rushed to BERLIN for analysis by German intelligence. Major Martin's death was mentioned in the next British casualty list and a month later published in *The Times* to further support the ruse. (It had previously been announced that several British officers had died when their aircraft was lost at sea en route to Gibraltar.)

When Major Martin's body and possessions were finally turned over to British officials and the briefcase examined, it was found that the papers had been read and carefully refolded and resealed—obviously by the Germans. The British Chiefs of Staff wired to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, then in the United States: "Mincemeat Swallowed Whole." Churchill's Chief of Staff, Gen. Hastings L. Ismay, later wrote: "The operation succeeded beyond our wildest dreams. To have spread-eagled the German defensive effort right across Europe, even to the extent of sending German vessels away from Sicily itself, was a remarkable achievement."

Major Martin—whose real identity is not publicly known—was laid to rest in the graveyard at Huelva.

The main instigator of the operation was EWEN MONTAGU, a lawyer who served in British naval intelligence during the war and afterwards became the Judge Advocate of the Fleet. He received the Military Order of the British Empire for conceiving Operation Mincemeat. Montagu's book about the operation, *The Man Who Never Was* (1953), was later made into a movie.

○○ Ming

CODE WORD used by British Special Operations Executive (SOE) for Germans and Germany.

○○ Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

MGB; see NKVD

○○ Ministry of State Security

see MSS

○○ Mintkenbaugh, Sgt. James A.

U.S. Army sergeant recruited by another soldier-spy, Sgt. ROBERT LEE JOHNSON, to spy for the KGB in West Germany in the 1950s. Mintkenbaugh was a HOMOSEXUAL "and this fact," says a government report on the case, "interested the KGB handlers since the homosexual frequently is shunned by society and made to feel like a social outcast. Such a personality may seek to retaliate against a society that has placed him in this unenviable position."

The KGB assigned Mintkenbaugh to spot other American homosexuals and sent him to Moscow for training. There he was ordered to marry a Soviet woman recruited by the KGB and travel to Canada to get birth certificates of Canadians who had died soon after birth or in childhood. Mintkenbaugh was also told to go to work as a real estate salesman in Washington so that he could get personal information on military people and government employees looking for homes.

The elaborate KGB scheme ended before Mintkenbaugh could get started. In 1965 Johnson gave himself up and implicated Mintkenbaugh. Both men were tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison for 25 years.

○○ Mir

Soviet manned orbiting laboratory, employed for scientific research as well as military activities, including RECONNAISSANCE. The Mir was placed in orbit on Feb. 19, 1986, succeeding the SALYUT series, the world's first space stations. On March 15 a spacecraft successfully docked with Mir to transfer two cosmonauts, who occupied the space station for 125 days.

The basic Mir—Russian for Peace—is essentially a control and living complex with actual experiments and other activities taking place in specially outfitted modules that connect to the Mir.

The U.S. Department of Defense report *The Soviet Space Challenge* (1987), predicted "Mir will be used to conduct military experiments. Many of these experiments will use visual observations, cameras, radars, spectrometers, and multi-spectral electro-optical sensors—devices that could support, among other things, ASAT [Antisatellite] and ballistic missile defense system development."

Compared with the Salyut 7, the last of the Salyut series space stations placed in orbit in 1982, the Mir had six docking ports for spacecraft compared to two in the earlier craft, enhanced solar energy and power systems, greater computer capability, and individual "cabins" for crew members. The Mir's solar panels provide nearly ten kilowatts of power for housekeeping and research projects.

Mir is regularly supplied by spacecraft with Mir's crews being rotated on a regular basis, although the station was breifly left empty after a three-man crew returned to earth in April 1989. Soviet officials cited a technical problem with new modules that were being prepared to mate with the space station as the reason for the delay.

The Russians carried aloft a Japanese journalist and, subsequently, French astronauts to spend time aboard the Mir. U.S. astronaut Norman E. Thagard, also launched in a Russian spacecraft, spent 115 days aboard the Mir in 1995. He was the first American to fly in a Russian spacecraft and established the record for an American in space.

In Nov. 1995 the U.S. space shuttle *Atlantis* docked with the Mir for three days to install a special docking port to Mir and for brief crew visits. On March 28, 1996, the Atlantis again docked with the Mir and U.S. astronaut Shannon W. Lucid transferred to the space station for a five-month stay on the Russian craft, the first such orbital transfer. (When the *Atlantis* returned to earth on March 31 it marked the first time a U.S. shuttle flight had landed with fewer crewmen aboard than when launched.)

Mir crews established several records for time-in-space; on Dec. 27, 1991, cosmonaut Yuri Romanenko returned to earth after 326 days in space.

The basic Mir space station weighed just over 22 tons and was placed in orbit 208 to 222½ miles above the earth. Subsequently, additional modules and enlarged docking ports have been added to the basic Mir. For example, the permanent docking port installed by the *Atlantis* in Nov. 1995 weighed 4½ tons. (During that *Atlantis* docking the U.S. spacecraft also transferred 991 pounds of fresh water and 1,038 pounds of hardware and food to the Mir, and took aboard 817 pounds of equipment to return to earth.)

○○ Mira, Sgt. Francisco DeA.

A noncommissioned officer in the U.S. Air Force, Francisco DeA. Mira was assigned to the 601st Tactical Control Group in West Germany when he became the TARGET of a security investigation in 1983. He admitted to passing films of classified documents to a terrorist group, which in turn passed them to the Soviets. He was convicted by a court-martial and under a plea bargain received a seven-year prison term and dishonorable discharge.

○○ Mitchell, Bernon F. (b. 1929)

Cryptologist for the NSA who, with WILLIAM MARTIN, defected to the Soviet Union in 1960.

After high school Mitchell attended the California Institute of Technology for a year and a half. A C+ student, he enlisted in the Navy and after cryptologic training was assigned to the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP radio intercept station in Kamiseya, Japan. There he met and befriended Martin. When his Navy enlistment ended in 1954, Mitchell enrolled at Stanford University to complete his college degree in mathematics. He maintained his friendship with Martin, and both began working at the NSA on July 8, 1957. Mitchell was hired despite having confessed during his interviews and POLYGRAPH tests that he had conducted sexual experiments with chickens and dogs when he was between the ages of 13 and 19.

Soon disillusioned by the NSA's activities, he and Martin flew to Cuba and met with Soviet diplomats in Dec. 1959. Subsequently, they took leave together in June 1960, first going to Mexico City, and the next day to Cuba, where they boarded a Soviet cargo ship. (See Martin entry for details of their defection and news conference after arrival in Moscow.)

Following their defection it was revealed that Martin and Mitchell were HOMOSEXUAL lovers.

By 1979 Mitchell had become disillusioned with the Soviet Union. He asked a U.S. State Department official if he could return to the United States as an immigrant or even as a tourist. His requests were rejected.

○○ MKULTRA

Highly secret CIA research project into the possible use of LSD and other mind-altering drugs to produce the perfect AGENT—someone whose brain was under the control of a CASE OFFICER.

MKULTRA spanned the tenure of ALLEN W. DULLES as the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) (1953–1961). It was proposed in April 1953 by RICHARD MCG. HELMS, a future DCI working in the CIA's clandestine service (then called the Directorate of Operations). He told Dulles that the CIA needed "to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials" and "the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations." If this could be accomplished, he said, the CIA would gain "a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are."

Trying to explain later why the CIA would enter into such strange science, Helms said that a CASE OFFICER or "clandestine operator" is trained to believe that "you can't count on the honesty of your agent to do exactly what you want, or to report accurately unless you own him body and soul." The soul, or at least the will, was the target of many MKULTRA experiments. One involving LSD resulted in a bizarre death.

The modern idea of mind-altering drugs can be traced to 1949, when the communist Hungarian government put Josef Cardinal Mindszenty on trial for treason. The cardinal, his eyes glazed, confessed in court. The CIA sent officers to Europe to discover what had been done to make the cardinal apparently controllable by his accusers. If the Soviets were manipulating people's minds, then the CIA wanted to know how it was done. The CIA was also interested in "truth serum" and in drugs that might induce amnesia.

The agency's Technical Services Staff (TSS), which produced TRADECRAFT gadgets such as miniature cameras and electronic BUGS, had a chemical division that studied poisons and disabling drugs. In the early 1950s Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, director of the chemical division, suggested that the agency study the use of a powerful new hallucinogenic drug, LSD (*l*ysergic acid *d*iethylamide). After Dulles approved the Helms proposal, it was given the CODE NAME MKULTRA (the MK indicating it was a TSS project and the ULTRA being a randomly chosen cryptonym that had nothing to with the wartime ULTRA).

Although other drugs would be studied, the emphasis would be on LSD, an incredibly potent drug that was, by weight, a million times stronger than hashish. The studies, funded through CUTOUTS ostensibly unconnected with the CIA, were done by such prestigious organizations as Columbia University and Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York, a National Institute of Mental Health research center, and the University of Illinois Medical School. One group of experimental subjects at the federal drug hospital in Lexington, Ky., was kept on LSD for 77 straight days.

Gottlieb's most notorious experiment began at a lodge in western Maryland, where he was meeting in Nov. 1953 with scientists from the U.S. Army's chemical and biological warfare facility at Fort Detrick, near Frederick, Md. Under a separate program, code-named

MKNAOMI, Detrick developed poisons and countermeasures to KGB poisons. (See GEORGI MARKOV.) Among the chemicals developed at Detrick was the lethal shellfish toxin that FRANCIS GARY POWERS would later carry on his ill-fated U-2 spyplane mission over the Soviet Union in 1960.

One of the Detrick scientists was Dr. Frank Olson. While he and several others were sitting around the lodge on Nov. 19, 1953, Gottlieb spiked their drinks with LSD. Olson became agitated, moody, depressed, and was diagnosed as needing psychiatric attention. Gottlieb sent him, in the company of two colleagues, to a New York City psychiatrist. They then returned to Maryland, but when Olson's condition worsened, they returned to New York and checked into a tenth-floor room in the Statler Hotel. Early on the morning of Nov. 27, Olson hurled himself through the window, plunging to his death. A forensic pathologist who reviewed Olson's death in 1994 said it was unlikely he committed suicide.

Other experiments were carried out in SAFE HOUSES in New York City and San Francisco between 1953 and 1966. Prostitutes, lured to the safe houses, were served spiked cocktails while CIA officers photographed and recorded their reactions. Besides LSD, MKULTRA scientists tested psychedelic mushrooms, mescaline, amphetamines, and marijuana. Illegal drugs were obtained through cooperation from the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics.

Information about MKULTRA was tightly guarded. As a CIA audit of the program said, "Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles."

MKULTRA was partially revealed by the Rockefeller Commission, which had been appointed by President Ford to investigate alleged CIA abuses. Helms had ordered the destruction of documents about the project. But JAMES SCHLESINGER, who succeeded Helms as DCI, had directed aides to produce a list of illegal or questionable CIA activities, and some MKULTRA material had been included (see FAMILY JEWELS). When DCI WILLIAM E. COLBY turned the material over to the commission, it discovered the Olson case but did not name him. Not until the publication of the commission report in June 1975 did Olson's widow, recognizing the circumstances of the anonymous victim's fate, discover what had happened to her husband. (Congress later passed a bill paying $750,000 in compensation to the Olson family.)

When the CHURCH COMMITTEE examined what could be learned about MKULTRA, it concluded:

> From its beginning in the early 1950s until its termination in 1963, the program of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored.

The next act of disclosure came in 1979, when JOHN MARKS wrote *In the Search for the "Manchurian Candidate,"* using the title of a 1962 film (based on a novel of the same name by Richard Condon) that popularized the idea of "brainwashing." (The Manchurian candidate was an American prisoner of war who had been programmed in a Manchurian prison camp to kill a presidential candidate years later. See MOVIES.) Many American prisoners taken during the Korean War tried to explain why they had made propaganda statements by saying they had been brainwashed by their Korean and Chinese captors. The idea that mind control was a possibility inspired the MKULTRA experiments.

Marks based his book on 16,000 pages of documents discovered in 1977 by members of the Carter administration while examining old, secret budget expenditures of the CIA. Marks, working through the new Freedom of Information Act, obtained the documents and used them as the basis for the book, augmented by interviews with people familiar with the project.

○○ MLAD

see THEODORE A. HALL

○○ MOBY DICK

CODE NAME for one of the first strategic SURVEILLANCE projects of the U.S. Navy and CIA, using camera-carrying, unmanned BALLOONS launched from Western Europe to drift over the Soviet Union and take photographs.

Also see GENETRIX.

○○ MODIN, YURI IVANOVICH (b. 1922)

Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who served as HANDLER for the members of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING.

Born in a small town in rural Russia, he was the son of a soldier who had fought on the Bolshevik side during the Russian Civil War (1917–1920). His father's assignments took young Yuri to many parts of the Soviet Union. In 1940 he entered a naval college in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) to study engineering. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, he took up arms to fight the advancing Germans until the school and students were moved to the interior in 1942.

That year he became involved with Soviet intelligence—the NKVD—when a chef at the school stole some butter and was arrested and shot by the NKVD. Modin, who had testified in the case against the chef, was subsequently recruited into the NKVD, being sent first to Moscow to further his English-language studies, and in Dec. 1943 being assigned as a translator at NKVD headquarters at the LUBYANKA. From March 1944 until 1947 he translated the flow of documents and other intelligence sent to Moscow by the Cambridge spies, without knowing their identities.

Then, in late June 1947, Modin was sent to London, accompanied by his wife and young daughter. He was to

be the assistant intelligence RESIDENT, working with Soviet AGENTS in Britain. (Modin had briefly visited London after World War II with a Soviet youth delegation.) Under the COVER of a press officer, he met regularly with ANTHONY BLUNT, GUY BURGESS, and JOHN CAIRNCROSS as well as other AGENTS, all without detection by British COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. In 1951 he helped Burgess and DONALD MACLEAN escape to the Soviet Union.

Modin was reassigned to Moscow in May 1953, but was sent back to London a year later to help solve the problems of another Cambridge spy, HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, and again in 1955 to help set up the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Britain. Modin remained in Britain until 1958 carrying out intelligence work.

But further visits became impossible when Blunt, undergoing lengthy interrogations by British counterintelligence (MI5), identified Modin as his handler. He continued his intelligence work for the KGB, including several visits to India. His final assignment was lecturing at the Andropov Institute in Moscow, a KGB SPY SCHOOL.

In Moscow he befriended the Cambridge spies who had sought sanctuary there and helped Philby write his autobiographic *My Silent War* (1968). Modin's own memoirs were published in 1994 under the title *My Five Cambridge Friends*. Modin concludes his book with an appraisal of the Cambridge spies:

> They weren't simply Communists or fellow-travellers; they saw themselves as true revolutionaries, ready to sacrifice other people as well as themselves for the cause. Nor can they be faulted on account of their trust in [Josef] Stalin: the same error was made by an entire generation of honest men and women all over the world.
>
> In hindsight, it is clear that they were naïve—but in the 1930s, that was the way it was.
>
> When I think of them now, I see them as Don Quixote figures who spent their lives tilting at windmills, while history was inexorably destroying their ideal. Scorning the other illusions of humanity—power, wealth, love, ambition, serenity and glory—they chose to follow the greatest illusion of all, which is politics. They swore an oath of loyalty to the revolution. They did not break faith.

●● Mogarrebi, Maj. Gen. Ahmed

Senior Iranian officer executed by firing squad on Dec. 25, 1977, after being convicted by a military court of spying for the Soviet Union. Mogarrebi, age 57 at the time, admitted to having spied for nine years, passing information to the Soviets about Iran's purchases of aircraft and other military equipment from the United States.

●● Mogul

An early Cold War proposal to detect Soviet nuclear test explosions by sending BALLOONS from Western Europe over the Soviet Union carrying seismic detectors.

●● MOL

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY

●● Mole

A high-level AGENT who is hidden within an enemy's government or military organization in the expectation that he or she will provide extremely valuable information. The most important Soviet moles were the members of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING, who penetrated the British government, and ALDRICH H. AMES, in the U.S. CIA.

Probably the West's most important mole in the Soviet government was Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY. However, the Russian moles that ALDRICH H. AMES revealed included at least one general in MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (GRU).

●● Molody, Col. Conon Trofimovich

see GORDON LONSDALE

●● Monarchist Association of Central Russia

see THE TRUST

●● Mongoose

Secret operation, ordered by President Kennedy, to get rid of Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Mongoose was born of the frustration and humiliation that followed the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961 (see CUBA).

"We were hysterical about Castro," Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara later said. RAY CLINE, the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the CIA at the time, recalled that President Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, believed "they had been booby-trapped at the Bay of Pigs, and it became a constant preoccupation, almost an obsession, to right the record somehow." Robert Kennedy said that to oust Castro "no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared."

No peacetime COVERT ACTION has ever had such high-level control. Instead of allowing the CIA to handle Mongoose, the agency was given only part of the operation. Control was from the White House, under the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) (SGA). Chaired by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Kennedy's military adviser, the SGA included McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, JOHN MCCONE, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SGA would meet 42 times between Jan. and Oct. 1962.

Brig. Gen. EDWARD LANSDALE, a Kennedy favorite because of his tough-talking knowledge of guerrilla warfare, was chief of operations for Mongoose. In Feb. 1962 Lansdale conceived a six-part operational plan to "help

the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace." Lansdale's plan called for starting a revolution in Cuba in July 1962, beginning guerrilla actions in Aug.–Sept. 1962, and touching off "open revolt and overthrow" in Oct. 1962, while simultaneously establishing a new government.

Lansdale envisioned sabotage and economic warfare against Cuba. And he asked for an extraordinary commitment—open use of U.S. military forces. The SGA, approving Lansdale's plan, conceded that "final success" would "require decisive U.S. intervention"—a major shortfall in the Bay of Pigs disaster.

In July, seeing his timetable slipping and sensing that SGA was cooling on Mongoose, Lansdale suggested alternative actions that ranged from simply treating Cuba as a Soviet Bloc country to staging a "provocation" and overthrowing Castro "by U.S. military force." While the SGA pondered the next act in Mongoose, reports began coming in about a sudden increase in Soviet shipping to Cuba. This was the prelude to the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

On Aug. 1 the CIA produced a NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE on Cuba reporting that Cuba's armed services were strong enough to quell an insurrection and repel any invasion "short of direct U.S. military intervention in strength." The estimate did not respond to the sharp increase in Soviet ship traffic. A supplementary report on Aug. 22 said Cuban forces were being considerably strengthened. The CIA reports dampened SGA interest in Mongoose.

Simultaneously the CIA was planning the assassination of Castro (see CUBA), but this was not part of Mongoose. On Aug. 10, during an SGA meeting, McNamara, unaware of the CIA assassination planning, suggested that the SGA might want to consider simply killing Castro. McCone protested, as did Edward R. Murrow, the director of the U.S. Information Agency. Such talk did not belong in the White House, they said. But two days after that meeting Lansdale requested that WILLIAM HARVEY, the CIA officer running the agency's part of Mongoose, submit anti-Castro plans, "including liquidation of leaders."

Operation Mongoose was known to the Soviets by July 1962, according to Soviet Gen. Anatoli I. Gribvov, who oversaw operation ANADYR, the shipment of Soviet missiles to Cuba. "We had known about it and about other activities that made the likelihood of an invasion seem very real to Khrushchev and others in 1962," Gribvov wrote in *Operation ANADYR* (1994), which he authored with U.S. Army Gen. William Y. Smith, who served on Taylor's staff at the White House during Mongoose and the missile crisis. Smith, looking back at Mongoose, wrote that the SGA "never allowed consideration of the use of U.S. military force to proceed beyond the planning stage." Several times, he wrote, the SGA "backed away from making a firm commitment to use military force in Cuba."

On Aug. 23 President Kennedy, going back to Lansdale's July report, called for a review of his recommendations, with an emphasis on one that called for exerting "all possible diplomatic economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military." Kennedy also called for moves that would "deliberately seek to provoke a full-scale revolt against Castro that might require U.S. intervention to succeed."

American interests in Cuba were now on two tracks: Mongoose; and the growing crisis over stepped-up Soviet military aid to Castro. Robert Kennedy focused on Mongoose, berating McCone and the CIA "with lack of action in the sabotage field." The CIA share of Mongoose, known as Task Force W, was 600 CASE OFFICERS, and 3,000 contract AGENTS, the CIA's largest single clandestine program. Harvey, a legendary, cantankerous CIA officer, was running Task Force W out of Miami. He did manage to get agent teams into Cuba and to commit some acts of sabotage—"We want boom-and-bang on the island," Lansdale said—but Harvey's agents reported that the possibility of a general rising was slim. Robert Kennedy himself went to Miami to see why Mongoose was moving so slowly. He and Harvey had words, which did not do much for Harvey's subsequent career.

In early Oct. 1962, Mongoose and the Cuban missile crisis planning collided in the White House. As the missile crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war, Robert Kennedy told McCone to stop all covert operations in Cuba. McCone passed the order to Harvey, who, correctly, saw a difference between operations and agents. Believing that TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE might be needed, he sent in an agent team on Oct. 21, the day before President Kennedy announced a sea blockade around Cuba. When Kennedy learned that Harvey had not stopped operations, Harvey was removed as head of Task Force W.

On Oct. 16, in the midst of the missile crisis, Robert Kennedy asked RICHARD HELMS, the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (clandestine activities), what percentage of Cubans "would fight for the regime" if the U.S. invaded Cuba. At that point, with high-level planners contemplating a possible military end to the crisis, Mongoose died.

○○ Montagu, Capt. Ewen Edward Samuel

(b. 1901 d. 1985)

British judge, writer, and INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. Montagu served as a machine gun instructor at a U.S. naval air station in World War I. He attended Trinity College, Cambridge, and Harvard University, being called to the bar in 1924.

During World War II, Montagu served in the NAVAL INTELLIGENCE Division of the Admiralty, where he conceived Operation MINCEMEAT, one of the major hoaxes played on German intelligence during the war. From 1945 to 1973 he held the position of Judge Advocate of the Fleet.

He wrote *The Man Who Never Was* (1953) (about Operation Mincemeat), *The Archer-Shee Case* (1974), and *Beyond Top Secret* (1977).

○○ Moore, Edwin G., II

Disgruntled former CIA officer who tried to sell information to the Soviets.

On the night of Dec. 21, 1976, Moore threw several documents over the fence at an apartment building housing Soviet embassy families in Washington, D.C. A Soviet security guard, thinking the package was a bomb, called the U.S. Executive Protection Service, thus becoming the first known Soviet ever to assist in the arrest of a would-be American spy. U.S. Army explosives experts discovered that the package contained not a bomb but several CIA documents accompanied by an offer of "penetration into the headquarters operations of the CIA." A note asked for $200,000, to be left at a drop site in the Washington suburb of Bethesda, Md.

The FBI followed the directions in the note, left a dummy package at the site, and hid agents nearby. A man across the street from the drop, raking the leaves on his own lawn, furtively looked around, put down his rake, and picked up the package. He was Moore.

Moore had not revealed anything to the Soviets, but his arrest was to reveal more about the lax security practices at the CIA. Moore had been employed from 1952 to 1963, primarily in map making and logistics studies. He had been fired from the CIA after having been arrested for arson. Acquitted on that charge, he appealed for reinstatement and was rehired in 1967.

Moore retired in 1973 because of a medical disability caused by a heart ailment. "His career," said a later CIA report, "had been marked by marginal work performance, chronic work frustrations, and a general reputation of being miscast in an intelligence agency." In his home FBI agents found classified CIA directories listing names, addresses, and phone numbers of CIA employees. Among the hundreds of documents was material dated *after 1973,* indicating that he had had contact with people at the CIA after his retirement.

Moore was convicted on two counts of espionage and three counts of unlawful possession of classified documents. Sentenced to 15 years in prison in May 1977, he was paroled in 1979.

○○ Moore, Michael R.

A U.S. Marine, absent without leave, who was planning to contact the Soviet Embassy in Manila in 1984 when his intentions were somehow discovered by U.S. intelligence officials. Confronted with the information, he was given a convenience-of-the-government discharge.

○○ Moravec, Brig. Gen. Frantisek

(b. 1895 d. 1966)

Leading Czech intelligence officer. In World War I he fought on several Allied fronts as a member of the Czech "foreign legion." After the war he remained in the Army, entering the intelligence field in 1934 when, as a lieutenant colonel, he was assigned to the General Staff as head of espionage and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. These were important to the Czech republic because of the threat from Germany and the 3.5 million Germans living in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland.

In 1936 Moravec began intelligence exchanges with the Soviets and the following year was made head of Czech intelligence. In this period he had several successes against Germany, including the acquisition of PAUL THÜMMEL as a spy.

When Germany took over Czechoslovakia on March 14, 1939, Moravec and his staff fled to Britain, where he worked for the Czech government in exile as well as with British MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. He played a major role in planning the assassination of REINHARD HEYDRICH in Czechoslovakia. He was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit and Order of the British Empire for services to Allied intelligence in World War II.

Moravec became deputy chief of the Czech General Staff while in Britain, but because of Soviet opposition he was dismissed in 1945. With the war in Europe over, he became a division commander in the Czech Army. When the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in Feb. 1948 he was forced to flee to the United States, where he remained until his death.

His autobiography, *Master of Spies,* was published in 1975.

○○ Morison, Samuel Loring (b. 1944)

U.S. Navy intelligence analyst who gave SATELLITE photographs of a Soviet shipyard to a British news magazine. Grandson of the distinguished naval and maritime historian Samuel Eliot Morison, Morison served briefly as an officer in the Navy during the Vietnam War; he then worked as a civilian employee for the Navy's history office before becoming an analyst at the NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CENTER (NISC) in 1976. A short time later he became the part-time Washington representative for *Jane's Fighting Ships,* a British reference annual containing unclassified information about all the world's navies. His work for *Jane's* was done with approval of his Navy superiors, although the conflict of interest was apparent, since Morison held a TOP SECRET clearance and certain COMPARTMENTED (CODE NAME) clearances.

Morison had committed several previous security violations. For example, he sold a used copy of *Jane's Fighting Ships* to a civilian who found several classified documents stuck in the book and called the FBI about the violation. Morison visited the Norfolk naval base and used his NISC identification to get on the base and take ship photos for *Jane's.* When stopped by base security officials, he claimed, falsely, that he was taking the photos for NISC. Nothing substantial happened as a result of these incidents.

Then, in 1984, Morison stole from a colleague's desk a set of three secret satellite photographs that showed a nuclear- propelled aircraft carrier under construction at a Black Sea shipyard. He snipped the upper-left corner containing the "secret" label off each photo and sent them to *Jane's Defence Weekly,* a news magazine published by the Jane's organization.

He was arrested on Oct. 1, 1984, for stealing and giving away the satellite photographs. Morison denied any knowledge of the photos, but when *Jane's* returned the photos to the Navy one of them bore Morison's thumbprint. An FBI search of Morison's home turned up other classified documents he had taken from NISC.

Morison was tried for espionage as a lesson to leakers of information.

Morison was indicted under a section of the 1917 ESPIONAGE ACT which prohibits people with lawful access to U.S. military documents from disclosing them to an unauthorized person. He was the first person in U.S. history actually to be tried under the statute. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who had given the PENTAGON PAPERS on the background of the Vietnam War to the press, had been charged under the law. But a federal judge had dismissed the case against them because of government misconduct in the WATERGATE era. The dismissal was not based on any deficiency in the espionage law.

Morison was found guilty in Oct. 1985 and sentenced to a two-year prison term.

○○ Moscow Rules

British term for intricate signs and countersigns used to indicate a clandestine meeting or DEAD DROP. If appropriate, the signs signify that neither party is being followed. Such signs can also be used to alleviate the need for a face-to-face encounter.

The signs and countersigns can be chalk marks on trees or lampposts, or a carefully discarded bottle or metal can of a certain kind. The latter must be in a location where it will not normally be moved or picked up, and must be clean so that an animal is not attracted by an odor and moves it.

Also see TRADECRAFT.

○○ Mosquito

In many respects the Mosquito was the most versatile aircraft of World War II, serving in the photo-RECONNAISSANCE, bomber, antiship strike, fighter-bomber, night-fighter, and pathfinder roles. In most roles the British Mosquito was superior to its contemporaries and was the fastest of any aircraft in the Royal Air Force from Sept. 1941 until early 1944. As *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* editor J. W. R. Taylor observed, "The Mosquito was the realization of an ideal: an unarmed bomber that would depend for its defence on sheer performance."

The first Mosquito deliveries to the Royal Air Force occurred in mid-1941, and the first operational sortie took place on Sept. 20, 1941, when a PR variant photographed harbors at Brest and Bordeaux in German-occupied France. Chased by three German Me 109 fighters, the Mosquito easily evaded its pursuers at 23,000 feet. Mosquito PR aircraft operated throughout the European and Mediterranean areas as well as over Burma during the war. Flights by Mosquito PR.IV aircraft over the German installation at Peenemünde on the Baltic from April to June 1943 led to the discovery of the V-2 rocket program. (See CONSTANCE BABINGTON-SMITH)

Some PR models were flown by the U.S. Eighth Air Force with the designation F-8. British Mosquitos and American-piloted F-8s kept all of western Europe under daily SURVEILLANCE in 1943–1945. Over 3,000 photo and meteorological sorties were flown in 1943 by these "recce" aircraft.

The ultimate Mosquito reconnaissance variants were the PR.34 and PR.35. (The early models of British aircraft had Roman numerical designations; later models used Arabic numbers.) The PR.34 model, which first flew in Dec. 1944, initially had a range of 2,500 miles, with a bomb-bay modification to carry additional fuel increasing the range to 3,500 miles. The PR.35 was a night-flying photo plane using flash bombs. One oblique and four vertical cameras were fitted in these aircraft. RAF Mosquitos became the first aircraft to use radar cameras that could penetrate clouds and darkness.

The Mosquito continued in British service in the PR role until late 1955, when it was finally replaced by the CANBERRA. In late 1948 a Mosquito PR aircraft made several overflights of Israeli territory at about 30,000 feet with impunity. However, on Dec. 1, 1948, a newly arrived Israeli P-51 Mustang took off and intercepted the Mosquito; although the Mustang's guns jammed after firing a few rounds, the Mosquito was hit and crashed into the Mediterranean with no survivors. Mosquitos transferred to Israel flew photo missions over Egypt during the 1956 Suez campaign and ranged as far as Tripoli to collect intelligence.

The Mosquito was begun as a private initiative of de Havilland Aircraft in the summer of 1938. In March 1940 the Air Ministry ordered the first 50 production aircraft, including three for prototype trials. The first Mosquito flew on Nov. 25, 1940, and demonstrated the speed and agility of the design in the bomber configuration. Next an armed fighter prototype flew on May 15, 1941, and the third—a PR prototype—flew on June 10, 1941. During the war 6,710 Mosquitos were delivered (another 1,071 were built after the war); several hundred were specialized PR aircraft of several models. The early PR aircraft carried one oblique and three vertical cameras in place of the bomb bay.

The key to the Mosquito's excellence lay in two Rolls-Royce Merlin engines merged with the smallest practical airframe, and extreme aerodynamic cleanliness. Made of wood, in the bomber and reconnaissance roles the Mosquito was unarmed, relying (effectively) on speed to escape interception. The PR.34 had a speed of 425 mph at 30,500 feet with a service ceiling of 36,000 feet. The PR.32 model, with reduced weight and extended wings, could reach 42,000 feet.

Most variants had two-man crews.

○○ Mosquito, Operation

Plan suggested to President Reagan in 1961 by Count ALEXANDRE DE MARENCHES, French intelligence chief, to subvert Soviet troops in Afghanistan with DISINFORMATION and drugs that had been seized from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The drugs would be sold to the troops by Pakistanis and Afghans in French employ. As Marenches told it, Reagan endorsed the idea, but it was abandoned when WILLIAM J. CASEY, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, could not guarantee that the COVERT ACTION would remain covert.

★ ○○ MOSSAD

Although Israel has several intelligence agencies (see ISRAEL), the term Mossad—short for Ha Mossad Le modi'in UleTafkidim Meyuhadim (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks)—is invariably used when speaking of the Jewish state's intelligence activities. While Mossad has suffered many failures and at times embarrassed Israel, more often it has had stunning successes, many of which have never been publicly revealed.

The Mossad evolved from the Political Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Established shortly after the creation of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948, the Political Department was given responsibility for collecting intelligence outside Israel. The first director was Latvian-born Boris Guriel, who served in the British Army in World War II and was captured by the Germans. During the period before Israeli independence he worked for SHAI, the intelligence arm of the underground Haganah force.

The Political Department's primary functions were to plant AGENTS—Israeli or native—in Arab countries and establish working relations with Western intelligence services. Political Department officers served under COVER in Israeli embassies throughout Western Europe.

But because of a conflict of personalities within the Political Department, differing individual priorities, and lack of knowledge of the SECRET WORLD, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion finally stepped in and demanded a reorganization of Israeli intelligence. On April 1, 1951, the Mossad was established. Responsible directly to the Prime Minister's office, it was created in the mold of the U.S. rather than the British intelligence book (the British Secret Intelligence service [MI6] came under the Foreign Office).

Originally the Mossad was named HaMossad Leteum (the Institute for Coordination), a truly ambiguous title. Not until 1963 was it renamed the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks.

The agency's brief was to collect intelligence overseas. Any overseas "operations" at that time were to be carried out by the Army's Unit 131. Army intelligence (AMAN) and the Mossad had joint oversight of Unit 131. The first head of the Mossad was REUVEN SHILOAH, a founder of Shai with extensive service in the Haganah as well as experience as an agent in Arab countries and, during World War II, behind German lines for the British.

Shiloah's tenure was brief, but he was able to establish certain standards and beliefs within the agency, although its operations—and handling of funds—were relatively sloppy. From the outset, the Mossad was hampered by incompetence and traitors. The first was DAVID MAGEN. Sent into Egypt to operate a NETWORK of informers, he made illicit contact with Egyptian INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. Another Israeli intelligence officer sent into Egypt, AVRAHAM DAR, botched up his assignment horribly in what became known as the Lavon affair.

But Mossad triumphs in this period included acquiring a copy of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech before the 20th Communist Party Congress in Moscow on Feb. 25, 1956, in which he denounced the late dictator Josef Stalin. A copy was provided to the U.S. CIA before that agency could acquire it from any other source. Another Mossad success was WOLFGANG LOTZ, who operated in Egypt with great skill from 1959 to 1964, when he was found out, tortured, and imprisoned. Still another highly successful Mossad agent was ELIAHU COHEN, who infiltrated the highest levels of Syrian government and society before being uncovered.

The first head of the Mossad, Shiloah, injured in a car accident and suffering from the political infighting, stepped down in Sept. 1952, having served only 18 months. His successor was the ambitious ISSER HAREL, whose 11-year tenure as head of the Mossad would be the longest of any director. Harel came from the position of director of the SHIN BET, the only person to head both of those intelligence agencies. Also, on Ben-Gurion's orders, Harel was designated the MEMUNEH, "the one in charge" of all Israeli intelligence activities, reporting directly to Ben-Gurion on both international and domestic security matters.

Under Harel the Mossad sought out former Nazis hiding in Europe and South America to bring them to trial. Mossad's greatest triumph in this field was the capture of Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi functionary who officiated over the killing of millions of Jews during the Holocaust. The joint Mossad-Shin Bet operation plucked Eichmann from his refuge in Argentina.

Also under Harel's direction, Mossad agents infiltrated Egyptian and West German intelligence agencies, using terrorist tactics to stop German scientists from working for Egypt. But Ben-Gurion wanted to strengthen Israeli–West German relations and turned against Harel. He reprimanded him for his campaign against the scientists, losing confidence in the man he had dubbed Memuneh. Harel resigned from government service in March 1963. (No one since has held such a position in Israeli intelligence.)

In Harel's place as head of the Mossad, Ben-Gurion appointed MEIR AMIT, the head of Aman. Significantly, before that appointment in 1962, Amit had never served in the intelligence field. He had made major contributions to Aman when, without warning, on March 26, 1963, Ben-Gurion called Amit to his office, having sent a plane to fetch him back from an inspection of military units near the Dead Sea. He was to take over the Mossad immediately.

Amit sought to change the Mossad into a serious and modern intelligence organization focusing on what he considered to be its major task: the collection of military and political data on the Arab states. He regarded the Mossad as an information-gathering body that would henceforth eschew show-off operations, which he viewed as a waste of resources. Influenced by the economic and business courses he had taken in the United States, Amit wished to imitate the American corporate mentality and style of management. In this period the Mossad and Aman together sought out the intelligence that made the Six Day War (1967) one of the greatest military triumphs in Israeli history.

But six years later Israeli intelligence appears to have failed to predict either the Egyptian crossing of the Suez

Canal at the start of the Yom Kippur War or the effectiveness of Egyptian forces once they entered the Sinai. The AGRANAT COMMISSION placed blame for the intelligence failure on the chief of MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira, and three other intelligence officers. Zvi Zamir, successor to Meir Amit as head of the Mossad, stepped down in 1974. (The Agranat Commission also laid blame on the chief of staff of the Israeli armed forces and the commander of the Southern Command. It cleared the Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan of "direct responsibility" for the disaster. Still, Meir and Dayan resigned after the report was issued.)

The commission also recommended changes in the organization of the Israeli intelligence community. The Mossad and a small research department of the Foreign Ministry would have an increased role in intelligence assessments, thus ending Aman's control of intelligence evaluation. Stung by the failures on the eve of the Yom Kippur War (and Aman was blamed for subsequent battle failures as well), the Israeli intelligence community adopted new methods and practices.

INTELLIGENCE WITHOUT WAR

Among the more spectacular nonwar intelligence successes were having an advanced MiG-21 fighter flown to Israel in 1963 by an Iraqi DEFECTOR while providing safe passage out of Iraq for his family; collecting some 200,000 technical documents on the Mirage aircraft from Swiss engineer ALFRED FRAUENKNECHT; hijacking a shipload of 200 tons of uranium—in a set-up deal—for use in Israeli's atomic bomb program; making raids into downtown Beirut to assassinate leaders of Arab radical groups; and carrying out "hits" on other individuals in other Arab states.

The year 1976 brought possibly the greatest triumph of the Mossad—the Israeli raid on the airport at Entebbe, Uganda, known as Operation Thunderbolt. Palestinian terrorists had hijacked an Air France airliner and flown it into Entebbe, where they were holding 97 passengers and some of the crew (although all of the crew had been allowed to leave). Under Yitzhak Hofi, the Mossad interviewed released passengers, sought out data on the airport (originally built with Israeli help), and compiled dossiers on Ugandan President Idi Amin's movements, bodyguards, and even his personal automobile.

Then, on the night of July 3–4, the most spectacular hostage rescue in history was carried out some 2,000 miles from Israel. Excellent intelligence, military planning, and performance by the Army-Air Force strike team rescued all but four hostages; Israeli loss was one officer, the commander of the strike force. (Six terrorists and 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed.)

Throughout this period, the Mossad also concentrated on obtaining intelligence about Arab weapons and electronics capabilities. The more advanced Arab weapons came from the Soviet Union, and the Mossad managed to obtain examples of many advanced systems—from Arab countries as well as elsewhere—much of which was shared with U.S. intelligence agencies.

Mossad cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies—legal and illegal—has been considerable, up to acting as the go-between in handling weapons for the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.

Still another Mossad triumph was the collection of intelligence on foreign TARGETS, often thought by their Arab neighbors to be beyond Israeli's military striking power. For example, the target folders for the precision air strike on Palestine Liberation Army headquarters in Tunis—1,500 miles from Israel—and the air strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor a decade before the Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated the excellence of Mossad intelligence collection.

Mossad's efforts, however, have not been omnipotent; assassins have occasionally killed the wrong people. And during the Persian Gulf conflict of 1991, the Mossad appears to have been unable to accurately predict certain Iraqi actions and capabilities, especially the threat from modified Scud missiles that would be fired against Israel.

In 1990 the U.S. government estimated that the Mossad had a staff of between 1,500 and 2,000.

MOSSAD DIRECTORS

The directors of the Mossad are listed below. Isser Harel is the only person to have served as a director of both the Shin Bet (1948–1952) and the Mossad; Meir Amit is the only person to have served as head of Aman (1962–1963) and the Mossad.

1951–1952	Reuven Shiloah
1952–1963	Isser Harel
1963–1968	Meir Amit
1968–1974	Zvi Zamir
1974–1982	Yitzhak Hofi
1982–1989	Nahum Admoni
1989–1996	Shabtai Shavit
1996–	Danny Yatom

○○ Most Secret

Highest British security CLASSIFICATION; it is the equivalent of TOP SECRET in the United States.

○○ Movies

Unlike spy novels (see LITERARY SPIES), spy movies usually do not rely on an air of authenticity for their entertainment value. The reader of a good spy novel usually gains insights by learning what is going on in the minds of spies and their pursuers. But in a movie, the slogging realities of espionage and counterespionage usually escape the camera. Most directors and producers opt for suspense and capers, and even special effects, rather than subtleties and true TRADECRAFT. Most spy movies are more accurately called spy thrillers, an espionage version of cops-and-robbers or cowboys-and-Indians.

James Grady, whose novel *Six Days of the Condor* (1974) was made into *Three Days of the Condor* (1975), assessed "spy-fi" films in 1985.

> Moviemakers love heroes and villains, clean endings, clear positions about right and wrong, and the endemic problem of moral ambivalence is often the reason they avoid accurately portraying spies. . . . Trying to sell the public a story that delves into the messy blood and guts of politics is risky business at the box office, so most spy movies are actually glorified and unrealistic global-cop films.

The spy film is a recognized genre. The authoritative Microsoft *Cinemania 95* compact disc movie directory lists 364 movies in the spy genre since 1928, when Germany's Fritz Lang used BERLIN as the backdrop for the first great spy movie, *Spies.* In it, the most villainous spy was made up to look like V. I. Lenin. Espionage during World War I got the romantic treatment in Britain, with *The Spy in Black* (1939), in which a German AGENT, played by Conrad Veidt, has a love affair with a British agent, played by Valerie Hobson.

Espionage fascinated Hollywood producers in the pre–World War II era. A movie about MATA HARI, made in 1931, starred Greta Garbo, and focused on the romance of espionage. Most spy movies of that time, however, simply showed U.S. or British spies as the good guys—in suits and ties but still Wild West marshals; the bad guys were usually from fictitious or unnamed countries. Jitters about Hitler's Germany inspired many prewar spy movies. Alfred Hitchcock dominated the genre, beginning with *The Man Who Knew Too Much* in 1934, in which Leslie Banks plays an innocent who stumbles into espionage and has his child kidnapped to keep him silent. The villain is Peter Lorre.

Hitchcock followed up with his 1935 classic *The Thirty-Nine Steps,* saying at the time, "I am out to give the public good, healthy, mental shake-ups. Civilization has become so screening and sheltering that we cannot experience sufficient thrills at first hand. Therefore, to prevent our becoming sluggish and jellified, we have to experience them artificially." This time Robert Donat played the Briton who stumbles into a plot. Madeleine Carroll costarred. This spy thriller was based on JOHN BUCHAN's 1915 novel of the same name.

Sabotage, another Hitchcock spy thriller, starred Sylvia Sidney, Oscar Homolka, and John Loder. Hitchcock picked Madeleine Carroll again for his 1936 spy movie *The Secret Agent,* which also starred John Gielgud and Peter Lorre. The movie, based on JOSEPH CONRAD's *Secret Agent,* was retitled *A Woman Alone* in the United States. In the 1940 chase movie *Murder in the Air,* future President Ronald Reagan, playing Secret Service agent Brass Bancroft, caught a spy trying to steal a death ray (a popular fictional weapon that presaged Reagan's "Star Wars" project).

John P. Marquand's *Mr. Moto,* the polite Japanese gentleman who specialized in saving innocents from spies and other malefactors, appeared in the 1930s, flourishing briefly as a series in Hollywood (with Peter Lorre as Mr. Moto). *Mr. Moto,* a victim of anti-Japanese prejudice, vanished with the advent of World War II.

Wartime U.S. spy thrillers included *Five Graves to Cairo,* a Billy Wilder film with Franchot Tone in Akim Tamiroff's oasis hotel trying to get secret information from Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, played by Erich von Stroheim. In *The House on 92nd Street,* told in documentary style, the FBI tracks down Nazi spies who are after atomic bomb secrets.

During the war the movie spies were despicable Japanese and fiendish Nazis and, in American movies, the spy catchers were astute, courageous FBI agents. Few war movies focused on espionage, which was still an arcane subject for most action-seeking moviegoers. In *Across the Pacific* Humphrey Bogart, Mary Astor, and Sydney Greenstreet conspire in a Japanese effort to destroy the Panama Canal. In a 1943 movie, *Flight for Freedom,* Rosalind Russell plays a fictional spying aviatrix obviously modeled on AMELIA EARHART, popularizing the persistent belief that she was spying on Japanese naval bases when she was lost in the Pacific on her around-the-world flight in 1937.

The *Mask of Dimitrios,* based on a novel by ERIC AMBLER, links Peter Lorre, Sydney Greenstreet, and Zachary Scott in Middle East intrigue. *March of Time* documentaries, popular in the 1930s and 1940s, inspired the storytelling style of *13 Rue Madeleine,* which takes place during World War II. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) agent James Cagney slips into occupied France to outwit the GESTAPO and complete the mission of a slain agent. He is committing an inexcusable blunder, for any INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who knows the identity of his agents does not go behind enemy lines. But movie espionage rarely resembles real espionage.

Hollywood's wartime movie output included escapist films, including a spy comedy, *They Got Me Covered,* with Bob Hope and Dorothy Lamour chasing down Nazi spies in Washington. Another Hope spy spoof, *My Favorite Spy,* teamed him with Hedy Lamarr.

After the war, wartime spies still inspired moviemakers. In *Notorious* Hitchcock again used espionage as an excuse for thrills and suspense, with secret agent Cary Grant and anti-Nazi Ingrid Bergman intriguing to smash Claude Rains's Nazi spy ring in Argentina. Ben Hecht's script sets the story in South America shortly after World War II.

Among the better movies based on real wartime events were *Five Fingers,* with James Mason playing CICERO, a valet for a British diplomat and a spy for Germany, and *The Man Who Never Was,* based on Operation MINCEMEAT, in which Clifton Webb supervises the planting of a hoax corpse in a DECEPTION plan tied to the invasion of Sicily.

In another wartime film, *The Quiller Memorandum,* George Segal plays Quiller, an agent assigned to break up a neo-Nazi organization in Berlin. Alec Guinness plays his chief. The script is by Harold Pinter based on the novel by Adam Hall. (See LITERARY SPIES.) Nazis were also the villains of a World War II–era thriller, *Eye of the Needle,* in which master Nazi spy Donald Sutherland tries to get secrets about D-DAY to Germany. The film was based on Ken Follet's novel of the same title.

Hollywood again turned to wartime Nazis for *Where Eagles Dare,* an impossible mission for Richard Burton and Clint Eastwood: They are ineptly disguised as Nazi

officers in a caper involving a D-Day deception plot. The movie is distinguished by having absolutely no relationship to reality, and it perverts history by having German agents infiltrate the highest councils of Allied intelligence.

The Cold War gave the movies a new set of enemies: brutal Soviets and the nefarious KGB. A rare treatment of realistic espionage and counterespionage appeared in the 1948 film *The Iron Curtain,* in which Dana Andrews plays IGOR GOUZENKO, who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and helped crack the ATOMIC SPY RING. East-West Cold War confrontation in VIENNA became the shadowy setting for *The Third Man,* in which spies are in the background and black marketeer Harry Lime (Orson Welles) is the hunted man. The screenplay was by GRAHAM GREENE, who noted that he used the term THIRD MAN before it became a label for HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY. Many believe that Greene, who knew Philby, based the Harry Lime character on Philby.

The Spy Who Came In from the Cold (1965), based on the novel by JOHN LÉ CARRE, took espionage as seriously as the book did. Richard Burton plays Alec Leamas, a burned-out British agent who, posing as a disgraced and dismissed officer, enters East Germany to destroy a Red spymaster.

The Manchurian Candidate (1962) popularized the idea of sinister communist "brainwashing," with Laurence Harvey playing a brainwashed Korean War veteran who has been programmed into a presidential assassin by Soviet and Chinese intelligence operatives. Frank Sinatra, from Harvey's old squad, has flashbacks to the brainwashing and moves to crack the plot, which is being run by Angela Lansbury. (For real attempts at brainwashing, see MKULTRA.)

Michael Caine became the screen's busiest spy actor in the 1960s, playing LEN DEIGHTON's soft-spoken Harry Palmer in *The Ipcress File.* Palmer gets involved in the defection of a high Soviet intelligence official (Oscar Homolka) in Deighton's *Funeral in Berlin.* High-speed but unrealistic espionage fueled *The Billion-Dollar Brain.* In 1987 Caine returned to espionage in *The Fourth Protocol,* a movie version of Frederick Forsyth's novel of the same name. In movies, agents are inevitably ignored by their superiors, and in *The Fourth Protocol* no one listens to Caine when he says a Soviet agent is sneaking components for nuclear weapons into Britain.

During the Cold War, as in World War II, movie spies were often not trained agents but innocent bystanders who had stumbled into a conspiracy. Beautiful women inevitably complicated life for the accidental spies. Hitchcock remade *The Man Who Knew Too Much* in 1955, with James Stewart and Doris Day stumbling into conspiracy as the time shifted from pre–World War II to the Cold War. In this, as in earlier Hitchcock movies, espionage is secondary to suspense. Hitchcock movies do not tell a spy story; they tell a thriller story. (*The Thirty-Nine Steps* was remade in 1978, without Hitchcock. The director was Don Sharp and the cast included Robert Powell, Eric Porter, and John Mills.)

In *North by Northwest,* still another classic Hitchcock thriller, foreign spies pursue Cary Grant, an innocent American mistaken for a spy. Hitchcock becomes somewhat more realistic with *Topaz,* in which French and U.S. intelligence officers team up to find a DOUBLE AGENT; the realism comes from Leon Uris's novel *Topaz,* which was based on a real espionage scandal. (See SAPPHIRE.) Another movie successfully adapted from a novel was *Three Days of the Condor,* in which Robert Redford plays CIA researcher Joe Turner, who becomes a target of both good guys and bad guys.

In *Hopscotch,* Walter Matthau is also a CIA man on the run, but the movie plays the pursuit for laughs rather than suspense. So does *The Tall Blond Man with One Black Shoe,* a 1972 French film in which an innocent violinist is mistaken for a spy. Hollywood remade it under the same title in 1990. AIR AMERICA, an airline in Southeast Asia run by the CIA, was the subject of a daredevils-in-action movie, the well-done *Air America,* released in 1990, starring Mel Gibson and Robert Downey, Jr.

The epitome of the cinema's Cold War spy was IAN FLEMING'S JAMES BOND [f]. Bond, who could at times be believable in the pages of a book, was incredible on the screen. Stunts, gadgets, and hairbreadth escapes were the standard plot ingredients. Readers of the Bond books hardly recognized their hero when he went Hollywood.

The 14 Bond novels began with *Casino Royale* in 1953. Under the same title, a star-filled movie (Peter Sellers, Ursula Andress, David Niven, Orson Welles, Woody Allen, Charles Boyer) came out in 1967. The film was conceived and produced as a spoof of spy movies. The plot—to the extent that there was one—had something to do with the British government recalling Sir James Bond to crush a plot by his nephew to take over the world with clones of world leaders. David Niven plays James Bond; Woody Allen his contemptuous nephew, Jimmy Bond; Joanna Pettet the glamorous spy Mata Bond; and Orson Welles the SMERSH villain Le Chiffre. Sellers plays baccarat expert Evelyn Tremble, recruited as a British agent to challenge Le Chiffre to a game of baccarat. The film was a debacle, mainly because of Sellers' demands for artistic license in shooting the film, the ridiculous plot, the inane sexual innuendoes, and the conflicting personalities of the stars. (The success of the Bond series inspired lower-grade movie spy spoof series, including *Our Man Flint, Matt Helm,* and *That Man.*)

The real James Bond film series began with Sean Connery playing the suave, daredevil agent who makes love to beautiful women and fights mad villains who are trying, in various ways, to conquer the world. Connery becomes AGENT 007 in *Dr. No* (book 1958, film 1963), with Ursula Andress helping him fight a fiend in the West Indies who is threatening the world. In *From Russia, with Love* (book 1957, film 1963) Connery outwits Soviet agent Robert Shaw, and in *Goldfinger* (book 1959, film 1964), Connery stops Gert Frobe, who wants to steal the gold from Fort Knox, with the aid of his bowler-tossing henchman Oddjob (Harold Sakata). Pussy Galore, an expert in the martial arts, is played by Honor Blackman, who had played a spy in the television series *The Avengers.* (See TELEVISION).

Connery remained in the Bond role in four more Bond epics: *Thunderball* (book based on a screen treat-

ment by Fleming and others, 1961; film 1965), which pits Bond against SPECTRE, a murderous Soviet agency; *You Only Live Twice* (book 1964, film 1967); *Diamonds are Forever* (book 1956, film 1971), and *Never Say Never Again* (1983), essentially a remake of *Thunderball.*

In *On Her Majesty's Secret Service* (book 1963, film 1969), the role of Bond remained the same but the actor changed, with fashion model George Lazenby playing Agent 007. Roger Moore took over the role in *Live and Let Die* (book 1954, film 1973). Moore continued playing Bond in *The Spy Who Loved Me* (book, with Vivienne Michel, 1962; film 1977); *The Man with the Golden Gun* (book 1965, film 1974), *Moonraker* (book 1955, film 1979); *For Your Eyes Only* (book 1960, film 1981); *Octopussy* (book 1965, film 1983); and *A View to a Kill* (1985).

The 16th Bond movie, *Licence to Kill* (1989), was the first whose title was not taken from a James Bond story by Ian Fleming. It did take parts from Fleming works, including the novella *The Hildebrand Rarity.* Timothy Dalton returned as James Bond in this film, the first Bond movie to receive an R rating for excessive violence.

Goldeneye (named after Ian Fleming's Jamaica retreat) came out in 1995, with Bond played by Pierce Brosnan and "M" played by a woman, actress Dame Judi Dench. (This is a double takeoff on reality. The head of MI5 is traditionally known by a single letter, in reality "C." And when the movie was released MI5 was headed by a woman, STELLA RIMINGTON.) Connery returned to espionage duty when he appeared in *The Russia House,* a slow-moving movie version of le Carré's novel of the same name (book 1989, film 1990).

A forecast of the problems in undoing Cold War espionage and sabotage was depicted in *Telefon,* produced in 1977, starring Charles Bronson as a KGB agent secretly sent to America to destroy the ingenious network. Soviet SLEEPERS had been sent into the United States, hypnotized so that a Robert Frost poem—said over the telephone—would activate them to leave their home or business and blow up military installations. Years later a KGB renegade threatens to activate the network—and destroys a couple of targets just to prove he can do it. Lee Remick plays a KGB agent sent to help Bronson—and then kill him.

○○ Mr. Bull

see ALLEN DULLES

○○ MSS

Ministry of State Security, principal Chinese intelligence-collection and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agency.

Raised from bureau to ministry status in 1983, the MSS was modeled after the KGB, at least for domestic SURVEILLANCE, and dominates the complex Chinese intelligence apparatus. The reason for establishing the MSS, said a Chinese statement in July 1982, was to combat foreign espionage agencies.

"Since China adopted the policy of opening to the outside world," the statement said, "intelligence agencies or secret services of some foreign countries have stepped up their activities to obtain China's state secrets and sent special agents into China for subversive and destructive purposes."

Western intelligence agencies had scarce and unreliable information about the MSS until 1985, when Yu Zhensan, the former director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the MSS, defected. Yu Zhensan probably exposed LARRY WU-TAI CHIN, a longtime CIA employee arrested for espionage in 1985.

MSS maintains bureaus devoted to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, along with a Foreign Affairs Bureau that oversees MSS operations elsewhere in the world. Intelligence gathering in Hong Kong and Macao has been sharply increased in recent years in anticipation of the absorption of those colonial territories into China.

The MSS has also pursued Chinese dissidents into other countries and supervises the SURVEILLANCE of foreigners, especially journalists. The MSS runs the Institute for Contemporary International Relations, a Chinese think tank in Beijing that ostensibly does not have government ties. The institute publishes a classified journal, *Contemporary International Relations,* which has a limited circulation among senior Communist Party officials. The MSS also operates the Beijing College of International Relations, which is actually an espionage school that trains MSS employees.

○○ Mueller, Airman 1st Class Gustav

A U.S. Air Force enlisted man who wanted to spy. In 1949, while attending an intelligence school in Oberammergau, West Germany, Mueller was arrested for attempting to sell classified information to what he took to be Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. In fact, he was dealing with U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agents.

Mueller was possibly the first U.S. serviceman to be tried for betraying secrets after World War II. He was sentenced to five years in prison and a dishonorable discharge.

○○ Muggeridge, Malcolm

(b. 1903 d. 1990)

British writer and INTELLIGENCE officer. Muggeridge spent much of World War II as an intelligence specialist in the Field Security Police. He once ran a security check on Gen. Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. Ironside, who had fascist leanings, was relieved of his position in 1940. Muggeridge was an official witness at the *in camera* trial of TYLER KENT, an American diplomat charged with security violations, and ANNA WOLKOFF, a Russian fascist. In 1941 he was assigned to MI6. Among his coworkers was HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY.

Muggeridge, renowned as a satirist and cynical observer of British life, was more amused than awed by what he saw as an intelligence officer. "Secrecy," he

wrote, "is as essential to Intelligence as vestments and incense to a mass, or darkness to a spiritual seance, and must at all costs be maintained, quite irrespective of whether or not it serves any purpose."

In Mozambique, Muggeridge's first duty station, he arranged the arrest of a captain whose merchant ship was to rendezvous with a U-boat to pass on supplies. The U-boat, Muggeridge later wrote, was captured. He also served in Algeria, Italy, and France. There, after liberation, he had to convince French intelligence authorities that some apparent collaborators had actually been British AGENTS using their friendship with Germans as COVER for their espionage activities.

Muggeridge was also involved in determining the status of P. G. Wodehouse, the British novelist who wrote humorously about the upper class. Wodehouse, interned in Vichy France and later taken to Germany, was accused of collaboration because of his radio broadcasts from BERLIN. While Wodehouse did not write any spy novels, his writings influenced German intelligence officers, who took Wodehouse's comedy seriously. Agents being sent to England were told that Wodehouse's hilarious putdowns of the aristocracy were true. One German agent had parachuted into England wearing spats.

Also see DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM.

○○ Murphy, Seaman Michael R.

Crewman aboard the U.S. strategic missile submarine *James Polk* who called the Soviet mission to the UNITED NATIONS in June 1981 and offered to make what was later officially described as "a deal that would be beneficial to both the Soviets and himself." He called the mission three times and his calls were apparently recorded by U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officials. Murphy admitted the calls. Investigation showed that Murphy, who had a SECRET clearance, had not given any information to the Soviets. He was honorably discharged from the Navy in Aug. 1981.

○○ Museums

Several intelligence agencies and services have established museums. The most significant are those of the CIA in LANGLEY, Va.; the National Cryptologic Museum of the NSA at FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md.; the British Intelligence Corps Museum at Templar Barracks, Ashford, Kent; and the KGB museum in the LUBYANKA building in Moscow.

There is also a Military Intelligence Museum at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., site of the U.S. Army's military intelligence school. That museum, the NSA museum, and the British Intelligence Corps Museum are open to the public.

A recently established museum is at BLETCHLEY PARK, the British World War II codebreaking center. Portions of the estate, including some of the war-built huts, in the Buckinghamshire countryside are open to the public on alternate weekends.

The CIA headquarters complex in Langley, Va., has a small exhibit area with a few significant artifacts; it is not open to the public.

The Imperial War Museum in London and the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American History in Washington, D.C., have mounted major exhibits on codebreaking.

○○ Music Box

Soviet slang for a clandestine radio.

○○ Musician

Soviet slang for a radio operator.

○○ MVD

see NKVD

○○ Mystic (M-17)

Soviet high-flying RECONNAISSANCE aircraft, similar in many respects to the U.S. U-2 spyplane. Development of the aircraft was completed in the late 1970s, and the first flight in May 1982 occurred 27 years after the first flight of the U-2!

Designed by the Molniya (Myasischev) design bureau, the Mystic was intended specifically for strategic reconnaissance. In addition to 5,500 pounds of cameras and other military reconnaissance equipment, the aircraft has also been employed in scientific research (as have modified U-2 aircraft).

The aircraft is essentially a powered glider with a wide wingspan (132 feet) and a twin-boom tail configuration. The wing has special lift devices fitted to the trailing edges of its wings, increasing aerodynamic efficiency. The aircraft has two turbofan (jet) engines, providing a maximum speed of about 466 mph, with an operating altitude of 70,000 feet.

Endurance of the Mystic is listed in the Russian press as 1½ hours; if true, it is far less than the U-2's 9½ hours. The M-55 variant of the Mystic is slightly smaller (wingspan of 123 feet) and carries 3,000 pounds of mission equipment, but its flight endurance is rated at 6½ hours. The aircraft is flown by a single crewman.

In a series of special tests in 1990, the aircraft bettered 25 world altitude-related flight records.

Mystic is the Western CODE NAME for the aircraft; the Soviet name is Stratosfera, with the design bureau designation M-17.

●● N2

Designation of intelligence staff of a U.S. Navy organization.

●● NACIC

NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CENTER

●● Napoleon Solo [F]

Star of the 1960s American TELEVISION spy series *The Man From Uncle*. Robert Vaughn was the smooth, sophisticated, and always successful Napoleon Solo; David McCallum played Illya Kuryakin, his faithful Russian sidekick.

●● Narodnyy Komisariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

NKGB; see NKVD

●● Narodnyy Komisariat Vnutrennikh Del

NKVD

●● Nashi

The Russian word for "ours," nashi is slang used by the KGB to indicate a KGB-controlled AGENT or collaborator.

The word has been corrupted in Western usage as "nash" for a person belonging to one's own side.

●● Nassiri, Nematollah (b. ? d. 1979)

Head of the Iranian Intelligence and Security Service (SAVAK). Nassiri was well known in the West through his contacts with Western intelligence services. SAVAK was the beneficiary of expertise from the CIA, the British Secret Service (MI6), and the MOSSAD. In 1953, the shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, was restored to his throne by a CIA-engineered coup against Muhammad Mossadegh (see KERMIT ROOSEVELT). Nassiri, a colonel of the shah's bodyguard, helped in the coup and was subsequently made chief of SAVAK. The secret police was ruthless in its pursuit of real and imagined enemies of the shah.

When the shah was overthrown in 1979, Muslim revolutionaries, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, arrested Nassiri and 19 other senior officers, accusing them of "treason, mass murder, and torture." Nassiri was condemned to death by an extraordinary Islamic revolutionary court and executed by firing squad in Feb. 1979.

Although Khomeini abolished SAVAK and destroyed its records, he set up a new secret police as ruthless as its predecessor.

●● National Agency Check

Background investigation for a U.S. SECURITY CLEARANCE. Conducted by the FBI, it includes a fingerprint

check, check of Department of Defense central index, and limited additional investigation of the person's past.

●● National Counterintelligence Center

(NACIC)

Coordinating organization for guiding all U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE activities at the national level. The NACIC was established in 1994 by the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) through a Presidential Decision Directive.

The center is controlled by the National Counterintelligence Policy Board under the NSC. Among the NACIC's missions is the countering of INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. The NACIC Threat Assessment Office compiles, from intelligence sources and open literature, the clandestine targeting of U.S. industry and technology by foreign powers or their intelligence services.

The center provides the NSC with analyses of threats to emerging or existing U.S. technologies, or to business executives at home or overseas. It also assesses the effect on U.S. interests of foreign ownership, technology transfers, and joint ventures.

The NACIC produces reports on industrial espionage to selected corporations and works to "enhance the relationship" between the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY and U.S. private industry.

●● National Foreign Intelligence Board

(NFIB)

Successor to the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD, the board acts as an advisory council to the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI).

The NFIB was created by President Carter, who gave it a mission different from that of the United States Intelligence Board, which had been involved directly in the production of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIEs). The NFIB was to have an advisory role. This was expanded and defined by President Reagan and his DCI, WILLIAM J. CASEY. In March 1981 Casey directed that the NFIB would produce, review, and coordinate national foreign intelligence; exchange intelligence among agencies in the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; protect intelligence sources and methods; and respond to matters brought to it by the DCI.

As constituted by Casey, the NFIB was chaired by the DCI with the deputy director of the CIA being its vice chairman. Other members were the director of the NSA, director of the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, director of the State Department's BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, the assistant director of the FBI, intelligence representatives from the Department of Energy and the Treasury Department, and representatives of "reconnaissance programs," which undoubtedly meant the NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE, whose name at that time could not be publicly disclosed.

The NFIB reviews NIEs to confirm that they reflect the consensus of the Intelligence Community. The board also draws up intelligence priorities and is the collective authority for determining the dispensing of intelligence to allies.

●● National Intelligence

Information required for the actions or decisions at the highest level of government. One of the needs of national intelligence is foreknowledge, so emphasis is usually placed on ways of finding indicators about an event that has just taken place or is about to take place.

National intelligence, as defined by U.S. intelligence specialists, is distinguished by two features: It is intended to serve in the formulation of national security policy; and its content, transcending the information of a single agency, represents the consensus of the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. It is usually presented by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE to the President or to the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

Also see STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

●● National Intelligence Authority

(NIA)

Precurser to the CIA. The NIA was created by an Executive memorandum signed by President Truman on Jan. 22, 1946. Its purpose was the coordination of U.S. foreign intelligence activities. Truman designated the members of the NIA to be Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Secretary of War Robert V. Patterson, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and, as the President's personal representative, Adm. William D. Leahy, the de facto chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NIA members were directed to assign personnel from the State, War, and Navy departments to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (CIG), which was headed by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

The NIA and the CIG lasted for 20 months. When the CIA was founded on Sept. 20, 1947, it inherited all the people and records of the CIG.

●● National Intelligence Council

Organization in the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) responsible for producing NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

The council—managed by a chairman, a vice chairman for evaluations, and a vice chairman for estimates—consists of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), experienced analysts (often not from the CIA) who are specifically responsible for analyses that respond to the needs of CONSUMERS. NIOs are usually specialists in certain geographical areas, such as the Middle East, or subjects, such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation. The NIOs also work closely with policymakers and serve as personal staff officers and senior advisers to the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE in their specialties.

○○ National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

Evaluations of national security concerns, usually regarding a specific country, prepared by the CIA. Typically an NIE is presented by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE to the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

In 1950 the CIA set up the OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES (ONE), a special group for developing NIEs. The office consisted of a staff, which gathered and summarized information for the NIEs, and a BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES (BNE), whose members—distinguished former military officers, State Department experts, academics—defined the framework of the NIEs and then oversaw their drafting.

The staff and board had virtually unlimited access to the most sensitive data. Although an NIE is the responsibility of the CIA, it is usually produced in collaboration with other members of the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY and, if necessary, will draw upon civilian experts.

From 1952 to 1967 the head of the ONE and chairman of the BNE was Sherman Kent, a former professor of history at Yale and the author of *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1949).

Kent tried to balance the language of NIEs between the "poets," who wanted to convince with words and phrases, and the "mathematicians," who wanted words like *probably* and *possibly* to have a precise meaning. Kent expressed the problem this way: "If you write to give no more than just the general idea or general feel you may get through with great success. Per contra, if you break your heart in an endeavor to make yourself fully and precisely understood, you may not."

Under Kent NIE producers worked out a chart giving a mathematical rating to what an NIE meant when it used words and phrases like "almost certain" or "almost certainly not." Some people proposed that the chart be put on the inside back cover of every NIE:

100% . . . . . certainty
93%, give or take about 6% . . . . . almost certain
75%, give or take about 12% . . . . . probable
50%, give or take about 10% . . . . . chances about even
30%, give or take about 10% . . . . . probably not
7%, give or take about 5% . . . . . almost certainly not
0% . . . . . impossibility

In 1993 the CIA's CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE began publishing declassified NIEs on the Soviet Union prepared by Kent's BNE from 1950 through 1959. In Dec. 1957, for example, an NIE examined the issue of Soviet compliance with a two-year moratorium on nuclear testing. NIEs started with the conclusion and then went to the information on which the conclusion was based. This particular NIE concluded

> We believe that, if the USSR agrees to a moratorium on nuclear tests, its initial policy will be to abide by the terms of the moratorium. We believe this because the Soviet leaders not only would not wish to follow a violation but because they probably would hope that the effect of the moratorium would give them political and strategic advantages. . . . We conclude that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly regard the political consequences of getting caught red-handed as unacceptable, except in extraordinary circumstances. . . .

Under Kent, the ONE produced scholarly, often academic NIEs that eventually went out of style. The ONE was sharply criticized by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, who complained about having to labor through " 'Talmudic' documents to find their real meaning." Kissinger started having the National Security Council write estimates for him; those estimates tended to agree with him more than the ones produced by the ONE.

The ONE was abolished in 1973 by WILLIAM E. COLBY, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. But Colby continued to have NIEs produced by National Intelligence Officers. Aided by experts in and out of the CIA, the NIOs produced estimates that often differed considerably from the ONE PRODUCT.

With the end of what Kent often called the "bipolar world" of U.S.-Soviet tension, NIEs no longer had a tight focus on a potential nuclear enemy. Other countries, other issues—such as terrorism and drug trafficking—preoccupy the NIOs of a new generation. The NIEs they are writing, according to CIA critics, are journalistic rather than scholarly, and often politically tuned to current administration policy.

○○ National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC)

Massive headquarters for U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard intelligence activities, located in Suitland, Md., a suburb of Washington, D.C.

Dedicated on Oct. 20, 1993, the center was designed during the Cold War to consolidate a number of NAVAL INTELLIGENCE activities scattered around the Washington area. The building, with 660,000 square feet of floor space, is located on the large Suitland Federal Center site. Designed for some 2,000 technical and support people, it is inundated with computers and secure meeting spaces (see SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY), has a 350-seat auditorium as well as high-tech conference rooms and PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION equipment, and other facilities.

○○ National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)

U.S. intelligence agency charged with interpretation of photography from OVERHEAD sources—RECONNAISSANCE aircraft and SATELLITES. It is referred to as *N-pic.*

In the mid-1950s, while the U-2 spyplane and CORONA photo satellites were under development, the CIA began assembling a staff of PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION specialists who would handle their film. Arthur C.

Lundahl was given the task of organizing the operation, including the selection and recruiting of people.

The CIA's photographic division was initially known by the CODE NAME HT/AUTOMAT. Lundahl adopted HT/AUTOMAT based on the initials of the security officer (Henry Thomas) and Lundahl's view that the division was an "automat" where intelligence "consumers" could come and pick up whatever interpreted photography they needed.

A "nondescript" office building at Fifth and K Streets Northwest in Washington, D.C., a crime-ridden area, was selected to house the expanded division. The three lower floors were used by an automobile firm and a real estate office. In *Eyeball to Eyeball* (1990), photo-interpretation specialist Dino A. Brugioni described the first home of NPIC: "The building was not air-conditioned, and there were heating problems in winter."

The first U-2 OVERFLIGHT of the Soviet Union occurred on July 4, 1956. After studying many hundreds of feet of "practice film," the photo specialists at last had real photographs of the secrets of the Soviet Union. On Aug. 19, 1960, an Air Force plane snatched the first film canister to be ejected from a CORONA satellite carrying photos of the Soviet Union. And in response to Cuba's commencement of special relations with Moscow, on Oct. 27, 1960, a U-2 overflew the island for the first time, bringing another area under intensive overhead photography.

As the division became increasingly involved with supporting national leaders, on Jan. 18, 1961, a few days before he left the White House, President Eisenhower signed NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Intelligence Directive No. 8, which formally established the NPIC under CIA administration. Earlier, Eisenhower had personally approved the U-2 and Corona programs.

When his successor, John F. Kennedy, learned of the shabby NPIC accommodations, he ordered better space to be found for this most useful activity. Accordingly, on Jan. 1, 1963, the center moved to more spacious offices in Building 213 at First and M Streets Southwest, part of the Washington Navy Yard complex. (It remains there today.)

As U.S. interest in Cuba increased because of Soviet arms shipments, photography from P2V NEPTUNE Navy patrol aircraft was also sent to the center. Lundahl, wrote Brugioni, "asked that the crates and containers be carefully analyzed and measured using photogrametric means. He labeled the science of measuring, identifying, and cataloguing the crates and their contents *cratology*."

The NPIC level of effort increased many times over during the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS of 1962, although both the Air Force's Strategic Air Command and Navy photo-interpretation centers were also employed to support that crisis. (Also see F-101 VOODOO, F8U CRUSADER)

Those photographs were described in a briefing to President Kennedy and his top advisers by Lundahl at the White House on an almost daily basis during Oct. 1962. Several top officials went to the Navy Yard to talk personally with the interpreters.

When Kennedy decided to confront the Soviets with having placed ballistic missiles in Cuba, NPIC-produced photos were carried by U.S. briefers to several Western capitals. And as contingency plans were made for either precision strikes on the island or an invasion, the top U.S. military commanders used NPIC photos and maps for their planning.

But, wrote Brugioni, there was a moment of humor in the crisis thanks to one NPIC photo:

> President Kennedy detested military jargon—particularly the reporting of MRBM [Medium-Range Ballistic Missile] positions as "occupied" (with launchers) and "unoccupied." A low-flying reconnaissance plane happened to photograph a soldier using an open three-hole latrine. When the photo was shown to the president as one "occupied," he laughed and asked why he didn't have this primer earlier.

Subsequently, with the increase in U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict, aircraft photography was again at the forefront of White House briefings. But Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara used NPIC-produced photography only to support his views. Lundahl never gave a briefing to President Johnson as he had to Kennedy. Recalled Brugioni,

> Observation of the heavily bombed and cratered roads on high-altitude photography created the impression of a successful military operation, but on low-level photography, large numbers of [North] Vietnamese soldiers could be seen pushing bicycles laden with supplies, weaving their way around the heavily cratered areas. NPIC briefing boards showing the Vietnamese resupplying their forces . . . were never shown to the president, we were told. Although Secretary [of State Dean] Rusk was aware of the unfavorable intelligence, Rusk was reluctant to challenge the aggressive McNamara, fearing a State-Defense split.

Aircraft and satellite photography—as interpreted by NPIC—were key factors in U.S. policy and military decisions in Vietnam and in subsequent U.S. conflicts and crises.

○○ National Reconnaissance Office

(NRO)

U.S. agency responsible for strategic spaceborne RECONNAISSANCE and SURVEILLANCE. An agency of the Department of Defense, the NRO was so secret that not until 1992 was its existence officially confirmed. A proposal is pending to replace the NRO with a new National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).

Created on Aug. 25, 1960 to coordinate OVERHEAD reconnaissance by SATELLITES and U-2 spyplanes, the NRO became an agency that spends far more funds than either the CIA or the NSA. The NRO was seen as settling disputes between the CIA and the Air Force, which had competing interests both in the use of satellites and what the satellites discovered. The Air Force wanted to find

evidence to support its position that the Soviets were pursuing a policy of continual arms buildup that had to be matched by ever-growing appropriations for the Air Force. The CIA believed that satellite intelligence would provide objective evidence of the size of the Soviet armory.

The NRO is responsible for the design, development, and procurement of all U.S. reconnaissance satellites, and for their management once they are in orbit. The NRO develops, acquires, and operates U.S. intelligence satellites. The agency also provides INDICATIONS AND WARNING derived from satellite intelligence, monitors arms control agreements, keeps military operations and exercises under surveillance from space, monitors natural disasters, and at times provides satellite support for environmental issues. Among the satellites managed by the NRO are the FERRETS for SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE and other satellites providing specialized communications. The NRO also provides data for producing the computerized maps used to guide cruise missiles.

The agency is part of the Department of Defense but is simultaneously managed by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI). It operates the 30-odd U.S. military satellite control stations around the world. These are never publicly designated as NRO facilities.

The DCI's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) tells the NRO what is needed. In 1992 COMIREX became part of a new Central Imagery Office, an interagency center that handles the distribution of overhead intelligence to customers. ("Exploitation" is the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S word for extracting information from what the NRO produces.)

Since 1991 there has also been a DCI Environmental Task Force, consisting of about 50 scientists and governmental and private specialists. All have the necessary SECURITY CLEARANCES for examining NRO products, which they use for environmental research into such phenomena as volcanic eruptions and forest fires.

The NRO was conceived at a meeting in Aug. 1960 between President Eisenhower and an ad hoc group he had appointed to study how to handle the new intelligence dimension promised by the CORONA satellite and the developing SAMOS (Satellite and Missile Observation Satellite). Among those who met with Eisenhower were John H. Rubel, deputy director of research and engineering for the Department of Defense; Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower's science adviser; and Dr. Joseph Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force.

The Air Force had been competing with the CIA for control of satellite intelligence and had opposed the CIA's control of the U-2 program. Now that the CIA had pioneered overhead reconnaissance with the U-2, the Air Force feared that the Corona program would also be placed under CIA control.

Eisenhower was politically harmed when the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 on May 1, 1960 (see FRANCIS GARY POWERS). Three months later, when contemplating what to do about space reconnaissance, he was still smarting from how the CIA had handled the U-2 incident. He decided that the satellite programs would have civilian-military oversight. From that decision came what was publicly known as the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (OMSS), within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The OMSS—later the Office of Space Systems—was the cover for the NRO. The first director was Charyk, who also continued as Under Secretary of the Air Force. Insiders said he wore two hats, a white Air Force hat and a black one—referring to the NRO's status as a BLACK, or undisclosed, program. The first U.S. reconnaissance satellite orbited on Jan. 31, 1961.

The NRO quickly established itself as a valuable agency for delivering dramatic intelligence results, for example, evidence that dispelled the "missile gap" theory by showing that the Soviets had fewer missiles than had been reported and photographs of huge projects for building underground bunkers for Soviet leaders—confirming their belief in the likelihood of nuclear war. The NRO was also crucial in reaching arms control agreements with the Soviets, for it could manage the monitoring of satellites to produce verification.

Martin C. Faga, as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space, was the last person to direct the NRO while its name was officially secret. His own career illustrates the dual nature of the NRO, for he had previously worked for the CIA. "It's fair to say that satellite reconnaissance has been a part of every security event of the last 30 years," Faga said, "whether it's preparing SAC [Strategic Air Command] for its bombing and missile missions, or assisting tactical units in the field, or keeping the president, secretary of Defense, national security adviser, and others informed. . . ."

The NRO grew in secrecy to a powerful, almost financially independent agency. Because of the deep secrecy that shrouded the NRO, its budget escaped congressional scrutiny, although criticism arose over its penchant for "gold-plated" technology. Estimates of the annual budget range from $5 to 7 *billion*.) Also contributing to oversight problems has been the NRO's dual control.

The NRO is staffed by an estimated 4,000 employees of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and members of the armed services, most of them in the Air Force. Interpretation of satellite images is the responsibility of the CIA's NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, not the NRO. Although the NRO has had jurisdiction over some reconnaissance AIRCRAFT, since June 1994 those tasks have been handled by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). This new office manages the development and acquisition of all airborne reconnaissance by both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, their sensors, data links, data relays, and ground stations. (Also see REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES.)

This administrative tangle has generated confusion and criticism. After the Persian Gulf War of 1991, military planners complained that intelligence had been delivered too slowly, singling out the NRO. The NRO responded by saying it was working on "demand-pull architecture" that would allow the planner of a combat mission to push a button and bring onto the screen of a monitor specific information, such as photographs of buildings in a city where peacekeeping forces had been trapped. The planner would be able to bring up data on

up-to-date intelligence information that is as near as possible to real time.

Meanwhile, in 1990 the NRO bought almost 14 acres more than was needed for its planned four-building, $304-million office complex near Dulles International Airport, in Virginia, about 20 miles west of Washington, D.C. The agency intended to use the extra land for two additional buildings that it would sell or lease to contractors it regularly deals with. All of this was done without informing the Department of Defense or the DCI.

Revelations about the plans were uncovered by congressional investigators, who were reacting to reports that the NRO had failed to reveal the cost of its new headquarters to Congress. The investigators further found that the cost of the headquarters was 30 percent higher than was deemed necessary for the NRO's 2,190 employees and nearly 1,000 on-site contractor personnel.

JOHN M. DEUTCH, who became DCI in May 1995, was in office only a month when congressional investigators told him that the NRO had accumulated almost $4 *billion* in surplus funds without telling its supervisor agencies about the unspent funds. (This amount exceeds the annual operating budget of the State Department.) Much of the money was believed to have been allocated for the launching of replacement satellites. They did not need to be replaced, but the NRO kept the money as what a congressional investigator called "a pot of gold." But as members of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee stated, "The NRO's top managers themselves had no idea" how much was unspent. A later audit by the NRO's new financial officer put the surplus at $4 *billion*.

Deutch and Secretary of Defense William Perry fired Jeffrey K. Harris, NRO director-Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space, and his deputy, Jimmie D. Hill. The firings were seen as a prelude to the creation of the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which would remain in the Department of Defense and be part of the Intelligence Community. Incorporated into the new agency would be the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery Office, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, imagery analysis personnel from the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, and at least some parts of DARO.

●● National Security Agency

see NSA

●● National Security Council (NSC)

Established by the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, the NSC advises the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The body acts on behalf of the President to provide guidance and direction for the conduct of all foreign intelligence and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE activities. As the senior policymaking body in the executive branch with respect to national security, the NSC is also the ultimate CONSUMER of national intelligence efforts.

The statutory members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The NSC is supported by a staff headed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, generally known as the national security adviser.

●● National Security Information

Information determined by a U.S. government agency to require protection against unauthorized disclosure. The CLASSIFICATIONS of TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL are used to designate such information.

Also referred to as "classified information."

●● National Technical Means

U.S. term for the use of AIRCRAFT photography, SATELLITE photography, the seafloor SOUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, and other means of RECONNAISSANCE to provide arms control verification.

In *Deep Black* (1986) William E. Burrows wrote that National Technical Means " . . . are deemed to be so important in the arms control process that interfering with them is specifically prohibited by each treaty. Finally, the [National Technical Means] systems act as a kind of alarm that is supposed to go off when any of many indicators signaling a possible attack against the United States or any of its allies is observed."

●● NATO

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

●● Naval Criminal Investigative Service

(NCIS)

U.S. Navy agency responsible for investigative and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE activities.

The NCIS had been the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) until Dec. 1992, when the Navy decided that a name change would somehow aid the battered reputation of the NIS. The investigative service had been severely criticized in the 1980s for its handling of espionage cases and again in 1992 for its failure to dig into sexual harrassment charges stemming from a wild naval aviators' convention known as Tailhook.

In 1987, the NIS, as it was then known, became the prime investigative organization in the sensational spy case involving U.S. Marine guards at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Although the FBI is the lead agency for U.S. espionage cases, the NIS was called in because the Marines came under Navy jurisdiction.

The service was also heavily criticized during 1985 for its failure to detect an international smuggling ring that stole sensitive F-14 Tomcat aircraft parts from the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* and sold them to Iran; and the Walker spy ring, which had been operating within the Navy since 1968. (See JOHN A. WALKER.) During World War I a rapidly expanded Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) began to employ professional investigators to collect information about the capabilities of foreign military organizations and possible subversion. ONI at that time became deeply involved in counterintelligence and security of Navy facilities. ONI re-

tained responsibility for these missions, through the Naval Investigative Service, until the establishment of a separate Naval Investigative Service Command in 1985.

○○ Naval Intelligence

Body of intelligence dealing with naval and maritime activities, especially the technical aspects of ships and other weapons of potential enemies, and the means of developing and producing ships and weapons.

See DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S., OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

○○ Naval Intelligence, U.S.

The nation's longest-surviving intelligence service, U.S. Naval Intelligence traces its origins to the establishment of the OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI), created in 1882.

While ONI has always served as the intelligence staff for the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, with the fleets having their own intelligence staffs, late in World War II the ONI also became responsible for OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, a function previously assigned to the operating fleets.

Navy INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS also served on the fleet staffs and manned FLEET INTELLIGENCE CENTERS. Several separate naval intelligence agencies or subcommands were created during World War II. The most prominent one was the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center (NAVPIC), created in 1941 to train and support fleet photographers.

During the Cold War a number of specialized commands were organized within naval intelligence. Initially these came under the Office of Naval Intelligence; however, in 1967 the NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND was established as part of a general Navy reorganization to reduce Navy headquarters personnel and to establish unified direction and oversight for the increasing number of intelligence subcommands.

A hallmark of the Cold War era was the major increase in SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL (S&T) INTELLIGENCE, which led to creation of the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (NAVSTIC) in 1960. In an effort to develop a parallel organization structure, in 1964 NAVPIC was redesignated the Naval Reconnaissance and Technical Support Center (NRTSC). NAVSTIC was located at the Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C.; beginning in 1967 its offices were moved to the Washington suburb of Suitland, Md., to collocate NAVSTIC and NRTSC. As part of a limited consolidation, these and other subcommands were placed under the Naval Intelligence Command, formed in 1967, under a rear admiral who also served as a deputy DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

With NAVSTIC and NRTSC both handling SATELLITE photography and related intelligence, the two agencies were combined in 1972 into the Naval Intelligence Support Center. The center soon established a reputation as the premier S&T center within the Department of Defense intelligence community. (In 1988 it was renamed the Naval Technical Intelligence Center—NTIC.)

Meanwhile, the operational intelligence activities of ONI—known as the Special Intelligence Section—were renamed the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) in 1957 and moved to FORT MEADE, Md., location of the NSA. By 1970, as Soviet at-sea operations were increasing dramatically, NFOIO was directed to establish a current intelligence section, called the Navy Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center (NOSIC), at Suitland.

The continued concern over Soviet naval operations led the Navy to combine NFOIO and NOSIC into the Naval Operational Intelligence Center (NAVOPINTCEN or NFOIO) in 1981, located at Suitland and the Baltimore-Washington International Airport. This center, keeping track of all Soviet naval-related activities, was charged with providing INDICATIONS AND WARNING, current operational intelligence, and in-depth analysis.

Meanwhile, TASK FORCE (TF) 168 was established in 1969 to manage intelligence collection and improve support to fleet intelligence activities. Over the years TF 168 evolved into the intelligence collection arm of Naval Intelligence, with personnel being assigned throughout the world.

In 1964 the Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity was set up in Alexandria, Va., to support the increasing use of computers aboard ship and throughout the naval intelligence community. Later the activity was assigned responsibility for worldwide intelligence telecommunications. While some of the activity was at Suitland to support other naval intelligence work, in 1979 the entire command was moved there. In 1985 the activity was given responsibility for data-processing security throughout the Navy. Inevitably, in 1988 it was renamed Naval Intelligence Automation Center to reflect more accurately the greater scope of its mission, and in 1990 the name was changed again, to Naval Intelligence Activity.

With indications that the Cold War was coming to an end, in the late 1980s the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Adm. Edward D. (Ted) Sheafer, took a major step toward consolidating intelligence activities. In Oct. 1991—on the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union—NTIC, NAVOPINTCEN, TF 168, and portions of the oft-renamed Naval Intelligence Activity were merged into the new Naval Maritime Intelligence Center at Suitland.

Finally, in Jan. 1993, those portions of the intelligence community remaining outside the Naval Maritime Intelligence Center were combined with the center and placed directly under the Office of Naval Intelligence as the NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER. (Subsequently, Marine Corps and Coast Guard intelligence staffs were shifted to the National Maritime Intelligence Center.)

Beyond the multitude of naval intelligence organizations listed here, since the start of the Cold War the Navy has maintained a large number of Naval Reserve intelligence units. The men and women in these units have, individually and as units, worked on a variety of projects. Individuals have also augmented fleet and intelligence center staffs during crises and wars.

Also see NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

○○ Naval Intelligence Command

(NIC)

U.S. Navy command that provides support to the OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI). NIC was established on July 1, 1967, as part of a general Navy reorganization to reduce the number of Navy headquarters personnel and to establish unified direction and oversight for the increasing number of subcommands already subordinate to ONI.

The commander of NIC is normally a rear admiral who is "double-hatted" as a deputy DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. When originally established, NIC was located in an office building in Alexandria, Va. In 1979 it was transferred to the Federal Center in Suitland, Md., also a suburb of Washington, D.C. And in late 1993 it was moved into the new NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER.

○○ Naval Investigative Service

see NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

○○ Naval Security Group (NSG)

U.S. Navy designation for NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE activities. The term was adopted on July 1, 1968, for both the headquarters activity (at the NAVAL SECURITY STATION in Washington, D.C.), and the various communications intercepts groups, both ashore and afloat, around the world.

○○ Naval Security Station

Site of U.S. NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE headquarters from 1943 to 1995. Located at Massachusetts and Nebraska Avenues in northwest Washington, D.C., the facility was formerly the Mount Vernon College for women. The government took it over in late 1942, and the Communications Security Group occupied the former campus in early 1943.

The activity remained at the Washington location until Nov. 1995, when the command was moved to FORT MEADE, Md., site of the NSA.

Also see NAVAL SECURITY GROUP.

○○ Nave, Capt. Eric (b. 1899 d. 1993)

Leading Australian-British naval CRYPTOGRAPHER who helped break Japanese codes during World War II. Nave made a highly disputed claim that the British government had full knowledge of the Japanese JN-25 CODE on the eve of the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK of Dec. 7, 1941, but refused to tell the Americans of the impending strike.

Born in Australia, Nave entered the Royal Australian Navy and, required to learn a foreign language to pass the sublieutenant examinations, chose Japanese. As part of his language training he lived for two years in a small Japanese village.

Beginning in 1925 Nave was assigned to the Royal Navy to help in Japanese radio TRAFFIC ANALYSIS. He achieved his first major success on the occasion of the death of Emperor Yoshihito in 1926, when he compared the public broadcasts of official statements with coded versions of the same message being sent to Japanese embassies and naval commands abroad. A year later he was able to develop the most comprehensive list of Japanese naval call signs available in the West.

His accomplishments led to his being brought to England in 1927 for assignment to the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL (GC&CS). He helped to set up the GC&CS Japanese section and became the section head. When the Australian Navy requested his return, he was formally transferred to the Royal Navy in 1930.

In 1939, as the political situation in the Far East deteriorated, he was sent to Hong Kong to attempt to break the newly introduced JN-25 Japanese naval code. In his book *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into War* (1991), Nave claimed that the British codebreaking successes led to full knowledge of the planned Japanese strike against Pearl Harbor. But, he wrote, the British government failed to pass this on to U.S. commands. Nave's claim has not been corroborated by any responsible British or U.S. source.

Nave retired from the Royal Navy in 1947 and returned to Australia, where he helped to set up the AUSTRALIAN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (ASIO). He served with the ASIO for 12 years, retiring in 1959 as its deputy director.

○○ Navy Communications Intelligence

U.S. Navy COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) activities began in World War I when a Cryptologic Bureau was established, primarily to develop CODES and CIPHERS for naval use but also to break foreign communications. The Navy used elaborate systems at the peace conference in Paris in 1919 to encode messages for President Wilson and the State Department.

However, the Army's codebreaking staff, headed by HERBERT O. YARDLEY, was readily able to solve the Navy's systems. At the same time, the Navy codebreakers were having considerable difficulty in their own efforts. When the OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE learned of the efficacy of Yardley's efforts, the Cryptologic Bureau was closed down in July 1918.

Navy COMINT efforts against the Japanese Navy began in 1924 with the establishment of a COMINT organization within the Office of Naval Communications with the COVER designation of Research Desk. The unit was given the Navy code OP-20-G, with *OP* indicating the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *20* indicating Navy communications, and *G* the seventh unit within that office. (NAVAL INTELLIGENCE was OP-16 at the time.) Subsequently, the "research desk" was renamed the Communications Security Group.

The initial staff of the COMINT unit consisted of Lt. LAURENCE F. SAFFORD and four civilians. They were housed in the Main Navy Building, a World War I–era "temporary" on the Washington Mall. Their first task

was to solve Japanese diplomatic codes because those messages were readily available. At the time there was no collaboration between the Army and Navy codebreaking activities; indeed, the Army denied that its codebreaking BLACK CHAMBER even existed (see HERBERT O. YARDLEY).

Efforts to intercept the Japanese Navy's radio communications began in Oct. 1927, when a COMINT unit under Lt. Comdr. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, then the Asiatic Fleet's INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, on the U.S. cruiser *Marblehead* monitored communications of a Japanese naval exercise. Other Navy ships periodically embarked a COMINT team—referred to as Fleet Radio Units (FRU)—so that trained radiomen could copy down the Kata Kana Morse code used by the Japanese for later analysis.

At the same time that it established the COMINT unit, the Navy began setting up radio intercept stations. The first was in Peking, China, in 1925, manned by Marines. Subsequent intercept stations were set up in Shanghai; Heeia, on the eastern coast of Oahu, Hawaii; Guam; the Philippines; Bar Harbor, Maine; and Washington, D.C. In addition to the main Navy COMINT staff in Washington (station NEGAT), COMINT units to study Japanese communications and work on DECRYPTING messages were set up at Olongapo in the Philippines in 1932 (station CAST) and at PEARL HARBOR on Oahu in 1936 (station HYPO); these were set up to support the Asiatic and Pacific Fleet commanders, respectively. (The Hypo station was moved to the fortress island of Corregidor in Sep. 1941 following the construction of an extensive, underground, bombproof complex.) These three COMINT units were staffed by the ON-THE-ROOF GANG of Navy and Marine personnel.

The Navy COMINT attempts to break into Japanese communications were greatly helped when, in 1920, the Navy financed the first of a series of BLACK BAG JOBS against the Japanese Consulate in New York City by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), FBI, and New York City police. At the consulate the "crooks" were able to pick the lock on the office and open a safe that contained a Japanese naval code book. The book was carefully photographed and replaced without the Japanese knowing they had been burgled. The book was appropriately mined by the COMINT unit.

Although a 1923 break-in attempt failed because the Japanese safe could not be opened, apparently in 1926 and again in 1927 the ONI-FBI returned to the New York consulate to successfully photograph revisions to the code books, and did so still again in Sep. 1929, when break-ins occurred during five consecutive nights at the office of the Japanese inspector of naval matériel in New York, all without detection. (More BLACK BAG JOBS were reportedly made in 1938 or 1939.) The information gained from the 1920s break-ins led to the compilation of a Japanese code book that was bound in red buckram, from which the Japanese code acquired its American color-code designation RED.

The COMINT unit was able to provide Navy leaders with details of Japanese plans and operations, including the major exercise of 1930 and the trials of the rebuilt battleship *Nagato* in 1936, which demonstrated that the Japanese had significantly increased the warship's speed. At the end of 1930 the Japanese changed their codes, going to a machine-generated Red code.

The Japanese Navy again introduced a new fleet code on June 1, 1939. This was soon penetrated by the Navy COMINT unit. But it was changed again on Dec. 1, 1941, and was not recaptured until two weeks later (i.e., after the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK) when the Navy COMINT unit on Corregidor determined that the same code was in use but with new keys. This was the third or fourth series of keys used with the same code, simplifying U.S. decryption.

While the fleet was employing book codes, the Japanese naval ATTACHÉS were using machine-generated codes, which the COMINT unit could read. In 1931 the COMINT unit was given permission to provide the Army's newly established SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE with copies of all the code keys it had recovered. This occurred despite the Army's refusal even to acknowledge to the Navy the existence of its own codebreaking operation—the Black Chamber. After this, the Army worked primarily to break into the Japanese diplomatic code, while the Navy concentrated on naval codes and ciphers. However, during the winter of 1940–1941 the increased interest in Japanese diplomatic codes caused the Navy to join the Army in that work. The first machine that could break into the diplomatic code–called PURPLE–was built in 1940 at the Washington Navy Yard; the first complete Japanese message text was deciphered in the fall of the following year. The Army and Navy handled the deciphering and distribution of these messages jointly.

The Navy COMINT unit grew steadily, reinforced with a large number of reservists called to active duty in June 1941. By Dec. 7, 1941, the COMINT organization had 730 men and women—75 Navy officers, 645 enlisted men, and 10 civilians. Most were in Washington, with 186 at Pearl Harbor and 78 on Corregidor plus 26 in transit to the Philippines (diverted to Australia after the war began).

Among the civilians was Mrs. Agnes Meyer Driscoll, about whom Rear Adm. EDWIN T. LAYTON, the Pacific Fleet's INTELLIGENCE OFFICER during the war, wrote in *And I Was There* (1985)

> In the navy she was without peer as a cryptanalyst. Some of her pupils . . . were more able mathematicians but she had taught cryptanalysis to all of them, and none ever questioned her superb talent and determination in breaking codes and ciphers. She understood machines and how to apply them. In 1937 she would share the fifteen-thousand-dollar prize granted by the Senate for her contribution to developing a cipher machine with Lieutenant Commander William F. Gresham.

At the time Safford was on his third tour of duty in OP-20-G, having served there from 1924 to 1926, 1929 to 1932, and again from 1936 to early 1942. He was truly the founder of Navy COMINT, and largely responsible for its many successes.

After the war began the organization grew rapidly, and in early 1943 the Communications Security Group

was moved to a former women's college at Nebraska and Massachusetts Avenues in northwest Washington. (See NAVAL SECURITY STATION.)

Meanwhile, the Japanese Navy continued to use the same codes, which the U.S. Navy was able to penetrate until a major code change occurred on June 1, 1942. The ability to read those codes and determine Japanese plans in advance made possible the U.S. successes at the battles of Coral Sea in early May 1942 and MIDWAY in early June 1942.

By this time the Navy had placed Radio Intelligence Units (RIU) on board the flagships of most task forces in the Pacific. The men of the RIUs copied Japanese radio transmissions and advised their admirals of Japanese tactical plans and intentions, as well as relaying material back to the FLEET RADIO UNIT PACIFIC (FRUPAC) at Pearl Harbor. Dr. Ronald H. Spector, in *Listening to the Enemy* (1988), cites a FRUPAC report

> Operating conditions for RI Units at sea were often difficult, and were increased greatly by the obvious necessity for security. . . . One rather subtle problem was that of building the Admiral's confidence in his RI Unit. In many situations in which things were happening fast, the Admiral had to take the information of his RIU at face value, without explanation of its sources, and had to have confidence in his unit in order to take the necessary immediate action. For that reason, as often as possible, RI officers remained with one Admiral during the Admiral's whole tour at sea.

For much of the war the standard shipboard RIU was one officer and four operators, resulting in an extremely heavy work schedule for the unit, especially in combat, with almost continuous enemy transmissions to monitor.

Navy COMINT was especially important in SUBMARINE operations in the Pacific. To quote a report in *Listening to the Enemy,* "Without Communications Intelligence submarine operations would unquestionably have been far more difficult and costly because of the vast areas which had to be covered and the attainment of the ultimate objectives would have been greatly delayed." One of the first successes of COMINT in the war came in on Jan. 27, 1942, when Japanese radio intercepts were used to guide the U.S. submarine *Gudgeon* to intercept and sink the Japanese submarine *I-73* some 240 nautical miles west of Midway. The large Japanese craft went down with her entire crew of some 70 men, the first Japanese warship to be sunk by a U.S. submarine.

The U.S. Navy's codebreaking efforts were also used to support Army operations, as the Army's SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE was not able to break into Japanese Army codes on a large scale until 1944. The Navy's codebreaking enabled the Army to tell when ships were bringing reinforcements by sea or when the Japanese fleet was providing aerial or ship support for ground operations.

During the war the Navy's COMINT efforts were able to penetrate *all* Japanese naval codes and ciphers except for the Flag Officer's Cipher—a slow, cumbersome, and complex cipher, which the Japanese stopped using early in the war.

By the end of the war Navy COMINT had 8,454 men and women assigned—1,499 officers, 6,908 enlisted men and women, and 47 civilians.

In the post–World War II era the Navy has continued to operate a network of COMINT stations ashore as well as employing shipboard COMINT activities. Known since 1968 by the euphemism NAVAL SECURITY GROUP, these efforts first operated under the aegis of the ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY and then the NSA.

○○ Need to Know

A determination made by the holder of classified material that a prospective recipient has a requirement for access to or possession of the material. Holding a SECURITY CLEARANCE at a certain level does not automatically give a person access to all material at that classification.

Also see COMPARTMENTED.

○○ Negat

Code name for U.S. Navy CRYPTANALYSIS station at Navy Department headquarters in Washington, D.C., from the late 1930s through World War II. The station was part of the OP-20-G staff (NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE). Negat was located in the temporary buildings on Constitution Avenue built during World War I. It was moved after the war to the NAVAL SECURITY STATION at Massachusetts and Nebraska Avenues in northwest Washington, the campus of what had been the Mount Vernon College for women.

Negat was the phonetic word for the letter N in military communications at the time.

○○ Negative Intelligence

Intelligence known to have been COMPROMISED or known to have been acquired by an enemy but rendered useless to the enemy by COUNTERINTELLIGENCE activities.

○○ Neighbors

Soviet slang for the KGB that is used by other Soviet intelligence activities. The term reportedly originated with the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which was physically located closer to the KGB headquarters (which became the "close" neighbors) and farther from the GRU headquarters (which became the "far" or "distant" neighbors).

○○ Nesbitt, Frank A.

Former Air Force and Marine Corps officer who gave a Soviet agent classified communications information that he had obtained when he was in the Air Force in the early 1960s and in the Marine Corps in the 1970s. When he was arrested in 1990, Nesbitt said he believed that the information was so old that it had been declassified. He pleaded guilty.

○○ Net Assessment Group

Organization set up within the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL under President Nixon in 1971 as part of a reorganization of the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. The group was to review intelligence PRODUCTS and use them to make a net assessment. Usually, this would consist of comparisons between the military forces and capabilities of the United States and those of the Soviet Union.

The group was formed on Dec. 6, 1971, in response to the Blue Ribbon Panel created by President Nixon to recommend reorganization in the Department of Defense. The director of Net Assessment reports to the Secretary of Defense.

○○ Network

A group of AGENTS or ILLEGALS who have common goals or espionage TARGETS and who have a common leader or HANDLER. A network may contain several CELLS to prevent the detection or COMPROMISE of one or more members from being able to identify all members of the network.

○○ NFIB

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

○○ NIA

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

○○ NIC

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

○○ Nicholson, Maj. Arthur D.

U.S. Army officer fatally shot by a Soviet sentry while taking photographs in a restricted zone in East Germany. Nicholson, part of a U.S. liaison unit observing Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, was taking photographs of Soviet military equipment when he was shot on March 24, 1985.

The Soviets claimed that Nicholson, although authorized to be a military observer, was in a restricted military zone and was not supposed to be taking photographs.

Army Sgt. Jesse Schatz, who had accompanied Nicholson, said that the major had entered a building in a military facility and had taken photographs in the building. But Schatz said that Nicholson was outside the restricted area when the sentry shot him. Nearly an hour passed before Nicholson, who lay dying, was given medical attention.

○○ Nicolai, Oberst Walther

(b. 1873 d. ?)

Chief of the German MILITARY INTELLIGENCE service (Geheime Nachrichtendienst des Heeres), Section IIIb of the General Staff of the Field Army, from 1913 to 1921.

After attending a church school and joining the cadet corps, Nicolai entered the Army as a 2nd lieutenant. Following three years at the staff college, in 1904 he was appointed to the General Staff.

In July 1906 he became the first INTELLIGENCE OFFICER to be assigned to the I Army Corps at Königsberg. He immediately concentrated on establishing a NETWORK of spies in the Russian frontier area. His efforts were highly successful. Nicolai subsequently became head of the Russian section of the military intelligence service, which was part of the headquarters of the German Field Army, and in 1913 he became head of the service, concerned with intelligence collection on both the French and Russian fronts.

Intelligence historian DAVID KAHN, in *Hitler's Spies* (1978), described Nicolai as " . . . . an energetic, blondish general staff officer of medium height, in his mid-thirties . . . . He ran the spy agency exactly as he would lead a regiment in the field, for he was a Prussian officer, who did his duty wherever he was assigned."

His organization ran hundreds of AGENTS in enemy and neutral countries, and coordinated reports from other commands for the German General Staff. His best-known spy was MATA HARI—who provided no real intelligence to him. His most successful spy was Baron Schulga—known as Agent 17—who provided vital information on French Army movements as troops mobilized in Aug. 1914. He was able to send reports to Nicolai every two days, his COURIERS taking just 48 hours to cross from France through neutral Switzerland to Germany. In failing health (he was 73 when the war began), Schulga went to Germany in March 1916 and retired.

In 1915 Nicolai established an internal intelligence service, with informers in German industrial firms, various institutions, and even private groups. The effort was initiated to collect information about foreign countries, but as conditions inside Germany became unsettled, Nicolai discovered information of value about the homeland as well.

Nicolai's agents and operations achieved few successes; according to Kahn he suffered from three major failures:

1. He undertook no espionage in the United States until several months after the American declaration of war in April 1917.

2. He failed to collect ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE on his enemies, an increasingly important factor in warfare.

3. He failed to learn in advance and advise the German High Command of an important new weapon appearing on the battlefield: the tank.

Six days after the armistice on Nov. 11, 1918, Nicolai's Section IIIb disbanded and he was transferred to the General Staff in BERLIN. There he established a small intelligence section that survived until the rebuilding of the German Army in the 1930s, when it evolved into FOREIGN ARMIES WEST.

Also see Vice Adm. WILHELM CANARIS, Oberstleutnant RICHARD HENTSCH.

●● NIE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

●● NIGHTMOVER

see ALDRICH H. AMES

●● NIKITIN, CAPT. 1ST RANK ALEXANDER

Retired Russian naval officer arrested on Feb. 6, 1996, by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSK) on charges of espionage. At the time Nikitin was employed as a consultant by Bellona, a Norwegian environmental group studying the problems of hazardous nuclear material originating from Russian submarines.

In 1995 the Russian government gave Bellona documents and computer records related to nuclear materials, Subsequently, the documents and records were taken back by the government but were returned to Bellona in the fall of 1995. Bellona officials decried the temporary seizure, claiming it was harassment. However, an FSK official claimed that Bellona and other foreign environmental organizations were working beyond their charters.

Nikitin was arrested for giving state secrets to Bellona in the form of classified documents. He may have been the first Russian to be arrested for espionage related to an environmental group.

Reportedly, all Norwegian parliamentarians wrote to the Russian government on Nikitin's behalf, and on Feb. 18, 1996, the Norwegian daily newspaper *Dagblader* stated, "If Nikitin is convicted, it will be a catastrophe for the significant environmental work done so far in Russia."

That same month, U.S. Vice President Albert Gore met in Washington, D.C., with Russian President Boris Yeltsin's environmental adviser, Alexei Yablokov, to express American concern over the proceedings against Nikitin.

●● NIKONOV, GEN. (?) A.M.

(b. ? d. 1938)

Reportedly the chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1922 to 1924. Very little information exists about him.

It is not clear whether Nikonov was his real name or a Bolshevik pseudonym (like Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky). He was chief of military intelligence after OSCAR STIGGA, but it is probable that YAN BERZIN took over from Nikonov.

He was executed in the Stalinist purges of 1938.

●● NIS

Naval Investigative Service; see NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

●● NISEI

Men and women born in the United States of immigrant Japanese parents (and therefore United States citizens). More than 6,000 Nisei men served with U.S. military headquarters and intelligence units as translators and interpreters in the Pacific areas during World War II. (Many others served in Army combat units in the European theater.)

Beginning in the spring of 1941, before American entry into World War II, several Japanese-Americans in the U.S. Army received Japanese-language training. Many, despite their ancestry, had no practical knowledge of the language. They received language training at the Presidio in San Francisco, Calif., until all Japanese-Americans were forcibly evacuated from West Coast in 1942. The language school then moved to Camp Savage and, in Aug. 1944, to Fort Snelling, both near Minneapolis, Minn. The first class of 45 students graduated from the six-month program in May 1942. Some students also attended a one-year Japanese course at University of Michigan.

On Feb. 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that resulted in the detention of nearly 120,000 men, women, and children on the West Coast who were of Japanese descent. About two-thirds of them were citizens (Nisei), and more than one-fourth of them were children under 15. The Nisei were soon allowed to enlist in the U.S. Army. (In all, more than 17,000 Japanese-Americans served in the U.S. Army during World War II.)

While most Nisei served in combat units in the European theater, more than 6,000 were given Japanese-language training and served in the Pacific Ocean and Southwest Pacific theaters. Almost all were U.S. Army enlisted men, and a few were made Army warrant officers. However, they were regularly assigned to Navy and Marine units to support intelligence activities, and some served in the China-Burma-India theater. (In addition, the U.S. Army had approximately 700 non-Japanese Americans trained in the Japanese language; the Navy used only non-Japanese Americans in this role.)

Most Nisei were employed to translate captured documents and interpret for prisoner of war interrogations; some served with Army COUNTERINTELLIGENCE units; and a very few were employed directly in code-breaking efforts (MAGIC-ULTRA). Some were parachuted behind Japanese lines with Army RECONNAISSANCE units to assess the enemy situation.

One Nisei, Richard M. Sakakida, was among 15 trained by the FBI in 1941 for counterintelligence work. Then an Army master sergeant, Sakakida entered Manila as an anti-American, draft-dodging seaman. With this COVER he collected information on Filipino firms that might have associations with the Japanese. When war erupted in Dec. 1941 he donned his uniform and served as an Army translator. Captured by the Japanese when U.S. forces in the Philippines surrendered on May 6, 1942, he underwent interrogation and torture, all the time claiming that he was in the Army against his will. His story was believed, and he was released on Feb. 11, 1943, to be employed by the Japanese as an interpreter.

Sakakida was subsequently able to help engineer a prison escape. Although able to join a Filipino guerrilla

group, he was not reunited with U.S. troops until Sept. 25, 1945. After the war Sakakida left the Army, entered the Air Force, and retired in 1975 with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The term Nisei is Japanese for "second generation."

○○ NKGB

see NKVD

★ ○○ NKVD

The "secret police" of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. The NKVD, Narodnyy Komisariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), and its immediate successors—the MVD, NKGB, and MGB—were responsible for both state security-espionage and internal security-repression from 1934 until 1953.

The terror and repression of the CHEKA—born of the Russian Revolution of 1917—and the replacement GPU and OGPU pale in comparison with the methods of the NKVD, in many respects history's premier apparatus for internal security and repression. However, the NKVD was also Stalin's foreign intelligence and security ORGAN, responsible for ferreting out secrets from the West and destroying enemies of the state who had fled to the West. The NKVD grew to a monstrous size—embracing not only traditional security and espionage roles but also internal and border troop formations, as well as the administrators of numerous institutions—including the vast Gulag, the constellation of prison camps that spread across the Soviet state.

The establishment of the NKVD was apparently linked to Stalin's decision to murder Sergei Kirov, a leading Russian revolutionary who in 1934 was head of the Leningrad Communist Party, the most powerful entity within the Soviet party organization.

On July 10, 1934, the existing security-espionage organ, the OGPU, was subsumed into the new All-Union NKVD. GENRIKH YAGODA, already a veteran perpetrator of state terror, was named head of the new agency. British political writer-historian Robert Conquest observed in *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties* (1968):

> The new body was to be efficiently deployed over the following years. Its increasingly privileged and powerful officers were to make its emblem—a serpent being struck down by a sword—prevail everywhere against the hammer and sickle of Party membership. From Politburo members down, no one was to be exempt from their attentions. They themselves were to remain under the careful control of the supreme political authority, Stalin.

On the afternoon of Dec. 1, 1934, in Leningrad, Sergei Kirov was walking through the darkened hallway of Communist party headquarters, en route to a meeting. His ever-present personal bodyguard was not present when a young assassin shot him in the back. The murder had obviously been arranged by Yagoda, as Stalin saw no other way to solve his complex political problems other than to kill his chief rival and then, seeking to blame those behind the killing, eliminate all potential opponents.

Yagoda's NKVD immediately conducted investigations—and arrests. The murderer and 116 others were convicted of conspiracy and were executed by the NKVD. Thus did Stalin destroy his immediate political enemies.

Meanwhile, Yagoda built, reshaped, and honed the NKVD. Known as "bluecaps"—for their hats and collar tabs—the NKVD officers were becoming the elite of the new Soviet society. Conquest observed:

> They were among the most highly regarded of the new *priviligentsia* which was arising from Stalin's anti-egalitarian policies. New and more ostentatious uniforms came in. At the same time, NKVD officers were expected to learn the social graces. Many of them married smart and good-looking wives from the old educated classes, the type who gravitate to power and money in whatever form, and who, moreover, gained immunity from the otherwise unfortunate results of their social origins. NKVD children attended special schools. Junior posts often went to the sons of high officials.

For himself Yagoda took the grandiose title of General Commissar of State Security (equivalent to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union) and designed a suitably ornate uniform. But the man who created this apparatus did not live to see its fruition. NIKOLAI YEZHOV, head of the Party Control Commission that handled NKVD matters for the Communist Party, increasingly took over NKVD direction. Yagoda was dismissed from all his positions on Sept. 30, 1936, and Yezhov took charge. Yezhov formally denounced Yagoda at a meeting of senior NKVD officers at the LUBYANKA headquarters on March 18, 1937. (Yagoda was executed after a show trial the following year.)

Throughout the Soviet Union senior NKVD officers were arrested, day and night, at home or in the office (and often while in their car en route between them). Some committed suicide—a pistol to the temple or a plunge through an open window, hoping to spare their families from retribution. In all, more than 3,000 of Yagoda's subordinates are said to have died in 1937.

THE GREAT TERROR

Meanwhile the "great terror" began: The first major victims were the leaders of the Army—potential opponents of Stalin. On June 11, 1937, it was announced that eight of the most senior officers of the Red Army had been arrested and charged with treason. The following day they were executed. Another senior officer, also implicated in the conspiracy, committed suicide. More officers followed to THE CELLAR of Lubyanka—and to the execution yard at the NKVD building at 11 Dzerzhinsky Street, and to execution cells in the massive Lefortovo prison, and in a score of other NKVD headquarters across the country. Three of the Red Army's five marshals were thus murdered, as were 14 of 16 senior army commanders, 60 of 67 corps com-

manders, 136 of the 199 division commanders, 221 of the 397 brigade commanders, and thousands of other officers.

The Navy was not immune, despite the Communist Party having taken personal control of that service after the bloody Kronshtadt revolt of 1921. All eight "flagmen" (admirals) were executed, as were thousands of lesser officers. (In Aug. 1938 M. P. Frinovsky, a former deputy head of the NKVD, was appointed commissar for the Navy; he was nominally head of the Navy until March 1939.) And throughout the country, the NKVD was arresting, and courts were trying, local political and party leaders; also taken off the streets and from their beds were authors, poets, scientists, artists, engineers, and teachers. No one was immune from the "black marias," the arrest vans driven by bluecaps.

Soon, however, Stalin appeared to be tiring of the purge, realizing perhaps that he could not allow it to go further without fatally disrupting Soviet society, industry, and the military. Yezhov's power was waning. There were reports of interrogations getting out of hand, with Yezhov personally shooting some senior military officers. He was dismissed from his NKVD position on Dec. 8, 1938, remaining briefly in a lesser government position. In early 1939 he disappeared. There was no trial or ritual denunciation, as there had been for his predecessor.

His successor was LAVRENTY BERIA, who would become Stalin's most trusted lieutenant—if the term "trusted" could be associated with Stalin. The reign of terror was completed under Beria. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS serving abroad—NKVD and GRU (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE)—were recalled to be "tried" and executed. Those who did not return tried to flee to the West; some succeeded. Others were killed by assassination teams sent to track them down. One political TARGET was Leon Trotsky, an "old Bolshevik" who had opposed Stalin's taking control of the government in the 1920s. Living in exile in Mexico, he was murdered by an NKVD assassin in 1940. A year later NKVD assassins executed the first senior Soviet intelligence officer to have defected, Maj. Gen. WALTER KRIVITSKY, who was found dead in a Capitol Hill hotel in Washington, D.C.

Not all "traitors" were executed. The prison camps—the Gulag—were being fed masses of men and women. There were true criminals, political prisoners, and those caught up in the quotas of the great terror. Despite a tremendously high death rate due to hard labor, scanty rations, brutal guards, and Siberian winters, there were an estimated eight million Soviet prisoners in Gulag camps before the Soviet Union entered World War II in June 1941. (Another million were estimated to be in prisons.)

In the camps the men and women prisoners usually worked 10 hours a day, or 12, or 16. They built dams and canals (see GENRIKH YAGODA); they laid hundreds of miles of railroad track; they logged (women were formally forbidden from logging in 1951); they dug for gold—and later for uranium. They were not paid, and they were fed starvation rations, all chronicled in Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn's two-volume *The Gulag Archipelago* (1973, 1975).

Beyond the Gulag camps and the prisons, the NKVD operated other internment facilities. The scientific research center on the outskirts of Moscow—vividly described in Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* (1968)—was staffed by prisoners. There were also aircraft design bureaus operated by the NKVD and staffed by prisoners. Many engineers and designers continued their work while incarcerated in "internal prison," sometimes under sentence of death. Many imprisoned aircraft designers served their internment at State Aviation Factory (GAZ) No. 39 in Moscow; others were at design bureaus (KB) while under detention; prisoner-designer Vladimir Petlyakov headed KB No. 100, Vladimir Myasishchev directed KB No. 102, and Andrei Tupolev was at KB No. 103.

Tupolev, the doyen of Soviet aircraft designers, had traveled to the United States and Germany in 1936 to study aircraft designs—with government approval. In 1938 he was arrested and charged with "sabotage." Imprisoned, he continued to design aircraft: " . . . I did spend five years in jail. I am the only aircraft designer in the world who designed a four-engine bomber under house arrest," he told a journalist. (He was released in 1943.)

The NKVD also operated a submarine design bureau. The only submarine known to have emerged from that KB was the *M-400,* designed by B. L. Bzhezinsky in 1939. The 65½-foot, high-speed, combination submarine-submersible torpedo boat was launched in July 1941. Her hull was damaged by German artillery fire during the siege of Leningrad and construction was suspended in 1942; she was never finished.

FOREIGN ESPIONAGE

This obsession with internal security-repression did not deter the NKVD from overseas espionage activities. Most Western countries were targets, but the most sought-after secrets were in Britain and the United States; Britain had been viewed as an enemy since the Russian civil war, while the United States had technology and manufacturing methods that Stalin coveted (see ARCOS AFFAIR).

The NKVD also established one of the most effective espionage NETWORKS of all time, the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING. For more than a decade these men spied out the secrets of Britain and the United States, some holding high positions in the British Foreign Office and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). When Cambridge spy JOHN CAIRNCROSS reported that the British were involved in atomic research related to the development of a super weapon, it was the signal for Beria to tell his AGENTS in Britain and the United States to establish an ATOMIC SPY RING and seek out the secrets of the atom.

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin suddenly found himself allied with Britain and the United States. This led to an increase in Soviet diplomatic, trade, and military delegations to both countries, as well as an increase in the number of NKVD and GRU LEGAL operatives.

Meanwhile, the massive troop units built up within the NKVD were increasingly committed to fighting for the Soviet homeland against *external* enemies. NKVD divisions, corps, and armies fought the Germans on the Eastern Front. Equally important, NKVD units operated

behind Soviet lines in critical areas, ensuring that troops did not retreat. NKVD's special ranks were changed to military ranks in 1943, as Stalin sought to integrate his hated secret police into the military establishment.

A more specialized NKVD military police unit was required to meet wartime contingencies, and in 1941 Beria created SMERSH ("Death to Spies") as an agency of the NKVD under Commissioner of State Security 3rd Rank Vasili Chernyshov. From April 14, 1943, to March 16, 1946, Smersh functioned as a separate agency directly under the State Committee of Defense, headed by Stalin. This marked the first and possibly only time that Soviet military COUNTERINTELLIGENCE came under the military establishment (albeit in the persona of Stalin) and not under the security organs. Significantly, Smersh officers had supremacy over standard NKVD forces.

During this period of independence from the NKVD, Smersh was commanded by Beria's deputy and protégé Col. Gen. VIKTOR ABAKUMOV, the First Deputy Commissar for State Security. There was also a Navy section of Smersh. Meanwhile, NKVD combat units fought, often with distinction, in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, and the North Caucasus. (NKVD internal troops did not fight in battles; they were needed for COUNTERESPIONAGE duties, and perhaps 250,000 continued to guard the Gulag camps and other prisons, and the special NKVD trains that shuttled prisoners around the country.)

The NKVD was also responsible for one of the most noteworthy of the innumerable heinous crimes of World War II: the KATYN MASSACRE. The Soviets had captured about 200,000 Polish troops in late 1939 as the Soviet Union joined Nazi Germany in assaulting Poland. About 15,000 of the prisoners—including 8,700 officers—were never seen again. They were murdered by the NKVD.

Among the many other activities of the secret police during the war was management of the Soviet atomic bomb project. As Stalin learned details of the American-British efforts, he placed various aspects of Soviet atomic bomb development—as well as atomic espionage—under Beria.

REORGANIZATIONS

In 1941 Stalin reorganized the security organs. From Dec. 1938 to Feb. 1941, Beria had served as both commissar for internal affairs (NKVD) and head of the main Administration of State Security (GUGB), a subordinate agency of the NKVD.

For a brief period, from Feb. to July 1941, Stalin separated these two organs, creating a People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB—People's Commissariat for State Security) under VSEVOLOD MERKULOV for state security-espionage while leaving the NKVD, responsible for internal security, under Beria. Merkulov was a member of Beria's "Georgian Mafia," so called because he, like Beria and many other Beria cronies, came from Soviet Georgia.

U.S. intelligence analyst John J. Dziak observed in *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (1988), "These particular organizational changes . . . were never fully explained but they may have had something to do with digesting captive lands and peoples"—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, portions of Poland, and the extraction of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania. "Arrests, deportations, executions, and prison camps increased, demanding reorganized and expanded security forces."

However, wrote Dziak, "The shock of the German invasion propelled a fusion in July 1941 and the two organs were united once again as the NKVD under Beria." This arrangement lasted until April 14, 1943.

Again Stalin reorganized, establishing the NKGB—again under Merkulov—and the NKVD under Beria. Wrote Dziak, " . . . the victory at Stalingrad and associated Soviet advances offered the prospect of reconquered lands and populations. Hence, the 1943 NKGB-NKVD separation once again."

This arrangement lasted until March 16, 1946. At that time Smersh was merged into the new Ministry of State Security (MGB), becoming the Third Chief Directorate, responsible for military COUNTERESPIONAGE. Merkulov became head of the MGB. Simultaneously, the NKVD—responsible for internal security—was elevated to the status of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

In this period Stalin also created the KI, or Committee of Information, to carry out the foreign intelligence and clandestine operations previously performed by the MGB. The KI was under the Council of Ministers, an awkward and, in practice, unworkable arrangement. There were too many overlaps and shortfalls in the KI's charter, and a year later, the GRU withdrew its foreign operations from the KI and returned several functions to the MGB. The KI was left with only foreign political and ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. These, too, were returned to the MGB in 1951, marking the end of the agency.

This MGB-MVD setup lasted for the rest of Stalin's life. One day after he died on March 5, 1953, Beria, at that moment the strongest of Stalin's potential successors, presided over another merger of the state security and internal security organs—under the rubric MVD—headed, of course, by Lavrenty Beria. (The massive reorganization had obviously been planned earlier.)

Beria shared power with others as the Soviet Union attempted to recover from the death of Stalin, who had ruled for almost three decades. But there could be no question that he envisioned himself becoming the first head of a state security agency to become chief of state. That vision ended in June 1953 when Beria was arrested and, a few months later, executed.

With his arrest, the NKVD and its successor agencies came to an end. Col. Gen. SERGEI KRUGLOV, a veteran NKVD and Smersh officer, took over the "super" MVD while the nation's political leaders sorted out and reorganized the complex institutions of Stalin's legacy.

The KGB (Committee for State Security) was established in March 1954 to undertake all state security and foreign intelligence operations (other than those assigned to the GRU). The MVD was reassigned to internal security functions, remaining the MVD.

CHIEFS OF THE NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD

The chiefs of these organs were:

NKVD

July 1934–Sept. 1936	Genrikh Yagoda (previously head of OGPU)
Sept. 1936–Dec. 1938	Nikolay Yezhov
Dec. 1938–Feb. 1941	Lavrenty Beria
July 1941–1946	Lavrenty Beria

NKGB (Narodnyy Komisariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)

Feb. 1941–July 1941	Vsevolod Merkulov
Apr. 1943–Mar. 1946	Vsevolod Merkulov

MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)

Mar. 1946–Oct. 1946	Vsevolod Merkulov
Oct. 1946–Aug. 1951	Viktor Abakumov
Aug. 1951–Dec. 1951	Sergei Ogoltsov
Dec. 1951–Mar. 1953	SEMYON IGNATYEV

MVD (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del)

1946–June 1953	Lavrenty Beria
Mar. 1953–Mar. 1954	Sergei Kruglov

○○ NM-1

A technology demonstration aircraft for the most ambitious strategic RECONNAISSANCE aircraft developed by the Soviet Union.

Referred to as *recativnyi strategicheskyi razvyedchik* (strategic reconnaissance aircraft), the definitive spyplane was to fly at more than 1,850 mph (Mach 2.8) at altitudes of about 100,000 feet. It would be fitted with high-speed cameras and, as they became available, other sensors.

The design was entrusted to Pavel V. Tsybin at the Flight Research Institute rather than to a traditional aircraft design bureau. Tsybin selected a radical design with a long, circular-section fuselage, relatively short wings with a large area provided by a trapezoidal planform, with jet engine pods fitted to the wingtips. Ironically, the design was somewhat akin to CLARENCE (KELLY) JONSON'S CL-282 and CL-400 designs, which evolved from the F-104 Starfighter. Propulsion for the Soviet aircraft was probably to be ramjets.

The complexity of the design led the decision to build a slower technology demonstration aircraft—designated NM-1—before proceeding with the full-scale, Mach 2.8 aircraft. This aircraft was flown in 1959–1960. It was found to have poor low-speed handling characteristics as well as other potential problems.

Data from the NM-1 flight tests and difficulties in development of the engines for the definitive aircraft led to cancellation of this most ambitious project by 1960.

○○ NMIC

NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER

○○ NOC

NON-OFFICIAL COVER

○○ NOFORN

Derived from "no foreign," a U.S. security restriction that prevents CLASSIFIED documents or other material from being shown or transferred to a foreign citizen regardless of his or her SECURITY CLEARANCE.

○○ NOLAN, BRIG. GEN. DENNIS

(b. 1872 d. 1956)

U.S. Army officer whose efforts raised the status of MILITARY INTELLIGENCE before and during World War I.

Nolan graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1896 and served in the Spanish-American War. Later he was stationed in the Philippines, where the U.S. Army put down an armed revolt against U.S. occupation of the islands.

Assigned to the War Department's General Staff as a captain, Nolan worked closely with Capt. RALPH H. VAN DEMAN, a pioneer in ARMY INTELLIGENCE (U.S.). When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, Maj. Gen. John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), chose Nolan to be his G-2, ordering him to develop an intelligence operation tailored to the war that the AEF was to fight.

Nolan set up an elaborate intelligence NETWORK, with officers specially trained for intelligence in every battalion and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE units in neutral countries to gather POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE as well as MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. To track down German spies behind the lines in France, Nolan set up the Corps of Intelligence Police, a rowdy crew of French-speaking sergeants who included a French murderer and a deserter from the French Foreign Legion.

Nolan ingratiated himself with his British counterparts. The chief of British general headquarters intelligence called him "clear-headed, and very penetrating in his criticisms and questions. He is the exact opposite of the usual British conception of the American." The British shared their counterintelligence reports, some of which were ordinarily shown only to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Nolan also became a friend of Maj. STEWART G. MENZIES, a future Director-General of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).

Nolan was promoted to brigadier general during the war; afterward he was returned to his permanent grade of major. His one-star rank was restored when he became director of the Army's Military Intelligence Division in Sept. 1920. At that time the Army engaged in DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE aimed at finding communists—popularly called Reds—plotting to overthrow the U.S. government. Popular opinion turned against the use of soldiers for internal intelligence, and Nolan ended the practice.

●● NONCONTRACT

Derived from "non contractor," a U.S. security restriction to prevent CLASSIFIED documents or other material from being shown or transferred to commercial contractors regardless of their SECURITY CLASSIFICATION.

The restriction was abolished in 1995 because it was found to add little to the security of national defense programs.

●● NON-OFFICIAL COVER (NOC)

Term used by the CIA for CASE OFFICERS who operate overseas outside the usual diplomatic COVER. Most case officers work out of U.S. embassies, protected by a diplomatic cover. An individual caught working as an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER is usually declared persona non grata (referred to as "being PNG'd") and ordered to leave the host country. NOCs do not have that privilege, and so their work can be more dangerous.

When ROBERT M. GATES was DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, he increased the number of NOCs, despite fears that this would place an added personnel and financial burden on the CIA. NOCs are denied the protection and the secure communications of an embassy. They work under a cover that is usually a legitimate or seemingly legitimate business.

NOCs usually operate outside of the UNITED STATES COUNTRY TEAM, the U.S. personnel in a country, including CIA officers, who are under the authority of the U.S. ambassador. NOCS may be involved in clandestine activities that are unknown to the ambassador.

●● NORCANUKUS

Security restriction that permits classified documents or other material from being shown or transferred to persons with the appropriate SECURITY CLEARANCE from Norway, Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States.

●● NORDPOL (North Pole)

German ABWEHR operation against the Dutch underground network set up by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II.

In March 1941 the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. The operator omitted certain words that served as a warning that the sender was under enemy control; the receiver in Britain was not supposed to acknowledge the message if it did not contain those words. To emphasize his predicament, the captured operator also got the word "captured" into the message. Nevertheless, the operator acknowledged the message—leading the operator to believe that the British knew he was captured but wanted him to continue contacting Britain.

The Germans thus penetrated the Dutch operation and became aware of the time and place of arrivals from Britain, even suggesting targets for sabotage and getting thousands of guns, containers of ammunition and explosives, and even food and currency.

For more than two years the GESTAPO or Abwehr captured AGENTS sent in by SOE and MI6 by parachute or by small boat. Eventually, Nordpol operatives were running 17 transmitters in Holland, sending thousands of false messages to the SOE and MI6. The Nordpol operation spread to Belgium and France, where more agents were captured.

Nordpol officers, knowing that the SOE dealt mostly with sabotage, invented acts of sabotage and kept running the captured SOE agents. But because it was more difficult to fake results from captured SIS agents seeking intelligence, they were usually executed immediately. In Sept. 1944, when the captured agents were no longer of any use to Nordpol, 47 of them were executed.

The SOE remained ignorant of Nordpol until about May 1943, when agents who escaped from the Germans were able to send messages to Britain. Two who managed to make it to Spain and then to Britain were imprisoned for giving aid to the enemy. Later in 1943, when other escaped agents told what had happened, the British released the original two and began understanding what really occurred.

●● NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

A major TARGET for espionage by Soviet intelligence during the Cold War. Soviet officials saw the Allies' defense organization as a military threat whose secrets had to be discovered in the event of East-West war.

NATO was founded early in the Cold War, soon after the Soviet Union blockaded BERLIN in 1948. By the time the Soviets ended the blockade in May 1949, nine World War II Allies—the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway—had joined with Italy, a former Axis enemy, and two nations neutral in the war, Portugal and Iceland, to form NATO. The NATO nations set up three principal military commands (with two permanently under American officers and one under a British officer) and pledged that an attack on any one of them would constitute an attack on all of them. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952.

When a rearmed West Germany joined NATO in 1955, the Soviet Union hastily organized the Warsaw Treaty Organization—consisting of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and East Germany. The intelligence services of each of these Eastern Bloc nations contributed to the unrelenting Soviet campaign. Several times the Soviets were successful in achieving a major intelligence objective: PENETRATION of NATO.

Western intelligence officials believe that penetration may have occurred very early. British spy DONALD MACLEAN's position in the British Foreign Office in the late 1940s enabled him to provide his Soviet HANDLERS with details of U.S.-British thinking on the founding of NATO. An official U.S. appraisal of Maclean's work

said: "In the fields of US/UK/Canada planning on atomic energy, US/UK postwar planning and policy in Europe, all information up to the date of [Maclean's] defection undoubtedly reached Soviet hands. . . ." (Maclean defected in 1951.)

JOHN CAIRNCROSS, a member, like Maclean, of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING, also revealed early secrets about NATO. YURI MODIN, the NKVD officer who handled members of the Cambridge ring, wrote that in the fall of 1948 Cairncross was working in the British Ministry of Defence on NATO plans when Modin asked him for information on the possible placing of nuclear weapons in West Germany. "A month later, I had in my possession every detail of NATO's plans for nuclear arms in Germany," Modin wrote in *My Five Cambridge Friends* (1994). "From the start," Modin said, "we knew what the American bases in Turkey, Norway, Iceland and Italy had cost to set up, the value of Britain's contribution of equipment, how many civilians were employed, who provided the food and who maintained the bases at what price. We also knew the nature of the weapons involved, how much they were worth and which country had supplied them."

The East German secret police, the Stasi (see MFS), was especially skilled at penetrating NATO. Handsome male Stasi AGENTS—dubbed "Romeos" by Western intelligence officials—targeted both West German agencies and NATO offices specifically to seduce secretaries and obtain secrets through SEX. Among the seduced spies was a German woman employed at NATO headquarters in Brussels. MARKUS WOLF, chief of the Stasi through most of the Cold War, boasted of placing agents in high councils of NATO. Some may never have been found.

HUGH GEORGE HAMBLETON, a NATO economist, spied for the Soviet Union for years. His espionage may have been revealed by ANATOLY GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected to the West in Dec. 1961. Golitsin told Western debriefers that a steady stream of NATO intelligence came to the Soviets from agents who were working at NATO.

Rear Adm. Hermann Luedke, chief of the logistics department of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, was suspected of being the highest-ranking Soviet spy in NATO. Knowing he was under suspicion, he killed himself in 1968. Two other officers and a civil servant subsequently committed suicide, but any connection betweeen them and Luedke was not made public at the time.

Probably the most valuable Soviet spy was REINER RUPP, who, together with his wife, provided the East Germans and, through them, the Soviet Union, with copies of an estimated 10,000 NATO documents. Their espionage, said a German prosecutor, "could have lost NATO a war."

Also valuable was U.S. Army Sgt. CLYDE LEE CONRAD, who ran a NATO spy ring that sold secrets of nuclear missiles and troop strength. Conrad, who served in Europe for ten years, in the late 1970s was in charge of maintaining classified documents at an Army base near Bad Kreuzbach, West Germany. The ring included at least two members of the Hungarian intelligence service. Reportedly, one of the Hungarians had also received payment from the CIA for what turned out to be fake documents.

Conrad had access to the general defense plans for one of two U.S. mechanized infantry divisions then in Europe. The divisions were part of a NATO force assigned to the Fulga Gap, a plain northwest of Frankfurt that NATO strategists pinpointed as a likely Warsaw Pact invasion route.

Conrad recruited Sgt. RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY and Staff Sgt. JEFFREY S. RONDEAU, who continued the espionage into the 1980s, passing NATO defense plans to Czechoslovakian and Hungarian INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. Ramsay, a document custodian, was said to have sold intelligence about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and military communications. The Hungarian service, like other Soviet-trained Eastern Bloc agencies, shared its intelligence successes with the Soviets.

U.S. Army Warrant Officer JOSEPH G. HELMICH, JR., A cryptomaterial custodian stationed in Paris in the early 1960s, decided to pay off his debts by becoming a WALK-IN (a volunteer spy). He walked into the Soviet Embassy in Paris and offered to sell secrets about U.S. and NATO communications.

The U.S.–West German extradition treaty did not cover espionage, so NATO spies caught in West Germany were tried there.

The Soviet spy ring, code-named SAPPHIRE, was headquartered in France, but its tentacles reached into NATO. Among the Sapphire spies was Georges Pâques, a NATO press secretary, who was seen by French SURVEILLANCE operatives passing material to a Soviet HANDLER. Pâques claimed at his trial that he passed diplomatic and military information to the Soviets for the sake of easing international tension. He said that his handlers had shown him a letter from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev saying that he had been guided during the Berlin crisis of 1961 by NATO documents provided by Pâques.

○○ Nosenko, Yuri Ivanovich (b. 1927)

Soviet DEFECTOR who became a prisoner of the CIA when his disclosures about the KGB polarized U.S. intelligence officials. Nosenko, a KGB officer under COVER as a member of a disarmament conference in Geneva, approached the CIA in 1963 and offered to become a DOUBLE AGENT. But he changed his mind, becoming a DEFECTOR in Jan. 1964.

Nosenko, who spoke fairly good English, began his espionage career in 1945 in the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, analyzing SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE from U.S. military communications in Asia. In 1953 he transferred to the KGB to work in foreign intelligence. He occasionally attempted to recruit American tourists in Moscow. In 1957, under cover of a Ministry of Culture official traveling with a Soviet athletic team, he visited Britain and got his first view of Western living standards. The visit may have inspired his decision to defect.

In 1959, as a KGB officer assigned to keep watch on foreigners, he became the case officer of Lee Harvey Oswald, a former U.S. Marine who had renounced his American citizenship and was living in the Soviet Union.

When Nosenko defected in 1964, he claimed to be a KGB lieutenant colonel when he was only a captain. This was one of his fabrications that raised suspicions in the CIA. The agency's chief COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officer, JAMES JESUS ANGLETON believed that Nosenko was a DISINFORMATION agent whose mission was to confuse those investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Nosenko claimed that he had been given the task of checking the KGB files of Oswald in Nov. 1963 following Oswald's arrest for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Nosenko said he had found no current connection between Oswald and the KGB.

But doubt was cast on Nosenko because ANATOLY GOLITSYN, an earlier defector, had predicted that the KGB would send other defectors who would deny Golitsyn's claims—the chief one being that a MOLE code-named Sasha had penetrated deep into the CIA. Golitsyn had said that Viktor Kovshuk, a high-ranking KGB officer, had been sent to Washington in 1957 specifically to "activate" Sasha, touching off a mole hunt by Angleton.

Nosenko said he had not heard of Sasha but knew of an agent code-named Andrei. He turned out to be a U.S. serviceman who had worked in the motor pool of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and who admitted to meeting Koshuk in 1957.

Angleton's mole hunters saw the revelation of "Andrei" as the kind of trick that Golitsyn had predicted. They relentlessly questioned Nosenko, trying in vain to get him to confess that he was not a defector but an agent sent to impersonate a defector. He was placed in a small room in solitary confinement, deprived of sleep, half-starved, and repeatedly interrogated. Another reason he was given such harsh treatment was to replicate the conditions under which the KGB kept Frederick Barghoorn, a Yale professor of political science seized by the KGB outside the Metropole Hotel in Moscow in 1963. The CIA believed that Nosenko had chosen Barghoorn as a hostage to exchange for a Soviet spy arrested in New York. But Barghoorn was held for two weeks; Nosenko was held in CAMP PEARY, the CIA's training center near Warrenton, Va., until 1968—four years.

When WILLIAM COLBY became director of the CIA in 1973, he ended the mole hunt, ordered back pay for Nosenko, and appointed him a consultant in counterintelligence.

○○ Notional Agent

Fictitious or nonexistent secret AGENT, usually used for a source of fabricated information or cited in describing the means by which such information was obtained.

Also see DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM and GARBO.

○○ Notional Mole

Fictitious MOLE, invented by an enemy intelligence agency to sow confusion in the targeted opposition agency. The concept of a notional mole was suggested by critics of JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, who as CIA chief of COUNTERINTELLIGENCE devoted immense resources to tracking down a mole who may have not existed at that time. (ALRICH H. AMES, the CIA mole discovered in 1994, did not begin his spying until 1985, a decade after Angleton's retirement.)

○○ Novels

see LITERARY SPIES

○○ NPIC

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

○○ NRO

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

★ ○○ NSA

National Security Agency, the principal U.S. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) organization. The highly secret NSA intercepts radio communications, telephone calls, and computer modem and fax machine transmissions, as well as signals emanating from radar and missile guidance systems.

NSA's Central Security Service (CSS) is responsible for U.S. CRYPTANALYSIS and CRYPTOSECURITY. The CSS has two missions: cracking other nations' CODES and providing Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) for official U.S. communications with encryption. INFOSEC expertise extends from protecting White House communications to safeguarding tactical military communications.

The director of NSA is also chief of the CSS and controls the signals intelligence activities of the military services. Both NSA and the CSS are under the Department of Defense, even though the agencies are part of the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY as well as under the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI).

NSA also monitors communications and signals emitted by the space vehicles and missile testing of other nations. The NSA National SIGINT Center provides "instant" intelligence. During crises, the center flashes messages code-named Critic to the White House Situation Room.

NSA headquarters are at FORT MEADE, Md., about midway between Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Md. From there NSA controls a global eavesdropping network that uses SATELLITE, AIRCRAFT, ship, and ground interception stations to provide the U.S. government with intelligence from virtually any place on earth. "There is not a single event that the U.S. worries about in a foreign policy or foreign military context that NSA does not make a very direct contribution to," Vice Adm. John M. McConnell, NSA director, said in 1995. It was a rare public assessment from NSA, whose initials are also said to mean "No Such Agency" or "Never Say Anything." (By convention, the agency is usually referred to as "NSA," not "the NSA")

NSA plucks from the air a staggering amount of communications. By NSA estimates, the U.S. Library of Congress holds about 1 quadrillion bits of information. "With the technology that's on the drawing boards now," McConnell said, "we will fill up the Library of Congress about every three hours. That's the kind of volume we're having to deal with in a global context."

LOUIS W. TORDELLA, longtime deputy director of NSA, told *The Baltimore Sun* in 1995, "I think it's fair to say that the demands on the agency approach infinity. Everybody wants to know everything about everything."

NSA evolved from the U.S. Army's SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE and the ARMED RORCES SECURITY AGENCY (AFSA). Reacting to complaints of low-quality STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE in the Korean War, a presidential committee urged the creation of a COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) agency subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. Meanwhile, the AFSA was secretly moving from ARLINGTON HALL, in a Virginia suburb of Washington, D.C., to Fort Meade.

President Truman's memorandum of Oct. 24, 1952, establishing the agency was itself TOP SECRET, with the added security of a CODE WORD. NSA's charter remains classified, except for a short excerpt, revealed in 1984 to show how the NSA was exempt from certain restrictions about the use of COMINT.

The CSS was established by presidential memorandum in 1972 to provide a unified cryptologic organization within the Department of Defense. Even less is known about CSS than about its parent agency. And deep within the CSS is an elite unit, the SPECIAL COLLECTION SERVICE (SCS), whose technicians eavesdrop on intelligence TARGETS in hostile countries.

NSA has gone to extreme lengths to keep itself invisible. For years employees were ordered to say nothing more than "federal government" or "Department of Defense" in reply to questions about where they worked.

The first frank admission of NSA's work came from Moscow in Sept. 1960, when two agency cryptographers, WILLIAM H. MARTIN and BERNON F. MITCHELL, revealed their defection and held a news conference. They told of the U.S.-Britain codebreaking link and said that NSA routinely intercepted the communications of more than 40 nations, including not only the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries but also such allies as Italy, Turkey, and France. Then in 1963, VICTOR N. HAMILTON, a research analyst in NSA's Near East section, appeared in Moscow and told the newspaper *Izvestia* that he and his colleagues were breaking the military and diplomatic CIPHERS and CODES of numerous countries and were intercepting communications to the UNITED NATIONS.

The three traitors had disclosed the basic mission of NSA, but its desire for secrecy was still intense. Learning that an amateur cryptologist, DAVID KAHN, was writing a book on cryptography, NSA tried to stop publication and even placed his name on a WATCH LIST for intercepts. In 1966, when his publishers submitted the manuscript to the Department of Defense for review, they were told that publication "would not be in the national interest." After some squabbling over a few passages, the book—*The Codebreakers*—was published in 1967. (In more recent years NSA has welcomed Kahn, appointing him a visiting distinguished historian in the new NSA Center for Cryptologic History during 1995.)

The first detailed description of NSA appeared in *The Puzzle Palace* (1982) by JAMES BAMFORD. The agency was not pleased with the book, but by then the Freedom of Information Act was enabling writers to obtain government documents that had previously (and sometimes arbitrarily) been denied. In a 1987 issue of NSA's monthly classified newsletter, Bamford and *New York Times* reporter Seymour Hersh were named in the same sentence with RONALD W. PELTON, an NSA analyst who sold secrets to the Soviet Union, as people who produced "a great deal of unwanted media exposure in recent years."

There is still not much in print about NSA. The Library of Congress catalog in 1995 listed only 12 books on the agency, and four of them were various editions of *The Puzzle Palace.*

The agency inherited 1940s intercepts of Soviet intelligence communications between the United States and Moscow. Those intercepts, given the U.S. code name VENONA, were historically rich, but NSA did not begin to release the Venona material until July 1995. By then, more than 60 million other NSA documents were in the process of declassification. As an indication of this new, relative openness, NSA is the National Cryptologic Museum, located in a former motel near NSA headquarters—and purchased to keep anyone from using it as a SURVEILLANCE outpost.

THE WORLD OF NSA

The 650-acre NSA site at Fort Meade is the most visible component of a worldwide complex that includes ground stations in Sugar Grove, West Va.; Yakima, Wash.; Anchorage, Alaska; and foreign countries from Argentina to Australia and China. Military cryptologic commands operate some NSA stations. During the Cold War the Navy provided spy ships (see *LIBERTY, PUEBLO*) as platforms for seagoing NSA listeners; U.S. Air Force aircraft also operated under NSA instructions, sometimes along Soviet and Chinese border air space to stimulate their air defense systems to obtain ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) as well as COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT). It was risky duty (see AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN).

In space, NSA pulls down intercepts from two kinds of satellites: commercial satellites that relay telephone calls, fax messages, and computer modem transmissions; and ELINT satellites designed to pick up two-way radio transmissions, microwave-relayed local telephone calls, and other electronic communications.

The agency works in close cooperation with Britain's GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS, Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Australia's Defence Signals Directorate, and New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau in a global intelligence alliance known as the UKUSA Community (see UKUSA AGREEMENT). It has long maintained listening posts in Xinjiang Province in remote northwestern China, near what was the Soviet border and nuclear and missile testing sites.