



Mobile Forensics and Challenges



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https://github.com/skmtr1/Workshop-Mobile-Forensics-And-Security



DIGITAL FORENSICS & INVESTIGATION



Terms and Definitions

- Mobile Forensics: The science of recovering digital evidence from mobile phone under forensically sound conditions using accepted methods. (NIST)
- Penetration Test: A method of evaluating the security of a computer system or network by simulating an attack from malicious outsider/insider. (Wikipedia)
- **Vulnerability Assessment:** A process of identifying, quantifying and prioritizing the vulnerabilities in a system.




Forensics Overview

- □ Potential scenarios, not specific to Mobile
- □ Evidence gathering for legal proceedings
- □ Corporate investigations
 - > Intellectual property or data theft
 - > Employment-related investigations including discrimination, sexual harassment
 - > Security audit
- □ Family matters
 - > Property disputes
 - > Divorce
- □Government security and operations
 - > Cyber Threats
 - > Stopping cyber attacks
 - Intelligence / Counter-intelligence gathering



Investigation Process





Forensics Considerations

- □ Important items to consider during investigations
 - Chain of custody
 - Detailed notes and complete report
- □ Validation of investigations results using tools or other investigators



Legalities

- □ Possibility of a mobile device being involved in crimes
- □ Easily cross geographical boundaries; multi-jurisdiction issues
- □Investigator should be well aware of regional laws
- □ Data may be altered during collections, causing legal challenges




MOBILE FORENSICS



Why Mobile Forensics?

- □ Technology improvements
- □User activities

- □Always powered on
- Multiple Communication Entity





Types of Evidence from Mobile

- Physical
- □ Electronic



Physical Evidence from Mobile

DNA

□ Fingerprints




Electronic Evidence

- □Can be use to establish LAB
- Location
- Association
- Behavior
- ■Some Information
 - Call history
 - > Contacts
 - > SMSs
 - > Calendar
 - Location
 - > Images
 - > Audio/Video
 - Many more...



Sources of Information





Network Service Provider

- □Can provide
 - > Subscriber details
 - Call History Call Details Record (CDR)
 - ➤ List of accessed web services IP Details Record (IPDR)
 - Geographic location Tower locations through which a phone is connected for communication
 - Cell Tower Logs (Tower Dump)



Call Details Record (CDR)

■Looks like

Info abut associated Mobile Device

Info about user location


Calling No.	Called No.	REC TYPE	TRANS_DT	Duration	IMEI	CELL ID
94XXXXX093	94XXXXX032	MOC	20130101113117	63	35789004232353	405-54-902-2
94XXXXX534	94XXXXX093	MTC	20130101132532	40	35789004232353	405-54-576-1
94XXXXX997	94XXXXX093	SMT	20130101165754	1	35789004232353	405-54-576-3
94XXXXX093	94XXXXX109	MOC	20130101165937	247	35789004232353	405-54-576-2

Calling No.	Called No.	REC TYPE	Date	Time	Duration	IMEI	FIRST_CELL ID (Origin)
94XXXXX093	94XXXXX032	OUT	01/01/2013	11:31:17	63	35789004232353	405-54-902-2
94XXXXX534	94XXXXX093	IN	01/01/2013	13:25:32	40	35789004232353	405-54-576-1
94XXXXX997	94XXXXX093	S_IN	01/01/2013	16:57:54	1	35789004232353	405-54-576-3
94XXXXX093	94XXXXX109	OUT	01/01/2013	16:59:37	247	35789004232353	405-54-576-2



Cell ID

- □Cell ID is used to uniquely identify BTS (base transceiver station)
- □ Comprises of four components
 - > Mobile Country Code (MCC): first 2-3 digit
 - > Mobile Network Code (MNC): next 2-3 digit
 - > Location Area Code (LAC): variable length
 - > Sector ID (SID): last digit
- □ Device is always associated with a BTS





Tower Dump

SUBS NO	OTHER PRTY NO	Date	TIME	Dur	CELLID FIRST	CELLID LAST	REC TYPE	SUBS IMEI	SUBS IMSI	SUBSCR IPTION TYPE	SMS CENTER NO	MSCID
9197XXXXX772	9177XXXXX344	8/20/2013	05:01:51	25	11971-20/8	11971-20/8	МОС	359326022655600	405804191782627	PRE	?	919762099002
9181XXXXX996	9183XXXXX714	8/20/2013	05:10:29	1	13311-20/8	13311-20/8	SMMT	358650031107530	405804191482793	PRE	919823000040	919762099002
9197XXXXX131	9198XXXXX217	8/20/2013	05:38:48	94	13311-20/8	13311-20/8	МТС	359351043644880	405804170433460	POST	?	919762099002
9187XXXXX730	9187XXXXX108	8/20/2013	05:53:03	1	13311-20/8	13311-20/8	SMMO	355672050976690	405804181584703	PRE	919716099155	919762099002




Challenges with Mobile Networks

- ■No uniformity between CDR format
- □ Correlation among multiple CDR
- □ Difficulty in analyzing tower dump
 - > Huge amount of data
 - > Difficulty in extraction of useful information
- ■Non availability of live tower data



Sources of Information





Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)


- □ Identifies/authenticates a subscriber to the network
- ■Two Unique Identities
 - > ICCID
 - > IMSI (Programmable)
- □Storage for contacts, SMSs, etc...



Integrated Circuit Card ID (ICCID)

- □It is a SIM serial number
- □19 or 20 digit length
- □ Service provider can identify phone number from ICCID
- □ Reveals country of origin, Industry Type, and network
 - > Issuer Identification Number: composed of industry type (first 2 digit), country code (next 2-3 digit), and issuer identifier (next 1-4 digit)
 - > Individual account identification: Variable length
 - Check digit Last digit of ICCID


IT: Industry Type
CC: Country Code
II: Issuer Identifier



3 Hub

International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)

- □Used by the network to identify subscriber
- □15 digit number
- □ Stored on the SIM card (programmed by the network provider)
- □ Reveals name and country of issuing service provider
 - > Mobile Country Code (MCC): first 2-3 digit
 - ➤ Mobile Network Code (MNC): next 2-3 digit
 - > Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN): remaining digits





Challenges with SIM

- □ Issue with ICCID
 - > Partial ID is printed on SIM card
 - > No printed information about ICCID

□ Damaged SIM card

□eSIM
















Sources of Information






Memory Card

- □ Serves as secondary storage for mobile
- ■Use file system to store information mostly FAT
- □Stores Audio, video, photos, backup, etc...


□Challenge:

- Damaged memory card
- > Corrupted file system
- > Encryption





Sources of Information





Mobile Handset

- ■Just Looking
 - > Make / Model
 - > Condition
 - > Age
 - Capabilities
 - Network type 2G, 3G, 4G, Others
- □ Rich source of information
 - Contacts, images, videos, call logs, SMSs, etc..
- □Uniquely identified by using IMEI










International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI)

- □Kind of serial number of the handset, (15 digit long)
- □Intended to be unique
 - > Can be reprogrammed with specialized equipment (illegal)
- □Can reveal (First eight digits, TAC)
 - > Make, mode, date and country of origin
- □ Serial Number (next six digits)
- □Check digit (last digit)
- □Can be validated by using <u>Luhn formula</u>

Check Digit



Type Allocation Code (TAC)

Serial No. (SNR)



Information of Interest

Basic Information

- IMEI
- H/W and S/W information
- Network Information

Event Logs

- Incoming, outgoing missed call history
- SMS history
- Session logs Wi-if, GPRS/3G/4G

Calendar Events

- Meetings, reminders
- Last modification

Tasks

- Description
- Deadline, priority
- Completion date & time

Messaging System

- Text and multimedia messages
- BIO messages: vCard, configurations, and others
- Beamed messages: file sent via Bluetooth, IT or USB



Information of Interest cont...

GPS Navigation

- Last fixed GPS coordinates
- Search and Routes history
- Saved maps, favorite places

Location Tagger

- GPS coordinates in camera snapshots
- Cell tower coordinates in camera snapshots
- · Cell tower coordinates for SMS, calls

IM Clients

- IP, Login (UID, email) and password*
- Contact list
- Chat and call history

Contact Info

- Caller groups
- Speed dials

Apps

- Multiple Apps with their storage capacity
- Like social media activities, emails, web history, etc..




Challenges with Mobile Device

- ■Multiple smartphone vendors and OS(es)
- Mobile platform security features
- □Generic state of the device
- □ Anti-forensic techniques
- ■Dynamic nature of evidence
- □ Accidental reset
- □ Device alteration
- ■Phone lock
- Malicious Programs
- Multiple communication point
- □Legal issues



Sources of Information





Applications (Apps)

- □Can be used to analyze behavior/state of person
 - > Social gathering, health condition, etc...
- □ App stores local data in SQLite database
- Application analysis can give type of information and metadata about an App

□Challenge:

- Different architecture for different Apps
- > Dynamic nature behave differently in different environment
- > Use of encryption to store data
- > Correlations between Apps



CASE STUDY

VAPT of Mobile Devices




Why VAPT of Mobile Devices?

- □In September 2021 (Lithuania Government)
 - > Malicious activities by Xiaomi Mi 10T mobile
 - > Communication to outside server
 - Censoring certain terms and phrases
- □C3i Hub at IIT Kanpur decided to test new Xiaomi Mi 10T device available in the Indian market




Analysis Workflow





How to Monitor Network traffic

■Two ways.





VAPT OF XIAOMI MI 10T



Analysis of Device

- ■Three scenarios
- □ First, Network traffic analysis without interaction
- □ Second, Traffic analysis with interaction
- □ Third, Static analysis of default applications (Apps)



Traffic Analysis Without Interaction

Configuration

- Did not configured Google account
- No third-party app installed
- No alteration to device such as rooting
- Connected with Wi-Fi router
- Wi-Fi router is connected with managed switch
- Port mirroring to get network traffic on a system

Results and Observation

- 188 unique IPs
- Active SSH connection to the device from IP 165.XXX.189.245. IP is not present in IP Abuse database.
- Communication with custom port (5222 seems web based SSH) with two IPs (13.XXX.155.113, 13.XXX.235.56). IP 13.XXX.235.56 was flagged malicious by VirusTotal.com



Traffic Analysis With Interaction

Configuration and conditions

- Connected with Wi-Fi router
- Wi-Fi router is connected with a managed switch
- Port mirroring to get network traffic on a system and started capturing
- Creating an Mi account and start interacting with the phone
- Storing sensitive data such as photos, videos. Text files etc., with fine name such as password, username ..



Static Analysis: Default Apps

Procedure

- 89 default Apps
- Extracted using ADB
- From each application extracted hardcoded:
 - IPs
 - URLs
- Obtained unique IPs/URLs
- Search of IPs/URLs in publicly known databases to flag malicious IP/URLs



Results: Traffic Analysis with Interaction and Static Analysis of Default Apps

Results and Observation

- 1533 Unique IPs associated with Apps
- Two IP (129.226.107.102, 129.226.106.5) belongs to Tenecent Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co.
- 15 malicious IP flagged by different services of Virustotal
 - Services: Webroot, Comodo Valkyrie Verdict, EST security-Threat inside
 - Malicious IPs: 163.XXX.208.212, 185.XXX.111.153, 185.XXX.108.153, 185.XXX.110.153, 185.XXX.109.153, 157.XXX.158.198, 157.XXX.163.158, 221.XXX.79.225, 104.XXX.20.226, 104.XXX.21.226, 151.XXX.128.14, 157.XXX.163.158, 157.XXX.158.198





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Thank You