First article

* Analyzes Chamber activity by decade, why not at the case level?
* Is there a way of testing overlap in language but not direct citation?
* Litigation arm founded in 1977, updated with political powerhouses in 2010
* Scalia thought business interest cases were boring
* Bottom line:
  + Increased amicus participation and court’s pro-business rulings are correlated but could not be causal for several reasons:
    - Increasing number of amicus briefs overall
    - Structural factors (internal and external) are more likely to influence court’s decision
    - Political parties inform justice’s votes
* Sima’s thoughts:
  + not great empirical paper (goes by the decade and only looks into year-based data for three years (2014-2016 terms)
    - Main finding is off of Epstein paper
  + Interesting historical tidbits but not entirely useful
    - Litigation arm founding dates, transformation in 2010
    - Scalia thought business cases were boring
  + Doesn’t mention antitrust

Epstein

* Finds correlation between Chamber amicus briefs and court’s pro-business decisions

Franklin

Amicus briefs are most salient in low public pressure cases (i.e. business cases)

* 102-126: amicus participation is related to success at the certiorari/merits stage
* Main point: skepticism about litigation as a mode of regulation
* Chamber sits out in business-on-business litigation 🡪 not prevalent in the antitrust disputes
  + Idea:
    - Question: does an amicus brief change an outcome of an antitrust ruling to make it more or less business friendly?
    - Alternative question: are justices more likely to vote against enforcement when there is a Chamber amicus about the case?
    - Compare antitrust enforcement outcomes of plb and non-plb cases
* Could the Supreme Court bar be influential? Richard Lazarus 2008

Narrow amicus briefs (narrow arguments) are more likely to be strategic attempts to get votes of swing justices (e.g. Breyer in Riegel)