(a) We can give only A and B shares of the secret and then require that there must be 2 out of 2 parties to construct the secret in a Shamir secret sharing scheme.

(b) Assuming we have some combination of gates that take inputs and outputs the secret if the inputs are correct, we will start our definition of our scheme by working top down starting from the output. Starting from the output, whenever there is an OR gate, we make it so each input of the OR gate will construct the same secret, which is also the output secret. Whenever we see an AND gate, we give each of the inputs of the gate a different share that is also itself a secret and make it so that we need shares equal to the number of inputs of the AND gate to produce the output secret with Shamir secret-sharing. Each input to an AND gate has its own secret (its share), different from that of the other inputs to that AND gate as well as the output. The input to the AND gate needs to determine its own secret before it can provide an input to the AND gate. In other words, we make each AND gate a N out of N gate and make it so that each input to the AND gate needs to construct its share since the share is also a secret. For each T out of N gate, we use Shamir secret-sharing. Part c will illustrate how this scheme works with an example.

(c) We make it so both inputs of the OR gate will construct the same secret. So, Professor Rivest gets the secret and ((2 out of 3 TA's) AND (10 out of 20 students)) will be able to construct the same secret. We then make the AND gate a 2 out of 2 Shamir secret-sharing gate and give both inputs a share which is also a secret. In this case, (2 out of 3 TA's) will be enough to reconstruct S1 and (10 out of 20 students) will reconstruct S2. Where S1 and S2 are secrets, S1 is not S2, and S1 and S2 are the shares that together will reconstruct out original secret. Then, we use Shamir secret-sharing for both (2 out of 3 TA's) and (10 out of 20 students) such that (2 out of 3 TA's) will reconstruct the secret S1 and (10 out of 20 students) will reconstruct the secret S2.

a. $E[collisions] = \sum P(h(x_i) = P(x_j)) = \binom{n}{2} \cdot 2^{-d}$. When n, the number of hashes we compute is $c \cdot 2^{d/2}$, $E[collisions] = \binom{c \cdot 2^{d/2}}{2} \cdot 2^{-d}$. This approximates to $\frac{(c \cdot 2^{d/2})^2}{2} \cdot 2^{-d} = \frac{c^2}{2}$. b. XOR is one way. AND is not because it changes the distribution c. Not collision resistant. For any x1, x2, you can pick y1, y2 such that y1 = x1 xor x2 and y2 = 0. Then we clearly have a collision. d. Not weak collision resistant. Given x = x1, x2, we can just find x' = x2, x1 which will collide. If x1 = x2, we can just use 0, 0.

3. a. 000000c4d41c812229f06b454c5be8ed7578a839ce14a564e29439700b0000d1 b. 000000000013e89b64470493a
if the current chain is the longest chain. 0000000013bd8a5052bf398013a5847d17df2ed0ab5856e937e060748bfd3ea
if a different chain overtakes the longest chain when the assignment is due. I currently suspect that
the teams pushing the chain where we have the second hash are hiding their results and will publish
all of them when the assignment is due. We coded a GPU based Java program using the aparapi
library and continuously tried to add to the current longest chain. The program works by randomly
creating hashes and checking if they have the correct number of zeros. Every some seconds, we
query to see if the current node has a next node. If so, we stop trying to build a block and work on
the next block instead. Generally, we waited at most 4 confirmations to determine that our block
was on the longest chain. We have about 300 Megahashes/second and have been running this since
2/26. c. Haven't done d. Peinan spent it on food.