## >>> Privacy-Preserving Data Generation:

>>> Towards Generating Privacy-Preserving, Synthetic and Useful Time Series ECG Data for Anomaly Detection

KTH x RISE Sijun John Tu March 13, 2024

[-]\$ \_ [1/34]

## >>> Outline

- 1. Project introduction
- 2. Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
- 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

[-]\$ \_ [2/34]


#### >>> Outline

- 1. Project introduction
- 2. Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
- 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

[1. Project introduction]\$

# >>> Machine Learning Pipeline

● ● ■ Figure: High-level machine learning pipeline



>>> Anomaly detection using privacy-preserving, synthetic time series data

#### \$ Problem

- ML models are very data hungry.
- In many cases sharing data comes with privacy risks.

# >>> Anomaly detection using privacy-preserving, synthetic time series data

- \$ Problem
  - ML models are very data hungry.
  - In many cases sharing data comes with privacy risks.
- **\$** Solution:
  - Promising solution: synthetic data with privacy guarantees!
  - Synthetic data with differential private (DP) guarantees is a promising solution to ensure privacy independent of downstream task.

[1. Project introduction]\$ \_ [5/34]

# >>> Anomaly detection using privacy-preserving, synthetic time series data

#### \$ Problem

- ML models are very data hungry.
- In many cases sharing data comes with privacy risks.


#### **\$** Solution:

- Promising solution: synthetic data with privacy guarantees!
- Synthetic data with **differential private** (DP) guarantees is a promising solution to ensure privacy independent of downstream task.

#### **\$** BUT:

- Privacy-Utility-Tradeoff: Commonly, a gain in privacy results in a loss of utility.
- For anomaly detection this might not be the case (?).

[1. Project introduction]\$ \_ [5/34]



[1. Project introduction]\$ \_ [6/34]

1. Train baseline model for anomaly detection only on regular, private heartbeat data using an LSTM-Autoencoder.

- 1. Train baseline model for anomaly detection only on regular, private heartbeat data using an LSTM-Autoencoder.
- 2. Generate regular heartbeat data using two approaches:
  - AE-(dp)MERF
  - AE-(dp)WGAN

- 1. Train baseline model for anomaly detection only on regular, private heartbeat data using an LSTM-Autoencoder.
- 2. Generate regular heartbeat data using two approaches:
  - AE-(dp)MERF
  - AE-(dp)WGAN
- 3. Train LSTM-Autoencoder for anomaly detection on synthetic data and test on real.
- 4. Assess **utility** by measuring performance for anomaly detection (Accuracy, precision, recall, F1).

[1. Project introduction]\$ \_ [7/34

- 1. Train baseline model for anomaly detection only on regular, private heartbeat data using an LSTM-Autoencoder.
- 2. Generate regular heartbeat data using two approaches:
  - AE-(dp)MERF
  - AE-(dp)WGAN
- 3. Train LSTM-Autoencoder for anomaly detection on synthetic data and test on real.
- 4. Assess **utility** by measuring performance for anomaly detection (Accuracy, precision, recall, F1).
- 5. Contaminate training data with anomalous heartbeats and repeat.

[1. Project introduction]\$ \_ [7/34]

#### >>> Outline

- 1. Project introduction
- 2. Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
- 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

## >>> Heartbeat Arrhythmia




Figure: Different heartbeat arrhythmias <sup>1</sup>

[2. Dataset: MITBIH ECG data]\$ \_ [9/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>source: https://www.parkwayshenton.com.sg/health-plus/article/arrhythmia-guide

We treat the problem of detecting anomalous heartbeats as an anomaly detection problem from machine learning based on the **reconstruction error**:

We treat the problem of detecting anomalous heartbeats as an anomaly detection problem from machine learning based on the **reconstruction error**:

\$ We train a model on regular heartbeats that is able to reconstruct that regular heartbeat.

We treat the problem of detecting anomalous heartbeats as an anomaly detection problem from machine learning based on the **reconstruction error**:

- \$ We train a model on regular heartbeats that is able to reconstruct that regular heartbeat.
- \$ Given an anomalous heartbeat the model should give higher reconstruction error.

We treat the problem of detecting anomalous heartbeats as an anomaly detection problem from machine learning based on the **reconstruction error**:

- \$ We train a model on regular heartbeats that is able to reconstruct that regular heartbeat.
- \$ Given an anomalous heartbeat the model should give higher reconstruction error.
- \$ Based on an optimal **threshold** for that error we classify this heartbeat as either regular or anomalous.


We treat the problem of detecting anomalous heartbeats as an anomaly detection problem from machine learning based on the **reconstruction error**:

- \$ We train a model on regular heartbeats that is able to reconstruct that regular heartbeat.
- \$ Given an anomalous heartbeat the model should give higher reconstruction error.
- \$ Based on an optimal threshold for that error we classify this heartbeat as either regular or anomalous.


Two reasons for this semi-supervised approach: high class imbalancy and no need for labelling.

#### >>> Baseline Model

Model is a LSTM-AE that is **trained only on regular**, **private samples** with the goal to reconstruct normal samples. The classification is made based on the reconstruction error.



**Figure:** reconstruction on normal sample



**Figure:** reconstruction on anomalous sample

#### >>> Outline

- 1. Project introduction
- Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
- 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

>>> Review: Differential Privacy

**Idea.** Hide the influence of one particular sample on the output of the model by adding randomness.

>>> Review: Differential Privacy

**Idea.** Hide the influence of one particular sample on the output of the model by adding randomness.

## Definition (Differential Privacy)

A randomised algorithm  $\mathcal{M}$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ - differentially private if for all sets of outcomes  $S \subset ran\mathcal{M}$  and for all databases x, y, such that they **only differ in one element**, we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(x) \in S) \le e^{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(y) \in S) + \delta \quad , \tag{1}$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of  $\mathcal{M}$ .

>>> Review: Differential Privacy

## Definition (Differential Privacy)

A randomised algorithm  $\mathcal M$  is  $(\epsilon,\delta)$ - differentially private if for all sets of outcomes  $S\subset ran\mathcal M$  and for all databases x,y, such that they **only differ in one element**, we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(x) \in S) \le e^{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(y) \in S) + \delta \quad , \tag{1}$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of  $\mathcal{M}$ .

**Informally.** Replacing one record in the data will not change the outcome of algorithm  $\mathcal M$  too much (specified via privacy budget  $\epsilon$ ). The lower  $\epsilon$  the stricter the privacy guarantees.

## >>> Examples of DP mechanism

- \$ Gaussian mechanism
  - Add Gaussian noise to output of some function.
  - For a given function  $f: \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|} \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$ , privacy parameters  $\epsilon \in (0,1)$  and  $\delta > 0$  define the gaussian mechanism F(x) as follows:

$$F(x) = f(x) + \xi \quad , \tag{2}$$

where  $\xi \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I)$  and  $\sigma \geq \frac{2\Delta f}{\epsilon} \ln(\frac{1.25}{\delta})$  to satisfy DP.

- \$ DP-SGD
  - DP version for training neural networks
  - · Add noise to gradients while training

## >>> AE-(dp)MERF: Architecture




Figure: AE-(dp)MERF architecture

- **1.** Encode dataset  $X: X^{enc} = Enc(X)$
- 2. Generate encodings by sampling from Gaussian noise:  $\widetilde{X}^{enc} = Gen(z)$
- 3. Train generator via loss maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) loss:

$$\begin{array}{l} MMD(X^{enc},\widetilde{X}^{enc}) = \\ ||\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^{m}\hat{\Phi}(x_{i}^{enc}) - \frac{1}{m}\sum_{j=1}^{m}\hat{\Phi}(\tilde{x}_{j}^{enc})||_{\mathcal{H}}^{2} \\ \text{where } \hat{\Phi}(x) \in \mathbb{R}^{D} \text{ and } \hat{\Phi}_{j}(x) = \sqrt{\frac{2}{D}}cos(\omega_{j}^{T}x). \end{array}$$

4. Decode generated encodings:  $\widetilde{X} = Dec(\widetilde{X}^{enc})$ 

We are making AE-MERF differentially private by adding noise to the loss function:

$$MMD(X^{enc}, \widetilde{X}^{enc}) = ||\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(x_i^{enc}) - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(\tilde{x}_j^{enc})||_{\mathcal{H}}^2 . \tag{3}$$

We are making AE-MERF differentially private by adding noise to the loss function:

$$MMD(X^{enc}, \widetilde{X}^{enc}) = ||\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(x_i^{enc}) - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(\widetilde{x}_j^{enc})||_{\mathcal{H}}^2 . \tag{3}$$

We are making AE-MERF differentially private by adding noise to the loss function:

$$MMD(X^{enc}, \widetilde{X}^{enc}) = ||\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(x_i^{enc}) - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(\tilde{x}_j^{enc})||_{\mathcal{H}}^2 . \tag{3}$$

We only need to add noise to the term that "sees" the original data:

We are making AE-MERF differentially private by adding noise to the loss function:

$$MMD(X^{enc}, \widetilde{X}^{enc}) = ||\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(x_i^{enc}) - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(\tilde{x}_j^{enc})||_{\mathcal{H}}^2 . \tag{3}$$

We only need to add noise to the term that "sees" the original data:

$$MMD(X^{enc}, \widetilde{X}^{enc}) = ||\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(x_i^{enc}) + \xi - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \hat{\Phi}(\tilde{x}_j^{enc})||_{\mathcal{H}}^2 , \qquad (4)$$

where  $\xi \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I)$ 

# >>> AE-(dp)WGAN: Architecture

- **1.** Encode dataset  $X: X^{enc} = Enc(X)$
- 2. Generate encodings by sampling from Gaussian noise:  $\widetilde{X}^{enc} = Gen(z)$
- 3. Discriminator learns to distinguish between real and fake samples.
- 4. Train Discriminator and Generator jointly.
- 5. Decode generated encodings:  $\widetilde{X} = Dec(\widetilde{X}^{enc})$




Figure: Architecture of AE-(dp)WGAN

# >>> AE-(dp)WGAN: Differential Privacy

- **1.** Encode dataset  $X: X^{enc} = Enc(X)$
- **2.** Generate encodings by sampling from Gaussian noise:  $\widetilde{X}^{enc} = Gen(z)$
- **3.** Discriminator learns to distinguish between real and fake samples.
- Train Discriminator and Generator jointly with DP-SGD.
- **5.** Decode generated encodings:  $\widetilde{X} = Dec(\widetilde{X}^{enc})$





Figure: Architecture of AE-(dp)WGAN


#### >>> Outline


- 1. Project introduction
- 2. Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
- 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

[4. Results]\$ \_ [19/34]

# >>> AE-(dp)MERF











Figure: AE-(dp)MERF generated samples

4. Results]\$ \_ [20/34


## >>> AE-(dp)MERF: Utility



**Figure:** Results of AE-(DP)MERF with different privacy budgets (lower epsilon means higher privacy)

[4. Results]\$ \_ [21/34

## >>> AE-(dp)WGAN: Utility



**Figure:** Results of AE-(dp)WGAN with different privacy budgets (lower epsilon means higher privacy)

[4. Results]\$ \_ [22/34

\$ AE-(dp)MERF performs best and is very efficient computationally.

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF performs best and is very efficient computationally.
- \$ AE-(dp)MERF can work in lower epsilon ranges, which translates to stronger privacy guarantees.

[4. Results]\$ \_ [23/34

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF performs best and is very efficient computationally.
- \$ AE-(dp)MERF can work in lower epsilon ranges, which translates to stronger privacy guarantees.
- \$ AE-(dp)WGAN gives worse utility and can only work with meaningless privacy budgets  $\epsilon$ .

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF performs best and is very efficient computationally.
- \$ AE-(dp)MERF can work in lower epsilon ranges, which translates to stronger privacy guarantees.
- \$ AE-(dp)WGAN gives worse utility and can only work with meaningless privacy budgets  $\epsilon$ .
- \$ We lose utility when replacing original data with non-private synthetic data.

[4. Results]\$ \_ [23/34

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF performs best and is very efficient computationally.
- \$ AE-(dp)MERF can work in lower epsilon ranges, which translates to stronger privacy guarantees.
- \$ AE-(dp)WGAN gives worse utility and can only work with meaningless privacy budgets  $\epsilon$ .
- \$ We lose utility when replacing original data with non-private synthetic data.
- \$ BUT: Adding privacy does not further degrade the utility for anomaly detection too much until too much noise is added.

[4. Results]\$ \_ [23/34

## >>> Contamination

We contaminate the train set that only consists of regular samples with 1%, 2%, 5% anomalous samples (the percentage of heartbeat arrhythmias is estimated to be around max. 5%).

[4. Results]\$ \_ [24/34

# >>> Contamination




Figure: Structure of Contamination Experiment




Figure: Contaminated training set: AE-(DP)MERF




Figure: Contaminated training set: AE-(DP)MERF

#### \$ Baseline model performance degrades with increasing contamination percentage.




Figure: Contaminated training set: AE-(DP)MERF

- \$ Baseline model performance degrades with increasing contamination percentage.
- **AE-MERF** generated samples retain stable utility.




Figure: Contaminated training set: AE-(DP)MERF

- \$ Baseline model performance degrades with increasing contamination percentage.
- **AE-MERF** generated samples retain stable utility.
- Utility of AE-dpMERF generated samples first increases and then decrease when contamination is too high.




Figure: Contaminated training set: AE-(DP)MERF

- \$ Baseline model performance degrades with increasing contamination percentage.
- **AE-MERF** generated samples retain stable utility.
- \$ Utility of AE-dpMERF generated samples first increases and then decrease when contamination is too high.
- \$ Utility of synthetic data is higher than baseline model

Hypothesis: Noise added during data generation and DP noise can have a regularising effect on the synthetic data which counteracts the contamination.

### >>> Outline

- 1. Project introduction
- Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
  - 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [28/34]

>>> Summary

\$ We tested two different DP times series data generation models on the MITBIH ECG data set.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [29/34

## >>> Summary

- \$ We tested two different DP times series data generation models on the MITBIH ECG data set.
- \$ We measured the **utility** of the synthetic data via the downstream task of anomaly detection (heartbeat arrhythmia).

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [29/34

## >>> Summary

- \$ We tested two different DP times series data generation models on the MITBIH ECG data set.
- \$ We measured the **utility** of the synthetic data via the downstream task of anomaly detection (heartbeat arrhythmia).
- \$ We investigated the **robustness** of the data generation by **contaminating** the data set with anomalous samples.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [29/34

# >>> Main Findings

**\$** AE-(dp)MERF works better than GAN based approach.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [30/34]

# >>> Main Findings

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF works better than GAN based approach.
- \$ The Privacy-Utility-Tradeoff is more nuanced and depends on the use case. For anomaly detection, privacy and utility can go hand in hand.

# >>> Main Findings

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF works better than GAN based approach.
- \$ The Privacy-Utility-Tradeoff is more nuanced and depends on the use case. For anomaly detection, privacy and utility can go hand in hand.
- \$ Synthetic data and DP can add robustness.

[5. Summary]\$\_ [30/34

**\$** Test with other time series data.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [31/34]

- \$ Test with other time series data.
- \$ Work with other use cases, e.g. classification, regression.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [31/34

- **\$** Test with other time series data.
- \$ Work with other use cases, e.g. classification, regression.
- **\$** Further investigate **robustness**.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [31/34]

- **\$** Test with other time series data.
- \$ Work with other use cases, e.g. classification, regression.
- \$ Further investigate robustness.
- \$ Verify theoretical privacy guarantees with empirical tests, e.g. membership inference attacks.

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [31/34]

>>> Privacy-Preserving Acknowledgement

Thank you Aflsono, Adenrs, Apslotsuo, Hna, Sihahd!

[5. Summary]\$ \_ [32/34

## >>> Outline

- 1. Project introduction
- 2. Dataset: MITBIH ECG data
- 3. Privacy-preserving Time Series Data Generation
- 4. Results
- 5. Summary
- 6. References

[6. References]\$ \_ [33/34

- Ang, Yihao et al. (2023). TSGBench: Time Series Generation Benchmark. arXiv: 2309.03755 [cs.LG].
- Dwork, Cynthia, Aaron Roth, et al. (2014). "The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy". In:

  Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science 9.3–4, pp. 211–407.
- Harder, Frederik, Kamil Adamczewski, and Mijung Park (2020). "Differentially Private Mean Embeddings with Random Features (DP-MERF) for Simple & Practical Synthetic Data Generation". In: <u>CoRR</u> abs/2002.11603. arXiv: 2002.11603. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.11603.
- Hu, Yuzheng et al. (2023). SoK: Privacy-Preserving Data Synthesis. arXiv: 2307.02106 [cs.CR].
- Pei, Hengzhi et al. (2021). "Towards Generating Real-World Time Series Data". In:

Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM).

[7. References]\$ \_ [34/34]

# >>> BACKUP

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [1/12]

# >>> Model Architecture




Figure: AE-(dp)MERF architecture







Figure: Architecture of AE-(dp)WGAN

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [2/12

# >>> AE-(dp)WGAN










Figure: AE-(dp)WGAN generated samples

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [3/12]

#### >>> Gaussian Mechanism

For a given function  $f: \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|} \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$ , privacy parameters  $\epsilon \in (0,1)$  and  $\delta > 0$  define the gaussian mechanism F(x) as follows:

$$F(x) = f(x) + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2) \tag{5}$$

where the variance is calibrated by the sensitivity of f and the given privacy level, such that  $\sigma \geq \frac{2\Delta f}{\epsilon} \ln(\frac{1.25}{\delta})$ 

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [4/12]

## >>> Performance metrics

\$ Accuracy measures the overall percentage of correct classifications:

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + FP + TN + FN} \quad . \tag{6}$$

\$ Precision looks only on the samples that are labelled as anomalies and computes the percentages of correctly detected anomalies:

$$Precision = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}$$
 . (7)

\$ Recall looks at all true anomalies and computes the percentage of correctly detected anomalies

$$Recall = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}$$
 (8)

F1 computes the an average of Precision and Recall

$$F1 = \frac{2 \cdot Precision \cdot Recall}{Precision + Recall} \quad . \tag{9}$$

#### >>> DP Illustrated





Figure: Illustration of DP<sup>2</sup>

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [6/12]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>taken from: https://medium.com/dsaid-govtech/protecting-your-data-privacy-with-differential-privacy-an-introduction-abee1d7fcb63

#### >>> Classification based on Reconstruction Error



**Figure:** Distribution of reconstruction error on regular & anomalous samples

We can clearly see a difference in error distribution for regular and anomalous samples. We choose the threshold that maximises the classification accuracy.

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [7/12]

## >>> Classification threshold




Figure: Adjusting the threshold according to classification accuracy

[8. Backup]\$ \_

#### >>> Models

# AE-(dp)MERF

- \$ AE-(dp)MERF is based on DP-MERF (best state of the art generator for tabular data).
- \$ Simple architecture with mathematically sophisticated loss function.
- \$ Does not work with time series data out of the box, but we will modify it so it works.


# AE-(dp)WGAN

- \$ Model based on GAN network, which are commonly used in image generation.
- \$ Based on RTSGAN, which delivers state of the art performance for time series data.

\$ No private counterpart, hence we will implement our own private version.

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [9/12]


# >>> AE-(dp)MERF: Utility



**Figure:** Results of AE-(DP)MERF with different privacy budgets (lower epsilon means higher privacy)

[8. Backup]\$\_ [10/12]

# >>> AE-(dp)WGAN: Utility



**Figure:** Results of AE-(dp)WGAN with different privacy budgets (lower epsilon means higher privacy)

[8. Backup]\$\_ [11/12




Figure: Contaminated training set: AE-(DP)MERF

- \$ Baseline model performance degrades with increasing contamination percentage.
- \$ AE-MERF generated samples retain stable utility.
- Utility of AE-dpMERF generated samples first increases and then decrease when contamination is too high.
- Utility of synthetic data is higher than baseline model

[8. Backup]\$ \_ [12/12]