

# Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2015

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## Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Dear ASEAN delegates,

Let me first begin by extending the warmest welcome to you all on behalf of the entire dais! My name is Eileen Siow, and I am currently in my fourth year at McGill, studying Political Science and pursuing a double minor in Psychology and Law/Politics/Society. In conjunction with my academic pursuits, I am a huge fan of Model United Nations (8<sup>th</sup> year and going strong!) and, along with our lovely vice-chairs, share multiple ties with the Southeast Asian nations- family, food and culture. As such, this committee is very near and dear to all our hearts, and we are absolutely thrilled to serve as your dais for this committee. I am ridiculously lucky to be working with three of the most hardworking and talented Vice-Chairs I've ever met:

Vareesha is in her third year at McGill pursuing a double major in Political Science and Cultural Studies. This will be her seventh and last year with MUN, so let's give her an incredible swan ~~song~~ committee! Outside MUN, she embraces her creativity with photography, films and performances.

Reshma is a second year at McGill, studying Economics with a double minor in Math and Finance. As an experienced MUN veteran (8 years!) and an avid traveler (Southeast Asia is practically her second home!), she has a wealth of information. Her other hobbies include binge-watching movies, singing, and eating.

Jamie is in her second year at McGill pursuing a double major in Political Science and International Development Studies. With five years of MUN under her belt, she has a lot to contribute! In addition, she is also involved in dance and Habitat for Humanity.

As 2020 approaches, it is up to this committee to focus on realizing the ASEAN Vision 2020: an international community of outward-looking, peaceful and prosperous countries. This year, we will be focusing discussion on solutions for the South China Sea Crisis, the construction and integration of the Asian identity, and the strengthening of the ASEAN Free Trade area. As there is no one magical panacea for these complex issues, it is up to you, dear delegates, to faithfully represent the political, economic, and cultural visions of your respective countries and come together to create effective and lasting resolutions.

Whether you are an experienced MUN fiend or an uncertain beginner, I would like to take the time to remind you that what you get out of this experience (or any, really) depends on how much you put into it. Do your research, come prepared! This committee will be infinitely more interesting and memorable to us all if you not just understand, but also enjoy the debates and their subject matter.

We look forward to meeting you all in November!

Best regards,  
Eileen Siow  
Chair



### Topic 1: Strengthening the ASEAN Free Trade Area

As a single entity, ASEAN ranks the seventh largest economy in the world. The size of its economy can be attributed to the fact that ASEAN and its member nations are involved in over 90 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) both internal and external to the association. The purpose behind these FTAs is to encourage greater investment and trade between countries by reducing or eliminating potential barriers such as tariffs, quotas, or subsidies.

The reasons for creating and utilizing FTAs surround factors that are both economic and political. From an economic perspective, they are seen as a way to attract greater foreign direct investment and achieve higher economic growth for participating nations. With greater economic growth, these nations are able to integrate themselves and remain competitive in the global economy. From a political perspective, FTAs serve as a tool for opening up dialogue on pressing issues and potential solutions common to participating nations and improving these bilateral and multilateral relations.

The aim behind this topic is to promote and fortify ASEAN's Free Trade Area internally in order for the economic organization to remain relevant and competitive on the global stage. Consequently, the two sub-issues that this topic should deal with are: eliminating any overlapping individual FTAs, and promoting greater FTA utilization. These issues have to be dealt with while keeping in mind that the ASEAN member states all have different economic, political, and geographical backgrounds.

#### Section 1: Background Information

##### The “Noodle Bowl” Effect

However, the recent proliferation of FTAs has proven more detrimental than helpful to many ASEAN economies. This problem, created by all the ASEAN member nations, affects them directly. While they are seen as a way for countries to expand their economies through trade and cooperation, they can also end up hindering the advancement of greater multilateral trade liberalization. The overlapping of these FTAs creates a “noodle-bowl effect”, wherein its member nations find themselves with conflicting external agreements. Member nations find themselves becoming parties to more exclusive, bilateral trade agreements instead of multilateral ones, which defeats the purpose of ASEAN as a whole. Out of all FTAs held amongst ASEAN members, almost three quarters of them were bilateral<sup>1</sup>.

Furthermore, through the trade diversion effect, some countries are becoming less economically efficient. The trade diversion effect occurs when countries import from its higher-cost member nations instead of low-cost nonmember nations<sup>2</sup>. However, the cost

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<sup>1</sup> “Asian Free Trade Agreements: Untangling the Noodle Bowl,” *Asian Development Bank*, 8 August 2013, <http://www.adb.org/features/free-trade-untangling-asia-s-noodle-bowl>.

<sup>2</sup> Patrizia Tumbarello, “‘Noodle Bowl’ Risk of Trade Pact Overlap,” *International Monetary Fund*, 25 June 2007, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/CAR0625A.htm>



of economic inefficiency is dependent on the level of discrimination against the nonmember states and the interests of the participating nations.

Within ASEAN itself, tariffs have been eliminated amongst its 10 member nations through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)<sup>3</sup>. This form of consolidation is a step towards untangling the “noodle bowl” effect that has been created, but ASEAN still has a long way to go before it fully utilizes the AFTA. Additionally, ASEAN should also start looking towards creating more multilateral initiatives to eliminate preferential trading with its nonmembers in order to foster a stronger global identity.

### The Roles of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)

Even with the promotion of internal free trade through agreements such as the AFTA, many of these FTAs still remain unexploited by smaller scale enterprises. Making up 96% of all enterprises, MSMEs contribute up to 53% of ASEAN’s total GDP figure and may generate up to 63 to 99% of employment rates in their respective countries<sup>4</sup>. The lack of FTA utilization amongst MSMEs raises the big question of how to promote *effective* economic integration within the ASEAN community.

The AFTA has already brought down tariffs between ASEAN countries to a minimal 0 to 5% range, and is currently in the process of undertaking initiatives to eliminate non-tariffs<sup>5</sup>. Despite that, many MSMEs under the private sector fail to take advantage of the benefits that such free trade agreement provides. This might be due to the fact that free trade policy-makers fail to take into account the importance of MSMEs during the bargaining stages; or it could also be on the part of MSMEs themselves in their failure to take advantage of these FTAs. These enterprises are important to ASEAN economies because they promote domestic innovation, competition, and efficiency<sup>6</sup>. Consequently, promotions of FTA utilization amongst MSMEs will not only enhance greater economic growth, but will also stimulate development within ASEAN.

Generating greater FTA utilization would require ASEAN to address the problems that these MSMEs face in trying to partake in freer trade, such as increasing transparency of trade procedures and coordinating on codes of trade conduct within ASEAN to ensure the promotion of collective economic development in Southeast Asia. The issue of ineffective FTAs, if left unresolved, compromises the purpose and role of ASEAN as a valuable organization. If the reputation of ASEAN is compromised, there are fewer incentives for the Southeast Asian nations to comply with ASEAN rules and regulations.

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<sup>3</sup> “ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA Council),” *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/category/asean-free-trade-area-afta-council>

<sup>4</sup> Tulus Tambunan and Alexander Chandra, “Maximizing the Utilization of ASEAN-Led Free Trade Agreements: The potential roles of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises,” p6, *Trade Knowledge Network*, March 2014, [http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/tkn\\_maximizing\\_asean.pdf](http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/tkn_maximizing_asean.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.



ASEAN members might resort to achieving economic competitiveness independently rather than doing so collaboratively, which becomes counterintuitive to ASEAN.

### Section 2: Past Actions

#### Policies

##### *ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)*

The AFTA was originally established in 1992 by the ASEAN-6: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Following their membership succession in 2002, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia became additional parties to the free trade area<sup>7</sup>. To date, all ASEAN members have signed on to this free trade agreement. Its objective is to increase regional competitive advantage as a major production hub globally through eliminating trade barriers amongst member nations, and promoting intra-regional trade<sup>8</sup>. AFTA aims to achieve these goals through tariff liberalization and trade facilitation through several initiatives.

Most notably, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Agreement set up by AFTA has significantly lowered the tariff ranges on 99% and 66% of the products under the Inclusion List for the ASEAN-6 and ASEAN respectively<sup>9</sup>. The AFTA targets 11 primary industries: agro-based, air travel, automotive, electronic information and technology equipment, electronics, fisheries, healthcare, rubber-based products, textiles and apparel, tourism, and wood-based products<sup>10</sup>. Amongst the ASEAN-6, all tariffs on these products have been lowered to a tariff rate of less than 5%<sup>TKNP5</sup>. Now, the goal of AFTA is to further integrate the more recent ASEAN members and bring down tariff rates amongst all the ASEAN members. The current challenges that AFTA faces at the moment are a matter of strengthening the rules and implementation of the CEPT Scheme, and making it more attractive to businesses and potential investors<sup>11</sup>.

##### *Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)*

A regional free trade partnership scheme made up by all ten ASEAN member states and nations with pre-existing FTAs with ASEAN such as Australia, China, India, Japan, New

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<sup>7</sup> “ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA Council),” *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/category/asean-free-trade-area-afta-council>

<sup>8</sup> “ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update,” *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/asean-free-trade-area-afta-an-update>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “Asia’s Free Trade Agreements”, Appendix p28, *Asian Development Bank and the ADB Institute with Edward Elgar Publishing*, <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28013/asias-free-trade-agreements.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> “ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA Council),” *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/category/asean-free-trade-area-afta-council>



Zealand, and South Korea<sup>12</sup>. Negotiations by the RCEP has the potential to make up for half of the world's population and 30% of global GDP.

### *Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)*

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a U.S. led initiative currently in the works which includes countries from around the Pacific region: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Of the twelve countries currently signed on to the TPP, only four countries - Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam - are ASEAN member states.

The TPP goes contradictory to the ASEAN goal of regional economic integration as it excludes over half of ASEAN. Such exclusion is not always intentional, but might also be due to the fact that these countries are unable to meet TPP standards, which emphasizes the range of diversity amongst ASEAN member economies. This has caused some worry amongst members like Cambodia, whose Prime Minister has voiced his country's concerns over it conflicting with the RCEP<sup>13</sup>.

### International Organizations

#### *The United Nations (UN)*

The United Nations holds initiatives such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to deal with similar issues, although they are not ASEAN-specific.

The UNESCAP includes all ASEAN member states alongside other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The commission provides technical assistance to states dealing with economic and social issues in order to promote prosperity, social equity, and sustainability<sup>14</sup>, whereas the UNCTAD focuses specifically on international trade as the driving force behind development. While holding similar functions to that of UNESCAP, the UNCTAD also organizes a World Investment Forum once every two years in order to facilitate discussion amongst the major players in international investment to help establish strong relationships and equitable growth<sup>15</sup>. ASEAN has often used and collaborated with these UN initiatives in the past in order to achieve economic and social goals, as these initiatives aid ASEAN in negotiating FTAs with non-member states such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

### *Other Intergovernmental Organizations*

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<sup>12</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, "Cambodia's Hun Sen Slams ASEAN-Splitting TPP," *The Diplomat*, 21 April 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/cambodias-hun-sen-slams-asean-splitting-tpp/>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> "About ESCAP," *United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific*, <http://www.unescap.org/about>

<sup>15</sup> "About UNCTAD," *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, 2013, <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx>





All ASEAN member states are members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All three organizations are global trade bodies that focus on the integration of these economies, and are useful for ASEAN because they host forums that facilitate open debates, discussions and economic cooperation. The ADB has also set up the Asia Regional Integration Center, which is a database initiative stemming from the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis that monitors the level of economic integration around Asia that varies from news articles, to opinion-editorials, to studies and researches surrounding the trade issues that ASEAN faces<sup>16</sup>.

### Section 3: Country Policies and Possible Solutions

The optimal direction in which this committee should head towards is one where goals of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) are recognized by becoming: a highly competitive economic region; a region that promotes equitable economic development; and a region that is fully integrated into the global economy<sup>17</sup>. The main hurdles that ASEAN faces in achieving freer trade include dealing with overlapping FTAs, encouraging greater FTA usage amongst smaller enterprises, and finding policies that are equally beneficial to all the ten members of ASEAN.

#### Bloc Positions

##### *Economic Divide*

The range of economic growth amongst all ten countries varies significantly. At one end of the spectrum it has some of Asia's richest countries such as Singapore and Brunei, and on the other it has some of Asia's poorest such as Cambodia and Laos<sup>18</sup>. Given their higher GDP, countries like Singapore are able to invest in greater technological advancements and better quality infrastructure while others might not be able to afford such. As a result, not all countries can afford to open itself up to numerous FTAs at the same time, as less developed countries might need more protection for their infant industries. However, the variety of economies in ASEAN also gives leeway for a high degree of trade specialization that might be - to a certain extent - beneficial to the regional trade association's competitiveness on a global scale.

##### *Political Divide*

As an entity originally set up as a collective security mechanism to protect itself from China, the driving force behind ASEAN has evolved the years to one that also focuses on tackling mutual social and economic issues. Despite that, China's predominant position

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<sup>16</sup> "Who We Are," *Asia Regional Integration Center*, 2006 – 2015, <http://aric.adb.org/whoweare>

<sup>17</sup> "ASEAN Economic Community," *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community>

<sup>18</sup> Jenny Balboa and Ganeshan Wignaraja, "ASEAN Economic Community 2015: What is next?" *Asia Pathways*, 12 December 2014, <http://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2014/12/asean-economic-community-2015-what-is-next/>

on the world stage still leaves the members of ASEAN divided based on its relationship to the superpower. Some ASEAN member countries, such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, remain highly dependent on China as their main export destination and source of Foreign Direct Investment. Whereas others, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, are against trading with China due to tense relationships that spillover from the South China Sea dispute. These divisions amongst ASEAN remain a potential impairment to the ASEAN-China FTA.




Figure 1: ASEAN Member Countries Geographically Mapped

### *Geographic Divide*

Laos is particularly troubled by its geographic location. As the only landlocked country in ASEAN, Laos has the smallest economy. Consequently, the country is disadvantaged when it comes to seaborne trading, which accounts for a sizable portion of international trade<sup>19</sup>. This disadvantage can also be viewed upon as an opportunity for ASEAN to improve economic cooperation. Instead of viewing the country as simply landlocked,

<sup>19</sup> Gretchen Kunze and Bruce Tolentino, "In Laos: Land-linked, not Land-locked," *Asia Foundation*, 27 August 2008, <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2008/08/27/in-laos-land-linked-not-land-locked/>





Laos can reach out to its ASEAN neighbors such as Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia to gain access to more trade and diversify its trading partners.

### Solutions

With regards to the “noodle bowl effect”, ASEAN can either seek to consolidate or pursue multilateral initiatives. Consolidation would entail either using the AFTA or creating a broader, regional FTA in order to harmonize and streamline all bilateral FTAs; while the alternative entails eliminating preference discrepancies, inclusive of both member and non-member states<sup>20</sup>. Untangling the “noodle bowl effect” will pave the way for more effective FTAs and a stronger ASEAN in general, as it will encourage member states to be responsible and follow up with their obligations through a concise yet comprehensive FTA that does not have any points of conflict.

As for increasing FTA utilization, ASEAN should focus on how to promote FTAs to MSMEs. One solution would be to simplify the requirements for compliance, as many MSMEs might not possess the bureaucratic or technical knowledge to uphold such standards<sup>21</sup>. Other alternatives also include increasing transparency of FTA regulations in general, and making information more accessible to MSMEs. An example to look at as a basis for pioneering such campaigns would be Philippine’s “Doing Business in FTAs” initiative, which holds frequent information sessions in a variety of major and minor cities in the Philippines<sup>22</sup>. This will expose MSMEs to the various market opportunities available to them and inform them of the benefits of utilizing such FTAs.

### **Further Research**

#### **Questions to Consider:**

1. Is there a need to scale back on the number of bilateral trade agreements and focus on multilateral and regional ones instead?
2. How much do MSMEs contribute to your country both socially and domestically in terms of GDP, employment, standard of living, etc.?
3. How can each individual government tackle the problems of accessibility of AFTAs to local businesses?

#### **Extra References:**

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<sup>20</sup> “Asian Free Trade Agreements: Untangling the Noodle Bowl,” *Asian Development Bank*, 8 August 2013, <http://www.adb.org/features/free-trade-untangling-asia-s-noodle-bowl>.

<sup>21</sup> Tulus Tambunan and Alexander Chandra, “Maximizing the Utilization of ASEAN-Led Free Trade Agreements: The potential roles of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises,” p20, *Trade Knowledge Network*, March 2014, [http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/tkn\\_maximizing\\_asean.pdf](http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/tkn_maximizing_asean.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> “Doing Business in Free Trade Areas (DBFTA),” *Export Market Bureau*, <http://www.emb.dti.gov.ph/dbfta/dbfta.htm>



## Association of Southeast Asian Nations

*ASEAN Economic Community*

<http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community>

*Asian Development Bank*

<http://www.adb.org/>

*Asia Regional Integration Center*

<http://aric.adb.org/>

*Pacific Economic Cooperation Council Report on “Asian Perspectives on Preferential Trading Agreements”*

[https://www.wto.org/english/forums\\_e/ngo\\_e/pecc\\_asean\\_e.pdf](https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/pecc_asean_e.pdf)

*Trade Knowledge Network on Maximizing the Utilization of ASEAN-Led FTAs*

[http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/tkn\\_maximizing\\_asean.pdf](http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/tkn_maximizing_asean.pdf)

*United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*

<http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx>

*IMF Survey on the “‘Noodle Bowl’ Risk of Trade Pact Overlap”*

<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/CAR0625A.htm>

*Oxford Business Group on “Strengthening Ties: The ASEAN Economic Community Aims to Boost Regional Integration”*

<http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/strengthening-ties-asean-economic-community-aims-boost-regional-integration>

## Topic 2: The South China Sea Crisis

### Section 1: Background Information

For the last several decades, sovereign states in the Southeast Asian region have had ongoing and increasingly heated disputes over territorial and maritime rights in the South China Sea. While the biggest dispute, involving five nation states, revolves around the Spratly Islands, there also exist dissensions about the Paracel Islands and the Natuna Islands.<sup>23</sup> Messy colonial rule in the early years of many of these countries is but one of the factors that have led to heated land disputes in the region,<sup>24</sup> others including the fight for fishing areas and natural resources.

Although the initial aims and objectives of ASEAN were predominantly aimed towards socio-economic and cultural development, the adoption of the Vientiane Action Programme at the ASEAN Summit in November 2004 broadened its purpose to include emphasis on strengthening the cooperation and participation of nation states in political development as well.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, full cooperation in other aspects of ASEAN's objectives will not be possible so long as the disputes continue. As such, developing peace and stability in the region plays an increasingly important role in better achieving ASEAN's goals.




Figure 1: Map of country claims over the Spratly Islands.

### Spratly Islands

#### *Overview*

The Spratly Islands are a group of over 100 islets and reefs in the South China Sea, scattered between Vietnam and the Philippines and located near several principal shipping lanes.<sup>26</sup> With an approximate total land area of less than five squared kilometres

<sup>23</sup> "South China Sea: Conflicting Claims and Tensions," *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea>.

<sup>24</sup> Rachel Caoili, "Reflections on Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: Why Do the Philippines and Singapore Differ?" *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, no. 6.2(2005) <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=cm&sei>.

<sup>25</sup> "ASEAN Foundation," *ASEAN Foundation*, <http://www.aseanfoundation.org/index2.php?main=about.htm>.

<sup>26</sup> "Spratly Islands," *Central Intelligence Agency*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.html>.

and a combined coastline measuring up to 926 kilometres, there are six governments with currently disputed claims over the archipelago. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim sovereignty of the archipelago in its entirety, while both Malaysia and the Philippines claim smaller, specific portions of the islands, and Brunei claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the waters of the area.<sup>27</sup> The coloured lines on the map in Figure 1 roughly depict the boundaries of each of the current territorial and maritime claims.

Though the islands are mostly uninhabitable and contain virtually no arable land, they are valued due to their proximity to nearby sedimentary basins, suggesting a potential for the region to contain significant oil and gas deposits.<sup>28</sup> In fact, some estimates suggest that they may contain more oil and natural gas reserves than any other part of the world aside from Saudi Arabia.<sup>29</sup> The region also has an abundant source of fish and guano (which has fertilizing properties, and has been used as a source of nitrate for gunpowder). Aside from being an abundant source of natural resources, however, the islands are deemed even more valuable because of their strategic location. The South China Sea is a world hub for maritime trade, with billions of barrels of oil and natural gas flowing through it annually (see Figure 2).<sup>30</sup>



Figure 2: Estimated volume of natural gas flows in the South China Sea

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Robert D Kaplan, "The South China Sea Will Be the Battleground of the Future." *Business Insider*, 21 Feb. 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2#ixzz3WSaMaKWs>.

<sup>30</sup> "18 Maps That Explain Maritime Security in Asia," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, <http://amti.csis.org/atlas/>.



### *History*

With no known indigenous inhabitants, the Spratly Islands first gained significance because of their strategic position. In 1933, France occupied the islands on behalf of its colony, Vietnam; later, during World War II, the islands were again taken over, but this time by Japan. Following the Second World War, China claimed the entire archipelago, after Japan renounced the islands in 1951. However, since France's claim to the islands were unclear after the war, Vietnam argued that the Spratly Islands should have been returned to them, as part of French Indochina. The Philippines added its claim to the islands in 1955 based on geographic proximity. In the years following the declarations of these initial claims, military garrisons and airstrips belonging to Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia respectively were established on various islands in the archipelago.<sup>31</sup> Brunei laid its claim to territory that falls inside its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1984.<sup>32</sup>

In 2004 Vietnam issued a statement that they had indisputable sovereignty over the islands, but were willing to enter peaceful negotiations to settle the conflicts. Since then, tensions over the islands have increased and there have been several skirmishes most often involving China and another state. In one case, Chinese patrol boats were accused of attacking two Vietnamese oil exploration vessels, and in another, Chinese naval vessels opened fire on Vietnamese fishing vessels in May 2012. A month later, Vietnam further contributed to this tension by passing legislation that demarcated Vietnamese sea borders to include the Spratly Islands as well as the Paracel Islands.<sup>33</sup> Even more recently, conflict was revived when China introduced a drilling rig in waters near the Paracel Islands, causing several confrontations with Vietnamese ships (May 2014). Satellite images from April 2015 further show that China has been building airstrips and military structures on reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands, which has raised tensions with the US as well.<sup>34</sup>

### Natuna Islands

The Natuna Islands are an archipelago consisting of roughly 150 islands near the southern tip of the South China Sea. Of the islands, only 27 are inhabited, with a combined population of less than 100,000.<sup>35</sup> Aside from being highly abundant in fish, the Natuna Islands are considered highly valuable due to rich natural gas reserves off its shores. While the Natuna Islands themselves are not contested, China's nine-dash-line

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<sup>31</sup> "Spratly Islands," *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*,  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/561209/Spratly-Islands>.

<sup>32</sup> "Territorial Claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands," *Global Security*,  
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-claims.htm>.

<sup>33</sup> Sayuri Umeda, "Vietnam: New National Law Intensifies International Dispute," *Library of Congress*,  
[http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc\\_news?disp3\\_l205403248\\_text](http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403248_text).

<sup>34</sup> Kaplan, "The South China Sea Will Be the Battleground of the Future."

<sup>35</sup> Andrew R.C. Marshall, "Remote, Gas-rich Islands on Indonesia's South China Sea Frontline," *Reuters*,  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/25/us-southchinasea-indonesia-natuna-insigh-idUSKBN0GP1WA20140825>.





clearly overlaps with waters that are part of Indonesia's EEZ – waters that contain part of the natural gas reserves (see figure 3).<sup>36</sup> Indonesia has continued to seek clarification over China's claims, but maintains that it is not directly involved in the South China Sea disputes.

### Section 2: Past Actions

#### ASEAN

Proposed initially by Malaysia, the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration was signed in Kuala Lumpur by the foreign ministers of ASEAN member states in November 1971.<sup>37</sup> It sought to realize the “neutralization of Southeast Asia,” which essentially entails remaining impartial in times of war and refraining from direct involvement in any conflict with countries outside the zone, particularly including the People's Republic of China.<sup>38</sup> While the ZOPFAN Declaration was an attempt at encouraging peace in the region, it is limited not only by the fact that it is not legally binding, but also because it applies only to the member states of ASEAN. In the case of the South China Sea disputes, which are highly contingent on the actions of China (a non-ASEAN member state), it is clear that the ZOPFAN is not very effective.

In November 2002, ASEAN collaborated with China to issue the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which reaffirmed the signatories' commitment to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and to peaceful negotiations in accordance with the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea. The Declaration also expressed interest in the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea.<sup>39</sup> Following skirmishes in 2011, China and Vietnam drew up a new set of guidelines, which directly referred to the 2002 Declaration. The new agreement reiterated the importance of the UNCLOS, but maintained that negotiations would be conducted only between themselves and other pertinent parties.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, not much progress has been made since then, and the actual establishment of a legally binding code of conduct is yet to occur.

Other ASEAN efforts related to this issue include the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in 1994 with the objective of fostering dialogue between member and non-member states regarding political and security issues in the region.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Karishma Vaswani, "The Sleepy Island Indonesia Is Guarding from China," *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29655874>.

<sup>37</sup> "Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," *NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative*, <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean/>.

<sup>38</sup> M.C. Abad, "The Role of ASEAN in Multilateralism ZOPFAN, TAC, and SEANFWZ," *ASEAN*, <http://www.asean.org/archive/arf/7ARF/Prof-Dment-Programme/Doc-10.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," *ASEAN*, <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>.

<sup>40</sup> "China and Vietnam Agree Principles for Resolving Maritime Disputes," *IBRU: Center for Borders Research*, [https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary\\_news/?itemno=12969](https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=12969).

<sup>41</sup> "Overview," *ASEAN*, <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/category/overview-6>.





The disputes in the South China Sea have been a prominent topic for discussion at various ARFs.

### The UN

The United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea is an international agreement established in 1982 that defines nation states' rights and responsibilities with respect to the world's oceans.<sup>42</sup> The Convention has been ratified by almost all the ASEAN member states (with the exception of Cambodia, who has signed but not ratified the convention) as well as by China. While the Convention details the laws of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), to which every coastal state has the undeniable legal right, it does not govern territorial land disputes.<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, in 2009 the Philippines passed a law establishing its coastal baselines in accordance with the guidelines of UNCLOS, which was an important step in clarifying the claims over the islands. Additionally in 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted a section of their extended continental shelves in the Southern Part of the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in accordance with the UNCLOS.<sup>44</sup> These actions have been important, because every coastal state is entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf under UNCLOS. In the case of overlapping boundaries, the convention calls for an equitable solution to be reached. However, a solution cannot be negotiated if the initially disputed boundaries are not officially demarcated.

More recently, the Philippines made an attempt at pursuing legal action. In January 2013, the Philippines announced that it would challenge China's territorial claims in the South China Sea in a United Nations Tribunal under UNCLOS. The case, which is to be tried in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, is still pending. However, China has refused to appoint an agent, maintaining that it does not accept the arbitration. In a press release issued in April 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal has stated that it will conduct a hearing in July 2015 to address China and the Philippines' jurisdiction claims and any objections that may exist.<sup>45</sup>

### Independent Efforts

Though the South China Sea disputes have largely been characterized by a lack of cooperation, some positive efforts have been made. Since 1990, Indonesia has hosted the Workshop Process on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. Because this is an informal approach to managing the conflict and is not directly associated with

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<sup>42</sup> "UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI," *UN News Center*,  
[http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm](http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm).

<sup>43</sup> Gregory B. Poling, *The South China Sea In Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute*,  
[http://csis.org/files/publication/130717\\_Poling\\_SouthChinaSea\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> "The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China," *Permanent Court of Arbitration*,  
[http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag\\_id=1529](http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529).



ASEAN, the Republic of China (Taiwan) has been included in the workshops.<sup>46</sup> The aim of these workshops is to promote dialogue and confidence building among interested parties, which is a step in the right direction.

In March 2005, the Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding (JMSU), a trilateral agreement between national oil companies of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, was signed in Manila. The agreement planned to conduct seismic exploration in an area covering 142,886 squared kilometres in the South China Sea. Although it can be seen as an attempt at cooperation, other ASEAN members did not look upon this agreement very favourably, as it strayed away from ASEAN's efforts to encourage multilateral dialogue on the South China Sea.<sup>47</sup>

### Section 3: Country Policies

#### China

As one of the largest and most powerful countries involved in the South China Sea disputes, China has been rather non-cooperative in terms of negotiation. Contrary to this hard stance on the issues, however, China's claims have remained rather ambiguous in terms of the exact extent of the resources and territory they are claiming. This ambiguous policy has allowed China to interpret its stance somewhat differently to take advantage of different situations. For example, in February 2012 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement asserting that no nation claims sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, despite the fact that it considers all waters inside the nine-dash line to belong solely to China.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, in response to the Philippines' 2013 request for an arbitral tribunal before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, China issued a Position Paper stating that it would "neither accept nor participate in the arbitration thus initiated," and arguing that the tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter.<sup>49</sup> Thus, it is clear that China's policies have not been entirely consistent, and their vagueness will definitely be a challenge in resolving the disputes.

#### Vietnam

Along with the Philippines, Vietnam has been one of the most vocal nations in the South China Sea disputes. Vietnam supports the challenge presented to China by the Philippines, and has submitted a position paper to the arbitral tribunal detailing its own stance on the matter.<sup>50</sup> Vietnam continues to contest China's claim to the Spratly and

<sup>46</sup> Hasjim Djalal, "Dispute Settlement and Conflict Management in the South China Sea," *Strategic Review* (2012), <http://www.sr-indonesia.com/in-the-journal/view/dispute-settlement-and-conflict-management-in-the-south-china-sea>.

<sup>47</sup> Ernest Z. Bower, "The JMSU: A Tale of Bilateralism and Secrecy in the South China Sea," *CSIS*, <http://www.csis.org/publication/jmsu-tale-bilateralism-and-secrecy-south-china-sea>.

<sup>48</sup> Poling, *The South China Sea In Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute*.

<sup>49</sup> People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines*, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1217147.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml).

<sup>50</sup> K Oanh Ha, Diep Pham, "South China Sea Tensions Flare as Vietnam Files Stance to Court," *Bloomberg Business*, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-12/south-china-sea-tensions-flare-as-vietnam-files-stance-to-court>.



Paracel Islands, arguing its rights to sovereignty based on historical background and international law. However, it has not yet filed a legal case of its own.

### Malaysia

Although Malaysia does not lay claim to all the Spratly Islands, and is therefore somewhat less involved in the disputes, it did file a claim to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2009.<sup>51</sup> However, the Malaysian government has more recently been committed to maintaining a good relationship with China, especially for economic reasons.<sup>52</sup> Despite increasing Chinese encroachment into Malaysian waters, Malaysia seemed to take a neutral stance on the issue of Chinese patrols in the South China Sea – an issue of more contention to other countries, including Vietnam.

### **Section 4: Possible Solutions**

The disputes in the South China Sea are very delicate and have the potential to erupt into a much larger issue. As such, delegates will need to focus primarily on how to solve the territorial disputes over the islands and how to determine rightful jurisdiction in the region. Due to the ambiguity of some states' territorial claims as well as the disagreement over the legality of the claims, it is highly encouraged that the involved states follow the example of the Philippines in seeking arbitration, by bringing cases to the attention of the ICJ or the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Another possible solution to the territorial disputes would be to create a zone of joint development. This would entail that states manage the islands, resources, and surrounding territory collectively, in a manner similar to the Svalbard island in Norway.<sup>53</sup>

While resolving the disputes is the ultimate goal, it cannot be achieved immediately. As such, it is import to address how to control tension between nations and minimize militarization until such a time as the disputes can be sufficiently dealt with. As seen in Figure 4, the region is saturated with military presences from various different countries, which renders the situation even more volatile.<sup>54</sup> Risk-reduction measures could include multilateral agreements ensuring that encounters in the disputed waters remain peaceful, as well as promoting communication between states regarding naval exercises and other activities that may be planned in the disputed waters.<sup>55</sup> The continued presence of military personnel and building of airstrips and other military stations should be strongly discouraged.

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<sup>51</sup> "Continental Shelf - Joint Submission to the Commission by Malaysia and Viet Nam," *UN News Center*, [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs\\_new/submissions\\_files/submission\\_mysvnm\\_33\\_2009.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm).

<sup>52</sup> Prashanth Parameswaram, "Malaysia's South China Sea Policy: Playing It Safe," *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/malaysias-south-china-sea-policy-playing-it-safe/>.

<sup>53</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.

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<sup>55</sup> Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea."




Figure 4: Diagram highlighting disputes in the South China Sea and military presence in the region.



Another aspect that should not be overlooked is possible environmental implications. Abundant natural resources including fish and natural gas are one of the primary reasons the islands are so greatly contested. However, extraction of the massive oil reserves in the region could cause significant environmental damage if proper measures are not put in place and actions go unmonitored.

### Further Research

#### Questions to Consider

1. What are possible consequences of the crisis escalating, and how would this affect Southeast Asia's political and economic dynamics?
2. To what extent is militarization among the islands a threat to the security of the region and the greater stability of Asia?
3. How is joint development of the islands a beneficial or detrimental solution for each involved nation?

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### Topic 3: Building & Integration of an ASEAN Identity

#### Section 1: Background Information

Member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) believe fostering relations between one another will further both domestic and regional development. However, this requires sociocultural values and history to be integrated into the concept of an ASEAN community. This has been the unified goal (without breaching each member nation's own identity) since the signing of the ASEAN Vision for 2020. Unity will be defined in terms of correlation and conglomeration of economic markets, cultural heritage, and multilateral international cooperation<sup>56</sup>. The original members, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, formed ASEAN in 1997. Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Brunei, and Laos, the later member nations, were integrated in 2000, in order to recover from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis<sup>57</sup>.

To complete this vision, ASEAN member nations have begun the Initiative for Asian Integration (IAI), a project in which infrastructural development, information and communication technology, regional economic access, and human resource innovation develop consistently and harmoniously trans-nationally<sup>58</sup>. Through increased contact at the institutional level, this initiative expects a stronger sense of regional identity by member citizens as domestic borders become more fluid and culture spreads from its origins.

Fully established in 2015, the ASEAN Community looks to succeed in One Vision, One Identity, and One Caring and Sharing Community through its three pillars. Between the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), this topic is interested in the efforts of the latter<sup>596061</sup>. These three pillars came from the 2003 Bali Concord II, which re-established the 1976 Bali Concord's goals. The plans for the AEC were signed in 2007 and the plans for the APSC and ASCC were signed in 2009 in

<sup>56</sup> "Overview." *Overview*. ASEAN. Web. <<http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview>>.

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Thailand<sup>62</sup>. While member nations have sent academics to join these committees, integration at the local level remains limited. In general, the populations do not feel tied to a regional identity and are not interested in visiting other member nations or learning other member languages<sup>63</sup>. The influence of foreign language and culture, such as those of the English and Chinese languages, as well as American and Korean culture, play a stronger role in shaping the attitudes and values of ASEAN citizens. Exposure of ASEAN values has not been occurring through a grassroots approach, but is rather secluded in the spheres of business, government, and higher education. Unity needs focus beyond the politics, and the ASCC must put consideration to issues of multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multilingual capacities.

However, the original 2020 Vision was pushed forward at the 12<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Summit in 2007, held in Cebu, Philippines. After reviewing the Bali Concord II and the ASEAN Charter in order to match the needs of the region, a five year acceleration was added to the Vision, with integration set to occur by 2015<sup>64</sup>. However, with 2016 on the horizon, member nations need to reconsider the feasibility of their goals and the limitations of their past efforts.

### Section 2: Hanoi Plan of Action

The importance of an ASEAN identity was reinforced on December 15<sup>th</sup>, 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. The Second ASEAN Informal Summit drew up the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) to implement the ASEAN 2020 Vision. The Hanoi Plan of Action was a six-year course of action from 1999 to 2004, with revisions scheduled at three-year increments. The HPA focused on economic crises and regional financial values as areas of interest to resolve the ASEAN economy<sup>65</sup>. The HPA's mandate included:

1. Strengthening Macroeconomic and Financial Cooperation to promote reliable policies and markets through consultation.
2. Enhancing Economic Integration through free trade and reducing poverty through financial equity.
3. Developing Communications Technology and Investing in Scientific Exploration.
4. Addressing the Social and Cultural Impacts of Economics Crises.
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<sup>62</sup> "Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)." *Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)*. ASEAN. Web. <<http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii>>.

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6. Investing in Sustainable Economic Systems.
7. Securing Regional Peace.
8. Propelling ASEAN as an international institution.
9. Promoting ASEAN Identity.
10. Improve the structure of ASEAN.

In the ASEAN perspective, each member nation faces shared issues that can be solved in a more robust capacity through a shared, regional effort. In order to do so, ASEAN is supporting technological and scientific programmes. This way, entrepreneurial innovations and networks of academic institutions can work on environmental issues, increase drug control, and make strides in primary health care, nutrition, and medical developments<sup>66</sup>. Citizens benefiting from these programmes will view themselves in greater solidarity to the ASEAN community.




Figure 2:  
<http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/sites/default/files/field/image/ASEAN/NewASEANGraphics/GDP%20growth.jpg>

Shared regional problems include poverty, illness, and inadequate nutrition. To protect the most vulnerable populations in possible economic crises, Social Safety Nets and ASEAN Rural Development and Poverty Eradication will be the focus of the HPA<sup>67</sup>. Out-of-school youth will be offered skill-training programs, under the Plan of Action for Children. Women are another priority of ASEAN, and the Association will be combating

<sup>66</sup> "ASEAN CSR Network." *ASEAN VISION 2020*. N.p., n.d. Web. <<http://www.asean-csr-network.org/c/programs/asean-vision-2020>>.

<sup>67</sup> "ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets." *ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets*. ASEAN. Web. <<http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-community/item/asean-action-plan-on-social-safety-nets>>.

trafficking and violence against women, working with various organizations to enhance opportunities for women. Additionally, development in rural areas will be focused through agrarian reform and academic scholarships for poor citizens<sup>68</sup>. To successfully take on these initiatives, ASEAN also will be evaluating internal systems and communication structures. Funding for community programmes looks to branch out into indigenous funding sources, and promoting awareness of established resources. The implementation of the Plan of Action and Work Programme will undergo periodic review, insuring that efficiency and effectiveness remain at the forefront.<sup>69</sup>

### Section 3: Culture

ASEAN representatives decided that without cultural integration, citizens would not view themselves as ASEAN members. The 1995 Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, Thailand emphasized the need for human development, technological competitiveness, and social consciousness<sup>70</sup>. Since ASEAN history and traditions have not been transferred to widely used technologies, such as the Internet, Western and East Asian countries have permeated the cultural front of Southeast Asia. ASEAN has banded with businesses to decrease the financial burdens of engaging with other cultures. *AirAsia*, a regional airlines company, began promotion of its 'ASEAN Pass.' This pass allows for several cross-national flights for a discounted price in member nations<sup>71</sup>. The pass was created in the hopes of opening up access to tourist destinations to ASEAN citizens, rather than being dependent on foreign tourism in the region, commonly from Australia or Western Europe.



Figure 3: <http://www.airasia.com/aa-images/common/asean-pass/aseanpass.jpg>

<sup>68</sup> "Preparatory Meetings for Sixth ASEAN Summit Held In Ha Noi." *Preparatory Meetings for Sixth ASEAN Summit Held In Ha Noi*. N.p., n.d. Web. <[http://www.wright.edu/~tdung/hanoi\\_plan.htm](http://www.wright.edu/~tdung/hanoi_plan.htm)>.

<sup>69</sup> "Hanoi Plan Of Action to Implement the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement." Arf Som, 20 May 2010. (n.d.): n. pag. Web. <[http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Plan%20of%20Action%20and%20Work%20Plans/Hanoi\\_Plan\\_of\\_Action\\_to\\_Implement\\_ARF\\_Vision\\_Statement\\_2010.pdf](http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Plan%20of%20Action%20and%20Work%20Plans/Hanoi_Plan_of_Action_to_Implement_ARF_Vision_Statement_2010.pdf)>.

<sup>70</sup> "The Fifth ASEAN Summit." *The Fifth ASEAN Summit*. ASEAN. N.p., n.d. <<http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-fifth-asean-summit>>.

<sup>71</sup> "AirAsia ASEAN Pass." *Search for Your Preferred Flight*. N.p., n.d. Web. <<http://www.airasia.com/aseanpass/>>.





Integration at the cultural level will include transforming the ASEAN University Network into an ASEAN University, building on previous resources to enhance programmes of ASEAN Studies and proliferating ASEAN culture<sup>72</sup>. Additionally the ASEAN 2020 Vision will target the youth by providing artistic and cultural immersion camps and exchange programmes, counteracting the limited worldview of current citizens in terms of accessing other member nations<sup>73</sup>.

### Section 4: Moving Forward

Having reached the end of 2015, ASEAN still has not successfully implemented the ASEAN Vision, and will be pushing the deadline back to 2020 once more. Delegates, using information on past methods of integration, will be asked to look ahead, incorporating 21<sup>st</sup> Century means of communication and cultural proliferation to achieve their goals. Delegates should investigate what has worked in fostering an ASEAN identity and what has not. Delegates should be prepared to create innovative plans to economically, socially, and structurally unite member nations of ASEAN.

### Questions to Consider

1. What measures can ASEAN countries take to build a united identity while still maintaining individual sovereignty?
2. What challenges do ASEAN citizens face in accessing other member nations and their cultures? What can ASEAN do to rectify such obstacles?
3. How can ASEAN overcome the disinterest of citizens in building an ASEAN identity?

### Further Reading

- <http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>
- <http://www.norcham.com/news/why-the-aec-in-2015-will-lead-to-few-changes-in-thailand>
- <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/09/27/perfect-10-paradise-asean-tourist-industry-booming-with-intra-asean-travelers.html>
- <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3173458.stm>
- [https://www.academia.edu/981239/Forging\\_an\\_ASEAN\\_Identity\\_The\\_Challenge\\_to\\_Construct\\_a\\_Shared\\_Destiny](https://www.academia.edu/981239/Forging_an_ASEAN_Identity_The_Challenge_to_Construct_a_Shared_Destiny)

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<sup>73</sup> "Ministry of Education, Singapore: ASEAN Scholarships." *Ministry of Education, Singapore: ASEAN Scholarships*. N.p., n.d. Web. <<http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/scholarships/asean/>>.



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