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Q1 - Let P be an EC point. What is the **minimum** number of EC operations necessary to compute [63]P? And more specifically which are these operations?

$63_{10} = 32+16+8+4+2+1 = 111111_2 \sim 6 \text{ bit}, 6 \cdot 2$

Computo allora 10 operazioni:

5 double (1 \forall bit) e 5 sum (1 \forall bit: '2')

	double	result
1	P	P
1	2P	↓ 3P
1	4P	↓ 7P
1	8P	↓ 15P
1	16P	↓ 31P
1	32P	↓ 63P

Q2 - Consider both commitments introduced in our classes (Feldman and Pedersen), and assume they “commit” a value x. Under which (eventually different) assumptions they can be considered secure?

- | Feldman | Pedersen | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a) no specific assumptions |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input checked="" type="radio"/> | b) must use a large prime p in the modular exponentiations |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c) require that the committed value x is drawn from a large space |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d) both large prime p and x drawn from large space |

$\hookrightarrow 1 < x < p-1$ per perfect Bind,
 \hookrightarrow voglio x in ampio spazio \rightarrow p ampio

Q3 - A strong prime p is defined as:

- ☐ a) a prime number p much larger than usual
- ☐ b) a prime p such as $2p+1 = q$ is also prime
- ☒ c) a prime p such as $p = 2q+1$ and q is also prime
- ☐ d) a prime p such as the Euler $\phi(p)$ is also prime

Q4 - Describe the Boneh-Franklin Identity Based Encryption scheme, specifying in particular, i) how a message is encrypted, ii) how a message is decrypted, and iii) what is the private key used by the receiver.

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Q5 - Consider an RSA digital signature based on a (2,2) secret sharing, and assume all following operations are based on modulo n, with n being the RSA parameter. The tag $H(m)^d$ is reconstructed by:

- ☐ a) Summing the tags constructed using the two shares
- ☒ b) Multiplying the tags constructed using the two shares
- ☐ c) Interpolating the tags constructed using the two shares using Lagrange coefficients
- ☐ d) Using a special approach proposed by Shoup.

Q6 - Assume arithmetic modulus 100. A Linear secret sharing scheme involving 3 parties is described by the following access control matrix:

A:	1	1	0	$1(110) - 1(011) - 1(00-1) = (100) \checkmark$
B:	0	1	1	$[1(51) - 1(63) - 1(11)] \bmod 100 = 77 = s$
C:	0	0	-1	

Assume that the following shares are revealed:

A → 51
B → 63
D → 11

What is the secret?

- a) 1 b) 3 c) 23 d) 25 e) 75 ~~f) 77~~ g) 97 h) 99 i) another result = _____

Q7 - A same message M is RSA-encrypted using two different public keys $e_1 = 5$ and $e_2 = 7$, but same RSA modulus $n=143$. The two resulting ciphertexts are: $c_1=23$ and $c_2=4$. Decrypt the message applying the Common Modulus Attack (show the detailed computations required).

Just in case you need to rapidly compute inverses modulus 143, here a few ones:

$x = \{4, 5, 7, 17, 20, 23, 29, 92\} \rightarrow x^{-1} \bmod 143 = \{36, 86, 41, 101, 93, 56, 74, 14\}$

$$\begin{cases} M^5 \bmod 143 = 23 \bmod 143 \\ M^7 \bmod 143 = 4 \bmod 143 \end{cases}$$

CMA:

find r, s $7 \cdot r + 5 \cdot s = 1$

a	b	val	r
1	0	7	1
0	1	5	2
1	-1	2	3
-2	3	1	Fine

$7(-2) + 5(3) = 1$

$$23^3 \cdot 4^{-2} \bmod 143 =$$

$$23^3 \cdot 36^2 \bmod 143 = 108 = M$$

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Q8 - A Shamir Secret Sharing scheme uses a non-prime modulus $p=55$ (if you need modular inverses see table on the right). Of the 5 participating parties P_1, \dots, P_5 , with respective x coordinates $x_i = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$, parties P_1, P_3 and P_5 aim at reconstructing the secret.

a) compute the Lagrange Interpolation coefficients for parties 1, 3, 5;

b) Reconstruct the secret, assuming that the shares are:

$P_1 \rightarrow 46$

$P_3 \rightarrow 51$

$P_5 \rightarrow 2$

c) Prove that the system is NOT unconditionally secure, by showing that the knowledge of the two shares P_3 and P_5 leak information about the secret – specifically, after knowing shares P_3 and P_5 which would be the only possible remaining secret values?

x	1/x mod 55
1	1
2	28
3	37
4	14
6	46
7	8
8	7
9	49
12	23
13	17
14	4
16	31
17	13
18	52
19	29
21	21
23	12
24	39
26	36
27	53
28	2
29	19
31	16
32	43
34	34
36	26
37	3
38	42
39	24
41	51
42	38
43	32
46	6
47	48
48	47
49	9
51	41
52	18
53	27
54	54

$$d) L_1 = \frac{-3}{1-3} \cdot \frac{-5}{1-5} = \frac{15}{-2 \cdot (-4)} = \frac{15}{8} \mod 55 = 15 \cdot 7 \mod 55 = 50$$

$$L_3 = \frac{-1}{3-1} \cdot \frac{-5}{3-5} = \frac{5}{2 \cdot (-2)} = -5 \cdot 11 \mod 55 = 40$$

$$L_5 = \frac{-1}{5-1} \cdot \frac{-3}{5-3} = \frac{2}{4 \cdot 2} = 3 \cdot 7 \mod 55 = 21$$

$$b) [50 \cdot 46 + 40 \cdot 51 + 21 \cdot 2] \mod 55 = 4382 \mod 55 = 37 = s$$

$$c) [50 \cdot x + 40 \cdot 51 + 21 \cdot 2] \mod 55 = (47 + 50x) \mod 55$$

$\begin{matrix} 0 \neq 0 & s=17 \\ 0 \neq 1 & s=42 \end{matrix} \rightarrow \text{SALTO DI 'S'}$

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Q9 - Prove that any linear secret sharing scheme is homomorphic with respect to the sum operation.

$$\begin{cases} A x_a = y_a & x_a = (s_a, a_1, \dots) & y_a = (\text{share } 1a, \dots) \\ A x_b = y_b & x_b = (s_b, b_1, \dots) & y_b = (\text{share } 1b, \dots) \end{cases}$$

$$y_a + y_b = A(x_a + x_b) = A(s_a + s_b, a_1 + b_1, \dots)$$

Q10 – 1) Determine the access control matrix that implements the policy: $\pi = (A \cap B) \cup (C \cap D \cap E)$, and then 2) turn it into a linear secret sharing scheme, by computing the shares to assigned to the 5 parties (use modulus 100, share secret $S=10$, invent your own random values if/when necessary)

1) $(A \text{ and } B) \text{ OR } (C \text{ and } D \text{ and } E)$

A	1	1	0	0
B	0	-1	0	0
C	1	0	1	1
D	0	0	-1	0
E	0	0	0	-1

2)

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} 10 \\ 3 \\ 7 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 30 \bmod 55 \\ -3 \bmod 55 = 52 \\ 10 + 7 + 4 = 21 \\ -7 \bmod 55 = 48 \\ -4 \bmod 55 = 51 \end{bmatrix}$$

5.6 4.1