Corrigendum

Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes: Is the Face-Vote Correlation Caused by Candidate Selection? Corrigendum

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This note corrects the analysis presented in "Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes: Is the Face-Vote Correlation Caused by Candidate Selection?" (Atkinson *et al.*, 2009). A coding error assigned incumbent Slade Gorton's (R-WA) facial competence score to his opponent, Maria Cantwell, and vice versa. The error does not substantively affect the results, and all claims made in the article but for those about these two candidates stand. We claimed that Cantwell's face had a negative effect on her margin of victory. In fact, her face score is above median and, by the estimates of our model, led to her victory over Gorton. Thus the statement in our abstract (Atkinson *et al.*, 2009, p. 229) "we find that the challenging candidate's face is never the difference between a challenger and incumbent victory in all 99 Senate elections in our study" should instead state "is the difference in one of 99 Senate elections in our study." The discussion of Cantwell and Gorton in the third full paragraph on page 240 is also inaccurate.

We produce below updated article tables and figures reflecting the corrected coding error. These tables and figures are produced using the updated replication archive housed with the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, or available from the authors.

Table 1. Predicting candidate facial competence with district competitiveness.

	House challengers	Senate challengers	House incumbents	Senate incumbents
Intercept	0.427	0.480	0.611	0.395
	(0.306)	(0.399)	(0.251)	(0.289)
Cook incumbent risk	0.304	0.287	0.103	−0.011
	(0.110)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.071)
1994 Fixed effect		−0.337		−0.035
		(0.450)		(0.327)
1996 Fixed effect		−0.408		−0.227
		(0.469)		(0.341)
1998 Fixed effect		−0.033		−0.442
		(0.448)		(0.325)
2000 Fixed effect		−0.393		−0.323
		(0.416)		(0.302)
2002 Fixed effect		0.001		0.103
		(0.416)		(0.302)
2004 Fixed effect		0.215		−0.248
		(0.425)		(0.309)
2006 Fixed effect		−0.203		−0.203
		(0.423)		(0.307)
N	148	145	167	145
R^2	0.049	0.078	0.008	0.042
Adjusted R^2	0.043	0.024	0.002	−0.014
Std. error of regression	0.989	1.169	0.852	0.849

Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. House models are for candidates from 2004, Senate models for candidates from 1992 to 2006. Dependent variable is facial competence, Cook incumbent risk is coded increasing from low to high risk.

Table 2. The Effect of Candidate Facial Competence and Partisanship on Incumbent Vote Choice.

	House 2004	House 2004	Senate 1992–2006	Senate 1992–2006
Intercept	0.336	0.293	−1.236	−0.785
	(0.671)	(0.694)	(1.217)	(1.559)
Cook incumbent risk	−0.139	−0.116	−0.106	−0.111
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Respondent shares challenger party	−1.311	−1.313	−1.039	−1.041
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Respondent shares incumbent party	1.392	1.393	1.079	1.079
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Challenger facial competence	−0.119	−0.080	−0.077	−0.076
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Incumbent facial competence	−0.024	−0.018	0.014	0.011
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Incumbent tenure	−0.009	−0.005	−0.014	−0.013
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Tenure squared	−0.000	−0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent age	−0.020	−0.021	0.055	0.039
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.052)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Challenger expenditures (logged)		−0.022		0.018
		(0.019)		(0.018)
State population (millions)				−0.007
				(0.008)
1994 Fixed effect				0.033
				(0.093)
1996 Fixed effect				0.057
				(0.077)
1998 Fixed effect				0.069
				(0.078)
2000 Fixed effect				0.047
				(0.079)
2002 Fixed effect				0.124
				(0.114)
2006 Fixed effect				0.008
				(0.134)
N	4250	4250	26454	26454
AIC	3372.005	3372.261	25310.858	25294.115

Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is respondent vote for incumbent candidate. Cook Incumbent Risk is coded from 0 for contests classified as "safe" to 3 for contests classified as "tossup." Robust standard errors clustered on state/district.

Figure 1. Estimated effect on challenger vote probability of increasing challenger facial competence, by respondent partisan affiliation with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Each point represents the estimated difference in challenger vote probability moving the challenger's face from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, holding incumbent age and tenure at their means, the Cook report at likely going to the incumbent, and the incumbent's face at the chamber median. The points represent the average estimate across 500 samples from the clustered coefficient distribution, and the lines the 2.5th to the 97.5th percentile of the sampled effects.

Figure 2. Estimated effect on challenger vote share moving challenger face from median senate candidate face to actual challenger face, by senate contest.

Each line represents the estimated difference in vote share between an election with the actual challenger's face and a hypothetical election with a challenger face at the median of all Senate candidates. Each election outcome is estimated using the results from the probit model in Table 2, column 3, weighted by the statewide partisan proportions estimated by Wright *et al.* (N.d.).

Table A1. Using candidate facial competence and partisanship to predict individual–level vote choice.

	House 2004	House 2004	Senate 1992–2006	Senate 1992–2006
Intercept	0.605	0.593	0.218	0.334
	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.330)	(0.418)
Cook incumbent risk	−0.032	−0.026	−0.028	−0.030
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Respondent shares challenger party	−0.431	−0.432	−0.371	−0.371
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Respondent shares incumbent party	0.379	0.378	0.324	0.323
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Challenger facial competence	−0.024	−0.014	−0.020	−0.020
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Incumbent facial competence	−0.005	−0.004	0.004	0.003
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Incumbent tenure	−0.001	−0.001	−0.004	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tenure squared	−0.000	−0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent age	−0.005	−0.005	0.014	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Age squared	0.000	0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Challenger expenditures (logged)		−0.005		0.005
		(0.004)		(0.005)
State population (millions)				−0.002
				(0.002)
1994 Fixed effect				0.009
				(0.025)
1996 Fixed effect				0.017
				(0.021)
1998 Fixed effect				0.019
				(0.022)
2000 Fixed effect				0.009
				(0.021)
2002 Fixed effect				0.031
				(0.031)
2006 Fixed effect				−0.000
				(0.037)
N	4250	4250	26454	26454
Adjusted R^2	0.496	0.496	0.372	0.373
Std. error of regression	0.351	0.351	0.393	0.393

Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is respondent vote for incumbent candidate. Cook Incumbent Risk is coded from 0 for contests classified as "safe" to 3 for contests classified as "tossup." Robust standard errors clustered on state/district.

Figure 3. Replication of Todorov *et al.* experimental results.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, M. D., R. D. Enos, and S. J. Hill. 2009. "Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes: Is the Face–Vote Correlation Caused by Candidate Selection?" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 4(3): 229–249.

Wright, G. C., J. P. McIver, and R. S. Erikson. N.d. "Aggregated CBS News/New York Times National Polls." Electronic File.