

THE SPYCRAFT MANUAL


**THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
ESPIONAGE TECHNIQUES**

**FOREWORD BY
RICHARD TOMLINSON**

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SPY SCHOOL INSTRUCTOR**



THE SPYCRAFT MANUAL



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AUTHOR'S NOTE

For the purpose of this book I have made several assumptions. Spies, handlers and field agents are all people who are trained and employed by an Intelligence Agency. Agents are those people who have been recruited to work for the spies, handlers or field agents. When referring to spies, handlers, field agents or agents, I do so only in the masculine sense – however, he or him should be read as both masculine and feminine.

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


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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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FOREWORD by Richard Tomlinson

To be a professional in any occupation, one must acquire the skills and tools of the trade and in this respect the modern spy is no different. The skills taught to a would-be spy are known as 'tradecraft'. It is a set of rules, or standard operating procedure. These are diverse, and include agent contact, surveillance, sabotage and a multiplicity of other subjects.

In the past, these skills would enable the spy to covertly gather intelligence, but today he finds himself little more than a frontline soldier. Equipped with these tradecraft skills and modern technology, the spy enters the underworld of espionage and counter-terrorism. Here he must operate in a hostile environment, among people of different cultures, faiths and beliefs. It is a world most of us never see, never hear of, but it exists in a layer of society controlled by the most powerful people in government.

A new enemy is at our doors – terrorism. Recruitment for the intelligence services has never been so intense, or so needed. Every year, brave men and women volunteer to be spies, learn their tradecraft skills, and when ready they are sent on operations. Their deeds may be great, but they go unheralded, and failure often results in torture and a slow, painful death.

RICHARD TOMLINSON

“Therefore, I say:
Know your enemy and know yourself;
in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated.
When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself,
your chances of winning or losing are equal.
If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself,
you are sure to be defeated in every battle.”

— *Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c.500 b.c.*

INTRODUCTION

Many years ago, my work as an SAS soldier took me to Northern Ireland. For the most part, my duties there consisted of undercover work and covert operation. With little guidance or support from Security Services, we would identify and infiltrate people we believed to be involved in terrorist activities. Our techniques were honed through constant operations, which demanded skills such as lock-picking, foot and vehicle surveillance and photography to name but a few.

On the odd occasion we came across something really worthwhile, the Security Services in London would inevitably raise a lazy eye. My first contact with an MI5 agent did not create the best of impressions; he was unfit, overweight and, in terms of technical expertise, our own people were light years ahead. Things have changed since those days and today the SAS plays a large part in the day-to-day operation of the Security Services – for the most part doing the "dirty work".

After leaving the SAS, I pursued a career in counter-terrorism, a subject that has now become a goal for most of the western intelligence agencies. So I decided to gather, collate and describe many of the techniques used by the world's leading intelligence agencies and call it *The Spycraft Manual*.

I shall no doubt find myself in hot water for some of the material contained in this book. I am not worried, as I can prove that the all of it is in the public domain and available to anybody.

The basic principle behind this manual is to demonstrate where the Intelligence world stands today by describing the techniques and tradecraft skills used by most of the world's leading intelligence agencies. There is a limit to what I can write about, not for reasons of security, but based purely on the sheer magnitude of the subject. As a result, I have opted for a middle-of-the-road explanation that covers the main reasons for why we have spies and what a spy must learn in order to both survive and to be a good spy.

Some subjects, such as surveillance, are easy to categorise. Others, however, are individual and are more difficult to place within a structured framework. To combat this, I have included several topics as "pop-up" subjects that appear where I feel they are relevant. There are also several

"case histories" that explain the reality of spying.

The Spycraft Manual is a book that talks about how spies learn their tradecraft and skills and how they employ them in the field. Each individual subject contains masses of fascinating information, and it covers subjects from the seven basic drills of agent contact to satellite surveillance and lock-picking, making it an utterly unique and fascinating peek into the very real present-day world of espionage.

Finally, for better or worse, intelligence agencies will always be with us, and they will always possess the means to delve deep into our innermost secrets. Let us hope that the sanctity of freedom, for which so many secret agents have died, rests consciously on the minds of those who currently control and direct covert operations.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

For the most part, the people who carry out daily surveillance operations – such as the police or private detectives – are governed by the basic laws of the country. While this should be true of intelligence services, few countries act within the framework of either national or international law. Even when they have been exposed, many will do all everything their power to annul the situation. To this end I place no emphasis on the law and how it might affect various intelligence agencies around the world.

However, the reader of this book should note that some activities discussed herein are carried out by professional agents and spies and are not legal in any country and they should never be attempted by civilians or other non-spies.

CHAPTER 1

They are the unseen warriors that walk the streets, always under the threat of danger. Since 9/11 their job has become even more precarious, and methods of discovering the enemy more complex.

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Intelligence agencies have existed in one form or another for centuries; their role was always to spy on each other. Much of that stopped in the early 1990s due to the disintegration of communism. By 2001, following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, a new enemy had been found: "Global Terrorism". In the world of terrorism, knowledge is everything; without it there is very little chance of success.

Although knowledge can be obtained from a number of sources, the primary method is through spying and surveillance. The United States and the rest of the world were looking for the perpetrators of this fiendish crime. They could only be found through collecting and analysing good intelligence.

Collecting intelligence involves human resource agencies (such as the CIA or MI5) and agencies who rely on 00JARIC. In addition, embassies normally have an operating system from which they can establish information on a particular country. There is also the military. Finally, there is open information, obtained largely through the world's media. In some cases, this can be a far quicker means of obtaining information than via government agencies. In addition to the media, there is normally a head of department, an official who follows the direction of their government. For example, the prime minister may pose the following question to his head of security: "Do we know who is responsible for last night's car bomb attack?"

The answer to this question is derived from information that has been gathered, interpreted and analysed into intelligence. The intelligence is then distributed to those who decide what course of action is required.

Where do we start looking for information? First, we look at those who have the capability and intent. Capability: "I know how to make a bomb from just about anything in the kitchen, but I have no intention of doing so, because it is dangerous and illegal." (I have the capability but not the intent.) Intent: "I don't know how to make a bomb but as soon as I am able to I will kill my neighbour." (I do not have the ability but I have the intention to commit harm.) Intelligence agencies are there to gather information about people who have both the capability and the intention.

One of the principal threats currently facing the world is that of bioterrorism. To defend against such a threat and the vast devastation any

biological attack could cause, governments are constantly on the lookout for terrorist organizations who have the capability to manufacture and deliver such weapons. Current biological threats come from the possible manufacture of anthrax, cholera and smallpox by terrorist organizations.

Who collects the information will depend largely on the enemy target and where that enemy is located. In most cases, several agencies will co-operate to achieve the same goal. Almost everyone is traceable. Individuals within the group use credit cards, mobile phones, vehicles, shipping, or may just be spotted walking down the street. Wherever they go, they can be tracked. Even terrorists living in remote areas can be found by the use of spy planes or satellite surveillance.

CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency was a late developer in terms of international espionage. Its predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was not formed until 1942. It officially became known as the CIA in 1947 after the National Security Act was passed and was charged with gathering, correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence affecting national security. Reporting to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, most of its operational ability and efficiency can be held accountable by the State. At times, this leads to public accusations and criticism of its activities, especially in the case of the Iran-Contra affair and Watergate. Although CIA involvement in both cases was not proved, suspicion still remains as to its responsibility. However, its role in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961) and in the Iraq missing weapons of mass destruction debacle, have proved damaging.

The headquarters of the CIA can be found on 258 acres of highly secured land at Langley, Virginia. Costing more than \$46 million to build, its tight cluster of buildings houses the specialists that make up the 20,000 employees based there. Approximately another 20,000 employees are based in various US offices and American diplomatic centres around the world. This number also includes those field staff on active field operations. Staff numbers have fluctuated vastly over the organization's history; following the end of the Cold War, staff numbers were reduced dramatically. However, with the new threat of Al Quaeda and the fall-out from the misleading intelligence which led to the second Gulf War, one would expect that the CIA will increase its recruitment of both field and support personnel.

The CIA today is divided into four specialist sections, or "directorates", all of which are concerned with the gathering and analysis of intelligence. In general, the CIA's sources are either manpower or hardware intensive and both require huge amounts of funding.

The Directorate of Operations is responsible for gathering foreign intelligence by covert means and classical espionage. At least a quarter of the estimated 8,000 overseas staff include case officers responsible for running several thousand agents in other countries. The Directorate of Intelligence is concerned with the production of finished intelligence, whether in the form of quick-reaction briefings or long-term studies. The focus is worldwide, but the directorate is split into regional departments (African and Latin American; south and east Asian; European; near eastern; Slavic and Eurasian) as well as four offices that specialize in different types of analysis: resources, trade and technology; scientific and weapons research; leadership analysis and imagery analysis.

The Directorate of Science and Technology provides a supporting role in terms of collecting and processing intelligence collected by covert technical means. This includes signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery, satellite data and open source. The directorate is based at a site at Reston in Virginia and also includes the National Photographic Interpretation Center. It is estimated that there are about 26,000 staff employed here, including engineers, physicists, linguists, chemists, computer programmers and imagery analysts.

The final division is the Directorate of Administration. As its name implies, it provides administrative and technical support backup to the other facilities. It is also responsible for training field staff in espionage basics such as lock picking, letter opening, etc. It is reported that about 1,000 personnel are employed within this directorate.

Since 9/11, the role of the CIA has become even more important in gathering intelligence to pre-empt any threat from militant Islamic terrorists such as Al Quaeda. Much criticism has already been levelled at the organization over whether or not warnings of a terrorist attack using aircraft were picked up and disseminated to the appropriate quarters of government. In addition, the CIA has recently been heavily lambasted over the weapons of mass destruction intelligence fiasco in Iraq. The Director of the CIA at the time, George Tenet, has recently resigned – reportedly for reasons unconnected with Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the new director will restructure the organization or whether he will recruit more field staff to answer the growing threat of international terrorism.

MI5/MI6



▲ Despite numerous intelligence indicators, the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America went ahead unchecked.

Although military intelligence in England can be traced back to Elizabethan times, a dedicated service was not established until 1909, when MI5 and MI6 were created as internal departments under the control of the Secret Service Bureau. Military Intelligence Department 5, under the control of Captain Vernon Kell, was then responsible for exposing German spies. MI6, under the command of Captain Mansfield Cumming, was in charge of

gathering foreign intelligence. The responsibilities of MI5 grew in 1931 when it was charged with assessing all threats to national security and was given the title of the Security Service, although its previous name has remained in popular usage.

During the Second World War, MI6, now known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) recruited and trained members of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a force that became crucial to wartime intelligence gathering and sabotage behind enemy lines. At the end of the war, many of these operatives were reabsorbed into SIS.

Previously under the command of the military, both services later became divorced from the armed services. MI5 became the responsibility of the Home Secretary and MI6 reported to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Both were issued with directives that defined their roles.

MI5 today is still responsible for national security and counter-espionage activities, but it does not have the power to arrest suspects. This job falls to Scotland Yard's Special Branch, which is also responsible for the presentation of evidence at court on MI5's behalf. MI6's principal role is to provide intelligence gathered from foreign sources in support of national security, defence and foreign and economic policies.

Although traditionally rivals, both services have had to work together closely, especially when events exposed weaknesses in their operations. Scandals, such as the defection of British agents spying for the Russians (Burgess, MacLean and Philby) and the Profumo affair (1963) in which the Secretary for War of the time was caught sharing a high-class call girl with a Russian agent, created massive embarrassment for the services. Also, incidents such as the hijacking of the Iranian embassy in London in 1980 and the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in 1984, not to mention the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, have meant that the two services have had to work together closely and share information in order to diffuse foreign threats on home ground.

Major changes took place in both services following the end of the Cold War. Staff numbers were reduced, as were budgets, as it was deemed that the threat from the Soviet Union was no longer so great. Arab terrorism still posed a danger, but the greatest danger came from Northern Ireland, whose terrorists had started to take their campaign onto the mainland. It is thought that many city-centre bombings, on the scale of the Manchester bombing in 1996, were averted as a result of gaining good intelligence.

After the Good Friday Agreement (1998), it seemed that yet another threat

had been removed, but it was soon replaced by another, potentially far greater, danger. Al Qaeda had always been a terrorist organization worth watching but, following the atrocities of 9/11, they suddenly became national security threat number one. Al Qaeda were not the only ones in the spotlight. Interest was also renewed in Iraq and its dictator, Saddam Hussein, following speculation that he possessed weapons of mass destruction. Both the security services in Britain and in the US claimed to have evidence to back up the accusation and it was on the strength of this evidence that the two countries and their allies went to war. In fact, as was published in the Butler Report in July 2004, it was clear that much of the so-called "intelligence" disclosed to the public was inaccurate. A lack of agents on the ground, second-hand intelligence and the claims of a few defectors who wished to see the overthrow of the regime, had all contributed to misleading claims about what Saddam actually possessed. Somehow, somewhere, between the intelligence agencies, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Whitehall, suppositions became definites and hearsay became evidence. Although the Butler Report cleared anyone of purposely misleading Parliament and the public, it remains an embarrassing episode for the intelligence services, their bosses and perhaps, above all, Tony Blair.

Currently, the staffing level at MI5, based at Millbank in central London, is around 1,900. MI6, recently relocated to its new headquarters at Albert Embankment, is far more secretive about its employment figures, but one



The British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a Civil Service department that reports to the Foreign Secretary. The department works closely with the intelligence organizations MI5 and MI6 and its objective is to protect the interests of the nation and keep government information systems safe. It does this through division into two parts: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) and Information Assurance.

GCHQ is responsible for solving codes and ciphers and many of the people working there are experts in cryptology, mathematics, languages, computing and related disciplines.

could safely assume that similar numbers to MI5 are involved, excluding those operatives in the field about whom nothing is known. The threat from terrorism remains real enough and if anything can be learned from the Butler Report it is that more spies are required and more intelligence about Al Quaeda and its allies needs to be gathered. This will probably lead to an escalation in recruitment for both MI5 and MI6.

KGB

KGB stands for Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or The Committee for State Security. The most feared security service in the world was created after the Russian Revolution in 1917. Lenin took command of the old Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, and reorganized and renamed it the CHEKA (Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Espionage). The organization would be renamed many times. From 1922–23 it was the GPU (State Political Administration) and from 1923–34 it became the OGPU (United States Political Administration). From there it changed to the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and then the MD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and it only became known as the KGB in 1954.

Throughout its evolution, the organization developed a dreaded reputation, especially among its own people. During Stalin's reign, murderous thugs, who were only too happy to carry out Stalin's often paranoid and bloody missions, headed the organization. For example, during the collectivisation of land, the organization was responsible for the displacement and murder of millions of Russians.

The more familiar, modern-day form of the KGB only came about after Stalin's death in 1953. It became the most important part of the Soviet Union's intelligence service. As well as its own operations, it also oversaw the work of the GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army), the military intelligence wing. It was still extremely powerful; it was allocated a huge budget and possessed a staff that numbered in estimates from 500,000 to 700,000. Agents were not only involved in foreign espionage but also in domestic spying, with members secreted in every town and factory. Anyone considered to have views that ran counter to the Party line was considered a traitor, was informed upon and was inevitably dealt with by the KGB's SMERSH Division. This was a division within the secret service responsible for meting out punishments and assassinations to those considered to be an internal security threat.

During the Cold War, KGB agents targeted the western powers, especially top officials and military commanders with access to national secrets. Their favourite method involved the entrapment of an individual, usually through sexual temptations and blackmail. Another popular method was to employ listening devices in various foreign embassies. In 1975, the KGB managed to secrete a sophisticated listening device into the American Embassy in Moscow. However, in order to activate it, it had to be bombarded by radioactive waves fired through the embassy windows. It was later reported that the Ambassador, Walter Stoessel, had to be sent home because of radiation poisoning.

The KGB's headquarters could be found at the infamous Lubyanka Square in downtown Moscow. The huge, intimidating building was once feared, but in later years it has been opened up to public inspection, thanks to the intervention of successive presidents from Yuri Andropov (1982–84) (once a KGB chief) onwards.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the KGB has been on a rocky road. In 1991, certain sections of the KGB Spetsnatz forces attempted to storm the Russian parliament building and force a coup against president Mikhail Gorbachev and other senior politicians. However, once there, some of the forces refused to take part and so the coup failed. The ringleaders were arrested and, in October 1991, Gorbachev signed a decree abolishing the KGB. Since then, most of its directorates have continued through separate organizations. However, it is interesting to note that the current president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, is also a former chief of the KGB. Today, Russia's security forces are more concerned with the fight against global and internal terrorism, especially that issuing from Chechnya and other former Soviet states.

MOSSAD

Mossad, the shortened form of its full Israeli name – ha Mossad le-Modin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim (The Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks) – is Israel's powerful and secretive intelligence agency. It was formed by Israel's prime minister, David Ben Gurion, in 1951, with the primary directive: "For our state, which since its creation has been under siege by its enemies, intelligence constitutes the first line of self-defence ... We must learn well how to recognize what is going on around us." The name Mossad was appropriate for an institution responsible for the defence of

Israel as it was also the name of an organization that, during the 1930s and 40s, helped to smuggle thousands of Jewish refugees into Palestine.

Mossad is responsible for gathering intelligence, secret operations connected with national security and counter-terrorism. Because of the conflicts Israel has had with its neighbours, much of its focus is on the Arab nations and, in particular, the activities of terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the PLO. However, it also conducts espionage and intelligence activities throughout the world and is still involved with the undercover movement of Jewish refugees from hostile countries, such as Ethiopia, Iran and Syria. It currently provides the West with information on the movement of known Arab terrorists and has excellent relations with corresponding western intelligence agencies, in particular with the CIA.

The headquarters of Mossad are in Tel Aviv. Details about employee numbers are hard to obtain, but it is estimated that between 1,200 and 1,500 work there. The "Institute" is headed by a director – currently Meir Dagan – who is only responsible to the prime minister. In line with its importance to the State of Israel, Mossad has a huge budget and, in contrast to other foreign intelligence agencies, also has the power to deal with countries with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. Its inner organization, although obscure, has at least eight known departments.

The largest of these is the Collections Department, which is responsible for espionage operations. It possesses offices in other countries – both acknowledged and unacknowledged – which are in charge of directing and recruiting agents. The Political Action and Liaison Department is in charge of communications with the foreign intelligence services of other countries as well as countries with which Israel does not normally engage. It is also responsible for political activities. The Special Operations Division is perhaps the one most often thought of when Mossad is mentioned. It is responsible for extremely covert actions such as assassination, sabotage and paramilitary activities. Also known by its other name, Metsada, one of its duties is to track down individuals who have harmed Jewish people in any country. One of its most publicized operations was the location and kidnapping of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, Argentina. They managed to smuggle him back to Israel where he was put on trial, found guilty and hanged. Also linked to this department is Mossad's special army unit known as the "Sayaret Matkal", or General Staff Reconnaissance Unit. This secretive force, known colloquially as "The Guys", numbers about 200 men and is responsible for many of the covert actions that take place.

The Research Department handles the analysis of intelligence, providing daily, weekly and monthly reports. It is organized into 15 geographical desks: the US; Canada and western Europe; the former Soviet Union; Africa; Latin America; China; the Mahgreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia); Saudi Arabia; Syria; Jordan; Iran; the United Arab Emirates; Iraq and Libya. There is also a "nuclear desk" concerned with weapons of mass destruction. The Technology Department researches and develops technologies that might be useful to Mossad and the LAP (Lohamah Psichologit) Department handles all propaganda and psychological warfare operations.

It is worth mentioning that many of Israel's top politicians and leaders began their working lives within the ranks of Mossad: Yitzhak Shamir, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Rabin had all been, at one time or another, part of the Mossad organization.


THE SPY

The dictionary describes a spy as (i) a person employed by a state or institution to obtain secret information from rival countries, organizations or companies; or (ii) a person who keeps watch on others.

However, this simple explanation does not come close to explaining the real complexities that make up the modern spy. Today's spy is far removed from the James Bond image we see on our cinema screens. Gone are the classical military and political intelligence agents that fight against enemy or rival states. The dinner jacket has been replaced by a bullet-proof vest worn underneath shabby clothes. If there is any comparison between fiction and reality, it is in the world of Q, for today's spy is equipped with state-of-the-art electronic wizardry.

Intelligence in the field of counter-terrorism is a different and, in many aspects, a more arduous and dangerous task. The lives of many agents are in continual danger. The rules of the game are cruel, as moral and ethical considerations are simply negated by the bullet. There is no honour between rivals on the streets of Kabul or Baghdad and only the quick survive. A modern spy must blend in, live among the enemy, speak their language and befriend and exploit the enemy at every opportunity. They are required to be streetwise, rough, tough and deadly.

All spies receive some form of basic military training. This involves learning how to fire a variety of weapons, self-defence and resistance to interrogation should they get caught. After the basic training, some spies are trained in the



▲ CIA operators in Afghanistan being briefed in the field.

arts of surveillance, others become technical officers, but by far the most dangerous job is that of the field officer. One vital role for this type of spy is to recruit local agents, people he can use to his advantage, people who will happily kill for him. Finding such people is the key to success in any intelligence operation. First and foremost he must identify the right person, someone who is in a position or has the skills to carry out his dirty work. Once he has established such a person he must go about recruiting them, discovering their weakness and exploiting it. In many instances, a field agent will be responsible for recruiting and running several agents at the same time, none of whom will know of the others' existence.

In the West, spies are trained and controlled by massive organizations such as the CIA or MI5. These provide the spy with technical support and, when required, hard back-up with a call on the full weight of military

WHAT MAKES A GOOD SPY?

One of the first skills a spy must have is good observation. No matter where he is or what he is doing, his mind should be systematically recording places, events and people, with great recall accuracy. The military have a lesson on this subject. They place a number of objects in an area some metres away from trainees. They are given a short period of time in which to observe all the objects before they are taken away. They are not allowed to write them down for several hours.

The spy will learn to remember objects in a room he has entered for the first time or car number plates. He will register the number of windows in a house he has just passed. The trick is to keep as much information in his brain for as long as possible and perfect the skill with constant practice.

The spy uses logic to understand things. How did they do that? How can

intervention. For the most part, however, spying is a lonely, shadowy game, fraught with danger. For this reason, the modern spy must learn all the basics of tradecraft. For example, in the United Kingdom, spies go through a procedure known as the Intelligence Officers' New Entry Course (INOEC). This course take place in various parts of the country, including the Fort at MI6's training establishment in Portsmouth and the SAS base at Credenhill, Hereford.

I do this? What if I go in totally the opposite direction, not just physically but mentally? Is there another way to solve this situation? He tries lateral thinking.

He adjusts his attitude to the situation and thinks before he reacts. What do people expect of him? What is his role model? It is no good pretending to be a bum if he is dressed like a prince. The weak have always been taken advantage of – if the situation allows, he takes control himself. He takes an interest in people, this takes the focus off himself. Most people are only too happy to boast about their social position, wealth, family or occupation, so he takes advantage of this. "That sounds interesting, it must be a wonderful job," will open up a conversation that could deliver lots of useful information. He plays on people's emotions: "I have just broken up with my girlfriend, she went off with another woman." His comment will get him both sympathy and inquisition into his ex-girlfriend's sexual habits. Another good opener in recruiting a possible agent is: "I have just won the lottery – not all of it, but a good sum."

The spy listens to his sixth sense and analyses any gut feelings he may get. There are many basic instructions in the human brain that warn us of danger – he learns to recognize them and take appropriate action. He may walk down a street and spot the same person he saw only an hour ago in a different part of the city – is this just a coincidence?

He only ever takes calculated risks and is never a gambler. With a calculated risk he can spot the drawbacks and adjust his plans accordingly. He analyses his actions and bases his actions on solid information. If he takes a gamble, he only needs to fail once. Here is how a spy thinks:

- ▶ A spy is always aggressive in a dangerous situation, because he can guarantee that the enemy will be. He'll let them know he is not to be messed with.
- ▶ He knows his own strengths and weaknesses.
- ▶ He knows his own territory and its inhabitants.
- ▶ It is better to be known than to be a stranger to the area and its inhabitants. The spy has a cover story to protect him.
- ▶ He knows when to get out and always has an escape route planned.
- ▶ When the situation goes pear-shaped and he gets caught – he never gives up.

THE COVER STORY

The one thing that must stand up in the world of spying is the spy's cover story. They must be who they say they are and, when working in a foreign country, be able to prove their identity. By far the best way of obtaining a cover story is to make it as near to the truth as possible; details such as his age and place of origin, his education, and his likes and dislikes, for example. By doing so, he does not fall into a trap when an enemy Intelligence Agency starts an in-depth background check into your life.

Many spies enter a foreign country as part of the embassy staff or as part of a diplomatic mission. In some countries, the role of the Defence Attaché is little short of a spymaster. His position will not allow him to partake in direct actions, but he will act more as an umbrella for a network of spies and agents working on behalf of his country. Spies are recruited by a government from time to time simply because they have the right qualification. They could, for example, be a businessman who has just won an order into a foreign country. This grants him an automatic cover story and a legitimate reason for travelling. However, both of the above examples are restricted, firstly by protocol and secondly by a lack of espionage training. The real answer is to train a potential spy in the arts of tradecraft and provide him with a believable cover story.

COVER STORY EXAMPLE

An English spy was sent to work in the border country of South Armagh in Northern Ireland. His accent was English, as was his manner, but he managed to operate and collect information from the local farmers for six months. How did he manage it?

He adopted the role of a salesman selling impactors for an American company that had an overseas office in Belfast. The impactor, which fitted to the back of most standard farm tractors, was designed to break up old concrete. It was a solid cover story; he even arranged for a demonstration of the impactor at a local agricultural show, all of which added credence to his entry into a known terrorist area. His explanation was simple; the company had afforded him six months in which to establish the impactor, after which his job would be in jeopardy. For their part, the American company were keen to have someone try to sell their implement, although everyone knew it was far too expensive.

The spy did his homework, first by obtaining good road maps and aerial photographs of the area. Secondly, he researched how and where the IRA

had been active and also did the same for the local British army. By doing this he could establish a route into the area he wished to visit without being stopped either by the IRA or by the British army. The latter would not pose a major problem but, in the eyes of the locals, it was best to stay clear of any association. He made all of his visits during daylight hours so that he could avoid being stopped by an IRA roadblock.

Although his movements around the area looked casual and random, they were meticulously planned. He managed to visit most of the farms and smallholdings in the area, taking in a local pub at lunchtime. At first, his reception by the locals was mixed. Some accepted him immediately while others eyed him with suspicion. The most common question that arose was "What are you doing here? You know this is a dangerous area?" This was a perfect question because it allowed the spy to open up the conversation with regards to the IRA. "That's all newspaper stuff. I have not seen any of the problems." At this point the local farmer would fall into a conversation recalling all the deeds of the local IRA. If the conversation went on for more than five minutes the spy would casually ask the farmer if he would like a drink. "I have a bottle in the car." Few refused.

Within two months he had built up a list of friendly farmers and restricted his lunchtime drinking to one particular public house. Having assessed all the people he had met, the spy set about homing in on several, the first being the daughter of the publican. She was a girl of about 24 years old, good looking and full-bodied. Since her father had died when she was very young, she helped her mother run the bar. Friday and Saturday nights saw her receiving a lot of attention from the local young men who attended the pub from both sides of the border. Because of this she had not ventured far from home and had seen little of the world. As far as she was concerned, the spy, who was some 35 years old, had appeared in the pub like a breath of fresh air. While the spy had noticed the attention whenever he entered the pub, he played on it in a friendly, but low key, way.

One lunchtime, the spy discovered early in the conversation, that her mother was away for several days. The spy turned on the charm and the girl fell for it. Closing time was 3 pm, but the girl indicated that he could stay if he wanted – he did. In the four hours until the bar opened for the evening, the spy made love to the girl three times – she was hooked. At 7 pm the bar opened; the spy had one pint and left. As he drove back to his safe house in Armagh city, he recalled all the names the girl had mentioned.

The liaison endured secretly for three months. Each time they were alone, the spy would ask his seemingly casual questions, all of which had been carefully rehearsed, with the miniature microphone faithfully recording every word the girl said. The information she gave was predominantly about the young men she had known since they became of drinking age. They had used the pub and had tried to impress her with their stories of heroism by pretending to be members of the IRA. For the most part this was just bravado, but she knew that one or two of them spoke the truth. "Be careful of him when he comes in," she would tell the spy. "He's a real nasty piece of work."

One day the spy simply never came back and after a time he was forgotten. He had managed to infiltrate a dangerous area by using a substantial and plausible cover story. The spy had taken time to get to know the area and the inhabitants before asking any questions. With the use of alcohol he had gained information from the farmers, with charm he had gleaned valuable information from the pub owner's daughter. By never exposing himself at night, he had managed to avoid running into direct confrontation with an IRA roadblock.


RECRUITING

Spies work for the intelligence services of their respective countries. They see themselves as either case officers or field officers, both of which are commonly referred to as "handlers". They rarely go into a foreign country and do the dirty work themselves. When a spy is operating in a foreign country, the best way to gather information is to recruit local agents. The basic plan is to get these agents to steal anything for you while never disclosing the spy's true identity. Once an agent is recruited properly, the spy can use them for just about anything: soliciting vital information, sabotage, deception, covert operations, assassination and sex. While this might sound a little outlandish, you must keep in mind that the recruitment machinery of most intelligence agencies is built on lies, deception and, above all, using people.

Most recruited agents are classified as either "primary" or "access". A primary agent will have direct access to what it is the spy requires, while an access agent is a go-between. When the operation is in the planning stages, a certain amount of money will be allocated to the handler to recruit agents and, in order to recruit several agents, the spy will need extra funding. The money may come from the intelligence agency budget or be

self-generating from the operation, i.e. the sale of weapons or drugs. Money can buy most things – friendship, favours, sex and drugs – although the latter may well be directly supplied by the intelligence agency. However, the best tool a handler can have is the ability to tell totally believable lies.

POTENTIAL AGENTS



Recruiting the right agent is very important. This engineer will have intimate knowledge of the project.

The first task of the handler is to spot his intended agent. That means finding people who have access to the information he requires. He may initially select several people and then narrow down his list accordingly. He will look for the lonely secretary or the disgruntled. The potential target may be a computer programmer or a code-breaker, but it would be better to recruit an analyst, as they have access to more information. Soft potential targets include:

- ▶ People with a careless security attitude or a grudge.
- ▶ Defectors who have fled their own country.
- ▶ Detainees or prisoners who will work for a reduced sentence.

- ▶ Foreign agents who have been caught and "turned". These are known as "double agents".
- ▶ People who can be threatened or blackmailed.
- ▶ Those who might be tempted by financial reward.

Once the handler has spotted someone in a position that best serves his interests, he must find a way to make them co-operate. First he must decide how he is going to make the initial contact. When doing so he must be careful to put some form of security and safety measures in place before approaching the new agent.

Having chosen his prospective agent, the handler must then evaluate him, test him and finally train him to do the required job.

The evaluation process is used to determine an agent's reliability and his capability to produce the required information. This process starts off with the initial contact between the handler and the agent. The handler will get to know the agent and will be trying to discover any weaknesses that will help. By this time the handler will have perfected his cover story and will be in full flow as to why he is in the country, where he lives and what work he does. He will also act a little superior, as if his job is extremely important. As the relationship becomes more refined, and after a degree of trust has been established, the handler will start providing little favours to the agent. If the handler has done his homework, he will know roughly how much the potential agent earns, from which he can deduce both his living conditions and his lifestyle needs. These rewards will then be increased, but always in a safe and logical way so that the agent does not become suspicious. When the moment comes to ask the agent to risk obtaining information for the handler, the handler will not depend solely on monetary rewards; a second and third option, such as blackmail, will be in place. At this stage in the recruitment process, the agent suddenly becomes aware of the trap he has fallen into; he has betrayed his country, his employer, his friends and his family. This is where the handler's cover story can come in useful, as it will allow him to add some lies to ease the agent's conscience. If the prospective agent categorically refuses to co-operate and indicates that he will go to the authorities, the handler must consider killing the agent.

Once the handler has hooked the agent, he will start the testing phase, effectively checking that the agent is capable of delivering the required information. If this proves successful, then the agent's training will begin.