*Delegation of Represented by*

*Jordan Marianopolis College*

**Position Paper for the International Atomic Energy Agency**

**I. The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism**

In a post Cold War context, it would seem as though the concern over the threat of nuclear power has died down. While it is true that on a global scale, nations no longer live in an era of a divisive conflict cultivating apocalyptic fear of the potential threat posed by nuclear weapons, it is crucial to recognize that this threat is not on the decline. Rather, in a world where both physical and virtual borders have become increasingly permeable and where radical Islamist terrorism is on the rise, if fallen in the wrong hands, nuclear weapons could cause unprecedented and horrific global damage. As a proud member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is dedicated to finding feasible long-term solutions to the ever-growing threat posed by nuclear terrorism. A strong supporter of the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is in commendable standing of all relevant non-proliferation treaties and has put into place numerous measures to move towards the goal of global peace and security such as signing the Joint Action Plan in collaboration with the United States to combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials, participating in ad-hoc efforts, most notably the US led Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as being the first Middle Eastern country to adopt the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which allows the IAEA extra inspection privileges (WNA).

In addition to participating in the aforementioned agreements, Jordan is a non-nuclear weapon state party of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty adopted by the United Nations in its international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and thus combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. The NPT has remained as the global standard for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. While it has provided important security benefits for non-nuclear-weapon states, they have aided in the renewal, maintenance and sometimes further development of nuclear arsenals of nuclear weapon States. Thus, not only does it undermines the legitimate interests of non nuclear-weapon States (Joyner), but it also increases the threat of these technologies falling into enemy hands. Moreover, the IAEA faces challenges of not being able to properly inspect nuclear-weapon States, as the authority provided by the protocol is limited to material already declared.

Although there has been no serious incident of nuclear terrorism to date, there nonetheless remain significant security risks concerning the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists, especially for the Kingdom, situated amidst the turmoil. Evidently, if fewer countries have nuclear weapons, there will be a diminished threat posed by nuclear terrorism. However, seeing as some countries already have these weapons and are unlikely to relinquish them, the absolute disarmament of nuclear weapons is unlikely. That being said, if these nuclear-weapon states do not disarm themselves, the NPT could be seen as a guarantor of the NWS’s nuclear monopoly, rather than as a body working towards global security. If this were the case, non-nuclear weapon state parties, such as Jordan, would withdraw, which would have consequential effects, as bodies like the IAEA would lose authority in regulating development and access to nuclear arsenal. Thus, there must be mechanisms put into place that will ensure the gradual disarmament, non-proliferation and safeguarding of these nuclear-weapon states in order to control the supply side of the nuclear marketplace (Rand). Member states, both nuclear and non-nuclear, must focus on strengthening the control of nuclear material in order to combat nuclear terrorism effectively.

**II. Nuclear Energy as an Alternate Source of Energy**

Although atomic energy is often seen in a negative light because of its association to weapons of mass destruction, it is important to note that it can also be used for peaceful purposes, most notably in terms of sustainable development. As a nation who relies heavily on foreign assistance to meet the country’s energy demands, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan values the evolution of atomic energy as a pivotal pillar in gaining energy independence. In order to promote the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, Jordan has established the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, which aims to help realize the country’s goal of using nuclear energy to produce 30% of their electricity by 2035 as well as to use this form of energy to convert salt-water into drinking water (access to freshwater being another obstacle for the country.) According to this commission, there is enough uranium within the nation to support the proposed nuclear program for 150 years. Moreover, Jordan has also put in place the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which focuses on controlling the use of nuclear energy and protecting the environment and human health from radiation (Wikipedia).

The UN has put into place numerous measures to regulate this form of energy, as there is undeniably a threat associated with its development. The NPT is once again the most important treaty put into place by the UN in this domain, as it was implemented in order to ensure that nuclear materials are used solely for peaceful purposes. This agreement also allows for the IAEA to conduct on-site inspections to fulfill this very task. However, this US led treaty displays a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation component and an unwarranted under-prioritization of not only civilian energy development but also disarmament components (Joyner). In other words, the policies imposed by this treaty restrict the rights of non-nuclear weapon States, such as Jordan, by limiting their development of civilian nuclear technologies.

Jordan strongly stands by the notion that the threat of nuclear terrorism and the development of sustainable nuclear energy can be mutually exclusive. The key is to have a sound verification system on the part of the IAEA to carefully inspect these country’s activities. That being said, as Jordan recognizes that the development of nuclear energy could increase the threat of nuclear terrorism, the possibility of developing nuclear energy should only be available to countries that are unable to produce 30% of their energy without relying on foreign assistance. Moreover, since developing nuclear energy is costly, countries should be granted funding by the IAEA in exchange for signing on to strict non-proliferation, safeguard and peaceful utilization treaties all the while adhering to strict check-ups on a regular basis. As sustainable development and the eradication of poverty are at the very heart of the United Nations, the international community must come together and aid developing nations in advancing their energy programs. Furthermore, as some nations may turn to micro-financing in order to develop these technologies, the UN should put in place mechanisms that would only allow these companies to financially support states if they are to adhere to safety regulations. This solution would provide an incentive to develop green energy while ensuring that nuclear energy is developed is within a strictly civil and peaceful framework.

**III. Measures to implement and enforce the nuclear program in Iran**

After years of struggling with negotiations, sanctions and other disciplinary action, in July 2015, an agreement to end the nuclear program of Iran was finally put in place. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan greatly welcomed this deal as it finally concluded a nuclear issue that had caused much polarization within the international community and much unease within the region of the Middle East. The notion of maintaining a secure and peaceful environment while fostering development is pivotal within the United Nations, and specifically within the IEAE in the context of nuclear weapons and energy. Although Jordan is pleased with the new deal, throughout the past decades, the Kingdom has largely been supportive of Iran’s right to develop a peaceful nuclear program. King Abdullah II has publicly opposed military strike against Iran and has proposed diplomatic solutions as an alternative resolution to the conflict.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan supports the new cooperation between the international community and Iran on the matter of nuclearization. However, before this deal was agreed upon, the main tactic used on Iran to halt their nuclear development was the use of sanctions. Although this method did succeed in stifling the economy by imposing barriers for trade and eventually lead to a concession on Iran’s part, it took decades to come to this decision and during that time, the people of Iran were being punished for actions that their government chose to take (Brookings). While the UN did not put these economic sanctions in place, there was no overt opposition to this tactic, which all too often turn out to be little more than expressions of foreign agendas, and are ineffective if time is limited.

Moving forward, in order to ensure the success of the JCPOA, it would be favourable to avoid sanctions when enacting policy. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan believes that the West and Iran should foster a positive relationship of cooperation in order for there to be long-lasting alliances, which would undeniably prove to be useful for both parties. Decades of hostile feuds are difficult to recover from. However, during this pivotal moment in time, it is crucial for the international community to be amicable with Iran in order to encourage them to be as transparent as possible in their actions, as their withdrawal from this agreement would have extremely detrimental consequences and would encourage Iran to isolate themselves and consequently, cut off all discourse on the matter. That being said, it is important for sanctions to be lifted in a gradual manner, not only for the transition of Iran’s economy, but also so that there is incentive from Iran to stay within the agreement.

**Works Cited:**

Daly, Sara A., John V. Parachini and William Rosenau. “Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo, Al Quaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor.” *CA: RAND Corporation*. 2005. Web. 09. Nov. 2016

Haass, Richard N. "Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing." *Brookings*. N.p., 1998. Web. 09 Nov. 2016.

Joyner, Daniel. "Interpreting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty." *Dag Hammarskjold Library*. Dag Hammarskjold Library, 2011. Web. 9 Nov. 2016.

"Nuclear Energy in Jordan." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 09 Nov. 2016.

"Nuclear Power in Jordan." *World Nuclear Association*. World Nuclear Association, Sept. 2016. Web. 09 Nov. 2016.