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Putting Shakertown Back Together: Critical Theory in Archaeology

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I. THE QUEST FOR RELEVANCE

"Contemporary archaeology," says Kohl in his recent state-of-the-art review, "is nothing if not tortuously self-conscious" (1981:108), yet, as he observes, this self-consciousness has been curiously limited. While, in an archaeology context, self-consciousness led to a "vehement advocacy" of positivist methods for realizing objective, validated knowledge of other (past) cultures, other social sciences were led, by similar self-criticism, to "question[ing] the possibility of impartial, value-free social science research" (Kohl 1981:93).

The reason for this discrepancy has to do, I suggest, with the fact that archaeologists were motivated to reassess and overhaul their discipline by a deep concern to make it more "relevant." It was recognized that, so long as research remained descriptive, it would yield only curiosities and relics while, if a method could be devised for reliably interpreting the data as evidence of the cultural past, it might be in a position to provide information of quite broad and even pragmatic value. Thus, the New Archaeologists promoted positivism as a methodology capable of progressively eliminating error and, in this, of assuring approximation to an ideal of objective and possibly useful truth in knowledge claims about the past. By contrast to this, the self-consciousness of sociology and social anthropology referred to by Kohl did not arise so much from a perceived need to make research relevant as from a concern to take stock of the social and political interests that it was already serving, deliberately or inadvertently. Kohl notes with a touch of irony that, while archaeologists were refining their methodology so that it would yield information relevant to "explaining the past and possibly directing future social change" (1981:92), social anthropologists were "acknowledging their discipline's unsavory relationship to colonialism" (1981:92) and its role in transforming formerly isolated, noncapitalist and nonindustrial societies. They were also beginning to acknowledge what Handsman (1981a) has

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described as a state of "twinship," a deep epistemological dilemma endemic to the whole social anthropology enterprise of understanding other cultures. Such understanding depends on the possibility of rendering these cultures intelligible *to us* and this, it was realized, inevitably involves some degree of distortion, specifically, distortion that obscures crucial differences between our culture and "theirs." Taken together, these two forms of self-consciousness constitute a growing awareness that the whole enterprise of systematically investigating other cultures is *itself* a culturally specific, social enterprise, one that is always rooted in and shaped by the specific interests and belief structures that constitute the context of the researcher. It is this sort of self-consciousness that Handsman and Kohl find lacking in archaeology.

As their own comments indicate, however, concerns of this sort are rapidly taking center stage in the discipline. Certainly, there is widely expressed concern with the "accountability" of archaeology, as a sort of academic "corporate citizen," to its nonacademic clients and to the communities whose cultural resources are the object of its attention (see papers included in "People and the Professional," Part 5, of Francis and Poplin 1982). And, there is increasing awareness of the influence that social or political factors may have on its practice and its products; this is seen in a concern with the effects of selective recruiting and of the internal social structure of the research community on the sort of research projects and interpretive claims that gain currency in the discipline (Kelley and Hanen n.d.; Gero et al. 1983; DeBoer 1982). For the most part, however, these counterparts to the self-consciousness of social anthropologists constitute fragmentary insights, not generally unified by any comprehensive recognition of the social nature of the discipline itself.

There remains then, at least the possibility of a deeper and more broadly encompassing form of critical self-consciousness and it is this that I would like to consider here, particularly as it has begun to appear in Handsman's work (cited above) and in that of Leone and a few associated historical archaeologists who have been influenced by "critical theory," the German tradition in Neo-Marxist social thought famous for its penetrating critique of what they call the "objectivist delusions" of positivist social science.[1,*] Let me first briefly describe what I take to be the core insights that they draw from critical theory. This will provide the framework for discussing a fundamental epistemological problem about the possibility of acquiring any knowledge of the past that this perspective raises for archaeology and for examining the sort of research program that Leone and Handsman advocate in solution of it.

* See Notes section at end of paper for all footnotes.

II. CRITICAL THEORY: THE CRITIQUE OF OBJECTIVISM

The driving concern behind critical theory has been to recover and build on Marx's insight that knowledge and knowledge-producing enterprises are grounded in "fundamental characteristics of the human species," in particular, for Marx, in the socially based productive activity (labor) that serves the species' fundamental interest in survival (Keat and Urrey 1975:222). In this, critical theorists are primarily concerned to expose and refute the "objectivist" pretensions of positivist social science embodied in the positivist "doctrine of value freedom." As it is formulated and defended by Popper, who is identified by the critical theorists as its chief exponent, this doctrine amounts to the claim that our understanding of social and natural reality will approximate to an ideal of objective truth if the research community as a whole adopts a persistently critical attitude to knowledge claims, treating them as conjectures to be systematically tested and accepting them only tentatively, pending further, potentially falsifying, tests. Objectivity thus depends not on the attitude, the neutrality or clear-sightedness, of individuals but on this *community* tradition of rational, empirical criticism which, it is argued, assures that factual truth will emerge because it is a process that progressively eliminates error, whatever value biases or preconceptions particular researchers bring to their investigations. The critical theorists' objection to this view of the scientific enterprise is summed up by Habermas in this way:

> In all sciences, routines have been developed that guard against the subjectivity of opinion and a new discipline, the sociology of knowledge, has emerged to counter the uncontrolled influence of interests on a deeper level, which derive less from the individual than from the objective situation of social groups. But this accounts for only one side of the problem. Because science presumes that it must secure the objectivity of its statements against the pressure and seduction of *particular* interests, it deludes itself about the fundamental interests to which it owes not only its impetus but the conditions of possible objectivity themselves. (1971:311)

Habermas ultimately argues that both the "reality" a discipline presumes to investigate, and the routines it develops to eliminate subjective bias in its understanding of this reality, are a function of fundamental "knowledge-constitutive" interests that the discipline serves, like the fundamental interest in survival and efficient production mentioned above.

In elaborating this thesis, Habermas's concern is to broaden Marx's original, narrow conception of knowledge-constitutive interests to include, not only a survival-based interest in knowledge that will facilitate productive, instrumental action in the world, but also what he calls a

practical interest in developing the kind of common knowledge of reality that will promote consensus in the human community and facilitate efficient social organization (this sort of interest is said to arise from the communicative, interactive aspects of human life), and also an emancipatory interest in escaping the "quasi-causal" constraints that existing social forms are said to impose on the individual. This last is understood to foster a search for reflective self-knowledge and knowledge of the *actual* conditions of existence that underlie the distorted appearances perpetrated by knowledge systems build up in the service of unreflective technical and practical interests. Thus, "critical," emancipatory knowledge is understood to supercede the first two forms of knowledge; it embodies the human capacity to reflect on and actively transform the manner in which the fundamental interests in survival and social organization are met.

The first, technological interest yields the empirical, analytic disciplines whose central aim is to provide reliable knowledge of *what* happens (or may be expected to happen) in the nature of social world. Given this mandate, they take the subject reality to consist just of observable, manipulable phenomena (i.e., phenomena amenable to control) and they make intersubjective empirical verification the epistemic standard that determines what knowledge claims may or should be accepted as "true" of these objects (i.e., as eminently applicable, deployable knowledge). By contrast, practical interests give rise to the various "hermeneutic–historical" disciplines whose primary objects of investigation are the intersubjective meanings that constitute the ground for what Habermas describes as "possible action-orienting mutual understanding" (1971:310). They undertake to promote consensus in such understanding through interpretive explication, subject to "interpretive" standards of validity (plausibility and coherence). What these two forms of knowledge or inquiry have in common is that in both, the role of knowledge constitutive interests is systematically overlooked so that they serve, ultimately, to enhance established modes of production and to reinforce the supporting social order. As Smart puts it, they simply "replace common-sense understandings with scientistic descriptions which better serve the purpose of the legitimation and rationalization of the given social order" (1976:174).

What distinguishes critical theory and other disciplines predicated on an interest in emancipation from these first two forms of inquiry is that they make it their business to:

> . . . reveal the role of [scientific, human] interpretation and action in reaffirming and modifying the categories [of objective understanding in terms of which we comprehend and thus act in the world] in order that human beings may realize the

> historical relativity of the alienated and estranged world in which they exist. (Smart 1976:162)

The emancipatory disciplines take subjectivity as a subject for investigation in its own right; their object is to understand the appearances and forms of life that uncritical disciplines reinforce by representing them as "objective facts." Given that this constitutes a sustained critique of objectivism, it would seem that knowledge claims can only be judged pragmatically, in terms of their effectiveness in promoting an interest in emancipation.

These distinctive features of critical theory emerge most clearly in the famous debate between Popper and Adorno in which Adorno objects that Popper's radical segregation of value judgements leaves science a purely cognitive enterprise, one preoccupied with intellectual gap filling and the elimination of inconsistencies in our knowledge systems. This, he argues, completely overlooks the extent to which the contradications exposed by rational, empirical criticism are themselves a product of interest-constituted modes of apprehending reality and reflect contradictions inherent in this reality. Given thus, they cannot be treated simply as "logical contradictions which can be corrected through more refined definitions"; that is to say, "criticism cannot be confined to the reformulation of contradictory statements [within the cognitive realm]" (1976:113) as Popper recommends. It must take the form of social criticism and social action which acknowledges that social research is both constitutive of and constituted by its subject reality.

What emerges, then, is that critical theory is "critical" in two senses. First, it involves critical reflection on the knowledge-producing enterprise itself. This encompasses the two forms of self-consciousness identified earlier with social anthropology: self-consciousness about the extent to which knowledge claims are conditioned by their social context and serve interests and beliefs that comprise this context. Second, where this self-consciousness reveals the form of a dominant ideology and social order as mediated by the scientific production of knowledge, it provides a basis for reflective understanding and criticism of the social context of research; it takes the form of prospective social criticism and action.

III. CRITICAL THEORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY: REFLECTIVE CRITICISM

Both these forms of critical awareness are advocated by Leone and Handsman in their appropriation of critical theory as an orienting framework for archaeological research.[2] In connection with the first form of "criticism," they have been concerned to draw attention to the fact that,

despite an entrenched preoccupation with accuracy, contemporary archaeology typically reconstructs the cultural past in the image of contemporary, familiar forms of life in a way that both embodies and serves dominant social, political interests. Handsman, for example, shows that this can be the case even with straightforwardly empirical reconstructions of historical settlement patterns (1980c, 1981b). New England historians had long and, he claims, wrongly presumed early settlement in the area to have been nucleated on the model of modern settlement patterns. This error arose and persisted because it was also presumed that premodern settlement was generated by the same social and economic factors as are responsible for modern day (nucleated) settlement, namely, by the actions of individuals who function as autonomous, economically motivated agents in acquiring and disposing of land. In fact, Handsman argues, premodern settlement patterns reflect a set of structuring principles that derive from a diffused, all-encompassing kinship system and thus create quite a different context and rationale for action regarding land than that which governs modern-day contractual exchanges. Handsman's "critical" conclusion is, more generally, that the distinctive features of the past will necessarily be obscured insofar as it is unreflectively reconstructed in terms of conceptual categories drawn from the present especially where these concern basic and culture-specific structural relations among people, like economic and kin relations, that determine the organization of their lives.

Leone makes essentially the same point about the cultural relativity of archaeological reconstructions but in analysis of how outdoor museums present the past to the public (1980, 1981a, 1981c, 1983). These reconstructions of the past are, he argues, a modern day "ideo-technic" artifact (1981a:305); through them, existing social forms are interpreted and legitimated as the "natural," inevitable outgrowth of a past which is, in the process, denied any independent reality as a source of contrast with and critical knowledge of the present. In this, museum reconstructions not only misrepresent the past, as was the case with the historical reconstructions discussed by Handsman, but, in doing this, they directly serve the interests of the present; they are a medium for the self-definition and self-legitimation of those who create and view them.

Given this general understanding of the nature and function of outdoor museums, the reenactment of Catholic:Protestant tensions at reconstructed St. Mary's City (Leone 1980) is seen to provide, through subtle but pervasive distortion of the actual past, a forum for acting out tensions (economic, religious, and political) inherent in the present community. The museum, that is, serves as a kind of ritual dream context in which unresolvable contradictions in the present are defined historically and symbolically resolved. The reconstruction of Shakertown at Pleasant Hill

(Leone 1981a) likewise serves, through much more pervasive distortion, to neutralize the critical import of what was once a social experiment dedicated to *actually* resolving, or escaping, the repressive conditions of then emergent industrial capitalism. This is achieved, Leone argues, by systematically fragmenting Shaker culture and by presenting it in terms that render it intelligible and acceptable to us as "efficient, profitable, logical and ingenious" (1981a:305) and, thus, as successfully predicated on our own highly valued ideals of economic rationality: as a culture "rising from function, behavior from efficiency, and thought from material necessity" (1981a:305). While this represents a "sort of narrow accuracy" in understanding Shaker life, it also obscures and ultimately trivializes those of its aspects that deviate from our own and from our naturalizing vision of the past. Communal living and ownership of property, ecstatic religious rites, and community-wide celibacy are represented as exotic curiosities distinctive of a way of life that ultimately disappeared; indeed, they are treated as a partial explanation for its failure. This, Leone argues, completely obscures the significance of the Shaker form of life as a concerted effort to "be humane industrialists" (1981a:308), to realize a "radical realignment of sexuality, work, family, and thought" (1981a:308), in what amounted to a profoundly critical *living* commentary on, and exploration of alternatives to, then dominant forms of industrial capitalism. Shaker culture is thus made to serve, he says, as a "secondary rationalization of our own" (1981a:305 in reference to Sahlins 1976:54); it stands as a large-scale object lesson warning against certain sorts of dissent or departure from the norms that structure life in the modern, industrial capitalist world.

As such, the whole reconstruction can be seen, on Leone's analysis, to serve what Habermas has identified as a "practical interest" in ensuring that the individuals articulated in this social formation share an underlying system of beliefs—an understanding of "how society ought to work"—that will, as Leone puts it (drawing here on Althusser), "permit [them] to operate smoothly in the everyday world" (1981b:10). Like Habermas, he treats not only the fundamental reality-defining concepts but also the criteria of adequacy structuring research as a function of this basic knowledge-constitutive interest. The whole preoccupation with accuracy in detail is, itself, he says, "a culture-specific effort to resolve the paradox between an unalterable past and a past thought essential for our self-definition" (1981b:12).

IV. CRITICAL THEORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY: SOCIAL CRITICISM

With these analyses, Leone and Handsman adopt the sort of critical self-consciousness that Handsman and Kohl, among others, have found

lacking in archaeology. A difficulty very quickly arises, however, when they begin to make the shift from this sort of double-edged self-consciousness, criticism in the first sense, to the formulation of constructive proposals for a program of research informed by what amounts to an emancipatory interest. Both argue that once archaeology has become conscious that its reconstructions of the past are interest relative, it should undertake to help "modern Americans reappropriate their past consciously" (Handsman and Leone, personal communication). It should, that is, provide a basis for systematic criticism of our current myths about the past, exposing the distortions inherent in them and, where this reveals something of our own "forms of consciousness," generating commentary on the contemporary social conditions that give rise to them. This amounts to an advocacy of criticism in the second critical theory sense—prospective social criticism—and it is expressed, in practical terms, in the recommendation that archaeologists should be particularly concerned to retrieve the past that is generally lost in unreflective reconstruction, namely the past as different from the present, as exemplifying alternatives to it, and as revealing the contingencies of its formation. The difficulty is, however, that this presupposes the possibility of securing relatively "objective," value-free knowledge of the past that supercedes all other (distorted, interest-relative) forms of historical understanding and provides a measure of their accuracy. It was precisely this ambition that the first, reflective form of criticism ruled out as vain pretension arising from positivistic blindness to the "interest-constituted" nature of all knowledge.

This constitutes the standard dilemma that, once a radical critique of objectivism is accepted, it leaves no grounds for preferring any one interpretation to its alternatives; on its own account, if it is consistent, there is no recourse but to embrace a radical subjectivism whereby all interpretations are equally legitimate relative to their own presuppositions or to the interests that they serve. Thus, it is not clear that a self-conscious archaeology—one that recognizes the influence of culture-specific views and interests on its reconstructions—has any option but to accept that "the past can be known only as a function of the present" (Handsman 1980d:2) and admit that, in the end, archaeologists must simply "allow the past to be the image of the present it must" (Leone 1981b:13). For the most part, however, Leone and Handsman resist this sort of relativism, insisting that their observations about the ideological nature of much archaeological reconstruction are not meant to "impose skepticism in any absolute sense on our knowledge of the past" (Handsman and Leone, personal communication). Their intention is, rather, to stimulate a more critical approach to reconstruction which fosters consciousness that the past, and museum presentations of it, "have

more to say to the present than is generally understood" (Handsman and Leone, personal communication)[3]. And, in fact, their own research clearly supports this optimism, providing a concrete indication of how a self-conscious archaeology might proceed so as to yield these sorts of constructive and prospectively critical insights.

What is most striking about the case studies mentioned, in this connection, is that in them Leone and Handsman typically build a case for rejecting or revising entrenched views of the past as distorted ideological constructs by exploiting the very empirical–analytic methods and standards of validity that unreflective researchers would normally use to establish the "accuracy" of their reconstructions. Handsman, for example, describes the process of identifying and correcting errors in established models of historic settlement patterns as one of "asking new questions," and "reworking old data in new patterns" such that, "through incredibly detailed studies of a variety of archival data," it gradually became clear that early settlement had not been nucleated as generally assumed (1981b:2). This was, in effect, a process of systematically testing the entrenched and generally unquestioned hypothesis that modern nucleated settlements represent a pattern that originated in the premodern period against the available empirical records and, through this, of unearthing and testing underlying assumptions about the structuring principles responsible for this settlement pattern.

In a similar vein, Leone (1981a) criticizes the Shakertown reconstruction from the vantage point of having first noted a curious gap in the account it gave of Shaker life, namely, that while Shaker products and innovations dominate the exhibits as evidence of efficiency and productivity, there is no systematic reconstruction of the industrial system responsible for them. It was in the course of filling this gap—in the course of reconstructing the Shakers' unique blend of agrarian and industrial production—that it became apparent that Shaker society was not, in fact, organized by structuring principles and technological interests like our own. Again, where this led to the identification and rejection of interpretive principles underlying an incomplete reconstruction (i.e., assumptions about the similarity between Shaker and more mainstream forms of industrialism), Leone's critical argument turns on a skillful use of evidence to demonstrate that the reconstruction is factually inadequate and that its implicit presuppositions about Shaker life must be reconsidered. In both cases, an empirical, rational demonstration of error in established views of the past provides the basis for identifying mistaken interpretive assumptions about the past which, in turn, exposes the contradictions inherent in contemporary society that are responsible for (and are embodied in) its persistently distorted appropriation of the past.

The methodological insight that underlies this procedure seems to be

that our subjectivity is only partial; not all components of our understanding are so profoundly interest constituted as to preclude the possibility of exposing error that reflects these interests. In particular, Leone and Handsman's practice suggests that there remains the possibility, at least, of using the standard methods for evaluating knowledge claims to assess those underlying category assumptions that might be suspected of embodying, most directly, the interests and associated world view responsible for the distortions in particular knowledge claims that critical reflection in the first sense brings to light. The methodological directive governing a "critical" emancipatory archaeology that emerges here is, then, that researchers should continually expand the range of assumptions or knowledge claims that they subject to rational, empirical evaluation; they should test not just the details of reconstruction but also the underlying interpretive principles framing these reconstructions.

This, it should be noted, represents a significant departure from strict critical theory of the sort developed by Habermas and his associates but it is not without precedent. The insight that much reconstruction is interest biased is not taken, by Leone and Handsman, to imply that the standard methods for establishing knowledge claims in archaeology are so irrevocably interest relative that they necessarily yield a distorted understanding of the world as a strict critical theorist might suggest. Rather, they suggest, by example if not always by explicit directive, that these methods have not been as widely or systematically applied as might be appropriate. Interests are thus treated as constitutive of knowledge in the more limited sense that they lead to a selective exemption from critical examination of those fundamental and particular value-charged assumptions about social, cultural reality that comprise the framework for contemporary life and its scientific projects of inquiry. As a qualification of Habermas' more radical thesis about knowledge-constitutive interests, this is quite similar to a position developed by Keat in *The Politics of Social Theory* (1981) in which he argues that the human capacity for reflective self-criticism makes it possible to use the "routines" or methods developed in the empirical–analytic and historical–hermeneutic sciences for the emancipatory purpose of identifying and correcting errors arising from the interest-laden presuppositions we bring to an investigation. The recognition that interests may distort knowledge claims simply serves, on this account, to direct attention to a new source of error that the scientific research process should undertake to control; it is not taken to imply that knowledge claims are so irrevocably tied to interests that they are impervious to rational, empirical methods of criticism. Thus, it is understood that commitment to an emancipatory interest in research does not imply that theory choice and theory evaluation must be treated as a purely pragmatic, explicitly ideological matter or that it requires the

development of some new, unique methodology (e.g. one derived from psychoanalysis as recommended by Habermas).

Transposed to an archaeological context this amounts to a recommendation that the New Archaeology revolution should simply be extended, not abandoned. The practice of systematically testing knowledge claims about the past advocated by the New Archaeologists should be used, self-consciously, to expose and test the underlying category assumptions that structure un-self-critical appropriation of the past. It is extremely important, however, to note that these practices do not, and cannot conform neatly to the positivist hypothetic-deductive (H-D) model in terms of which they were originally characterized by New Archaeologists. They are structured, not by the deductive logic of subsumption and instantiation, but, most often, by a closely controlled inductive logic of analogy, the reasoning process by which information is systematically imported from better known contexts to reconstruct inaccessible features of lesser known (i.e., past) contexts. (I have argued this at length elsewhere, Wylie 1982, 1985.)

The basis of such interpretive arguments is a series of assumptions, or premises, about the significance of similarities that are known to hold between the well-known source and enigmatic subject; these suggest that further similarities of specific sorts may be expected to hold, as postulated in an interpretive or explanation conclusion. What critical self-consciousness about the interest-constituted nature of knowledge reveals is the fact that information is being imported to archaeological contexts in this way; Leone's analysis turns on the observation that "we know artifacts never speak for themselves: we have to give them meaning" (1981b:12). Where the process of giving artifacts meaning inevitably depends analogically on our understanding of the present (e.g., on our knowledge of familiar forms of production, social orgainzation, and kinship or economic relations), it follows that, as he urges, it is essential for archaeologists to "raise hidden assumptions to the surface" (1981b:14). At a first level of critical self-consciousness it is essential, that is, for archaeologists to identify underlying assumptions about the significance of similarities between their chosen source(s) and the archaeological subject—assumptions about why these similarities hold—that justify the transposition of information from present to past in reconstructing the past, particularly where these assumptions are implicit in the very descriptive and analytical categories that are used to systematize archaeological data. What Leone and Handsman argue is, in effect, that these submerged premises, and not just the interpretive conclusions they support, should be made the object of rational, empirical investigation. Their further point is that insofar as archaeology is practiced with this degree of self-consciousness, it can become a basis for criticism in the second

critical theory sense, critical commentary on the social, ideological forms that have informed the reconstruction of "a past thought essential for our self-definition" (Leone 1981b:12).

V. CONCLUSION

Whether or not you share the ambition of making archaeology critical in this second sense and of pressing it into the service of emancipatory interests, the need that Leone and Handsman demonstrate for critical self-consciousness about the nature of the research enterprise is clearly inescapable. The possibility of making any use of the archaeological record as a source of evidence and not just relics depends fundamentally on an awareness of the constituted nature of knowledge claims and on an active concern, inspired by this awareness, to more carefully control the information drawn from the present in reconstruction of the past. Critical self-consciousness in the first sense is then a necessary extension of the original New Archaeology revolution if its primary anthropological, explanatory goals are to be realized.

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NOTES

[1] This more comprehensive critique of positivism has been developed by archaeological structuralists and Marxist structuralists; Miller and Tilley 1984; Hodder 1982; and it is discussed by Miller 1982; Renfrew 1982; and Leone 1982. Although these are important, indeed foundational contributions to "critical" archaeology, I want to concentrate here on Leone and Handsman's work because they ground their theoretical, programmatic claims in empirical analyses of interest-relative bias and because they are perhaps uniquely straightforward and pragmatic in their treatment of the epistemological difficulties associated with a thorough-going critical self-consciousness.

[2] Leone and Handsman typically refer to their position as one influenced by "critical theory" but they also regularly cite structuralist–Marxists. Leone draws heavily on Althusser's theory of ideology, for example, when he develops the insight that much museum presentation of the past is interest constituted and interest serving. On this account, Habermas' "practical" interests are not set apart from "technical" interests; rather, they are treated as subsidiary to them. That is, museums, like other educational institutions, are understood to be one arm of an amorphous "ideological state apparatus" that supports and reinforces the repressive structures by which the state controls the population and reproduces the social conditions essential for continued production in the established mode.

Museums serve, in particular, to ensure the reproduction and maintenance of a labor force that functions smoothly within the established social and economic system (Althusser 1971:156). Where educational institutions, Althusser's main interest, provide a primary socialization, the outdoor museums studied by Leone and Handsman effectively reinforce this training. What Leone draws from structural-Marxism is, then, theoretical corroboration of the critical theory insight that the reproduction of ideological forms serves "practical interests" which are, in turn, directly tied to the demands of dominant technological interests.

[3] In collaboration with Parker Potter, Mark Leone has recently developed an analysis of how museum presentations may be formulated and used to bring visitors to an awareness of the constructed nature of the past (Leone and Potter 1985). The proposals that they make explicit here are embodied in a series of guidebooks to historic architecture and archaeological research at Annapolis (Leone and Potter 1984) which deal directly with the way perceptions of the past have changed over time and reflect shifting contemporary interests in the past.

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