

Spy Who Came In from the Cold—because of their cynicism and themes of betrayal. Helms authorized HOWARD HUNT to write spy novels while he was on the CIA payroll. There was hope that Hunt would produce the American answer to James Bond. Helms, like DCI ALLEN W. DULLES, believed that spy novels of the James Bond variety helped popularize an agency that could do little to publicize itself.

La Carré noted that intelligence agencies had frequently recruited writers and did not realize the price that had to be paid. “Writers are a subversive crowd, nothing if not traitors,” le Carré told *The Sunday Times* in 1986. “The better the writer, the greater the betrayal tends to appear, a thing the secret community has learned the hard way, for I hear it is no longer quite so keen to have us aboard.”

Often, the discriminating reader does not know where reality begins or ends. The same is true when the ex-agent decides to write a nonfiction book. The prime example of this true-or-false nonfiction is *My Silent War* (1968), in which HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY writes of his DOUBLE AGENT career working for both MI6 and the KGB. Philby’s book was expected to ooze with propaganda, but Graham Greene called the book “far more gripping than any novel of espionage I can remember.”

HISTORY AND ESPIONAGE

Unlike other facets of history, the role of intelligence in world events does not get the coverage it deserves. Most historians, facing the chasms of misinformation inherent in intelligence, abandon attempts to write about it. When information about ULTRA and other World War II code-breaking was finally released, for example, most historians failed to credit the importance of CRYPTANALYSIS in winning and losing battles.

Robin W. Winks of Yale University is one of the few historians who have carefully examined intelligence. Looking primarily at the culture that produced the first recruits of the Office of Strategic Services, Winks wrote an informative, witty, and well-documented book *Cloak & Gown* (1987), which he called “a history of a peculiar kind.”

Historians, he noted, “traditionally rely upon documentation,” but intelligence relies “on the denial, the falsifying, and the destruction of documentation.” And even when documentation is provided to the archives, it is often jumbled and deliberately riddled with inaccuracies.

Espionage literature, Winks wrote:

tends either to partake of the special pleading generally associated with the memoir, which is natural to a person who has come to the field through participation in it; or to be defensive—one not very hidden agenda being a plea for understanding that spying is essential to the protection of an open and democratic society from its closed enemies—or wildly, arrogantly angry, as with the work of PHILIP AGEE and the “disclosers.”

(For a list of books that the authors of this book found reliable, see the Recommended Reading list at the back of this book.)

The search for truth in spy fiction can be as frustrating as the search for truth in supposedly well-documented nonfiction treatments of espionage. Rupert Allason, the leading writer on the subject of British intelligence in the 1970s and 1980s (writing under the pseudonym NIGEL WEST), said in *MI6* (1983), “The dangers of placing faith in documentary records was pointed out by one particular retired Head of Station who told me that much of the information in his Station’s Registry was pure fiction.”

Philip Roth, whose career has clearly been that of a novelist, mystified readers (and spy novel fans) with his *Operation Shylock* (1993), which at least some U.S. bookstores put on the “spy thriller” shelves. Roth has a character named Philip Roth work in Athens as an Israeli spy. Readers and critics assumed that the book was a novel, but Roth later insisted that what he had written was indeed true. At the end of the book a MOSSAD operative tells “Roth” that it is in his interest to say that the book is fictional. “And I became quite convinced that it was in my interest to do that,” Roth added, explaining, “. . . I’m just a good Mossadnik.”

●● LOCKHART, SIR ROBERT BRUCE

(b. 1887 d. 1970)

British diplomat who played a complex role during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917–1918.

Born in Scotland, Lockhart later proclaimed, “There is no drop of English blood in my veins.” He was educated in Germany and France and, after completing his studies, went to Malaya to work on a rubber plantation, where, at great personal risk, he made a sultan’s ward his mistress.

After a time in Japan and Canada, he returned to Scotland, but soon accepted an appointment as British vice consul in Moscow, the center of radicalism in Russia, then heavily engaged in disastrous World War I battles. He became consul in 1915, as German victories on the Russian front were demoralizing the home front. A year later, with the war going even worse for the Russians, the British mounted a propaganda effort, with Lockhart getting pro-British, pro-war articles into Russian newspapers.

In the summer of 1917 the British ambassador recalled him to Britain, ostensibly due to fears about his health; in reality Lockhart, who was married, had become involved with a married Russian woman, and the ambassador felt that his removal would end the affair. He arrived back in England six weeks before the Bolshevik Revolution began.

Sent back to Russia after the Nov. 1917 revolution to make contact with the revolutionaries, he arrived in the capital of Petrograd (St. Petersburg) while Bolshevik negotiator Leon Trotsky was at Brest-Litovsk arranging a separate peace with Germany. After the Bolshevik press hailed Lockhart’s arrival, a U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER in

Petrograd reported that Lockhart was a dangerous revolutionary. Lockhart found himself caught between those who supported the Bolsheviks and those who believed that a democratic state was possible.

After his first meeting with Trotsky, Lockhart wrote in his diary, "He strikes me as a man who would willingly die for Russia provided there was a big enough audience to see him do it."

As Allied diplomats began leaving Russia, Lockhart arranged to get them Bolshevik-stamped passports. He got most approved, but a functionary made a pile of rejects, including one belonging to a Col. Keyes, a British intelligence officer under diplomatic COVER. The woman stamping the passports was pretty, Lockhart recalled. "I talked to her gently, and she smiled. I continued to talk, and, as we talked, I began to fiddle with the passports. As I was whispering to her, I slipped Keyes's passport into the large pile. And, God bless her blue eyes, she stamped it!"

The last Allied diplomats left Petrograd on Feb. 28, 1917. Lockhart volunteered to stay and, as the sole British diplomatic representative in Russia, moved to Moscow when the Bolsheviks relocated the government there. Remaining with Lockhart was a Navy intelligence officer: To prevent Germany from getting the Russian Baltic Fleet, he recruited AGENTS who would try to scuttle the ships if necessary.

In May 1918 Lockhart was told that a British officer had appeared in Moscow and demanded to see Lenin, claiming to have been sent by Prime Minister Lloyd George. The man was master spy SIDNEY REILLY, sent by British intelligence (MI6) to undermine the Bolsheviks. In August, as Lockhart was preparing to leave Russia, agents of the CHEKA, the Bolshevik secret police, arrested him at gunpoint, took him to the LUBYANKA, the Cheka prison, and demanded to know the whereabouts of Reilly.

Lenin had been shot and grievously wounded, and a British-backed plot was suspected. The Bolshevik press proclaimed a "Lockhart Plot"—a plan to murder Lenin and Trotsky and set up a military dictatorship. Reilly, who had vanished, was also cited as a plotter (which he was). Lockhart was picked up again and held in solitary confinement for more than a month before being exchanged for Maxim Litvinov, a Soviet agent being held in Britain.

Celebrated by British newspapers as the "Boy Ambassador," Lockhart arrived in Britain a hero. He later wrote that he had been tempted to remain in Russia and had been offered employment in the Cheka. After leaving the foreign service in 1928, he became a journalist and author.

In his book *Memoirs of a British Agent* (1932) he limned a penetrating, close-in view of the Russian Revolution, introducing readers to Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and FELIKS DZERZHINSKY, head of the Cheka. He also met and "paid little attention" to a "strongly-built man with a sal-low face, black moustache, heavy eyebrows, and black hair"—Josef Stalin. The book was a sensation in Britain and the United States. Subsequent editions were pub-

lished in French, German, Italian, Swedish, Danish, Polish, and Finnish.

Lockhart's memoirs were republished in 1974 and 1984, with an introduction by his son, Robin Bruce Lockhart, who served in British NAVAL INTELLIGENCE during World War II. The younger Lockhart later wrote *Reilly: Ace Of Spies* (1967), which subsequently became a TELEVISION miniseries.

In 1966 the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*, resurrecting the old charges that Lockhart and Reilly had tried to subvert the revolution, claimed that Cheka agents had penetrated the plot and that Lockhart had known more about Reilly's plans than he had later admitted.

●● LODY, LT. CARL HANS

German naval reserve officer who spied for Germany in Britain during World War I.

As a tourist guide for the Hamburg-Amerika Line, Lody learned to speak English with an American accent. Recruited as an AGENT by German MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, he arrived in Edinburgh, Scotland, on a U.S. passport, posing as an American tourist. German intelligence had stolen the passport from an American in BERLIN.

Lody's CASE OFFICER was Adolf Burchard in Stockholm, Sweden. Lody sent a cable that announced his arrival in Scotland—and also delighting in recent German military losses. The cable had been routinely intercepted by the British Security Service (MI5), which thought the language and tone of the cable peculiar. Lody was placed under SURVEILLANCE.

He continued to send messages to Burchard, but MI5 let only one reach him: a false rumor that Russian troops were passing through Scotland on their way to the Western Front.

Lody was arrested and court-martialed in London in Oct. 1914. He was found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad on the grounds of the Tower of London on Nov. 6. Supposedly, he turned to the officer in charge of the firing quad and said, "I suppose you will not shake hands with a spy?" The officer replied, "No, I will not; but I will shake hands with a brave man."

Lody was one of 30 spies arrested in Britain during World War I. He and 11 others were executed, one killed himself, and the others were imprisoned. After Lody's "well-publicized execution," Phillip Knightley wrote in *The Second Oldest Profession* (1986), there was "a distinct lack of volunteers" in Germany. Like most German spies of that time, Knightley wrote, Lody was "scandalously ill-prepared" and was one of a "pathetic group of inadequates" drawn to espionage in search of easy money or the fulfillment of fantasies.

●● LONDON CAGE

Mansion in Kensington Palace Gardens, London, where British INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS conducted interrogations of German prisoners of war during World War II. Often their rooms had BUGS, and British officers listened to their private conversations.

●● LONDON CONTROLLING STATION

(LCS)

Secret Allied unit that organized DECEPTION plans to mislead German strategists. Prime Minister Churchill established the unit, which was usually referred to as the LCS. The chief of the LCS was called “the Controller of Deception.”

LCS invented and developed deception plans—such as A FORCE, a phantom army of inflatable tanks and dummy parachute troops—but did not carry out operations. These were conducted by such agencies as the TWENTY COMMITTEE, MI6, SOE, and the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. For the D-DAY deceptions, LCS worked with the Anglo-American Deception Unit of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the American Joint Security Control.

●● LONETREE, CPL. CLAYTON J.

(b. 1961)

U.S. Marine Corps guard at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1984–1986 who divulged classified information to the KGB. He was the first and only U.S. Marine ever convicted of espionage. His being a TARGET of Soviet intelligence was part of the KGB policy of seeking to subvert U.S. minorities.

Lonetree, grandson of the chief of the Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin and nephew of a Marine who won the Medal of Honor in the Korean War, enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1980. In 1984 he volunteered for embassy guard duty and took a six-week embassy service course. After being given a SECURITY CLEARANCE at the TOP SECRET level along with all of the other graduates, he awaited assignment.

In 1984 he was ordered to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. There, like all other Marines assigned to Moscow, Lonetree signed a nonfraternization agreement and promised to report all contacts with Soviet citizens. In letters home Lonetree said he had become a minor celebrity, “surrounded” by Muscovites who gawked at him because they had never seen an American Indian. But for all the attention, he was often lonely and morose. He drank more than he should have; according to a Marine officer familiar with Lonetree’s record, he was “a loner and a loser.”

One day he met a pretty, 25-year-old Russian employee of the embassy, Violetta A. Seina, at a Moscow metro stop. “Violetta said she was going home but continued to talk with me after missing her train stop,” Lonetree later recalled. “We got off together at a later stop and began a long walk together, talking about various subjects, including American movies, books, food, likes and dislikes.” They walked and talked for about two hours. Their friendship soon developed into a sexual relationship.

Their dating was interrupted when Lonetree, despite his poor disciplinary record, was sent to Geneva as part of the security force for the Nov. 1985 summit meeting of President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

When Lonetree returned to Moscow, his romance with Violetta deepened. “We both agreed that it was not safe for us to be seen together in public or near her house,” Lonetree later recounted. “I would utilize counter-surveillance techniques in leaving the embassy and going to Violetta’s house.”

In Jan. 1986 Violetta introduced Lonetree to her “Uncle Sasha,” whose was really Aleksey Yefimov, a KGB INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. Uncle Sasha asked the Marine if he would like to be a friend of the Soviet Union. “At that time,” according to Lonetree, “he began asking me a series of questions which were written on a list he held on his lap. He said the list had been prepared by a friend of his who is a general in the KGB and also a member of the Central Committee.”

Yefimov showed Lonetree photos of Marines and other people who worked at the U.S. Embassy. There were also some snapshots of men and women. Lonetree rearranged the photos to show Uncle Sasha who was married to whom. Lonetree also described in detail the layout of the ambassador’s office. What else Lonetree told Uncle Sasha—and what he did for him and Violetta—may never be known. But he had obviously become the victim of a KGB HONEY TRAP operation.

On March 9, 1986, the day before Lonetree’s departure for the Marine guard force at the U.S. Embassy in VIENNA, Yefimov gave Lonetree a piece of paper to sign that said, “I am a friend of the Soviet Union. I will always be a friend of the Soviet Union, and will continue to be their friend.” At this or another meeting with Uncle Sasha, Lonetree was asked to place a BUG in the ambassador’s office. He later said that he had refused, but that he did provide “plans” not otherwise described.

Lonetree agreed to meet Yefimov in Vienna, where the Marine provided information on Americans in that embassy and handed over a floor plan of the embassy, a phone directory, and the names of the Austrian cleaning women, along with the rooms each woman was responsible for. He was paid a total of \$2,500 in U.S. currency and the equivalent of \$1,000 in Austrian currency.

Yefimov wanted to know whether any Marines were HOMOSEXUALS or had alcohol problems, and asked Lonetree what he knew about the ambassador’s secretary. Later, alone one night on guard duty, Lonetree slipped top-secret documents out of the embassy and hid them in a drainpipe on the roof of the building where the Marines lived. He also stole the contents of a burn bag—about 120 documents that included information on America’s position on negotiations for a Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.

On Dec. 12, 1986, Yefimov turned Lonetree over to “George,” a KGB officer named Yuri Lysov, who asked questions similar to the ones Yefimov had asked. There was also talk about getting Lonetree back to Moscow and his beloved Violetta, perhaps with the aid of a Soviet diplomatic passport. But on Dec. 14, 1986, Lonetree told the CIA station chief what had been happening. Some sources say that the CIA instinctively moved to make Lonetree a DOUBLE AGENT. But the Department of Defense

refused to let Lonetree be TURNED. His case was handed to the NAVY INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS).

Lonetree was charged with espionage, but the investigation did not end there. The NIS began questioning other Marines. Cpl. Arnold Bracy and Lonetree were accused of allowing KGB operatives into the embassy at night and giving them access to secret documents and cryptographic equipment.

In the panic that followed, embassy officials, fearing that the KGB had bugged communications rooms, cut back messages to and from Washington. All 28 Marines in Moscow were replaced. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said that the United States had suffered “a very great loss.” Congressional critics clamored for the razing of the unfinished building that was to be the new U.S. Embassy, which was said to be riddled with bugs.

A third Marine, Staff Sgt. Robert S. Stufflebeam, deputy leader of the Moscow guard unit, was charged with failing to report fraternizing with Soviet women. The cases against Bracy and Stufflebeam were dropped, and the NIS was severely criticized for its handling of the situation.

Lonetree was court-martialed in 1987 for supplying classified information, conspiring to commit espionage, disclosing the identities of covert agents, and other offenses. He was sentenced to 30 years, but his sentence was shortened because he cooperated with COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officers after his arrest. He was released in Feb. 1996 after having served nearly nine years.

●● LONG, LEO

Member of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING recruited by Sir ANTHONY BLUNT.

Long entered Cambridge University, where he concentrated on French studies, in 1935. The son of an unemployed carpenter and a bitter critic of British society, Long became a member of the Communist Party cell at the university. He also joined The Apostles, a secret Cambridge society whose members included Blunt and GUY BURGESS, another member of the Cambridge ring.

During World War II Long worked in British MILITARY INTELLIGENCE as a uniformed officer and gained access to highly secret codebreaking work at BLETCHLEY PARK, passing this information to Blunt, also a Soviet AGENT. Later, at Blunt's urging, Long was assigned to the military intelligence section that assessed German SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. His information on German intercepts supplemented that being sent to the Soviets via another Blunt recruit, JOHN CAIRNCROSS.

After the war, Long worked for the British Control Commission in Allied-occupied Germany as deputy head of military intelligence. When Blunt retired from the Security Service (MI5), he tried unsuccessfully to have Long appointed in his place. Long left intelligence work and, presumably, espionage, in 1951.

PETER WRIGHT, the MI5 officer who interrogated Blunt, got Long's name from him and then questioned Long, who, like Blunt, was promised immunity from prosecution in exchange for giving information. “Far

from being helpful in his debriefing,” Wright wrote in *Spycatcher* (1987), “his attitude, when challenged on a point, was invariably to say that we would just have to take his word for it.”

●● LONSDALE, GORDON ARNOLD [P]

(b. 1922 d. 1970)

The assumed name of a Soviet ILLEGAL sent to the United States as a potential spy at the age of 11. The man known as Lonsdale carried the name of a child who had been born in Canada and taken by his mother to Finland, where he died, possibly during the Finno-Soviet War in 1939–1940. Soviet espionage operatives obtained Lonsdale's Canadian birth record and passport and used the documents to manufacture an identity for Conon Trofimovich Molody, the Moscow-born son of a Soviet science writer.

When Conon was eleven, his mother sent him to live in California with her sister, who posed as his mother. After five years in California, he returned to the Soviet Union, where he received a commission in the Red Navy and was trained in espionage. A Soviet grain ship carried him to Vancouver, where, with the Lonsdale documents, he established a Canadian identity. He attributed his odd accent—American English tinged with a Russian—to his days as a lumberjack far from civilization.

Sometime after World War II, Lonsdale wrote in his book, *Spy* (1965), he went to the United States and met a Soviet AGENT who appears to have been RUDOLF ABEL. “I do not propose to describe in any detail my experiences in the United States,” he wrote coyly. “Any reader will understand my reason for this.” He claimed that the FBI had been unable to learn what he did in the United States. The manuscript was prepared with the aid of the KGB.

In 1955 Lonsdale journeyed to England, where he spied out British defense secrets under COVER of a businessman whose enterprises included renting jukeboxes and manufacturing bubblegum machines. One of his TARGETS was a Royal Navy underwater weapons facility.

In 1960 revelations of Lt. Col. MICHAL GOLIEWSKI, a DEFECTOR from the Polish Intelligence Service, inspired a security investigation at the facility. This led to Lonsdale's arrest and the roundup of four members of his ring. Two of them, Helen and Peter Kroger (see MORRIS COHEN), also had identities created by the KGB and its predecessors.

Tried and convicted at London's Old Bailey for conspiring to pass information “which might be directly or indirectly to an enemy,” Molody-Lonsdale was sentenced to 25 years in prison. In 1964 he was exchanged for British AGENT GREVILLE WYNNE. The SPY SWAP had been originated by Lonsdale's wife and Mrs. Wynne.

Lonsdale, hailed as a hero when he returned to Moscow, became part of the ex-spy community there. He was particularly friendly with GEORGE BLAKE, a British spy Lonsdale had met in prison when both were serving their espionage sentences.

The MI5 CODE NAME for Lonsdale was Last Act.

Also see PORTLAND CASE, HARRY HOUGHTON.

●● LORD HAW HAW

see WILLIAM JOYCE

●● LOTZ, WOLFGANG

(b. 1921 d. 1995)

German-born Israeli INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who operated in Cairo from 1959 to 1964.

Lotz's father was a Gentile, his mother a Jew. His father died when he was quite young. In 1937, fleeing Nazi persecution of Jews, Lotz and his mother emigrated to Palestine, then under British control. The boy joined the Haganah, the Jewish defense force, and after the European War began in Sept. 1939, he volunteered for the British Army. Lotz became a commando and fought in North Africa.

After the war, Lotz returned to Palestine and took part in the Israeli War of independence in 1948, running arms and then fighting in the Israeli Army, ending his war service as a major.

Sometime after that he was recruited by the MOSSAD, the Israeli intelligence service. Tall, blond, and fluent in German, Lotz was an ideal operative to infiltrate the Nazi colony that had sprung up in Cairo. Lotz's LEGEND was that he was a former German officer who had fought in Rommel's Afrika Korps in the desert war in Egypt and had moved to Australia, where he had made a fortune as a racehorse owner and breeder. He spent a year in Germany to harden his COVER story.

Lotz opened a riding school and stud farm near Cairo and strutted around like a dedicated Nazi expatriate. Rumors spread that he had been an SS officer. He became friends with the head of the Egyptian police and with scientists among the ex-Nazis. (The Israelis were concerned about possible Egyptian use of former rocket developers and weapons specialists.)

To complete his cover, the Mossad arranged for Lotz, whose wife and child were in Israel, to take a blond, Nordic-looking German wife named Waldraut Neumann. A fake wedding ceremony took place in Munich. (He later claimed that he had met her on the Orient Express and married her without telling her he was a Mossad operative.)

Lotz, who periodically made secret trips to Israel to see his family, continued living his double life until 1964. By then Egypt had developed an efficient Secret Service, with officers trained by British, U.S., and Soviet intelligence officers. Aided by Soviet experts in radio detection techniques, the Egyptian Secret Service traced his transmissions and found his clandestine radio hidden in a bathroom scale.

The Secret Service arrested, interrogated, and tortured Lotz, who insisted that he was a German working for Israeli money; the fact that he was not circumcised helped him sustain his cover. If the Egyptians had known he was an Israeli, he probably would have been executed. Put on trial as a formality, he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. Waldraut, who had also been arrested and tried, was sentenced to three years.

Lotz was freed in 1968 in exchange for nine Egyptian generals captured the year before in the Six Day War.

Lotz, who divorced his wife in Israel and truly married Waldraut, wrote about his adventures in *The Champagne Spy* (1972). The title came from the Mossad nickname for the high-living Lotz. Waldraut, who converted to Judaism, died in 1973. Lotz moved to Germany, where he married twice more before his death.

●● LOURDES

Site of massive Soviet-Russian SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE facility near Havana, Cuba. Called the most sophisticated Soviet spy base outside the Eastern Bloc when it was publicly revealed by the U.S. government in March 1985, it was credited with being able to monitor telephone conversations in the southeastern United States, space activities at Cape Canaveral, Fla., and transmissions by U.S. commercial and military SATELLITES.

At that time the facility was operated by 2,100 technicians, military and civilian.

The facility was established in the mid-1960s.

Also see CUBA.

●● LOWE, THADDEUS S.C.

(b. 1832 d. 1913)

BALLOON enthusiast who served as an aerial spy for the Union Army during American Civil War. Interested in balloons from the age of about 25, in 1860 he came to the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. to propose making a balloon flight across the Atlantic Ocean.

When the war began in 1861 he offered his services to the Union Army. President Lincoln invited him to dine at the White House and listened to his proposals for military use of observation balloons. On June 18, 1861, he went aloft in a balloon over Washington with a telegraph key and sent what is believed to be the first message ever transmitted electrically from the air. It was addressed to Lincoln.

Paid \$5 per day while constructing balloons for the Army and \$10 per day while an "aeronaut" for the Army, Lowe began producing and flying balloons for the Army. The Balloon Corps of the Army of the Potomac—with four balloons—was formally established in Nov. 1861. Lowe was the first man known to observe artillery fire from the air and to telegraph corrections back to the cannoneers. He may also have been the first man to use a camera effectively from a balloon for gathering intelligence about enemy forces, and he was the first to collect intelligence from a balloon tethered to a barge (in the Potomac River).

Lowe and the other Union balloonists were never really supported by the Army, although their missions were often successful. He left Army service in May 1863.

He continued his interest in science and is credited with being the first person to manufacture artificial ice.

●● L-PILL

Lethal or poison pill, traditionally carried by spies to be used if captured to prevent their being tortured and revealing secrets. During World War II some lethal pills

consisted of cyanide encased in glass. They could be concealed in a false tooth and worked loose by the AGENT's tongue if necessary. He would then bite into the capsule, breaking the glass, and would die almost instantly. If the pill broke loose while the agent was sleeping, however, it would pass harmlessly through his digestive track.

Of course, an agent caught with an L-pill who was not able to use it would immediately be identified as a spy.

Records of the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) indicate that an L-pill was used only twice by OSS agents. Significantly, when OSS chief WILLIAM DONOVAN and his aide David Bruce visited the Normandy beaches on June 7, 1944, the day after the Allied landings, they had no L-pills. Donovan, fearful of capture, told Bruce he would kill them both with his pistol if they were in danger of capture.

During the Cold War American spies employed more sophisticated methods of suicide if caught. Initially, pilots of U-2 spyplanes were issued cyanide pills. GARY FRANCIS POWERS, whose U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, and his fellow spy pilots were later issued what looked like ordinary silver dollar coins fitted with a metal loop that could be fastened onto a key chain or a chain worn around the neck. But this charm was lethal: When unscrewed revealed a thin needle carrying curare, a deadly poison. (When Powers was shot down his captors immediately took the silver dollar—and discovered the poison needle; it is now on display at the KGB MUSEUM in Moscow.)

●● LUBYANKA

Longtime headquarters of Russian-Soviet state security ORGANS. Located at No. 2 Dzerzhinsky Street, just off DZERZHINSKY SQUARE, the building became synonymous with the terror of Soviet intelligence-security agencies. The building served as organ headquarters, prison (with rooftop exercise yard), and execution center.

Before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the large, gray stone building had housed the insurance companies called "Anchor" and "Russia." The single Soviet insurance company, which had taken over the functions of these two as well as other czarist companies, was called Gosstrakh. This was an acronym from the words *gosudarstvennoye* and *strakhovaniye*, the Russian words for "state insurance company." NKVD officer A. I. Romanov, in his autobiographic *Nights Are the Longest There* (1972) told how "In Russian the word Strakh, the second part of the acronym, means terror, and people used to say jokingly, 'It used to be Gosstrakh, now its Gosuzhas', which we must translate as, 'It used to be state terror, now it's state horror.'

Countless numbers of men and women were incarcerated in Lubyanka. The term THE CELLAR was often used as the threat of imprisonment in Lubyanka. In fact, the cellar was used for executions; there are no cells there. Robert Conquest wrote in *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties* (1968):

The cellars of the Lubyanka were really a sort of basement divided into a number of rooms off corri-

dors. Later on, in ordinary routine, the condemned handed in their clothes in one of these rooms and changed into white underclothes only. They were taken to the death cell and shot in the back of the neck with a TT eight-shot automatic. A doctor then signed the death certificate, the last document to be put in their files, and the tarpaulin on the floor was taken away to be cleaned by a woman specially employed for that purpose.

The Lubyanka's principal internal prison is located on the sixth floor of the building. (Much larger was Moscow Lefortovo's prison—where during the height of the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s up to 70 men per day were executed with a shot to the back of the neck.)

The cells in Lubyanka could be kept cold, very cold, hot, or very hot; if a prisoner's attitude so warranted, lights would be kept on for 24 hours. When a prisoner being taken for an examination would pass another, one would be faced to the wall so there could be no recognition. Sometimes guards escorting prisoners would continually snap their fingers, the noise preventing an accidental meeting of escorted prisoners. Interrogations (often torture sessions) were conducted by trained interrogators aided by assistants—known as "bone crushers."

The chairman of state security (at times combined with internal security—see RUSSIA-USSR) had his office on the third floor, as did most other officers of the executive branch of the agency. Hidden in the labyrinth is a MUSEUM, which in recent years has grown to considerable size, and a wall honoring state intelligence and security officers who have been awarded the honor of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After World War II the Lubyanka complex was expanded, the workmen being German prisoners of war, who were retained for several years (or until they died).

The headquarters and certain directorates of the KGB were later moved from Lubyanka into modern office buildings in another Moscow location, all linked by computer and telex networks. Major KGB offices were relocated to the 31-story SEV building at the Tchaikovsky Street end of Kalinia Prospect, one of Moscow's major boulevards.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, selected foreigners and Russians were being given guided tours of *parts* of Lubyanka for \$30 per person.

●● LUCY SPY RING

World War II Soviet espionage operation named after Lucy, CODE NAME for Karl Sedlacek, a Czech military INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who worked in Switzerland under COVER as a journalist named Thomas Selzinger.

One of the Soviets running the ring was Sando Rudolphi. Hungarian-born, he became a communist in 1919 and began working for Soviet intelligence. As an undercover agent for the Comintern, he spied in Paris in the early 1930s and in 1936. After changing his name to Alexander Rado, with the anagram CODE NAME Dora, he became the resident director of the Soviet intelligence network in Switzerland.

The other key members of the ring were RUDOLPH ROESSLER, an anti-Nazi German with connections in the German Army, and ALEXANDER FOOTE, a British leftist who became the radioman for the ring. He transmitted to Moscow almost daily. Soviet AGENT Ursula Kuczynski (see SONIA) also served the ring; so did Rachel Duebendorfer, a Pole code-named Sissy, who sometimes got direct orders from Moscow, and Christian Schneider, code-named Taylor, who was Duebendorfer's CUTOUT with Roessler. In 1943 Soviet intelligence officials asked Duebendorfer to find out the Lucy's identity. She refused.

Through tight compartmentalization and a series of cut-outs, members of the ring did not meet one another. Rado, using Duebendorfer and Schneider as cutouts, never met Roessler. Foote later said he only once met Roessler face to face.

The ring produced amazing intelligence. From it came a warning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, giving the exact date, June 22, 1941, and the ORDER OF BATTLE. The Lucy ring also gave the Soviets the exact time of a planned German offensive at Kursk, giving the defenders in that battle a great advantage. ALLEN W. DULLES, European spymaster stationed in Switzerland for the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, said that the ring got intelligence from the German High Command "on a continuous basis, often less than twenty-four hours after its daily decisions concerning the Eastern front were made." Incredibly, intelligence officers in Moscow, reflecting the paranoia of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, often rejected the material coming from the ring. The most glaring rebuff was the refusal to act on the forecast of the German invasion. (See BARBAROSSA.)

Some British sources claimed that British intelligence, aware of the Lucy ring, saw to it that Rado and Foote got sanitized ULTRA intelligence from the BLECHLEY PARK codebreakers. But British intelligence historian F.H. HINSLEY wrote, "There is no truth in the much publicised claim that the British authorities made use of the Lucy ring . . . to forward intelligence to Moscow."

Swiss authorities had been tolerant of the ring because Roessler also provided them with intelligence on Germany. In Nov. 1943, perhaps over concern about Swiss neutrality, Swiss security officers arrested Foote. Roessler was prevented from communicating with Moscow and was finally arrested in May 1944, as were Duebendorfer, her daughter Tamara, and Boetcher. The Swiss, who may have been protecting them from German SD officers, released Foot, Roessler, and the others in Sept. 1944. Rado, meanwhile, had slipped off to liberated Paris.

Duebendorfer and Boetcher, who went to the Soviet Union in 1945, were imprisoned for long terms, probably because Josef Stalin did not want to acknowledge that anti-Nazi Germans had aided the Soviets. Foote and Rado flew to Moscow from liberated Paris in Jan. 1945. When the Soviet plane made a routine landing in Cairo, Rado left it and disappeared. He was later found by Soviet intelligence officers, who took him to the Soviet Union, where he was imprisoned until Stalin's death in

1953. He returned to Hungary, where he died in 1981. Foote defected from Soviet intelligence and managed to get back to his native England.

Roessler ended his days in Switzerland after another sojourn into spying in the 1950s, resulting in his conviction on espionage charges in West Germany and a one-year prison sentence.

●● LUDWIG, KURT FREDERICK

(b. 1903 d. ?)

Head of the "Joe K" German spy ring in the United States in 1940–1941.

The ring was known as the Joe K because that was the signature used on letters sent to BERLIN addresses giving information on Allied shipping in New York Harbor. Ludwig also used the CODE NAME Fozie—and at least 50 other male and female aliases.

Born in Ohio, Ludwig was taken as a child to Germany, where he grew up and married. He visited the United States several times in the 1920s and 1930s. He was arrested for espionage in Austria in Feb. 1938 after police noticed that he had been photographing bridges near the Austro-German border; but the case was delayed, and Ludwig was not tried because the Nazis entered into Austria in March. Ludwig remained in Germany until March 1940, when he returned to the United States to establish a spy ring. (It was separate from, but had connections to, the DUQUESNE SPY RING, also broken by the FBI.)

American and British authorities knew that a spy ring was operating out of New York City, sending information on Allied shipping to Germany by letters mailed to Berlin and to ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES in neutral Spain and Portugal. The first break came at the secret mail-intercept operation in Bermuda, run by BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION (BSC), a COVER for the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). In 1940 the British operatives intercepted a letter from New York, signed "Joe K," to "Lothar Frederick," known to be an alias used by REINHARD HEYDRICH, chief of the RSHA, the main Nazi secret police organization. BSC experts in Bermuda opened letters, read their contents, and resealed the envelopes so well that their recipients did not detect tampering.

Joe K had shown up as the signature on many letters sent to accommodation addresses. In March 1941 BSC chemists detected SECRET WRITING in a Joe K letter; the secret message referred to a duplicate letter sent to "Smith" in China. The BSC mail-intercept operation was run in cooperation with the FBI—even though J. EDGAR HOOVER, head of the FBI, and WILLIAM STEPHENSON, head of the BSC, did not get along. The FBI traced the Smith letter and found that it contained a plan of U.S. defenses at Pearl Harbor. (There is another German connection to the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—see DUSKO POPOV.)

Another Joe K letter, also followed up by the FBI, contained a panicky secret message about a car in New York's Times Square deliberately running down and killing "Phil." The BSC told the FBI that Phil had been Ulrich von der Osten, a German MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

officer who had been “removed from circulation” a month after his arrival in the United States via Japan. Piecing together a reference in dead Phil’s notebook, an intercepted cable from Portugal to “Fouzie,” and information from the Joe K letters, the FBI found Fred Ludwig, who had fled the scene when von der Osten had been struck down on March 18.

Ludwig was being paid through the German Consulate in New York City and was recruiting AGENTS and COURIERS through the German-American Bund. With the death of von der Osten, Ludwig was the ranking German spy in the United States. Under FBI SURVEILLANCE, Ludwig was seen visiting the docks in New York Harbor and U.S. Army posts around New York. In May, accompanied by an 18-year-old secretary, he traveled to Florida, stopping along the way at Army camps, airfields, and factories. Ludwig met with an agent in Miami and sent back reports through a mail drop arranged, by a U.S. Army enlisted man stationed on Governor’s Island in New York Harbor.

In Aug. 1941, apparently sensing he was under surveillance, Ludwig drove to Montana, stored his car—leaving behind his shortwave radio—and took a bus to the West Coast. Believing that he was planning to go to Japan and make his way from there to Germany, the FBI arrested him near Seattle, Wash. The FBI then rounded up eight others, including the secretary and the soldier. Put on trial for espionage in March 1942, Ludwig was

convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, as was the soldier. The young secretary, who testified for the government, was sentenced to five years. The five others received sentences of 10 to 15 years.

A ninth member of the ring, known only as “Robert,” was tracked down by the FBI through papers obtained from a janitor in the building housing the German Consulate; the janitor regularly put papers into the furnace as Germans watched, then pulled them out, doused the flames, and passed the singed sheets to the FBI. Robert turned out to be Paul Borchardt, a German Army veteran and scientist who, though fired from his university post for being a Jew, agreed to come to the United States as a refugee and spy. He said he did it as a German patriot. He was sentenced to 20 years. (He and the others escaped the death penalty because their spying was undertaken before the outbreak of war.)

●● LUMINAIRE

Soviet CIPHER machine of the 1960s that was plugged into a radio receiver. The machine translated sound signals into numbers that appeared on ten small dials in the top of the machine. The numbers were an enciphered message that was solved by a ONE-TIME PAD. The Luminaire was designed for agents who did not know Morse code or who needed to have a silent method of receiving messages.



●● M-94 CIPHER MACHINE

Hand-held cylinder used by the U.S. Army from 1934 through World War II that permitted simple enciphering of messages. Based on the concept of the CIPHER DISK, the aluminum cylinder was constructed of 25 individual disks with the 26 letters of the alphabet set in the edge of each disk in random sequences.

The M-94 was six inches long and had a diameter of two inches. No two disks had the same sequence of letters. The disks could be fixed in any arrangement, with an external bar running the length of the cylinder to aid in aligning the disks and reading the resulting cipher.

The user arranged the disks to spell the first 25 letters of his message, then read the enciphered message off another row. The recipient set up the enciphered message on his device and then read the PLAIN TEXT message. The M-94 provided a fast and efficient method of enciphering and deciphering messages, although security was limited.

●● M-134

see SIGABA

●● M-209 CIPHER MACHINE

A small, compact mechanical cipher machine used by U.S. military forces in World War II. The device, intended for field use, was encased in a metal box and had the benefits of simple operation and having a built-in tape printer. Encryption was done by six rotors or wheels, set by hand.

The M-209 could encipher a PLAIN TEXT message by substituting a letter for a letter, automatically printing the enciphered text on a paper tape; it could reverse the process, deciphering a message that had been previously enciphered by another M-209. The device—officially called a “converter”—offered a high degree of security when used properly. However, in the field it was difficult and slow to use.

The M-209 weighed 7¼ pounds including carrying case and tools.

●● MACARTNEY, LT. WILFRED F. R.

Former British Army INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who led a Soviet spy ring. His espionage activities followed a truly remarkable, albeit brief, Army career.

In 1915, at the age of 16, Macartney had failed an Army medical examination because of poor eyesight. Still, he was able to join the Royal Army Medical Corps as an ambulance driver. He was sent to France, where he gained a commission in the Royal Scots. But after several months his eyes deteriorated and he was forced to resign his commission. After treatment he was again commissioned, this time in the Essex Regiment, and sent first to Malta and then to Egypt.

He was then assigned to work for Capt. COMPTON MACKENZIE, the Royal Marine officer in charge of British intelligence activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sent back to France in Sept. 1917, he was taken prisoner by the Germans at the Battle of Cambrai. But he escaped by jumping from a train near Aix-la-Chapelle. He was cited for his audacity.

With the end of the war in Nov. 1918, 19-year-old Macartney was assigned to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway Mission at Constantinople. He left the Army in Aug. 1919 as a lieutenant.

In 1926, Macartney smashed the window of a jeweler's, was arrested, and was sentenced to nine months in prison. When he got out, he contacted a Lloyd's underwriter and inquired about arms shipments to Finland. The Lloyd's employee who willingly provided the information was surprised when Macartney gave him £25. Macartney explained that he was working for the Soviets and asked for some information about the Royal Air Force (RAF).

Thoroughly alarmed, the Lloyd's employee sought advice and was introduced to Sir REGINALD HALL, who promptly passed him on to VERNON KELL, head of the Security Service (MI5).

Kell decided to set a trap, by having a secret RAF manual passed to Macartney, who was then observed passing the document to a member of the Soviet Trade Delegation in London.

Using this secret document as an excuse, Kell and the SPECIAL BRANCH of Scotland Yard planned an elaborate raid on the Soviet trade delegation, which was located in the same building as ARCOS Ltd. company registered in Britain. Although it had long been suspected of carrying out espionage activities, the trade delegation had diplomatic immunity. The raid, the British government would explain, was only to seek the secret document in the Arcos offices. The May 12–13 raid gave British officials an excuse to sift through thousands of documents.

The RAF manual was never found, but other documents of political interest were. On May 26 the British government published a White Paper and announced that relations with the Soviet Union, established in 1921, would be ended.

Macartney was allowed to continue at liberty in the hope that he would lead MI5 to other Soviet contacts. When this did not happen, he was arrested on Nov. 16, 1927, tried at the Old Bailey, and convicted under the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT of "attempting to obtain information on the RAF." He was sentenced to ten years in prison and two years at hard labor.

He was released early and quickly produced two books, *Walls Have Mouths* (1936) and *Zigzag* (1937). He joined the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, fighting on the Republican side, and became the first commander of the brigade's British battalion. He was wounded in an accident in 1937 and returned to Britain.

Later he was again prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act, this time for having revealed in a magazine article the World War II exploits of a German DOUBLE AGENT, Edward Chapman (CODE NAME Zigzag). He was given a nominal fine.

●● MACKENZIE, SIR COMPTON

(b. 1883 d. 1973)

British secret AGENT and author who was prosecuted for violating the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. Mackenzie, an ac-

complished writer and naval officer, attained the rank of captain in the Royal Marines and subsequently served with the Navy in the ill-fated Dardanelles landings of 1915. Invalided out of the service that same year, he became a secret agent in Greece in 1916. Mackenzie directed British intelligence activities in Syria in 1917.

Mackenzie had the misfortune to have an early spy novel, *Extremes Meet*, published in 1928, the same year that SOMERSET MAUGHAM's *Ashenden* was published. He complained that Maugham was getting more attention even though he had so few real adventures as a secret agent.

He subsequently described his own secret activities in his autobiography, *Greek Memories* (1932). This book led to his being tried under the Official Secrets Act; the book was seized by the British government and withdrawn from publication. Mackenzie's offenses included revealing the pseudonym "C" used by Capt. Sir MANSFIELD CUMMING, first head of MI6. Despite the fact that Cumming was dead and the other revelations dated, Mackenzie was found guilty and fined £100 plus court costs. The government's ban on the book was lifted, and it was published again in 1940 as *Aegean Memories*.

These events were described in his subsequent book *Greece in My Life* (1960). Mackenzie also wrote several plays and novels and in 1933 published a spoof on the British intelligence services, *Water on the Brain*. "It has indeed become impossible for me to devise any ludicrous situation the absurdity of which will not soon be surpassed by officialdom," he wrote in a preface to the 1954 edition.

In World War II he served as a captain in the Home Guard. He was knighted in 1952.

Also see LITERARY SPIES.

●● MACLEAN, DONALD DUART

(b. 1913 d. 1983)

Member of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING with HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, GUY BURGESS, and ANTHONY BLUNT. They were among history's most successful spies, penetrating both British and American secrets at the highest levels.

Maclean was the son of a lawyer who became a distinguished member of Parliament, being knighted in 1917. As the son of a privileged and good family, Maclean naturally went to Cambridge, where many men of his class were being introduced to communism. At Cambridge, like Burgess, Philby, and Blunt, he was recruited to spy for the Soviet Union.

Following the orders of his recruiters, he stopped being an active communist at Cambridge in preparation for entering the Foreign Office. When he applied for the diplomatic service, he told interrogators that he had had communist leanings while a student and had never completely abandoned them. His clever candor helped ease his way into a Foreign Office where pedigree was considered sufficient grounds for patriotism and a fling at communism was considered a mere youthful indiscretion.

After being accepted into the diplomatic service in 1935, he was assigned to the Central Department of the



Donald Maclean. (ARCHIVES PHOTOS)

Foreign Office, which was responsible for Belgium, Germany, and France. In 1938 he was posted to Paris, where he undoubtedly worked as an AGENT for NKVD officers connected to the Soviet Embassy. The Soviets may not have gotten much from the junior diplomat, but they were biding their time. In Paris Maclean met an American, Melinda Marling. They were married in June 1940 just after France had been overrun by German troops. Soon after they arrived back in London, Melinda left for the United States, where she gave birth to their first child, who lived only for a few days. She returned to London in the fall of 1941.

Maclean's work as a Soviet agent began in earnest in 1944 when he was sent to the British Embassy in Washington as first secretary. He also substituted for the head of chancery. The two positions gave him the opportunity to see and photograph every message and paper of importance received by the ambassador. Melinda delayed joining her husband in America until she had another baby. When she did come, she lived with her mother in New York City, giving Maclean an excuse for frequent visits, during which he met with a Soviet HANDLER in New York. After Melinda moved to Washington, Maclean continued his trips to New York, leading his embassy colleagues to conclude he kept a woman there. Soviet message traffic about the visits to New York would in later years make Maclean a suspected spy.

Since Maclean was also Britain's secretary on the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Development, he was able to pass along—from the very minutes of the committee meetings—information on such subjects as British-U.S. postwar policy on atomic energy and the planning and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. He also had access to the new U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. He was a busy man, a busy atomic spy. "No task was too hard for him; no hours were too long," wrote fellow diplomat Robert Cecil in *A Divided Life* (1989). "He gained the reputation of one who would always take over a tangled skein from a colleague who was sick, or going on leave, or simply less zealous. In this way he was able to manoeuvre himself into the hidden places that were of the most interest to the NKVD."

Maclean worked with ALGER HISS, a U.S. State Department official, on the creation of the UNITED NATIONS. One issue taken up at Maclean-Hiss meetings involved discussions about U.S. military units overseas, including how many were in South Korea. Assessors of Maclean's treachery believe that he was thus able to pass to the Soviet Union intelligence of great value to North Korea and communist China prior to the Korean War.

Maclean's New York work enabled him to make contact with Soviet intelligence agents in the United Nations and at the Soviet Consulate in New York City. One of the pieces of information that helped to unmask Maclean was the cracking of a 1946 NKVD message from New York noting the visit of an AGENT named Homer to New York on the occasion of the birth of his child. (See also VENONA.) The message, decrypted in 1951, showed that Homer's visit coincided with Maclean's trip to New York in July 1946 when Melinda gave birth to their son Donald. Maclean delivered to his Soviet contact in New York two cables sent by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to President Truman on June 5, 1945. The cables had to do with talks in Moscow between Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and Harry Hopkins, the longtime adviser to President Roosevelt who had assumed the same role for Truman. The CIPHER clerk at the Soviet Consulate in New York, transmitting a coded cable to Moscow, included the serial numbers of the Churchill-Truman cables. Thus, when this 1945 cable traffic was decrypted, U.S. intelligence analysts could easily determine who handled those specific cables, narrowing the search for a MOLE to a few people, including Maclean.

But it was another event that touched off an immediate investigation: On June 15, 1945, muckraking columnist Drew Pearson published a magazine article disclosing the Stalin-Hopkins talks and a Churchill cable to Truman. The FBI began probing the leak, suspecting that Pearson's source was a Soviet agent, particularly since the article portrayed Stalin sympathetically. The FBI suspected a leak in the British Embassy but could not prove it.

Around this time the FBI had Maclean under SURVEILLANCE because of his drunken escapades in Washington, often with known HOMOSEXUALS. The possibility of blackmail based on homosexuality probably inspired the FBI surveillance.

In Aug. 1948 Maclean left Washington and after a brief time in London went on to his next post: counsellor and head of chancery of the British Embassy in Cairo. The youngest in the diplomatic service to hold this position, he seemed destined for a successful career and perhaps a knighthood. But after several binges and drunken brawls, he was recalled to London in May 1950. A forgiving Foreign Office attributed Maclean's bizarre behavior to stress and suggested medical help. He began seeing a psychiatrist but did not change his ways. He kept on drinking and, when his wife temporarily left him, picking up male lovers.

Early in 1951 he was given charge of the American Department in the Foreign Office. At social occasions he spoke out openly against the immoral policies of the West as contrasted with the enlightened policy of the Soviets. Later that same year he was appointed head of a Foreign Office delegation to the United States. Among the papers he saw, and presumably passed to the Soviets, was a report on Prime Minister Clement Attlee's visit to President Truman in Dec. 1950 to get assurance that Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur would not be permitted to use the atomic bomb in Korea. Maclean also gave the Soviets every cable sent from Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to Lord Halifax, Britain's ambassador to Washington.

In 1949 Philby had been assigned to the British Embassy in Washington, as liaison between MI5 and both the CIA and the FBI. In Jan. 1951 Philby learned about the codebreaking that exposed Homer and realized that Maclean was in peril. Philby wanted to warn Maclean, then in London, but could not risk cabling or telephoning him. Accordingly, Burgess, who was also then assigned to the British Embassy, managed to get himself expelled from the embassy and sent back to London, where he could personally warn Maclean.

In London, Burgess immediately contacted Blunt, who passed the warning on to his Soviet handler, YURI MODIN. Alerted by Modin, Moscow authorized Maclean's flight to the Soviet Union. By then TOP SECRET documents were being withheld from Maclean and he was under SURVEILLANCE by Scotland Yard's SPECIAL BRANCH. Maclean did not want to leave; Melinda was about to have another baby.

But Modin and Burgess set up an escape plan and forced it on Maclean. On Friday, May 25—Maclean's 38th birthday—Burgess invited himself to dinner, the signal for flight. Maclean was to be interrogated on Monday, and, given his precarious mental state, probably would have broken down. (No authority, British or Soviet, has ever satisfactorily explained the coincidence of Maclean's flight just before interrogation.)

Burgess rented a car and elaborately acted as if he were going off on a holiday with a male lover. Instead, he picked up Maclean at his suburban home in Tatsfield, Kent. The two men sped to Southampton, where they abandoned the car and boarded a ferry that was just about to leave for a weekend cruise along the French coast. The ferry made stops at French ports, but customs officials did not ask for papers, out of discretion for un-

married couples on board. On the morning of May 26 they disembarked at St. Malo and took a cab to Rennes, where they boarded a train to Paris. From there they took another train to Bern, where they picked up false British passports at the Soviet Embassy. They then traveled on to Zurich and boarded a plane to Stockholm, but left it at Prague. From there Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS flew them to Moscow.

On Monday, May 28, Melinda Maclean called the Foreign Office, ostensibly looking for her husband. British security officers kept the escape secret, but on June 7 a British paper broke a story about "two Britons" being sought. By then Melinda had her baby, a girl. In July, Melinda, the children, and Melinda's mother traveled to Switzerland. Meanwhile, the KGB had deposited £2,000 in a Swiss bank account in Melinda's name.

Eighteen months after Donald Maclean defected, Modin approached Melinda in London to arrange her migration to Moscow. In *My Five Cambridge Friends* (1994), Modin tells of signaling Melinda by showing her half of a postcard. "The other half had been handed to Melinda by her husband a year and a half before, with orders that she should trust nobody who did not produce its match." (Modin claimed that Melinda had known about Maclean's espionage for many years. Other writers dispute this.)

Melinda first moved to Switzerland. Then in Sept. 1953 she and the children boarded a train on a KGB-arranged trip that ended in Moscow.

In 1956 the Soviets officially revealed that Burgess and Maclean were in Moscow. They said in a joint statement that they had not been Soviet agents and that they had gone to the Soviet Union "to further understanding between East and West." Although Burgess learned only enough Russian to get by, Maclean seriously studied the language and went to work for the Institute of World Economics. He also wrote *British Foreign Policy Since Suez*, which was published in the Soviet Union and in Britain in 1970.

In 1964 Philby began an affair with Melinda Maclean. In 1966 she left Maclean, who was drinking heavily, and moved in with Philby. She returned to the United States in 1979. Maclean's three children married in the Soviet Union but eventually left, two to Britain, one to the United States. Maclean died in 1983, and his ashes were taken to Britain, as had been the ashes of Burgess, who had died in 1963.

Assessments of Maclean's value to the Soviets range widely. But many intelligence officials who have studied his case conclude that his information from Foreign Office and embassy sources far outweighed what Philby and Burgess were obtaining from intelligence files. He was in a position to tell his Soviet handlers the most intimate details of U.S.-British thinking on such subjects as the future of nuclear weapons and the founding of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. An official U.S. appraisal of Maclean's work said: "In the fields of US/UK/Canada planning on atomic energy, US/UK post-war planning and policy in Europe, all information up to the date of [Maclean's] defection undoubtedly reached Soviet hands. . . ."

●● MADSEN, YEOMAN 3RD CLASS EUGENE L.

A U.S. Navy yeoman who worked on the strategic warning staff in the Pentagon. He was arrested in 1979 for attempting to sell classified information to the Soviet Union. He was sentenced to eight years.

●● MAGDEBURG

German "small" cruiser sunk in the eastern Baltic early in World War I. The recovery of one of the ship's CODE books provided British codebreakers in ROOM 40 with the means of breaking into secret German military communications. In *Seizing the Enigma* (1991), code-breaking historian DAVID KAHN called the incident "the most fateful accident in the history of cryptology."

The fast, small (4,570-ton) ship set out from Memel, at the eastern extreme of Prussia, to join other German warships attacking Russian ships at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. At 12:37 A.M. on Aug. 26, 1914, the ship ran aground off the island of Odensholm. While efforts were made to free the ship, most of the code books and CIPHER KEYS were destroyed; some were retained, however, for communicating with rescuers. Unable to free the cruiser, her captain decided to destroy the ship because of approaching Russian warships. The scuttling charges were lit without orders, and the crew hastily abandoned the ship. Some of the code books were lost in the commotion as the charges exploded. Fifteen men died.

The Russians quickly took possession of the wreck of the *Magdeburg* and the surviving crewmen, who had not been taken off by a German torpedo boat. Russian officers searching the hulk found a code book forgotten at the bottom of a locker. Later, Russian divers found another code book that had been thrown overboard and a third lost in abandoning the ship.

Realizing the value of the code books and cipher keys, the Russians immediately offered the undamaged one to the British allies. The prize was carried to Britain by British warship, via Archangel, arriving at the British Admiralty on Oct. 13. The code book was handed to Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty.

The *Magdeburg* code book became the basis for British code-breaking successes in ROOM 40.

(The myth has often been spread that the Russians found the *Magdeburg* code book clutched in the arms of a drowned German sailor who was washed ashore.)

●● MAGEN, DAVID

An Israeli INTELLIGENCE OFFICER sent into Egypt, who became a DOUBLE AGENT, spying for Egypt against Israel.

Born in the early 1920s in Hungary as Theodore Gross, he and his family emigrated to South Africa. He subsequently went to Italy to study music, becoming an accomplished singer with an international reputation. When World War II erupted he joined the British Army and served as an intelligence officer, apparently going behind German and Italian lines on special operations.

When conflict broke out in Palestine in 1948 on the eve of Israeli independence, Gross went to Israel to join the newly formed Israeli Army. With his intelligence background and knowledge of languages, he was recruited for the Political Department, the precursor of the MOSSAD. In Israel—as was the custom—he Hebraicized his name, using *Magen*, Hebrew for "shield."

Under the name Ted Cross he was dispatched to Italy to run a NETWORK of Arab AGENTS who were collecting intelligence for Israel. In 1950 he was sent into Egypt to operate a network of local informers.

The Israeli COUNTERESPIONAGE service, the SHIN BET, discovered that Magen was in contact with Egyptian intelligence officers. He was ordered back to Israel in 1952, arrested upon arrival, and charged with espionage—the first Israeli to be arrested on that charge. He was tried secretly, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years.

Without authorization—or reporting to the Mossad—Magen had made contact with Egyptian intelligence officers. His defense was that he was trying to become a TRIPLE AGENT loyal to Israel, a standard excuse for those convicted of becoming double agents. Magen had many supporters and their efforts led to his release in 1959. Upon release he changed his name and continued to live in Israel, believing until his death in 1973 that he had been unjustly treated.

●● MAGIC

Intelligence derived by the U.S. Army and Navy (and later British) from the codebreaking effort against the Japanese diplomatic CODE given the U.S. designation PURPLE.

In March 1939 the Japanese began to employ the new Purple code machine and CIPHER. This code was first broken in the fall of 1940 by a U.S. military cryptologist team directed by WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN, the chief cryptanalyst of the Army's SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. Friedman referred to his staff as "magicians." This apparently is the origin of the term Magic that was used for Purple-derived intelligence.

Subsequently the term Magic was applied to a much broader category of Allied codebreaking operations in the war against Japan.

●● MAGNUM

The third major U.S. SATELLITE for the collection of COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) and TELEMETRY INTELLIGENCE (TELINT). The successor to the CHALET system, the first Magnum satellite was orbited on Jan. 24, 1985, to monitor Soviet and Chinese microwave communications as well as telemetry data transmitted during the two nations' intercontinental ballistic missile tests.

That first launch was to be highly classified. After an Air Force spokesman declared that such launches from Cape Canaveral, Fla., would come under new rules to deny America's adversaries as much information as possible, on Dec. 19, 1984, *The Washington Post* ran a

front-page story reporting that the shuttle *Discovery* would be carrying a “new military intelligence satellite that is to collect electronic signals and retransmit them to a U.S. receiving station on earth.” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger promptly denounced the *Post*, and the Air Force spokesman was reassigned.

The Magnum satellite, unlike its predecessors Chalet and RHYOLITE, was initially placed in a highly elliptical orbit with an apogee of 21,543 miles and a perigee of only 212 miles. According to William E. Burrows in his revealing *Deep Black* (1986), Magnum’s initial orbit was:

a temporary so-called parking orbit where it was stabilized before being rerouted to geosynchronous [i.e., a 22,300-mile orbit]. . . . thereby attempting to undo what [the Air Force] saw as the damage that had been done by the earlier disclosures. This was a neat bit of what was later to be officially called a deliberate policy of disinformation by the Defense Department.

●● MAGPIE

see ERICH GIMPEL

●● MAIL COVER

Request made by an intelligence service to a postal agency to examine the exterior of mail addressed to or from a particular individual or organization believed to be possibly involved with espionage. The mail is not opened and the person or organization involved is not made aware of the examination.

●● MAIL DROP

see ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS

●● MAJOR MARTIN [F]

Maj. William Martin, Royal Marines, was the fictional persona given to a human body used by the British to deceive the Germans in Operation MINCEMEAT in 1943.

●● MALINOVSKY, ROMAN

(b. ? d. 1918)

Czarist MOLE in the Bolshevik leadership prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Malinovsky was a Moscow worker whose criminal record for burglary gave him connections to the police, leading to his spying on the Bolsheviks for the OKHRANA, the czarist secret police. He was apparently recruited in 1910. The Okhrana intended to have Malinovsky help the Bolshevik Party to continue the split with the Menshevik Party, thereby preventing unification of the Russian revolutionary movement.

His success in infiltrating the Bolshevik movement was demonstrated by his being elected in 1912 as one of

the six Bolshevik deputies to the Duma, the czarist parliament. He became head of the Bolshevik faction among the 13 Social Democratic Party deputies in the Duma and became treasurer of the newly founded Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* (Truth). The latter position enabled him to provide the Okhrana with details of the party’s finances and membership (the paper’s editor, Miron Chernomazov, was also an Okhrana spy.)

Early on Malinovsky was suspected as a police spy. But V. I. Lenin, head of the Bolshevik Party, steadfastly defended him, calling him an “outstanding leader.” American intelligence analyst John J. Dziak, in *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (1988), wrote: “Lenin protected Malinovsky almost to the end, hurling venomous charges of ‘malicious slanderers’ at . . . [those] who in 1914 demanded a nonfactional Social Democratic Party investigation of Malinovsky.”

The director of the state police, S. P. Beletsky, described Malinovsky as “the pride of the Okhrana.” During his spy career Beletsky increased Malinovsky’s pay from 50 to 700 rubles per month as he submitted detailed reports on the Bolshevik leadership. But Malinovsky’s double life was taking its toll on him. He was induced to resign from the Duma and fled from St. Petersburg with 6,000 rubles from the Okhrana, which told him to go abroad and begin a new life.

Malinovsky was captured by the Germans and placed in a prisoner-of-war camp, where he promptly began spreading Bolshevik propaganda to the captured Russians. When released, he began a correspondence with Lenin. In 1917 Lenin was called upon to testify about Malinovsky before the CHEKA as that Bolshevik ORGAN investigated earlier Okhrana operations and provocations. Dziak wrote of Lenin, “He emphatically exonerated Malinovsky on the grounds that everything he did benefited the Bolshevik faction, which gained far more than did the Okhrana.”

Malinovsky returned to Russia in Oct. 1918—a year after the Russian Revolution, insisting that he could not “live outside the revolution.” He demanded to be arrested and brought to see Lenin. Lenin agreed to the arrest but refused to see Malinovsky, who was brought before a tribunal on Nov. 6, 1918, and charged with spying for both the Okhrana and the Germans. Found guilty, he was shot within hours of the verdict being delivered.

Dziak speculates, “Was Malinovsky’s bravado [in returning to Russia] driven by a stricken conscience or did he expect a deserved exoneration and welcome from a Bolshevik leadership whose double agent he really was?”

●● MALPAS

SURVEILLANCE efforts by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II to monitor and arrest diamond smuggling from the neutral west African states to enemy countries. The effort was carried out in cooperation with the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and British consular offices.

●● Maly, Theodor (b. ? d. 1937)

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who reportedly recruited HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY to spy for the Soviet Union. Generally described as large and handsome, Maly was Hungarian by birth and had been ordained as a Catholic priest prior to World War I. During the war he served as a chaplain in the Austro-Hungarian Army and was taken prisoner by the Russians in the Carpathian campaign. After suffering in several prisoner-of-war camps, Maly gave up his religious beliefs and joined the Bolsheviks.

Despite twangs of conscience over the atrocities of the Bolsheviks during the Revolution and Civil War, Maly remained a staunch supporter of their cause, serving in the OGPU, the state intelligence service. Late in 1932 he was sent as an ILLEGAL to Germany and then assigned to VIENNA.

Philby was working in Vienna at this time as a COURIER between the outlawed Communist Party and contacts in Paris and Prague. Maly recruited Philby for Soviet intelligence in May 1934, sending him back to Britain.

Maly was sent to Britain in April 1936 as chief of the ILLEGAL station in London; he and his wife used false Austrian passports. One of his most important responsibilities was management of the growing CAMBRIDGE SPY RING, and in early 1937—on orders from Moscow—he sent Philby to Spain with the COVER of a journalist.

Maly himself was recalled to Moscow in July 1937. By that time both officers of Soviet intelligence (at the time NKVD) serving abroad and veteran Bolsheviks were being purged by Stalin. Maly certainly knew what was happening to returning NKVD officials. He nevertheless went back to Moscow, perhaps because a commendation from Stalin the previous year led Maly to believe that he would be immune to the fate of many of his colleagues. He may also have understood the fate awaiting him, as he told a friend that he “decided to go there [Moscow] because nobody can say, ‘That priest may have been a real spy after all’.” Upon returning to Moscow he was arrested; late in the year he was shot.

While he was an illegal in Europe, Maly’s principal reporting name was Mann, but he was known to the Cambridge recruits as Theo.

●● MAMBA

Operation by British Special Operations Executive (SOE) beginning in 1944 to suborn ex-Soviet soldiers in German service in Germany and occupied nations of Europe. The British dropped fake documents and subversive equipment (e.g., clandestine radios) to known Soviet units to encourage the Germans to believe that there was a resistance movement within the units.

SOE officials believed that these operations forced the Germans to replace the Soviet units in northern France with SS troops. Operations Cafeka and Restinga were components of Mamba.

●● MANDRAKE (Yak-25RD)

Soviet high-altitude RECONNAISSANCE aircraft whose effectiveness was somewhat curtailed by the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 spyplane in 1960. The Mandrake—the CODE NAME assigned by the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION—was derived from the Yak-25 Flashlight, a twin-jet, swept-wing fighter developed specifically for night and all-weather operations. That plane—armed with 23-mm cannon, carrying a long-range radar, and having a maximum speed of 677 mph—first flew in 1953 and entered service two years later. But it was already outdated by the advanced U.S. B-47 STRATOJET bomber, which was almost as fast as the Yak-25.

The Mandrake had straight wings with a span of 75 feet, more than twice that of the swept-wing fighter. The wings were also set higher on the fuselage than in the Flashlight, with twin turbojet engines in wing-mounted nacelles. Cruise altitude was about 60,000 feet, although the aircraft may have been able to reach 70,000 feet. The Yak-25s had a crew of two.

Sometimes called the “Soviet U-2,” the straight-wing Mandrake flew reconnaissance flights over Western Europe in the late 1950s, as well as over areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. The flights over the West are believed to have halted abruptly following the shooting down of the U-2 on May 1, 1960, as the Soviets probably wished to avoid having aerial spying charges leveled at them.

Apparently some fighters were rebuilt as reconnaissance variants (as well as modified to electronic warfare configurations). Total Yak-25 production through about 1958 was some 1,000 aircraft of all types—fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance. The basic arrangement of the Yak-25 was further refined in the much-improved Yak-28 Brewer bomber and Firebar fighter aircraft.

●● MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY

(MOL)

U.S. Air Force program to maintain a manned spacecraft in orbit, primarily for RECONNAISSANCE purposes. This most ambitious proposal did not come to fruition because of increasing costs and the “black hole” of the Vietnam War that soaked up all available funds.

As initially proposed, the orbit of the craft was *not* to overfly the Soviet Union, and there were no plans to carry out intelligence collection. When the proposal was put forward in Jan. 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara rejected it, failing to see a need for the Air Force to put men in space.

Two major changes were proposed for the MOL: a large radar antenna and a camera system to take photos of intelligence quality, the latter making the “laboratory” part of the KEYHOLE program. The revised MOL concept was given the CODE NAME DORIAN.

The MOL was to consist of a three-man Gemini space capsule attached to a 41-foot cylindrical laboratory and living chamber; it would weigh about 25,000 pounds, including 6,000 pounds for the Gemini B capsule

and 5,000 pounds for the reconnaissance payload. They would be launched into orbit together, carried into space by a Titan 3C rocket. The MOL would be placed in orbit at an altitude of about 150 miles. Orbiting the earth once every 90 minutes, the MOL would remain aloft for several years, with the crew and supplies being replaced by replenishment capsules. A 30-day mission was envisioned for the two-man crews.

The proposed MOL camera system would have a four-inch resolution, meaning it would be able to sight an object that size on earth. However, atmospheric distortions would reduce the effective resolution to about nine inches, still a valuable capability.

JEFFREY RICHELSON, in *America's Secret Eyes in Space* (1990), wrote:

It was hoped that putting a man in the loop and in space would heighten the value of the photos that would be produced. Detection and high-resolution photography of a new target might take weeks or months using unmanned satellites, but men could spot and photograph a new target without delay. In addition, rather than wasting film where there was clearly no activity of interest, certain areas could be bypassed. Thus, the astronauts would serve as part-time photo-interpreters as well as determining some of the targets for the MOL camera.

A major selling point for the MOL project was its predicted ability to continuously monitor Soviet missile and bomber deployments, helping to verify arms control agreements. At the same time, it would provide more flexibility than unmanned reconnaissance satellites (see CORONA), and would be used simultaneously for man-in-space research. Also, the Navy hoped that MOL could be employed in ocean SURVEILLANCE activities.

But some Pentagon officials considered the MOL project little more than an Air Force "toy," while the CIA, responsible for developing reconnaissance satellites, felt that the incursion was duplicative and unnecessary. The lack of CIA support was a significant factor in all OVERHEAD reconnaissance decisions.

Furthermore, several members of Congress from Florida, upon hearing that the MOL would be sent aloft from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California rather than Cape Canaveral, began to oppose the project. They feared it would cost jobs in Florida. The plan was to launch the MOL from Vandenberg because to reach a polar orbit from Canaveral would require cutting the payload by 2,500 to 5,000 pounds, severely reducing MOL's effectiveness. (The difference was caused by the reluctance to fly the spacecraft over populated areas during launch, necessary for a polar orbit from Canaveral.)

Development of MOL proceeded apace with the first, unmanned launch scheduled for April 15, 1969, and the first manned launch for Dec. 1969. Meanwhile, the MOL's weight increased to more than 15 tons, greater than a Titan 3C missile could lift. A new version of the Titan, designated 3M, would have to be developed.

MOL components were being tested, some in space flight, but the entire project was not to be. Increasing

costs and diminishing political support caused its demise. McNamara was gone from the Pentagon, and the increasing U.S. efforts in the Vietnam War were forcing cancellation or delay of many nonwar-related projects. Also, the Air Force was initiating a new bomber (the B-1) and the Navy a new strategic missile submarine (the Trident). The MOL was the largest "nonwar" item in the Air Force's research and development budget, which, wrote Richelson, "made an inviting target." Meanwhile, the first unmanned MOL flight was pushed to late 1970 and the first manned flight to mid-1971.

There were continued cost increases and flight delays until the project was canceled. The public announcement was made on June 10, 1969. The project had "soaked up" about \$1½ billion.

●● MARCHETTI, VICTOR L.

Coauthor with JOHN D. MARKS of the controversial *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (1974), which the CIA tried to stop from publication.

Marchetti served in the U.S. Army in the early 1950s. After earning a degree in Soviet studies at Pennsylvania State University, he joined the CIA in 1955. Working as an analyst in the Soviet field, from 1966 to 1969 he served on the immediate staff of the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI). However, during the late 1960s he became disenchanted with the CIA and resigned in 1969. At the time he was executive assistant to the Deputy DCI.

Upon leaving the CIA he wrote a novel, *The Rope Dancer* (1971), and then, with John Marks, began writing a book about the CIA's policies and operations. According to their publisher, the book was "the first in American history to be subjected to prior government censorship. . . ."

The CIA claimed right of prior censorship through Marchetti's employment agreement with the agency. Legal proceedings followed. Referring to the Marchetti-Marks book, President Nixon later recalled in his memoirs "the visible concern" on the face of the DCI, RICHARD HELMS, "over the possible publication of a book by two [sic] disaffected CIA agents. Helms had asked if I would back up legal action by the CIA, despite the fact that there would be cries of 'suppression.' I had told him that I would."

A first review of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript resulted in more than 350 passages being censored by the CIA—from single words to entire pages. Following demands by the authors, lawyers, and publisher (Alfred A. Knopf), the CIA yielded on almost 200 deletions.

After several delays, the book was published in 1974, with the cuts on which the CIA had yielded indicated in boldface type. The word DELETED—also in boldface—was printed, with appropriate "white space," wherever material was excised from the book.

Examples of material originally cut by CIA censors and then restored:

The National Security Agency tuned its huge antennae in on Soviet shipping and Cuban communica-

tions. ITT had operated much of the Cuban communications system before Castro's nationalizations, and the company worked closely with the CIA and NSA [National Security Agency] to intercept messages.

The CIA learned that Soviet military personnel were being secretly used in combat roles as submarine crews in Indonesia and as bomber crews in Yemen, a drastic departure from previous Soviet practice.

Some of the original deletions were strictly political:

Vice President Spiro Agnew gave an impassioned speech on how the South Africans, now that they had recently declared their independence, were not about to be pushed around, and he went on to compare South Africa to the United States in its infant days. Finally, the President [Nixon] leaned over to Agnew and said gently, "You mean Rhodesia, don't you, Ted?"

Even after the final cut list was agreed to, the CIA still opposed publication of the book. Reportedly, one proposal made at LANGLEY was simply to purchase every copy of the book to prevent it being made available to the public. That course of action was not pursued.

The entire book, in measured tone and apparently factual, was highly critical of the CIA. The final chapter began:

["] It is a multi-purpose, clandestine arm of power . . . more than an intelligence or counterintelligence organization. It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation, and violence, for the secret intervention in the affairs of other countries." Allen Dulles wrote those words about the KGB in 1963 so that Americans would better understand the nature of the Soviet security service. His description was a correct one, but he could—just as accurately—have used the same terms to describe his own CIA.

●● MARENCHES, COUNT ALEXANDRE DE

(b. 1924)

Director-General of the SDECE, the major French intelligence service, from 1970 to 1981.

Marenches joined the French Resistance in German-occupied France when he was 18. Still in his teens, he made his way across France to neutral Spain, and thence to the Free French forces in North Africa. After training there he was commissioned a lieutenant and posted to a Moroccan unit fighting with Allied forces in Italy in 1944. He was wounded in battle.

Marenches later served as an officer in the French liaison mission attached to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces. There he met, and translated for, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, the Free French leader.

After the war Marenches founded a machinery business and spent 15 years earning enough money to devote time to what he called duties "of a confidential and deli-

cate nature" for the French government both as a civilian and as a lieutenant colonel in the French Army Reserve. On one mission—a broad intelligence-gathering trip to Hawaii, Guam, and Japan—his COVER (with U.S. intelligence approval) was "Col. David Alexander" of the U.S. Army.

President Georges Pompidou had contemplated abolishing the SDECE when he took office in 1969. Instead, at the urging of Marenches, Pompidou kept the agency and appointed Marenches the Director-General.

The SDECE, when Marenches took over, was more like a criminal gang than an intelligence agency. "Some agents were running drugs and guns; others were engaged in kidnapping, murder, and the settling of the most bloody scores," he later said. His staff, wrote JEFFREY T. RICHELSON in *Foreign Intelligence Organizations* (1988), "ranged from gangsters and fascist Gaullists to incompetent military men and Soviet agents." The scandal-rocked SDECE had engendered a distrust that extended from ordinary citizens to political leaders.

Soviet penetration of the agency added to the distrust. Marenches, known for his dry wit, said that the Soviets' extreme efforts to get SDECE secrets showed the value of those secrets. (See SAPPHIRE, LAMIA.)

On his first day as Director-General he fired a number of senior officers, beginning a cleanup and reorganization that transformed the SDECE into a professional organization. Because of his own pro-American sentiments, he also led the agency toward more cooperation with the U.S. CIA—while still engaging in INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE against the United States. He also set up a cooperative intelligence arrangement with China.

The SDECE predicted that the Soviet Union would attack Afghanistan well in advance of the Dec. 1979 invasion. To develop intelligence ASSETS in the Middle East, Marenches had AGENTS in Iran and, after the U.S. Embassy staff was held hostage in Teheran in 1979, he developed a plan to kidnap the Ayatollah Khomeini and hold him for exchange of the hostages. The United States vetoed the plan.

Marenches developed close personal ties with President Reagan and his DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WILLIAM J. CASEY. The French intelligence chief came close, as he told it, to setting up Operation MOSQUITO, in which the French would set up a drug network in Afghanistan to demoralize Soviet troops with drugs seized by U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and smuggled into Afghanistan by the SDECE.

After Pompidou's death in March 1974, Marenches continued to serve under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and served briefly under his successor, François Mitterrand. After leaving the SDECE he became a private consultant. With David A. Andelman, he wrote *The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in an Age of Terrorism* (1992). He maintained that radical religious fanatics, terrorists, and drug traffickers of the Southern world—including Iran, Libya and Syria—were waging undeclared war against the nations of the North. He urged Northern nations to use joint military and intelli-

gence resources against these threats to international security.

●● MARKOV, GEORGI

The first known fatality of the infamous “umbrella gun” developed by the KGB for specialized assassinations. Markov, a Bulgarian émigré writer living in Britain, was a former protégé of Todor Zhikov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist party. He had fled to Britain, where he broadcast for the BBC World Service and publicized the abuses of the Zhikov regime.

The KGB technical directorate developed an umbrella gun that fired a metal pellet, the size of a pinhead, containing the highly toxic poison ricin, made from castor-oil seeds. The KGB RESIDENT in Washington, D.C., purchased the umbrellas and sent them on to Moscow for modification. The umbrella was probably fitted with a compressed gas cylinder as well as a firing mechanism. The umbrella guns were then taken to Sofia, where officers of the Bulgarian secret police—Durzhavna Sigurnost—were instructed in their use.

An assassination team armed with the umbrellas was then sent to London; the target was Markov. In Sept. 1978 he was “accidentally” prodded by an umbrella when he was bumped by a stranger on London’s Waterloo Bridge. The man apologized and disappeared.

Markov fell ill and was taken to a hospital, but before he died on Sept. 11 he was able to recall the accidental prodding. A tiny stab wound and the pellet were found in his right thigh; the ricin had decomposed by the time of the autopsy.

Markov was not the first victim of an umbrella gun attack. Another Bulgarian émigré, Vladimir Kostov, had been similarly “bumped” in Paris on Aug. 26, 1978. Word of the Markov assassination led to an operation on Kostov on Sept. 25. A steel pellet similar to the one that killed Markov was removed intact from his back.

An earlier version of the umbrella gun may have also been used against Nobel Prize winner Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in Aug. 1971, while he was still in the Soviet Union. According to Solzhenitsyn, he was stricken by a mysterious ailment while standing in a food line. His body subsequently became covered with terrible blisters, and he was bedridden for almost three months before recovering.

●● MARKS, JOHN D.

Coauthor with VICTOR L. MARCHETTI of the controversial *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (1974), which the CIA tried to stop from publication.

Marks is often identified with Marchetti as one of two CIA employees who wrote the book; however, he was never in the agency. Marks was employed by the State Department from 1966 to 1970 as an analyst and then as staff assistant to the intelligence director at State. He left to become executive assistant to Sen. Clif-

ford Chase. (See MARCHETTI entry for details about the book.)

Marks also wrote *The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”* (1979), which reported on MKULTRA, the CIA project involving hallucinogenic drugs.

●● MARLOWE, CHRISTOPHER

(b. 1564 d. 1593)

English poet and dramatist who served as a spy for Sir FRANCIS WALSHINGHAM, the 16th-century diplomat and spymaster for Queen Elizabeth I.

The son of a shoemaker, Marlowe was recruited while a student at Cambridge, long a fruitful campus for spy TALENT SPOTTERS (see CAMBRIDGE SPY RING). Marlowe’s most significant period in espionage appears to have begun when he suddenly left Cambridge in Feb. 1587 and, pretending to be a Catholic sympathizer, traveled to Rheims to infiltrate Catholic conspirators plotting against Elizabeth’s regime. When he returned to Cambridge in July, he was arraigned for leaving without permission and for visiting a Jesuit seminary in Rheims, where he protested against the Protestant establishment in England. A letter from the Queen’s Privy Council, which declared Marlowe to have been engaged “on matters touching the benefit of his country” and denying he had any intention of entering the college at Rheims, enabled him to gain his master’s degree.

Little is known of his other endeavors on behalf of Walsingham, the focus of his life unquestionably being his brilliant literary efforts. Still, there is evidence that his secret life continued; indeed, even his death had innuendoes of the secret world: He was allegedly stabbed to death during a drunken brawl in a Deptford tavern on May 30, 1593. His murderer, Ingram Frizer, claimed that Marlowe had drawn a dagger and that he had seized it as the two argued about the bill. Frizer was fully pardoned a month later.

Never explained was the presence of Robert Poley in an upstairs room of the tavern. Poley, a known spy for Walsingham, had been a steward to Lady Sidney, Walsingham’s daughter and a key figure in his espionage activities. Informers had already come forth with alleged evidence that Marlowe was guilty of treason. Was Marlowe assassinated—conceivably on Walsingham’s orders—because of his tendency to be outspoken and unguarded in conversation? Or was he involved in an espionage operation that went wrong?

●● MARQUAND, JOHN P.

(b. 1893 d. 1960)

Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist who worked for the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) during World War II. Marquand won the Pulitzer Prize in 1938 for *The Late George Apley*.

While in the OSS, among his projects was the testing of German prisoners of war for antitoxins in an attempt to learn whether they were being protected against biological warfare agents that Germany might use against the Allies. Marquand was also director of intelligence

and information for biological warfare research, although little information about this was ever released.

Also see LITERARY SPIES.

●● MARTIN, WILLIAM H. (b. 1931)

Cryptologist for the NSA who, with BERNON F. MITCHELL, defected to the Soviet Union in 1960. Their defection, wrote JAMES BAMFORD in *The Puzzle Palace* (1982), was the "worst scandal in the history of NSA. . ."

A math genius, "Ham" Martin had finished high school in two years instead of three, having spent his summers studying college subjects. After a year of college he enlisted in the Navy. Following cryptographic training, he was assigned to the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP radio intercept station in Kamiseya, Japan. There he met Mitchell. After his Navy enlistment was over in 1954, Martin remained in Japan for a year as a civilian with the ARMY SECURITY AGENCY. Subsequently, he returned to the United States to study mathematics at the University of Washington.

He and Mitchell maintained their friendship and both began working at the NSA on July 8, 1957. They soon became disillusioned with the NSA's activities, however, and after an abortive attempt to tell a U.S. congressman about their views, they began planning to defect to the Soviet Union.

In 1959 Martin was awarded an NSA scholarship for a master's degree in mathematics at the University of Illinois, the first two-year scholarship ever awarded by the NSA. At Illinois he excelled, earning a straight A average, while also taking a Russian course and associating with members of the Communist Party. In Dec. 1959 he and Mitchell flew to Cuba and probably met with Soviet diplomats—against NSA rules.

Martin and Mitchell took leave together in late June 1960, going first to Mexico City, and then on to Cuba the next morning to board a Soviet cargo ship. The NSA initiated a search when the two failed to return from vacation in July. In a safe-deposit box in Mitchell's name, NSA officials found a letter explaining "why we have sought citizenship in the Soviet Union."

On Aug. 1 a Pentagon news release stated that two NSA employees had failed to return from vacation and that they were missing and unaccounted for. Five days later Pentagon officials revised the statement, adding, "It must be assumed that there is a likelihood that they have gone behind the Iron Curtain."

Nothing was heard from them until Sept. 6, 1960, when they appeared on a televised Moscow news conference to reveal the "unscrupulous" NSA spying on other nations, including U.S. allies. They said that the NSA was breaking the CODES of at least 40 nations. Obviously the two men were able to provide Soviet intelligence officials with a considerable amount of information on U.S. electronic spying activities. President Eisenhower labeled Martin and Mitchell "self-confessed traitors," and former President Truman declared that "they ought to be shot."

After their defection it was revealed that Martin and Mitchell were HOMOSEXUAL lovers. In a subsequent

purge, the NSA fired 26 employees for "indications of sexual deviation."

In the Soviet Union the defectors were given Soviet citizenship. Martin changed his name to Sokolovsky, enrolled in an advanced education course, and got married.

●● MASON, LT. COMDR. THEODORUS B. M.

(b. 1848 d. 1899)

First U.S. Navy Chief Intelligence Officer (predecessor of the DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE). Mason, an 1868 graduate of the Naval Academy, held the chief intelligence position from June 1882 to April 1885. He was a lieutenant at the time of his appointment.

He retired from the Navy in 1894.

●● MASON-MACFARLANE, LT. GEN. SIR NOEL

(b. 1889 d. 1953)

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER for the British military forces in France in 1940 when they were routed by the German Army.

Educated at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, Mason-MacFarlane entered active service in 1909 as an artillery officer. He served in France, Belgium, and Mesopotamia during World War I and was heavily decorated. He was British military ATTACHÉ in VIENNA from 1931 to 1934, and after attending the Imperial Defence College and commanding an artillery brigade, he served on the Army staff and as ATTACHÉ in Copenhagen and BERLIN.

In 1939, as a major general, he was appointed the director of MILITARY INTELLIGENCE for the British Expeditionary Force in France under Gen. Sir John Gort. Deprived of his staff by Gort's order to maintain a small headquarters in France, Mason-MacFarlane was unable to provide proper intelligence to his superior during the ill-fated campaign in France, which led to the German victory and the British evacuation from Dunkirk. As the British forces retreated, Mason-MacFarlane hastily assembled stragglers and support troops to form an effective force that fought its way to the beaches against heavy German opposition.

In the summer of 1941 he was named head of the British military mission to the Soviet Union. Leaving Moscow in early 1942, he later served as governor of Gibraltar. In 1944 he underwent extensive medical treatment and retired from the Army the following year.

●● MASSINGHAM

British Special Operations Executive (SOE) activities in German-occupied Europe carried out from bases in North Africa.

●● MASTERMAN, SIR JOHN CECIL

(b. 1891 d. 1977)

Chairman of the TWENTY COMMITTEE, which during World War II ran the DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM, the ingen-

ious scheme that transformed captured German AGENTS in Britain into DOUBLE AGENTS. To German INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, the TURNED agents appeared to be operating successfully because they were transmitting back to Germany information that seemed to be valid.

Masterman credited DICK WHITE of the Security Service (MI5) with inventing the idea, but Masterman ran the system. (See DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM and TWENTY COMMITTEE.)

An Oxford don who had been trapped in Germany during World War I, Masterman polished his German during four years in a prisoner-of-war camp in Rühleben. After the war he returned to Oxford, becoming vice chancellor and provost of Worcester College. He was regarded as a fine player of cricket, tennis, and field hockey.

Information about the double-cross system remained secret after the war. In 1961 Masterman began pressing the British intelligence establishment for permission to publish a book on the system. ROGER HOLLIS, Director-General of MI5, refused to authorize publication, as did Prime Minister Alexander Douglas-Home.

Revelations about the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING devastated British intelligence in the 1960s. Masterman, “depressed by the low state of the reputation of the Security Service,” believed that publication would help restore public confidence. He drolly listed the book before it was published in his *Who’s Who* entry, then vaguely sketched the system in a mystery novel, *The Case of the Four Friends* (1957).

In April 1970, when the British government again declined permission, Masterman decided to publish the book in America, beyond the reach, he believed, of the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. He called this secret effort Plan Diablo.

Aiding in the effort was Norman Holmes Pearson, a member of the Yale University faculty, who nominated Yale University Press as the publisher. Pearson, head of X-2, the COUNTERINTELLIGENCE branch of the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) during the war, had served on the Twenty Committee. Yale had contributed many scholars and students to the OSS, and Chester B. Kerr, director of the press, saw the book as both important and a potential commercial success.

For a time British authorities threatened legal action against Masterman, but they then reluctantly decided to grant permission as long as about 60 passages in the manuscript were deleted. Kerr would delete only a dozen. The book, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-45*, was published in Feb. 1972, with a foreword by Pearson, who did not refer to his work on the Twenty Committee. Nor did Masterman reveal that ULTRA codebreaking, still highly secret, had greatly aided the double-cross system.

●● MATA HARI [P] (b. 1876 d. 1917)

The most renowned woman spy in history—although she probably wasn’t one. She was naïve and easily duped—and trapped—by her “friends” as well as her enemies during World War I. The *Oxford English Dictionary* describes her as “Prototype for seductive spy.”

Born in Holland as Margaretha Gertrud Zelle to a well-to-do Dutch shopkeeper and his Javanese wife, she



Mata Hari, clothed, in 1915.

attended a school for teachers but was forced to leave for having sex with the headmaster. At age 18 she married a Dutch naval officer who was 20 years her senior. They soon moved to the Dutch East Indies and had two children, but divorced in 1906.

She went to Paris in 1905, assuming the name Mata Hari (Eye of the Dawn) and the persona of a Javanese princess. She made her debut as an erotic dancer at the Oriental Studies Museum, followed by performances to ecstatic audiences throughout Europe and in Egypt. She also began having wealthy and influential lovers.

During World War I Mata Hari had an affair with a 25-year-old Russian pilot flying with the French, Capt. Vadim Maslov, son of a Russian admiral. When Maslov was wounded in the summer of 1916 she asked permission to visit him in a forward hospital. French officials at the DEUXIÈME BUREAU gave her permission—in return for her agreeing to spy on Germans, including possibly the crown prince, whom she knew. She was to receive one million francs for her efforts.

To carry out her assignment, Mata Hari traveled to Spain en route to neutral Holland, from which she could cross over into Germany to rendezvous with the crown

prince. En route to Holland, her ship stopped over in Falmouth, England, where she was detained and interrogated. British officials warned her not to go to Germany and sent her back to Spain. There she met and had an affair with the German military ATTACHÉ, Maj. Kalle. He sent a message to Berlin in a CODE that he knew the Allies could read, saying that spy "H-21" had proved valuable.

Mata Hari returned to Paris on Jan. 4, 1917, and was arrested on Feb. 13. Although the French and British intelligence services suspected her of spying for Germany, neither could produce definite evidence against her. Secret ink was found in her room—incriminating evidence in that period. She contended that it was part of her makeup. She admitted to taking money from Germans but claimed that it was for love, not spying.

Still, she was tried by a closed court-martial, found guilty, and executed by a French firing squad on Oct. 15, 1917. Refusing a blindfold or to be bound to the stake, she blew a kiss to the 12-man firing squad before their rifles shattered the morning stillness. Neither former lovers nor family claimed her body, and her remains were taken to a Paris hospital, for dissection by medical students.

Three films attempted to capture the theatrics of her life: *Mata Hari*, a 1931 classic melodrama, starred Greta Garbo, Ramon Novarro, and Lionel Barrymore. The French version *Mata Hari, Agent H21* (1964) starred Jeanne Moreau, while the third *Mata Hari* (1985) was an absurd attempt to trade on the name of an exotic nonspy.

●● MAUGHAM, W. SOMERSET

(b. 1874 d. 1965)

Author and spy. Maugham, clubfooted and too old and short to serve in the armed services, became an ambulance driver in World War I. Then, because he was fluent in German and French, he was recruited in 1915 as an AGENT for the British SECRET SERVICE. His first major success, *Of Human Bondage*, had just been published. So his COVER—an author writing a book—was a natural one. He went to Switzerland, where for about a year he kept watch on suspected German spies, contacted other Allied agents, and made regular reports to the Secret Service. He worked without pay as a patriotic gesture.

In 1917 he believed that his Secret Service career was over. But Sir WILLIAM WISEMAN, chief of British intelligence in America, persuaded Maugham to go to Russia on a mission to support the Mensheviks and counter the Bolshevik plans to pull Russia out of the war. Under the CODE NAME Somerville, Maugham went to Russia, posing as a writer for U.S. publications. Maugham met with Aleksandr Kerenski, the socialist leader, who sent Maugham to London with a desperate request to the Allies to raise an anti-Bolshevik army.

Maugham wrote a number of stories based on his experiences. Warned prior to publication that some stories violated the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, Maugham burned them. The rest, including an account of a mission to Russia, were published in *Ashenden* (1928), the name of Maugham's alter ego in *Of Human Bondage* and hero of the book. (He also uses Somerville as a name in the book.) "The work of an agent in the Intelligence Depart-

ment is on the whole monotonous," he wrote in the foreword to *Ashenden*. "A lot of it is uncommonly useless." He is believed to be the first author of spy books to write from the perspective of being a former spy. Assessing Maugham's contribution to espionage literature, *The Times Literary Supplement* said of *Ashenden*, "Never before or since has it been so categorically demonstrated that counterintelligence work consists often of morally indefensible jobs not to be undertaken by the squeamish or the conscience-stricken."

"*Ashenden* had a lasting influence on post-war espionage writing," Anthony Masters wrote in *Literary Agents* (1987), his book on authors who spied. "... Eric Ambler, Graham Greene, John le Carré and Len Deighton all created middle-aged and often cynical heroes who were locked into a particular series of Intelligence rituals. But of all fictitious spy stories, *Ashenden's* adventures come nearest to the real-life experiences of his creator."

During World War II, Maugham did some intelligence work for Sir WILLIAM STEPHENSON, head of MI6 in the United States. But Stephenson indicated to Maugham's biographer, Ted Morgan, that the author had not performed any important missions. Maugham, Stephenson said, was typical of volunteers who did not have "much taste for the business and became involved because they saw no alternatives."

●● MAX

see FRITZ KAUDER

●● MAXWELL SMART [F]

Central character of an American TELEVISION series *Get Smart*, produced in the 1960s. Smart, also known as Agent 86, is a bumbling intelligence AGENT who is helped in his duels against KAOS by a woman who is supportive and much brighter, Agent 99. They work for a secret intelligence agency known only as Control.

Don Adams played Max and Barbara Feldon was "99."

●● MAY, ALLAN NUNN

(b. 1912)

British nuclear physicist who spied for the Soviet Union while working in Canada on the atomic bomb.

May had been a communist since his student days at Cambridge University, from which he graduated in 1933. Other members of the communist cell at Cambridge included HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY and DONALD MACLEAN, two members of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING. May had also been a radical in the Cambridge branch of the Union of Scientific Workers.

In 1942 May joined the secret British atomic bomb project, CODE-NAMED Tube Alloys, working first at a laboratory in Cambridge. Sometime late in 1944 or early in 1945 he was sent to Canada. He visited a project site at Chalk River, about 200 miles northwest of Ottawa, and talked to American scientists working on the atomic bomb, under the code name Manhattan Project, at the University of Chicago. While in Ottawa he was recruited

for espionage by Col. NIKOLAI ZABOTIN, the military ATTACHÉ at the Soviet Embassy. Zabotin was a Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER in the GRU. May then worked at Chalk River, where one of his physicist colleagues was BRUNO PONTECORVO, a suspected spy who later defected to the Soviet Union.

May reported to Soviet intelligence on the successful U.S. test of the atomic bomb at Alamogordo, N. Mex., on July 16, 1945, although the report did not reach Moscow until Aug. 9, three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. May also gave Zabotin samples of Uranium-235, the critical material in the Hiroshima bomb.

The embassy played a crucial role in the Soviets' U.S.-Canadian-British ATOMIC SPY RING. On Aug. 2, Zabotin's superiors in Moscow had asked him to "take measures to organize acquisition of documentary materials on the atomic bomb! The technical processes, drawings, calculations."

This was one of the many messages supplied to Western intelligence by IGOR GOUZENKO, a CIPHER clerk in the Soviet Embassy. Gouzenko defected in Sept. 1945, the same month that May returned to Britain and a position at King's College in London.

He was placed under SURVEILLANCE by the British Security Service (MI5) and interrogated by MI5 in Feb. 1946. MI5 knew he had three times failed to show up for meetings at the British Museum with his GRU HANDLER. Stunned at MI5's knowledge of his spying, May confessed, saying he had passed secrets from Feb. to Aug. 1945. "The whole affair was extremely painful to me and I only embarked on it because I felt this was a contribution I could make to the safety of mankind," he said. "I certainly did not do it for gain." (He had, in fact, accepted \$700 and two bottles of whiskey from his GRU HANDLER.)

He was arrested on March 4, 1946, by the SPECIAL BRANCH of Scotland Yard. After a one-day trial at the Old Bailey, he was found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison. Released in 1952 after time off for good behavior, he later became a professor of physics at the University of Ghana.

He was code-named Alek by the GRU and Primrose by MI5.

●● MB

The Russian Ministry of Security was in existence from 1991 to 1993 as the initial successor to the KGB. The MB was established by a decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued on Dec. 19, 1991. The first minister was Marshal VIKTOR BARANNIKOV, through July 1993, when he was replaced by Col. Gen. NIKOLAY GOLUSHKO.

The ministry was abolished in 1993. Its principal intelligence components were the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Federal COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Service (FSK).

See RUSSIA-USSR.

●● McCONE, JOHN A. (b. 1902 d. 1991)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) during the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, having been brought into the posi-

tion by President Kennedy after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion (see CUBA). Following the long-serving ALLEN W. DULLES, McCone held the DCI position from Nov. 1961 to April 1965.

A 1922 graduate of the University of California at Berkeley with a degree in engineering, McCone held various engineering and then corporate executive positions. On several occasions he left industry for government appointments.

He was a member of the President's Air Policy Committee in 1947-1948, Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1948, Under Secretary of the Air Force in 1950-1951, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1958-1960 before becoming DCI.

During the missile crisis of 1962 he was a member of President Kennedy's EXCOMM, which met almost daily for six weeks to advise the President. McCone was one of those who advised Kennedy against an invasion of Cuba. Robert F. Kennedy, in *Thirteen Days* (1969) wrote:

John McCone said everyone should understand that an invasion was going to be a much more serious undertaking than most people had previously realized. "They have a hell of a lot of equipment," he said, "And it will be damn tough to shoot them out of those hills, as we learned so clearly in Korea."

Subsequently, McCone had a key role in the development of U.S. intelligence activities and sources in Vietnam.

He was considered an outsider by most at the CIA when he was appointed DCI, having had no previous intelligence or military experience (other than as a civilian executive in the Pentagon). However, he was relatively close to both John F. and Robert Kennedy and helped to rebuild the CIA's image after the Bay of Pigs disaster.

DCI was McCone's last position in Washington, D.C. After retiring from government service, McCone served as the U.S. government representative to the Vatican.

●● McCORMICK, DONALD

see RICHARD DEACON

●● MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE (MEDINT)

Intelligence derived from foreign medical, bioscientific, and environmental information that is of interest to military planners, especially medical personnel. For example, details of diseases in a potential combat area, or medical problems being encountered by enemy forces, are invaluable to planners.

●● MELEKH, LT. COL. IGOR YAKOVLEVICH

Career Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER caught spying while assigned to the UNITED NATIONS in New York City.

A graduate of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages and later an instructor at the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trains officers for the GRU, Melekh was

sent to the United States in 1958. He was assigned to the United Nations secretariat.

Melekh was observed meeting in New York City with Willie Hirsch, who was already under FBI SURVEILLANCE at the time (see JOHN GILMORE). The FBI put Melekh under surveillance as well. On Oct. 23, 1958, at another meeting, this time in Chicago, Melekh, accompanied by Hirsch, handed \$200 to a man who was to provide aerial photographs and maps of the Chicago area.

The man was a DOUBLE AGENT, called Agent X by the FBI. Agent X had helped to entrap Hirsch and was now operating against Melekh as well. Some time later Melekh telephoned Agent X and told him to come to New York, where Melekh gave him another \$200 and demanded action in getting the Chicago photos and maps.

Another Melekh-Agent X rendezvous was arranged in Jan. 1959, at a subway station in Brooklyn, N.Y. On the evening of Jan. 17 Melekh and Agent X, closely watched by FBI agents, met at the underground station. A package was exchanged for an envelope from Melekh containing \$500.

The FBI waited for Melekh to arrange further dealings with Hirsch or Agent X. Finally, on Oct. 27, 1960, the FBI took both Melekh and Hirsch into custody in New York City. That day a federal grand jury in Chicago had charged them both with espionage—"conspiracy to obtain information pertaining to our national defense for transmittal to Soviet Russia."

Melekh, who did not have diplomatic immunity, was released on bail after a brief stay in jail and was forbidden to leave Manhattan. Hirsch remained in jail. Melekh was not brought to trial. He was released on condition that he leave the United States, which he did on April 8, 1961.

There was considerable criticism in the American press of the Kennedy administration's dismissal of the charges against Melekh. Although President Kennedy denied any link between Melekh and the release of two U.S. fliers who had survived when their aircraft was shot down by Soviet fighters on July 1, 1960, the actions were related. (See AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.)

(Hirsch was also released on condition that he leave the country; the case against him fell apart when it was decided to free Melekh. Hirsch, too, was involved in the tenuous SPY SWAP for the two B-47 aviators.)

●● MEMUNEH

Israeli term for "the one in charge," the honorific given by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to ISSER HAREL in 1957. At the time Harel was director of the MOSSAD, the Israeli foreign intelligence service. He had previously been director of the SHIN BET, the domestic security service, over which he continued to have controlling influence; he simultaneously chaired the intelligence coordinating committee known as Varash, making him de facto head of all Israeli intelligence activities until he stepped down as director of the Mossad in 1963 (when Ben-Gurion also ended his tenure as Prime Minister).

Harel was the only person to hold the title of Memuneh.

●● MENZHINSKY, VYACHESLAV RUDOLFOVICH

(b. 1874 d. 1934)

Head of the Soviet OGPU, the secret police-security ORGAN, from 1926 to 1934 (see CHEKA). Successor to FELIKS DZHERZHINSKY, Menzhinsky was also of Polish noble origins. He was the first deputy chief of the GPU from 1923 to 1926, before succeeding as head of the organization through 1934.

U.S. intelligence analyst John Dziak described Menzhinsky in his *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (1988): "A gifted linguist and intellectual dabbler, Menzhinsky was either sickly or a hypochondriac, all of which made, in his case, for a weak leader. This suited Stalin's technique, because Menzhinsky's deputy [Genrikh] Yagoda already was one of Stalin's henchmen."

Menzhinsky fell victim to a heart attack on May 10, 1934. He was known to have had a heart condition and was under the care of Kremlin physicians. In July 1934 the OGPU was abolished and absorbed into the Main Administration of State security (GUGB) within the NKVD (Commissariat of Internal Affairs). Menzhinsky's principal deputy chairman was GENRIKH YAGODA, who succeeded him as head of Soviet intelligence.

●● MENZIES, MAJ. GEN. SIR STEWART G.

(b. 1890 d. 1968)

Director of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service, from 1939 to 1953. Menzies (pronounced MING-iss) was responsible for much of Britain's intelligence activities during World War II, including operations at BLETCHLEY PARK, and the early period of the Cold War.

Educated at Eton, Menzies subsequently served briefly as an officer in the Grenadier Guards and then in the Army's Life Guards from 1910 to 1939. He saw action in France during World War I and was decorated by the king for bravery. As a colonel he was deputy to Adm. Sir HUGH SINCLAIR (head of MI6 from 1923 until his death in 1939), and then succeeded to the directorship of MI6. His position was particularly difficult during the war in that he worked for Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who had an insatiable appetite for intelligence and secret projects.

A strong proponent of codebreaking, Menzies enthusiastically sponsored efforts at Bletchley Park to develop the BOMBE machines that began deciphering the German ENIGMA machine CIPHER in 1940. Promoted to major general in 1945, he remained the head of MI6 until 1953, when he retired in the aftermath of the defection of DONALD MACLEAN and GUY BURGESS to the Soviet Union.

Menzies left the day-to-day operation of MI6 to his subordinates; "don't expect me to read everything that's put on my desk," he told them. Maintaining MI6's rela-

tionship with the ministries was his primary occupation. "In personal relationships he was always polite, but never warm—'hard as granite under a smooth exterior' is the description of one SIS officer's wife. He was a clubman, loved horses and racing, and drank heavily," wrote Phillip Knightley in *The Second Oldest Profession* (1986).

Many in the intelligence services believed that Menzies was the illegitimate son of Edward VII.

●● MERKULOV, VSEVOLOD NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. ? d. 1953)

Head of the NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security) from Feb. to July 1941, and again from April 1943 until March 1946. Merkulov was a member of the so-called Georgian mafia of LAVRENTY BERIA, head of the NKVD.

The 1941 separation of intelligence agencies followed the Soviet takeover of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. "Arrests, deportations, executions, and prison camps increased, mandating reorganized and expanded security forces," wrote John J. Dziak in *Chekisty* (1988). The 1943 changes came after the Battle of Stalingrad, when Soviet advances "offered the prospect of reconquered lands and populations."

Merkulov worked successively for the CHEKA, GPU, and OGPU from 1921 to 1931, after which he did party work in Georgia for the next seven years. He became Beria's first deputy at the NKVD in Dec. 1938 (first deputies of intelligence/security ORGANS generally succeeded to the chief position).

Hungarian diplomat Nicholas Nyaradi, in *My Ringside Seat in Moscow* (1953), wrote of Merkulov:

A paradox: a man of great kindness and bestial cruelty, one who is deadly earnest while being quite witty. He has the patience of Job and yet he chain-smokes 40 to 50 cigarettes during a business day. A man of such prominence that Russian ambassadors stand to attention in his presence, Merkulov is always diffident, a shy smiled playing about his lips as he speaks. Merkulov was the man who personally supervised the liquidation of nearly two million Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians with heartless efficiency; but, like a gangster who bursts into tears at the strains of Brahms 'Lullaby', he has the typical Russian sentimentality about children, and, after I knew him better, he once showed me with welling eyes a photo of his soldier son.

When not directing the NKGB, Merkulov worked directly for Beria within the NKVD. After the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, Beria was arrested; so were many of his henchmen, including Merkulov. He was one of six Beria aides tried by the Soviet Supreme Court on multiple charges from Dec. 18 to 23, 1953, and executed on Dec. 23. (Beria had already been shot.)

●● METRIC

The highest security CLASSIFICATION used by the Atlantic Union from 1948 and then by the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. It was changed to COSMIC in the early 1950s.

●● MfS

Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, the East German Ministry for State Security. Established in April 1950, the MfS was modeled on the Soviet security apparatus—the MGB and its predecessors, the NKGB and NKVD. (The Soviet Union established the German Democratic Republic—East Germany—on Oct. 7, 1949.)

MfS was developed from several smaller intelligence activities that supported Soviet internal security in the one-third of Germany that was the Soviet zone of occupation from May 1945 until Oct. 1949. Even after the establishment of East Germany in the former Soviet zone, the Red Army intelligence (GRU) and other Soviet intelligence ORGANS continued to be highly active.

Invariably known as the Stasi, the MfS had headquarters in East BERLIN, from where it carried out repression at home and espionage abroad. The latter operations were most often a surrogate for the agency's Soviet "senior." The foreign intelligence arm of the Stasi was the Chief Administration, Intelligence (HVA). Its principal TARGET was West Germany, although other Western European countries and U.S. military forces in Europe were also targeted.

At home, the Stasi carried out repression of the East German population through a massive NETWORK of informers, often with members of the same family reporting on others (and being paid). The pre-Stasi organizations had made use of several former German police and intelligence officials, many ex-GESTAPO and SS officers. Even after the establishment of the MfS, their employment continued; one of them was Lt. Gen. Rudolf Bamler, former head of COUNTERESPIONAGE for the ABWEHR. (Of course, the same was being done in the West; see GEHLEN ORGANIZATION.)

East Germany was stark and cold; the Stasi fit into the motif perfectly, as depicted in JOHN LE CARRÉ's classic book *The Spy Who Came In from the Cold* (1963). But the Stasi was effective in penetrating the West German government, and subverting officials, at virtually every level. (See GERMANY.)

When East Germany merged with West Germany on Oct. 3, 1990, the Stasi was reported to have 173,000 registered informers out of a population of less than 17 million or about one per 100 citizens. This number was in addition to a full-time MfS staff of more than 90,000 uniformed and civilian personnel.

After the union of the two Germanys, several former East German intelligence officials were tried for their previous activities and indiscretions as well as border, police, and some informers. After several trials of former Stasi officials, including the East German spymaster MARKUS WOLF, the unified Germany's Constitutional Court ruled

on May 23, 1995 that former Stasi officials could not be prosecuted for conducting Cold War espionage against the West. The 5-to-3 ruling effectively gave amnesty to Wolf and other East Germany former foreign intelligence officials who had stolen secrets from the West.

Also see BFV.

●● MGB

see NKVD

●● MI

- (1) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.
 - (2) Designation for British intelligence/security activities. The term was derived from the pre-World War I establishment of branches within the War Office, with their original designation having the prefix MO for Military Operations. They were changed to MI for Military Intelligence in 1916.
- The principal MI organizations were:

- MI1 Directorate of Military Intelligence
- MI1(b) CRYPTANALYSIS Section (incorporated into the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL in 1919)
- MI1(c) Foreign Section
- MI3 European Country Section

- MI3(b) German sub-section (changed to MI14 in 1940)
- MI5 Security Service (originally Security Intelligence Service)
- MI6 Secret Intelligence Service
- MI8 Radio Security Service
- MI9 Escape and Evasion Service
- MI11 Field Security Police
- MI14 German Section
- MI19 Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre
- MI(L) War Office Liaison with Allied Intelligence Services


Not all of the above organizations were in existence at the same time.

★ ●● MI5

British Security Service responsible for COUNTERESPIONAGE activities in the United Kingdom.

In March 1909, according to historian F. H. HINSLEY in *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (1990), “to the accompaniment of mounting public concern about alarmist spy stories and lurid invasion novels . . .” a subcommittee of the Committee on Imperial Defence was set up to consider the nature and extent of foreign espionage in Britain—and who should attempt to counter such activities. The report, issued in July 1909, found no

MI5 Organization



doubt that “an extensive system of German espionage exists in this country . . .” and that there was “no organisation for . . . accurately identifying its extent and objectives.”

In response to the report, the Secret Service Bureau—formally the Imperial Security Intelligence Service—was created on Oct. 1, 1909, to serve as an intermediary between the War Office, the Admiralty, and Britain’s spies and AGENTS abroad, as well as to undertake counterespionage functions for the British government. The bureau was divided into a Home Section and a Foreign Section.

Although the Secret Service Bureau was to be separate from any government department, it was placed administratively under the War Office’s MO5, the special branch of the Military Operations Directorate responsible for questions relating to foreign aliens. Initially the bureau was organized into a naval branch, under Capt. MANSFIELD CUMMING, and a military branch, under Capt. VERNON KELL (pseudonym Kelly). Subsequent reorganizations gave Cumming, soon known by the designation “C,” the responsibility for foreign intelligence collection while Kell, using “K,” was assigned the spy-catching responsibilities of the bureau.

The bureau was busy as the British sought intelligence on Germany’s military and naval buildups, while 12 spies were arrested in Britain before the outbreak of World War I. Further, there was evidence of a spy NETWORK in Britain that would be activated when war began.

At the outbreak of World War I in Aug. 1914, the Home Section was placed directly under the War Office (MO5), being changed to MI5 when a new directorate of MILITARY INTELLIGENCE was established. The Foreign Section became MI1(c) and was made responsible for COUNTERESPIONAGE outside the British Empire as well as intelligence collection abroad.

Again, there were extensive espionage activities abroad and counterespionage work at home. At the start of the war the bureau arrested 21 suspected spies (one other escaped). Another 35 were apprehended during the war, and by 1916 there were probably no more spies loose in Britain.

By the end of World War I the Foreign Section was moved to the Foreign Office and became known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with the designation of MI6. Cumming remained its chief until 1923. The Home Section evolved into the Security Service with the designation MI5. Kell held the position of Director-General of MI5 until 1940. (He used the initial “K,” although his successors never adopted it to the extent that the heads of MI6 employed the pseudonym “C”.)

THE BOLSHIE THREAT

Between the World Wars there were periodic efforts to restructure the British intelligence services, especially to combine MI5 and MI6. But in the period when Germany was not yet a threat, there was the threat of bolshevism as Soviet Russia sought to export world revolution. A high point in the MI5 efforts to uncover

“bolshie” plots came in May 1927, when a massive MI5 and police raid was conducted against Soviet front activities in Britain (see ARCOS AFFAIR, WILFRED MACARTNEY). Indeed, despite the growth of fascist movements in Britain, especially the one led by crowd-drawing Black-shirt leader Sir Oswald Mosley, the Security Service and police believed that communists were a much graver threat to British society.

However, by the late 1930s it was obvious that Germany was again a threat to Britain, and there was renewed concern over potential German espionage. This concern was exacerbated as tens of thousands of refugees from Hitler’s terror began to arrive in Britain.

The head of MI5 for most of World War II was Sir DAVID PETRIE, who served in that post from Nov. 1940 until 1946. Upon his appointment Petrie was given three simultaneous ranks in the Army Intelligence Corps: 2nd lieutenant, acting colonel, and local brigadier.

The MI5 organization appears to have been highly successful. Sixteen German spies were captured and executed in Britain during the war, and two Spaniards were executed as spies at Gibraltar. Many other German agents were TURNED and forced to participate in a massive British DECEPTION scheme that made the German intelligence services—and Adolf Hitler himself—believe that they had an extensive and effective spy NETWORK in Britain. (See DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM.)

Only one man is known to have spied in Britain during the war and evaded capture or being “turned,” Jan WILHELM TER BRAAK. At least two other men claimed to have parachuted into Britain during the war and successfully returned to Germany without being detected, but their stories could not be substantiated.

The basic wartime organization of MI5 provided for five major divisions:

- A Administration
- B Counterespionage
- C Security
- D Military Liaison
- E Aliens
- F Overseas Control

COLD WAR TRIBULATIONS

The successes that MI5 enjoyed in World War II were not to carry over into the lengthy Cold War period. There were several highly successful MI5 operations against the Soviet, French, and Egyptian embassies in London (see ENGULF). In addition, a number of Soviet agents operating in Britain were captured, mostly by MI5 sleuthing.

But during and after the war the British government was infiltrated by several Soviet MOLES, mostly young men recruited at Cambridge University (see CAMBRIDGE SPY RING). Over time these men rose to senior positions in the Foreign Office and MI6, among other agencies.

The escape of DONALD MACLEAN from Britain in 1949 and of HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY from Beirut in 1963, both to the Soviet Union while under active MI5 investigation, led to public as well as official dismay about the agency.

Indeed, there was concern—and even evidence—that MI5 itself was infiltrated by Soviet moles.

In 1963 it was discovered that ANTHONY BLUNT, who had served in MI5 during the war, was a Soviet mole. There were more suspects. A major 1960s investigation by a joint MI5-MI6 panel—given the CODE NAME of the FLUENCY COMMITTEE—investigated the charges and concluded that there were indications of almost continuous Soviet penetration of MI5 from 1942 to at least 1962. The committee's candidates for undiscovered Soviet moles in MI5 were Michael Hanley, at the time a branch director in MI5, and ROGER HOLLIS; at the time Hollis was the Director-General of MI5, while Hanley later became Director-General!

Hanley and Hollis were interrogated, in a friendly manner, and although the results were inconclusive, their files were closed. (In 1981 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the House of Commons that, after further review, it had been concluded that Hollis was not a spy.)

Hollis's successors, especially MARTIN FURNIVAL JONES, faced a considerable challenge to restore confidence in the agency, including helping sagging internal morale. Of particular concern to Furnival Jones and his successors was the reestablishment of close, open relations with the United States through the FBI and CIA, whose leaders regarded the penetration of British intelligence and the Foreign Office, as well as the U.S. atomic bomb project, as a major British security failure. Despite earlier suspicions that he was a Soviet mole, Michael Hanley succeeded Furnival Jones in 1972, causing much consternation in the U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, which felt that it had been “burned” continuously by the British failure to discover either the British members of the ATOMIC SPY RING or the Cambridge spy ring.

Two decades later, in Dec. 1991, the British public were surprised—and some old-timers were shocked—to open their morning newspapers and read that a 56-year-old mother of two had been named to head MI5. Mrs. STELLA RIMINGTON was the first woman named to head an intelligence agency in any major country. She was also the first head of MI5 to be named officially in the press. However, the official statement announcing her appointment noted: “. . . no photographic or interview facilities are being provided in connection with this appointment.” (In 1993, for the first time, the head of MI6, Sir Colin McColl, was officially identified.)

The official revelations continued when, on July 16, 1993, MI5 published the glossy-paper, 36-page booklet *The Security Service*. Inside were details of MI5's activities, the exact wording of its charter, and even an organization chart (see page 362). It was revealed that MI5 had a staff of 2,000 employees.

Also released at the time were photos of Mrs. Rimington, the head who brought the Security Service out of the shadows of the Cold War.

The Security Service lists five functions of MI5: (1) counterterrorism (“Irish organisations currently pose the principal terrorist threats to the security of the United Kingdom”); (2) counterespionage (“It is a fact that the old threat [Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact] no longer exists, but it is equally true that spying continues”); (3) counter-

subversion (“Since the collapse of Soviet Communism . . . [these efforts] now represent less than five percent of the investigative work of the Service”); (4) protective security; (5) security intelligence; and (6) record keeping.

The counterterrorism efforts take up some 70 percent of the Security Service's resources, with about 26 percent being allocated to international security threats and 44 percent to Irish and domestic concerns. Obviously, MI5 works closely with MI6 and the military intelligence activities—including the Special Air Service and Special Boat Service—in carrying out counterterrorism activities.

Upon taking over as Director-General of MI5 from Rimington on April 1, 1996, Stephen Lander was expected to emphasize further the counterterrorism role in the wake of a renewed bombing campaign by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Lander, former director of Irish counterterrorism in MI5, was known to have strong feelings on this issue.

DIRECTORS-GENERAL

The Directors-General of MI5 were:

1909–1940	Maj. Gen. Sir Vernon Kell
1940–1946	Sir David Petrie
1946–1953	SIR PERCY SILLITOE
1953–1956	SIR DICK WHITE
1956–1965	Sir Roger Hollis
1965–1972	Sir Martin Furnival Jones
1972–1979	Sir Michael Hanley
1979–1981	Sir Howard Smith
1981–1985	Sir John Jones
1985–1988	Sir Anthony Duff
1988–1991	Sir Patrick Walker
1991–1996	Dame Stella Rimington
1996–	Stephen Lander



●● MI6

British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), responsible for foreign intelligence. The SIS also had its origins in the Secret Service Bureau created in 1909 (see MI5, above).

Upon the outbreak of World War I in Aug. 1914, the bureau's Foreign Section became MI1(c) and was made responsible for COUNTERESPIONAGE activities outside the British Empire as well as intelligence collection abroad. The Foreign Section was shifted back to the War Office from 1916 to 1918, when it was placed under the aegis of the Foreign Office. In 1921 the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was established as Britain's foreign intelligence agency under the control of the Foreign Office. Capt. MANSFIELD CUMMING (known as “C”) was head of the Foreign Section/SIS/MI6 from 1909 until 1923, stepping down a few months before his death.

The principal TARGET of Cumming's AGENTS at this time was Germany. The intelligence staff of the British Expeditionary Force in France, which was responsible for TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE, was performing poorly. Cumming's efforts, involving higher levels of intelligence collection, yielded greater success. He placed local directors of intelligence, who reported to his headquarters, in all of the theaters.

Cumming became involved in POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE as well. When Czar Nicholas II abdicated on March 16, 1917, it became expedient for Britain to support the efforts of Aleksandr Kerensky to form a new government that would keep Russia in the war against Germany. To this end, the British government sent him funds via an office that Cumming had set up in New York City. The courier who used to carry the funds was Cumming's agent W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM. Maugham then became a go-between for Prime Minister Lloyd George and Kerensky. Meanwhile, other British intelligence agents were at work in revolution-torn Russia, most notably Maj. STEPHEN ALLEY and the irrepressible SIDNEY REILLY.

It is not clear what Reilly's mandate was, nor from whom he got it. He had earlier been in Russia representing Cumming—whom he referred to, sometimes even affectionately, as “that one-legged bastard”—as well as German shipyards and himself. Reilly, a staunch royalist, met with Bolshevik leaders and then tried to foment a counterrevolution. He was unquestionably involved in the attempted assassination of Bolshevik leader V. I. Lenin, which left him badly wounded.

Reilly's complex and grandiose plans to retake Russia (and set himself up as prime minister) ended in disaster. Cumming never again employed him—at least not officially. But he continued to send his other agents abroad. The March 1921 trade agreement between Britain and Russia, which constituted de facto recognition of the Bolshevik regime, prohibited each country from undertaking espionage activities against the other. This, however, did little to deter Cumming or his Russian counterpart, FELIKS DZERZHINSKY from their profession. The British were particularly concerned that the Russians might interfere in the ongoing conflict in Ireland. And there was soon evidence that the Russians were both spying in Britain and supporting a communist movement, which was particularly troublesome as the economic situation in Britain deteriorated.

(Significantly, in 1919 the highly successful Admiralty CRYPTANALYSIS program, known as ROOM 40, and the small War Office cryptanalysis effort were merged to establish the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL, which was also placed under Cumming's overall direction. It was soon able to break the diplomatic cipher used by the Russians to communicate with their embassy in London.)

Reilly became a major problem for MI6 in 1924. Although now living in the United States, he was financially supporting anti-Bolshevik movements in Europe. In 1924 he was lured back to the Soviet Union (established in 1922) by a DECEPTION operation known as THE TRUST. When he disappeared across the Finnish border, his wife began demanding help from MI6 officers in determining his fate. (The Trust was in fact a front for the Russian intelligence service, then known as OGPU.)

In 1923 the Secret Intelligence Service gained a new Director-General, another Navy officer, Rear Adm. HUGH SINCLAIR, who had served as DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE immediately after the war. There was overlap in his intelligence efforts against the Soviets and the German situation. Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty

the Germans were forbidden from developing military aviation as well as certain other weapons. German leaders—including Hermann Göring—went to Russia to establish secret training facilities and programs and to work with the Soviets in weapons development. And, as the Soviet Union began its own industrial and military rebuilding after revolution and civil war, it considered Great Britain its principal enemy.

Germany began rebuilding its military strength in the 1930s, causing MI6 agents to work harder to determine the size and scope of the rearmament efforts. But MI6 resources were too little for the foreign intelligence effort needed to support Britain's worldwide interests. There was little warning of Italy's African adventure into Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, or of Germany's occupation of the Rhineland that same year. MI6 also provided insufficient notice of Hitler's intentions—and capabilities—when Germany took over the Sudetenland and invaded Czechoslovakia (1938) and Poland (1939).

British intelligence historian NIGEL WEST [p.] describes the state of MI6 at the beginning of World War II in *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–45* (1983):

Admiral Hugh Sinclair's first sixteen years as Chief of SIS were made extremely difficult for him because he was starved of funds. This made him close much needed [foreign] Stations and keep on too many rundown old pros from the Great War. Nor did he use what monies he had to great advantage: he spent too much on Russian intelligence from gullible émigré sources and too little elsewhere. As a result, he was caught napping by the rise of Nazism.

* * *

During the inter-war period, SIS lacked clout in Whitehall. Cumming's Russian reports had lost the Service credibility, so that when officers . . . did field useful data, they were not believed. This lack of enthusiasm for SIS deepened in Whitehall when the Abyssinian and Rhineland *coups d'état* arrived unforeseen and unheralded by SIS. Sinclair's belated recognition of Germany as its principal target had meant that when Whitehall's demands for German intelligence began to increase, Sinclair was in no position to deliver. Good sources take years to develop and the hostile security climate in Nazi Germany made SIS's task an arduous one.

Two months after the war began, on Nov. 4, 1939, Adm. Sir Hugh Sinclair died in office. His successor, Col. STEWART MENZIES, also held the post for well over a decade. Menzies, later promoted to major general, was responsible for much of Britain's successful intelligence activities during the war, including the ULTRA cryptanalysis efforts. There were some successes in the months before Britain went to war. For example, Group Capt. F. W. WINTERBOTHAM was able to carry out extensive collection missions to Germany—even meeting Adolf Hitler. Another success was obtaining high-altitude aerial photography of Germany. The Royal Air Force had no photographic

RECONNAISSANCE unit; beginning in March 1939, MI6 and the French sponsored an Australian, SIDNEY COTTON, who made high-altitude spy flights over Germany in a commercial aircraft with hidden cameras.

But there were also monumental failures. In the VENLO INCIDENT on the Dutch-German frontier, two MI6 officers were kidnapped by the Germans in Nov. 1939. The two officers, Capt. PAYNE S. BEST and Maj. H. RICHARD STEVENS, subsequently revealed many of MI6's secrets, including the names of British agents, to the Germans.

Despite this inauspicious beginning, MI6 achieved considerable success in World War II. Together with the ULTRA successes against German communications (see ENGIMA, CRYPTANALYSIS), MI6 was able to provide Allied leaders with extensive and useful knowledge of German and Italian capabilities and, to a large degree, intentions.

Menzies was able to work well with U.S. and the other British intelligence agencies. There were many problems, especially in dealing with the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES and British Special Operations Executive (SOE), but in the course of the overall war effort they were minor. (This is demonstrated by the actual cooperation among the services, and the awarding of decorations; Menzies was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit.)

During World War II, MI6 comprised two major branches, designated Y for headquarters activities and YP for overseas stations. The former had the following sections:

I	Political
II	Military
III	Naval
IV	Air
V	Counterespionage
VI	Industrial
VII	Financial
VIII	Communications
IX	Cipher
X	Press

In the summer of 1944 a new section was established, given the (existing) designation IX: Soviet espionage and subversion. The head of the new section was a veteran of Section V (counterespionage). His name was HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, one of the Soviet Union's most successful spies.

COLD WAR ESPIONAGE

The Cold War brought new challenges to British intelligence, as former ally Josef Stalin was rapidly transformed into the new enemy. Soviet intelligence had gained a major foothold in the British intelligence services during the war, mainly through the efforts of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING. Besides Kim Philby, who had been considered a rapidly rising star in MI6, possibly even a future director-general, there was JOHN CAIRNCROSS, who served at the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL as well as in MI6, and GEORGE BLAKE who began spying for the Soviets after the Korean War. Further, the close relationship between MI5 and MI6 meant that ANTHONY

BLUNT and other Soviet MOLES in the Security Service often had access to MI6 material.

(One of the strangest cases was that of CHARLES H. ELLIS, an MI6 officer in World War II who sold intelligence to both the Germans and Soviets; his spying for the Soviets may have continued after the war.)

These Soviet penetrations revealed much of British and American intelligence operations to the Soviet intelligence services. The Allied failures during the Cold War that can definitely be attributed to these penetrations include the loss of agents sent into Albania and the Soviet knowledge of the BERLIN TUNNEL project. Scores of additional British-U.S. intelligence operations were also compromised.

MI6 itself was responsible for several intelligence failures (and embarrassments). In 1956, for example, MI6 sent overage and overweight ex-Navy diver LIONEL CRABB on a secret mission in Portsmouth Harbor to examine the underwater hull of the new Soviet cruiser *Or-dzhonikidze*, which had brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and N. A. Bulganin to Britain. A headless body was later found floating in the harbor, presumably the remains of Crabb.

Still, several major successes could be recorded by MI6. Soviet intelligence officer OLEG PENKOVSKY had first approached the U.S. CIA seeking to reveal military secrets of the Soviet armed forces. Ignored by the Americans, he approached a British businessman, GREVILLE WYNNE, who passed on the contact to MI6. Although the British had to "share" Penkovsky with the CIA, for a brief period in the early 1960s Soviet military policies and weapons were laid bare to the British and American political and military leaders.

There have been other MI6 successes, although few as dramatic and productive as the short-lived Penkovsky triumph. The Secret Intelligence Service, unlike the Security Service under STELLA RIMINGTON, has not yet "gone public." It is unlikely to do so as, despite the end of the Cold War, MI6 agents are still being sent into foreign lands on dangerous missions.

DIRECTORS-GENERAL

The Directors-General of MI5 were:

1909-1923	Capt. Sir Mansfield Cumming
1923-1939	Adm. Sir Hugh Sinclair
1939-1952	Maj. Gen. Sir Stewart Menzies
1953-1956	Sir John Sinclair
1956-1968	SIR DICK WHITE
1968-1973	Sir John Rennie
1973-1978	SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD
1979-1982	Sir Arthur Franks
1982-1985	Sir Colin Figures
1985-1989	Sir Christopher Curwen
1989-1994	Sir Colin McColl
1994-	David Spedding

Significantly, the indefatigable Dick White, a veteran of MI5 service in World War II, is the only man to have

been head of both MI5 and MI6, serving a total of 15 years as head of major intelligence services.

●● MICRODOT

The photographic reduction of writing or other material to facilitate transfer from one location to another without detection. The Germans are generally given credit for inventing the microdot. However, the French used microdots during the siege of Paris by the Prussians in 1870. Microdots at that time were 70 millimeters in size and contained 300,000 characters; microdots were sent across enemy lines by BALLOONS and PIGEON POST. Also, ALEXANDER FOOTE, a Soviet AGENT, wrote in his book *Handbook for Spies* (1949) that the Soviet intelligence services had used microdots before World War II.

Even if the Germans did not invent microdots, they made important contributions to the development of microdot technology and used microdots aggressively before and during World War II. The Germans used microdots extensively for their espionage operations throughout the world prior to and during the war.

The United States learned of microdots through DUSKO POPOV, a DOUBLE AGENT who came to the United States in 1941. Although the British were controlling Popov and advised J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI, of his activities, Hoover directed that Popov leave the United States. After the war, Hoover wrote that Popov was a German AGENT who had “revealed” the German microdot equipment to the FBI.

The British also used microdots during the war, employing 35-mm negatives as an intermediate layer, which was then backed away from a negative 1,270 mm.

Because the preparation of microdots requires special photographic equipment, which would be suspect unless the spy had appropriate cover as a professional photographer or was an established amateur photographer, microphotography is usually confined to headquarters-to-agent communication. One microdot device used by the Germans was a six-foot-long optical bench weighing 4,200 pounds and employing handmade emulsion on glass sheets. Another model fit into a satchel and used high-resolution emulsion and thin film backing.

Microphotography also includes the use of positive-type film (as opposed to negative-type film); a bleaching of the image prior to dispatch occurs so that the “dot” appears as a clear piece of cellophane or thin plastic. This product of microphotography, referred to as a “mikrat,” was extensively developed by the Germans during World War II. Modern mikrats measure one mm by one mm and are believed to be employed by the Soviet intelligence services.

In the late 1950s the KGB was reportedly training agents to produce microdots by using a 35-mm reflex camera with the document to be photographed laid on a flat table. The agent would then clamp the camera to a chair (or any object that could hold the camera steady) and take the picture. After development, the negative would be placed between two glass slides to hold it flat; a piece of ordinary cellophane was then used to make it

light-sensitive with specially prepared chemicals provided by the Soviets. The agent would then put a piece of white paper on the flat surface, clamping a small microdot camera over the paper.

The Soviets also used a microdot camera in the form of a small brass tube, about 1½ inches long with lenses at both ends. Exactly 35 inches above the bottom end of the microdot camera, a glass plate was mounted with the negative and a three-power, hand magnifying glass held above the glass plate. Above that a 100-watt, clear glass electric light shone through the magnifying glass and then the negative and microdot camera. The agent raised or lowered the glass until he could focus the negative on the tiniest possible spot on a piece of white paper. He then marked the spot with an x, turned off the light, and, after about three minutes, took the cellophane out and developed it. After the cellophane was developed, he looked for a black dot about the size of a period. Using a razor blade, he then cut out the spot (microdot).

The agent made a slit 1/16-inch deep in one edge of a postcard, picked up the microdot with tweezers, and slipped it into the slot. He sealed the slot with a paste made from flour and water (because other pastes contain bone marrow that shows up under ultraviolet light).

●● MIDAS

First U.S. early warning SATELLITE, designed to detect the launching of long-range ballistic missiles. Conceived in the 1950s—before the Soviet orbiting of the first Sputnik in 1957—the project was designated MIDAS, an acronym for Missile Alarm Defense System. It was one of the early satellite efforts proposed by the U.S. Air Force. (Also see SAMOS.)

MIDAS was fitted with infrared scanners. Eight satellites, equally spaced in two orbital rings, were to provide complete coverage of missile launch sites in the Soviet Union. The eight satellites would be needed to maintain continuous SURVEILLANCE (rather than RECONNAISSANCE) of the sites.

The first MIDAS test vehicle was launched from Cape Canaveral, Fla., on Feb. 26, 1960. The launch initially went well, but when the Agena A satellite separated from the Atlas D booster there was an explosion. The second MIDAS launch on May 24, 1960, went almost perfectly. The Agena A sensor package—with 3,246 pounds of infrared sensor and data-link equipment—entered an orbit from 292 to 322 miles above the earth. Although fitted with batteries for a 28-day flight, the data link failed after 16 orbits.

Additional tests followed. There were problems: too high a false alarm rate and too low a reliability. In 1961 the MIDAS program was changed from a development effort to a test program, given the designation Program 461. The program seemed doomed until a MIDAS was launched on April 9, 1962—a year before the original MIDAS plan had envisioned an operational system.

The MIDAS went into an orbit 1,749 to 2,102 miles high; the satellite sensors operated for six weeks. During that time it successfully detected the launching of nine

U.S. ballistic missiles. Although there would be more failures, the April 9 satellite had demonstrated the validity of the concept, especially since it detected the solid-propellant Minuteman and Polaris missile launches, which have smaller infrared signatures at launch than do larger, liquid-propellant missiles.

Despite additional successes, development of MIDAS halted in Nov. 1963 because of the need to detect submarine-launched missiles and the smaller, intermediate-range ballistic missiles. When flight testing of modified satellites began in June 1966, there were again problems, and by the end of the year the follow-on MIDAS program was canceled.

In its place the United States initiated Program 949, a larger satellite that could be placed in a geosynchronous orbit 23,500 miles above the earth. This meant that only a few satellites, orbiting at the same speed as the earth, would be relatively stationary and hence would provide continuous surveillance of Soviet missile launch sites.

The first Program 949 launch occurred on Aug. 6, 1968. It entered a near-geosynchronous orbit of 19,686 to 24,769 miles above the earth. This and follow-on launches were intended primarily to watch the ocean-operating areas of Soviet ballistic missile submarines, which were of increasing concern to U.S. defense planners. (Land-based radars in Greenland, Alaska, and Canada were positioned to detect Soviet ballistic missiles during their early, boost phase trajectory.)

More Program 949 launches followed, some successful, some less so. While a final launch on Dec. 1972 was a good one, the whole program was looked at as a development effort, paving the way for the definitive U.S. early warning satellite—the Program 647.

The first Program 647 launch on Nov. 6, 1970, was only a partial success, as a geosynchronous orbit was not achieved. This was a 2,500-pound satellite with four 23-foot solar panels for recharging the batteries for essentially unlimited endurance.

The second Program 647 launch on May 5, 1971, reached a perfect orbit. The flight time for a ballistic missile launched from the Soviet Union toward the United States would have a flight time of some 30 minutes. The Program 647 satellite could detect the launch and give essentially instantaneous warning; after six minutes it could provide sufficient data to determine the trajectory and, hence, target of the missile.

The satellite surveillance system was now operational. Its success led to an unprecedented amount of detail being made available to the public in 1973–1974, at which time the program was renamed the Defense Support Program (DSP). By the mid-1970s three DSP satellites were in geosynchronous orbit, two over the Western Hemisphere and one over the Eastern Hemisphere, providing continuous coverage of Soviet and Chinese launch sites. DSP satellites remain aloft.

In addition to fixed ground receiving stations in the United States and at Alice Springs in Australia, several mobile ground receiving stations were developed. Subsequently, the Air Force's flying command posts (E-4 Looking Glass) and Airborne Warning And Control System (E-3 AWACS) aircraft were fitted with DSP receivers,

providing a high degree of survivability for U.S. nuclear retaliation decision makers.

While designed to detect ballistic missile launches, the infrared detectors in these satellites can also detect some turbojet aircraft using afterburners for acceleration, especially when over water. However, this capability is rarely discussed by U.S. officials in public forums.

●● MIDWAY

The “turning point” of World War II in the Pacific occurred when an inferior U.S. naval force decisively defeated a Japanese fleet attempting to capture Midway Island in the Hawaiian Islands and force the U.S. fleet into a decisive battle. The American victory at Midway was possible because U.S. Navy CRYPTOLOGISTS were able to read the Japanese naval CODE. (See NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE)

Japanese strategy called for the capture of Midway and the western Aleutian Islands to create a Japanese defense line from Kiska in the Aleutians through Midway, Wake, the Marshall Islands and the Gilbert Islands, then west to Port Moresby and the Dutch East Indies. The capture of Midway would also be a response to the April 1942 bomber raid on Japan led by Lt. Col. James (Jimmy) Doolittle, would deprive the United States of a forward base for submarines, and would serve as a stepping stone for the capture of Hawaii.

U.S. Navy cryptologists were able to determine that a major Japanese operation was forthcoming but could not identify the target. Several Japanese CODE NAMES for places were being used. One of the cryptologists, Comdr. W. J. HOLMES, suggested having the U.S. commander on Midway send a message to Pearl Harbor that the island's water-distilling unit had broken down, using a low-grade code that the Japanese could probably decipher. A short time later the cryptologists read a coded Japanese message stating that said there was a shortage of water on AF. Thus the Americans learned that the target was Midway, AF having been previously identified as the target of the Japanese operation.

The Japanese committed almost every available warship to the Midway-Aleutians assault, including eight of Japan's ten operational aircraft carriers. U.S. Navy codebreakers had been piecing together a relatively accurate picture of this plan. The U.S. Pacific area commander, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz—over the objections of some staff officers who were skeptical about the codebreakers' analysis—decided to send his only three aircraft carriers against the Japanese forces led by Adm. ISOROKU YAMAMOTO. The Japanese were taken by surprise and, in the ensuing daylong battle on June 4, 1942, four Japanese carriers and a Japanese cruiser were sunk by U.S. carrier dive bombers; another was severely damaged. All 250 planes on the carriers were lost, along with many of their trained pilots and maintenance crews. U.S. losses were one aircraft carrier and a destroyer.

This was the first decisive defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy since 1592. The battle also marked the zenith of Japanese expansion in the Pacific.

Also see Capt. JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT.

●● MIKHAYLOV, GEN. OF THE ARMY VLADLEN MIKHAYLOVICH

(b. 1925)

Chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1987 to 1991. He had no background in military intelligence and no experience with foreign activities before becoming chief of the GRU.

Mikhaylov entered the Soviet Army in 1942 and became an officer upon completion of military school two years later. He served initially in the Far East, completed the prestigious Frunze Military Academy (i.e., war college) in 1954, and went on to command an Army division. He was chief of staff of the Turkistan Military District prior to becoming chief of the GRU.

●● MIKRAT

The product of microphotography, as used in MICRODOTS.

●● MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (MI)

(1) Designation scheme for British intelligence/security activities; see MI.

(2) The end product of the collection, processing, production, and dissemination of information related to foreign military forces (see INTELLIGENCE CYCLE). Military intelligence is usually concerned with foreign ground forces and is distinct from NAVAL INTELLIGENCE and, by some interpretations, air intelligence.

See ARMY INTELLIGENCE, ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND.

●● MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

see ARMY INTELLIGENCE, U.S.

●● MILLER, RICHARD (b. 1937)

First FBI agent ever convicted of spying for the Soviet Union.

Miller, an overweight (250 pounds), inefficient, and sloppy agent, joined the FBI in 1964 but rarely acted like an FBI agent. In 1982 he was transferred from the local FBI office in Riverside, Calif., to the Los Angeles field office and assigned to the COUNTERINTELLIGENCE division, at that time a safer place to keep him under supervision than divisions concerned with domestic crimes. His record was poor. He peddled Amway products out of his FBI car, used his badge to cadge candy from a 7-11 store, and sold FBI information to a private investigator.

He once lost his gun and his credentials. One night, when he locked up the Los Angeles field office, he left the key in the lock. It was still there the next morning. Miller's reputation, as he himself put it, "wasn't very good, to say the least." Yet, Miller usually received an "excellent" rating—as did about 90 percent of all agents.

He was constantly behind on paperwork. A former colleague described him as "lunchy," meaning "a guy

that's unkempt, disheveled. Looks like he's got bread crumbs and soup spots on his shirt and tie." His own lawyer said of him, "He was certainly no Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., and he was, in fact, much closer to an overweight Inspector Clouseau."

The father of eight children, he was always scrambling for money. He lived alone during the week in Lynwood, a Los Angeles suburb, and on weekends drove more than 100 miles to northern San Diego County, where he and his wife tried to run an avocado ranch that produced more debt than fruit.

The FBI physical standard for an agent of Miller's height—5 feet, 10 inches—was a maximum of 193 pounds. When Miller's weight reached 250 pounds, he was suspended for two weeks and told to lose his excess pounds. A few weeks after this low point in his career, a beautiful 34-year-old Soviet émigrée, Svetlana Ogorodnikov, asked him if he wanted to become a spy.

One day in Aug. 1984, FBI agents, who were keeping the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco under SURVEILLANCE, observed a woman getting out of a car later traced to the FBI field office in Los Angeles. She was Svetlana Ogorodnikov. The FBI surveillance team assumed that an agent from the Los Angeles office was on a case that took him to the consulate.

What they did not know at the time was that when Ogorodnikov went into the consulate she had in her hands Miller's badge and credentials to prove that the man in the car parked outside was indeed an FBI agent. She also had a copy of an FBI manual on the gathering of intelligence information. Miller had made the copy of the manual on the Los Angeles field office photocopying machine. The FBI later described the 24-page classified manual as a guide that could give the Soviets "a detailed picture of FBI and U.S. intelligence activities, techniques and requirements."

The consulate was kept under continuous surveillance because it was a Soviet spy nest. The FBI had once even tried to dig a tunnel under it. The burrowing had been detected, and so the counterintelligence agents had to be satisfied with conventional surveillance techniques—tapping phones; following Soviets believed to be KGB officers; and photographing people who entered and left the consulate, which was known as KGB West. Miller could not have picked a better place in North America to be seen by FBI spy hunters.

When Miller became a counterintelligence agent in 1982, Svetlana Ogorodnikov was the responsibility of an agent, John E. Hunt, assigned to watch on the large Soviet émigré community in West Hollywood. Hunt met with her many times, once to accompany her to the office of a physician. Hunt said Ogorodnikov was being examined for "a rare blood disease." She later said that Hunt took her to the physician for an abortion and strongly implied that he was the father, apparently not knowing that the agent had had a vasectomy in 1960. When he retired in 1984, Ogorodnikov was handed over to Miller.

Ogorodnikov was believed to be a KGB "contact agent," who spotted potential recruits for KGB officers under diplomatic COVER. The field office watched her be-

cause she was not an ordinary Russian émigré. She and her husband, Nikolay Ogorodnikov, had emigrated to the United States in 1973. Other émigrés called them pro-Soviet informers working for the KGB. She boasted of her connections with the Soviet Consulate and, unlike other émigrés, was allowed to travel back and forth to the Soviet Union.

After the first rendezvous observed by the FBI agents in San Francisco, she and Miller had what the FBI called “numerous personal meetings.” They became lovers. Svetlana said she tried to resist Miller’s sexual advances and submitted only “because he scared me.” Claiming to be a KGB major, she promised \$65,000 in gold and money—and a \$675 Burberry trenchcoat—if he would spy for the KGB. The FBI stepped up its surveillance and began building a case in an operation given the CODE NAME Whipworm.

She asked Miller to learn the whereabouts of KGB Maj. STANISLAV LEVCHENKO, who had defected, and Victor Belenko, a Soviet pilot who defected in a MiG-25 he flew to Japan in 1976. They had been condemned to death in absentia in the Soviet Union and presumably would be targets for KGB assassins. Miller did not provide the information.

In Sept. 1984, as the FBI was about to close in, Miller told his superior that for months he had been working on his own to penetrate the KGB by becoming a DOUBLE AGENT. He said that he had hoped to trick Svetlana—and the KGB—into thinking that he was a traitor as part of his plan. He said he also wanted to “prove to myself and to the rest of the FBI that I wasn’t the klutz that everybody thought I was.”

After a marathon interrogation that spanned several days, FBI agents arrested Miller. In a search of his apartment they found secret and confidential documents. The Ogorodnikovs were also arrested, and a search of their apartment produced such standard TRADECRAFT tools as ONE-TIME PADS, SECRET WRITING instruments, and photographic equipment for concealing material in MICRODOTS.

Svetlana and Nikolay interrupted their trial by pleading guilty in a deal that sentenced Svetlana to 18 years and Nikolay to 8 years. She agreed to testify against Miller, who was charged with conspiracy to commit espionage and passing classified documents. Miller’s defense attorneys virtually conceded the FBI case against their client, claiming, however, that he had merely bumbled trying to carry out his self-appointed mission as a KGB mole for the FBI. The jury could not agree on his guilt and the judge declared a mistrial in Nov. 1985.

In a second trial three months later, Svetlana testified—as a defense witness. She now insisted that Miller was innocent and that she had made a plea bargain to save herself from a life sentence. Under cross-examination, prosecutors revealed that she had confessed secretly to the judge at her interrupted trial. This time the jury found Miller guilty of six counts of espionage. He was sentenced to two life terms plus fifty years and fined \$60,000.

●● MINARET

Highly classified, COMPARTMENTED program of the NSA to intercept communications from foreigners to foreign nationals or American citizens in the United States suspected of involvement with civil disturbances, especially regarding opposition to the Vietnam War. The July 1, 1969, charter for Minaret—itsself TOP SECRET—called for the monitoring of “communications concerning individuals or organizations, involved in civil disturbances, antiwar movements/demonstrations and Military deserters involved in the antiwar movements. . . .”

Also see DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE and Operation SHAMROCK.

●● MINCEMEAT

Ingenious British DECEPTION operation during World War II to make the German High Command believe that the Allies would invade the Balkans in mid-1943 instead of Sicily, the real objective. The operation called for making the Germans believe that they had, by accident, intercepted highly confidential documents that foretold Allied war plans. If successful, the Germans would divert troops to the Balkans at the cost of defending Sicily.

British NAVAL INTELLIGENCE took the corpse of a man who had recently died in England and preserved his body in dry ice. They quickly developed a *persona* for him—Major Martin of the Royal Marines: William Martin, a captain and acting major, born in Cardiff, Wales, in 1907, and assigned to Headquarters, Combined Operations.

The corpse was outfitted in a Marine officer’s uniform, complete with service ribbons, identity disks and papers, theater ticket stubs, pound notes, loose change, a statement from his club for lodging in London, etc. Most important, chained to him was a locked briefcase with official documents and a personal letter from one senior Allied officer to another. The letter and papers indicated that Major Martin was en route by aircraft from England to Allied headquarters in North Africa.

Major Martin was then placed in a sealed steel canister and taken on board the British SUBMARINE *SERAPH*, which sailed to a position off of Huelva on the coast of Spain. There, early in the morning of April 30, Lt. N. L. A. (Bill) Jewell, the submarine’s commanding officer, and his officers, sworn to secrecy, opened the canister on the deck of the surfaced submarine. (The crew was told they were deploying a secret weather reporting device.) Major Martin was fitted with a life jacket and, after a final check of the body and its outfit, the 39th Psalm was read and the body gently pushed into the sea where the tide would bring it ashore.

German operatives inundated Spain and quickly learned of the body washing toward the shore, being found by a fisherman on April 30. While British officials, who also learned of the body demanded its return, the briefcase was carefully opened by the Germans and photographed, the papers returned, and then given to British diplomats by Spanish officials. The photographs were