



Threat Level



HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY



## ATTACK REPORT

### Iranian OilRig Group Strikes with AutoHotkey Keylogger and Malicious Macro

Date of Publication

February 7, 2023

Admiralty Code

A2

TA Number

TA2023065

# Summary

**First appeared:** August 2022

**Threat Actor:** OilRig (APT 34, Helix Kitten, Twisted Kitten, Crambus, Chrysene, Cobalt Gypsy, TA452, IRN2, ATK 40, ITG13)

**Attack Region:** Oman, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritius, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, Turkey, UK, USA.

**Attack Sector:** Chemicals, Education, Energy, Financial, Government, Legal, Oil and Gas, Telecommunications, Aviation, High-Tech, Hospitality.

**Attack:** In a recent intrusion, a threat actor utilized AutoHotkey to launch a keylogger. The Iranian Oilrig group is suspected to be the culprit behind this attack. The initial compromise was initiated with a malicious VBA macro embedded in a Word document.

## ⚔️ Attack Regions



**OilRig**

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# Attack Details

#1

An attack began with the activation of a malicious macro in a Word document disguised as a job application. Upon opening the file, the victim was prompted to enable macros to complete the form, which then triggered the malware's execution. The macro generated a VBS script and two PowerShell scripts (temp.ps1 and Script.ps1) and installed a persistent presence through a scheduled task.

#2

The PowerShell script established a secure connection to the C2 server. The Iranian OilRig group initiated discovery operations using basic commands executed through PowerShell cmdlets or standard Windows tools such as whoami, net, time, tzutil, and tracert. The information gathered from LDAP discovery was saved in an XML file prior to exfiltration. Several files collected during discovery tasks, such as domain user account information and later the keylogger collected data, were exfiltrated to the C2 server via POST requests.

## Recommendations



### Security Leaders

Phishing simulations and routine education and awareness training and communications rarely account for MFA fatigue and web browser hygiene. Integrate and communicate all lessons learned.



### Security Engineers

- **Uni5 Users:** This is an actionable threat advisory in HivePro Uni5. Prioritize and block all indicators attributed to the threat actors and attacks through your Command Center. Test your controls with Uni5's Breach & Attack Simulation.
- **All Engineers:** Refer to and action upon the 'Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs' & 'Indicators of Compromise (IoC)' on the following pages.

# ☠ Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b>TA0001</b> Initial Access	<b>TA0002</b> Execution	<b>TA0003</b> Persistence	<b>TA0005</b> Defense Evasion
<b>TA0006</b> Credential Access	<b>TA0007</b> Discovery	<b>TA0009</b> Collection	<b>TA0011</b> Command and Control
<b>T1059</b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b>T1059.001</b> PowerShell	<b>T1204</b> User Execution	<b>T1204.002</b> Malicious File
<b>T1087</b> Account Discovery	<b>T1087.002</b> Domain Account	<b>T1082</b> System Information Discovery	<b>T1057</b> Process Discovery
<b>T1033</b> System Owner/User Discovery	<b>T1049</b> System Network Connections Discovery	<b>T1053</b> Scheduled Task/Job	<b>T1113</b> Screen Capture
<b>T1056</b> Input Capture	<b>T1056.001</b> Keylogging	<b>T1573</b> Encrypted Channel	<b>T1573.001</b> Symmetric Cryptography
<b>T1560</b> Archive Collected Data	<b>T1560.001</b> Archive via Utility	<b>T1518</b> Software Discovery	<b>T1518.001</b> Security Software Discovery
<b>T1083</b> File and Directory Discovery	<b>T1124</b> System Time Discovery	<b>T1007</b> System Service Discovery	<b>T1112</b> Modify Registry
<b>T1566</b> Phishing	<b>T1566.001</b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b>T1053.005</b> Scheduled Task	<b>T1027</b> Obfuscated Files or Information

## ☒ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>URLs</b>	hxxp://45.89.125[.]189/get hxxp://45.89.125[.]189/put
<b>IPV4</b>	45.89.125[.]189

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	7ae52c0562755f909d5d79c81bb99ee2403f2c2ee4d53fd1ba7692c 8053a63f6,eb2a94ee29d902c8a13571ea472c80f05cfab8ba4ef80d 92e333372f4c7191f4,b92be3d086372fc89b3466e8d9707de78a5b 6dff3e4a2eecc92c01d55a86fd7d,e4b2411286d32e6c6d3d7abffc7 0d296c814e837ef14f096c829bf07edd45180,45f293b1b5a4aaec48 ac943696302bac9c893867f1fc282e85ed8341dd2f0f50,ac933ffc33 7d13b276e6034d26cdec836f03d90cb6ac7af6e11c045eeeae8cc05, d4857156094963c8e38f6e88f4d72cb910aa537e3811eae0579f7ab c568c9ae8,be0e75d50565506baa1ce24301b702989ebe244b3a1d 248ee5ea499ba812d698,16007ea6ae7ce797451baec2132e30564 a29ee0bf8a8f05828ad2289b3690f55,bda4484bb6325dfccaa464c2 007a8f20130f0cf359a7f79e14feeab3f
MD5	691332c86dd568f87b7fff4601c37895 fc5f490dbe375779b2c6bbccdd869ca6 9a7d5f126904adc194df4dcbc2c5715c c65b10c1113c0f0d4e06609fa60d9aad f769f67681707e8f69ecdf9e62fb944c 34a2677a7776f87e810814c2d3845f47 f7611e77c5f99b81085e61b17b969afe 850b8d07180601417193a6f88227130a c3aedb781a5b96674764cd43ef076d10 a3c14604fb4454ba5722f07f89780e73
SHA1	0b676ea2ad205b70b9feb1eedbfdec72137e08e5 b8c8171b6e8efd2bb0ae8d5b22749564edd38109 a86088cf31c72cc4648ee8dfa082979a74044203 2ca263fc5f1e505c1839ab0abf56571af6c7809d c5f6a48fa52a279e1f3424b97662b479716229af 79b1f6b0afe943a60560eb20677d5b801dc29ba3 475320a5bf0ba52fc9ff711d8e6dba512b3fefbf e1f4a8e434638c56b7a0d2d0317f4d0d84987a40 86da0100bb6a07a89eaa4dc3ec220e9dbd6ecf71 ed7b9ddbbaee794cecb80fac794b0e6cb0ae073b5

## References


<https://thedfirreport.com/2023/02/06/collect-exfiltrate-sleep-repeat/>

<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049/>

# What Next?

At **Hive Pro**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with **HivePro Uni5**: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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