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Lies, Labor, and Luck

Comparing Lying in Real-Effort and Luck Tasks

Simon D. Halliday · Oumayma Koulouh ·

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Abstract We study the differences in lying behavior between real-effort and luck-based tasks. While many papers use luck-based tasks to study deception, recent research shows that individuals may behave differently when the payoffs result from luck or from real effort. We conduct an experiment (n = 114) with a 2 by 2 factorial design in which we observe lying behavior at the individual level. We compare lying in luck-based and real-effort tasks and find that the proportion of people is constant across the tasks. We also compare two real-effort tasks, one of which contains a greater luck component and find no differences across the two tasks. **JEL Classification:** C91, D01, D82, H26

Keywords Deception · Lying · Luck · Real Effort ·

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1 Introduction

Many economic activities involve sharing private information in contexts where the stakes are significant. Whether it's an employee reporting the hours worked on a project, a real estate broker sharing their best advice with clients, or an individual filling out their insurance claims, people sometimes find it in their best interest to lie about private information they observe. For example, Mazar and Ariely (2006) argue that deception leads to a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars for the US economy every year, through loss of tax revenues and wages for example. Understanding the drivers of dishonesty therefore remains an important topic of study.

Recent work suggests that a person's choice to behave deceptively is sensitive to the nature of the task (Kajackaite 2018). The bulk of the economics experiments on deception focuses on luck-based tasks, such as a die roll or a coin toss, in which the outcome depends solely on luck. If participants behave differently depending on the source of income, then behavior in luck-task experiments might not characterize behavior in real life because most tasks in real-life contain a real-effort component. In the context of deception, we expect to have a higher proportion (extensive margin) and magnitude of lies (intensive margin) in luck-based tasks than in real-effort tasks. This is due primarly to the higher mutability of luck tasks (Kahneman and Miller 1986).[1]

We study the effect of task type on deceptive behavior comparing luck tasks and real effort tasks. We use two real-effort tasks: a mathematically-based matrix task and a spelling-error detection task inspired by existing experimental designs (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002). In the United States, many students perceive mathematical ability to be a result of innate ability rather than improvement through effort (Uttal 1997; Devlin 2000), whereas effort is considered more important than ability in achieving good spelling (Rankin, Bruning, and Timme 1994). Subjects may therefore perceive the matrix task as relatively more luck-based than the spelling error task.

Our contribution is two-fold. First, we extend the work of Kajackaite (2018) who finds that deceptive behavior in a luck-based task is different than behavior in a real-effort task. Instead of inferring lying from results of a control treatment, we detect lying at the individual level using a method adapted from Chao and Larkin (2017). Second, we compare lying in real-effort and luck tasks, as well as differences between two different real-effort tasks. It is important to investigate whether lying behavior changes within real-effort tasks depending on whether they include a perceived luck component independent of choices in purely luck-based tasks.

Each luck task had a distribution of numbers mirroring that of the number of true outcomes in the corresponding real-effort task. For the luck tasks,

[1] Researchers argue that it is much easier to imagine a different outcome when the outcome is determined by luck compared to when it's determined by real-effort. Various papers have shown that higher mutability leads to more lying (Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer 2012; Shalvi et al. 2015).

participants were asked to select one piece of paper from a stack of papers and report the number they picked. Participants get paid a dollar for the value of the number they report in $[1, 20]$, which is a formulation that Kajackaite (2018) uses to correspond roughly to the format of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).

Our experiment data shows statistically significant incidence of lying in the spelling error task, and no statistically significant incidence of lying in the other three tasks. Comparing lying in real-effort and luck tasks, the average lies are at least twice as large in the luck tasks. Unlike the results from Kajackaite (2018), this difference is not statistically significant. We also find no significant difference between the two real-effort tasks.

While research focused on the impact of non-task related variables, little research has compared how the propensity to lie changes across different tasks. To our knowledge, only Kajackaite (2018) compares lying in luck and real-effort tasks. Kajackaite (2018) detects lying by comparing the distribution of reported outcomes to outcomes from a control group. Our design, which is based on Chao and Larkin (2017), allows us to detect lying at the individual level and therefore to identify both the intensive and extensive margins more precisely. We also extend the work on luck versus real-effort tasks by comparing differences in lying behavior within two real-effort tasks, one of which may be perceived to include a greater luck component.

While our experiments do not provide information about the subjective lying cost parameters in an individual's utility function, the experiments allow us to draw some conclusion on how the parameters would change depending on the nature of the task. The two hypotheses we are testing are the following: first, people incur a higher cost of lying in real-effort tasks compared luck effort tasks; second, people incur a higher cost of lying in real-effort tasks that contain a higher perceived luck component. Therefore, in the context of our experiment, we expect more lying to occur in the matrix test.

2 Experimental Design

Participants were asked to complete one of four tasks- two real-effort tasks and two based on luck. We call these tasks Real Effort I (matrix task), Real Effort II (spelling task), Luck 1 (distribution based on Real Effort 1), and Luck II (distribution based on Real Effort II). For Real Effort I and Real Effort II, subjects were given 5 minutes for the real-effort task. The first real-effort task (Real Effort I) is based on Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) where subjects solved mathematical matrices. Real Effort I represents the real-effort task with a higher perceived luck component as it involves a mathematics-related task (Uttal 1997). The second real-effort task (Real Effort II) involved detecting spelling errors, inspired by Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002). Examples of both tasks are included in the appendix. The spelling task used text generated from a post-modern text generator so that comprehension was irrelevant to spelling error detection.

R1	Number of Subjects	25
	% Female	48%
	Average age	19.80
	Average pay	10.68
	Average lie	0.24
L1	Number of Subjects	30
	% Female	59%
	Average age	19.87
	Average pay	12.93
	Average lie	0.47
R2	Number of Subjects	29
	% Female	47%
	Average age	20.10
	Average pay	13.34
	Average lie	0.31
L2	Number of Subjects	30
	% Female	70%
	Average age	19.69
	Average pay	15.20
	Average lie	0.83

Table 1 Summary of experimental conditions

The third task (Luck I) is a luck-based task, in which participants were given a stack of stapled papers with numbers between 1 and 20. The distribution of numbers mirrored that of the true number of solved matrices in Real Effort I. Participants were asked to select one piece of paper and remember the number it contained. The fourth task (Luck II) is similar to Luck I, but the distribution of numbers mirrored that of the number of true spelling errors in Real Effort II. All experiment materials are included in the Appendix.

Table 1 summarizes the experimental conditions of each treatment. One session was run for each treatment.

To detect lying, we use the methodology from Chao and Larkin (2017). The [Blinded for Submission] Experimental Economics Laboratory contains blocks of three seats so we numbered each adjacent seat and gave each block of seats a shared bin in which they disposed of all materials by the end of the experiment. For the real-effort tasks, we gave the three participants different colored pens. For the luck tasks, the stacks of paper were printed in three different colors. The contents of the bin allowed us to detect lying at the individual level at the end of the experiment by connecting the pen colors to the seat number. A participant's identity could not be connected to their seat number, so their behavior remained confidential.

3 Results

3.1 Description of the sample

For each treatment, we collect data about the participant's demographic data, true outcome, reported outcome, and relevant treatment. We define two variables to track lying behavior. The first is a binary variable measuring the extensive margin – whether participants lied or not. The second measures the intensive margin, that is, we measure the size of the lie by the difference between the reported outcome and the true outcome. Further, we classify lies into 2 categories. A subject *partially* lies when the reported outcome is greater than the true outcome but the reported outcome is less than 20, the maximum possible outcome. A subject *full extent* lies when the reported outcome is greater than the true outcome and the reported outcome is equal to 20. For each treatment, we compute the magnitude of lies as the difference between the reported outcome and the true outcome.

In the discussion below, we show support for the the following main results:

1. The only task in which there is statistically significant incidence of lying (on the extensive margin) is Luck II.
2. The incidence of lying is not statistically significantly different compared across treatments.

Figure 1 shows the average reported outcome by task and treatment. Figure 2 presents the average lie by treatment (intensive margin). Figure 3 shows the distribution of real and reported outcomes by treatment.



Figure 1. Average reported outcome by treatment and task

Note: Error bars are standard errors of the mean.



Figure 2. Average lie per treatment

Note: Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
Numbers in parentheses are incidence of lying as a proportion.



Figure 3. Distribution of actual and reported outcome by treatment

Note: The blue bars represent the reported outcomes and the red bars represent the true outcomes.

3.2 Lying across the four treatments

In the Real Effort I (RI) task, participants reported solving 10.68 matrices on average (SD=4.12). The average number of true solved matrices is 10.48 (SD=4.03). Testing for the presence of lying using the extensive margin binary variable, we find that lying is not significant (p=0.11, Fisher's exact test), with

4 participants (16%) lying. All lying in RI was partial lying with magnitudes of 1 or 3.

In the Real Effort II (RII) task, participants reported finding 13.34 errors on average (SD=3.98). The average number of true detected errors is 13.07[2] (SD=3.76). Testing for the presence of lying on the extensive margin, we find that there is statistically significant lying (p=0.023, Fisher's exact test), with 6 participants (20.7%) lying. All lying in RII was partial lying with magnitudes varying between 1 and 3.

In the Luck I (LI) task, participants reported an average of 12.93 (SD=4.57). The true average number is 12.47 (SD=4.38). Testing for the presence of lying on the extensive margin, we find that lying is not statistically significant (p=0.49, Fisher's exact test), with 2 participants (6.7%) lying. One participant reported a partial lie of size 5, and the other reported a full extent lie of size 9 (i.e. 20 - 11 = 9).

In the Luck II (LII) task, participants reported an average of 15.20 (SD=3.81). The true average observed number is 14.37 (SD=4.05). Testing for the presence of lying using the extensive margin binary variable, we find that lying isn't significant (p=0.24, Fisher's exact test), with 3 participants (10%) lying. 2 participants reported partial lies of sizes 7 and 10, and one reported a full extent lie of size 8.

3.3 Comparing lying in luck and real-effort treatments

Comparing luck and real-effort outcomes in Task I, the average lie in the luck treatment (0.47) is almost twice the average lie in the real-effort treatment (0.24). The difference is not statistically significant (p=0.34, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).

Similarly for Task II, the average lie in the luck treatment (0.83) is more than twice the average lie in the real-effort treatment (0.31). This difference is not statistically significant (p=0.37, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) due to the high standard deviations of the average lies of the luck and real-effort treatments (SD=2.57 and SD=0.71 respectively).

3.4 Comparing lying across the two real-effort tasks

As discussed above, 16% and 20.7% of participants lied in the Real effort I and Real effort II treatments respectively, with average lies of 0.24 and 0.31 respectively. Both the difference in the extensive margin (p=0.74, Fisher's exact test) and the difference in the intensive margin (p=1, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) are not statistically significant.

[2] The average number of solved matrices is lower than the average detected spelling mistakes unlike the pilot experiments in which the two averages were similar.

3.5 Comparing lying across the two luck tasks

Comparing the distribution of the numbers provided in the stack of stapled papers in Luck I and Luck II, we find that we have a higher distribution of numbers in LII compared to LI (p=0.008). However, the level of lying isn't statistically different in both the extensive margin (p=0.65, Fisher's exact test) and the intensive margin (p=0.66, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
This is consistent with the literature that finds that an increase in payoffs doesn't affect lying behavior (Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond 2016; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008).

3.6 Regression Results

We run four regressions to analyze further the extensive and intensive margins of lying. We report the results in Table 2. The explanatory variables are the same across the four models: the participant's age and the treatment in which they participated.[3]

The first two regressions estimate the probability of lying through an ordinary least squares (OLS, column 1) and probit model (coefficients in column 2 and marginal effects in column 3). Both regressions show that an increase in age decreases the probability of lying, and that the probability of lying is higher in the RII task, followed by RI, LII then LI. None of the treatment dummies in the two regressions are statistically significant, consistent with our analysis in the previous section.

The second two regressions estimate the size of lying through an OLS (column 4) and tobit model (column 5). The tobit model allows us to cater for left-censoring and right-censoring of the outcome variable at 0 and 20 respectively. The predictions over the lie over the four treatment differ across the two regressions with larger effects suggested by the Tobit regressions. The OLS model predicts that the size of the lie is the highest in LII, followed by LI, RII and RI while the Tobit model predicts that the size of the lie is the highest in RII, followed by LII, RI and LI. None of the coefficients in the two regressions are statistically significant, consistent with our analysis in the previous section.

4 Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, our experiment data shows significant lying in the real-effort spelling task, and no lying across the other 3 experimental tasks. Our results are close to those of Abeler, Becker, and Falk (2012) who found no evidence of lying in their luck experiment.

[3] We exclude gender from the regressions. Please see the appendix for results that include a dummy variable for male subjects as compared to female and non-binary subjects. The coefficient on the male dummy variable is not statistically significant.

Table 2 Regression estimates

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin	
	OLS	Probit	Probit MFX	OLS	Tobit
Age	−0.01	−0.07	−0.01	−0.09	−0.57
	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.70)
Treatment LII	0.03	0.21	0.04	0.35	1.93
	(0.09)	(0.47)	(0.11)	(0.44)	(3.20)
Treatment RI	0.09	0.51	0.12	−0.23	1.96
	(0.09)	(0.47)	(0.12)	(0.46)	(3.32)
Treatment RII	0.14	0.72	0.18	−0.13	3.37
	(0.09)	(0.44)	(0.12)	(0.44)	(3.22)
Constant	0.33	−0.09		2.29	1.23
	(0.41)	(2.03)		(2.05)	(13.82)
R^2	0.03			0.03	
Adj. R^2	-0.01			-0.01	
Log Likelihood		-42.61	-42.61		-77.62

Note: $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

The relatively low amount of lying makes it hard to detect differences over the treatments. While the average lies support the results from Kajackaite (2018), we find no significant differences between lying in real-effort and luck tasks. This emphasizes the dependence of lying preferences on the specific context of the experiments, even when the same experimental task is used. The difference between the results in Kajackaite (2018) and ours suggests a need for further research into comparing real-effort and luck tasks in different environments and experimental conditions. We find no significant difference between the two real-effort tasks, which contradicts our original hypothesis. Therefore, if there is more lying in real-effort tasks that contain a luck component as we had hypothesized, the effects are small enough to be overlooked in modeling behavior and designing policy.

Our experiments therefore show low incidence of lying, suggesting that people face an intrinsic cost of lying in low-stakes circumstances. Comparing lying behavior between real-effort and luck tasks, we find that the proportion of individuals choosing to lie remains constant. We also extend the comparison by using two real-effort tasks, one of which includes a higher luck component. Our results show no difference within real-effort tasks.

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Lies, Labor and Luck

Appendix A: Methods and Additional Regressions

Anonymized for Review

Abstract

JEL Classification: C91, D01, D82, H26

Keywords: Deception; Lying; Luck; Real Effort

1 Experimental procedure

1.1 Experiment tasks

Real Effort 1:

Participants were asked to complete one of four tasks- two real-effort tasks and two based on luck. The first real-effort task (Real Effort I) is based on Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008). Participants were given a sheet with twenty 4 by 3 matrices with each matrix containing 12 numbers. They were given 5 minutes to identify two numbers that add up to 10 for as many matrices as possible. Real Effort I represents the real-effort task with a higher luck component as it involves a mathematics-related task (Uttal 1997).

Real effort II:

The second real-effort task (Real Effort II) involved detecting spelling errors, inspired by Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002). Participants were given a text with 20 spelling errors and had 5 minutes to find as many errors as possible. The text used is realistic but meaningless and was generated using a postmodernism generator,[1] and therefore the task didn't test a participant's abilities to understand the meaning of the text per se, but did require them to

[1]The postmodernism generator is a system to generate random texts from recursive grammar. See, for example, http://www.elsewhere.org/journal/pomo/.

pay attention to the words themselves to detect spelling errors. In pilot experiments, we designed the error rate of Real Effort II to equalize the marginal return of cheating and have roughly equal average pays for both tasks. Real Effort II represents the real-effort task with little to no luck component as it involves spelling abilities.

The third task (Luck I) is a luck-based task, in which participants were given a stack of stapled papers with numbers between 1 and 20. The distribution of numbers mirrored that of the number of solved matrices in Real Effort I. Participants were asked to select one piece of paper and remember the number it contained. The fourth task (Luck II) is similar to Luck I, but the distribution of numbers mirrored that of the number of detected spelling errors in Real Effort II. All experiment materials are included in the Appendix.

1.2 Participants, materials & setup

The experimental sessions were run at the [Blinded for Review] Experimental Economics Laboratory. The subjects were students of [Blinded for Review] and were recruited using the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner 2015). 36 participants were recruited for each session, with an average number of 28.75 participants showing up. 56% of subjects were female and participated in one treatment only. The average length of each session was 60 minutes. Table 1 in the main paper summarizes the experimental conditions of each treatment.

1.3 Procedure

Upon arriving to the lab, participants were seated and asked to read and sign the consent form. They were then asked to read the instructions for the task they were assigned and given 5 minutes to complete their assigned tasks. In the case of the real-effort tasks, the participants were given answer sheets and asked to grade their work at the end of the allocated time. For the luck-based tasks, participants were asked to remember the number they saw on the piece of paper they picked. All participants then reported their performance on a pay slip which we collected. Upon finishing a questionnaire, the participants received their payment and left

the lab. At the end of all rounds of experiments, the participants will be debriefed about the experiment procedures and results.

2 Results

2.1 Description of the sample

For each treatment, we collect data about the participant's gender, true outcome, reported outcome, relevant treatment and age. We then define two variables to track lying behavior. The first is a binary variable measuring the extensive margin– whether participants lied or not. The second measures the intensive margin. That is, conditional on a subject having lied, we measure the size of the lie by the difference between the reported outcome and the true outcome. Further, we classify lies into 2 categories. We have a partial lying when the reported outcome is greater than the true outcome but the reported outcome is less than 20, the maximum possible outcome. We have full extent lying when the reported outcome is greater than the true outcome, but the reported outcome is equal to 20. For each treatment, we also create a vector that stores only stricly positive size of lies to allow for a comparison of magnitude of lies.

2.2 Gender differences

Many studies found more lying with male participants (Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013; Bucciol and Piovesan 2011). We compare lying behavior by gender across the four tasks to test the hypothesis that the propensity to lie is different across genders. We find no statistically significant difference between males and females (p=1, Fisher's exact test). The gender differences in each individual task are also not statistically significant (p=1, Fisher's exact test).

2.3 Regressions with Gender

To analyze the effect of various variables on both the extensive and intensive margins, we run the four regressions reported in Table 2 below. The explanatory variables are the same across the four models: participant's gender[2] , age and the treatment they participated in.

The first two regressions estimate the probability of lying through an ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit model. The coefficients are reported in Table 1, and the marginal effects of the probit regression are reported in Table 2. Both regressions show that an increase in age decreases the probability of lying, and that the probability of lying is higher in the RII task, followed by RI, LII then LI. The gender effects are different across the two models. The OLS regression predicts higher probability of lying for male participants while the probit regression predicts higher probability of lying for females participants. None of the coefficients in the two regressions are significant, consistent with our analysis in the previous section.

The second two regressions estimate the size of lying through an OLS and tobit model. The tobit model allows us to left-censor and right-censor the variable at 0 and 20 respectively. The coefficients of each regression are reported in Table 1. Both regressions show that an increase in age decreases the size of the lie, and that male participants lie less than women participants on average. The predictions over the lie over the four treatment differ across the two regressions. The OLS model predicts that the size of the lie is the highest in LII, followed by LI, RII and RI while the probit model predicts that the size of the lie is the highest in RII, followed by LII, RI and LI. None of the coefficients in the two regressions are significant, consistent with our analysis in the previous section.

[2]The effect of non-binary gender is not shown in the regression output for the small sample size of non binary participants (1.75%). Excluding non-binary participants from the regression doesn't change the significance and direction of other effects. Recoding non-binary to female or male changes the direction of effects of some variables. Recoding to female also makes the effect of the RII treatment significant at the 10% level.

Table A1: Regression estimates

	Dependent variable:			
	Extensive margin		Intensive margin	
	OLS	*probit*	*OLS*	*censored regression*
Male (=1)	0.003	−0.011	−0.123	−0.397
	(0.063)	(0.333)	(0.336)	(2.584)
Age	−0.028	−0.183	−0.117	−1.392
	(0.021)	(0.125)	(0.109)	(1.024)
Treatment LII	0.028	0.201	0.376	2.126
	(0.085)	(0.493)	(0.450)	(3.702)
Treatment RI	0.057	0.352	−0.238	1.347
	(0.090)	(0.502)	(0.474)	(3.925)
Treatment RII	0.113	0.626	−0.162	3.165
	(0.085)	(0.462)	(0.452)	(3.665)
Constant	0.616	2.089	2.828	16.212
	(0.415)	(2.462)	(2.201)	(19.450)
Observations	112	112	112	112
R^2	0.034		0.031	
Adjusted R^2	−0.012		−0.014	
Log Likelihood		−38.115		−69.441
Akaike Inf. Crit.		88.230		152.881
Bayesian Inf. Crit.				171.911
Residual Std. Error (df = 106)	0.324		1.715	
F Statistic (df = 5; 106)	0.738		0.688	
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2: Marginal effects of the probit regression

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Male (=1)	112	−0.034	0.013
Age	112	−0.002	0.001
Treatment LII	112	0.029	0.010
Treatment RI	112	0.056	0.019
Treatment RII	112	0.119	0.035

Table A3: Regression estimates using texreg output

	OLS	Probit	Probit MFX	OLS	Censored regression
Male (=1)	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.12	−0.29
	(0.06)	(0.33)	(0.07)	(0.33)	(2.29)
Age	−0.03	−0.18	−0.04	−0.11	−1.08
	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.31)	(0.10)	(0.81)
Treatment LII	0.03	0.20	0.04	0.38	1.96
	(0.08)	(0.49)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(3.28)
Treatment RI	0.05	0.35	0.08	−0.25	0.85
	(0.09)	(0.50)	(0.61)	(0.47)	(3.46)
Treatment RII	0.11	0.63	0.15	−0.15	2.86
	(0.08)	(0.46)	(1.04)	(0.45)	(3.23)
Constant	0.59	2.09		2.69	11.36
	(0.40)	(2.46)		(2.12)	(15.44)
R^2	0.15			0.03	
Adj. R^2	0.10			-0.02	
Log Likelihood		-38.11	-38.11		-75.44

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$.

2.4 Pooled Results without male dummy variable

Given that gender is not statistically significant in the prior regressions and does not seem to add explanatory power in the model, we exclude it from the model and run the same regressions with the full sample ($n = 114$) and separate treatment dummies where Real effort $= 1$ for both real-effort tasks and the excluded category is the luck-based treatments pooled into one group. The coefficient on Real effort is statistically significant at the 10% level in the probit specification, but none of the other specifications.

Table A4: Regression estimates

	Dependent variable:			
	Extensive margin		Intensive margin	
	OLS	*probit*	*OLS*	*censored regression*
Age	−0.013	−0.072	−0.092	−0.573
	(0.020)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.701)
Treatment LII	0.031	0.210	0.351	1.932
	(0.088)	(0.474)	(0.439)	(3.202)
Treatment RI	0.092	0.505	−0.233	1.961
	(0.092)	(0.466)	(0.460)	(3.317)
Treatment RII	0.143	0.718	−0.135	3.371
	(0.089)	(0.443)	(0.443)	(3.215)
Constant	0.329	−0.095	2.289	1.233
	(0.412)	(2.030)	(2.052)	(13.820)
Observations	114	114	114	114
R^2	0.030		0.026	
Adjusted R^2	−0.006		−0.010	
Log Likelihood		−42.611		−77.616
Akaike Inf. Crit.		95.221		167.232
Bayesian Inf. Crit.				183.649
Residual Std. Error (df = 109)	0.340		1.697	
F Statistic (df = 4; 109)	0.840		0.724	
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Marginal effects of the probit regression

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Age	114	−0.015	0.005
Treatment LII	114	0.031	0.005
Treatment RI	114	0.092	0.012
Treatment RII	114	0.148	0.018

Table A6: Regression estimates

	Dependent variable:			
	Extensive margin		Intensive margin	
	OLS	*probit*	*OLS*	*censored regression*
Age	−0.013	−0.066	−0.093	−0.540
	(0.020)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.691)
Real Effort	0.104	0.509*	−0.355	1.717
	(0.064)	(0.307)	(0.317)	(2.248)
Constant	0.336	−0.089	2.499	1.567
	(0.403)	(1.979)	(2.014)	(13.497)
Observations	114	114	114	114
R^2	0.026		0.020	
Adjusted R^2	0.009		0.002	
Log Likelihood		−42.850		−77.920
Akaike Inf. Crit.		91.699		163.840
Bayesian Inf. Crit.				174.785
Residual Std. Error (df = 111)	0.338		1.687	
F Statistic (df = 2; 111)	1.488		1.118	
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A7: Marginal effects of the probit regression

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Age	114	−0.014	0.004
Real Effort	114	0.106	0.012

3 References

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Instructions for luck-based experiments:

Welcome and thank you for participating to our experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand and we will come over to you. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.

In front of you is a stack of stapled papers. While keeping the stack face down, please select a random piece of paper from it and tear it from the stack. There are 25 pieces of paper in the stack. The numbers on the paper pieces are between 2 and 20 and they are placed in a random order. There is 1 piece of paper with the number "2" on it, 1 piece with the number "4", 3 pieces with the number "6", 2 pieces with the number "8", 2 pieces with the number "9", 4 pieces with the number "10", 3 pieces with the number "11", 2 pieces with the number "12", 1 piece with the number "13", 2 pieces with the number "14", 2 pieces with the number "15", 1 piece with the number "16" and 1 piece with the number "20".

Instructions for the matrix task:

Welcome and thank you for participating to our experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand and we will come over to you. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.

Your task is to solve the following matrices problem. We will give you an envelope with a sheet with 20 matrices as the one below in it:

Example

3.91	0.82	3.75
1.11	1.69	7.94
3.28	2.52	6.25
9.81	6.09	2.46

In each matrix you should look for a set of numbers that **sum up exactly to 10**.
When you find a set, circle the numbers, as in the example below:

Example

3.91	0.82	3.75
1.11	1.69	7.94
3.28	2.52	6.25
9.81	6.09	2.46

You will have **5 minutes** for this task. Please solve as many matrices as you can. If you finish early, please wait until the experimenter gives further instructions.

Instructions for the spelling task:

Welcome to our experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand and we will come over to you. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.

Your task is to detect spelling errors. You will be given two texts with a total of 20 spelling errors across both texts, and you should circle all spelling errors you find, as shown below:
"In the works of Smith, a predomenant concept is the distinction betwen masculine and feminine. Derrida uses the term 'dialectic capitalism' to denote the role of the reader as poet. Thus, if semioticist theory holds, the works of Smith are reminiscent of Tarantino."

You will have **5 minutes** for this task. Please circle as many errors as you can. If you finish early, please wait until experimenter gives further instructions.

Matrix task

5.64	2.85	9.48
1.68	9.52	2.15
6.71	4.36	1.67
8.1	5.48	8.91

1.63	2.32	7.93
4.92	6.1	5.83
2.81	6.78	7.19
8.46	5.67	7.57

7.87	3.62	9.41
5.72	7.4	5.84
2.49	9.59	6.62
4.16	5.61	0.49

8.18	9.01	3.97
5.2	4.56	9.12
0.28	2.92	6.59
1.12	6.93	9.72

1.43	2.11	5.36
7.45	8.57	9.3
5.39	2.29	0.42
3.28	4.43	2.6

3.99	3.91	4.34
8.39	2.72	0.51
9.61	3.57	2.36
6.09	4.56	1.58

4.74	4.23	1.34
2.1	5.49	4.21
6.26	7.86	9.78
0.89	2.14	6.71

6.58	8.97	3.21
3.85	3.87	5.82
4.14	9.46	6.15
9.12	4.2	6.83

4.91	6.86	7.76
8.96	2.29	5.99
7.71	2.94	4.25
2.01	1.28	5.12

5.47	2.49	6.28
3.82	4.21	7.91
2.65	4.17	4.53
7.49	0.55	6.39

9.83	0.65	2.23
6.52	5.1	9.28
3.91	1.42	4.42
3.48	6.95	4.87

6.09	8.66	7.37
3.51	2.9	1.34
2.02	5.06	2.89
8.1	7.61	8.84

3.53	5.94	4.16
6.15	2.97	2.32
1.9	9.3	7.68
3.55	4.72	2.32

0.74	4.55	3.19
8.17	7.91	1.83
5.62	0.81	2.15
3.75	3.72	2.09

1.08	5.19	6.6
6.56	3.06	2.72
8.98	9.22	3.39
0.71	3.44	4.48

0.17	7.13	7.2
2.54	5.16	5.49
9.48	8.5	9.71
2.87	6.86	1.23

2.32	4.51	6.13
9.35	8.05	4.96
1.02	6.34	1.95
8.82	7.2	2.14

8.19	6.46	1.62
8.29	2.91	2.03
2.73	7.89	9.86
6.21	3.54	3.18

9.43	6.57	8.33
1.58	8.55	0.67
9.33	3.5	3.72
3.46	2.36	2.66

3.47	2.6	4.11
6.63	8.89	2.36
1.32	9.84	4.9
7.4	1.65	2.09

Spelling task

Expressions of fatal flaw

The characteristic theme of the works of Madonna is the dialectic, and subsequent futility, of material sexual identity. Therefore, the subject is contextualised into a deconstructive appropriation that includes langage as a reality. The example of dialectic capitalism prevalent in Madonna's *Sex* is also evident in *Material Girl*, although in a more mythopoetical sense.

If one examines deconstructive appropriation, one is faced with a choice: either accept constructivism or conclude that consensus is a product of the collective unconscious. In a sense, Baudrillard uses the term 'the pretextual paradigm of discourse' to denote the bridge between society and sexual identity. Bataille suggests the use of deconstructive apropriation to modify and challenge society.

Thus, Debord uses the term 'dialectic capitalism' to denote the role of the reader as poet. Bataille promotes the use of cultural situationism to deconstruct the status quo.

But the subject is interpolated into a dialectic capitalism that includes truth as a whole. The primary theme of Dahmus's[1] analysis of materialist sublimation is a self-sufficient totality.

However, the subject is contextualised into a dialectic capitalism that includes reality as a whole. Derrida suggests the use of subdialectic discourse to modify sexual identity.

But in *Sex*, Madonna denies dialectic capitalism; in *Material Girl*, however, she examines deconstructive appropriation. Bataille uses the term 'dialectic capitalism' to denote the common ground between art and society.

Consensuses of economy

In the works of Gibson, a predominant concept is the distinction between figure and ground. Lacan uses the term 'cultural capitalism' to denote the absurdity, and some would say the futility, of prestructural sexual identity. Thus, if realism holds, we have to choose between cultural capitalism and dialectic narrativ.

The main theme of Scuglia's[2] essay on realesm is the role of the observer as writer. The characteristic theme of the works of Gibson is not theory, as Baudrillard

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[1] Dahmus, K. H. P. (1984) *Constructivism and dialectic capitalism*. Panic Button Books
[2] Scuglia, Y. Z. ed. (1977) *Contexts of Defining characteristic: Cultural capitalism and realism*. O'Reilly & Associates

would have it, but pretheory. In a sense, Sontag suggests the use of dialectic neocapitalist theory to attack sexisme.

In the works of Gibson, a predominant concept is the concept of materiel narrativity. Many situationisms concerning a postconceptualist whole exists. It could be said that the premise of realism suggests that culture is capable of intantionality, but only if Lacan's analysis of capitalist theory is invalid.

"Truth is part of the absurdity of narrativity," says Derrida; however, according to la Tournier[3] , it is not so much truth that is part of the absurdity of narrativity, but rather the fatal flaw of truth. Sartre promotes the use of realism to analyse sexuel identity. But the subject is interpoleted into a subtextual paradigm of discourse that includes reality as a paradox.

Any number of deconstructions concerning realism may be discovered. In a sense, the subject is contextualised into a cultural capitalisme that include language as a whole.

Baudrillard uses the term 'realism' to denote not, in fact, semioticism, but postsemeoticism. However, the subject is interpolated into a cultural capitalism that includes reality as a paradox.

Many theorys concerning the role of the artist as poet exist. Thus, Debord uses the term 'materialist desublimation' to denote the paradigm, and eventually the defining caracteristic, of precultural class.

Hanfkopf[4] states that the works of Pynchon is empowering. Therefore, Bataille suggests the use of dialictic neocapitalist theory to challenge sexist perceptions of society.

If capitalist theory holds, we have to chose between dialectic neocapitalist theory and Foucaultist power relations. However, the premis of cultural capitalism holds that truth may be used to exploit the prolitariat.

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[3] la Tournier, U. (1995) *Cultural capitalism in the works of Pynchon*. Schlangekraft

[4] Hanfkopf, R. B. ed. (1983) *The Rubicon of Consensus: Realism and cultural capitalism*. O'Reilly & Associates

Payment instructions for the luck tasks

You will be paid $5 for participating in our experiment. In addition, you will receive 1 times the number you found on the piece of paper slip you have picked from the stack of papers. For example, if the number 2 appeared on your piece of paper, you will get 5+2*1=7 dollars.

Please use the method above to calculate your total payment and complete the pay slip below. Please dispose of the paper you have picked for the experiment in the bin next to you and stay in your seat until the experimenter collects the pay slips.

Pay slip

Seat number: _____

Number on the paper slip: _____

Total payment: _____

Payment instructions for the matrix task:

In the envelope in front of you are the solutions to your task. Use the solutions to calculate the total number of matrices you have correctly solved.

You will be paid $5 for participating in our experiment. In addition, for each correctly solved matrix, you will receive $1. For example, if you solved 2 matrices, you will get 5+2*1=7 dollars.

Please use the method above to calculate your total payment and complete the pay slip below. Please dispose of all the papers you have used for the experiment in the bin next to you and stay in your seat until the experimenter collects the pay slips.

Pay slip

Seat number: _____

Number of matrices solved: _____

Total payment: _____

Payment instructions for the spelling task:

In the envelope in front of you are the solutions to your task. Use the solutions to calculate the total number of spelling errors you have correctly identified.

You will be paid $5 for participating in our experiment. In addition, for each correctly identified spelling error, you will receive $1. For example, if you correctly identified 2 errors, you will get 5+2*1=7 dollars.

Please use the method above to calculate your total payment and complete the pay slip below. Please dispose of all the papers you have used for the experiment in the bin next to you and stay in your seat until the experimenter collects the pay slips.

Pay slip

Seat number: _____

Number of detected spelling error: _____

Total payment: _____

Post-experiment questionnaire:

Instructions: Please respond to the following questions to the best of your ability.

1. Age: ____

2. Gender (circle one)
   - Male
   - Female
   - Other (specify): _____

3. Race (circle one)
   - Asian
   - Black
   - Caucasian
   - Hispanic
   - Other (specify): _____

4. If you are a student, what year in school are you? (circle one)
   - Freshman
   - Sophomore
   - Junior
   - Senior
   - None of the above/ Other (Specify): _____

5. What do you expect your salary to be in 10 years?
   $ _____ (nearest $5,000)

6. What is your declared undergraduate major or intended major? (e.g. Advertising)
   A: _____

7. What is your home language?
   - English
   - Spanish
   - Other (Specify): _____

8. What kind of company or organization do you expect to work for after graduation? (circle one)
   - Traditional Manufacturing (automotive, chemical, aerospace, etc.)
   - Technology (hardware, software, technology services, etc.)
   - Financial Services (banking, insurance, investment products, etc.)
   - Other Professional Services (legal, consulting, accounting, etc.)
   - Arts / Entertainment / Media / Journalism
   - Health Care
   - Education
   - Government Services (including military)
   - None of the Above
   - Don't know

9. What kind of job do you expect to have after graduation? (circle one)
    - Engineer or Computing / Technical Professional
    - Management
    - Sales
    - Marketing
    - White-Collar (banking, consultant, lawyer)
    - Doctor or other Health Care Professional
    - Professor or Teacher
    - Researcher
    - Administrative / Clerical
    - Artist / Entertainer / Writer
    - None of the Above
    - Don't Know

10. What do you think today's experiment was measuring?
    A: _____
    _____

11. In one or two words, please describe your feelings about the task:
    A: _____

12. Approximately how many studies in the *WillisLab* have you participated in prior to this one?
    A: _____

13. Below are statements describing people's behaviors and attitudes. Please use the rating scale below, which ranges from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, to describe the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Please read each statement carefully, and then fill in the corresponding bubble for your choice.

    Note: Some statements refer specifically to you; in these instances, describe yourself as you generally are now (not as you wish to be in the future) and as you honestly see yourself (in relation to other people you know of the same gender and general age as you). Other statements do not refer directly to you, but instead represent a commonly held opinion, some of which you will agree with and others you will disagree with. For all types of statements, simply indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree.

	Statement	Agree 1	2	3	4	Disagree 5
1	I see myself as someone who is reserved and quiet.	o	o	o	o	o
2	It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.	o	o	o	o	o
3	It is very easy for me to admit when I make a mistake.	o	o	o	o	o
4	I am poor at making financial decisions compared to the average student.	o	o	o	o	o

5	The task was not set up in a fair way.	o	o	o	o	o
6	Moral standards are not personal rules, and thus can be used to judge others.	o	o	o	o	o
7	If I have done well on a job or assignment, I insist on a reasonable reward.	o	o	o	o	o
8	The dignity and welfare of people should not be the most important concern in any society.	o	o	o	o	o
9	The task consisted of reasonable expectations.	o	o	o	o	o
10	I am worse at standardized tests than most of my friends.	o	o	o	o	o
11	I see myself as someone who is bold and energetic.	o	o	o	o	o
12	People should ensure their actions never intentionally harm another even minutely.	o	o	o	o	o
13	The task was frustrating.	o	o	o	o	o
14	I see myself as someone who is moody and temperamental.	o	o	o	o	o
15	No matter what I do, I always take great pride in the outcome.	o	o	o	o	o
16	There are ethical principles so important they should be in all codes of ethics.	o	o	o	o	o
17	I see myself as someone who is generally trusting.	o	o	o	o	o
18	Ethics in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should formulate their own codes.	o	o	o	o	o
19	I am worse at spelling/math than my peers.	o	o	o	o	o
20	The task was fun.	o	o	o	o	o
21	I see myself as someone who is sympathetic and warm.	o	o	o	o	o
22	One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.	o	o	o	o	o
23	I do not like it when friends or colleagues see I've done a poor job.	o	o	o	o	o
24	Different sets or types of moralities cannot be compared as to their "rightness."	o	o	o	o	o
25	I see myself as someone who has few artistic interests.	o	o	o	o	o
26	What one person considers moral may be immoral to another.	o	o	o	o	o
27	I am a better driver than most people.	o	o	o	o	o
28	I get frustrated easily.	o	o	o	o	o
29	I see myself as someone who is outgoing and sociable.	o	o	o	o	o
30	I feel I did a great job in today's experiment.	o	o	o	o	o
31	I see myself as someone who is dependable and systematic.	o	o	o	o	o

32	In general, it is important to me to be reasonably rewarded based on the amount of effort I put forth.	o	o	o	o	o
33	I see myself as someone who is disorganized and careless.	o	o	o	o	o
34	I tend to get frustrated when I can't finish a task.	o	o	o	o	o
35	Risks to another, no matter how small, should never be tolerated.	o	o	o	o	o
36	I see myself as someone who is rude and harsh.	o	o	o	o	o
37	Whether a lie is moral or immoral does not depend upon the circumstances.	o	o	o	o	o
38	I see myself as someone who is bashful and shy.	o	o	o	o	o
39	I enjoyed the challenge of the task.	o	o	o	o	o
40	Rigid ethical positions can stand in the way of bettering human relations.	o	o	o	o	o
41	Even when facing a challenging situation, I tend to stay calm and unemotional.	o	o	o	o	o
42	I am better at very difficult tasks than most of my friends.	o	o	o	o	o
43	In general, it is of little consequence to me if I am not fairly rewarded for a personal accomplishment.	o	o	o	o	o
44	If an action could harm an innocent other, it should not be done.	o	o	o	o	o
45	I am proud of the number of spelling errors/matrices I was able to identify/solve in today's experiment	o	o	o	o	o
46	I see myself as someone who is unenvious of others.	o	o	o	o	o
47	I know I could have done better in today's experiment than I actually Did	o	o	o	o	o
48	Deciding an action by balancing the positive and negative consequences is not immoral.	o	o	o	o	o
49	If I have performed poorly on a task, it is only fair that I am rewarded poorly.	o	o	o	o	o
50	I have better decision-making skills than most people.	o	o	o	o	o
51	Five minutes was not a fair amount of time for the task.	o	o	o	o	o
52	Moral actions are not those that closely match ideals of the "perfect" action.	o	o	o	o	o
53	I do not take it personally when I've done a bad job or made a mistake.	o	o	o	o	o
54	I see myself as someone who is relaxed and handles stress well.	o	o	o	o	o
55	I do not feel hassled when performing a task under time pressure.	o	o	o	o	o
56	General rules concerning lying can be formulated, as it does not vary between situations.	o	o	o	o	o
57	What is ethical does not vary from one situation or society to another.	o	o	o	o	o

58	I see myself as someone who is conventional and uncreative.	o	o	o	o	o
59	I see myself as someone who tends to find fault with others.	o	o	o	o	o
60	I was fairly paid for my work on the task.	o	o	o	o	o
61	Determining what is ethical for everyone is impossible since it is up to the individual.	o	o	o	o	o
62	I see myself as someone who is complex and open to new experiences.	o	o	o	o	o
63	I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy.	o	o	o	o	o
64	Potential harm to others is not always wrong; it depends on the benefits gained.	o	o	o	o	o
65	I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily.	o	o	o	o	o
66	The time limit on the task was annoying to me.	o	o	o	o	o
67	One may at times perform an action that might threaten the dignity or welfare of another.	o	o	o	o	o
68	I am embarrassed about my performance in today's task.	o	o	o	o	o
69	I see myself as someone who has an active imagination.	o	o	o	o	o
70	I see myself as someone who does a thorough job.	o	o	o	o	o
71	I am afraid of looking foolish in social situations.	o	o	o	o	o

14. Do you have any further comments about today's session?
A: _____
_____
_____