THE STATE IN CAPITAL

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Abstract

This paper reviews the development of state theory in the work of Karl Marx with a particular attention to Capital Volume I. While, in my opinion, Marx never developed a systematic analysis of the state throughout his scholarship, much of his theorization on the capitalist mode of production includes the germs of some inspirational ideas on the state, however they may have remained dispersed, incomplete, and incoherent. I treat Marx's account of the capitalist state as a 'descriptive state theory' (Althusser, 1971, p. 71), which represents the initial phase and general framework of the more elaborate Marxist theories of the state to come. In this paper, I try to enlarge the descriptive core of the theory through interpretation, which is occasionally informed and guided by the work of later Marxists, particularly that of Gramsci and Poulantzas. In the first section of the paper, I present a general outline of Marx's principal arguments on the state through a reading of some of his works, which are most central to the state theory. In the second section, I concentrate on Capital Volume I to explain how and to what extent this book contributes to the Marxist theories of the state.

A general framework of Marx's conception of the state

There are four main perspectives on the capitalist state that can be found in the works of Marx and Engels: The state as (1) an instrument of class rule, (2) a reflection of class struggles, (3) an apparatus of social cohesion, and (4) an organization to secure the external conditions of capital accumulation. Since the state was mostly tangential to Marx's analysis of capitalist production, we do not find these perspectives presented as a coherent whole; instead, they usually remain dispersed, anecdotal, and peripheral to the main tasks undertaken. Therefore, it is difficult to discern whether they indicate an evolution of Marx's view on the state, accompanying the progress of his systematic analysis of capitalism, or represent the moments when Marx emphasized different aspects of the state under capitalist mode of production. The immediate mental pictures these perspectives evoke, although not incompatible, are distinct and in need of further elaboration, which Marx did not provide. It is not straightforward, for instance, to view the state as both an instrument of class rule and a reflection of class struggles at the same time. While the first proposition seems to suggest a strict political domination of one class over the other(s), the second is more lenient in that the exercise of political power depends on the balance of class forces. These perspectives, taken to their extremes, also produced distinct political positions with regards to the state power and particularly electoral politics in the history of socialist movements.

Far from being an attempt to resolve the tensions among different Marxist approaches on the state, this section only concerns charting out the trajectory of the four lines of thought as presented in the works of Marx up until his magnum opus Capital. Further, this review only aims providing a preliminary framework for Marx's 'class theory of the state' as Bob Jessop calls it (Jessop, 1982, p. 7), hence neglecting young Marx's dialogue with Hegelian philosophy for the most part. However, I still wish to bring two of his early works, namely Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and On the Jewish Question, into discussion since they both include important remarks on the separation between the state and civil society, a recurrent theme that is emerging in later studies of Marx and Engels as well. In both books, Marx problematizes Hegel's distinction between the state and civil society, particularly focusing on the privileged position given to the former. In Contribution to the Critique, Marx argues, in a rather crude materialist fashion, for inverting the relationship and viewing the state rooted in civil society as opposed to constituting its basis. The state, he maintains, is "an abstraction, people alone is what is concrete" (Marx, 1843, p. 45). In the same line of thought, he argues that the state cannot be represented as an omnipotent force independent of the dynamics of civil society. While he borrows and accepts Hegel's designation of civil society as a "sphere of egoism and self-interest", he diverges from Hegel in arguing that such individualistic motivations penetrate into the political field and govern the mindsets of political actors. In other words, the bureaucracy, which is so upheld by Hegel and viewed as the 'universal class' responsible for representing universal interests, is, for Marx, stained with the same egoism that reigns over civil society. Thus, he claims "the state objective turns into his private objective" for bureaucrats, who pursue their individual self-interests just like any other actor within the civil sphere (Marx, 1843, p. 46).

In On the Jewish Question, Marx tackles the question of autonomous power of the state, which isolates itself from the religious, economic, and status-based power structures and pushes them into the realm of civil society. The isolation of political power constitutes the basis for the 'political freedom' of citizens, who are "equal partners in popular sovereignty" albeit they are, at the same time, exposed to various social inequalities operating within the civil sphere. Marx says, "The state abolishes... the distinctions established by birth, social rank, education, occupation ... (as) non-political distinctions ... But the state, none the less, allows private property, education, occupation to manifest their particular nature. Far from abolishing these effective differences, it only exists so far as they are presupposed... it manifests its universality only in opposition to these elements" (Marx, 1844, p. 33). In other words, the state's existence depends upon the reproduction of social inequalities within civil society. The state, therefore, is possible only through this duality, through which it is able to assert its neutral character and appear to represent the general interest. Based on Marx's arguments, it can be concluded that the state, being 'as spiritual as heaven to earth' when compared with civil society as he remarks (Marx, 1844, p. 34), produces a mystification of actual social relationships by reducing human emancipation, as realization of individuals as species-being, to political emancipation. For Marx, the first requires a complete restructuring of civil society through which the state does no longer build its authority and legitimacy on the duality between political and civil spheres, and individuals emancipate from being reduced to 'abstract citizens'.

Under the influence of Hegel and Feuerbach, and in the absence of his distinctive theories on history and economy, young Marx is unable to connect his conception of the state with neither class struggles nor capitalist production. Although his thesis on the state's role in constructing an illusionary representation of the general interest is noteworthy and inspirational for successive Marxist intellectuals, he does not have much to offer in terms of the relationship between political power and class power at this stage. Instead, in his early works, Marx's analysis seems to be constrained within Hegelian dualities, and the state's function is limited to mystification of social inequalities and serving to the interests of the bureaucratic class. However, old Marx meets young Marx in Capital, in which political equality is the hidden basis of the assumption of equality among the agents of market exchange. This observation is, of course, not adequate to demonstrate the continuity between the young and old Marx. It may simply refer to the beginning of his intellectual journey, where he reaches at economic relationships through the study of the political, and its end, where he develops a systematic account of production relations that are progressively imbued with political forces.

Moving onward, Marx developed his class theory of the state starting in German Ideology, where he also lays out his account of historical materialism in its elaborate form. I believe that this book, which represents a significant change of direction for Marx's studies if not an Althusserian 'epistemological break', lays out the very foundations of Marxist theories of the state, which remains, for the most part, underdeveloped until his death. Indeed, if interpreted rather freely, almost all four perspectives on the state I outlined above can be found in this work. I start with the perspective that takes the state as a reflection of class struggles. Here, in his account of division of labor, the state emerges to represent the general

interest of the whole society as opposed to the particular interest of individuals. Division of labor transforms individuals' activity into a forced activity as long as common interests remain separated from her particular interests and subjugate her in the form of an alien power. Marx continues, "And out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community the latter takes an independent form as the State, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life...always based on the classes, already determined by division of labor" (Marx, 1845, p. 160). The state, then, emerges out of the new hierarchical, fragmented, and unequal organization of the relations of production. It appears to stand for the general interest as an alienated political power above individual interests, while, in reality, functioning to serve the particular interests of one class. This is where the complementary 'independent' and 'illusory' characters of the state come into play. Every class, even in the case of the proletariat, which ultimately aims to "abolish the old form of society in its entirety and of domination itself", must first capture political power "in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest" (Marx, 1845, p. 161). This means changing the positions in the relations of production on the part of the working class and solidifying them on the part of the dominant class require these classes to produce an illusion which transposes the particular as the general. It is an illusion in double senses: First, multiple and various particular interests are subsumed under the interests of one class in the form of representation. Second, political struggles for the representation of general interests are reflections or appearances of the real material struggles between classes, as Marx puts it: "(A)ll struggles within the State are merely illusory forms in which the real struggles of different classes are fought out among one another" (Marx, 1845, p. 161). Once again, the two theses on illusion are not readily compatible with each other. The first thesis projects the representation of general interest as a political goal that is to be taken up by the working class. It brings into discussion and underscores the role of ideology in class struggles. The second, however, seems to emphasize material struggles among classes within and on the economic structure and devalues the role of ideology as a mere reflection of the real antagonism. There is another argument in German Ideology that complicates things even further. Marx says, "The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as if the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class" (Marx, 1845, p. 174). This phrase, I believe, is critically important to understand Marx's perspective on the relationship between class struggles and political power. It suggests that representation of the general interest does not start when the state power is wielded; instead it is built up along the process of class struggles and secured firmly by this revolutionary class through the capturing of the state, until the rise of the next revolutionary agent. In other words, class struggles for the state power are hegemonic and processual struggles. In a Gramscian sense, representation of the general interest is as much about mobilization as it is about ruling. Conceived as a reflection of class struggles, the state has a privileged position within the superstructure. For Marx, the ultimate goal of revolutionary classes is still not holding the state power, but transforming the economic base. However, on the path leading to the latter, the former symbolizes an important threshold, where quantitative increase in polit-

ical power (processual struggles) takes a dramatic qualitative turn with the state power relocated.

The state's privileged role in the representation of the general interest, or in establishing political hegemony, is of course as much about the conception of the state as an instrument of class rule as it is about its representation as a reflection of class struggles. The first perspective is supported by many arguments Marx offers in German Ideology, such as the one that approaches the state as "the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests" (Marx, 1845, p. 187). The same argument is echoed in Manifesto of the Communist Party, where the state is defined as a "committee for managing the common affairs of whole bourgeoisie" (Marx, 1848, p. 475). As I mentioned earlier, the two conceptions of the state as an instrument and as a reflection are difficult to be combined as aspects of a whole, at least on surface. The first has a finished or static ring to it, while the second opens the state to a field of contention. Further, the first offers, at the first glance, the view that the state serves only to the interests of the ruling class. The second hints the actions of compromise on the part of the dominant class and negotiations between classes. The way to consolidate the two perspectives, I believe, is to take a step away from the repressive role of the state. Rather than viewing the state as solely a mean of domination of one class over the other, I argue that instrumental aspect of the state can be much better understood if one focuses on its role in securing social cohesion, which may allow us to approach the state as a dynamic field of class politics. Both static (no pejorative meaning intended) and dynamic interpretations can find their support in Marx's writings. Lenin, for instance, in his State and Revolution, engages in a long diatribe against Mensheviks and Social Democrats of his time, who allegedly view the state as an "organ for reconciliation of classes" (Lenin, 1964, p. 390). Against the reduction of the state solely to a repressive organ, later Marxist, such as Gramsci and Poulantzas, were more attentive to the 'flexibility' of the state action. Following the dynamic approach, it can be argued that the state is instrumental for the bourgeoisie not only for repression, but also for "asserting their common interests". It, therefore, provides cohesion within the dominant classes and class fractions. This is why "the bourgeois necessarily adopt (the state) for internal and external purposes for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests" (Marx, 1845, p. 187). Furthermore, the state's role in securing cohesion is not limited to consolidating the variations of interest among the members of the dominant class, but it is also active in constructing cohesion across classes. Reminding the egoism of civil society, Marx argues, "the practical struggle of these particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory 'general' interest in the form of the State" (Marx, 1845, p. 161). Here, Marx emphasizes the 'socially necessary' function of the state, mobilized not for domination through repression, but for domination through governance.

What are the state's socially necessary functions? It is clear from the above discussion that Marx intends to identify a regulatory aspect of the state, apart from its repressive elements. Being a necessary function, it can be assumed that it survives dramatic societal transformations, an obvious example being revolutions. So, the question can be posed differently as "What functions of the capitalist state remain intact during the transition to communism?" This is the exact question

Marx directs to the German Workers' Party in his Critique of the Gotha Program (Marx, 1975, p. 95). The answer he provides is not really satisfactory however, since he merely indicates the final form of the revolutionary transformation of the state, that is the dictatorship of the proletariat, but neglects the constitutive elements of this state form in his critique. Still, in this particular text, it is clear that Marx's perception of the socially necessary does not involve a hint of reformism. Instead, he criticizes the Workers' Party for asserting reformist demands, such as universal suffrage, popular rights, direct legislation, equal education, and progressive taxation, which, according to Marx, were already realized in some capitalist societies (Marx, 1975, pp. 95-97). Of particular interest Marx's remarks on education, which, he suggests, should be organized independent from the state control and include technical education that can ameliorate the separation of mental and physical labor (Marx, 1975, p. 97). It is interesting to see that Marx's main emphasize still, in this work of his mature scholarship, remains on the alienation of the state from society and the alienation stems from the division of labor in the economic base. Freedom, he argues, "consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it." However being alienated, it does not constitute "an independent entity that possesses its own intellectual, ethical, and libertarian bases" (Marx, 1975, p. 94), rather it stays determined by the bourgeoisie rule. Marx offers a more lucid account of his definition of the socially necessary function in the Civil War in France where he lays out the Commune's strategy as follows: "While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society" (Marx, 1871, p. 633). The Commune started with abolishing the repressive organs of the state, namely the standing army and the police, and the ideological apparatuses, of which the Church was the foremost. Transformation of public services and education, however, were carried out in a gradual manner rather than as a rupture. Education, for instance, was made "accessible to whole... and freed from the fetters which class prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it" (Marx, 1871, p. 632). Similarly, 'the judicial functionaries' were rendered responsible, accountable, and revocable, while the executive ranks were terminated altogether. In sum, the socially necessary functions of the state, which are mobilized to secure social reproduction and social rights, are to be preserved under socialism, while the remaining repressive and ideological functions are to be removed. While Marx recognizes 'the left and right hands of the state' to an extent, he views the definitive characteristic of the capitalist state to be its repressive function, at least in this work. According to Marx, the socialist state is distinct from the capitalist one in that it is no longer defined by repression but by actualization of the common interest, as he argues: "The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favor, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive" (Marx, 1871, p. 634).

Marx's treatise of the Paris Commune in Civil War in France is significant due to both its conceptualization of the state and its specification of a revolutionary strategy. Observing the complete overhaul of the capitalist state's executive, religious, and repressive organs by the Commune, Marx says, "... the working class

cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes" (Marx, 1871, p. 629). The political lesson to be drawn from this phrase is that a proletarian dictatorship, however short it may be as in the case of the Commune, can only be established after smashing the capitalist state machinery to ruins, and reorganizing civil society with its 'democratic' organizations thereafter. The theoretical lesson is that the state is not capitalist only because its executive ranks are committed to the interests of capitalists. Instead, the state has a capitalist structure from top to bottom; it is thus a capitalist state.

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in my opinion, offers the most elaborated theory of the state that can be found in the works of Marx and Engels. In this book, Marx enhances upon many of the arguments about the state, which had remained underdeveloped in his previous studies. While Marx persistently develops a materialist account of concrete historical events, many of his earlier aphorisms about the state are to be revised here to fully capture the multifaceted character of class struggles for political power in the mid-19th century France. The first dramatic shift is that the focus of analysis is no longer on the capitalist state per se, but on a state, which seems to "have made itself completely independent" under the tyranny of the second Bonaparte (Marx, 1852, p. 607). How does this state without its capitalist essence fit into Marx's progressive conception of history? For sure, Marx treats the French state under Bonaparte as a deviation from the progressive development of forces of production or as an unfitting superstructure imposed upon developed economic forces. The dictatorship is thus only a caricature of the old regimes, doomed with fiasco from the beginning. The pressure of forces of production asserts itself strongly into the political game and cannot be veiled by pure repression, thereby introducing numerous dilemmas for the dictator, as Marx succinctly reflects, "Bonaparte feels it is to be his mission to safeguard civil order. But the strength of this civil order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class... Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew" (Marx, 1852, p. 615). In short, Marx emphasizes that the state cannot withstand or change the direction of development of the forces of production over the long term.

For Marx, the government of Louis Bonaparte was a departure from the norm of capitalist development also for its dependence on brute force. "The state", he argues, "only appears to have returned to its oldest form, to the shamelessly simple domination of the sabre and the cowl" (p. 597). Sharpening the repressive function of the state, Bonaparte's rule brought about the conditions where legislative power, representing the law of the ruling class, was engulfed by executive power (p. 606). Marx makes it clear that the increasing significance of political violence, though it may an antithesis to democracy, in no way symbolizes a retreat on the working class front. For Marx, the working class struggles for the political forms (e.g. social republic) distinct from bourgeois republic, which represents nothing but the "unlimited despotism of one class over other classes" (p. 602). Marx suggests that the tyranny of Louis Bonaparte is both a consequence of the ascending working class struggles and an opportunity for a proletarian revolution. It was a consequence because the state's independence from the control of

the capitalist class was a result of a particular balance of antagonistic class powers: The rising working class and the declining bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, after the 1848 February Revolution, lets its grip on the state in order for a strong executive command to resolve social disorder and break the rising tide of working class mobilizations. In this sense, by removing itself from the control of the state power and choosing 'despotism' over 'anarchy', the capitalist class sacrificed its short-term interests for the sake of its long-term goals (p. 614). On the other hand, Marx, during this transition from the 'despotism of a class' to the 'despotism of an individual' sees a window of opportunity for the working class who facilitated the reduction of the state to its simplest mechanistic form, a repressive organ. He says, "But the revolution is thorough-going. It is still traveling through purgatory. It does its work methodically.... It first completed the parliamentary power in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it has achieved this, it completes the executive power, reduces it to its purest expression, isolates it, sets it up against itself as the sole target, in order to concentrate all its forces of destruction against it" (p. 606). Here, Marx suggests that the state structure goes through transformations as a result of class struggles. It is also appropriate to draw a parallel between Marx and Lenin, who, in The State and Revolution, defines democracy to be "the best possible political shell for capitalism" (Lenin, 1964, p. 393). Authoritarian deviations from democracy are not as efficient for the capitalist class. More importantly, the state lacking political mechanisms of consent and being reduced to a machine of repression is rendered more vulnerable to the attacks of revolutionary classes. In this sense, the rule of Louis Bonaparte also represents a stage in the life of revolutionary struggles, in which workers, having succeeded in dislocating the trenches of civil society, get prepared for a war of maneuver in Gramscian sense (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 237-239).

In addition, rather than basing his analysis on two antagonistic classes, in this concrete historical case, Marx's gaze in keen to the interplay of class alliances (bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie), class fractions (commercial bourgeoisie and landowner bourgeoisie), and supporting classes (peasantry), which all have varying influences on the organization of political power. Of particular interest is the peasantry on which the second Bonaparte's despotism was built upon. Marx defines this group as a non-class, that is historically "incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name"; and their political influence "finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself" (Marx, 1852, p. 608). Under the rule of Napoleon, bourgeoisie empowered peasants by granting them small holding property in order to weaken the material bases of feudalism. However, during the July Monarchy, fragmentation of land, increasing indebtedness of small-holding peasantry, and taxes on which the huge state bureaucracy and the army depended upon, led peasants to pauperization. Deprived of the guardianship of bourgeoisie, peasants found their last resort under Louis Bonaparte who commanded over a brutal, albeit clumsy, state. Marx says, "With the progressive undermining of this small-holding property, the state structure erected upon it collapses. The state centralization that modern society requires arises only on the ruins of the military-bureaucratic governmental machinery which was forged in opposition to feudalism" (p. 614). Marx's analysis of mid-19th century French politics inspired burgeoning amount of studies on the 20th century's fascist and authoritarian regimes, which have become, contrary to Marx's

expectations, recurrent modes of governance rather than exceptions under capitalism. Within this framework, alliances of conservative landowner classes and small peasantry have repeatedly become the centers of strong anti-democratic currents, particularly in underdeveloped and developing countries (See, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, Stephens, 1992). Was Marx wrong in viewing the isolated executive command, 'one-man leadership', and primarily repressive function of the state as exceptions to capitalist rule? In one sense it is defensible that Marx underestimated the extent of 'relative autonomy' the state can enjoy in spite of the capitalist class. However, in many cases of dictatorship and authoritarianism of the 20th century, the state has never acquired an independent status from the capitalist class, as opposed to the rule of Louis Bonaparte, and remained rather bound to the stages of development of productive forces. More importantly, with the 18th Brumaire, Marx adds historical specificity to the state analysis. Indeed, he shows how bourgeoisie can reconfigure its relationship to the state, use state power strategically, and facilitate changes in the state structure. In this sense, it can be argued that Marx invites a particular form of historical-materialist analyses of the state, which is open to historical variations of the modes of governance under capitalism.

During the last years of Marx, and after his death, Marx's long time collaborator Engels authored two books that might be telling about the foundations of Marxist theories of the state. In The Origin of Family, Private Property and State, he argued that the state, 'arising out of society' and increasingly 'alienating itself from it', functions to hold class antagonisms in check. Its second function, by providing the economically dominant class with the means of exploitation and repression over the oppressed class, is to render it the politically dominant class (Engels, 1884, pp. 752-753). In Anti-Duhring, he adds, "And the modern state, again, is only the organization that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists." (Engels, 1969, p. 168) Engels highlights two important aspects of the state power. First, the state, in normal conditions, stays outside the production process, and instead secures the political context of capitalist exploitation. Second, in its operation, it strives to protect the unity of the capitalist class both from the working class and from the self-interest of individual capitalists.

Up to here, I tried to sketch the progress of four perspectives on the capitalist state that can be found in the works of Marx and Engels. These four perspective can be added together, however inharmoniously, as follows: The state is an instrument of class rule, which is determined by class struggles and overdetermined by the development of forces of production. It works to secure the external conditions of capitalist accumulation and social cohesion through force and ideology. In the next section, I attempt to show to what extent this definition holds in the case of Capital.

The state in Capital

Capital Volume I has an ironic language. In the text, it sometimes becomes difficult to distinguish whether Marx states his own opinions or of his opponents, since he tries to defeat bourgeoisie political economists in their own game by accepting

the notions of free exchange and competition as given and starting points. The same ambiguity exists in the case of his views on the state power as well. Is the absence of a theoretical discussion on the state for the large chunk of the book a logical extension of his economic theory, or does Marx still pretend to follow the path of the bourgeoisie economist, by presupposing no external political interference is necessary for the laws of capitalism to take action? Indeed, Marx tackles with the question of state coercion extensively only towards the end of the Volume I, where his discourse also turns out to be more direct, in order to demonstrate how the bourgeoisie and proletariat positioned at the opposite ends of the class structure in the first place. There, in the process of dispossession of a large population from their means of production, the premise of free exchange becomes hollow in view of the bare truth of the worker who "belongs to capital before he has sold himself to the capitalist" (Marx, 1867, p. 723). Therefore, in Marx's account, political domination, in the form of appropriation of land, destruction of craftsmanship, and punitive and disciplinary measures against the unemployed, seems to precede and lay the ground for capitalist exploitation. In this account, the state has primarily a repressive function that is adopted to raise and discipline the labor force necessary for the new mode of production. In the phase of primitive accumulation, the state, through violence, forces agricultural population "into accepting the discipline necessary for the system of wage-labor" (p. 899). In other words, it is a catalyst for society's transition to capitalism. This definition of the state includes the two perspectives I mentioned above: First, the state as an organization of class rule with repression being its primary mode of operation. Second, the state as an organization to secure the (preceding) external conditions of capitalist accumulation.

Violence is a necessary component of the bourgeoisie revolution. For Marx, a premature capitalist class needs the state power to regulate wages, lengthen the working day, and keep workers always dependent on the capitalist production process. The bourgeoisie's demand for constant state interference is a necessary evil during the 'historical genesis of capitalist production'(p. 899). However, as the process of production develops fully, Marx argues, economic relations only become adequate to keep the flow of capital's valorization process in continuum. He says, "The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. Direct extra economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases. In the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the 'natural laws of production'"(p. 899). In this sense, the state is not required by the capitalist class under normal conditions, rather it is an emergency exit to be used when the capitalist process of production is interrupted. Since production of a relative surplus population, oscillations in prices and wages, and workers' subsistence levels can all be regulated by market-mechanisms and defined by economic laws of capitalism, interruptions of the valorization process rarely, but systematically, happen as in the crises of overproduction. Apart from intra-economic challenges to capitalism, worker resistances also constitute an example of the 'exceptional cases' that necessitate state intervention. Treating labor movements as exceptional may at first sound strange for Marx, who has been the primary inspiration for anti-capitalists with revolutionary fervor. However, as he makes clear, capitalism positions individuals in a class matrix and compels them to sell their labor-power voluntarily. It conditions workers to the reproduction of

their conditions of production and makes them depended on capital. It naturalizes its existence in the eyes of the worker and leaves little room for resistance. Marx's emphasis on the durability of social structures and their reproduction indicates the limits of organization against capitalist processes of accumulation. For Marx, resistance is always a class action and hence an outcome of long processes of class formations. Dispersed individuals or a class in its dormant phase, class-in-itself, does not have the potential to break through the iron cage of capitalist production. In sum, it can be suggested that violence is a mean to revolutions of both bourgeoisie and proletarian kinds. It is the expression of political wills of organized classes. However, in-between revolutions, major confrontations are rare and daily conducts of capitalists are carried on in more subtle ways. Marx writes, "The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws" (p. 899). While Marx seems to agree with Foucault in that the degree of physical violence declines dramatically and is replaced by more subtle mechanisms of discipline and reintegration, he does not consider this development as a consequence of technical specialization of the modern state, but rather as a feature of capitalist production. In this sense, roots of hegemony stem directly from the production space itself as opposed to, say, civil society's political-intellectual organizations as suggested by Gramsci, or the state apparatuses as Althusser contends. While Marx certainly attributes distinctive characteristics to modern education in disciplining working people, he, in Capital, does not consider education apart from its role in the production process, hence minimizes its impact outside the context of the factory (pp. 618-9). At this point, alienated from its functions in reproduction and social cohesion, the state is presented once again as a primarily repressive organization. Active consent of laborers is achieved through economic relationships, primarily at the factory, where the state is not directly involved. Legitimation is, therefore, an economic process. Despite the state's absence in the constitution of hegemony, it is important to note that Marx clearly recognizes that capitalism requires more than the structural positioning of social classes and the easiness by which exchange relationships are carried on for its survival. For Marx, the belief in the institutions and relations of capitalism as being natural and existing time immemorial is a complementary and necessary component of the economic system. This belief may be undermined by historical and groundbreaking changes in the economic structure, but, in Marx's account, it is still hard to imagine the state being the origin or initiator of a crisis in hegemony.

In the chapter The Working Day, Marx presents his treatment of the state action as determined by class struggles. The establishment of restrictions on the working day does not correspond to any laws of the capitalist system and is determined by the balance of political forces, as he argues, "(T)he nature of commodity exchange itself imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to surplus labour...Between equal rights, force decides" (p. 344). The laws of capitalist competition charge each individual capitalist with a 'werewolf-like hunger' and force them to extract surplus labor as much as possible. In the embryonic stage of capitalism, in between the 14th and 18th centuries, capitalists armored themselves with state power to lengthen the working day in order to sate their desire for profit. The state, acting here as the werewolf's claws and teeth, became the nec-

essary coercive force that brought large populations into labor force and kept them there under unfavorable working conditions. Apart from working class struggles for a normal working day, the limit on the working day was further imposed by drastic demographic changes, such as the great plague, which made it difficult to attract workers into factory jobs (pp. 382-383). The Statutes of Laborers enacted during this period were primarily the results of such demographic changes and epidemics. In the 19th century of capitalism, Marx explains, limitless extension of the working day brought forth working class struggles, first in the form of 'outrages without measure' and then in the form of demands for social control (pp. 411-412). These rebellions counteracted by the state in a series of Factory Acts, which "curb capital's drive towards a limitless draining away of labor-power by forcibly limiting the working day on the authority of the state, but a state ruled by capitalist and landlord" (p. 348). Military recruitment of working class people set further limits to the extension of the working day and to the degradation of working population. Here, Marx notes the declining standards of height in the military through the near French history (p. 349). While the army establishes and secures a nation's domination over others, it also, consequently, serves the long-term interests of the capitalist class. Both in the case of epidemics and military recruitment, then, the state sets limits to the mindless rush of individual capitalists for ever more profit in order to secure the long-term interests of the capitalist class. The army also constitutes a basis of political power for the landed aristocracy who unexpectedly supported workers in their struggles for shorter working days. Aside from the military interests of the landlords, this support was partly due to the increasing tensions between the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Through a political campaign, which gained the support of workers, the bourgeoisie succeeded in abolishing the Corn Laws and reducing the price of foreign wheat and bread, which in return had a detrimental effect on the wealth of landlords (Harvey, 2010, pp. 151-152). In response, in order to curb the power of rising capitalist class and gain the patronage of working populations, the landed aristocracy emerged as a supporter of the English Factory Acts.

In sum, struggles over the limits of the working day demonstrate several aspects of the state power. First, while economic relations are enough to "set the seal on capitalist domination" by creating the conditions of exploitation and workers' continuous dependence on capital, such relations of 'hidden' domination have their internal contradictions. Looking at the way Marx presents the problem, it can be suggested that political force starts to decide only when economic relationships fail to legitimize particular inequalities and injustices. The limitless extension of the working day in accordance with the bourgeoisie logic is just an example where the capitalist class had been unable to gain the consent of the working class despite the latter's inclination to affirm the existing conditions of domination. Such weaknesses of the legitimatizing power of economic relations necessitate the state's intervention as well as some concessions on the part of the capitalist class. Why does the state need to get involved? Bringing Gramsci's account of the state vis-a-vis class relations into discussion may be fruitful to answer this question. Gramsci argues, "(T)he life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups – equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail..."(Gramsci, 1971, p. 182). For

Gramsci, the ruling class, in order to sustain its domination, has to make some real concessions that satisfy the material interests of dominated classes. In other words, in order to integrate dominated classes to capitalism and preserve its core interests, the juridico-political mechanisms of consent are not enough; instead, the capitalist class has to give up on some of its minor interests in favor of the working class. Choosing not to sacrifice minor interests is dangerous as it may reveal the class character of the state unmistakably and make conditions of production unbearable for workers. Willing to sacrifice some interests is not without drawbacks either, since it introduces a trajectory of reformism to capitalism and raises workers' expectations to the levels, which "no national capitalist economy can totally ensure" (Anderson, 1976, p. 29). In contrast to Gramsci, Marx does not consider active consent of workers as a principal constituency of class relations. Instead, he views domination deriving from mystification of class relations that imposes false consciousness upon workers. However, I claim that they share the view that the state brings rationality to the impulsiveness of bourgeoisie competition and regulates the concessions to be made by the capitalist class (Gramsci, 1971, p. 247). In this sense, the state introduces a certain degree of reformism to the fabric of capitalism; such reformism, on the other hand, is demanded by the working class itself. Blind and fierce competition among capitalists always threatens the stability of capitalist production by desecrating the supply of labor-power and resources and igniting intra-class conflicts which may slip out of control. However, an empowered working class forces capitalists to consider the future of their reproduction as a class, removes the short-sightedness of their accumulative drive and unites them in strategic action (Harvey, 2010, p. 157). Limiting of the working day, may indeed be in line with the long-term interests of the capitalist class, as Marx points out: "If then the unnatural expansion of the working day ... shortens the life of the individual worker, and therefore the duration of his labor-power, the forces used up have to be replaced more rapidly, and it will be more expensive to reproduce labor-power... It would seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working day" (Marx, 1867, p. 377). In sum, as Marx's discussion on the working day reveals, the state's role is to manage this delicate balance of conflicting interests, hold class antagonisms in check, and govern the material transactions between classes while always privileging the ruling class in the end.

Interestingly, Marx seems to move a step away from unresolvable antagonisms between classes and suggest that a reform of the working day within capitalism may indeed be beneficial for both the capitalist and working classes. Workers, he says, must act as a class for 'protection' against the limitless extension of the working day by making a "voluntary contract with capital" in the form of a "modest Magna Carta of the legally limited working day" (Marx, 1867, p. 416). What should we make of this temporary suspension of the revolutionary ideal? It certainly seems to be at odds with the view that revolutionary conditions becomes ripe when workers become totally crushed under the capitalist machinery. The image here is rather of a 'healthy' capitalism with a relatively strong working class. In my opinion, the radicalism of this seeming reformist account of the struggles over the extent of working day lays in the double-edged character of material concessions. It is difficult to define limits of reformism and separate it from revolutionary struggles once and for all. Instead, concessions always bear the risk

of giving up too much, and reformist demands may sometimes radicalize beyond containment. Ambiguity about the limits of reformism keeps the revolutionary potential alive. The state plays the role of a watchdog of this unstable equilibria. There is still one remaining question, however. If capitalist pressure to extend absolute surplus value is an integral part of the production process under capitalism, then it can be assumed that class conflict over the length of the working day would incessantly reoccur throughout the history of capitalism. If this is the case, then how can we assume that economic relations without the state intervention can guarantee workers' obedience? And, in what sense is the state power required by the capitalist class only in exceptional circumstances, since capitalists' desire for long working days is not exceptional at all? I do not think Marx gives a satisfactory answer to these questions. However, it is safe to say that contracts on the length of the working day delay open confrontations between classes and mark the beginning of periods where workers are become docile through the process of capitalist production. The state here moves to the backstage of history only to reappear again when class conflicts arise.

Second, the chapter on the working day offers a historical example where the state power is manipulated through class alliances and class conflicts. As his earlier works exemplify, in Marx's analysis, the state gains its dynamic and multifaceted character only when it is not under the direct control of the capitalist class. Its relative autonomy from class relations is more fully recognized when feudal classes are not completely neutralized or when the working class has an exceptionally strong claim over the state power. Whether during primitive accumulation or in the periods of heightened class struggles, the state becomes responsible for bringing a tumultuous society back into its normal (capitalist) mode of operation. For Marx, the state expresses its agency and fulfills its transitory function only in historical crossroads. This view ultimately stresses the repressive function of the state and devalues its other functions, such as the state's role in class reproduction. The state is admittedly active in checking external threats to capital's valorization, such as epidemics and war. However, it does not interfere with the simple reproduction that rejuvenates fresh labor power, and let's it be carried out by capital alone (p. 718). Similarly, different forms of surplus population are produced, incorporated to and expelled from the labor process solely through capital's own dynamics (pp. 795-798). Capital appears to be able to produce its own social relations in the absence of the state.

However, a closer reading of Capital shows that the state plays an indirect role in hastening the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Marx considers class struggles as the engine of history. And, as long as class struggles influence state policies, the state contributes to increases in the pace of capitalist development. For instance, when the state puts barriers to the extension of the working day, capitalists strive to speed up technological developments to maximize the relative surplus value produced (p. 532). Similarly, when state regulation constrains capitalist production, capitalists seek new areas of capital accumulation to compensate for what they have to give up. In line with this thesis, Marx views the integration of domestic labor to capitalist economy as a consequence of the restrains imposed upon capital by the state (p. 621). Moreover, state regulation of capitalist production accelerates the concentration of capital by facilitating the dissolution of isolated small industries, while, on the other hand, ameliorating the conditions

of production for laborers. Extension of factory legislation, for instance, was responsible for both speeding up the process of transition to large-scale industry and enforcing "uniformity, regularity, and order" to the production process. Marx argues, "It destroys both the ancient and traditional forms behind which the dominion of capital is still partially hidden, and replaces them with a dominion which is direct and unconcealed. But by doing this it also generalizes the direct struggle against its rule" (p. 635). With the help of factory inspectors, the state removes the last remnants of feudal methods in the organization of production. It helps the development of forces of production and, by doing so, sets the stage for the next level of class struggles where the antagonisms between capital and labor-power become ever more transparent.

It is safe to argue that the state has a transitory function in Marx's view. However transitory, its role in the expansion and development of capitalism in a global scale is fundamental, as Marx points out: "These methods (of primitive accumulation) depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society, which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power" (p. 916). It is important to notice that, as the case on the extension of factory legislations demonstrates, the state's role in completing the transition to capitalism cannot be described as being exclusively repressive. Instead, the state is also responsible for introducing capitalist rationality to the production process. This feature of the state remains under-theorized in Capital Volume I, but I would like to suggest that it is hinted. When Marx describes capitalists as 'capital personified', I think he implies an absence of agency on the part of capitalists whose actions are dictated by an alienated force. In this sense, they are as chained to the production process as a worker. And, while the factory provides the context for building class-consciousness for workers, capitalists, in their pursuit of personal profit, which constitutes the central logic of their lives, have difficulties in associating with a class. Indeed, Marx many times emphasizes the shortsightedness of the capitalist class. What Poulantzas calls 'the bourgeoisie's lack of political capacity' (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 183) to lead its own political projects renders this class always depended on the elements of other classes, which constitute the bureaucracy and party cadres, and, of course, on the state. Rationalizing the technical aspects of the production process may, to an extent, be done by acquiring and developing the technology demanded by capitalists. However, social organization of capitalist production requires a form of rationality to be introduced by the state. To achieve this task, the state asserts a logic of its own apart from the logic of capitalism to preserve social order, which is translated into fragmentation for the working class, and cohesion for the capitalist class fractions. This discussion inevitably brings forth the question of state managers' role in the production of capitalist rationality, which was taken to the frontiers of the state theory by Marxists and non-Marxists alike during the 1970s and 1980s (E.g. Block, 1977). Marx, on the other hand, is not too concerned about them in Capital. However, especially in the sections on the factory acts, factory inspectors, regulation of capital, and the health, education, and military requirements of capitalist societies, Marx hints that rationality does not directly grow out of the processes of capitalist pro-

duction, but it is brought into these processes from outside.

Conclusion

The state theory developed in the works of Karl Marx generally emphasizes the coercive and transitory functions of the state. On the other hand, the state's roles in social cohesion and reproduction, its repertoires of compromise and autonomous action remain less central to Marx's theorization. However, it is evident that even in one of his most 'economic' and least 'political' writings, in Capital, Marx provides the reader with many innovative ideas about the state that inspired later generations of Marxist scholars. In this sense, while the four perspectives outlined in the beginning of this paper set the general principles of Marxist approaches to the state, Marx's contribution to the state theory, however descriptive it may be, extends beyond this framework.

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