**On the ascription of pleasure to the state of liberation by Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika syncretic** **in the light of sūtra-s**

**4n**

The discourse of ascription of happiness or pleasure of the highest degree to the state of liberation is heavily contested among Indian theist schools. The systematic nature of disagreement among post Sūtra Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Vedāntic scholars regarding the status of mokśa in terms of pleasure is worth noting. The disagreement that ensued regarding the nature of liberation in terms of what we would call in a parochial sense “pleasure” can be captured in a long line of literatures of both these schools.

Language and the Thresholds

of Sense: Some Aspects

of the Failure of Words

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But what has been a lack is the summation to root of this disagreement, it rests on linear analysis of tenacity of the propositions raised by the concerned systems to issue their position. The arguments that we witness in the literature of both systems envisage manifold corpus interwoven together which we try to bifurcate into many components-

1. the linguistic nature as well as function of predicating terms to the status of liberation in the Vedāntic texts; in terms of whether they are performing metaphors or literal pronouncements,
2. the theoretical nature of disagreement such with both of the polemics either engaging with the same terms with different meanings or different terms with a fortiori different meanings.
3. The thesis of ineffability and metaphoric evocation in the Vedānta goes in hand with each other.
4. Situating the stark absence of positive characterisation of mokśa in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Sūtra-s with the pertinent ananda moksha\_\_\_\_ of the post sūtra scholars with an end to highlight the instrumentalization of various concepts as unique to serving the respective praxis of the system.

1

The linguistic nature of the term

He (Samkara) seems reluctant to accept bliss as a central property of brahman, equivalent to being (sat) and consciousness (cit). – A. Fort

We survey the whole extant literature and the debate on mokśa in terms of highest happiness.

The absence of positive characterisation of mokśa in the Nyāya Sūtra and Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is translated as denial by the post sūtra commentators. What followed in the sūtra tradition was only the causal linkup to liberation; a mere genesis. N.S 1.1.22 *tadantyavimokśo apavargah*

V.S 3.2.13 *ātmakarmasu vyakhyata*

In the commentary The absence cannot be always translated as denial and that the absence is s

I would underline those sutras here. The absence of any attempt in the Sūtra to indicate any positive characterisation of the liberation is congruous with the fact that Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika pertains within the domain of vyavahārika sattā, i.e. the empirical. It is symptomatic of the pattern that is replicated in entire philosophical rapture of Indian philosophy that scholars have entirely neglected that a specific system use specific set of instrumentalization as per the certain

The question arises, a simple “why”, why would aphoristic Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika would not engage in the positive affirmation while

In the course of analysis that starts with mere objective of deconstructing the affirmation or rejection to the predication to something transcendent as state of liberation, the analysis un-covers the broader scheme of predications and the function they serve in much wider scope of Hinduism apart from being the literal object of theoretical agreement or disagreement.

The metaphors cannot be factual, and hence disagreements cannot have a chance if the predication deviates from being factual and are metaphorical models.

Through this paper, we will try to deconstruct the systematic divide between the two schools of Indian philosophical systems regarding the much-debated scope of predication of what we call pleasure in the parochial sense to status of mokśa. Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy on one hand and Vedanta system on the other when it comes to the characterisation of soul and the state of liberation. The contrasting claims are associated with the later scholars of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika on one hand and Advaita philosophers on the other. Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika scholars held fast to the ground that the state of liberation cannot be ascribed in terms of positive narration and status of ātma qua atma remains without the faculty of consciousness.

The predicates terms might not only be a serving metaphor as it has been taken into the consideration that Hindu philosophical aspects take a multifaceted aspect. But these evocations are indeed at least metaphors.

Upaniṣads have declared in summation the status quo of Brahma in any possible linguistic genre to be ineffable, the import of which rests in the fact that nothing can stand as a predication to the state of mokśa or Brahman.

So much so, that scholars have treated the qualifying terms for liberated state as literal characteristics or qualities or literal states rather than performing metaphors whose only function was to serve a guiding imagery to conduct into ātmavidya. The qualifying terms for brahman are not a positive attribution, or characteristics for it would be penchant blow to the Nirguna brhman. If the qualifying predicate is metaphor, the question is what kind nature of disagreement would fall under the scope of metaphors. It may be that metaphors can be felicitous or infelicitous, but disagreements between the concerned schools have an interesting

George Lakoff, Mark Johnson marked four types of metaphors based on their nature with

In metaphors, the word used a principle metaphor is

The signified in the Vedantic texts not only share the conceptual schemes with the significand but the latter ontologically partakes off the signified. In his commentary, Samkaracarya proceeds to underline that ananda that is witnessed by the

brahman do not only share a conceptual scheme with the signify but are ontologically

The Platonic and Upanisadic yearning to conduct a metaphorical display for a reality cannot be taken as literal vocations and then succumbed to factual discussions.

That Brahma is indeed beyond words and understanding, claims Taittiriya Upanisad and yet refers it to by calling it ananda in the very same line*.* It would have been pure contradiction if it is weren’t a statement with metaphoric insinuation. Shankaracharya also follows the same lead in the In 2.9, yato va

What is aananda but a metaphor or metonym? Ananda was a metaphor for brahman, a keyword to point towards something; that something being the scope of language. We have an embodied experience of something that correlates in varieties of ways with something of the other domain which is imparted to this domain, this is how metaphor works. Shankaracarya elucidate this by saying a clear distinction between ananda and anandmaya, in tattiriya 2.5, while anandmaya is state or an characteristics that a being possess in the state closer to liberation, ananda is a signifier performing as a metaphor. The metaphor shares partakes in the conceptual scheme of the

ananda is what we see in the life of many

The issue disseminates in two ways-

* first, the disagreement and argument involve by these systems in employing two different terms that are sukha and ananda with altogether two different conceptual imports.
* Second, these two different words signify the same conceptual scheme.

The word ātman is defined ostensive in

In this paper, we have post sutra Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas have constructed various arguments against Advaitins that very conception of soul in the pristine state cannot be construed in positive ways without falling into contradiction. It seems peculiar maintaining that it somehow might goes against the general Upaniasadic weltanschauung for their position seems to be peculiar maintaining their commitment to Upaniasdic sayings. Upanisads are replete with the positive narration of the state of liberation. On the whole the post Sutra Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers have altogether registered their reservations against postulation of atman qua atman in any positive manner whether in terms of characterisation, indication.

The state of infinite pleasure is generally captured by the Sanskrit terminologies like sukha and ananda. For them, ascribing consciousness to the liberated atman or to the state of liberation would be an anomaly.

What is connotated as pleasure by “sukha” or the “ananda”.

It can be found its full exposition in Nyayamanjari where

Considering their Veda affirming orientation, their system might seem to be picking up peculiar position and this has been picked up by the school of Advaitins. The philosophers of Nyaya-Vaisesika syncretic have been vehemently engaged in defending their respective systems from the attacks of Advaitins who hold just the opposite position.

The problem seems to arise due to dichotomy of sukha and ananda. It is the misplacement of these two words that the philosophical differences arose between the Advaitins and the Nyaya-Vaisesikas. Sukha has entirely different usage than that of ananda. Ananda functions relatively different in Upanisadic

While the overall Upanisadic weltanschauung and the Advaitins use terminological tools to indicate state of liberation denoted by Brahman, in the system of metaphors, the system of Nyaya-Vaisesika stood on the opposite end. The key terms of sat, cit and ananda actually make ample appearances in the Upanisads, to indicate the state of liberation. These terms among other group of terms like satyam, jnanam, anatam are taken to be either in symbolic form or metaphoric form. The pleasure debate forms one of the many differentiated viewpoints among the Naiyayika-Vaisesika-s and the Advaitins.

These key terms among many constitute a major function of denoting a non-empirical state of being that is Brahman. It is conspicuous that these terms were not supposed to be used as literal adjectives nor imply any sense of positive qualification, for that would be a misnomer to the unlimitedness of liberation. Whether the nature of language employed is symbolic or else, it remains a minimum constant fact that the terminologies are employed to serve a function to denote or imply the state of liberation. The question of as t o why there is such explicit positive characterisation will be elucidated later in this paper.

It is the two of these, the cit and the ananda that are among these key terms that It is in the functionality of cit and ananda that foreshadows the debate between the concerned systems. It might be the

This denial seems to be the result of logical derivation right from the sutras, this denial is set against in contrast with the Advaita position in the later literature. The authors from Nyaya-Vaisesika syncretic and Advaita system have been engaged in a long mutual disagreement over the ascription of pleasure to the nature of liberated atman or atman qua atman and the state of liberation itself. The problem arises when the upanishadic and Advaitic tenet seem to propose the bliss or pleasure to indicate the state of liberation is contrated by the nyaya position.

The question is raised in Nyayavartika as to why the

Sutras recorded the absence and the absence is translated into denial by most commentators. The Nyayavartikakar resorts to another way, in answering the question as to why the sutra doesn’t mention the term sukha along with dukha, he included Sukha within the scope of facticity of Dukha.[[1]](#footnote-2) Most commentators have resorted in other direction by firm establishment that bliss in any form is not a part and parcel of liberation.

Then the debate is surged between the aforesaid system. For the very long time, the scholars from Nyaya-Vaisesika syncretic and Advaita have had been engaged in the disagreement regarding the nature of liberation and the nature of liberated self. It becomes imperative trace the roots of this disagreements in the Sutras themselves. An obvious question arises, have sutras recorded the

What is postulated of as an inferential nature

What is meant by the term lingam in Sutra 1.1.3 is decisive of how the Sage sets up the discussion of atman. What is captured in lingam becomes vital to the discussion of atman. The term lingam only should be taken up as a mark

* The tone of characterisation – The term lingam functions as a description.
* In the sense of inference, Vatsyasyan postulated
* The signs or the marks of the soul. The term atman is unique because it captures the notion of self and also an entity in the third person. The

Nyaya Sutras

* Badhanalaksanam dukham 1.1.21 (Nyaya Sutra)
* Tadatyantavimokso apavargah 1.1.22 (Nyaya Sutra)

*Uddyotakara says things which confirm the suspicion that duḥkha (sorrow) was taken at least more objectively than a mere subjective feeling. He incidentally gives a list of twenty-one types of duḥkhas among which sukha (pleasure) is one. In explanation, we get the cryptic remark: “Pleasure is so (i.e., of the nature of pain) because it is inextricably intermingled with pain*

The third sutra that mentions

Liberation or to use the key term apavarga is free from dukkha which is of the nature of bondage. of affirmative in nature

There might be a reason why the Sutrakar of both these systems don’t seem to veer towards the positive characterisation of atman qua atman neither the state of liberation itself.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika syncretic was meant to be operative within the realm of Vyavaharika sat per say. The Upanishadic tenet, even the strict system of Advaita never disowned the Vyavahirka satta. It does exist, it has the element of sat only as long as the paramthika sat doesn’t down upon. The vyavaharika sat would only obey the vyavahar. The job of Nyaya-Vaisesika was meant to be limited to this horizon only, this is the reason why the duo Sutrakars never tended to present or indicate any positive characterisation or indication of soul in the liberated state or the state of liberation in any ways. They only did the job of ridding of the empirical baggage off from the liberated soul and the state of liberation.

* There is no mention of positive affirmation by the Nyaya-Vaisesika Sutrakars that the liberation is without pleasure or bliss.
* The interexchange of pleasure and bliss with each other.
* The keyterm of ananda altogether serves a different function than that of sukha. Ananda alongwith the
* The term atman is indicative of two entities- first as functioning as only referring to the self. This self is mostly in the karan vibhatkti of Tritiya meaning through the self (aatmana) and in the seventh vibhakti meaning in the self that is aatmana. The second sense is indicative of aatma as an entity that is addressed in the third person. Its common that both these senses overlap too.
* The pleasure along with other 6 items constitute what is called linga or the marks for the self as narrated by the Nyaya Sutrakar. Linga means indicative of something.

Nyaya and Vaisesika forms two of the six strong alignments to the Vedic Vakyas among the six school of theistic systems.

Consciousness and pleasure are part and parcel of atma only in the unliberated form.

The root of the pleasure debate lies in the fact that the connotations of Ananda and sukha are unified into one, the ananda and sukha have both different praxis. To advance a claim by using these terms in one sense brought about the Ananda and sukha have entirely different roles to play meaning a state of happiness (not necessarily in as a hedonistic one).

For Naiyayikas the liberated atman being conscious would be an anomaly. The same is said of pleasure in the sense of ananda and sukha. The denial of pleasure and consciousness to the state of liberation is set in contrast to Vedantic conception of liberation.

There might be a reason why authors of Sutras only restricted themselves with the negative associations. According to Advaita Vedānta the Absolute cannot be indicated directly in any positive way. The only true way of talking about it is in strictly negative terms. Nevertheless, it can be analogically referred to or implied by the positive expressions sat, cit, ānanda: Being, Consciousness, Bliss. (Again, we are reminded of a similar discussion in Thomistic theology about the analogical application of names to God.)31 The liberated Advaitin realizes the nature of Brahman as such, that it is in essence these things; i.e., it does not exist, but it is the Existence; it is not conscious, but it is Consciousness; it is not blissful, but it is Bliss itself.

NYÄYAKANDALI on Prasastapädas s PADÄRTHADHARMASAMGRAHA Summary by Karl H. Potter

(E16-18; T13-15) In order to meet an objection of Mandana Mishra era that to view liberation as the cessation of a specific quality is to view it as self-annihilation, Srïdhara argues that destruction of pain results in the self's true nature (svarüpa) being realized» If someone should object that liberation as defined here means complete absence of pleasure and so cannot be desired by mee2 Srïdhara answers that because pleasures are fleeting and always mixed with pain men will desire their cessation also. Absence (äbkäva) is omitted from Prasastapada

NYÄYAMUKTÄVALI on Bhasarvajna’s NYÄYASÄRA Summary by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, in Karl H Potter

Advaitins hold that pleasure (= bliss) is identical with consciousness itself and thus is self-evident. This is wrong; we perceive the difference between consciousness and pleasures.

NYÄYAVÄRTTIKATÄTPARYATIKÄ Summarized by Bimal Krishna Matilal, (E refers to the edition in Kashi Sanskrit Series 24 by Rajeshwara Sastri Dravid, Banaras 1925) (B25G9).

(Pp. 238ff.) Pleasure or happiness is really a quality of the self, and hence not identical with the self. Similarly, consciousness is a quality of the self. States of consciousness, i.e., judgments, emerge and go out of existence and hence they cannot be identified with the self which is supposed to be permanent and nonemergent. In the judgment "I know the pot" the three elements—the knower, the known object, and knowledge—are registered as distinct entities. Such registration cannot be due to error, since apart from possessing these emergent states of consciousness the self nowhere appears to be naturally conscious. Moreover, in the state of deep sleep (susupti) no state of consciousness emerges, since no object is revealed. Thus, this is a time when the self is without consciousness.

NYÄYAVÄRTTIKA (Summary by Karl H. Potter)

This is an example, though still a simple one, of how recognition and interpretation of a metaphor may require attention to the particular circumstances of its utterance. (Max Black, Models and Metaphors)

(E84-87; T (1913) 350-58) Objection'. The scriptures say that there is eternal pleasure for the liberated self, but Naiyäyikas deny it. Answer: What the scripture really means is that there is final cessation of pain. We frequently talk that way. I say "I am well and happy ' when I have recovered from a major illness but still have minor aches and pains. And furthermore, if one aims for release under the impression that he is going to gain pleasure he will never obtain release at all, since such an attitude involves attachment. Objection: But so is aversion to pain an attitude of attachment. Answer: True. The seeker's proper attitude in seeking release is one of indifference.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika system engage itself with the realm of Vyavarika satta that is the empirical world. The Vaisesikas deals with the ontological scope of padarthas while the Nyaya is concerned with the epistemological categorisation of padartha with both serving the end of soteriology.

The understanding that is given for Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy for soul with reference to as not conscious by nature but it become conscious when it is involved in the process of cognition. For the Vaiśeṣikas, consciousness must be embodied. Without abandoning the opposition between empirical and true reality, they believe the supreme Ātman has no consciousness, for which they are mocked by their numerous opponents who caustically compare such a Self to a log or a stone.[[2]](#footnote-3)

What is involved here is the misinterpretation and wrong interchange of cetana as cit tattva and cetana as being having the scope of consciousness or awareness. In the Upanisadic thought, seers made use of linguistic tool which verily uses language as a tool to communicate the apparently incommunicable; the extra linguistic facts to instigate pattern of motivation among followers,

First thing first. The Sanskrit word cetanaa is transcribed as ‘consciousness’ which gives away the only import of being aware, the opposite of being in the psychological state of unconscious. The state of awareness whether in of the degrees suffices to empirical avenue. But there is

What is left out is the fact that cetana is derived from cit. The three versions are cit, caitanya and cetana. The misinterpretation arises from dissolving the difference between cit tattva and cetana or caitanya. The more level of misinterpretation is due cit is both used and understood as being conscious or awareness of something

The Sutras of Nyaya and Vaisesika don’t engage in positive attributions to atma

with regard to the pristine version of entity of atman entirely

Wittgenstein was clear that being religious is not a matter of proposing explanatory hypotheses about the world of a scientific or quasi-scientific kind, but rather of passionate commitment to a certain system of reference, a certain framework for interpreting the world.

The attribution of pleasure

Moreover, it is the controller (adhiṣṭhātā) of body and sense organs, etc. In other words, self indirectly brings consciousness to the body as well as sense organs.11 It is noteworthy that one of the recent commentators of Vaiśeṣikasūtras has clearly characterized self as non-material (ajaḍa).1

The liberated soul

Dissociating consciouseness from cetana tattva in Advaita Vedanta and Nyaya-Vaisesika

Cetana is used here for not for consciousness, but to mean awareness which is derived from its being in contact with man.

Difference in atma tattva and aatman from soul

The understanding given over atma and liberation is that

In the Nyāya-Vaiseśika philosophy, Mokṣa is known as Apavarga. According to Nyāya, soul is naturally nirgun and inactive. The consciousness is neither eternal attribute nor natural attribute of the soul. The consciousness is non-eternal and accidental attribute of the self. When the self is related with the manas, manas is related with the senses and senses are related with the external objects, then consciousness originates in the self

Atman, atma and aatma tattva.

Cetana and cetana

In the system of Indian philosophy,

two different terms are used to allude to two different entities in different stages.

The Advaitis have been attentive to the usage of atma tattva and jeevatma.

Both authors of Nyaya and Vaisesika Sutra doesn’t engage with the positive characterisation of the atma tattva.

In - Śaṅkara’s philosophy of dreaming: Constructing an unreal world Neil Dalal -

Br\_U 4.3.10–11, for example, states: This is how he dreams. He takes materials from the entire world and, taking them apart on his own and then on his own putting them back together, he dreams with his own radiance, with his own light. In that place this person becomes his own light. In that place there are no carriages, there are no tandems, and there are no roads; but he creates for himself carriages, tandems, and roads. **In that place there are no joys, pleasures, or delights; but he creates for himself joys, pleasures, and delights.** In that place there are no pools, ponds, or rivers; but he creates for himself pools, ponds, and rivers for he is a creator (Olivelle, 1996, p. 59)

According to conceptual metaphor theories, metaphors are systems of conceptual mappings and not just a linguistic tool, they are harboured on our thoughts.

As per Arundhati- metaphor cannot be taken as some kind of linguistic abnormality, or something totally far away from a set course which needs a total special explanation — rather, metaphor should be regarded as an essential element of normal linguistic phenomenon. However, this kind of view is more extended by Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Gadamer (1900–2002) by taking metaphor as a principle of language that transcends our common literal understanding. Metaphor, to Nietzsche, is not merely a linguistic entity, rather it is ‘a process by which we encounter our world’ (Hinman, 1982).

For Gadamer, one should believe in the fundamentality of metaphor, because human beings ‘transfer’ words from some things to others in the light of their ‘widening experience, which sees similarities.

Jacob Hesse underlines the Davidson’s and other’s intent that metaphors don’t give way to propositional translation, but only renders a sort of non-propositional imagery, they cannot be either hence true or false, but they are but repository of imagination. Davidson and, following him, Rorty (1987), Reimer (2001), White (1996) as well as Matthew Stone and Ernie Lepore (2010) argue that the whole enterprise to look for propositional contents that are communicated by metaphors is misguided. Now within the framework of Western analytic philosophy of language if we consider Donald Davidson’s approaches or if we look at non-constructivist approaches, we find that they are not so much inclined to accept metaphor as a fundamental phenomenon. A non-constructivist approach, as differing from the constructivist approach, holds metaphors as rather deviant, unimportant, and parasitic upon normal usage. Metaphors break the normal linguistic rules. So they maintain that metaphors are fuzzy — they are only perfect for the poets and politicians and not for those people who like to furnish an objective description of physical reality. Contrast to the non-constructivists, the constructivists see metaphor to play a crucial role in our language and thought, and also they try to break the distinction between literal and metaphorical. Constructivist emphasizes on the creative aspect of language use, and thus, takes metaphor as an essential characteristic of creativity of language.

“This perspective cannot be true or false and is, at least according to Davidson, non-propositional in nature.”

“Victor Turner, for example, in Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (1967), wrote that ‘Metaphor is, in fact, metamorphic, transformative’, and quoted Robert A. Nisbet- Social Change and History... (1969): “Metaphor is our means of effecting instantaneous fusion of two separated realms of experience into one illuminating, iconic, encapsulating image.”

“When we conceptualize an intangible or less tangible domain metaphorically as, and from the perspective of, a more tangible domain, we create a certain metaphorical reality” – metaphors Routledge

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)