




# Higher-Order Separation Logic for Distributed Systems and Security

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PhD dissertation defence  
17 March, 2023

# Programs.



TLA+ Toolbox

TLA/Firewall.tla

```

----- MODULE Firewall -----
Integers
Address, /* The set of all addresses
Port, /* The set of all ports
Protocol /* The set of all protocols

Range == /* The set of all address ranges
ss \X Address

Range[r \in AddressRanges, a \in Address] ==
1] <= a
<= r[2]
== /* The set of all port ranges
\X Port

ge[- \in PortRange, p \in Port] ==
1] <= p
<= r[2]

21 Packet == /* The set of all packets
22 [sourceAddress : Address,
23 sourcePort : Port,
24 destAddress : Address,
25 destPort : Ports,
26 protocol : Protocol]
27
28 Firewall == /* The set of all firewalls
29 [Packet -> BOOLEAN]
30
31 Rule == /* The set of all firewall rules
32 [remoteAddress : AddressRange,
33 remotePort : PortRange,
34 localAddress : AddressRange,
35 localPort : PortRange,
36 protocol : SUBSET Protocol,
37 allow : BOOLEAN]
38
39 Ruleset == /* The set of all firewall rulesets
SUBSET Rule

```

```

// a small example spin model
// Peterson's solution to the mutual exclusion problem


bool turn, flag[2]; // the shared variables, booleans
byte ncrit; // nr of procs in critical section

active [2] proc type user() // two processes
{
    assert(_pid == 0 || _pid == 1);
again:
    flag[_pid] = 1;
    turn = _pid;
    if(flag[1 - _pid] == 0 || turn == 1 - _pid);

    ncrit++;
    assert(ncrit == 1); // critical section
    ncrit--;

    flag[_pid] = 0;
    goto again
}
// analysis:
// $ spin -run peterson.pml

```



The type "2a" message sent by this action therefore tells every acceptor  $a$  that, when it receives the message, all the enabling conditions of  $\text{VoteFor}(a, b, v)$  but the first,  $\text{maxBal}[a] \leq b$ , are satisfied.

$\text{Phase2a}(b, v) \triangleq$

$\wedge \neg \exists m \in \text{msgs} : m.\text{type} = "2a" \wedge m.\text{bal} = b$

$\wedge \exists Q \in \text{Quorum} :$

LET  $Q1b \triangleq \{m \in \text{msgs} : \wedge m.\text{type} = "1b"$

$\wedge m.\text{acc} \in Q$

$\wedge m.\text{bal} = b\}$

$Q1bv \triangleq \{m \in Q1b : m.\text{mbal} \geq 0\}$

IN  $\wedge \forall a \in Q : \exists m \in Q1b : m.\text{acc} = a$

$\wedge \forall Q1bv = \{\}$

$\wedge \exists m \in Q1bv :$

$\wedge m.\text{meal} = v$

$\wedge \forall mm \in Q1bv : m.\text{mbal} \geq mm.\text{mbal}$

$\wedge \text{Send}([type \mapsto "2a", bal \mapsto b, val \mapsto v])$

$\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \{\text{maxBal}, \text{maxVBal}, \text{maxVal}\}$

The  $\text{Phase2b}(a)$  action describes what acceptor  $a$  does when it receives a phase 2a message  $m$ , which is sent by the leader of ballot  $m.\text{bal}$  asking acceptors to vote for  $m.\text{val}$  in that ballot. Acceptor  $a$  acts on that request, voting for  $m.\text{val}$  in ballot number  $m.\text{bal}$ , iff  $m.\text{bal} \geq \text{maxBal}[a]$ , which means that  $a$  has not participated in any ballot numbered greater than  $m.\text{bal}$ . Thus, this enabling condition of the  $\text{Phase2b}(a)$  action together with the receipt of the phase 2a message  $m$  implies that the  $\text{VoteFor}(a, m.\text{bal}, m.\text{val})$  action of module Voting is enabled and can be executed. The  $\text{Phase2b}(a)$  message updates  $\text{maxBal}[a]$ ,  $\text{maxVBal}[a]$ , and  $\text{maxVal}[a]$  so their values mean what they were claimed to mean in the comments preceding the variable declarations.

$\text{Phase2b}(a) \triangleq$

$\exists m \in \text{msgs} :$

$\wedge m.\text{type} = "2a"$

$\wedge m.\text{bal} \geq \text{maxBal}[a]$

$\wedge \text{maxBal}' = [\text{maxBal EXCEPT } !a = m.\text{bal}]$

$\wedge \text{maxVBal}' = [\text{maxVBal EXCEPT } !a = m.\text{bal}]$

$\wedge \text{maxVal}' = [\text{maxVal EXCEPT } !a = m.\text{val}]$

$\wedge \text{Send}([type \mapsto "2b", acc \mapsto a,$

$\text{bal} \mapsto m.\text{bal}, val \mapsto m.\text{val}])$

The definitions of  $\text{Next}$  and  $\text{Spec}$  are what we expect them to be.

$\text{Next} \triangleq \vee \exists b \in \text{Ballot} : \vee \text{Phase1a}(b)$

$\vee \exists v \in \text{Value} : \text{Phase2a}(b, v)$

$\vee \exists a \in \text{Acceptor} : \text{Phase1b}(a) \vee \text{Phase2b}(a)$

#### Algorithm 1 Intent Communication Algorithm


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




1: procedure DEC-MDP( $S, A, P, R, O, \Omega$ )
2:    $A \leftarrow A_1 \times A_2$ 
3:    $s_1, s_2 \leftarrow S$ 
4:    $a_1, a_2 \leftarrow A$ 
5:    $R(s_i, a_i) = 0, i = 0, j = 0$ 
6:   repeat
7:      $i \leftarrow i + 1, j \leftarrow j + 1$ 
8:     for  $o_1, o_2$  do
9:       Determine scenario  $\in [1, 4]$ 
10:       $p_1, p_2 \leftarrow P(s' \mid s, a_1, a_2)$ 
11:       $a_1, a_2 \leftarrow A$ 
12:       $\text{max}_{a_1, a_2} r_{1,2}(s_1, s_2, a_1, a_2)$ 
13:      for  $s_1, s_2$  do check
14:        if  $d(s_1, s_2) \leq \text{scenario threshold}$  then
15:          Update  $\theta_i, \theta_j$  using  $d(s_1, s_2)$ 
16:        end if
17:         $\pi[s_1, s_2] = \arg \max_{a_1, a_2} r_{1,2}$ 
18:      end for
19:    end for
20:   until  $s_1 = s_{g_1}$  or  $s_2 = s_{g_2}$ 
21:   return  $\pi, R(s_i, a_i)$ 
22: end procedure

```


“A computer program is a sequence or set of instructions in a programming language for a computer to execute.”







# In a nutshell



This dissertation

... for computer programs, not busses!

# This dissertation

## Features

- ▶ Distribution
- ▶ Information-flow control types
- ▶ Randomization

## Properties


- ▶ Safety
- ▶ Simulation
- ▶ (Liveness)
- ▶ Noninterference
- ▶ Contextual equivalence

# This dissertation

- Aneris: A Mechanized Logic for Modular Separation**  
Morten Krogh-Jespersen, Amin Timany, Morten Mørch, Simon Oddershede Gregersen, Lars Birkedal  
  
Distribution      Safety      Security types      Noninterference      Simulation      Liveness  
@ ESOP '20      @ POPL '21      @ POPL '21
- Distributed Causal Memory: Modular Specification and Verification**  
Léon Gondelman, Simon Oddershede Gregersen, Amin Timany, Morten Mørch, Lars Birkedal  
  
Distribution      Safety      Distribution      Safety  
@ POPL '21
- Mechanized Logical Relations for Termination**  
Simon Oddershede Gregersen, Johan Bay, Morten Mørch, Lars Birkedal  
  
Security types      Noninterference
- Trillium: History-Sensitive Refinement in Separation Logic**  
Amin Timany, Simon Oddershede Gregersen, Léon Gondelman, Morten Mørch, Lars Birkedal, Niccolò D'Antonio  
  
Distribution      Safety      Simulation      Liveness
- Asynchronous Probabilistic Couplings in Separation Logic**  
Simon Oddershede Gregersen, Alejandro Rovatti, Lars Birkedal  
  
Randomization      Ctx. equiv.
- [Manuscript]

**Thesis statement:**

**Higher-order separation logic** is all you need!



# This dissertation

**Aneris: A Mechanized Logic for Modular Reasoning about Distributed Systems**

Morten Krogh-Jespersen, Amin Timany, Marit Edna Ohlenbusch, *Simon Oddershede Gregersen*, Lars Birkedal

@ ESOP '20

**Distributed Causal Memory: Modular Specification and Verification in Higher-Order Distributed Separation Logic**

Léon Gondelman, *Simon Oddershede Gregersen*, Abel Nieto, Amin Timany, Lars Birkedal

@ POPL '21

**Mechanized Logical Relations for Termination-Insensitive Noninterference**

*Simon Oddershede Gregersen*, Johan Bay, Amin Timany, Lars Birkedal

@ POPL '21

**Trillium: History-Sensitive Refinement in Separation Logic**

Amin Timany, *Simon Oddershede Gregersen*, Léo Stefanescu, Léon Gondelman, Abel Nieto, Lars Birkedal

[Manuscript]

**Asynchronous Probabilistic Couplings in Higher-Order Separation Logic**


*Simon Oddershede Gregersen*, Alejandro Aguirre, Philipp G. Haselwarter, Joseph Tassarotti, Lars Birkedal

[Manuscript]

# Mechanized Logical Relations for Termination-Insensitive Noninterference

joint work with Johan Bay, Amin Timany, and Lars Birkedal

The prevailing basic semantic notion of secure information flow is **noninterference**.



Program  $e$  satisfies **termination-insensitive noninterference**, abbrv. **TINI**( $e$ ), when

$$e[v_1/x] \Downarrow o_1 \quad \text{and} \quad e[v_2/x] \Downarrow o_2 \quad \text{implies} \quad o_1 \simeq o_2$$

for all secrets  $v_1$  and  $v_2$ .

# The problem

Information-flow control enforcement often comes as a static type system:

$$\Gamma \vdash e : t^\ell \quad \text{implies} \quad \text{TINI}(e)$$


To really be useful, it must support the same features as modern languages:

- ▶ higher types
- ▶ reference types
- ▶ higher-order state
- ▶ ...

The difficulty of proving the system sound increases, however.

# This work

- ▶ shows that such a rich type system satisfies TINI
- ▶ with full mechanization of all results in Coq
- ▶ using a semantic model



Compositional integration of syntactically well-typed and ill-typed components:

$$\Gamma, x : \tau_2 \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \quad \text{and} \quad e_2 \in \llbracket \tau_2 \rrbracket \quad \text{implies} \quad \mathbf{TINI}(e_1[e_2/x])$$

# Types

$$\tau ::= t^\ell$$

$$t ::= \mathbb{B} \mid \mathbb{N} \mid \tau \times \tau \mid \tau + \tau \mid$$


$$\tau \xrightarrow{\ell} \tau \mid \text{ref}(\tau) \mid \alpha \mid \forall_\ell \alpha. \tau \mid \forall_\ell \kappa. \tau \mid \exists \alpha. \tau \mid \mu \alpha. \tau$$

$$\ell ::= \kappa \mid l \in \mathcal{L} \mid \ell \sqcup \ell$$

For this presentation we consider  $\mathcal{L} = \{\perp, \top\}$  where  $\perp \sqsubseteq \top, \top \not\sqsubseteq \perp$

Consider `if secret then f ()` — if  $f$  has public side effects,  $secret$  is leaked

# Typing judgment



# Type system

$$\text{T-IF} \quad \frac{\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc} e : \mathbb{B}^\ell \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2\}. \Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc \sqcup \ell} e_i : \tau \quad \Psi \vdash \tau \searrow \ell}{\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc} \text{if } e \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 : \tau}$$

$$\text{T-STORE} \quad \frac{\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc} e_1 : \text{ref}(\tau)^\ell \quad \Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc} e_2 : \tau \quad \Psi \vdash \tau \searrow pc \sqcup \ell}{\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc} e_1 := e_2 : 1^\perp}$$

## Theorem (Termination-Insensitive Noninterference)

If

$$x : \mathbb{B}^\top \vdash_{\perp} e : \mathbb{B}^\perp, \quad \vdash_{\perp} v_1 : \mathbb{B}^\top, \quad \text{and} \quad \vdash_{\perp} v_2 : \mathbb{B}^\top$$

then

$$(\emptyset, e[v_1/x]) \rightarrow^* (h_1, v'_1) \quad \text{and} \quad (\emptyset, e[v_2/x]) \rightarrow^* (h_2, v'_2) \quad \text{implies} \quad v'_1 = v'_2.$$

# Our approach

We set up a binary logical relation

$$\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \models e_1 \approx e_2 : \tau$$

such that

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \vdash_{pc} e : \tau & \Rightarrow & \Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \models e \approx e : \tau \\ \Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \models e \approx e : \tau & \Rightarrow & \text{TINI}(e) \end{array}$$

However, this requires manipulating and defining a complex semantic model.

# Our approach cont'd

We combat the complexity by defining the relation in Iris:

- ▶ Convenient logical connectives for expressing the relation,
- ▶ High-level logic to reason within, and
- ▶ Coq formalization and the Iris Proof Mode to mechanize our proofs

Not a novel approach, but some novel challenges!

### Value relation

$$\begin{aligned}
\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho} &\triangleq \pi_1(\Theta(\alpha)) \\
\llbracket 1 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq v = v' = () \\
\llbracket \mathbb{B} \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq v = v' \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\} \\
\llbracket \mathbb{N} \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq v = v' \in \mathbb{N} \\
\llbracket \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \exists v_1, v_2, v'_1, v'_2. v = (v_1, v_2) * v' = (v'_1, v'_2) * \llbracket \tau_1 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v_1, v'_1) * \llbracket \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v_2, v'_2) \\
\llbracket \tau_1 + \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \bigvee_{i \in \{1, 2\}} \exists w, w'. v = \text{inj}_i w * v' = \text{inj}_i w' * \llbracket \tau_i \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(w, w') \\
\llbracket \tau_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_e} \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \square (\forall w, w'. \llbracket \tau_1 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(w, w') \dashv \mathcal{E} \llbracket \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(w, w')) * \\
&\quad \llbracket \tau_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_e} \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta_L}^{\rho}(v) * \llbracket \tau_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_e} \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Theta_R}^{\rho}(v') \\
\llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \square (\forall \Phi : \text{Rel}. \forall \Phi_L, \Phi_R : \text{Pred}. \\
&\quad \square (\forall v, v'. \Phi(v, v') \dashv \Phi_L(v) * \Phi_R(v')) \dashv \mathcal{E} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta, \alpha \mapsto (\Phi, \Phi_L, \Phi_R)}^{\rho}(v, v')) * \\
&\quad \llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta_L}^{\rho}(v) * \llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta_R}^{\rho}(v') \\
\llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \kappa. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \square (\forall l \in \mathcal{L}. \mathcal{E} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho, \kappa \mapsto l}(v, v')) * \llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \kappa. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta_L}^{\rho}(v) * \llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \kappa. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta_R}^{\rho}(v') \\
\llbracket \exists \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \square (\exists \Phi : \text{Rel}. \exists \Phi_L, \Phi_R : \text{Pred}. \\
&\quad \square (\forall v, v'. \Phi(v, v') \dashv \Phi_L(v) * \Phi_R(v')) \dashv \\
&\quad \exists w, w'. v = \text{pack } w * v' = \text{pack } w' * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta, \alpha \mapsto (\Phi, \Phi_L, \Phi_R)}^{\rho}(w, w')) \\
\llbracket \mu \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho} &\triangleq \mu \Phi : \text{Rel}. \lambda(v, v'). \exists w, w'. v = \text{fold } w * v' = \text{fold } w' * \\
&\quad \triangleright \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta, \alpha \mapsto (\Phi, \llbracket \mu \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta_L}^{\rho}, \llbracket \mu \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta_R}^{\rho})}^{\rho}(w, w') \\
\llbracket \text{ref}(\tau) \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \exists \ell, \ell'. v = \ell * v' = \ell' * \boxed{\exists w, w'. \ell \mapsto_L w * \ell' \mapsto_R w' * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(w, w')}^{\mathcal{N}_{\text{root}}(\ell, \ell')} \\
\llbracket t^{\ell} \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') &\triangleq \begin{cases} \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(v, v') & \text{if } \llbracket \ell \rrbracket_{\rho} \sqsubseteq \zeta \\ \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\Theta_L}^{\rho}(v) * \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\Theta_R}^{\rho}(v') & \text{if } \llbracket \ell \rrbracket_{\rho} \not\sqsubseteq \zeta \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

### Expression relation

$$\mathcal{E} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(e, e') \triangleq \text{mwp } e \sim e' \{ \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho} \}$$

### Environment relation

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{G} \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(\epsilon, \epsilon) &\triangleq \text{True} \\
\mathcal{G} \llbracket \Gamma, x : \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(\vec{v}w, \vec{v}'w') &\triangleq \mathcal{G} \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(\vec{v}, \vec{v}') * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(w, w')
\end{aligned}$$

### Semantic typing judgment

$$\begin{aligned}
Coh(\Theta) &\triangleq \underset{(\Phi, \Phi_L, \Phi_R) \in \Theta}{\ast} \square (\forall v, v'. \Phi(v, v') \dashv \Phi_L(v) * \Phi_R(v')) \\
\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \models e \approx_{\zeta} e' : \tau &\triangleq \square \left( \begin{array}{c} \forall \Theta, \rho, \vec{v}, \vec{v}'. \text{dom}(\Xi) \subseteq \text{dom}(\Theta) * \text{dom}(\Psi) \subseteq \text{dom}(\rho) \dashv \\ \text{Coh}(\Theta) * \mathcal{G} \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket_{\Theta}^{\rho}(\vec{v}, \vec{v}') \dashv \mathcal{E} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Theta}(e[\vec{v}/\vec{x}], e'[\vec{v}'/\vec{x}]) \end{array} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

### Value relation

$$\begin{aligned}
\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho} &\triangleq \Delta(\alpha) \\
\llbracket 1 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq v = () \\
\llbracket \mathbb{B} \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq v \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\} \\
\llbracket \mathbb{N} \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq v \in \mathbb{N} \\
\llbracket \tau_1 \times \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \exists v_1, v_2. v = (v_1, v_2) * \llbracket \tau_1 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v_1) * \llbracket \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v_2) \\
\llbracket \tau_1 + \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \bigvee_{i \in \{1, 2\}} \exists w. v = \text{inj}_i w * \llbracket \tau_i \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(w) \\
\llbracket \tau_1 \xrightarrow{\ell_e} \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \square (\forall w. \llbracket \tau_1 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(w) \dashv \mathcal{E}_{\ell_e} \llbracket \tau_2 \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(w)) \\
\llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \square (\forall f : \text{Pred}. \mathcal{E}_{\ell_e} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta, \alpha \mapsto f}^{\rho}(v)) \\
\llbracket \forall_{\ell_e} \kappa. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \square (\forall l \in \mathcal{L}. \mathcal{E}_{\ell_e} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho, \kappa \mapsto l}(v)) \\
\llbracket \exists \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \square (\exists \Phi : \text{Pred}. \exists w. v = \text{pack } w * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta, \alpha \mapsto \Phi}^{\rho}(w)) \\
\llbracket \mu \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho} &\triangleq \mu \Phi : \text{Pred}. \lambda v. v = \text{fold } w * \triangleright \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta, \alpha \mapsto f}^{\rho}(w) \\
\llbracket \text{ref}(\ell) \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \exists \ell, \mathcal{N}. v = \ell * \mathcal{R}(\Delta, \rho, \ell, \ell, \mathcal{N}) \\
\mathcal{R}(\Delta, \rho, \ell, \ell, \mathcal{N}) &\triangleq \begin{cases} \square \forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{N} \subseteq \mathcal{E} \Rightarrow \\ \left( \varepsilon \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{E} \setminus \mathcal{N}} \triangleright \left( \left( (\triangleright \ell \mapsto_i w * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(w)) \dashv \varepsilon \setminus \mathcal{N} \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{E}} \text{True} \right) \right) \right) & \text{if } \llbracket \ell \rrbracket_{\rho} \sqsubseteq \zeta \\ \square \forall \mathcal{E}. \mathcal{N} \subseteq \mathcal{E} \Rightarrow \\ \left( \varepsilon \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{E} \setminus \mathcal{N}} \triangleright \left( \left( (\triangleright \exists w'. \ell \mapsto_i w' * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(w')) \dashv \varepsilon \setminus \mathcal{N} \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{E}} \text{True} \right) \right) \right) & \text{if } \llbracket \ell \rrbracket_{\rho} \not\sqsubseteq \zeta \end{cases} \\
\llbracket t^{\ell} \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v) &\triangleq \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(v)
\end{aligned}$$

### Expression relation

$$\mathcal{E}_{pc} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(e) \triangleq \llbracket pc \rrbracket_{\rho} \not\sqsubseteq \zeta \Rightarrow \text{mwp}^{\mathcal{M} \Rightarrow} e \{ \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho} \}$$

### Environment relation

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{G} \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(\epsilon, \epsilon) &\triangleq \text{True} \\
\mathcal{G} \llbracket \Gamma, x : \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(\vec{v}w) &\triangleq \mathcal{G} \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(\vec{v}) * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(w)
\end{aligned}$$

### Semantic typing judgment

$$\Xi \mid \Psi \mid \Gamma \models_{pc} e : \tau \triangleq \square \left( \begin{array}{c} \forall \Delta, \rho, \vec{v}. \text{dom}(\Xi) \subseteq \text{dom}(\Delta) * \text{dom}(\Psi) \subseteq \text{dom}(\rho) \dashv \\ \mathcal{G} \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(\vec{v}) \dashv \mathcal{E}_{pc} \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}^{\rho}(e[\vec{v}/\vec{x}]) \end{array} \right)$$

# Challenge #1

Existing encodings of “logical” logical relations are **termination sensitive**:

$$e_1 \rightarrow^* v_1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad e_2 \rightarrow^* v_2 \quad \wedge \quad v_1 \approx v_2.$$

However, we need a **termination insensitive** notion:

$$e_1 \rightarrow^* v_1 \quad \wedge \quad e_2 \rightarrow^* v_2 \quad \Rightarrow \quad v_1 \approx v_2.$$

**Solution:** a new **modal weakest precondition** theory  $\text{mwp } e \sim e' \{Q\}$

## Challenge #2

$$\frac{\text{T-IF} \quad \exists | \Psi | \Gamma \vdash_{pc} e : \mathbb{B}^\ell \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2\}. \exists | \Psi | \Gamma \vdash_{pc \sqcup \ell} e_i : \tau}{\exists | \Psi | \Gamma \vdash_{pc} \text{if } e \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 : \tau} \quad \Psi \vdash \tau \searrow \ell$$

As part of our proofs, we have to show, e.g.,

$$\models \text{if } v \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 \approx \text{if } v' \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 : t^\top$$

where  $\models v \approx v' : \mathbb{B}^\top$ , meaning  $v, v' \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ . This means we have to prove, e.g.,

$$\models e_1 \approx e_2 : t^\top$$

Luckily, we don't really need to care about return values, only **side-effects!**

# Challenge #2

**Solution:**

- A **binary relation** for relating terms that are “publicly equivalent”
- A **unary relation** for characterising terms that do not have public side-effects

$$\llbracket t^\ell \rrbracket_\Theta^\rho(v, v') \triangleq \begin{cases} \llbracket t \rrbracket_\Theta^\rho(v, v') & \text{if } \llbracket \ell \rrbracket_\rho = \perp \\ \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\Theta_L}^\rho(v) * \llbracket t \rrbracket_{\Theta_R}^\rho(v') & \text{othw.} \end{cases}$$

Needs two instantiation of the MWP theory:  $\text{mwp } e \{Q\}$  and  $\text{mwp } e \sim e' \{Q\}$  and a logical way of encoding a “subsumption” property.


# Asynchronous Probabilistic Couplings in Higher-Order Separation Logic


joint work with Alejandro Aguirre, Philipp G. Haselwarter, Joseph Tassarotti, and Lars Birkedal

# Setting the stage

- ▶ Distributed applications often communicate over an **untrusted** network.
- ▶ **Randomization** is a crucial ingredient in cryptographic protocols.
- ▶ **Security** is often phrased as an **indistinguishability** of two probabilistic programs.

**Goal:** a relational program logic for an expressive language with coin flips for proving contextual equivalences.





# Complications

Programs evaluate to distributions over values, not just values.

What do we do about those?

Many probabilistic relational Hoare logics (pRHLs) make use of **probabilistic couplings**:

$$\mu_1 \sim \mu_2 : R$$

If  $R \triangleq (=)$  then  $\mu_1 = \mu_2$ .

$$\Theta \mid \Gamma \vdash e_1 \simeq_{\text{ctx}} e_2 : \tau \triangleq \forall \tau', \mathcal{C} : (\Theta \mid \Gamma \vdash \tau) \Rightarrow (\emptyset \mid \emptyset \vdash \tau'), \sigma.$$
$$\text{exec}_{\Downarrow}(\mathcal{C}[e_1], \sigma) = \text{exec}_{\Downarrow}(\mathcal{C}[e_2], \sigma)$$

# Couplings in pRHLs

In pRHLs, couplings manifest as **coupling rules**:

$$\frac{\text{PRHL-COUPLE} \quad f \text{ bijection}}{\{\text{True}\} \text{ flip} \sim \text{flip } \{v_1, v_2. \exists b : \mathbb{B}. v_1 = b \wedge v_2 = f(b)\}}$$

E.g., for One-Time Pad:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{let } k = \text{flip} \text{ in} & \sim & \text{flip} \\ k \otimes m & & \end{array}$$


Pick  $f(b) = \text{if } m \text{ then } \neg b \text{ else } b$

# Couplings in pRHLs cont'd

However, the approach requires you to **synchronize** the probabilistic choices.

This is not always possible.

```
let b = flip in  
λ_. b
```



```
let r = ref(None) in  
λ_. match !r with  
  Some (b) ⇒ b  
  | None    ⇒ let b = flip in  
            r := Some (b);  
            b  
end
```

# This work

- ▶ A higher-order probabilistic relational separation logic, “Clutch”, for proving contextual equivalence of probabilistic programs with higher-order references, impredicative polymorphism, and recursive types.
- ▶ A proof method for asynchronous couplings that allows us to reason about sampling as if it was state.
- ▶ Full mechanization of all results in Coq.

# Key ideas of Clutch

A (separation logic) refinement judgment

$$\Delta \models e_1 \precsim e_2 : \tau$$



" $e_1$  refines  $e_2$  at type  $\tau$ "

$$\Theta \mid \Gamma \vdash e_1 \precsim_{\text{ctx}} e_2 : \tau \triangleq \forall \tau', (\mathcal{C} : (\Theta \mid \Gamma \vdash \tau) \Rightarrow (\emptyset \mid \emptyset \vdash \tau')), \sigma. \\ \text{exec}_{\Downarrow}(\mathcal{C}[e_1], \sigma) \leq \text{exec}_{\Downarrow}(\mathcal{C}[e_2], \sigma)$$

**REL-PURE-L**

$$\frac{e_1 \xrightarrow{\text{pure}} e'_1 \quad \Delta \models K[e'_1] \precsim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \models K[e_1] \precsim e_2 : \tau}$$

**REL-LOAD-L**

$$\frac{\ell \mapsto v \quad \ell \mapsto v \rightarrow * \Delta \models K[v] \precsim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \models K[!\ell] \precsim e_2 : \tau}$$

**REL-STORE-R**

$$\frac{\ell \mapsto_s v \quad \ell \mapsto_s w \rightarrow * \Delta \models e_1 \precsim K[()] : \tau}{\Delta \models e_1 \precsim K[\ell := w] : \tau}$$

**REL-COUPLE-FLIPS**

$$\frac{f \text{ bijection} \quad \forall b. \Delta \models K[b] \precsim K'[f(b)] : \tau}{\Delta \models K[\text{flip}] \precsim K'[\text{flip}] : \tau}$$


# Asynchronous couplings

To support asynchronous couplings, we introduce [presampling tapes](#).

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
Operationally, we extend the state of program execution with a “heap of tapes” onto which we can presample bits.



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


# Asynchronous couplings

To support asynchronous couplings, we introduce [presampling tapes](#).

Operationally, we extend the state of program execution with a “heap of tapes” onto which we can presample bits.

$\text{flip}(\iota_3) \rightarrow^{\frac{1}{2}} b$




# Asynchronous couplings

To support asynchronous couplings, we introduce [presampling tapes](#).

Operationally, we extend the state of program execution with a “heap of tapes” onto which we can presample bits.

`flip( $\iota_2$ )`




# Asynchronous couplings

To support asynchronous couplings, we introduce [presampling tapes](#).

Operationally, we extend the state of program execution with a “heap of tapes” onto which we can presample bits.

$\text{flip}(\iota_2) \rightarrow^1 1$



# Asynchronous couplings

But no language primitives add values to the tapes!



Instead, presampling steps will be [ghost operations](#) purely used in the logic.

— in fact, they can be entirely erased!

# Asynchronous couplings cont'd

Tapes are “just” state so we introduce a separation logic connective

$$\iota \hookrightarrow \vec{b}$$

that denotes ownership of a tape and its contents.

REL-ALLOC-TAPE-L


$$\frac{\forall \iota. \iota \hookrightarrow \epsilon \multimap \Delta \models K[\iota] \lesssim e : \tau}{\Delta \models K[\text{tape}] \lesssim e : \tau}$$

REL-FLIP-TAPE-L

$$\frac{\iota \hookrightarrow b \cdot \vec{b} \quad \iota \hookrightarrow \vec{b} \multimap \Delta \models K[b] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \models K[\text{flip}(\iota)] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}$$

# Asynchronous couplings cont'd

$$\frac{\text{REL-COUPLE-TAPE-L} \quad \begin{array}{c} f \text{ bijection} \\ \iota \hookrightarrow \vec{b} \\ \forall b. \iota \hookrightarrow \vec{b} \cdot b \rightarrow* \Delta \models e \lesssim K'[f(b)] : \tau \end{array}}{\Delta \models e \lesssim K'[\text{flip}()] : \tau}$$



# Motivating example

```
let r = ref(None) in  
  λ_. match !r with  
    Some (b) ⇒ b  
  | None     ⇒ let b = flip in  
    r := Some (b);  
    b  
end
```

~<sub>ctx</sub>

```
let b = flip in  
  λ_. b
```

# Motivating example

```

let r = ref(None) in
λ_. match !r with
  Some (b) ⇒ b
  | None      ⇒ let b = flip in
                  r := Some (b);
                  b
end

let ϖ = tape in
let r = ref(None) in
λ_. match !r with
  Some (b) ⇒ b
  | None      ⇒ let b = flip(ϖ) in
                  r := Some (b);
                  b
end

let b = flip in
λ_. b

```



# Motivating example

$$\frac{\text{REL-COUPLE-TAPE-L} \quad f \text{ bijection} \quad \iota \hookrightarrow \vec{b} \quad \forall b. \iota \hookrightarrow \vec{b} \cdot b \rightarrow * \Delta \models e \lesssim K'[f(b)] : \tau}{\Delta \models e \lesssim K'[\text{flip}()] : \tau}$$

```
let r = ref(None) in  
λ_. match !r with  
  Some (b) ⇒ b  
  | None     ⇒ let b = flip in  
                r := Some (b);  
                b  
end
```

```
| let  $\iota$  = tape in  
| let  $r$  = ref(None) in  
|  $\lambda_.$  match ! $r$  with  
|   Some ( $b$ )  $\Rightarrow b$   
|   | None       $\Rightarrow$  let  $b$  = flip( $\iota$ ) in  
|     r := Some ( $b$ );  
|     b  
| end
```


# Conclusion



indeed



Higher-order separation logic is all you need!



# Thank you!

Simon Oddershede Gregersen  
PhD dissertation defence  
17 March, 2023

# (Very) simple examples

- ▶ **Multiplying by zero**

$$\lambda v. v * 0$$

cannot be syntactically typed at  $\mathbb{N}^\top \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^\perp$ .

- ▶ **Temporary explicit “leaks”**

```
let x = ! l in l := ! h; ...; l := x
```

is not syntactically well-typed if  $h$  contains sensitive information.

$$\frac{\iota = \text{fresh}(\sigma)}{\text{tape}, \sigma \rightarrow^1 \iota, \sigma[\iota \mapsto \epsilon]}$$

$$\frac{\sigma(\iota) = \epsilon \quad b \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}}{\text{flip}(\iota), \sigma \rightarrow^{1/2} b, \sigma}$$

$$\text{flip}(\iota), \sigma[\iota \mapsto b \cdot \vec{b}] \rightarrow^1 b, \sigma[\iota \mapsto \vec{b}]$$

**Definition** (Coupling). Let  $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{D}(A)$ ,  $\mu_2 \in \mathcal{D}(B)$ . A sub-distribution  $\mu \in \mathcal{D}(A \times B)$  is a *coupling* of  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$  if

1.  $\forall a. \sum_{b \in B} \mu(a, b) = \mu_1(a)$
2.  $\forall b. \sum_{a \in A} \mu(a, b) = \mu_2(b)$

Given relation  $R : A \times B$  we say  $\mu$  is an  $R$ -coupling if furthermore  $\text{supp}(\mu) \subseteq R$ . We write  $\mu_1 \sim \mu_2 : R$  if there exists an  $R$ -coupling of  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$ .

**Lemma** (Composition of couplings). Let  $R : A \times B$ ,  $S : A' \times B'$ ,  $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{D}(A)$ ,  $\mu_2 \in \mathcal{D}(B)$ ,  $f_1 : A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A')$ , and  $f_2 : B \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(B')$ .

1. If  $(a, b) \in R$  then  $\text{ret}(a) \sim \text{ret}(b) : R$ .
2. If  $\forall (a, b) \in R. f_1(a) \sim f_2(b) : S$  and  $\mu_1 \sim \mu_2 : R$  then  $\mu_1 \gg f_1 \sim \mu_2 \gg f_2 : S$

**Definition** (Refinement Coupling). Let  $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{D}(A)$ ,  $\mu_2 \in \mathcal{D}(B)$ . A sub-distribution  $\mu \in \mathcal{D}(A \times B)$  is a *refinement coupling* of  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$  if

1.  $\forall a. \sum_{b \in B} \mu(a, b) = \mu_1(a)$
2.  $\forall b. \sum_{a \in A} \mu(a, b) \leq \mu_2(b)$

Given relation  $R : A \times B$  we say  $\mu$  is an  $R$ -refinement-coupling if furthermore  $\text{supp}(\mu) \subseteq R$ . We write  $\mu_1 \lesssim \mu_2 : R$  if there exists an  $R$ -refinement-coupling of  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$ .

$$\text{exec}_n(e, \sigma) \triangleq \begin{cases} \text{ret}(e) & \text{if } e \in \text{Val} \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{if } e \notin \text{Val}, n = 0 \\ \text{step}(e, \sigma) \gg \text{exec}_{(n-1)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{exec}(\rho)(v) \triangleq \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \text{exec}_n(\rho)(v)$$

$$\text{exec}_{\Downarrow}(\rho) \triangleq \sum_v \text{exec}(\rho)(v)$$

**Lemma (Erasure).** *If  $\sigma_1(\iota) \in \text{dom}(\sigma_1)$  then*

$$\text{exec}_n(e_1, \sigma_1) \sim (\text{step}_\iota(\sigma_1) \gg \lambda \sigma_2. \text{exec}_n(e_1, \sigma_2)) : (=)$$

**Theorem (Adequacy).** *Let  $\varphi : \text{Val} \times \text{Val} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$  be a predicate in the meta-logic. If*

$$\text{specCtx} * \text{spec}(e') \vdash \text{wp } e \{ v. \exists v'. \text{spec}(v') * \varphi(v, v') \}$$

*is provable in Clutch then  $\forall n. \text{exec}_n(e, \sigma) \lesssim \text{exec}(e', \sigma') : \varphi$ .*

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \models_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \precsim e_2 : \tau &\triangleq \forall K. \text{specCtx} \rightarrow* \text{spec}(K[e_2]) \rightarrow* \text{naTok}(\mathcal{E}) \rightarrow* \\ &\mathsf{wp}\;e_1\;\{v_1. \exists v_2. \text{spec}(K[v_2]) * \text{naTok}(\top) * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2)\}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}G(\rho) &\triangleq \text{specInterp}_{\bullet}(\rho) \\ \text{specInv} &\triangleq \exists \rho, e, \sigma, n. \text{specInterp}_{\circ}(\rho) * \text{spec}_{\bullet}(e) * \text{heaps}(\sigma) * \text{execConf}_n(\rho)(e, \sigma) = 1 \\ \text{specCtx} &\triangleq \boxed{\text{specInv}}^{\mathcal{N}. \text{spec}} \\ \mathsf{wp}_{\mathcal{E}}\;e_1\;\{\Phi\} &\triangleq (e_1 \in \textit{Val} \wedge \not\models_{\mathcal{E}} \Phi(e_1)) \vee \\ &(e_1 \notin \textit{Val} \wedge \forall \sigma_1, \rho_1. \\ &\quad S(\sigma_1) * G(\rho_1) \rightarrow* {}_{\mathcal{E}}\not\models_{\emptyset} \\ &\quad \text{execCoupl}(e_1, \sigma_1, \rho_1)(\lambda e_2, \sigma_2, \rho_2. \\ &\quad \triangleright {}_{\emptyset}\not\models_{\mathcal{E}} S(\sigma_2) * G(\rho_2) * \mathsf{wp}_{\mathcal{E}}\;e_2\;\{\Phi\})) \\ \text{execCoupl}(e_1, \sigma_1, e'_1, \sigma'_1)(Z) &\triangleq \mu \Psi : \textit{Cfg} \times \textit{Cfg} \rightarrow \textit{iProp}. \\ &(\exists R. \mathsf{red}(e_1, \sigma_1) * \\ &\quad \text{step}(e_1, \sigma_1) \sim \text{step}(e'_1, \sigma'_1) : R * \\ &\quad \forall \rho_2, \rho'_2. R(\rho_2, \rho'_2) \rightarrow* \not\models_{\emptyset} Z(\rho_2, \rho'_2)) \vee \\ &(\exists R. \mathsf{red}(e_1, \sigma_1) * \\ &\quad \text{step}(e_1, \sigma_1) \sim \text{ret}(e'_1, \sigma'_1) : R * \\ &\quad \forall \rho_2. R(\rho_2, (e'_1, \sigma'_1)) \rightarrow* \not\models_{\emptyset} Z(\rho_2, (e'_1, \sigma'_1))) \vee \\ &(\exists R, n. \text{ret}(e_1, \sigma_1) \sim \text{execConf}_n(e'_1, \sigma'_1) : R * \\ &\quad \forall \rho'_2. R((e_1, \sigma_1), \rho'_2) \rightarrow* \not\models_{\emptyset} \Psi((e_1, \sigma_1), \rho'_2)) \vee \\ &\left( \bigvee_{\iota \in \sigma_1} \exists R. \text{step}_{\iota}(\sigma_1) \sim \text{step}(e'_1, \sigma'_1) : R * \right. \\ &\quad \forall \sigma_2, \rho'_2. R(\sigma_2, \rho'_2) \rightarrow* \not\models_{\emptyset} \Psi((e_1, \sigma_2), \rho'_2) \Bigg) \vee \\ &\left( \bigvee_{\iota' \in \sigma_2} \exists R. \text{step}(e_1, \sigma_1) \sim \text{step}_{\iota'}(\sigma'_1) : R * \right. \\ &\quad \forall \rho_2, \sigma'_2. R(\rho_2, \sigma'_2) \rightarrow* \not\models_{\emptyset} Z(\rho_2, (e'_1, \sigma'_2)) \Bigg) \vee \\ &\left( \bigvee_{(\iota, \iota') \in \sigma_1 \times \sigma'_1} \exists R. \text{step}_{\iota}(\sigma_1) \sim \text{step}_{\iota'}(\sigma'_1) : R * \right. \\ &\quad \forall \sigma_2, \sigma'_2. R(\sigma_2, \sigma'_2) \rightarrow* \not\models_{\emptyset} \\ &\quad \left. \Psi((e_1, \sigma_2), (e'_1, \sigma'_2)) \right)\end{aligned}$$