WebAuthn as Second Factor module
The module is implemented as an Authentication Processing Filter. That means it can be configured in the global config.php file or the SP remote or IdP hosted metadata.
You can install this module with composer:
% composer require simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp-module-webauthn
How to setup the webauthn module
You need to enable and configure the module's authprocfilter at a priority level so that it takes place AFTER the first-factor authentication. E.g. at 100:
100 => ['class' => 'webauthn:WebAuthn', /* required configuration parameters */ 'store' => [ 'webauthn:Database', 'database.dsn' => 'mysql:host=db.example.org;dbname=fido2', 'database.username' => 'simplesaml', 'database.password' => 'sdfsdf', ], 'attrib_username' => 'urn:oid:18.104.22.168.4.1.23735.100.0', 'attrib_displayname' => 'urn:oid:22.214.171.124', /* optional configuration parameters */ /* FIDO2 is phishing-resistent by binding generated credentials to a scope. * Browsers will only invoke the registration/authentication if the scope * matches the principal domain name the user is currently visiting. * If not specified, the scope will be the hostname of the IdP as per * its metadata. It is permissible to widen the scope up to the prinicpal * domain though (e.g. authentication service is "saml.example.com" => scope * can be extended to "example.com"; but not "examp1e.com". A registered * FIDO2 token can then also be used on other servers in the same domain. * If configuring this item, be sure that the authentication server name and * the desired scope are a suffix match. * * If you do not control the entirety of your second-level domain, you must * set the scope here explicitly to your own hostname to prevent some * contrived attack scenarios with other servers in that same second-level * domain. */ 'scope' => 'example.com', /* the following will interactively ask the user if he is willing to share * manufacturer and model information during credential registration. * The user can decline, in which case registration will still succeed but * vendor and model will be logged as "unknown model [unknown vendor]" * * When not requesting this, there is one less user interaction during the * registration process; and no model information will be saved. * * defaults to "false" */ 'request_tokenmodel' => true, /* should FIDO2 be enabled by default for all users? If not, users need to * be white-listed in the database - other users simply pass through the * filter without being subjected to 2FA. * * defaults to "disabled by default" === false */ 'default_enable' => false, ],
You first need to setup the database.
Here is the initialization SQL script:
CREATE TABLE credentials ( creation_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, user_id VARCHAR(80) NOT NULL, credentialId VARCHAR(500) NOT NULL, credential MEDIUMBLOB NOT NULL, signCounter INT NOT NULL, friendlyName VARCHAR(100) DEFAULT "Unnamed Token", UNIQUE (user_id,credentialId) ); GRANT SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE ON ...credentials TO '...dbuser'@'126.96.36.199' IDENTIFIED BY '...dbpass'; CREATE TABLE userstatus ( user_id VARCHAR(80) NOT NULL, fido2Status ENUM("FIDO2Disabled","FIDO2Enabled") NOT NULL DEFAULT "FIDO2Disabled", UNIQUE (user_id) ); GRANT SELECT ON ...userstatus TO '...dbuser'@'188.8.131.52' IDENTIFIED BY '...dbpass';
webauthn:Database backend storage has the following options:
: Must be set to
: Data Source Name must comply to the syntax for the PHP PDO layer.
: Username for the database user to be used for the connection.
: Password for the database user used for the connection.
: The number of seconds to wait for a connection to the database server. This option is optional. If unset, it uses the default from the database-driver.
Example config using PostgreSQL database:
100 => array( 'class' => 'webauthn:WebAuthn', 'store' => array( 'webauthn:Database', 'database.dsn' => 'pgsql:host=sql.example.org;dbname=fido2', 'database.username' => 'simplesaml', 'database.password' => 'sdfsdf', ), ),
Example config using MySQL database:
100 => array( 'class' => 'webauthn:WebAuthn', 'store' => array( 'webauthn:Database', 'database.dsn' => 'mysql:host=db.example.org;dbname=fido2', 'database.username' => 'simplesaml', 'database.password' => 'sdfsdf', ), ),
: FIDO2 is phishing-resistent by binding generated credentials to a scope. Browsers will only invoke the registration/authentication if the scope matches the principal domain name the user is currently visiting. If not specified, the scope will be the hostname of the IdP as per its metadata. It is permissible to widen the scope up to the prinicpal domain though (e.g. authentication service is "saml.example.com" => scope can be extended to "example.com"; but not "examp1e.com". A registered FIDO2 token can then also be used on other servers in the same domain. If configuring this item, be sure that the authentication server name and the desired scope are a suffix match.
: The following will interactively ask the user if he is willing to share manufacturer and model information during credential registration. The user can decline, in which case registration will still succeed but vendor and model will be logged as "unknown model [unknown vendor]". When not requesting this, there is one less user interaction during the registration process; and no model information will be saved. Defaults to "false".
: Should WebAuthn be enabled by default for all users? If not, users need to be white-listed in the database - other users simply pass through the filter without being subjected to 2FA. Defaults to "disabled by default" === false
User Experience / Workflow
Users for which WebAuthn is enabled cannot continue without a FIDO2 token. The UI is different depending on the number of tokens the user has registered:
- User has 0 tokens: UI requires the user to register a token. The user can choose a convenient name for the token to recognise it later. If request_tokenmodel is set, the name will be appended with the token model and vendor. After successful registration, the authprocfilter is done (user continues to SP)
- User has 1 token: UI requires the user to authenticate. After the authentication, user can optionally enroll another token.
- User has 2+ tokens: UI requires the user to authenticate. After the authentication, user can optionally enroll another token or delete an obsolete one.
If a user is enabled but has forgotten all of his tokens, the person would need to contact his administrator and have his account temporarily disabled for two- factor authentication.
As long as a user account has 0 tokens there is no benefit yet; it's effectively still single factor authentication because anyone with the user's password can register any token. That is in the nature of things. It could be avoided with an out-of-band registration process (in the same scope).
Device model detection
request_tokenmodel can be used to get a token's so-called AAGUID
which uniquely identifies the model and manufacturer (it is not a serial
Mapping the AAGUID to a cleartext model and manufacturer name is done by having (or not) meta-information about the AAGUID. The FIDO Alliance operates a Metadata Service (MDS) which has a good number of AAGUIDs registered. However, manufacturers are not required to submit their AAGUIDs and metadata to that MDS, and indeed, some manufacturers are missing.
The module contains a full list of AAGUIDs and relevant metadata as pulled from
the FIDO MDS. It also has a limited amount of manually curated information of
some AAGUIDs which are not in the FIDO MDS, namely for Yubico products and
Microsoft. This list is in the
config/webauthn-aaguid.json file, and this file
needs to be moved to your SimpleSAMLphp configuration directory.
If you want, you can also manually update this file, if you believe there might
be new models listed. In order to do that, run the
% php bin/updateMetadata.php <MDS_TOKEN>
MDS_TOKEN is the API token you get after registering
As a consequence, depending on the token model the user uses, even if the AAGUID is being sent as part of the registration process, it may be that the device is still stored as unknown model/unknown vendor.
I contacted FIDO Alliance to ask about the lack of complete information in their MDS. Purportedly, listing in the MDS has chances of becoming mandatory in a future FIDO Certification. Until then, there is no good solution to the problem.
You can disable the module entirely by not listing it as an authprocfilter.
You can disable the module by default by setting default_enable = false. You can
then enable WebAuthn second-factor authentication for individual users by adding
them with status "FIDO2Enabled" to the
If the module is enabled by default, you can selectively disable WebAuthn
second-factor authentication by adding the username with status FIDO2Disabled to
Limitations / Design Decisions
This implementation does not validate token bindings, if sent by the authenticator (§7.1 Step 7 / §7.2 Step 11 skip token binding information validation if present). That is because Yubikeys do not support token binding and the corresponding functionality thus has no test case.
This implementation does not distinguish between User Presence (user has proven to be near the authenticator) and User Verification (user has proven to be near the authenticator AND to have unlocked the authenticator with a personal asset such as PIN or fingerprint). Both variants are considered sufficient to authenticate successfully (§7.1 steps 11 and 12 are joined into one condition)
The implementation requests ECDSA keys (algorithm -7) because all Yubikeys support that. It is trivial to add RSA support if there are keys which don't.
The implementation does not request any client extensions. The specification gives implementations a policy choice on what to do if a client sends extensions anyway: this implementation chose to then fail the registration/authentication.
The implementation supports the attestation formats "none", "packed / x5c" and "packed / self", and "fido-u2f". Other attestation formats lead to a registration failure.
For the attation type "packed / x5c",
- the optional OCSP checks are not performed (this is explicitly permitted in the spec due to other means of revocation checking in the FIDO MDS).
For bith "packed / x5c" and "fido-u2f":
- due to the lack of any externally provided knowledge about CAs(???) all attestations are classified as "Basic" (i.e. no "AttCA" level)
Given the sorry state of completeness of the FIDO MDS, only very few attestation root CAs are known and validation as per §7.1 Step 18 would often fail. That step is therefore ignored. All the "None", "Self" and "Basic" attestation levels are considered acceptable; meaning §7.1 Step 21 does not apply.
If the implementation detects signs of physical object cloning (not incremented signature counter), it follows the policy of failing authentication.