Protocol Audit Report

Cyfrin.io

March 7, 2023

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Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

Disclaimer

The YOUR_NAME_HERE team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in the document correspond the following commit hash:

`2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990`

Scope

```
./src/
|- PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

- Owners: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read the password.

Executive Summary

Add some notes about how the audit went, types of things you found, etc.

We spent X hours with Z auditors using Y tools. etc

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone, and no longer private.

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed through `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

We show one such method of reading any data off chain below.

Impact: Anyone can read the private password, severly breaking the functionality of the protocol.

Proof of Concept: (Proof of Code)

1. Create a locally running chain

```
make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool. We use 1 because that's the storage slot of s_password in the contract.

```
cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

4. You'll get an output that looks like this:

```
0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

5. You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
cast parse-bytes32-string 0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

6. And get an output of:

`myPassword`

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the stored password. However, you're also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with this decryption key.

My Recommendation: The password could be encrypted off-chain and then store the encrypted password on-chain. User would have to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the stored password. Remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a txn with this decryption key.

Likelihood & Impact:

- Impact: HIGH
- Likelihood: HIGH
- Severity: HIGH (or CRITICAL)

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password

Description: The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password.`

```
    function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
@>          // @audit - There are no access controls
        s_password = newPassword;
        emit SetNetPassword();
    }
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severly breaking the intended functionality.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` file.

Code

```
    function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {
        vm.assume(randomAddress != owner);
        vm.prank(randomAddress);
        string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
        passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);
```

```
        vm.prank(owner);
        string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
        assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
    }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
if(msg.sender != s_owner) {
    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
}
```

Likelihood & Impact:

- Impact: HIGH
- Likelihood: HIGH
- Severity: HIGH

Informational

[I-1] THe `PasswordStore::getPassword` natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect

Description:

```
     * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
     // @audit - There is no newPassword parameter!
     * @param newPassword The new password to set.
    function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
```

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` while the natspec says it should be `getPassword(string)`.

Impact: The natspec is incorrect.

Proof of Concept:

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
-     * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```

Likelihood & Impact:

- Impact: NONE
- Likelihood: NONE
- Severity: Informational/Gas/Non-crits