

in the day by British surface ships. That same month she rammed and damaged an Italian submarine.

In early 1943 the *Seraph* sailed for England and a needed refit. In April she set out again for the Mediterranean, still under command of Lt. Jewell. In addition to her normal crew, packed in dry ice was the unidentified body of a dead man dressed as a Royal Marine officer, with a briefcase handcuffed to his coat that contained several secret documents. On the morning of April 30 the *Seraph* surfaced off the coast of Spain and the body, with a life jacket, was lowered over the side in Operation MINCEMEAT.

During the remainder of 1943 the *Seraph* operated against German and Italian forces in the Mediterranean and attacked several convoys, but her only kills were a few barges and other small craft destroyed by gunfire. For the rest of the war the *Seraph* operated in the eastern Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, and served as a guide ship for the D-DAY landings on June 6, 1944.

The *Seraph* remained in active service into the early 1960s. When the submarine was scrapped in 1965, her conning tower was preserved as a memorial at the Citadel campus in Charleston, S.C. (Clark was a graduate of the Citadel and its president from 1954 to 1965.)

●● **Sgt. CREST [P]**

Pseudonym for a U.S. Air Force enlisted man assigned to the 40th Tactical Fighter Group in Italy. He was stopped and arrested in Dec. 1976 while attempting to enter West Germany from East Germany. Subsequent investigation revealed that Crest had been involved in black market operations and had dealings with Hungarian intelligence officials. However, because of lack of evidence he was not prosecuted but was administratively discharged from the Air Force. His case was given a pseudonym.

●● **SEROV, COL. GEN. IVAN ALEXANDROVICH**

(b. 1905 d. 1962)

Soviet Army officer, NKVD officer, chairman of the KGB from 1954 to 1958, and chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1958 to 1962. Having survived the bloody purges of the Stalin era despite his involvement with state security organs, Serov was forced to retire from his GRU position in 1962 because of his close ties to Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY, a major spy for the West. Serov was considered a brutal, albeit "not enthusiastic," executioner.

Originally a military intelligence officer, at the time of the GRU purges in the late 1930s he managed not only to survive but also to transfer to the NKVD. According to some reports, on June 12, 1937, he executed Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevski, the first major victim of Stalin's purges of the military establishment, and other leading figures of the Red Army. (Some sources put his assignment to the NKVD in 1938.)

Beginning in 1940 Serov was continually engaged in the suppression and murder of enemies of the Soviet

state: He distinguished himself in the pursuit and liquidation of the anti-Soviet groups in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940 and again in 1944–1947, and he was personally involved in the murder of Polish officers in the KATYN MASSACRE. He was deputy chief of SMERSH in 1941, a deputy to LAVRENTY BERIA from 1943 to 1945, and the deputy chief of Smersh in Soviet-occupied Germany in 1945.

After World War II he served in the NKVD and then became a deputy chief of GRU. As deputy chief of the GRU, Serov was one of the conspirators against Beria after Stalin's death in 1953. After the fall of Beria that June, Serov became deputy head of the MVD (formerly NKVD) and the following year the chairman of the newly established KGB. Together with Ambassador YURI ANDROPOV, he seized the leaders of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 by deceit and took part in their torture and execution, earning him the nickname the "hangman of Hungary."

In Dec. 1958 Serov became chief of the GRU. As a former NKVD and Smersh official he had many enemies in the Army and GRU. Under his leadership, corruption in the GRU flourished; those years were also the most unproductive in the history of the GRU. It was the only period of the Soviet regime when GRU officers voluntarily made contact with Western services and gave them considerably more valuable information than they took from them.

In 1962, because of the defection of Penkovsky to the West, Serov was demoted to the rank of major general and stripped of his decorations. He died a short time later.

Nikita Khrushchev, who removed Serov from his post as chairman of the KGB to the less influential position of chief of the GRU, wrote in *Khrushchev Remembers* (1970) that the subsequent dismissal of Serov in 1962 was because he was "careless." According to Khrushchev, Serov "was an honest, uncorruptible, reliable comrade despite his mistakes. I respected and trusted him. He was a simple person, simple to the point of being naïve."

●● **SERVICE, THE**

The nickname of KGB officers for their own service.

●● **SERVICE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS**

(SR)

●● **SERVICES, PRESS AND BROADCASTING COMMITTEE**

see D NOTICE

●● **SESSIONS, JUDGE WILLIAM S.**

(b. 1930)

Director of the FBI from Nov. 1987 until he was fired by President Clinton on July 19, 1993, for ethics violations.

A former U.S. attorney and Justice Department official, Sessions spent 13 years as a federal judge in Texas,

where he gained a reputation for being a stern but fair-minded jurist. He received national attention when he presided over the trial of several men charged in the 1979 assassination of federal Judge John H. Wood.

Sessions' appointment by President Reagan for a ten-year term as director of the FBI was easily confirmed by Congress. His support in Congress was enhanced when, early in his tenure, he censured six FBI employees for mishandling an investigation into a group that opposed the Reagan administration's policy in Central America. Sessions, who liked being referred to as "Judge Sessions," resisted internal FBI pressure to appeal a court finding that the FBI engaged in a pattern of discrimination against Hispanic agents.

His congressional backing was strongest among liberal Democrats, who applauded what *The New York Times* called "his mild displays of independence" from the Reagan administration.

During his tenure the FBI was heavily involved in investigations of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the Ill Wind investigations into bribery and fraud in the Pentagon, and cases growing out of the savings and loan scandals.

By 1992, however, charges were being made that Sessions had evaded paying taxes and was refusing to cooperate with an investigation of a home mortgage loan. Following an investigation by the Justice Department's internal ethics office, in Jan. 1993 Attorney General William P. Barr sent Sessions a strongly worded letter ordering him to pay income taxes on benefits that he had not disclosed and to reimburse the FBI almost \$10,000 for the cost of a security fence around his home. Barr also chastised Sessions for violating regulations on the use of his official limousine and FBI aircraft.

Within the FBI he was being criticized for his handling of administrative matters and for allowing his wife to influence his official decisions. Sessions fought in vain to hold on to the FBI position, and in July 1993 he left office.

OO SEVEN DOORS

U.S. intelligence operation aimed at recruiting a Soviet believed to be an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER and turning him into a DEFECTOR IN PLACE.

The operation was contemplated in Teheran, Iran, in 1976, when Americans and Soviets frequently tried such recruitment attempts on each other. The approach, "a controlled social relationship operation," was to be made by an American, untrained in intelligence but run by U.S. intelligence officers.

Scattered references to the operation appear in documents seized and circulated by Iranian militants who took over the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in 1979. The documents did not reveal the outcome of the attempt, but they did provide insights into the paperwork behind such an operation, which was run by the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

The Air Force officer assigned to the operation had to sign an agreement that he would voluntarily undergo a POLYGRAPH examination, that he would live under a pseudonym during the operation, and that his wife would

be debriefed. She would be "assessed for potential in fulfilling an operational role directed toward the respective targets' wives, when and if such a situation warrants. . ." The commanding officer's wife, who was to be involved, was eventually ruled out.

Each step of the planned recruitment was accompanied by memos, whose subjects ranged from events at cocktail parties to decisions that kept extending the start of the operation. Documents about Seven Doors begin to appear in Aug. 1976; the operation was still going on in March 1978, but the Soviet officer had still not been approached.

OO SEX

Sex—real and fictional—has been a part of espionage since biblical times. Joshua's two spies, sent "to spy secretly . . . view the land, even Jericho" (Joshua 1:2) hid at the home of the harlot Rahab (see BIBLICAL SPIES).

From then to the present, sex has been used both to garner secrets from the unsuspecting and to blackmail people into revealing secrets. The most celebrated example of sex in espionage—that of exotic dancer and femme fatale MATA HARI—was built almost completely on myth. She was probably not a real spy, but rather naïve and easily duped by her friends and foes alike.

But Mata Hari's image, false as it was, persisted. The proliferation of World War II-era posters warning against German and Japanese spies, emblazoned with such slogans as "Loose Lips Sink Ships," more often had a rendering of a seductive blonde than caricatures of Adolf Hitler and Emperor Hirohito. (See page 530.)

This is not to say that all TARGETS were men; VERA GERHARDSEN, wife of the Norwegian Prime Minister, was allegedly seduced by a young KGB officer in Moscow. He was then posted to Oslo to continue the liaison with her—and to garner secrets about Norwegian defenses and the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

American-born Mildred Fish Harnack, heroine of the RED ORCHESTRA anti-Nazi espionage and resistance network of World War II, slept with an ABWEHR officer at the request of her husband, another Red Orchestra member. After determining that she had obtained information from the Abwehr officer, a GESTAPO officer reported that it was "incomprehensible" to him "how a woman in bed with her lover could put to him questions bearing no actual relationship to what was happening at the moment, unless she did so with treasonable intent." Both she and the officer were found guilty of treason and executed.

The principal targets of espionage-related sex have overwhelmingly been men who knew secrets. In the PROFUMO AFFAIR of the early 1960s, a teenage prostitute was placed between a Soviet naval INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, Capt. 3rd Rank YEVGENY IVANOV, and the British Secretary of State for War, John D. Profumo. The complex relationship eventually caused the resignation of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

In another Cold War love affair, the first known compromise of a U.S. Marine on embassy guard duty occurred in Moscow when a Soviet SWALLOW seduced him

into providing information to her "uncle," a KGB officer (see Cpl. CLAYTON LONETREE). Another first was RICHARD MILLER, an FBI agent in California who fell victim to the charms of a KGB officer, SVETLANA OGORODNIKOVA.

The Soviets were not the only side to employ sex in espionage during the Cold War. In Operation Deep Root in 1968, the ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE managed to obtain a photograph showing the wife of a Soviet diplomat having sexual intercourse with a Canadian. The Canadians then tried to force the woman to reveal secrets. She refused and promptly departed for Moscow.

In another diplomatic love affair during the same year, the KGB tried to blackmail the British ambassador to Moscow with photographs showing him engaged in sexual acts with a Russian maid who worked in the ambassador's residence. He reported the blackmail attempt to the Foreign Office, which had him discreetly questioned by the British Security Service (MI5). The intelligence officers were shocked, not at his indiscretion but at the fact that the KGB had apparently been able to enter and photograph inside the residence. After a quiet investigation, the ambassador admitted that the events had taken place outside the residence. He had been set up in at least one room equipped with a camera.

Some kinds of sex and espionage do not mix. GEOFREY PRIME, a British CIPHER expert who was selling secrets to the Soviets, also molested young girls. When arrested for the sex crimes, his wife revealed to authorities that he was also a Soviet spy.

During World War II the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) parachuted female AGENTS into German-held territory. However, some male OSS agents protested, fearing that they would crack and divulge secrets if the team was captured and the female agent was tortured. Two decades later ALLEN W. DULLES, an OSS veteran and the U.S. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) wrote in *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963):

Women in CIA undergo much the same training as men and can qualify for the same jobs, except that overseas assignments for women are more limited. One reason for this is the ingrained prejudice in many countries of the world against women as "managers" of men—in their jobs, that is. An agent brought up in this tradition may not feel comfortable taking orders from a woman, and we cannot change his mind for him in this regard.

Unreported by Dulles—and possibly unknown to him—was the very real prejudice against women within the CIA. That situation continued for at least another three decades, with the CIA agreeing in 1995 to pay more than 250 female CASE OFFICERS back salaries totaling nearly one million and making 25 retroactive promotions as part of a settlement to head off a gender-based discrimination suit. In addition, 15 women who had transferred out of CASE OFFICER assignments were allowed to return to their former roles. (One woman who was a case officer, MARTHA PETERSON, was arrested by the KGB in 1977 while she was serving under diplomatic COVER in Moscow. CIA officers said privately that the KGB did not

show her the normal courtesy afforded intelligence officers, probably because they resented working against a well-trained woman.)

The class action suit by female case officers against the CIA had begun in Dec. 1992. Realistic negotiations did not begin until Sept. 1993, however, with then DCI R. JAMES WOOLSEY becoming personally involved.

Dulles ruled against the use of women to ensnare men in CIA operations. Whether this tactic was ever employed after his tenure is a question that remains unanswered.

Also see HOMOSEXUALS, HONEY TRAP, RAVEN, SWALLOW.

OO SEXPIIONAGE

Term coined by British journalist David Lewis in his book by that name, published in 1976. He claimed that the first recorded use of sex in espionage occurred in the tenth Century B.C., when Delilah used her charms to destroy Samson. (See BIBLICAL SPIES.) The present authors, however, find little in the realm of espionage in this act: Samson was an enemy; Delilah simply captured and, with the help of a barber, disarmed him, while he was asleep.

OO SGA

SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

OO SHADRIN, NICHOLAS GEORGE

(b. 1928 d. 1975)

Soviet naval officer who defected to the United States. The FBI subsequently forced him to become a DOUBLE AGENT, and as a result he was captured by the KGB and killed.

Born Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, he attended the Frunze Higher Naval School (academy), graduating in 1949, and served in the Soviet Navy. In 1955 he became the youngest commanding officer of a destroyer, with the rank of captain 3rd rank.

While his ship was in Gdansk, Poland, to train Indonesian sailors in 1959, he and his Polish girlfriend defected to Sweden, crossing the Baltic Sea by small boat on the night of June 7–8. (He left a wife in the Soviet Union, from whom he was later divorced, and married the woman with whom he escaped from Poland.)

After asking for political sanctuary, he went to the United States and, taking the name Shadrin, performed low-classification work for the U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In Sept. 1960, immediately prior to the visit by Nikita Khrushchev to the United States, Shadrin testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee. He attacked the Soviet political system and gave the committee details of the Soviet espionage system.

Shadrin and his wife subsequently became American citizens. In 1972 he received his doctorate in international affairs from the George Washington University in Washington, D.C., his thesis being an in-depth evaluation of the Soviet Navy.

Although Shadrin had been tried in absentia in the Soviet Union and sentenced to death, he was contacted by the KGB in 1966 and, at the direction of the FBI, be-

came a double agent. It was while on a trip to VIENNA in this role that he was abducted by KGB agents on Dec. 20, 1975. According to Soviet defector VITALY YURCHENKO (1985), Shadrin was fatally chloroformed by accident while struggling with his captors in the back of an automobile in Vienna. He was to have been protected by the U.S. CIA while in Vienna, but the CIA officers bungled the operation.

●● SHAI

Intelligence service of the Haganah (Defense), the underground Jewish army in Palestine prior to the establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948. The Haganah, established in 1920, sought to protect Jewish settlements and interests against both the Arabs and the British, who controlled Palestine through an international mandate until the establishment of the Jewish State. (Many members of the Haganah served in the Jewish Brigade of the British Army in World War II, while others carried out clandestine missions for the British in countries allied with Germany).

An intelligence branch called Shai, for Sherut Yediot, (Information Service) was established within the Haganah in 1934. Shai-provided intelligence soon became vital as the Haganah sought to counter Arab attacks on Jewish settlements, assist the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine during and after World War II, and, on the eve of Israeli independence, counter the British efforts to leave the Arabs in key military positions when the British withdrew. Shai established its AGENTS in the British police force and among customs officials, postal workers, and telephone operators as it sought to gain information about British plans and operations.

Shai had a major success in 1946 when it broadcast over its clandestine radio station the contents of the British "black book" with data on members of the Jewish underground. The commanding officer of the British Army in Palestine reportedly described Shai as "a perfect intelligence system." Shai was abolished in July 1948 when AMAN, the military intelligence service, and SHIN BET, the domestic secret service, were established.

Also see ISRAEL.

●● SHALIN, COL. GEN. MIKHAIL ALEKSEEVICH

Chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1951 to 1956 and again from Nov. 1957 to Dec. 1958. Little is known of his career and activities despite his several years of service in this post. Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY, who spied for the West, in his autobiographic *The Penkovskiy Papers* (1965), called Shalin "a good, experienced intelligence officer . . . working in intelligence since the war."

●● SHAMROCK

Probably the most ambitious DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE operation undertaken by the U.S. armed forces. Sham-

rock was a continuation of the World War II operation to intercept overseas cable traffic to detect foreign intelligence communications.

In late 1945, with the war over, Brig. Gen. W. Preston Corderman, chief of the ARMY SECURITY AGENCY (ASA), knew how difficult it would be to continue and improve the Army's expertise in CRYPTOGRAPHY without having access to foreign cables. According to historian JAMES BAMFORD in *The Puzzle Palace* (1982), "He felt it was of the utmost importance to establish, in some way, a very secret, very intimate arrangement with the three major cable companies in order to have access to the all important telegrams."

ASA soon made arrangements with Western Union Telegraph Co., ITT Communications, and RCA Communications to have access to all overseas cables to and from foreign embassies and consulates—as well as all such communications by private American citizens and commercial firms. The operation began with Army personnel (in civilian clothes) picking up from the cable firms the daily tapes of cables; this system was later changed to provide hard copies of each and every overseas telegram that the firms handled.

The heads of the cable firms, however, were apprehensive about the illegality of handing over the telegrams to the Army. They sought assurances from the Secretary of Defense, then the Attorney General, and even the President that they would not be subject to federal prosecution. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal did meet with firm's top executives on Dec. 16, 1947, to assure them—in the name of President Truman—that the intercept effort "constituted a matter of great importance to national security."

Subsequently, members of Forrestal's staff met secretly with key members of Congress to discuss legislative relief for the clandestine intercept operation. But when it appeared that there would be a formal bill and appropriate hearings, that avenue was quickly closed off.

Operation Shamrock continued under the aegis of the ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY when it was secretly founded in 1949, and subsequently under the NSA when it was established in 1952.

Shamrock continued with little change in procedures until the early 1960s, when the cable companies began to shift to computerized systems, wherein instead of paper tapes and hard copies of cables, all messages began to be placed on magnetic tapes. Bamford wrote, ". . . the change in technology was also about to enable America to make a quantum leap forward in its ability to snoop . . . Now, instead of sorting manually the daily batches of hard copies and paper tapes in the NSA room at RCA, [Army] couriers would simply pick up the ten to twelve tape disks each morning, fly them down to FORT MEADE [Maryland] to be copied, and, with luck, get them back to New York the same day." From 1966 to 1973, NSA shared office space with the CIA in Manhattan, where the magnetic tapes could be copied without having to go through the trouble (and risk) of daily flying them by commercial aircraft from New York to Baltimore. When the CIA's general counsel discovered the operation and kicked out the NSA specialists copying the tapes, they promptly leased their own facilities in Manhattan.

The NSA computers would race through the tapes, seeking out preprogrammed names, addresses, words, or even phrases, and in a fraction of a second reproduce the full text of the telegram. Such WATCH LISTS of names and addresses would include all communist embassies and legations, as well as persons suspected of having communist sympathies; the words and phrases could include "blueprint," "atomic bomb," or any other term that might lead to a foreign or domestic intelligence operation.

(During this period the FBI was similarly being passed copies of international cables from the various cable offices in Washington, D.C.)

When Robert F. Kennedy became Attorney General in 1961 he distributed a watch list of racketeers to various government agencies, among them NSA. This effort undoubtedly contributed to Kennedy's successes in prosecuting major crime figures. Kennedy also provided NSA with a watch list of U.S. citizens and business firms that had dealings with Castro's Cuba. Here, too, U.S. law enforcement agencies began benefiting directly from Shamrock.

The peak of Army-NSA domestic spying began in 1967, however, when Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough, the Army's ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE), sent a message to NSA director Marshall Carter, requesting NSA to provide information about possible foreign influence on the civil disturbances in the United States related to the Vietnam War. This NSA operation was given the CODE NAME MINARET and included overseas telephone calls as well as cables. An NSA director would later state that from 1967 to 1973 NSA monitored the overseas telephone calls and cables of as many as 1,650 American citizens and U.S. organizations as well as those of almost 6,000 foreign nationals and groups.

Even this domestic intelligence effort would be expanded. After the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., his suspected killer, James Earl Ray, and his family were added to the NSA cable watch list. Subsequently, drug trafficking and suspected drug handlers were included in the eavesdropping effort.

Under the Nixon administration there were efforts to expand NSA involvement in domestic intelligence even further. (See HUSTON PLAN.)

Operation Shamrock and its offshoots came to an end in 1975. In the early 1970s congressional investigating committees began looking into domestic spying by the CIA, an effort that soon extended to NSA. (See CHURCH COMMITTEE and PIKE COMMITTEE) It seemed only a matter of time before Congress or the press would reveal the full dimensions of the 30-year-old NSA efforts. Accordingly, on May 12, 1975, NSA director LEW ALLEN, JR., wrote a memorandum that ended what Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Frank Church had called "probably the largest government interception program affecting Americans ever undertaken."

OO SHARK

Name assigned by the British GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL (GC&CS) to the German ENIGMA CIPHER machines fitted with a fourth ROTOR. These ma-

chines were introduced by the German Navy on Feb. 1, 1942. This was one of the most significant events in German cryptology in World War II, as it deprived the Allies of their ability to read U-boat communications.

The four-rotor Enigmas, designated M4 by the Germans, replaced three-rotor machines. The fourth rotor, however, remained in a single position for the encryption of a message, while the three other rotors could change position with each letter. The four-rotor machines were used by the Navy only in U-boats.

In Oct. 1942 the submarine U-559 was attacked and fatally damaged by British destroyers off the coast of Egypt, near El Alamein. The stricken U-boat had surfaced and been abandoned by her crew. An officer and a sailor from the destroyer *Petard* jumped into the water and swam to the submarine, followed by a 15-year-old canteen assistant. The first two entered the U-boat and were able to hand up to the boy the four-rotor Enigma machine, charts, and signal books before the submarine sank—with the two of them trapped inside.

The Enigma machine from the U-559 was sent to the GC&CS codebreakers at BLETCHLEY PARK. With the help of the U-559's treasure trove, Bletchley Park codebreakers were able to use U-boat weather broadcasts as a CRIB to break into the four-rotor ciphers. Success against Shark was achieved on Dec. 13, 1942.

However, not all Shark ENIGMA KEYS could be recovered. For example, no settings were recovered for a ten-day period in Jan. 1943, and none was broken from Feb. 10 to 17. Still, most keys were recovered, usually in less than 24 hours, making them invaluable for Allied anti-submarine operations.

OO SHARPE, MAJ. GEN. GEORGE H.

(b. 1828 d. 1900)

Senior Union Army INTELLIGENCE OFFICER during the U.S. Civil War. Sharpe was the only intelligence officer of the Army of the Potomac, the principal Union fighting force. Information he gathered helped lead to the defeat of Gen. Robert E. Lee at the crucial battle of Gettysburg in July 1863.

A lawyer who had served with the U.S. diplomatic corps, Sharpe was commissioned as a captain in the New York State Militia on May 11, 1861. He was mustered out three months later to be commissioned a colonel in the 120th Regiment of New York Volunteers.

In early 1863 he was named head of the BUREAU OF INFORMATION of the Army of the Potomac. He held that position until the end of the war in 1865, processing the large amount of information that spies and deserters brought out from the Confederate lines. He was awarded the brevet rank of brigadier general in Dec. 1864, and for war service was subsequently promoted to major general.

After the war Sharpe served in Europe with the State Department and held several public offices in New York.

OO SHEEP DIPPING

U.S. intelligence term for camouflaging or disguising the true identity of equipment or individuals, especially

for the use of military equipment or services—including personnel—in clandestine intelligence activities, generally under the direction of a nonmilitary sponsor.

●● SHELEPIN, ALEKSANDR NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. 1918)

Head of the KGB from Dec. 1958 to Nov. 1961.

A history and literature major while studying at the Moscow Institute of Philosophy and Literature, Shelepin was a guerrilla leader during World War II, becoming a senior official of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) in 1943, and head of the Komsomol from 1952 to 1958. He accompanied Nikita Khrushchev on the Soviet leader's trip to China in 1954.

Shelepin then became the second head of the KGB, the intelligence-security organ established after the death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Khrushchev appointed Shelepin in part because of several major KGB defections in the 1950s during the tenure of IVAN SEROV as head of the KGB. Shelepin attempted to return state security to its position of importance during the Stalinist era. He demoted or fired many KGB officers, replacing them with officials from Communist Party organizations and, especially, from the Komsomol.

He left the KGB and was promoted to the Central Committee secretariat in Nov. 1961, where it is believed he still exercised control over the KGB, which was taken over by his protégé VLADIMIR SEMICHASTNY. Shelepin became a First Deputy Prime Minister in 1962. He was a principal player in the coup against Khrushchev in Oct. 1962, obviously influencing the KGB to support the conspirators.

Shelepin probably expected to become First Secretary and de facto head of the government when Khrushchev was overthrown. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn suggested that he had been the choice of the surviving Stalinists in the government, who asked what "had been the point of overthrowing Khrushchev if not to revert to Stalinism?"

Rather, Shelepin's reward was to be made a full member of the ruling Presidium (Politburo) in Nov. 1964—by a significant margin its youngest member. But he still held ambitions of becoming the "first among equals." His colleagues on the Presidium watched him carefully, seeking to halt his ambitions. He survived in that body until 1975, when he rapidly fell from power.

●● SHEVCHENKO, ARKADY NIKOLAYEVICH

(b. 1930)

The most senior Soviet diplomat to defect to the West. Shevchenko was an Under Secretary-General of the UNITED NATIONS when he defected on April 6, 1978. For the previous two and a half years in that position, he had provided U.S. intelligence with secret information and documents about the Soviet Union.

Born in a Ukrainian coal-mining town, he was the son of a medical family; his father was a physician and his mother a nurse. His father was given a commission in the Red Army's medical corps.

In 1949 Shevchenko entered the Moscow State Insti-

tute of International Relations, which trained future Soviet diplomats. He graduated in 1954 and, after returning for graduate studies, in 1956 joined the Foreign Ministry to begin a promising diplomatic career.

His first visit to the United States was for a conference in 1958. He subsequently served in New York in the 1960s and became Under Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs in early 1973.

As he rose in the Soviet hierarchy he became more and more disillusioned with the leadership. In his memoirs *Breaking with Moscow* (1985), Shevchenko wrote:

I sat at a table with [Leonid] Brezhnev, [Andrei] Gromyko, and other members of the Politburo, and I learned a great deal about the men who were the masters of the Soviet Union. I saw how easily they called vice virtue, and just as easily reversed the words again. How their hypocrisy and corruption had penetrated the smallest aspects of their lives, how isolated they were from the population they ruled.

Gromyko, for example, had not set foot in the streets of Moscow for almost forty years. Almost all the others were no different. In the gilded, stale, and silent Kremlin corridors a museum has been ensconced, a museum of ideas, visible but fossilized as a fly in amber. Those who have made their careers preserving these relics have tried to force the Soviet people to believe in a social system based on utopian myth. . . .

The Kremlin was the last place on earth where one might expect directness, honesty, and openness.

In 1974 Shevchenko approached U.S. officials and revealed that he wished to defect to the United States. After being persuaded to remain at the United Nations and to provide intelligence on Soviet matters, he was given the U.S. CODE NAME Andy.

Finally, believing that the Soviet government was becoming suspicious of him, on a Friday evening, while ostensibly driving to the Soviet diplomatic country home on Long Island, N.Y., he defected. His wife and daughter did not go with him. (He remarried in 1978.)

●● SHEYMOV, MAJ. VICTOR IVANOVICH

(b. 1946)

DEFECTOR from the Eighth Chief Directorate of the KGB, a specialist in SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE and COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY.

Sheymov graduated from the Moscow State Technical University in 1969 with a degree in engineering, having specialized in missile and spacecraft designs. He then worked on space warfare at a scientific research institute of the Ministry of Defense.

In 1971 he entered the KGB, being assigned to the Eighth Chief Directorate and, subsequently, the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence), where he monitored cable traffic from KGB residences around the world. Sheymov returned to the Eighth Chief Directorate

in 1976 to work in the highly sensitive area of CIPHER communications.

Disillusioned with the Soviet system, Sheymov contacted the U.S. officials in Moscow and in 1980 the CIA arranged for him to escape from Moscow, along with his wife and daughter.

The story of Sheymov's KGB career is told in his autobiographic *Tower of Secrets* (1993).

OO SHI PEI PU

see BERNARD BOURSICOT

OO SHILOAH, REUVEN

(b. 1909 d. ?)

First director of the Israeli MOSSAD and in many respects the "father" of modern Israeli intelligence services.

Born Reuven Zaslanski in Jerusalem, Shiloah came from an Orthodox Jewish family. He was a short man, and behind his glasses his blue-gray eyes focused a penetrating stare on the person to whom he was speaking.

During World War II, Shiloah, a founder of SHAI, the Haganah's intelligence arm, went behind German lines on missions for the British. He also worked with the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) in Washington, D.C., Cairo, and Istanbul. Among the Americans he dealt with was JAMES JESUS ANGLETON of the x-2, the COUNTERINTELLIGENCE section of the OSS. Shiloah developed a close relationship with Angleton, who would later head counterintelligence for the CIA.

In 1949 Shiloah was named chairman of Israel's Coordinating Committee of the Intelligence Services in an attempt by the government to oversee and coordinate the several Israeli intelligence services. (Shiloah would head that body until March 1953.) But problems continued (see AMAN). There were no clear lines of responsibility, and there were personality conflicts within the intelligence community. Finally, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion stepped in and demanded a reorganization of Israeli intelligence. On April 1, 1951—when the state was three years old—the Mossad was established. It was tasked with overseas intelligence collection and was to be responsible directly to the Prime Minister's Office.

Shiloah's tenure as head of the Mossad was brief, but he was able to establish certain standards and beliefs within the agency, although its operations—and handling of funds—were relatively sloppy.

The continued controversy among Israeli intelligence leaders, along with injuries from an automobile accident in mid-1952, led Shiloah to step down in Sept. 1952 as head of the Mossad. A year later he was sent to Washington as Minister Plenipotentiary at the Israeli Embassy.

Discussing Shiloah's tenure as head of the Mossad in *Israel's Secret Wars* (1991), Ian Black and Benny Morris wrote:

Friends as well rivals explained that he had never suited the job; they defined him as an 'ideas man' rather than an organization man immured in the brass tacks of clandestine operations. It was later said that the collapse of the Baghdad network, the

Gross Affair and other problems had simply worn him down.

OO SHIMSHON

Intelligence and sabotage unit within the Palmach, the commando wing of the underground Jewish army in Palestine during the British mandatory period. Shimshon teams carried out operations against the Arabs from 1943 until the founding of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. The Shimshon unit continued within the Israeli Army until 1950.



OO SHIN BET

Israel's internal security force. Shin and bet are the names of the first two Hebrew letters of the term Sherut Habitachon Haklali (General Security Service). Shin Bet has had numerous publicized failures; its successes, unlike those of the MOSSAD, have rarely been publicized.

Shin Bet was established on June 30, 1948, six weeks after Israeli independence. Commanded by ISSER HAREL, initially it was part of the Israel Defense Forces, which provided support, pay, and military ranks for Shin Bet's few personnel. (Harel was made a lieutenant colonel.) Harel believed that Shin Bet should be a civilian organization, and in early 1950 it was placed directly under the Ministry of Defense.

Still "lost" within the budget and policy disputes of the ministry, Harel continued to press Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion—a close friend—to establish an autonomous agency. This was done later in 1950, with Shin Bet reporting directly to the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, with the disgrace and fall of ISER BE'ERI in 1949, Harel additionally became head of AMAN, Israeli MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. At Ben-Gurion's direction, he was named MEMUNEH, "the one in charge" of all Israeli intelligence activities. Harel held on to the Shin Bet job until 1952, when his deputy, Isi Dorot, took command for a year. Subsequently the directors of the Mossad and Shin Bet were separate positions.

Internal security in Israel for most of the country's history stemmed from concern about the large Arab population—some 18 percent in late 1948, declining to smaller fractions as the Jewish population increased by immigration as well as births. The Arab threat was twofold: First, there was the possibility of espionage on behalf of the surrounding Arab states, which not only fought major wars with Israel but also sent in saboteurs and terrorists; second, there was the possibility of domestic sedition. In time, with limited recognition by Arab states, beginning with Egypt in 1979, the internal threat from terrorist organizations increased, especially the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah. These groups fought against any agreements with the Israelis. (The situation was exacerbated much later when accommodations were finally reached granting Palestinians limited control of the West Bank and Gaza—the so-called occupied territories.)

This concern with the Arab population tended to preoccupy Shin Bet. But Israel was also being "pene-

trated" by non-Arab countries—friends as well as foes. Shortly after he arrived in Israel in 1948, WOLFF GOLDSTEIN was sending information back to the Soviet NKVD and, subsequently, the KGB. Later SHIMON LEVINSON also spied for the Soviets. Both men reached senior positions in the Israeli government and did considerable damage before being discovered. Several lesser Soviet AGENTS were also tracked down. And YOSSI AMIT spied for the United States, Israel's key ally.

As Soviet policy shifted from supporting Israel to becoming the principal arms supplier of Arab states, Shin Bet expanded its interests to provide coverage of Soviet and Eastern Bloc diplomats in Israel.

However, Shin Bet's emphasis continued to be the Arabs. Avraham Ahituv resigned as director in Dec. 1980 in the midst of a political controversy surrounding assassination attempts against three Arab mayors of West Bank towns in June 1980. The mayor of Nablus lost both legs in the bombings, and the mayor of Ramallah lost a foot.

Shin Bet officials attempted to cover up the April 12, 1984, beating deaths of two Arab bus hijackers near Gaza. The Arabs were captured when Army troops stormed a bus held by the hijackers; two other terrorists had been killed in the attack, which also cost the life of an Israeli woman soldier who was a passenger on the bus. Shin Bet director Avraham Shalom tendered his resignation in July 1986 in the aftermath of revelations that the two hijackers were alive when led away by Shin Bet officers, who at the time reported that they had been killed in the assault on the bus. (Shalom and three operatives were given a full pardon by President CHAIM HERZOG in June 1986, although the four men had not yet been charged or convicted of a crime in connection with the murders. Herzog—twice head of military intelligence—issued a blanket pardon to avoid further damage to security. Subsequently, seven other members of the Shin Bet were pardoned for their roles in the incident.)

A year later Shin Bet was involved in more controversies: In May 1987 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the agency had used illegal interrogation methods and had given false testimony in the espionage case of Army Lt. Izat Nafsu, a member of the Circassian minority. The soldier, who was freed after seven and a half years in prison for allegedly selling secrets and stolen weapons to Palestinian guerrillas, had been framed by Shin Bet.

Shin Bet officers had presented false testimony to the military tribunal that had tried Nafsu. A judicial commission set up to investigate the methods and practices of Shin Bet reported in 1987 that for the previous 17 years Shin Bet interrogators had routinely lied in court about their interrogation methods. The commission also said that they had regularly used physical and psychological mistreatment to obtain confessions.

Before the end of 1987 it was revealed that three Shin Bet officers had been suspended for allegedly trying to cover up the circumstances of the death in prison of a 23-year-old Palestinian being interrogated in July 1987. Yosef Harmelin resigned as Shin Bet director the following year.

In Dec. 1987 concern over internal security increased with the start of the Palestinian uprising known as the Intifada. Young Arabs began rioting in the West Bank and

Gaza—stoning Israeli security forces, smashing the windows of Arab shopkeepers who remained open during strike hours, and generally running amok. The Israeli answer was force—tear gas, beatings, rubber bullets, and at times real bullets as Shin Bet and police opened fire with real guns against young boys armed with stones.

The uprising created a new, younger generation of militant Palestinian leadership; a sense of self-reliance; and an ability on the part of the local Palestinians to transcend religious, political, economic, and social differences to form a common front against Israeli control of the area.

The intifada—which lasted until 1990—was superimposed over the existing Arab "threats" to Israel. Still another internal security threat came to the fore in 1993, when secret talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were revealed. Portions of the West Bank and Gaza would eventually be turned over to a PLO authority.

There was immediate Israeli right-wing opposition to such moves. But Shin Bet was slow in recognizing the extent of this opposition. Israelis living in the occupied territories, a minute number of settlers, soon became violent in their opposition. Attacks on Arabs—including one by a lone gunman on Muslims at prayer in a mosque—brought a new reality to the issue of internal security.

Shin Bet failed to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on Nov. 4, 1995. The thought of a Jew killing another Jew for "political" reasons was apparently so abhorrent that the agency had not fully investigated reports of a possible attempt on the Prime Minister's life.

The murder, which was captured on a home video, clearly showed the ease with which the assassin had approached his target. Karmi Gilon, director of Shin Bet, took full responsibility for the failure to protect Rabin. His successor, Rear Adm. AMI AYALON, had just stepped down as head of the Israeli Navy. He was the first Shin Bet director to be named publicly at the time of his appointment, an obvious move to help restore public confidence in the security service.

DIRECTORS OF SHIN BET

The directors of Shin Bet are listed below; note that Yosef Harmelin twice headed the agency; Isser Harel is the only person to have served as a director of both Shin Bet and the Mossad.

1948–1952	Isser Harel
1952–1953	Isi Dorot
1953–1963	Amos Manor
1964–1974	Yosef Harmelin
1974–1981	Avraham Ahituv
1981–1986	Avraham Shalom
1986–1988	Yosef Harmelin
1988–1994	Jacob Peri
1995–1996	Karmi Gilon
1996–	Ami Ayalon

OO SHOEMAKER

Russian slang for a forger. Also see COBBLER.

OO SHOPPED

British intelligence term for someone who has been assassinated or murdered.

OO SHOPWORN GOODS

Information offered by a DEFECTOR or would-be defector that is so dated or unrelated to intelligence needs as to be worthless to the country or intelligence service to which it is being offered.

OO SHTEMYENKO, GEN. OF THE ARMY SERGEI MATVEYEVICH

(b. 1907 d. 1976)

Senior Soviet staff officer and twice chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1946–1948 and 1956–1957. GRU Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY wrote in the *Penkovskiy Papers* (1965) that he “worked very hard and introduced many wise reforms” to the GRU, and “He was good chief, mainly because of his administrative abilities but was disliked by the generals of the General Staff.”

Of peasant origins, Shtemyenko entered the Red Army in 1926 and served mostly in artillery and armored units until assigned to the General Staff in Sept. 1939. In May 1943 he was named head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and thus became a high-level planner of Soviet military operations and a principal assistant to Josef Stalin.

He served as chief of the GRU from April 1946 until Nov. 1948, when he was appointed chief of the General Staff and promoted to General of the Army. In the June 1952 controversy between Josef Stalin and the Politburo he sided with Stalin but was nevertheless removed from his post, demoted to lieutenant general, and assigned to command the Volga Military District, *away* from Moscow. In 1956 he was recalled to Moscow by Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, reinstated as a General of the Army, and reappointed chief of the GRU. With the ouster of Zhukov in Oct. 1957, Shtemyenko was again dismissed and again demoted to lieutenant general. However, in June 1962 he was made commander in chief of Ground Forces (i.e., head of the Army). In 1968 he was—for the third time—promoted to General of the Army and appointed a First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces; he held those positions at the time of his death.

Shtemyenko’s career was feverish as well as resilient. His name was put forward three times for the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, the first time at the age of 41, but he never received the honor. He is considered by some observers to have been the most energetic, erudite, and merciless of all GRU chiefs.

Shtemyenko authored two major military histories, *The Soviet General Staff at War* (1981) and *The Last Six*

Months (of World War II—1973), both of which went through several revised editions.

OO SI

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

OO SIBLINGS

(1) The term for another intelligence service of the same country; (2) At one time the term used in the CIA for the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

OO SIGABA

Also called ECM (Electrical Enciphering Machine), this was the principal U.S. CIPHER machine for higher-classification encryptions during World War II. The Sigaba is believed to have been the only cipher machine used in the war that was never compromised.

Development of Sigaba began in 1935 as a joint Army-Navy project; it entered service in 1938. The U.S. Army designation was M134-C, the Navy CSP-888.

Like the ENIGMA encryption machine, the Sigaba employed ROTORS—ten replaceable wheels; up to four rotors could turn with each letter selection, compared to one in the Enigma, and the rotors could reverse direction (unlike the Enigma rotors, which could turn in only one direction). The Sigaba was designed as an ON-LINE SYSTEM, meaning that it was connected directly to a radio or telephone so that encryption and transmission would be simultaneous. However, it was not used in that manner; instead, it produced an enciphered tape that could then be transmitted by radio.

In addition to being used by the U.S. Army, Army Air Forces, Navy, and Marine Corps, U.S. SPECIAL LIAISON UNITS (SLUs) employed the Sigaba, as did British SLUs in the China-Burma-India Theater.

There was never any serious attempt by the Germans or Japanese to break into the Sigaba ciphers. The Germans called it the “American Big Machine.”

Only one is known to have been lost: In Feb. 1945 a U.S. Army truck was stolen by French resistance fighters in France. The thieves, wanting the truck and not its contents, dumped the safelike container with the Sigaba and M138 backup converter into a nearby lake and fled. The machine was recovered.

Sigaba was in use by U.S. military forces into the 1960s. Despite the fact that it has been out of service for three decades, little information on the Sigaba has been made available.


OO SIGINT

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

OO SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

(SIS)

U.S. Army organization established on Apr. 24, 1930, to consolidate all Army activities engaged in CRYPTOLOGY under the Signal Corps. The SIS was responsible for producing the Army’s own CODES and CIPHER devices and for efforts to DECRYPT the communications of potential enemies. Previously, Army cryptologic functions had



The rotor "basket" of the U.S. Sigaba, showing ten rotors in place; two additional rotors are lying next to the machine. (NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY)

been carried out by the War Department's MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION through a clandestine effort headed by HERBERT O. YARDLEY and funded with State Department support. That effort had been halted in 1929 by then Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who reputedly said, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

The first chief of SIS was WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN, who created a small and extremely talented staff: four junior CRYPTANALYSTS and one cryptanalyst-clerk. An Army officer was placed in charge of SIS in 1935, with Friedman continuing as the guiding force of the organization.

In addition to its cryptologic activities, SIS published a series of influential studies on cryptology and developed machine ciphers for secure Army communications. The greatest pre-World War II accomplishment of SIS was breaking the machine cipher employed by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the so-called PURPLE cipher. Through purely cryptanalytic methods, Friedman and his colleagues, working closely with the Navy, were able to produce an analog of this machine and read Japanese communications as quickly—or even more so—than the intended recipients. The decrypts of Purple messages were initially called MAGIC.

When war erupted, SIS rapidly expanded. At the time of Pearl Harbor SIS had 45 Army officers, 177 enlisted men, and 109 civilians—a total of 331. Most of the enlisted men and one officer were with field units, the remainder in Washington.

In June 1942 the growing SIS moved from its World War I-era temporary buildings on the Washington Mall to ARLINGTON HALL in nearby Virginia. That same month personnel from the Army's 2ND SIGNAL SERVICE BATTALION—the intercept arm of SIS—began operations at Vint Hill Farms in Warrenton, Va., a major radio intercept station "feeding" Arlington Hall. (Prior to the war the Army had seven fixed radio intercept stations; ten more were established during the war. See below.)

SIS was renamed the Signal Intelligence Service Division in 1942 and, subsequently, Signal Security Division, Signal Security Branch, Signal Security Division, Signal Security Service, and, from, July 1, 1943, through Sept. 14, 1945 the Signal Security Agency (SSA).

In June 1942 the agency was given exclusive responsibility for exploiting foreign diplomatic communications, a mission previously shared with the Navy. While



Paired Sigaba machines; the rotor "basket" fits into the top of the machines. (NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY)

SIS achieved an outstanding triumph breaking into Purple, breaking into Japanese military codes was much more difficult, because the Japanese Army employed REENCIPHERED CODES and not a code machine. Not until Apr. 1943 was the agency able to make a single entry into a Japanese Army system. The first usable intelligence was not derived until June 1943 and not until 1944 were Japanese Army communications read on a continuous basis.

Similar frustration was encountered in the Army's work on German military systems, which the British at BLETCHLEY PARK were also working on. The official and excellent *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II* (1993), edited by James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan, notes that the lack of British cooperation—"justified by the British on grounds of security and economy of effort—became even more grating when the Army became aware that the British were willing to share high-level COMINT [COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE] with the U.S. Navy to meet the operational needs of fighting the U-boat war."

The U.S. Army's success against Japanese military codes led to belated full collaboration by the British at Bletchley Park. (With this collaboration high-level COMINT became known as ULTRA within the U.S. Army and Navy, as it was within the British services.)

In addition to the vast increase in Army radio-intercept units that served in every theater, the Army also

supported the Army Air Forces' establishment of radio intercept squadrons to support numbered air forces, which began in 1944. But problems continued throughout the war. To quote Gilbert and Finnegan,

the Army's strategic and tactical signals intelligence assets were still not coordinated properly. Tactical COMINT units were trained by the Army Ground Forces, not SSA [Signal Security Agency], and they functioned under the direction of theater and numbered air force commanders, not SSA, despite the fact that this division of labor did not reflect the reality that the communications intelligence process was a seamless web.

At this time coordination between the Army and Navy was poor, despite their fine pre-Pearl Harbor cooperation in the handling of Purple and the setting up of an Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee in early 1944.

Finally, at the end of the war the new head of Army intelligence, Maj. Gen. CLAYTON BISSELL, spurred better cooperation with the Navy. At his direction, on Sep. 15, 1945—13 days after the end of the war—the ARMY SECURITY AGENCY was established to control "all signals intelligence and security establishments, units, and personnel" and to function directly under the MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2).

By the end of the war SIS had undergone a 30-fold increase: On Aug. 14, 1945 it numbered 792 officers, 2,704 enlisted men, 1,214 enlisted women, and 5,661 civilians—a total of 10,371. Most were at Arlington Hall. In addition, there were 17,000 Army personnel engaged in signal intelligence activities under theater and other major commanders. This buildup was hampered by some ridiculous Civil Service and Army regulations, as well as the Secretary of the Army's decree that no officer under age 28 could be in Washington after Jan. 31, 1942, regardless of expertise or experience that might be of value to intelligence activities!

SIS operated 17 fixed radio intercept stations during the war; in addition, there were hundreds of mobile Army intercept stations with Army units in the field.

Established before the war:

Corozal, Panama Canal Zone
Fort Hancock, N.J.
Fort Hunt, Va.
Fort McKinley, near Manila, Philippines
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
Fort Shafter, Hawaii
Established during the war:
Amchitka, Aleutian Islands
Asmara, Eritrea
Bellmore, Long Island, N.Y.
Fairbanks, Alaska
Guam
Indian Creek Station, Miami Beach, Fla.
New Delhi, India
Petaluma, Calif.
Tarzana, Calif.
Warrenton, Va.

These stations used secure codes to forward their intercepts to SIS in Washington D.C., and later Arlington Hall.

In the Philippines in 1941 the Army intercepts, taken by the Army's 2nd Signal Service Company, were also delivered to the Navy unit on Corregidor—Station CAST—which had a Purple machine for the decryption of Japanese diplomatic communications. Those were passed to the two senior U.S. commanders in the Philippines, Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Thomas C. Hart. Fort McKinley was lost when Manila was abandoned in late Dec. 1942, although some intercepts were still made from Corregidor before the intelligence personnel were evacuated from the island in early 1942. (Corregidor fell to the Japanese on May 6, 1942.)

The Guam intercept station was established after Marines retook the island in mid-1944. The stations at Bellmore and Tarzana, originally established by the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, were taken over by SSA and used to monitor U.S. radio communications for security purposes.

The Army also received a large number of intercepts from the Navy's intercept stations at Bainbridge Island, Wash., and Bar Harbor, Maine.

The SSA was renamed the ARMY SECURITY AGENCY (ASA) on Sep. 15, 1945, and merged with ARMY INTELLI-

GENCE (G-2) in 1977 to form the ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND (INSCOM).

Also see NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

●● SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

(SIGINT)

Intelligence derived from combinations of COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) and ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE (ELINT).

●● SILICON VALLEY

Area near Sunnyvale-Palo Alto-San Jose, Calif., built up from the 1960s onward, possessing the highest concentration of high-technology industry in the United States. Primarily known for computer-related technologies, the area has become a major TARGET for foreign intelligence agencies and INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE activities.

In the early 1980s Silicon Valley was the ninth-largest manufacturing center in the United States, producing one-third of the semiconductors and related devices, one-quarter of the guided missiles and space vehicles, and almost one-sixth of the electronic computing equipment made in the United States. Also located in Silicon Valley were the Moffett Naval Air Station, a major antisubmarine warfare center (now operated largely by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration); an Air Force SATELLITE tracking and servicing center at Sunnyvale; and a major Lockheed Missile and Space Co. facility.

The foreign intelligence penetration of the Valley was discussed by FBI agents in 1992. They told *Forbes* magazine,

An estimated 10% of all Silicon Valley engineers are Chinese ethnics. The vast majority are loyal employees. But [China] has learned how to elicit information from some. Mainland Chinese, visiting as students or on exchange programs, act as "spotters," compiling lists of Chinese ethnics working at U.S. firms. Some are invited to come to China and visit with relatives still living on the mainland—all at no cost.

The agents also emphasized French efforts at INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE against U.S. firms in the area.

●● SILLITOE, SIR PERTH

(b. 1888 d. 1962)

Director-General of the British Security Service (M15) from 1946 to 1953.

Sillitoe began his intelligence career when he joined the South African police force in 1908. He subsequently served with the Northern Rhodesian police from 1911 until 1923, when he went to Britain and continued his police work. In 1929 he set up the country's first forensic science laboratory. During World War II, as chief constable of the coastal county of Kent, he worked closely with MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

In April 1946 he was appointed head of M15. His tenure was marked by the operation of a large number of

Soviet spies within the British government and even the intelligence services. Only one spy was discovered by MI5 during his time in office: William M. Marshall. An MI5 WATCHER observing a Soviet diplomat saw him speaking to Marshall, a radio operator in the British Foreign Office, who had recently returned from duty as a CIPHER clerk in the British Embassy in Moscow.

Sillitoe retired after eight years in MI5. He then went to work for the De Beers firm in South Africa, tracking down diamond smugglers.

OO SILVER

see VIENNA

OO SINCLAIR, ADM. SIR HUGH

(b. 1873 d. 1939)

Director-General of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) from June 1923 to Nov. 1939. Sinclair succeeded Sir MANSFIELD CUMMING, the founding head of MI6, who held that position from 1909 to 1923.

A career naval officer, Sinclair had joined the Royal Navy in 1886. After shipboard and shore assignments, including command of the battleship *Hibernia*, he served during World War I as deputy DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE under Rear Adm. REGINALD (BLINKER) HALL. He succeeded Hall in that position from 1919 to 1921, having been promoted to rear admiral. He was serving as head of the submarine service when he was named to the MI6 position.

As Director-General of MI6 he was concerned both with the threat of political infiltration from the Soviet Union and of rearmament by Germany. His efforts were often frustrated because of the very limited funding made available to him by the Foreign Office.

As the war approached, he began to make preparations for MI6 to carry out sabotage and guerrilla operations as well as espionage against Germany. On Nov. 4, 1939, two months after World War II began in Europe, Sinclair died in office.

OO SINCLAIR, MAJ. GEN. SIR JOHN

(b. 1897 d. 1977)

Director-General of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) from 1953 to 1956.

He was known as "Sinbad" Sinclair because he served as a Navy midshipman after being educated at Winchester and the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. He entered the Army in 1918 and following a year at the Royal Academy, Woolwich, he was commissioned in the Royal Artillery.

In World War II he served as deputy director of military operations. Thus, he had little intelligence experience when he was appointed to MI6. His tenure was somewhat abbreviated because of the revelation that MI6 had employed retired Navy diver LIONEL CRABB to carry out a spy mission against the cruiser *Ordzhonikidze*, which had brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and N. A. Bulganin to Britain in April 1956. When Crabb was killed and the spy mission publicly revealed, Prime

Skorzeny, Generalmajor Otto

Minister Anthony Eden fired the Foreign Office adviser to MI6 and then Sinclair. (An official inquiry had exonerated Sinclair of direct involvement in the Crabb operation.)

OO SINGLETON

Intelligence operations conducted by a single INTELLIGENCE OFFICER or AGENT. These operations include intelligence collection, servicing agents, and COURIER services.

OO SIS

(1) SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; (2) Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

OO SKORZENY, GENERALMAJOR OTTO

(b. 1908 d. 1976)

SS officer who led several daring commando-style operations. Skorzeny began his spectacular career as a member of Adolf Hitler's Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler, the Führer's bodyguard regiment. He also fought as an SS officer in the campaigns in France and the Low Countries in 1940 and the subsequent German campaign in the Soviet Union.

Skorzeny studied British commando tactics and training, hoping to establish a similar special operations unit in the SS. He received little support until he successfully completed his first major mission: the release of Benito Mussolini after the Italian dictator was deposed and arrested in July 1943. Hitler personally selected Skorzeny for the mission, which was complicated by the fact that the Italian authorities kept moving Mussolini. Skorzeny, who organized an intensive intelligence effort to find him, remained a step behind him in the game of hide-and-seek with the dictator's Italian captors. Once, reconnoitering a hideout on an island off Sardinia, Skorzeny's plane was shot down by Allied aircraft.

Skorzeny finally learned that Mussolini was in a heavily guarded resort hotel in the Gran Sasso mountains north of Abruzzi. On Sept. 12, 1943, Skorzeny and an assault force flew to the high plateau in 12 gliders, landing on a 3,000-foot meadow next to the hotel. Cowing Mussolini's guards, Skorzeny entered the hotel, found the dazed dictator, told him that Hitler had sent him, and said, "You are free!" Skorzeny shoved Mussolini into a small, Fi 156 Storch aircraft that could barely take off from the rock-strewn meadow and delivered him to VIENNA that night, completing what Skorzeny called an "impossible mission."

There were rumors that Skorzeny would attempt to kill Soviet dictator Josef Stalin at the conference in Teheran when he met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt in late 1943.

Following the July 20, 1944, assassination plot against Hitler, Skorzeny sped to the Ministry of War in Berlin and for a short while during the confusion virtually ran the German Army. He organized an SS battalion

to help guard the ministry, found evidence of the plot, and rounded up many of the conspirators.

Skorzeny's next mission—CODE-NAMED Mickey Mouse—was inspired by Hitler's desire to keep Hungary in the Axis. In Sept. 1944 Adm. Miklós Horthy, the dictator of Hungary, had begun trying to negotiate a separate peace with the Soviet Union, whose troops were nearing Budapest. Skorzeny took a special force into Hungary and kidnapped Horthy's son Mikio, threatening to kill him if Horthy did not resign. Skorzeny also seized Horthy's citadel and ruled Hungary for a short time until a fascist puppet regime was installed.

When Germany launched the Ardennes offensive that triggered the Battle of the Bulge in Dec. 1944, Skorzeny once again showed his genius for special operations. In an operation code-named GREIF (snatch), he trained a force of English-speaking German soldiers, dressed them in American uniforms, and, with captured U.S. vehicles, sent them behind American lines to raise havoc.

Skorzeny's ersatz GIs cut communications wires, changed road signs, and gave confusing, GI-to-GI information to U.S. soldiers stunned by the sudden German attack. At the headquarters of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces at Versailles, just outside Paris, extra security was thrown around Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower because of planted rumors that a Skorzeny-led assassination squad had targeted Eisenhower. American forces captured many of the disguised GIs and summarily executed them as spies.

Skorzeny was captured by U.S. forces in Austria in May 1945. An American war crimes tribunal accused him of illegal warfare in the Battle of the Bulge. He was acquitted after a British officer testified that British and U.S. special forces had used similar irregular tactics.

German authorities arrested him and placed him in an internment camp in Darmstadt. He escaped in July 1948, assumed a new identity, and helped to found ODESSA, a secret West German organization of former SS officers. According to Skorzeny-inspired accounts, Odessa and its escape network, Die Spinne (the spider), helped get hundreds of SS officers out of Germany. Odessa-aided escapees reportedly included the infamous Adolf Eichmann.

Skorzeny settled in Spain, started an export-import business as a cover for Die Spinne activities, and helped to maintain the escape network that got SS officers to safety in sympathetic countries in the Middle East and South America. In 1959 Skorzeny, who had access to caches of SS loot, bought a country estate in Ireland and began raising horses. He died in Madrid.

OO SKUNK WORKS

Slang for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's design bureau at Burbank, Calif., founded in 1943 by CLARENCE L. (KELLY) JOHNSON. The bureau—the existence of which was long kept a secret—was established initially to build the P-80 Shooting Star, America's first jet-propelled combat aircraft. Subsequently the bureau designed and built the highly secret U-2, A-12 OXCART, and SR-71 BLACKBIRD spyplanes.

Other aircraft produced by the Skunk Works include the U.S. Air Force's F-117A "stealth" strike aircraft. The bureau also developed the Navy's *Sea Shadow*, a stealth research ship.

The name Skunk Works was chosen because of its proximity to a foul-smelling chemical plant, akin to the skunk works of Al Capp's newspaper comic strip "L'il Abner."

The heads of the Skunk Works were:

1943–1975

Kelly Johnson

1975–1991

Benjamin Rich

1991–1993

Sherman Mullen

1993–

Jack Warden

Also see CL-282 and CL-400.

OO SKYLARK

CODE NAME for planned flights of U.S. A-12 OXCART spyplanes over Cuba. Operation Skylark called for "emergency" operational readiness for overflights beginning on Nov. 5, 1964, one year before the A-12 actually became operational.

A CIA detachment began training for the Cuban flights, which would be undertaken on two weeks' notice. However, the U-2 RECONNAISSANCE aircraft continued to make the Cuban overflights, the A-12 being reserved for more critical requirements.

OO SLAMMER

U.S. project for obtaining firsthand information from Americans in prison for espionage. The videotaped interviews by U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS were conducted to gain insights into the motives and attitudes of U.S. spies.

Although the interviews remain classified, excerpts from them have been leaked. Imprisoned spies who were interviewed include MICHAEL WALKER, whose father, JOHN A. WALKER, JR., recruited him. Michael Walker was a U.S. sailor when he was arrested. He told his interviewer that when he was copying documents in the CODE room of a U.S. Navy warship, the other sailors "saw what I was doing but never took any notice. There were a couple of times when it got kind of close, but I was good at lying."

JEFFREY CARNEY, a U.S. Air Force communications specialist who spied for the Soviets, said that he had no trouble "putting my nose in books where I didn't belong . . . talking to people, gathering information from conversations. It was actually very obvious. Somebody should have noticed."

Writer Jeff Stein, who has seen portions of the Slammer report, wrote in *The New York Times* that the authors of the report discovered that "behavioral changes are often associated with acts of espionage. Heavy drinking, drug dependence, signs of depression or stress, extramarital affairs and divorce could be warning signs of a security problem. The authors believe that if co-workers and bosses

could be educated to intervene with a troubled employee early on, damaging espionage might be prevented."

●● SLAVENS, BRIAN E.

U.S. Marine Corps deserter who in 1982 called the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and offered to sell military information to the Soviet Union. His telephone call was intercepted by the FBI. He was arrested, convicted on espionage charges, and sentenced to two years at hard labor.

●● SLEEPER

A spy placed in a TARGET area but does not engage in espionage until he or she is activated at a future time.

The 1992 British TELEVISION drama series *Sleeper* told of two Soviet sleepers sent to Britain in the 1960s. But when ultimately contacted by THE CENTER in Moscow and ordered back because the Cold War has ended, they have genuinely made new lives for themselves—one is married with children, and the other has become a successful financial account executive. Neither man wants to return to Russia. The drama raised the question about what exactly did happen to the Soviet sleepers planted in the United States and Britain during the Cold War.

●● SLU

SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT

●● SMEDLEY, AGNES (b. 1894 d. 1950)

An American, long involved in intrigue and espionage, who played a key role in the Far East Soviet spy ring headed by RICHARD SORGE.

An idealist from an early age, in New York City in 1918 Smedley became involved with an Indian revolutionary movement financed by the German government as a means of damaging Britain, then at war with Germany, by undermining British imperial rule in India. Smedley was arrested for violating the U.S. neutrality laws, but she was not brought to trial and was soon released. This incident and others aroused in her a strong hatred for the United States and, by extension, the West. Although she had sexual relations with men (and was briefly married at age 18), she generally dressed in a manish manner. Later, when in communist-held territory of China she wore the uniform of the Red Army.

She was in BERLIN in the 1920s and became active in the communist movement while earning a living as a writer. She visited Moscow in 1921 to attend a meeting of Indian revolutionaries. In 1928 she went to China via Moscow and by then had become a well-known character in the ranks of international communism.

While in the Far East she was a correspondent for the German newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung* (and later the *Manchester Guardian*), working out of Shanghai. Although she did not speak Chinese and knew nothing about the country or the people, she immediately began

writing "authoritatively" about China in both articles and books. Her articles revealed little of China, but much of her prejudices and attitudes.

With her strong communist sympathies, she befriended Sorge, who worked for the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. He used her apartment for clandestine radio transmissions, and she introduced Sorge to her friend OZAKI HOZUMI, who would become his principal Japanese collaborator.

Hozumi was her first recruit for Sorge's spy ring. Sorge would write: "The only person in China upon whom I knew that I could depend was Agnes Smedley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my group in China and particularly in selecting Chinese co-workers." Sorge generally remained in the background until Smedley had identified and begun to develop a candidate for his espionage ring.

Others in her Shanghai circle included SONIA, another top Soviet spy, and ROGER HOLLIS, a future head of the British Security Service (MI5).

When Sorge moved from China to Japan in 1933, Smedley went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. She then traveled through Europe and back to New York, returning to China in 1935. There she continued to send intelligence material to Moscow and continued her attempt to influence people with her idealistic and naïve views of communism.

The British ambassador to China in the late 1930s, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (later Lord Inverchapel) considered her one of the "greatest women" on earth; he subsequently became British ambassador to the United States, and his views helped confuse the issue of American policy toward China after the war. Similarly, Smedley became friends with Joseph Stilwell, later the commanding general of U.S. forces in Burma and China, and had some influence on his views of China; some said there was a great "mutual admiration" between the two Americans. Also influential was her book *Battle Hymn of China* (1943), which praised the communist forces in China and compared the Nationalist Kuomintang with the Nazi Party in Germany.

From 1941 onward she remained in the United States, writing and lecturing on China. After the war, Maj. Gen. CHARLES WILLOUGHBY, Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur's chief INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, exposed Smedley as a key member of the communist conspiracy in the Far East in an official report completed in 1947 and released in Washington, D.C., two years later. Smedley wrote to President Truman asking him to force MacArthur to apologize to her or to waive the general's immunity so that he could be sued for libel. The Department of the Army issued a retraction: "The [intelligence] division has no proof to back up the spy charges. The report was based on information from the Japanese police and should have said so. While there may be evidence in existence to substantiate the allegations, it is not in our hands."

Several journalists took up the cry for Smedley. And former Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes wrote: "No one who knows Miss Smedley would ever suspect that this courageous and intelligent American citizen has

stooped to be so low as to be a spy for any country—even for her own to which she is deeply attached. . . .”

She went to London in 1950, where she died suddenly. She left her estate to Chu-The, former commander of the Chinese communist military forces—which were then fighting U.S. troops in Korea. When she died she was writing a biography of Chu-The. She requested that her body be cremated and the ashes “be laid to rest at any place designated by General Chu-The or his heirs.” The ashes were buried in Peking (now Beijing), with honors, and several Chinese leaders were among the reported 800 people who attended the interment.

Willoughby repeated his charges against Smedley in his book *Shanghai Conspiracy* (1952). His extensive discussion of Smedley and her activities begins:

The American, Miss Agnes Smedley, has been one of the most energetic workers for the Soviet cause in China for over twenty years. She was one of the early perpetrators, if not the originator, of the hoax that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists at all but were only local agrarian revolutionists innocent of any Soviet connections. This concocted tale has had enormous effect in molding American opinion on China, both private and official.

OO SMERSH

Soviet intelligence organization with broad activities in field of counterespionage, personally organized and named by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. The name is an abbreviation of the Russian words *smert' shpionam*, meaning “death to spies.”

Smersh was charged with tracking down traitors and deserters behind the front lines, shooting retreating soldiers, and arresting men who escaped from German captivity; in addition to the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air Force, Smersh had jurisdiction over the NKVD military forces and institutions. Smersh also supervised a network of informers within the armed forces and helped to direct partisan operations behind German lines.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE activities within the armed forces were carried out by the Osobyie Otdely (Special Departments), of the NKVD prior to the establishment of Smersh. Smersh was created in 1941 by LAVENTRY BERIA as an agency of the NKVD under Commissioner of State Security 3rd Rank Vasili Vasilevich Chernyshov. From April 14, 1943, to March 16, 1946, Smersh functioned as a separate agency directly under the State Committee of Defense headed by Stalin. During this period of independence from the NKVD, Smersh was commanded by Beria's deputy and protégé Col. Gen. v. s. ABAKUMOV, the First Deputy Commissar for State Security. At the same time, apparently under Abakumov's overall direction, Petr Andreevich Gladkov became head of the Smersh naval component (1943–1946); Chernyshov, with the rank of colonel general, remained a deputy head of Smersh into 1946, after which he became Deputy Minister of the newly established MGB.

The principal directorates or administrations of Smersh were:

First Administration: Provide representatives at all levels of Soviet military units down to the battalion and company level to observe officer and enlisted personnel, and monitor informers.

Second Administration: Conduct operations (including support of partisans, military police-type activities), carry out liaison with the NKVD and NKGB, and provide special security troops to protect headquarters and senior officers (on the average a company to each army and a battalion to each front).

Third Administration: Receive, maintain, and disseminate intelligence related to Smersh activities.

Fourth Administration: Carry out investigations of military personnel suspected of anti-Soviet activity and of civilians in areas of military activity.

Fifth Administration: Provide tribunals of three Smersh officers (i.e., a troika) to try suspects.

Smersh had a cadre of personnel transferred from OO-NKVD, thus ensuring continuity and expertise in pursuing death to spies. All men and women in Smersh—from senior officers to clerks, secretaries, and typists—held officer rank.

Smersh officers were assigned to all higher-level field headquarters, with Smersh detachments operating at subordinate levels. Former Smersh officer A. I. Romanov [p] wrote in his autobiographic *Nights Are Longest There* (1972) that even Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, in some respects the highest-ranking Soviet officer in the war, “. . . as a high-ranking non-CHEKIST, had been completely surrounded by Chekist generals. . . . The higher a man's rank and the stronger his apparent power, the more he was kept under surveillance by the security services.” Lt. Gen. A. I. Vadis was Zhukov's chief of Smersh.

Among the many thousands of victims arrested by Smersh during and immediately after the war was artillery officer and writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

Late in the war Smersh teams entered Germany behind advancing Soviet troops to seek out Nazi officials. In early May 1945, Lt. Col. Ivan I. Klimenko, commander of the Smersh unit with the 79th Rifle Corps (3rd Shock Army) brought his men into the Reich Chancellery garden, the site of the Führerbunker, Hitler's underground headquarters. Klimenko—through the astute observations of his Pvt. Ivan Churakov—found and took possession of the charred bodies of Adolf and Eva Hitler as well as those of Josef and Magda Goebbels and their six children. Smersh officials took charge of the interrogations and investigation (including autopsies) to ensure that the actual remains of Hitler had been found and not those of a double.

In *The Gulag Archipelago* (1973), novelist-historian Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn told of the authority of a

. . . State Security representative in the army—a SMERSH man, and a mere lieutenant; but the portly old colonel, the commander of the unit, stands up when you enter the room and tries to flatter you, to play up to you. He doesn't even have a drink with his chief of staff without inviting you to join them. The fact that you have only two tiny

stars on yours shoulder boards doesn't mean a thing; it is even amusing. After all, your stars have a very different weight and are measured on a totally different scale from those of ordinary officers. (On special assignments you are sometimes even authorized to wear major's insignia, for example, which is a sort of incognito, a convention.) You have a power over all the people in that military unit, or factory, or district, incomparably greater than that of the military commander, or factory director, or secretary of the district Communist Party.

Smersh's functions were taken over by the the newly established MGB in 1946, becoming the Third Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of that ministry.

One-time British intelligence officer IAN FLEMING later used an organization known as Smersh as the "bad guys" in some of his JAMES BOND novels.

Also see GRU.

● ● SMITH, RICHARD C. (b. 1924)

Former enlisted man in the U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND (INSCOM) arrested for espionage, tried, and acquitted.

From 1973 to 1980, while attached to INSCOM, Smith worked on the U.S. DOUBLE AGENT program Royal Mitre, developing cover stories for them. He left the Army in 1980 and started a video production company in his home state of Utah. He had learned Japanese while in the Army, and in June 1981 he went to Tokyo as a representative of several American firms looking for Japanese investors.

Smith was arrested in April 1984 on charges of accepting \$11,000 from a Soviet agent in payment for the identities of six U.S. double agents. Smith admitted taking the money but said that he had done so as part of a plot set up by the CIA to infiltrate the KGB with double agents.

After his arrest Smith told the FBI that in Tokyo two men approached him and identified themselves as CIA employees. Aware of his background, they asked him to help in a plan to penetrate the KGB through Tokyo. (Two years before, KGB Maj. STANISLAV LEVCHENKO had defected from the large KGB residency in Tokyo and told the CIA about Soviet espionage activities in Japan.)

Smith said that the CIA operatives had instructed him to pose as an American businessman who, broke and dying of cancer, was willing to sell anything—including secrets he possessed—so that he could provide his widow and four children with a legacy. In fact, Smith did have four children and his video business was bankrupt by the time he carried out the plot by meeting with a KGB officer in Tokyo in 1982 and 1983.

After not hearing back from the CIA operatives, Smith told the FBI what he had done. After ten months of questioning Smith intermittently, the FBI finally decided not to believe him. He was arrested and then indicted for espionage, largely on the basis of his own story.

The trial called for the use of the CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT, which protects security information by allowing a judge to decide on ways to keep

secrets out of trials. Smith, who said that the CIA had left him out in the cold, wanted classified documents for his defense that would prove his story. When the trial judge ruled that Smith could use certain classified information, the Department of Justice appealed to the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which narrowed the amount of information that would be made available to Smith. The appellate court's ruling included footnotes that were themselves classified.

When Smith went on trial in April 1986, the judge ordered the government to produce a witness to clarify the CIA's involvement with Smith. The witness said that the CIA had no record of the men Smith allegedly met in Tokyo. But the jury believed Smith and acquitted him.

● ● SMITH, GEN. WALTER BEDELL

(b. 1895 d. 1961)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) from Oct. 1950 to Feb. 1953. Smith had served in World War II as chief of staff to Gen. of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Inevitably nicknamed "Beetle," Smith had a high school education when he entered the Indiana National Guard in 1910. He served as an infantry soldier in France with the 4th Division during World War I. Subsequently commissioned in 1917, he served as an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER and attended all major Army schools and colleges, returning to the Infantry School as an instructor. As a junior officer he was reassigned from the Army to the Bureau of the Budget for four and a half years, and also served as executive vice chairman of the board that completed the disposal of surplus World War I materials.

Smith quickly gained a reputation for harmoniously handling intricate and differing views of military and civilian leaders.

At the time of America's entry into World War II he was a brigadier general and the secretary of the Army's General Staff, a key position for an up-and-coming officer. Smith was appointed chief of staff to Lt. Gen. Eisenhower in Sept. 1942 as Eisenhower was planning the U.S.-British invasion of French North Africa. He remained with Eisenhower throughout the war, rising to the rank of lieutenant general. As Eisenhower's chief of staff he negotiated the Italian surrender in Sept. 1943 and the German surrender in May 1945. Eisenhower called Smith "the general manager of the war."

Eisenhower, in *Mandate for Change: 1952-1956* (1963), wrote of a conversation he had with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill:

... he expressed his admiration of the way Bedell Smith, my brilliant Chief of Staff in World War II, and I used to work together. He said that he had been in my headquarters on a day when Bedell was carrying on a heated argument with me, I not only allowed him to argue; I urged him to continue. The Prime Minister thought the incident a quite notable clash of views and men. But then, he said, I made a decision which settled the proposition and, to his

amazement, Bedell's instant reaction was exactly as if he had got his own way—which he had not.

In 1946 Smith was in the process of taking over the operations division of the General Staff when he was appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union. He retained his military status and served in that position until March 1949. He then became Commanding General of the First Army, with headquarters in New York City.

Smith held that assignment only a few months. He was appointed DCI in Oct. 1950 by President Truman in the wake of the failure of U.S. intelligence to predict the North Korean assault on South Korea in June 1950. On July 1, 1951, while serving as DCI, Smith was promoted to full general.

HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, a Soviet MOLE in British intelligence, wrote of Smith in *My Silent War* (1968):

He had a cold, fishy eye and a precision-tool brain. At my first meeting with him, I had taken a document of twenty-odd paragraphs on Anglo-American war plans. . . . He had flipped over the pages casually and tossed it aside, then engaged me in close discussion of the subjects involved, referring from memory to the numbered paragraphs. I kept pace only because I had spent a whole morning learning the document by heart.

(Philby invariably and incorrectly called him "Bedell-Smith.")

Smith departed the CIA and retired from active duty in early 1953, when President Eisenhower appointed him Under Secretary of State, a position he held until 1954.

He wrote *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions* (1956) and *My Three Years in Moscow* (1949), among other books.

OO SMUDGER

Intelligence slang for a photographer.

OO SNEPP, FRANK W.

CIA officer who, after two tours of duty in Southeast Asia, publicly protested U.S. policy failures in the Vietnam War.

After earning a master's degree from Columbia University in 1965, majoring in Elizabethan literature, Snepp entered the CIA, apparently to avoid being drafted during the Vietnam War. Initially he was assigned as an analyst specializing in NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION affairs.

Some of Snepp's colleagues played a practical joke on him by volunteering him for assignment to the CIA station in Vietnam. Although he sought to avoid the assignment, he was warned that his refusal to go would jeopardize his career in the agency. He served in Vietnam in 1969–1971, preparing estimates and briefings as well as handling interrogations and informants.

He returned to CIA headquarters at Langley, Va., where he served on the Vietnam Task Force, but was reportedly removed from that team for "political reasons."

Snepp returned to Vietnam in 1972 for a second tour, as the senior analyst for the Saigon CIA post's indications analysis branch. He served there until the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in April 1975.

Snepp was then sent to Thailand, where he debriefed journalists and refugees escaping from the communist takeover of South Vietnam. In Aug. 1975 he was recalled to CIA headquarters to be promoted and receive an award for his "analytical acuity" during the final weeks of the war.

Three weeks later Snepp resigned after futile attempts to develop an objective "after-action" report on the CIA's activities in Vietnam. Determined to produce an accurate record of CIA failures in Vietnam, he wrote *Decent Interval*, published in 1977 with the subtitle "An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam." He was particularly critical of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's highly secretive "virtuoso performance" in negotiating "peace" with the North Vietnamese. His 580-page tome also criticized Ambassador Graham Martin and other U.S. as well as Vietnamese officials.

The CIA argued that Snepp had violated his secrecy agreement with the agency and sued for the profits from the book. In 1980 the suit reached the Supreme Court, which decided in favor of the CIA. Snepp was forced to relinquish \$140,000 in royalties from the book.

Snepp was also required to submit his novel *Convergence of Interest* to the CIA for approval in 1980. The novel was about alleged CIA involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA found no legal problems with what Snepp said in the novel except the use of the real name of a CIA officer, which Snepp had used along with the real identities of others. But when the agency asked him to delete the name of the man in question, Snepp countered that it had been taken from another book on the Kennedy assassination, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* (1978) by Edward Jay Epstein. Snepp also said the AGENT had been named in other books, one written by a CIA agent and approved by the agency. After being advised of the prior publication of the name, the CIA withdrew its opposition noting that the agent in question had "retired under cover." In the end, however, Snepp did use a pseudonym for the agent.

OO SOBELL, MORTON

Longtime friend of JULIUS ROSENBERG and a member of the ATOMIC SPY RING in New York City.

Sobell, like Julius Rosenberg and his wife, Ethel, was the son of Russian-Jewish immigrants to the United States. A classmate of Julius at City College of New York, after college Sobell remained a close friend of Rosenberg.

He first came to the attention of U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officials in Jan. 1941, when he and Max Elitcher, both employees of the Navy Department, used Sobell's car to take people to and from an antidraft rally sponsored by the American Peace Mobilization Committee, an organization known to include many commu-

nists. Sobell soon left the Navy Department, going to work for a commercial firm, Reeves Instruments, but Elitcher continued to work for the Navy during World War II.

The FBI apparently next came across Sobell in 1948 when Elitcher and his wife, believing that they were under FBI SURVEILLANCE, went to the Sobell home in Queens, N.Y., on the night of July 30, to spend the night. They were confident they had shaken the tail, but Sobell was furious and concerned. He told the visitors that he had some material for the Rosenbergs that was "too good to throw away," yet too dangerous to be kept in the house.

Sobell and Elitcher then drove into Manhattan and parked in a deserted waterfront area. Max waited in the car while Sobell walked to the nearby Rosenberg apartment carrying a can of 35-mm film.

Nothing more happened to Sobell until July 1950 when Julius Rosenberg was arrested. Sobell and his family fled to Mexico. The FBI discovered the family at an apartment in Mexico City, but Morton was away, visiting Vera Cruz and Tampico in an attempt to find a freighter on which the family could travel to Eastern Europe without proper travel documents.

He returned to his apartment on Aug. 16, and that evening Mexican security police arrested him as an undesirable alien. On Aug. 18 Sobell was turned over to the FBI at the U.S.-Mexican border; the rest of his family was set free on the U.S. side. Although Sobell claimed that he and his family were on vacation in Mexico, documents found in his Mexican apartment revealed his plans to flee the country.

Sobell went on trial with the Rosenbergs and DAVID GREENGLASS in March 1951. Convicted, he was given a life sentence. Several years later a further link was established when Reino Hayhanen, an assistant of RUDOLF ABEL, a Soviet ILLEGAL in New York City, defected to the West rather than return to the Soviet Union. Hayhanen revealed that in 1955 he had been sent to dig up a cache of \$5,000 to give to Helen Sobell to cover legal costs. He did dig up the money, but kept it himself.

Helen Sobell was not accused in the spy ring case. But in *The FBI-KGB War* (1986), FBI agent Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman wrote: "The idea that Mrs. Sobell could be involved with the Soviets was debunked by Rosenberg case critics at the time, but was later confirmed by a fortuitous find of microfilm in an old wallet of Abel."

Sobell was initially sent to the penitentiary on Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay. He was subsequently transferred to the federal prison at Atlanta, Ga., where Abel was incarcerated. The two men became regular chess players, their games ending only when Abel was exchanged for U-2 pilot FRANCIS GARY POWERS in 1962.

Sobell was released from prison in Jan. 1969.

OO SOE

The Special Operations Executive was created by the British government on July 16, 1940, to undertake sabotage, subversion, and the formation of secret military forces in German-occupied countries of Europe. It was a

de facto intelligence-gathering agency in those occupied areas.

The SOE was strongly supported by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who wanted a special force to "set Europe ablaze." The SOE was formed from three separate organizations already in existence in the summer of 1940: MI R of the War Office; Section D (sabotage) of MI6; and EH (Electra House), a propaganda group within the Foreign Office.

A highly secret agency, the SOE was placed under the COVER of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, which provided a useful location for handling information about enemy industry and other sabotage targets. Thus the Minister of Economic Warfare, Dr. Hugh Dalton, became de facto head of the SOE. Initially SOE was organized into three major sections: SO1 dealt with propaganda, SO2 with operations, and SO3 with planning. After a year only SO2 remained, becoming the basis for the SOE.

SOE operations were conducted in France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Middle East, throughout Africa, and the Far East. In Europe especially, as well as in some other areas, the SOE worked with the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS). There was rivalry between the SOE and OSS in the Balkans, North Africa, and even France despite agreements between the two agencies on their respective areas of operations and responsibilities. The SOE was also plagued by petty jealousies and rivalry with MI6, which caused each agency to withhold information from the other, sometimes to the detriment (and death) of AGENTS in the field.

Probably the most disastrous SOE operation was in Holland, where the Germans found an attaché case abandoned by an MI6 agent that contained the names and addresses of all his Dutch associates. With this information and SOE's failure to follow radio security procedures or to recognize warning signals from captured Dutch agents, the Germans succeeded in forcing Dutch operatives to work for them. As a result they captured the entire SOE-underground network in Holland, seizing 51 SOE agents, nine MI6 agents, and one—Beatrix Terwindt—from MI9, the British office in charge of escape and evasion from German-controlled areas. Terwindt survived concentration camps; 47 of the others were shot. (See NORDPOL.)

The SOE attempted to work with Soviet forces too, and SOE planning for operations in the Soviet Union began in late 1940 in anticipation of a German invasion. After the German assault took place in June 1941, a British SOE mission to Moscow in Sept. 1941 established a mutual formal liaison with the NKVD stipulating that neither agency would conduct subversive operations in each other's territory (including the British Commonwealth and mandated territories). The British were to parachute Soviet agents into Europe in a series of operations known by the general CODE NAMES PICKAXE and MAMBA. However, the NKVD provided little help in suborning Russians who had been forced to serve in the German Army and had been recaptured by the Soviets. In the event, the SOE went ahead with these operations in Europe without Soviet approval, using Russians who were recaptured by British forces.

Soviet hostility toward the SOE (as well as the OSS) intensified from 1944 onward because of perceived SOE inefficiency as well as Soviet suspicion of SOE activities in areas considered within the Soviet sphere of influence. There were, however, several examples of successful co-operation between the SOE and NKVD, especially in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia.

At the end of the war the SOE developed extensive plans to participate in the soon-to-be-called Cold War, but the agency was disbanded in early 1946. SOE strength peaked at about 13,000 men and women, both military and civilian. The SOE had three operational heads:

Aug. 1940–May 1942
May. 1942–Sept. 1943
Sept. 1943–Jan. 1946

—Sir Frank Nelson
—Sir Charles Hambro
—Maj.-Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins

OO SOG

SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP

OO SOKOLOV, ALEKSANDR

(b. 1919)

Soviet spy who was deported, along with his wife, from the United States in Oct. 1964.

Sokolov and his wife were charged with conspiring to commit espionage in the United States from 1957 to 1963 by attempting to collect intelligence on U.S. missile sites, nuclear weapons, and other military activities. They pleaded not guilty to the charges. The U.S. government decided not to prosecute because of concerns that SENSITIVE information would be made public in a trial.

One of the principal witnesses against the Sokolovs was KAARLO RUDOLPH TUOMI, a DOUBLE AGENT working for the FBI.

Sokolov, a Soviet citizen, asked to be deported to Czechoslovakia rather than the Soviet Union. The U.S. government acceded to his request.

OO SOLO

CODE NAME for a longtime COUNTERINTELLIGENCE operation conducted by the FBI against the U.S. Communist Party.

From the mid-1950s until about 1977 two brothers, Jack and Morris Childs, were trusted members of the U.S. Communist Party, carrying cash from Moscow to the United States to finance the party, meeting Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, and conveying their Cold War attitudes toward the United States. At the same time, the Childs brothers were informers for the FBI.

Ukrainian-born Morris Childs joined the American Communist Party in 1921 and was sent to the Lenin School in Moscow for training as an AGENT in the espionage underground that Soviet intelligence was running in the United States. In 1932 Morris's younger brother, Jack, became the business manager of the Young Communist League and was also sent to Moscow for training. Later Morris became the Moscow correspondent for *The*

Daily Worker, the newspaper published by the U.S. Communist Party.

After a hiatus during the 1940s, in 1954 Morris Childs returned to the communist underground. One of his duties was getting money from Moscow to U.S. communists. From about that time, however, Morris and Jack Childs were working for the FBI.

The brothers reported to the FBI that Stanley Levison, a close adviser to civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was a communist. Armed with this information, J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI, began his campaign to discredit King and privately spread the word to U.S. officials that King had communist ties.

The first authoritative information on the Solo operation came in *The FBI and Martin Luther King Jr.: From 'Solo' to Memphis* (1981) by historian David J. Garrow. More details came in *Operation Solo* (1996) by JOHN BARRON, an author well connected to FBI sources. Barron said that Morris Childs had a close relationship with YURI ANDROPOV, then head of the KGB and later the leader of the Soviet Union. Barron also said that the brothers were sent on missions to Cuban leader Fidel Castro and China's Mao Zedong.

Morris Childs reported that he had witnessed meetings about the widening split between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. By getting such inside information through Solo, U.S. officials had more knowledge about the Soviet-China breach than historians had previously believed.

OO SOMBOLAY, SPECIALIST ALBERT T.

U.S. Army soldier who spied for the Iraqis prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Sombolay, with an artillery battalion of the 8th Infantry Division based in Germany, pleaded guilty to contacting Iraqi officials and committing espionage.

He negotiated to provide the Iraqis with information about troop movements to the Middle East and various military documents. He received approximately \$1,300 from the Iraqis for his efforts, according to an Army spokesman. He was sentenced to 34 years in prison by an Army court.

OO SONIA

(b. 1907 d. ?)

CODE NAME for Ruth Hamburger Beurton (néé Ursula Kuczynski). CHAPMAN PINCHER, author of *Too Secret Too Long* (1984), called Sonia "the most successful female spy in history."

Born in BERLIN, to a communist father, Ruth joined the Communist Youth Union when she was 17. In 1929 she married Rolf Hamburger in Germany, and the following year she was ordered by Soviet intelligence to go to Shanghai. There she met AGNES SMEDLEY, RICHARD SORGE, and probably ROGER HOLLIS. Sorge persuaded Ruth to work as an ILLEGAL for the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. She allowed her apartment to be used as a meeting place for Sorge and also served as courier for the group.

In Dec. 1932 Sorge reported to Moscow that Sonia was a capable AGENT. She was then invited to Moscow to learn TRADECRAFT, including the use of clandestine radios. At that time she was given the CODE NAME Sonia, which she is believed to have used for the rest of her career.

The Soviets sent her to Mukden, the capital of Japanese-controlled Manchuria, in April 1934. Her assignment was to maintain contact between Moscow and the Chinese partisans fighting the Japanese. She was subsequently sent to Peking (now Beijing) in May 1935, but she soon left China when Sorge's successor in Shanghai was arrested. Back in Europe, she visited her parents in London and then accompanied the Hamburgers to Poland, where Rolf also worked for the GRU. Sonia returned to Moscow June 1937 for advanced training and to be decorated with Order of the Red Banner, the highest honor then available to a non-Soviet citizen; she was made a major in the GRU.

In June 1938 Sonia was directed by Moscow to recruit Britons to serve under her as spies in Germany. The GRU ordered her to divorce Rolf and to marry one of her British agents, Len Beurton, to enable her to become a British citizen. She married Beurton on Feb. 23, 1940, and received a British passport in May.

"Ollo," who had been Sonia's nanny in Germany, wanted to go to England with the family. Told she could not go, she revealed Sonia's and Beurton's espionage activities to the British consular representative in Montreux, Switzerland, but was ignored. When Sonia and her two children arrived in Britain in Feb. 1941, she moved into a home near Oxford and began her radio transmissions in the spring of 1941.

KLAUS FUCHS supplied Sonia with information about his work related to the atomic bomb beginning in 1941. (See ATOMIC SPY RING.) In Sept. 1944, Sonia's brother, Juergen Kuczynski, was asked to participate in an American effort to assess the damage to the German war effort by Allied bombing. He was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army and was thus able to pass on to Sonia the results of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

In June 1947 two British MI5 officials and a local detective attempted to question Sonia and her husband about alleged spy activities. When the couple refused to answer questions, the officers left without searching the house; there was apparently no further interest in the family by COUNTERESPIONAGE officials.

In 1950 Sonia and two of the children went to East Germany for a vacation. She never returned to Britain, and Beurton joined her in East Germany later that year. In 1969 Sonia received her second Order of the Red Banner. She published her memoirs in 1977, wrote several other books, and was awarded the Order of Karl Marx in 1984.

OO SORGE, RICHARD

(b. 1895 d. 1944)

Highly successful Soviet spy whose reports from Japan permitted the shift of major Soviet military forces from the Far East to help stop the German advances of 1941–1942.

Born in Russia to a German father and Russian mother, Sorge received a doctorate in political science

from the University of Hamburg. He served in the German Army in World War I and was wounded three times. Sorge became a communist in 1920 and began working for the GRU in Germany in the late 1920s with the COVER of a teacher. After serving in Moscow from 1924 to 1927, he was sent to Scandinavia (1927), the United States (1928), Britain (1929), and Shanghai (1930).

Under the cover of a correspondent for a German magazine, Sorge then served as a Soviet spy in Japan from Sept. 1933 until his arrest in Oct. 1941. As the Tokyo correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Germany's most respected newspaper, and two other German publications, he infiltrated the German Embassy in Tokyo, the Japanese General Staff, and even the imperial family to collect valuable military and POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE. He also sought to persuade the Japanese to avoid war with the Soviet Union.

He was able to inform the Soviets in 1941 that the Japanese planned to move south (toward the Dutch Indies and French Indochina). With this knowledge Soviets were able to shift military forces from the Far East to the German front confident that the Japanese would not launch an attack to support the German invasion of European Russia.

Sorge's principal Japanese collaborator was HOZUMI OZAKI, an adviser to the Japanese premier, who gained information using his access to classified information on military and government policies. Ozaki said that he had become a traitor to save Japan, which "had to be reconstructed as a socialist state." He saw himself helping Sorge to prevent Japan from attacking and destroying the Soviet Union. (Ozaki was raised and educated in Taiwan. He learned English at special schools and turned to Marxism in 1923 to find out more about politics, social problems, and minorities. AGNES SMEDLEY had introduced Ozaki to Sorge in Shanghai in 1930.)

The Sorge spy ring was discovered by accident as Japanese COUNTERESPIONAGE efforts focused on locating communists were led to Sorge although he had a strong anti-Soviet reputation. Both Sorge and Ozaki were arrested on Oct. 16, 1941, tried, and hanged on Nov. 7, 1944. Sorge was posthumously given the Hero of the Soviet Union award and was honored by a Soviet POSTAGE STAMP.

Sorge used the cover names Johnson in China and Ramsey in Japan.

OO SOSS

SOVIET OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

OO SOSUS

SOUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

OO SOUERS, REAR ADM. WILLIAM H.

(b. 1892 d. 1973)

The first U.S. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI), appointed on Jan. 23, 1946, the day after Presi-

dent Truman signed the presidential directive establishing the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP. Souers was DCI only until June 1946.

Souers, a 1914 graduate of Miami University of Ohio, had a successful career in mortgages, securities, and investments. In April 1929 he was appointed a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve and remained on inactive status as an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER until 1940. He was then called to active duty and assigned to the district intelligence office at Great Lakes, Ill. He had other intelligence assignments at the naval district headquarters in Charleston, S.C., and San Juan, P.R.

In July 1944 Souers reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C., as assistant chief of naval intelligence in charge of plans and the deputy chief of NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. Souers was promoted to rear admiral in 1945. During this period he also served as representative of the Secretary of the Navy on the government committee studying the formation of a central intelligence organization.

Truman, with great interest, personally reviewed the proposals for a central intelligence service. "My inclination was to favor the plan worked out by the Army and the Navy, with the aid of Admiral Souers, and I was ready to put it into effect," he wrote in his memoirs, *Years of Trial and Hope: 1946–1952* (1956).

Although Souers wished to return to his business career, Truman persuaded him not to, recalling, "I assured him that as soon as the Army, Navy, and State Departments would agree upon a candidate acceptable to me I would release him." The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP—immediate predecessor of the CIA—came into being on Jan. 22, 1946; Souers was formally appointed the following day, and on the 24th Truman invited Souers to the White House to present him with his "badges of office"—a black cloak and wooden dagger. (See CLOAK AND DAGGER)

Souers supervised the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group, with the President and his chief of staff, Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, taking a personal interest in the new service.

After five months as DCI, Souers briefly returned to private life. However, at the request of the newly established Atomic Energy Commission he conducted an extensive survey of intelligence requirements for the commission. In Sept. 1947 President Truman appointed Souers the first executive secretary of the new NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, a position he held until Jan. 1950. Upon leaving the council he became a special consultant to the President on national security matters while returning to his business career. He retired from the Naval Reserve on Jan. 1, 1953.

Souers continued to be involved in national security matters; speaking out during the communist-hunting McCarthy era, he warned that the Subversives Control Act and the wave of anticommunism sweeping the country contained "the seeds of danger." Souers said that unconstrained and indiscriminate anticommunist activities could be as dangerous to American liberties as anything the communists could do.

● ● SOUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

(SOSUS)

U.S. seafloor acoustic detection system for detecting SUBMARINES. The U.S. Navy operates SOSUS arrays in various parts of the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as across the Strait of Gibraltar and off the North Cape (north of Norway). SOSUS is used to detect transiting submarines and, in wartime, would be used to direct Allied air, surface, and submarine forces to underwater targets. However, the SOSUS arrays are vulnerable to active and passive (i.e., jamming) attacks by hostile naval and, possibly, merchant forces.

During World War II the U.S., British, and Soviet navies installed limited-capability acoustic arrays on the ocean floor in shallow waters, especially near harbors. Immediately after the war the U.S. Navy began a major development program of deep-ocean arrays. By 1948 arrays were being tested at sea, and by 1951 the first SOSUS arrays were being implanted at sea. Also termed Project Caesar, the first set of operational hydrophones was installed at Sandy Hook, south of Manhattan, followed in 1952 by a deep-water (1,200-foot) installation off Eleuthera in the Bahamas. That year the Chief of Naval Operations directed the establishment of six arrays in the western Atlantic, all to be ready by the end of 1956. The first arrays in the Pacific were operational in 1958. Installations in other areas followed, especially the Norwegian Sea area. (The locations of U.S. SOSUS arrays were eventually identified in Soviet magazines.)

Initially a number of Naval Facilities (NAVFACs) were established as the shore terminals for SOSUS; these were located along both U.S. coasts and in the Caribbean, Iceland, and Japan as well as at other overseas locations. Subsequently, the seafloor hydrophones have been replaced, and the NAVFACs in the United States and Caribbean have been consolidated as more capable arrays and computers have been developed.

The SOSUS system and surface ships fitted with the Surveillance Towed-Array Surveillance System (SUR-TASS) are linked with the so-called Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). Acoustic data from the NAVFACs and Regional Evaluation Centers (REC) are provided through the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) to the Atlantic, Pacific, and European area Fleet Command Centers (FCC) and to the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC), in Suitland, Md., near Washington, D.C., as well as to national command centers.

Published sources cite SOSUS detection ranges of "hundreds" of miles. An improved SOSUS-type system known as the Fixed Distributed System (FDS) is under development. This system is intended to detect quiet, deep-running Russian submarines. A shallow-water FDS variant is being developed, with greater emphasis on fiber optics than SOSUS-type systems, and possible integration of nonacoustic sensors.

The Advanced Deployable System (ADS) is also being developed. ADS is intended to provide an undersea surveillance system to detect diesel-electric submarines

operating in shallow waters, observe mine-laying activity, and track surface contacts. The system will interface directly with tactical forces (ships and aircraft). During a crisis or conflict ADS is to be deployed within ten days to the operational area.

In the late 1960s then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara first publicly acknowledged the existence of SOSUS.

The Soviet Navy had employed limited seafloor acoustic systems to detect submarines since World War II, when hydrophones were planted near harbor entrances and across bays to detect German U-boats. The Soviets deployed a modern acoustic detection system with planar arrays in the Pacific near the Soviet landmass where surveillance of a broad area is desired. This project was called Cluster Lance by the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. The Soviets may also have deployed barrier arrays at points of ingress and egress from their strategic missile submarine operating areas in the Barents, Greenland, and Kara Seas, placed in or near trenches at choke points along the polar archipelago. These arrays were to serve as choke point "trip wires" to detect Western attack submarines and were not for long-range surveillance (as is the U.S. SOSUS system). However, the lack of fixed, long-range acoustic systems has forced the Soviets to rely largely on ship and aircraft acoustic detection for open-ocean search. (SATELLITES may also be used for submarine detection.)

● SOUTHER, GLENN M.

(b. 1957 d. 1989)

U.S. Navy enlisted man who spied for the Soviet Union. Souther, a Navy photographer with a TOP SECRET clearance, had access, according to the Soviets, to "the most secure and valuable documents disclosing plans of the U.S. Navy's operations in a nuclear war. . . ."

Souther enlisted in the Navy in 1976 and later said he had begun spying for the Soviets in 1980. He was a WALK IN: He went to the Soviet Embassy in Rome and offered to become a spy. In 1982 his estranged, Italian-born wife told an agent of the NAVAL (CRIMINAL) INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE that she believed her husband was a Soviet spy. The NIS agent dismissed her report as the ravings of a vengeful woman with a marital problem.

Souther's active duty in the Navy ended in 1982, but he remained in the reserve. His weekend-a-month reserve service was in the public affairs office of the Naval Air Station in Norfolk. There he attended Old Dominion University, majoring in Russian. In 1983 the DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE began a background investigation of Souther to upgrade his security clearance to top secret. In Dec. 1984, soon after getting the new clearance, he began working in the FLEET INTELLIGENCE CENTER EUROPE AND ATLANTIC (FICEURLANT), where he gained access to SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION, PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE, and SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

In 1985, after the arrest of Navy radioman JOHN WALKER, a naval officer who had married Souther's ex-wife again reported suspicions about Souther. But NIS

officials decided that, since Souther was a civilian, the investigation should be handled by the FBI. The FBI office in Norfolk, which had orchestrated the arrest of Walker, filed away the Souther report for eight months.

On May 21, 1986, two FBI agents asked Souther whether he had had any contact with any hostile intelligence service. He said he had not. On June 9 he flew to Rome and vanished. On July 17 the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* reported that he was in Moscow and had been granted political asylum. Two days later he appeared on Soviet television and announced his decision to change his life. He did not admit that he had been a spy.

On June 27, 1989, the Red Army paper *Krasnaya zvezda* reported that Mikhail Yevgenyevich Orlov, a 32-year-old Soviet intelligence officer, had died. The obituary, which lauded Orlov for "working for a better future for all mankind," gave Orlov another name: Glenn Michael Souther.

The use of a Russian name for Souther prompted speculation in Western intelligence circles that he had been a longtime plant—a Soviet citizen posing as an American. Some officials had suspected that the Soviets sometimes selected children or teenagers to become spies in the United States, raising them in a KGB facility that simulated a U.S. community. But VLADIMIR KRYUCHKOV, chief of the KGB, later said at a news conference in Moscow that Souther was an American recruited while he was in the Navy. Kryuchkov also said Souther killed himself because "his nervous system could not stand the pressure" of his dual life. He supposedly asked to be buried in a KGB uniform, as he was a KGB major. The ceremony, with full military honors, was conducted at Novokuntsevskoye Cemetery, near Moscow, where HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, the British spy, was buried. Souther left a Russian wife and an 18-month-old daughter.

● SOVIET OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

(SOSS)

A worldwide SURVEILLANCE system established by the Soviet Union during the 1960s to keep track of Western warships, especially U.S. aircraft carriers and—eventually—SUBMARINES. The Soviet Ocean Surveillance System was the principal means of keeping track of Soviet and foreign naval and air forces. It was fed by a variety of surveillance and RECONNAISSANCE activities, among them the Navy's operating forces (aircraft, surface ships, and submarines) and specialized intelligence collection activities.

The principal contributors to SOSS were aircraft, radio intercepts, SATELLITES, surface ships, submarines, and spies—AGENTS of both the KGB and GRU. The aircraft were primarily the long-range BEAR-D, which flew from bases in the Soviet Union and, beginning in 1970, also from Cuba, with some flights stopping at Conakry, before crossing the Atlantic to Cuba.

In addition to naval ships, SOSS used information obtained from the state-owned and centrally controlled

merchant and fishing fleets, and especially from the large Soviet research fleets. The last consisted of ships and aircraft engaged in academic oceanographic and polar research, which supports the nation's civilian and military space and atmospheric research programs.

The information collected by the various components of SOSS was correlated at command centers in the four fleet headquarters—Northern (Arctic), Baltic, Pacific, and Black Sea—and at naval headquarters in Moscow. These centers had hardened, highly survivable communication facilities with alternative facilities ready to serve as a backup, ensuring the rapid intake of intelligence data and the rapid outflow of directions to fleet and tactical commanders. Although Soviet tactics were highly dependent upon communications, after the outbreak of hostilities it was possible that Soviet forces would be less dependent than Western naval forces on command direction because of the Soviets' relatively rigid doctrine and tactics.

In addition to these fixed facilities, several cruisers and several submarine tenders were fitted with command and control systems to process and employ the products of SOSS.

Some portions of SOSS have survived the end of the Cold War, especially satellite reconnaissance systems.

Also see RADAR OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE.

● ● SOVIET UNION

see RUSSIA—USSR

● ● SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM

U.S. intelligence term for a program established to control access and distribution and to provide protection for particularly SENSITIVE information that requires controls beyond that required for CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET material.

There are restrictions on who can authorize a special access program.

● ● SPECIAL BRANCH

Scotland Yard department that conducts police work for British intelligence agencies, especially MI5. Members of the Special Branch carry out SURVEILLANCE, arrest suspects, and testify at their trials. MI5 does not have arrest powers and, to keep its officers' identities secret, rarely allows them to testify at trial. As a police agency, the Special Branch also protects foreign dignitaries and, in cooperation with MI5, watches for would-be terrorists and assassins.

● ● SPECIAL COLLECTION SERVICE

Elite, highly secret U.S. ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE group that conducts eavesdropping operations in hostile countries.

Members of the group, which includes specialists from NSA, usually serve under diplomatic COVER, setting up highly sensitive electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy or theoretically safe buildings in the TARGET coun-

try. The service is controlled by the NSA, which provides the equipment and backup personnel. CIA experts are also often assigned to the service.

In a typical operation, a Special Collection Service team uses highly sensitive equipment to listen in on communications, including conversations, emanating from a specific TARGET, which could be a government office or a terrorist headquarters. The work is so sensitive that very little is known about the unit. Even the training site is highly classified. There is no public record of the unit's achievements, but it is highly regarded in the U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

● ● SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE

see SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

● ● SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

(SGA)

White House committee that ran a U.S. campaign to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

In Nov. 1961 President Kennedy approved a COVERT ACTION sabotage and subversion project with the CODE NAME MONGOOSE and created a cabinet-level committee, known as the Special Group (Augmented), to control the project.

Never before had a covert action project had such high-level control. The White House group included Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the President's brother; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the President's military adviser, who was chairman. Also in the SGA were JOHN A. MCCONE, newly named DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser; Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson; Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric; and Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SGA secretary was Tom Parrott, a CIA officer who occasionally fed what he knew back to that agency.

The operational director of Mongoose was Maj. Gen. EDWARD LANSDALE, an expert on insurgency, who reported to the SGA. Mongoose activities centered on Miami and were code-named Task Force W, under WILLIAM K. HARVEY, a CIA veteran.

The SGA was to meet 42 times from the time it was formed until Oct. 1962, when the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS abruptly ended Operation Mongoose. At an SGA meeting in Dean Rusk's office on Aug. 10, the Kennedy administration's most secret plan—the assassination of Castro—came up when McNamara raised the idea as a possibility, not knowing that such a plan was already in existence. He was admonished by Edward R. Murrow, the director of the U.S. Information Agency, who had been invited to the meeting. McCone later phoned McNamara and told him that such talk was not appropriate.

Information about this meeting—and about the SGA and Mongoose—emerged from the CHURCH COMMITTEE investigation into CIA abuses of power.

●● SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

(SI)

U.S. COMPARTMENTED intelligence, primarily dealing with SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

●● SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT

(SLU)

U.S. and British units established during World War II at major forward commands to provide special handling of ULTRA and, subsequently, MAGIC decrypts.

The SLUs were conceived by Group Capt. F. W. WINTERBOTHAM. He explained in *The Ultra Secret* (1974):

I pointed out that there would have to be very strict rules as to the number of people who could know the existence of this information and perhaps, on a more delicate footing, rules for those in receipt of the information, to ensure that they did not take any action which would either arouse enemy suspicions or confirm his fears that the Allied commander had any pre-knowledge of his plans. This one, I knew, was a hard one to put over to a commander-in-chief. in some circumstances it might be very tempting to make a quick but tell-tale coup.

The head of the individual SLU had authority from the highest U.S. and British military commanders to enforce this policy. The SLU officer was personally responsible for delivering an Ultra/Magic message to the senior commander or a specific individual on his staff designated to receive it. After the message was read it was taken back by the SLU officer and destroyed.

The SLUs communicated with BLETCHLEY PARK in England, with ARLINGTON HALL outside Washington, D.C., and with various NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE facilities using ONE-TIME PADS and the U.S. SIGABA and British TYPEX machines. These cipher transmissions were never "read" by the Germans or Japanese, with the possible exception of some minor Typex transmissions.

The SLUs were so efficient that Prime Minister Winston Churchill began using them for his own communications when maximum secrecy was useful, such as discussing personalities. Similarly, in Dec. 1944, when there were serious disagreements between Gen. of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower and Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, the SLU communications link was used to transmit Eisenhower's personal message to Churchill stating that Eisenhower was prepared to tell his boss, Gen. of the Army George C. Marshall, that it was either "him or Montgomery."

Winterbotham had responsibility for establishing and monitoring the SLUs through the Allied operational areas.

●● SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE

SOE

●● SPECIAL REPORTING FACILITY

(SRF)

Euphemism for CIA personnel reporting to Department of State activities; these are usually INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS operating under COVER at U.S. embassies.

●● SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER (SSO)

Individual in a U.S. government or commercial organization who manages the handling of documents and other materials of a SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM; he or she is also responsible for the SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY.

●● SPECIAL TASKS

Russian intelligence term for assassinations, kidnappings, murders, and sabotage operations. An NKVD group was organized specifically for carrying out special tasks about 1936 by NIKOLAY YEZHOV; similarly, on July 5, 1941, an NKVD Administration for Special Tasks was set up for espionage operations against Germany and its allies.

See PAVEL SUDOPLOTOV.

●● S.P.E.C.T.R.E.

The Special Executor for Counter-Intelligence, Terrorism, Revenge, and Extortion, a huge, multinational criminal organization found in several JAMES BOND spy novels and MOVIES.

Conceived by IAN FLEMING, S.P.E.C.T.R.E. originally stood for Special Executive for Terrorism, Revolution, and Espionage. It would be the COVER for Bond's villains—former SMERSH, GESTAPO, Mafia, and Black Tong of Peking AGENTS, and, later, members of the Baader-Meinhof gang. The organization first appeared in *Dr. No* (1958).

With headquarters in Paris, S.P.E.C.T.R.E. also had a sun-drenched island for training its operatives (actually at Pinewood Studios).

●● SPECULATORES

Intelligence collection officials established in the Roman legions at the time of Gaius Julius Caesar (100–44 B.C.). Each legion of 1,000 men was assigned ten speculatores.

The establishment of the speculatores was the first known instance of intelligence personnel appearing in a military staff organization. By the time of Caesar the art of war had progressed sufficiently for military commanders to be able to differentiate between the intelligence and operational functions.

●● SPETSNAZ

Abbreviation for Chasti Spetsial'nogo Naznacheniya, Soviet-Russian special forces that are similar to the U.S. Navy's SEALS and the Royal Marines' SPECIAL BOAT SQUADRON. Spetsnaz special warfare forces are controlled by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian General Staff; however, the Soviet KGB (and now its Russian successors) have responsibility for the planning and operations of those groups in peacetime.

The term Spetsnaz was used during World War II to designate NKVD-NKGB-GRU special units that operated

behind the German lines. Their activities included intelligence collection (including the capture of prisoners), attacks on German transportation and supply lines, assassination of collaborators, the spread of propaganda to local populations, and support for partisan units.

Spetsnaz forces conduct reconnaissance and special warfare missions in "peacetime" as well as in war. Peace-time operations, such as the assassination of Afghanistan's president in Dec. 1979, were under the direction of the KGB.

By the late 1980s several Spetsnaz brigades of approximately 1,000 men were assigned to each of the four groups of forces in Europe, as well as to several of the major military districts. A naval Spetsnaz brigade was assigned to each of the four Soviet fleets. The naval brigades had combat swimmers as well as parachutists. Their training included parachuting, scuba diving, demolition, sabotage, SURVEILLANCE, and TARGET selection, as well as languages.

According to GRU defector VIKTOR SUVOROV there were 20 Spetsnaz brigades plus 41 separate companies. Thus, total strength of Spetsnaz forces in the 1980s could have been on the order of 30,000 troops within the Soviet armed forces (which at the time had almost 5 million men and women in the five military services).

Spetsnaz troops are trained and equipped to carry out a number of sensitive missions, among them clandestine RECONNAISSANCE, sabotage or destruction of targets behind enemy lines, and assassination.

OO SPITFIRE

The outstanding British fighter aircraft of World War II, which was produced in several PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE (PR) variants. The Spitfire, or "Spit," was an effective, superb flying machine.

The aircraft's combat debut occurred on Oct. 16, 1939, when Spitfire fighters shot down two German bombers over the Firth of Forth; these were the first German aircraft to be shot down over Britain since 1918. The first photo-reconnaissance sortie was flown the following month, on Nov. 18, by a converted Spitfire I from a base in France over the German city of Aachen. Specialized Spitfire PR aircraft were subsequently widely flown in the war, being fitted with two oblique cameras in the wings. The Spitfire's speed made it an excellent unarmed photo aircraft with several PR variants being used for both low-level and high-level reconnaissance. The Fighter-Reconnaissance (FR) variants retained a gun armament.

The Spit was the most widely used Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter during World War II; small numbers were also flown by the U.S. Army Air Forces and U.S. Navy, as well as by several other nations. The Spitfire began as a private venture, and the prototype "eight-gun fighter," as it was known, flew on March 5, 1936. Production was approved in June 1936, and deliveries to RAF Fighter Command began in June 1938. Altogether, 20,351 Spitfires were built through Oct. 1947, including many hundreds of reconnaissance aircraft. The Spit was the only Allied fighter in production throughout the war; in addi-

tion, 2,408 similar naval Seafires were built for carrier operation.

Relatively few Spitfire reconnaissance aircraft were lost during the war; however, Israeli antiaircraft guns and fighters shot down four armed reconnaissance Spitfires within a few minutes in 1948 (some of the kills being made by Israeli "Spits"; see AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN).

The Spitfire was a particularly clean design, with a Rolls-Royce in-line engine and a small air intake under the fuselage. The elliptical wingtips and pointed tail fin were particularly distinctive. The aircraft went through a large number of improvements and modifications during the war.

The Spitfire was a single-seat aircraft. Maximum speed for the Spitfire I was 362 mph at altitude; combat range with 15 minutes in combat was 395 miles; maximum range was 575 miles. The later PR models had considerably more range than contemporary fighter models.

OO SPONSOR

Slang for an organization or intelligence service that finances, controls, or itself carries out an operation.

OO SPOOK

Used as a noun for a person or as an adjective to describe equipment, operations, or agencies involved in intelligence activity, usually intelligence collection.

OO SPOT

French commercial SATELLITE that provides intelligence-quality photographs. SPOT—for Système Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre—was first launched from Guinea aboard an Arianne rocket booster on Feb. 22, 1986. Orbiting some 515 miles above the earth, the SPOT 1 satellite weighed 4,000 pounds and carried two cameras.

Previously, the only photographic satellite images that were readily available to the public—and hence other countries—were from the U.S. Landsat program, whose satellites first orbited in 1972. But SPOT photos were superior and for sale at a nominal price. Further, for a price, the SPOT Image Corp. would direct the satellite to photograph specific TARGETS.

William E. Burrows wrote in *Deep Black* (1986):

SPOT's implications are profound because it blurs the distinction between civilian and military observation from space in direct proportion to the clarity of its imagery. The satellite's potential for intelligence officials have already begun tasking it for that purpose and will continue to do so until France's own military intelligence satellite, Helios, is launched. . . .

SPOT photography has been used by the news media and, beginning in the late 1980s, by the U.S. Department of Defense for use in the unclassified publication *Soviet*

Military Power, as Defense officials were reluctant to publish U.S. satellite images.

●● SPOTTER

see TALENT SPOTTER

●● SPY DUST

Harmless powder the KGB used in the 1980s in an effort to keep track of Western diplomats and MILITARY ATTACHÉS. Several chemicals, including nitrophenyl pentadien (NPPD) and luminol, were used against specific Westerners. When the use of spy dust was discovered, the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Arthur A. Hartman, told reporters in Moscow on Feb. 14, 1986, "We want to make clear to the Soviet authorities that active measures against Americans in Moscow are not acceptable." He added, "It's unacceptable to subject Americans to any outside substance."

The previous year U.S. officials discovered that the Soviets were placing NPPD on door handles and in cars to trace the movements of U.S. officials. The Soviet government rejected the charge. (No ill effects were detected from the substances.)

●● SPY SCHOOLS

All intelligence services operate schools to train their AGENTS and, sometimes, their internal staff and analysts. Formal spy schools—or at least extensive classroom sessions—appear to have been first established early in the 20th Century.

Dr. Armgaard Karl Graves, in *The Secrets of the German War Office* (1914), tells of his acceptance into the German Secret Service in 1903 and describes his five months of training before he was to be dispatched to Port Arthur in the Far East:

During those five months I was kept at a steady grind of schooling in certain things. Day after day, week after week, I was grounded in subjects that were essential to efficient Secret Service work.

Broadly, they could be divided into four classes—topography, trigonometry, naval construction and drawing. . . . A Secret Service agent sent out to investigate and report on the condition, situation, and armament of a fort like Verdun in France must be able to make correct estimates of distances, height, angles, conditions of the ground, etc. This can only be done by a man of the correct scientific training.

Beyond these formal classes in BERLIN, Graves visited the museum of the German General Staff and armament works and shipyards in Kiel and Wilhelmshafen. "There I was taught every detail of the mechanics of naval construction and I was not pronounced equipped until I could talk intelligently about every unassembled part of a gun, torpedo tube, or mine."

By World War II there were two major espionage schools operated by Germany's RSHA, one in The Hague

and one in Belgrade (see A-SCHULE). Several lesser spy schools were operated by the ABWEHR, German MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, and SD. There were at least a score of these, and they usually trained spies for specific missions in specific geographic areas. These were clustered in BERLIN, Hamburg, Königsberg, Stettin, Stuttgart, and VIENNA. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Germans set up nine schools in occupied Soviet territory—with a capacity of 10,000 spies and saboteurs. Most of the students were Soviet soldiers who had agreed to work against the Stalinist regime.

Describing one of the schools for training agents to operate against the West in *Hitler's Spies* (1978), DAVID KAHN wrote:

Agents studied Morse code, radio construction and repair, cipher systems, invisible ink, microdots, spotting and shaking shadows, and recognizing aircraft types. Instruction was nearly always individual. [Compared to large classes for agents going to the Russian Front.] So time-consuming and costly was this training that only about 200 young men attended the Hamburg school throughout the entire war.

The Russian intelligence-security services established specialized intelligence schools early in the Soviet era, both for agents being sent overseas and for internal security personnel. Former Soviet NKVD officer A. I. Romanov [p], in his memoirs *Nights Are the Longest There* (1972) wrote of attending a state security school in the Moscow suburb of Babushkin in 1942. There were, he recalled, four "special subjects" taught at the school; No. 1 being political affairs:

During the whole of my time at the NKVD school I don't recall a single occasion when the political affairs period lasted for more than ten or fifteen minutes. . . . what was the point of wasting time, which was short anyway, on long talks about success in the fields of the collective farms or the factories, or even about the splendour of Marxism-Leninism, when in all the special subject lessons we were taught hard facts about the essential nature of both the Soviet State and communism, about difficulties and mistakes and plans for the future, in any case without any dull, long-winded routine propaganda.

Subject No. 2 was the organization and activities of foreign intelligence services. This had two parts: first, Germany and its allies; second, the intelligence services of Britain and the United States. No. 3 was operational work—the TRADECRAFT of intelligence and espionage.

Romanov pointed out that at this school, during wartime, the instructors "left the school immediately the lesson was over. I am sure that they had other duties. Perhaps these other duties were their main job or perhaps they just went to other identical schools and taught the same lessons there. Sometimes they would simply miss a lesson and be replaced by another instructor."

The state security ORGANS—namely, NKVD, MVD, KGB, and their successors—have operated several spy

schools to train Soviet and Eastern European intelligence and security officers. The training facility at Pushkin, near Moscow, is known to have been used extensively to train Arab terrorists.

The Military-Diplomatic Academy in Moscow is the senior postgraduate institution for intelligence officers. Most of its graduates go to the GRU (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE) but some go to the other state security organs. Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY, a 1953 graduate of the school, reported that in the early 1960s the KGB took between 30 and 40 percent of the graduates of the Military-Diplomatic Academy.

Senior schools operated by the KGB during the Cold War were the Andropov Institute (Moscow), Mossoviet Higher Border Command School (Moscow), Dzerzhinsky Higher Border Command School (Alma-Ata), and Voroshilov Higher Border Military Political School (Bolitsino).

The MVD—responsible for internal police forces—operated a separate school system. In 1992 the MVD's Dzerzhinsky Higher Military Command School in Saratov became the Russian Academy of Security under the FSK (Federal Security Service).

The GRU has long operated a large education system. The principal school is the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but GRU officers also study at intelligence faculties at the General Staff Academy, Training Center of Illegals, Frunze Military Academy, Naval Academy, Military Signals Academy, Military Institute of Foreign Languages, Cherepovetski Higher Military Engineering School for Communications, Higher Naval School of Radio Electronics, SPETSNAZ Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Airborne School, Kiev Higher Military Command School, and Kharkov Higher Military Aviation and Engineering School. (Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in Dec. 1991, some of these schools were outside the new Russian Federation.) In addition, GRU agents are trained in various aspects of spy tradecraft at specialized schools.

The first major American spy school system was established by the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) in Britain to support operations in Europe during World War II. These were established in conjunction with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Like German and British wartime spy schools, they were generally short-term classes, tailored to specific missions in specific geographic areas. There was also a school in Canada on the north shore of Lake Ontario, secretly operated by BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION. Known as Camp X, it drew Canadian, British, and American agents to train for operations in Europe.

During the Cold War the major U.S. intelligence agencies operated formal school programs. The CIA trains its agents at CAMP PEARY, Va., and the FBI at the academy located at the sprawling Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Va. Both agencies use a variety of military schools for specialized training for their agents, including the Department of Defense-operated POLYGRAPH school at Fort McClellan, Ala. The FBI Academy, of course, emphasizes criminal law and other law enforcement studies, placing special stress on weapons training. (This aspect of

FBI training was reinvigorated after the Waco and Ruby Ridge incidents and because of the growing concern over the number of heavily armed private militias in the United States.)

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE long trained its intelligence personnel at FORT HALOBIRD in Baltimore, Md. (invariably called The Bird); that school has moved to Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The Army, Navy, and Air Force offer specialized intelligence curricula at their respective war colleges and postgraduate schools. The primary U.S. graduate-level intelligence institution is the Joint Military Intelligence College, located at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. (formerly the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE, renamed in May 1993). A highly specialized school for an NSA elite unit, the SPECIAL COLLECTION SERVICE, is so secret that even its location is classified.

All U.S. military services and intelligence agencies make use of the Defense Language School in Monterey, Calif., to train agents and ATTACHÉS in foreign languages.

● ● SPY SHOPS

Commercial stores that sell high-tech BUGGING and SURVEILLANCE equipment, marketed as "personal protection devices." Much of the equipment is the kind to which heretofore only major intelligence agencies had access. The largest store chains in this field include the Spy Factory, Inc. and Counter Spy Shops. The firms have stores throughout the Western world as well as in Moscow and in Sofia, Bulgaria.

A vast variety of microphones and cameras disguised as clocks, briefcases, and even food are for sale, as are devices to ascertain if one's office, home, or telephone is bugged. Also available are night-vision goggles, night cameras, invisible inks, and even a "truth phone" that can allegedly detect if a caller is lying.

The number of high-tech devices available has apparently reached illegal levels: On April 5, 1995, U.S. Customs Service officers raided more than 40 shops around the country seeking illegal bugging and wiretap devices. Subsequently, executives of the Spy Factory were indicted in federal court on charges of selling illegal wiretapping devices.

● ● SPY SWAPS

The exchanging of AGENTS and INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS who have been caught and imprisoned by an enemy country. During the Cold War many East-West swaps in BERLIN were arranged by WOLFGANG VOGEL.

Possibly the most famous swap was the exchange of U-2 spyplane pilot FRANCIS GARY POWERS for convicted Soviet spy RUDOLF ABEL in Berlin on Feb. 10, 1962. Another major swap was the exchange of British go-between GRENVILLE WYNNE and Soviet spy GORDON LONSDALE at another East-West crossing point near Spandau in West Berlin, on April 22, 1964. (Wynne was the go between for U.S. and British intelligence services and Soviet Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY.)

Sometimes "hostages" are exchanged for spies. For



Spies can be anywhere: A World War II poster. (IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM)

example, Briton Gerald Brooke, an idealistic young man involved with an anticommunist emigré organization, had volunteered to carry forbidden pamphlets into the Soviet Union. He was arrested for smuggling documents. But the Soviet government later announced that he would be tried for espionage and would likely face 15 years in prison. He had already served four years in a Soviet prison. He was neither a spy nor an employee of the British intelligence services.

In exchange for Brooke, the British released PETER KROGER and his wife Helen, highly effective spies who had worked in the United States as well as Britain. Brooke was flown from the Soviet Union to London (on a Soviet aircraft) on July 23, 1969. In the complex spy swap two other British citizens, who had been sentenced to lesser prison terms for alleged drug smuggling, were allowed to leave the Soviet Union, and three other British citizens—three men and a woman—were allowed to enter the Soviet Union, marry their sweethearts, and leave with them.

In return, on Oct. 24, 1968, the Krogers were flown to Warsaw, Poland. They had served almost eight years

in British prisons. They flew first class, the Polish Embassy having paid for their tickets.

Also see BENJAMIN CHURCH.

OO SR

Service de Renseignements, (Information Service), a branch of the French DEUXIÈME BUREAU (DB).

After France's defeat by Germany in 1870 the SR was established by the French Army to gather MILITARY INTELLIGENCE on German troops occupying Alsace-Lorraine. Like the DB, the SR suffered from the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, in which Capt. ALFRED DREYFUS was framed for espionage by French INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. In 1899, as a direct result of the scandal, the SR was abolished as a separate agency; its functions were divided between the military's DB and the SÛRETÉ GÉNÉRALE, a civilian police organization.

The section under the DB coordinated foreign intelligence, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, telephone tapping, and, through a division known as the central registry, gathered intelligence from sources outside the SR. In World War I a Service de Renseignements Aériens was created to handle the PRODUCT of aerial RECONNAISSANCE.

The SR, through AGENTS and sharp analysis, determined some aspects of the strategy that the German Army would use in its opening offensive in World War I. Modern historians, however, question claims that the agency had obtained the actual German war plan from a mysterious German general in 1904.

After World War I, the SR dealt primarily with counterintelligence, relying on telephone taps, agents, and analysis of OPEN SOURCE intelligence on foreign armies and arms industries. Under the DB, the SR eventually resumed an important role in the complex world of French intelligence.

In 1936 the SR regained its independence, although it was still theoretically controlled by the DB. Its responsibilities included both counterintelligence and the gathering of intelligence, with Germany being the prime TARGET. The SR also had sections that gathered and analyzed foreign weapon and aviation development. SR listening posts intercepted radio communications from Germany, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe.

The SR-DB intelligence apparatus was generally credited with producing a credible stream of intelligence about Germany. But as its officers later bitterly complained, France's military and political leadership failed to make use of the intelligence.

When Germany overran France in May 1940, the SR continued to exist in unoccupied France—that part of the country that was governed by the pro-Nazi Vichy regime. Tainted by its service in Vichy, the SR was viewed with suspicion by Gen. Charles de Gaulle and his followers. As head of the Free French movement in Britain, de Gaulle formed his own intelligence agency, the BCRA, the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Central Bureau for Information and Action).

After the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in Nov. 1942, de Gaulle forced the BCRA and the SR to



Spies can be anywhere: A World War II poster. (IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM)

merge, with the SR becoming the technical division of a new agency, the DGSS.


OO SR-71 BLACKBIRD

Strategic RECONNAISSANCE aircraft developed as the successor to the U-2 spyplane, the SR-71 remains the world's fastest and highest-flying operational aircraft.

A Mach 3 photo-electronic aircraft, the SR-71 was a development of the A-12 OXCART developed by the Lockheed SKUNK WORKS as the successor to that firm's U-2 spyplane. Whereas the U-2 had been designed for high altitude and had a relatively slow speed (Mach 0.7), the SR-71 was fast, flying at some 2,000 mph (Mach 3) at altitudes of 85,000 feet and produced a smaller radar "sig-

nature" that was less vulnerable to interception. Its cameras were able to sweep more than 100,000 square miles of the earth each hour.

Fabricated of titanium, the SR-71 has an unconventional design with a long, tapering fuselage of very small cross-section blending into a delta wing with rounded wingtips. The forward part of the fuselage is flattened and has sharp chines along each side. A turbojet engine nacelle is blended into the middle of each wing and each nacelle supports a low tail fin, canted slightly inward. Skin temperatures on the fuselage rise considerably during high-altitude, high-speed flight and the fuselage stretches 11 inches. The immense amount of fuel needed for high-speed flight fills most of the fuselage and acts as a heat sink. (Although the plane is unarmed, there were



SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft. (U.S. AIR FORCE)

proposals to fit a pod under it for carrying a nuclear weapon.) The aircraft can be refueled in flight. It is flown by a crew of two.

The initial contract with Lockheed called for four aircraft. Three were completed as YF-12A fighter prototypes (see A-12 OXCART). The fourth became the first SR-

71, which flew for the first time on Dec. 22, 1964. The plane was to have been designated RS-71 but President Johnson inadvertently transposed the letters during his announcement of the plane's existence. (RS would have indicated Reconnaissance-Strike, a logical follow-on to the RS-70 VALKYRIE.)

The SR-71 variant became operational in Jan. 1966 with the U.S. Air Force's 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. In addition to flying from U.S. bases, SR-71s regularly operated from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and Mildenhall Royal Air Base in Britain.

They flew many missions over China; an SR-71 photographed China's first H-bomb explosion in 1967. The SR-71's were first used over North Vietnam in 1968. The aircraft subsequently flew reconnaissance missions over Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf area. In Sept. 1974 an SR-71 flew from New York to London in 1 hour, 54 minutes at an average speed of 1,894 mph (Mach 2.8). In July 1976, an SR-71 set the absolute world speed record of 2,193 mph (Mach 3.31) over a straight course; in addition, a closed-circuit record was set at 2,092 mph (Mach 3.17).

The "final" SR-71 flight was on March 6, 1990. The SR-71 was to be retired in a cost-cutting action, while its predecessor, the U-2, continued to fly strategic reconnaissance missions.

In 1995, however, Congress provided funds to reactivate two SR-71 aircraft to provide a limited Mach 3 reconnaissance capability.

Although the actual numbers built are still classified, probably 28 aircraft were produced. Just under 20 aircraft were in the inventory in 1990 when the SR-71 was retired, of which only eight or nine were operational at any one time because of the aircraft's high maintenance requirements. (The Pentagon had announced the loss of eight SR-71s in accidents through 1970. Unlike the U-2s, none was lost to hostile fire.)

Since the SR-71 tooling was destroyed after the production run, no more could be built. According to designer CLARENCE (KELLY) JOHNSON, then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara specifically ordered the destruction so that SR-71 variants would not compete for funding with the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle and other combat aircraft.

OO SRF

SPECIAL REPORTING FACILITY

OO SS

Adolf Hitler's elite personal guard, which became a political police and intelligence force that symbolized Nazi terrorism and slaughter. The Schutzstaffel (Protection Detachment), abbreviated as SS, was created in the early 1920s as a small unit to serve as a bodyguard for Nazi leaders. The SS, with only 280 members, was a tiny but well-disciplined unit under the 60,000-strong SA or "brown shirts," the thuggish Nazi paramilitary organization.

The SS began to grow in 1929 when Hitler appointed HEINRICH HIMMLER as Reichsführer SS. Himmler, an ambitious and fanatic disciple of Hitler, saw a major role for the SS as a mystic brotherhood to enforce and perpetuate Nazi ideology. Known as the "black shirts," with the skull-and-crossbones insignia on their black tunics, the force attracted a more elite-minded German than the street-fighting SA.

By 1930 Himmler had recruited an SS force of more

than 3,000 men, each a paragon of Nazi standards for racial purity, for SS men were expected to show an Aryan ancestry going back to the 18th Century. Candidates' pedigrees were examined by the Race and Settlement Office, headed by Richard-Walther Darré, a pig breeder who was the author of the "blood and soil" theory that claimed European civilization was the work of racially pure Germans. The office also investigated the prospective brides of SS members.

The SS motto was "Believe! Obey! Fight!" The SS men, who fancied themselves modern Teutonic knights, usually fought by slaughtering unarmed foes. Soon after the invasion of Poland in Sept. 1939, SS units launched their first reign of terror in a conquered land—what the SS called the "housekeeping of Jews, intelligentsia, clergy, and the nobility."

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the SS was given the task of annihilating the Soviet Jews and "Bolshevik agitators." To do this, the SS set up action groups (Einsatzgruppen) to follow the German Army's advances into the Soviet Union. Einsatzkommando detachments rounded up civilians, mostly Jews, and shot them down in massive slaughters. More than two million Jews were murdered by these SS units, according to war crimes testimony.

Separate from the Einsatzkommandos, the SS also formed an elite combat force, the Waffen SS. In 1934, Hitler had assured the nation's military leaders that they were to be the "sole bearer of arms" in Germany's external affairs. However, the "heavy" SS police units were soon wearing Army uniforms except on ceremonial occasions, had a military organization, and were provided with heavy weapons.

When the war began there were some 20,000 SS in military units. Hitler's need for elite combat forces led to the rapid growth of the Waffen SS; by the end of 1944 the Waffen SS had some 600,000 troops, with seven Panzer (armored) divisions and numerous lesser units; SS commanders directed several corps and armies. The SS units were larger and more heavily armed than conventional Army units. The Waffen SS was both a producer and consumer of TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE.

These units fought on virtually every European battlefield. Although their activities were far removed from the police and internal suppression of other SS forces, the Waffen SS was considered by the Allies to be equally guilty of criminal behavior.

In Germany and the conquered lands, the vast network of concentration and death camps was guarded and—with the Gestapo—operated by the SS. Thus, the SS was directly responsible for the privation, torture, and deaths of millions of Europeans—Jews and Christians, Germans and foreigners.

The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal that tried German war criminals after the war declared the SS and GESTAPO organizations guilty of war crimes. The tribunal declared that, except for some clerical and low-level members, every individual member of the SS was a war criminal guilty of planning and carrying out crimes against humanity.

Also see SD.

OO SSO

SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER

OO S&T

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

OO STAR

see ATOMIC SPY RING

OO STASHINSKY, BOGDAN

(b. 1931)

KGB assassin who was trained to use poison dust on his victims.

A Ukrainian, Stashinsky had been working for Soviet intelligence ORGANS since the age of 19 when, in 1957, he was given the assignment of murdering Lev Rebet, a Ukrainian nationalist leader living in West Germany.

Stashinsky was to use a special pistol loaded with a capsule of prussic acid and fire the pistol into Rebet's face. The capsule would be crushed and the acid expelled. Inhaling the prussic acid would poison the victim and trigger a fatal heart attack. Stashinsky was provided with an antidote that he was to take immediately before attacking Rebet.

On Oct. 12, 1957, he ambushed and killed Rebet.

Next Stashinsky was assigned to murder Stefan Bandera, another exiled Ukrainian leader. This time he was provided with a double-barreled pistol, to spray the poisoned acid in the face of Bandera's bodyguard as well as the principal target.

Stashinsky lost his nerve. He reported to his superiors that circumstances prevented him from carrying out the assignment. He was told to try again and did so on Oct. 15, 1959. (No bodyguard was with Bandera.)

In Dec. 1959, Stashinsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his successes. And he was given a new assignment: to kill Raoslav Stetskow, who had been Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Republic in 1941 and was also living in West Germany.

About this time Stashinsky married an East German woman, who was horrified to find out her new husband's profession. Feeling remorse, guilt, and fear, he and his wife defected to U.S. officials in BERLIN on Aug. 12, 1961. Stashinsky was placed on trial and confessed his "successes"; he was sentenced to eight years in prison but was secretly released at the end of 1966 and taken to the United States.

OO STASI

see MFS

OO STATION X

see BLETCHLEY PARK

OO STEPASHIN, LT. GEN. SERGEY VADIMOVICH

(b. 1952)

Senior Russian INTELLIGENCE OFFICER of the post-Soviet era.

A 1973 graduate of the Higher Political School of the Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) in Leningrad, Stepashin also studied for a doctorate in history at the Military-Political Academy. His thesis was "Party Direction of Fire Fighting Formations."

He served in the MVD troops and taught at the Leningrad Ministry of Internal Affairs Institute. In 1990 he became deputy chief of the Political Department at the Higher Political School, combining his political duties with lecturing at the school.

From 1990 to 1993 he was an elected deputy of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, representing the left-of-center cooperation faction of the Army Reform Group. From 1991 to 1993, the period in which the Soviet Union was dismembered, he was chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Defense and Security Committee. He also headed a state commission investigating activities of the KGB and state security apparatus. During this tumultuous period, in Aug. 1991, he quit the Communist Party.

Following the review of KGB activities, in 1991 the FSK, Federal Counterintelligence Service, was established and Stepashin was appointed deputy general director of the new agency. That same year the Russian Security Ministry (MB) was created, and Stepashin additionally became a deputy minister.

In Sept. 1991 he was promoted from colonel to the rank of major general and a year later to lieutenant general.

For nine months he combined his duties at the MB with his work in the Supreme Soviet. In Sept. 1992 he attempted to resign from the Supreme Soviet, but that body voted to request that President Boris Yeltsin relieve him of his duties in the security services instead so that he could carry out his duties in the Supreme Soviet. (The MB was abolished in 1993.)

In March 1994 President Yeltsin appointed Stepashin to the Russian Federation's Security Council and named him head of the FSK.

OO STEPHENSON, SIR WILLIAM

(b. 1896 d. 1989)

Director of BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION (BSC) in the United States during World War II—the British spymaster in the United States.

Canadian-born, Stephenson served in the Royal Canadian Engineers in World War I. After being gassed on the Western Front in 1915 he was invalidated out to England. Following his recovery he transferred to the Royal Flying Corps and as a fighter pilot was credited with shooting down 26 German aircraft before he was himself shot down and taken prisoner. He escaped and returned to British lines, providing detailed observations on what he had seen in Germany.

After the war Stephenson became a boxer, earning the world amateur lightweight champion title. He then became involved in commercial radio development and other interests, among them aviation. In 1934 he won the King's Cup air race in an aircraft that he had designed and built in one of his factories. During the 1930s he also