

INTELLIGENCE, a key position during the Cold War. He held that post for 12 years.

His success in the United States led to his being promoted to general in 1974, the youngest in the KGB. He returned to KGB headquarters to become head of the foreign COUNTERINTELLIGENCE or K branch of the First Directorate of the KGB.

His promising career was derailed in 1980 when differences between Kalugin and the KGB leadership led to his being “exiled” from KGB headquarters to become the deputy head of the Leningrad KGB. His continuing criticism of the KGB’s policies, methods, and “demonization” of the U.S. CIA caused VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV to dismiss Kalugin from the KGB in 1987.

As the Soviet Union underwent changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, Kalugin became more vocal and public in his criticism of the KGB, denouncing Soviet security forces as “Stalinist.” Finally, in 1990, on Gorbachev’s orders he was stripped of rank, decorations, and pension. Still—despite opposition supported by the KGB—in Sept. 1990 he was elected to Parliament, a people’s deputy for the Krasnodar region.

Kalugin became a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin, head of the Russian Republic. During the Aug. 1991 abortive coup against Gorbachev he led crowds to the Parliament building (“White House”), center of anticoup efforts, and induced Yeltsin to address the crowds.

After the coup he became an adviser to the new KGB chief, VADIM BAKATIN. (Bakatin, however, was fired from that post in Nov. 1991.) Ever vocal, Kalugin told the press that in the future the KGB would have “no political functions, no secret laboratories where they manufacture poisons and secret weapons.” He continued to speak out, both in Russia and in the United States, in favor of oversight of Russian intelligence activities.

Kalugin’s autobiographic *Burning the Bridges* was published in 1992.

### ●● KAMPILES, WILLIAM P. (b. 1955)

Former CIA watch officer who sold a TOP SECRET manual on the BIG BIRD SATELLITE to the Soviet Union.

A graduate of Indiana University, Kampiles worked at CIA headquarters in LANGLEY, Va., from March to Nov. 1977. Chided for poor performance and his dream of becoming an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER shattered, he quit the CIA, taking a copy of the Big Bird manual with him. In Feb. 1978 Kampiles flew to Athens, where he sold the manual for \$3,000 to a military ATTACHÉ at the Soviet Embassy.

Until Kampiles sold the manual, Soviet intelligence officials were apparently unaware that the Big Bird was both a SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE and photo SURVEILLANCE satellite. Analysts at the NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER knew that something had gone wrong when they noticed that the Soviets were changing their camouflage methods for military installations and strategic missile silos.

Then came a letter to one of Kampiles’ superiors in the CIA, describing his dealings with the Soviet. The letter “remained unopened for two months at the CIA,” ac-

cording to Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney General at the time. Bell later wrote that the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY “had come to believe that every time you prosecuted a spy, you would lose the secret, and that it was better public policy—the lesser of two evils—to let the spy go and keep the secret. But I had the idea that you could prosecute these cases without losing the secret.” An informal CIA-Justice Department agreement essentially gave the CIA veto power over espionage prosecutions.

Bell had successfully fought the intelligence community to prosecute RONALD L. HUMPHREY, a U.S. Information Agency officer, and David Truong, the Vietnamese AGENT Humphrey had been providing with government documents. Bell, learning of Kampiles’ espionage, told the CIA he wanted to put Kampiles on trial. The CIA wanted his betrayal kept secret. Bell went to President Carter to get approval. Kampiles was arrested in Chicago by the FBI on Aug. 17, 1978.

The Kampiles case was a turning point for espionage prosecution. Kampiles was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 40 years in prison. His theft revealed that the CIA’s internal security procedures were “surprisingly lax,” according to Adm. STANSFIELD TURNER, who was DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE at the time. “When we learned that one [Big Bird manual] was missing,” he wrote in *Secrecy and Democracy* (1985), “we also found we could not account for thirteen others!”

### ●● K’ANG SHENG (b. 1899 d. 1975)

Director of Chinese intelligence activities under Mao Zedong. Born Chao Yun, the son of a wealthy landlord, he changed his name as an act of opposition to his father. While attending Shanghai University he joined the Communist Party in 1925 and became a labor organizer.

K’ang apparently began intelligence work in the 1920s, supplying local Communist leaders with intelligence. He was in Moscow in 1928 and again in the 1930s to study Soviet intelligence and security techniques. According to most reports, however, he never fully trusted the Soviets. He wrote a book in the 1930s, intended for Soviet audiences, entitled *Revolutionary China Today*.

He became head of the She-hui pu (Social Affairs Department), or main security organ, from about 1939 until 1946. During World War II he infiltrated some of his AGENTS into the Nationalist intelligence service of Chiang Kai-shek. After the war K’ang’s intelligence activities supported the Chinese revolution and, subsequently, the quest for intelligence from the West on atomic weapons.

K’ang became a member of the Central People’s Government Council and the Chinese Politburo in 1949, marking him as a national leader. He was in Moscow again in 1959, accompanying Prime Minister Chou En-lai, and in 1960 for meetings with Warsaw Pact representatives.

K’ang fell from favor after the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s.

### ●● KARLA [F]

Soviet espionage chief and main villain of several JOHN LE CARRÉ novels. East German master spy MARKUS



WOLF has been cited as the model for Karla, but in reality there appear to have been few similarities between the men other than their profession and relative success.

### ●● KARLOW, SERGE PETER (b. 1921)

U.S. CIA employee branded a MOLE—in error. Karlow was a veteran of the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) and, subsequently, the CIA.

Born in the United States, Karlow spent part of his childhood in Germany, from where his parents had immigrated. He was attending Swarthmore College (on a full scholarship) when, in July 1942, he was commissioned as an ensign in the U.S. Navy and assigned to the OSS. He served in the Mediterranean, with high-speed PT-boats that supported OSS operations. He lost a leg when a captured Italian PT-boat he was riding struck a mine and blew up. (He received the Bronze Star for that mission.) Karlow returned to Washington, D.C., and in 1946 was assigned with KERMIT ROOSEVELT to write a history of the OSS (published in 1976 as *War Report of the OSS*).

Upon joining the CIA he worked both in the United States and in West Germany on high-tech “gadgets” and materials needed for espionage TRADECRAFT. Karlow described his work to David Wise for his book *Molehunt* (1992): “We dealt with guns, locks, paper. We made the tools you need to send people into denied areas. . . . Clothing with correct labels, identity papers, union membership cards, employment documents, ration cards.”

Karlow had a successful career in the CIA, mostly in the Technical Services Division, until COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agents of the CIA and FBI came to believe that they had found a Soviet mole given the CODE NAME Sasha. The tenuous identification was based on leads provided by two DEFECTORS from the KGB—ANATOLI GOLITSYN and YURI NOSENKO.

In 1962 Karlow was assigned as the CIA’s representative at the State Department’s operations center in order to deny him access to more SENSITIVE information available at the CIA. Late in 1962 he was confronted by the FBI in what appeared to be a routine investigation. On Feb. 11, 1963, Karlow was told that he was under investigation. After extensive investigation and interrogation, he was fired from the CIA.

Karlow went to work for a commercial firm and concentrated on clearing his name. He was still a “prime suspect” for Sasha, but there was no proof and hence no formal charges were brought against him. In a strange twist of fate, the head of CIA counterintelligence who had helped to build the case against Karlow was JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, who was himself fired from the agency in Dec. 1974. The two knew each other well, and now Karlow pumped his former adversary for information that would help him clear his name.

With additional laws having been passed allowing greater access to CIA files, Karlow intensified his efforts to clear his name. He and WILLIAM J. CASEY, then DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI), both spoke at an OSS reunion in Oct. 1986. Casey promised to have the case reopened. But Casey died a few months later. The

new DCI, WILLIAM H. WEBSTER reviewed the case and decided Karlow had been unjustly discharged from the CIA.

In 1988 Congress passed a special provision to permit payment to Karlow. The following year he was paid almost \$500,000. He was also given a medal and a citation in recognition of 22 years of service to the CIA.

(Additional payments totaling some \$200,000 were also made to former CIA employees Paul Garbler and Richard Kovich, also suspected of being Soviet spies. Both had been given relatively unimportant assignments and allowed to retire from the CIA. They were given the additional compensation in 1981.)

### ●● KATYN MASSACRE

The mass slaughter of Polish officers in 1940 by the Soviet NKVD. On April 12, 1943, German radio announced that the bodies of 4,143 Polish officers, all bound and shot in the back of the head, had been found in eight communal graves in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. The Germans said the officers had been killed by the Soviets.

The Soviets took about 200,000 Polish prisoners of war in late 1939 as the Soviet Union joined Nazi Germany in assaulting Poland. About 15,000 of the prisoners—including 8,700 officers—were never seen again. The Soviets claimed that Germans had killed the Poles during the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Not until 1989 did the Soviets officially begin to admit that the Poles had been murdered by NKVD units. The mass killings took place in the spring of 1940 when Soviet troops held the area, before the German invasion of July 1941. The murders were said to have been ordered by Josef Stalin because of his deep hatred of Poles. Another reason, put forth by a Soviet researcher in 1990: The NKVD was evacuating prison camps to make room for deportees from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The other Polish prisoners who vanished were never accounted for. Similar executions were reported elsewhere with some mass graves still unlocated; other prisoners were reportedly loaded on barges that were scuttled in the White Sea. (The CHEKA had used a similar drowning method for mass executions in the Russian Civil War.)

### ●● KAUDER, FRITZ (b. 1903 d. ?)

Principal player in a highly successful Soviet DECEPTION operation against the Germans in World War II. Assigned the CODE NAME Max by the ABWEHR, Kauder forwarded bogus intelligence to the German armed forces for three and a half years.

Kauder was born in VIENNA to a Jewish mother and a father who had converted to Judaism but was later baptized as a Christian. Working mainly as a journalist and businessman in the early 1930s, Kauder lived in Budapest, where he became friendly with influential Hungarians and helped in some illegal matters, such as the obtaining of fraudulent visas. He also befriended German intelligence officials and American diplomats in Budapest.



When the war began in Europe, despite being Jewish, he began selling documents and information to the Abwehr and SD. Operation Max began about the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in July 1941, with former White Russian officers offering to send the Abwehr intelligence about the Soviets. The Germans provided two radio transmitters, which were set up in Moscow and in central Russia with the code names Max and Moritz, respectively. The latter soon disappeared, but Max continued to send information until early 1945.

Intelligence from Max included strategic and tactical material, all ostensibly of the highest CLASSIFICATIONS, indicating that Max was a spy within the Kremlin. Some in Germany thought he was a physician who attended Stalin; others believed Max was a tap on Kremlin telephone lines. Probably the most astounding Max message was that of Nov. 4, 1942, which revealed the timeliness and high level of the source:

On 4 November war council in Moscow presided over by Stalin. Present: 12 marshals and generals. In this war council the following principles were set down: a) Careful advance in all operations, to avoid heavy losses. b) Losses of ground are unimportant. \*\*\* f) Carrying out all planned offensive undertakings, if possible, before 15 November, insofar as the weather situation permits. Mainly: from Grozny [out of the Caucasus] . . . ; in the Don area at Voronezh; at Rzhev; south of Lake Ilmen and Leningrad. The troops for the front will be taken out of the reserves. . . .

Initially, Vienna was the reception point for radio messages from Max in Moscow. However, near the end of 1941 the reception point was moved to Sofia, Bulgaria, and Kauder took over that post. He received messages from Moscow and retransmitted them to Vienna, which forwarded them to Abwehr headquarters in BERLIN for further distribution to the military services.

The possibly unprecedented duration of the deception operation testifies to its success. According to some sources, NKVD commissar LAVRENTY BERIA personally directed the operation from Moscow. The British interception of many of the Max messages through ULTRA led ANTHONY BLUNT, a Soviet MOLE in MI5, to advise the Soviets of the "leak." But German intelligence apparently never questioned the validity of Max's information. While periodic questions were raised about the validity of the whole operation, too many German officials found the information correct (to the extent it could be checked) and declared it was vital for the war. Reportedly, Adolf Hitler, who knew of the operation, heard that Max was a Jew and refused to accept further information from that source. The German High Command argued for Max's importance regardless of his religious ancestry.

Late in the war the Abwehr decided that the operation was a Soviet deception effort, but by that time the Abwehr was being ignored by the German leadership. Kauder's information was believed by the German armed forces until the messages from Max ceased in Feb. 1945, when the Soviet Army was marching eastward.

As in Operation SCHERHORN, Max demonstrated the Soviet expertise in such deception activities.

Kauder also used the name Richard Klatt.

### ●● KAUFFMAN, CAPT. JOSEPH P.

U.S. Air Force officer court-martialed in West Germany in 1962 for having passed unspecified "military secrets" to East German intelligence. Kauffman was exposed by a DEFECTOR who had been an East German INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years at hard labor. On appeal the sentence was reduced to two years.

### ●● KEARN, OPERATIONS SPECIALIST 1ST CLASS BRUCE L.

While serving on the U.S. tank landing ship *Tuscaloosa*, Kearn left the ship on an unauthorized leave in 1984, taking with him secret documents, including CRYPTOMATERIAL. Sentenced to four years at hard labor and given a dishonorable discharge, he plea-bargained and was sentenced to one and a half years.

### ●● KEDROV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH

(b. 1878 d. 1941)

Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who, along with his son, was executed for reporting on illegal actions of LAVRENTY BERIA. Kedrov's famed "last letter" was cited by Nikita Khrushchev when he exposed the excesses of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin at the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956.

An early Bolshevik, Kedrov was head of the secret police—the CHEKA—in the Archangel area during the Russian civil war (1917–1920). Subsequently, in 1921, while head of the special division of the OGPU (the renamed Cheka), he investigated the secret police situation in Azerbaijan, where Beria was vice chairman of the OGPU. He found that Beria had released enemies of the Soviet regime and had condemned innocent people. He wrote to Moscow recommending that Beria be removed. Nothing happened.

Kedrov was himself a brutal interrogator and ran the forced labor division of the state intelligence apparatus. He extracted false confessions from his victims when they were required.

He retired in 1939, by which time his son Igor was an investigator for the Soviet intelligence service, the NKVD. When Beria was appointed Commissar of Internal Affairs and head of the NKVD in 1939, both Kedrov and his son, and several friends, wrote a number of letters of protest to Stalin during Feb.–March 1939.

Igor Kedrov was immediately arrested and shot. The senior Kedrov was arrested in April 1939 and imprisoned. There he penned a letter to Communist Party Secretary A. A. Andreyev:

From a gloomy cell in Lefortovskaia Prison, I appeal to you for help, Hear my cry of horror, don't pass on by, intercede, help to destroy a nightmare



of interrogations, to discover the mistake. . . . I am an innocent victim. Believe me. Time will show. I am not an agent-provocateur of the tsarist secret police, not a spy, not a member of an anti-Soviet organization, as I am accused on the basis of slanderous declarations. And I have committed no other crimes against the Party or the homeland. I am a stainless old Bolshevik; for almost forty years I have fought honorably in the Party ranks for the good and happiness of the people. . . . Now the investigators are threatening me, an old man of sixty-two, with measures of physical coercion even more severe, cruel, and humiliating.

The letter continued, expressing his faith in the party and the Soviet government.

Kedrov's innocence was obvious. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court completely exonerated him, an almost unique occurrence during the Stalinist purges. But Beria would not release him, and in Oct. 1941 he received the customary single bullet in the back of the head. A new, backdated verdict was drawn up after his murder.

At the 20th Communist Party conference in Moscow in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev quoted Kedrov's letter to Andreyev. In his memoirs, *Khrushchev Remembers* (1970), Khrushchev, one of Stalin's most trusted lieutenants, wrote that after Stalin died and Beria had been deposed, "I remember I was particularly shocked at the revelation that Kedrov had been executed as an enemy of the people."

### ●● KEELER, CHRISTINE

see PROFUMO AFFAIR.

### ●● KELL, MAJ. GEN. SIR VERNON

(b. 1873 d. 1942)

Founder and first head of MI5. A graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, Kell fought in the BOXER Rebellion in China in 1900. Displaying an early facility for languages—he was fluent in French, German, Italian, and Polish from home schooling—he served and studied in China and Russia. He was an intelligence officer on General Lorne Campbell's staff in Tientsin while also the foreign correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, an interesting mix of occupations.

From 1902 to 1906 Kell was head of the German section in the War Office. During this period he suffered from severe asthma and was unable to continue on active military service. He was accordingly, in 1906, given the task of organizing the Security Service (initially MO5 and, from 1916, known as MI5). He began using the initial "K" on official documents, as a result of which that letter became a synonym for the position of head of MI5.

When Kell organized MI5 in 1909 he was given one room in the War Office. By 1914, MI5 had a staff of 14; and by 1918 the number had grown to 700. He continued to head MI5 after the war and through the 1930s, although he had officially retired from the Army in 1923.

Kell was sacked by Prime Minister Winston Churchill on May 25, 1940. Several events led to his dismissal, the principal cause being the fact that a German U-boat sank the British battleship *Royal Oak* inside the naval base at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys on Oct. 14, 1939. Newspapers ran front-page stories speculating that German espionage had caused or at least contributed to the sinking. After an explosion at the Royal Gunpowder factory at Waltham Abbey in Jan. 1940, there was again speculation of sabotage. More reports of sabotage followed, and finally, Churchill confronted Kell privately in the Prime Minister's office. His dismissal stunned Kell and surprised MI5.

### ●● KEMPEI TAI

Japanese intelligence organization founded in 1881 as a military police agency. It became a dreaded secret police organization, reaching the peak of its power in World War II.

Kempei Tai exerted immense control over civilians and searched for signs of subversion with a ruthlessness comparable to that of Germany's GESTAPO. During World War II, when it dealt continually with civilians, the Kempei Tai remained under the War Ministry. Because the Imperial Navy existed as a separate source of power, however, the Kempei Tai was frequently impeded by the Navy.

Many Kempei Tai agents came from distinguished Japanese families. Entry was restricted to candidates who passed rigorous mental and physical examinations. Units of 1,000 or so men were attached to each army, which used the Kempei Tai for COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, including the interrogation and handling of prisoners of war. Many Allied prisoners suffered at the hands of Kempei Tai interrogators.

Sometimes working in uniform, sometimes in civilian clothes, Kempei Tai agents could arrest soldiers and determine punishment without resort to courts. Their power extended to civilians and to foreigners. A few women were also employed as Kempei Tai agents.

The Kempei Tai is sometimes referred to as the "thought police," but that was a separate organization. The Thought Section of the Criminal Affairs Bureau was created by the Ministry of Justice in 1927 to root out members of the outlawed Communist Party and subversives. Later, the Peace Preservation Law, which prohibited any plans to change the government, was put under Thought Section jurisdiction.

After World War II, Allied occupation authorities abolished the Kempei Tai, along with secret societies that had engaged in espionage. (See JAPAN.)

### ●● KENNAN

U.S. spy SATELLITE carrying the KH-11 camera system (see KEYHOLE). The system provided real-time viewing, with photo images of long, narrow strips of the earth being transmitted in digital form to relay satellites that send the signals to a ground receiving station at Fort



Belvoir, Va., south of Washington, D.C. (Later, other ground stations were able to pull down KH-11 imagery.)

The Kennan/KH-11 vehicle has been reported as cylindrical in shape, some 64 feet long, 10 feet in diameter, and weighing 15 tons.

The first KH-11 launch occurred on Dec. 19, 1976, and the first pictures were transmitted on Jan. 20, 1977. Not being limited by the amount of film carried, as were previous photo satellites, the Kennan had a useful orbital life of more than two years (770 days). Several KH-11s would exceed four and a half years in orbit.

KH-11 satellites initially flew in company with KH-8 and KH-9 photo satellites but subsequently succeeded them. Two KH-11s were usually in orbit during the next several years, providing detailed photography of the Soviet Union, China, and other areas of interest to U.S. political and military leaders. A KH-11 was used to locate the American hostages inside the U.S. Embassy compound in Teheran after its takeover by Iranian militants in 1980; this provided the intelligence needed to plan the abortive raid on the embassy.

A KH-11 photo was probably the first U.S. spy satellite view to be publicly shown, when a shot of the Soviet Tu-160 Blackjack bomber appeared in the Dec. 14, 1981, issue of the magazine *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. According to its caption, the photo showed the bomber at the Ramenskoye research facility near Moscow and had been taken little more than two weeks earlier. It was, of course, classified. The KH-11 satellites continued to be orbited into the 1990s.

Late in the program, the KH-11 name was changed from Kennan to Crystal. There were continued improvements to the KH-11 satellites, with the weight increasing to some 16 tons.

The KH-11 flew in an orbit approximately 172 to 287 miles above the earth.

Also see BIG BIRD.

## ●● KENT, TYLER G.

(b. 1911 d. 1988)

CODE clerk in the U.S. Embassy in London who smuggled highly secret cables and other documents to a pro-German organization during World War II.

Kent was born in Manchuria, where his father was the U.S. consul. After graduating from Princeton, he studied Russian at the Sorbonne. He became a State Department employee, working as a clerk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for William C. Bullitt, first American ambassador to the Soviet Union. There Kent was promoted to code clerk.

He was transferred to the U.S. Embassy in London, beginning work there on Oct. 5, 1939. Winston Churchill had just been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. He was communicating regularly with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and both men expected that he would eventually become Britain's wartime Prime Minister.

As soon as Kent arrived in London, he was seen in the company of a suspected German AGENT who was being tailed by detectives of Scotland Yard's Special Branch. He also frequented the Russian Tea Room, a ren-

dezvous for White Russians run by Adm. Nikolai Wolkoff, the former Imperial Russian naval ATTACHÉ in London, and his wife, a former maid of honor to the czarina. Through one of their daughters, Anna, Kent met Irene Danischewsky, wife of a naturalized British merchant who frequently visited the Soviet Union. She became Kent's mistress. Both she and her husband were under MI5 surveillance as possible spies for the Soviets.

The cables that Kent stole included some sent to Roosevelt by Churchill before and after he became British Prime Minister. Disclosure of them at the time would probably have ruined U.S.-British relations, for the documents showed that Roosevelt was looking at ways to evade U.S. neutrality laws to help Britain survive the German onslaught.

When officers of the British Security Service MI5 arrested Kent on May 20, 1940, they found 1,929 official documents in his apartment. Besides copies of Churchill's cables, there was a book containing the names of people under surveillance by Scotland Yard's SPECIAL BRANCH and MI5. Searchers also found keys to the U.S. Embassy code room.

After 11 days under secret arrest, the U.S. State Department announced that Kent had been fired and "detained by order of the Home Secretary." The statement did not say that he had been arrested for violating the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. ANNA WOLKOFF was arrested the same day and charged with violating the same act.

A State Department official made a confidential assessment: "They are a complete history of our diplomatic correspondence since 1938 . . . . It means not only that our codes are cracked . . . but that our every diplomatic maneuver was exposed to Germany and Russia. . . ." Later investigation established, however, that Kent had not seriously compromised State Department codes.

On Oct. 23 the secret trial of Kent began at the Old Bailey. Brown paper was pasted on the windows and glass door panels. The only spectators were official observers, including MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE, representing MI6. Two of the witnesses against Kent were Maxwell Knight, head of countersubversion for MI5, and Capt. Archibald Maule Ramsay, who was interned by Knight on the Isle of Man because he had seen the documents. British officials knowledgeable about the papers believed that if their contents were revealed Roosevelt's bid for reelection would fail. Ramsay had founded the Right Club, whose members believed in a conspiracy of Jews, Bolsheviks, and Masons.

Kent was specifically charged with obtaining documents that "might be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy" and letting Wolkoff have them in her possession. He was also accused of stealing documents that were the property of the American ambassador to London, Joseph P. Kennedy. (Kennedy, the father of John F. Kennedy, was skeptical about Britain winning against Germany.)

Kent admitted that he had also taken documents from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and had hidden them away, vaguely thinking that someday he might show them to U.S. senators who shared his isolationist, anti-Semitic views. He said he had burned the Moscow documents before being assigned to London. (In Moscow he



had fallen in love with an interpreter who also worked for the NKVD, and this led to suspicions that he may have had Soviet contacts. His predecessor as a code clerk in Moscow, Henry W. Antheil, Jr., had passed information to the Soviets. He was killed in a commercial plane crash in 1940 before formal charges were made against him.)

When news of Kent's arrest broke, the U.S. and British governments tried to play down the affair. Anti-Roosevelt rumors spread that Kent had been imprisoned to keep him quiet, allegedly because he had found evidence that Churchill and Roosevelt were conspiring to involve the United States in the war. The documents, finally released in 1972, did not support the conspiracy rumor. The papers that Kent conveyed did indicate Anglo-American naval cooperation. But they also showed that Roosevelt was reluctant to go further without congressional or public approval.

Kent was released in Sept. 1945 and deported to the United States. He never changed his opinions. After marrying a wealthy woman, he became the publisher of a weekly newspaper that attacked blacks, Jews, and the late President Roosevelt. He condemned President John F. Kennedy as a communist and charged that the son of Joseph Kennedy was killed by communists because he was abandoning his communist leanings.

Despite his anticommunist writings, officials in the FBI still suspected him to be a secret Soviet sympathizer. Between 1952 and 1963, Ray Barse and Anthony Read wrote in *Conspirator* that there were six FBI investigations of Kent, "all ending inconclusively."

## ●● KEY LIST

see CIPHER KEY

## ●● KEYHOLE

U.S. designation for IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE collected by spy AIRCRAFT and SATELLITES. The Keyhole (KH) designations were assigned to the cameras. For example, the CORONA satellite cameras were designated KH-1 through -4; ARGON cameras were KH-5; and LANYARD cameras were KH-6.

Later satellites have been designated KH-7, KH-8, KH-9 (BIG BIRD), and KH-11 (KENNAN and Crystal). There was a planned KH-10, but before it could be produced the more advanced KH-11 design became available. While KH-12 and KH-13 satellites have been mentioned in books and articles, the NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE reportedly ceased using the designation scheme in the late 1980s, KH-11 being the last used.

The CIA lists the following early KH missions:

Program	KH Camera	Operational	Successes	Failures	Ground Resolution
Corona	KH-1	1960	1	9	40 ft
Corona	KH-2	1960–1961	4	6	25 ft
Corona	KH-3	1961	4	2	12–25 ft
Corona	KH-4/A/B	1962–1972	86	9	6–25 ft
Argon	KH-5	1962–1964	6	6	460 ft
Lanyard	KH-6	1963	1	1	6 ft

In 1962, when Corona satellites were orbiting with the KH-4 camera, all previous Corona missions were retroactively given the KH-4 designator, leading to some confusion in satellite histories.

Also see LACROSSE, TALENT KEYHOLE.

## ●● KG 200

Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wing) No. 200 was a "special duties" group of the German Air Force in World War II that was used extensively for clandestine operations. The Luftwaffe established KG 200 on Feb. 20, 1944, primarily to drop AGENTS behind enemy lines in support of operations by the ABWEHR and the SS. KG 200 had a key role in Operation ZEPPELIN, the German attempt to assassinate Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.

The wing flew a variety of aircraft, German as well as captured American, British, French, and Italian planes. The more unusual planes on the KG 200 roster included captured U.S. four-engine B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator bombers as well as six-engine Ju 390 very long-range transports and multiengine flying boats. In addition to dropping agents by parachute and landing them behind enemy lines, the wing also used the PAG drop device to deliver people.


## ★ ●● KGB

Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) was the Soviet agency responsible for state security from Mar. 1954 until Oct. 1991—the eve of the demise of the Soviet Union in Dec. 1991. Subsequently, the principal foreign intelligence functions of the KGB were assigned to the newly established Central Intelligence Service. In addition, from 1960 to 1966 the KGB was also responsible for the internal security of the Soviet Union (see NKVD).

The KGB's functions included COUNTERESPIONAGE, foreign intelligence collection and analysis, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE for the armed forces, protection of the state's land and maritime borders, and certain special security functions, among them the control of nuclear weapons, communications for the national leadership, and provision of the Kremlin guards. The KGB was the world's largest intelligence and police agency, probably larger than all Western intelligence agencies combined. For most of its existence it was responsible for the functions that in the United States are carried out by the CIA, NSA, FBI, DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, Marine Corps embassy guards, military service counterintelligence agencies, Border Patrol, and SECRET SERVICE.

KGB agents have generally been depicted in the Western media as being large, bull-necked, strong, and stupid. Many were. In *Breaking with Moscow* (1985), Soviet defector ARKADY SHEVCHENKO, former Under Secretary General of the UNITED NATIONS, described one KGB operative in New York as "muscular, and blonde, he looked like the incarnation of a Gestapo stereotype," who liked to talk about the skyscrapers in Manhattan.

KGB ORGANIZATION





“All those shining towers,” he said, “they look so strong, so tall, but they’re just a house of cards. A few explosions in the right places and *do svidaniya* [goodbye].”

### MODUS OPERANDI

Murder, kidnapping, and intimidation have been the tools of the trade for Soviet security-intelligence organs, from the CHEKA to the KGB. But there were many recent examples of KGB (as well as GRU) operatives acting in a sophisticated and innovative way. On one occasion a U.S. government employee was contacted by a Soviet intelligence operative. After some discussions, the contact was allowed to drop. But two or three years later, after the American had moved, divorced, and changed his car, the same Russian met him in a drugstore to renew the contact.

More devious and concealed operations have also occurred. DONALD ULTAN, a 30-year-old, Brooklyn-born employee of the American Embassy in VIENNA, was a target for Soviet intelligence because he was a CODE clerk—the highest priority for KGB and GRU efforts. The complex and somewhat bizarre plan had a Soviet agent who was a naturalized citizen of a Western country invite a close friend of Ultan for a drink. Thus was arranged a “chance” meeting in a cafe with a semiretired Belgian businessman who was, of course, a KGB officer. This, in turn, was maneuvered into a meeting with Ultan. The KGB officer never appeared to be particularly interested in Ultan but instead scheduled more encounters with Ultan’s friend. There followed many hours of friendly meetings in cafes and coffee houses, chess playing, and an occasional outing. Ultan—Jewish and fluent in French—began a pleasant association with the Belgian, who claimed to be Jewish (with relatives in Israel) and who also spoke French.

Only after five months did the KGB agent ask Ultan to provide code information for money. After a brief delay, Ultan went to the embassy security officer and revealed the KGB contact. The Soviet effort against Ultan was sophisticated and, in the words of a U.S. intelligence report on the incident, “well-planned.”

Ultan and other Americans involved with codes—such as Navy radio specialists JOHN WALKER and JERRY WHITWORTH—have been the top targets of Soviet espionage. According to the U.S. government’s classified manual *Soviet Intelligence Operations Against Americans and U.S. Installations*, “It is this broad category of code clerks, secretaries, Marine guards, etc., which the Soviets regard as particularly vulnerable since (in the words of one KGB directive) ‘they do not belong to the privileged class and are worse off financially.’” The last point is critical: Most of the Americans who have betrayed America to the Soviets have done so for money.

A recent notable exception may have been the Marine guards at the American Embassy in Moscow in the mid-1980s, several of whom were accused of betraying classified access to offices and materials in return for sexual favors. At least in the initial stages of the investigation of the Marines stationed in Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), money was not seen as a motive.

The KGB continued to try to introduce “class wars” into spy recruiting; blacks and a full-blooded American Indian were major targets among the Marine guards at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. However, one Marine officer who served in the Embassy in this period was quick to point out that the Soviet efforts to turn embassy staff as well as guards into spies constituted “a blanket operation.”

“These [American] people are in Moscow for a short time, two years,” he told the authors. “The Soviets go after them all; certainly some appear more vulnerable to their attempts than others, but almost everyone at the embassy—especially the junior people and enlisted Marine guards—are the subject of KGB attention.”

Thus, the KGB employed virtually all aspects of intelligence TRADECRAFT to garner information. Women were a particularly effective weapon, and the HONEY TRAP was often employed against Americans and other foreigners in the Soviet Union and, on at least one occasion, in the United States (see RICHARD MILLER).

### PERSPECTIVE

The KGB was established as a state committee under the Council of Ministers in 1954 in an effort by the Soviet leaders who followed Josef Stalin and LAVRENTY BERIA to ensure control over the state security agency. With Beria’s demise the internal security function was assigned to the MVD and state security (including foreign intelligence) to the KGB. In July 1978 the KGB was changed to a state committee of the Soviet Union, elevating the agency to ministerial status 24 years after its establishment.

The significance of the KGB to the Soviet system has been described by John J. Dziak, a lecturer on Soviet intelligence at George Washington University, in an interview with *The Washington Times*: “The KGB is the cutting edge of the [Soviet] system. The Soviet system can’t survive without it.” Raymond G. Rocca, deputy chief of counterintelligence for the U.S. CIA until 1974 and a lecturer at the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE, who was also interviewed by *The Washington Times*, regarded the KGB as a major player in the theory and practice of communist ideology. “It’s the linchpin of the communist system,” he said.

The first head of the KGB was IVAN SEROV (1954–1958), who had previously been deputy chief of the GRU; in Dec. 1958 he returned to head that intelligence agency as its chief. (Most chiefs of the GRU had previously served in the KGB and its predecessor agencies.) ALEKSANDR SHELEPIN, head of the KGB from 1958 to 1961, attempted to rebuild the agency into an effective intelligence and counterintelligence service.

Under the chairmanship of YURI ANDROPOV (1967–1982) the KGB assumed a relatively high level of respectability and power. Upon the death of Leonid Brezhnev, Andropov left the KGB to become head of the Communist Party and de facto ruler of the Soviet Union. He was second only to Beria in longevity as head of the principal Soviet intelligence service.

VITALY FEDORCHUK briefly succeeded Andropov in 1982 but was transferred to the post of Minister of In-



ternal Affairs when Andropov replaced Brezhnev, reflecting the Soviet leader's confidence in him.

VLADIMIR KRYUCHOV, who had become head of the KGB in 1988, was one of the plotters in the abortive Aug. 1991 coup to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev. He was dismissed and promptly arrested. Also among the 13 men charged in the plot were Lt. Gen. Yuri Plehanov, head of the Kremlin's presidential guard, who had helped keep Gorbachev under house arrest in the Crimea; Vladimir Grushko, deputy head of the KGB; and Vyacheslav Generalov, deputy head of the Kremlin guard. None of these men would be brought to trial.

Leonid Shebarshin was briefly named head of the KGB following the attempted coup. He had served in Afghanistan, Iran, and India before becoming KGB deputy chief in 1987. But Shebarshin was unacceptable to some of the Soviet leadership and that same month he was succeeded as head of the KGB by VADIM BAKATIN.

Bakatin had been fired as Minister of Interior in Dec. 1990 by Kremlin hard-liners. Under his direction the KGB changed its composition and mission; its border troops became a separate agency, its combat forces were transferred to the Soviet Army (Ground Forces), and the Kremlin guard and communications troops were made directly responsible to the Soviet government (see below). Former KGB Gen. OLEG KALUGIN, an adviser to Bakatin, in Aug. 1991 said that in the future the KGB would have "no political functions, no secret laboratories where they manufacture poisons and secret weapons."

Bakatin's tenure lasted only until the beginning of Oct. 1991, when he was replaced by YEVGENY PRIMAKOV, to whom it fell to preside over the dismantling of the KGB, which was formally abolished on Oct. 22, 1991 (although Primakov appears to have retained the position of head of the KGB into Dec. 1991). The KGB's components were reorganized into three separate services: the MB (Russian Ministry of Security), in existence from 1991 to 1993, when it changed to the FSK (Central Intelligence Service); the Inter-Republic Council for Security; and the State Border Guards Service.

## KGB ORGANIZATION

The basic organization of the KGB provided for nine chief directorates:

*First Chief Directorate:* Foreign intelligence, active measures, counterintelligence, analysis.

*Second Chief Directorate:* Domestic counterintelligence, countersubversion, industrial security.

*Third Chief Directorate:* Counterintelligence and countersubversion within the Soviet armed forces, including the Special Departments (Osobyie Otdely—OO).

*Fourth Chief Directorate:* Embassy security and internal security.

*Fifth Chief Directorate:* Dissidents.

*Sixth Chief Directorate:* Economic, secret political and transport.

*Seventh Chief Directorate:* Surveillance equipment.

*Eighth Chief Directorate:* SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY.

*Ninth Chief Directorate:* Protection of national leadership and sensitive installations, including the Kremlin guards.

(In the late 1960s the Fourth through Sixth Chief Directorates were absorbed by the Second Chief Directorate; however, in 1969 the Fifth Chief Directorate was established to deal with political, social, and cultural dissidents.)

Officers of the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB—responsible for counterintelligence within the armed forces—were assigned to all branches of the armed forces; they generally wore standard military uniforms but were readily recognized as KGB officers, reported only through the KGB chain of command, and operated a network of "informers." In the Navy, uniformed KGB officers were assigned to large surface ships as well as to shore bases.

In his book *Inside the KGB* (1990), Soviet defector Aleksei Myagkov, a former KGB officer, described being told that "when recruiting informers, you must not only convince them but also compel them to work for us. The KGB has enough power for that." And, he added:

The KGB had the rights and the power needed. If it was an officer [wanted as an informer], then his career could be threatened (without KGB approval no officer can be sent to a military academy or get promotion). With regular [enlisted] servicemen it was even simpler; they could just be dismissed from the army. Any Soviet citizen's life, too, could be threatened; he could be barred from an institute or from work in any undertaking, or be forbidden to travel abroad.

During the 1980s the KGB was estimated to number more than 400,000 personnel, including 230,000 to 250,000 border troops and approximately 50,000 signal and security troops supporting the national and Communist Party leadership. There were also several hundred thousand KGB informers within Soviet society, including the government and armed forces.

It had been estimated that between 40 and 60 percent of Soviet Embassy officials in Washington, D.C., were attached to the KGB. Officers of the KGB also served in combat areas, supporting Soviet military and state interests. From 1954 to 1989 a total of 572 KGB personnel were killed "rendering military-technical assistance to other countries"—including Arab countries, North Vietnam, and Afghanistan—and in border conflicts.

KGB headquarters were located at No. 2 DZERZHINSKY SQUARE in Moscow, the location of its predecessor and successor agencies. During the 1970s the KGB's First Chief Directorate (foreign operations) moved to a modern, Finnish-designed office building at Yaseenevo on the Moscow Ring Road.

The KGB and its predecessors operated a large education and training network, with several SPY SCHOOLS to train Soviet and Eastern European intelligence and security personnel. The training facility at Pushkina, near Moscow, was used extensively to train Arab terrorists.



## KGB CHAIRMEN

The following were chairmen of the KGB:

Mar. 1954–Dec. 1958	I. A. Serov
Dec. 1958–Nov. 1961	A. N. Shelepin
Nov. 1961–Apr. 1967	V. Y. Semichastny
May 1967–May 1982	Yu. V. Andropov
May 1982–Dec. 1982	V. Fedorchuk
Dec. 1982–Aug. 1988	V. M. Chebrikov
1988–Aug. 1991	V. A. Kryuchov
Aug. 1991	Leonid Shebarshin
Aug. 1991–Oct. 1991	Vadim Bakatin
Oct. 1991–Dec. 1991	Yevgeny Primakov

## ●● KH-SERIES SATELLITES

see KEYHOLE

## ●● KHAKI

CIPHER system used by the U.S. Navy during World War II for secure communications between major intelligence activities, especially for the transmission of MAGIC and ULTRA material.

See NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

## ●● KHOKHLOV, CAPT. NIKOLAY Y.

A trained Soviet assassin and the first major Soviet DEFECTOR of the Cold War.

Khokhlov was recruited into Soviet intelligence (NKVD) in 1941. About 12 years later, he was recruited for assassination or WET AFFAIRS operations. He was to kill Georgi Sergeevich Okolovich, an influential Russian émigré and official of the Popular Labor Alliance of Russian Solidarists, an anti-Soviet party based in West Germany. Three years earlier a Soviet attempt to kidnap Okolovich had failed.

Khokhlov's weapon was an electrically operated gun, fitted with a silencer and concealed in a gold cigarette case. It fired cyanide-tipped bullets that would probably lead a pathologist to diagnose the cause of death as heart failure.

On Feb. 18, 1954, Khokhlov called at Okolovich's apartment and told him that he had been sent to assassinate him. Then, with his wife, he defected to the U.S. CIA. He also revealed the identities of two other Soviet AGENTS, sent to assist him, who corroborated his revelations. After extensive debriefings by the CIA, on April 20, 1954, he gave a press conference, revealing the unusual assassination gun and the plan to kill dissidents living overseas.

Khokhlov subsequently wrote *In the Name of Conscience* (1959), publicly revealing many of the excesses of the NKVD. On Sept. 15, 1957, while attending a conference in Frankfurt, he fell ill. He was found to have a severe blood disorder that would soon lead to his death. Transferred to a U.S. military hospital, he was kept alive by intravenous feeding and massive blood transfusions while a variety of "miracle" drugs were tried on him. He survived,

and it was subsequently determined that he had been poisoned with thallium that had been subjected to intensive radiation in a complex Soviet assassination attempt.

## ●● KI

Komitet Informatsii was the Soviet agency charged with all foreign intelligence and clandestine operations that previously were carried out by the MGB and the GRU (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE). Soviet dictator Josef Stalin established the Committee of Information in Oct. 1947 under the control of the Council of Ministers. As such, the KI was chaired by a succession of officials from the Foreign Ministry: V. M. Molotov, Yakov Malik, Andrei Vyshinskiy, and Valeriy Zorin.

The KI responsibilities were

- (1) Military and political espionage abroad
- (2) Operations against all anti-Soviet organizations abroad
- (3) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE for Soviet embassies, missions, trade delegations, and citizens abroad
- (4) Intelligence operations in other Communist countries

Certain, limited clandestine activities—such as assassinations—were still directed by the MGB.

The KI concept was a complete failure, in part because there were now four state security ORGANS—the MGB, GRU, and MVD as well as the KI—resulting in overlap, shortfalls, and confusion. In mid-1948, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. A. Bulganin, himself a former CHEKIST, prevailed upon Stalin to permit the GRU to withdraw its foreign intelligence operations from the KI. Later that year counterintelligence and some other elements previously conducted by the MGB were returned to that agency.

A year after its establishment the KI was left with only the tasks of collecting foreign political and economic intelligence. These, too, were returned to the MGB in 1951, ending an awkward and (from a Soviet viewpoint) perilous arrangement.

The true rationale for the establishment of the KI is not clear. It may have been either a power play by Molotov or Stalin's attempt to reduce the power of the state security organs.

## ●● KILLIAN, JAMES R., JR.

American scientist who had a profound affect on U.S. intelligence, SATELLITE, and strategic weapon programs. In describing his role as President Eisenhower's science adviser, Killian wrote, "Only when Jefferson was his own science adviser and Vannevar Bush was advising Franklin Roosevelt during World War II was science so influential in top government councils as it became in Eisenhower's second term."

President Truman had appointed Killian a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1951. In the spring of 1954 Killian was the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology when President Eisenhower, a year after entering



the White House, asked Killian to establish a Technological Capabilities Panel to look into the potential of long-range, strategic missile developments. Long-range missiles were under development in the Soviet Union, and the threat of a surprise attack by such weapons was a major concern of U.S. political and military leaders.

Inevitably called the Killian Committee for its chairman, the panel consisted of some 50 distinguished scientists and engineers from academia, laboratories, and the government who served in several subpanels that looked into various aspects of strategic offensive weapons, strategic defense, and STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE technologies. The panel issued its report—"Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack"—on Feb. 14, 1955. It recommended acceleration of U.S. strategic missile development, with the emphasis on 1,500-nautical-mile missiles launched from overseas land bases and from ships (or submarines). Significantly, the report also laid the foundation for the U-2 spyplane and SATELLITE programs to provide RECONNAISSANCE of strategic TARGETS in the Soviet Union.

The intelligence subpanel, led by Edwin H. Land of Polaroid fame, stated in the report:

We *must* find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend the adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology.

The intelligence portion of the report was considered so sensitive that President Eisenhower forbade even the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL being briefed on it for fear of leaks. In their several private meetings with Eisenhower, Killian and Land discussed a variety of OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE systems that could provide factual intelligence on Soviet strategic weapons developments, both manned bombers and missiles.

President Eisenhower embraced the Killian Committee's recommendations, accelerating the nation's strategic missile program (including the Polaris sea-based missile) and pursuing the proposed strategic reconnaissance efforts. Killian was also influential in convincing Eisenhower that the strategic reconnaissance programs (the U-2 aircraft and satellites) should be under the control of the CIA and not the military services. According to Killian, when discussing the U-2 program, Eisenhower "stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services." In particular, Gen. Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command, which needed data on Soviet targets, demanded control of overhead reconnaissance systems.

When Eisenhower established the PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD in 1956 (originally known as the President's Board of Consultants on For-

eign Intelligence Activities), he named Killian as the first chairman. Killian served in that role until 1963.

After the Soviets orbited the world's first artificial satellite on Oct. 4, 1957, Killian was named President Eisenhower's science adviser and asked to organize and chair the President's Scientific Advisory Committee.

Killian's memoirs, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, were published in 1977.

## ●● KIM [F]

Hero of Rudyard Kipling's popular novel of the same name. An Irish orphan raised as a Hindu in India, Kim was an exemplar to many who, in real or imagined life, played what Kipling called the GREAT GAME. Kim could slip from one identity to another—now a Hindu, now a Muslim, now a European, now an Indian. He was the ideal AGENT: He could spy and accurately report what he had seen.

Words in *Kim* became an anthem for players and spectators of the Great Game:

From time to time, God causes men to be born—and thou art one of them—who have a lust to go ahead at the risk of their lives and discover news. Today it may be of far-off things, tomorrow of some hidden mountain, and the next day of some nearby man who has done a foolishness against the State. . . . When he comes to the Great Game, he must go alone—alone and at the peril of his head. Then, if he spits, or sits down, or sneezes other than as the people do whom he watches, he may be slain.

HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY got his nickname from the hero-spy. And, as Peter Grose notes in *Gentleman Spy* (1994), a biography of ALLEN WELSH DULLES, a DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, Dulles had a lifelong attachment to the book. It was at his bedside when he died.

## ●● KING, CAPT. JOHN H.

CIPHER clerk in the British Foreign Office who gave information to the Soviet Union. He was specifically recruited by the NKVD because of his sensitive position.

King served in the British Army during World War I and was commissioned as a captain. Becoming a cipher specialist, he served in Damascus, Paris, and—after the armistice of 1918—in Germany. He joined the communications department of the Foreign Office in 1934.

Estranged from his wife, he met an American woman in Geneva in 1935 who became his mistress. King increasingly found it difficult to live within his income.

His recruitment to work for the Soviets was slow and deliberate, being undertaken by Henri Christiaan Pieck, a successful Dutch artist. Pieck and his wife entertained King and his mistress and took them on expensive European holidays.

Finally, visiting London, Pieck undertook a FALSE FLAG operation, telling King that he was anxious to obtain inside information on international relations for a Dutch banker. King could both help Pieck's friend and make much-needed money. King agreed to the proposal.



He began supplying Pieck with classified documents, which were photographed in a London apartment and returned to him. Some of the documents—secret cables between British officials—were considered important enough to be passed directly to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.

NKVD officer WALTER KRIVITSKY, who had defected in 1937, led the British to conclude that a high-placed spy was providing the Soviets with high-level political secrets. By 1939, the suspicions of the security department of the Foreign Office pointed to King. Two security officials met King one evening and, in a pub on Curzon Street, bought him whiskey after whiskey. Intoxicated, King admitted that he was working for the Soviets.

Arrested, he was brought to a secret trial at the Old Bailey on Oct. 18, 1939, and admitted his guilt. He was sentenced to ten years but was released after the war with full remission for good conduct.

### ●● KINGFISHER

High-performance strategic RECONNAISSANCE aircraft proposed by the Convair Corp. to succeed the U-2 spy-plane. The new plane was supposed to be carried aloft beneath a B-58 Hustler turbojet bomber and then to be released after the “mother” plane exceeded the speed of sound. The project was not pursued.

### ●● KITES

Periodically efforts have been made to employ tethered kites for military RECONNAISSANCE. In the late 1800s the U.S. Army experimented with kites carrying observers and unmanned kites fitted with cameras. Although successful, these experiments showed how kites were totally dependent upon winds. Serious interest in kites soon ended.

The reconnaissance kite concept was resurrected in Germany in World War II when the Focke-Achgelis firm developed the Fa 330 “automotive kite,” an unpowered kite towed by surfaced submarines to increase their reconnaissance range. It had a three-blade rotor that enhanced lift as it was towed.

The Fa 330 had a steel tubular construction with a conventional tail assembly that could be folded and disassembled and stowed within the submarine. Some 200 to 500 feet of steel cable were usually winched out for the operation; a telephone line imbedded in the cable permitted communication with the submarine. The kite flew at an altitude of about 300 feet.

Several of the approximately 200 Fa 330s that were built were operated from U-boats. Their pilots, usually enlisted, trained in a wind tunnel at Chalais-Meudon, France. Some kites were fitted with wheels and a tail skid so that they could be towed behind light observation planes for in-flight training.

### ●● KOCH, HUGO ALEXANDER

Dutch engineer who registered a patent for an enciphering machine in 1919. His “secret writing machine”

concept was the precursor of the ENIGMA CIPHER machine. Koch’s patent for a secret writing machine declared that “steel wires on pulleys, levers, rays of light, or air, water, or oil flowing through tubes could transmit the enciphering impulse as well as electricity did.”

Koch established a company to produce secret writing machines and sold patents to ARTHUR SCHERBIUS, a German engineer.

### ●● KOECHER, KARL F. (b. 1934)

Former employee of the CIA who provided classified U.S. information to the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service (CIS). He was the first known Eastern Bloc spy to have penetrated the CIA.

Born in Czechoslovakia, Koecher had undergone training as an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER by the CIS from 1962 to 1965. He and his wife, Hana, “defected” to Austria in 1965 and entered the United States as immigrants on Dec. 4, 1965. He claimed that he was a DEFECTOR from the CIS. After studying at Indiana University, he moved to New York and attended Columbia University.

The Koechers became American citizens in 1971. They led an adventurous social life, reportedly attending wife-swapping parties and frequenting sex clubs as well as a nudist colony, possibly seeking to recruit additional AGENTS for Eastern Bloc intelligence agencies.

An ILLEGAL AGENT, Koecher was ordered to seek employment with a U.S. intelligence agency. The FBI undertook a SECURITY CHECK on Koecher, and he passed a CIA POLYGRAPH test in Oct. 1972. (Later investigations revealed that CIA technicians had misread the polygraph test results.)

From 1973 to 1975 Koecher worked as a translator at the CIA and held a SECURITY CLEARANCE at the TOP SECRET level. Subsequently, he worked as a CIA contract employee in New York from 1975 to 1977. Information about Koecher’s activities before he worked for the CIA has not been revealed by the U.S. government. He came under suspicion when he was observed meeting with CIS officers during a routine FBI SURVEILLANCE operation.

One of the documents that Koecher passed to the CIS compromised ALEKSANDR D. OGORODNIK, a Soviet diplomat in Moscow who was a CIA MOLE. (When confronted by Soviet officials in 1977, Ogorodnik committed suicide.)

Koecher was arrested in his apartment in New York City on Nov. 27, 1984, while preparing to fly to Switzerland. He was charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. His wife was described in court papers as having served as a COURIER between Koecher and the CIS from 1974 to 1983. Although she was held as a material witness in the case, she was not charged, because the FBI had violated legal guidelines by continuing to interview her after she had requested a lawyer.

Held without bail, Koecher had not yet stood trial when he was exchanged for Soviet dissident Anatoly Scharansky. (The government-to-government exchange was called a SPY SWAP, but Scharansky was not a spy.) The Koechers crossed the Glienicker Bridge from West to East Germany in BERLIN on Feb. 1986, half an hour after Scharansky had crossed the bridge to the West.



Author Ronald Kessler, writing in *The Washington Post*, gave this description of them at the time of their exchange for Scharansky: "With his mustache and fur-lined coat, [he] looked like nothing so much as a fox. His wife, Hana, wore a mink coat and high white mink hat. Blonde and sexy, with incredibly large blue eyes, she looked like a movie star."

Kessler interviewed the Koechers in Prague in 1987. Karl still worked for the CIS; his field of expertise: the United States.

### ●● KOEDEL, SIMON E. (b. 1881 d. ?)

American who spied for Germany during World War II.

Koedel, born in Bavaria, came to the United States when he was 22, served in the U.S. Army for three years, and became an American citizen. From afar he followed the rise of Adolf Hitler and ardently supported him. Sometime in the early 1930s he traveled to Germany and offered his services as a spy. The ABWEHR trained him, began paying him a stipend, and told him to return to the United States as a SLEEPER and await instructions.

In Sept. 1939, as Germany was invading Poland, the "awakening" order came: a cable from Germany containing the CODE WORD "alloy" and signed "Hartmann."

Although Koedel was a movie projectionist with no knowledge of the U.S. defense industry, he joined the American Ordnance Association and used this connection to gain entry to the U.S. Army arsenal at Edgewood, Md. After his tour, he wrote a long report on weapons development at Edgewood.

Through the ordnance association he became acquainted with Sen. Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina, who provided him with, among other information, a list of U.S. ports "capable of handling ships loading oil and coal as well as general cargo." The Abwehr had asked for precisely that in March 1940 to gauge what supplies could come from the United States in response to the planned German offensive.

Koedel was an industrious and ingenious spy. To gather shipping information, he would ride the Staten Island ferry, checking the names of ships in port. Sometimes he posed as a longshoreman. Koedel's information went to Germany via the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., and through ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES in neutral countries.

Koedel's daughter, Marie, went to New York waterfront bars to pick up intelligence for her father. She also recruited a British sailor, Duncan Scott-Ford, who provided information about convoys. (Scott-Ford was hanged as a spy by the British in Nov. 1942.) Koedel was finally caught in Oct. 1944 after Marie's former fiancé went to the FBI with his suspicions. Koedel was imprisoned and deported after the war.

### ●● KOMETA

Fourth-generation Soviet SURVEILLANCE SATELLITE. This further refinement of the earlier ZENIT satellites was fitted with solar panels for recharging its batteries, thus

extending its operational life. Some reports credit later versions of this satellite—employed for topographic mapping—with a life of up to 45 days.

### ●● KOMITET GOSUDARSTVENNOY BEZOPASNOSTI

KGB

### ●● KONDOR (Condor)

CODE NAME for German effort to plant ABWEHR AGENTS in Cairo, the capital of British-held Egypt, in 1942. The operation was planned in anticipation of German troops entering the city.

### ●● KRÄMER, DR. KARL-HEINZ

(b. 1914 d. ?)

German air ATTACHÉ in Stockholm, Sweden, during World War II who struck the fear into British intelligence services that there was a major spy NETWORK operating in Britain.

Krämer was attending the University of Hamburg in 1939 when he was drafted into the German Air Force with the rank of specialist lieutenant and assigned to the ABWEHR's intelligence station in Hamburg. He handled AGENT operations in the Low Countries, Hungary, and Turkey, supervising several successful operations. He was also able to get valuable information from Sweden on British aircraft production and plants. He was sent to Stockholm in Oct. 1942.

After his arrival in Stockholm, Krämer engaged a maid who was anti-Nazi and especially disliked Krämer's wife, Eva. Peter Falk, an officer of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in Stockholm, made contact with the maid through a mutual friend. She began to report Krämer family gossip to Falk and also provided scraps from Krämer's wastebasket. Then she made a mold of the key to his desk and, after Falk had a key made, she was able to provide the British with copies of numerous intelligence documents. Since most of the communications between the German Embassy in Stockholm and BERLIN went by land line and cables, the British ULTRA intercepts of German radio communications were useless to intercept these messages.

The maid's work was vital to the British. The documents she purloined helped MI6 identify several German intelligence sources. Then there was a shock: German sources with the CODE NAMES Hektor and Josefine were supplying important material from Britain, including details of the secret telegrams passing between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Early in World War II the British Security Service (MI5) had captured and incarcerated or TURNED all German agents. (See DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM)

Wrote NIGEL WEST [p] in *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945* (1983):

The prospect of a major Abwehr network operating in London filled MI5 [British Security Service] with dread. Many of its double-agent operations relied



on there being no independent agents at liberty, and several important strategic deception plans were likely to be endangered if the Germans had the capability to double-check their information. Krämer's information appeared authentic and, on occasion, enough to jeopardize major operations.

MI5 put one of its best people on the case: ANTHONY BLUNT, who, unknown to the British, was a major Soviet spy. Still, Blunt performed well. He was able to identify Hektor as Col. Count Johan Oxenstierna, the Swedish naval attaché in London, and William Strang, a junior official at the Foreign Office.

Strang underwent "a painful interview," wrote West. Oxenstierna was fed what MI5 called BARIUM—carefully provided information, which began showing up in Krämer's Hektor-Josefine reports. Oxenstierna was declared persona non grata by the British government, left Britain, and the Hektor-Josefine network ceased to operate.

A follow-up Swedish investigation found that Oxenstierna was sending his reports to the Swedish Defense Staff, not to Krämer, who had recruited a secretary on the staff. She had taken material that Oxenstierna had reported, some based on discussions with Strang, and passed it to Krämer. MI5 apologized to Strang.

After the war Krämer, interrogated by MI5, confirmed the true source of his reports to Berlin.

## ●● KRASNEY KAPEL

see RED ORCHESTRA

## ●● KREML

Successful German DECEPTION operation against Soviet forces in May–June 1942. After winning the battle for Kharkov, 400 miles south of Moscow in late 1941, the German High Command planned an offensive to destroy the Soviet forces toward the southern end of the Eastern Front. To divert Soviet attention from that thrust (which would lead to the decisive Battle of Stalingrad), on May 29, 1942, the German High Command ordered "the earliest possible resumption of the attack on Moscow" by Army Group Center. Kreml ("Kremlin") was the CODE NAME for the deception operation.

U.S. Army historians Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, in *Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East* (1985), observed:

KREML was a paper operation, an out-and-out deception, but it had the substance to make it a masterpiece of this somewhat speculative form of military art. In the first place, it coincided with Soviet thinking—which, of course, the Germans did not know. In the second, its premise—to simulate a repeat of the late 1941 drive on Moscow—was solid; in fact, it made better strategic sense that did that of BLAU [the southern operation]. . . . The army group directive, which assigned two panzer armies the identical missions they had received in the previous fall, could have been taken for the real

thing even by German officers who were not told otherwise, and most were not.

As part of Operation Kreml, the German Air Force increased RECONNAISSANCE flights over and around Moscow, prisoner-of-war interrogators were given lists of questions to ask about Moscow's defenses, the German intelligence staff sent "swarms" of AGENTS toward Moscow, and sealed packets of Moscow maps were distributed down to the regimental level. A readiness date of Aug. 1 was announced.

Postwar Soviet accounts contend that Kreml failed, but the Soviet High Command (Stavka) had in fact believed that Moscow was again the target of the German offensive. On June 28, Operation Blau—the main German attack eastward—began. It was a highly successful thrust.

## ●● KRIVITSKY, MAJ. GEN. WALTER

The first senior Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER to defect to the West.

A Polish Jew born with the name Ginsberg, Krivitsky began his career with the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. In Germany in 1923 he attempted to foment a communist revolt, after which he worked for the Red Army staff and in GRU headquarters in Moscow. He was transferred to the NKVD in 1934. Both his GRU and NKVD service involved foreign intelligence activities.

As the NKVD RESIDENT in the Netherlands, he was responsible for Soviet *military* intelligence in Western Europe, when in Sept. 1937 he was ordered to return to Moscow. Fearing that he was to be a victim in the ongoing Stalinist purges, Krivitsky decided to defect. He went to Paris and sought asylum at the French Ministry of the Interior. Along with his wife and four-year-old son he was able to reach the United States safely despite two reported attempts by Soviet AGENTS to assassinate him while he was still in France.

Krivitsky's revelations were of great interest to U.S., British, and French security services. He traveled to Britain in 1939, where his revelations gave early evidence of the penetration of the British government by Soviet MOLES and led directly to the arrest of JOHN H. KING. He also called attention to another Soviet spy in Britain, "a young English journalist" for a London newspaper who covered the Spanish Civil War. Although not identified at the time, this was HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY.

As NIGEL WEST wrote in *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909–1945* (1981), "The real value of Krivitsky's information lay in his ability and willingness to identify NKVD men working under diplomatic cover in Britain and even a few of their sources." Krivitsky revealed that 61 Soviet agents worked in Britain and the Commonwealth, although he could not specifically identify them all. Three, he said, were in the Foreign Office and three in British intelligence services. John King was identified by Krivitsky but was said to be in the Cabinet secretariat.

He also wrote articles (including one for *The Saturday Evening Post* in 1939) exposing Soviet espionage,



and he testified before the U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee in 1939. His autobiography *In Stalin's Secret Service* was published that same year (the British title was *I Was Stalin's Agent*).

Krivitsky checked into Room 524 of the Hotel Bellevue on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on Sunday afternoon, Feb. 9, 1941. He paid \$2.50 for the night. The next morning a maid found him dead from a gunshot to the temple; the room had been locked and there were three suicide notes. The Metropolitan Police ruled it a suicide, but he was undoubtedly murdered by a Soviet assassin.

His Soviet CODE NAME was Groll.

### ●● KROGER, PETER

see MORRIS COHEN

### ●● KRUGLOV, COL. GEN. SERGEI NIKIFOROVICH

(b. 1903 d. ?)

Senior Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who served as head of internal security (MVD) from Dec. 1945 to March 1953, and of the "super" MVD responsible for both internal and state security from June 1953 to Feb. 1956.

A career intelligence-security officer, from 1941 to 1945 he was deputy head of the NKVD, the state security-intelligence ORGAN. Specifically, from 1943 until the end of 1945, Kruglov was deputy to VIKTOR ABAKUMOV, head of SMERSH, the military COUNTERESPIONAGE organization. In that position Kruglov ran the security detail at the Teheran conference in Nov.—Dec. 1943, attended by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and again at Yalta in Feb. 1945. At Yalta, which had been a Black Sea resort of the czars, the NKVD provided lavish hospitality to the American and British leaders, personally supervised by Kruglov. Joan Bright of the British secretarial staff described Kruglov as "the most powerful-looking man I had ever seen, with huge shoulders, face, hands and feet."

But more important, Kruglov's minions provided the Allied leaders with a careful and rapid response to their every whim and desire, while providing security. And of course, his specialists unquestionably conducted SURVEILLANCE of the American and British leaders and their staffs.

(For his services at Teheran and Yalta, Kruglov was later awarded an honorary British knighthood, becoming the only Soviet intelligence officer to be so honored.)

In Dec. 1945 Stalin removed his chief of intelligence and repression, LAVENTRY BERIA, from the head of the internal security apparatus, the MVD, and gave that post to Kruglov. In March 1946, the MVD was raised from a commissariat to a ministry, with Kruglov being promoted to minister. Although Kruglov had been appointed to the important Smersh position by Beria, he was not considered a Beria loyalist, and Stalin wished some balance to the increasing powers and honors being accorded to Beria in the postwar period.

Kruglov held the MVD position for more than seven years. On March 7, 1953, two days after Stalin's death, the Soviet government merged the MVD and the MGB, the state security agency, into a single "super" MVD

under Beria. "Kruglov of the MVD and [Semyon] Ignatiev of the MGB were dropped with equally speeded dispatch, but neither man was arrested or shot, a clear departure from the norm for fallen leaders of organs," wrote U.S. intelligence analyst John J. Dziak in his *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (1988). "Indeed," Dziak noted, "Kruglov was retained as Beria's deputy. That was a mistake for Beria."

On June 26, 1953—almost four months after Stalin's death—Beria was arrested. Kruglov sided with the anti-Beria faction and was rewarded by succeeding him as Minister of Interior. Kruglov appears to have had a key role in the fall of Beria, including the arrest of his other deputies. Indeed, some reports cite that Kruglov's wiretapping of Beria's telephones had revealed that Beria was planning his own coup on June 27 to take over the government.

Kruglov continued as head of the MVD, which in March 1954 was downgraded with the establishment of the KGB which became agency responsible for state security, the MVD reverting to internal security activities. He was fired by Nikita Khrushchev on the eve of the 20th Party Congress in Feb. 1956, at which Khrushchev revealed the excesses and terror of Stalin and his police-intelligence organs—activities in which Kruglov had been a major participant.

Reportedly, Kruglov subsequently committed suicide, fearing that the retribution against the state terrorists would reach out to him.

### ●● KRYUCHOV, COL. GEN. VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH

(b. 1924)

Head of the KGB from 1988 to 1991. After brief service in the Soviet Army, Kryuchov studied at the Law Institute. Following graduation he served in the Public Prosecutors Office in the early 1950s. He was subsequently posted to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, Hungary. From 1957 to 1967 he served in the Central Committee department responsible for foreign communist parties, at the time headed by YURI ANDROPOV.

When Andropov was promoted to chairman of the KGB in 1967, Kryuchov was made head of a department within that ORGAN. By 1978 he was serving as head of a chief directorate of the KGB with the rank of lieutenant general. He was promoted to deputy chairman of the KGB prior to becoming head of the organization in 1988.

As head of the KGB he launched a campaign to improve the agency's image. Although he earlier called for efforts to "win the minds" of Western politicians, just before the attempted coup on Aug. 18, 1991, he had been charging the West with trying to undermine Soviet society. He was ousted from his position on Aug. 18 for collaborating with the failed putsch against President Mikhail Gorbachev.

### ●● KUCZYNSKI, DR. JÜRGEN

(b. 1904 d. ?)

Soviet AGENT in Britain; he was the brother of the Soviet spy known as SONIA.



Kuczynski joined the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1930. Subsequently, he was recruited by the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, and posted to BERLIN in 1936 to help the communists in their efforts to overthrow the Nazi regime.

He went to England before World War II and became a leader of the underground section of the KPD there while continuing to serve the GRU. There he promoted relations with the British Communist Party and organized communist groups in several cities.

Kuczynski was interned in Jan. 1940, being considered a security risk, but was released after three months. Although he remained an active GRU agent during the war, once he was freed from internment he was never investigated by the British Security Service (MI5).

It was Kuczynski who introduced KLAUS FUCHS to a Soviet intelligence contact in 1941.

The U.S. Embassy in London asked Kuczynski in Sept. 1944 to participate in the American Strategic Bombing Survey to help evaluate the impact of the Allied bombings on the German war effort. This required that he be appointed a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army. The information he received in this role was passed on via Sonia's radio to Moscow. Other, more valuable U.S. intelligence was also passed to Kuczynski, who was on various U.S. military distribution lists.

He disappeared into East Germany in Nov. 1945.

### ●● KUCZYNSKI, DR. ROBERT RENÉ

(b. 1876 d. 1947)

Father of Soviet spies SONIA and JÜRGEN KUCZYNSKI. Polish-born, Kuczynski was an economist and ideological communist. He was deeply involved with German left-wing politics until 1933, when he went to Britain.

The senior Kuczynski knew about his daughter's espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union and helped her when she arrived in Britain in 1941.

### ●● KUCZYNSKI, URSULA

see SONIA

### ●● KUEHN, DR. BERNARD

German spy in Hawaii on the eve of World War II, along with his wife and Ruth Kaethe Suse, who posed as their daughter. All three worked for the German ABWEHR and also gathered intelligence for Japanese NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

Kuehn joined the Nazi Party in 1930. He visited Japan, and in 1935, following meetings with the Japanese naval ATTACHÉ in BERLIN, he agreed to spy for Japan. He was to receive \$2,000 per month plus a \$6,000 bonus at the end of each year.

To carry out his espionage, Kuehn, his wife, and Suse traveled to Hawaii in 1936. He was ostensibly to study Japanese at the University of Hawaii.

In March 1939 he was given a portable radio transmitter fitted in a suitcase. The transmitter had a range of only 100 miles. Thus, it is assumed he was to contact Japanese submarines operating off Hawaii. (There is no

record of any such communications.) The Kuehns worked closely with the Japanese Navy's most important AGENT in Hawaii, TAKEO YOSHIKAWA.

Sometime around early 1939 Kuehn came under suspicion as a spy, but no action was taken against him.

It is unlikely that Kuehn contributed any intelligence to the Japanese Navy for the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. A Japanese INTELLIGENCE OFFICER's estimate of Kuehn (made in 1950): "... so poor and primitive that it was feared he would not be able to get sufficient information for our intention of launching an air strike upon Pearl Harbor. ... it was decided to use him only when other means were of no avail. ..." He also developed a useless scheme for signaling submarines offshore with a combination of lights, radio advertisements, and markings on sailboats.

During the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK on Dec. 7, 1941, Kuehn was reported by an American intelligence officer to be sending light signals from his attic window to the Japanese consul. But such an action seems unlikely—what could Kuehn have been telling the Japanese at that point?

After the attack, Kuehn and Suse were arrested by the FBI, which later arrested Mrs. Kuehn as well. Kuehn was at first sentenced to death for his attempted espionage, but he gave U.S. authorities information on foreign intelligence activities, and his sentence was commuted to 50 years' imprisonment. In 1946 he was freed.

Mrs. Kuehn and their "daughter" were deported at the end of the war.

### ●● KUKLINSKI, COL. WLADYSLAW

(b. 1930)

Polish Army officer who provided the U.S. CIA with intelligence on Soviet military planning from 1970 until he defected in 1981.

In early Nov. 1981, Kuklinski, his wife, and at least one son were helped to leave Poland for the West by the CIA. Kuklinski had been involved in planning the martial law crackdown on the Solidarity trade union, which occurred Dec. 13, 1981.

Polish authorities first realized his espionage activities when he failed to report for work on Nov. 6, 1981. He was tried and convicted in absentia and sentenced to death. Kuklinski and his family are now believed to be living in the United States.

He was described in *The Washington Post* in 1986 as "a very brave man who became an agent [for the CIA] not for money but because he detested what the Soviets and [Polish] military government had done to his country."

### ●● KUNKLE, CHIEF PETTY OFFICER CRAIG D.

(b. 1949)

Former U.S. Navy chief aviation antisubmarine operator who pleaded guilty to espionage charges after try-



ing to sell secrets to two undercover agents of the FBI posing as Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

Kunkle, a veteran of 11½ years in the Navy, had been discharged in 1985 for multiple acts of indecent exposure. At the time of his attempted espionage in 1988 he was working as a hospital security guard. He said that he wanted to spy for the Soviets to make money and have revenge on the Navy for his discharge.

Beginning in Dec. 1988, Kunkle made contact six times with a man he believed to be from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. The man was an FBI agent, and after offering secret information—based on what he remembered from being an instructor in antisubmarine warfare—Kunkle was paid \$5,000. Hidden FBI cameras recorded the meetings and Kunkle was arrested on Jan. 11, 1989.

After pleading guilty to charges of espionage, Kunkle was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

How the FBI was able to intercept Kunkle's attempts to contact the Soviets has not been revealed, but it was probably through wiretaps on Soviet Embassy telephones.

### ●● KURASOV, GEN. OF THE ARMY VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH

(b. 1897 d. 1973)

Soviet Army commander and chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, in 1949. A czarist officer who went over to the Bolshevik side after the October Revolution, Kurasov served mainly on staffs. In 1940 he was made deputy chief of the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. He held this position until World War II began, when he became commander of the 4th Shock Army.

After the war he served as commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Austria. Promoted to general of the Army, he became chief of the GRU in Feb. 1949. Later that year he was transferred to become head of the General Staff Academy (the senior war college). From 1956 to 1961 he was deputy chief of the General Staff.

### ●● KUZNETSOV, COL. GEN. FEDOR FEDOTOVICH

(b. 1904 d. 1979)

Chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1943 to 1946; he also had a major role in the murderous purges of the military, both before and after World War II.

Kuznetsov was a factory worker in Moscow and an active member of the Communist Party when he was called up into the Army in 1938 as deputy head of the Chief Political Directorate. In that position he was active in the Stalinist purges of the Red Army, including the GRU.

In 1943 he was named head of the GRU, after the sudden removal of his predecessors. He helped to organize the Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin conference at Teheran (Iran) from Nov. 28 to Dec. 1, 1943, after

which he was promoted to the rank of colonel-general. Subsequently, he had key roles in the Yalta (Crimea) and Potsdam (Germany) conferences in 1945. Under Kuznetsov's direction the GRU emphasized espionage efforts to steal U.S. atomic technology in this period (see ATOMIC SPY RING).

In 1948 he was made head of the Chief Political Directorate of the armed forces. Kuznetsov held that position until Stalin's death in March 1953, after which he was demoted to head the Chief Personnel Directorate of the armed forces. He later headed a military academy and ended his career as chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces. He retired in 1969.

### ●● KW-SERIES CIPHER MACHINES

U.S. post-World War II CIPHER machines. KG series, KL, and KY series are also designations used for U.S. cipher machines and associated equipment.

These machines enciphered and deciphered messages at high speeds. The KW designations were sometimes assigned the suffix letters R and T, indicating that they were allocated to receiving and transmitting functions, respectively. Because of the difficulty in keeping track of the designations, various KW and KY-series cipher machines were also assigned mythological names, such as Creon, Jason, Nestor, and Pontis.

During the 1960s and 1970s the KW-7 Orestes was the most widely used cipher machine in the U.S. military services; these machines were also used by other government agencies as well as several allied nations. U.S. naval ships, for example, had from one KW-7 in small ships to some 25 in the nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier *Enterprise*.

The KW-7 was housed in a plain gray box about the size of a teletype printer. The vital parts of the machine were encased in shielding material to prevent the emission of electronic signals that could be intercepted by a nearby intercept device.

A message was typed into the KW-7 in PLAIN TEXT English. The signals went through cryptographic circuits within the box and were encrypted according to a CODE preset for that day by the numbers on the CIPHER KEY. The message was then transmitted via radio as a stream of grouped numbers. At the receiving end, the message entered another KW-7, where the message could be decrypted only if the machine had been set with the same key. Messages were entered on a teletype keyboard; incoming messages were printed out electronically through the teletype component of the machine.

The cipher keys or "key lists" have evolved in form through the years. The key—the daily set of numbers that actuates the machine—was once simply printed on what was called a key list. The radioman operating the cipher machine would punch keys corresponding to those numbers, and the machine would then align its logic to decipher the messages being received that day or to encipher and transmit the day's outgoing messages.

Later, the key list became the "key card," which resembled an early IBM computer punch card (still referred to as the key list). Using the card version, the radioman



opened a compartment on the side of the cipher machine, pressed the card against an electronic sensor, and closed the compartment. The sensor translated the card's holes into signals that gave the machine the day's key numbers. The cards are still used, but some machines now also accept keys in the form of cassette tapes. The key numbers are electronically imprinted on an ingeniously designed spool of tape that cannot be rerolled back into its container.

Like the key lists and cards, the tape is merely a medium for what Navy radiomen call "filling" the machine with the day's key numbers. Some machines also demand the simultaneous use of a key card and a CRIB (Card Reader Insert Board), which has a function similar to the key card. But whether the radioman uses lists, cards, or tapes, the system is the same: a machine, a key, and—what is sometimes overlooked in descriptions of the system—a radioman. (This is the U.S. Navy designation for both male and female radio operators.)

Although the method of "filling" the cipher machines kept changing through the years, there were relatively few changes in the machines, especially the long-serving KW-7. The cost to replace machines is considerable, especially when one considers that many thousands are in use by the U.S. military services and other government agencies (as well as allies).

(Even the White House uses these machines, as do the President and White House officials when traveling, although they usually make use of military communications systems. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North used a portable KL-43 when overseas while running the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.)

## BREAKING THE CIPHERS

Security for cipher machines is maintained through physical security of the machines and—especially—the key lists. The rules to protect the key lists are the heart of the Classified Materials System, which was developed by the NSA and administered by a string of handlers, beginning with the couriers who carry keying materials, in tamperproof packages, from the NSA's tightly guarded printing plant at FORT MEADE, Md., to secure NSA depots around the world. From there they are carried by the Armed Forces Courier Service or COURIERS supplied by the machines' operators—embassies, military bases, intelligence-agency offices, and Navy shore stations and ships.

In the U.S. Navy, the final destination for this complex delivery system is a Navy radioman designated as the Classified Materials System custodian. Ashore or aboard ship, the key lists are signed for, carefully kept track of, stored in safes, and destroyed after use. Only personnel with TOP SECRET and special "crypto" SECURITY CLEARANCES are allowed to handle the key lists.

At least that was the way the system was designed to work.

Many Americans and some foreigners with detailed knowledge of cipher machines and access to key lists have provided information about U.S. cipher machines—

and key lists—to the Soviet Union. And the Soviets have obtained numerous U.S. cipher machines.

The Soviets received firsthand information on U.S. cryptologic efforts and cipher systems in 1960, when NSA cryptologists WILLIAM H. MARTIN and BERNON F. MITCHELL defected to the Soviet Union. Then in 1963–1964, Warrent Officer JOSEPH G. HELMICH, an Army communications specialist, sold details of cipher machines to the Soviets. He provided key lists for the KL-7 and possibly for the KW-26 as well as other equipment. (At his 1981 trial the government stated "... the residual impact of the compromise continues to the present time because the KL-7 was continuously in use and still is.")

Five years after Helmich sold out, with the capture of the *PUEBLO*, a U.S. Navy-NSA spy ship, in January 1968, the Soviets obtained several U.S. cipher machines, including the KW-7, KWR-37, and KG-14. At the time the KW-7 used a worldwide key list, meaning that anyone with a machine and key list could read military communications (for the period of the list) anywhere in the world.

More machines were lost in 1975 as North Vietnamese troops overran the South, and the U.S.-supplied Saigon forces hastily retreated, leaving their weapons and cipher machines in their wake. The North Vietnamese and their Soviet allies captured some 30 U.S. cipher machines; the exact number 32 has been mentioned by some sources.

From at least 1968, U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer JOHN A. WALKER and his comrade in betrayal, Senior Chief Radioman JERRY WHITWORTH, supplied the Soviets with key lists and innumerable other documents and manuals, permitting them full use of the machines in their possession. Further, the materials and information provided by Walker and Whitworth enabled the Soviets to break into ciphers used by machines not in their possession.

Walker and Whitworth supplied so much cryptologic information to the Soviets that they eventually became discriminating about what they wanted. In particular they wanted the KW-7 key lists; they did not want messages carried on the KW-8 system, encoded voice circuits, or other intelligence information, which they apparently preferred to get from other sources.

Also in the late 1970s, the Soviets obtained information on the KW-7 as used by the CIA from CHRISTOPHER BOYCE and ANDREW D. LEE. Boyce had access to sealed plastic envelopes that contained the key lists. He removed the lists from the envelopes, photographed them, and then replaced them and resealed the envelope with an iron or a carelessly applied touch of glue. Once, when he had messed up a resealing, a government inspector checked the botched code binder but ignored the broken seal. (Beyond key lists and cipher documentation, the American spies have provided the Soviets with technical manuals for the machines, which, according to NSA engineers, could enable them to construct such devices.)

Because the KW-7 and certain other U.S. cipher systems were in use by numerous other nations, one could speculate that CRYPTOMATERIAL was also compromised by foreign sources.




“We knew the KW-7 was vulnerable,” a retired high-ranking Navy communications officer told the authors in 1987. “We never heard that NSA said there was a [security] problem with the key list, except for some being lost once. We heard that they had been lost in [aircraft] crashes. And 30 machines had been lost in Vietnam. But having the machines was not enough. The Soviets did not

have computers that could calculate fast enough to understand the algorithm.” (The algorithm is the mathematical logic that translates a message’s number groups into electronic signals that can be read by the machine’s teletype system.)

But the Soviets had previously made inroads into reading Western codes and ciphers; see CRYPTANALYSIS.





## ●● LACOSTE, ADM. PIERRE

Director of France's DGSE, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, (General Directorate for External Security), who was dismissed in Sept. 1985 after it became publicly known that DGSE operatives had sunk the Greenpeace ship *RAINBOW WARRIOR* in the harbor of Auckland, New Zealand, on July 10, 1985.

After attending the French Naval Academy during World War II, Lacoste served with the Free French Navy in the Mediterranean. When the war ended, he began serving in naval assignments both ashore and at sea; he saw action in Indochina. After studying at the French Center for Higher Military Studies and the National War College, he became deputy military executive to the Minister of Defense (1972–1976), and the Commander of the Naval War College (1976–1982).

Lacoste took over the DGSE in 1982 in the wake of the resignation of its first director, former aerospace executive Pierre Marion, who served only 18 months. Lacoste was the first naval officer to run a major French intelligence agency.

After the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior*, Lacoste denied that he had ordered the operation, but French intelligence sources later said that Lacoste was aware that some "action" was planned against the ship. She was to have sailed into an area where France was about to test nuclear weapons. The ship, owned by the Greenpeace environmental organization, was blown up by a bomb. One man drowned as the ship sank. Eleven crew members and visitors survived.

Defense Minister Charles Hernu was forced to re-

sign, although he, too, took the PLAUSIBLE DENIAL route out of the debacle.

After departing DGSE, on July 1, 1986, Lacoste was named President of the Foundation for the Studies of National Defense. A frequent speaker on defense and intelligence issues, he has written numerous magazine articles and several books in those fields.

## ●● LACROSSE

U.S. SATELLITE program developed to overcome the problem of cloud cover over the Soviet Union, which was hindering RECONNAISSANCE by spy satellites. Cloud cover was a serious impediment to monitoring the Soviet Union, limiting the effectiveness of early photographic satellites. For example, a CORONA satellite first detected the possible Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system near Tallinn in Estonia in 1961. However, it was eight years before additional, detailed satellite photography could be obtained mainly because of clouds.

The solution was to employ radar—the reflection of focused radio waves—that could penetrate cloud cover as well as darkness. The U.S. SEASAT-A experimental ocean surveillance satellite, orbited on June 27, 1978, carried a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) with a resolution of 82 feet, i.e., capable of detecting objects of that size from an altitude of some 780 miles above the earth. The relatively small antenna of the SAR makes use of the movement of the satellite to enhance radar.

The space shuttle *Columbia* went into orbit on Nov. 12, 1981, carrying imaging radar that, unexpectedly, was able to penetrate down 16 feet into the dry sands of the



eastern Sahara desert. On Oct. 5, 1984, the shuttle *Challenger* went aloft on another imaging radar mission, "photographing" several North American cities. Jeffrey T. Richelson wrote in *America's Secret Eyes in Space* (1990):

Given the cloud cover that blanketed many of the targets, the mission was a dramatic demonstration of the additional capability provided by radar imaging. The mission produced excellent photographs that have a clear indication of what radar imaging could do over Eastern Europe and the USSR in autumn and winter during cloud cover or night.

The Lacrosse satellite began life at the CIA under the CODE NAME Indigo, to carry a SAR system that would electronically downlink images to receiving stations on earth. While Lacrosse was intended to provide reconnaissance of ground targets, an ocean reconnaissance satellite employing SAR was initiated for the Navy. (That program, called Clipper Bow, was later canceled; the Soviet Union already had an operational RADAR OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE.)

The CIA initially planned to have the SAR fitted "piggy back" to the KH-11 camera satellite (see KEY-HOLE). The proposal was vetoed by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who believed that the plan placed too many surveillance assets on too few satellites.

Meanwhile, costs of development increased rapidly in the Lacrosse program, and questions were being raised in Congress about the accuracy of cost estimates produced by the CIA and the NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. But there was considerable pressure in Congress for Lacrosse because it could help to verify Soviet compliance with arms limitation treaties.

Launching of the first Lacrosse satellite was delayed because of the *Challenger* explosion on Jan. 28, 1986, which essentially grounded U.S. space launches. The use of the shuttle as virtually the only U.S. satellite launch vehicle had helped to justify the high cost of the shuttle system. Not until Dec. 2, 1988, was a Lacrosse satellite carried into orbit as the payload aboard the shuttle *Atlantis*. Even then there were problems; the launch facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California was having technical problems, and launching the shuttle from Cape Canaveral, Fla., provided a flight path that prevented coverage of the Soviet submarine bases and building yards on the Kola Peninsula, many strategic missile bases, and the space launch facility at Plesetsk.

Once deployed from the shuttle, the Lacrosse satellite's twin, 150-foot solar panels and a data-link antenna were extended; the solar panels provided power for the radar. Several weeks after it was orbited at an altitude of almost 300 miles, the Lacrosse used on-board rockets to attain a permanent orbit of between 415 and 437 miles.

The Lacrosse launched in late 1988 joined two KH-11 (KENNAN/Crystal) camera satellites already in orbit.

Additional Lacrosse satellites have been placed in orbit, although details are still classified.

### ●● LADYGIN, LT. GEN. FEDOR IVANOVICH

Chief of the GRU, Russian MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, since late Aug. 1992. A career GRU officer, Ladygin served from 1990 to 1992 as chief of the legal-treaty directorate of the Russian General Staff with additional duty in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He has a reputation within the Russian Army as a capable administrator and a disciplinarian.

### ●● LAHOUSEN, GENERALMAJOR ERWIN VON

(b. 1897 d. 1955)

Chief of German sabotage during World War II and plotter who played a key role in an attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

An Austrian from an aristocratic family, Lahousen served in the Austrian Army during World War I. After the war he became chief of Austrian COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. When Nazi Germany took over Austria in the 1938 Anschluss, the Austrian intelligence services were absorbed into Germany's and Lahousen was posted to the ABWEHR, headed by WILHELM CANARIS, a German naval officer.

Canaris quickly forged a bond with Lahousen, who shared his anti-Nazi feelings. "He hated Hitler, his philosophy, his system and to an even greater degree his methods," Lahousen later said of Canaris. Lahousen's diary reflected his dilemma: loyalty to Germany, disloyalty to Hitler and the Nazis. Lahousen, speaking for Canaris, tried in vain, for example, to prevent the killing of Russian prisoners as dangerous Bolsheviks. *Spies and Saboteurs* (1958) by Charles Wighton and Günter Peis is based on Lahousen's diary.

Canaris appointed Lahousen head of Abwehr Section II, which was concerned primarily with sabotage. He handled the successful sabotage aspects of the German invasion of Poland in Sept. 1939. But because Canaris believed that sabotage was not as important as espionage, Lahousen ordered that AGENTS being sent to Britain be trained primarily in spying, not sabotage. His agents failed miserably (see DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM), while saboteurs landed in the United States were quickly rounded up. (See FBI.)

In 1943 Lahousen was ordered to the Eastern Front and escaped the final days of the Abwehr, which, along with Canaris, had fallen into disfavor. Lahousen later said that he had supplied the bomb used on July 20, 1944, in the attempt to kill Hitler during a conference at his field headquarters in Rastenburg in East Prussia. The officer who placed the bomb and about 200 accused plotters, including Canaris, were later executed; thousands were imprisoned. But Lahousen escaped punishment even though the bomb was British-made and it was



known that such sabotage bombs were confiscated and stored by the Abwehr.

Lahousen testified against Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg trials.

## OO LAKAM

A highly secret Israeli intelligence agency founded to guard Israeli efforts to build nuclear weapons. In the fall of 1956, as Israeli, British, and French officials met secretly to plan the abortive British-French strike to seize the Suez Canal from Egypt, the Israeli government initiated efforts to obtain from France a nuclear reactor capable of producing material for nuclear weapons.

Two Israeli intelligence agencies, the MOSSAD and AMAN, had worked on the TOP SECRET plan to make Israel a nuclear power. But both Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his chief defense aide, Shimon Peres, director-general of the Defense Ministry, believed that a new agency was needed so that nuclear information could be tightly held. Accordingly, the agency was set up in 1957 under BINYAMIN BLUMBERG, a veteran officer of SHIN BET, Israel's domestic security agency.

At first Blumberg's agency was called the Office of Special Assignments, operating secretly out of the Defense Ministry. Later it became the *Lishka LeKishrei Mada* (Science Liaison Bureau), secretly known as Lakam, an acronym of its Hebrew letters. Even ISSER HAREL, the top Israel intelligence officer (the MEMUNEH, "the one in charge") did not know of the existence of Lakam when Peres founded it. Scientific ATTACHÉS sent to Israeli embassies in the United States and Europe reported to Lakam. The agency also gently pressured Israeli scientists, asking them to be patriotic about knowledge they picked up abroad.

Lakam oversaw security for the building of the reactor in the Negev Desert, claiming that the project was a textile factory. French intelligence officials, well aware of the nature of the project, infiltrated the area to learn what the Israelis were doing. U.S. intelligence was alerted by PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE.

While Israel publicly insisted it was not building an atomic bomb, U.S. and French intelligence agencies were skeptical. As French support weakened, Lakam developed a new source of supply, the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC), of Apollo, Penna. In 1965 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission discovered that Numec, which supplied uranium for U.S. nuclear reactors, had somehow "mislaidd" 200 pounds of enriched uranium. U.S. intelligence officials established that NUMEC had been in touch with the Israeli scientific attaché in Washington, D.C.—a Lakam operative. The NUMEC incident convinced the United States that Israel was developing nuclear weapons.

In 1981 Blumberg was succeeded by RAFAEL EITAN, a legendary Mossad officer who had been a major figure in Israeli intelligence since the birth of the nation in 1948. Eitan, already an adviser on counterterrorism to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, retained that post while heading Lakam. In his latter job he reported to Ariel Sharon, longtime military figure and Minister of Defense. Sharon,

who had fought in the several Arab-Israeli wars, took a keen interest in Lakam.

Sharon, distrustful and contemptuous of the Mossad, built up Lakam as his private, worldwide intelligence agency. Lakam's targets included the United States, despite the fact that the two nations had an agreement not to spy on each other. Through Lakam, for instance, krytrons—devices that can be used as nuclear bomb detonators—were smuggled out of the United States. When the FBI uncovered the smuggling plot, Israel officially apologized and returned all detonators, except those ostensibly for use for medical research.

Another Lakam operation—CODE NAME Plumbat—carried out with the aid of the Mossad, got uranium to Israel through a complicated plot. About 200 tons of uranium oxide, bought by a German firm from a Belgian firm, was loaded onto the German-flag freighter *Scheersberg* in Antwerp in late 1968. The ship never reached the supposed destination, Genoa. When the ship did reappear, she was at a Turkish port, empty. The uranium cargo had been transferred at sea to an Israeli ship.

Lakam probably would have remained an anonymous intelligence unit if an American spy, JONATHAN J. POLLARD, had not blurted out Eitan's name on a tapped telephone as the FBI closed in on Pollard in Nov. 1985. Pollard, an American working as a civilian intelligence analyst for the U.S. Navy, had approached an Israeli official in New York City and offered to spy for Israel. The Mossad was not interested, but Lakam was.

Eitan instructed his operatives—"scientific attachés" in Washington and New York—to work as Pollard's HANDLERS. Eitan met Pollard and personally ordered specific documents for Pollard to filch, copy, and return to intelligence files. To handle the thousands of papers Pollard stole, Lakam set up a high-speed copying system at an apartment in Washington.

When Pollard was arrested, Israel officially denied knowledge of the operation, though American officials assumed that Pollard had been directed by the Mossad. In Israel, Mossad officers brooded over the incident, which made that reputable organization look so amateurish.

Peres, the founder of Lakam, was Prime Minister when Pollard was arrested. He claimed that he was unaware that intelligence information he was receiving came from an American spy working for Lakam. Eitan, however, was quoted in the Israeli newspaper *Hadashot* as saying that all his actions, including the running of Pollard, "were done with the knowledge of those in charge."

Lakam was quietly dissolved in 1986.

## OO LALAS, STEVEN J.

An employee of the U.S. Embassy in Athens who spied for Greece from at least 1977 to April 1993, when he was arrested. U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officers first suspected a leak in the embassy when, in conversations between U.S. and Greek officials, the Greeks disclosed information that was classified.



Lalas was placed under SURVEILLANCE and was videotaped copying documents. Information he stole included the names of AGENTS of the CIA, cables about terrorist organizations sent to Athens from the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the FBI, assessments by the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY of troop strength and deployments in Europe, cables between Athens and the White House, and information about U.S. intelligence activities in Bosnia.

Lalas began his espionage career in 1977 when he was in the U.S. Army. From 1983 to 1993 he worked for the State Department. His motive, officials said, was greed. His espionage earned him \$24,000 in two years, but other spy income figures were not revealed.

U.S. authorities arrested him and took him to Alexandria, Va., where the FBI prefers to hold trials because there is a higher rate of convictions in the U.S. District Court there than in its counterpart in Washington, D.C. Federal prosecutors attribute the reason to the differing racial compositions of juries. Lalas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and received 14 years, instead of the maximum life term, in return for cooperating with CIA counterintelligence officials.

The CIA was concerned about what Lalas turned over to his Greek HANDLERS. Although Greece, a member of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, is officially a U.S. ally, CIA officials believed that Greece, acting in its own self-interest, could have traded the intelligence from Lalas for information the Greeks wanted from the Soviet Union and later Russia.

## ●● LAMIA

CODE NAME for Philippe L. Thyraud de Vosjoli, a French INTELLIGENCE OFFICER whose tour in the United States was marked by crisis and misadventure.

De Vosjoli also used *Lamia* as the title of his book, published in 1970 as the memoirs of a man named Lamia; he worked so long as Lamia that the name de Vosjoli seems hardly to have existed.

A member of the French Resistance when he was 19 years old in 1940, de Vosjoli managed to make his way to Free French Algeria via Spain. He joined the Algerian branch of the BCRA, the intelligence service begun by Gen. Charles de Gaulle in exile in London. He later served in India as part of the French Military Mission.

After the war he served successively in the series of postwar French intelligence agencies—the DGSS, the DGER, and the SDECE. After serving as a confidential aide to Henri Ribière, head of SDECE, in April 1951 he was sent to Washington as SDECE station chief.

One of his first duties, he wrote in *Lamia*, was at the request of Gen. WALTER BEDELL SMITH, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI). Smith said that Joseph Kennedy, former U.S. ambassador to Britain, was serving as a member of the U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee. Kennedy's son, John F. Kennedy, was running for the U.S. Senate from Massachusetts, Smith told de Vosjoli, and, since there were many people of French origin in Massachusetts, "it would be helpful to his campaign" if France awarded a posthumous Legion of Honor to

John's brother Joseph, who had been killed in a bomber accident in World War II. France did so—after Kennedy won the election.

De Vosjoli was in Cuba on Jan. 1, 1959, when Fidel Castro's forces took over Havana and proclaimed victory in the revolution. He had set up a NETWORK in Cuba, where anti-French Algerians of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) were training for guerrilla warfare in Cuban training camps.

Back in Cuba in March 1961 he found Havana "transformed into a military camp." De Vosjoli heard rumors there and in Washington that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent. The abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco did come the following month (see CUBA). Before and after the invasion Castro rounded up thousands of suspected subversives and U.S. AGENTS. But, de Vosjoli later claimed, his net survived.

In July 1962 he began getting reports of the presence of Soviet ships. Shortly before the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS in Oct. 1962, he said he had advised JOHN A. MCCONE, the DCI, about the presence of offensive missiles on the island.

De Vosjoli's tenure as SDECE's man in Washington came to an abrupt end as a result of the accusations made by ANATOLI GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected in Dec. 1961. Golitsyn, code-named Martel by the French, claimed that the SDECE was riddled with Soviet MOLES. The KGB defector sketched a Soviet network code-named SAPPHIRE and indicated that it reached into the inner circle of President Charles de Gaulle.

Outraged, de Gaulle suspected a plot against him concocted by the CIA. In turn the CIA, concerned about the lack of French response to Golitsyn's revelations, suspected he was right. JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, head of CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE and a friend of de Vosjoli, engineered a BLACK BAG JOB to break into the French Embassy in Washington.

De Vosjoli's superiors in Paris accused him of collaborating with Angleton. He was concerned that Soviet agents within the SDECE wanted to derail his career because of his efforts to prove that Sapphire did exist. He even feared for his life. He resigned in Oct. 1963 and fled to Mexico.

In 1967 *Topaz*, a novel by American author Leon Uris, was published amid publicity asserting that it was a thinly veiled account of the Sapphire ring. De Vosjoli successfully sued Uris for basing a character too closely on him.

## ●● LAMPLIGHTERS

British term for support personnel in intelligence operations. The term was made popular in JOHN LÉ CARRE novels.

## ●● LAND, EDWIN H.

(b. 1909 d. 1991)

Distinguished American inventor, scientist, and business executive who played a key role in U.S. acquisition of spyplanes and photographic SATELLITES. Land is best



known as inventor of the Polaroid Land camera, the world's first practical instant camera.

His efforts to develop air and space spy systems began in the early 1950s, when President Truman appointed him to the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization. In the spring of 1954, when JAMES R. KILLIAN, then president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was asked by President Eisenhower to establish a Technological Capabilities Panel to look into the potential of long-range, strategic missile developments, Killian selected Land to head the intelligence subpanel.

Land's report (see Killian entry) was a key factor in President Eisenhower's approving the U-2 spyplane program. His involvement in the U-2 program and its successor, the A-12 OXCART, continued, and he was instrumental in the start-up of the CORONA satellite program. Often he served as the "go between" for RICHARD M. BISSELL and both Killian and President Eisenhower. He was involved in the technological developments to improve these systems—in the words of one CIA participant in these efforts, Don Welzenbach, "Land was always pushing the envelope,"—that is, he continually strove for better systems.

After the Soviets brought down the U-2 flown by FRANCIS GARY POWERS, President Eisenhower wanted to halt further OVERFLIGHTS. Land and Killian argued against this so effectively that Eisenhower changed his mind and approved satellite RECONNAISSANCE of the Soviet Union.

Land also served on Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (see PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD).

In the business world, Land demonstrated his first instant cameras in 1947 and introduced color film in 1963. Many other photographic developments came from his imaginative mind. He retired as president of Polaroid in 1975 and as chairman of the board in 1982.

### ●● LANG, HERMANN (b. 1902 d. ?)

German-born worker who gave Germany the U.S. plans for the TOP SECRET Norden bombsight.

Lang emigrated to the United States in 1927 and eventually found a job at the Norden Co., a small factory in New York City that was working on the Norden bombsight, an aiming device for high-altitude bombers. It was named after Carl L. Norden, a Dutch-American inventor who started developing it in 1928 with Theodore H. Barth, an engineer.

In 1937, NIKOLAUS RITTER, an officer of the ABWEHR, the German intelligence service, traveled to New York City and met Lang through an informant. Ritter was head of espionage against the United States and Britain. Lang told Ritter that he had blueprints of the bombsight. Lang, an inspector, slipped blueprints out of the factory, brought them home, and, while his wife was asleep, traced the blueprints. He returned them the next day.

The tracings were large and needed to be rolled, not folded. Ritter had a COURIER conceal the rolls in an umbrella and take them aboard a German liner docked in

New York. Lang later traced other bombsight plans, which he sent to Germany through intermediaries by cutting them up and concealing them in newspapers bound for Germany. Acquisition of the bombsight plans was Ritter's most important intelligence coup in the United States.

Lang made a trip to Germany in 1938, was thanked by the Luftwaffe, and was recruited as an AGENT by the Abwehr. But when Lang returned to the United States and his Norden inspection job, he could not top his previous achievement. He did, however, join the DUQUESNE SPY RING.

The bombsight had a high degree of accuracy, though not as good as claimed by its boosters, who said it could "drop a bomb into a pickle barrel from 25,000 feet." The bombsight first got widespread use in U.S. heavy bomber raids over German-occupied Europe in 1942. The device was so secret that Norden bombsights were not used in the B-25 bombers of the Doolittle raid on Japan in April 1942 lest the bombsight fall into Japanese hands. Well before then the German Luftwaffe had incorporated Norden principles into German bombsights. Details of the bombsight were kept classified until 1947.

Lang was identified by WILLIAM G. SEBOLD, a DOUBLE AGENT working for the FBI and was sentenced to 18 years in prison following his trial in 1942.

### ●● LANGLEY

Term sometimes used by employees of the CIA to designate their workplace. CIA headquarters are in Langley, Va., part of the Washington, D.C., suburb of McLean. See also FIRM, COMPANY.

### ●● LANSDALE, MAJ. GEN. EDWARD

(b. 1908 d. 1987)

U.S. Army officer who became a clandestine operative in the Philippines and Vietnam and a key figure in the backstage U.S. campaign to topple Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba.

Lansdale was attracted to the military life as a high school student in Los Angeles, where he enrolled in the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) in 1923, obtaining a commission via ROTC, which he later resigned when he entered the University of California at Los Angeles. He left college before graduating and drifted into the glamorous new world of advertising. After the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK on Dec. 7, 1941, Lansdale, married and the father of a baby boy, requested recommissioning as an Army second lieutenant but did not pass the physical examination. He appealed, and in Feb. 1943 he was commissioned as a first lieutenant and assigned to the San Francisco field office of the Army's Military Intelligence Service (MIS) "for limited service only."

Soon afterward he was recruited by the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS). He simultaneously worked for the OSS and the MIS, developing a frequent use of MILITARY INTELLIGENCE as a COVER for deeper COVERT ACTION. During World War II most of Lansdale's duties involved



writing OSS training manuals and gathering basic intelligence information, often finding specialists on remote Pacific areas where U.S. forces planned actions.

When the war ended, he was sent to the Philippines, where he launched his career as a clandestine operator. Left-wing Filipino insurgents, who evolved from guerrilla groups fighting the Japanese, were threatening the stability of the government. One group had become the de facto government in much of Luzon: the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Habon in the Filipino Tagalog language—the Huks to Americans. Lansdale targeted the Huks as he sought to find ways to aid the Filipino government. But he had to leave the Philippines in 1948 after he was transferred to the recently created U.S. Air Force and sent to an intelligence school in Colorado.

In 1949 he was assigned to the Office of Policy Coordination, the highly secret covert action organization run by FRANK WISNER independent of the new CIA. In Washington, D.C., Lansdale met Ramón Magasaysay, a member of the Filipino Congress, and mapped out a way to make him an anti-Huk President of the Philippines.

Once again Lansdale used intelligence as a cover. He supposedly was a military intelligence adviser to the President of the Philippines, Elpidio Quirino, while simultaneously running the covert U.S. effort to create a political power base for Magasaysay, who, under U.S. pressure, had been appointed Secretary of Defense by Quirino. Lansdale used bizarre tactics, such as spreading rumors that a local vampire was pursuing Huks and then having Filipino anti-Huk units kill Huks by puncturing their throats and draining their blood. Or he had Huk leaders thanked for their help in order to make their comrades believe they had been betrayed.

In June 1953, as Magasaysay's American backers directed his campaign, Lansdale traveled in Indochina for six weeks to observe French antiguerrilla warfare against insurgents of the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Magasaysay won a landslide victory over Quirino, launching Lansdale's reputation as America's leading expert in beating communist guerrillas.

In July 1954, following their disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the French agreed to partition Vietnam along the 17th parallel, with a communist North Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and a Republic of South Vietnam, with its capital Saigon. This was to be a temporary measure pending Vietnam-wide elections in 1956.

ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ordered Lansdale to Saigon, upsetting both the CIA and the French, who distrusted Lansdale. The CIA and the SDECE, the French intelligence service, were regularly exchanging intelligence information. Both sides feared that Lansdale would jeopardize the cooperation because he already had a reputation as a lone wolf. To soothe the French, Dulles made a deal: a large supply of CIA radios in exchange for a tolerance of Lansdale. His cover was assistant U.S. air ATTACHÉ while he directed the CIA-run Saigon Military Mission. Lansdale was to help set up a stable, anticommunist South Vietnam government and work out ways to oppose Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale, by then an Air Force lieutenant colonel, ran into immediate opposition from the CIA's Saigon station

chief, who was running his own cover programs. Dulles had set it up so that Lansdale would operate outside the control of the station chief. Thus was born, in confusion and animosity, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Lansdale backed Ngo Dinh Diem, a former French colonial functionary, to be president of the Republic of South Vietnam. To Lansdale, Diem was potentially another Magasaysay. Lansdale also conceived of the idea of a propaganda campaign ("psywar," he called it) to get nearly one million Catholics in the north to migrate south. The refugees massed in the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong, badly in need of aid. Lansdale got the U.S. Navy to bring in medical supplies and food and the CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT, a CIA PROPRIETARY COMPANY, to airlift refugees to South Vietnam. One of the propaganda stars was DR. THOMAS DOOLEY, whose work for the refugees was highly publicized in the United States by reporters who did not know Dooley was part of a CIA operation.

Having set up Diem as the American-approved President of South Vietnam, Lansdale returned to Washington, where he became a major adviser on special operations to the Secretary of Defense; his job essentially gave him control of military support for CIA covert operations.

Around that time Lansdale earned some fame when literary critics wrote that he was the model for Alden Pyle, a character in *The Quiet American* (1955) by GRAHAM GREENE. Pyle was a zealous CIA agent under cover in Vietnam during the Eisenhower administration. (Greene, who often denied any specific person was a model for a fictional character, said that he would never use Lansdale "to represent the danger of innocence.") Lansdale fared better as the model for the title character in *The Ugly American* (1958) by William J. Lederer, a former U.S. Navy officer who knew Lansdale in the Philippines, and Eugene Burdick, a political scientist sympathetic to the U.S. policies Lansdale carried out. The quiet American was Col. Edwin Barnum Hillandale, who connected with the people in the Philippines and won more respect than the stuffy diplomats. *The Ugly American* became a bestseller, endorsed by Sen. John F. Kennedy and other U.S. Senators and was cited as an inspiration for the Peace Corps. In Jean Lartéguy's novel, *Le Mal Jaune*, published in the United States as *Yellow Fever* (1965), Lansdale is thinly veiled as an anti-French Col. Lionel Teryman, a new COL. THOMAS E. LAWRENCE.

In 1960, as the Eisenhower administration began looking to Cuba as a new trouble spot, Lansdale, now a brigadier general, learned of the plan to invade Cuba and vigorously opposed it. After the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion (see CUBA) the Kennedy administration began operation MONGOOSE, an intensive covert action campaign against Cuba, and had the CIA develop plans to assassinate Castro. Lansdale got into that side of the project by suggesting that "gangster elements" might be recruited for a "special target" operation and "liquidation of leaders." He also suggested nonlethal poisoning of sugar field workers to stop the Cuban sugar harvest and the creation, with fireworks, of an apparition that would convince Catholic Cubans that Castro was the anti-Christ.



The CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS ended Mongoose, and Lansdale was soon on his way to Venezuela and Bolivia to inspect antiguerrilla activity. In Sept. 1963 his Pentagon post was abolished, and he was forced into retirement. In his biography *Edward Lansdale* (1988), Cecil B. Currey writes:

The Joint Chiefs viewed him as a bizarre variation from normal officers of flag rank . . . [Secretary of State] Dean Rusk . . . could not countenance his diplomacy of concern and friendship. . . . His approach to foreign policy at once appealed to Kennedy and horrified the bureaucracy. His very effectiveness in what he did became a double-edged sword that others now used against him.

But even in retirement Lansdale continued to serve. He returned to Vietnam in Aug. 1965 as a special assistant to U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Lodge's successor, Ellsworth Bunker, until June 1968. His autobiographical book, *In the Midst of Wars*, appeared in 1972.

## ●● LANYARD

An unsuccessful U.S. spy SATELLITE developed to provide high-resolution photographs of suspected antiballistic missile sites in the Leningrad (St. Petersburg) area of the Soviet Union.

Lanyard was expected to provide high-resolution imagery—a resolution of about two feet (i.e., identifying objects that size on the ground). But its best performance was only six feet using a KH-6 camera (see KEYHOLE). Employing modified CORONA technology, the single Lanyard mission was launched into orbit on July 31, 1963. The camera failed after 32 hours.

(There had been two previous attempts to fly the KH-6 camera: On March 18, 1963, the Agena booster failed and orbit was not achieved; on May 18, 1963, a KH-6 orbit was achieved, but the system failed.)

The single successful Lanyard orbit was at an altitude of 98 to 255 miles.

## ●● LAOS

see VIETNAM

## ●● LASER INTELLIGENCE (LASINT)

Intelligence derived from laser systems. LASINT is a subset of IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE.

## ●● LATZ, T.D. [P]

COVER NAME of a CIA official, a former U-2 pilot, who was the senior AIR AMERICA officer at U.S. Embassy in Saigon in April 1975. He was responsible for the helicopter evacuation of a large number of Americans and South Vietnamese nationals, many involved in intelligence operations, when communist forces assaulted the city.

## ●● LAVON AFFAIR

see AVRAHAM DAR

## ●● LAWRENCE, COL. THOMAS E.

(b. 1888 d. 1935)

British INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who operated extensively behind Turkish lines in Arabia during World War I, collecting intelligence and leading an Arab revolt. In many respects he was the West's leading Arabist of the period—invariably known as Lawrence of Arabia.

Born the second of five illegitimate sons of Sarah Maden and Sir Thomas Chapman, Lawrence attended Oxford University. While a student he developed an intense interest in the Arab world, traveling to Syria in 1909 to research his thesis. While there he was engaged to work on the archaeological dig at Carchemish in Syria.

He returned to Oxford in 1913. The following year he came back to the Middle East to join a British expedition, led by a British intelligence officer, ostensibly to search for the route used by Moses, although in reality the group was mapping the northern Sinai. (From this trek Lawrence and Capt. S. F. Newcombe wrote *The Wilderness of Zin* [1915], the first of his ten books.)

Lawrence was commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant in Oct. 1914 after the outbreak of World War I and assigned to a British intelligence unit in Cairo. There he produced maps of Arabia, interrogated prisoners, handled communications, and performed other tasks as the British fought the Turks (Germany's ally) in the Middle East.

He was one of several junior officers sent to work with Arab forces to harass the Turks. Lawrence particularly impressed the Emir Feisal, and the British command directed him to serve as the Emir's military adviser. Lawrence subsequently led Arab raids against Turkish rail lines and collected intelligence for the British. Against specific orders, Lawrence led a force that captured the key city of Aquaba (ancient Elath), a port on the Gulf of Aquaba, on July 6, 1917. This move turned the Turkish flank and allowed British troops under Gen. Edmund H. H. Allenby to take Jerusalem in Dec. 1917.

It appears that it was Lawrence's betrayal by a guide that led to his capture and torture by the Turks. He was apparently sodomized by the Turks.

He escaped his captors and in Oct. 1918 led Arab forces in the capture of the Syrian capital of Damascus. But when the Anglo-French command refused to recognize Feisal as head of an independent Arabia, Lawrence—believing that he had been betrayed and had in turn betrayed the Arabs—returned to England. At the time he held the rank of colonel in MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

Back in England, and at the Paris peace conference of 1919, he advocated independence for Arabia. When King George V was to invest Lawrence with the Order of Bath, he refused the honor, greatly embarrassing the monarch. He did return to the Middle East with Winston Churchill for the 1921 Cairo conference that established the bor-



ders of Iraq and Transjordan. His book *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926) sought to demonstrate that the Arabs were entitled to their own land and had been betrayed by the Allies.

Obsessed with the need to do penance for his failures, Lawrence enlisted under an alias in the Royal Air Force (RAF) and later the Royal Tank Corps. Friends of Lawrence, concerned for his sanity, were able to have him transferred to the RAF and assigned to India. But when a rebellion erupted near his base he was rushed back to England. There, from 1929 until his discharge in Feb. 1935, he led a relatively happy and quiet life.

When he left the RAF he became involved with the Nazi movements in Britain and Germany. While riding a motorcycle on May 13, 1935, he was in a road accident. He lay in a coma for six days before dying of his injuries. The heavy security at the military hospital where he was taken after the accident raised questions about the possible involvement of British intelligence in his death.

### ●● LAYTON, REAR ADM. EDWIN T.

(b. 1903 d. 1984)

Head of intelligence for the U.S. Pacific Fleet during World War II. Layton was largely responsible for intelligence from breaking Japanese codes being used by the fleet commander at the battles of Coral Sea and MIDWAY, as well as later Pacific campaigns.

A 1924 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, during the 1920s and 1930s Layton served in surface ships, interspersed with tours ashore—in Japan for language training, in Peking and later Tokyo as assistant naval ATTACHÉ, and in Washington, D.C. After a little more than a year as commanding officer of a destroyer-minesweeper, in Dec. 1940 then-Lt. Comdr. Layton became intelligence officer for the fleet commander at Pearl Harbor, Adm. James O. Richardson. He continued to serve in that role for Richardson's successors, Adm. Husband E. Kimmel (1941) and Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz (1942–1945).

Layton's codebreakers at Pearl Harbor made major inroads in reading the Japanese naval codes and analyzing radio transmissions for ship movements. However, just before the outbreak of war there was a constant struggle between Layton and the intelligence staff in Washington. Layton later charged that the refusal of those in Washington to share information with his staff contributed to the failure to know the location of Japanese warship movements at the outbreak of the Pacific War. His autobiographic study of naval intelligence in the Pacific War—*And I Was There*—was published the year after his death. The book cited incompetence, bureaucratic feuding, and empire building in Washington, particularly by Capt. Richmond Kelly Turner, then director of Navy war plans.

Layton was a champion user of codebreaking information to plan operations, and he had a strong supporter in Adm. Nimitz. At the end of the war Layton, then a captain, was ordered by Nimitz to join him at the surrender ceremony on the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay as a

mark of the admiral's regard for his staff's intelligence work.

From Feb. 1946, Layton held several shore assignments, including the task of setting up the U.S. Navy's intelligence school and serving as naval attaché in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. As a rear admiral he was assistant director of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assistant chief of staff to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. He retired in Nov. 1959.

### ●● L CLEARANCE

U.S. SECURITY CLEARANCE given by the Department of Energy (formerly Atomic Energy Commission) to DOE employees, personnel of other government agencies, and contracts. An L clearance is valid for access to RESTRICTED DATA at the CONFIDENTIAL level and to national security information at the SECRET level.

An L clearance is necessary for access to nuclear weapon materials.

Also see Q CLEARANCE.

### ●● LCS

LONDON CONTROLLING STATION

### ●● LE CARRÉ, JOHN [P] (b. 1931)

Pseudonym of David Cornwell, a British Security Service MI5 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who became an internationally acclaimed master of the espionage novel. Although his novels seemed to well up from the underworld of spy and counterspy, the authenticity stemmed from his characters rather than their activities.

He wrote of espionage as a profession that psychologically crippled its practitioners. Serving a nation that no longer served them, his characters either cynically went through the motions, answering their own code of honor, or they deceived and even betrayed each other.

The traitor Bill Haydon in *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1974; adapted for television, 1980) reflects le Carré's belief that as British values eroded, so did the nation's secret services. Le Carré said HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, the real-life traitor in MI5, was "a creature of the post-war depression, of the swift snuffing out of the Socialist flame, of the thousand-year sleep of [British political leaders] Eden and Macmillan." Underscoring the Haydon-Philby connection, le Carré has a character refer to Haydon as "our latter-day Lawrence of Arabia" (see Col. THOMAS E. LAWRENCE)—a clear reference to Philby's father, an Arabist who had been likened to Lawrence. Also, Haydon, like Philby, was educated at Cambridge.

Le Carré's first two novels—*Call for the Dead* (1961) and *A Murder of Quality* (1962)—starred a shadowy, middle-aged intelligence officer named GEORGE SMILEY [f]. Not until his third novel, *The Spy Who Came In from the Cold* (1963), was le Carré established as a major spy writer. The book was acclaimed both in Britain and the United States and became a movie in 1966, with Richard Burton playing the title role. (See MOVIES.)



Le Carré was the son of a debt-ridden, womanizing father who lived a life of lies. "So we found ourselves, my brother and I, often living in the style of millionaire paupers," le Carré wrote about the lifestyle his father imposed. His father, described by le Carré as "a fantasist, perhaps a schizophrenic" who "liked using several names," appears as a thinly veiled fictional character in *A Perfect Spy* (1986; adapted for television, 1988).

After a boyhood and youth in what he called "occupied territory," le Carré spent a year in Switzerland as a student. He learned German there, and when he was drafted into the Army he was assigned to intelligence in Germany, where he interrogated displaced persons in refugee camps.

When he completed his Army service, he went to Lincoln College, Oxford, where he graduated with first-class honors. After a stint of teaching at Eton, he became a freelance illustrator. One of his commissions was the drawings in *Talking Birds*, by Maxwell Knight, for many years the head of MI5's countersubversive department. Knight recruited le Carré into MI5, whose Director-General was Sir ROGER HOLLIS, one of the many real people who are believed to have been models or partial models for le Carré characters.

In 1960 le Carré was transferred to MI6 and sent to the British Embassy in Bonn under diplomatic COVER as a second secretary. He was later given the cover of consul in Hamburg.

Of Smiley le Carré said in 1980: "I think he stands where I stand; he feels that to pit yourself against any 'ism' is to strike a posture which is itself ideological, and therefore offensive in terms of practical decency. In practice almost any political ideology invites you to set aside your humanitarian instincts."

Alec Leamas, the spent, cynical, but honorable hero of *The Spy Who Came In from the Cold*, sees himself engaged in a war—"fought on a tiny scale, at close range." He sees "people cheated and misled, whole lives thrown away, people shot and in prison, whole groups and classes of men written off for nothing."

George Smiley is introduced in *Call for the Dead* as a scholar who had served in intelligence during World War II. He is called back into intelligence because "the revelations of a young cipher-clerk in Ottawa had created a new demand for men of Smiley's experience." (In real life, IGOR GOUZENKO was such a clerk.) Smiley's estranged wife, Ann, describes him as "breathtakingly ordinary," an advantage for a field man. "Short, fat, and of a quiet disposition, he appeared to spend a lot of money on really bad clothes, which hung about his squat frame like a skin on a shrunken toad," according to Ann.

Smiley was often presented as being modeled on SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD, Director-General of MI6. But, when Oldfield died in 1986 and the *The Times* made that assertion, le Carré denied it, telling *The Times*: "I never heard of Sir Maurice either by name or in any other way until long after the name and character of George Smiley were in print."

Most intelligence officials in Britain hated the spy world that le Carré portrayed. In *Literary Agents* (1987), Anthony Masters quotes from an unpublished manu-

script by John Bingham, who was both an intelligence officer and a writer. Clearly targeting le Carré, Bingham wrote, "The belief encouraged by many spy writers that Intelligence officers consist of moles, morons, shits and homosexuals makes the Intelligence job no easier." RICHARD HELMS, who was DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE when le Carré emerged, detested his novels because of their cynicism and themes of betrayal.

When the Cold War ended, le Carré announced that he, too, had entered a new era. In the post-Cold War world, he said in 1993, "what espionage looks like now is what it always was: a sideshow got up as major theater."

Le Carré's other novels include *The Looking Glass War* (1965), *A Small Town in Germany* (1968), *The Honourable Schoolboy* (1977), *Smiley's People* (1977), *The Little Drummer Girl* (1983), *The Russia House* (1989), *The Secret Pilgrim* (1991), *The Night Manager* (1993), and *Our Game* (1995).

## ●● LEE, ANDREW D. (b. 1952)

American who sold SATELLITE secrets to the Soviets. Conspiring with CHRISTOPHER BOYCE, for nearly two years Lee carried to Soviet HANDLERS film containing photographs of TOP SECRET documents that Boyce had photographed.

Lee was caught after he threw something onto the grounds of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, trying to get the attention of his HANDLER. When Mexican police, thinking he was a terrorist, started questioning him, Lee asked for help from a U.S. diplomat. At police headquarters, police opened an envelope Lee had been carrying. It was full of film strips. The police developed the film and gave the prints to U.S. officials, who knew about Lee because of the incident at the embassy. The photos were of U.S. documents marked top secret.

Lee, who was arrested on Jan. 6, 1977, implicated Boyce, who was arrested on Jan. 18 (See CHRISTOPHER BOYCE for details of the case.) Tried and convicted of espionage, Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment, Boyce to 40 years.

## ●● LEGAL

Intelligence AGENT who comes into a country using an official position as his COVER, such as commercial ATTACHÉ or clerk.

## ●● LEGEND

False identity that an AGENT builds up through forged documents and other means such as living under the name of the person whose identity he assumes.

## ●● LE QUEUX, WILLIAM TUFNELL

(b. 1864 d. 1927)

English novelist and amateur spy who said he based his spy books on his experiences in the SECRET SERVICE.



His claim was never officially confirmed; if it was true, Le Queux was the first in a long line of British INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS turned writer. (See LITERARY SPIES.)

His 1896 thriller, *A Secret Service*, was taken seriously by some British officials, who used the book as a call for preparedness. The book told of an impending German invasion of Britain (a theme echoed by ERSKINE CHILDERS in 1903). In 1905 Le Queux claimed that a friend in BERLIN had revealed to him the existence of a huge German spy NETWORK in Britain. He also claimed to know about British traitors who belonged to a secret organization called the "Hidden Hand."

Le Queux continued writing thrillers and spy novels until his death. His other works included *Guilty Bonds* (1890), *Secrets of Monte Carlo* (1899), *An Observer in the Near East* (1907), and *Where the Desert Ends* (1923).

### ●● LESSENTHIEN, MACHINIST MATE 1ST CLASS KURT G.

U.S. sailor charged with attempted espionage. An instructor at the Navy Nuclear Power School in Orlando, Fla., Lessenthien was accused of offering information about U.S. nuclear submarine technology to a Russian government representative. He had served on three U.S. submarines.

The FBI learned of the sailor's alleged contact apparently through electronic SURVEILLANCE of the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. An FBI agent posing as a Russian then contacted Lessenthien. In March 1996, a Navy official said, Lessenthien offered a Russian TOP SECRET data for "tens of thousands of dollars."

He was charged with 22 counts of attempted espionage or failure to safeguard classified material. He was accused of photographing classified equipment on a Trident-class submarine and removing classified documents from it. He was taken into custody after he mailed classified material to the "Russian" AGENT as a "show of good faith." At a meeting he handed over more material and was arrested. A court martial is pending.

### ●● LEVCHENKO, MAJ. STANISLAV ALEKSANDROVICH

(b. 1941)

Former KGB officer who defected to the United States.

Levchenko grew up as the privileged son of a military school faculty member. He attended Moscow University's Institute of Oriental Studies and studied Japanese in the hope of becoming a diplomat stationed in the Far East. After graduating in 1964, the following year he became an interpreter for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, making several trips to Japan.

In 1966 he was drafted into the Army and was ordered into the GRU (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE). In 1971 he was assigned to the First Directorate (foreign operations) of the KGB and, after another year of training, to the Japanese desk at THE CENTER. He was given the COVER of

a journalist and in Feb. 1975 was sent to Tokyo as a correspondent for the magazine *New Times*. There he cultivated contacts with Japanese political, military, and economic leaders.

He became bitter over his treatment by the KGB, and in Oct. 1979, after seeking out U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS in Tokyo, he defected and named many of his KGB colleagues as well as Japanese contacts. He alleged that the KGB was paying at least 200 Japanese, although not all were active spies. He named some, but not all, fearing some would commit suicide if their identities were revealed.

He subsequently testified before the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in July 1982, describing KGB programs directed against the United States.

Levchenko was sentenced to death in absentia by a Soviet court in 1981 while he was living in the United States. His book, *On the Wrong Side* (1988), recounted his life in the GRU and KGB.

### ●● LEVINSON, COL. SHIMON (b. 1933)

Israeli INTELLIGENCE OFFICER and security chief for the Prime Minister's office who was convicted of spying against Israel for the KGB.

He entered the Army as an enlisted man. Subsequently commissioned, Levinson was the Israeli military representative on the Israeli-Jordanian cease-fire committee from 1954 to 1961. He joined AMAN, Israeli MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, in 1963, undertaking various assignments until he rejoined the cease-fire committee in 1967. After the Six Day War (1967) he became a liaison officer to UNITED NATIONS forces. He later became the chief military liaison officer to the United Nations, a position he held until 1978.

The following year he took leave of the Army to work in counter-drug activities in Southeast Asia. About 1983, while in Bangkok, Levinson volunteered to work for the KGB, apparently for financial reasons. Levinson testified that over the next six years he met with his KGB controllers in European cities on 11 occasions.


He returned to Israel in 1983 and two years later was appointed security chief for the Prime Minister's office.

Levinson was arrested on May 12, 1991, as he was returning from abroad after his contacts with the KGB apparently broke down.

Israeli officials declared that Levinson had passed the highest secrets related to nuclear and military matters to the KGB. However, former Israeli intelligence official RAFAEL EITAN said that the only important information passed by Levinson that could help the Soviets was about senior Israeli officials.

A trial in camera was held in 1992-1993 and is believed to have been the longest spy trial in history. In July 1993 Levinson was convicted of giving information to the enemy, espionage, and having contact with a foreign AGENT. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison. He received only about \$30,000 from the KGB for his services.





U.S. intelligence collection ship *Liberty* after being damaged by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats on June 8, 1967. (U.S. NAVY)

## ●● LIBERTY

U.S. Navy INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIP attacked by Israeli air and naval forces on June 8, 1967, when she was in the Mediterranean off the Sinai coast during the Arab-Israeli Six Day War.

The *Liberty* was collecting ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE from both Israeli and Egyptian forces fighting in that area when Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats, misidentifying the ship, concentrated heavy fire on her. In the attack 34 crewmen were killed, 170 were wounded, and the ship was severely damaged.

The ship was launched in May 1945 as *Simmons Victory*, a Victory-class cargo ship for carrying supplies to Allied forces in the Pacific during the last months of World War II. She did the same during the Korean War, being decommissioned in 1958. The U.S. Navy bought the ship in Feb. 1963, refitted it as an intelligence collection ship, and assigned it the classification AGTR, indicating miscellaneous auxiliary (AG) and technical research (TR). As the fifth AGTR ship, she was designated AGTR-5. She was rechristened *Liberty* and, after commissioning in Dec. 1964, was sent along the African coast, under control of the NSA. Her SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE equipment included an ingenious system for bouncing a signal off the moon to be picked up by a shore station or other ship. The system allowed the *Liberty* to transmit large amounts of data while eluding HIGH-FREQUENCY DIRECTION FINDING devices.

In May 1967, under the command of Comdr. William McGonagle, she was ordered to Rota, Spain,

where she took on supplies and six Arabic linguists—three from the NSA and three U.S. Marines—and proceeded to an operations area off Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal. A crisis was brewing between Israel and Egypt, with Syria and Jordan allying with Egypt. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced a blockade of the Strait of Tiran at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula.

As the *Liberty* headed toward Israel, the Six Day War started, and the ship was ordered to keep 20 miles from the coast. A second order would have put her 100 miles off the coast. She did not get that order. Besides, for her mission the electronic eavesdroppers on board needed to be close to the coast to intercept tactical communications.

Early on June 8, an Israeli Air Force patrol plane spotted the *Liberty* about 70 miles west of Gaza and correctly identified her. In the maelstrom of battle between Israeli and Egyptian ships and aircraft, an Israeli pilot reported to the Israeli command center that an unidentified ship had fired on him. There were also reports, which later proved to be false, that Israeli troops in the Egyptian coastal town of El Arish were being shelled by a ship. Israeli aircraft reported a ship, heading westward along the coast, going so fast that it had to be a warship. The ship was the *Liberty*, but the speed estimates were wrong. (The Israeli command center twice contacted the U.S. naval ATTACHÉ in Tel Aviv to ask if any U.S. ships were in the area. Both times the attaché responded “No.”)

At about 2 P.M., two Israeli Mirage jet aircraft spotted the *Liberty*, identified her as an enemy ship (the



Egyptian troop transport *El Quseir*), and strafed her. They did not see her American flag, whose mast was knocked down on one of the strafing runs. Two Israeli Super-Mystère aircraft, diverted from another mission, arrived and dropped napalm on the ship. One napalm bomb struck her.

As the aircraft broke off their attack, two Israeli torpedo boats approached and asked the smoke-engulfed ship to identify herself. Getting what was later described as an evasive answer, the boats launched four torpedoes. One hit the ship below the waterline, destroying a signals compartment, opening it to the sea; 25 technicians, attached to the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP intercept unit, drowned or were killed in the explosion. As the boats maneuvered for another attack, an Israeli crewman read the letters GTR on the *Liberty*'s bow and an immediate cease-fire was ordered.

On board the listing *Liberty*, Comdr. McGonagle, his right leg torn by shrapnel, his executive officer and operations officer dead or dying, commanded a floating inferno. He rejected Israeli offers of assistance and conned his crippled ship out of the area. She sailed through the night by the north star and at dawn rendezvoused with U.S. Navy ships and helicopters, which took off her dead and wounded. McGonagle stayed on board and sailed his ship to Malta.

Israel rapidly tried to end a diplomatic uproar by setting up a court of inquiry. It reported that the attack "was perpetrated as a result of a chain of three errors"—the false report that El Arish was being shelled, the wrong estimate of the *Liberty*'s speed, and the misidentification of the ship as the *El Quseir*. Critics of Israel's findings wondered how the 10,680-ton, 455-foot *Liberty* could be mistaken for the 2,640-ton, 275-foot *El Quseir*. Controversy was heightened by discrepancies between the Israeli and U.S. battle reports.

The Israeli government paid \$3,323,000 to the families of the 34 men who were killed; \$3,566,547 was paid in compensation to the wounded, but some of the funds went to U.S. lawyers who negotiated the settlement. After years of claims and counterclaims, in 1980 Israel paid the U.S. Navy \$6,000,000 for damage done to the *Liberty*. For many, particularly those in the NSA and Navy with close attachments to the ship and its operations, Israel remained unforgiven. But on a government-to-government level, the attack on the *Liberty* was sadly accepted as a tragic incident in the fog of war.

### ●● LIE DETECTOR

see POLYGRAPH

### ●● LINDBERG, LT. COMDR. ARTHUR E.

U.S. Navy officer who helped the FBI in a scam to trap Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. Following an elaborate FBI scenario, Lindberg boarded the Soviet cruise ship *Kazakhstan* for a week-long, New York-to-Bermuda voyage in the summer of 1977. As Lindberg was leaving the ship, he handed an officer a note saying that he was "interested in making additional money prior to [his] retirement." Soviets did contact him, and he provided them

with information about underwater acoustics and detection techniques used in the hunting of Soviet submarines. Navy antisubmarine warfare experts doled out the information, which Lindberg photographed. He placed the film at DEAD DROPS near New Jersey highways. In May 1978 FBI agents staked out a drop in Woodbridge, N.J., and arrested three Soviets who serviced the drop. Two of them were UNITED NATIONS employees; the third was an ATTACHÉ in the Soviet United Nations mission and had diplomatic immunity. He was expelled.

The other two Soviets did not have immunity and were to be put on trial—over the objections of the Navy, which feared that submarine-hunting secrets would be revealed in testimony; of the CIA, which feared reprisals against its own agents in the Soviet Union; and of the State Department, which worried about the possible effect of the arrests on a forthcoming summit meeting planned between President Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

In Moscow the KGB retaliated by arresting an American businessman for smuggling and by revealing the previously undisclosed arrest and expulsion of MARTHA PETERSON, a CIA CASE OFFICER in Moscow. Meanwhile, the two Soviets were tried and convicted of espionage; each was given a 50-year sentence. They were then traded to the Soviet Union for five Soviet dissidents and "other considerations," which some sources said included a Soviet promise not to execute an imprisoned CIA agent. The American businessman was convicted on a lesser charge, given a five-year prison sentence, and expelled.

### ●● LINK ENCRYPTION

The application of on-line CRYPTOSECURITY to a communications system or "link" so that all information passing over the link is totally encrypted.

### ●● LIPKA, ROBERT S. (b. 1946)

U.S. Army intelligence analyst accused of spying for the Soviets while working at the NSA.

Lipka, who worked at the NSA from 1964 to 1967, was not arrested until Feb. 1996. The FBI was alerted to Lipka when his former wife called the FBI in 1993 and said that he had been spying for the Soviets.

Lipka was assigned to the NSA as an intelligence analyst when a young soldier. He worked in the central communications room, where he removed highly classified documents from teleprinters and distributed them around the agency.

His age and actions coincide with a "young soldier" who was a WALK-IN volunteer spy, as described by former KGB Maj. Gen. OLEG KALUGIN in his book *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (1994). "The young soldier," Kalugin wrote, "... was involved in shredding and destroying NSA documents and could supply us with a wealth of material," giving his HANDLER "whatever he got his hands on, often having little idea what he was turning over." These included the NSA's "daily and weekly top-



secret reports to the White House, copies of communications on U.S. troop movements around the world and communications among the NATO allies.” Kalugin said that the soldier used the money he received—\$500 to \$1,000 for each package he delivered—to finance his college education.

After leaving the Army, Lipka attended Millersville University in Millersville, Penna., and received a bachelor’s degree in education in 1972. He became a schoolteacher and worked on the side as a coin dealer. He and his wife, Patricia, divorced in 1974.

After his former wife made her accusations to the FBI, an agent posing as “Sergey Nitikin” called on Lipka and said he was a Russian MILITARY INTELLIGENCE officer who wanted to resume contact. They met four times and in the conversations, the FBI said, he admitted having been a spy while at the NSA.

The FBI said Lipka used classic TRADECRAFT in making his deliveries in one place (such as the men’s room in a restaurant) and picking up his payment at a DEAD DROP. The FBI also said that the KGB gave him a “roll-over” camera, which snapped photos as it was rolled over a document.

According to FBI sources, a man and wife, identified as Peter and Ingeborg Fischer, acted as CUTOUTS between the KGB and Lipka. They were under SURVEILLANCE during the 1960s, but as far as is publicly known, they were not apprehended.

## ●● LITERARY SPIES

Writing about espionage is as old as writing itself (see BIBLICAL SPIES). The earliest source for spy stories is Ti Jen-chieh, a seventh-century Chinese spymaster, whose exploits were fictionalized in 18th-century stories known as the *Dee Goong An*. They were translated and adapted in recent times by a Dutch diplomat, R. H. Van Gulik, who published them as the “Judge Dee Stories.” So even these tales, although rooted in ancient sources, are, like other spy fiction, relatively young.

In Western literature JAMES FENIMORE COOPER is generally credited with writing the first spy novel, *The Spy* (1821), which was based on the real espionage of a Patriot in the American Revolutionary War (see HARVEY BIRCH [f]). Then follows a long period without spy fiction in America, other than the exaggerated memoirs that poured out of the pens of spies who served on both sides of the American Civil War.

In England DANIEL DEFOE worked as a spy against the Jacobites before writing *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), but he did not merge his two careers. Charles Dickens wove espionage into the plot of *A Tale of Two Cities* (1859). Then, as in America, there was a dry spell for fictional spies. At the end of the 19th Century, two prolific British authors turned to espionage for plots and launched the genre in Britain. E. Phillips Oppenheim sometimes gets the credit for the first British spy novel, *Mysterious Mr. Sabin* (1898), but his contemporary, WILLIAM TUFNELL LE QUEUX, preceded him with *The Secret Service* (1896). Oppenheim’s *The Great Impersonation* (1920) is the best known of his spy novels.

In 1903 came *The Riddle of the Sands* by ERSKINE CHILDERS, who had become convinced that Germany planned to invade Britain. His novel, about two British yachtsmen stumbling onto German invasion plans, inspired the British Admiralty to create a North Sea Fleet. Childers launched a wave of British spy novels, including two by JOSEPH CONRAD: *The Secret Agent* (1907) and *Under Western Eyes* (1911). In *The Secret Agent*’s somber world of anarchists Conrad anticipates the haunted AGENTS of GRAHAM GREENE and JOHN LE CARRÉ. G. K. Chesterton, in *The Man Who Was Thursday* (1908), uses a conspiracy to take over the world—a plot device that foreshadows the would-be world conquerors confronted by IAN FLEMING’S JAMES BOND[f].

SOMERSET MAUGHAM, himself a British agent in World War I, drew upon his experiences to write *Ashenden* (1928). “Of all fictitious spy stories,” Anthony Masters wrote in *Literary Agents* (1987), “Ashenden’s adventures come nearest to the real-life experiences of his creator.” *Ashenden*, le Carré told a Maugham biographer, influenced him in his espionage writing. Maugham, said le Carré, “was the first person to write anything about espionage in a mood of disenchantment and almost prosaic reality.”

In the 1930s spy thrillers began appearing as serials in pulp magazines (so called because they were published on cheap newsprint). The most popular were the fantastic adventures of Secret Service Operator 5, “America’s Undercover Ace,” also known as Operator 5 (and sometimes Operator Z7).

Cyril Henry Coles, a British intelligence officer in World War I and World War II, collaborated with Adelaide Frances Manning to write a series of some 25 books under the pseudonym Manning Coles. The hero of the series is Tommy Hambledon, an agent working for the “British Intelligence Service.” The Manning Coles books include *Drink to Yesterday*, *Pray Silence* (both 1940), and *They Tell No Tales* (1941). F. van Wyck Mason, more famous as a murder mystery author, used “Hugh North of Army intelligence” as a hero in *Seeds of Murder* (1930).

ERIC AMBLER wrote of a Europe moving toward war in his series of prewar novels. Graham Greene also anticipated the war with his *The Confidential Agent* (1939). Later would come *Our Man in Havana* (1958) and *The Human Factor* (1978), graphic novels of the Cold War. In *The Quiet American* (1955) Greene used a real U.S. COVERT ACTION operative, U.S. Maj. Gen. EDWARD LANSDALE, as the model for Alden Pyle, a zealous CIA agent under COVER in Vietnam during the Eisenhower administration. Lansdale had the paradoxical distinction of being such a good SECRET AGENT that he became the model for characters in three works of fiction: Greene’s; *The Ugly American* (1958) by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, who portrayed Lansdale as Col. Edwin Barnum Hillandale, who connected with the people in the Philippines and won more respect than the stuffy diplomats; and Jean Lartéguy’s novel *Le Mal Jaune*, published in the United States as *Yellow Fever* (1965), in which Lansdale is thinly veiled as an anti-French Col. Lionel Teryman, a new Col. THOMAS E. LAWRENCE.



During World War II many writers worked in intelligence, some gaining experience they would later use as novelists. Greene was an AGENT for MI6; IAN FLEMING, creator of JAMES BOND [f], was a British NAVAL INTELLIGENCE officer. British author Angus Wilson started his writing career as a result of his wartime work as a cryptographer at BLETCHLEY PARK, where he had a nervous breakdown and was advised by a psychotherapist to take up writing.

Novelist John P. Marquand worked for the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS). Among his projects was the testing of German prisoners of war for antitoxins in an attempt to learn whether they were being protected against biological warfare agents that Germany might use against the Allies.

The two world wars produced a time and a setting for few spy novels compared to the rich offerings of the Cold War, which became the arena for countless novels pitting agents of the West against agents of the East. Heroes and villains spied for the CIA, MI6, and the KGB. Intelligence agencies emerged from the shadows and appeared on pages of fiction when little about their real work was appearing on pages of nonfiction books.

Most spy novels were thrillers featuring as heroes spies who in no way resembled real INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, HANDLERS, or agents. Writer MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE, who was an intelligence officer during World War II, commented that thriller writers took to espionage “as easily as the mentally unstable become psychiatrists or the impotent pornographers.”

James Bond—Agent 007—burst into spy fiction in *Casino Royale* (1953), the first of 11 Bond novels portraying the spy as a superhero. President John F. Kennedy, who said that Bond’s creator, IAN FLEMING, was one of his favorite authors, helped put James Bond novels on U.S. bestseller lists. So did Bond films. (For titles and dates of James Bond films, see MOVIES.)

JOHN LE CARRÉ introduced a realistic spy, a brooding, tormented man who saw himself playing a role he did not fully understand. Le Carré’s weary GEORGE SMILEY [f] appears in *Call for the Dead* (1961), but it was his *The Spy Who Came In from the Cold* (1963) that established him as a master of the espionage tale.

Charles McCarry’s adept writing about espionage is based on his career in the CIA. He considers himself a novelist, not a *spy* novelist. But his authentic hero, Paul Christopher, works for a CIA-like agency and uses the COVER of a magazine writer. (After leaving the CIA, McCarry served for several years as a senior editor on *National Geographic Magazine*.) His first novel, *The Miernik Dossier* (1973), was hailed by Eric Ambler as “wholly convincing.” McCarry’s other novels include *The Tears of Autumn* (1975), *The Secret Lover* (1977), and *The Last Supper* (1983). Other authors followed le Carré’s realistic style, using TRADECRAFT and authentic situations to portray the life of the spy. Ken Follett, who sometimes built plots around INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, offered realism in *The Shakeout* (1975), *The Key to Rebecca* (1980), *The Man from St. Petersburg* (1982), and *Five Tigers* (1985).

William F. Buckley, a conservative writer and former CIA officer, straddled the spy style, putting his character, Blackford Oakes, somewhere between an American

James Bond and a realistic hero. Oakes, who resembles Buckley at least politically, is a former CIA agent recalled for special projects. His cycle of ten Oakes novels ended in 1994 with *A Very Pretty Plot*.

LEN DEIGHTON established himself with his first book, *The Ipcress File* (1962). Other books included *Funeral in Berlin* (1964), *Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Spy* (1976), and a trilogy: *Berlin Game* (1983), *Mexico Set* (1984), and *London Match* (1985). In *Day of the Jackal* (1971) Frederick Forsyth stepped up the pace of the spy story by adding an assassin and counterintelligence officers racing against the clock. His other novels include *The Odessa File* (1972), *The Dogs of War* (1974), and *The Fourth Protocol* (1984). *Leighton’s Hope* (1995) takes his Bernard Samson, the weary British intelligence officer, through the ebbing Cold War. *The Fist of God* (1994) took Deighton into the Persian Gulf War.

Trevanian (the pen name of Rod Whitaker) added brutality to the realism of *The Eiger Sanction* (1972), *The Loo Sanction* (1973), and *Shibumi* (1979). Robert Ludlum, a prolific writer, placed himself somewhere between Fleming’s outlandish tales and le Carré’s realism. Complex global conspiracies abound in Ludlum’s novels, which include *The Scarlatti Inheritance* (1971), *The Matarese Circle* (1979), *The Bourne Supremacy* (1986), and *The Icarus Agenda* (1988).

With the arrival of Tom Clancy’s *The Hunt for Red October* (1984) high-tech talk about military weapons systems was added to espionage, but Clancy’s intrepid CIA hero, Jack Ryan, was much more a young executive who ran intelligence operations than a spy in the mold of George Smiley. Clancy’s Ryan, like le Carre’s Smiley, is found in successive novels.

## THE REAL AND UNREAL

The lines between fiction and nonfiction often become hazy. Fictional accounts of espionage are often so authoritative that the CIA began a library of spy novels published throughout the world. This secret library is the setting for a fictional thriller in *Six Days of the Condor* (1974) by James Grady, one of the innumerable spy novels that became the basis for movies about spies. The hero of Grady’s book and movie is a low-level CIA employee caught up in a swirl of intrigue and murder.

Former intelligence officers become authors of novels, and novelists with no experience in espionage write about it, sometimes basing their work on solid research and sometimes letting their imagination do the research.

Intelligence agencies frown on officers who put away the cloak and dagger and pick up the pen. Sir COMPTON MACKENZIE was tried and convicted of violating the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT in 1932 for publishing his World War I memoirs. The British intelligence establishment sharply criticized le Carré and Greene for their portrayals of that establishment. Prosecution under the Official Secrets Act was contemplated when Greene’s *Our Man in Havana* was published. (For other examples, see Sir JOHN CECIL MASTERMAN, PETER WRIGHT, FRANK SNEPP, and PHILIP AGEE.)

RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) did not like le Carré’s spy novels—especially *The*