

包名：com.bw30.zsch

强制更新



四川航空

6.13.1

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APK 路径	/data/app/com.bw30.zsch-8EfAA...
UID	10172

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使用 jadx 反编译 App 时，发现应用采用了 360 加固。首先尝试使用 `frida-dump` 进行脱壳，但未成功，脱下来的dex不完整。随后借助一个免费的脱壳网站完成脱壳，脱壳后的文件看起来较为完整。

现在打开app后发现有一个强制更新，我们去找一下它的代码，看看能不能hook掉：


```

protected void doAppResult(CheckUpdateRespBody.CheckUpdateRespInfo checkUpdateRespInfo) {
    int i;
    LogUtil.i(checkUpdateRespInfo.getType().getName() + "");
    UpdateStatus updateStatus = checkUpdateRespInfo.getUpdateStatus();
    if (updateStatus == UpdateStatus.NOT_NEED_UPDATE) {
        ICheckVersion iCheckVersion = this.callback;
        if (iCheckVersion != null) {
            iCheckVersion.checkResult("现在已经是最新版本");
        }
    } else if (updateStatus == UpdateStatus.FORCE_UPDATE) {
        try {
            int i2 = numFirst;
            if (i2 == 0) {
                numFirst = i2 + 1;
                new UpdateDialog(activity, checkUpdateRespInfo.getUrl(), checkUpdateRespInfo.getTip(), 1, checkUpd
            }
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    } else if (updateStatus == UpdateStatus.SELECT_UPDATE && (i = numFirst) == 0) {
        numFirst = i + 1;
        if (NotificationDownloadManager.isDownloading()) {
            if (NotificationDownloadManager.downState == 1) {
                activity.sendBroadcast(new Intent(activity, DownBrcastReceiver.class));
                DialogUtils.showToast(activity, "新版本继续下载中", 1);
                return;
            }
            DialogUtils.showToast(activity, "新版本正在下载中", 1);
            return;
        }
    }
}

```

可以看到在 doAppResult 方法里有三个if判断，分别是判断 updateStatus 的值，是否等于

UpdateStatus.NOT_NEED_UPDATE、UpdateStatus.FORCE_UPDATE、
UpdateStatus.SELECT_UPDATE

我们点这三个值进去可以看到这是一个枚举类，里边有三个枚举变量，分别代表 不需要更新、可选更
新、强制更新。

```

/* Loaded from: D:\桌面\资料\带带弟弟学爬虫
8 public enum UpdateStatus {
    NOT_NEED_UPDATE(1, "不需要更新"),
    SELECT_UPDATE(2, "可选更新"),
    FORCE_UPDATE(3, "强制更新");

```

private int code:

这里是强制更新，所以应该是返回3：FORCE_UPDATE。

可以看到这个 updateStatus 是通过调用 checkUpdateRespInfo.getUpdateStatus() 得到的

```
UpdateStatus updateStatus = checkUpdateRespInfo.getUpdateStatus();
```

所以我们可以直接去hook这个 checkUpdateRespInfo.getUpdateStatus()，让他的返回值为：
NOT_NEED_UPDATE 或者 UpdateStatus.SELECT_UPDATE，这样就直接不需要更新就进入app了

```

public UpdateStatus getUpdateStatus() {
    return this.updateStatus;
}

```

我们直接去使用spwan的方式去hook，发现hook不到，找不到对应的类，这应该跟加固有关系，加固后的类加载机制可能有些变化，所以我采用了attach的方式，在软件启动的那一刻，注入。侥幸可以注入，等有时间了需要去看看加壳脱壳，学习学习类加载机制。

这里看到枚举类中，2代表的是选择更新，为了验证返回值是否更换成功，所以我直接让返回值为2。

但是呢，不能直接返回2，直接返回2会报错，但是不影响过掉强制更新。

经过gpt验证，可能是以下原因：

一、核心原因定位

错误信息 `expected return value compatible with...UpdateStatus` 表明：

1. Hook方法返回的枚举实例与目标方法声明的枚举类**不属于同一个ClassLoader加载**
2. 返回对象可能来自其他包名/类名的同名枚举（如子类或动态加载类）
3. Frida-Java-Bridge的类型校验机制触发了兼容性检查失败 ¹

分析完了，是因为返回值类型不匹配。经过豆包提醒，返回值用 `valueOf` 包裹了一下：


```
Java.perform(function () {
    let CheckUpdateRespInfo =
    Java.use("com.bw.zsch.client.android.model.message.CheckUpdateRespBody$CheckUpdateRespInfo");

    //UpdateStatus枚举类
    var updateStatus =
    Java.use("com.bw.zsch.client.android.model.common.enumeration.UpdateStatus");

    //hook getUpdateStatus
    CheckUpdateRespInfo["getUpdateStatus"].implementation = function () {
        console.log(`CheckUpdateRespInfo.getUpdateStatus is called`);

        //直接返回SELECT_UPDATE: 可选更新
        return updateStatus.valueOf("SELECT_UPDATE");
    };
});
```

效果如下：



当然，也可以采取离线进入app，然后再联网，也是可以跳过的

登录


现在看看登录，先抓包！

我用的验证码登录，返回的是验证码错误，但是直接搜索 验证码错误 搜不到，因为这个请求体和响应体是加密的了。

这里通过逐一查看请求网址，找到两条高度疑似的：codeLogin

Charles 4.6.2 - Session 1 *										
File Edit View Proxy Tools Window Help										
<div><div></div></div>										
Structure Sequence										
Code	Method	Host	Path	Start	Duration	Size	Status	Info		
200	POST	mapsichuanair.com	/zt/tribeport/get_tag_manager.htm?actionType=GET_TAG_MANAGER&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:20	115 ms	3.07 KB	Complete			
200	POST	mapsichuanair.com	/zt/tribeport/get_tag_manager.htm?actionType=GET_TAG_MANAGER&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:23	118 ms	3.51 KB	Complete			
200	POST	mapsichuanair.com	/zt/tribeport/get_mult_func_list.htm?actionType=GET_MULT_FUNC_LIST&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:23	109 ms	2.98 KB	Complete			
200	GET	mapsichuanair.com	/zsresource/multifunctionPic/tag/19/20210715141755/imageFile20210715141755.png	08:34:24	45 ms	35.26 KB	Complete	246...		
200	POST	mapsichuanair.com	/zt/tribeport/tp_use_valid_system.htm?actionType=TP_USE_VALID_SYSTEM&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:24	114 ms	2.97 KB	Complete			
200	POST	rcs.sichuanair.com	/udid/m1?sign=560026b7b25df542bfb11ef9273d09da&appKey=798feaf018020ed00e4b6f1d3fc745&app=com.bw30.zsch&version=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:43	130 ms	3.01 KB	Complete			
200	POST	mapsichuanair.com	/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codelogin.htm?actionType=clientapi/login/member/codelogin&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:43	127 ms	3.15 KB	Complete			
200	POST	mapsichuanair.com	/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codelogin.htm?actionType=clientapi/login/member/codelogin&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a99...	08:34:43	139 ms	3.15 KB	Complete			
Filter: sichuan								<input type="checkbox"/> Focused <input type="button" value="Settings"/>		
Overview Summary Chart										

但是不知道为什么同一时间有两条？是我点到了吗？我们再去请求一下看看：



又抓了一次，是有两条登录信息，其中有一条要早1秒，这个早一秒的在 Session Resumed 这里是no，而晚一秒的是yes

在 Charles 抓 HTTPS 包时出现这种情况，原因如下：

“Session Resumed” 及 “No” 的情况

当第一次点击登录发送请求时，“Session Resumed” 表示尝试恢复之前的会话连接来传输数据。而 “No (Client session resumed, server session restarted)” 说明客户端这边成功恢复了会话，但服务器端由于某些原因（比如服务器端的会话管理策略，超时、服务器重启、或者内部的会话刷新机制等）重新启动了会话。这就导致虽然客户端想基于之前的会话来通信，可服务器并不认同这个旧会话，而是开启了新的会话处理这次请求。

“Session Resumed” 及 “Yes” 的情况

第二次请求出现 “Session Resumed” 且是 “Yes”，意味着客户端和服务器之间成功恢复了会话连接。可能是因为第一次请求时服务器重新启动会话后，在第二次请求到达时，服务器识别到客户端的会话相关信息符合预期，允许基于已有的会话继续通信，这样可以减少一些连接建立和初始化的开销，提高数据传输效率。

所以我们去看 Session Resumed 为yes的那个请求

请求网址：

https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codeLogin.htm

请求方式：POST

请求头：

```
Cookie JSESSIONID=838DF1059ECB8D42CA751AA6A561049F
Content-Length 1100
Content-Type text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Host mapi.sichuanair.com
Connection Keep-Alive
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1
Accept-Encoding gzip
```

携带参数:

```
actionType      clientapi/login/member/codeLogin
platformID      0
appVersion      6.13.1
channelID       myself
imei            5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator
mac              02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId   517cf7c2-41f2-4705-a458-fe6048fbf9e9
```

请求体:

```
GKu4Leqtpn/v2wI1HP7J+WQStqM9H5DMRM11jRMwXSoDwsCOCKzI+Ou5DqukrBkcv4fUxk+hjZN55ys8
wqBpC986aG0sbcse7/r7oMIrVNjN+/I8OgIgTIZn1iRB1nn3L0NbV/1EGBX98tkbNcy6chSKPMNIMBrO
u1JH0S9xv5s1LhNJH4G7+R3C/gA1lD+wGqnRE4I0HwAy/dZMVO4oS0PcVI41mRfGcDV3JihapHF6RiR5
eQnb+4sXaek1bxJrZKQDHqA0nekjvdZZp0NBk4+95/2vmRKhp1/JjsX6XjCzJMDbiymZ1JrSPbou1Agd
B5MtYm1Xn0uhE9nfD8hMuYchjPt6eMhcgba0iUC1gybbXjto1J+EmAncAlaA9Yasp4IckPIxA+zs83/N
/gT2x9hn5ZixJkdKYxqVuCTU+WbZG85sDQfsQg8LKtaR/1QeWFJfw3yvOguPz9ow+m1yDUEVwaLtIIPm
Jupjz8U91e9fKGHI5UUHeKtIZPGan9fanPj6rNBPs721Y/K+WGlYqA9JrxJKhGwf+fG93CuoxY5w6kuw
5r01x67AADJGwYA0mXh26zTrLVSHt60SBn+QMCN9ZXdaTlmo/2Qk+05c3T71JZDYwepieRQFoHsnN4/
EYOnz713Qit46tnCXBp2LcLag1slcf3o3EV4/irKNL3ktOGifdJSz51BVZVbGsG6Cb8II8uISbpvX6gB
vDSy/8nSH8ZQJw42f3IZMa/t6DplishoZEw97uo22w7ojjy7wiM154QAHcdSFMyLcrfOUN0nLpOpZ8y+
Tb7S3QqpbnbkaFVSm9XXXM6KxOg/3zOuQkF+ODdzwwpvJPRjeULI6sozSpEaAnYooCpcnCwgV3TyZeP4
+YbsbM6kM1R3jzfAcMZBUjvbcOuiLI6EIXBUKA5M2GoWC9AEQ57pauD0oEH2DgcjFLaT7w/KcneDLVG
IMJ53IccFun5aAEkUaFL+W2RslUAGJmFo1xbibspQHbgIXtiHp+b6zpxTtX5xHj4jzpw9W5Rv1Ifrrqg5
YFrJA5DYUs0A0qxAezjeew1bJcuwOKVgc8TXkuh3vrJCbeihUKQ12JuhjM=
```

这里我们先搜索一下请求网址看看:



找到了三条, 看类名应该是关于登录的 `Activity`, 这里要注意到, 虽然是三条登录的信息, 但是可以看到都是走的 `ServiceFactory.getBasciFactory().callweb` 方法

我们现在去hook一下这个 `callweb2(参数1, 参数2, 参数3, 参数4)`, 看下它的参数是什么

[Pixel::四川航空]->

ServiceDataImpl.callWeb2 is called:

```
obj=CodeLoginReqBody(phone=15512103215,verifyCode=123456,picCode=null,mobileCountryCode=86),
```

```
obj2=TPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody{validType='0',funcType='null',constId='67c4f6ad0bm8RHhdjCSvkxHijv49hTBMtpQPWct3',token='null',ip='null',phoneNumber='null',userId='null',userName='null',source='null',extCurrentUrl='null',extCookie='null',extSessionId='null',extAccountExist='null',extPasswordCorrect='null',extIdState='null',extLoginType='null',extId='null',extIdNo='null',email='null',memberLevel=null,serchFlightRequest=null,submitOrderRequest=null,activityRequest=null,payRequest=null,refundTicketRequest=null},
```

```
str=clientapi/login/member/codeLogin,
```

```
serviceDataCallback=[object Object]
```

我们现在去看这个 `ServiceFactory.getBasciFactory().callWeb2` 的代码

```
public void callWeb2(Object obj, Object obj2, String str, final
ServiceDataCallback<ClientApiResult> serviceDataCallback) {
    ClientApiRiskReq clientApiRiskReq = new ClientApiRiskReq();
    clientApiRiskReq.setBody(obj);
    clientApiRiskReq.setRiskReqBody(obj2);
    clientApiRiskReq.setHead(new ReqHead(str))
    //上边四行是封装请求数据的,这里new了一个ClientApiRiskReq的对象,这里很重要,是new的
    ClientApiRiskReq对象
    //这里set了三个地方,我们点进ClientApiRiskReq类,可以看到,里边只有一个
    RiskReqBody, body和head是继承的父类的

    EncryptUtils2.encrypt(
        //调用方法: EncryptUtils2.encrypt
        参数1: clientApiRiskReq,
        //待加密的请求数据
        参数2: new IEncrypData() { //回调},
        参数3: ClientApiResult.class
    );
}
```

我们去hook一下这个 `EncryptUtils2.encrypt` 函数

[Pixel::四川航空]-> EncryptUtils2.encrypt is called:

参数1:

```
clientApiReq=ClientApiRiskReq{head=ReqHead{proVersion='null',path='null',action='clientapi/login/member/codeLogin',transactionId='null',timestamp='null',verify='null',sign='null',channelId='null',platformId=null,imie='null',macAddress='null',uuid='null',idfa='null',jpushId='null',appVersion='null',sessionId='null',tokenId='null',accountType='null',callWebAction='null',clientId='null',checkKey='null',customerId='null',externalChannel='null'},body=CodeLoginReqBody(phone=15512103215,verifyCode=123456,picCode=null,mobileCountryCode=86),riskReqBody=TPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody{validType='0',funcType='null',constId='67c4fcean2b1e14y8QKTT2iSA1tlxhjsQxSZZE53',token='null',ip='null',phoneNumber='null',userId='null',userName='null',source='null',extCurrentUrl='null',extCookie='null',extSessionId='null',extAccountExist='null',extPasswordCorrect='null',extIdState='null',extLoginType='null',extId='null',extIdNo='null',email='null',memberLevel=null,serchFlightRequest=null,submitOrderRequest=null,activityRequest=null,payRequest=null,refundTicketRequest=null}}ClientApiReq{head=ReqHead{proVersion='null',path='null',action='clientapi/login/member/codeLogin',transactionId='null',timestamp='null',verify='null',sign='null',channelId='null',platformId=null,imie='null',macAddress='null',uuid='null',idfa='null',jpushId='null',appVersion='null',sessionId='null',tokenId='null',accountType='null',callWebAction='null',clientId='null',checkKey='null',customerId='null',externalChannel='null'},body=CodeLoginReqBody(phone=15512103215,verifyCode=123456,picCode=null,mobileCountryCode=86)},
```

参数2: iEncryptData=[objectObject],

参数3: cls=classcom.bw.zsch.client.android.model.common.api.ClientApiResult

可以看到 ClientApiRiskReq 类中目前只有 body 以及 head 的 action 是有值的.其他都是null

在 callWeb2 中, new 的是 ClientApiRiskReq 类的对象, ClientApiRiskReq 类是继承于 ClientApiReq 类的;

```
21 public class ClientApiRiskReq<T, R> extends ClientApiReq<T> implements Serializable {}
```

在调用 EncryptUtils2.encrypt 函数的时候, 传进去的也是 ClientApiRiskReq 类的对象, 但是 EncryptUtils2.encrypt 函数接收的是一个 ClientApiReq 类的对象, 所以这里有一个多态的应用, 向上转型, 转为了父类的类型

下边看看这个 EncryptUtils2.encrypt 函数

```

public static void encrypt(ClientApiReq clientApiReq, IEncrypData iEncrypData,
Class cls) {

    if (SystemInfo.isLager() && SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER != null &&
SystemInfo.key_LAGER != null)
    {
        getData(clientApiReq, iEncrypData, false, cls, new
RequestObject(SystemInfo.key_LAGER, SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER,
SystemInfo.isLager()));
    } else if (!SystemInfo.isLager() && SystemInfo.JSESSIONID != null &&
SystemInfo.key != null) {
        getData(clientApiReq, iEncrypData, false, cls, new
RequestObject(SystemInfo.key, SystemInfo.JSESSIONID, SystemInfo.isLager()));
    } else {
        EncryptBeforeReqManager.moreRequest(clientApiReq, iEncrypData,
false, cls, SystemInfo.isLager(), 2);
    }
}
}

```

这里通过一些判断，分为了三个分支，分别走 `getData` 或 `moreRequest`，我们去hook一下，看看走的是 `getData` 还是 `moreRequest`

hook-moreRequest

没走这个

hook-getData

[Pixel::四川航空]-> EncryptUtils2.getData is called:

```

clientApiReq=ClientApiRiskReq{head=ReqHead{proVersion='null', path='null',
action='clientapi/login/member/codeLogin', transActionId='null',
timestamp='null', verify='null', sign='null', channelId='null', platformId=null,
imie='null', macAddress='null', uuid='null', idfa='null', jpushId='null',
appVersion='null', sessionId='null', tokenId='null', accounttype='null',
callWebAction='null', clientIp='null', checkKey='null', customerId='null',
externalChannel='null'}, body=CodeLoginReqBody(phone=15512103215,
verifyCode=123456, picCode=null, mobileCountryCode=86),
riskReqBody=TPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody{validType='0',
funcType='null', constId='67c50a93civY8glrBNefT3ydm8L3Ie18Eb409d3',
token='null', ip='null', phoneNumber='null', userId='null', userName='null',
source='null', extCurrentUrl='null', extCookie='null', extSessionId='null',
extAccountExist='null', extPasswordCorrect='null', extIdState='null',
extLoginType='null', extId='null', extIdNo='null', email='null',
memberLevel=null, serchFlightRequest=null, submitOrderRequest=null,
activityRequest=null, payRequest=null, refundTicketRequest=null}}
ClientApiReq{head=ReqHead{proVersion='null', path='null',
action='clientapi/login/member/codeLogin', transActionId='null',
timestamp='null', verify='null', sign='null', channelId='null', platformId=null,
imie='null', macAddress='null', uuid='null', idfa='null', jpushId='null',
appVersion='null', sessionId='null', tokenId='null', accounttype='null',
callWebAction='null', clientIp='null', checkKey='null', customerId='null',
externalChannel='null'}, body=CodeLoginReqBody(phone=15512103215,
verifyCode=123456, picCode=null, mobileCountryCode=86)},

```

```

iEncrypData=[object Object],

```

```

z=false,

```

```

cls=class com.bw.zsch.client.android.model.common.api.ClientApiResult,

```

```

requestObject=RequestObject

```

```

[key=YfxMVBfhw1Q3XTo++q7mdH92jRuWCBtiQ1sVh88IPBN7JmRY28br6UziMIMyDTiz7y92FLDQO52
LNf1AVzL/gwd1A2Vttidfa84XR4ih+Vhr/RDKuCETK8uy5cyF1Oz/QPxWNTTU/GufKNU8BmPbR6E6Rnq
s5naXATvcZv4xzBI=, sessionId=EBFA757F309486D3D71A7A88496CED5D, islager=false]

```

```

//调用栈

```

```

java.lang.Throwable

```

```

    at

```

```

com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2.getData(Native Method)

```

```

    at

```

```

com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2.encrypt(EncryptUtils2.java:41)

```

```

    at

```

```

com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2.encrypt(Native Method)

```

```

    at

```

```

com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.ServiceDataImpl.callWeb2(ServiceDataImpl.java:4444)

```

```

    at

```

```

com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity.lambda$doVerifyCodeLogin$16$com-bw-zsch-member-login-LoginActivity(LoginActivity.java:493)

```

```

    at

```

```

com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity$$ExternalSyntheticLambda0.onToken(Unknown Source:4)

```

```

    at com.bw.zsch.dxrisk.DXRiskUtils$1.run(DXRiskUtils.java:69)

```

确实走了这个 `getData`，然后可以看到是从 `encrypt` 这里调用的。

那我们现在去看下这个 `getData` 函数

```
public static void getData(final ClientApiReq clientApiReq, final IEncrypData
iEncrypData, final boolean z, final Class<?> cls, RequestObject requestObject) {
    try {
        //以下是为clientApiRiskReq的head去赋值
        clientApiReq.getHead().setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelId());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setPlatformId(SystemInfo.getPlatformId());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setProVersion(SystemInfo.getProVersion());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setImie(SystemInfo.getUniqueDeviceId());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setJpushId(SystemInfo.jpushId);
        clientApiReq.getHead().setCustomerId(SystemInfo.customerId);
        if (SystemInfo.getPlatformId().intValue() == 0) {

            clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getAppVersion());
        } else {

            clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getApp_Version());
        }
        clientApiReq.getHead().setMacAddress(SystemInfo.getMacAddress());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());
        if (requestObject != null && requestObject.getSessionid() != null) {

            clientApiReq.getHead().setSessionid(requestObject.getSessionid());
        }

        clientApiReq.getHead().setTransactionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
        if (!requestObject.islager && SystemInfo.TOKENID != null &&
!SystemInfo.TOKENID.equals("")) {
            clientApiReq.getHead().setTokenId(SystemInfo.TOKENID);
        }
        //以上是为clientApiRiskReq的head去赋值

        if (requestObject != null && requestObject.getKey() != null) {

            String encrypt = BWSecurityNative.encrypt(clientApiReq,
requestObject.getKey());
            //加密请求数据，密文为请求体

            final String requestUrl2 =
SystemInfo.getRequestUrl2(clientApiReq.getHead());
            //把参数拼接到请求网址后边，参数为clientApiRiskReq的head的某几个属性

            //这里调用了post方法
            HttpEngine.post(
                requestUrl2, //请求网址
                encrypt, //加密后的请求体
                new IHttpCallback() {回调逻辑}, //回调
                requestObject //desede的key
```

```

        );
        return;
    }
    iEncrypData.encryptData(null);
} catch (Exception e) {
    LogUtils.i(e.getMessage());
}
}

```

通过刚刚的分析，是在 `getData` 这个函数中，对url进行了拼接，以及对请求数据进行加密。然后调用 `HttpEngine.post` 来进行发送请求。

我们可以去hook一下这个 `HttpEngine.post` 看看它的参数和我们抓包得到的是否一样

`HttpEngine.post` is called:

参数1:

`https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codeLogin.htm?actionType=clientapi/login/member/codeLogin&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOperator=&mac=02:00:00:00:00:00&transactionId=59e078be-c363-4723-b8c9-a8771c92af24,`

参数2:

`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`

参数3:

`iHttpCallback=com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2$1@33cc81e, requestObject=RequestObject[key=j6vgasM76sYNop50Borz3aig03tVERYpLvC6YX6Du+6LfII1MA+6UOHZm+dHqg9OPOzWHqzL5tuQydtktJ7djQw71mPcdAo9AT/ekr2mgVYCCUNVSSWU13100fQI4IKpp/ZwV8+1xBeBYE843zaTAs6VQCYGCEHZqkmmQ1k+Ug0=, sessionId=4F39F3AF84ED0F5C63FD77E79DAEFC30, islager=false]`

再对比我们刚刚抓包得到的请求：

抓包得到的:

```
1N1TvuqTNNKJPULGeXPd8uZE9JeMRzIaba3/3Z7DiyP/RpwPP62SyUwhhRa9Pm++8WwSbyqgpAgPyRAN
Q+Pcfh1NpnzOnMTD5WawvNIM2P4fmZDwsdadccchfYf1ueTiCdULz+k9znk1+xK5IPL5lMDvga4rhItwq
KQCKLf5OFppmZkQHbkgyqcDeJX+KhLP3aGjr04gdAzECCwkBOHNxR2svPuenvw5wxZfnVJywtKRGASdo
O+go0Nz/bPmHhECCzFmke04vdRRz21p0TmCwr3sn7hq0EOLj51IGB1oT2V5k6JhcXr4jpTGwjXImeuDr
Lb07KUMVCPDx7GFTcG5l/WOMN8mAlGn8KJCEBrWUWFCC5CobA7UXRwpcgi0CvPFkbmfho2Fid01Urrsi
r40NnMmLWCNHmuoBheOgu9iC3uv8SZ6TrHf+nwPzqWEIXU/SnffQSRsWFWUM4ws9FmuGW5WHRDuOrEod
c0POQ5iLxjx4Noxt/Ju4o9Q+jSSEzt+2B8LMuogh7tERJLNaH1fBFYB08BMho/CVaniKbGZCEu76LIXZ
Fcp+54vuHePASJ3KKWz9FSV/OFzoXZ1KaD0Xvc1F4/U+Tj7K6l9CWudGPj0SU2nrwn5mbEaF5cMejwZ8
JYJL+qwddChCaSdGxEnGe2MCeN+Mu07xIGChurWD/wvi/Xxp2T1XmsHhD244q1MtBW89mBMWwfqttBJO
I2AoZvhdqkEokXqErOfgn04Vs8w71CEWDrk2LGHJsc8p0RWA7jEhThrhzwgmGuQuKUVYEIVzT3fn4wf+
zmOBhC2autcWVJXKyFDb4CXBUqAsq9EXnz7zhX2MZ8vxud2qhzhRxiZgKxRmAqsw8lpD0JTSkeBdgMr
Q9knwfzVh7DSmQnSXENw2U6UGB2aIGsvNv8U9x/FChNJ3AA140NTXyo2KxxMSU+4/agA3vbhykBgVpBZ
h1IGd597CgchCfOFed0qKJAp4Am4gw1P6MrStb4L7KwO8Ix1Iz53cITJfRSZnUTkQzvU4adw1IZ5M2/z
b1vswVmDOz+jr4axd00HFxFPDy6gTOLYfEbOG/ItWHxf1C8GmPMrxw+bd7Y=
```

hook post方法得到的 post 的第二个参数:

```
1N1TvuqTNNKJPULGeXPd8uZE9JeMRzIaba3/3Z7DiyP/RpwPP62SyUwhhRa9Pm++8WwSbyqgpAgPyRAN
Q+Pcfh1NpnzOnMTD5WawvNIM2P4fmZDwsdadccchfYf1ueTiCdULz+k9znk1+xK5IPL5lMDvga4rhItwq
KQCKLf5OFppmZkQHbkgyqcDeJX+KhLP3aGjr04gdAzECCwkBOHNxR2svPuenvw5wxZfnVJywtKRGASdo
O+go0Nz/bPmHhECCzFmke04vdRRz21p0TmCwr3sn7hq0EOLj51IGB1oT2V5k6JhcXr4jpTGwjXImeuDr
Lb07KUMVCPDx7GFTcG5l/WOMN8mAlGn8KJCEBrWUWFCC5CobA7UXRwpcgi0CvPFkbmfho2Fid01Urrsi
r40NnMmLWCNHmuoBheOgu9iC3uv8SZ6TrHf+nwPzqWEIXU/SnffQSRsWFWUM4ws9FmuGW5WHRDuOrEod
c0POQ5iLxjx4Noxt/Ju4o9Q+jSSEzt+2B8LMuogh7tERJLNaH1fBFYB08BMho/CVaniKbGZCEu76LIXZ
Fcp+54vuHePASJ3KKWz9FSV/OFzoXZ1KaD0Xvc1F4/U+Tj7K6l9CWudGPj0SU2nrwn5mbEaF5cMejwZ8
JYJL+qwddChCaSdGxEnGe2MCeN+Mu07xIGChurWD/wi/Xxp2T1XmsHhD244q1MtBW89mBMWwfqttBJOI
2AoZvhdqkEokXqErOfgn04Vs8w71CEWDrk2LGHJsc8p0RWA7jEhThrhzwgmGuQuKUVYEIVzT3fn4wf+z
mOBhC2autcWVJXKyFDb4CXBUqAsq9ENz7zhX2MZ8vxud2qhzhRxiZgKxRmAqsw8lpD0JTSkeBdgMrQ9
knwfzVh7DSmQnSXENw2U6UGB2aIGsvNv8U9x/FChNJ3AA140NTXyo2KxxMSU+4/agA3vbhykBgVpBZh1
IGd597CgchCfOFed0qJAp4Am4gw1P6MrStb4L7KwO8Ix1Iz53cITJfRSZnUTkQzvU4adw1IZ5M2/zb1v
swVmDOz+jr4axd00HFxFPDy6gTOLYfEbOG/ItWHxf1C8GmPMrxw+bd7Y=
```

文本比对工具

[全屏]

```
1 'mDOz+jr4axd00HFxFPDy6gTOLYfEbOG/ItWHxf1C8GmPMrxw+bd7Y=
1 'mDOz+jr4axd00HFxFPDy6gTOLYfEbOG/ItWHxf1C8GmPMrxw+bd7Y=
```

经过对比,是一样的。

那么就可以确定了,软件在发送请求的时候,会先对请求体进行加密。

是通过 `BwSecurityNative.encrypt` 来对请求体进行加密的。

我们去看看 `BwSecurityNative.encrypt`











```
public static native String encrypt(ClientApiReq clientApiReq, String str);
```

下边,我们去把这个加密函数解出来,解出来后就能对请求体进行解密了。并且我们在这还看到一个名为 `decrypt`,很可能是对响应体解密的。

我们现在去找这个native函数看看

关于encrypt

可以直接跳到 [encrypt总结](#)，去看最终的总结。这里分析的过程有些啰嗦！

Name	Address	Ordinal
 Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_decrypt	00003086	
 Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_encrypt	000024F0	
 Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_reqSign	00003348	
 Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_sign	00003050	
 Java_org_xdq_aes_util_AES4CUtil_base642Byte	00005454	
 Java_org_xdq_aes_util_AES4CUtil_decrypt	000055C0	
 Java_org_xdq_aes_util_AES4CUtil_encrypt	00005580	
 Java_org_xdq_aes_util_AES4CUtil_getAesKey	00005678	
 Java_org_xdq_aes_util_AES4CUtil_setAesKey	00005694	
 Java_org_xdq_aes_util_AES4CUtil_string2Base64	00005368	

打开看到是静态注册的：

```
1 int __fastcall Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_encrypt(  
2     JNIEnv *env,  
3     jclass jclass,  
4     jstring clientApiReq,  
5     jstring jstr_2)  
6 {  
7     int v4; // r0  
8     int JbyteArray; // [sp+4h] [bp-3Ch]  
9     int v7; // [sp+8h] [bp-38h]  
10    int v8; // [sp+Ch] [bp-34h]  
11    int v9; // [sp+10h] [bp-30h]  
12    int v10; // [sp+14h] [bp-2Ch]  
13    int v11; // [sp+18h] [bp-28h]  
14    int v12; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-24h]  
15    int v13; // [sp+20h] [bp-20h]  
16    int des_key; // [sp+24h] [bp-1Ch]  
17  
18    des_key = j_des_key_m((int)env, (int)jstr_2);  
19    v13 = j_req_sign((int)env, (int)clientApiReq);  
20    v12 = j_md5_encrypt(env, v13);  
21    v11 = j_hex_encode(env, v12);  
22    v10 = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v11);  
23    v9 = j_rsa_encrypt_by_public_key(env, v10);  
24    v8 = j_hex_encode(env, v9);  
25    j_set_req_sign(env, clientApiReq, v8);  
26    v7 = j_to_json(env, clientApiReq);  
27    JbyteArray = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v7);  
28    v4 = j_desecb_encrypt(env, des_key, JbyteArray);  
29    return j_base64_encode(env, v4);  
30 }
```

这样看还挺友好的，见明知意

关于v14 = j_des_key_m(env, jstr_2);

```
des_key = j_des_key_m((int)env, (int)jstr_2);
```

里边有两条逻辑，如下：

```
v2 = j_base64_decode(env, jstr_2);  
return j_rsa_decrypt_by_private_key(env, v2);
```

其中j_base64_decode的逻辑就是通过jni函数调用java层的base64的decode：

```
v4 = (*env)->FindClass(env,  
"com/bw/zsch/client/android/service/util/Base64");
```



```
v2 = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(env, v4, "decode", "(Ljava/lang/String;)[B");
```

```
return (int)(*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, v4, v2, jstr_2);
```

虽然调用的不是系统的base64，但经过验证，这是一个标准的base64解码函数

接下来是j_rsa_decrypt_by_private_key(env, v2);

把env和v2传进去了，v2是我们对java层传过来的第二个参数进行base64解码后的结果

进去后先获取了private_key，经静态分析及hook验证确认private_key如下：

```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```

对这个j_rsa_decrypt_by_private_key(env, v2);进行了分析，总的来说，就是一个RSA解密的函数，把从java层传过来的第二个参数，解密，其私钥为MIIC...0GKM=解密后返回

总结v14 = j_des_key_m(env, jstr_2)

```
1 int __fastcall des_key_m(JNIEnv *env, jstring jstr_2)
2 {
3     int base64_decode_result; // r0
4
5     base64_decode_result = j_base64_decode(env, jstr_2);
6     return j_rsa_decrypt_by_private_key(env, base64_decode_result);
7 }
```

在这个里边主要是由两条逻辑：

一个是base64解码：

```
1 int __fastcall base64_decode(JNIEnv *env, int jstr_2)
2 {
3     _jmethodID *v2; // r0
4     jclass v4; // [sp+Ch] [bp-14h]
5
6     v4 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "com/bw/zsch/client/android/service/util/Base64");
7     v2 = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(env, v4, "decode", "(Ljava/lang/String;)[B");
8     return (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, v4, v2, jstr_2);
9 }
```

base64就是直接调用的java层的，通过验证是标准的base64解码

一个是rsa解密：

```

1 int __fastcall rsa_decrypt_by_private_key(JNIEnv *env, int base64_decode_result)
2 {
3     size_t private_key_len; // r0
4     _jmethodID *doFinal_id; // r0
5     _jmethodID *Cipher_init; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-84h]
6     jobject Cipher_Instance; // [sp+30h] [bp-80h]
7     _jmethodID *Cipher_getinstance_id; // [sp+34h] [bp-ACh]
8     jclass Cipher_class; // [sp+38h] [bp-A8h]
9     jobject PrivateKey; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-A4h]
10    _jmethodID *generatePrivate_id; // [sp+40h] [bp-A0h]
11    jobject KeyFactory_Instance; // [sp+44h] [bp-9Ch]
12    jstring jstr_RSA; // [sp+48h] [bp-98h]
13    _jmethodID *KeyFactory_getInstance_id; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-94h]
14    jclass KeyFactory_class; // [sp+50h] [bp-90h]
15    jobject PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_obj; // [sp+54h] [bp-8Ch]
16    _jmethodID *PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_init_id; // [sp+58h] [bp-88h]
17    jclass PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_class; // [sp+5Ch] [bp-84h]
18    int private_key; // [sp+60h] [bp-80h]
19    jstring private_key_base64; // [sp+64h] [bp-7Ch]
20    char *ptr; // [sp+68h] [bp-78h]
21    int v21; // [sp+6Ch] [bp-74h]
22    size_t v24; // [sp+C8h] [bp-18h]
23    char *v25; // [sp+CCh] [bp-14h]

```

首先这一块是初始化一些变量的

```

24
25    private_key_len = _strlen_chk(::private_key[0], 0xFFFFFFFF); // 获取private_key的长度
26    ptr = malloc(private_key_len + 1); // 开辟private_key这么大的空间
27    _strncpy_chk(ptr, ::private_key[0], 10, -1); // 从private[0]开始复制10位到ptr中
28    ptr[10] = 0; // 为ptr添加\0
29    _strncat_chk(ptr, ::private_key[0] + 20, 10, -1); // 从private[20]的位置开始, 往ptr中追加
30    ptr[20] = 0; // 为ptr添加\0
31    _strncat_chk(ptr, ::private_key[0] + 10, 10, -1);
32    ptr[30] = 0;
33    v25 = ::private_key[0] + 30;
34    v24 = _strlen_chk(::private_key[0], 0xFFFFFFFF) - 30; // private_key的长度减去30 30是已经复制进ptr的个数
35    _strncat_chk(ptr, v25, v24, -1); // 把剩下的复制进ptr
36    //
37    private_key_base64 = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, ptr); // 这里就是去取到了private_key, 先取前10个, 然后取10-20, 然后取20-30, 最后把剩下的全取过来
38    free(ptr);
39    private_key = j_base64_decode(env, private_key_base64); // 拿到字节形式的私钥

```

这里是从private_key数组中拿私钥, 拿到后进行base64解码

```

40    PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/security/spec/PKCS8EncodedKeySpec"); // 找PKCS8EncodedKeySpec类
41    PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_init_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_class, "<init>", "([B)V"); // 获取PKCS8EncodedKeySpec的初始化方法id
42    PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_obj = (*env)->NewObject(env, PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_class, PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_init_id, private_key); // 创建PKCS8EncodedKeySpec对象
43    KeyFactory_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/security/KeyFactory"); // 找KeyFactory类
44    KeyFactory_getInstance_id = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(
45        env,
46        KeyFactory_class,
47        "getInstance",
48        "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/security/KeyFactory;"); // 调用KeyFactory的getInstance方法id
49    if ( KeyFactory_getInstance_id )
50    {
51        jstr_RSA = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "RSA"); // 为获取实例做准备
52        KeyFactory_Instance = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, KeyFactory_class, KeyFactory_getInstance_id, jstr_RSA); // 调用KeyFactory的getInstance方法
53        generatePrivate_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(
54            env,
55            KeyFactory_class,
56            "generatePrivate",
57            "(Ljava/security/spec/KeySpec;)Ljava/security/PrivateKey;"); // 获取类PrivateKey下generatePrivate的方法id
58        PrivateKey = (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, KeyFactory_Instance, generatePrivate_id, PKCS8EncodedKeySpec_obj); // 调用类PrivateKey下generatePrivate的方法
59        Cipher_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "javax/crypto/Cipher");
60        Cipher_getinstance_id = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(
61            env,
62            Cipher_class,
63            "getInstance",
64            "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/crypto/Cipher;");
65        Cipher_Instance = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, Cipher_class, Cipher_getinstance_id, jstr_RSA);
66        Cipher_init = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, Cipher_class, "init", "(ILjava/security/Key;)V");
67        (*env)->CallVoidMethod(env, Cipher_Instance, Cipher_init, 2, PrivateKey);
68        doFinal_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, Cipher_class, "doFinal", "([B)[B");
69        return (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, Cipher_Instance, doFinal_id, base64_decode_result);
70    }
71    return v21;
72}

```

这里就是获取RSA实例, 初始化为解密模式, 用的是刚刚拿到的私钥

然后对v14 = j_des_key_m(env, jstr_2)中的jstr_2进行了解密, 解密后传给了v14

关于v13 = j_req_sign(env, clientApiReq);

```

des_key = j_des_key_m((int)env, (int)jstr_2);
v13 = j_req_sign((int)env, (int)clientApiReq);

```

这里传进去的是env和java层传过来的请求数据

```

1 int __fastcall req_sign(JNIEnv *env, int clientApiReq)
2 {
3     jstring str_classesdex; // r0
4     jclass ZipEntry_class; // r0
5     jobject (*CallObjectMethod)(JNIEnv *, jobject, jmethodID, ...); // [sp+20h] [bp-E8h]
6     jmethodID (*GetMethodID)(JNIEnv *, jclass, const char *, const char *); // [sp+28h] [bp-E0h]
7     size_t transActionId_byteArray_len; // [sp+40h] [bp-C8h]
8     int v8; // [sp+44h] [bp-C4h]
9     void *ptr; // [sp+48h] [bp-C0h]
10    size_t size; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-BCh]
11    _jmethodID *getCrc_id; // [sp+5Ch] [bp-ACh]
12    jobject call_getEntry_classesdex; // [sp+60h] [bp-A8h]
13    jmethodID getEntry_id; // [sp+64h] [bp-A4h]
14    jobject ZipFile_obj; // [sp+68h] [bp-A0h]
15    _jmethodID *ZipFile_init_id; // [sp+6Ch] [bp-9Ch]
16    jclass ZipFile_class; // [sp+70h] [bp-98h]
17    jobject codePath; // [sp+74h] [bp-94h]
18    _jfieldID *codePath_id; // [sp+78h] [bp-90h]
19    jclass SystemInfo_class; // [sp+7Ch] [bp-8Ch]
20    _BYTE *timestamp_byteArray; // [sp+80h] [bp-88h]
21    const char *transActionId_byteArray; // [sp+84h] [bp-84h]
22    jobject transActionId; // [sp+88h] [bp-80h]
23    _jfieldID *transActionId_id; // [sp+8Ch] [bp-7Ch]
24    jobject timestamp; // [sp+90h] [bp-78h]
25    _jfieldID *timestamp_id; // [sp+94h] [bp-74h]
26    jclass clientApiReq_class_2; // [sp+98h] [bp-70h]
27    jobject v27; // [sp+9Ch] [bp-6Ch]
28    _jfieldID *v28; // [sp+A0h] [bp-68h]
29    jclass clientApiReq_class; // [sp+A4h] [bp-64h]
30    char v32[16]; // [sp+E8h] [bp-20h] BYREF
31    int v33; // [sp+F8h] [bp-10h]

```

初始化变量

```

33 clientApiReq_class = (*env)->GetObjectClass(env, clientApiReq);
34 v28 = ((*env)->GetFieldID)(env, clientApiReq_class);
35 _android_log_print(4, "testL", "head");
36 v27 = (*env)->GetObjectField(env, clientApiReq, v28);
37 clientApiReq_class_2 = (*env)->GetObjectClass(env, v27);
38 timestamp_id = ((*env)->GetFieldID)(env, clientApiReq_class_2, "timestamp");
39 timestamp = (*env)->GetObjectField(env, v27, timestamp_id);
40 transActionId_id = (*env)->GetFieldID(env, clientApiReq_class_2, "transActionId", "Ljava/lang/String;");
41 transActionId = (*env)->GetObjectField(env, v27, transActionId_id);
42 transActionId_byteArray = j_stringTostring(env, transActionId);
43 timestamp_byteArray = j_stringTostring(env, timestamp);
44 SystemInfo_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "com/bw/zsch/client/android/service/util/SystemInfo");
45 codePath_id = (*env)->GetStaticFieldID(env, SystemInfo_class, "codePath", "Ljava/lang/String;");
46 codePath = (*env)->GetStaticObjectField(env, SystemInfo_class, codePath_id);
47 ZipFile_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/util/zip/ZipFile");
48 ZipFile_init_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, ZipFile_class, "<init>", "(Ljava/lang/String;)V");
49 ZipFile_obj = (*env)->NewObject(env, ZipFile_class, ZipFile_init_id, codePath);
50 getEntry_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, ZipFile_class, "getEntry", "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/util/zip/ZipEntry;");
51 CallObjectMethod = (*env)->CallObjectMethod;
52 str_classesdex = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "classes.dex");
53 call_getEntry_classesdex = CallObjectMethod(env, ZipFile_obj, getEntry_id, str_classesdex);
54 GetMethodID = (*env)->GetMethodID;
55 ZipEntry_class = (*env)->GetObjectClass(env, call_getEntry_classesdex);
56 getCrc_id = GetMethodID(env, ZipEntry_class, "getCrc", "()J");
57 (*env)->CallLongMethod(env, call_getEntry_classesdex, getCrc_id);
58 memset(v32, 0, sizeof(v32)); // 把v32清空
59 v33 = 0;
60 sub_33DC(v32, 20, "%lld", 2822563731LL);
61 _android_log_print(4, "testL", "%s", v32);
62 transActionId_byteArray_len = _strlen_chk(transActionId_byteArray, 0xFFFFFFFF);
63 size = transActionId_byteArray_len + _strlen_chk(v32, 0x14u) + 11;
64 ptr = malloc(size);

65 if (!ptr)
66     exit(1);
67 _strncpy_chk(ptr, timestamp_byteArray, 11, -1);
68 _strcat_chk(ptr, transActionId_byteArray, -1);
69 _strcat_chk(ptr, v32, -1);
70 v8 = j_stoByteArray(env, ptr);
71 (*env)->DeleteLocalRef(env, ZipFile_class);
72 (*env)->DeleteLocalRef(env, call_getEntry_classesdex);
73 (*env)->DeleteLocalRef(env, clientApiReq_class);
74 (*env)->DeleteLocalRef(env, clientApiReq_class_2);
75 (*env)->DeleteLocalRef(env, v27);
76 free(ptr);
77 return v8;
78 }

```

最后返回的是v8，v8是由下边三次拼接复制得到的

```

_strncpy_chk(ptr, timestamp_byteArray, 11, -1);
_strcat_chk(ptr, transActionId_byteArray, -1);
_strcat_chk(ptr, v32, -1);

```

对这个j_req_sign进行hook，打印返回值发现是：

2025-03-071584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f142822563731

第一部分	第二部分	第三部分
2025-03-07	1584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f14	2822563731

对比发现，这个返回值是由三部分组成的，也分别对应这三次复制拼接

第一部分对应的是：`_strncpy_chk(ptr, timestamp_byteArray, 11, -1);`

可以看到是一个时间戳，并且是只有年月日的，且长度为11(包含\0)

分析：

```
timestamp_id = ((*env)->GetFieldID)(env, clientApiReq_class_2, "timestamp");
timestamp_jstring = (*env)->GetObjectField(env, v27, timestamp_id);
```

这里它是调用的`clientApiReq`类下的`timestamp`属性，来拿到这个日期的。

我们去java层看下这个类`clientApiReq`，看了下发现没有这个属性，后边经过验证是传进来的`clientApiReq`的父类，父类李有这个属性，这里就是去拿`timestamp`的值，然后再拼接的时候，只取了11位(包含\0)

第二部分对应的是：`_strcat_chk(ptr, transActionId_byteArray, -1);`

验证发现是传进来的对象中`head`的`transActionId`

```
transActionId_id = (*env)->GetFieldID(env, clientApiReq_class_2,
"transActionId", "Ljava/lang/String;");
transActionId = (*env)->GetObjectField(env, v27, transActionId_id);
transActionId_byteArray = j_jstringToString(env, transActionId);
```

这里是从java层反射拿到这个类中`head`的`transActionId`的值，然后拼接到里边

第三部分对应的是：`_strcat_chk(ptr, v32, -1);`

这个是固定的：`2822563731`，并且可以看到，它是通过`sub_33DC(v32, 20, "%11d", 2822563731LL);`得到的

```
int sub_33DC(int a1, int a2, int a3, ...)
{
    _DWORD *v3; // r12
    va_list va; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-4h] BYREF

    va_start(va, a3);
    *v3 = va;
    return _vsprintf_chk(a1, 0, a2, a3);
}
```

这个是计算dex的CRC值，以验证dex的完整性，6.13.1版本对应的值为：`2822563731`

总结v13 = j_req_sign(env, clientApiReq);

传进去的是java传来的请求数据

返回的是一个字符串的字节数组，其由三部分组成：时间戳的日期部分 + transActionId + dex的CRC值:2822563731，如下：

```
2025-03-07 1584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f14 2822563731
```

第一部分	第二部分	第三部分
2025-03-07	1584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f14	2822563731

核心功能

1. 提取请求头信息：

从 `clientApiReq` 对象中提取 `timestamp`（时间戳）和 `transActionId`（事务ID）字段。

2. 获取应用代码路径：

读取 `SystemInfo` 类的静态字段 `codePath`（APK/DEX文件路径）。

3. 计算DEX文件CRC校验值：

通过 `ZipFile` 读取 `classes.dex` 的CRC值（唯一标识DEX文件的校验码）。

4. 拼接签名内容：

将 `timestamp`、`transActionId` 和 CRC 值拼接成一个字符串，最终转换为字节数组返回。

关于v12 = j_md5_encrypt(env,v13);

传进去的是env和前边通过 `j_req_sign` 拿到的拼接的字符串的字节数组

```
1 int __fastcall md5_encrypt(JNIEnv *env, jbyteArray timestamp_transActionId_guding)
2 {
3     jstring MD5; // r0
4     jmethodID *digest_id; // r0
5     jmethodID getInstance_id; // [sp+4h] [bp-2Ch]
6     jobject (*CallStaticObjectMethod)(JNIEnv *, jclass, jmethodID, ...); // [sp+8h] [bp-28h]
7     jobject MD5_Instance; // [sp+14h] [bp-1Ch]
8     jclass MessageDigest_class; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-14h]
9
10    _android_log_print(4, "testL", "md5-encrypt");
11    MessageDigest_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/security/MessageDigest");
12    getInstance_id = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(
13        env,
14        MessageDigest_class,
15        "getInstance",
16        "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/security/MessageDigest;");
17    CallStaticObjectMethod = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod;
18    MD5 = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "MD5");
19    MD5_Instance = CallStaticObjectMethod(env, MessageDigest_class, getInstance_id, MD5);
20    digest_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, MessageDigest_class, "digest", "([B)[B");
21    return (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, MD5_Instance, digest_id, timestamp_transActionId_guding);
22 }
```

这个比较简单，就是调用MD5对刚刚得到的那个字符串:时间戳的日期部分 + transActionId + dex的CRC值:2822563731 进行加密

关于v11 = j_hex_encode(env, v12);

```
v12 = j_md5_encrypt(env, v13);
```

传进去的是env和刚刚MD5的结果

```

1 jobject __fastcall hex_encode(JNIEnv *env, jbyteArray md5_result)
2 {
3     jobject encode16_result; // [sp+Ch] [bp-1Ch]
4     _jmethodID *encode16_id; // [sp+10h] [bp-18h]
5     jclass Base64_class; // [sp+14h] [bp-14h]
6
7     _android_log_print(4, "testL", "byte to hex");
8     Base64_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "com/bw/zsch/client/android/service/util/Base64");
9     if (!Base64_class)
10         _android_log_print(4, "testL", "clazz null");
11     _android_log_print(4, "testL", "byte to hex 1");
12     encode16_id = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(env, Base64_class, "encode16", "([B)Ljava/lang/String;");
13     _android_log_print(4, "testL", "byte to hex 2");
14     encode16_result = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, Base64_class, encode16_id, md5_result);
15     _android_log_print(4, "testL", "byte to hex 3");
16     return encode16_result;
17 }

```

这个应该是进行了hex编码，但调用的不是系统的，而是自己写的，我们现在去看看这个是标准的hex编码吗

```

public static byte[] decode16(String str) {
    String upperCase = str.trim().replace(" ", "").toUpperCase(Locale.US);
    int length = upperCase.length() / 2;
    byte[] bArr = new byte[length];
    for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        int i2 = i * 2;
        int i3 = i2 + 1;
        bArr[i] = (byte) (Integer.decode("0x" + upperCase.substring(i2, i3)
+ upperCase.substring(i3, i3 + 1)).intValue() & 255);
    }
    return bArr;
}

```

是标准的hex，所以这里就是对MD5的结果进行hex编码的

关于v10 = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v11);

v10 = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v11);

这里就是把MD5后的结果的hex编码进行了getBytes

```

1 jint __fastcall jstringToJbyteArray(JNIEnv *env, jstring a2)
2 {
3     _jmethodID *v2; // r0
4     jstring v4; // [sp+8h] [bp-18h]
5     jclass v5; // [sp+Ch] [bp-14h]
6
7     v5 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/lang/String");
8     v4 = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "utf-8");
9     v2 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v5, "getBytes", "(Ljava/lang/String;)[B");
10    return (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, a2, v2, v4);
11 }

```

关于v9 = j_rsa_encrpy_by_public_key(env, v10);

v9 = j_rsa_encrpy_by_public_key(env, v10);

传进去的是env和MD5加密然后hex编码再转byte数组的值

```

1 int __fastcall rsa_encrypt_by_public_key(JNIEnv *env, jbyteArray md5_hex_jbytearray_result)
2 {
3     size_t public_key_len; // r0
4     _jmethodID *v3; // r0
5     _jmethodID *v5; // [sp+20h] [bp-A8h]
6     jobject v6; // [sp+24h] [bp-A4h]
7     _jmethodID *v7; // [sp+28h] [bp-A0h]
8     jclass v8; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-9Ch]
9     jobject v9; // [sp+30h] [bp-98h]
10    _jmethodID *v10; // [sp+34h] [bp-94h]
11    jobject v11; // [sp+38h] [bp-90h]
12    jstring RSA; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-8Ch]
13    _jmethodID *X509EncodedKeySpec_instance; // [sp+40h] [bp-88h]
14    jclass KeyFactory_class; // [sp+44h] [bp-84h]
15    jobject v15; // [sp+48h] [bp-80h]
16    int public_key_bytearray; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-7Ch]
17    jstring public_key_; // [sp+50h] [bp-78h]
18    char *ptr; // [sp+54h] [bp-74h]
19    _jmethodID *X509EncodedKeySpec_init_id; // [sp+58h] [bp-70h]
20    jclass X509EncodedKeySpec_class; // [sp+5Ch] [bp-6Ch]
21    int v21; // [sp+60h] [bp-68h]

```

初始化参数

```

22
23 X509EncodedKeySpec_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/security/spec/X509EncodedKeySpec");
24 X509EncodedKeySpec_init_id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, X509EncodedKeySpec_class, "<init>", "([B)V");
25 public_key_len = strlen_chk(public_key[0], 0xFFFFFFFF);
26 ptr = malloc(public_key_len + 1);
27 strncpy_chk(ptr, public_key[0], 10, -1);
28 ptr[10] = 0;
29 strncat_chk(ptr, public_key[0] + 15, 5, -1);
30 ptr[15] = 0;
31 strncat_chk(ptr, public_key[0] + 10, 5, -1);
32 ptr[20] = 0;
33 strncat_chk(ptr, public_key[0] + 20, -1);
34 public_key_ = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, ptr);
35 free(ptr);
36 public_key_bytearray = j_base64_decode(env, public_key_);

```

获取公钥

经hook，得到公钥的base64编码为：

MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCSm2i tn3R35Jw1rJwqEXHTHw+Qkdm
YKqFu09sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fukox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg7
BE+8zWAUJFZvwp7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREKofhfNaay5QIDAQAB

```

37 v15 = (*env)->NewObject(env, X509EncodedKeySpec_class, X509EncodedKeySpec_init_id, public_key_bytearray);
38 KeyFactory_class = (*env)->FindClass(env, "java/security/KeyFactory");
39 X509EncodedKeySpec_instance = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(
40     env,
41     KeyFactory_class,
42     "getInstance",
43     "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/security/KeyFactory;");
44 if ( X509EncodedKeySpec_instance )
45 {
46     RSA = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "RSA");
47     v11 = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, KeyFactory_class, X509EncodedKeySpec_instance, RSA);
48     v10 = (*env)->GetMethodID(
49         env,
50         KeyFactory_class,
51         "generatePublic",
52         "(Ljava/security/spec/KeySpec;)Ljava/security/PublicKey;");
53     v9 = (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, v11, v10, v15);
54     v8 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "javax/crypto/Cipher");
55     v7 = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(env, v8, "getInstance", "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/crypto/Cipher;");
56     v6 = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod(env, v8, v7, RSA);
57     v5 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v8, "init", "(ILjava/security/Key;)V");
58     (*env)->CallVoidMethod(env, v6, v5, 1, v9);
59     v3 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v8, "doFinal", "([B)[B");
60     return (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, v6, v3, md5_hex_jbytearray_result);
61 }
62 return v21;
63 }

```

使用公钥加密

关于v8 = j_hex_encode(env, v9);

v8 = j_hex_encode(env, v9);

对刚刚RSA加密后的结果进行hex编码

关于j_set_req_sign(env, jobject, v8);

```
j_set_req_sign(env, clientApiReq, v8);
```

```
1 int __fastcall set_req_sign(JNIEnv *env, int ClientApiRiskReq, int md5_hex_jbytearray_RSACrypt_hex_result)
2 {
3     jfieldID v3; // r0
4     jclass v5; // [sp+4h] [bp-24h]
5     jobject v6; // [sp+8h] [bp-20h]
6     jfieldID *v7; // [sp+Ch] [bp-1Ch]
7     jclass v8; // [sp+10h] [bp-18h]
8
9     v8 = (*env)->GetObjectClass(env, ClientApiRiskReq);
10    v7 = (*env)->GetFieldID(env, v8, "head", "Lcom/bw/zsch/client/android/model/message/ReqHead;");
11    v6 = (*env)->GetObjectField(env, ClientApiRiskReq, v7);
12    v5 = (*env)->GetObjectClass(env, v6);
13    v3 = (*env)->GetFieldID(env, v5, "sign", "Ljava/lang/String;");
14    return ((*env)->SetObjectField)(env, v6, v3, md5_hex_jbytearray_RSACrypt_hex_result, v3);
15 }
```

这里是进行了一个签名，是把拼接的字符串=>MD5加密=>hex编码=>RSA加密=>hex编码=>然后进行签名，给了clientApiReq的head.sign，也就是java层传过来的要加密的数据

代码功能

1. 目标:

将 `md5_hex_jbytearray_RSACrypt_hex_result` (可能是一个加密后的签名字符串) 设置到 `ClientApiRiskReq` 对象的 `head.sign` 字段中。

2. 操作对象结构:

- `ClientApiRiskReq` 是一个 Java 类, 包含字段 `head` (类型为 `ReqHead`) 。
- `ReqHead` 类包含字段 `sign` (类型为 `String`) 。

关于v7 = j_to_json(env, jobject);

```
v7 = j_to_json(env, clientApiReq);
```

```
1 int __fastcall to_json(JNIEnv *a1, int a2)
2 {
3     jmethodID *v2; // r0
4     jclass v4; // [sp+4h] [bp-14h]
5
6     v4 = (*a1)->FindClass(a1, "com/bw/zsch/client/android/model/util/JsonUtils");
7     v2 = (*a1)->GetStaticMethodID(a1, v4, "toJson", "(Ljava/lang/Object;)Ljava/lang/String;");
8     return (*a1)->CallStaticObjectMethod(a1, v4, v2, a2, v2);
9 }
```

这里不是直接转为json的，是先做了一些操作，我们去java层分析一下：

找到了最终转json的逻辑：

```
public static String toJSONString(Object obj, SerializeConfig serializeConfig,
SerializeFilter[] serializeFilterArr, String str, int i, SerializerFeature...
serializerFeatureArr) {
    SerializeWriter serializeWriter = new SerializeWriter(null, i,
serializerFeatureArr);
    try {
        JSONSerializer jsonSerializer = new JSONSerializer(serializeWriter,
serializeConfig);
        if (str != null && str.length() != 0) {
```

```

        JsonSerializer.dateFormat(str);
        JsonSerializer.config(SerializerFeature.WriteDateUseDateFormat,
true);
    }
    if (serializeFilterArr != null) {
        for (SerializeFilter serializeFilter : serializeFilterArr) {
            JsonSerializer.addFilter(serializeFilter);
        }
    }
    JsonSerializer.write(obj);
    return serializeWriter.toString();
} finally {
    serializeWriter.close();
}
}
}

```

大概就是取了head、body、riskReqBody三部分，然后把值为null和空的剔除

关于v6 = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v7);

JbyteArray = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v7);

把json结果进行getBytes

关于v4 = j_desecb_encrypt(env, jstr2_decode, v6);

v4 = j_desecb_encrypt(env, des_key, JbyteArray);

```

1 int __fastcall desecb_encrypt(JNIEnv *env, int jstr2_decode, int ClientApiRiskReq_json_bytearray)
2 {
3     jstring v3; // r0
4     int v4; // r0
5     jstring v5; // r0
6     _jmethodID *v6; // r0
7     jobject (*NewObject)(JNIEnv *, jclass, jmethodID, ...); // [sp+10h] [bp-80h]
8     jmethodID v9; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-74h]
9     jobject (*v10)(JNIEnv *, jclass, jmethodID, ...); // [sp+20h] [bp-70h]
10    jmethodID v11; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-64h]
11    jobject (*CallStaticObjectMethod)(JNIEnv *, jclass, jmethodID, ...); // [sp+30h] [bp-60h]
12    _jmethodID *v13; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-54h]
13    jobject v14; // [sp+40h] [bp-50h]
14    jclass v15; // [sp+48h] [bp-48h]
15    int v16; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-44h]
16    jmethodID v17; // [sp+50h] [bp-40h]
17    jclass v18; // [sp+54h] [bp-3Ch]
18    jobject v19; // [sp+58h] [bp-38h]
19    _jmethodID *v20; // [sp+5Ch] [bp-34h]
20    jobject v21; // [sp+60h] [bp-30h]
21    jclass v22; // [sp+68h] [bp-28h]
22    jobject v23; // [sp+6Ch] [bp-24h]
23    _jmethodID *v24; // [sp+70h] [bp-20h]
24    jclass v25; // [sp+74h] [bp-1Ch]
25

```

初始化变量

```

26 _android_log_print(4, "testL", "desecb_enc");
27 v25 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "javax/crypto/spec/DESedeKeySpec");
28 v24 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v25, "<init>", "([B)V");
29 v23 = (*env)->NewObject(env, v25, v24, jstr2_decode);
30 v22 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "javax/crypto/SecretKeyFactory");
31 v11 = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(env, v22, "getInstance", "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljavax/crypto/SecretKeyFactory;");
32 CallStaticObjectMethod = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod;
33 v3 = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "DESede");
34 v21 = CallStaticObjectMethod(env, v22, v11, v3);
35 if ( !v21 || !v23 )
36     return 0;
37 v20 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v22, "generateSecret", "(Ljava/security/spec/KeySpec;)Ljavax/crypto/SecretKey;");
38 v19 = (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, v21, v20, v23);
39 v18 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "javax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec");
40 v17 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v18, "<init>", "([B)V");
41 NewObject = (*env)->NewObject;
42 v4 = j_stoJbyteArray(env, iv);
43 v16 = NewObject(env, v18, v17, v4);
44 v15 = (*env)->FindClass(env, "javax/crypto/Cipher");
45 v9 = (*env)->GetStaticMethodID(env, v15, "getInstance", "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljavax/crypto/Cipher;");
46 v10 = (*env)->CallStaticObjectMethod;
47 v5 = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
48 v14 = v10(env, v15, v9, v5);
49 v13 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v15, "init", "(ILjava/security/Key;Ljava/security/spec/AlgorithmParameterSpec;)V");
50 (*env)->CallVoidMethod(env, v14, v13, 1, v19, v16);
51 v6 = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, v15, "doFinal", "([B)[B");
52 return (*env)->CallObjectMethod(env, v14, v6, ClientApiRiskReq_json_bytearray);
53 }

```

进行3des加密

加密算法: desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding

key: F33EDEAC9994DB34BC10007D (Utf8) //后验证为不是固定的, 是请求体中sessionId的前24位, 是通过向服务器发送请求拿到的

i v: 01234567 (Utf8)

关于return j_base64_encode(env, v4);

```
return j_base64_encode(env, v4);
```

将3des加密后的结果进行base64编码

encrypt总结

可以直接跳到最后一段看简洁版!!!

可以直接跳到最后一段看简洁版!!!

可以直接跳到最后一段看简洁版!!!

在java层的代码为: `public static native String encrypt(ClientApiReq clientApiReq, String str);`

传进去的是请求数据以及一段base64编码的字符串(后经验证为desede的key, 是经过RSA加密的)

进入native层后是静态注册的, 追进去可以看到有这么几条逻辑

- 1、 v14 = j_des_key_m(env, str2);
- 2、 v13 = j_req_sign(env, clientApiReq);
- 3、 v12 = j_md5_encrypt(env, v13);
- 4、 v11 = j_hex_encode(env, v12);
- 5、 v10 = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v11);
- 6、 v9 = j_rsa_encrpy_by_public_key(env, v10);
- 7、 v8 = j_hex_encode(env, v9);
- 8、 j_set_req_sign(env, clientApiReq, v8);
- 9、 v7 = j_to_json(env, clientApiReq);
- 10、 v6 = j_jstringToJbyteArray(env, v7);
- 11、 v4 = j_desecb_encrypt(env, v14, v6);
- 12、 return j_base64_encode(env, v4);

在1、的时候，是把java层传进来的str进行了base64解码然后又使用私钥进行了RSA解密(私钥在下边)，解密后返回给了v14，这个是后边用作desede加密的key

在2、的时候，是把java层传进来的clientApiReq取了一个timestamp的日期部分和transActionId然后和dex文件CRC值拼接起来的，进而把拼接的字符串返回给了v13

在3、的时候对刚刚拼接的字符串进行了MD5加密，然后把byte数组返回给了v12

在4、的时候对刚刚的MD5的密文进行了hex编码，编码完返回给了v11

在5、的时候又对hex编码进行了getBytes操作，把最终的byte数组给了v10

在6、的时候对v10这个字节数组进行了RSA加密(公钥在下边)，加密后把字节数组给了v9

在7、的时候把RSA加密后的结果进行了hex编码

在8、的时候，为clientApiReq的head.sign属性进行了赋值，其值为RSA加密结果的hex编码。
2345678这几步，总的说就是：把由timestamp的日期部分，transActionId，以及dex文件CRC值组成的字符串，进行一个MD5，然后进行hex编码，再对hex编码进行getBytes，然后再使用公钥进行RSA加密，加密后再进行hex编码，然后把hex编码写到head.sign中

在9、的时候，把clientApiReq转为json

在10、的时候，对这个json进行getBytes

在11、的时候进行desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密，key：从java层传进来的str，进行base64解码，RSA解密后，前24位用作desede的key，iv：01234567(utf8)

在12、的时候对desede加密的结果进行base64编码，然后返回

总的来说在encrypt中干了两件事：

1. 为clientApiRiskReq中head的sign进行赋值，其值为：timestamp的日期部分，transActionId，以及dex文件CRC值拼接起来=>进行MD5加密=>进行hex编码=>再对hex编码进行getBytes=>再进行RSA加密=>加密后进行hex编码=>然后给了clientApiRiskReq中head的sign
//其中timestamp和transActionId在clientApiRiskReq中head下，dex的CRC值在6.13.1版本中为固定值：2822563731

2. 把java层传来的clientApiRiskReq进行加密：先转为json=>再进行getBytes=>进行desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密，key为encrypt的第二个参数(解base64，解RSA后使用)，iv为：01234567(utf8)=>加密后进行base64编码=>返回给java层

在1、的时候解密所用到的RSA私钥的base64编码：

```
MIICdwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAmEwgggJdAgEAAoGBAJwHM1FGXfknFuiVTWJcabu02KO2dRMD
EHbyJ780JpSw+vrp6JPXsdXd/NiN6Tyxcfc1u1FYxf+eUj7IjR89Io9CbNmaynUywfAkN7I/Ov6lNQRN
Og50nHEh2Nt5SFVuhNsrYmH+Qbw5ACkbbk//Sr45oL5pyILtLJS+Iaw29N+8pAgMBAAECgYEAhYXT8LWb
Lcp51EgR+R9EjJHS4yb9QWvZ5ZCLuyDR82URIZCRDBos6Ay0mE25T2rh8FK1A4BI0NuX3oqZ2ixjMAe4
2jhIVLj5qEI7x10PGUnahpi3mS3Cr4445eqzymt39GHnz/BVqjqR5noMMAQetKc/0uc3YFz1Lh01c/eM
+FECQDQK9tIozBbXhrLbGryYpmu/GSeLhiwI5yQlRVYGOW1zHjtY+cpGyKHes/gyv2QvwsSv57Uco0fk
9sZdSx8r1uJ7AkeAXMyelSEXyPL3fAks0t50+TpetXNnjUgOHnk6iPjrAzAia2YVXsh0ICKYA7Z91Vn1
krimQXyc4Wr/ELUD05LFqwJBaKN5ndhCwfuKgLC9nj4NfSdUaweV0A3zrkdgGnT2R2T7aq3Fs91iBtAL
gNPPGDCUGWvdYyEH2rZu1wM7SIXhZ9UCQWE1N79VgwnjELbP/1vZELjO9b/z0gB6p8ooV4nhjYvYQB0
j7JoKKtPrQdYLQzh/IBCL3/gj8/xo/q9Z4Zd7s0CQAMpp+//yb/ZkL2ksIIj5MtJHoYDcXZAe6aZvXNn
kCxUwPwqdSocU9Y8Xkf+vUH6f10tUwBn1rdb3x0tHLX0GKM=
```

在6、的时候加密所用到的RSA公钥的base64编码：

```
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdq4yZcGX2yVCSM2itn3R35Jw1rJWqEXHTHW+Qkdm
YKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fukox4MwzWjaouMurpzwNwMJg7
BE+8zwAUJFZvP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7xm2zRekofhNAaY5QIDAQAB
```

那么到现在，我们知道了，encrypt是进行desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密，key为encrypt的第二个参数(解base64，解RSA后使用)，iv为：01234567(utf8)，加密后进行base64编码，然后返回给java层。

我们现在去hook一下系统加解密函数：

同时也在抓包，拿响应体搜了一下，发现：

```
=====
Cipher.init.overload('int', 'java.security.Key', 'java.security.spec. ') is called!
-----解密-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Utf8:  CD8093353CBFA3EEDEE54637
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Base64:  Q0Q4MDkzMzUzQ0JGQTNFRURFRRTU0NjM3
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Hex:    434438303933333533434246413345454445453534363337
-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Utf8:  01234567
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Base64:  MDEyMzQ1Njc=
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Hex:    3031323334353637
=====
Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B') is called!
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data   Utf8:  0kj0<0e0I'>+
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data   Base64:  r2tq9jyVZQ7jSWAZ3o0nKwAcbzVUD5qphsCTRfkJPhg119EpHVUpJqQ3srWHVpRiYjDyDNNZzc1Nn9e0yDPVh3VSz/ALYs5oYpFhC
QA2L6ncCHDrFe7sWGZItD0pzcVLqEb7UKezuD3Eh4WGqz0ju9HdJwc99LTrEaCUjBFxTycoBYwz9nW9/qVPwshWg0s+m0As5b+hxt3hyBkNfa1SNWFP8WPraJM7nL3Lqk1kcha+e83E1YU4A8ZU
```

拿请求体搜了一下：

```
=====
Cipher.init.overload('int', 'java.security.Key', 'java.security.spec. ') is called!
-----加密-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Utf8:  CD8093353CBFA3EEDEE54637
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Base64:  Q0Q4MDkzMzUzQ0JGQTNFRURFRRTU0NjM3
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Hex:    434438303933333533434246413345454445453534363337
-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Utf8:  01234567
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Base64:  MDEyMzQ1Njc=
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Hex:    3031323334353637
=====
Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B') is called!
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data   Utf8:  {"body":{"mobileCountryCode":"86","phone":"15512103215","verifyCode":"123456"},"head":{"action":"client
api/login/member/codeLogin","appVersion":"6.13.1","channelId":"myself","customerId":"","imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01dfd4","jpushId":"120c8
3f7611feca6238","macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00","platformId":0,"proVersion":"2.0","sessionId":"CD8093353CBFA3EEDEE546376ACECB02","sign":"3237b468c61
e4254ad230d11702b794e77fc6e1fc4a68b6050804f9cda8681e39806b3ebd83ef6ae05a0fe6a6f11f57db8687f116e43088411fcddcac9fbcfe5f14db06581422fec0e173ef172fb65d1
```

经过多次对比，发现了desede的key是怎么来的了，请看vcr：

```
Terminal  Local  Local (2)  Local (3)  Local (4)  Local (5)  Local (6)  Local (7)  Local (8)  Local (9)  Local (10)  +  -
=====
Cipher.init.overload('int', 'java.security.Key', 'java.security.spec. ') is called!
-----加密-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Utf8:  18F90EA09B4BDF4CEB2F7E4F
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Base64:  MTh6OTBFQTAs5QjRCREY0Q0VCMkY3RTRG
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key   Hex:    313846393045413039423442444634434542324637453446
-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Utf8:  01234567
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Base64:  MDEyMzQ1Njc=
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV    Hex:    3031323334353637
=====
Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B') is called!
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data   Utf8:  {"body":{"mobileCountryCode":"86","phone":"19944015856","verifyCode":"123555"},"head":{"action":"client
api/login/member/codeLogin","appVersion":"6.13.1","channelId":"myself","customerId":"","imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01dfd4","jpushId":"120c8
3f7611feca6238","macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00","platformId":0,"proVersion":"2.0","sessionId":"18F90EA09B4BDF4CEB2F7E4F83CCD4E6","sign":"8fe199077fb
88fa9eff43d175cf30fc70705e6f1d802a66e0e34e63be255b094b22770819556d86fb329d05b17a4550599a584cba846a14a96c9afa346bf943da345e12538526350636e28a8d3d1ed
WebStorm_project  Demo  > AllDemo  > 四川航空  > Java层加密算法通杀脚本.js  > showStacks()
8:6  CRLF  UTF-8  4 spaces
```

它是截取了sessionId的前24位，这也对应上了desede的168位密钥

sessionId是变化的，每重启一次软件就会重新得到一个新的

然后在调用encrypt方法前，会先对desede的key进行RSA加密，加密后进行base64编码，然后在调用encrypt时，传过来做第二个参数，到so层的时候再进行base64解码，私钥解密，然后在desede初始化密钥的时候使用

所以，要想对请求体进行解密，我们需要先去抓一下这个sessionId然后去取前24位

登录接口的请求数据分析

在之前的分析过程中，我们说过发送登录请求是在 `HttpEngine.post` 方法里进行的

所以对 `post` 方法进行了hook，打印了堆栈：

`HttpEngine.post` is called:

参数1

`https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codeLogin.htm?actionType=clientapi/login/member/codeLogin&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOperator=&mac=02:00:00:00:00:00&transactionId=c77d5076-3f00-484d-9a8e-e088f684db82,`

参数2

`HLYW8GLYRI8JFuVtD6wriUrKdMUNM7w132BdBaJSV0qcRMR92gj7Yso6KnHDFsfvyYvPKBVNIQ+yJ9Pf
wqY6/56TNGqPMENZaoofN/1E6zykMZQN+MbDriZWq+8Wfexa1NjF9RrCTy1zGA+E+sK2ytsq/IWNd8SO
9qROP2FmCWBosKuuHiCEPf37gEL0pQoyK4eaWRYTKVPA0i13sJf70qymkND14aj5g5YjJPNNVYLAfDmo
HTYgfXC9A1Rbow1Q4zqn+NcqBg4akxFWwpJ+LbE7outXuLoYwot1PjQ1/KYtqHz7drUNTOTkX8UHFVup
Tz1uBOR/XYQ2++V8vCvDUu1Zbzj/HW9IO7B/3ZEx1MupK8ZXsBbquI/VKQbsq0YwMwIUU1zm3eDbDprx
uc6IRzYOAi1fw6qN6/5Gxwfbwf5616EThv+Hn8BWWF6v3PstM1VoZHQv6BHV1kR3nkMuJMLgHPX0Ljg
uA0jxKYFF5zn4X3me76G1m1SjEgnXwktowijFyuridItKB1Rc/GRXk8zZqpj43kyf3/Q+9J3nL2zTH+J
bs2G/+ps0Mpt6DBpDzc29sc4OvrhrUz2tHiFkC4UBpCfMOWEK5NMAU2rFL931HL7VNWgKut15n3hoyjT
4rfzTV1RoRXwbRJDhTVUdj8qD1ctnGKISVxg0xRpoHOr2HDxtoy+2jLcp31ciOKKrODBBJrirsijLuF7
/1XgdFboXpY/wmMCJ3FetFiiuJeHq0a5X0pdOPwh3DHIXM89uBrk7D8GzwroGfhqAYUm/QmchU+h4R5o
sA1JNT3cuuw8awwDVgRPHmBZ6W3GHkNfR8BwfnwvUD3um11ZpiDMcvbGbgheio06kXTN7BGa+8oI7eXI
IWcgq00ek+R580zsTpofSeS3evjfNpmzun8gUeD+ck7CEDRZuv2+pPdXpYGwgZ+Pfltw4Xpk4ef34Cu3
OZFtHo0YkCQZMets3wasqvw459XemuZMrVE0iuOCr461xOPGciP3mdvBjXv58T/OGuFninPjigkuj+1G
hgCP+fmbhESOaJAr+uFQOb45H1DTiYCIrqKWNb0q5+ReTvnpe3d0ZRjd3V4=,`

参数3

`com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2$1@bcf312,`

参数4

`RequestObject[key=Bo1FCBT+odVACEpErQ1hps7gsjmqdSzwjxVHzJF9TOCFi1LGPMQoS9csXqPytf
T2Ar76CeFdL9v4bRU6y50AKOd1naj6IH9n8+WSEqFo6CQoHvugi1AvYN/3VNjBZYogVYrUUQJ7V5YOWE
nMeFxsLKtA2q9FtvkOYT2bt8s8k50=, sessionId=17963D3EAD17AC4407B1DFFBEFF541FA,
islager=false]`

调用堆栈

`java.lang.Throwable`

```
    at com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.http.HttpEngine.post(Native Method)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2.getData(EncryptUtils2.java:91)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2.encrypt(EncryptUtils2.java:41)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.ServiceDataImpl.callWeb2(ServiceDataImpl.java:4444)
    at com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity.lambda$doVerifyCodeLogin$15$com-bw-zsch-member-login-LoginActivity(LoginActivity.java:501)
```



```

        at
com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity$$ExternalSyntheticLambda3.data(Unknown
Source:8)
        at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.ServiceDataImpl$183.encryptData(ServiceDataIm
pl.java:4447)
        at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2$1.onSuccess(EncryptUtil
s2.java:130)
        at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.http.HttpEngine$1.onSuccess(HttpEngine.java:1
06)
        at
com.lidroid.xutils.http.HttpHandler.onProgressUpdate(HttpHandler.java:225)
        at
com.lidroid.xutils.task.PriorityAsyncTask$InternalHandler.handleMessage(Priority
AsyncTask.java:206)
            at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:107)
            at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:214)
            at android.app.ActivityThread.main(ActivityThread.java:7356)
            at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
            at
com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run(RuntimeInit.java:492
)
            at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main(ZygoteInit.java:930)

```

这里的参数1就是我们的请求网址及请求参数，参数2就是我们的请求体，所以我们继续往上追，然后去看我们的请求体和请求网址生成的过程

根据堆栈，继续看 `getData`

```

public static void getData(final ClientApiReq clientApiReq, final IEncrypData
iEncrypData, final boolean z, final Class<?> cls, RequestObject requestObject) {
    try {
        //以下是为clientApiRiskReq的head去赋值
        clientApiReq.getHead().setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelId());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setPlatformId(SystemInfo.getPlatformId());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setProVersion(SystemInfo.getProVersion());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setImie(SystemInfo.getUniqueId());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setJpushId(SystemInfo.jpushId);
        clientApiReq.getHead().setCustomerId(SystemInfo.customerId);
        if (SystemInfo.getPlatformId().intValue() == 0) {

            clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getAppVersion());
        } else {

            clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getAppVersion());
        }
        clientApiReq.getHead().setMacAddress(SystemInfo.getMacAddress());
        clientApiReq.getHead().setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());
        if (requestObject != null && requestObject.getSessionid() != null) {

            clientApiReq.getHead().setSessionid(requestObject.getSessionid());

```



```

    }

    clientApiReq.getHead().setTransActionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
    if (!requestObject.islager && SystemInfo.TOKENID != null &&
!SystemInfo.TOKENID.equals("")) {
        clientApiReq.getHead().setTokenId(SystemInfo.TOKENID);
    }
    //以上是为clientApiRiskReq的head去赋值

    if (requestObject != null && requestObject.getKey() != null) {
        String encrypt = BwSecurityNative.encrypt(clientApiReq,
requestObject.getKey());
        //加密请求数据，密文为请求体
        final String requestUrl2 =
SystemInfo.getRequestUrl2(clientApiReq.getHead());
        //把参数拼接到请求网址后边，参数为clientApiReq的head的某几个属性

        //这里调用了post方法
        HttpEngine.post(
            requestUrl2,
            encrypt,
            new IHttpCallback() {回调逻辑},
            requestObject
        );
        return;
    }
    iEncrypData.encryptData(null);
} catch (Exception e) {
    LogUtils.i(e.getMessage());
}
}

```

可以看到这里在调用post的时候传的参数是 requestUrl2、encrypt

其中 requestUrl2 是请求网址， encrypt 是加密后的请求体

我们先去看看 clientApiReq 的结构，这是 getData 的第一个参数，后续都是对 clientApiReq 来加密，拼接，发请求的！

但是之前说了，这里传的是他的子类： clientApiRiskReq,所以这里有一个多态的用法

```

public class ClientApiReq<T> implements Serializable {
    protected Map<String, Object> attachements;
    protected T body;
    protected ReqHead head;

    public ReqHead getHead() {
        return this.head;
    }

    //一些set get方法
}

```

```

        public String toString() {
            return "ClientApiReq{head=" + this.head + ", body=" + this.body
+ TokenCollector.END_TERM;
        }
    }

    public class ClientApiRiskReq<T, R> extends ClientApiReq<T> implements
    Serializable {
        private static final long serialVersionUID = 1443572875916929462L;
        private R riskReqBody;
        //一些set get方法
        @Override
        public String toString() {
            return "ClientApiRiskReq{head=" + this.head + ", body=" + this.body + ",
riskReqBody=" + this.riskReqBody + "} " + super.toString();
        }
    }
}

```

请求网址及参数

我们先看 `requestUrl2` :

```
final String requestUrl2 = SystemInfo.getRequestUrl2(clientApiReq.getHead());
```

它传进去的是 `clientApiRiskReq` 下边的 `head` , 然后去 `SystemInfo.getRequestUrl2` 进行拼接的

`SystemInfo.getRequestUrl2` :

```

public static String getRequestUrl2(ReqHead reqHead) {
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
    sb.append(SERVER_URL);
    //SERVER_URL = "https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/";
    sb.append(TextUtils.isEmpty(reqHead.getPath()) ? "" :
reqHead.getPath());
    //这里是获取head里的Path的值, 若为空就给 ""
    sb.append(reqHead.getAction());
    //添加head里的action
    sb.append(".htm?actionType=");
    //添加字符串
    sb.append(TextUtils.isEmpty(reqHead.getCallWebAction()) ?
reqHead.getAction() : reqHead.getCallWebAction());
    sb.append(getINFO());
    sb.append("&transActionId=");
    sb.append(reqHead.getTransactionId());
    return sb.toString();
}

```

这里我们可以去hook一下 `getData`，在进来的时候打印一下head，执行完了再打印一下head。看看head的所有信息是不是都在 `getData` 中添加的、

```
Enter getData heade is => ReqHead{proVersion='null', path='null',
action='clientapi/login/member/codeLogin', transActionId='null',
timestamp='null', verify='null', sign='null', channelId='null', platformId=null,
imie='null', macAddress='null', uuid='null', idfa='null', jpushId='null',
appVersion='null', sessionId='null', tokenId='null', accounttype='null',
callWebAction='null', clientIp='null', checkKey='null', customerId='null',
externalChannel='null'}
```

```
leave getData heade is => ReqHead{proVersion='2.0', path='null',
action='clientapi/login/member/codeLogin', transActionId='9bb01874-04bb-42dd-
af15-27867829843c', timestamp='2025-03-08 16:03:35', verify='null',
sign='54a3f392cec106b7155789306fc7a8568c054114de177ac710aac1cb79500b03f83b10a641
4f27113b1057d3b7732df9f7dabe1fe64ee58e2ccfe8f9114b1f346b7f6b0682f88defa1572682d1
c7237eaca8abf06fd6e4af5460406ec30964ae9335c2b1320fe7ed2b82d761118e520ee8ea27a364
3130d1de4d3b4be17e17f5', channelId='myself', platformId=0, imie='00000000-6fd2-
5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4', macAddress='02:00:00:00:00:00', uuid='null',
idfa='null', jpushId='120c83f7611fec6238', appVersion='6.13.1',
sessionId='AC74ABA9C8B12473B4711BE23A579222', tokenId='null', accounttype='null',
callWebAction='null', clientIp='null', checkKey='null', customerId='',
externalChannel='null'}
```

在进入的时候只有action是有值的，其他的都是null

在 `getData` 函数中设置了：`proVersion`、`transActionId`、`timestamp`、`sign`、`channelId`、`platformId`、`imie`、`macAddress`、`jpushId`、`appVersion`、`sessionId`、`customerId`

我们逐一去看看

proVersion

```
clientApiReq.getHead().setProVersion(SystemInfo.getProVersion());

public static String getProVersion() {
    return PRO_VERSION;
}

public static String PRO_VERSION = "2.0";
```

这里初始值是2.0，在登录场景下还是2.0，它对应的也有set方法

transActionId

```

clientApiReq.getHead().setTransActionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());

public void setTransActionId(String str) {
    this.transActionId = str;
}

```

这个就是个UUID

timestamp

```

clientApiReq.getHead().setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());

public void setTimestamp(String str) {
    this.timestamp = str;
}

public static String getCurrentTime() {
    SimpleDateFormat simpleDateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat();
    Date date = new Date();
    simpleDateFormat.applyPattern("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
    return simpleDateFormat.format(date);
}

```

这个就是获取当前时间，用这种格式： yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss

sign

这个咱们在so层分析的时候说过!

也就是那个encrypt方法，encrypt就做了两件事，一件事是签名，另一件事就是加密请求体

所以我们拿之前分析的这个签名

把拼接的字符串=>MD5加密=>hex编码=>getBytes=>RSA加密=>hex编码=>然后进行签名

这个字符串是以下三部分组成的：

第一部分	第二部分	第三部分
2025-03-07	1584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f14	2822563731
timestamp的日期部分	transActionId	CRC校验值

这个sign虽然在head里，但是在拼接URL时并没有用到，在后边加密请求体的时候是对head和body一起加密的。

我们去复现一下sign

```

# 拼接的明文字符串：2025-03-094a2f8eb2-c59e-486c-8fe5-119008c5d0802822563731
# RSA公钥：
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35Jw1rJWqEXHTHw+QkdM
YKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg7
BE+8zWAUJFZvwp7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB

```

下边是用java写了生成sign的逻辑

```
import base64
import hashlib
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
import time
import uuid
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
import requests
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
import json

def bytes_to_hex(bytes_data):
    return bytes_data.hex()

def rsa_encrypt(plain_text, public_key_str):
    # 解码Base64公钥
    public_key_bytes = base64.b64decode(public_key_str)
    # 加载DER格式的公钥
    public_key = serialization.load_der_public_key(
        public_key_bytes,
        backend=default_backend()
    )

    # 获取RSA公钥参数
    n = public_key.public_numbers().n
    e = public_key.public_numbers().e

    # 计算模长的字节数
    modulus_bytes = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8

    # 将明文转换为字节并进行填充
    plain_bytes = plain_text.encode('utf-8')

    # 检查长度是否超过模长
    if len(plain_bytes) > modulus_bytes:
        raise ValueError(f"明文过长 ({len(plain_bytes)} > {modulus_bytes} bytes)")

    # 使用零字节在前方填充至模长
    padded = b'\x00' * (modulus_bytes - len(plain_bytes)) + plain_bytes

    # 将填充后的字节转换为整数
    m_int = int.from_bytes(padded, byteorder='big')

    # 执行RSA加密:  $c = m^e \bmod n$ 
    c_int = pow(m_int, e, n)

    # 将加密结果转换回字节
    encrypted_bytes = c_int.to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder='big')

    return encrypted_bytes

def getSign(inputStr):
    md5 = hashlib.md5()
```

```

md5.update(inputStr.encode('utf-8'))
md5_hex_str = md5.hexdigest()
public_key_str =
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35Jw1rJwqEXHTW+Qkd
MYKqFUo9sv07LD+u/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg
7BE+8zWAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
encrypted_bytes = rsa_encrypt(md5_hex_str, public_key_str)
sign_hex = bytes_to_hex(encrypted_bytes)
return sign_hex

```

channelId

```
clientApiReq.getHead().setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelID());
```

是通过 `SystemInfo.getChannelID()` 去取到的，我们去看下这个方法

```

public static String getChannelID() {
    Object obj;
    try {
        ApplicationInfo applicationInfo =
            CTX.getPackageManager().getApplicationInfo(CTX.getPackageName(), 128);
        return (applicationInfo.metaData == null || (obj =
            applicationInfo.metaData.get("ZSCH")) == null) ? "" : obj.toString();
    } catch (Exception e) {
        e.printStackTrace();
        return "";
    }
}

```

在 Android 开发中，**ChannelID**（渠道 ID）通常有两种不同的含义，具体取决于上下文场景：

1. 应用分发渠道（App Distribution Channel）

这是最常见的场景，主要用于 **统计不同渠道来源的用户**（如应用市场、广告平台、官网等）。

用途：

- 区分用户安装来源，统计不同渠道的下载量、激活量、用户行为等。
- 针对不同渠道做定制化功能（例如不同渠道展示不同的活动页面）。

实现方式：

在 `AndroidManifest.xml` 中通过 `` 标记渠道标识：

```

<<xml
<application>
    <meta-data
        android:name="CHANNEL" <!-- 例如 ZSCH、UMENG_CHANNEL -->
        android:value="google_play" />
</application>
<<<

```

代码中获取：

```

<<<java
public static String getChannel() {

```

```

    try {
        ApplicationInfo appInfo = context.getPackageManager()
            .getApplicationInfo(context.getPackageName(),
PackageManager.GET_META_DATA);
        return appInfo metaData.getString("CHANNEL");
    } catch (Exception e) {
        return "unknown";
    }
}
}
```

```

#### \*\*多渠道打包\*\*:

通过 Gradle 自动化生成不同渠道的 APK:

```

```groovy
android {
    flavorDimensions "channel"
    productFlavors {
        google_play {
            dimension "channel"
            manifestPlaceholders = [CHANNEL: "google_play"]
        }
        huawei {
            dimension "channel"
            manifestPlaceholders = [CHANNEL: "huawei"]
        }
    }
}
}
```

```

---

### \*\*2. 通知渠道 (Notification Channel) \*\*

从 Android 8.0 (API 26) 开始, 系统要求为通知分配 \*\*通知渠道 (Notification Channel) \*\*, 用户可以通过渠道管理通知权限。

#### \*\*用途\*\*:

- 将通知按类型分组 (如“营销消息”、“系统通知”)。
- 允许用户按渠道关闭或调整通知优先级。

#### \*\*创建通知渠道\*\*:

```

```java
public void createNotificationChannel() {
    if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.O) {
        String channelId = "order_updates"; // 渠道唯一标识
        CharSequence channelName = "订单通知"; // 用户看到的渠道名称
        int importance = NotificationManager.IMPORTANCE_HIGH;

        NotificationChannel channel = new NotificationChannel(channelId,
channelName, importance);
        channel.setDescription("订单状态变更通知");

        NotificationManager manager =
getSystemService(NotificationManager.class);
        manager.createNotificationChannel(channel);
    }
}
```

```



```

}
```

#### **发送通知**：
```java
NotificationCompat.Builder builder = new NotificationCompat.Builder(context,
"order_updates");
builder.setTitle("订单提醒")
 .setContentText("您的订单已发货");
```

---

### **两种 ChannelID 的区别**



**类型**	**应用分发渠道**	**通知渠道**
统计用户来源	管理通知分类和权限	
**配置位置**	`AndroidManifest.xml` 或 Gradle   代码动态创建 (Android 8.0+)	
**数据形式**	字符串 (如 `google_play`)	唯一字符串 (如 `order_updates`)
**系统要求**	无	Android 8.0+



---

#### **实际场景示例**

##### **场景 1：统计应用市场下载量**
```java
// 获取分发渠道 ID
String channel = getChannel();
Analytics.trackInstall(channel); // 上报统计平台
```

##### **场景 2：发送分类通知**
```java
// 发送订单通知 (需提前创建渠道)
NotificationManager.notify(1, builder.build());
```

---

### **注意事项**

1. **分发渠道**：
    - 确保渠道 ID 唯一且有意义 (如 `huawei`、`xiaomi`)。
    - 使用第三方统计工具 (如友盟、Firebase) 时，需按文档配置渠道 ID。

2. **通知渠道**：
    - 渠道一旦创建，无法通过代码修改 (用户可手动调整)。
    - 合理规划渠道分类，避免过多冗余渠道。

```

这个应该是统计下载渠道的，不同的应用市场对应不同的字符串
这里我使用的adb install
因从这里返回myself可能是因为我自己安装的原因

platformId

```
clientApiReq.getHead().setPlatformId(SystemInfo.getPlatformId());

public static Integer getPlatformId() {
    return PLATFORMID;
}

public static Integer PLATFORMID = 0;
```

这里初始值是0，在登录的场景下，返回的也是0

imie

```
clientApiReq.getHead().setImie(SystemInfo.getUniqueDeviceID());

public static String getUniqueDeviceID() {
    return new UUID(("LT" + Build.BOARD + Build.BRAND + Build.DEVICE +
        Build.MANUFACTURER + Build.PRODUCT).hashCode(), -905839116).toString();
}
```

在 Java 中，通过 new UUID(long mostSigBits, long leastSigBits) 构造函数传入固定的参数时，生成的 UUID 是固定的。UUID 的值完全由你传入的两个 long 型参数（高64位 mostSigBits 和低64位 leastSigBits）决定。

这里是直接拿的uuid，但是在new uuid的时候给的参数是关于手机的信息取的哈希。

macAddress

```
clientApiReq.getHead().setMacAddress(SystemInfo.getMacAddress());

public void setMacAddress(String str) {
    this.macAddress = str;
}

public static String getMacAddress() {
    String string = SharedPreferencesUtil.getString(CTX,
        "system_mac_address", "");
    if (TextUtils.isEmpty(string)) {
        try {
            string = ((WifiManager)
                CTX.getSystemService(TencentLocationListener.WIFI)).getConnectionInfo().getMacAddress();
            SharedPreferencesUtil.putString(CTX, "system_mac_address",
                string);
            return string;
        } catch (Exception e) {
```

```

        e.printStackTrace();
        return string;
    }
}
return string;
}

```

这里是获取mac地址，这个随机给应该也是可以的

jpushId


```

clientApiReq.getHeader().setJpushId(SystemInfo.jpuid);

public static String jpuid = "";

```

看了下这个类里边没有set方法，那么肯定是类名.属性的方式赋值的，所以直接去搜了 SystemInfo.jpuid



发现只有一个地方是赋值的，其他地方都是调用的

```

SystemInfo.jpuid = JPushInterface.getRegistrationID(context);

public static String getRegistrationID(Context context) {
    checkContext(context);
    JCoreHelper.runActionWithService(context, JPushConstants.SDK_TYPE,
    "get_rid", null);
    return JCoreHelper.getRegistrationID(context);
}

public static String getRegistrationID(Context context) {
    Object onEvent = JCoreManager.onEvent(context, JPushConstants.SDK_TYPE,
    4, null, null, new Object[0]);
    return onEvent instanceof String ? (String) onEvent : "";
}

```

这个也没看懂是干什么的，我hook 修改了这个字段的值，也不影响发送请求

appVersion

```
if (SystemInfo.getPlatformId().intValue() == 0) {

    clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getAppVersion());
    } else {

    clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getApp_Version());
    }

    public void setAppVersion(String str) {
        this.appVersion = str;
    }

    public static String getApp_Version() {
        return APP_VERSION;
    }

    public static String APP_VERSION = "2.0";
```

这个if好像没用，无论是否等于0，都是要走这个
clientApiReq.getHead().setAppVersion(SystemInfo.getAppVersion());逻辑

这里APP_VERSION默认的是2.0

又仔细看了下，发现一个是getAppVersion()另一个是getApp_Version()。还是有些不同的，这里应该是走了getAppVersion()

```
public static String getAppVersion() {
    try {
        return CTX.getPackageManager().getPackageInfo(CTX.getPackageName(),
0).versionName;
    } catch (PackageManager.NameNotFoundException e) {
        e.printStackTrace();
        return "";
    }
}
```

这里就是获取版本号，我用的版本是：6.13.1

sessionId

```
clientApiReq.getHead().setSessionId(requestObject.getSessionid())
    public String getSessionid() {
        return this.sessionid;
    }
```

//但是在给sessionId赋值的只有这三个地方：两个构造器，一个set方法

```

public RequestObject() {
    this.key = null;
    this.sessionid = null;
}

public RequestObject(String str, String str2, boolean z) {
    this.key = str;
    this.sessionid = str2;
    this.islager = z;
}

public void setSessionId(String str) {
    this.sessionId = str;
}

```

在desede加密的时候, sessionId的前24位是用作key的, 每次重启app都会有不同的值

这里看了下 setSessionId 方法没被调用, RequestObject() 也没被调用;

是通过 RequestObject(String str, String str2, boolean z) 来赋值的

我们去打印一下 RequestObject(String str, String str2, boolean z) 的调用栈:

RequestObject.\$init is called:

```

str=GYCtoCCqX6IveHXPKEm38sPOW+lcygkzigz0/K6TSrRyw80Bg67hdGm1Y390tvrig00moo/Sv1F+
Mw+m7ArArjiH+04Qo
5iv6LeqDrstur3OU7Z/RodZ2cRwtQHq1pwAS7+139fE3t4j7txowXSJyiujbIyxD1q0LeyR8IGk1Tr8=,

str2=E5BBD8AE25F889EDBCF2867A4E4AF559,

z=false

java.lang.Throwable

    at com.lidroid.xutils.http.RequestObject.<init>(Native Method)


    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils2.encrypt(EncryptUtils2.j
ava:41)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.ServiceDataImpl.callWeb2(ServiceDataImpl.java
:4444)
    at
com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity.lambda$doVerifyCodeLogin$16$com-bw-zsch-
member-login-LoginActivity(LoginActivity.java:493)
    at
com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity$$ExternalSyntheticLambda0.onToken(Unknown
Source:4)
    at com.bw.zsch.dxrisk.DXRiskUtils$1.run(DXRiskUtils.java:69)

```

可以看到是在EncryptUtils2.encrypt调用的这个构造方法

```
getData(  
    clientApiReq,  
    iEncrypData,  
    false,  
    cls,  
    new RequestObject(SystemInfo.key_LAGER, SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER,  
SystemInfo.isLager())  
);
```

这里是在调用getData方法的时，在参数的位置，直接new了RequestObject然后把对应参数传了过去，SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER是我们的Sessionid，这是一个静态变量，并且看到是没有对应的set方法的。所以我们直接去搜类名.属性，看看能不能找到赋值的地方



搜到了13条，都去看看，有些是调用的看不看都行

只有倒数五、六条是赋值的，其他都是调用的，去看看那两条

```
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.http.HttpEngine.AnonymousClass1.onFailure(HttpException, String) void    SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER = value;
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.http.HttpEngine.AnonymousClass1.onSuccess(ResponseInfo<String>) void    SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER = value;
```

这大概是在某个回调的时候去赋值的把，如果成功赋值，失败了也赋值

```
public static void post(String str, String str2, final IHttpCallback
iHttpCallback, RequestObject requestObject) {
    if (iHttpCallback != null) {
        hu = new HttpUtils();
        RequestParams requestParams = new RequestParams();
        try {
            requestParams.setBodyEntity(new StringEntity(str2));
        } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
        final CookieStore basicCookieStore = new BasicCookieStore();
        hu.configCookieStore(basicCookieStore);
    }
}
```

```

        if (requestObject != null && requestObject.getSessionid() != null) {
            requestParams.setHeader("Cookie", "JSESSIONID=" +
requestObject.getSessionid());
        }
        mHttpHandler = hu.send(HttpRequest.HttpMethod.POST, str,
requestParams, new RequestCallback<String>() {
            @Override
            public void onStart() {
                super.onStart();
                IHttpCallback.this.onStart();
            }

            @Override
            public void onLoading(long j, long j2, boolean z) {
                super.onLoading(j, j2, z);
                IHttpCallback.this.onLoading(j, j2, z);
            }

            @Override
            public void onFailure(HttpException httpException, String str3)
{
                for (Cookie cookie : basicCookieStore.getCookies()) {
                    if (cookie.getName().equalsIgnoreCase("JSESSIONID")) {
                        LogUtils.i("cookie" + SystemInfo.JSESSIONID);
                        String value = cookie.getValue();
                        if (SystemInfo.isLager()) {
                            SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER = value;
                        } else {
                            SystemInfo.JSESSIONID = value;
                        }
                        LogUtils.i("cookie" + value);
                    }
                }
                IHttpCallback.this.onFailure(httpException, str3);
            }

            @Override
            public void onSuccess(ResponseInfo<String> responseInfo) {
                for (Cookie cookie : basicCookieStore.getCookies()) {
                    LogUtils.i("cookie" + cookie.getName());
                    if (cookie.getName().equalsIgnoreCase("JSESSIONID")) {
                        LogUtils.i("cookie" + SystemInfo.JSESSIONID);

                        String value = cookie.getValue();
                        if (responseInfo.getRequestObject() != null &&
responseInfo.getRequestObject().isLager) {

                            //设置sessionid
                            SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER = value;
                        } else {
                            SystemInfo.JSESSIONID = value;
                        }
                        LogUtils.i("cookie" + value);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

```



```

        LogUtils.i("返回: " + responseInfo.result);
        if (responseInfo.getRequestObject() != null &&
responseInfo.getRequestObject().getKey() != null) {
            if (responseInfo.getRequestObject() != null &&
responseInfo.getRequestObject().islager) {
                if (SystemInfo.key_LAGER != null &&
!SystemInfo.key_LAGER.equals(responseInfo.getRequestObject().getKey())) {
                    IHttpCallback.this.onSuccess(null, null);
                    return;
                }
            } else if (SystemInfo.key != null &&
!SystemInfo.key.equals(responseInfo.getRequestObject().getKey())) {
                LogUtils.i("返回: SystemInfo.key不一致");
                IHttpCallback.this.onSuccess(null, null);
                return;
            }
        }
        IHttpCallback.this.onSuccess(responseInfo.result,
responseInfo.getRequestObject());
    }, requestObject);
}
}
}

```

经过验证得到这个是从服务器拿到的，那既然是从服务器拿到的，就应该要发请求，然后下发把，我们去找找发请求的逻辑

我直接拿这个 `sessionId` 的值去搜索，在charles中找到了一条疑似的：

The screenshot shows the Charles Proxy interface. The top section displays a list of intercepted requests. The selected request is a POST to `mapisichuanair.com` with a path of `/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm?actionType=ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=my...`. The response is a 200 OK status with a duration of 219 ms and a size of 19.41 KB. The response body is a JSON object containing an 'encryptContent' field with a long base64-encoded string.

The bottom section shows the response headers. A red box highlights the 'Set-Cookie' header, which contains the following text:

```

Set-Cookie: SESSIONID=CSD13485A0579B13F15E07E13A87B479; Path=/zt/tribeport/; HttpOnly

```

The status bar at the bottom indicates the connection is to `https://a14-mtalk.google.com`.

在这个响应头里，可以看到有这个sessionId的值

我们清除一下记录，重新打开app去看看；经过验证，就是从服务器下发的。并且多试了几次，只有打开app的时候会发这个请求，后边就不会再发了

向服务器索要 sessionId 请求

目标网址: https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm

请求方式: POST

请求头:

```
Content-Length 751
Content-Type text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Host mapi.sichuanair.com
Connection Keep-Alive
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1
Accept-Encoding gzip
```


请求体:

```
{
  "body": {
    "encryptContent":
    "kSXfQvJSCRM9rtia/DNVZW77NsZGhDwaOdJrVkv3xtTSpqT8QzqJYDh0jtx7CpPt/Mb1f0ztzaPgYrd
    StKwhgg==",
    "key":
    "CoUnrcZI+s8glknCCwyu0E/faj0KIXCW2VQFe4o8/g7+ictmzwtmDirWe4ZDDsLMQzUV7YSoj5KcXgl
    foIemf8uyddFimYcDnh7XBwqIDIqv+wP/AlIiJTmtYMhM0/BVg/6zFEArQgpXkw5vanjgxDPDjjThtHs
    GWQqyA+s1bDU="
  },
  "head": {
    "action": "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY",
    "channelId": "myself",
    "platformId": 0,
    "proVersion": "2.0",
    "sign":
    "2e93b528dea6d2c517a993d645c2ee539754c8515aa2c049b4ef143893d2053b929b62a938be71c
    de57a3d2eeb90074d08c202c943a3789fab5f34cde1fd723cad3cb0ac43183b32fb464bc6bd37c5e
    f63d9bfc4effd08c29e561f5322b7fdd9fcc06a4399bb36ffe9f4132cd7319e4adf5c6514d304e84
    e659c377458252558",
    "timestamp": "2025-03-11 18:32:24",
    "transActionId": "2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef"
  }
}
```

携带参数:

```
actionType ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
platformID 0
appVersion 6.13.1
channelID myself
imei 5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator
mac 02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId 2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef
```

我们去搜下这个链接



这个挺像，先去看看这个

```
public void encryptVerification(final IEncryptVerificationCallback
iEncryptVerificationCallback, RequestObject requestObject) {
    try {
        String info = SystemInfo.getINFO();
        if (info != null && info.length() > 64) {
            info = info.substring(0, 63);
        }
        String encryptThreeDESECB = DESedeUtil.encryptThreeDESECB(info,
info, "UTF-8");
        System.loadLibrary("BWSecurity");
        String sign = BwSecurityNative.sign(info);
        EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody encryptTranslateKeyReqBody = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody(sign, encryptThreeDESECB);
        EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead encryptTranslateKeyReqHead = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead();
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setPlatformId(0);

        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setAction(ReqHead.ActionType.ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY.get
etValue());
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setProVersion(SystemInfo.PRO_VERSION);
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelID());

        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTransActionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
        EncryptTranslateKeyReq encryptTranslateKeyReq = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReq(encryptTranslateKeyReqHead, encryptTranslateKeyReqBody);
        BwSecurityNative.reqSign(encryptTranslateKeyReq);
        //设置请求信息

        //调用post发送请求
        HttpEngine.post(
            SystemInfo.getRequestUrl(encryptTranslateKeyReqHead),
            encryptTranslateKeyReq.toJson(),
            new IHttpCallback() { //回调 },
            requestObject
        );
    } catch (Exception e) {
        iEncryptVerificationCallback.verify(false, null);
        e.printStackTrace();
    }
}
```

这里应该是调用的post发送的请求，我们去hook下看看post函数的参数：

HttpEngine.post is called:

```
str=https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm?
actionType=ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself
&imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOperator=&mac=02:00:00:00:00:00&transActionId=d24f
7151-237d-467e-86d2-33e567f28446,
```

```
str2={"body":
{"encryptContent":"kSXfQvJSCRM9rtia/DNVZW77NsZGhDwaOdJrVkv3xtTSpqT8QzqJYDh0jtx7C
pPt/MblfOztzaPgYrdStkwhgg==","key":"CoUnrcZI+s8glknCCWyu0E/fajOKIxCW2VQFe4o8/g7+
ictmzwtmDirWe4ZDDSLMQZUV7YSoj5KcXglfoIemf8uyddFimYcDnh7XBWqIDIqv+wP/AliiJTmtYMHM
0/BVg/6zFEARQgpXkw5vanjgxDPDjjThthSGWQqyA+s1bDU="},"head":
{"action":"ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY","channelId":"myself","platformId":0,"proversio
n":"2.0","sign":"8f75e044bc6014d4288b3395f59490eca36d50f860dedf9bdbdb3daef194cf
e360d818f3a7bff5d73ab4d12530c448e78a6bf8d7d20ed0e729e8ab97a6db788e3c401184bf3a4d
a856ce1ae2ba47fd7a56d1fcb49a6abe1c9e686210dc09619de32f06359b73c23e88d8bfe98e18d5
0cad4db5e190272b554433ee9c08a9476","timestamp":"2025-03-11
20:21:15","transActionId":"d24f7151-237d-467e-86d2-33e567f28446"}},
```

```
iHttpCallback=com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptInterfaceVerifyuti
l$1@8e50f0b,
```

```
requestObject=RequestObject [key=null, sessionId=null, islager=false]
```

```
java.lang.Throwable
    at com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.http.HttpEngine.post(Native Method)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptInterfaceVerifyUtil.encryptVerif
ication(EncryptInterfaceVerifyUtil.java:66)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.EncryptBeforeReqManager.moreRequest(EncryptBeforeReqM
anager.java:73)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.encrypt.EncryptUtils.encrypt(EncryptUtils.jav
a:43)
    at
com.bw.zsch.client.android.service.ServiceDataImpl.tp_use_valid_system(ServiceDa
taImpl.java:4172)
    at
com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity.loadRiskTag(LoginActivity.java:161)
    at com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity.onCreate(Native Method)
    at android.app.Activity.performCreate(Activity.java:7802)
    at android.app.Activity.performCreate(Activity.java:7791)
    at
android.app.Instrumentation.callActivityOnCreate(Instrumentation.java:1306)
    at
android.app.ActivityThread.performLaunchActivity(ActivityThread.java:3245)
    at android.app.ActivityThread.handleLaunchActivity(ActivityThread.java:3409)
    at
android.app.servertransaction.LaunchActivityItem.execute(LaunchActivityItem.java
:83)
```

```

        at
        android.app.servertransaction.TransactionExecutor.executeCallbacks(TransactionEx
        ecutor.java:135)
        at
        android.app.servertransaction.TransactionExecutor.execute(TransactionExecutor.ja
        va:95)
        at android.app.ActivityThread$H.handleMessage(ActivityThread.java:2016)
        at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:107)
        at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:214)
        at android.app.ActivityThread.main(ActivityThread.java:7356)
        at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
        at
        com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run(RuntimeInit.java:492
        )
        at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main(ZygoteInit.java:930)

```

```

public void encryptVerification(final IEncryptVerificationCallback
iEncryptVerificationCallback, RequestObject requestObject) {
    try {
        String info = SystemInfo.getINFO();
        if (info != null && info.length() > 64) {
            info = info.substring(0, 63);
        }
        String encryptThreeDESECB = DESedeUtil.encryptThreeDESECB(info,
info, "UTF-8");
        System.loadLibrary("BWSecurity");
        String sign = BwSecurityNative.sign(info);
        EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody encryptTranslateKeyReqBody = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody(sign, encryptThreeDESECB);
        EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead encryptTranslateKeyReqHead = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead();
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setPlatformId(0);

        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setAction(ReqHead.ActionType.ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY.g
etValue());
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setProVersion(SystemInfo.PRO_VERSION);
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());
        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelID());

        encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTransActionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
        EncryptTranslateKeyReq encryptTranslateKeyReq = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReq(encryptTranslateKeyReqHead, encryptTranslateKeyReqBody);
        BwSecurityNative.reqSign(encryptTranslateKeyReq);
        //设置请求信息

        //调用post发送请求, 经过hook得知, post的第二个参数, 即
encryptTranslateKeyReq就是我们的请求体
        //请求参数也在encryptTranslateKeyReq里边,
        //是对应的encryptTranslateKeyReq里边的encryptTranslateKeyReqHead
        HttpEngine.post(
            SystemInfo.getRequestUrl(encryptTranslateKeyReqHead),
            encryptTranslateKeyReq.toJson(),
            new IHttpCallback() { //回调逻辑},

```

```

        requestObject);
    } catch (Exception e) {
        iEncryptVerificationCallback.verify(false, null);
        e.printStackTrace();
    }
}

```

请求数据的组成：请求头，请求体，请求参数

关于请求体：

请求体是由两部分组成的：encryptTranslateKeyReqBody、encryptTranslateKeyReqHead

//调用post发送请求，经过hook得知，post的第二个参数，即encryptTranslateKeyReq就是我们的请求体

//我们去看看encryptTranslateKeyReq是怎么来的，往上看，可以看到：

```

EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody encryptTranslateKeyReqBody = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody(sign, encryptThreeDESECB);
EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead encryptTranslateKeyReqHead = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead();

EncryptTranslateKeyReq encryptTranslateKeyReq = new
EncryptTranslateKeyReq(encryptTranslateKeyReqHead, encryptTranslateKeyReqBody);

```

可以看到是先new了encryptTranslateKeyReqHead和encryptTranslateKeyReqBody，然后再去new encryptTranslateKeyReq，然后把他们两个传进去。他们就分别对应的是EncryptTranslateKeyReq中的head和body。对于body是传参数然后直接new出来的；head是先new了一个空的，然后再去设置的参数

-----分割线-----

关于body:

```

String encryptThreeDESECB = DESedeUtil.encryptThreeDESECB(info, info,
"UTF-8");
String sign = BwSecurityNative.sign(info);
encryptTranslateKeyReqBody = new EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody(sign,
encryptThreeDESECB);

```

去看看EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody的构造函数：

```

public EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody(String str, String str2) {
    this.key = str;
    this.encryptContent = str2;
}

```

第一个参数就是body里的key，第二个参数就body里的encryptContent

```

"body": {
    "encryptContent":
"kSXfQvJScRM9rtia/DNVZW77NsZGhDwaOdJrVkv3xtTSpqT8QzqJYDh0jtx7CpPt/Mb1foztzaPgYrd
StKwhgg==",
    "key":
"CoUnrcZI+s8glknCCWyu0E/faj0KIXCW2VQFe4o8/g7+ictmzwtmDirWe4ZDDsLMQZUV7YSoj5KcXgl
foIemf8uyddFimYcDnh7XBwqIDIqv+wP/Al i iJTmtYMhM0/BVg/6zFEARQgpXkw5vanjgxDPDjjThtHs
GWQqyA+s1bDU="
},

```

我们再去单独看他们生成的逻辑，先看第二个参数：encryptContent，因为这个是java层的，简单一些：

```
String info = SystemInfo.getINFO();
if (info != null && info.length() > 64) {
    info = info.substring(0, 63);
}
String encryptThreeDESECB = DESedeUtil.encryptThreeDESECB(info,
info, "UTF-8");
```

首先是获取info，然后判断如果info不为空并且长度大于64，那么就取前64位

这里我们去看看SystemInfo.getINFO()

```
public static String getINFO() {
    if (getPlatformId().intValue() == 0) {
        return "&platformID=" + getPlatformId() + "&appVersion=" +
getAppVersion() + "&channelID=" + getChannelID() + "&imei=" + getImei() +
"&networkOperator=" + getSimOperatorName() + "&mac=" + getMacAddress();
    }
    return "&platformID=" + getPlatformId() + "&appVersion=" +
getAppVersion() + "&channelID=" + getChannelID() + "&imei=" + getImei() +
"&networkOperator=" + getSimOperatorName() + "&mac=" + getMacAddress();
}
```

我们可以去hook一下这个getINFO，看看返回的是什么：

&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOperator=&mac=02:00:00:00:00:00

我们取前64位就是：

&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681

接下来就是调用DESedeUtil.encryptThreeDESECB(info, info, "UTF-8")然后拿到encryptThreeDESECB

我们去看看DESedeUtil.encryptThreeDESECB

```
public static String encryptThreeDESECB(String str, String str2, String
str3) throws Exception {
    SecretKey generateSecret =
SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("DESede").generateSecret(new
DESedeKeySpec(str2.getBytes(str2)));
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
    cipher.init(1, generateSecret, new IvParameterSpec(iv.getBytes()));
    return Base64.encode(cipher.doFinal(str.getBytes(str3)));
}
```

这里是做了一个desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密，key为：传进去的info，iv为："01234567"，最后进行base64编码，就得到了encryptThreeDESECB。这里key是24位的，所以会截取前24位：

&platformID=0&appVersion

这里可以固定写死，或者一会变化着去看看，应该都可以发请求。

现在去看看body里的key，也就是第一个参数：

```
String sign = BwSecurityNative.sign(info);
encryptTranslateKeyReqBody = new EncryptTranslateKeyReqBody(sign,
encryptThreeDESECB);
```

这个info和之前的是同一个：

&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681

然后通过BwSecurityNative.sign(info)得到的sign

现在去看看这个 `BwSecurityNative.sign`

```
int __fastcall Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_sign(JNIEnv
*env, int a2, int a3){
    int v3; // r0
    void *v5; // [sp+4h] [bp-1Ch]
    _BYTE *info_cstr; // [sp+8h] [bp-18h]

    info_cstr = j_jstringToString(env info);
    v5 = j_stoJByteArray(env, info_cstr);
    v3 = j_rsa_encrpy_by_public_key(env, v5);
    return j_base64_encode(env, v3);
}
```

这里是进行了一个rsa加密，然后转base64.公钥为:

MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHTHW+Qkdm
YKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fukox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg7
BE+8zWAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB

到这里请求体中的 `body`部分就解决了:

`info: &platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681`
`body`中的key: 通过rsa对info进行加密后转为base64编码
`body`中的encryptContent: desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密后转为base64编码,
其中key为: `&platformID=0&appVersion`,
iv为: 01234567

-----分割线-----

关于head:

```
"head": {
    "action": "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY",
    "channelId": "myself",
    "platformId": 0,
    "proVersion": "2.0",
    "sign":
"2e93b528dea6d2c517a993d645c2ee539754c8515aa2c049b4ef143893d2053b929b62a938be71c
de57a3d2eeb90074d08c202c943a3789fab5f34cde1fd723cad3cb0ac43183b32fb464bc6bd37c5e
f63d9bfc4effd08c29e561f5322b7fdd9fcc06a4399bb36ffe9f4132cd7319e4adf5c6514d304e84
e659c377458252558",
    "timestamp": "2025-03-11 18:32:24",
    "transActionId": "2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef"
}
```

主要有这么几个参数需要搞定: `action`、`channelId`、`platformId`、`proVersion`、`sign`、`timestamp`、`transActionId`

我们先去看看new `EncryptTranslateKeyReqHead()`那里, new的时候是空参构造, new完后用set设置了对应值:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setPlatformId(0);
```

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setAction(ReqHead.ActionType.ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY.g
etValue());
```

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setProVersion(SystemInfo.PRO_VERSION);
```



```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelID());
```

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTransactionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
BwSecurityNative.reqSign(encryptTranslateKeyReq);
```

platformId:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setPlatformId(0);
这里直接赋值0
```

action:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setAction(ReqHead.ActionType.ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY.getValue());
```

这个是获取枚举变量的值，这里对应的就是：ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY

proVersion:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setProVersion(SystemInfo.PRO_VERSION);
```

```
public static String PRO_VERSION = "2.0";
```

这里就是：2.0

Timestamp:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTimestamp(DateTool.getCurrentTime());
```

```
public static String getCurrentTime() {
    SimpleDateFormat simpleDateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat();
    Date date = new Date();
    simpleDateFormat.applyPattern("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
    return simpleDateFormat.format(date);
}
```

时间戳是通过Date和SimpleDateFormat类得到的，按照"yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"格式输出

channelId:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setChannelId(SystemInfo.getChannelID());
```

```
public static String getChannelID() {
    Object obj;
    try {
        ApplicationInfo applicationInfo =
CTX.getPackageManager().getApplicationInfo(CTX.getPackageName(), 128);
        return (applicationInfo.metaData == null || (obj =
applicationInfo.metaData.get("ZSCH")) == null) ? "" : obj.toString();
    } catch (Exception e) {
        e.printStackTrace();
        return "";
    }
}
```

这里是判断app是通过什么渠道下载的，这里是同adb安装的，所以这里的值为：myself

transActionId:

```
encryptTranslateKeyReqHead.setTransActionId(UUID.randomUUID().toString());
```

这里就是直接拿一个uuid

sign:

```
BwSecurityNative.reqSign(encryptTranslateKeyReq);
```

这里是设置sign的，我们之前分析native方法encrypt的时候就遇到过签名的sign，那个是拼接字符串，然后md5=>hex=>RSA=>hex

我们去reqSign函数中看看，是什么逻辑：

```
int __fastcall Java_com_bw30_zsch_security_BwSecurityNative_reqSign(JNIEnv *env,
jclass jclass, void *req){
    int v3; // r0
    void *v5; // [sp+10h] [bp-28h]
    void *v6; // [sp+14h] [bp-24h]
    void *v7; // [sp+18h] [bp-20h]
    void *v8; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-1Ch]
    void *v9; // [sp+20h] [bp-18h]

    v9 = j_req_sign(env, req);
    v8 = j_md5_encrypt(env, v9);
    v7 = j_hex_encode(env, v8);
    v6 = j_jstringToByteArray(env, v7);
    v5 = j_rsa_encrypt_by_public_key(env, v6);
    v3 = j_hex_encode(env, v5);
    return j_set_req_sign(env, req, v3);
}
```

跟之前的是共用的同一批函数，整体逻辑如下：

拼接字符串=>对拼接字符串进行MD5加密=>对MD5结果进行hex编码=>RSA加密=>RSA密文进行hex编码=>设置到head中的sign里

2025-03-0631743738-5a2f-4a09-8f83-4f85359248102822563731

2025-03-071584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f142822563731

| 第一部分 | 第二部分 | 第三部分 |
|------------|--------------------------------------|------------|
| 2025-03-07 | 1584b7ee-3039-43b7-b9f0-cbc7925e3f14 | 2822563731 |

第一部分：timestamp的年月日部分

第二部分：transActionId

第三部分：dex文件CRC值拼接起来：2822563731

经过验证，的确是和之前的sign是相同的算法

head的总结: action、channelId、platformId、proVersion、sign、timestamp、transActionId

action固定值: "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY"

channelId固定值: "myself"

platformId固定值: 0

proVersion固定值(不换版本就不需要换): "2.0"

timestamp: 通过Data和SimpleDateFormat类得到的, 按照"yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"格式

输出

transActionId : UUID

sign: timestamp的年月日部分+transActionId+dex文件CRC值拼接起来, 然后对拼接字符串进行MD5加密=>对MD5结果进行hex编码=>RSA加密=>RSA密文进行hex编码=>结果

每个版本的dex大小不同, 得到的CRC的值应该也不同, 6.13.1版本的值为: 2822563731

CRC主要是校验dex文件的完整性的, 类似于哈希

-----分割线-----

请求参数:

我们在对post进行hook的时候, 发现post有四个参数, 其中第二个是我们的请求体, 但是我们当时没看第一个, 我们把第一个参数拿过来看看:

https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm?

actionType=ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY&

platformID=0&

appVersion=6.13.1&

channelID=myself&

imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOperator=&

mac=02:00:00:00:00:00&

transActionId=d24f7151-237d-467e-86d2-33e567f28446,

对比抓包得到的参数:

```
actionType  ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
platformID  0
appVersion  6.13.1
channelID   myself
imei        5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator
mac 02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId  2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef
```

可以发现, psot的第一个参数就是我们的请求参数, 不过他给组装起来了, 我们在使用request发送请求的时候, 自己组装起来像参数1这样也行, 或者自己写一个表单放进去。

所以我们去追这个参数1的来历, 这样就能搞明白这些参数是怎么来的了:

```
SystemInfo.getRequestUrl(encryptTranslateKeyReqHead);
```

它是把encryptTranslateKeyReqHead传进去拼接的:

```
public static String getRequestUrl(ReqHead reqHead) {
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
    sb.append("https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/");
    sb.append(TextUtils.isEmpty(reqHead.getPath()) ? "" :
```

```
reqHead.getPath()); //空
```

```
sb.append(reqHead.getAction().toLowerCase(Locale.CHINA)); //encrypt_translate_ke
y
```

```
sb.append(".htm?actionType=");
```

```

        sb.append(TextUtils.isEmpty(reqHead.getCallWebAction()) ?
reqHead.getAction() :
reqHead.getCallWebAction()); //ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
        sb.append(getINFO());
        sb.append("&transActionId=");
        sb.append(reqHead.getTransactionId());
        return sb.toString();
    }

    getINFO():
    public static String getINFO() {
        if (getPlatformId().intValue() == 0) {
            return "&platformID=" + getPlatformId() + "&appVersion=" +
getAppVersion() + "&channelID=" + getChannelID() + "&imei=" + getImei() +
"&networkOperator=" + getSimOperatorName() + "&mac=" + getMacAddress();
        }
        return "&platformID=" + getPlatformId() + "&appVersion=" +
getAppVersion() + "&channelID=" + getChannelID() + "&imei=" + getImei() +
"&networkOperator=" + getSimOperatorName() + "&mac=" + getMacAddress();
    }

    getINFO()返回的是:
    &platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOp
erator=&mac=02:00:00:00:00:00

```

总的说就那几个参数都是在head里的。只有个别几个是不在的，并且那些也是固定的

```

actionType同head: ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
platformID同head: 0
appVersion同head: 6.13.1
channelID同head: myself
imei固定的(跟设备信息有关): 5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator(固定的): 空
mac(固定的): 02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId同head: 2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef

```

所以这个请求参数，大部分是和请求体的head一样，有个别的是固定的

请求头:

请求头看着没有什么加密的东西，可以直接使用看看

到这里，向服务器发请求拿sessionId就结束了，我们去自己发请求拿一下看看

customerId

```

clientApiReq.getHeader().setCustomerId(SystemInfo.customerId);


public static String customerId = "";

```

这个默认是空，在进行设置请求头的时候也是空

请求体

我们看到，请求体是加密了的



之前分析过，它是进行了desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密然后base64编码的，其key为sessionId的前24位，iv: 01234567

所以我们拿到响应体后可以先进行base64解码，然后desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding解密，然后再转String就可以看到响应体了。

hook-java层算法通杀

```
-----加密-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key  Utf8:  0C9AE2425AD050460C7A910A
-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV  Utf8:  01234567
=====
Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B') is called!

desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data  Utf8:  {"body":
{"mobileCountryCode":"86","phone":"15512103215","verifyCode":"123456"},"head":
{"action":"clientapi/login/member/codeLogin","appVersion":"6.13.1","channelId":
myself","customerId":"","imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-
ffffca01fdf4","jpushId":"120c83f7611feca6238","macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00",
platformId":0,"proVersion":"2.0","sessionId":"0C9AE2425AD050460C7A910AE682BFEA",
"sign":"6f1ca25394a3e4b40b8c399d202efaf682f914a4cf73137f496d5f4ad5fab3ef9a3a5061
9641a801886f7424841e8abda86a2fc68edaa2fb4433d12454a18a2bafef8f4d8ac2e975f4c39181a
2d286009c1c028b238c44567f0ede4f218f15589d1dc740993a1e5a59054fb5901722ac8ddeeca2
ff90fc6552513b8df80cb82f","timestamp":"2025-03-09
16:43:13","transActionId":"0cbcb77b-6bf2-46ec-ae97-5cbb7b61fe37"},"riskReqBody":
{"constId":"67cd54a1h118yuhL38dc82jsn8w0GGc3EbwsZ3n3","validType":"0"}}
-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal result  Base64:
uJ/B4Y3fDwHwnM3xXntIgm0Fh9Ifc9vogRZkB8mYyCVSJ3X4qO0TkUPeKG+j6MC5t7xqBI68www4iJYB
8U+mUHBoac06Pcs/+Dds3zs0c+thsPyNh0sa1jwSALOozyphwZ/eFId303EqTDxaCsX1jxCDCb1FcGTQ
dVqnyMX1ruapkJGwt+sG7csOK4dmpgIzhrqsZpAmbQJ+G7QLF6wtFeoUspQ8TFmknm/+NOARs1M2+/g
UawYGvkmhgTRpMXGh562yHRHsKn67R1VP9Ge64wJ0fj6tHEPDTM01iGsca/Boyio15+DJJ3sUib0oeQI
+HZ+q5WZ4Yc2j+bP3bDLt707XIDtpBVIXagYhphy8y3UrqsD53ZvH687tQ1g1yYPMsARNXhjU99kI1BF
qw014V7hutRmv4wCBSTKasawMBdDU75viqFpu4g4dEpt023ZeUS8G0WPG7LfFs3rB189qosoavyX3vFN
+qSW6iuiGLxmJML3IFX5kN/ASdrhFj+MfXx5um1bf3KMVUOXJMtMS4MvLmic3G52FKuMzytVIEctb6fH
CMqrc+xUfmTpq20VstexHqnCDHJoUCCbrk+I7nRkzet381ahQLhisi693f6DHRncnwa7pf7NADNF40j0
r5vCCrHav7/Tu3NkIfqhJWYFq1irkpwwk2oIHYtBmu7xMTj1BG2hkvGWBCE7bn+saJRzJ7oQFcbr4bDQ
rH65M+z3E8Heb9pBUAowzp2/pGWXCLcmEpP0zRqtqDc16RPeP1tPekCkxrYgvF5PJdVwOQ3DSXKRMBP
hjAcY3povt4mHThdox3azi7P1hLFV5w09v+vFhLUKxmz6g1IX8EenH1jsAd78PJ+mU5egKEoH7x8HVH
O1IoX065KNGT38/QLpJc+/cjJ5D+AdbUwrj2tLKEut6ht9kRay5YNCGrfQVZ/jyvSSPh1zPcT/3T9HUL
yJDrxFocshog9KXSD5vfbFpri5o+hvrgfUSXhsXqgsLRxtahjGIBpci+v4dxzcjNDxd07cbv9ynSs6sP
OFy+r2ii6gfg3MSPKTEJTMPYAz1hwGXioEH/3nyutPnDB0grdRUbda6aVoM=
=====
```

我们可以看到这个加密前的请求体分为三部分：body、head、riskReqBody

```
{
  "body":{"mobileCountryCode":"86","phone":"15512103215","verifyCode":"123456"},

  "head":{
    "action":"clientapi/login/member/codeLogin",
    "appVersion":"6.13.1",
    "channelId":"myself",
    "customerId":"",
    "imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4",
    "jpushId":"120c83f7611fec6238",
    "macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00",
    "platformId":0,
    "proVersion":"2.0",
    "sessionId":"0C9AE2425AD050460C7A910AE682BFEA",
    "sign":"6f1ca25394a3e4b40b8c399d202efaf682f914a4cf73137f496d5f4ad5fab3ef9a3a50619641a801886f7424841e8abda86a2fc68edaa2fb4433d12454a18a2bafef4d8ac2e975f4c39181a2d286009c1c028b238c44567f0ede4f218f15589d1dc740993a1e5a59054fb5901722ac8ddeeca62ff90fc6552513b8df80cb82f",
    "timestamp":"2025-03-09 16:43:13",
    "transActionId":"0cbcb77b-6bf2-46ec-ae97-5cbb7b61fe37"
  },

  "riskReqBody":
  {"constId":"67cd54a1h118yuhL38dC82jsn8w0GGc3EbwsZ3n3","validType":"0"}

}
```

head的参数咱们已经分析过了

下边就是把body和riskReqBody搞定即可

body的话不用分析，直接就是手机号，验证码，国际区号

看看riskReqBody，跟着调用栈往前看把

```

    public static void encrypt(ClientApiReq clientApiReq, IEncrypData
iEncrypData, Class cls) {
        if (SystemInfo.isLager() && SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER != null &&
SystemInfo.key_LAGER != null) {
            getData(clientApiReq, iEncrypData, false, cls, new
RequestObject(SystemInfo.key_LAGER, SystemInfo.JSESSIONID_LAGER,
SystemInfo.isLager()));
        } else if (!SystemInfo.isLager() && SystemInfo.JSESSIONID != null &&
SystemInfo.key != null) {
            getData(clientApiReq, iEncrypData, false, cls, new
RequestObject(SystemInfo.key, SystemInfo.JSESSIONID, SystemInfo.isLager()));
        } else {
            EncryptBeforeReqManager.moreRequest(clientApiReq, iEncrypData,
false, cls, SystemInfo.isLager(), 2);
        }
    }
}

```

可以看到是在encrypt中调用的getData，在这里没看到设置clientApiReq，我们再去hook一下，看看在encrypt的时候，clientApiReq都有什么

```

|= riskReqBody=TPSelfChannelRiskControllersSystemReqBody {
| |  | validType='0'
| |  | funcType='null'
| |  | constId='67cd7d62QGzGOPud58ccv4RX0Qaw1fiHqw52ow23'
| |  | token='null'
| |  | ip='null'
| |  | phoneNumber='null'
| |  | userId='null'
| |  | userName='null'
| |  | source='null'
| |  | extCurrentUrl='null'
| |  | extCookie='null'
| |  | extSessionId='null'
| |  | extAccountExist='null'
| |  | extPasswordCorrect='null'
| |  | extIdState='null'
| |  | extLoginType='null'
| |  | extId='null'
| |  | extIdNo='null'
| |  | email='null'
| |  | memberLevel=null
| |  | serchFlightRequest=null
| |  | submitOrderRequest=null
| |  | activityRequest=null
| |  | payRequest=null
| |  | refundTicketRequest=null
| | }
| }
}

}

```

这里有个多态的关系，它传过来的不是clientApiReq的对象，而是clientApiReq子类：ClientApiRiskReq的对象，所以再打印的时候才会有这么多信息

```
public class ClientApiRiskReq<T, R> extends ClientApiReq<T> implements
Serializable {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1443572875916929462L;
    @NotNull(message = "风控参数不能为空")
    @ApiModelProperty("风控参数")
    private R riskReqBody;

    public R getRiskReqBody() {
        return this.riskReqBody;
    }

    public void setRiskReqBody(R r) {
        this.riskReqBody = r;
    }

    @Override
    public String toString() {
        return "ClientApiRiskReq{head=" + this.head + ", body=" + this.body + ",
riskReqBody=" + this.riskReqBody + "} " + super.toString();
    }
}
```

所以在保存请求信息的时候，一直是保存到了ClientApiRiskReq类的对象里了

回来继续看，在这个encrypt函数的时候，riskReqBody里的constId就已经有值了，继续往前追。

callWeb2

```
public void callWeb2(Object obj, Object obj2, String str, final
ServiceDataCallback<ClientApiResult> serviceDataCallback) {
    ClientApiRiskReq clientApiRiskReq = new ClientApiRiskReq();
    clientApiRiskReq.setBody(obj);
    clientApiRiskReq.setRiskReqBody(obj2);
    clientApiRiskReq.setHead(new ReqHead(str));
    //设置 Body、RiskReqBody、Head

    EncryptUtils2.encrypt(clientApiRiskReq, new IEncrypData() {
        //调用encrypt，传进去了clientApiRiskReq
        @Override // com.bw.zsch.client.android.IEncrypData
        public void encryptData(Object obj3) {
            ServiceDataCallback serviceDataCallback2 = serviceDataCallback;
            if (serviceDataCallback2 == null || obj3 == null) {
                return;
            }
            serviceDataCallback2.data((ClientApiResult) obj3);
        }
    }, ClientApiResult.class);
}
```


可以看到是在这里进行 `new ClientApiRiskReq()` 的, 并且设置了 `Body`、`RiskReqBody`、`Head`。

参数1给了body、参数2给了RiskReqBody、参数3是new ReqHead(str)后给了Head, 追进去后可以看到就是把参数3给了head 的action

我们重点去看这个参数2

我们去hook一下这个callWeb2, 看看传进来的参数是什么

ServiceDataImpl.callWeb2 is called:

参数1: CodeLoginReqBody(phone=15512103215, verifyCode=123456, picCode=null, mobileCountryCode=86),

参数2: TPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody{validType='0', funcType='null', constId='67cd8b18vkfopnV9GBtT8mTCU4byx2S05jMYnoH3', token='null', ip='null', phoneNumber='null', userId='null', userName='null', source='null', extCurrentUrl='null', extCookie='null', extSessionId='null', extAccountExist='null', extPasswordCorrect='null', extIdState='null', extLoginType='null', extId='null', extIdNo='null', email='null', memberLevel=null, serchFlightRequest=null, submitOrderRequest=null, activityRequest=null, payRequest=null, refundTicketRequest=null},

参数3: clientapi/login/member/codeLogin,

参数4: [object Object]

在这个时候, validType和constId就已经有值了

继续往前追, 去看看

com.bw.zsch.member.login.LoginActivity.lambda\$doVerifyCodeLogin\$15\$com-bw-zsch-member-login-LoginActivity..最终找到了m514xc4c291da

```
public void m514xc4c291da(final CodeLoginReqBody codeLoginReqBody, String str)
{
    final TPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody
    tPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody = new
    TPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody();
    tPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody.setValidType("0");
    tPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody.setConstId(str);
    //设置RiskReqBody的参数

    ServiceFactory.getBasciFactory().callWeb2(
        codeLoginReqBody,
        tPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody,
        "clientapi/login/member/codeLogin",
        new ServiceDataCallback() {
            @Override
```

```

        public final void data(Object obj) {
            LoginActivity.this.m513x6da4a0fb(
                tPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody,
                codeLoginReqBody,
                (ClientApiResult) obj
            );
        }
    });
}

```

/*

这里是通过ServiceFactory.getBasciFactory().callWeb2发送请求

参数1 是验证码登录的请求体

参数2 是封装了风险控制相关信息

参数3 是目标urlz

参数4 是回调函数，在请求成功后，进行调用data函数。在data方法中，将请求体对象

tPSelfChannelRiskControllerSystemReqBody、codeLoginReqBody和返回的结果对象（转换为ClientApiResult类型）作为参数，调用LoginActivity类中的m513x6da4a0fb方法，以进一步处理登录请求的结果，例如判断登录是否成功，处理可能的风险验证等情况。

*/

可以看到这个constId值是在调用m514xc4c291da时传进来的，我们需要继续往前追

追到了doVerifyCodeLogin中

```

private void doVerifyCodeLogin(String str, String str2) {
    final CodeLoginReqBody codeLoginReqBody = new CodeLoginReqBody();
    codeLoginReqBody.setPhone(str);
    codeLoginReqBody.setVerifyCode(str2);

    codeLoginReqBody.setMobileCountryCode(this.mBinding.getMobileCountryCode().substring(1));
    CommonUtils.cleanTokenid(this);
    showPd();
    this.mRespUtils.setLoginType(1);
    DXRiskUtils.getToken(new DXRiskUtils.TokenCallback() {
        @Override
        public final void onToken(String str3) {
            LoginActivity.this.m514xc4c291da(codeLoginReqBody, str3);
        }
    });
}

```

可以看到在调用LoginActivity.this.m514xc4c291da(codeLoginReqBody, str3);时是把str3传进去了

我们去看看这个onToken的调用

跟过来后发现，这个constId就是Token，是通过getToken获得的：

```

public static void getToken(final TokenCallback tokenCallback) {
    new Thread() {
        @Override // java.lang.Thread, java.lang.Runnable
        public void run() {
            HashMap hashMap = new HashMap();

```

```

        hashMap.put("KEY_URL", "http://rcs.sichuanair.com");
        hashMap.put("KEY_BACKUP", "VALUE_ENABLE_BACKUP");
        hashMap.put("KEY_DELAY_MS_TIME", "2000");
        //这里调用DXRisk.getToken(DXRiskUtils.appId, hashMap)
        String token =
DXRisk.getToken("798feafe018020ed00e4b6f1d3fcf745", hashMap);
        TokenCallback tokenCallback2 = TokenCallback.this;
        if (tokenCallback2 != null) {
            tokenCallback2.onToken(token);
        }
    }
    }.start();
}

//DXRisk.getToken("798feafe018020ed00e4b6f1d3fcf745", hashMap)
public static String getToken(String str, HashMap<String, String> hashMap) {
    try {
        //这里调用DXRiskInternal.getToken(str, hashMap);
        return DXRiskInternal.getToken(str, hashMap);
    } catch (LinkageError e) {
        c.a(a.a(), e);
        throw null;
    }
}

//DXRiskInternal.getToken(str, hashMap);
public static String getToken(String str, HashMap<String, String> hashMap) {
    if (l.c(str)) {
        //这里经过hook发现是返回的false, 所以没进来, 直接return了
        str = mAppId;
    }
    if (hashMap == null) {
        //这里hashMap不为空
        hashMap = mParamsMap;
    }
    //这里继续调用 getTokenInternal(str, hashMap, true)生成token
    return getTokenInternal(str, hashMap, true);
}

// getTokenInternal(str, hashMap, true);
public static String getTokenInternal(String str, HashMap<String, String>
hashMap, boolean z) {
    //调用x.1去生成token
    return (String) x.1(2, str, hashMap, Boolean.valueOf(z));
}

//x.1
public static native Object l(int i, Object... objArr);
这个好像是顶象的, 目前(2025.3.9)测试都是固定的, 明天重启一下, 再测试测试
2025.3.10又进行测试, 针对于这个设备是固定的, 那就先暂且认为是固定的

```

所以请求体中的riskReqBody是固定的, 跟设备有关

所以这个请求体的明文就搞定了

登录接口总结

请求网址:

`https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codeLogin.htm`

请求方式: POST

请求头:

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Cookie | JSESSIONID=838DF1059ECB8D42CA751AA6A561049F |
| Content-Length | 1100 |
| Content-Type | text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
| Host | mapi.sichuanair.com |
| Connection | Keep-Alive |
| User-Agent | Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1 |
| Accept-Encoding | gzip |

携带参数:

| | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| actionType | clientapi/login/member/codeLogin |
| platformID | 0 |
| appVersion | 6.13.1 |
| channelID | myself |
| imei | 5a9992681fc4b10a |
| networkOperator | |
| mac | 02:00:00:00:00:00 |
| transActionId | 517cf7c2-41f2-4705-a458-fe6048fbf9e9 |

请求体:

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 fdJSz51BVZVbGSg6Cb8II8uISbpvX6gbvDSy/8nSH8ZQJw42f3IZMa/t6DplishoZEW97uo22w7ojjy7wiM154QAHcdSFMyLCrfoUN0nLpOpZ8y+Tb7S3QqDbnbkaFVSm9XXXM6KxOg/3zOuQkF+ODdzwwpvJPRjeULI6sozSpEaAnYooCpcnCwgv3TyZeP4+YbsbM6kM1R3jzfACMZBUjvcbCOuili6EIXBUKa5M2GoWC9AEQ57pauD0oEH2DgcjFLaT7w/KcneDLVGIMJ53IccFun5aAEKUaFL+W2RslUAGJmFo1xbibsPqHbgIXtiHp+b6zpxTtx5xHj4jzpw9w5Rv1Ifrrqg5YFrJA5DYUs0AOqxAezjeew1bJcuwOKVgc8TXkuh3vrJCbeIuhUKQ12JUhm=

登录请求头

登录请求的请求头里有一个 `Cookie` 参数, 这个参数我们前边分析过了, 是给服务器发送请求, 然后拿到的, 他的作用就是给请求体, 响应体加解密用的。它是desede加密的key。

请求头:

```
Cookie                JSESSIONID=838DF1059ECB8D42CA751AA6A561049F
Content-Length        1100
Content-Type          text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Host                  mapi.sichuanair.com
Connection            Keep-Alive
User-Agent            Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1
Accept-Encoding       gzip
```

关于 `Cookie` 参数请求的请求数据如下:

目标网址: https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm

请求方式: POST

请求头:

```
Content-Length        751
Content-Type          text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Host                  mapi.sichuanair.com
Connection            Keep-Alive
User-Agent            Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1
Accept-Encoding       gzip
```

请求体:

```
{
  "body": {
    "encryptContent":
"KSXFqVJS CRM9rtia/DNVZW77NsZGhDwaOdJrvkv3xtTSpqT8QzqJYDh0jtx7CpPt/Mb1foztzaPgYrd
StKwhgg==",
    "key":
"CoUnrcZI+s8glknCCwyu0E/fajOKIxCW2VQFe4o8/g7+ictmzwtmDirWe4ZDDsLMQZUV7YSoj5KcXgl
foIemf8uyddFimYcDnh7XBwqIDIqv+wP/Al iJTmtYMhM0/BVg/6zFEARQgpXkw5vanjgxDPDjjThtHs
GWQqyA+s1bDU="
  },
  "head": {
    "action": "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY",
    "channelId": "myself",
    "platformId": 0,
    "proVersion": "2.0",
    "sign":
"2e93b528dea6d2c517a993d645c2ee539754c8515aa2c049b4ef143893d2053b929b62a938be71c
de57a3d2eeb90074d08c202c943a3789fab5f34cde1fd723cad3cb0ac43183b32fb464bc6bd37c5e
f63d9bfc4effd08c29e561f5322b7fdd9fcc06a4399bb36ffe9f4132cd7319e4adf5c6514d304e84
e659c377458252558",
    "timestamp": "2025-03-11 18:32:24",
    "transActionId": "2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef"
  }
}
```

}

携带参数:

```
actionType  ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
platformID  0
```

```
appVersion 6.13.1
channelID myself
imei 5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator
mac 02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId 2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef
```

拿Cookie的请求头

```
Content-Length 751
Content-Type text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Host mapi.sichuanair.com
Connection Keep-Alive
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1
Accept-Encoding gzip
```

不需要动，固定就行

拿Cookie的请求体

```
{
  "body": {
    "encryptContent":
"KSXFqvJSCRM9rtia/DNVZW77NsZGhDwaOdJrVkv3xtTSpqT8QzqJYDh0jtx7CpPt/Mb1foztzaPgYrd
StKwhgg==",
    "key":
"CoUnrcZI+s8glknCCwyu0E/fajOKIxCW2VQFe4o8/g7+ictmzwtdirWe4ZDDsLMQzUV7YSoj5KcXgl
foIemf8uyddFimYcDnh7XBwqIDIqv+wP/Al1iJTmtYMhM0/BVg/6zFEARQgpXkw5vanjgxDPDjjThtHs
GWQqyA+s1bDU="
  },
  "head": {
    "action": "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY",
    "channelId": "myself",
    "platformId": 0,
    "proVersion": "2.0",
    "sign":
"2e93b528dea6d2c517a993d645c2ee539754c8515aa2c049b4ef143893d2053b929b62a938be71c
de57a3d2eeb90074d08c202c943a3789fab5f34cde1fd723cad3cb0ac43183b32fb464bc6bd37c5e
f63d9bfc4effd08c29e561f5322b7fdd9fcc06a4399bb36ffe9f4132cd7319e4adf5c6514d304e84
e659c377458252558",
    "timestamp": "2025-03-11 18:32:24",
    "transActionId": "2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef"
  }
}
```

首先body部分：

```
info: &platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681
      body中的key: 通过rsa对info进行加密后转为base64编码
      body中的encryptContent: desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding加密后转为base64编码,
      其中key为: &platformID=0&appVersion,
      iv为: 01234567
```

head部分:

```
actionType: ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
platformID: 0
appVersion: 6.13.1
channelID: myself
imei固定的(跟设备信息有关): 5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator(固定的): 空
mac(固定的): 02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId: uuid
timestamp:时间戳
```

拿Cookie的请求参数

```
actionType  ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY
platformID  0
appVersion  6.13.1
channelID   myself
imei        5a9992681fc4b10a
networkOperator
mac         02:00:00:00:00:00
transActionId  UUID
```

拿Cookie的请求代码

```
import base64
import hashlib
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
import time
import uuid
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
import requests

def desede_encrypt(plaintext, key):
    # 检查密钥长度是否符合要求, DESede 密钥长度必须是 16 或 24 字节
    if len(key) not in [16, 24]:
        raise ValueError("密钥长度必须为 16 或 24 字节")
    # 将写死的 IV 定义为字节类型
    iv = b'01234567'
    # 如果传入的明文是字符串类型, 将其编码为字节类型
```

```

if isinstance(plaintext, str):
    plaintext = plaintext.encode('utf-8')
# 创建 DES3 加密器对象, 采用 CBC 模式和预先定义的 IV
cipher = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC, iv)
# 对明文进行 PKCS5 填充, 使其长度为块大小的整数倍
padded_plaintext = pad(plaintext, DES3.block_size)
# 执行加密操作
encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(padded_plaintext)
return encrypted_data
def base64_encode(input_data):
# 判断输入的数据类型
if isinstance(input_data, str):
    # 如果是字符串, 将其编码为字节类型
    input_bytes = input_data.encode('utf-8')
elif isinstance(input_data, bytes):
    # 如果是字节类型, 直接使用
    input_bytes = input_data
else:
    # 如果输入既不是字符串也不是字节类型, 抛出异常
    raise ValueError("Input must be either a string or bytes.")

# 使用 base64 库进行编码
encoded_bytes = base64.b64encode(input_bytes)
# 将编码后的字节类型转换为字符串类型
encoded_string = encoded_bytes.decode('utf-8')
return encoded_string
def bytes_to_hex(bytes_data):
return bytes_data.hex()
def rsa_encrypt(plain_text, public_key_str):
# 解码Base64公钥
public_key_bytes = base64.b64decode(public_key_str)
# 加载DER格式的公钥
public_key = serialization.load_der_public_key(
    public_key_bytes,
    backend=default_backend()
)

# 获取RSA公钥参数
n = public_key.public_numbers().n
e = public_key.public_numbers().e

# 计算模长的字节数
modulus_bytes = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8

# 将明文转换为字节并进行填充
plain_bytes = plain_text.encode('utf-8')

# 检查长度是否超过模长
if len(plain_bytes) > modulus_bytes:
    raise ValueError(f"明文过长 ({len(plain_bytes)} > {modulus_bytes} bytes)")

# 使用零字节在前方填充至模长
padded = b'\x00' * (modulus_bytes - len(plain_bytes)) + plain_bytes

# 将填充后的字节转换为整数

```



```

m_int = int.from_bytes(padded, byteorder='big')

# 执行RSA加密: c = m^e mod n
c_int = pow(m_int, e, n)

# 将加密结果转换回字节
encrypted_bytes = c_int.to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder='big')

return encrypted_bytes
def getSign(inputStr):
    md5 = hashlib.md5()
    md5.update(inputStr.encode('utf-8'))
    md5_hex_str = md5.hexdigest()
    public_key_str =
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHThw+Qkd
MYKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg
7BE+8zwAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
    encrypted_bytes = rsa_encrypt(md5_hex_str, public_key_str)
    sign_hex = bytes_to_hex(encrypted_bytes)
    return sign_hex
def getTimestamp():
    # 获取当前时间戳
    timestamp = time.time() # 示例输出: 1742002245.123456
    # 转换为本地时间并格式化
    local_time = time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S', time.localtime(timestamp))
    return local_time
def getTransActionId():
    # 生成一个UUID4 (随机生成的UUID)
    generated_uuid = uuid.uuid4()
    return str(generated_uuid)
def getKey():
    inputStr = "&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681"
    public_key_str =
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHThw+Qkd
MYKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg
7BE+8zwAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
    rsa_result = rsa_encrypt(inputStr, public_key_str)
    return base64_encode(rsa_result)
def getEncryptContent():
    str = "&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681"
    key = "&platformID=0&appVersion"
    desede_result = desede_encrypt(str, key)
    return base64_encode(desede_result)
def connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId):
    timestamp_cut = timestamp[:10]
    end_str = timestamp_cut+transActionId+"2822563731"
    return end_str
def getSessionId():
    encryptContent = getEncryptContent()
    key = getKey()
    imei = "5a9992681fc4b10a"
    action = "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY"
    networkOperator = ""
    mac = "02:00: 00:00: 00:00"
    channelId = "myself"

```

```

platformId = "0"
proVersion = "2.0"
appVersion = "6.13.1"
timestamp = getTimestamp()
transActionId = getTransActionId()
sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp,transActionId))
url = f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm?
actionType={action}&platformID={platformId}&appVersion={appVersion}&channelID=
{channelId}&imei={imei}&networkOperator={networkOperator}&mac=
{mac}&transActionId={transActionId}"
header = {
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1"
}
data = {
    "body": {
        "encryptContent": encryptContent,
        "key": key
    },
    "head": {
        "action": action,
        "channelId": channelId,
        "platformId": platformId,
        "proVersion": proVersion,
        "sign": sign,
        "timestamp": timestamp,
        "transActionId": transActionId
    }
}
rep = requests.post(url, headers=header, json=data)
header_cooie = rep.headers["Set-Cookie"][11:34]
print(rep.headers["Set-Cookie"])
print("header_cooie is =>", header_cooie)
return header_cooie
def main():
    # timestamp = "2025-03-11"
    # trans_action_id = "2f44daf9-3a3b-4d2e-99b9-473d901bd4ef"
    # dex_crc = "2822563731"
    # str_concatenated = timestamp + trans_action_id + dex_crc
    # print("sign is =>", getSign(str_concatenated))
    # print(getTimestamp())
    # print(getTransActionId())
    # print(base64_encode("123456"))
    # print(connect_sign_plaintext(getTimestamp(), getTransActionId()))
    desede_key = getSessionId()

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

登录请求体

```
{
  "body": {
    "mobileCountryCode": "86",
    "phone": "15512103215",
    "verifyCode": "123456",
    "head": {
      "action": "clientapi/login/member/codeLogin",
      "appVersion": "6.13.1",
      "channelId": "myself",
      "customerId": "",
      "imie": "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4",
      "jpushId": "120c83f7611feca6238",
      "macAddress": "02:00:00:00:00:00",
      "platformId": 0,
      "proVersion": "2.0",
      "sessionId": "0C9AE2425AD050460C7A910AE682BFEA",
      "sign": "6f1ca25394a3e4b40b8c399d202efaf682f914a4cf73137f496d5f4ad5fab3ef9a3a50619641a801886f7424841e8abda86a2fc68edaa2fb4433d12454a18a2bafef8f4d8ac2e975f4c39181a2d286009c1c028b238c44567f0ede4f218f15589d1dc740993a1e5a59054fb5901722ac8ddeeca62ff90fc6552513b8df80cb82f",
      "timestamp": "2025-03-09 16:43:13",
      "transActionId": "0cbcb77b-6bf2-46ec-ae97-5cbb7b61fe37",
      "riskReqBody": {
        "constId": "67cd54a1h118yuhL38dC82jsn8w0GGc3EbwsZ3n3",
        "validType": "0"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

对这些字符串，进行3des加密后=>base64编码，然后就是请求体了

这里的明文又分为三部分：body、head、riskReqBody

请求体明文的body

```
"body": {
  "mobileCountryCode": "86",
  "phone": "15512103215",
  "verifyCode": "123456"
}
```

就是国际区号、手机号、验证码

请求体明文的head

```
"head": {
  "action": "clientapi/login/member/codeLogin",
  "appVersion": "6.13.1",
  "channelId": "myself",
  "customerId": "",
  "imie": "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4",
  "jpushId": "120c83f7611feca6238",
  "macAddress": "02:00:00:00:00:00",
  "platformId": 0,
  "proVersion": "2.0",
  "sessionId": "0C9AE2425AD050460C7A910AE682BFEA",
  "sign": "6f1ca25394a3e4b40b8c399d202efaf682f914a4cf73137f496d5f4ad5fab3ef9a3a50619641a801886f7424841e8abda86a2fc68edaa2fb4433d12454a18a2bafef8f4d8ac2e975f4c39181a2d286009c1c028b238c44567f0ede4f218f15589d1dc740993a1e5a59054fb5901722ac8ddeeca62ff90fc6552513b8df80cb82f",
  "timestamp": "2025-03-09 16:43:13",
  "transActionId": "0cbcb77b-6bf2-46ec-ae97-5cbb7b61fe37",
}
```

```
"action": "clientapi/login/member/codeLogin", 固定的
"appVersion": "6.13.1", 固定的
"channelId": "myself", 固定的
"customerId": "", 固定的
"imie": "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4", 由设备信息得到的uuid，这里可以固定
"jpushId": "120c83f7611feca6238", 固定的
"macAddress": "02:00:00:00:00:00", 固定的
"platformId": 0, 固定的
"proVersion": "2.0", 固定的
"sessionId": "0C9AE2425AD050460C7A910AE682BFEA", 通过getJSESSIONID去拿
"sign": "6f1ca25394a3e4b40b8c399d202efaf682f914a4cf73137f496d5f4ad5fab3ef9a3a50619641a801886f7424841e8abda86a2fc68edaa2fb4433d12454a18a2bafef8f4d8ac2e975f4c39181a2d286009c1c028b238c44567f0ede4f218f15589d1dc740993a1e5a59054fb5901722ac8ddeeca62ff90fc6552513b8df80cb82f", 通过getSign去拿
```

```
"timestamp":"2025-03-09 16:43:13", 通过getTimestamp去拿  
"transActionId":"0cbcb77b-6bf2-46ec-ae97-5cbb7b61fe37" 通过getTransActionId去拿
```

请求体明文的riskReqBody

```
"riskReqBody":  
{ "constId": "67cd54a1h118yuhL38dc82jsn8w0GGc3EbwsZ3n3", "validType": "0" }}
```

constId是固定的, validType是0

登录请求的代码

```
import base64  
import hashlib  
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization  
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend  
import time  
import uuid  
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3  
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad  
import requests  
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad  
import json  
  
def str_to_json(json_str):  
    """  
    将字符串转换为 JSON 对象。  
  
    :param json_str: 要转换的 JSON 字符串  
    :return: 转换后的 JSON 对象（Python 字典或列表），如果转换失败返回 None  
    """  
    try:  
        # 尝试将字符串转换为 JSON 对象  
        json_obj = json.loads(json_str)  
        return json_obj  
    except json.JSONDecodeError:  
        # 若字符串不是有效的 JSON 格式，捕获异常并打印错误信息  
        print(f"输入的字符串 '{json_str}' 不是有效的 JSON 格式。")  
        return None  
  
def desede_decrypt(ciphertext, key):  
    # 检查密钥长度是否符合要求，DESede 密钥长度必须是 16 或 24 字节  
    if len(key) not in [16, 24]:  
        raise ValueError("密钥长度必须为 16 或 24 字节")  
    # 将写死的 IV 定义为字节类型，需与加密时的 IV 一致  
    iv = b'01234567'  
    # 创建 DES3 解密器对象，采用 CBC 模式和预先定义的 IV  
    cipher = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC, iv)  
    # 执行解密操作
```

```

decrypted_data = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
# 去除 PKCS5 填充
unpadded_data = unpad(decrypted_data, DES3.block_size)
try:
    # 尝试将解密后的字节数据解码为字符串
    result = unpadded_data.decode('utf-8')
    return result
except UnicodeDecodeError:
    # 如果解码失败，返回字节数据
    return unpadded_data
def desede_encrypt(plaintext, key):
    # 检查密钥长度是否符合要求，DESede 密钥长度必须是 16 或 24 字节
    if len(key) not in [16, 24]:
        raise ValueError("密钥长度必须为 16 或 24 字节")
    # 将写死的 IV 定义为字节类型
    iv = b'01234567'
    # 如果传入的明文是字符串类型，将其编码为字节类型
    if isinstance(plaintext, str):
        plaintext = plaintext.encode('utf-8')
    # 创建 DES3 加密器对象，采用 CBC 模式和预先定义的 IV
    cipher = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC, iv)
    # 对明文进行 PKCS5 填充，使其长度为块大小的整数倍
    padded_plaintext = pad(plaintext, DES3.block_size)
    # 执行加密操作
    encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(padded_plaintext)
    return encrypted_data
def base64_encode(input_data):
    # 判断输入的数据类型
    if isinstance(input_data, str):
        # 如果是字符串，将其编码为字节类型
        input_bytes = input_data.encode('utf-8')
    elif isinstance(input_data, bytes):
        # 如果是字节类型，直接使用
        input_bytes = input_data
    else:
        # 如果输入既不是字符串也不是字节类型，抛出异常
        raise ValueError("Input must be either a string or bytes.")

    # 使用 base64 库进行编码
    encoded_bytes = base64.b64encode(input_bytes)
    # 将编码后的字节类型转换为字符串类型
    encoded_string = encoded_bytes.decode('utf-8')
    return encoded_string
def base64_decode(encoded_data):
    # 判断输入的数据类型
    if isinstance(encoded_data, str):
        # 如果是字符串，将其编码为字节类型
        encoded_bytes = encoded_data.encode('utf-8')
    elif isinstance(encoded_data, bytes):
        # 如果是字节类型，直接使用
        encoded_bytes = encoded_data
    else:
        # 如果输入既不是字符串也不是字节类型，抛出异常
        raise ValueError("Input must be either a string or bytes.")

```

```

try:
    # 使用 base64 库进行解码
    decoded_bytes = base64.b64decode(encoded_bytes)
    try:
        # 尝试将解码后的字节数据解码为字符串
        decoded_string = decoded_bytes.decode('utf-8')
        return decoded_string
    except UnicodeDecodeError:
        # 如果解码失败，返回字节数据
        return decoded_bytes
except base64.binascii.Error:
    # 如果 Base64 解码失败，抛出异常
    raise ValueError("Invalid Base64-encoded input.")
def bytes_to_hex(bytes_data):
    return bytes_data.hex()
def rsa_encrypt(plain_text, public_key_str):
    # 解码Base64公钥
    public_key_bytes = base64.b64decode(public_key_str)
    # 加载DER格式的公钥
    public_key = serialization.load_der_public_key(
        public_key_bytes,
        backend=default_backend()
    )

    # 获取RSA公钥参数
    n = public_key.public_numbers().n
    e = public_key.public_numbers().e

    # 计算模长的字节数
    modulus_bytes = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8

    # 将明文转换为字节并进行填充
    plain_bytes = plain_text.encode('utf-8')

    # 检查长度是否超过模长
    if len(plain_bytes) > modulus_bytes:
        raise ValueError(f"明文过长 ({len(plain_bytes)} > {modulus_bytes} bytes)")

    # 使用零字节在前方填充至模长
    padded = b'\x00' * (modulus_bytes - len(plain_bytes)) + plain_bytes

    # 将填充后的字节转换为整数
    m_int = int.from_bytes(padded, byteorder='big')

    # 执行RSA加密:  $c = m^e \bmod n$ 
    c_int = pow(m_int, e, n)

    # 将加密结果转换回字节
    encrypted_bytes = c_int.to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder='big')

    return encrypted_bytes
def getSign(inputStr):
    md5 = hashlib.md5()
    md5.update(inputStr.encode('utf-8'))
    md5_hex_str = md5.hexdigest()

```

```

    public_key_str =
    "MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHThw+Qkd
    MYKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg
    7BE+8zwAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
    encrypted_bytes = rsa_encrypt(md5_hex_str, public_key_str)
    sign_hex = bytes_to_hex(encrypted_bytes)
    return sign_hex
def getTimestamp():
    # 获取当前时间戳
    timestamp = time.time() # 示例输出: 1742002245.123456
    # 转换为本地时间并格式化
    local_time = time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S', time.localtime(timestamp))
    return local_time
def getTransActionId():
    # 生成一个UUID4 (随机生成的UUID)
    generated_uuid = uuid.uuid4()
    return str(generated_uuid)
def getKey():
    inputStr = "&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681"
    public_key_str =
    "MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHThw+Qkd
    MYKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNwMJg
    7BE+8zwAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
    rsa_result = rsa_encrypt(inputStr, public_key_str)
    return base64_encode(rsa_result)
def getEncryptContent():
    str = "&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681"
    key = "&platformID=0&appVersion="
    desede_result = desede_encrypt(str, key)
    return base64_encode(desede_result)
def connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId):
    timestamp_cut = timestamp[:10]
    end_str = timestamp_cut+transActionId+"2822563731"
    return end_str
def getJSESSIONID():
    encryptContent = getEncryptContent()
    key = getKey()
    imei = "5a9992681fc4b10a"
    action = "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY"
    networkOperator = ""
    mac = "02:00: 00:00: 00:00"
    channelId = "myself"
    platformId = "0"
    proVersion = "2.0"
    appVersion = "6.13.1"
    timestamp = getTimestamp()
    transActionId = getTransActionId()
    sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId))
    url = f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm?
    actionType={action}&platformID={platformId}&appVersion={appVersion}&channelID=
    {channelId}&imei={imei}&networkOperator={networkOperator}&mac=
    {mac}&transActionId={transActionId}"
    header = {

```

```

        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1"
    }
    data = {
        "body": {
            "encryptContent": encryptContent,
            "key": key
        },
        "head": {
            "action": action,
            "channelId": channelId,
            "platformId": platformId,
            "proVersion": proVersion,
            "sign": sign,
            "timestamp": timestamp,
            "transActionId": transActionId
        }
    }
    rsp = requests.post(url, headers=header, json=data)
    return rsp
def login_code():
    mobileCountryCode = "86"
    phone = input("请输入你的手机号:")
    verifyCode = input("请输入你的验证码:")
    constId = "67cd54a1h118yuhL38dC82jSn8w0GGc3EbwsZ3n3"
    validType = "0"
    action = "clientapi/login/member/codeLogin"
    appVersion = "6.13.1"
    channelId = "myself"
    customerId = ""
    imie = "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4"
    jpushId = "120c83f7611fec6238"
    macAddress = "02:00:00:00:00:00"
    platformId = "0"
    proVersion = "2.0"
    networkOperator = ""
    sessionId = getJSESSIONID().headers["Set-Cookie"][11:43]
    timestamp = getTimestamp()
    transActionId = getTransActionId()
    sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId))
    url =
f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codeLogin.htm?
actionType=clientapi/login/member/codeLogin&platformID={platformId}&appVersion=
{appVersion}&channelID={channelId}&imei={imie}&networkOperator=
{networkOperator}&mac={macAddress}&transActionId={transActionId}"
    body = f'{"body":{{"mobileCountryCode":"{mobileCountryCode}","phone":'
{phone}"},"verifyCode":"{verifyCode}"}},'
    header = f'{"head":{{"action":"{action}","appVersion":"'
{appVersion}"},"channelId":"{channelId}","customerId":"{customerId}","imie":"'
{imie}"},"jpushId":"{jpushId}","macAddress":"{macAddress}","platformId":
{platformId},"proVersion":"{proVersion}","sessionId":"{sessionId}","sign":'
{sign}"},"timestamp":"{timestamp}","transActionId":"{transActionId}"}},'
    riskReqBody = f'{"riskReqBody":{{"constId":"{constId}","validType":"'
{validType}"}}'

```



```

data = "{"+body+header+riskReqBody+"}"
ciphertext = base64_encode(desede_encrypt(data,sessionId[:24]))
encoded_data = ciphertext.encode('ISO-8859-1', errors='replace')
header = {
    "Cookie": f"JSESSIONID={sessionId}",
    "Content-Length": "1100",
    "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1",
    "Host": "mapi.sichuanair.com",
    "Connection": "Keep-Alive",
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel2
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1",
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip"
}
rsp = requests.post(url,headers=header,data=encoded_data)
return rsp

# rsp = requests.post(url,headers=header,data=data)
def main():
    # 发送登录请求
    login_rsp = login_code()
    # 拿登录请求的desede的key
    login_des_key = login_rsp.request.headers["Cookie"][11:43][:24]
    # 拿到响应体,此时还是desede加密后又base64编码过的
    login_response_ciphertext_base64=login_rsp.text
    # base64解码, desede解密
    login_response_plaintext=
desede_decrypt(base64_decode(login_response_ciphertext_base64),login_des_key)
    # 转为json, 方便拿吐丝信息
    login_response_plaintext_json = str_to_json(login_response_plaintext)
    # 打印吐丝信息
    print(login_response_plaintext_json)
    print(login_response_plaintext_json["body"]["message"]["value"])

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

发送验证码接口

一直没搞发送验证码的接口, 刚刚测试的时候发了个请求, 抓到了包:

请求网址:

<https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType.htm?>

actionType=clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681fc4b10a&networkOperator=&mac=02:00:00:00:00:00&transActionId=912b431f-1568-46f6-8863-887ab13a3f5f

请求方式: POST

请求头:

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Cookie | JSESSIONID=DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5DE55314BD |
| Content-Length | 1048 |
| Content-Type | text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |

```

Host          mapi.sichuanair.com
Connection    Keep-Alive
User-Agent    Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1
Accept-Encoding    gzip
请求体: 加密前的
{
  "body":{
    "mobile":
    {"plaintext":"15512103215"},"mobileCountryCode":"86","type":"CODE_LOGIN","verify
    Code":"firstValid"
  },

  "head":
  {"action":"clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType","appversion":"6.13.1","channelI
  d":"myself","customerId":"","imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-
  076ffffca01fdf4","jpushId":"120c83f7611feca6238","macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00
  ","platformId":0,"proVersion":"2.0","sessionId":"DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5DE55314B
  D","sign":"25fa4c25823d3c95f031a0276d50f5074e7308ed543436c62629429d6e2228889b8cf
  288ad29e020616a7b1fea849dc49144c77cb26205c4b646bf02a22e6315cf34c1c4a4d3305383796
  d737ff84e77ca84e054f69adae589f9c4570197c2534cd138dcc19adfc2dc83d2f2956ae89731a7c
  b8879f08fefe03379db6e144b92","timestamp":"2025-03-15
  12:43:03","transActionId":"912b431f-1568-46f6-8863-887ab13a3f5f"}
}
请求参数:
  actionType      clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType
  platformID      0
  appVersion      6.13.1
  channelID       myself
  imei            5a9992681fc4b10a
  networkOperator
  mac             02:00:00:00:00:00
  transActionId   912b431f-1568-46f6-8863-887ab13a3f5f

```

抓包的同时，我们hook了java层系统加密库，我们拿请求体，响应体搜一下：

```

请求体:
=====
Cipher.init.overload('int', 'java.security.Key', 'java.security.spec. ') is
called!
-----加密-----
  desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key  Utf8:  DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5D
-----
  desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV  Utf8:  01234567
=====
Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B') is called!

```

```
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data Utf8: {"body":{"mobile":
{"plaintext":"15512103215"},"mobileCountryCode":"86","type":"CODE_LOGIN","verify
Code":"firstValid"},"head":
{"action":"clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType","appversion":"6.13.1","channelI
d":"myself","customerId":"","imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-
ffffca01fdf4","jpushId":"120c83f7611feca6238","macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00","
platformId":0,"proVersion":"2.0","sessionId":"DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5DE55314BD",
"sign":"25fa4c25823d3c95f031a0276d50f5074e7308ed543436c62629429d6e2228889b8cf288
ad29e020616a7b1fea849dc49144c77cb26205c4b646bf02a22e6315cf34c1c4a4d3305383796d73
7ff84e77ca84e054f69adae589f9c4570197c2534cd138dcc19adfc2dc83d2f2956ae89731a7cb88
79f08fefe03379db6e144b92","timestamp":"2025-03-15
12:43:03","transActionId":"912b431f-1568-46f6-8863-887ab13a3f5f"}}}
```

```
-----
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal result Base64:
KiNW+2dJ/qh8sAUGwbQeCt8qwfHrNUKQXGKA8xNlL36Qr9i7nQE4FFky+dYMoPdvUTUvwkj7m5t1hWPu
TadvLYfzZ52m22/c1fksf6xnPPZU6EXXjo0QrNcm+oBYA55/yrXzDZnwgpd4zidC1wCq79K1PnKeZZpG
M5K8ePe2w+mVr4HPMPuGQt78pDbEWZpiTv0So1PPIakSBohiYkn92vZTTP160/0R+qe1mZzFIVQxOtTu
JBpG05STRgQV8yMyLCjbcmlA9KyCzdXBZk0IXDjkwFqyFYaL6gMT3WkyVvEsJAZ45XNJQZ2wjaBdGBxA
AGYJ21DBOL3LIOMzKiHuq6Y5pMPi rNySHLRky3ugo2DTX9ybQTUO4DpJwYKK9W0GuA8k/1x5L1B0v6QU
6eotOHan7SLCHPMfuUq4E/qDzmWUMac0CWS3/Z+sJCyGjypnfB3wrVKaqeY1ijynvj3/5SsDK1pnoHEa
Kess9Afy8TLn12R9vJnp9Way1htRB0xwKuLRumjZCMQ8YZ9s9j91N1jFencyXRdjZfmB5x1+Bd0I8RTI
I5wuPov/M/k2KEkp15qVWS2Qy8NCM4OUXYDCGOKkJVN5SaCWNfs/q3G1Y82wFSPY15da6xCK8brhKJ6C
Hmt6Q6Ngyacy7NAznA5Q6StSc7e69nTREgeGgaB9mYCx9unvjKMq3GYRFAhGjvhb5spr069kXNwRw1xK
xsf3Qeb9uVkoCE36xkdzaorF8NjuRpqn1Lar90dtxA7gbIudz1R7gBjv1MS9X5vYEPzqk3B1QVp0AW4p
Djwc3CVNc8hxrKwm0TO02EDpOrH44ftZM/FWS7qudmrv7fkxk8La9QVPezHtqlf10pcnEDmZuvaLPmdz
/5Jz/xgmXgfOtVxWm5yg5RgSiLpOn5sug4gaUjhrEFg4T+/jGO/AaiJ609U6pg23K9jw8coLC1bn3Ppj
/SRtdStwwTmRRqMXhwJ6hhM93frVMDYZZEScySDvW/miHa3EJF7iAkEmgwmZ+Ya9BQILuCorXLQMyvqv
esdpkA==
```

响应体:

```
Cipher.init.overload('int', 'java.security.Key', 'java.security.spec. ') is
called!
```

-----解密-----

```
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init key Utf8: DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5D
```

```
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding init IV Utf8: 01234567
```

```
Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B') is called!
```

```
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal data Base64:
```

```
KiNW+2dJ/qi9Jgu9tI+okkSsd/ebAXyz8FC7bgw6Z/jIJqayfxRmEtBRlj/o6WAIh3msrXzMV9/TjlIv
w986BqLHow+685jJwww9Z
```

```
Hncevyp42VdJ99rZqF02VHXK1JueNLZQTtjXJSDzfBg7yBrD+VRpYNbfETvKgtkCNnyX3ZGyxM14+Dt
dZRfO1d13ves7TsZ1Paoj7BVYZD7lg95/eQRmhJE1H12qHpmy/7TH4=
```

```
desede/CBC/PKCS5Padding doFinal result Utf8: {"body":
{"hasMessage":false,"message":{"keyCode":0,"value":"成
功"},"status":"OK","timestamp":1742013797852},"head":
{"forceLogout":false,"serverTime":"2025-03-15 12:43:17"}}
=====
```

大致看了看，发送验证码接口的参数和登录接口的基本上一样，我觉得直接去发请求应该也可以发。

请求头带着Cookie User-Agent就行;

请求参数之前都说过, 然后拼接到请求网址后边就行

请求体的明文: body和head, 不过在body里一些新增的参数。

请求头

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Cookie | JSESSIONID=DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5DE55314BD |
| Content-Length | 1048 |
| Content-Type | text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
| Host | mapi.sichuanair.com |
| Connection | Keep-Alive |
| User-Agent | Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1 |
| Accept-Encoding | gzip |

都带着就行, cookie改一下即可

请求体的明文

```
{
  "body":{"mobile":
{"plaintext":"15512103215"},"mobileCountryCode":"86","type":"CODE_LOGIN","verify
Code":"firstValid"},

"head":
{"action":"clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType","appversion":"6.13.1","channelI
d":"myself","customerId":"","imie":"00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4","jp
ushId":"120c83f7611feca6238","macAddress":"02:00:00:00:00:00","
platformId":0,"proVersion":"2.0","sessionId":"DC31CCE030FB605CFE65BE5DE55314BD",
"sign":"25fa4c25823d3c95f031a0276d50f5074e7308ed543436c62629429d6e2228889b8cf288
ad29e020616a7b1fea849dc49144c77cb26205c4b646bf02a22e6315cf34c1c4a4d3305383796d73
7ff84e77ca84e054f69adae589f9c4570197c2534cd138dcc19adfc2dc83d2f2956ae89731a7cb88
79f08fefe03379db6e144b92","timestamp":"2025-03-15
12:43:03","transActionId":"912b431f-1568-46f6-8863-887ab13a3f5f"}
}
```

只有body需要添加两个参数: type和verifyCode

type对应的应该是类型, 这里是验证码登录所以就是CODE_LOGIN, 即登录的验证码

verifyCode对应的是第几次获取?应该是这样的

我们去模拟一下请求:

```
def sendLoginCode(phone):
    mobileCountryCode = "86"
    action = "clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType"
    appversion = "6.13.1"
    channelId = "myself"
    customerId = ""
    imie = "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4"
    jpushId = "120c83f7611feca6238"
```

```

macAddress = "02:00:00:00:00:00"
platformId = "0"
proVersion = "2.0"
networkOperator = ""
sessionId = getJSESSIONID().headers["Set-Cookie"][11:43]
timestamp = getTimestamp()
transActionId = getTransActionId()
type= "CODE_LOGIN"
verifyCode="firstValid"
sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId))
url =
f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/ztt/tribeport/clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType.
htm"
body = f'body:{{"mobile":{{"plaintext":"{phone}"}},"mobileCountryCode":
{mobileCountryCode},"type":"{type}" ,"verifyCode":"{verifyCode}"}},'
heade = f'head:{{"action":"{action}" ,"appVersion":
{appVersion},"channelId":"{channelId}" ,"customerId":"{customerId}" ,"imie":
{imie}" ,"jpushId":"{jpushId}" ,"macAddress":"{macAddress}" ,"platformId":
{platformId},"proVersion":"{proVersion}" ,"sessionId":"{sessionId}" ,"sign":
{sign}" ,"timestamp":"{timestamp}" ,"transActionId":"{transActionId}"}}'

data = "{" + body + heade+ "}"
ciphertext = base64_encode(desede_encrypt(data, sessionId[:24]))
# encoded_data = str(ciphertext.encode('ISO-8859-1', errors='replace'))

header = {
    "Cookie": f"JSESSIONID={sessionId}",
    "Content-Length": "1048",
    "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1",
    "Host": "mapi.sichuanair.com",
    "Connection": "Keep-Alive",
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1",
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip"
}
params = {
    "actionType": action,
    "platformID": platformId,
    "appVersion": appVersion,
    "channelID": channelId,
    "imie": imie,
    "networkOperator": networkOperator,
    "mac":macAddress,
    "transActionId": transActionId
}

rsp = requests.post(url, headers=header, data=ciphertext,params=params)
return  rsp

```

登录接口的模拟请求

完整代码

```
import base64
import hashlib
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
import time
import uuid
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
import requests
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
import json

def str_to_json(json_str):
    """
    将字符串转换为 JSON 对象。

    :param json_str: 要转换的 JSON 字符串
    :return: 转换后的 JSON 对象（Python 字典或列表），如果转换失败返回 None
    """
    try:
        # 尝试将字符串转换为 JSON 对象
        json_obj = json.loads(json_str)
        return json_obj
    except json.JSONDecodeError:
        # 若字符串不是有效的 JSON 格式，捕获异常并打印错误信息
        print(f"输入的字符串 '{json_str}' 不是有效的 JSON 格式。")
        return None

def desede_decrypt(ciphertext, key):
    # 检查密钥长度是否符合要求，DESede 密钥长度必须是 16 或 24 字节
    if len(key) not in [16, 24]:
        raise ValueError("密钥长度必须为 16 或 24 字节")
    # 将写死的 IV 定义为字节类型，需与加密时的 IV 一致
    iv = b'01234567'
    # 创建 DES3 解密器对象，采用 CBC 模式和预先定义的 IV
    cipher = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC, iv)
    # 执行解密操作
    decrypted_data = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
    # 去除 PKCS5 填充
    unpadded_data = unpad(decrypted_data, DES3.block_size)
    try:
        # 尝试将解密后的字节数据解码为字符串
        result = unpadded_data.decode('utf-8')
        return result
    except UnicodeDecodeError:
        # 如果解码失败，返回字节数据
        return unpadded_data

def desede_encrypt(plaintext, key):
    # 检查密钥长度是否符合要求，DESede 密钥长度必须是 16 或 24 字节
    if len(key) not in [16, 24]:
        raise ValueError("密钥长度必须为 16 或 24 字节")
```

```

# 将写死的 IV 定义为字节类型
iv = b'01234567'
# 如果传入的明文是字符串类型，将其编码为字节类型
if isinstance(plaintext, str):
    plaintext = plaintext.encode('utf-8')
# 创建 DES3 加密器对象，采用 CBC 模式和预先定义的 IV
cipher = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC, iv)
# 对明文进行 PKCS5 填充，使其长度为块大小的整数倍
padded_plaintext = pad(plaintext, DES3.block_size)
# 执行加密操作
encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(padded_plaintext)
return encrypted_data
def base64_encode(input_data):
    # 判断输入的数据类型
    if isinstance(input_data, str):
        # 如果是字符串，将其编码为字节类型
        input_bytes = input_data.encode('utf-8')
    elif isinstance(input_data, bytes):
        # 如果是字节类型，直接使用
        input_bytes = input_data
    else:
        # 如果输入既不是字符串也不是字节类型，抛出异常
        raise ValueError("Input must be either a string or bytes.")

    # 使用 base64 库进行编码
    encoded_bytes = base64.b64encode(input_bytes)
    # 将编码后的字节类型转换为字符串类型
    encoded_string = encoded_bytes.decode('utf-8')
    return encoded_string
def base64_decode(encoded_data):
    # 判断输入的数据类型
    if isinstance(encoded_data, str):
        # 如果是字符串，将其编码为字节类型
        encoded_bytes = encoded_data.encode('utf-8')
    elif isinstance(encoded_data, bytes):
        # 如果是字节类型，直接使用
        encoded_bytes = encoded_data
    else:
        # 如果输入既不是字符串也不是字节类型，抛出异常
        raise ValueError("Input must be either a string or bytes.")

    try:
        # 使用 base64 库进行解码
        decoded_bytes = base64.b64decode(encoded_bytes)
        try:
            # 尝试将解码后的字节数据解码为字符串
            decoded_string = decoded_bytes.decode('utf-8')
            return decoded_string
        except UnicodeDecodeError:
            # 如果解码失败，返回字节数据
            return decoded_bytes
    except base64.binascii.Error:
        # 如果 Base64 解码失败，抛出异常
        raise ValueError("Invalid Base64-encoded input.")
def bytes_to_hex(bytes_data):

```

```

    return bytes_data.hex()
def rsa_encrypt(plain_text, public_key_str):
    # 解码Base64公钥
    public_key_bytes = base64.b64decode(public_key_str)
    # 加载DER格式的公钥
    public_key = serialization.load_der_public_key(
        public_key_bytes,
        backend=default_backend()
    )

    # 获取RSA公钥参数
    n = public_key.public_numbers().n
    e = public_key.public_numbers().e

    # 计算模长的字节数
    modulus_bytes = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8

    # 将明文转换为字节并进行填充
    plain_bytes = plain_text.encode('utf-8')

    # 检查长度是否超过模长
    if len(plain_bytes) > modulus_bytes:
        raise ValueError(f"明文过长 ({len(plain_bytes)} > {modulus_bytes} bytes)")

    # 使用零字节在前方填充至模长
    padded = b'\x00' * (modulus_bytes - len(plain_bytes)) + plain_bytes

    # 将填充后的字节转换为整数
    m_int = int.from_bytes(padded, byteorder='big')

    # 执行RSA加密:  $c = m^e \bmod n$ 
    c_int = pow(m_int, e, n)

    # 将加密结果转换回字节
    encrypted_bytes = c_int.to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder='big')

    return encrypted_bytes
def getSign(inputStr):
    md5 = hashlib.md5()
    md5.update(inputStr.encode('utf-8'))
    md5_hex_str = md5.hexdigest()
    public_key_str =
    "MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCSM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHTHW+Qkd
    MYKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNWMJg
    7BE+8zwAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
    encrypted_bytes = rsa_encrypt(md5_hex_str, public_key_str)
    sign_hex = bytes_to_hex(encrypted_bytes)
    return sign_hex
def getTimestamp():
    # 获取当前时间戳
    timestamp = time.time() # 示例输出: 1742002245.123456
    # 转换为本地时间并格式化
    local_time = time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S', time.localtime(timestamp))
    return local_time
def getTransActionId():

```



```

# 生成一个UUID4（随机生成的UUID）
generated_uuid = uuid.uuid4()
return str(generated_uuid)

def getKey():
    inputStr = "&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681"
    public_key_str =
    "MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCdqp4yZcGX2yVCsM2itn3R35JW1rJwqEXHTHW+Qkd
    MYKqFUo9sv07LD+U/tqXGjKeSu3oLc3B49P3j62Ex2w1As9Q75Ibf53fUkox4MwzwjaouMurpzwNWMJg
    7BE+8zwAUJFZvWP7P/ses87N2nje/m/wy7Xm2zREkOfhfNAaY5QIDAQAB"
    rsa_result = rsa_encrypt(inputStr,public_key_str)
    return base64_encode(rsa_result)

def getEncryptContent():
    str = "&platformID=0&appVersion=6.13.1&channelID=myself&imei=5a9992681"
    key = "&platformID=0&appVersion="
    desede_result = desede_encrypt(str,key)
    return base64_encode(desede_result)

def connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp,transActionId):
    timestamp_cut = timestamp[:10]
    end_str = timestamp_cut+transActionId+"2822563731"
    return end_str

def getJSESSIONID():
    encryptContent = getEncryptContent()
    key = getKey()
    imei = "5a9992681fc4b10a"
    action = "ENCRYPT_TRANSLATE_KEY"
    networkOperator = ""
    mac = "02:00: 00:00: 00:00"
    channelId = "myself"
    platformId = "0"
    proVersion = "2.0"
    appVersion = "6.13.1"
    timestamp = getTimestamp()
    transActionId = getTransActionId()
    sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp,transActionId))
    url = f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/encrypt_translate_key.htm?
    actionType={action}&platformID={platformId}&appVersion={appVersion}&channelID=
    {channelId}&imei={imei}&networkOperator={networkOperator}&mac=
    {mac}&transActionId={transActionId}"
    header = {
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
        Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) version/4.0
        Mobile Safari/533.1"
    }
    data = {
        "body": {
            "encryptContent": encryptContent,
            "key": key
        },
        "head": {
            "action": action,
            "channelId": channelId,
            "platformId": platformId,
            "proVersion": proVersion ,
            "sign": sign,
            "timestamp": timestamp,

```

```

        "transActionId": transActionId
    }
}
}
rsp = requests.post(url, headers=header, json=data)
return rsp
def sendLoginCode(phone):
    mobileCountryCode = "86"
    action = "clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType"
    appVersion = "6.13.1"
    channelId = "myself"
    customerId = ""
    imie = "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4"
    jpushId = "120c83f7611feca6238"
    macAddress = "02:00:00:00:00:00"
    platformId = "0"
    proVersion = "2.0"
    networkOperator = ""
    sessionId = getJSESSIONID().headers["Set-Cookie"][11:43]
    timestamp = getTimestamp()
    transActionId = getTransActionId()
    type= "CODE_LOGIN"
    verifyCode="firstValid"
    sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId))
    url =
f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/common/sendMsgCodewithType.
htm"
    body = f'{"body":{{"mobile":{{"plaintext":{{"phone"}}},"mobileCountryCode":{
mobileCountryCode},"type":{{"type}}","verifyCode":{{"verifyCode"}}},"
    heade = f'{"head":{{"action":{{"action}}","appVersion":{
{appVersion},"channelId":{{"channelId}}","customerId":{{"customerId}}","imie":{
{imie},"jpushId":{{"jpushId}}","macAddress":{{"macAddress}}","platformId":{
{platformId},"proVersion":{{"proVersion}}","sessionId":{{"sessionId}}","sign":{
{sign}}","timestamp":{{"timestamp}}","transActionId":{{"transActionId"}}}}'

    data = "{" + body + heade+ "}"
    ciphertext = base64_encode(desede_encrypt(data, sessionId[:24]))
    # encoded_data = str(ciphertext.encode('ISO-8859-1', errors='replace'))

    header = {
        "Cookie": f"JSESSIONID={sessionId}",
        "Content-Length": "1048",
        "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1",
        "Host": "mapi.sichuanair.com",
        "Connection": "Keep-Alive",
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1",
        "Accept-Encoding": "gzip"
    }
    params = {
        "actionType": action,
        "platformID": platformId,
        "appVersion": appVersion,
        "channelID": channelId,
        "imie": imie,

```

```

        "networkOperator": networkOperator,
        "mac": macAddress,
        "transActionId": transActionId
    }

    rsp = requests.post(url, headers=header, data=ciphertext, params=params)
    return rsp

def login_req(phone, verifyCode, sessionId):
    mobileCountryCode = "86"
    constId = "67d637c2yQnUEroozJZv8dbuwT2dEdV6iTOYgvZ3"
    validType = "0"
    action = "clientapi/login/member/codeLogin"
    appVersion = "6.13.1"
    channelId = "myself"
    customerId = ""
    imie = "00000000-6fd2-5a75-ffff-ffffca01fdf4"
    jpushId = "120c83f7611feca6238"
    macAddress = "02:00:00:00:00:00"
    platformId = "0"
    proVersion = "2.0"
    networkOperator = ""
    # sessionId = getJSESSIONID().headers["Set-Cookie"][11:43]
    timestamp = getTimestamp()
    transActionId = getTransActionId()
    sign = getSign(connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp, transActionId))
    url =
f"https://mapi.sichuanair.com/zt/tribeport/clientapi/login/member/codeLogin.htm"
    body = f'{"body":{{"mobileCountryCode":{{mobileCountryCode}},"phone":'
{phone}},"verifyCode":{{verifyCode}}}},'
    head = f'{"head":{{"action":{{action}},"appVersion":'
{appVersion}},"channelId":{{channelId}},"customerId":{{customerId}},"imie":'
{imie}},"jpushId":{{jpushId}},"macAddress":{{macAddress}},"platformId":'
{platformId}},"proVersion":{{proVersion}},"sessionId":{{sessionId}},"sign":'
{sign}},"timestamp":{{timestamp}},"transActionId":{{transActionId}}}},'
    riskReqBody = f'{"riskReqBody":{{"constId":{{constId}},"validType":'
{validType}}}},'
    data = "{"+body+head+riskReqBody+"}"
    ciphertext = base64_encode(desede_encrypt(data, sessionId[:24]))
    # encoded_data = ciphertext.encode('ISO-8859-1', errors='replace')
    header = {
        "Cookie": f"JSESSIONID={sessionId}",
        "Content-Length": "1100",
        "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1",
        "Host": "mapi.sichuanair.com",
        "Connection": "Keep-Alive",
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; zh-cn; Pixel2
Build/QP1A.191005.007.A3) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0
Mobile Safari/533.1",
        "Accept-Encoding": "gzip"
    }

    params = {
        "actionType": action,
        "platformID": platformId,

```

```

        "appVersion": appVersion,
        "channelID": channelId,
        "imie": imie,
        "networkOperator": networkOperator,
        "mac": macAddress,
        "transActionId": transActionId
    }
    print("body plaintext is =>",data)
    rsp = requests.post(url,headers=header,data=ciphertext)
    return rsp

# rsp = requests.post(url,headers=header,data=data)

def main():
    # 输入手机号
    phone = input("请输入你的手机号:")
    # 发送获取验证码请求
    sendLoginCodeRsp = sendLoginCode(phone)
    print("sendLoginCode request status:",sendLoginCodeRsp)
    # verifyCode = input("请输入您收到的验证码:")
    # print("sendcode cookie is =>",sendLoginCodeRsp.request.headers["Cookie"]
[11:43])
    # 发送登录请求
    # login_rsp =
login_req(phone,verifyCode,sendLoginCodeRsp.request.headers["Cookie"][11:43])
    # print("login request url is =>",login_rsp.request.url)
    # print("login request header is =>",login_rsp.request.headers)
    # print("login request body is =>",login_rsp.request.body)
    # 拿登录请求的desede的key
    # login_des_key = login_rsp.request.headers["Cookie"][11:43][:24]
    # 拿到响应体,此时还是desede加密后又base64编码过的
    # login_response_ciphertext_base64=login_rsp.text
    # base64解码,desede解密
    # login_response_plaintext=
desede_decrypt(base64_decode(login_response_ciphertext_base64),login_des_key)
    # print(login_response_plaintext)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

各函数介绍

```

def str_to_json(json_str)
# 字符串转为json
def desede_decrypt(ciphertext, key)
# desede加密,输入明文和key
def desede_encrypt(plaintext, key)
# desede解密,输入密文和key
def base64_encode(input_data)
# base64编码函数

```

```
def base64_decode(encoded_data)
# base64解码函数
def bytes_to_hex(bytes_data)
# byte转hex
def rsa_encrypt(plain_text, public_key_str)
# rsa加密, 输入明文和公钥
def getSign(inputStr)
# 获取sign, 输入拼接好的字符串
def getTimestamp()
# 获取固定格式的时间戳
def getTransActionId()
# 获取TransActionID, 其实就是uuid
def getKey()
# 获取发送拿seesionid的请求体的head的参数key
def getEncryptContent()
# 获取发送拿seesionid的请求体的head的参数EncryptContent
def connect_sign_plaintext(timestamp,transActionId)
# 进行拼接生成sign的字符串,
def getJSESSIONID()
# 发送请求, 拿到sessionid
def sendLoginCode(phone)
# 发送请求, 发送手机验证码
def login_req(phone,verifyCode,sessionId)
# 发送请求, 进行验证码登录
def main()
# 调用函数, 完成 输入手机号、发送验证码、输入验证码、登录操作
```