CNS LAB

LAB - 8

Heartbleed Attack Lab

NAME: SIRI S

SEMESTER: 5

SECTION:H

SRN: PES1UG19CS485


LAB SETUP:

VICTIM: 10.0.2.18


ATTACKER: 10.0.2.17

IPADDRESSES

Attacker:




Victim:




Step 1: Configure the DNS server for Attacker machine

Firstly, we edit the *hosts* file on the attacker machine using the command:




We modify the /etc/hosts on the Attacker's machine (10.0.2.14) to make them believe

www.heartbleedlabelegg.com is on the server machine. If we skip this, our interaction will only affect the localhost server. It is done as follows:




WARM-UP EXERCISE

Store the code, *attack.py*, on the attacker VM which id obtained from the SEED website:




Now we make the code executable using the following command:

\$ sudo chmod 777 attack.py



Now that the code is executable, we run it on the attacker VM and we can see that when we send out a malicious heartbeat request to the server www.heartbleedlabelgg.com and in response, it will get random data from the server.




From the random data, we can see that the server is vulnerable because it is sending more data than it should.


Step 2: Explore the damage of the Heartbleed attack

Step 2(a): On the Victim Server:


We visit the *https://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com* website and login as Admin, with the credentials given in the manual:



Now, we add Boby as a friend to our admin account:



After completing the above tasks, we compose a message to Boby and send it.



By doing this, we have completed the tasks that were necessary to be done on the victim machine.


Step 2(b): On Attacker machine:

Now we run the attack.py code file on the attacker VM to find out user activity, password, username and the content of the user's private message. Command:

\$ python attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com


The server is not empty anymore after we accessed the website from the victim machine, hence after running it multiple times, we get the following information:

1. Username and Password:



The username and password is clearly visible in the highlighted area.

2. The exact content of the private message:



From this screenshot we can see that the message sent to Boby is decoded in the highlighted area:

Subject: Good Morning

Body: HEYYYY BOBY, This is SIRI.


Step 3: Investigate the fundamental cause of the Heartbleed attack

The fundamental cause of the Heartbleed attack vulnerability is that there is a missing user input validation while constructing the Heartbeat response packet.

Now we attempt to change the value of the payload length variable to 40 as seen below:

Command:

\$ python attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com --length 40




Step 4: Find out the boundary value of the payload length variable

We are required to use 'trial and error' method to find the exact boundary value of the payload length variable which will not leak any extra data, anything beyond this boundary value will leak extra data from servers' memory.

From the step above it is confirmed that anything above 40, causes payload leak. This is confirmed by the message printed on the screen:


"Returned more data than it should- Server is vulnerable"

So, we first attempt with a boundary value of **20** to check if it leaks at this value.




As we can see, there is absolutely no leak of payload data at the payload length variable of 20.

Now let us check if it leaks at payload length variable 23:



We can see that at 23, there is a leak of payload data. Therefore we can conclude that we have narrowed the search value as the boundary value exists somewhere **between 20 and 23.**

Hence we check payload length variable 22:



In conclusion we can say that the <u>boundary value of the payload</u> <u>length variable is 22.</u>

Anything beyond this value will leak extra data blocks from the server's memory.

Step 5: Countermeasure and bug fix

This lab task requires us to give a solution at the code level to better analyse the code first:

For this we change to root from seed. Then we enter the directory / home/seed/openssl-1.0.1/ssl

Here, we are required to change two files, namely, $d1_both.c$ and $t1\ lib.c$

The necessary changes are available in:

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/731f431497f463f3a2a97236fe0187b11c44aead

1. Changes in d1 both.c:

```
*d1_both.c (/home/seed/openssl-1.0.1/ssl) - gedit
                                                         File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help
               Open 🔻 🛂 Save
                                       Undo
       *d1_both.c *
              unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
              unsigned short hbtype;
              unsigned int payload;
              unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
              if (s->msg_callback)
                       s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
                               &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
               /* Read type and payload length first */
               if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
    return 0;
              hbtype = *p++
              if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
              if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
                       unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
                       int r;
                         Allocate memory for the response size is 1 byte
                                                  C * Tab Width: 8 *
                                                                     Ln 1475, Col 39
```

2. Changes in t1 lib.c:

```
t1_lib.c (/home/seed/openssl-1.0.1/ssl) - gedit
       File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help
               Open 🔻 💆 Save
                                         undo 👆
       *t1_lib.c *
       #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
       tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
               unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
               unsigned short hbtype;
               unsigned int payload;
               unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
               /* Read type and payload length first */
               if (s->msg_callback)
                        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
                                 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
                                 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
                /* Read type and payload length first */
                  (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
               hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
                        return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520
               # (hbtung -- TIC1 HD DECHIECT)
                                                     C + Tab Width: 8 +
                                                                         Ln 2458, Col 16
                                                                                          INS
```

These changes made in the code fixes the bug that causes the attack to take place. Now that the bug is fixed, there will not be any kind of leakage of extra data no matter what the payload length variable is.

Conclusion: We have successfully fixed the bug and there is NO leakage of extra payload data

