

Reducing Alignment Debt in AI Advisory: The Dialogue-as-Elicitation Approach

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Abstract

Problem: In the emerging market of AI advisory services, a fundamental **Principal-Agent Problem** exists between users (Principals) and AI agents. Users suffer from **bounded rationality** and **sticky information** [Von Hippel, 1994], making it prohibitively expensive to transfer their tacit preferences, constraints, and long-term goals to the AI via ad-hoc prompting. This friction results in high **Alignment Debt**, where users must continuously correct suboptimal advice.

Mechanism: We propose **Dialogue-as-Elicitation (DaE)**, a mechanism design that shifts the burden of alignment from ex-post correction to ex-ante elicitation. DaE employs a dual-agent architecture to construct a **Personal Strategic Asset (PersonaProfile)**—a structured, reusable ledger of user attributes. The mechanism follows a four-stage process: (1) Asset Collection, (2) Dialectical Audit (Socratic questioning to reveal hidden constraints), (3) Asset Refinement, and (4) Strategic Pathfinding.

Contribution: Through a **Comparative Framework Analysis**, we demonstrate that DaE outperforms traditional ad-hoc prompting by: (a) restructuring high-noise input into low-noise assets; (b) shifting cognitive load from user to algorithm via scaffolding; and (c) transforming alignment efforts from a disposable “flow” into a cumulative “stock” of capital. This paradigm reduces the transaction costs of human-AI collaboration and enables high-fidelity personalization from the first interaction.

Code and Data Availability: The minimal operational prompt and full framework documentation are available at the project repository: <https://github.com/sirsws/DaE-Personal-Strategic-Asset>.

Keywords: AI Alignment, Principal-Agent Problem, Alignment Debt, Personal Strategic Assets, Mechanism Design, Human-AI Collaboration

JEL Classification: D83, O33, M15, C9

1 Introduction: The Economics of Alignment

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has reduced the cost of *prediction* [Agrawal et al., 2018], yet the cost of *alignment*—ensuring these predictions serve the user’s specific, long-term interests—remains high.

We define **Alignment Debt** as the cumulative effort (time, cognitive load, frustration) a user must invest to bridge the gap between their intent and the AI’s output. In current paradigms, this debt is paid in high-interest installments: users write prompts, get generic answers, rewrite prompts, provide more context, and correct misunderstandings.

This paper argues that the root cause of this inefficiency is not a lack of model capability, but a failure of **information mechanism design**. The information required for high-quality advisory—deep values, hidden constraints, and strategic resource allocations—is “sticky” [Von Hippel, 1994]. It resides tacitly in the user’s mind and is costly to encode into a single prompt.

We introduce **Dialogue-as-Elicitation (DaE)**, a framework that treats user alignment not as a prompt engineering task, but as an **asset accumulation** process. By investing in a dedicated elicitation phase, users build a **Personal Strategic Asset** that amortizes alignment costs over all future interactions.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Principal-Agent Problem in AI

In Agency Theory [Jensen and Meckling, 1976], agency costs arise when the Principal (User) cannot perfectly monitor the Agent (AI) or when their goals diverge. In AI advisory, the divergence is rarely malicious but rather due to **information asymmetry**. The AI “hallucinates” or gives generic advice because it lacks access to the Principal’s utility function.

2.2 Bounded Rationality and Sticky Information

Simon [1955] posited that humans have **bounded rationality**—they cannot articulate all their constraints in advance. Furthermore, Von Hippel [1994] showed that information regarding needs is often “sticky” and difficult to transfer. DaE addresses this by creating an external **Scaffolding** mechanism that guides the user to externalize this sticky information step-by-step.

3 The DaE Mechanism Design

3.1 Architecture Overview

We propose a Dual-Agent Architecture to separate the concern of *learning the user* from *serving the user*.




Figure 1: The Dual-Agent Architecture. The Elicitation Agent (EA) actively mines the user for information to build the Asset. The Application Agent (AA) consumes this Asset to provide low-friction advisory.

3.2 The Four-Stage Elicitation Process

The mechanism proceeds through four rigorous stages, designed to convert noise into signal.

1. **Collection (The Survey)**: A breadth-first scan of the user’s current state (Assets, Liabilities, Goals).
2. **Contradiction (The Audit)**: A depth-first stress test. The agent identifies logical inconsistencies (e.g., “You claim to value stability but your goal is high-risk entrepreneurship”). This **Socratic friction** is the core value-add of DaE.
3. **Refinement (The Contract)**: Converting the user’s vague natural language into precise, reusable statements (the “Asset Ledger”).
4. **Strategy (The Application)**: Generating initial strategic paths to demonstrate the asset’s utility.




Figure 2: Four-stage elicitation flow in DaE: initial collection, contradiction analysis and deep questioning, iterative refinement, and strategic pathfinding.

4 Comparative Framework Analysis

We evaluate DaE against the prevailing “Ad-hoc Prompting” paradigm using a four-dimensional comparative framework.

Table 1: Comparative Framework Matrix

| Dimension | Ad-hoc Prompting (Status Quo) | DaE Framework (Proposed) |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Info Structure | High Noise / Unstructured Dependent on user’s immediate memory and mood. | High Signal / Structured Enforced by a comprehensive schema (Asset/Liability). |
| 2. Cognitive Load | User-Led (High) User must be a “Prompt Engineer” and recall all constraints. | Algorithm-Guided (Low) User operates in “Reactive Mode” to specific questions. |
| 3. Asset Nature | Flow (Disposable) Context is lost after the session window closes. | Stock (Cumulative) The profile grows in value with every update. |
| 4. Alignment Mode | Ex-post Correction “Repairing” bad advice after it’s generated. | Ex-ante Elicitation “Preventing” bad advice before it happens. |

4.1 From Flow to Stock

In Ad-hoc Prompting, the user’s effort is a “Flow” variable—it is consumed instantly. In DaE, the effort is a “Stock” variable—it accumulates as capital. This shift is critical for long-term advisory, where the history and evolution of the user’s preferences are as important as their current request.

4.2 The “Socratic Friction”

Paradoxically, DaE introduces *more* friction in the beginning (Stage 2: Contradiction). However, this is **productive friction**. By forcing the user to resolve conflicts early (Ex-ante), we eliminate the **unproductive friction** of misunderstanding later (Ex-post).

5 Conclusion and Managerial Implications

We argue that the future of personalized AI lies not just in better models, but in better **information supply chains**. The DaE framework offers a blueprint for reducing the **Alignment Debt** that currently plagues human-AI interaction.

For Platform Builders: Shift focus from “Magic Prompts” to “Asset Management”. Provide users with tools to visualize, edit, and carry their PersonaProfile across applications.

For Users: Treat your persona not as a biography, but as a strategic asset. Invest time in building it to enjoy lower transaction costs in all future digital interactions.

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