



SAPIENZA
UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA

BlueTracer: a Robust API Tracer for Evasive Malware

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
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Malware: an increasingly significant problem

Total malware



Malware Analysis



Two main types:


- **Static Analysis:**
involves the inspection of the different data and code sections of a binary
- **Dynamic Analysis:**
the malware sample is executed and the actions it performs on the environment are observed

Dynamic analysis strongly favoured as it allows to dodge code obfuscations and deal with a large number of samples

The threat posed by evasive malware

Evasive malware

Malware that conceals its harmful behaviour when detecting a hostile environment, such as a well-known sandbox solution



Function call monitoring

Functions can abstract implementation details providing a semantically richer representation of some functionality.

Example:

`[2, 4, 1, 3, 5]` \longrightarrow `sort()` \longrightarrow `[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]`

The abstractions embodied by **system calls** and **library calls** can be used to grasp the visible behavior of a malicious sample

Implementation of function call monitoring

API Hooking

The interception of function calls provided by dynamically linked libraries (DLLs)

Three broad categories:

- Binary Rewriting
 - Call Redirection
 - Function Rewriting
- Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
- **Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI)**



Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI)

A dynamic binary analysis technique in which the behaviour of an application is inspected at run-time, without the need of recompiling it, via the injection of analysis code.

```
record_before(libcall_name, arg1)
retval = libcall(arg1, &arg2)
record_after(retval, *arg2)
```

Problems:


- 1 Existing products have limited logging capabilities
- 2 API hooking techniques in literature are not coupled with mechanisms to hide their presence from evasive malware

Our solution: BlueTracer

BlueTracer is a robust library and system call tracer for Windows programs specialized in evasive malware

Building blocks:

- Based on the **Intel Pin** DBI framework
- Integrated with the **BluePill** stealthy execution framework



BlueTracer: challenges and features


Implementation challenges:

- Heterogeneity of Windows libraries used in malware and the lack of well-structured documentation for their prototypes
 - Integration of reliable external sources
(**Dr. Memory** and **CISCO PyREBox**)
- Making best use of Intel Pin's capabilities with respect to run-time CPU and memory costs
- Addressing some inherent limitations of Intel Pin

Key features:

- Undetected tracing of input parameters, output buffers and return values of over 17 000 system calls and library calls
- Logging of asynchronous events
- Resolution of named constants

BlueTracer's architecture



Evaluation with AI-Khaser

AI-Khaser is an open-source application which performs common checks employed by malware families to determine if they are being executed in an analysis environment.

Checks divided in categories:

- **Anti-Debugging**
- **Timing-based**
- **Human Interaction Detection**
- **Anti-Virtualization**
- **Anti-Analysis**



BlueTracer:

- remained undetected thanks to its integration with BluePill
- managed to track all the checks

Example of tracked evasion check

Tracing a particular action of a malware instance allows to understand in detail what the sample's intentions are

Example: file system artifacts can be checked in order to uncover the presence of a virtualized environment.

```
~~3160~~ 24980 KERNELBASE.dll!GetFileAttributesW
24980  arg 0: C:\Windows\system32\drivers\VBoxMouse.sys
        (name=lpFileName, type=wchar_t*, size=0x2)
24980      executed KERNELBASE.dll!GetFileAttributesW =>
24980  retval: 0xffffffff (name=Return value, type=DWORD, size=0x4)
```

Evaluation with evasive malware samples

Five highly evasive samples collected by Joe Security:

| ID | MD5 | Name |
|----|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | 0af4ef5069f47a371a0caf22ae2006a6 | <i>trojan/banker</i> |
| 2 | 9437eabf2fe5d32101e3fbf9f6027880 | <i>dropper</i> |
| 3 | cbdda646a20d95f078393506ecdc0796 | <i>trojan</i> |
| 4 | cfdd16225e67471f5ef54cab9b3a5558 | Olympic |
| 5 | ef694b89ad7addb9a16bb6f26f1efaf7 | CCleaner |

Evaluation was done manually and is a time-consuming process:

- Check if logs are congruous with Joe Security reports
- Process Monitor as ground truth for system activity

The logs collected by BlueTracer reveal behaviors consistent with the analysis reports authored by Joe Security

Conclusions

Contribution:

Design and implementation of **BlueTracer**, a robust library and system call tracer for Windows programs specialized in evasive malware.

Future Developments:

- Adoption of an automatic methodology for large-scale evaluation
- Improvement of logging capabilities
- Usage of log filtering techniques

Thank you for your attention!