

The Global Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy

Riccardo Degasperi*

Banca d'Italia

Seokki Simon Hong[†]

Paris School of Economics

Giovanni Ricco[‡]

École Polytechnique, University of Warwick, CEPR and OFCE-SciencesPo

14 October 2023

Abstract

US monetary policy shapes economic conditions globally due to the dominant role of the dollar in the world economy. We study the propagation of US monetary policy shocks abroad using a state-of-the-art high-frequency identification and a harmonised dataset covering 30 economies and over 150,000 datapoints. A policy tightening has large contractionary effects on both advanced and emerging economies. The propagation via financial variables limits foreign central banks' control over domestic economic conditions by increasing risk premia and by destabilising the medium-long segment of the yield curve. The responses of headline prices abroad are instead shaped by spillovers via commodity markets.

Keywords: Monetary policy, Trilemma, Exchange Rates, Monetary Policy Spillovers.

JEL Classification: E5, F3, F4, C3.

*DG Economics, Statistics and Research; via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy. Email: riccardo.degasperi@esterni.bancaditalia.it Web: www.riccardo-degasperi.com

[†]Paris School of Economics, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. Email: simon.hong@psemail.eu

[‡]CREST – École Polytechnique, 5 Avenue Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau, France. Email: giovanni.ricco@polytechnique.edu Web: www.giovanni-ricco.com

We are grateful to Borağan Aruoba, Gianluca Benigno, Andrea Carriero, Luca Dedola, Alex Luiz Ferreira, Georgios Georgiadis, Linda Goldberg, Ethan Ilzetzki, Marek Jarociński, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Bartosz Maćkowiak, Michael McMahon, Silvia Miranda-Agrippino, Hélène Rey, Alberto Romero, Barbara Rossi, Fabrizio Venditti, Nicola Vieg, the 2021 NBER Summer Institute session on Monetary Economics, the European Central Bank, the Cleveland Fed, the Bank of Canada, the Central Bank of Ireland, the Banco de México, the National Bank of Ukraine, Danmarks Nationalbank, the CREST, the DIW, participants at the 3rd Annual Meeting of CEBRA's International Finance and Macroeconomics Program, the 2019 Annual Conference of the Chaire Banque de France, the 2019 ERS Monetary Policy Workshop, the 7th Annual Monetary Economics workshop, the 2020 EABCN Conference on 'Empirical Advances in Monetary Policy', the 2020 VMACS Junior Conference, the 3rd Warsaw Money-Macro-Finance Conference, the 52nd Annual Conference of the Money, Macro and Finance Society, the 27th International Conference on 'Computing in Economics and Finance', the 2021 IAAE Annual Conference, the 2021 RES Annual Conference, the 2022 ASSA Annual Meeting, the 2022 LAMES-LACEA Conference, and seminar participants at Paris Dauphine, Lancaster University, University of Navarra, Queen Mary University London, University of Surrey, University of Bologna, University of Copenhagen, University of Pretoria, the T3M seminar series, and the Warwick macroeconomics workshop for insightful comments. We are grateful to Now-Casting Economics and CrossBorder Capital Ltd for giving us access to the Global Liquidity Indexes dataset. We thank Václav Žďárek for excellent research assistance. The authors acknowledge support from the British Academy: Leverhulme Small Research Grant SG170723.

1 Introduction

The recent tightening of monetary policy in the United States has sparked a renewed debate about the potentially destabilising effects of spillovers from US policy shocks on the frontier and emerging markets, as well as on advanced economies like the UK and the Euro Area. The status of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency and its dominant role in global trade and financial markets means that the Federal Reserve’s decisions have a far-reaching impact beyond the US.

The classic Mundell-Fleming model identifies two channels of international transmission of monetary policy. On the one hand, an increase in US interest rates has a contractionary effect on domestic demand, which leads to lower demand for both domestic and foreign goods (‘demand-augmenting’ effect). On the other hand, the appreciation of the dollar makes foreign goods relatively cheaper, leading to a shift in demand away from home-produced goods and towards foreign goods (‘expenditure-switching’ effect). These two channels partially offset each other.

In addition to these traditional channels, US monetary policy can affect the rest of the world through financial linkages ([Rey, 2013, 2016](#); [Farhi and Werning, 2014](#); [Bruno and Shin, 2015a,b](#)). A Fed rate hike transmits along the yield curve at longer maturities and reduces the price of risky financial assets. Portfolio rebalancing by investors in the integrated global financial market can put upward pressure on foreign long-term yields and downward pressure on the prices of foreign risky assets. This determines a correlation between US and foreign assets and can trigger a sudden deterioration of financing and financial conditions abroad, destabilising capital flows from foreign countries.

From an empirical point of view, the overall impact of policy spillovers and the relative strength of different channels are important open questions, plagued with technical difficulties. In his Mundell-Fleming lecture, [Bernanke \(2017\)](#) outlined some of the challenges and issues with existing evidence on this topic. First, monetary policy actions are largely endogenous to economic conditions and have strong signalling and coordination effects. Second, the limited availability of high-frequency data on financial and cross-border flows has constrained much of the literature. Finally, there are many dimensions along which countries may differ that can influence the transmission of external shocks – their cyclical positions and structural features such as trade exposure, openness to foreign capital, exchange rate and policy regimes.

We take on these three challenges to provide precise estimates of the impact of US monetary policy across the globe. First, we use a high-frequency identification (HFI) strategy for conventional monetary policy shocks that is robust to the information channel of monetary policy ([Romer and Romer, 2004](#); [Melosi, 2017](#)). This strategy exploits intra-day revisions in the price of federal funds futures around FOMC announcements as an instrument to identify monetary policy shocks. In order to isolate exogenous variation in market expectations about the policy rate it controls for the potential disclosure of information by the Fed to market participants using the informationally robust methodology proposed by [Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco \(2021\)](#). Second, we compiled an extensive and harmonised monthly dataset that includes a wide range of macroeconomic and financial variables for the US, 15 advanced economies (AEs), and 15 emerging markets (EMs), as well as a comprehensive set of global indicators. This dataset also incorporates country-specific and aggregate harmonised monthly indexes of credit flows and liquidity conditions.¹ The dataset includes over 150,000 observations, spanning the period from 1990:1 to 2018:12, which can qualify it as ‘big macro data’ (see [Giannone et al., 2021](#)). Third, we use Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) techniques to efficiently deal with the dataset and examine the international transmission of US monetary policy.

In our empirical analysis, we first offer a landscape view of the effects of a monetary tightening on the world economy by focusing on global economic indicators. We then use country-level data and median estimators to compare the average transmission of the shock in advanced and emerging markets. By analysing the transmission of the shock through different blocks of variables in our VAR, we provide evidence on the importance of the different variables in transmitting the shock. Additionally, we examine differences at the country level by conditioning responses to exchange rate regimes, the openness of capital markets, exposure to the dollar, and share of dollar trade invoicing. Finally, we explore the potential for asymmetric effects of tightenings in particularly fragile economies.

Our research reveals a number of novel findings. First, a US monetary policy tightening has large and fairly homogeneous real and nominal contractionary spillover effects onto both AEs and EMs. Previous studies have reported, on average, contractionary

¹Along with official data from the IMF, we employ CrossBorder Capital Ltd indicators on liquidity and financial conditions, covering all of the economies of interest at monthly frequency. The underlying data are mostly publicly available and obtainable from the BIS and various statistical offices.

effects on output (and often mixed results on prices), with heterogeneous effects at the country level ([Dedola et al., 2017](#); [Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019](#)). Our paper shows that both real variables and prices contract for most of the economies – except the most fragile ones – with a pattern of responses that is both more robust and more homogeneous across countries than previously reported. While different in magnitude, the responses of real, nominal, and financial variables abroad are in line with the domestic effects of US monetary policy. This provides a striking visual image of the role of the Fed as the global central bank.

Second, while the contraction of both output and prices would simplify the policy problem for non-US central banks, the presence of strong financial spillovers limits the effectiveness of their policy response and reduces the degree of insulation provided by exchange rates. Our results show that changes in risk premia triggered by a US tightening shift up the long-end of the yield curve, tightening financial conditions abroad against the policy easing of the central bank. This mechanism explains the sizeable spillover effects on foreign economies, including the advanced economies with inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate. However, a comparative analysis reveals that, for both real and nominal variables, the spillovers are larger in countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes. These findings extend the important results of [Kalemli-Özcan \(2019\)](#) on the short- to medium-term response of the yield curve in emerging markets and show that this mechanism is at play not only for those economies but also for advanced ones, with stronger effects at medium- to long-term maturities. These results also provide new insights into the Trilemma debate and the constraints on monetary independence imposed by financial integration (see [Rey, 2013](#)). Additionally, we find that AEs and EMs with more open capital markets experience stronger negative responses in industrial production and CPI than those with less open capital markets.

Third, we show that commodity and oil prices play a critical role in the transmission of US policy shocks to nominal variables around the world. This ‘commodity price channel’ is a new and previously unreported channel in the literature on global spillovers. The intuition behind this channel is that a US monetary policy tightening affects not only domestic conditions but also global demand. This, in turn, puts downward pressure on commodity and oil prices and is reflected in the differential response of headline CPI compared to core CPI: while the former contracts, the latter remains stable.

A simple model offers insight into how the relative strength of the financial channels and the commodity price channel shapes the overall transmission to prices and real variables and conditions the policy problem of the foreign central banks. The model rationalises the average contractionary responses across advanced and emerging economies of prices and real variables due to the existence of sizeable financial frictions and strong commodity price spillovers, for most of the economies in our sample. For fragile economies characterised by strong financial spillovers and a high pass-through of imported prices, the model predicts upward pressure on prices due to the deterioration of the terms of trade, following a US tightening. The central bank is forced to engage in a domestic tightening to stabilise the economy and the exchange rate. Interestingly, we show that impulse response functions for the most fragile economies in our sample bring this response pattern typical of currency crises.

Our results have important policy implications. The depth and reach of the international spillover effects of US monetary policy call for ex-ante macro-prudential policies, policy coordination, and possibly the activation of multiple monetary policy tools to absorb external shocks. Flexible exchange rates provide a substantial degree of insulation but cannot entirely prevent spillovers via financial variables that limit the ability of a central bank to fully stabilise the economy. For most of the countries in our sample, a US monetary policy shock appears as a negative demand shock that contracts prices and output, calling for a loosening of the domestic policy stance. However, movements in risk premia destabilise long-term maturities and limit the transmission of conventional monetary policy along the yield curve, potentially calling for policy interventions to steady the yield curve and support financial conditions.

Finally, our findings on the insulation effects of capital flow management suggest that these measures may have a role to play in helping fragile economies and in emergency situations to reduce volatility and stabilise economies, in line with the International Monetary Fund's most recent institutional view (see for instance [IMF, 2018](#)). However, it is important to note that our results are positive and not normative: while focusing on the dynamic response to US shocks, we do not address the potential side effects or long-term effects of such measures.

The structure of the paper is the following. The remainder of this section provides a

review of the relevant literature. Section 2 describes the methodology and the data used in our empirical exercises. Section 3 discusses the effects of US monetary policy on the global economy, studies the transmission of US shocks to a set of AEs and EMs, explores the channels of transmission of these shocks, and discusses differences and similarities in the responses across countries. Section 4 introduces a simplified model to rationalise our key empirical results on the relative importance of different channels. Section 5 studies the asymmetric response of fragile economies to US tightenings and loosening. Section 6 explores the importance of structural features – such as exchange rate regimes, capital flow management, and dollar exposure – in the transmission of the shocks. Section 7 concludes.

Related Literature. Our work is closely related to [Rey \(2013\)](#)’s Jackson Hole lecture and to a number of her subsequent works with other scholars, which have documented the existence of a ‘Global Financial Cycle’ in the form of a common factor across international asset prices and different types of capital flows ([Passari and Rey, 2015](#); [Gerko and Rey, 2017](#); [Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020](#); [Miranda-Agrippino et al., 2020](#)).² Building on those works, we study the international spillovers of conventional US monetary policy by employing an informationally robust identification strategy and a large cross-section of countries and variables. We connect to an extensive literature that has generally reported sizeable real and/or nominal effects with a large heterogeneity across countries and periods.^{3,4} We complement these previous results by showing more robust patterns of response with the adoption of modern econometric and identification techniques.

The works of [Dedola et al. \(2017\)](#), and [Iacoviello and Navarro \(2019\)](#) are the most

²Recent papers documenting capital flow cycles are [Forbes and Warnock \(2012a\)](#); [Cerutti et al. \(2019\)](#); [Acalin and Rebucci \(2020\)](#); [Jordà et al. \(2019\)](#).

³Some early contributions to US monetary policy spillovers include: [Kim \(2001\)](#), [Forbes and Chinn \(2004\)](#), [Canova \(2005\)](#), [Maćkowiak \(2007\)](#), [Craine and Martin \(2008\)](#), [Ehrmann and Fratzscher \(2009\)](#), [Wongswan \(2009\)](#), [Bluedorn and Bowdler \(2011\)](#), [Hausman and Wongswan \(2011\)](#), [Fukuda et al. \(2013\)](#). A number of papers have studied the effects of US monetary policy on Europe, or vice-versa, or compared the spillovers from the US and the Euro Area. Among others, [Ehrmann and Fratzscher \(2005\)](#), [Fratzscher et al. \(2016\)](#), [Brusa et al. \(2020\)](#), [Ca’ Zorzi et al. \(2020\)](#). A different stream of literature has focused on spillovers to EMs in different settings: [Chen et al. \(2014\)](#), [Takats and Vela \(2014\)](#), [Aizenman et al. \(2016\)](#), [Ahmed et al. \(2017\)](#), [Anaya et al. \(2017\)](#), [Bhattarai et al. \(2017\)](#), [Siklos \(2018\)](#), [Coman and Lloyd \(2022\)](#), [Vicondoa \(2019\)](#), [Bhattarai et al. \(2021\)](#).

⁴While our focus is on conventional monetary policy, a number of works have discussed spillovers from unconventional monetary policy actions. For example, [Neely \(2012\)](#), [Bauer and Neely \(2014\)](#) (long-term yields), [Stavrakeva and Tang \(2015\)](#) (exchange rates), [Fratzscher et al. \(2018\)](#) (portfolio flows), [Rogers et al. \(2018\)](#) (risk premia), [Curcucu et al. \(2018\)](#) (conventional vs. unconventional).

closely related to ours in terms of data coverage. Compared to them and a number of previous studies, we take a step forward by adopting a high-frequency identification strategy that crucially controls for the information channel of monetary policy and Bayesian techniques that, in combination with a large set of indicators and countries, deliver a landscape view on the international transmission of US monetary policy shocks (see also [Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020](#); [di Giovanni et al., 2022](#); [Cesa-Bianchi and Sokol, 2022](#)).⁵ Notably, [Ilzetzki and Jin \(2021\)](#) find that there has been a structural change in the international transmission of US monetary policy: a US tightening is expansionary abroad since the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that this is possibly due to problems with the identification of the monetary policy shock. Not controlling for information effects when identifying monetary policy shocks can confound the effects of monetary policy and the propagation of other macroeconomic shocks. If the relative importance of the shocks varies over time, this might incorrectly lead to the conclusion that there are breaks in the structural parameters.

Our results complement the literature that studies financial spillovers via cross-border bank lending and international credit channels, by which an appreciation of the dollar causes valuation effects, and the risk-taking channel, where US monetary policy affects the risk profile and the leverage of financial institutions, firms, and investment funds.^{6,7}

We also compare the transmission across policy regimes and other structural characteristics. A number of works have reported that short-term rates of countries adopting a flexible exchange rate are less correlated with the policy rate of the centre country than those of peggers and interpreted this as evidence in favour of the effectiveness of flexible rate arrangements.⁸ Our results shed new light on this by showing that the limited transmission of domestic policy impulses due to movements in risk premia along the

⁵A few papers, such as [Georgiadis \(2016\)](#), [Feldkircher and Huber \(2016\)](#), and [Dées and Galesi \(2021\)](#), have also used large panels of countries in Global VAR settings. Compared to these, our approach affords us more modelling flexibility, since we refrain from using GDP or trade weights to model international interactions, and avoids imposing restrictions on the signs of the responses to identify monetary policy shocks.

⁶As a reference to a cross-border bank lending channel, see, among others, [Cetorelli and Goldberg \(2012\)](#); [Bruno and Shin \(2015a\)](#); [Cerutti et al. \(2017\)](#); [Temesvary et al. \(2018\)](#); [Avdjiev and Hale \(2019\)](#); [Buch et al. \(2019\)](#); [Moraes et al. \(2019\)](#); [Albrizio et al. \(2020\)](#); [Bräuning and Ivashina \(2020\)](#).

⁷Studies on the risk-taking channel include, among others, [Adrian and Song Shin \(2010\)](#); [Ammer et al. \(2010\)](#); [Devereux and Yetman \(2010\)](#); [Borio and Zhu \(2012\)](#); [Bekaert et al. \(2013\)](#); [Morris and Shin \(2014\)](#); [Bruno and Shin \(2015a\)](#); [Adrian et al. \(2019\)](#); [Cesa-Bianchi and Sokol \(2022\)](#); [Kaufmann \(2020\)](#).

⁸See, for instance, [Shambaugh \(2004\)](#); [Obstfeld et al. \(2005, 2004\)](#); [di Giovanni and Shambaugh \(2008\)](#); [Goldberg \(2013\)](#); [Klein and Shambaugh \(2015\)](#); [Obstfeld \(2015\)](#); [Aizenman et al. \(2016\)](#); [Georgiadis and Mehl \(2016\)](#); [Obstfeld et al. \(2019\)](#); [Kalemli-Özcan \(2019\)](#).

maturity structure of the yield curve impairs the effectiveness of the countercyclical monetary policy. We also revisit previous results on capital flow management that pointed to the limited effectiveness of these measures (see, for example, [Miniane and Rogers, 2007](#)). Though silent about the side-effects of such policies, our results indicate that financial openness plays a potentially important role in determining the degree of spillovers that originated in the US.⁹ Similar results for both conventional and unconventional monetary policy have been recently reported by [Kearns et al. \(2018\)](#).

Finally, and more broadly, our results speak to the important literature on reference (see [Ilzetzki et al., 2019](#)) and dominant currencies (see [Gourinchas and Rey, 2007](#); [Maggiori, 2017](#); [Gourinchas et al., 2019](#); [Maggiori et al., 2019](#); [Gopinath et al., 2020](#)).

2 Data and Empirical Methodology

A central challenge to the study of the international propagation of US monetary policy is how to efficiently extract the dynamic causal relationships from a vast number of time series covering both global and national variables. Our approach combines three elements: a novel harmonised dataset spanning a large number of countries and variables (described in [Section 2.1](#)); a high-frequency informationally robust identification of US monetary policy shocks (presented in [Section 2.2](#)); and state-of-the-art Bayesian dynamic models able to handle large information sets (discussed in [Section 2.3](#)).

2.1 Data

Our dataset contains over 150,000 data-points covering the US, 30 foreign economies, the Euro Area as an aggregate, and global economic indicators from 1990 to 2018. Most of our data are publicly available and provided by national statistical offices, treasuries, central banks, or international organisations (IMF, OECD, and BIS). We also employ liquidity and cross-border flow data at a global and national level from CrossBorder Capital Ltd, a private data provider specialising in the monitoring of global liquidity flows. All variables are monthly.¹⁰

⁹Side effects of capital flow management measures are discussed, for instance, in [Forbes \(2007\)](#); [Forbes et al. \(2016\)](#); [Erten et al. \(2019\)](#).

¹⁰If the original series are collected at a daily frequency, we take the end-of-month value.

In terms of global aggregates, the dataset includes 16 indicators: industrial production, CPI, and stock price index of OECD countries, the differential between average short-term interest rate across 15 AEs in our dataset and the US, the global economic activity index of Kilian (2019), the real CRB commodity price index, the real global price of Brent crude oil, and 3 major currency exchange rates per USD: Euro, Pound Sterling, and Japanese Yen. It also includes gross inflows and outflows of EMs from the IMF Balance of Payments (BOP) and four world-aggregated liquidity indexes from CrossBorder Capital Ltd (financial conditions, risk appetite, fixed income and equity holdings).¹¹ The financial conditions index represents short-term credit spreads, including the deposit-loan spreads. Risk appetite is based on the balance sheet exposure of all investors between equity and bonds. It measures their allocation between ‘risky’ assets (equities and corporate bonds) and ‘safe’ assets (government bonds, cash, and gold bullion).¹² Finally, equity and fixed income holdings measure the holdings of listed equities and both corporate and government fixed income assets, respectively.¹³

At the national level, our dataset covers 30 economies (15 AEs and 15 EMs in Table 1), plus the US and the Euro Area as a whole. For each of these countries, we collect 15 indicators: industrial production, CPI, core CPI, stock price index, export-import ratio, trade volume, nominal bilateral exchange rate, short-term interest rate, policy rate, long-term interest rate, plus five liquidity indices (financial conditions, risk appetite, net cross-border flows, fixed income and equity holdings). The cross-border flows index captures all financial flows into a currency, including banking and all portfolio flows (bonds and equities). It is estimated from national trade and current account data, movements in foreign exchange reserves, and (interpolated) quarterly data on net FDI flows. For the US, we also collect the excess bond premium from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), the VIX index, and the IMF BOP gross inflows and outflows. We substitute the nominal

¹¹Following the convention, we construct gross inflows and outflows from the IMF BOP data. For instance, gross inflows are the sum of the net incurrence of liabilities in direct, other, and portfolio investment flows from the financial account. Gross outflows are the sum of the net acquisition of assets in the three components above. We interpolate the resulting series, originally at a quarterly frequency, to obtain monthly observations.

¹²These indices vary between 0 and 100, with 50 indicating ‘neutral’ relative to a 40-month moving average.

¹³Table C.2 in the Online Appendix lists all global aggregates and the US variables in our dataset and details the sources, sample availability, and transformations. EM inflows and outflows are the sum of inflows/outflows of 15 EMs in our dataset, plus Hong Kong, which has played the role of the financial centre for China since 1999. Table C.3 in the Online Appendix lists the variables we collect for each country and the US counterparts, detailing the transformations. Table C.4 in the Online Appendix lists the short-term rates used to construct the interest rate differential.

Table 1: Country coverage

Advanced	Estimation sample	Emerging	Estimation Sample
Australia	1990:01 - 2018:12	Brazil	1999:12 - 2018:11
Austria	1990:01 - 2018:12	Chile	1995:05 - 2018:05
Belgium	1990:01 - 2018:12	China	1994:08 - 2018:08
Canada	1990:01 - 2018:12	Colombia	2002:09 - 2018:11
Denmark	1999:10 - 2018:12	Czech Rep.	2000:04 - 2018:11
Finland	1990:01 - 2018:12	Hungary	1999:02 - 2018:11
France	1990:01 - 2018:12	India	1994:05 - 2018:08
Germany	1990:01 - 2018:12	Malaysia	1996:01 - 2017:12
Italy	1990:01 - 2018:12	Mexico	1998:11 - 2018:02
Japan	1997:10 - 2018:12	Philippines	1999:02 - 2018:02
Netherlands	1990:01 - 2018:12	Poland	2001:01 - 2018:12
Norway	1995:10 - 2018:12	Russia	1999:01 - 2018:06
Spain	1990:01 - 2018:12	South Africa	1990:01 - 2018:12
Sweden	2001:10 - 2018:12	Thailand	1999:01 - 2018:05
UK	1990:01 - 2018:12	Turkey	2000:06 - 2018:10

Notes: The table lists the advanced and emerging countries in our data set and reports the estimation sample for the exercises in Sections 3 and 6.

bilateral exchange rate with the nominal effective exchange rate and exclude the short-term interest rates. Instead, the monetary policy indicator is the 1-year treasury constant maturity rate.

Our benchmark estimation sample spans January 1990 to September 2018 to minimise the impact of historical transformations of the global economy – e.g. the end of the Cold War and the transition of China to a market economy – and also to align the data with our US monetary policy instrument.¹⁴ In Section 6 we classify the countries in our dataset based on selected observables: the degree of capital market openness, exchange rate regimes, trade shares invoiced in USD, and dollar exposure. We divide countries into more- or less-open capital markets based on Chinn and Ito (2006)’s index. We also provide a robustness check based on the measure provided in Fernández et al. (2016). Classification into pegging, managed floating, and freely floating regimes is based on Ilzetzi et al. (2019). Data on the US dollar trade invoicing is from Gopinath (2015). Our measure of dollar exposure is based on Bénétrix et al. (2015). Countries are divided

¹⁴The estimation sample for the global exercise described in Section 3 spans the period from 1990:01 to 2018:12. However, given the different availability of data across countries, the estimation sample used in the ‘median economy’ exercises described in Section 3 varies. Table 1 details the estimation samples used in each bilateral system.

into groups based on the median over the sample period of these indices.¹⁵

2.2 Identification of the US Monetary Policy Shock

High-frequency market surprises around monetary policy announcements have been used extensively to identify monetary policy shocks (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Gertler and Karadi, 2015). The rationale is that any movement observed in a set of asset prices in a tight 30-minute window around FOMC announcements captures unexpected changes in market beliefs about the monetary policy stance. This approach provides an instrument to identify the causal effects of monetary policy. However, recent literature has documented the existence of a signalling channel of monetary policy that questions the exogeneity of this instrument. Monetary policy actions convey to imperfectly informed agents signals about the Fed’s view of the state of the economy (Romer and Romer, 2000; Melosi, 2017). Intuitively, to informationally constrained agents, a policy rate hike can signal either a deviation of the central bank from its monetary policy rule (i.e. a contractionary monetary shock) or better-than-expected fundamentals to which the monetary authority is endogenously responding. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021) and Jarociński and Karadi (2020) show that high-frequency surprises combine policy shocks with information about the state of the economy due to the information disclosed through the policy action.

To obtain a clean measure of conventional monetary policy, we adopt the informationally robust instrument of Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021) that directly controls for the signalling channel of monetary policy. This instrument is constructed by regressing high-frequency market surprises in the fourth federal fund future onto a set of Greenbook forecasts for output, inflation, and unemployment.¹⁶ Intuitively, the Greenbook forecasts and revisions directly control the information set of the central bank, hence the macroeconomic information transferred to the agents through the announcement: the signalling channel of monetary policy. This instrument is available from January 1990 to December 2009. We identify conventional US monetary policy shocks using this informationally ro-

¹⁵Although this method for grouping countries necessarily misclassifies some countries for some periods, our results in Section 6 validate our classification.

¹⁶We focus on conventional monetary policy because of the additional complications connected to identifying other dimensions of monetary policy. In principle, it is possible to obtain instruments that capture forward guidance or quantitative easing while controlling for information effects by complementing the procedure in Swanson (2021) with the methodology of Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021). See Degasperis and Ricco (2021) for a discussion.

bust instrument in a Proxy SVAR/SVAR-IV setting (Stock and Watson, 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2013).

2.3 BVARs and Asymmetric Priors

In our analysis, we consider two main empirical specifications:¹⁷

- A **US-global VAR** incorporating 32 variables: 16 for the global economy and 16 for the US.
- A battery of 31 **US-foreign country bilateral VARs** covering the 30 countries considered plus the Euro Area. Each model contains 16 US macroeconomic variables, 15 foreign financial and macroeconomic indicators, and three global controls: the global price of Brent crude oil, the CRB commodity price index, and Kilian (2019)’s global economic activity index.

The adoption of large endogenous information sets in our bilateral VAR models captures the rich economic dynamics at the country level and the many potential channels through which US monetary policy can affect the rest of the world. Global controls in the bilateral system allow for higher-order transmission channels induced by interactions among countries that are important in correctly capturing international spillovers (see discussion in Georgiadis, 2017). In line with the standard macroeconometric practice for monthly data, we consider VAR models that include 12 lags of endogenous variables.

The use of large information sets requires efficient big data techniques to estimate the models. We adopt a Bayesian approach with informative Minnesota priors (Litterman, 1986). These are the most commonly adopted macroeconomic priors for VARs and formalise the view that an independent random-walk model for each variable in the system is a reasonable centre for the beliefs about their time series behaviour (see Sims and Zha, 1998). In particular, in estimating the VAR models, we elicit asymmetric Minnesota priors, which break the symmetry across the VAR equations and enable us to set tighter priors for some lags of selected regressors in a particular equation. This allows us to rule out a direct response of selected US variables to economic conditions in other countries.

¹⁷Table C.2 in the Online Appendix lists all global and US variables in our specification. Due to data availability, Core CPI, Fixed Income, and Equity Holdings are used only in the endogenous set of AEs. Hence, the bilateral system of EMs includes only 12 domestic variables and 15 US variables. Table C.1 in the Online Appendix reports the specifications for each exercise.

Specifically, in the US-global system, we allow the US variables, the oil price, and the commodity price index to respond endogenously to each other but to respond to global conditions only via the global economic activity index.

Similarly, in the bilateral systems, we impose a tight prior for all coefficients directly connecting US variables to periphery country indicators. In other words, the US variables, the commodity price index, the oil price, and the global economic activity index do not endogenously respond to the periphery country indicators but can react with each other. Therefore, we allow for an indirect response of US variables via higher-order effects (as proposed in [Georgiadis, 2017](#)). These restrictions reduce parameter uncertainty and alleviate multicollinearity problems, which are particularly relevant when studying the transmission channels of US monetary policy.

The adoption of asymmetric priors complicates the estimation problem, making it impossible to use dummy variables to implement the priors. Instead, we employ the efficient methodology proposed in [Chan \(2022\)](#).¹⁸ The tightness of the priors' hyperparameters is estimated by using the optimal prior selection approach proposed by [Giannone et al. \(2015\)](#).

2.4 Estimation of Median-Group Responses

In several exercises, we estimate median group dynamic responses to US monetary policy shocks for selected groups of countries based on some common structural characteristic. The goal is to provide an indication of how a synthetic 'median' economy, representative of the underlying group, would be affected by the shock. To do this, we aggregate the bilateral VARs to obtain the median result across countries, which we interpret as the median group estimator. While less efficient than the pooled estimator under dynamic homogeneity, it delivers consistent estimates of the average dynamic effect of shocks if dynamic heterogeneity is present (see [Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013](#), for a discussion).¹⁹ Moreover, our approach affords us more modelling flexibility than global VARs, where

¹⁸Standard Minnesota priors are implemented as Normal-Inverse Wishart priors that force symmetry across equations because the coefficients of each equation are given the same prior variance matrix. This implies that own lags and lags of other variables must be treated symmetrically.

¹⁹If we were willing to assume that the data-generating process featured dynamic homogeneity across countries (and to condition on the initial values of the endogenous variables), a pooled estimation with fixed effects, capturing idiosyncratic but constant heterogeneities across units, would be the standard approach to estimate the parameters of the model. However, in our setting, dynamic heterogeneity seems to be a likely property of the systems.

GDP or trade weights are necessary to model international interactions. Importantly, we opt for the median group estimator instead of the mean group estimator to reduce the importance of outliers (e.g. episodes of hyperinflation in some countries within the sample period).

The estimation of posterior coverage bands for the parameters of interest relies on the standard Gibbs sampling algorithm. We aggregate the country responses into ‘median’ economy responses as follows: we take one draw out of the distribution of impulse responses of a specific variable for each country and compute the median at each horizon across countries. We repeat this for all available draws and for all variables. This delivers structural impulse responses for each variable that can be interpreted as the response of the ‘median’ economy to the shock. What we report in the charts are the median, 68%, and 90% posterior coverage bands computed over these ‘median’ draws.²⁰

2.5 Disentangling the Channels of Transmission

Part of this paper is devoted to quantifying the relative importance of the various channels of transmission of the shock. While a fully structural exercise would require a multi-country DSGE model, a channel decomposition exercise can be performed with our estimated VARs. This is done by zeroing out the transmission coefficients on specific endogenous variables that are thought to capture the channels of interest and comparing the responses from the restricted and unrestricted systems. The larger the difference in the responses, the more important the role played by those variables in the transmission of the shock. In practice, the coefficients are set to zero on all the lags of the selected variables in all the equations of the reduced-form VAR. Then, the structural form is recovered, and the impulse responses are generated. A similar approach is used in [Ramey \(1993\)](#) and [Uribe and Yue \(2006\)](#) (see also [Dées and Galesi, 2021](#) and [Vicondoa, 2019](#)).

It is important to stress that this exercise is not a structural scenario analysis, and its merits should not be assessed against a Lucas critique type of argument. We are merely interested in establishing the marginal contribution of specific variables in the transmission of the shock.²¹

²⁰See the Online Appendix, Section [B](#), for additional details.

²¹While in principle we could perform a policy scenario analysis as discussed in [Antolín-Díaz et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Georgiadis et al. \(2021\)](#), the type of restrictions we discuss here are most likely to fail the full support and conditional independence assumptions that would be required in order to justify such an exercise (see [Kocherlakota, 2019](#)).

3 The Global Propagation of U.S. Monetary Policy

What are the effects of US monetary policy actions on the global economy and how are they transmitted? We answer these questions in three steps. First, we focus on global aggregates. We estimate a bilateral VAR incorporating 32 US and global variables on the sample from January 1990 to December 2018 and trace the impulse responses to a US monetary policy tightening. Second, we study how US monetary policy transmits differentially to AEs and EMs. We estimate 30 bilateral VARs, each one incorporating variables for the US and for one of the 30 countries in our sample, and aggregate the individual country responses into median responses for AEs and EMs. Third, we perform a channel decomposition exercise to assess the relative importance of the various mechanism of international transmission of US monetary policy.

3.1 U.S. Tightenings Cause Global Recessions


Following a tightening of US monetary policy, the global economy contracts sharply (Figure 1). A monetary tightening that increases the US 1-year treasury rate by 1% causes a contraction in OECD industrial production by 1.5% and a contraction in OECD CPI by 0.5% at the trough, roughly 6 months after the shock. The deterioration of global economic activity is also visible in the downward adjustment of real commodity (-5%) and oil prices (-15%).

Global financial conditions deteriorate. Global risk appetite falls, and equity holdings decrease, suggesting worldwide portfolio rebalancing towards safe assets, in a risk-off scenario. These adjustments, marked by an appreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis major currencies, lead to a global contraction in cross-border flows, inducing outflows and immobilising capital particularly in EMs: they experience both a contraction in inflows and a sharp surge in outflows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012b). The deterioration of global economic conditions and portfolio rebalancing out of risky assets put downward pressure on foreign asset prices, and the world's stock markets revise downwards.²²

The landscape view of the response of the global economy to US monetary policy provides a powerful image of the Fed as a global central bank. The global and domestic effects of US monetary policy are similar in magnitude: following the shock, production in

²²The OECD ex. NA stock price index is a weighted average of stock prices in AEs excluding North America, so the comovement with US stock prices is not mechanical.

Figure 1: GLOBAL EFFECTS OF US MONETARY POLICY



Note: Global responses to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. Informationally robust high-frequency identification. Sample 1990:01 – 2018:12. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands. These responses are estimated jointly to those reported in Figure D.1, in the Online Appendix, which also shows the response of the policy indicator.

the US declines by 2.5%, while prices contract by 0.5%.²³ Consistently with the literature on the ‘global financial cycle’, the dynamics of stock prices and other financial variables in the US and the global economy are largely synchronised, conditionally on a US tightening

²³The US domestic impulse responses are reported in Figure D.1 in the Online Appendix.

(Rey, 2013).

In line with the responses of global aggregates, the contractionary effects of a US monetary tightening are also evident at the country level. Both the median AE and EM experience contraction in output, persistent deflationary pressure on CPI, and sharp tightening of financial conditions. The effects on the two median countries differ in magnitude but present strong similarities in the dynamics (Figure 2).²⁴

Following a negative shock that increases the US 1-year rate by 1%, industrial production contracts by 1.4% for the median AE and 2.5% for the median EM, at the trough, roughly 6 months after the shock. At the same time, CPI contracts by 0.4% for the AE and by 1% for the EM. These results indicate that in both groups, the effect of higher import prices is dominated by the contraction in aggregate demand and in commodity prices. The responses of the AE include core CPI, which also falls, although it is only significant at the 68% level. This points to the importance of commodity and oil prices in the transmission of the shock to consumer prices.

In both median economies, the domestic currency depreciates vis-à-vis the dollar.²⁵ Far from being stimulative of domestic export, we find that the demand-reducing effect of the US tightening dominates over the expenditure-switching effect: gross trade volumes plummet by 6% for the AE and by 13.5% for the EM, while changes in the export-import ratio are insignificant, pointing to a symmetric contraction of export and import (similarly to Gopinath et al., 2020).

The US tightening triggers a risk-off scenario. Financial conditions and risk appetite deteriorate. The stock market plummets, and investors shift their asset allocation away from riskier investments. At the same time, capital flows out of EMs, albeit the response is only significant in the aggregate at the 68% level.²⁶ Overall, for both economies, financial channels seem to play a major role in the transmission of the shock.


An interesting case study is the Euro Area – a large economic bloc with a flexible exchange rate and open capital markets. Following a US monetary tightening, the Euro

²⁴It is important to stress that the quality and reliability of EMs data are of concern in any empirical exercise. The use of a relatively recent sample and the adoption of a median estimator help in averaging out and alleviating potential data issues.


²⁵EMs in our analysis have less flexible exchange rate regimes than AEs. None of our EMs is classified as a pure floater, and very few of them have hard pegs. We discuss this dimension in detail in Section 6.

²⁶In general, the EMs in our analysis have stricter capital controls than the advanced ones. The median value of the Chinn-Ito index for AEs is 0.965, while it is only 0.338 for EMs. Table C.5 in the Online Appendix reports the average values of the index for all countries.

Figure 2: MEDIAN RESPONSES OF ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES



(a) Median Advanced Economy



(b) Median Emerging Economy

Note: Median responses of the 15 AEs and 15 EMs to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. Informationally robust high-frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands.


Area also suffers from recessionary effects, with production contracting by 4% and CPI by 1% at the trough, roughly 5 months after the shock (Figure D.2 in the Online Appendix). This result is in line with the effects on the median AE and comparable to the results in Ca' Zorzi et al. (2020).

3.2 Risk Premia are a Concern also for AEs


A US monetary tightening appears as a negative demand shock to the rest of the world. In both the median AE and EM, the central bank reacts to the contractionary pressure by easing the policy stance (Figure 2). Our results show that the domestic monetary policy response of EMs to a US tightening is expansionary on average. In this sense, EMs' monetary policy is not pro-cyclical, as it is sometimes found in the literature that uses short-term market rates, which conflate policy stance and risk premia, as a proxy for policy rates (see De Leo et al., 2022, for a recent discussion). Indeed, in the AE, the policy easing is transmitted neatly to the short-term interest rate, while in the EM, the pass-through is only marginal. This is consistent with the result in Kalemli-Özcan (2019) of a disconnect between short-term and monetary policy rates in EMs.

For the median EM, the monetary authority eases monetary conditions with a lag. The effect materialises roughly 3 to 6 months after the shock and persists for 12 to 16 months. At the trough, the policy rate is cut by 50bp. The policy easing is not transmitted along the yield curve, as the short-term rate does not respond significantly and the long-term yields move upwards, although with a lag of 12 months. Long-term yields start to increase when the monetary policy normalisation begins. They increase by roughly 50bp. For the median AE, the responses are similar for what concerns the dynamics and the timings. The difference is in the magnitudes. The policy rate decreases by 20bp and long-term yields rise by 20bp. On impact the long-term yields drop, albeit not significantly. They revert back almost immediately, against the policy action. Overall, for both economies, the long-term rate moves up, inducing a steepening of the yield curve. This suggests that movements in risk premia impair the transmission of the policy action to the long end of the yield curve, hence to the economy, not only for EMs but also for AEs. Movements in risk premia limit the policy space in both groups of countries and create a powerful stumbling block on the ability of domestic central banks to respond to deteriorating economic conditions.

Figure 3: DISENTANGLING THE CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION



(a) Channels of Transmission, Global economy



(b) Channels of Transmission, Advanced Economies

Note: Lines correspond to impulse responses obtained: with the baseline specification (solid red); assuming the Brent crude and commodity prices do not react (solid black); exchange rates do not react (dashed black); financial conditions, risk appetite, cross-border flows, the excess bond premium, and VIX do not react (dashed-dotted black), the policy rate does not react (dotted). The shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. Informationally robust high-frequency identification. Sample for Figure 3a: 1990:01–2018:12. Sample for Figure 3b reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. A full set of responses can be found in the Online Appendix, Figures D.5 and D.6.

It is unclear what the specific types of risk determining these movements are, or if they are the same for both groups of countries. Although EMs now mostly finance themselves by issuing debt denominated in local currency, global investors may hold assets in local currency but incur liabilities predominantly in dollars (Carstens and Shin, 2019). This ‘original sin redux’ exposes EMs to capital flights in a risk-off scenario, which amplifies the risk of default and currency devaluation. These dynamics are probably less relevant for AEs, where risk premia reflect mostly duration risk.

3.3 Financial Channels and the ‘Commodity Price Channel’

What is the relative importance of the various channels at play in the international propagation of the shock? We perform a channel decomposition analysis for the global

VAR and for the median AE (Figure 3). In both cases, we employ the VAR models estimated in this section and sequentially shut down the following sets of variables: (i) real commodity and oil prices, (ii) nominal exchange rates, and (iii) a set of financial variables (financial conditions, risk appetite, cross-border flows, VIX, and Excess Bond Premium). This allows us to assess the relative importance of commodity prices, the exchange rate channel, and the financial channel in the transmission of the shock.²⁷ In the case of the median AE, we also consider the role of (iv) the domestic policy rate, which gauges the importance of the endogenous response of the domestic monetary authority.²⁸

Two results stand out. First, industrial production and the stock price contract less and rebound more quickly when the transmission via financial variables is shut, suggesting that financial channels play a major role in the global propagation of US monetary policy shocks. Second, the response of CPI becomes immaterial when oil and commodity prices cannot respond to the shock. This result is novel and shows that the contractionary effect of the shock on consumer prices is in fact driven by the contraction in oil and commodity prices, because of their importance in the headline inflation basket. This is what we label the commodity price channel. Once their effect is factored out, the upward pressure from the pass-through of higher dollar prices and the downward pressure from weaker demand roughly balance out.


The effects of central bank actions and exchange rates appear relatively small. This is not a surprise, given the limited propagation of the policy impulse due to the movements in risk premia that are prominent in the baseline results. The impairment in the transmission of domestic monetary policy is the main reason why we observe recessionary effects, as the central bank is not able to counteract the contractionary shock. In AEs, core CPI, which does not contain energy prices, shows a mild response with weaker dependence on commodity prices. The response of core CPI is partly explained by commodity prices and partly by financial variables. The role of the commodity price channel is due to the pass-through of higher commodity prices (relative to baseline) from headline to core prices. The role of the financial channel is due to the transmission from the real side, which recovers more quickly relative to the baseline, to the nominal side of the economy.

The existence of a commodity price channel postulates a significant response of com-

²⁷The methodology is discussed in Section 2.5.

²⁸It is important to notice that the set of variables used to capture the financial channel does not include all of the forward looking variables in the system, for instance commodity prices and exchange rates. As a consequence, we still control expectations about the future state of the economy.


Figure 4: COMMODITY PRICE CHANNEL




Note: Pooled responses across 15 AEs to a contractionary US monetary policy shock, normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. Informationally robust high-frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 68% and 90% posterior coverage bands of the pooled distribution of responses.

modity and oil prices to the US monetary policy shock. Figure 4 shows the pooled responses across AEs for oil and commodity prices. In line with our results from the global VAR, oil and commodity prices contract respectively by 20% and 5% at the trough, roughly 6 months after a US tightening. This contraction is consistent with the compression in global demand after the shock. Notably, this finding contrasts with Kilian and Zhou (2022)’s result that an exogenous increase in the US real interest rate causes only a modest and short-lived decline in the real price of oil (see also Frankel, 2008; Akram, 2009).²⁹ It is also interesting to notice that the negative comovement between commodity prices and the strength of the dollar induced by a US monetary policy tightening conforms with the observed negative correlation in these two series starting in the mid-1990s (Fratzscher et al., 2014). In broad terms, US monetary policy shocks induce (i) a strong contraction of real variables by activating financial channels and (ii) deflationary pressure via commodity prices.³⁰

Figure 5: HOMOGENEITY IN THE RESPONSES ACROSS COUNTRIES



(a) Advanced Economies



(b) Emerging Economies

Note: Coloured lines: median responses of the 15 AEs and 15 EMs. Shaded area: 90% posterior coverage bands for the responses of the median AE or EM. The shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. Informationally robust high-frequency identification. Sample reported in Table 1. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors.

3.4 Responses are Homogeneous Across Countries

We now explore whether the median group responses are masking a large degree of heterogeneity across countries, as reported in previous studies (Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019; Dedola et al., 2017). As shown in Figure 5, responses are fairly homogeneous across AEs and also EMs, albeit to a lesser degree. This contrasts with the finding of a large heterogeneity reported in the previous literature. In AEs, a marginal degree of

²⁹Notice that the interest rate shock in Kilian and Zhou (2022) is not a nominal monetary policy shock, as in the current paper, but a shock to the longer-term U.S. real rate of interest controlling for global shocks.

³⁰The channel analysis for the median EM, while not in contradiction with what we found for the AE, reveals a limited differential role for each group of variables (Figure D.7). Output still bounces back more when the financial variables do not react, but now it happens only after 9 months. Shutting the oil and commodity prices channel reduces the extent of the fall in headline inflation, but only marginally. No channel seems to be predominant in the transmission to stock prices.

heterogeneity is visible in the responses of production and CPI. Three countries display an increase in production on impact before contracting afterwards, while two countries exhibit an increase in CPI inflation, one on impact and the other with a delay. In this instance, the heterogeneity is due to differences in sample size. The responses of stock markets, exchange rates, and trade volumes show a striking degree of homogeneity.³¹

The same patterns hold for the EMs, albeit with more visible outliers. Across the responses, we observe remarkably stronger reactions in Brazil and Turkey, for instance. We explore such EMs with country-specific fragilities in more detail later in Section 5. A larger residual heterogeneity appears in cross-border flows, policy rates, and interest rates (Figure D.4 in the Online Appendix). This reflects the underlying heterogeneity in structural characteristics, policy frameworks, and country-specific risks. In fact, EMs in our sample differ along several dimensions: the monetary policy framework adopted, the degree of openness to capital flows, the dependence on dollar-denominated funds, and the prevalence of invoicing in dollars. Before exploring these dimensions further in Sections 5 and 6, we provide a framework to rationalise the results on median responses and the role of channels in the next section.

4 A Mundell-Fleming type Framework

The empirical results in the previous section show a common qualitative pattern for the median AE and EM, albeit with different quantitative effects. A tightening in the US induces an economy-wide contraction with a decline in output and asset prices, downward pressure on prices, depreciation of the exchange rate and contraction of trade volumes, and an overall tightening of financial conditions with the term premium moving against the domestic central bank easing. While such a pattern may be expected for AEs, it contrasts with the standard narrative about currency crises in EMs triggered by a monetary tightening in the US. There, the deep devaluation of the domestic currency forces the domestic central bank to tighten in order to stem the sharp outflows of capital and the mounting inflationary pressure.

This section provides a rationalisation of these results using a stylised Mundell-Fleming type model that is generalised to study the effects of the financial and com-

³¹The complete set of responses is shown in Figure D.3 in the Online Appendix.

modity price channels, which in our empirical analysis appear to dominate the output and price responses over the standard demand and exchange rate mechanisms. We build on [Blanchard \(2017\)](#) and [Gourinchas \(2018\)](#), which introduce financial spillovers and risk premia in a Mundell-Fleming setting with only real variables.

A domestic small open economy and the US – a large economy – are described by the following system of equations

$$Y = \underbrace{\xi - c(I - \Pi^e)}_{\text{domestic demand}} + \underbrace{a(Y^{US} - Y) + b(E + \Pi^{US} - \Pi)}_{\text{net export}} - \underbrace{f(E + \Pi^{US} - \Pi)}_{\text{financial spillovers}}, \quad (1)$$

$$Y^{US} = \xi^{US} - c(I^{US} - \Pi^{e,US}), \quad (2)$$

$$E = \underbrace{d(I^{US} - I) + E^e}_{\text{UIP}} + \underbrace{gI^{US} + \chi}_{\text{risk premia}}, \quad (3)$$

$$\Pi = eY + mE + hC, \quad (4)$$

$$\Pi^{US} = eY^{US} + hC, \quad (5)$$

$$C = lY^{US}, \quad (6)$$

where lowercase letters are the non-negative parameters of the model, and the variables are in deviation from the steady state. The nominal exchange rate, E , is defined as such that an increase corresponds to a depreciation of the domestic currency. Domestic output Y is a function of domestic demand, net exports, and financial spillovers. Domestic demand depends positively on a demand shifter, ξ , and negatively on the domestic real interest rate, $R = I - \Pi^e$. Net exports are increasing both in US output, Y^{US} , and in the real exchange rate, $\epsilon = E + \Pi^{US} - \Pi$, and decreasing in the domestic output. Financial spillovers impact domestic absorption and depend negatively on the real exchange rate, as in [Gourinchas \(2018\)](#). The financial spillover term captures different mechanisms through which an appreciation of the US dollar can affect the domestic economy via financial links. The relative importance of financial spillovers is gauged by the parameter f , with the model reverting to the standard Mundell-Fleming case for $f = 0$.

US output, Y^{US} , depends positively on a demand shifter, ξ^{US} , and negatively on the real interest rate, $I^{US} - \Pi^{e,US}$. The exchange rate E depends on the interest rate differential and the expected exchange rate E^e – the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) determinants – and a risk premia term that is a function of interest rates in the US, plus

an independent shock χ .

Domestic inflation, Π , is a function of the domestic output gap – a static Phillips curve –, the exchange rate, and the price of commodities, C . The last term captures direct spillovers to domestic prices via commodities and oil prices: a reduction in US demand can induce an adjustment in commodity prices that, in turn, transmits to headline inflation. Under the assumptions of dominant-currency pricing, US inflation Π^{US} is a function of US output but does not depend on the exchange rate.

Solving Equations (1) to (6), we find the effects on domestic output and inflation of an exogenous shift in the US nominal policy rate:³²

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial I^{US}} = \frac{1}{\psi} [(1 - m) (bd - fd + (b - f)g) - ac - ce(b - f)] , \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial I^{US}} = e \frac{\partial Y}{\partial I^{US}} + m(d + g) - hlc . \quad (8)$$


First, we discuss the transmission to output (Eq. 7). In the standard Mundell-Fleming, the effect of a US tightening on domestic output is given by $bd - ac$.³³ bd captures the expenditure-switching channel, while ac is the demand-augmenting effect. The sign of $bd - ac$ determines the baseline ‘classic’ transmission – i.e. whether a tightening in the US is expansionary or contractionary for the domestic economy, absent other channels. The financial channels are represented by fd , which captures the negative effect of a dollar appreciation on domestic output via financial spillovers, and by $(b - f)g$, which represents the effect of risk premia. Specifically, bg captures the stimulative effect of risk premia on domestic output via the trade balance, and fg represents the negative effect via financial spillovers. Finally, the terms ceb and cef represent the effects of lower US prices via the exchange rate and financial spillovers, respectively.

Second, we consider the response of prices (Eq. 8). The first term reflects the transmission from the real to the nominal side of the economy via the Phillips curve. The second term, $m(d + g)$, captures the direct effect of the appreciation of the dollar on import prices coming from the interest rate differential (md) and higher risk premia (mg).

³²We assume that the expectational variables Π^e , $\Pi^{e,US}$ and E^e are known constant, that we set to zero for the sake of simplicity. A detailed discussion of the model and its solution is reported in the Online Appendix, Section A.

³³In fact, absent financial spillovers (i.e. $f = g = \chi = 0$) and excluding any effect on domestic output coming from movements in prices (i.e. $e = m = h = 0$), the model reduces to the standard Mundell-Fleming, as a special case.

Figure 6: REAL AND NOMINAL SPILLOVERS



Notes: This schematic representation of the channels assumes that both thresholds \bar{f} and $\bar{\bar{f}}$ exist. Conditions for existence are given by Eq. A.14 and Eq. A.15 in the Online Appendix. It also assumes that in the classic Mundell-Fleming model, at the bottom-left corner of the diagram, a US monetary policy tightening has an expansionary effect abroad.

The third term is the effect on domestic inflation of lower commodity prices.

To explore the relative importance of financial and commodity price channels compared to the classic channels, let us focus on the case in which the expenditure-switching channel dominates the demand-augmenting effect, $bd > ac$, and hence a tightening in the US is expansionary abroad in the baseline Mundell-Fleming model. In Figure 6, this corresponds to the blue dot in the bottom-left corner.

As the strength of financial channels, f , increases from that point, simple derivations show that there exists a threshold, \bar{f} , above which a US tightening causes a decline in domestic output, irrespectively of the classic channels. It can also be easily shown that there exists a threshold, $\bar{\bar{f}} > \bar{f}$, separating the standard case where a domestic tightening contracts domestic output (below the threshold) from the case where a tightening induces

an expansion in the economy (above the threshold).³⁴ The two thresholds define the three horizontal regions of weak, intermediate, and strong financial spillovers in Figure 6 (see also Gourinchas, 2018).

If commodity price spillovers, h , are not too strong, a US tightening increases domestic inflation via the Phillips curve and the depreciation of the domestic currency. In particular, it can be shown that there exists a threshold, $\bar{h}(f)$, which is a monotonically decreasing function of f , separating the regions of weak and strong commodity price spillovers. Above this threshold, which is plotted in red in Figure 6, a tightening in the US creates deflationary pressure on domestic prices. Importantly, as the pass-through to domestic import prices, m , increases, the threshold $\bar{h}(f)$ shifts rightward. In other words, the stronger the pass-through, the larger the region of weak commodity price spillovers.³⁵

The empirical results in the previous section show that the median AE and EM in our sample can be characterised as having intermediate financial spillovers and substantial commodity price effects. In other words, a tightening in the US induces a contraction of prices and output, with larger effects on the EMs than the advanced ones. On the contrary, the model predicts another response pattern for economies that are particularly fragile to US spillovers and particularly sensitive to exchange rate pass-through: a tightening in the US would generate a deep contraction of the domestic output accompanied by strong inflationary pressure. The policy rate would have to hike in response to financial spillovers in order to support the economy and stabilise the exchange rate. The median aggregation across economies is likely to mask the underlying heterogeneity of EMs in terms of their overall fragility, policy regimes, and other structural characteristics that may determine the exposure to the US dollar. In the next section, we explore in detail the responses of what can be thought of as fragile economies before inspecting the potential heterogeneity in policy regimes and other structural characteristics in the last chapter.

³⁴Conditions for the existence of the two thresholds, \bar{f} and $\bar{\bar{f}}$, and for their existence on the support $[0, \hat{f}]$ are given in the Online Appendix, Section A. The Appendix also provides a discussion on the optimal monetary policy responses to spillovers.

³⁵By assumption, m has to be smaller than 1.

5 Asymmetric Effects in the ‘Fragile Five’

Emerging markets with pre-existing fragilities – heavy reliance on foreign capital and high exchange rate pass-through in particular – have been hit hard by sudden reversals of easing cycles in the US. Following US monetary loosening, financial conditions in EMs ease, as foreign capital flows into local bonds and risky assets. When the policy stance reverses and becomes a tightening, however, it often leads to economic crises in EMs with abrupt outflows of capital, increase in risk premia, and sharp devaluations of the domestic currency that, in turn, cause hyperinflation and deep recessions. These sudden stops justify a policy stance informed by the ‘fear of floating’, whereby domestic central banks hike interest rates in response to a tightening in the US.

This story is inconsistent with the responses to US monetary shocks of the median EM in Figure 2b. However, those responses are averages across different economies with largely heterogeneous degrees of exposure to the US dollar. To further explore this point, we now zoom in on the ‘fragile five’ EMs – Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, Chile, and Mexico – to provide a more granular view of how policy regimes and country-specific fragilities may interact in shaping asymmetric responses to US policy shocks. This is an interesting pool of countries, with high exposure to the US dollar and potentially a high exchange rate pass-through, that either experienced currency crises (Mexico in 1994, Brazil in 1999, and Turkey in 2001) or conducted particularly prudent monetary policy (Chile, South Africa, Mexico) for fear of exposing themselves to global shocks.


In studying the transmission of US monetary policy to these countries, we divide our monetary policy instrument into positive (tightening) and negative (loosening) surprises. Then, we identify the shock in the bilateral VARs by employing these two different external instruments.³⁶ For ease of comparison, in plotting the IRFs, we flip the loosening response and normalise both shocks to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year rate. For all five countries, we extend the sample back to the early 1990s.³⁷

The responses of ‘fragile five’ countries uncover asymmetries and patterns of responses

³⁶This amounts to assuming that while the system is still linear, tightenings and loosening are two different types of shock with distinct transmissions. It can be seen as a stylised way to gauge the extent of the different impacts of tightenings and loosening while maintaining large information sets. Alternatively, one could explore the same effects using a Local Projections approach. The two approaches are largely equivalent.

³⁷See Table C.9 in the Online Appendix for details on the sample, the interpolation method used to reconstruct some of the series, and the estimation set.

Figure 7: ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS IN THE ‘FRAGILE FIVE’



Note: Orange line – median responses of each EM to a contractionary US monetary policy shock. Dashed blue line – median responses of each EM to an expansionary shock. Shocks are normalised to induce a 100bp rise in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. Informationally robust high-frequency identification. Sample reported in Table C.9 in the Online Appendix. For Brazil, we replace IP by monthly GDP interpolated backwards from 1996:01 to 1990:01. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.

largely in line with the narrative evidence on sudden stop crises (Figure 7). Following a US tightening, all countries but Chile experience steep devaluations of the domestic currency that feeds into a high rate of inflation, while output contracts and short-term interest rates spike up. The rise in inflation is particularly dramatic in Turkey and Brazil. For instance, Turkey’s CPI increases by 5% on the impact of a tightening and the effect persists for 12 months. On the other hand, for a loosening, the response of prices is not significant, with a weaker effect on the exchange rate.

The dramatic surge in the short-term rate following a US tightening – that is par-

ticularly large on impact for Brazil, Turkey, and Chile – is due to the response of the policy rate and the increase in risk premia. Differently from the case of the median EM, the central banks react to plummeting exchange rates by hiking rates in the attempt of steadying the economy, as is visible in the response of the policy rates, where available.³⁸ This in turn exacerbates the contraction in domestic economic conditions.

These responses bear the pattern of the currency crises experienced by EMs (see, for example, [Eichengreen et al., 2007](#)).³⁹ Our results confirm both the narrative on currency crises and intuition provided by our model, whereby fragile economies can be characterised by strong financial spillovers and large exchange rate pass-through to prices. The monetary policy is forced to tighten in response to a US monetary tightening in order to stabilise the economy against capital flights and hyperinflation.

6 Exchange Rates and Capital Flow Management

Since the wave of financial crises in the EMs in the late 1990s, there has been a step change in macroeconomic policy, with most central banks embracing floating exchange rates, the build-up of large foreign exchange reserves in an effort to create a buffer against external shocks, and a shift in government borrowing from foreign to national currencies. How effective are these policies in insulating countries from US monetary policy spillovers?

We now explore the role of different policy regimes. We group countries by their (i) exchange rate regimes (as defined by [Ilzetzi et al., 2019](#)) and (ii) degree of openness to capital (based on [Chinn and Ito, 2006](#)’s index). These are two key dimensions of the classical Trilemma. We also briefly discuss the role of (iii) dollar trade invoicing (see [Gopinath, 2015](#)) and (iv) dollar gross exposure (see [Bénétrix et al., 2015](#)) in the transmission of US monetary policy. The Online Appendix reports the results of these additional exercises.

³⁸The policy rate series are available from the BIS policy rate database. For Chile and Mexico, they start late relative to our sample (in 1995:5 for Chile and 1998:11 for Mexico).

³⁹For instance, Brazil suffered various hyperinflationary spells during the 1980s and 1990s. The annualised policy interest rate (SELIC) grew exponentially since the early 1980s and peaked in February 1990 at 355,085.6%. By May 1990, various reforms, among which a redenomination of the currency, brought the SELIC annual rate down to 65%. In June 1994, however, the SELIC was at a new annual high of 15,405.6%. After the introduction of the Real in July 1994, Brazil managed to rein in inflation and stabilise interest rates. The average policy rate from 1995 to 2018 is around 17%.

6.1 Exchange Rate Regimes

To explore the role of exchange rate regimes, we classify countries into three different groups: (i) floaters, (ii) managed floaters, and (iii) crawling peggers. We assign each country to the regime corresponding to its median value of [Ilzetzi et al. \(2019\)](#)’s classification over the sample period.⁴⁰ In our sample, there are 17 floaters (all AEs except Canada, plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), 7 managed floaters (Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey), and 6 crawling peggers (China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, and Thailand). As before, we obtain median group responses by aggregating IRFs from the countries’ bilateral models. To provide a thorough picture of capital movements, we use measures of gross inflows and outflows constructed from the official IMF balance of payments data.⁴¹


A few important results emerge when comparing the median responses of the three different exchange rate groups (Figure 8). First, the exchange rate response validates our classification: it depreciates for the first two groups but does not react for the crawling pegs. The stronger depreciation of the exchange rate in the managed float group reveals the relative weakness of this group as compared to the free floaters, which are mainly AEs. Second, US monetary policy spillovers affect all regimes – output, CPI, stock prices, and risk appetite contract in all three groups – but the overall recessionary effects are somewhat more muted for the floaters. Crawling peggers suffer the most severe deflation by fully importing the US monetary policy shock. The trough response of output is also the strongest for peggers, although bands are large.

Floaters, mostly AEs, suffer from a significant fall in both inflows and outflows, while managed floaters experience only a mild drop in inflows and no reaction in outflows. Peggers face some outflows and contraction in inflows with a delay, but responses are insignificant. Both floaters and peggers loosen monetary conditions in response to the shock. This is not surprising once we notice that our group of peggers are the least open in terms of capital control management. Importantly, managed floaters have to hike rates, possibly to avoid capital outflows. This group is indeed formed by countries that combine managed but flexible exchange rates with relatively more open capital markets.

⁴⁰We use [Ilzetzi et al. \(2019\)](#)’s ‘fine’ classification to construct the three exchange rate regimes. Table C.8 in the Online Appendix contains more information about these criteria.

⁴¹The IMF BOPS series are not sufficiently long for Belgium and China, as they start respectively in 2002 and 2005. For the exercise in Section 6, we use the BIS data for Belgium, while we extend the IMF series back to 1999 using capital flow data of Hong Kong for China.


Figure 8: EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES



Note: Orange line – median responses of 17 floaters (15 AEs except Canada, plus Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), Dotted blue line – median responses of 7 managed floaters (Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey), Green dash-dotted line – median responses of 6 crawling peggers (China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, and Thailand). Data on exchange rate regimes are from [Ilzetzi et al. \(2019\)](#). The shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.

The policy rate seems to stabilise capital flows: cross-border flows remain steady for this group. Conversely, floaters experience significant swings in capital flows in the absence of the capital controls that shield the peggers. Overall, responses corroborate our findings: consistent with the ‘fear of floating’ argument, managed floaters seem to target capital flow stability by mimicking US monetary policy. Hence, compared to floaters, they are exposed to larger real and nominal spillovers.

Figure 9: EMERGING ECONOMIES WITH MORE V. LESS OPENNESS TO CAPITAL




Note: Orange line – median responses of 5 EMs (Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, and Poland), whose overall degree of capital openness corresponds to the top 1/3 among 15 EMs. Dotted blue line – median responses of 5 EMs (China, India, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey), whose overall degree of capital openness corresponds to the bottom 1/3. Data on capital restrictions are from [Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#). The shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.

6.2 Capital Flows Management

We now explore the role of capital flow management in the transmission of US monetary spillovers by comparing more- and less-open EMs (Figure 9). Differences in spillover effects between EMs with open and less-open capital markets are stark. The output turns significantly negative for the open markets, and the median response stays below the trend for almost two years. The output response of less-open countries is mostly insignificant and reverts more quickly. CPI responses of the two groups overlap for six months, but only open markets experience a significant fall afterwards. Moreover, even though the nominal exchange rate depreciates for both groups, it depreciates more for the open markets. The response of policy rates suggests that less-open EMs can afford more policy space relative to more open markets. Finally, we find almost no difference in the responses of stock prices, trade volume, and long-term rates.

Focusing on EMs is informative about the importance of capital openness since coun-

Figure 10: AEs OPENNESS TO CAPITAL: INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS



Note: Orange line – median responses of 5 AEs (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and UK), whose overall degree of capital openness corresponds to the bottom 1/3 among 15 AEs. Dotted blue line – median responses of 6 AEs (Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden), whose overall degree of capital openness corresponds to the top 1/3. Data on capital flow management are from [Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#). The shock is normalised to induce a 100bp increase in the US 1-year treasury constant maturity rate. BVAR(12) with asymmetric conjugate priors. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.

tries are heterogeneous along this dimension. To construct more- and less-open country groups, we calculate the arithmetic average over the sample period of the Chinn-Ito index, which measures the degree of de jure capital market openness of a country.⁴² Then, we classify countries in the top tercile as more-open capital markets and countries in the bottom tercile as less-open ones.⁴³ It is worth highlighting that the two groups differ not only in terms of capital openness but also in terms of other structural features. For instance, we find a prevalence of floaters among more-open markets and a prevalence of peggers among less-open ones.

We repeat the exercise by comparing more- and less-open AEs and focusing on gross capital flows (Figure 10). Notably, all countries in both groups adopt a flexible exchange rate regime during the sample period 1990–2018. The two sides of flows drop and mirror each other for both groups of AEs due to the contraction of global financial activities, but the magnitude is larger for the more-open capital markets. This result indicates that even marginal differences in the degree of openness to capital can result in large spillover

⁴²We use the *ka_open* index, a continuous measure that ranges between 0 and 1. The higher the number is, the more open a country's capital markets are. Table C.5 in the Online Appendix contains more information about the classification.

⁴³The average value of the Chinn-Ito index for more and less open EMs is 0.469 and 0.354, respectively. Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, and Poland have more open capital markets, while China, India, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey have relatively closed capital markets.

effects via capital flows.⁴⁴

6.3 Trade and Financial Exposure to the US Dollar

We conclude this section by focusing on EMs to explore the role of (i) the share of trade invoiced in dollars and (ii) gross dollar exposure as determinants of US monetary policy spillovers. We use data from [Gopinath \(2015\)](#) to classify countries between the high and low share of dollar trade invoicing, while we follow [Bénétrix et al. \(2015\)](#) to divide countries between high and low exposure to the dollar.⁴⁵

Countries with a high degree of dollar trade invoicing/gross dollar exposure display responses that are similar to those of crawling peggers, while economies that are less dependent on the dollar behave similarly to managed floaters (Figures [D.8](#) and [D.9](#), in the Online Appendix). We also conduct a robustness check on our capital flow management results, where we classify EMs into less- and more-open countries based on [Fernández et al. \(2016\)](#). Results in Figure [D.10](#) in the Online Appendix are consistent with those in Figure [9](#) reported above.

The degree of openness to capital flows and the exchange rate regime are two important dimensions for understanding the global transmission of US monetary policy. The responses of industrial production and CPI are stronger and more negative for economies with more open capital markets. Crucially, neither flexible nor the ‘middle-ground’ exchange rate regimes can fully insulate economies from US monetary policy shocks that transmit through both financial and classic channels. However, it is important to notice that different policy dimensions and country characteristics – the exchange rate regime, openness of capital markets, dollar trade invoicing, and gross dollar exposure – appear to be related, and the choice of the regime is likely to be endogenous and determined by country-specific deeper structural features.

⁴⁴The group of more-open capital markets consists of five countries: Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and the UK. The relatively less-open markets are Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The full set of responses for AEs is reported in Figure [D.11](#).

⁴⁵[Gopinath \(2015\)](#) reports the fraction of a country’s exports/imports invoiced in a foreign currency. We construct a measure of gross dollar exposure for each country by taking the sum of USD total assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP from the dataset of [Bénétrix et al. \(2015\)](#). As done for the degree of capital openness, we select countries that are in the top and bottom tercile in terms of the sample average of the two measures. Then we compare their median responses. See Tables [C.6](#) and [C.7](#) in the Online Appendix for details about the classifications.

7 Conclusion

This paper provides novel estimates of the spillover effects of US monetary policy shocks and delivers a number of novel findings. First, a tightening of the Fed policy stance triggers a global contraction in real activity, a risk-off scenario with the repricing of risky assets, capital outflows and, on average, downward pressure on prices. The pattern is robust and fairly homogeneous at the country level, especially across advanced economies. A detailed analysis of emerging economies shows that structural features, such as monetary policy regimes and capital flow management policies, explain part of the heterogeneity in the responses of exchange rates, policy rates, and capital flows.

Second, commodity prices are central in the transmission of the shock to headline inflation across different economies. The synchronised reduction in global activity puts downward pressure on commodity and oil prices and, in turn, on headline inflation. This mechanism operates differently in fragile emerging markets with strong financial exposure to the US dollar and a high pass-through of imported prices, where the US tightening causes upward pressure on prices.

Third, the transmission to real variables largely operates via financial variables. A key mechanism is the repricing of risk premia that steepens the term structure, with the long end of the yield curve moving against the policy impulse and partially neutralising the response of the local central banks. Flexible exchange rates provide a substantial degree of insulation. However, they cannot entirely prevent spillovers via financial variables and risk premia that limit the ability of a central bank to stabilise the economy fully. The depth and reach of the international spillovers of US monetary policy indicate the need for a rich policy toolkit, including ex-ante macro-prudential policies and the ex-post activation of multiple monetary policy tools to cushion the shocks.

References

- Acalin, Julien and Alessandro Rebucci**, “Global Business and Financial Cycles: A Tale of Two Capital Account Regimes,” Technical Report 2020.
- Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin**, “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics,” in “Handbook of Monetary Economics,” Vol. 3A, Elsevier Ltd, 2010, chapter 12, pp. 601–650.
- , **Arturo Estrella, and Hyun Song Shin**, “Risk-taking channel of monetary policy,” *Financial Management*, 2019, 48 (3), 725–738.
- Ahmed, Shaghil, Brahim Coulibaly, and Andrei Zlate**, “International financial spillovers to emerging market economies: How important are economic fundamentals?,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2017, 76, 133–152.
- Aizenman, Joshua, Menzie D. Chinn, and Hiro Ito**, “Monetary policy spillovers and the trilemma in the new normal: Periphery country sensitivity to core country conditions,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2016, 68, 298–330.
- Akram, Q. Farooq**, “Commodity prices, interest rates and the dollar,” *Energy economics*, 2009, 31 (6), 838–851.
- Albrizio, Silvia, Sangyup Choi, Davide Furceri, and Chansik Yoon**, “International bank lending channel of monetary policy,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, Apr. 2020, 102, 102124.
- Ammer, John, Clara Vega, and Jon Wongswan**, “International transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks: Evidence from stock prices,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 2010, 42 (SUPPL. 1), 179–198.
- Anaya, Pablo, Michael Hachula, and Christian J. Offermanns**, “Spillovers of U.S. unconventional monetary policy to emerging markets: The role of capital flows,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2017, 73, 275–295.
- Antolín-Díaz, Juan, Ivan Petrella, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez**, “Structural scenario analysis with SVARs,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2021, 117, 798–815.
- Avdjiev, Stefan and Galina Hale**, “U.S. monetary policy and fluctuations of international bank lending,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2019, 95, 251–268.
- Bauer, Michael D. and Christopher J. Neely**, “International channels of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2014, 44, 24–46.
- Bekaert, Geert, Marie Hoerova, and Marco Lo Duca**, “Risk, uncertainty and monetary policy,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2013, 60 (7), 771–788.
- Bénétrix, Agustin S., Philip R. Lane, and Jay C. Shambaugh**, “International currency exposures, valuation effects and the global financial crisis,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2015, 96 (S1), S98–S109.
- Bernanke, Ben S.**, “Federal reserve policy in an international context,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2017, 65 (1), 5–36.
- Bhattarai, Saroj, Arpita Chatterjee, and Woong Yong Park**, “US Monetary Policy Spillovers,” Technical Report 17 2017.
- , —, and —, “Effects of US quantitative easing on emerging market economies,” *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 2021, 122, 104031.
- Blanchard, Olivier**, “Currency wars, coordination, and capital controls,” *International Journal of Central Banking*, 2017, 13 (2), 283–308.
- Bluedorn, John C. and Christopher Bowdler**, “The open economy consequences of U.S. monetary policy,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2011, 30 (2), 309–336.

- Borio, Claudio and Haibin Zhu**, “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?,” *Journal of Financial Stability*, 2012, 8 (4), 236–251.
- Bräuning, Falk and Victoria Ivashina**, “Monetary Policy and Global Banking,” *Journal of Finance*, 2020, 75 (6), 3055–3095.
- Bruno, Valentina and Hyun Song Shin**, “Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary policy,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2015, 71, 119–132.
- and —, “Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, apr 2015, 82 (2), 535–564.
- Brusa, Francesca, Pavel Savor, and Mungo Wilson**, “One Central Bank to Rule Them All,” *Review of Finance*, 2020, 24 (2), 263–304.
- Buch, Claudia M., Matthieu Bussière, Linda S. Goldberg, and Robert Hills**, “The international transmission of monetary policy,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2019, 91, 29–48.
- Ca’ Zorzi, Michele, Luca Dedola, Georgios Georgiadis, Marek Jarociński, Livio Stracca, and Georg Strasser**, “Monetary policy and its transmission in a globalised world,” Technical Report 2407 2020.
- Canova, Fabio**, “The transmission of US shocks to Latin America,” *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 2005, 20 (2), 229–251.
- and **Matteo Ciccarelli**, “Panel vector autoregressive models: A survey,” *Advances in Econometrics*, 2013, 32 (15), 205–246.
- Carstens, A and Hyun Song Shin**, “Emerging markets aren’t out of the woods yet,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2019.
- Cerutti, Eugenio, Stijn Claessens, and Andrew K. Rose**, “How Important is the Global Financial Cycle? Evidence from Capital Flows,” *IMF Economic Review*, Mar. 2019, 67 (1), 24–60.
- , —, and **Lev Ratnovski**, “Global liquidity and cross-border bank flows,” *Economic Policy*, jan 2017, 32 (89), 81–125.
- Cesa-Bianchi, Ambrogio and Andrej Sokol**, “Financial shocks, credit spreads, and the international credit channel,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2022, 135, 103543.
- Cetorelli, Nicola and Linda S. Goldberg**, “Banking Globalization and Monetary Transmission,” *Journal of Finance*, 2012, 67 (5), 1811–1843.
- Chan, Joshua C.C.**, “Asymmetric conjugate priors for large Bayesian VARs,” *Quantitative Economics*, 2022, 13 (3), 1145–1169.
- Chen, Jiaqian, Tommaso Mancini Griffoli, and Ratna Sahay**, “Spillovers from United States Monetary Policy on Emerging Markets: Different This Time?,” *IMF Working Papers*, 2014, 14 (240), 1.
- Chinn, Menzie D. and Hiro Ito**, “What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2006, 81 (1), 163–192.
- Coman, Andra and Simon P. Lloyd**, “In the face of spillovers: Prudential policies in emerging economies,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2022, 122, 102554.
- Craine, Roger and Vance L. Martin**, “International monetary policy surprise spillovers,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2008, 75 (1), 180–196.
- Curcuru, Stephanie E., Steven B. Kamin, Canlin Li, and Marius del Giudice Rodriguez**, “International spillovers of monetary policy: Conventional policy vs. quantitative easing,” *Quantitative Easing*, Aug. 2018.

- Dedola, Luca, Giulia Rivolta, and Livio Stracca**, “If the Fed sneezes, who catches a cold?,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2017, 108, S23–S41.
- Dées, Stéphane and Alessandro Galesi**, “The Global Financial Cycle and US Monetary Policy in an Interconnected World,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2021, 115, 102395.
- Degasperi, Riccardo and Giovanni Ricco**, “Information and Policy Shocks in Monetary Surprises,” Technical Report, Working Paper 2021.
- Devereux, Michael B. and James Yetman**, “Leverage constraints and the international transmission of shocks,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 2010, 42 (SUPPL. 1), 71–105.
- di Giovanni, Julian and Jay C. Shambaugh**, “The impact of foreign interest rates on the economy: The role of the exchange rate regime,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2008, 74 (2), 341–361.
- , **Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Mehmet Fatih Ulu, and Yusuf Soner Baskaya**, “International spillovers and local credit cycles,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2022, 89 (2), 733–773.
- Ehrmann, Michael and Marcel Fratzscher**, “Equal size, equal role? Interest rate interdependence between the euro area and the United States,” *Economic Journal*, 2005, 115 (506), 928–948.
- and —, “Global financial transmission of monetary policy shocks,” *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 2009, 71 (6), 739–759.
- Eichengreen, Barry, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza**, “Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and the Original Sin: Why They Are Not the Same and Why It Matters,” in “Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and Consequences” NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2007, pp. 121–170.
- Erten, Bilge, Anton Korinek, and José Antonio Ocampo**, “Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA nov 2019.
- Farhi, Emmanuel and Iván Werning**, “Dilemma not trilemma? Capital controls and exchange rates with volatile capital flows,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2014, 62 (4), 569–605.
- Feldkircher, Martin and Florian Huber**, “The international transmission of US shocks—Evidence from Bayesian global vector autoregressions,” *European Economic Review*, 2016, 81, 167–188.
- Fernández, Andrés, Michael W. Klein, Alessandro Rebucci, Martin Schindler, and Martín Uribe**, “Capital control measures: A new dataset,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2016, 64 (3), 548–574.
- Forbes, Kristin J.**, “The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls,” in Sebastian Edwards, ed., *Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and Consequences*, University of Chicago Press, May 2007, pp. 171–202.
- and **Francis E. Warnock**, “Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2012, 88 (2), 235–251.
- and —, “Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2012, 88 (2), 235–251.
- and **Menzie D. Chinn**, “A decomposition of global linkages in financial markets over time,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2004, 86 (3), 705–722.
- , **Marcel Fratzscher, Thomas Kostka, and Roland Straub**, “Bubble thy neighbour: Portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2016, 99, 85–104.

- Frankel, Jeffrey A.**, “The effect of monetary policy on real commodity prices,” *Asset prices and monetary policy*, 2008, 291.
- Fratzscher, Marcel, Daniel Schneider, and Ine Van Robays**, “Oil Prices, Exchange Rates and Asset Prices,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2014.
- , **Marco Lo Duca, and Roland Straub**, “ECB unconventional monetary policy: Market impact and international spillovers,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2016, 64 (1), 36–74.
- , —, and —, “On the International Spillovers of US Quantitative Easing,” *The Economic Journal*, feb 2018, 128 (608), 330–377.
- Fukuda, Yoshiyuki, Yuki Kimura, Nao Sudo, and Hiroshi Ugai**, “Cross-country Transmission Effect of the U.S. Monetary Shock under Global Integration,” *Bank of Japan Working Paper Series*, 2013, 13 (16).
- Georgiadis, Georgios**, “Determinants of global spillovers from US monetary policy,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2016, 67, 41–61.
- , “To bi, or not to bi? Differences between spillover estimates from bilateral and multilateral multi-country models,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2017, 107, 1–18.
- and **Arnaud Mehl**, “Financial globalisation and monetary policy effectiveness,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2016, 103, 200–212.
- , **Gernot J. Müller, and Ben Schumann**, “Global risk and the dollar,” *CEPR Discussion Paper 16245*, 2021.
- Gerko, Elena and Hélène Rey**, “Monetary policy in the capitals of capital,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2017, 15 (4), 721–745.
- Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi**, “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2015, 7 (1), 44–76.
- Giannone, Domenico, Michele Lenza, and Giorgio E. Primiceri**, “Prior Selection for Vector Autoregressions,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, may 2015, 97 (2), 436–451.
- , —, and —, “Economic predictions with big data: The illusion of sparsity,” *Econometrica*, 2021, 89 (5), 2409–2437.
- Gilchrist, Simon and Egon Zakrajšek**, “Credit spreads and business cycle fluctuations,” *American Economic Review*, 2012, 102 (4), 1692–1720.
- Goldberg, Linda S.**, “Banking globalization, transmission, and monetary policy autonomy,” Staff Reports 640, Federal Reserve Bank of New York September 2013.
- Gopinath, Gita**, “The International Price System,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA oct 2015.
- , **Emine Boz, Camila Casas, Federico J. Díez, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Mikkel Plagborg-Møller**, “Dominant currency paradigm,” *American Economic Review*, 2020, 110 (3), 677–719.
- Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier**, “Monetary Policy Transmission in Emerging Markets: An Application to Chile,” in Enrique G. Mendoza, Ernesto Pastén, and Diego Saravia, eds., *Monetary Policy and Global Spillovers: Mechanisms, Effects and Policy Measures*, Vol. 25, Central Bank of Chile, 2018, chapter 08, pp. 279–324.
- and **Hélène Rey**, “International Financial Adjustment,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2007, 115 (4).
- , —, and **Maxime Sauzet**, “The International Monetary and Financial System,” *Annual Review of Economics*, 2019, 11, 859–893.

- Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian P. Sack, and Eric T. Swanson**, “Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements,” *International Journal of Central Banking*, 2005, 1 (1), 55–93.
- Hausman, Joshua and Jon Wongswan**, “Global asset prices and FOMC announcements,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2011, 30 (3), 547–571.
- Iacoviello, Matteo and Gaston Navarro**, “Foreign effects of higher U.S. interest rates,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2019, 95, 232–250.
- Ilzetzki, Ethan and Keyu Jin**, “The puzzling change in the international transmission of U.S. macroeconomic policy shocks,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2021, p. 103444.
- , **Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff**, “Exchange Arrangements Entering the Twentieth-First Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2019, pp. 599–646.
- IMF**, “The IMF’s institutional view on capital flows in practice,” *IMF Note to G20*, 2018, pp. 1–14.
- Jarociński, Marek and Peter Karadi**, “Deconstructing monetary policy surprises-The role of information shocks,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2020, 12 (2), 1–43.
- Jordà, Òscar, Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor, and Felix Ward**, “Global Financial Cycles and Risk Premiums,” *IMF Economic Review*, March 2019, 67 (1), 109–150.
- Kalemli-Özcan, Şebnem**, “U.S. Monetary Policy and International Risk Spillovers,” *Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole*, 2019, pp. 95–191.
- Kaufmann, Christoph**, “Investment funds, monetary policy, and the global financial cycle,” Technical Report 2020.
- Kearns, Jonathan, Andreas Schrimpf, and Fan Dora Xia**, “Explaining Monetary Spillovers: The Matrix Reloaded,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2018.
- Kilian, Lutz**, “Measuring global real economic activity: Do recent critiques hold up to scrutiny?,” *Economics Letters*, 2019, 178, 106–110.
- and **Xiaoqing Zhou**, “Oil prices, exchange rates and interest rates,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2022, 126.
- Kim, Soyoung**, “International transmission of U.S. monetary policy shock: Evidence from VAR’s,” *Journal of monetary economics*, 2001, 48, 339–372.
- Klein, Michael W. and Jay C. Shambaugh**, “Rounding the corners of the policy trilemma: Sources of monetary policy autonomy,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2015, 7 (4), 33–66.
- Kocherlakota, Narayana R.**, “Practical policy evaluation,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2019, 102 (C), 29–45.
- Leo, Pierre De, Gita Gopinath, and Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan**, “Monetary Policy Cyclicity in Emerging Economies,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.
- Litterman, Robert B.**, “Forecasting with bayesian vector autoregressions—five years of experience,” *Journal of Business and Economic Statistics*, 1986, 4 (1), 25–38.
- Maćkowiak, Bartosz**, “External shocks, U.S. monetary policy and macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2007, 54 (8), 2512–2520.
- Maggiore, Matteo**, “Financial intermediation, international risk sharing, and reserve currencies,” *American Economic Review*, 2017, 107 (10), 3038–3071.
- , **Brent Neiman, and Jesse Schreger**, “The Rise of the Dollar and Fall of the Euro as International Currencies,” *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 2019, 109, 521–526.

- Melosi, Leonardo**, “Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 2017, 84 (2), 853–884.
- Mertens, Karel and Morten O. Ravn**, “The Dynamic Effects of Personal and Corporate Income Tax Changes in the United States,” *American Economic Review*, jul 2013, 103 (4), 1212–1247.
- Miniane, Jacques and John H. Rogers**, “Capital controls and the international transmission of U.S. money shocks,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 2007, 39 (5), 1003–1035.
- Miranda-Agrippino, Silvia and Giovanni Ricco**, “The Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2021, 13 (3), 74–107.
- **and Hélène Rey**, “U.S. Monetary Policy and the Global Financial Cycle,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2020, 87 (6), 2754–2776.
- **, Tsvetelina Nenova, and Hélène Rey**, “Global Footprints of Monetary Policies,” Technical Report 2020.
- Morais, Bernardo, José Luis Peydró, Jessica Roldán-Peña, and Claudia Ruiz-Ortega**, “The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects,” *Journal of Finance*, 2019, 74 (1), 55–90.
- Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin**, “Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: A Global Game Approach,” *Working Paper Series*, 2014, I, 1–22.
- Neely, Christopher J.**, “The Large-Scale Asset Purchases Had Large International Effects,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2012.
- Obstfeld, Maurice**, “Trilemmas and Tradeoffs: Living with Financial Globalization,” in Claudio Raddatz, Diego Saravia, and Jaume Ventura, eds., *Global Liquidity, Spillovers to Emerging Markets and Policy Responses*, Vol. 20 of *Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series*, Central Bank of Chile, November 2015, chapter 2, pp. 013–078.
- **, Jay C Shambaugh, and Alan M Taylor**, “Monetary sovereignty, exchange rates, and capital controls: The trilemma in the interwar period,” *IMf staff papers*, 2004, 51 (Suppl 1), 75–108.
- **, —, and —**, “The trilemma in history: tradeoffs among exchange rates, monetary policies, and capital mobility,” *Review of economics and statistics*, 2005, 87 (3), 423–438.
- **, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Mahvash S. Qureshi**, “A tie that binds: Revisiting the trilemma in emerging market economies,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2019, 101 (2), 279–293.
- Passari, Evgenia and Hélène Rey**, “Financial Flows and the International Monetary System,” *Economic Journal*, 2015, 125 (584), 675–698.
- Ramey, Valerie A.**, “How important is the credit channel in the transmission of monetary policy?,” *Carnegie-Rochester Confer. Series on Public Policy*, 1993, 39, 1–45.
- Rey, Hélène**, “Dilemma not trilemma: the global cycle and monetary policy independence,” *Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole*, 2013, pp. 285–333.
- Rey, Hélène**, “International channels of transmission of monetary policy and the mundellian trilemma,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2016, 64 (1), 6–35.
- Rogers, John H., Chiara Scotti, and Jonathan H. Wright**, “Unconventional Monetary Policy and International Risk Premia,” *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 2018, 50 (8), 1827–1850.
- Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer**, “Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates,” *The American Economic Review*, 2000, 90 (3), 429–457.
- Romer, Christina D and David H Romer**, “A new measure of monetary shocks: Derivation and implications,” *American economic review*, 2004, 94 (4), 1055–1084.

- Shambaugh, Jay C.**, “The effect of fixed exchange rates on monetary policy,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2004, 119 (1), 301–352.
- Siklos, Pierre L.**, “Boom-and-bust cycles in emerging markets: How important is the exchange rate?,” *Journal of Macroeconomics*, 2018, 56 (November 2017), 172–187.
- Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha**, “Bayesian Methods for Dynamic Multivariate Models,” *International Economic Review*, 1998, 39 (4), 949–968.
- Stavrakeva, Vania and Jenny Tang**, “Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy,” Technical Report 15-16 2015.
- Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson**, “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007–09 Recession,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2012.
- Swanson, Eric T.**, “Measuring the effects of federal reserve forward guidance and asset purchases on financial markets,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2021, 118, 32–53.
- Takats, Elod and Abraham Vela**, “International Monetary Policy Transmission,” *BIS Papers chapters*, 2014, 78 (78), 25–44.
- Temesvary, Judit, Steven Ongena, and Ann L. Owen**, “A global lending channel unplugged? Does U.S. monetary policy affect cross-border and affiliate lending by global U.S. banks?,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2018, 112, 50–69.
- Uribe, Martín and Vivian Z. Yue**, “Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives whom?,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2006, 69 (1 SPEC. ISS.), 6–36.
- Vicondoa, Alejandro**, “Monetary news in the United States and business cycles in emerging economies,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2019, 117, 79–90.
- Wongswan, Jon**, “The response of global equity indexes to U.S. monetary policy announcements,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2009, 28 (2), 344–365.