

Country: Russian Federation

Committee: International Atomic Energy Agency

Topic: Addressing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

In the past, the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to ensure the security of nuclear material and weaponry from non-state actors, including engaging in several different international non-proliferation treaties and fortifying protective provisions within the country. Presently, Russia has been asserting believes in a nation's right to independently develop its own nuclear energy program, causing the country to retain all information about its nuclear stockpile. This lack of disclosure causes hesitancy on the part of other nations to relinquish nuclear weapons. The state has also recently exited a nuclear security pact and now has the ability to produce nuclear warheads once again due to western hostility, bringing non-proliferation and its correlation to global relationships to the forefront of international attention. Such actions are indicative of the responsibility of nations to independently protect nuclear materials from acquisition by non-state actors such as ISIS and al-Qaeda Throughout the history of the issue, Russia has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and other comprehensive action plans addressing the threat of rising nuclear technology. Russia has also worked collaboratively with the United States in a series of nuclear agreements including SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), SALT II, START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), START II, framework for START III, SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), and others that have made gradual movement toward nuclear weapons reduction from 1969 to modern times.¹ Many of these have proven effective, but there have also been shortcomings of the plans, including the inability of START II to be implemented and the consequential failure of START III. These shortcomings have ultimately led to the recent deterioration of global nuclear partnerships, making domestic control a more contemporary necessity to prevent non-state actors from attaining nuclear material than ever before.

In regards to internal action, the Russian Federation published a new military doctrine that recognized the threat of nuclear terrorism (2014).² Russia has also reinforced infrastructure with the construction of new underground nuclear command posts (2016). In the past, Russia's focus in regards to external threat has been primarily rooted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) particularly the United States, but with the rise of extremism in contemporary society the Russian Federation views the eminence of nuclear terrorism as a major priority for all nations possessing significant nuclear material. Despite the rising awareness of Russia to this issue, other international tensions still take precedence, as displayed in the recent case where Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to exit a nuclear security pact in response to 'hostility' from the United states. Russia has cooperated extensively with the US in the past, but has begun to detect increasing threat from them and would like to see corresponding concessions from both sides of the deal.

In order to address the threat of nuclear terrorism, Russia proposes the establishment of a committee of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) that regulates revision of multilateral nuclear agreements such as those between Russia and the US. This would allow nations to develop more concise compromises that address the issue more effectively. In addition to this, Russia suggest the creation of the Nuclear Terrorism Addressment Index (NTAI). This index would compound the locational, demographic, security, and developmental factors to assess the risk that different facilities have regarding nuclear terrorism. Another important factor in protection of nuclear sources is the reinforcement of storage facilities and transportation of nuclear materials. Russia recognizes the need to increase safe mobility of nuclear materials to decrease accessibility of them. To provide better distribution, Russia encourages nations to create a Nuclear Material Mobility Network facilitated by military infrastructure and monitored by INTERPOL.³ This network would provide an adaptable framework for transporting nuclear materials, making it easy to quickly adjust routes and promote security and help to standardize nuclear packaging with internal GPS systems for tracking. Russia also urges nations to establish checkpoints along transport routes also regulated by INTERPOL that inspect all transport vessels moving along routes and build the database of information regarding nuclear weaponry and material. Russia would also like to create of centrally controlled mobile Nuclear Investigation Taskforces that are sub entities of a global taskforce under joint mandate of the IAEA and INTERPOL that maintain nuclear facility infrastructure and conduct inspections. The final element of Russia's plan involves a peer review system among countries facilitated by the IAEA that helps to alleviate tensions and make improvements to nuclear security programs in an individual basis. Through these methods, the Russian Federation intends to establish more efficient disarmament and security to affirm prevention of nuclear warfare from non-state actors.

¹ <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010>

² <https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf>

³ <https://www.interpol.int/>

Topic: Nuclear Energy as an Alternate Source of Energy

The Russia Federation is currently among leaders of the global community in development of new reactor technology and the rise of Nuclear Energy. On the international scale, Russia has recently signed an intergovernmental agreement with Tunisia facilitated by the IAEA that undertakes the task of assisting in the development of Tunisia's nuclear energy program with specific regards to infrastructure, uranium deposits, and mineral resources. Russia has also recently suspended the 2013 nuclear energy agreement with the United States in accordance with the current tension between the two nations. The US established Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has developed into the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) in response to influence from the IAEA and the Russian Federation.⁴ This partnership deals with non-proliferation, nuclear waste, recycling/reprocessing of nuclear material, funding, and many other aspects of providing secure development of nuclear energy. The plan intends to do this through dividing responsibility among different entities within energy management through the reliable nuclear fuel services working group and the infrastructure development working group. Russia has been heavily involved in the reprocessing and enrichment aspects, helping to lead research that ensures sustainability of nuclear energy sources.

Russia initiated the country's first nuclear energy reactor in 1954 with the Obninsk reactor and gradual diffusing technology and infrastructure thereafter. Russia has engaged in exporting reactors to countries such as China, India, Pakistan, and other countries with a growing nuclear energy program. The funding from this has stimulated revival of various nuclear projects within Russia. In 1992 Russia established Rosenergoatom to manage nuclear energy facilities and it became a utility in 2001 as a division of SC Rosatom.⁵ Rosenergoatom is currently in control of all ten nuclear plants within the country, with 36 reactors divided among the 10 plants. In response to increasing demand for nuclear energy, in 2010 Rosatom (under Russia's centrally controlled Unified Energy System) set goals for 2050 for increased nuclear energy production based on fast reactors. However, these plans have been hindered by economic constraints such as privatization of Russia's leading energy companies including Gazprom, which has been cutting down on domestic use of natural gas in order to export it to western countries. Russia is also in the process of constructing new plants and extending the life of old plants while uprating them.

The Russian Federation recognizes the lack of sufficient policy structure to support proliferation of nuclear energy and would like to propose corresponding policy adjustment. In order to ensure stability of the nuclear energy management sector, Russia proposes the implementation of law that regulates privatization, specifically in regards to nuclear energy. This would prevent corporate monopolization of the nuclear energy sector and prevent issues with corruption and instability. Russia also intends to create an adaptable framework for life extension of nuclear facilities along with an index to measure security based on various security factors to improve allocation of nuclear facilities. The aforementioned index along with scientific and infrastructural corporate insight will be taken into consideration during allocation of nuclear plants. In regards to international cooperation, Russia urges nations to assist in the formation of the Atomic Research, Security, Energy, Non-proliferation, Allocation, and Leadership Symposium (ARSENALS), which would facilitate compilation of nuclear research and the creation of new plans in regards to it that are more direct and effective than the arbitrary plans of existing organizations like IFNEC. Such actions include implementation of mobile inspection units that evaluate nuclear facilities based on guidelines set by ARSENALS. In order to participate in this program countries would be required to contribute a small fee to a fund that goes towards the IAEA to increase their budget. The IAEA would, in return, help to facilitate the symposium. Plans created by ARSENAL could then be achieved through cooperation between member states and the IAEA. Through these actions, the Russian Federation intends to expedite global advancement on nuclear energy production in a secure, sustainable manner.

⁴ <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx>

⁵ <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx>

Topic: Measures to Implement and Enforce the Nuclear Program in Iran

The Russian Federation is a major leader in the project regarding security of the nuclear program in Iran, joining with other P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, UK, and US) to come to an agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).⁶ This plan has been mostly adopted by the government of Iran and has proven relatively effective in preventing Iran's nuclear weapon production. However, speculation about the long term stability of the plan has brought to attention the need for a more permanent way of ensuring stability to the entire region surrounding Iran. The JCPOA addresses aspects such as transparency of Iran's nuclear program, reprocessing nuclear materials, uranium enrichment, Iranian stockpiles and many other aspects. This plan also has provisions for dispute resolution, implementation, and enforcement. While the enforcement is effective for the time being, the sanctions used to enforce the plan have created further long term instability and need to be addressed in regards to the future of the issue. The plan also fails to encompass several related issues that fall under jurisdiction of other entities such as the Human Rights Council and the International Court of Justice. The lack of cooperation between aforementioned groups has also resulted in the neglect of aspects that are highly pertinent to the issue.

Russia is recognized, among several middle eastern countries, as a fundamental component at the core of the issue due to the eminence of the nuclear threat that the country posed from the Iranian perspective, but Iran eventually allied with Russia on the dilemma. Russia is currently in favor of the lifting of sanctions on Iran, despite the potential economic ramifications. The sanctions currently prevent Iran from capitalizing on its natural gas deposits, which are highly desirable in the eyes of the Russian energy system due to its considerable reliance on natural gas. However, the lifting of the sanctions also increases competitiveness in the natural gas exchange, creating a significant alteration in the structure of the global economy.⁷ As Iran has been compliant with the JCPOA in recent times, the sanctions are currently not in place, but their lasting presence creates an ominous threat in the eyes of Iran. This situation furthers the tensions that generate the continual discord in the region.

In response to monitoring issues Russia would like to bring attention to the fact that eminent economic sanctions are ultimately the only way to effectively enforce the nuclear program in Iran, but it creates a major stagnation in the natural gas exchange. In response to this Russia would like to revise the sanctions to allow bilateral exchange partnerships while incorporate the aforementioned global Nuclear Investigation Taskforce under joint mandate of the IAEA and INTERPOL that possess documentation that warrant entrance to Iran's nuclear facilities. This is enforced through the potential reimplementing of the sanctions with the new revisions. It is also essential to recognize the potential issues with structural integrity of the JCPOA, as it was largely a short term, hastily created solution that can be altered to be more adaptable to conform to changes in the global society. It is imperative that nations ensure that this plan facilitates long term stability. In order to address this, the Russian Federation suggests the creation of a global summit that runs on an adaptable framework and can be summoned as necessary. In regards to funding, Russia would like to create a system in which the IAEA, in cooperation with the JCPOA, is able to siphon long term funds from the bilateral trade partnerships, which can then in turn be used to compensate countries that give short term funds to the IAEA for immediate actions. This would facilitate more ease in taking immediate, direct action when Iran failed to comply with the internationally established guidelines set by the JCPOA as well as alleviating some of the tension in Iran by making the sanctions less detrimental to them while still remaining effective. The final aspect is the need for a way to address things outside of the jurisdiction of the JCPOA. In order to address this, Russia urges the United Nations to facilitate communication between the International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Council, the IAEA, and the JCPOA so that external influential bodies on the global scale can create more comprehensive solutions in regards to the situation with Iran and deal with the situations such as support of Yemen rebels and human rights violations that the JCPOA are unable to address.

⁶ <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/>

⁷ http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT442/RAND_CT442.pdf