# Pseudorandomness Program Open Problems

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## 1 Additive Combinatorics

# 2 Cryptography

# 2.1 Cryptography using Weak Sources of Randomness (Feb 6–Feb 9)

Open Problems presented by Yevgeniy Dodis at the Simons Working Group on Cryptography using Weak Sources of Randomness.

Prepared by Siyao Guo.

#### Interactive proofs with imperfect randomness.

The class of languages which admit deterministic interactive proofs is  $\mathbf{NP}$ . The class of languages ( $\mathbf{IP}$ ) which admit *probabilistic* interactive proofs is  $\mathbf{PSPACE}$ .

**Question:** Is **IP-weak** = **IP**? Can we simulate probabilistic interactive proofs using imperfect random sources?

Dodis et al. [DOPS04] (pdf) showed that block sources are sufficient to similate interactive proofs.

#### Extraction from limited "bit-coin source"

source parameterized by  $\gamma$ , n and b.

repeat the following steps until n b-bit blocks output:

- 1. sample random b-bit X
- 2. sample a coin which is 1 with probability  $1 \gamma$ .
- 3. if coin=0, output X as next block and go to step 1.
- 4. if coin=1, ask attacker if he wants to block X or not
- 5. if block, don't output anything and go to step 1, else output X and go to step 1.

Goal: extract (for now 1)  $\varepsilon$ -unbiased bit from such  $X_1 \dots X_n$ 

Known: impossible if A can block unbounded number of times.

So let's limit number of blocked times by t

Question 1: b = 1. given  $t, \varepsilon, \gamma$ , what is smallest n for which possible?

Question 2: given  $t, \varepsilon, \gamma$ , what is smallest alphabet b for which can set n = t + 1.

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Consider the case of (information-theoretic) private-key encryption where parties wish to encrypt a b-bit value using shared secret key sampled from an imperfect random source X over n bits. Bosley and Dodis [BD07] (pdf) showed that if such scheme is secure, then one can deterministically extract  $b - \log n$  bits from X. Hence, to a large extent, true randomness is inherent for encryption.

#### Separation between encryption and extraction.

They conjecture that extracting b bits from X is impossible.

For any extractor Ext:  $\{0,1\}^n \times (\{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(n)})^B \to \{0,1\}$ , there exists distribution X over  $\{0,1\}^n$  and Enc:  $\{0,1\}^n \times [B] \to \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}$  such that

- for any  $m_0 \neq m_1$ ,  $\Delta(\text{Enc}(X, m_0), \text{Enc}(X, m_1)) = 0$ ,
- $\Delta(\operatorname{Ext}(X, \operatorname{Enc}(X, 1), \dots, \operatorname{Enc}(X, B)), U_1) > \Omega(1)$

where  $U_1$  is the uniform distribution over  $\{0,1\}$ ,  $B=2^b$  and  $\Delta$  stands for statistical distance.

Bosley and Dodis [BD07] showed that above conjecture is true for  $b \leq \log n - \log \log n$ .

#### Is true randomness inherent for sharing schemes?

A randomize function share  $(m, X) \to (L, R)$  (which takes a message m over b bits as input and uses X as the random source) is a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme if

• (Reconstruction) there exists an algorithm Rec such that

for every 
$$m$$
,  $\Pr[\operatorname{Rec}(L, R) = m] = 1$ ,

• (Privacy) for any  $m' \neq m$ ,  $\Delta(L(m), L(m')) = 0$  and  $\Delta(R(m), R(m')) = 0$ .

**Question:** If  $\operatorname{share}(m, X)$  is a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme, can we deterministically extract random bits from X?

More background in secret sharing can be found in the survey by Beimel [Beil1] (pdf).

#### Beating RT-bound using computational extractor.

Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RTaShma97] (pdf) showed that any seeded extractor with error  $\varepsilon$  suffers from  $2\log 1/\varepsilon$  entropy loss (entropy loss is the amount of entropy in source and seed substracting output length). Motivated by bypassing this limitation, one approach is to consider computational extractor, whose output is only required to be computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random.

Dachman-Soled et al. [DachmanSoledGKM12] (pdf), together with the result of Dodis et al. [DPW14] (pdf) showed that any efficient computational extractor beating RT-bound implies one-way function.

Question: Can we construct an *efficient* computational extractor *beating RT-bound* based on one-way functions?

Krawczyk [Kra10] (pdf) used extract-then-expand approach and showed a computational extractor for medium-to-high entropy sources. More background and other approaches for constructing computational extractors can be found in Yevgeniy's slides and lecture note.

# 3 Expanders and Extractors

## 3.1 Expanders and Extractors Workshop (Jan 30–Feb 3)

Open Problems presented at the Simons Workshop on Expanders and Extractors.

Compiled by Noga Alon.

#### Partial Steiner systems of large girth, Nati Linial

Let us first recall that the *girth* of a graph G is the least integer g such that there is a set of g vertices in G that spans at least g edges. We seek an analogous notion for 3-uniform hypergraphs. In fact we only deal with *linear* hypergraphs H where every two hyperedges share at most one vertex. As defined by Erdős, the girth of H is the smallest integer  $g \geq 4$  such that there is a set of g vertices in H that spans at least g-2 hyperedges. He conjectured that there exist Steiner Triple Systems with arbitrarily high girth, but despite considerable attempts over the years, the state of our knowledge concerning this problem is quite bad. I therefore formulate a variant that may be more accessible:

Question: Does there exist c>0 and n-vertex 3-uniform hypergraphs with at least  $cn^2$  hyperedges and arbitrarily high girth?

#### Cliques in near Ramanujan Graphs, Noga Alon

An  $(n, d, \lambda)$ -graph is a d-regular graph on n vertices so that all eigenvalues but the top one are in absolute value at most  $\lambda$ . Let G be an  $(n, d, 100\sqrt{d})$ -graph. It is known that:

- 1. There is a constant c > 0 so that if  $d \ge cn^{2/3}$  then G contains a triangle.
- 2. The statement in (1) is tight up to the constant c.
- 3. There is a constant c > 0 so that if  $d \ge cn^{4/5}$  then G contains a copy of  $K_4$ .

**Open:** Is (3) tight up to the value of c? That is, is there an  $(n, d, 100\sqrt{d})$ -graph containing no  $K_4$ , where  $d = \Omega(n^{4/5})$ ? It is not even known whether or not there is such a graph with  $n^{2/3} = o(d)$ .

#### On the extractable entropy from zero-fixing sources, Gil Cohen

Let  $n \ge k \ge 0$  be integers. An *n*-bit random variable X is called a k-zero-fixing source if there exists a subset of indices  $R \subseteq [n]$  such that the marginal of X when projected to R is uniformly distributed, and the remaining bits of X are fixed to zero. The parameter k is called the entropy of X. Let m = m(n, k) be the largest integer for which there exists a function  $\operatorname{Ext}_k: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$  with the following property: for any k-zero-fixing source X,  $\operatorname{Ext}_k(X)$  is within statistical distance 1/5 from uniform (here 1/5 is an arbitrary choice of a small constant.) We stress that  $\operatorname{Ext}_k$  does not get the description of the source X (namely, the set R) but rather a single sample from X. Such a function Ext<sub>k</sub> is called an extractor for k-zero-fixing sources. We would like to have a better understanding of the function m(n, k) that, informally speaking, captures the amount of extractable entropy from zero-fixing sources. Clearly,  $m(n, k) \le k$ . By a straightforward counting argument, for any  $k > \log_2 \log n + \log_2 \log \log n + \Omega(1)$ , m(n,k) = k - O(1). That is, when the entropy k is high enough, one can extract essentially all the entropy from the source. What about smaller entropies? For any k,  $m(n,k) \ge 0.5 \log_2 k - O(1)$  as can be seen by considering the function that takes the Hamming weight of the input X modulo  $\Theta(\sqrt{k})$  [KZ06][RV13]. That is to say, a logarithmic amount of entropy is always extractable. Interestingly, this simple function is optimal for small enough k. Put formally,  $m(n, (\log^* n)^{2/3}) \le 0.5 \log_2 k + O(1)$  [CS15]. The natural open problem is to understand the behavior of m(n, k)and close the gap between  $k = \Omega(\log \log n)$  and  $k = O((\log^* n)^{2/3})$ . In particular, it is not clear if m(n,k) has a threshold behavior, namely, if there exists a function  $\tau(n)$  such that for  $k = \omega(\tau(n))$ , m(n,k) = k - O(1) whereas for  $k = o(\tau(n)), m(n, k) \le 0.5 \log_2 k + O(1)$ .

#### Beating the expander mixing lemma for small sets, David Zuckerman

The expander mixing lemma asserts that in a d-regular graph G on n nodes, for sets S and T of size k, we have

$$|e(S,T) - dk^2/n| < \lambda k$$
,

where  $\lambda = \max(\lambda_2, -\lambda_n)$  is the largest nontrivial eigenvalue in absolute value. Even for optimal  $\lambda = O(\sqrt{d})$ , this is useless when  $k < c\sqrt{n}$ . On the other hand, when  $d > (n/k)\log(n/k)$ , most d-regular graphs achieve an upper bound of  $O(k\sqrt{(dk/n)\log(n/k)})$ . This is better than the expander mixing lemma for k = o(n).

The problem is to give an upper bound f(G, k) that is better than  $\lambda k$  for some interesting graphs or for most or even many graphs. For dense graphs, this corresponds to two-source extractors. Bounds on line-point incidence graphs are also known. It would be extremely interesting to have a general method.

#### Spectral radius problem for free groups, Emmanuel Breuillard

If  $\mu$  is a probability measure on a non-abelian free group F, let  $\sigma(\mu) := ||T_{\mu}||$  be the norm of the convolution operator on  $\ell^2(F)$ 

$$T_{\mu}: f \mapsto \mu * f$$

where 
$$\mu * f(x) = \sum_{g \in G} f(g^{-1}x)\mu(x)$$
.

Is it true that for every  $\epsilon > 0$  there is  $\delta > 0$  such that for all probability measures  $\mu$  on F, the condition  $\sigma(\mu) > \epsilon$  implies that there is a coset xH of a cyclic subgroup H of F such that  $\mu(xH) > \delta$ ?

#### **Explicit Coding Power Series, Anup Rao**

We are interested in giving an explicit description of a formal power-series over a finite field F with some nice properties. The motivation comes from several applications related to coding.

We say that a power series  $P(X) = p_0 + p_1 X + \dots$  is  $\epsilon$ -sparse if there is a finite k such that of the first k coefficients of P(X), at most  $\epsilon k$  of them are non-zero.

Definition: P(X) is an  $\epsilon$ -coding power series if for every polynomial g(X) with 0/1 coefficients, the power series (1 + Xg(X))P(X) is not  $\epsilon$ -sparse.

Fact: For every  $\epsilon > 0$ , there is a finite field F for which a random power series P(X) will be a coding power series with positive probability.

Open Problem: Give an explicit example of a coding power-series.

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