

#### 서강대학교 ICT법경제연구소 세미나

## Machine Learning and Market Competition: Some Preliminary Thoughts

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August 31, 2017

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- I. New Era: Advent of Machine Learning!
- II. Competition Issues related to Machine Learning

New Era:
Advent of Machine Learning!




### **Machine Learning**

- Machine learning, in general
  - X=features, classifiers, characteristics, covariates
  - Y=label, category, outcome
- Deep learning
  - (X, Y): supervised learning
  - X alone: unsupervised learning, clustering problem
- Reinforcement learning
  - Not maximizing predictive accuracy, but maximizing value
  - Periodically updating "policy" and "value" in order to maximize the probability of winning
  - Generating additional data through self-play

## **Machine Learning: Pre-requisites**









Training Data (examples to learn from) **CPU** 


Greg Corrado, "Machine Intelligence at Google" (2016)

#### Data-driven economy and users' personal information

- Some characteristics of data-driven economy
  - Massive and continuous collection, analysis, and utilization of (personal) data
  - Collection is important
    - However, collection itself is not the goal
    - Data analytics and its business utilization are what matters.
  - Competition often happens at a platform level
    - Network externalities; multi-sided market
    - Platform competition often entails competition for user data, at the same time
  - Platform-level competition may, or may not, foster competition
    - Impact of data on competition?

#### Role of data in platform competition?

- Significance of data: analytics
  - $\rightarrow$  (1) pattern recognition, (2) marketing, (3) demand estimation...
- Platform business
  - Often serviced for free
    - → In return, collection of user data
  - Ability to collect data and conduct analytics became an important dimension of competition
  - In particular, in a multi-sided market (e.g., 'match-making' type), having individualized information on each user is crucial
    - (1) important for 'good' match with another user who belongs to another side of the market;
    - (2) important for purposes of targeted advertisement





D. Evans, "The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy" JEP (2009)

모바일 뉴스피드 데스크톱 뉴스피드

오른쪽 칼럼



페이지 좋아요

It's fig season! Not sure what to do with figs? Here's a great dessert recipe to share.



#### Fig Tart with Almonds

The simplicity of this tart perfectly accents ripe figs. If you don't have enough time t...

WWW.JASPERS-MARKET.COM

더 알아보기

공감 120개 댓글 5개 공유 19회

좋아요

댓글 달기

공유하기



- Competition when ML is involved
  - Market competition may involve (1) platform competition, and may show (2) network externalities
    - → From a competitor's perspective, it could be crucial to preempt the market, to provide *de facto* standards, and to secure many users at an early stage
  - ML product may or may not form a separate market
    - ML may only play a role of improving existing products
    - Even when there's no separate market for an ML product, there may well be fierce competition underneath among existing competitors
  - Thus, many technology companies provide API (application programming interface) for free
    - To try to secure a large 'installed user base', and to induce 'tipping'
    - Through this, at the same time, competition takes place to collect users' data

- Competition when ML is involved
  - Competition sometimes involves widespread use of robots (bots) in order to monitor competitors' behavior, in particular pricing behavior
    - Automated price adjustment mechanism, reflecting the result of monitoring ← very low "menu cost"
  - Constant monitoring of pricing behavior of competitors
    - This may paradoxically lead to price rigidity
    - Although competitors may be exposed to tremendous competitive pressure, "conscious parallelism" may be a market outcome

- Case of 'price matching/guaranteeing lowest price'
  - Conceptually a form of MFN (most-favored-nation clause)
    - Would the resulting prices resemble the prices that would be formed under perfect competition?
    - Or, on the contrary, to induce tacit collusion or something analogous to collusion?
      - Possibility of overall upward shift of prices, and of price rigidity
  - Plausibility of MFN (and of lessening of competition)
    - Widespread use of robots and the possibility of monitoring competitors' prices easily
  - "lowest price guarantee" could lead to overall price rigidity
    - This could even function as de facto "entry barrier"

- Algorithmic tacit collusion might be facilitated, if
  - 1. Concentrated markets with homogeneous products
    - In such markets monitoring competitors' behavior would be less burdensome
  - 2. Credible deterrence or punishment possible for deviation
    - Speedy and effective retaliation would be a key
  - 3. Markets with diffused consumers
    - Consumers are unable to exert de facto bargaining power as a group
  - 4. Markets where algorithms with similar functionality and where market data are available among competitors
    - Industry-wide use of a single algorithm
    - Industry-wide sharing of relevant data

See Ezrachi and Stucke, "Two Artificial Neural Networks Meet in an Online Hub and Change the Future (of Competition, Market Dynamics and Socity)" (2017)

- ML, Big Data analytics and price discrimination
  - Businesses would try to engage in extensive monitoring of consumers' behavior, conduct analysis regarding individuals' preference structure, and, try to offer tailored and targeted services
    - At the same time, prices could also be tailored, targeted prices, which reflect consumers' individual level "willingness to pay"
    - In the extreme, this could be a perfect (first degree) price discrimination
  - Economic impact of price discrimination
    - Dead-weight loss could be reduced → beneficial to social welfare
    - Consumer surplus could be reduced, while producer surplus could be enlarged → detrimental impact on wealth distribution possible

#### Enforcement challenges

- Liability
  - Imputing liability could be difficult for a company's unilateral competitive behavior, using algorithms and available data
- Detection
  - Even if above-competition level prices are prevalent, it could be difficult to detect
  - It could be difficult to assess competition-level prices
  - Also, auditing or verifying algorithms may not be practicable due to (1)
     concerns on gaming/abusing and (2) lack of explainability

#### **Concluding observations**

- ML may, or may not, facilitate collusive behavior and/or lead to price rigidity
  - Conjectures explained above are mostly theoretical or anecdotal
  - More detailed analyses in individual markets are needed
- 2. Enforcement is a separate issue
  - Further discussions are warranted as to whether liability can be imputed
  - Even when there might be anti-competitive behavior, detection and verification could be troublesome
- → New challenges for regulators and researchers!