EPR-ETH EGIP Claims
Coding Comments

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This dataset codes geopolitical claims of governmental ethnic groups (EGIP) on behalf of their transborder ethnic kin groups. The claim coding builds directly on the Self-Determination-Movement (SDM) data (Sambanis et al. 2015), that records claims of minority groups.

Afghanistan 700

EGIP Pashtuns 70012000

In 1893, a the British officer Sir Henry Mortimer Durand established the Durand Line, which demarcated the border between Afghanistan and British India, and divided the Afghan Pashtun tribe between Afghanistan and British India. Afghans were not happy with this border demarcation. However, the country had little power against the British superpower. The situation changed when Pakistan was created in 1947 (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012: 40).

Pashtuns in Pakistan: Immediately after Pakistan emerged, Afghanistan put forward a demand for the creation of an independent "Pashtunistan," meaning "land of the Pashtuns" (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012: 40) The idea was that Pakistan should allow the Pashtuns in the northwestern part of their country to; if they so chose; secede and become an independent state. Though the size of the envisioned Pashtunistan differed over time, Afghanistan's proposals frequently encompassed about half of West Pakistan, including areas dominated by Baluch majorities (ibid.). Though these demands were framed as supportive of Pashtun national independence, they were in fact irredentist. If Pashtunistan came to exist, it probably wouldn't remain independent for long, as it would be a fragile and essentially defenseless state. The historical linkage between the Pashtuns and Afghanistan would likely dictate a merger of Pashtunistan into Afghanistan (ibid.). This situation went on until 1978, when the Daoud government was overthrown and replaced by the socialist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which ruled from 1978-1992. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and were supportive of the Afghan government's policy(Emadi 2010: 82).

By the mid 1990s, Pakistan had de facto control of most of Afghanistan through their proxy Taliban (Tarzi 2012: 26). Pakistan was hoping that the Taliban would accept the border as drawn by the Durand line and trying to attenuate the Pashtunistan issue. Instead, the Taliban started to foster Pashtun nationalism, albeit of an Islamic character (ibid.). The Taliban held office in Afghanistan from 1996-2001, and they supported the idea of an independent Pashtunistan. After the Taliban were ousted by US troops in the wake of 9/11, and a new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai was installed. Karzai did not issue a formal policy on the Durand Line, although like other Afghan governments in the past, it did not recognize it as an international border (Barber 2008: 39). Even though Karzai was chosen as a Pashtun to lead post-Taliban Afghanistan, he proved ineffective in rallying Pashtun support, because he was mainly supported by the mostly non-Pashtun, anti-Taliban United Front f,or the Islamic Salvation of Afghanistan, the US, and its allies (Saikal 2010: 10).

Pashtuns in Pakistan: 1947- 2001, Secession

Sources

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Albania 339

EGIP Albanians 33901000

Albania has seen its native population be divided amongst its neighbouring nations time and again. Albanians have been spread over into Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Greece and Macedonia, to name only those nations in which Albanians constitute a considerable ethnic minority. Apart from this, Kosovo Albanians for example underwent an exodus to Switzerland, the USA and Germany (ICG, 2004), thus showing the extent of the Albanian ethnic kin's reach. As such, it is not surprising that some irredentist movements might sprout from this population, as indeed is the case. Pan-Albanianism as well as Greater Albania are two such concepts, both of which aim at reincorporation the original Albanian land into one greater nation (Albania proper, Kosovo, and parts of Macedonia and Serbia (Savich 2008). Even though these ideals are supported to various degrees through the past few decades by the Albanian population, the government itself has never made any official irredentist claims (Judah, 2001), even denying such intentions outright (ICG 2004). Albania has at times supported their ethnic kin abroad though, as can be seen in their recognition of the newly declared independent state of Kosovo, only days after the declaration taking place (Heenan & Lamontagne 1999). None of these fall under the category of a direct claim relating to the here analyzed categories, and as such, these are not coded here.

No claim

Sources

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Armenia 371

EGIP Armenians 37101000

General: Armenia was part of the Soviet Union until 1991. In 1989, there were around 400,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan. Around one-third of the Armenian population was resident in the enclave of Nagorno Karabakh (Minority Rights Group International 2005), an estimated 95% in Nagorno Karabakh are therefore Armenians.

Armenians in Georgia (Samthshe-Javakheti): There is a substantial Armenian community in Tbilisi, and rural Armenian communities are compactly settled in the southern region of Javakheti bordering on Armenia. There is also a substantial Armenian community in Abkhazia (Minority Rights Group International 2005). In 2005 and 2006 mass demonstrations and political meetings were organized by Samtskhe-Javakheti activists, whose demands included autonomy within Georgia for Samtskhe-Javakheti and Tsalka Armenians and an end to settlement of ethnic Georgians from other parts of the country in Samtskhe-Javakheti (ibid.). Even though Armenia has territorial claims on both Georgia and Azerbaijan, they are latent more in the case of Georgia (Cornell 2001: 38). In particular, the Armenian government has not encouraged any moves towards separatism in Javakheti, although some Armenian political groups in southern Georgia (supported by some political parties in Armenia, like Dashnaktsutyun) have mobilized for territorial autonomy and even secession (Minority Rights Group International 2005; Anjaparidze 2005).

Armenians in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh): With the break-up of the Soviet Union, in late 1991, Karabakh declared itself an independent republic, further escalating the conflict into a full-scale war (BBC 2015). By 1993, the Armenian forces took control over not only the originally disputed Nagorno-Karabakh, but also several districts surrounding the region in Azerbaijan. Glasnost under Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the region's simmering ethnic tensions to be expressed openly. Demands for greater cultural, economic, and linguistic freedom by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated to demands for full reunification with Armenia by 1988 (Parker and Wilson 2015). Armenia supports Nagorno-Karabakh on the basis that it is populated by an Armenian majority that has declared independence under the principle of self-determination (ibid.).

The Armenian government does not have territorial claims in Western Armenia which is an area in Turkey, and in Javakheti which is a region in Azerbaijan. However, the Republic of Armenia

does not have any territorial claims against the Republic of Turkey, although, one political party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the largest Armenian party in the diaspora, claims the area given to the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) by US President Woodrow Wilson's arbitral award, as part of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, also known as Wilsonian Armenia.

1991-2013, General irredentism
Armenians in Georgia: 2005-2013, Autonomy
l Armenians in Azerbaijan: 1988-2013, Irredentistm

Sources

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Australia 900

EGIP Whites

No claims

Austria 305

EGIP Austrians

Austrians (South-Tyrol): Italy annexed the mostly German-speaking territory of South Tyrol in 1918, after World War I. At first, Italy granted the German-speaking population a significant level of self-government. However, in the early 1950s a crisis started in South Tyrol because the Austrian government was not satisfied with the provisions of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement from

1946 (The Austrian Foreign Ministry (n.y.). The crisis deteriorated when in 1956, bombs were thrown by South Tyrolese activists seeking to draw international attention to South Tyrol (Alcock 2001: 8). In 1957, massive demonstrations in Bozen called for the separation of South Tyrol from Italy (ibid). In September 1959, the South Tyrol question was raised for the first time before the UN in New York by the then Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Bruno Kreisky (Peterlini 2005: 14). However, the Italians refused on the ground that this was an Italian question alone. As a consequence, negotiations took place over the next nine years which involved representatives of Austria and Italy but also of the South Tyrolese Peoples Party (SVP) which, since the first Regional elections in 1948, had continually obtained an outright majority of seats in the Bozen/Bolzano Parliament (Alcock 2001.: 9). It ended in the 1972 Autonomy Statute. Despite the expectation that the contents of the Autonomy Statute would be completed quickly, the complexity of the issue as well as their controversial nature ensured that it was not until 1992 that the SVP was able to inform the Austrian Government that the Statute had been implemented to its satisfaction (ibid.: 18). The latter was able to declare that the dispute with Italy on the fulfillment of the Paris agreement was over only after 46 years after its signature (ibid.).

(In 2015: public surveys show that 89% of Tyrolese people would like to become part of Austria (The Local 2015)).

German-speakers in Italy: 1946-1992, Autonomy

Sources

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Azerbaijan 373

EGIP Azeri 37301000

After Azeri independence in 1992, the first elected president Elchibey spread the idea of a Greater Azerbaijan. Worryingly for Iran, the 'Greater Azerbaijan' idea gained widespread support in Azerbaijan. This idea posited that Azeri national unity had been split into northern and southern

halves by imperial Russia and Iran and should therefore reunite (Sadegh-Zadeh 2008: 4) President Elchibey led the "Greater Azerbaijan" campaign and accused Iran of mistreating its' Azeri population living in northern Iran close to Azerbaijan's border (ibid.).

Azeris in Georgia: No unrest or separatism has been observed among Azeris in Georgia, who are concentrated in the southern and southeastern regions of Georgia (2002: 272). There is no clearly demarcated Azeri area in Georgia, and given their lack of autonomy, it would be difficult for Azeris to outline which areas they would consider "theirs" (ibid.: 273). Moreover, relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia are fairly good and this is what has made Azeri areas among the calmest in Georgia's turbulent post-perestroika history (ibid.).

Azeris in Iran: Despite a history of political expression in the early-mid 1900s, Azeris have tended to identify with the central government Iran (Minority Rights Group International 2005). Until 2006, the overwhelming majority of Iranian Azeris has displayed little interest in ethnic-inspired instability and virtually no interest in secession or unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan (Molavi 2003). However, October 2006, for example, saw demonstrations both in Iran and Azerbaijan for the uniting of the Azeris. These included the September demonstrations in Urumiyeh in Iran, calling for greater linguistic and educational rights. Demonstrations in Azerbaijan near the Iranian Embassy in Baku, however, have gone further as there was some support for political movements aiming at a united Azerbaijan (ibid.). In September 2010, field research conducted by Emil Souleimanov revealed a surprising development among Iran's Azeri community (Souleimanov, Pikal and Kraus 2013). For example, there is almost open talk in Tabriz about the need for federalization in Iran and for the establishment of Azeri autonomy. One even hears occasional assertions about the need for Azerbaijan to split away from Iran. In spite of the problematic relations between the two countries, official policy in Azerbaijan distances itself from the affairs of its southern neighbors. President Ilham Aliyev has regarded the question of southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan as being exclusively Iran's internal political affairs, despite increasing demands of southern (Iranian) Azeris for the expansion of their ethno-lingual rights (ibid.). After all, it is questionable whether the government in Baku is determined to support separatism of the Azeris in northwestern Iran.

1992-1993, General irredentism

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Bahrain 692

EGIP Bahraini Arab and other Arabs 69201000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories: 1948-2013, secession

Sources
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Bangladesh 771

EGIP Bengali Muslims 77102000

General: Bengali Muslims have focused on supporting other states and populations with a Muslim majority (Heitzman and Worden 1989). While there are individual foreign claims that Bangladeshi

nationalists plan to extend its borders by supporting its ethnic kin in the last decades, there was no scientifically valid evidence available to corroborate these statements.

Pakistan: The Bengali Muslims founded a state independent from Pakistan after the independence war in 1971. Despite these originally conflictive relationship there was no evidence for relevant claims since 1972. This is likely to be a result of the quickly improving relationship and the ever more equally conflictive position towards India. The fact that Pakistan is also a state ruled by a Muslim majority appears to have weakened the basis for any geopolitical claims (Heitzman and Worden 1989).

India: Prior to independence in the 1950s the head of the Congress party claimed Bihar as territories of a Greater West Bengal. Since the state was not yet independent and the EPR coding rules require that the claim must be repeated at least every decade, the Bengali Muslims have been coded as making no relevant claims regarding India. (Chatteriji 2007: 47) While there are militant organizations, such as the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam, Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam and Muslim Volunteer Force, which have demanded a "Greater Bangladesh" in the early 2000s (Karlekar 2005: 169), there was no evidence available that this claim was made by Bengali Muslim political organizations within Bangladesh.

By contrast, Indian officials referred to potential geopolitical claims. In 1998, General Sinha, then the Governor of Assam claimed that large-scale immigration from Bangladesh was directly linked with attempts to create a "Greater Bangladesh" (Pandey 2001: 106). Again there was no objective evidence for similar or lesser claims (autonomy or secessionism) among the Bengali Muslims.

The Bengali Muslims in Mauritius, Nepal, Singapore, and Sri Lanka are ethnic kin Bengali Muslims, but I did not find any relevant claims and conclude that the Bengali Muslim group in Bangladesh has not made any demands in their name (cf. Heitzman & Worden 1989).

No claim

Sources
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Belarus 370

EGIP Byelorussians 37001000

No claim

Benin 434

EGIP Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur) 43401000

The majority of the Ewe population and the separatist politics that has historically accompanied them center around Ghana and Togo (Brown 1980:581; Minahan 2002:592). We find no evidence of the government of Benin intervening in Ewe politics when Fon were Senior Partner. Minorities at Risk record the input of Ghana and Ghanese Ewe in the fighting that took place in Togo in 1991-94, but only mention Benin as a country where 45,000 refugees fled to in 1993 (although not necessarily Ewe) (MAR 2006).

No Claim

Sources

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Bolivia 145

EGIP Aymara

Even though Bolivia is the South-American nation with the largest number of Aymara residents, no claims have been made by the Bolivian government relating to the Aymara people living outside of Bolivia. The Aymara people are by no means stagnant, as can be seen with the 2009 renaming of the Puno region in Peru to "Quechua and Aymara Autonomous Federal Region" (Peruvian Times, 2009) or the Bolivian Gas Wars (MAR, 2006). With the advent of Aymara-descendant Evo Morales' election into presidency in 2006, some moves have been made to improve the situation of the local indigenous people (e.g. facilitating access to the Aymara language [Reel, 2007], or the

additions to the 2009 Bolivian constitution [Carroll, 2009]). Even so, no claims have been made by the Bolivian government relating to their Aymara ethnic kin living in the neighboring nations.

No claim.

Sources

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Bosnia and Herzegovina 346

EGIP Bosniaks/Muslims 34601000

The Bosnian war of 1992-1995 was characterised by extreme ethno-nationalism and violence among the 44% Muslim Bosniaks, 31% Orthodox Serbs and 17% Catholic Croats (Minority Rights 2015). Attempts were made by all sides to territorially divide BiH along ethnic sides. The Serbs had (and remain to have) Republika Srpska (RS), the Croats had Herceg-Bosnia, and the Bosnians the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs were supported by their 'homeland' Serbia, and their President, Slobodan Milosevic, while Bosnian Croats were supported by Croatia and their President Franjo Tudjman. Together, these two 'motherlands' played a highly significant role in the Bosnian war effort. The Bosniaks however, were generally less keen on partition and were fighting for the only homeland they had, Bosnia and Hercegovina (Kivimaki et al. 2012).

Following the end of the Bosnian war in 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement reorganized the state of Bosnia and Hercegovina, providing it with a new constitution (Annex Four). The constitution states that Bosnia and Hercegovina is made up of two entities which largely reflect the front line

at the end of the war: the Republika Srpska (49% of the territory) and the Bosnian-Croatian Federation (51% of the territory) (Minority Rights 2015). BiH consists of three ethnic groups which all profess deep ethno-nationalism with very few touching points (Kivimaki et al. 2012).

Regional loyalties play an important role in BiH today and perceived past injustices has a significant role in the discourse. While the EU supports inter-BiH cohesion, the different ethnic groups continue to look for support from their 'homelands' (Croatia, Serbia). Generally, the Bosniak population supports the strengthening of the centralised structures over the entities, whereas, the Serb population in particular, seeks to increase the influence and autonomous rights of the entities with a focus on RS. Some of the Croats too, support the Serbs idea by stating that a separate Croatian entity should also be created; an idea which is vehemently opposed by the Bosniaks (Minority Rights 2015). The ambiguity about the constitutional set-up and its future prospects is in the meantime being abused by political elites in the respective entities to gain popular votes by applying rhetoric that is not conform with the constitution and by threatening secession.

Furthermore, the Dayton Agreement stipulates that the ethnic groups are compelled to take all state-level decisions together, but Croats and Serbs often deliberately block or boycott the work of the institutions. Bosniaks appear to be the only ones in favour of a 'unitary' state. Yet, none of the three groups accepts Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is at this moment. Something that all ethnic groups have in common is, however, their aspiration to join the European Union (EU) as a full-fledged member (Kivimaki et al. 2012).

In 2007 the Republika Srpska president called for a referendum on independence (Mabry et al, 2013).

More recently, the issue of Sutorina has gained momentum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the aftermath World War II in 1947, The Sutorina territory was part of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Austria-Hungary and the first Yugoslavia, and then became a part of Montenegro within second Yugoslavia. Bosnians claim that the territory was illegally transferred, and Montenegrin sovereignty over the area is disputed (SNS 2015).

As Bosnia and Herzegovina only has access to the international waters from the Neum bay across Croatian internal waters, since the mid 2000s, Bosnia and Herzegovinian prominent politicians Zeljko Komsic (Presidential candidate throughout the 2000s) and Haris Silajdic (President from 2006 until 2010) have called for the return of Sutorina within Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders. Furthermore, in 2008, Bishop Grigorije of the Eparchy of Zahumlje and Herzegovina formally requested that the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina join the international arbitration regarding the coastline near Igalo (Radio Free Europe). In the following year, the mayor of Trebinje, Slavko Vucurevic claimed Sutorina was part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SNS 2015).

No claim

Sources

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Bulgaria 355

EGIP Bulgarians 35501000

The largest territory under Bulgarian rule in the 20th century existed during World War II due to its - at first - beneficial support of Nazi Germany and its allies. However, at the end of the war Bulgaria was forced to change sides and therefore fought alongside the forces of the Soviet Union. Hence, it later came under the sphere of Soviet rule and only held its first democratic election after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Crampton, 2005).

Due to geographical changes in history there are significant numbers of Bulgarians living in Greece, Moldova and FYROM. However, while there have been some calls for annexation of FYROM territory by some minor nationalist groups in Bulgaria after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, no major political power is claiming foreign territory. Although FYROM and Bulgaria are closely related ethnically and linguistically, the Macedonian identity, continually created since FYROM's independence in 1992, is not close knit to Bulgaria's. Hence, there are no known calls for reunification of FYROM's territory with Bulgaria's or any other irredentist claims (Bogdan 1996).

Bulgarians in Moldova: Moldova around 65'000 Bulgarians live in the south of the country, most of which claim Bulgarian as their first language and therefore share a significant sense of belonging to Bulgaria. These sentiments were noticeable during a dispute concerning county boundary

changes in 1999 of the counties of Taraclia, where most Bulgarians live in Moldova, and the county of Cahul. The planned changes to the county boundaries would have abolished Taraclia County and therefore would have incorporated its Bulgarian majority into Cahul County, in which Bulgarians would have become an insignificant minority. However, the plans by the Moldovan government did not realize due to a 92% vote against the boundary changes and temporary boycott movements by the Bulgarian population (Minority Groups International 2008). Recently there have been calls for cultural and administrative autonomy by the Taraclia district council, the local governing body of Taraclia region, of which 65% of the population is ethnic Bulgarian. It remains to be seen whether such claims will be successful (Goble 2013).

Bulgarians in Moldova: 2010-2013, autonomy.

Sources
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Cambodia 811

EGIP Khmer 81103000

The relationship between Cambodia and Vietnam has always been, one the one hand stable, as the former's political status and statement was mostly influenced by the latter's, and on the other hand conflicted, mainly in issues relating to border demarcation. One of the longest standing discussions was over the coastal islands, chief among which the much contested Koh Tral, to which Cambodia claimed historical ownership up until the end of the 20th century. Even though this is a long-standing dispute, the argumentation going back to the 18th century, "no one has offered compelling evidence that Khmers have ever had a substantial modern presence there, or that a Cambodian state exhibited authority during a time of Khmer occupation" (Mudrick, 2014). Throughout what is known in the West as the Vietnam War, Cambodia was also involved in the conflict, which led to many discussions about their borders. Since on Cambodia's part these involved the upkeep of

their already existing borders, as opposed to Vietnam's claim of much of Cambodia's territory (Pouvatchy, 1986), these discussions have not been recorded as a claim.

No claim

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Chad 483

EGIP Zaghawa, Bideyat 48302200

The Zaghawa politically dominate Chad, yet are weak in the neighbouring country of Sudan. Relations between the two countries have been tense with regards to the Dafur (Sudan) situation, where many of the Zahjawa of Sudan live (BBC 2006). The Chad government did support the rebels from the Justice and Equality rebel group in Darfur, who are majority Zaghawa (Al Jazeera 2009). Many sources argue that the Darfur situation affects both countries equally although it is in Sudan, who broke and resumed relations several times across 2006 to the present day. No claims of creating a separate Zaghawa state have been made however. Therefore, we code autonomy for this period, following the ten year rule: In 2010 the two governments signed a promise not to fight proxy wars (Mail and Guardian 2010).

Zaghawa in Sudan: 1991-2010, Autonomy

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China

EGIP Chinese (Han)

Chinese in South Africa:Even though throughout the Apartheid years, Chinese migrants in South Africa were strongly discriminated against, in the aftermath, they were not included in the "privileges" for those who suffered during that period. Only in 2006 did the Chinese Association of South Africa sue the South African government, and in 2008 Hu Jinhao and president Jacob Zuma sign an agreement, reassigning Chinese South African as "black", thus enabling them to take part in the opportunities reserved for the victims of the apartheid (Canaves, 2008). Since these privileges include only education and housing benefits, this is not coded as a geopolitical claim.

Chinese in Taiwan:In Taiwan on the other hand, one can observe what is often called the Taiwan Issue. After the Chinese Civil War, the People's Republic of China, kept control over mainland China, while the Republic of China moved to Taiwan. To this day the PRC claims ownership over the territory of Taiwan (China Today).

Chinese in Myanmar:China and Myanmar have enjoyed a stable relationship over the past century, the latter being one of the first countries to openly recognize the People's Republic of China (Ramachandran 2005). While there are a number of Han Chinese living in Myanmar, there have been no overt claims made by the Chinese government in favour of their ethnic kin in the country. Political and Financial agreements have been made, but these do not focus on the Han people (Geng 2006). In the past years, with conflicts rising in the Kokang region of Myanmar, the Chinese nation has taken in refugees from that region, and reiterated the need for Myanmar to respect the Sino-Burmese border, but nothing more (P s 2015).

Chinese in Thailand: Thailand boasts one of the biggest, if not the biggest population of Han Chinese living outside of mainland China. Due to this, and to the long-standing relation between both nations, their political landscape is rather stable. While in other regions of South-East Asia the Han Chinese were persecuted, or avoided, in Thailand they were assimilated, brought into the community and made a part of it (CPA media). As such, no claims were made by the Chinese government, regarding the Han minority living in Thailand.

Chinese in Cambodia: With Cambodia as well, China's relation are strongly economically related. Chinas has always had a foothold in Cambodia, but the strength of this has ebbed considerably throughout the years (Jeldres 2003). During the Khmer Rouge the Han were driven out of the country, but with the coup in 1997, the influx of Han Chinese has once again increased, with them overtaking much of the general market of Cambodia (Finlay 2008). No direct claims regarding the Han minority in Cambodia have been made by the Chinese government though.

Chinese in Vietnam:China's relationship with Vietnam has been one of many ups and downs.

While China supported Vietnam's struggle for independence, it allied only with the communist North during the Vietnam War, and subsequently allied with Cambodia (Kampuchea at the time) during the Vietnam-Cambodian Conflict. None of these were sparked by a claim towards the Han Chinese living in Vietnam. During the first years of Deng Xiaoping's rule, China took an anti-Soviet Union & Vietnam stance, and invaded the latter. Even though part of the reason for this was the renewed mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam (McCarthy, 1999), the main reason for it was to "teach Vietnam a lesson" (Pham 2009). As the confict did not focus on the rights, autonomy, independence, or annexation of Vietnam territories, it is not coded here. In latter years, China and Vietnam have also been involved in the South China Sea territory dispute. Since the reason for this dispute is mainly of an economical nature, e.g. gas and oil reserves in the region, it is not coded here (Stout 2014).

Chinese in Vietnam:As for China's relationship with the Republic of Vietnam, since the latter only existed from 1954-1975, their relationship was troubled, at best. During the Second Indochina War, a.k.a. Vietnam War, China sided with the communist North, in the latter's attempt to overtake the South, or what is known as the Republic of Vietnam. The reason for this was to make a political statement (Jian 1999), and no claims were made regarding its ethnic kin residing in South Vietnam, and, as such, is not coded here.

Chinese in Malaysia: Even though China has a large ethnic presence in Malaysia (e.g. Hokkien, Hakka, etc), and both countries have had positive relations since the end of the second Inodchina war, no claims have been made for these people.

Chinese in Singapore: While nowadays Singapore and China are closely linked, politically and economically, the former was one of the last Asian nations to formally establish diplomatic relations with China, after 1989 (Lepoer 1989). No claims have been made, though, regarding the Han Chinese living in Singapore.

Chinese in Philippines: Between China and the Philippines on the other hand, one can observe what Heydarian titles "Asia's most toxic relationship" (2015). While this toxicity relates to the many territorial disputes which have taken place and are still happening between both nations, none of these has focused on Han people living in what is considered the territory of the Phillipines.

Chinese in Indonesia: China and Indonesia have held diplomatic relations since 1950, with a longer stretch during which these were halted, due to allegations of China's support of those responsible for the coup attempt in Indonesia (Jakarta Post 2010). Although in 1998 concerns were uttered on the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, during the period of strong anti-Chinese sentiment, no official claim was made (Suryadinata 2005).

Chinese in Australia: In the case of the Chinese relationship with Australia, even though the former is considered the latter's biggest trading partner (Economist, 2014), no claims have been made by the Chinese government regarding their ethnic kin in Australia.

Chinese in New Zealand Even though the China-New Zealand relation has been in the news lately, due to accusations by the latter of Chinese mongering of housing assets in New Zealand (Hunt 2015), no claims have been made by the Chinese government relating to their ethnic kin in New Zealand.

Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese in Taiwan: 1949-2013, Irredentism

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Cote d'Ivoire 437

EGIP Kru 43702000

The Kru peoples contain roughly 24 subgroups and have related tribes that spread across Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, that are decentralized and tribal in nature (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). There is no evidence that the Cote d'Ivoire government supported their kin in Liberia over this time, particularly as this period (2001-2011) spans the first and second civil wars in Liberia.

2001-2011: No Claim

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Croatia 344

EGIP Croatians 34401000

The most recent expression of irredentism claims in Croatia arose after the breakup of Yugoslavia. When the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, Bosnian Serb political representatives, who had boycotted the referendum, established their own government of Republika Srpska, who then attached the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Minority Rights 2015).

The subsequent war that followed was a territorial conflict, initially between Bosnian Serb forces

on one side, and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Croat forces on the other. However, the Croats also aimed at securing parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croatian (ICTY 2003). Even ahead of Bosnia and Hercegovina's declaration of independence in 1992, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and his party hoped to annex the majority-Croat areas of the vulnerable multi-ethnic Bosnian state. Indeed, in March 1991 Tudjman and Milosevic met to negotiate the partition of Bosnia and Hercegovina between them (Ambrosio 2001). At the 1991 Karadordevo agreement between Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, and at the Graz agreement of 1992, the Serb and Croat political leaderships agreed on a partition of Bosnia, resulting in the Croat forces turning on the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lead to the Croat-Bosniak war (Silber & Little 1997).

Following Tudjman's death, it was revealed that both Milosevic and Tudjman had ignored pledges to respect Bosnia's sovereignty, even after signing the Dayton accord in 1995 (ICTY 2001). In one conversation Tudjman told an official: "Let's make a deal with the Serbs. Neither history nor emotion in the Balkans will permit multinationalism. We have to give up on the illusion of the last eight years... Dayton isn't working. Nobody- except diplomats and petty officials - believes in a sovereign Bosnia and the Dayton accords." (Lashmar et al, 2000).

Furthermore, since the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Croatia and Slovenia have both claimed sovereignty over Pirin Bay and four villages, and Slovenia has objected to Croatia's claim of an exclusive economic zone in the Adriatic Sea. However in 2009, Croatia and Slovenia signed a binding international arbitration agreement to define their disputed land and maritime borders, which led to Slovenia lifting its objections to Croatia joining the EU. Slovenia continues to impose a hard border Schengen regime with Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013 but has not yet fulfilled Schengen requirements (CIA 2015).

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1991-1995, irredentism

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Cyprus 352

EGIP Greeks 35201000

During World War II the Greek population of Cyprus sought an 'enosis', which was historically a part of the Megali Idea, or an expansion of Greek territory. Since the 1950s, the majority Greek Cypriot population and its Orthodox church had been pursuing union with Greece, while the partition of Cyprus and creation of a Turkish state in the north became a policy of Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey. In 1955, the Cypriot Orthodox Church and Greek military officers and professionals, founded the guerrilla organisation EOKA (Lange 2011). The Greek Cypriots viewed the island as historically Greek and sought a union with their "motherland" (Diez 2002). Cyprian President Makarios III and the Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou agreed that enosis should be the ultimate aim and King Constantine wished Cyprus "a speedy union with the mother country". Greece dispatched 10,000 troops to Cyprus to counter a possible Turkish invasion (Mirbagheri 2014).

Following nationalist violence in the 1950s, Cyprus was granted independence in 1960 (Giakoumis 2003). In 1963, the 11-year intercommunal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots started, which displaced more than 25,000 Turkish Cypriots and brought the end of Turkish Cypriot representation in the republic (Mallinson 2005). On 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta carried out a coup d'etat in Cyprus, to unite the island with Greece (Papadakis 2003). The coup ousted president Makarios III and replaced him with pro-enosis nationalist Nikos Sampson (Time 1974). In response to the coup (Ronen 2003) five days later, on 20 July 1974, the Turkish army invaded the island (Gray 2008), which led to the capture of the present-day territory of Northern Cyrpus, and the displacement of 150,000 Greek Cypriots and 50,000 Turkish Cypriots (Borowiec 2000). These events and the resulting political situation are matters of a continuing dispute.

Constitutional order was restored and the Archbishop Makarios III returned to Cyprus in December 1974, where Turkish troops remained, occupying the northeastern portion of the island. In 1983, the leader of Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is only recognised by Turkey and been condemned by United Nations resolutions,

which are reaffirmed by the Security Council every year (UN).The last major effort to settle the Cyprus dispute was the Annan Plan in 2004, drafted by the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The plan was put to a referendum in both Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus. 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in support of the plan and 74% Greek Cypriots voted against the plan, claiming that it disproportionately favoured the Turkish side (Palley 2005).

1960-1974: General irredentism

Sources

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Egypt 651

EGIP Arab 65101000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories: 1948-2013, Irredentism

Sources

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Finland 375

EGIP Finns 37501000

Finland stopped to voice any irredentist claims after World War II, even though it was a widespread idea in the 1910s until the 1930s (Browning 2008 : 135).

No claims

Sources

Browning, Christopher S. 2008. "Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis. A Case Study of Finland." Bern: Peter Lang AG.

France 220

EGIP French 22001000

No claims

Gabon 481

EGIP Mbede (Nzebi, Bateke, Obamba) 48104000

Due to conflict raging across the Congo from the 1960s and a free and fair election was first held in 2006, it is difficult to identify specific claims being made to the Bateke/Teke group in this time.

No Claim.

Gambia 420

EGIP Wolof 42003000

The Wolof in Gambia seem to have made no general or directed irredentist claims regarding their TEK in Senegal in the period 1965-1993. The Wolof in Senegal number up to 40% of the population and their language was promoted in the process of state creation as an anti-colonial (French) symbol (Diallo 2010, :74-77). Contrastingly, the official language of the Gambia is English (Bertelsman Stiftung 2014:6). Through the process of "Wolofisation" in Senegal, they have become politically as well as ethnically dominant group, representing the "core" of Senegal culture over time, much like the English to the UK (O'Brian 1998:29). Although they are ethnic kin, therefore, the distinctions between the two countries explain the lack of political claims or irredentist co-ethnic demands. Although the confederation between the two countries began when Wolof came into power in Senegal (1981), we code no claim as this was a logistical decision in response to various security problems shared by both countries - it was no irredentist move (see Wolof in Senegal).

No Claim

Sources

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Ghana 452

EGIP Ewe 45202000

Around the time of independence (1957), there was a greater Togo movement which encapsulated the Ewe in Ghana, Togo and modern day Benin. However, as Rawlings came into power in 1982, there is much evidence to suggest that the movement had all but died (Minahan 2002:592).

In June 1993, President Rawlings, a Ewe, gave refuge to thousands of Ewes fleeing from Togo (MAR 2006). Rawlings is alleged from numerous sources to have supported the opposition politicians in Togo, and relations between the two countries under the premiership of Eyadema in Togo were tense (ECOWAS 2005; Ghana Web 1998). He is reported to have demanded the "well being

of our peoples" in 1998 (Ghana Web 1998). We therefore begin the claim of "autonomy" for the Ewe kin in Togo as starting in 1993 with the refugee influx, and ending as Rawlings left power.

1982-1992: No Claim
1993-2000: Autonomy

Sources

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Georgia 372

EGIP Georgians 37201000

No claim.

Greece 350

EGIP Greeks 35001000

From the War of Independence in the 1820s until the Balkan wars of the 20th Century, Greece's foreign policy and domestic politics were dominated by the 'Megali Idea'. This was an irredentist concept of Greek nationalism which sought to establish a Greek state that would encompass all ethnic Greek inhabitants in the former Ottoman Empire, including Cyprus and Asia Minor including the large Greek populations which, after the Greek War of Independence (1830) from the Ottoman Empire, were still under Ottoman occupation (NSD).

Despite the end of the Megali Idea project in 1922, the Greek state expanded five times in its history, either through military conquest or diplomacy. In 1947, the Dodecanese Islands which were also claimed by Turkey, were annexed and became Greek territory (Grant & Barker 2006).

Furthermore, during World War II the Greek population of Cyprus was hopeful for an 'enosis', which was historically a part of the Megali Idea. The idea was actively pursued by the Cypriot

Orthodox Church, who together with Greek military officers and professionals, in 1955 found the guerrilla organisation EOKA (Lange 2011). The Greek Cypriots viewed the island as historically Greek and sought a union with their "motherland" (Diez 2002). In the 1950s, the persuit of enosis was a part of the Greek national policy (Huth 2009). Makarios and the Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou agreed that enosis should be the ultimate aim and King Constantine wished Cyprus "a speedy union with the mother country". Greece dispatched 10,000 troops to Cyprus to counter a possible Turkish invasion (Mirbagheri 2014). The Zuerich Agreement of 1959 however, culminated in independence of the island within the British Commonwealth. The inter-ethnic clashes from 1960 led to the dispatch of a peacekeeping force of the United Nations in 1964.

On 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta carried out a coup d'etat in Cyprus, to unite the island with Greece (Papadakis 2003). The coup ousted president Makarios III and replaced him with pro-enosis nationalist Nikos Sampson (Time 1974). In response to the coup (Ronen 2003) five days later, on 20 July 1974, the Turkish army invaded the island (Gray 2008), which led to the capture of the present-day territory of Northern Cyrpus, and the displacement of 150,000 Greek Cypriots and 50,000 Turkish Cypriots

This action precipitated the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which led to the capture of the present-day territory of Northern Cyprus the following month, after a ceasefire collapsed, and the displacement of over 150,000 Greek Cypriots (Johnston et al 2009) and 50,000 Turkish Cypriots (Borowiec 2000). A separate Turkish Cypriot state in the north was established in 1983. These events and the resulting political situation are matters of a continuing dispute.

Tensions continue to exist between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the delimitation of borders in the Aegean Sea. However, relations warmed after both countries suffered earthquakes in 1999 and offered each other practical help. Although the disputes remain unresolved, the Greek government gives backing to Turkey's EU bid (NSB). Recently however, the far-right Golden Dawn party, which has had a recent surge in electoral support and is the third largest political party in Greece, supports the Megali Idea (Elinas 2013).

Another Greek irredentist claim supported by the Golden Dawn party includes North Epirus (currently a part of Albania), where a sizable Greek minority lives, predating the formation of independent Albania.

The Greek minority was subjected to repressive measures, as well as not receiving education in Greek, and the Hoxha government also diluted the ethnic demographics by the region by relocating Greeks and substituting them with Albanians (Konidaris 2005). In the 1980s, Greece abandonment any territorial claims over Northern Epirus and the lifting of the official state of war between the two countries (Konidaris 2005). In the post-Cold War era relations have continued to improve though tensions remain over the availability of education in the Greek language outside the official minority zone, property rights, and occasional violent incidents targeting members of the Greek

minority

Relations between Greece and Albania further improved in the 1990s, and the two countries signed a Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighborliness and Security Agreement in 1996 (Konidaris 2005). Furthermore, Greece is Albania's main foreign investor, having invested more than 400 million dollars in Albania, Albania's second largest trading partner, with Greek products accounting for some 21% of Albanian imports, and 12% of Albanian exports coming to Greece, and Albania's fourth largest donor country, having provided aid amounting to 73.8 million euros.

Greeks in Cyprus: 1960-1974, irredentism
Greeks in Albania: 1946-1984, irredentism

Sources

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Guinea 438

EGIP Malinke 43801000

There is no evidence that, under the leadership of Sekou Toure as President, the Malinke group made any claims for foreign kin (MAR 2006). Under Conde from 2009 onwards, no claims were made.

1960 - 1982, 2009-2013: No Claim

Sources
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Hungary 310

EGIP Hungarians

General: Although Hungary called for a Greater Hungary and for restoration of its borders previously to World War I, Hungarian politicians stopped to voice irredentist claims after World War II.

Hungarians in Slovakia: By 1994, a number of Hungarian politicians, such as Viktor Orban, called for autonomy of Hungarian minorities abroad and lobbied against a treaty that would clarify contentious bilateral issues on ethnic minorities (Mihailescu 2007: 262). The EU has expressed concern at the reported increase in incidents against the Hungarian minority since the far-right Slovak National Party joined the coalition government in June 2006 (Minority Rights International 2005). In 2009, five years after the Hungary's and Slovakia's accession to the EU, the two countries were suddenly squabbling over the ethnic minority in Slovakia, particularly over a Slovak language law. For their part, ethnic Hungarians are frustrated at being a minority in the small Carpathian state (Spiegel 2009.) In 2009, Hungary's President and former Prime Minister Viktor Orban, promised to represent the interests of "all Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin" if his party would win the 2010 election. That would include not only ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, but also the larger groups living in Romania, Serbia and Croatia. Orban's party believed (back in 2009) the plight of all Europe's minorities could be solved by adopting the Kosovo model (ibid.). Orban won the 2010 elections and is since then generally advocating more autonomy for all Hungarian minorities in other countries (than 2014).

Hungarians in Romania (Transylvania): Hungarians are a minority in Transylvania where they

are called Szeklers. The Szeklers demand autonomy since 1993. Ever since its foundation in 2003, Jobbik (Hungarian nationalist party) has always been actively promoting the right of self-government for all Hungarians native to the Carpathian basin, so the leaders of the neighboring countries must respect the will of the several million-strong Hungarian community, just like ethnic minorities native to Hungary can freely use their languages and symbols (Jobbik 2013). Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary condemns the anti-Hungarian acts committed by the Romanian state, since double standards applied in minority issues are not acceptable in any part of Europe (ibid.). The national radical party believes it is indispensable that Szeklers living in the territory of present-day Romania be allowed to freely use their Hungarian native language as well as to make decisions about themselves (ibid.).

Hungarians in Yugoslavia: Hungarians are a minority in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito, particularly with regard to the Hungarian minority in Serbina Vojvodina, were harmonious (Jenne 2004: 740). However, relations changed after Tito's death, when Serbia's communist leaders began to assert greater dominance under Slobodan Milosevic's leadership. In 1988, Milosevic ordered the removal of Vojvodina's pro-autonomist provincial assembly (ibid.). In 1990, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall announced that he was "in spirit" the prime minister of Hungarians throughout the world, including 5 million outside Hungary's borders. When Yugoslavia teetered on the brink of collapse in 1991, Antall asserted that Hungary's southern borders applied only to Yugoslavia and not to Serbia, implying that Hungary might make territorial claims on Vojvodina if Yugoslavia disintegrated (Oltay, 1992: 28). However, Hungarians wanted an autonomous region and were not thinking about secession from Serbia.

Hungarians in Serbia (1991 onwards): Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the Hungarian Antall government voiced intentions to re-establish autonomy for the Vojvodina Hungarians in Serbia. However, by 1994, a new socialist government in Budapest marked a significant moderation in Hungary's policies toward the Vojvodina minority (Jenne 2004: 742). The new Hungarian government even declined support for a Hungarian party in Vojvodina in its calls for autonomy (ibid.: 743). Through the remainder of the 1990s, mainstream Hungarian leaders abandoned their program of autonomy and focused instead on defending the minority from ethnic reprisals and other discrimination (Fox 1996). When Viktor Orban was for the first time PM of Hungary from 1998-2002, engagement for ethnic Hungarian autonomy in Vojvodina peaked (Hagan 2009: 620). In 2002, cultural autonomy was granted to the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. Since Hungary's 2004 entry into the EU, Hungarian officials there have used their position to advocate claims of Vojvodina Hungarians regarding minority rights, but not explicitly territorial autonomy. However, Orban's Fidesz party (and later also Jobbik) have always supported territorial autonomy for Vojvodina Hungarians. In 2011, Hungary accused Serbia of collectively discriminating against ethnic Hungarians and threatened to withdraw support for Serbia's EU candidacy bid over a rehabilitation law. Furthermore, in 2013, Krisztina Morvai, who is a Hungarian member

of the European Parliament (and member of the Hungarian Jobbik party), said Serbia should not be admitted to the EU before territorial autonomy in the northern province of Vojvodina is offered to ethnic Hungarians living there (Balkan Insight 2013).

Hungarians in Ukraine: Zakarpattia is a region in the southwest of Ukraine, which is home to a considerable Hungarian minority in the country. There has been a trend for territorial autonomy among Hungarians in Zakarpattia. The flagship motto of the autonomy trend in Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia) is the notion, popularized especially by the former President of the Hungarian Cultural Federation in Zakarpattia (KMKSz) Miklos Kovacs, of a "prytysjanski county", which means a separate electoral district within Ukraine (Kalan 2014: 2). A key argument for its followers was the 1991 referendum, carried out in parallel with referenda on the independence of Ukraine and Zakarpattia's self- government (ibid.). In the latter, the referendum concerned the creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in the Berehove area. Although 82% of the population of Berehove and surroundings were in favor of the new region, the results were not recognized by Kyiv, which in the 1990s struggled to contain the separatist tendencies in Crimea (ibid.). In Ukraine, the ruling FIDESZ and the nationalist Jobbik party want Kiev to create a Hungarian autonomous region in Ukraine. Moreover, the demands put forward by Hungarian prime Minister Orban are a constant element of his country's policy regarding ethnic Hungarians living abroad, which his government has been implementing since 2010, but has become stronger in 2014 (Sadecki 2014). Over this period, Hungary has expressed its support for the aspirations of ethnic Hungarian communities living in the neighbouring countries on numerous occasions. (Gulevich 2015). Nevertheless, Orban's calls for autonomy since May 2014 could have come as a surprise because they somehow stand in opposition to the voices of the Zakarpattia Hungarian's organizations, which only recently pointed out that what matters to them is not a lack of autonomy, but linguistic issues (Kalan 2014: 3).

For future research:

Hungarians in Ukraine: Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister has repeatedly called for autonomy for Hungarian-Ukrainians, especially since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 (The Economist 2015; Kates 2014).

No claim
Hungarians in Slovakia: 1994-2013, autonomy
Hungarians in Yugoslavia: 1990-1991, autonomy
Hungarians in Serbia: 1991-1994, autonomy: 1998-2002, autonomy: 2010-2013, autonomy.
Hungarians in Romania: 1993-2013, autonomy
Hungarians in Ukraine: 2010-2013, autonomy
Future updates: Hungarians in Ukraine: 2014, autonomy claim)

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India 750

EGIP Hindi (non-SC/ST) 75005000

General: Hindus are spread among many countries but their perception of shared identity is much rather religious than political (e.g. Vertovec 2000). Some authors use the term "pan-Hinduism"

(e.g. Sweetman 2003), but not in combination with concrete territorial ideas.

Pakistan: While India and Pakistan clash over the Kashmir region, these irredentist clashes do not involve the Hindu minority in Pakistan, who lives dispersed all over the country. The number of Hindus in Pakistan is decreasing and although Hindu experience discrimination in Pakistan (The Hindu 2010), the Indian government or representatives of the Hindu in India have not explicitly made any claims for the Pakistan Hindus.

Nepal: From time to time, the Indian press accuses Nepal of planning the creation of greater Nepal and claiming the areas inhabited by Nepali in India (Sharma 1997: 487-488). However, the other way round, Hindus in India are not claiming to unify or support Nepal.

The Indians / Asians in Uganda, Fiji and Mauritius They are ethnic kin Hindus, but I did not find any proof and conclude that the Hindi group in India has not made any demands in their name.

Bangladesh: In the 1990s and 2000s, violence against Hindus in Pakistan escalated several times, resulting in many destroyed temples and buildings (Minority Rights Group International 2005). Several organizations in India, e.g. the South Assam Bengali Hindu Association, demanded that the Indian government took steps to protect Hindus in Bangladesh and stop the atrocities (The Sentinel 2002). However, these claims focused on security issues and a potential Indian intervention and did not include demands for increased political autonomy.

Myanmar: India has carried out several joint-cross border operations in Myanmar previously, most prominently in 1995 and 2006 [and 2015]" and attacked rebel groups (The Diplomat 2015). However, these clashes occurred in the context of the very insecure situation in the border region and have never been brought in connection with the Indian minority in Myanmar, that either lives in the concerned territory but mostly in urban centres.

No claims

Sources

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Iran 630

EGIP Persians 6300900

Iranian general irredentism: After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, Iran missed it to expand its sphere of influence to the newly independent countries of Central Asia, with significant Persian minorities. This was due in part to Iran's wish to maintain good relations with the Russian Federation in terms of the newly independent Central Asian countries. It needs to be noted, that Iran has shown signs of religious irredentism in the Iran-Iraq war which lasted from 1980 to 1988. Iran's Islamist government called to Iraq's shi'ites to overthrow the Sunni government of Saddam Hussein (Hutchinson and Smith 2000: 1143). Ethnic irredentism did not seem to play a role in Iran in the time frame from 1946 to 2013.

Persians in Afghanistan Iranians or Persians in Afghanistan have never made territorial claims which were in any way supported by the Iranian motherland.

Persians in Tajikistan: The Tajik people are Persians, they also speak a Persian language. However, Iran has never claimed territories in Tajikistan.

Persians in Uzbekistan: No territorial claims.

Persians in the Soviet Union: No territorial claims.

No claims

Sources
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Iraq 645

EGIP Arab 64503000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories: 1948-2013, Independence

Sources

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Israel 666

EGIP Ashkenazim (Jews) 66602000

Israel general irredentism: Since the creation of Israel in 1948, Jews from all over the world settled down or were deported to Israel. Israel does generally not display ethnicirredentism. The occupation of territories in the West Bank or the Gaza strip is not ethnically motivated, but is more based on postcolonial irredentism, or in other words the notion 'in the minds of nationalists [that] the territory of the state in its present form may not be the homeland but a part of a larger homeland still to be pursued" (Kamel 2014).

Jews in Yemen: From 1949 to 1950, the overwhelming majority of Yemenite Ashkenazim Jews was transported from Yemen to Israel. The few remaining Jews in Yemen are subject to violent

anti-Semitism on a daily basis. Ashkenazim Jews from Israel have never voiced territorial claims in Yemen.

Jews in Poland: Before WWII, there were Jewish autonomy communities in Poland, however, their autonomy was dissolved in the wake of WWII. After World War Two and the annihilation of most of Polish and Lithuanian Jewry, few attempts were made to re-establish traditional forms of Jewish communal life, not in the least due to the strong pressure of Communist rule. Jewish sections of left wing parties did not survive for long, attempts to establish Jewish cooperative settlements in Silesia, resonating to a certain degree with some Polish-Jewish traditions, came to naught. However, the tradition of Jewish autonomy and self-government in Poland has inspired political movements on the left and the right of the political spectrum, as well as communal organization throughout the 20th century and beyond, and can justly be considered one of the central political forebearers of contemporary Jewish life. (UCL Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies 2015).

Jews in Russia: Russia has a Jewish autonomous Oblast in the far East of the country, bordering on China. It was created in 1934. After WWII, there was a renewed interest in this area, as a potential home for Jewish refugees, however after the creation of Israel many Jews emigrated from there to Israel.

Jews in Libya: Jews in Libya were first deported by the Fascist Italian regime which started to colonize Libya in 1911, and afterwards, from 1948 on, most of the 40'000 Jews living in Libya, emigrated to Israel. In the following years, Jews were subject to attacks. By the time Gaddafi came to power in 1969, roughly 100 Jews remained in Libya and these Jews were never granted any rights, on the contrary, their properties were confiscated. Jews in Libya have never claimed territory.

Jews in Iran: Most Jews emigrated to Israel, the US or Western Europe after 1948. The small remaining community in Iran is oppressed. No territorial claims were ever made.

Jews in Egypt: Sporadic pogroms took place in 1942 against Egypt's Jews onwards. In 1945, the Jewish quarter of Cairo was severely damaged. As the Partition of Palestine and the founding of Israel drew closer, hostility strengthened, fed also by press attacks on all foreigners accompanying the rising ethnocentric nationalism of the age. In 1947, the Company Laws set quotas for employing Egyptian nationals in incorporated firms, requiring that 75% of salaried employees, and 90% of all workers be Egyptian. As Jews were denied citizenship as a rule, this constrained Jewish and foreign owned entrepreneurs to reduce recruitment for employment positions from their own ranks. The law also required that just over half of the paid-up capital of joint stock companies be Egyptian.

No claims

Sources

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Italy 325

EGIP Italians

Italian irredentism disappeared after World War II. However, there were sporadic claims made
by Italian nationalists and politicians (such as Mirko Tremaglia) who were convinced that the
Dalmatian and Istrian territories in Croatia should belong to Italy (Spiegel 1994). These claims
were never seriously pursued by Italian politicians or the Italian Government which is why they
are politically irrelevant.

No claims

Sources
Der Spiegel. 1994. "Flamme aus dem Sarg des Fuehrers." Accessed on 21.08.2015 from `http:`
`//www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13684301.html`.

Jordan 663

EGIP Arab 66301000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the
Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is
not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand
an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been
internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories: 1948-2013, seccession

Sources
BBC. 2015. "Golan Heights Profile-Overview." Accessed on 11.10.2015 from

Kazakhs in Mongolia: Kazakhs in Mongolia exist predominantly in Mongolia's far Western province
of Bayan Olgi (aimag), and they have been insulated from both cultural changes occurring in

their historic homeland (the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, later the Republic of Kazakhstan) as well as assimilative dynamics of minority existence within their host-state Mongolia (Diener 2007: 465). After Kazakhstan's independence, a significant stream of Kazakhs from Mongolia began flowing into Kazakhstan (ibid.: 466). Territorial claims were never made.

Kazakhs in China: Most Kazakhs in China live in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in northernmost Xinjiang Uighur province. Kazakhstan has never made territorial claims in China.

No claims

Sources\ Diener, Alexander. 2007: "Negotiating Territorial Belonging: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Mongolia's Kazakh's." Geopolitics 12(3):459-487.

Kosovo 347

EGIP Albanians 34701000

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 as the Republic of Kosovo. While Serbia recognises the Republic's governance of the territory, it still continues to claim it as its own Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (EU Observer 2013). Initially there were no relations between the Kosovo and Serbia, however the following years have seen increased dialogue and co-operation between the two governments.

The open discussion of the potential union between Kosovo and any other territory is explicitly forbidden by the Ahtisaari plan of conditional independence that was put in place in Kosovo by the United Nations in 2007. Among all the other conditions, the report states that 'Kosovo will have no territorial claims against and will not seek union with another State or part of any State' (Ahtisaari 2007:1).

Vetevendosje is the foremost party campaigning for Kosovar self-determination and unification. It became the third largest political party in Kosovo after winning 14 seats at the 2010 Parliamentary elections. The party manifesto calls for a referendum on union with Albania and rejects the Ahtisaari plan implemented in Kosovo as a condition of its independence. Vetevendosje has become the third-greatest force in the Kosovar parliament and they have, unsuccessfully, requested that Kosovo's leaders reject any compromise in negotiations with the Serbian government. The party symbolises its objective of unification with Albania by flying the Albanian flag at all their protests, and rejecting the Kosovar flag, even in the Kosovo parliament. The party works with the Red and Black Alliance of Albania, supports Albanian communities in Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM and has advocated unification of Kosovo and Albania.

In May 2011, the Movement for Integration and Unification (Levizja per Integrim dhe Bashkim, LBI), a smaller and newly formed political party in Kosovo which also sought unification with Albania, joined the Movement for Unification (Levizja per Bashkim LB). LB's objectives of Kosovo uniting with Albania are rather more explicit than Vetevendosje's. In their political platform, the party states that 'the Albanian people against have against their will been divided into several states, and as a consequence, the Albanian issue remains unresolved' and that 'throughout the history of the Albanian people, their real goal has been and continues to be the merger into a single state - Albania' (LB 2012). Like Vetevondosje however, LB rejects the Ahtisaari package, stating 'that the Albanian people in Kosovo do not exercise sovereignty on its territory and do not recognize the right of nations of self-determination, therefore, after Kosovo's declaration of independence under the Ahtisaari Package, the Albanian issue remains unresolved' (LB 2012).

Vetevondosje have also criticized the Kosovo government for ignoring the calls of the Albanians of the Preshevo valley in Serbia, who seek the same rights as the Serbs in Kosovo (Balkan Update 2005 & Balkan Insight 2013). The Preshevo Valley is a region in southern Serbia composed of the municipalities of Bujanovac, Preshevo and Medve?a (Palka et al. 2005).] Geopolitically, the region is the center of the Albanian community in Serbia (not counting Kosovo) with Albanians comprising 54.6% of Bujanovac and 89% of Presevo (and 26% in Medvea) (Judah 2007).

Although Vetevondosje make irredentism claims in their party manifesto, this has not voiced by them in the Kosovo parliament, for this reason, it can be considered that no claim was made in Kosovo since 2008.

No claim

Sources\ Balkan Update. 2005. "Albanians in south Presevo valley seek same rights as Kosovo Serbs". Accessed on 17.09.2015 from `http://www.balkanupdate.com/2005/12/albanians-in-south-presev html`.\ EU Observer. 2013. "Kosovo: EU meeting is 'de facto recognition' by Serbia". Accessed on 17.09.2015 from `https://euobserver.com/foreign/118965`.\ Balkan Insight. 2013. "Serbia's Presevo Albanians Ask Pristina for Support". Accessed online on 17.09.2015 from `http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/presevo-asks-pristina-for-support`.\ Levizja per Bashkim. Party Manifesto. 2015. Online: http://levizjaperbashkim.com/new/default.php. Accessed: 17.9.2015.\ Ahtisaari, M. 2007. "Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement". United Nations of Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo. New York: United Nations Security. Council. Accessed on 17.09.2015 `http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal. html`.\ Judah, T. 2007. "Kosovo. What everyone needs to know." Oxford University Press.\

Kuwait 690

EGIP Kuwaiti Arab and other Arabs 69003000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories: 1948-2013, secession

Sources BBC.2015. "Golan Heights Profile-Overview". Accessed on 11.10.2015 from (`http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842\` Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. "Ethnic Groups in Conflict." Berkeley: University of California Press.\ Mara'i, Tayseer and Halabi, Usama R. 1992. "Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights." Journal of Palestine Studies 22(1):78-93.\ Zambelis, Chris. 2014. "The Struggle for Arabistan: Tensions and Militancy in Iran's Khuzestan Province." Accessed on 11.10.2015 `http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41865#.VhtZ1GO_H4U`.

Laos 812

EGIP Lao (incl. Phuan) 81203000

The northern region of Cambodia known as Sian, is and has been home to a large amount of people of Lao ethnicity. Even though the Cambodian government is said to have undertaken massive work to diminish the Lao influence in the region, from encouraging Khmer migration to the region, to prohibiting the use of the Lao language, Lao presence is still strong in the region. Ever since both nations' independence in 1953, discussions about the delineation of their borders have been ongoing. A joint effort was started in 2000, but the disputes have not been resolved yet (Baird, 2010).

Laos and Thailand on the other hand have had a rather stable political relationship, with a sporadic dispute over border demarcations, the main focus of these happening during the 1980s. These, as with the disputes between Laos and Cambodia, stem from the French dominion days, as the borders of the nations in what used to be Indochina were separated and set by the French (Global Security). Yet, even though both nations claimed the fought over villages as their own, at the time they belonged to Laos' territory, thus disqualifying this as an irredentist claim (Whitaker, 2013).

Finally, Laos and Myanmar have enjoyed stable relations over the past century. Pacts for mutual cooperation have been made, but none regarding the Lao people living in Myanmar.

No claim

Sources Baird, Ian G. 2010. "Different views of history: Shades of irredentism along the Laos-Cambodia border". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 41.2:The National University of Singapore.\ Global Security. 2015 "Laos-Thai Relations." Accessed on 29.08.2015 from `http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/laos/forrel-thai.htm`\ Whitaker, Cary Pendleton. 2013." Understanding territorial disputes: Case studies regarding the disputes between Ecuador and Peru, Belize and Guatemala, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Laos and Thailand". Boulder: University of Colorado.

Lebanon 660

EGIP Arab 66010000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories, 1948-2013: secession

Sources BBC.2015. "Golan Heights Profile-Overview". Accessed on 11.10.2015 from (`http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842`\ Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. "Ethnic Groups in Conflict." Berkeley: University of California Press.\ Mara'i, Tayseer and Halabi, Usama R. 1992. "Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights." Journal of Palestine Studies 22(1):78-93.\ Zambelis, Chris. 2014. "The Struggle for Arabistan: Tensions and Militancy in Iran's Khuzestan Province." Accessed on 11.10.2015 `http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41865#.VhtZ1GO_H4U`.

Kyrgyzstan 703

EGIP Kyrgyz 70301000

Kyrgyz in China: There is a small Kyrgyz minority in China, which lives in the Kizilsu Kirghiz autonomous prefecture. However, the majority population there is ethnic Uyghur. Kyrgyz people and the Kyrgyz government have never made territorial claims in China.

No claims

Macedonia 343

EGIP Macedonians 34301000

Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on the 8th of September 1991, the only former Yugolsav republic to have seceded non-violently from the federation. (Mickey & Albion 1993, p. 58).

In the past, irredentists from the Republic of Macedonia have expressed land claims to the entire region of Macedonia out of which only 40% lies within the Republic of Macedonia, the rest being in Greece, Bulgaria and Albania, on the purported ethnic, historical and geographic grounds (Dimitrov 2003).

The Republic of Macedonia promotes the irredentist concept of a United Macedonia (Macedonian: Obedineta Makedonija) among ethnic Macedonian nationalists which involves territorial claims on the northern province of Macedonia in Greece, but also in Blagoevgrad Province ("Pirin Macedonia") in Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia. The United Macedonia concept aims to unify the transnational region of Macedonia in the Balkans (which they claim as their homeland and which they assert was wrongfully divided under the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913), into a single state under Macedonian domination, with the Greek city of Thessaloniki (Solun in the Slavic languages) as its capital.

Before and just after the Republic of Macedonia's independence, it was assumed in Greece that the idea of a united Macedonia was still state-sponsored. In the first constitution of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia, adopted on 17 November 1991, Article 49 read as follows:

(1) The Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries, as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes links with them.\ (2) The Republic cares for the cultural, economic and social rights of the citizens of the Republic abroad.

On 13 September 1995, the Republic of Macedonia signed an Interim Accord with Greece in order to end the economic embargo Greece had imposed, amongst other reasons, for the perceived land claims. Amongst its provisions, the Accord specified that Macedonia would renounce all land claims to neighbouring states' territories (United Nations, 1995.)

1991-1995, general Irredentism

Sources United Nations. 1995. "Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". Accessed on 17.09.2015 from `http://www.hri.org/docs/fyrom/95-27866.html`\ Mickey, R. W. and Albion, A. S. 1995. "Success in the Balkans? A Case Study of Ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia." In: *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue.* Institute for East West Studies. New York. 1993.\ Dimitrov, G. 2003. "The Significance of the Second Balkan Conference." on 17.09.2016 from `https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1915/balkan.htm`. .

Malaysia 820

EGIP Malays 82005000

Singapore's relation with its closest neighbours is usually highly dependant on political factors. With Malaysia, for example, relations have always been slightly strained. On the one hand, both nations lead a relationship of mutual support, helping each other, while on the other hand, Singapore is quite dependant on Malaysia for many of their daily needs (Omar). Although there were territorial disputes, as with the case of Pedra Branca (Pulau Bau Puteh), which was partly resolved in 2008 (ICJ 2008), there have been no claims made over the Malay minority inhabiting Singaporean territory.

Malaysia and Indonesia have quite a different relationship though. The two nations have had a few territorial disputes over the years, but most of those were initiated by Indonesia. During the time of Malaysia's creation, Indonesia strongly opposed their independence, as they felt that this would only turn the region into a satellite nation for the English (Haller-Trost), and the confrontation went on from 1963-1966. More recently, the two nations have discussed the ownership of a few islands off the coast. In the 1990s, the discussion focused around Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan. While the former is mostly a volcanic island, having been turned into a bird paradise during the 1960s, the latter houses a small village. Since the island belonged to Malaysia at the time of the dispute, the claim was made by Indonesia. Thus, it is not coded here. The latest territorial dispute between both nations is that over the island of Pulau Alambat. Here as well though, the focus of the claim is not a regional minority, but in this case economical and environmental factors (Kesumawardhani, 2008).

Malaysia and Thailand on the other hand have had quite peaceful relations over the last century. Even though there have been some discussions since the turn of the millenium, focusing mainly around the south of Thailand, but no claims concerning the Malay minority in Thailand have been made by the Malaysian government.

Malaysia and Cambodia have a strong economically driven relationship, but no specific claims have been made regarding the Malay minority in Cambodia.

No claims

Sources\ Haller-Trost, Renate. 1995. "The Territoria Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Sipidan and Pulau Ligitan in the Celebs Sea: a Study in International Law" in *Boundary and Territory Briefings* 2.2.\ ICJ. 2008. "Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge." International Court of Justice.\ Kesumawardhan, Resistencia. 2008. "Dispute between Indonesia - Malaysia over Ambalat Rock" in Yuridika 23.3.\ Omar, Rusdi. "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Issues and Strategies." Universiti Utara Malaysia.

Mali 432

EGIP Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.) 43201000

The "Blacks" in Mali, number around 90% of the population and have held a significant share of the power since independence. We find no evidence to explicitly link the government with making claims regarding independence, rights or autonomy of kin groups.

No claims

Mauritania 435

EGIP White Moors (Beydan) 43501000

We find no evidence for claims being made on behalf of the Arabs in Mali by the White Moors in Mauritania 1960-1977. This period was the premiership of President Moktar Ould Daddah, who instated a one party rule after being handed power by the French (Arba and Iallo, 2015). The end of his rule in 1977 came with a coup, allegedly due to the Western Saharan conflict (BBC 2003). The moors of Mauritania are most similar to the Saharawi Arabs.

No Claim

Sources Arba, G and Iallo, D. 2015 "Mauritania: Countries and their Culture Online." Accessed 15.02.16 from `http://www.everyculture.com/Ma-Ni/Mauritania.html\` BBC. 2003. "Mauritania lays president to rest." Accessed on 16.02.16 from `http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3203896.stm`

Mexico 70

EGIP Mestizos 7001000

No claims.

Moldova 359

EGIP Moldovans 35901000

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moldova declared independence on August 27 in 1991 and chose to be neutral. Consequently it intended to quickly turn away of Soviet Russian influence. Additionally, it has been in search of its own identity differing from its Romanian heritage. Moldova has been part of Romania from 1918 until 1940. The ethnic composition of the country consists of around 75% Moldovan, 8.4% Ukrainian, 5.9% Ukrainian, 4.4% Gagauz, 2.2% Romanian and 1.9% Bulgarian (Minority Rights Group 2004).

Upon its independence, some parts of the population have called for a reunification of Moldova and Romania. Ever since, such calls remain a part of Moldovan politics. However, the most powerful and ruling party of the country, the Communist party, opposes the reunification with Romania and therefore the government chooses to remain an independent and sovereign state (Klussmann 2009).

A large minority in Ukraine is of Moldovan origin. According to a census conducted in 2001 more than 250'000 ethnic Moldovans reside on Ukrainian territory (Ukraine, 2001). According to research there is no major irredentist claims of Moldovans in the country, nor are there any major calls for reunification of territory in Ukraine with Moldova.

The independence and breakaway of Moldova from the Soviet Union was not welcomed by parts of the population in the east of the country. These differences became apparent during the Transnistria war. The war between Transnistrian Armed Forces, the Russian army, Soviet splinter groups and the Moldovan Armed Forces supported by Romanian volunteers, which lasted less than five months in 1992, resulted in the creation of the independent region of Transnistria, which is not

under the administrative control of the Moldovan government. Ever since, the peace agreement signed in 1992, an uneasy peace or a "frozen conflict" prevailed between the two belligerents, Moldova and Transnistria (Boonstra 2007: 2). Transnistria has not been formally recognized by any United Nations member country since its formation, which led to a certain degree of isolation of the region, particularly from Western governments. The issue of Transnistrias status has been a top priority for the Moldovan government, which claims it to be within the territory of the Moldovan state. Renewed talks, that started in 2012 and are called the 5+2, between Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, United States, European Union, Chisinau and Tiraspol, are intended to find a workable solution for all parties involved. However, due to previous failures of such diplomatic approaches experts question a successful outcome of the talks and therefore the future status of Transdnistria and Moldovan integration remains uncertain (Socor 2012).

No claims

Sources\ Boonstra, J. 2007. "Moldova, Transnistria and European Democracy Policies". FRIDE. Accessed on 10.10.2015 from `http://fride.org/download/COM_Moldav_ENG_feb07.pdf.`\ ICG. 2004. Moldova: Regional tensions over Transdniestria. Accessed on 10.10.2015 from `http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan017188.pdf`\ Socor. 2012. A Failed Re-Start to 5+2 Negotiations on Transnistria. The James Town Foundation.Accessed on 10.10.2015 from `\protect\T1\textbraceleft`http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single_tx_ttnews[tt_news` Klussmann. 2009." Reunification with Romania? EU Dreams in Communist Moldova." Accessed on 10.10.2015 from `http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/reunification-with-romania-eu-dr` `html.`\ Minority Rights. 2004. "Moldova." Accessed on 17.09.2015 from `http://minorityrights.` `org/country/moldova/`\ Ukrainian Census 2001. Accessed on 02.11.2015 from `http://2001.` `ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/`\

Mongolia 712

EGIP Mongols 71203000

Relations between Mongolia and China have always been somewhat strained, and one of the main reasons for this are their territorial disputes, focusing mainly on the region known as Inner Mongolia. This is the region with the biggest concentration of Mongols in China but, due to pressure from the Chinese government, they have turned into a regional minority (Minority Rights, 2008). Since before the nation's independence, the wish to annex Inner Mongolia has been one of the country's goals. But after the division of the regions by the two ruling powers of the region after WWII, China and Soviet Russia, the Mongolian government set the issue aside (Kotkin and Elleman, 1999). In 1990, though, the Mongolian Democratic Party released a statement aimed at Uniting the Three Mongolias, aiming to create a Great-Mongolia (Wei-Fang, 2005). Even though

this sparked some nationalist feelings in the general population, it did not make a great difference, and due to Mongolia's financial dependence from China, the movement has ebbed back into a background position. Even during this period though, the political relations between both countries have seemed stable (Sanders, 2010).

Mongols in China: 1990-2000, irredentism

Sources Minority Rights. 2008. "Mongols". Accessed on 16.08.2015 from `http://www.minorityrights.org/5329/china/mongols.html.\` Sanders, Alan J.K. 2010. "Historical Dictionary of Mongolia." Lanham: Scarecrow Press.\ Kotkin, Stephen and Bruce A. Elleman (eds.). 1999. "Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan." Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.\ Wei-Fang, Wang. 1969 [sic]. "'Pan-Mongolism' and U.S.-China-Mongolia Relations" in China Brief 5.10. Translated by Derek Grossman. Accessed on 16.08.2015 from `http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3856&tx_ttnews[backPid]=195&no_cache=1#.VdCzibW-W-8>.`

Montenegro 341

EGIP Montenegrins 34101000

After holding an independence referendum on the 21st of May 2006, Montenegro declared independence from Serbia on the 3rd of June of that year. Generally, Montenegrins and all minorities were pro-independence, whilst most Serbs were opposed (Minority Rights 2015). The pro-independence camp led by Prime Minister Djukanovic argued that the association with Serbia was holding the republic back, not least with its bid for EU membership (BBC 2015).

The largest group of Montenegrins outside of Montenegro are in Serbia, where Montenegrins number 69,049, or 0.9% of the population in Serbia (Minority Rights 2015). However, the general consensus is that these Montenegrins have integrated in Serbian society, and do not identify themselves as Montenegrins, but rather as Serbians. This was evident during the 2006 independence referendum, when the 250,000 Montenegrins living in Serbia, who were predominantly against Montenegro's independence, were not permitted to vote, in fear that they would vote against independence (Marxer 2012, p. 28).

No claim

Sources BBC. 2012. "Montenegro Country Profile." Accessed on 17.09.2015 from `http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/5033274.stm.\` MinorityRights. 2015. "Serbia." Accessed on 17.09.2015 from `http://www.minorityrights.org/4028/serbia/serbia-overview.html.\` Marxer, W. 2012: "Direct Democracy and Minorities." Springer Sci-

ence & Business Media.

New Zealand 920

EGIP New Zealanders

No claims.

Nicaragua 93

Niger 436

EGIP Hausa 43602000

Although Hausa make up a considerable proportion of both countries (Niger and Nigeria), no "pan-Hausa" statements have been made (Miles and Rochefort 1991; Miles 2005:297). Religion, specifically Islam, is often cited as the factor that unites across the Niger/Nigeria border. The period between 1992-1996 marked the end of the Nigerian Civil war - only after this was Hausa secession voiced by political actors such as the "Arewa People's Congress", in 1999 (Arrous and Ki-Zerbo:92). Violence between Hausa and other ethnic groups, such as the Yoruba in 1991, did cause deaths, but due to the civil war and the increasing dominance of Islam, they were not a persecuted minority (BBC 1991).

1992-1996, No Claim

Sources Arrous, Michel Ben and Ki-Zerbo, Lazare. 2009. African Studies in Geography from Below African Books Collective, \ BBC. 1991. "World: Africa Kano "tense" after Ethnic riots." Accessed on 17.02.16 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/401888.stm \ Miles, William F.S. 2005 ."Development, not division: local versus external perceptions of the Niger-Nigeria boundary". The Journal of Modern African Studies 43:2:297-320\ Miles, William F. S and Rochefort, David A. 1991. "Nationalism versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa." The American Political Science Review. Vol 85(2).

Nigeria 475

EGIP Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt 47501000

The emphasis in Nigerian politics has been on the construction of a federation of states, separated into North, East and Western parts in the first Nigerian Republic. The northern part gained more seats in the parliament from 1963 onwards, and the Hausa/Fulani were therefore (as the majority group in the north) dominant. Increasingly, the Hausa/Fulani north has identified with Islam, which has exaggerated differences between them and their co-citizens. The general claim for the group over this time has been autonomy, and even violent groups such as the Arewa People's congress make no claims regarding outside co-ethnics (Minahan 2002:718; Agbu 2001, appendix 2). \ **1960-2010, No Claim** \ *Sources*\ Agbu, Osita (2004) Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria Nordic Africa Institute\ Minahan, James (2002). Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Pakistan 770

EGIP Mohajirs 77003000

General: Mohajirs in Pakistan left India for Pakistan after the partition of India into two separate states in 1947 (Jaffrelot 2000: 293). In the first decade after independence the Mohajirs successfully took power and became senior partners despite their recent immigration during the war with India. Because the Punjabis became more powerful during the late 1950s and 1960s Mohajirs' experience of immigration and loss of their "homeland" facilitated the strengthening of a Mohajir identity (Murtaza 2014). Still there was no sufficient evidence to corroborate the hypothesis that Mohajirs made use of the geopolitical claim of "Greater Pakistan" as a vehicle to support their ethnic brethren abroad.

India: Within Pakistan's party system Mohajirs supported the populist Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) and the more middle-class oriented Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) (Paracha 2014). While the Jamaat-i-Islami have been described as "torch-bearers" of irredentism towards India (Grare 2001), it is difficult to find empirical evidence for a direct link between their claims and the Mohajirs. The claims are particularly driven by the Islamist ideology which framed for example the 1965 war against India as a holy war. In light of the primarily religious dimension which does not take into account the ethnic kinship encompassed within the EPR data set and due to the lack of reliable evidence for a link between Pakistani geopolitical demands for Muslim minorities, the relationship towards Mohajirs India is coded as being without claims.

The Mohajirs in Mauritius and Bangladesch are ethnic kin Mohajirs, but I did not find any relevant claims and conclude that the Muhajir group in Pakistan has not made any demands in their name. Moreover, in the case of Bangladesh there is only a one-year nominal overlap of the period of Mohajirs as power-sharing group and the independence of Bangladesh.

No claim.

Sources\ Grare, Frederic. 2001. "Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami, Manohar-CSH."\ Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2000. "A History of Pakistan and its Origins". Anthem Press.\ Murtaza, Niaz. 2014. "The Mohajir question". Accessed on 13.09.2015 from `http://www.dawn.com/news/1082152.`\ Paracha, Nadeem F. 2014. "The evolution of Mohajir politics and identity." Accessed on 13.09.2015 from `http://www.dawn.com/news/1100948.`

EGIP Punjabi 77005000

Since Pakistan's independence in 1947 the Punjabis have been politically represented by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (Abderrahim 2014). They have been the most influential ethnic group in politics and have been represented both in the army and in the public administration.

India: Pakistan's best-known geopolitical claim is the revision of the status of Kashmir. Building on the claim of self-determination and brotherhood among Muslims the government has always supported a unification of the Kashmir with Pakistan. Compared to other ethnic groups the Punjabis have rather close ethnic ties to Kashmir. There are several reasons for this affiliation. Firstly, Punjab constitutes Pakistan's border region to Kashmir. Settlements therefore tend to overlap which has reinforced the shared sense of ethnic kinship across the border (Shah 1997: 145). Secondly, many soldiers fighting in the Kashmir conflict come from Punjab (Burki 2003). Apart from the living space there is also a deeper "emotional investment in irredentism" towards India than among other ethnic groups. (Saideman and Ayres 2008: 223). Irredentist claims have been made by the Pakistan government since Pakistan separated from India (Paul and Hogg 2005). Despite the recent rapprochement between the two states there are still numerous voices within the Punjabi-controlled government that claim a right to unite with their ethnic brethren in Kashmir (Rosel 2010). I have therefore decided to code the geopolitical claim as being irredentist for the whole period under scrutiny.

The Punjabis in Bangladesch, Mauritius, Nepal, Singapor, and Sri Lanka are ethnic kin Punjabis, but I did not find any relevant claims and conclude that the Punjabis group in Pakistan has not made any demands in their name.

Punjabi in India, 1947-201, irredentism

Sources\ Abderrahim, A. 2014."Political parties and ethnic groups in Pakistan." Accessed on

14.05.2015 from `http://www-pub.naz.edu/~aamghar6/political_parties_and_ethnic_groups.htm`\ Burki, Shadid J. 2003. "Keeping Out Pakistan". Dawn.\ Cohen, Stephen P. 2004. "The idea of Pakistan". Brookings Institution Press.\ Paul, T.V. and Hogg, William. 2005. "South-Asia's embedded conflict: understanding the India-Pakistan rivalry", in: Paul, T.V. (ed.). *The India-Pakistan Conflict. An Enduring Rivalry.* Cambridge University Press: 251-266.\ Ruesel, Jakob. 2010. "Ist der Kaschmir-Konflikt loesbar? Analysen: Suedasien - Politik & Recht" Accessed on 14.09.2015 from `http://www.suedasien.info/analysen/2819`\ Saideman, Stephen and Ayres, William R. 2008. For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War, Columbia Press.\ Shah, Mehtab A. 1997. "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy". 1971-1994, Taur.

Poland 290

EGIP Poles 29001000

General: After World War II, the pre-war eastern Polish territories of Kresy, which the Red Army had invaded already in 1939, were permanently annexed by Stalin's Soviet Union. Today, these territories are part of Belarus and Ukraine and Lithuania. In turn, postwar Poland received the Free City of Danzig and the former territory of Nazi Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line, consisting of the southern two-thirds of East Prussia and most of Pomerania, Neumark (East Brandenburg), and Silesia. The German population fled and was forcibly expelled before these Recovered Territories (official term) were repopulated with Poles expelled from the eastern regions and those from central Poland. The small area of Zaolzie, which had been annexed by Poland in late 1938, was returned to Czechoslovakia on Stalin's orders. Today, the Polish government supports Poles living in Kresy and there are Polish sports clubs, newspapers, radio stations etc. Poles living in Kresy are helped by "Fundacja Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie", a Polish government-sponsored organization, as well as other organizations, such as The Association of Help of Poles in the East Kresy (see also Karta Polaka). Money is frequently collected to help those Poles who live in Kresy, and there are several annual events, such as a Christmas Package for a Polish Veteran in Kresy, and Summer with Poland, sponsored by the Association "Polish Community", in which Polish children from Kresy are invited to visit Poland .Despite the strong support of Poles living in the Kresy, no territorial claims were ever made in the region. Poles in Lithuania: According to surveys conducted in the spring of 1990, 47% of Poles in Lithuania supported the pro-Soviet Communist party (in contrast to 8% support among ethnic Lithuanians), while 35% supported Lithuanian independence (Budryte 2005: 148). In 1989 regional authorities in Vilnius and Salonnikai region, under Polish leadership, with support from Soviet authorities, argued for the establishment of an autonomous region in South Eastern Lithuania, a request that was declined by the Lithuanian government and left lasting resentment among some residents (Petersen 2002). The Government of

Poland, however, never officially supported the autonomist tendencies of the Polish minority in Lithuania because it regarded the Lithuanian Poles as a Sovietized diaspora, any support of which might possibly benefit the Soviet Union (Keiji 2008: 150).

Poles in Belarus: The Polish minority in Belarus led a quite life until in 2005 the Lukashenka regime started to crack down on the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB). This was in part due to Poland's accession to the EU and adoption of a pro-Western orientation (Minority Rights Group International 2005). However, despite Lukashenka's crackdowns on the Polish minority in Belarus, there are no signs of irredentism, secessionist or autonomy claims among the Poles in Belarus. The Polish elite condemns Lukashenka's actions, but does not make any geopolitical claims (Kascian 2012). This is perhaps due to the fact that a majority of Belarus's Poles are collective farm workers in Hrodna region and are seen by some analysts as loyal to the Lukashenka regime regardless of their ethnicity (Minority Rights Group International 2005).

No claim

Sources Budryte, Dovile. 2005. "Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States". Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.\ Keiji, Sato. 2008. "Mobilization of Non-Titular Ethnicities During the Last Years of the Soviet Union: Gagauzia, Transnistria, and the Lithuanian Poles.". Acta Slavica Iaponica 26:141-157.\ Kascian, Kiryl. 2012. "Poles in Belarus: The Story of an Unnecessary Conflict." Accessed on 19.08.2015 from `http://www.thepointjournal.com/output/index.php?art_id=158&spr_change=eng.`\ Minority Rights Group International. 2005. "Poles". Accessed on 31.07.2015 from `http://www.minorityrights.org/4672/belarus/poles.html`\ Petersen, Roger D. 2002. "Understanding Ethnic Violence. Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe."

Romania 360

EGIP Romanians 36001000

Having been an ally of Nazi Germany in World War II, Romania was occupied by the Red Army forces in 1944 and consequently changed sides. Hence, it later became part of the Warsaw pact until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when it transitioned back to a democratic state with a capitalistic economy.

During the interwar period Romania or "Greater Romania" consisted of modern day Romania, parts of Bulgaria, Ukraine and the complete territory of Moldova. The relationship between Romania and Moldova is particularly interesting due to the shared heritage and history. During and after dissolution of the Soviet Union pro-Romanian nationalism within Moldova, which brought the Moldova Popular Front to power in Moldova, caused some serious tensions between

the Romanian-Moldovan majority of the country and its minorities, such as Russians and Ukrainians. Due to the fear of said minorities that they would be play a minor role within a Romanian led state, caused the breakaway of the Transnistria region in the east of the Moldovan territory during a short lived civil war in 1992. However, unlike the goal of the Moldova Popular Front, Moldova kept its sovereign statehood ever since independence in 1991 (Ekstrom 2013).

Currently there are certain claims from minor political parties within Romania, such as the "Greater Romania" party, to the territory of Moldova. However, the Romanian government does not officially seek reunification with Moldova. Nevertheless, some argue that Romania increased its influence within Moldova after its independence and it introduced citizenship policies, which some Moldovans believe undermine Moldova's legitimacy. For instance, Romania allows former citizens and their descendants to re-obtain Romanian citizenship without actually residing on Romanian territory. Hence, the increasing number of "new" Romanians living on Moldovan territory has caused some Moldovan officials to criticize the Romanian citizenship policy, which was introduced in 2000; "creating Romanian citizens within Moldovan territory" (Heintz 2005, 3; 12-13).

Further territories claimed by extreme right wing groups and the "Greater Romania" party include the Bukovina region in Ukraine, parts of Bulgaria and even parts of Hungary. However, the "Greater Romania" party has not been represented in the Romanian parliament since 2008 national elections and therefore does not represent a large group of Romanian society. Its peak was reached in the year 2000 national elections when it received 19.48% of votes (Jiglau & Gherghina, 2011). According to a census conducted by the Ukrainian government in 2001, 12.5% of the population in the Bukovina region was Moldovan/Romanian (Ukraine census). Therefore, except for the "Greater Romania" party, no major political power has called for the reunification or irredentism of the Romanian population in the Bukovina region.

No claim.

Sources Heintz, M. 2005. "Republic of Moldova versus Romania: The Cold War of National Identities." Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 1 (3), 71-81.\ Ekstrom, M. 2013. "Romanian nationalism in Moldova 1988-1994." Accessed on 20.10.2015 from `http://www.sras.org/romanian_nationalism_in_moldova.`\ Jiglau, G. & Gherghina, S.2011. "The Ideological Institutionalization of the Romanian Party System." The Romanian Journal of Political Science. Accessed on 20.10.2015 from `http://www.sar.org.ro/polsci/?p=605.`\ 2001 Ukraine census results. Accessed on 20.10.2015 from `http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng.`\

Russia 365

EGIP Russians 36501000

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was established in 1917. After World War II, the RSFSR saw a continuous expansion of territory and territorial shifts within various Soviet Republics. During the period of the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1991, Russians were unified. Under president Michail Gorbachev the disintegration of the Soviet Union took place in 1991, reducing it to what is known today as the Russian Federation. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation became the country with Russians as dominant population and with Russian minorities scattered throughout the newly independent countries that made up the former Soviet Union. The following claims were made after the abolition of the Soviet Union since 1991.

Russia after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) in general: According to Saideman and Ayres (2012: 175), the Russian course, somehow surprisingly, did not include any significant irredentism. They argue that this is due to the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes an ethnic Russian. Instead of demanding territorial autonomy, ethnic Russians in Central Asia seem to have rather opted for emigration to Russia.

Russians in Moldova: The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1990 (Notholt 2010: 7.19). Russian-speakers, including ethnic Russians, comprise a plurality in Transnistria and played a central role in the Transnistrian campaign for separation from Moldova (Minority Rights Group International 2005). After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, tensions between the newly created Moldova and the de facto sovereign state of Pridnestrovie (which unlike the rest of Moldova did not wish to separate from the Soviet Union) escalated into a military conflict that started in March 1992 and was concluded by a ceasefire in July 1992. As part of that agreement, a three-party (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria) Joint Control Commission supervises the security arrangements in the demilitarized zone. Although the ceasefire has held, the territory's political status remains unresolved: Transnistria is an unrecognized but independent presidential republic with its own government, parliament, military, police, postal system, and currency. Its independence has not been recognized by Russia and there is no evident support of the Russian government for Transnistrian independence (see also Primakov memorandum, 1997 and Kozak memorandum, 2003) (Secrieru 2015).

Russians in Estonia: Estonia got independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. Ethnic Russians in Estonia mostly live in the main industrial towns in the north-east of the country bordering the Russian Federation, and accounted for around 25.6 per cent of the total population in 2000 (Minority Rights Group International 2005). The Russian minority has been leading a relatively peaceful life in Estonia, however, there was a short period in 1993, when ethnic Russians in the

settlement of Narva and Sillam called for autonomy by organizing a referendum, which lacked Russian support in the sense that Moscow portrayed the referendum as strictly internal affair of the Estonian state and by excluding the possibility of a union with Russia (Smith 2002: 98). In the end, the Estonian Legal Chancellor declared the referendum unconstitutional before it even took place, and that's when the whole undertaking failed, leaving no room for further attempts (Bahovski 2014). *Russians in Latvia:* Latvia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. The country has a large Russian minority (most of them live in the province Latgale), with a substantial part of them being "non-citizens", that is, stateless Russians without passports who are not allowed to vote-despite having lived in Latvia for decades (Deutsche Welle 2015). The Latvian-Russian citizen Vladimir Linderman, who has been a member of the Russian National Bolshevik Party since 1997 and leads the Latvian branch of the party, called for Latgalian autonomy in 2012 (Goble 2015; Luxmoore 2015). However, the Russian government has never openly voiced support for Linderman, nor for any autonomy claims within Latvia. On the contrary, Russia even delivered him back to Latvia after he tried to appeal for political asylum in Russia in 2006 (RT 2012).

Russians in Ukraine: Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Since then, separatist and irredentist Russian movements have existed on the Crimean peninsula, which has a large number of ethnic Russians (Palamar 2014). In February 1992, the "Crimean Republic" was established with a Constitution providing for the right to secede from Ukraine, and in May 1992, a resolution of the Russian State Duma declared the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine to have been illegal (Bowring 2005: 71). In July 1993, the Duma resolved that Crimea was a part of Russia, and the Russian government invited the separatist speaker of the Crimean parliament, and a delegation to discuss the situation (ibid.). Only after Leonid Kuchma was elected president of the Ukraine (with the support of Russia) in 1994, could the Crimean issue be settled, with the Russian government claiming that as a state, Russia was opposed to any irredentist tendencies (ibid.).

The Donbas region of Southeaster Ukraine has also a large ethnic Russian minority. According to Kubicek (2010: 286) Russians in the Donbas have been feeling closer to the Soviet Union and not necessarily to the Russian Federation. Smaller skirmishes in the Donbas erupted in 1993, when the dire economic situation sparked mass demonstrations organized by miners and industrial workers that called for early elections, federalism, and economic autonomy for the region (ibid.: 287). However, the mass demonstrations in the Donbas did not have consequences. The status quo of the region was not changed.

Russians in Kazakhstan: Since president Nursultan Nasarbayev took office in 1990, the Russian minority in Kazakhstan has been gradually displaced from all levels of government employment (Minority Rights Group International 2005). Furthermore, the government has been encouraging repatriated ethnic Kazakh to resettle in the more Slavic regions of Kazakhstan (ibid.). The interest of Russia motherland in its ethnic kin in Kazakhstan is limited. As Olcott (2010: 183) notes "Putin appears to have other priorities, and most ordinary Russians are too preoccupied with their own

lives and problems in their own country to worry much about ethnic kin who live beyond their borders. Thus, absent of a foreign sponsor, the Russians of Kazakhstan are growing more stoic in their steadily eroding political and economic status".

Russians in Ukraine, 1992-1994: irredentism\ Russians in all other countries: no claim

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Saudi Arabia 670

EGIP Arab 67005000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand

an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories, 1948-2013: secession

Sources BBC. 2015. "Golan Heights Profile-Overview." Accessed on 11.10.2015 from `http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842.`\ Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. "Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.\ Mara'i, Tayseer and Halabi, Usama R. (1992): Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights. Journal of Palestine Studies 22(1):78-93.\ Zambelis, Chris. 2014: "The Struggle for Arabistan: Tensions and Militancy in Iran's Khuzestan Province." Accessed on 11.10.2015 from `http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41865#.VhtZ1GO_H4U.`

Senegal 433

EGIP Wolof 43301000

As shown in "Wolof, Gambia", the differences between the Wolof in Senegal and the Wolof in the Gambia are large and, as the ethnic group has held positions of power in both countries, claims regarding autonomy or irredentism have been notably absent. The short lived confederation between the two countries (1981-1989) is often explained as a security fix, specifically regarding trade with Europe and the west and curtailing the black market, and also the growing unrest in the Casamance region (Hughes and Lewis, 1995, pp. 234-6). Wolf argues that the phenomenon of "wolofisation" that occurred in Senegal may well spread to the Gambia due to trade links, but that this has not happened yet (Wolf 2001).

1981-2012: No Claim

Sources Hughes, Arnold; Lewis, Janet. 1999. "Beyond Francophonie: The Senegambia Confederation in Retrospect". In Kirk-Greene, Anthony; Bach, Daniel. *State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence.* Oxford, England: St. Martin's Press:230.\ Wolf, Hans-Georg. 2001. "English in Cameroon. Contributions to the sociology of Language 85." Berlin. Mouton de Gruyter. Excerpt accessed on 08.02.16 from `https://www.angl.hu-berlin.de/department/staff/2283/English%20in%20West%20Africa/english_in_west_africa_gambia`

Serbia and Montenegro / Yugoslavia 345

EGIP Serbs 34501000

Yugoslavia became extremely polarized along ethnic lines after Tito's death in 1980. However, during Yugoslav times, from 1946 until 1990, the Serbs were unified and dominant in Yugoslavia and did not make any territorial claims. When Yugoslavia disintegrated, Serbs became minorities in all of the newly independent states: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. These stranded minorities were a major reason for the outbreak of the war on the Balkans in the 1990s.

Under president Slobodan Milosevic, claims for a so-called "Greater Serbia" and the right of Serbs to be unified in a Serbian state became extremely mainstream (Pesic 1996: vi). The Serbian government, supported by majority of the population in core Serbia, did not recognize the independence of the breakaway republics and treated the Serb minorities abroad like citizens and supported them financially, military and politically (Saideman & Ayres 2008). The Dayton Conference in 1995 led to a change in official Serbian polices, and the Serb government under Milosevic officially ceased to claim unification with Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. Although the support was strongest for Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia during the early 1990s (Saideman 1998: 54), some Serbian officials still demanded the unification of Serbs in later years. For example, the creation of Greater Serbia ("Velika Srbija") was a core goal stated in the program of the Serbian Radical Party that was popular in Serbia in the 1990s until its split in 2008. As of 2008, many Serb representatives abandoned the idea of Greater Serbia and started to recognize existing state borders, including current prime minister Vucic and president Nikolic (Stojarova & Emerson 2010: 112; Vachudova 2015: 611).

1991-1995: irredentism general\ Serbs in Croatia, 1991-1995: irredentism.\ Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-1995: irredentism

Sources\ Pesic, V. 1996. "Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis", United States Institute of Peace.\ Saideman, S. M. 1998. "Inconsistent irredentism? Political competition, ethnic ties, and the foreign policies of Somalia and Serbia." Security Studies, 7 (3): 51-93.\ Saideman, S. M., & Ayres, R. W. 2008. "For kin or country: Xenophobia, nationalism, and war." Columbia University Press.\ Stojarov, V., & Emerson, P. 2010. "Party politics in the Western Balkans." Routledge.\ The New York Times. 2013. "Serbia and Kosovo Reach Agreement on Power-Sharin". 19. 4. 2013.\ Vachudova, M. A. 2015. "The transformation of the state in Eastern Europe." In: Leibfried, S., Huber, E., Lange, M., Levy, J. D., & Nullmeier, F. (eds.). *Oxford Handbook on Transformation of the State.* Oxford University Press.\

Serbia 340

EGIP Serbs 34001000

While the prospects of European integration strongly decreased Serbian irredentist claims, because the recognition of existing state borders is a precondition for negotiations with the European Union, several groups in Serbia still demand unification with the Bosnian Republika Srpska and particularly the Serbs in Kosovo. Moreover, as of today, the Serb government refuses to recognize Kosovo. However, in April 2013 an agreement was reached between Belgrade and Prishtina, the Brussels Agreement, that clarified the status of Serbs in Kosovo (The New York Times 2013). Although Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, they dismantled their institutions in Northern Kosovo and agreed on the integration of Serbs in Kosovo. Hence, the dominant irredentist claim ends in 2013.

Serbs in Kosovo, 2008-2013: irredentism\ (for future updates: Serbs in Kosovo, 2014-: autonomy

Sources\ Pesic, V. 1996. "Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis," United States Institute of Peace.\ Saideman, S. M. 1998. "Inconsistent irredentism? Political competition, ethnic ties, and the foreign policies of Somalia and Serbia." Security Studies, 7 (3), 51-93.\ Saideman, S. M., & Ayres, R. W. 2008. "For kin or country: Xenophobia, nationalism, and war." Columbia University Press.\ Stojarov, V., & Emerson, P. 2010. "Party politics in the Western Balkans." Routledge.\ The New York Times. 2013. "Serbia and Kosovo Reach Agreement on Power-Sharing". 19. 4. 2013.\ Vachudova, M. A. 2015.. "The transformation of the state in Eastern Europe." In: Leibfried, S., Huber, E., Lange, M., Levy, J. D., & Nullmeier, F. (eds.). *Oxford Handbook on Transformation of the State.* Oxford University Press.\

Singapore

EGIP Chinese

Singapore's diplomatic relations with South Africa were only instituted in 1992 (SADIRC). Even though Singapore condemned South Africa's Apartheid policy, no claims were ever made regarding their ethnic kin specifically. Both countries have had stable diplomatic relations since, yet no claims have been made by Singapore, regarding Chinese people living in South Africa.

In the case of Taiwan, Singapore is among the nations which recognize mainland China (the People's Republic of China) as the governing body of all of China (mainland & Taiwan). As such, no official diplomatic ties exist between the nations, but informal trade relations are still maintained.

Even though through this, Singapore acts as a sort of middle-man between China and Taiwan (as can be seen in its hosting the historical meeting of both nations' presidents [BBC 2015]), no claims have been made by Singapore relating to their Chinese ethnic kin living in Taiwan.

Throughout the years of Myanmar's political exclusion by most nations in the world, Singapore has kept unofficial ties with Myanmar (Mahtani 2012). Be it through services (e.g. hospital services in Singapore), or through trade opportunities, Singapore has steadily supported Myanmar (Wijaya 2012). But here as well, no specific claims have been made regarding Chinese ethnic kin of Singapore residing in Myanmar.

With Thailand as well, Singapore's relationship has been stable and mostly positive over the years. Diplomatic ties between both nations were instituted shortly after Singapore's independence (Straits Times 2015), and ever since Singapore and Thailand have worked on bettering and furthering their joint developments (NewsAsia 2015). Yet, no claims have been made relating to the Chinese ethnic kin of Singapore residing in Thailand.

Cambodia is yet another Southeast Asian country to have established diplomatic ties with Singapore from the onset of its independence in 1965 (NewsAsia 2015). Although here as well, Singapore has advocated for a balanced overall relationship inland and with the overall context of Southeast Asia, Singapore has taken a sideline position in its relationship with Cambodia. No claims have been made.

Singapore's relationship with Vietnam follows along the lines of the former's relationship with its other fellow Southeast Asian nations. Although in this case diplomatic relations were only instituted later (1973 [Singapore Government]), Singapore has only made statements on Vietnam and its relationship to its fellow nations. Even during the Vietnam War, although Singapore reiterated the need for the U.S. continuing its conflict in Vietnam, these claims were rather related to the U.S.' political presence (Harvard Crimson 1967), and not the people residing in Vietnam. Thus, no claims have been made relating to Singapore's ethnic kin in Vietnam, though.

Singapore's relationship with the Republic of Vietnam relied mainly on the former's support for the latter's anti-communist conflict agenda. Whereas Singapore offered (and gained) war-related infrastructure to the Republic of Vietnam & U.S.' effort (Abhijit 2009), the city-state never made any claims regarding their ethnic kin residing in the Republic of Vietnam.

Singapore and Malaysia have also maintained diplomatic ties since the former's independence. Even though these have been mostly stable, tensions have arisen throughout the years (Omar), but as these do not focus on Chinese people living in Malaysia, no claims have been coded here.

Singapore's relationship with China revolves much around its close to advisory role the Asian superpower. Official diplomatic ties were only initiated in 1990, even though informal links were already being maintained (Min 2014), Singapore being the last South-East Asian country to rec-

ognize the People's Republic of China. From thereon, Singapore has served as an advisor of sorts to China, advocating for a responsible expansion of the latter (Goh 2004). Although the consequences of this might reverberate to the Chinese population, the main aim seems to be economical and political. Thus, no claims have been made relating to the Chinese people residing in mainland China though.

The relationship between Singapore and the Philippines has also been mostly stable throughout the years. Although both nations have been involved in some disputes and tensions (e.g. Spratly Islands dispute [Dolan 1991] and the execution of a Filipino maid [Son 1995], respectively), no claims have been made by Singapore regarding their ethnic kin in the Philippines.

Whereas Singapore and Indonesia have had longer periods of unrest in their relationship, through most of the second half of the 20th century, namely under the Suharto regime, relations were stable and mostly positive (Desker 2015). In latter years though, tensions have arisen once more, with Singapore making claims towards various events and aspects of Indonesia. As these relate either to both nations' political ties, or to the well-being of people living in Singapore and not in Indonesia (Desker 2015), these are not coded here.

Even though Australia and Singapore have held ongoing diplomatic ties since the latter's independence (Australia being the first country to do so [Parameswaran 2015]), no claims have been made regarding Singapore's ethnic kin residing in Australia. A Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2003, and further projects for more joint ventures are being worked on (Shanahan 2015), yet these all relate to the overall diplomatic and economic relationships, and not to the people themselves. Thus, no claims are coded here.

With New Zealand as well, Singapore's relationship has been overall positive and stable. While the mutual cooperation has been in place since before Singapore's independence (NZMFAT), the relationship has always been mutually agreeable. As such, no claims have been made regarding Singapore's ethnic kin residing in New Zealand.

No claim

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Switzerland 225

EGIP Swiss Germans 22501000

No claims

Syria 652

EGIP Arab 65202000

Generally, all Arab-majority governments condemn the actions of the state of Israel against the Palestinians and demand that the Palestinian territories be freed from Israeli occupation. It is not so much a question of irredentism, rather Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments demand an independent Palestinian state in the sense of a two-state solution. Palestine has still not been internationally recognized as an independent state.

Arabs in the Palestinian territories, 1948-1969: secession

Sources BBC. 2015. "Golan Heights Profile-Overview." Accessed on 11.10.2015 from `http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842`.\ Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. "Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.\ Mara'i, Tayseer and Halabi, Usama R. (1992): Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights. Journal of Palestine Studies 22(1):78-93.\ Zambelis, Chris. 2014: "The Struggle for Arabistan: Tensions and Militancy in Iran's Khuzestan Province." Accessed on 11.10.2015 from `http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41865#.VhtZ1GO_H4U`.

Taiwan

EGIP Taiwanese

Even though Taiwan and South Africa enjoyed growing diplomatic relations throughout the second half of the 20th century, strongly due to both countries' isolation from the global context (Grimm et all, 2014), the nations cut relations in 1996, after then president Mandela's decision to switch support from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People's Republic of China (China) (McNeil, 1996). After the beginning of the new millennium the relationship between both countries has seen new enterprises to strengthen these diplomatic ties again (Grimm et all, 2014). No claims relating to Taiwan's ethnic kin in South Africa have been made, though.

Whereas Taiwan is known to be under constant threat of China's irredentism (China Today), the main aspect of this conflict seems to be that even though the governing bodies of both nations agree that Taiwan is a province of China, what exactly is meant by China, and who rules over it is a topic of much discussion. Whereas since 1949 China (People's Republic of China) has been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, and Taiwan (Republic of China) by the Chinese Nationalist Party, both Governments lay claim to the whole of China (J.M. 2014). Even though both nations started discussing the issue in the 1990s, the issue has still not been resolved, and, as such, is considered an ongoing irredentist claim.

Taiwan's relationship with Myanmar on the other hand is rather new. The nations have not had official diplomatic relations until now, even though Myanmar has just opened a trade office in Taiwan (Yeh, 2015). Thus, no claims have been made relating to Taiwanese Mainland Chinese people living in Myanmar.

Taiwan's relationship with Thailand has not been all too stable throughout the past 70 years. Whereas at one point both were strong trading partners, during the 1970s, Thailand began strengthening its ties to mainland China (PROC), thus damaging its relationship with Taiwan (The Nation, 2012). Although the relationship between both nations has been getting more stable again (Taiwan News, 2009), no claims have been made pertaining to Taiwanese ethnic kin living in Thailand.

Cambodia being one of the strong supporters of the "One China" policy, and by this, of the People's Republic of China, does not have positive relations with Taiwan. Both nations severed ties in 1997 (Radio Free Asia, 2012), and this enmity was only reinforced in 2014 with Prime Minister Hun Sen's vetoing of the opening of a Taiwanese trade center in Cambodia (Khmer Times, 2014). No claims have been made by the government of Taiwan relating to any ethnic kin inhabiting Cambodia, though.

Vietnam and Taiwan have had a strained relationship over the course of the 20th century, owing to their starkly contrasting political stances. Most of this conflict between the nations was caused by Vietnam's aligning with communist China during the Vietnam War, and later continuing on that path (China Post 2006). The 21st century has seen quite a bit of change to this though, since Taiwan has even been hailed Vietnam's biggest foreign investor (China Post 2006). Even so, no claims have been made relating to the ethnic kin of Taiwan residing in Vietnam.

Whereas Taiwan was one of the Republic of Vietnam's main supporters during the Vietnam, due to both nations' anti-communist agendas (Ku, 1999), no claims were made regarding mainland Chinese living in South Vietnam. Not even during the periods of unrest, during which the Chinese living in the Republic of Vietnam were forcefully forced to integrate (An, 1967).

As with its other fellow Southeast Asian nations, Taiwan's relationship with Malaysia has been somewhat unstable, even inexistent at times during the past 70 years. Whereas diplomatic ties were established in 1964, these were again recinded in 1974, when Malaysia recognized the People's

Republic of China, thus forcing Taiwan to close its embassy in Malaysia (TECOM 2011). Even though the relationship has been seeing steady improvement over the past few decades (Ku, 2000), no claims relating to Taiwanese citizens (mainland Chinese) living in Malaysia have been made.

Even though nowadays Singapore recognizes the People's Republic of China, not Taiwan, as the ruling body of the Chinese nation, both countries still lead political ties (The Economist 2015). As with most nations in Southeast Asia, though, these are informal, and focus mainly on economical issues (e.g. the new FTA signed in 2013 [Fensom 2013), not on Taiwanese residents of Singapore. Thus, they are not coded here.

The Philippines as well, recognize the "One China Policy", but lead informal trade relations with Taiwan (ed. Dolan, 1993), through its Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Manila. Even though disputes have erupted during the past few years, these relate either to territorial issues (both are involved in the South China Sea dispute over access to gas, oil and other natural resources [Jennings 2015]) or to specific incidents (e.g. the heated discussions over the shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman [Mullen 2013]). No claims relating to mainland Chinese living in the Philippines have been made by the governing body of Taiwan, though.

Indonesia, while adhering to the "One China Policy" from the beginning, has long had relations with Taiwan, albeit not official diplomatic ties. The relationship between both nations has naturally been much influenced by Indonesia's relationship to mainland China (PRoC), the latter being the region's superpower. Yet, even though this relationship was strained, even halted for close to 25 years (Ku, 2002), the relationship between Taiwan and Indonesia did not change much, apart from an upgrade to the Taiwanese office in Jakarta, to the Taipei Economic and Trade Office (Ku, 2002). Although both nations are also a part of the South Chine Sea territorial dispute, the claims made do not focus on their ethnic kin, and as such, no claims are coded here.

Australia as well, adheres to the "One China Policy", and, as many of the countries which do, still maintains informal relations with Taiwan. These relations became somewhat more stable in 1981, with the building of the Australia Commerce and Industry Office (Babb 2006). Yet, even though this year (2015), complaints were made by the Taiwanese representative office in Australia, relating to the mistreatment of migrant workers (Taipei Times 2015), this claim does not fit any of the prescribed categories. As such, no claims are coded here.

Taiwan's relationship with New Zealand is similar to that with Australia. Even though New Zealand recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the governing body of China in 1961, in 1972 it switched recognition to the People's Republic of China (China), thus severing official diplomatic ties with Taiwan (TECONZ 2014). As with most other nations, though, informal links were maintained through the opening of the New Zealand Commerce & Industry Office in Taipei in 1973 (TECONZ 2014). Nowadays, both nations are strong trading partners (Indian Newslink 2014), but no claims have been made regarding Taiwan's ethnic kin residing in New Zealand.

No claim *Sources* An, Thomas S. 1967. "The Overseas Chinese in South Vietnam: A Note." In Vietnam Perspectives 2. 4. Taylor & Francis Ltd, 13-19. \ Babb, Jeffry. 2006. "Eastern Asia: Australia and Taiwan's special relationship." News Weekly Online. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=2473`. \ The China Post. 2006. "Taiwan-Vietnam ties are looking better than ever." The China Post Online. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2006/11/20/95576/Taiwan-Vietnam-ties.htm`.\ China Today. Accessed on 03.11.2015 from `http://www.chinatoday.com/city/china_taiwan_issue.htm`. \ Dolan, Ronald E. ed. 1993. "Philippines: A country study." U.S. Government Printing Office. \ Fensom, Anthony. 2013. "Taiwan-Singapore FTA." The Diplomat Online. Accessed online on 05.11.2015 from `http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/taiwan-singapore-fta`. \ Grimm et all. 2014. "South African relations with China and Taiwan - Economic realism and the 'One China' doctrine." Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. Accessed on 03.11.2015 from `http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Research-Report_FEB-2014_Formatting.pdf>` \ Indian Newslink. "Taiwan seeks closer bilateral relations in New Zealand." Indian Newslink Online. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://www.indiannewslink.co.nz/taiwan-seeks-closer-bilateral` \ Jennings, Ralph. 2015. "Common Threat To Cool Dispute Between Taiwan and The Philippines". Forbes Online. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2015/06/07/3177` \ J.M. 2014. "Why China and Taiwan are Divided." The Economist Online. Accessed online on 03.11.2015 from `http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/08/economist-explains-16`. \ Khmer Times. 2014. "Prime Minister Hun Sen forbids Taiwan Relations.' Khmer Times Online. Accessed on 04.11.2015 from `http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/2913/prime-minister-hun-sen-forbids-taiwan-relations/`. \ Ku, Samuel C. Y. 1999. "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with Vietnam" in Contemporary Southeast Asia 21.3. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 405-423. \ Ku, Samuel C. Y. 2000. "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with Malaysia: Opportunities and Challenges." Journal of Asian and African Studies. \ Ku, Samuel C. Y. 2002. "Indonesia's Relations With China and Taiwan: From Politics to Economics" in Asian Perspective 26.4. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 227-256. \ McNeil, Donald G. 1996. "Taiwan, Snubbed by South Africa, Ends Aid and Recalls Envoy." New York Times Online. Accessed on 03.11.2015 from `http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/06/world/taiwan-snubbed-by-south-africa-ends-aid-and-recalls-envoy.html>` Mullen, Jethro. 2013. "Relations sour between Taiwan and Philippines over fisherman's death." CNN Online. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/17/world/asia/philippines-taiwan-dispute`. \ Radio Free Asia. 2012. "Cambodia to extradite Taiwanese to China." Radio Free Asia Online. Accessed on 04.11.2015 from `http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/taiwan-05222012154740.html`. \ Taipei Times. 2015. "Taiwanese in Australia exploited." ABC. Taipei Times Online.Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/05/07/2003617705` \ Taiwan News. 2009. "Thailand and Taiwan enjoy mutually prospering relations." Taiwan News Online. Accessed on 04.11.2015 from `http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1124763`

\ TECOM. 2011. "Organizations. Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Malaysia." Accessed on 04.11.2015 from `http://www.taiwanembassy.org/MY/ct.asp?xItem=232971&CtNode=4921&mp=297&xp1=`. TECONZ. 2014. "An Introduction of Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New Zealand." Taiwan-ROC Government Homepage. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from "http://www.roc-taiwan.org/NZ/mp.asp?mp=217". \ The Economist. 2015. "Friends from afar." The Economist Online. Accessed on 05.11.2015 from `http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21647094-taiwans-president-makes-unprecedented-foreign-visit-singapore-friends-afar>` \ The Nation. 2012. "Fear has caused lost opportunities for Thailand." The Nation Multimidia. Accessed on 04.11.2015 from `http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Fear-has-caused-lost-opport html>` \ Yeh, Joseph. 2015. "Myanmar opens trade office in Taiwan in bid to boost ties." The China Post Online. Accessed on 03.11.2015 from `http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/06/25/439156/Myanmar-opens.htm`.

Tajikistan 702

EGIP Tajik 70203000

Tajiks in Afghanistan: The Tajiks in Afghanistan are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, after the Pashtuns. They have a considerable say in Afghan politics. Since Tajiks in Afghanistan do have political clout, they never voiced any territorial claims. However, the Tajik motherland did: In 1995, Tajikistan's Minister for the Interior Yaqubian Salimov openly demanded the unification of all ethnic Tajiks (whether in Afghanistan or Uzbekistan) (Hyman 1998: 106). However, was promptly repudiated by the Tajik government, but it nevertheless reflected the populist nationalist undercurrents in the country (ibid.). Some of Tajikistan's leaders even tried, and failed, to persuade the Afghan Tajik leader Amed Shah Massoud to build a Greater Tajikistan (Rashid 2010). Right after Tajik independence in 1991, the Tajik nationalist bloc (represented by movements like Rastokhez, and La'li Badakhshan) wanted to revive Tajik nationalism by returning to the Arabo-Persian script and support closer links between Tajikistan and Iran (Daghiev 2014: 111). However, it seems that Tajik irredentism remained politically irrelevant.

Tajiks in Uzbekistan: With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, radical Tajik nationalists demanded the return of Bokhara and Samarkand from Uzbekistan, increasing tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Taras and Ganguly 2010: 15). In their hope to reclaim the two cities, Tajiks increasingly turned to the Afghan Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Masood. Masood's army was the best Tajik military force in the region. Although Masood has never supported the idea of a greater Tajikistan, the Uzbek government feared that a victory for Masood in Afghanistan would lead to a new boost for Tajikistan that could reclaim Samarkand and Bukhara, two cities both located in Uzbekistan (Roy 2000: n.p.). After 1992, the considerable weakening of Tajik-

istan removed any threat of irredentism over Samarkand and Bukhara, and distanced the Tajiks of Uzbekistan from notions of pan-Tajikism, which had been discredited by the traumatic experience of the civil war (Roy 2000: 178).

Tajiks in Iran: Since Tajiks see themselves as Persian people, relations with Iran are good. Territorial claims were never made.

Tajiks in Uzbekistan: 1991-1992: irredentism

Sources Daghiev, Dagikhudo. 2014. "Regime Transition in Central Asia. Stateness, Nationalism and Political Change in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan." Oxon: Routledge.\ Hyman, Anthony. 1998. "Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban." In: Maley, William (ed.): *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* London: C. Hurst and Co. ltd., 104-116.\ Roy, Olivier. 2000. "The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations." London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd.\ Roy, Olivier. 2000. "Why War is Going on in Afghanistan: The Afghan Crisis in Perspective." Journal of International Affairs.\ Taras, Raymond C. and Ganguly, Rajat. 2010: "Understanding Ethnic Conflict." New York: Routledge.\

Thailand 80003000

EGIP Thai 800

Thailand, as most nations in the region, has had ongoing border disputes to some extent or another with their direct neighbours. With Cambodia, Thailand's relationship has been mostly stable in recent years, even though both nations used to have a very inimical relationship a few centuries ago, and both countries' recurring oppositional siding in the conflicts that have plagued the region. Even though in recent years here have been some conflicts in the border region, mainly focusing on the ownership of the Preah Vihear temple, of which the control was given to Cambodia after a ruling in 1962 (International Court of Justice, 1962). The claim Thailand makes is mainly historical, and not aimed at the few Thai residents in the region (BBC, 2013).

What pertains to the relations between Thailand and Myanmar, apart from some border clashes in 2010 (AlJazeera, 2010), relations have been (politicaly) mostly peaceful. There have been ongoing clashes with minorities along the border, but those are of Burmese origin. There have also been discussions about Myanmar's relocation of people living in regions with high rates of drug trafficking, but again, these relate to citizens of Myanmarese decent, not Thai (Chongkittavorn, 2001).

Thailand's relation with Vietnam has also been generally peaceful. Excepting the years of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, when some border clashes came to pass, both countries' re-

lations have been stable. No claims have been made regarding the Thai ethnic minority living in Vietnam.

Thailand and Laos have also led a somewhat stable relation over the past few decades, with the most strainful periods being concentrated around the 1960s to the 1980s. Whilst during the former period the strain between both nations focused rather on the changing political landscape of the time, the 80s saw some border disputes between Thailand and Laos. Both of these periods were heavily influenced by the constantly changing political hierarchy of Thailand. While the 1980s saw at least one larger conflict regarding the drawing of the border between these nations, the claim made by Thailand did not relate to a Thai minority living in Laos, but to the region in which three Lao villages were built. As such, no claim is recorded here (Whitaker, 2013).

No claim.

Sources AlJazeera. 2010. "Thousands flee Myanmar clashes." AlJazeera Online.Accessed on 19.09.2015 from `http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2010/11/2010118479326824.html`.\ BBC. 2013. "Q&A: Thailand-Cambodia temple dispute." BBC Online. Accessed 19.09.2015 from `http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12378001`.\ Chongkittavorn, Kavi. 2001. "Thai-Burma Relations" in Challenge to Democratisation in Myanmar: Perspectives in Multilateral and Bilateral Response. Stockholm: Internal Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance.\ International Court of Justice. 1962. "Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand). International Court of Justice." Accessed on 19.09.2015 from `http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=284&p1=3&p2=3&case=45&p3=5`.\ Whitaker, Cary Pendleton. 2013. "Understanding territorial disputes: Case studies regarding the disputes between Ecuador and Peru, Belize and Guatemala, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Laos and Thailand." Boulder: University of Colorado.\

Togo 461

EGIP Ewe (and related groups) 46101000

Following the irredentist, Pan-Ewe movement, which culminated in an armed struggle in Ghana in 1957, Ewe leaders (such as those in the Greater Togo Movement who had led the rebellion) were arrested and many fled to Togo (Minahan 2002:591).

The Togo president from 1960-1963, Slyvanus Olympio, made direct irredentist claims regarding the unification of the eastern part of Ghana, where the Ewes predominantly lived, with Togo (Englebert 2004:1141). The Ghana leader, Nkrumah, contrastingly envisaged the unification of the Ewe to involve Togo becoming part of Ghana. This caused tension between the countries (Owusu-Ansah 2014, pp.304). Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated in 1963 and replaced by his

rival Nicolas Grunitzky, who attempted to create a multi-party government but was unsuccessful, and was overthrown by Eyadema (Englebert 2004:1142). According to Minahan, Eyadema's premiership "eliminated most Ewes from government and suppressed Ewe nationalism", bringing an authoritative end to the irredentism of the early 1960s (Minahan 2002:590). Following the ten year rule, we code a directed irredentist claim for this period.

1960-66: Ewe in Ghana, irredentism

Sources Engleberg, Pierre. 2004. "Togo: Recent History" in Africa South of the Sahara 2004, Europa Publications (no named editor).\ Minahan, James . 2002. "Encyclopaedia of the stateless nations". Greenwood Publishing Group. \ Owusu-Ansah. 2014. "Historical Dictionary of Ghana." Rowman and Littlefield.

Turkey 640

EGIP Turks 64002000

Turks in Cyprus: The partition of Cyprus and creation of a Turkish state in the north became a policy of Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey in the 1950s as a response to Greek self-determination and irredentism on the island (enosis vs. taksim) (Wikipedia). The Turkish leader Adnan Menderes (in office from 1950-1960) considered Cyprus an "extension of Anatolia", rejected the partition of Cyprus along ethnic lines and favored the annexation of the whole island to Turkey. Nationalistic slogans centered on the idea that "Cyprus is Turkish" and the ruling party declared Cyprus to be a part of the Turkish homeland that was vital to its security. Upon realizing the fact that the Turkish Cypriot population was only 20% of the islanders made annexation unfeasible, the national policy was changed to favor partition. Therefore, Turkish irredentism was different than the Greek: whereas Greece sought to incorporate the entire island as a territory, Turkey has pushed for a separate, independent, homogeneous entity for its ethnic kin, either with an eye toward creating de facto ruling connections or paving the way for future integration (Saidemann and Ayres 2008: 216).

Following the Zurich and London agreement on Cyprus' independence, a united Cyprus gained independence from British rule in 1960. Turkey seemed to accept the existence of a Cypriot state and its irredentist policy changed into favoring the creation of an independent state in the northern part of the island (Behlul 2012: 199). In 1963, the Cypriot president Makarios proposed unilateral changes to the constitution, via 13 amendments. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected the proposed amendments, claiming that this was an attempt to settle constitutional disputes in favor of the Greek Cypriots and as a means of demoting Turkish status from co-founders of the state to one of minority status removing their constitutional safeguards in the process. In 1963,

the Greek Cypriot wing of the government created the Akritas plan which outlined a policy that would remove Turkish Cypriots from the government and ultimately lead to union with Greece. The plan stated that if the Turkish Cypriots objected then they should be "violently subjugated before foreign powers could intervene" (US Library of Congress n.y.). When the Greek staged a coup against President Makarios in 1974 and Turkey feared a takeover of the whole island by the Greek nationalist Ionnidis government, Turkey invaded northern Cyprus with thirty thousand troops (Saidemann and Ayres 2008: 217). A UN led ceasefire led to talks in the same year, however, these talks broke down over Turkish and Turkish Cypriot demands for a bi-zonal federation that would include separate Turkish enclaves (ibid.). Turkish government forces have continued to maintain a significant presence in the northern region and the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared a "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975, and an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TNCR) in 1983 (ibid.). According to Saidemann and Ayres (ibid.: 218), official Turkish policy continues to support self-determination for Turks on Cyprus, but in the absence of a direct 1974-style crisis, it is difficult to tell to what degree irredentism remains a motive in Turkish policy towards Cyprus.

General in the Balkans: Turkey did not show irredentist tendencies after the dissolution of Yugoslavia during the early 90s (Koinova 2008: 373). The country took a conservative stance towards the recognition of self-determination movements in general.

*Turks in Yugoslavia*Yugoslavia came into existence in 1918, after World War I):

Turks in Macedonia: Turkey has never claimed territory in Macedonia.

Turks in Greece: Approximately 120'000 to 130'000 ethnic Turks live in Western Thrace, in the northeastern part of Greece. Members of the Turkish minority speak Greek as well as Turkish (Whitman 1990: i). "The Greek government refers to them as "Greek Muslims," and flatly denies the existence of a Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Moreover, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that for many years, the Greek government has been trying to reduce the number of ethnic Turks in Western Thrace. This has been done via techniques ranging from the deprivation of citizenship to "encouraging" emigration to Turkey, to efforts to assimilate the Turkish minority" (nal 2015). By 1985, ethnic tensions in Thrace increased, and for the first time during elections, the Turkish minority began to cast its vote not on the basis of individual favors promised by candidates in the two main political parties, but by asserting distinct ethnic Turkish consciousness (Anagnastou 2001: 102). The movement of self-determination had the explicit backing of Turkey as it stated an initiative that slated independent minority candidates for the 1985 elections which was perceived by the Greek as a prelude to autonomy demands (ibid.). In the second half of the 1990s, the intransigent style of identification with the Turkish motherland no longer constituted the basis for Turkish minority policies in Thrace, but gave way to more integrationist policies. In 2011, the Turks in Western Thrace demanded educational autonomy and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attached the opening of the Christian orthodox Halki seminar to the condition of

educational autonomy of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace (Today's Zaman 2011).

Turks in Bulgaria: Turkey's relations with Bulgaria were especially strained during the last years of the Cold War owing to the assimilation campaign launched by the Bulgarian communist regime against the Turks in the mid-1980s, and the subsequent expulsion of more than 400,000 Turks in 1989 (Koinova 2008: 382 f.). Yet the political changes as of 1990 and the early incorporation of the moderate ethnic Turkish MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) as a parliamentary power in Bulgaria paved the way for an improved relationship (ibid.). Turkey backed the integrationist MRF and refrained from developing close ties with a radical Turkish formation that advocated autonomy and constitutional changes in Bulgaria (ibid.). As a consequence, Turkey never made territorial claims to Bulgaria.

Turks in Kosovo: Kosovo became independent from Serbia in 2008. There are 20,000 Turks living in Kosovo, and Turkish is one of the official regional languages of Kosovo. Relations between Turkey and Kosovo are good. In his last visit to Kosovo in Prizren, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said ""We all belong to a common history, common culture, common civilization; we are the people who are brethren of that structure. Do not forget, Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey!" (Baydar 2013). This statement however, should not be misunderstood as a territorial claim, although Serbian politicians were infuriated by this statement.

Turks in Macedonia, No claim.\ Turks in Kosovo, No claim.\ Turks in Greece (Western Thrace), 1946-2013: autonomy\ Turks in Cyprus, 1950-1959: irredentism, 1960-2013: secession\ Turks in Bulgaria, no claim

Sources\ Anagnastou, D. 2001. "Breaking the Cycle of Nationalism: The EU, Regional Policy and the Minority of Western Thrace, Greece." South European Society and Politics 6(1): 99-124.\ Behlul, Ozkan. 2012. "From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey." New Haven: Yale University Press.\ Koinova, Maria. 2008." Kinstate Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Albania and Turkey Compared." Ethnopolitics 7(4): 373-390.\ Baydar, Yavuz. 2013. Erdogan: "Kosovo is Turkey". Accessed on 26.09.2015 from `http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/erdogan-kosovo-turkey.html`.\ Saidemann, Stephen M. and Ayres, Williams. 2008. "For Kin or Country: Xenophobia Nationalism, and War." New York: Columbia University Press.\ Today's Zaman. 2011. "Turks of Western Thrace Demand Educational Autonomy." Accessed on 26.09.2015 from `http://www.todayszaman.com/national_turkey-western-thrace-demand-educational-autonomy_254384.html`\ Unal, Ali. 2015. "Turkish Leader in Western Thrace Dr. Sadik Ahmet Commemorated." Accessed on 26.09.2015 from `http://www.dailysabah.com/balkans/2015/07/27/turkish-leader-in-western-thrace` US Library of Congress (n.y.): The Republic of Cyprus. Online: (http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/12.htm [07.10.2015]).\ Whitman, Lois. 1990: Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece. New York: Human Rights Watch.\

Turkmenistan 701

EGIP Turkmen 70113000

Turkmen in Iran: The Islamic Republic of Iran is made up of foremost Shi'a muslims, ten percent of Iran's population are Sunni Muslims. According to the Iranian Constitution, ethnic minorities have a right to practise their religious beliefs, nevertheless, ethnic minorities are being repressed (Saleh 2013: 63). Turkmen people in Iran do not have the same rights as Persians in Iran. In 2008, a gunboat of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shot and killed a 20-year-old Turkmen fisherman in the coastal waters of the Caspian Sea (Taheri 2008). The incident caused riots across Iranian provinces where Turkmen are a majority. The Turkmen anger appears to have been as strong and widespread as to oblige the government in Ashgabat, capital of neighboring Turkmenistan, to stop its flow of natural gas to Iran, provoking a diplomatic tussle with Tehran (ibid.). Despite these happenings, relations between Iran and Turkmenistan are quite good, and there is no evidence of Turkmens in Persia demanding autonomy, or even secession.

Turkmen in Afghanistan: Turkmen (and Uzbeks) occupy the greatest share of Afghanistan's arable land in the north, and are mostly farmers by occupation, growing grain and vegetables (Minority Rights Group International 2005). Throughout Afghan history, Turkmen sought to avoid confrontation by remaining neutral throughout the decades of conflict (ibid.). As a result they had no powerful leaders or warlords to represent them politically during and in the aftermath of the civil war and the modern rebuilding process (ibid.).

No claim.

Sources\ Minority Rights Group International. 2005. "Uzbeks and Turkmens". Online: Accessed on 10.09.2015 from `http://www.minorityrights.org/5442/afghanistan/uzbeks-and-turkmens.html`.\ Taheri, Amir. 2008. "Iran's Latest Ethnic Revolt." Accessed on 10.09.2015 from `http://nypost.com/2008/01/14/irans-latest-ethnic-revolt`\ Saleh, Alam. 2013: "Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran." New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Uganda 500

Ukraine 369

EGIP Ukrainians 36901000

`UkrainiansinMoldova(Transnistria)`: Transnistria is a breakaway state that de jure still be-

longs to Moldova and has not been recognized by any UN member state since its declaration of independence in 1990. Transnistria is designated by the Republic of Moldova as the Transnistria autonomous territorial unit with special legal status. According to a population census carried out by the PMR authorities in 2004, ethnic Ukrainians make up 28.8% of the population in Transnistria (Minority Rights Group International 2005). Ukrainian-Transnistrian relations have been quite good since Transnistria broke away from Moldova, declaring its (unrecognized) independence in the 1990s (Kosienkowski 2014). Volunteers from the Ukrainian nationalist from the Ukrainian National Assembly-People's Self-Defense movement (UNA-UNSO) even helped Transnistrians in their fight against Moldovans in the 1992 war, however, the Ukrainian authorities have incessantly declared their support for Moldova's territorial integrity (ibid.).

For future research: The situation changed when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in March 2014 and the pro-Russian rebellion began in eastern Ukraine (Kosienkowski 2014). Relations between Ukraine and the pro-Russian Transnistria, with 1,500-2,000 Russian soldiers on its soil, became hostile (ibid.). Ukrainian authorities identified the quasi-state as a staging ground for Russian and Transnistrian groups to infiltrate and destabilise south-western Ukraine, mainly the neighbouring Odesa region (ibid.). After Russia's aggressive moves against Ukraine, Ukraine is very unlikely to recognize Transnistria's independence, since Transnistria is seen as a Russian puppet state by Ukrainian authorities.

No claim

Sources Kosienkowski, Marcin. 2014: "Ukraine and Transnistria: A Troubled Borderland." Accessed on 21.08.2015 from `http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1342-ukraine-and-transnistria-a-troubled-borderland`.

United Kingdom 200

EGIP English

No claims

Uzbekistan 704

EGIP Uzbek 70406000

According to Fumagalli (2006: 2) ethnicity has played little role in shaping Uzbekistan's regional policy. Uzbek co-ethnics, disempowered in their new countries of residence, have felt progres-

sively ignored by Uzbekistan (ibid.). Fumagalli conducted also a field study in Uzbekistan, asking the Uzbek population about their co-ethnics abroad. Drawing on this, he discovered that Uzbekistan does not have a diaspora policy aimed at repatriation or protection of co-ethnics abroad (ibid.: 15).

Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgystan's Uzbeks live, with very few exceptions (in the northern cities of Bishkek and Tokmok), in the southern Ferghana Valley provinces, namely Osh, Jalalabat and Batken (Fumagalli 2006: 10). Relations between between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan throughout the 1990s have remained peaceful, despite the potential for conflict over resources or territory (ibid.: 13). The tension arose in the late 90s and early 00s when Uzbekistan started to blame Kyrgyz authorities for not stopping Islamist militants, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), on Kyrgyz territory. From then on, tighter border controls were established. In 2010, violent clashes erupted in South Kyrgyzstan between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek population. "When interviewed in May, Abdurashid Khojaev, president of the Uzbek National Center in Osh, seemed to sum up the sense of caution among Uzbek community leaders. "We do not want power or authority, and we do not want clashes," he said. "There's no word among Uzbeks about autonomy. We saw how much blood there was in 1990 because of gossip about autonomy. We know that if we start a fight with the Kyrgyz, it could open the way for extremists, terrorists, and the Taliban." In the first week of May, an ethnic Uzbek delegation met with leaders of the interim government in Bishkek to call for provisions in the draft constitution that would benefit the Uzbek community. Demands included proportional representation for ethnic Uzbeks at all levels of government administration and state recognition of the Uzbek language, meaning that street signs, textbooks, and official documents would be printed in Uzbek as well as Kyrgyz" (Khan 2010).

Uzbeks in Tajikistan: Tajikistan is home to the largest Uzbek population in Central Asia with Uzbeks being concentrated in the northern province of Leninabad and in the south-west of the country (Khatlon province) (Fumagalli 2006: 10). As Tajikistan descended into civil war from 1992 to 1997, there was considerable intrusion on Uzbekinstan's part in the conflict. However, as Fumagalli (ibid.: 12) concludes, the clashes between the two neighbors should be seen through the lenses of power politics rather than as a manifestation of ethnic tensions.

No claim

Sources Fumagalli, Matteo. 2006. "Ethnicity and Foreign Policy: Uzbekistan" and "Uzbeks Abroad". Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association of Ireland, University College Cork:1-26.\ Khan, Sam. 2010. "Kyrgyzstan's Uzbeks. Our Voices are not Heard". Accessed on 12.09.2015 from `http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstans_Uzbeks_Say_Our_Voices_Are_Not_Heard/2079281.html`\

Republic of Vietnam 81702000

EGIP Kinh (Vietnamese) 817

As with the region known as Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had its fair share of skirmishes during the past century. During the First Indochina War, although Vietnam was still one united nation, the North and South had a somewhat different agenda. While both halves were fighting for their Independence to some extent, the North was mostly controlled by the Communists, and thus was intent on fighting the French, and gaining control of the South (Steibel, 1972). The South on the other hand, or better, the parts of the South still under the rule of Bao Dai (who was acting as a stand-in for the ruling French), was fighting alongside the French, vying to maintain control of the whole nation (Vietnam Gear). Right after the end of the First Indochina War, Vietnam found itself fighting a new conflict, the Second Indochina War, or Vietnam War. Once again, North was pitched against South Vietnam, this time as a divided nation, each with its own independent government. The latter allied with the U.S., trying to defeat the Communists in the North and regain control of the nation (CNN). Since during the years when North and South Vietnam were divided into two separate nations, the South (Republic of Vietnam) did not make any claims referring to its ethnic kin in Cambodia, no claims are coded here.

Kinh (Vietnamese) in Vietnam, 1954-1975: irredentism

Sources BBC. Cambodia Profile - Timeline. BBC Online. Accessed on 31.08.2015 from `http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13006828\` CNN. Vietnam War Fast Facts. CNN Online. Accessed on 31.08.2015 from`http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/01/world/vietnam-war-fast-fact` Steibel, Gerald L. 1972. "Communist Expansion in Indochina: Part One. The First Indochina War and After". Southeast Asian Perspectives 6. Taylor & Francis Ltd.\ Vietnam Gear. Vietnam War Biographies: Bao Dai. Vietnam Gear. Accessed online on 31.08.2015 from `http://www.vietnamgear.com/bio/8.aspx`.

Vietnam 816

EGIP Kinh (Vietnamese) 81602000

Throughout the years when North and South Vietnam were divided, the North enjoyed a somewhat favorable relation with Cambodia, in that the latter allowed the former to position their military outposts in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. No pacts or claims referring to the North Vietnamese ethnic kin were made during that time though. Later, after being reunited with their southern counterparts, the greater nation of Vietnam warred with Cambodia. The conflict began

in 1977, Cambodia being overtaken in 1979. They stayed in power, fighting the local resistance alliance between the Khmer Rouger and prince Sihanouk up to 1989, when the Vietnamese finally retreated (BBC 2015). Although the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia faces widespread discrimination, the Vietnamese government has not taken any actions to support their foreign kin. Most Vietnamese in Cambodia are stateless, but the Vietnamese government refuses to accept Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia (Berman 1996).

As mentioned above, one must analyze Vietnam's political landscape throughout time in different time periods. First there are the years before and right after the nation's independence, in which the nation as a whole was fighting against the French, what is known as the First Indochina War. Although this was a war fought by the whole nation, one could argue that its main proponent was North Vietnam, as that is where the Communist forces were the strongest, and could mount a charge against the French in the South (Steibel 1972). At the same time, the North also pursued an irredentist agenda, in that it wanted to spread communism throughout the whole nation, joining both North and South under it. Since the nation was still one unit, the independence claim is considered dominant, and is, thus, coded here. To this, the claim is coded from the years 1946-1954 because during this time the ongoing conflict was focused on releasing all the Vietnamese people from the French colonial control.

The next step in the Vietnamese conflict follows this pattern of Communist North vs. Non-Communist South. About one year after the end of the First Indochina War, the Second Indochina War followed, dividing the country into Vietnam (North) and Republic of Vietnam (South). Also known as the Vietnam War, this lead to almost 20 years (1955-1975) of constant conflict with the communists in the North vying for control of the U.S.-supported South. Although one could divide this war into pre-U.S. Intervention and post-U.S. Intervention, the reason for Vietnam's push to overtake the Republic of Vietnam are the same throughout, and thus the whole period is considered as one long conflict. The Second Indochina War ended in 1975 with the take-over of Hanoi, and the reunification of North and South Vietnam into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (CNN 2013).

King (Vietnamese) in Republic of Vietnam, 1954-1975: irredentism

Sources

BBC. 2015. "Cambodia Profile - Timeline. BBC Online. " Accessed on 28.08.2015 from `http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13006828.\` Berman, Jennifer S. 1996. "No Place Like Home: Anti-Vietnamese Discrimination and Nationality in Cambodia," 84 Cal. L. Rev. 817.\%dodgy CNN. 2013. "Vietnam War Fast Facts." CNN Online. Accessed on 30.08.2015 from `http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/01/world/vietnam-war-fast-facts/>\` Steibel, Gerald L. 1972. "Communist Expansion in Indochina: Part One. The First Indochina War and After". Southeast Asian Perspectives 6. Taylor & Francis Ltd.

Central African Republic 482

EGIP Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.) 48206000

Over this time period the CAR was ruled by David Dacko and Bokassa, the infamous president who declared himself emperor of the "Central African Empire" in 1976. However this empire referred only to the land within the CAR. Bokassa was sucessful in bankrupting the country through lavish ceremonies and suspicious activities (The Guardian 2010). No claims were made regarding Nbaka in DRC at this time, in so far as we can gather.

1960-1981: No Claim

Sources The Guardian. 2010. "Cannibal dictator Bokassa given posthumous pardon". Accessed on 22.02.16 from `http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/03/jean-bedel-bokassa-posthumous-pa`

Chad 483

EGIP Sara 48304000

During this time period in CAR was the regime of Dacko and Bokassa, both of the riverine group, which is coded in the EPR as dominant in this time. Northern groups are powerless until 1966, then junior partner (they include Sara according to EPR description). We find no evidence of Chad supporting the Sara or other northern groups at this time.

1960-1978: No Claim

Chad 483

EGIP Toubou 48306000

According to SDM coding notes, secessionist or irredentist claims from the Toubou in Niger only emerged in 1994, with the forming of the FDR. Similarly in Libya, SDM codes a start date of much later, 2011, for the claim of separatism. It is unclear if the government in Chad supported Toubou claims for autonomy in Libya or Niger between 1980 and 1990.

1980-1990: No Claim

Uganda 500

EGIP South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) 50011000

Many sources argue that Hutus and Tutsis cannot be called separate ethnic group, MAR noting that "ethnic labels" developed from class and instrumental usage of ethnicity by politicians. Therefore the South Westerners in Uganda have both groups as trans-border ethnic kin (MAR 2006). Congo DRC Tutsi fleeing to Rwanda increasingly.

Numerous sources corroborate suggestions made at the time, that the Ugandan government was at least indirectly supporting the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), that were responsible for much of the Tutsi-side militia fighting (Jones 2001:69; Otunnu 1999: 3-29). Museveni, the President of Uganda at this time, is alleged to have supported the RPF with logistical and military support from 1990 onwards, declaring the war in Rwanda "my war". The logic behind his support for the RPA was explained by the US ambassador to Uganda at the time, as "Uganda was free of the Rwandans, Museveni was free of his obligations to them, and the Rwanadans themselves now had the opportunity to forge their own destiny" (Collins 2014:68). As the fighting ended in 1994, following the ten year rule, we code an autonomy claim for their Tutsi Kin in Rwanda until 2004.

Museveni also supported the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo Zaire (AFDL) which was mainly formed from Congolese Tutsi, whose aim was to depose Zaire's long term leader Seko in 1996. Inflows of Hutu refugees from Rwanda following the genocide played a role in this reaction from Congolese Tutsi. However, it is unclear whether Museveni truly supported Tutsi in DRC, as the motives behind his support seem to have been selfish. In 1998, for example, attempted to oust the leader of the AFDL they had two years previously supported, Kabila (Global Security 2015).

There are fewer connections between the Tutsis and Hutus living in Burundi and Uganda, as Rwanda separates the two countries. Museveni has been involved in negotiating peace settlements in recent years, but no direct claims regarding Tutsi or Hutu claims have been made (Global Securityb 2015; Manirabusha 2015)

Tutsi-Banyamulenge in Congo DRC: 1996-2008, Autonomy Claim\ Tutsi in Rwanda: 1990-2004, Autonomy Claim \ *Sources*\ Collins, Barrie. 2014. "Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and its Consequences." Palgrave Macmillan. \ Global Security (a). 2015. "Congo Civil War/First Congo War 1996-1998". Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo-1.htm` \ Global Security (b). 2015. "Burundi Civil War." Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/burundi.htm` \ Jones, Bruce. 2001. "Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure." Boulder, Lynne Rienner Press.\ Maniranburusha, Clement. 2015. "Uganda President

Calls for Unity to end Burundi Crisis." Reuters Online. Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN0PP1VB20150715` \ Minorities at Risk. 2006. "Assessment for Hutus in Rwanda." Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=51702` \ Otunnu, Ogenga. 1999."Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Rwanda" in Howeard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire

Kenya 501

EGIP Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu 50101000

The four ethnic groups above were politically represented by KADU until 1964, when they merged with KANU (Osamba 2001: 87). We find no evidence for claims made on behalf of the Maasai in Tanzania. However, the "other southern nations" in Ethiopia include the Sidama group, who founded the Sidama Liberation Front in 1978, who were supported from the Somali government (SDM coding notes). Again, no reference is found to show the Kenyan government supporting them at this time.

1979-2002: No Claim

Sources Osamba, Joshia. 2001. "The dynamics of ethnopolitical conflict and violence in the Rift valley province of Kenya." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7 (4) 87-112.

Tanzania 510

EGIP Mainland Africans 51001000

We find no claims made on behalf of the above groups in Kenya and Malawi for the time periods designated. In terms of relations between these countries, the most notable event has been border disputes between Malawian and Tanzanian governments, which has been erupting across the political map between 1967 and 2012 (Reuters 2012).

1964-2013: No Claim

Sources

Reuters. 2012. "Tanzania asks for mediation over Lake Malawi dispute." Online. Accessed on 04.03.16 from `http://malawivoice.com/2012/09/03/jb-meets-opposition-leaders-on-tanzania-again`

Burundi 516

EGIP Hutu 51601000

Following independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi and Rwanda became separate countries, although they were ethnically and culturally similar. Violence between the Hutus and Tutsis took place in Burundi too, although the events in Rwanda gained more press attention: Refugees fled from Burundi to Rwanda in 1993, due to large scale violence, for example (UNHCR 2015). However there is no clear evidence that the Burundi government supported Hutu in Rwanda over these dates. This could be due to non-ethnic style of politics President Pierre Nkurunziza, a former Hutu military leader, is trying to emulate (BBC 2015). President since 2005, he has a Tutsi mother and Hutu father, and has remained in post for three terms.

Regarding Uganda, as noted above, the Ugandan president did offer help to Burundi in the recent civil war but it seems that no claims of a geopolitical nature were made.

No Claim

Sources

BBC. 2015. "Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunzizz in Profile." Hugo Williams. Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32490645` \ UNHCR. 2015. "Sub-regional Operations Profile - Central Africa and the Great Lakes." Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c056.html`

Burundi 516

EGIP Tutsi 51602000

Tutsi are a minority in Burundi, yet they have held strong positions up to 2006, and the relations between them and the Hutu majority, as with neighbouring Rwanda, play a divisive role in politics. Many Tutsis fled to safety in Burundi during the Rwandan genocide. However, following the assassination of the first democratically elected president, a Hutu Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993, retributive attacks on Tutsi civilians sparked civil war that lasted until 2003 and claimed 300,000 lives (AlJazeera 2015). With low living conditions and near state-collapse, the absence of support given or claims made on the behalf of ethnic kin in Congo, Uganda and Rwanda is explicable. Future coders should note the escalation of tensions once more after 2014 (Kliegman 2015). In recent months claims have been made against the Rwandan government that they support the overthrow of Burundi president Bujumbura (New Zimbabwe News 2016)

No Claim

Sources\ Al Jazeera. 2015. "As elections approach, Burundians fear a return to war." Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/23/as-elections-approach-burundian` `html` \ Kliegman, Aaron. 2015. "Ethnic Divisions are Central to Crisis in Burundi. Centre for Security Policy." Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/` `2015/04/28/ethnic-divisions-are-central-to-crisis-in-burundi` \ New Zimbabwe Press. 2016. "Burundi, DRC ask United nations to act against Rwanda." Accessed on 28.02.16 from `http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-27766-Burundi,+DRC+ask+UN+to+act+against+` `Rwanda/news.aspx`

Rwanda 517

EGIP Hutu 51701000

Leaders Kayibanda and Habyarimana set the groundwork for the genocide that begun in 1994, which mainly consisted of Hutus killing Tutsis and moderate Hutus. It is clear that Hutus in Burundi at this time demanded greater autonomy, full political participation and rights (Lemarchand 1996:21). Moreover, the 1972 killings of Hutus in Burundi by the Tutsi army have been described as a genocide, which would provide a good opportunity for Hutus abroad to have made claims on their behalf. We find no evidence to code this claim however. Although refugee flows between the two countries were consistent and devastating for those affected, the respective leaders were intent on dealing with relations within their countries. For example, Kayibanda reacted to violence and refugee flows between Tutsi and Hutu by replacing key cabinet members and consolidating his power in 1972 (Longman:85). Similarly, no claim is found for Uganda at this time.

1962-1994: No Claim *Sources*\ Lemarchand, Rene.1996. "Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide." Cambridge University Press.\ Longman, Timothy. 2010. "Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda." Cambridge University Press. \ Minorities at Risk. 2006. "Assessment for Hutus in Rwanda." Accessed on 04.04.2016 from `http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?` `groupId=51702`

Rwanda 517

EGIP Tutsi 51702000

The border between DRC and Rwanda has caused by-proxy and direct conflict between the two countries, although natural resources and refuge seeking in the forests have been cited as reasons for the tension, instead of ethnic tensions (Kinshasa 2012). Paul Kagame, the Tutsi leader who took power in 1994, allegedly supported Tutsi in the Kibvu region of DRC, specifically claiming to have helped the planning of the anti-Mobutu rebellion which led to the formation of the new state DRC. This supportive relationship ultimately breaks down, and relations between Kagame and Kabila sour. Therefore it is unclear whether the intervention of Rwandan government on behalf of the Tutsi rebels was ethnic in nature, or, as suggested by a UN report, motivated by mineral resources in DRC (UNHCR, reported in Africa Time 2014). To simplify, I code an autonomy claim from 1994 to 1998, but as soon as the relations sour over foreign intervention in 1998, coding ends. I find no evidence between 2008 and 2013 of autonomy claims.

Kagame was brought up in Uganda, and helped Museveni achieve power in 1987 through the National Resistance army (although it is disputed whether Museveni belongs to the Tutsi ethnic group at all) (Chothia 2010). However, no evidence was found for his government supporting the Banyarwanda in Uganda, although some sources state that many Banyarwanda feel Rwandan. Similarly with Burundi, no claims have been made (that we can find) on behalf of the Tutsi from Rwanda at this time (Bisika 2013). As cited above (see Burundi:Tutsi), in recent years the group have held either Dominant, Senior or (For a short period of time) Junior Partner, and tensions have arisen between the governments regardless of ethnic kinship.

Tutsi-Banyamulenge in Congo DRC: 1994-2008: Autonomy\ Banyarwanda in Uganda: 1994 - 2013: No Claim\ Tutsi in Burundi: 1994 - 2008: No Claim

Sources\ Africa Time. 2014.“Two Decades of strained relations between DRC and Rwanda.” Accessed on 04.03.16 from `http://en.africatime.com/articles/two-decades-strained-relations-between` Bisika, Asuman. 2013. “There is a “Banyarwanda Question” in this region.” Accessed from the Daily Monitor online, on 04.03.16 from `http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/There-is-a--Banyarwanda-Question--in-this-region/-/689364/1982786/-/qs2igf/-/index.html` \ Chothia, Farouk. 2010.“Profile: Rwanda's President Paul Kagame.” BBC online. Accessed on 04.03.16 from urlhttp://www.bbc.com/news/10479882 \ Kinshaha, M.K. 2012. “Congo and Rwanda: Stop messing each other up.” The Economist Online. Accessed on 04.03.16 from `http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/07/congo-and-rwanda`

Djibouti 522

EGIP Isaas (Somali) 52201000

To assess the nature of the claims made on behalf of Isaa kin in Somali, Ethiopia and Kenya, the nature of Somalian nationalism has to also be explained. Numerous conflicts in Ethiopia, tensions between Kenya and Somalia and civil war in Somalia itself confused understanding of Somalian nationalism across this time period. Each country shall be considered now in turn.

Somalis in Ethiopia (Ogaden) are coded in the EPR dataset as discriminated or powerless throughout the time period. The Ogaden war (1977-78) was fought between the Somali government and the Ethiopian government over the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, also known as one of the "lost territories" of Somalian nationalism (Schraeder 2010:109). The Djiboutian president, Hassan Gouled, was a proponent of the yes campaign in the 1958 referendum for then-called "French Somaliland" to join with Somalia, and is cited as supporting the irredentist claims of Somali and the Ogaden in Ethiopia. Gouled was a Somali nationalist, it could be argued that there was a generalized claim of irredentism whilst he was in power (1977-1999) (Pecastaing 2013:300). Shehim and Searing argue that there was a general belief in pan-Somali nationalism across the Issa population at least until 1980, when the Ogaden war weakened the support for the pan-somali state and incited the government to preserve their newly independent state (1980:210). We code this claim until the outbreak of the Somalian civil war in 198-, which many authors correlate with the demise of pan-Somali belief.

It is difficult, within this context, to code any claims made by the Somalis in Somalia, as put by the EPR coding notes, no claims were made on ethnic group lines, instead lines emerged between "clan based armed factions". Therefore as a broadly homogenous society in ethnic terms, the Issa in Djibouti cannot have openly supported one clan over another with ease. As a failed or collapsed state from the early 1990s onwards, this coding difficulty only increases.

Regarding Kenya, the Somali group are very small (0.2% population) and have been discriminated or irrelevant throughout the time period. Discrimination against Kenyan Somalis, including requirements for them to carry two identity cards to prove citizenship from 1989, has been consistent. That being said, in previous coding, we argue that the irredentist claims of the Somalian minority in Kenya ended in 1967 (MAR 2009). It seems that no claims were made actively by Djibouti on behalf of Kenyan Somalis. However, the pan-Somali generalized irredentist claim holds also for this group.

Kenyan Somalis 1977-1998: Irredentism\ Somalian Somalis 1977-1998: Irredentism\ Ethopian Somalis 1977-1998: Irredentism \ *Sources*\ Minorities at Risk. 2009. "Assessment for the Somali in Kenya." Accessed on 07.03.16 from `http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.`

asp?groupId=50106 \ Pecastaing, Camille .2013. "Jihad in the Arabian Sea." Hoover Press. \ Schraeder, Peter J. 2003. "From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali Nationalism." From After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States, Lowell W. Barrington (eds.) University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.\ Shehim, Kassim and Searing, James .1980. "Djiboutiland and the Question of Afar Nationalism." African Affairs. Royal African Society. Vol.79 (315) 209-226.

Mozambique 541

EGIP Tsonga-Chopi 54104000

We find no evidence for explicit claims made on behalf of the Tsonga in South Africa in the time period above. The potential for governmental claims was present in two ways: Firstly, the relations between the government (FRELIMO) and the South African Apartheid government had been soured due to their outright support of the rebel group RENAMO, who were fighting FRELIMO in the civil war from 1977-1994(BBC 2015). Secondly, the Tsonga group had been allocated a homeland statues in South Africa, but a legislative assembly in this province (Ganzankulu) had made some demands for more autonomy within South Africa (US Congress, Masondo 2015). However, although FRELIMO was dominated by groups such as the Tsonga-Chopi, other groups were also involved, as the movement that began the party had predominantly been for independence from Portugal. Therefore, in order to maintain order and monopoly power, ethnic identity was reduced to a low level of salience (Enclyclopedia Brittanica).

However, for the Blacks in South Africa, Mozambique were thanked personally by Nelson Mandela after he was released from prison, for their support of ANC exiles when it was banned in South Africa. This continued for the duration of the civil war(MCSA 2015). For this reason, we code and autonomy claim for the period 1975-1993.

Tsonga in South Africa 1975-2013: No Claim\ Blacks in South Africa 1975-1993: Autonomy

Sources\ BBC. 2015. "Mozambique Profile: Timeline." Accessed online on 04.03.2016 from`http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13890720` \ Encyclopedia Britannica. 2014. "Frelimo: Political Party, Mozambique." Accessed on 04.03.2016 from `http://www.britannica.com/topic/Frelimo`\ Masondo, David. 2015. "Tribalism, Language and the national question in post apartheid SA." Accessed on 04.03.2016 from `http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/tribalism-language-and-the-national-question-in-po` \ Media Club South Africa. 2015. "How our African neighbors helped end apartheid." Accessed online on 04.03.2016 from `http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/culture/4182-south-africa-s-neighbours-helped-to-end-aparthei` US Congress. 1999. Tsonga and Venda From the Country studies collection, US Department of

the Army. Accessed online on 04.03.2016 from `http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/48.htm`

Zimbabwe 552

EGIP Europeans 55202000

It could easily be assumed that the relationship between Afrikaners in South Africa and Europeans in Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia) was supportive. However tension between the two countries was strong due to historical differences between British and Afrikaner (Dutch) imperialism. In the time that the Europeans held a monopoly in Rhodesia, they claimed independence but were not recognized by the international community, including the Afrikaners in South Africa. The Bush war raged through the country from 1972 onwards, guerilla factions including the ZANU and ZAPU (Jakobsen 2012). Over the time period 1965-1979 no explicit demands made on behalf of Namibian whites and Botswana whites were made either, most likely explained by their rogue status in the international community and the preoccupation with the Bush War.

1965-1979: No Claim

Sources Immerman, Richard H and Goedde, Petra.2013. "The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War." Oxford University Press. \ Jakobsen, Tor. G. 2012. "The Fall of Rhodesia." Accessed online from Popular Social Science, on 04.03.2016 from `http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/10/19/the-fall-of-rhodesia/`

Malawi 553

EGIP Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao) 55301000

Between 1995 and 2013, the southerners in Malawi gained senior partner status as the voting system changed to represent three distinct regions. Starting with Mainland Africans in Tanzania (which until 2010 included Muslims), they were ominant n power status terms from 1993-2010, which somewhat excludes them from making geopolitical claims about autonomy. Further research also shows that they made no independence or irredentist claims at this time. The Mainland muslim group, who became a separate group in 2010, were not explicitly supported by the southerners in Malawi.

In 1995 the civil war between the FRELIMO and RENAMO movements in Mozambique was drawing to a close. The Makonde Yao were then junior partner, and had not been represented by

either side explicitly in the conflict. We find no evidence of geopolitical claims made, or support given from the Malawi government.

Similarly in Zambia, the Nianja speakers (Eastern) group were coded Senior Partner in the EPR, and we find no evidence of claims made or supported.

1995-2013 : No Claim

Sources EPR coding notes

Malawi 553

EGIP Central (Chewa) 55302000

Easterners in Zambia were senior partner status in the period 1964-1994. They made no claims for increased autonomy and the Central group in Malawi, the Chewa, did not support them for other geopolitical claims such as irredentism or independence.

No Claim

Sources \ EPR

South Africa 560

EGIP Afrikaners 56001000

As coded previously, although it could be assumed that the cleavage of "race" or white/black power brought the white or European groups across countries closer together across southern Africa, there was often more competition than similarity. For example, Botswana was considered less extreme in its racism than South Africa, and gave refuge to ANC members under apartheid (US Congress 1999). Botswana signed the international condemnation of apartheid.

Zimbabwean relations were similar throughout apartheid: Support for the ANC was given in both military and monetary terms (US Congress 1999)

Relations between Afrikaners and whites in Namibia were also strained somewhat by the recent geurilla war which resulted in the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibian territory, which ended in 1988. No evidence can be found pointing to explicit geopolitical support from the Afrikaners to the Whites. Moreover, although "Whites" , "Europeans" and Afrikaners may be linked together as TEK, the differences across colonies and countries historically epitomize the

strain on coding southern African states.

1948-1993: No Claim

Sources US Congress. 1999. "South Africa: Foreign Relations ". From the Country studies collection, US Department of the Army. Accessed online on 07.03.16 from `http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/83.htm` % %