degree of x and out-degree of y
- $I_{x,1}(t), I_{x,2}(t)$: time-varying indicators of new edge 'burstiness'
- $Z_{xy}(t)$: matrix of attraction $x \leftrightarrow y$ (similarity between clients and servers)



Cluster membership indicators

Dot-products of latent feature positions

1. Cluster Formulation (hard-thresholding)

Simultaneous biclustering of clients and servers:

$$\mathbb{C} = \{C_1, \dots, C_L\}$$
 partition of the client set X

$$\$ = \{S_1, \dots, S_M\}$$
 partition of the server set Y

$$Z_{xy}(t) = \left(N_{x|\mathfrak{S}(y)}^+(t), N_{y|\mathfrak{C}(x)}^-(t)\right)$$

outdegree of
$$y$$
 restricted to cluster $l(x) \in \mathbb{C} \to N^+_{x|S}(t) = \sum_{n \geq 1} \mathbbm{1}_{[0,t)}(t'_n) \mathbbm{1}_x(x'_n) \mathbbm{1}_S(y'_n)$ indegree of x restricted to $m(y) \in \mathbb{S} \to N^-_{y|C}(t) = \sum_{n \geq 1} \mathbbm{1}_{[0,t)}(t'_n) \mathbbm{1}_x(y'_n) \mathbbm{1}_C(x'_n)$

limitations: single, finite representation + each data point only to one cluster

2. Latent Feature Formulation (soft-thresholding)


flexible embedding: potentially infinite number of latent features

$$\begin{split} K &= \text{number of latent features} \\ U &= (u_1, \dots, u_{|X|}) \in \mathbb{R}^{|X| \times K} \text{ (clients)} \\ V &= (v_1, \dots, v_{|Y|}) \in \mathbb{R}^{|Y| \times K} \text{ (servers)} \end{split}$$

$$Z_{xy}(t) = u_x \cdot v_y^T$$

automatically accounts for biclusters

↓
Indian Buffet Process (IBP)



Two-step Inference

Bayesian framework \rightarrow posterior inference with MCMC

MCMC depends on starting values \rightarrow need 'good' initial latent structure:

Surrogate Model for Cluster form.: Model-based Agglomerative Biclustering Surrogate Model for Latent form.: Sparse SVD + stability selection

Updating scheme

 $\mathbf{1^{st}}$ step: initial latent structure via surrogate model

 $\mathbf{2}^{\mathbf{nd}}$ step: jointly update initial structure and model parameters through MCMC

Cyber-security application

Application to Computer Network Data


The LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) Data Set

Bulk:

- 1,648,275,307 events in total (58 days of traffic)
- 16,230 clients 15,417 servers


Red Team:

- penetration testing: subset labelled as known compromised events
- 48,079 of the total records: 4 compromised clients



Red Team

Client computer	Frequency		Unique Server computers	
	Red Team	Total	Red Team	Total
C17693	701	1717	296	534
C18025	3	101	1	29
C19932	19	10,008	8	30
C22409	26	36,253	3	31



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Model Prediction Performance


Method tested under both cluster and latent formulation:

- 15 sample repetitions (all events from 1000 randomly sampled clients)
- positive model coefficients: strong impact of degree and latent structure
- out-of-training log likelihood on the last 10,000 events

Model	Log Likelihood	Iteration Time
Cluster	-18804.34	81.4s
Latent-feature (IBP)	-18379.93	131.7s

We find that the latent feature model outperforms the cluster model

Anomaly-detection




H₀: normal behaviour

 \mathbf{H}_1 : departure from model of normality learned


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Anomaly-detection



$$\begin{split} p_n &= \frac{\sum_{(x,y) \notin G_{t'_n}} \lambda_{xy}(t'_n) \mathbb{I}_{(0,\lambda_{x'_n y'_n}(t'_n)]} \{\lambda_{xy}(t'_n)\}}{\sum_{(x,y) \notin G_{t'_n}} \lambda_{xy}(t'_n)} \\ s_x(t) &= \bar{\chi}_{2\{1+N_x^+(t)\}}^2 \left(-2 \sum_{n \geq 1} \mathbb{I}_{[0,t)}(t'^x_n) \log p^x_n\right) \text{ s.t. } \inf_{t \geq 0} \ s_x(t) \end{split}$$

Anomaly-detection



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Conclusion

We proposed a Bayesian model and anomaly-detection method:

- 1) modelling rate and identity of new edges and simultaneously
- 2) detecting latent network structure to aid new edge prediction

Application to computer network data:

- good prediction performance
- latent formulation outperforms cluster formulation
- anomaly-detection with good false/positive rate
- successfully detected two known compromised clients

Further Research:

- adapt the choice of the construction of the control chart
- exploit faster inference methods (e.g. variational inference)

References

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Thank you!