∉ programma

Security in Wireless Cellular systems

(focus limited to authentication, at this stage)

Architecture of wireless cellular systems (abstracted)



Security in 1G



GSM

Security in 2G



COMP-128 Security by obscurity

No mutual auth (Rogue BS)

No core network security

. . . . . .

Security in 3G

(fairly) good ciphers - public scrutiny!

Encryption AND (in part) Integrity

Multual authentication

Core network security

Multiple keys

. . . . . .

Security in 4G

("rinnovamento" generale, per avere un'organizzazione più "chiara", definizione di "componenti")

Time for a Security architecture!

Systematic approach





Security in 4G and 5G

(oggi e' 4G+, non 5G)

è importante poter distinguere ciò che è protetto da ciò che non lo è!

Actually... this is already the 5G security architecture... to save one slide (couple of differences over 4G)!

Time for a Security architecture!

Systematic approach





inizialmente Wifi ≠ Rete cellulare, col 5G anche Wifi può usare stessi metodi di autenticazione

AMF: Access Managment Function

SEAF: Security Anchor Function

5G Security Architecture -

No security support in DU (deployed in untrusted sites)

Manage Network Access Security (AMF+SEAF co-implemented)

The 5G «vault» ☺: User data (UDR) and credentials (ARPF) used by UDM authentication/identification functions

Deco… Identit…

Test Framework SCAS for Security Assurance

non3G… access

…3IWF

AMF

SEAF

SEPP

Security Edge Protection Proxy

SEPP

AUSF

SIDF

Home network (è questo che deve essere "sicuro")

ARPF

UDM

UDR

Security for non-3GPP access (Wi-Fi, etc)

key for later reuse

DU istributed nit

CU entralized nit

molte antenne usate

solo qui c'è integrità

difficile implementarla ovunque

gNB

Improved AUTH and home control via Proof-of-Presence

Access Stratum Security terminated at CU (in una cabina)

Improved ke… …fe…

Security for interconnection traffic

…omains) → + SICURO ← − SICURO

…e-siz… …G/6G network!

…geo-political security debate is in part ill-posed)

L2 message integrity?

Breaking LTE on Layer Two

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DU

CU

N3IWF

…or Function

Non 3GPP Inter Working Function

SEPP

Security Edge Protection Proxy

ARPF Auth credential Repository & Processing Fct

UDM Unified Data Management

UDR Unified Data Repository

But sys… …nplex

BUT SYSTEMS ARE WAY MORE COMPLEX

5G è ± sicuro degli altri?
· ∃ tantissimi aspetti da considerare

5G/6G systems' security: A small part of a bigger picture!!



possibile ∃ "bugdoor" {bug lasciato di proposito non possono incolparmi}

No 5G security ∥ SW/HW implementation is insecure!

(è come luce o l'acqua) **Critical infrastructure = high tier threats**

«They» might *design* vulnerabilities!

SW networks, third party suppliers:

Complexity, increased threat surface!

Too many «optional/should» In the standard!

Very risky! (you might believe you are secured, while…)