Intro to Bilinear Maps

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Outline

Motivation

normalmente uso $\mathbb{Z}^*_{(p)}$ group e $EC[\mathbb{Z}_p]$

MANY GROUPS, mi muovo da gruppo in gruppo tramite punti diversi

Why bilinear maps?

- Bilinear maps are the tool of *pairing-based crypto*
  - Hot topic started with an identity based encryption scheme by Boneh and Franklin in 2001
  - Really useful in making new schemes, lots of low hanging fruit
  - Over 200 papers and counting as of March 2006
- What do they basically do?
  - Establish relationship between cryptographic groups
  - Make DDH easy in one of them in the process
  - Let you solve CDH "once"

Definition of a Bilinear Map

Let G_1, G_2, and G_t be cyclic groups of the same order.

Definition

A *bilinear map* from $G_1 \times G_2$ to G_t is a function $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_t$ such that for all $u \in G_1$, $v \in G_2$, $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab} \quad .$$

Bilinear maps are called pairings because they associate pairs of elements from G_1 and G_2 with elements in G_t. Note that this definition admits degenerate maps which map everything to the identity of G_t.

Definition of an Admissible Bilinear Map

Let $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_t$ be a bilinear map. (g_t generator)
Let g_1 and g_2 be generators of G_1 and G_2, respectively.

Definition

The map e is an *admissible bilinear map* if $e(g_1, g_2)$ generates G_t and e is efficiently computable.

These are the only bilinear maps we care about. Sometimes such a map is denoted $\hat{e}$; we continue to use e. Also, from now on we implicitly mean admissible bilinear map when we say bilinear map.

Relationships Between G_1, G_2, and G_t (tranf che USIAMO)

▷ $G_1, G_2 \in$ EC GROUP ; $G_t : \hat{Z}(p)$ = Weil Pairing & tate pairing

- G_1, G_2, and G_t are all isomorphic to one another since they have the same order and are cyclic
- They are different groups in the sense that we represent the elements and compute the operations differently
- Normally, however, $G_1 = G_2$ (in addition to being isomorphic)
  - From now on we assume this unless otherwise noted
  - Denote both by $G = G_1 = G_2$
- G and G_t may have either composite or prime order
  - Makes a difference in how they work / are used
  - Most often prime order
- If $G = G_t$ called a self-bilinear map
  - Very powerful
  - No known examples, open problem to make one

The Other Notation

- Sometimes G is written additively
  - In this case P, Q normal names for elements of G
  - Bilinear property expressed as $\forall P, Q \in G,\ \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)^{ab} \quad \text{(è 1 operazione!)}$$

- I prefer notation of both G and G_t written multiplicatively
- Will continue to use it

What Groups to Use? SKIP

- Typically G is an elliptic curve (or subgroup thereof)
  - The elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 1$ over the finite field F_p (simple example)
  - Supersingular curves (MAI USARLA PER CRYPTO con 256 bit)
  - MNT curves
  - Choosing between supersingular curves and MNT curves has performance implications
- More generally, G is typically an abelian variety over some field
  - Elliptic curves are abelian varieties of dimension 1
  - Other abelian varieties have had some consideration
- G_t is normally a finite field

Insane curve che ammettono PAIRING può andare bene per modern crypto, per altri contesti no!

What Bilinear Maps to Use? SKIP

- (Modified) Weil pairing and Tate pairing are more or less only known examples
  - Very complicated math
  - Non-trivial to compute
  - No need to understand it to use them
- Weil and Tate pairings computed using Miller's algorithm
  - Computationally expensive
  - Common to be very explicit about how many pairings are needed for operations in some scheme
  - Tate pairing normally somewhat faster than Weil
  - Making these faster still is current research

Normal Pairing $(G, G) \not\Longrightarrow G_T$ NON INVERTIBLE

Decisional DH problem

Dati g, g^a, g^b, α → 50% → g^{ab} ; 50% → g^z (z = random value)

è D.DH se non so distinguerli!

Ovviamente, se potessi computare D.H ($g^a, g^b \rightsquigarrow g^{ab}$) sarebbe banale!

- ROMPO DDH ↛ ROMPO CDH (distinguo, non posso calcolare)
- ROMPO CDH ↛ ROMPO DDH (calcolo, posso distinguere)

· DDH senza CCH (ECDDH)

Ho EC generator, ho EC POINTS GENERATORS g, g^a, g^b, ho bilinear pairing: $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g,g)^{ab}$, posso rompere DDH?

Pairing non calcola g^{ab}, cambia solo set di punti.

▷ Con g, g^a, g^b EC points, $e(g,g) = g_t$ = generator of transf. group

Se prendo $g^a, g^b \rightarrow e(g^a, g^b) = g_t^{ab}$ NON è DH, non è EC point, ora prendo α e faccio $e(g, \alpha) \rightarrow e(g, g^z) = g_t^z \neq g^{ab}$

$e(g, g^{ab}) = g_t^{z \cdot ab}$ PAIRING ROMPE DDH !!

Ho rotto DDH, non CDH, non so come calcolare g^{ab}! Non posso riapplicare Pairing, perché arrivato nel dest. group, non sono più nell'EC domain. Posso rompere anche discrete log!

In DH, DLOG, crypto su $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ uso chiavi in ordine 2048, ma con EC uso 256 bits (dim punti), perché l'op. su EC è più complessa a livello computazionale. Factory problem in 256 bit easy, ma EC in 256 bit hard, a meno che non combi gruppo!

1993 'move reduction': uso pairing per rompere EC

Ho DLOG problem in EC group: $G^x = RES$ (G = generator), $x = ?$ suppongo sia HARD in EC group (size 256)

Scopro che su tale EC posso fare pairing in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$: $G \times G \xrightarrow{e} G_T$.

EC GROUP, 256 ; $\mathbb{Z}_{256}^*(p)$

SVOLGIMENTO

$e(RES, G) = e(G^x, G) = e(G,G)^x = g_t^x$ DLOG problem in WEAKER group. PAIRING può essere pericoloso!

Computational DH: dati g^x, g^y → (non devo poter fare) → g^{xy}
(classico DH)

Decisional Diffie-Hellman

First thing to know about bilinear maps is their effect on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Review definition:

Definition

Let G be a group of order q with generator g. The advantage of an probabilistic algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ in solving the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in G is

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DDH}}_{\mathcal{A},G} = \left|\mathsf{P}\left[\mathcal{A}(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) = 1\right] - \mathsf{P}\left[\mathcal{A}(g, g^a, g^b, g^z) = 1\right]\right|$$

where a, b, z are drawn from the uniform distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and the probability is taken over the choices of a, b, z and $\mathcal{A}$'s coin flips.

extra details

. . . is Easy with a Bilinear Map!

- Basic property of bilinear map is making DDH easy in G
  - With bilinear map $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_t$, a polynomial time $\mathcal{A}$ may gain advantage one
  - Given g, g^a, g^b, g^c, determine whether $c \equiv ab \mod q$ by just checking whether $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g^c)$
- However if the map is from distinct groups G_1 and G_2, DDH may still be hard in G_1 and / or G_2 (XDH assumption)
  - Believed to be the case with some MNT curves (and only those)
  - Only possible if there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between G_1 and G_2
  - A few schemes use this assumption

Computational Diffie-Hellman

- Note that Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) could still be hard in G
- That is, a bilinear map is not known to be useful for solving CDH
- A prime order group G is called a gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group if DDH is easy in G but CDH is hard
  - Definition is independent of presence of bilinear map
  - Bilinear maps may be viewed as an attempt to make GDH groups

Discrete Log

Next thing to know is the following fact about discrete logs with a bilinear map.

Theorem

If there exists a bilinear map $e : G \times G \to G_t$, then the discrete log problem in G is no harder than the discrete log problem in G_t.

Also straightforward. Given $g \in G$ and $g^a \in G$, we can compute $e(g, g) \in G_t$ and $e(g, g^a) = e(g, g)^a \in G_t$. Then we can use a discrete log solver for G_t to obtain a. This is called the MOV reduction.

Most Common New Problems

Some new problems have been defined and assumed hard in the new bilinear context.

Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Given g, g^a, g^b, g^c, compute $e(g,g)^{abc}$ (something like a "three-way" CDH but across the two groups)

Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Distinguish $g, g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g,g)^{abc}$ from $g, g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g,g)^z$

k-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion Given $g, g^y, g^{y^2}, \ldots g^{y^k}$, compute $e(g,g)^{\frac{1}{y}}$

k-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion Distinguish $g, g^y, g^{y^2}, \ldots g^{y^k}, e(g,g)^{\frac{1}{y}}$ from $g, g^y, g^{y^2}, \ldots g^{y^k}, e(g,g)^z$

More New Problems

Skip

If we have a map from distinct groups G_1 and G_2, then we can make the "Co" assumptions.

Computational Co-Diffie-Hellman Given $g_1, g_1^a \in G_1$ and $g_2, g_2^b \in G_2$, compute g_2^{ab}

Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman Distinguish $g_1, g_1^a \in G_1$ and $g_2, g_2^b, g_2^{ab} \in G_2$ from $g_1, g_1^a \in G_1$ and $g_2, g_2^b, g_2^z \in G_2$

Co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Given $g_1, g_1^a, g_1^b \in G_1$ and $g_2 \in G_2$, compute $e(g_1, g_2)^{ab}$

Decisional Co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Distinguish $g_1, g_1^a, g_1^b, g_2, e(g_1, g_2)^{ab}$ from $g_1, g_1^a, g_1^b, g_2, e(g_1, g_2)^z$

Introduction of Pairings to Cryptography

- 1993: used to break crypto
  - Weil and Tate pairings first used in cryptographic context in efforts to break ECC
  - Idea was to reduce DLP in elliptic curves to DLP in finite fields (MOV reduction)
- 2000: first "good" use
  - Joux's protocol for one-round 3-party Diffie-Hellman
  - Previous multi-round schemes for 3-party Diffie-Hellman existed, but showed how bilinear maps could be useful
- 2001: Boneh and Franklin's identity-based encryption scheme
  - First practical IBE scheme
  - Showed bilinear maps allowed dramatic new constructions, very influential

2001 to Present (2006)

skip

- Many schemes for new primitives and improved schemes for existing primitives based on bilinear maps
- IBE related stuff
  - Hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE)
  - Dual-HIBE
  - IBE, HIBE without random oracles
  - IBE with threshold decryption
  - Identity based signatures (also ID-based blind signatures, ring signatures, hierarchical ID-based signatures)
  - Identity based chameleon hashes
  - Identity based "signcryption"

2001 to Present (2006) SKIP

- Signatures
  - Short signatures (also without random oracles)
  - Blind signatures
  - Multi-signatures
  - Aggregate signatures
  - Verifiable encrypted signatures
  - Ring signatures
  - Threshold signatures
  - Unique signatures without random oracles
  - Authentication-tree based signatures without random oracles

2001 to Present (2006) Skip

- Other stuff
  - BGN cryptosystem, which is sort of doubly homomorphic
  - Threshold decryption
  - k-party key agreement
  - Identification scheme
- Much more

Intuition (3 party DH)

- Informally, why are bilinear maps so useful?
- Lets you "cheat" and solve a computational Diffie-Hellman problem
- *But only once!*
- After that, you are stuck in the group G_t
- Seems to be just the right level of power
  - Enough to be useful in making a construction work
  - But not enough to make it insecure
- Now several examples of pairing-based constructions to hopefully illustrate this

Third Party DH



, calcolo $(g^x)^z = g^{xz}$

vorrei g^{xyz}, ma NON posso. Perché ahora, posso cambiare gruppo! $e(g^{xz}, g^y) = e(g,g)^{xyz}$ computabile da tutti e tre. Posso espanderlo a 4?

Con $e(g,g)^{xyz} = g_t^{xyz}$ faccio $e(g_t^{xyz}, g^w) \neq g_t^{xyzw}$! Posso usare questa tecnica solo all'ultimo step (cheat DH una volta sola)

NB: $e(g^x, g) \equiv e(g,g)^x$

Il PAIRING prima era strumento per rompere EC crypto (fino al 1993), ma con JOUX si inizia a considerarlo come un NUOVO TOOL più ampio, come fare cheat su DH (solo una volta)

Identity Based Encryption

Voglio PK cryptosystem dove PK = stringa leggibile (nome, ricordabile) es: uso "Google", non 156.172.82.3, sfruttando un "certificato"

Voglio P_K leggibile → la scelgo io, normalmente viene derivata da S_K (es: $x \to g^x$).

In RSA ho (e,n), dipende da "n" (large prime). Solo nel 2001 trovo risposta!

Intuition

- From Alice's perspective, map lets you "cheat" to get $\hat{g}^{bc}$ from g^b and g^c
- Then regular exponentiation gets you the rest of the way to $\hat{g}^{abc}$
- Note that you can't use e to get $\hat{g}^{abc}$ from g^a, g^b, g^c
  - $e(g^a, e(g^b, g^c)) = e(g^a, \hat{g}^{bc}) \neq \hat{g}^{abc}$ ($\hat{g}^{bc}$ not in G)
  - Only one cheat allowed!

Joux's 3-Party Diffie-Hellman (vedi disegno)

This is a simple protocol; you could almost come up with it yourself on the spot.
Let G be a group with prime order q, $e : G \times G \to G_t$ be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G. Let $\hat{g} = e(g, g) \in G_t$.

Protocol

1. Alice picks $a \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, Bob picks $b \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and Carol picks $c \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$.
2. Alice, Bob, and Carol broadcast g^a, g^b, and g^c respectively.
3. Alice computes $e(g^b, g^c)^a = \hat{g}^{abc}$, Bob computes $e(g^c, g^a)^b = \hat{g}^{abc}$, and Carol computes $e(g^a, g^b)^c = \hat{g}^{abc}$.

Boneh and Franklin's IBE Scheme

(EC group)

Let G be a group with prime order q, $e : G \times G \to G_t$ be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G. Let $\hat{g} = e(g, g) \in G_t$. Let $h_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to G$ and $h_2 : G_t \to \{0,1\}^*$ be hash functions. These are all public parameters.

Setup

PKG picks $s \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then g^s is the public key of PKG.

h_1 stringa di 0 e 1. (arbitrario) e ci applico funzione che la mappa su EC point (ho fatto hash di str, $0 < \text{size} < 2^{|\text{digest}|}$)

- prendo poi h_2 che prende da punto $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ e mappa su string ($\approx$ SHA1, da number a string)

Posso fare:

Schema

(P3) PK Generator, ha propria S_K, G_K (s, g^s) in group G — 3-component



"Alice vuole mandare msg a Bob

EL GAMAL



Alice (P_1) g^r, $m \oplus e(g^s, BOB)^r = g^r, m \oplus e(BOB, g)^{rs}$ ② Bob (P_2)

③ (g^r, BOB^s) input per Bob, calcola $e(g^r, BOB^s) = e(g, BOB)^{rs}$

$P_{K_{BOB}}$ = "Bob" (general point)

Vuole fare encrypt data to Bob

- r mio
- BOB di BOB
- g^s PK gen

encrypt: da g^s, BOB → $(g^s, BOB)^r$ ⇝ $e(BOB, g)^{rs}$ ← $e(g^r, BOB^s)$

serve mome, non S_K — serve S_K

Perché funziona?

Suppongo:

PKG $<s, g^s>$

ALICE $<r, g^r>$ — con pairing $e(g^s, g^t)^r = \hat{g}^{rst}$

BOB $<t, g^t>$ — con pairing ~~$e(g^s, g^t) = \hat{g}^{rst}$~~ $e(g^{st}, g^r) = \hat{g}^{rst}$

mew pair BOB = g^t, t ignoto, ma non serve! "t" inclusa nel pairing

S_K, ephim. form

Voglio 3way-DH

NB: Non ho "t" S_K, Dan Bone risolve: invece di avere g^s, e fare $(g^s)^t$, fornisce già $g^{st} = (g^t)^s$ (decido io!), Poi è PKG che calcola $(BOB)^s$

Boneh and Franklin's IBE Scheme

Encryption

genero r e poi g^r (come DH)

If Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, she picks $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ then computes the following.

h_1: da string a EC point

PAIR

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Encrypt}(g, g^s, \text{“Bob”}, m) &= (g^r, m \oplus h_2[e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g^s)^r] \\ &= (g^r, m \oplus h_2(e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g)^{rs})\end{aligned}$$

(g: generator, g^s: P_K generator, “Bob”: name, m: msg)

Making a Private Key

PKG may compute the private key of Bob as follows.

Bob da str a EC point, elevo alla 's', e' sempre EC point

$$\text{MakeKey}(s, \text{“Bob”}) = h_1(\text{“Bob”})^s$$

Chi la crea e' "molto potente' perche' ci crea la S_K, PKG ha ruolo fondamentale! Posso "distribuirlo?" SI! $Bob^{\wedge} = Bob^{\sigma_1} \cdot Bob^{\sigma_2} \ldots$ come fare Distributed PKG (Pedersen with Homomorphic)

Boneh and Franklin's IBE Scheme

Decryption

Given an encrypted message $(u, v) = (g^r, m \oplus h_2(e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g)^{rs})$ and a private key $w = h_1(\text{“Bob”})^s$, Bob may decrypt as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Decrypt}\,(u, v, w) &= v \oplus h_2(e(w, u)) \\
&= m \oplus h_2(e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g)^{rs}) \\
&\quad \oplus h_2(e(h_1(\text{“Bob”})^s, g^r)) \\
&= m \oplus h_2(e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g)^{rs}) \\
&\quad \oplus h_2(e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g)^{rs}) \\
&= m
\end{aligned}$$

Boneh and Franklin's IBE Scheme

- How to understand this?
- Let t be the discrete log of $h_1(\text{“Bob”})$ base g
- We don't know what it is, but it is well defined (esiste)
- Now the situation is like 3-party Diffie-Hellman
  - Alice has public g^r, private r
  - PKG has public g^s, private s
  - Bob has public g^t, unknown (!) t
- $e(h_1(\text{“Bob”}), g)^{rs} = e(g^t, g)^{rs} = \hat{g}^{rst}$ is like session key for encryption

▷ DH sempre in EC group, posso fare "cheat" una volta sola!

Boneh and Franklin's IBE Scheme

- Alice and PKG could compute $\hat{g}^{rst}$ just like in Joux's scheme
- But what about Bob?
  - PKG helps him over previously authenticated, secure channel
  - PKG computes $(g^t)^s = g^{st}$ and sends it to Bob
  - Bob can now compute $e(g^{st}, g^r) = \hat{g}^{rst}$
- The point is that Bob gets g^{st} rather than $\hat{g}^{st}$
  - With g^{st}, still one cheat left
  - If it was $\hat{g}^{st}$ (which anyone can compute), couldn't apply e anymore

Questions?

- Best reference is a website called the *The Pairing-Based Crypto Lounge*
- Huge list of papers relating to bilinear maps
- To get the URL just Google for it