The Design and Price of Information

Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin

Discussed by Silvio Ravaioli

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Overview of the Paper

- Model of data trading
- The fully informed monopolist data seller offers a menu of stochastic experiments
- Data buyers acquire additional information in order to improve own decision before taking an action
- Distribution of buyers: ex-ante identical, but with different interim beliefs (partially informed)
- ► Focus on the seller: properties of the revenue-maximizing menu of experiments
- Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix
- Every menu contains a fully informative experiment
- Special case (binary states and actions): construction of optimal menu



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Motivation

- ► Unprecedented amount of information collected and traded: \$20B to acquire/process consumer data in 2018
- What is the value of this data?
- Significant effort to link the design with real-world information products: Acxiom, Nielsen, Equifax, and Oracle [marketing and risk-mitigation purpose]
- Typically data buyers choose what to acquire from a standard database, such as potential consumers with prespecified characteristics (rows), or desired consumer attributes (columns)
- ▶ Rephrase the design of a statistical experiment in terms of hypothesis testing. Equifax (data seller) can provide characteristics (*red flags*) to improve an action (grant/deny a loan), with a trade-off between type I and type II errors

- Novel with respect to the literature because of the setup and the insights it provides
 - Information is useful as long as it guides the actions
 - ▶ Horizontal and vertical differentiation of data buyers
 - Explanation for "no garbling" observed in real world settings

► Information trading

ADMATI AND PFLEIDERER 1986: homogeneous data buyers, imperfectly informed, trading an asset with a common value BABAIOFF, KLEINBERG, AND PAES LEME 2012: similar setup but different timing; the payoff function depends on two state variables (private information for buyers and sellers), the seller offers a contract based on the observed variable

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Discriminatory information disclosure

<u>LIZZERI 1999</u>: the seller decides whether to disclose match value <u>ESO AND SZENTES 2007</u>: the seller can make the payment contingent on statistical experiment and buyer's action

- ► Bergemann and Bonatti 2015 "Selling cookies" model
- Focus on the data buyer (advertiser) optimal behavior
- ▶ Data buyers are identical in the prior (no private information), and they differ in the pair-specific match value v(i, j), that is the profit of firm j being matched with consumer i
- ► Information structures are restricted to "queries": reveal or not the state realization
- ► The paper characterizes the optimal queries given the distribution of match values and the cost of advertising
- ► The price of information is determined by a competitive market
- ► Starting from BERGEMANN-BONATTI-SMOLIN's setup, we can consider further dimensions of heterogeneity across data buyers: action space, actions' costs, match value, preference for timing of information, ...

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1. Contracts are contingent on Experiments only

- ► In the model, the seller commits to a disclosure policy [standard assumption in the Bayesian persuasion literature]
- Motivation: when the buyer acquires the database, she does not know its content and it may be profitable or not. Similarly, companies commission a record without knowing if its content will be helpful
- ► The commitment assumption (contracts are contingent on the experiment, not on action/utility) is strong, and often difficult to motivate
- We have other examples [e.g. Eso and Szentes 2007] in which the seller provides a "bundle" of service+information. For example, Google ads are paid per click, and the seller provides a service (show the ad to a group of users) and uses own information (select targets based on available data)



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2. Common Knowledge and Inference from Tariff


- ► It is standard in mechanism design to offer a menu of options as the one presented in the paper
- ▶ But in this framework the "product" that is sold is *information*, and we can be concerned about the menu providing some information itself
- ▶ If the seller is informed about buyers' type distribution, but buyers are not, can they make some inference about other buyers' types, and therefore about the value of data?
- ▶ Suppose that the buyer updates own beliefs after observing the menu: what does she learn about the buyers' type θ [and ω] distribution? what are her "new" interim beliefs? Do the constraints change based on these interim beliefs?

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3. Cost for Collecting Information

- In the model, the seller already has a database, and the marginal cost for sharing information is zero
- ► What if we add a third population of agents (users) who decide whether to provide own data?
- Conclusions: a richer model should include the cost of acquiring the information (duplicate, distribute, and potentially degrade the available information)
 - Users may have heterogeneous WTA for providing own data
 - ► WTA may be a combination of own cost (e.g. fill a survey) and benefit (e.g. be part of a newsletter)
 - Based on the seller-user IC, only some users will provide own data, and they will self-select in the database
 - ► The seller-user IC constraint and database composition should also change based on buyer distribution



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