

Soon after she was appointed, the Security Service—MI5's formal name—published an unprecedented booklet that cautiously described the organization. Rimington, in an introduction to the booklet, said it was being published to “dispose of some of the more fanciful allegations surrounding” the work of MI5. She also provided a post office box number for the use of “members of the public who believe that they may have useful information.”

### ●● RITTER, NIKOLAUS (b. 1897 d. ?)

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER for the ABWEHR, the German MILITARY INTELLIGENCE service, who developed AGENTS in the United States and Britain.

Ritter had one major success: In 1937 he obtained for Germany the plans for the U.S. Norden bombsight (see HERMAN LANG). This was the Abwehr's greatest coup in the United States. For the rest of his career, however, Ritter was a dismally ineffective spymaster.

After completing his university education in Cologne in 1924, Ritter became a textile salesman. In 1927 he managed sales from a New York City office.

Ten years later he returned to Germany, where he joined the Abwehr. For his first assignment he was put in charge of the Abwehr section in Hamburg dealing with aviation intelligence for the German Air Force. Sent back to the United States in 1937 to recruit AGENTS, he was introduced to Herman Lang, who worked in the plant producing the bombsight.

Ritter, using the CODE NAME Dr. Rantzau, also recruited WILLIAM SEBOLD, an American visiting his relatives in Germany. After attending a SPY SCHOOL in Germany, Sebold went back to the United States and became a DOUBLE AGENT, passing on enough information to the FBI to destroy Ritter's DUQUESNE SPY RING. Two other Ritter spies, WILLIAM COLEPAUGH and ERICH GIMPEL, were quickly caught, after being delivered to the United States by SUBMARINE.

One of the first British AGENTS Ritter recruited was Arthur Owens, code-named Johnny, a Welsh engineer who sold Ritter information about Royal Air Force equipment. Ritter did not know that Owens was also the earliest double agent run by Britain's DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM. Johnny's British code name was Snow. As far as Ritter knew, Johnny was a valuable agent with about a dozen subagents. They were imaginary.

When Britain went to war against Germany in Sept. 1939, Owens was briefly jailed. Representatives of the TWENTY COMMITTEE, which ran the Double-Cross System, brought Owens' Ritter-supplied radio set and, from his cell in Wandsworth Prison, Snow launched the phenomenally successful British scheme to TURN Ritter's agents.

Ritter spent the war unaware that his agents were actually working for the British.

### ●● RIVET JOINT

Major U.S. Air Force program during the Cold War to employ converted C-135 STRATOTANKER aircraft in an ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) role. Designated RC-

135, these highly specialized aircraft were also employed in SURVEILLANCE operations against Third World countries in addition to the Soviet Union.

Variations of the Rivet Joint program included Rivet Amber, a single RC-135B fitted with a large side-looking radar (that plane was lost over the Bering Sea in 1969 as a result of a structural failure). This prototype was followed by several similar RC-135V ELINT/radar aircraft. The Israeli Air Force converted at least one Boeing 707 (the basis of the C-135) to a similar ELINT/radar configuration. These side-looking, phased-array radar antennas resemble large “slabs” on the forward fuselage of the aircraft.

### ●● ROCHEFORT, CAPT. JOSEPH J.

(b. 1898 d. 1976)

Head of HYPO, the U.S. Navy CRYPTANALYSIS station located at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in the crucial months just before and after Japan's PEARL HARBOR ATTACK in Dec. 1941.

A graduate of the University of California, Rochefort enlisted in the Navy during World War I. In 1919 he was commissioned an ensign, and after two years as an executive officer on board a destroyer, he became the officer in charge of the cryptographic section of NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE in Washington, D.C., succeeding Lt. Comdr. LAURENCE L. SAFFORD. “I've often said it is not necessary to be crazy to be a cryptanalyst,” he said years later, “but it always helps.”

Rochefort learned codebreaking skills from Safford and Agnes Meyer Driscoll. Driscoll was renowned for having achieved the first breakthrough in the Japanese CODE known as the RED BOOK.

After spending three years in Japan learning the Japanese language, he began alternating duty at sea with intelligence work ashore. When he was assistant operations and INTELLIGENCE OFFICER on the staff of the Pacific Fleet commander in the 1930s, Adm. Joseph M. Reeves called Rochefort “one of the most outstanding officers of his rank” whose “judgment and ability are truly remarkable”—especially for a non–Naval Academy graduate, he added. (Rochefort's lack of a Naval Academy ring would haunt his career.)

Rochefort reported to the underground headquarters of the Pearl Harbor codebreakers—the “dungeon,” they called it—in June 1941. Rochefort named the unit the Combat Intelligence Unit as a COVER for the codebreaking. (It was later designated FLEET RADIO UNIT PACIFIC.) He played a key role in deciphering and analyzing Japanese codes, which led directly to the overwhelming U.S. victory at MIDWAY in June 1942. Rochefort had predicted a Japanese attack on Midway; Navy intelligence officers in Washington believed that the attack would come two weeks later at Johnston Island or even the West Coast of the United States.

The U.S. commander in the Pacific, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, accepted Rochefort's prediction, based on intercepts of Japanese messages. Immediately after the battle, Nimitz welcomed Rochefort to a staff meeting by saying, “This officer deserves a major share of the credit for the victory at Midway.” Nimitz recommended Rochefort for

the Distinguished Service Medal for his brilliant work. But officers in Washington denied the award. Rochefort was summarily relieved of his codebreaking post in Oct. 1942 and reassigned to a minor, noncombat command.

"Communications Intelligence fell in a no-man's-land between the Communications Division and the Intelligence Division of the Navy Department, subject to the pressures, jealousies, and petty politics of both divisions," W. J. HOLMES, an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who served with Rochefort, wrote in *Double-Edged Secrets* (1979). "The only probable explanation of what happened to Rochefort is that he became the victim of a Navy Department internal political coup."

After the war, when Nimitz learned why the medal had not been given to Rochefort, he wrote to the Navy Department on Rochefort's behalf. The publication of "*And I Was There*" (1985), by Rear Adm. EDWIN T. LAYTON, Nimitz's chief intelligence officer, resurrected the injustice. Finally, in 1986, through the efforts of then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the Distinguished Service Medal was awarded posthumously to Rochefort, with President Reagan personally presenting it to his family in a White House ceremony.

## ●● ROESSLER, RUDOLF

(b. 1897 d. 1958)

Anti-Nazi German who was a key member of the LUCY SPY RING.

Roessler served in the German Army during World War I, but unlike many veterans in tumultuous postwar Germany, he was anti-Nazi. After a time in BERLIN, where he wrote anti-Nazi articles and worked for a theater organization, he and his wife moved to Lucerne, Switzerland. There he managed a small publishing house and became a one-man intelligence operation. A pamphlet he published, for example, predicted Nazi Germany's 1936 plan to occupy the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland a month before it happened.

Roessler had connections in the German Army who supplied him with intelligence, including a forecast of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, with the exact date, June 22, 1941, and the order of battle.

In *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963), ALLEN W. DULLES, who was the European representative of the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES in Bern at the time, wrote, "By means which have not been ascertained to this day, Roessler in Switzerland was able to get intelligence from the German High Command in Berlin on a continuous basis, often less than twenty-four hours after its daily decision...."

While serving the Soviet Union, Roessler was also earning immunity from arrest as a spy by providing Swiss intelligence with information about German intentions toward Switzerland. The Swiss were particularly concerned about what appeared to be a massing of German troops near the Swiss-German border in July 1940. Through his German Army sources, he learned that the troop movements had nothing to do with an attack on Switzerland.

The threat lingered, however, and he continued to watch the Germans for the Swiss until the Swiss arrested him and members of the Lucy ring in May 1944, possibly

to protect them from German SD officers who were hunting for them. Roessler and the others were released in Sept. 1944.

Roessler remained in Switzerland after the war, except for at least one mysterious visit to West Germany in the 1950s, when he was arrested on a vague charge of espionage. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison for one year. He died in poverty in Switzerland, and an anonymous donor paid for his funeral.

## ●● ROMAN, HOWARD

Real or possibly "working name" of the CIA CASE OFFICER who handled, Col. MICHAL GOLIENIEWSKI a Polish INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. His defection to the West in Dec. 1960 provided information that led to the arrest of GEORGE BLAKE, a KGB spy in the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and HARRY HOUGHTON, a civilian employee of the Portland naval base.

## ●● RONDEAU, STAFF SGT. JEFFREY S.

U.S. Army enlisted man arrested in 1992 for conspiring to sell classified documents pertaining to the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION to Czechoslovakian and Hungarian INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. Rondeau, along with JAMES R. RAMSAY, was accused of working with CLYDE LEE CONRAD, another former U.S. Army sergeant, who was convicted of treason in a West German court.

## ●● RONGE, GEN. MAXIMILIAN

Director of the Austrian Army's intelligence service, the Kundschaftsstelle, during World War I.

Ronge caught ALFRED REDL, an Austrian INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who was a DOUBLE AGENT for Russia. Redl was working in the Kundschaftsstelle when he started spying for the Russians, giving them material that included Austrian war plans. After Austrian officials learned that Russia had the plans, Ronge was assigned to find the Austrian spy. To help him and keep him in his post, the Russians had given Redl the identities of minor AGENTS for him to seemingly discover. Impressed by his performance, Redl's superiors promoted him to director of the Kundschaftsstelle. In 1912 he was made chief of staff of an army corps in Hungary, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Ronge, Redl's successor as head of the intelligence service, developed one of Redl's projects: interception of mail. In 1913 a cooperative German intelligence chief sent Ronge two envelopes from Germany addressed to a "Nikon Nizetas" at a general post office address in VIENNA. When the envelopes were not picked up, the German intelligence officer sent them to Ronge to investigate.

On discovering that the envelopes contained money and the addresses of agents in France and Switzerland, Ronge had them delivered to the Vienna post office, which he kept under SURVEILLANCE. Two more envelopes arrived and were found to contain apparent references to espionage from a Russian intelligence officer.

One day a man arrived to pick up the mail. It was Redl. Confronted by fellow officers, Redl shot himself.

## ●● Roof

That part of an AGENT'S LEGEND that he uses openly.  
Also see ON-THE-ROOF GANG.

## ●● Roofers

see ON-THE-ROOF-GANG

## ●● Rook

see ROBERT S. LIPKA

## ●● Room, The

Secret American society founded in 1927 by group of wealthy New Yorkers who had MILITARY INTELLIGENCE backgrounds or who felt intelligence work had a romantic interest. Its principal founders included VINCENT ASTOR and KERMIT ROOSEVELT. Other powerful men in the Room included banker Winthrop W. Aldrich and Foreign Service officer David K. E. Bruce.

When World War II began in Europe in Sept. 1939, the Room changed its name to the Club, and it took a more active role in providing intelligence directly to President Roosevelt.

## ●● Room 40

Location and name of the Royal Navy's codebreaking operation during World War I. The Navy started its code-breaking efforts when war began in Aug. 1914 and British radio stations—naval and civilian—began picking up coded German communications. The DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, Rear Adm. H. F. Oliver, recognized the potential of these messages and asked the director of naval education, Sir ALFRED EWING, to see if he could exploit them.

Ewing grabbed at the opportunity and rapidly assembled a staff to attack the German CODES: His first recruits were faculty members, particularly German instructors, at the Royal Naval Colleges of Dartmouth and Osborne, who were on their summer leave at the time. Among them was ALASTAIR DENNISTON, a German master at Osborne. (Later, Ewing recruited professors from Cambridge, seeking mostly classicists and linguists.)

Initially this staff, working in Ewing's cramped office, sorted and filed the intercepts, learning to distinguish German military messages from naval ones and to identify some of the transmitting radio stations. But they were unable to break into the German codes.

The situation changed dramatically on Oct. 13, 1914, when a code book taken from the grounded and blown-up German cruiser *MAGDENBURG* was delivered to the Admiralty. The book contained hundreds of pages of columns with five-digit and three-letter groups, which were substituted for German words in communications. But even with this windfall, the codebreakers were unable to break into the messages until another windfall arrived at the Admiralty: a code book seized from a

German merchant ship off Melbourne, Australia. It held the second key needed to break into German naval communications, a guide to the SUPERENCIPHER process. By early Nov. 1914 the Ewing-Denniston effort had broken into the German Navy's most secret communications.

(The German Admiralty conducted several reviews of its communications security during the war. German authorities learned that "the encipherment key to the codebook [was] not destroyed with certainty" when the *Magdenburg* was lost. In Aug. 1915 the Germans actually captured the Russian naval officer who had recovered the *Magdenburg*'s code books; he confirmed the find. Even then the German Admiralty refused to believe that there could be serious consequences from this loss.)

The success of the initial British team meant that more CRYPTANALYSIS specialists were needed, and Room 40 in the Old Admiralty Building in Whitehall was assigned to them. From that point onward, Room 40 became a euphemism for Royal Navy codebreaking.

The codebreakers were further aided a month later when a British trawler pulled in a code book jettisoned by the German torpedo boat *S-119*. Throughout the war more German code books and enciphering keys were recovered, usually from U-boats sunk in shallow waters.

Room 40's efforts were expanded in time to include the deciphering of almost every message the German authorities sent to their surface ships, submarines, and merchant ships, as well as to their consulates and embassies. The Germans periodically changed the superencipher key, but the basic code book remained in service—and vulnerable to British codebreakers. In the course of the war about 20,000 German messages were deciphered in Room 40, some of vital importance. For example, the codebreakers learned in advance of the German battle fleet sortie in late May 1916 that led to the historic Battle of Jutland, the only major engagement between the British and German fleets in World War I. Unfortunately, the original question asked of Room 40 led to a correct, but misleading, response because the British were unable to close the trap that Room 40 helped to set.

Still other windfalls came to Room 40 through neutral Sweden and the United States. The seafloor cables used for diplomatic traffic between Europe and the Western Hemisphere passed through British waters. The Germans continued to use cables for diplomatic communications during the war, passing through neutral Sweden. But the British were effectively able to tap into these cables and read the enemy's diplomatic mail (as well as that of the United States). As a result of this capability, they intercepted a telegram from the German Foreign Ministry to the ambassador to Mexico on Jan. 16, 1917, foretelling the German resumption of unrestricted U-boat attacks in the Atlantic and an effort to involve Mexico in the war. The interception of that message, called the ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM, had major implications for America's entry into World War I in April 1917.

Until May 1917, the Room 40 codebreakers were kept separate from other aspects of Admiralty intelligence and operations. Consequently, Room 40 intelligence was disseminated to a small group of senior

officers who lacked experience and, in some cases, even the broad knowledge of operations to make full use of the material.

As a result of a change, instead of sending raw decrypts to the Admiralty's Operations Division, Room 40 provided appreciations or reports that contained estimates of German intentions, as well as all relevant facts related to the decrypts of radio intercepts. This improved the usefulness of Room 40's efforts (and paved the way for the 1937 establishment of the Admiralty's OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE).

Throughout the war British intercept stations plucked German radio messages from the air or took them off cables and forwarded them, still in code, to the Admiralty. After their receipt, they were sent by pneumatic tube to Room 40, where at times the rapid arrival of the cylinders sounded like machine-gun fire. Scores of intercepted messages arrived every day; from Oct. 1914 until Feb. 1919, the codebreakers in Room 40 were able to read some 15,000 secret German communications (as well as some American and neutral messages). This effort was invaluable in the vital campaign against the U-boats, as well as on the diplomatic and, to a lesser degree, the military front.

The German Navy learned of Room 40 when Adm. of the Fleet Sir John Fisher, First Sea Lord during the war, wrote in his *Memories* (1919):

The development of the wireless has been such that you can get the direction of one who speaks and go for him; so the German daren't open his mouth. But if he does, of course, the message is in cypher; and it's the elucidation of that cypher which is one of the crowning glories of the Admiralty work in the late war. In my time they never failed once in that elucidation.

In 1923 the *World Crisis* series by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty during the early part of the war, revealed the manner in which the signal books and ciphers were obtained from the sunken cruiser *Magdeburg*. Churchill told how the Royal Navy had made use of German decrypts: "the German fleet command, whose radio messages were intercepted by the English, played so to speak with open cards against the British command."

Thus warned, the German Navy's leadership took action to ensure that such an advantage would not accrue to an enemy in the future. The German Navy shifted from the use of code books to machine-generated ciphers (see ENIGMA) and established its own cryptanalysis organization, the highly successful B-DIENST.

After the war Room 40 evolved into the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL.

## OO ROOSEVELT, KERMIT

(b. 1916 d. ?)

CIA official who planned and led the plot to overthrow the left-wing government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953.

Roosevelt had started his intelligence career as an

amateur: He was a member of the THE ROOM, a secret society of wealthy Americans, founded by VINCENT ASTOR and Roosevelt in 1927. The Room's members informally gathered intelligence and passed it to high government officials. By the 1930s the Room's CONSUMERS included President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was teaching history at Harvard when America entered World War II. He joined the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) and served in the Middle East.

Roosevelt became an expert on this region, where in postwar years the CIA developed ASSETS and kept its operatives, including Roosevelt, under various COVERS.

In 1951, after nationalist groups had gained control of the Iranian parliament, the young shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, reluctantly appointed Mossadegh Prime Minister. When Mossadegh nationalized Iran's oil, he triggered an international crisis, not only about the oil but about a possible Soviet takeover of Iran.

In July 1953 Roosevelt met with the shah, who approved of a joint British MI6-CIA plan code-named AJAX. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former head of the New Jersey State Police (and father of the U.S. commander in the Persian Gulf War), had commanded the imperial Iranian guard during World War II. Roosevelt convinced him to return to Iran and aid in the operation by keeping the troops on the shah's side in the forthcoming coup.

In Aug. 1953 the shah announced that he had removed Mossadegh and replaced him with Gen. Fazollah Zahedi. Mossadegh refused to step down, more rioting erupted, the shah left Iran, and the coup began. Under Roosevelt's management, loyalist troops suppressed anti-shah rioters and protected CIA-paid pro-shah marchers. Zahedi led a force against Mossadegh, driving him into hiding and taking over as the Prime Minister. The shah returned, the Western oil companies got new contracts, and the United States granted Iran \$45 million in economic aid.

Roosevelt, secretly awarded the National Security Medal, was hailed as a hero who had proved that the CIA could manage a coup. His success led the CIA down the path toward more coups.

Operation Ajax was the highlight of Roosevelt's career, which coincided with the tenure of ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE from 1953 to 1961.

(Another grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, Archibald Roosevelt, also served in the CIA, mostly under COVER as an employee of the Voice of America.)

## OO RORSAT

RADAR OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE

## OO ROSE, FRED

(b. 1907 d. ?)

Member of the Canadian spy network revealed by IGOR GOUZENKO in 1946. Rose, as a member of the National Research Council, passed secrets about atomic research to the Soviet Union. When he was arrested in 1946 he had recently been elected a member of the Canadian House of Commons.

Born in Poland of Russian Jewish parents named Rosenberg, he emigrated to Canada with his family in 1920. He did not become a Canadian citizen until his father died in 1926 because he had been classified a minor on his father's passport. He changed his name to Rose and joined the Canadian Communist Party in 1927. Imprisoned for sedition in 1931–1932, he was interned in 1942 because he was a communist. He was released the following year after falsely promising not to participate in illegal organizations or the Communist Party.

He was convicted of spying by a court in Quebec in June 1946 and sentenced to six years. He automatically lost his seat in Parliament.

## ●● ROSENBERG, JULIUS

(b. 1918 d. 1953)

American who was a key member of the international ATOMIC SPY RING, which gave secrets about the U.S. atomic bomb project to the Soviet Union. Rosenberg's wife, Ethel, was also a member of the ring.

The children of Jewish immigrants from Russia, the Rosenbergs were both born and raised in New York City. Julius graduated from City College of New York as an electrical engineer. Ethel, who had a beautiful operatic voice, was a high school graduate. She was three years older than Julius.

The Rosenbergs were exposed as Soviet spies after the arrest, confession, and conviction of British physicist KLAUS FUCHS in 1949. The U.S.-British-Canadian investigation of Fuchs was aided by TOP SECRET intelligence—intercepted, decrypted copies of cables between Soviet intelligence OPERATIVES in the United States and Moscow. The project, code-named VENONA, was so secret that

nothing about it could be released, lest the Soviets realize that their cable traffic had been compromised.

It was evidence provided by Fuchs, rather than the Venona material, that led the FBI to HARRY GOLD, who had been his COURIER. Arrested on May 22, 1950, on espionage charges, Gold confessed to U.S. officials and revealed DAVID GREENGLASS and MORTON SOBELL as other spies at the atomic laboratory in Los Alamos.

Greenglass and his wife, Ruth, both members of the American Communist Party, implicated David's sister, Ethel Rosenberg, and her husband, Julius, who were also communists. Sobell and Julius Rosenberg were friends.

The Rosenbergs, like many American communists of the time, faithfully followed a twisting Communist Party line, which called for U.S. neutrality at the beginning of World War II and U.S. assistance for the Soviets after Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. In 1940 Julius began work as a civilian for the U.S. Signal Corps; he was fired in 1945 because of his pro-Soviet views. By then he was living the triple life of ordinary American, avowed party member, and underground AGENT for the Soviet Union. He was the leader of a CELL of engineers who during and after the war worked in defense plants and on military bases and stole what they could.

GAIK OVAKIMIAN, the NKVD's RESIDENT in New York City in the 1930s, recruited the Rosenbergs as well as other spies. Ovakimian was under COVER of AMTORG, the Soviet purchasing organization that was a large-scale espionage operation. The Rosenbergs were initially not in a cell devoted to getting atomic secrets; they were drawn into the atomic ring when Gold and Greenglass, in separate cells, worked together in a breach of TRADECRAFT. David Greenglass told the FBI that soon after he was as-

*Julius and Ethel Rosenberg with Morton Sobell (left). (NATIONAL ARCHIVES)*



signed to Los Alamos, N. Mex., in 1944, Ethel and Julius persuaded him to spy for the Soviet Union.

Several Americans spying for the Soviets slipped out of the country after Fuchs and Gold were arrested. Among them was MORRIS COHEN and his wife, Lona, who were agents under RUDOLF ABEL, then the New York resident.

In June 1950 Rosenberg obtained passport photos for himself and his family. But it was too late. The FBI arrested him on espionage charges on July 17 and took Ethel into custody on Aug. 11. Their two sons, Michael, 7, and Robert, 3, were put in the care of Ethel Rosenberg's mother.

In March 1951 the Rosenbergs, along with Sobell and Greenglass, went on trial in New York City before Judge Irving Kaufman. The U.S. Department of Justice recommended that Julius Rosenberg be executed and that Ethel Rosenberg be sentenced to 30 years in prison. Kaufman linked the Rosenbergs' espionage to the Korean War, which had begun less than a month before Julius Rosenberg's arrest, declaring that by helping the Soviets to get the atomic bomb much earlier than they would have on their own, the couple had set in motion the events leading to the war and had "undoubtedly . . . altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country." He sentenced them both to death.

The sentences shocked the world. Sympathizers—ranging from liberals to hard-line communists—rallied to have the sentences set aside. However, after more than 20 appeals over more than two years, the Rosenbergs were both executed in the electric chair in Sing Sing Prison in Ossining, N.Y., on June 19, 1953. Ethel was the first woman to be executed in the United States for a federal offense since Mary Surratt was hanged in 1865 for her role in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were the only American traitors ever to be executed during peacetime.

In the years that followed, doubts grew over the Rosenbergs' guilt. Their sons, who had been adopted and took their adoptive parents' name, as adults began their own campaign, claiming that evidence of their parents' innocence had been suppressed. But in recent years the evidence that has emerged has confirmed the Rosenbergs' guilt.

Former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, in *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (1990), recalled how Soviet dictator Josef Stalin had praised the Rosenbergs. "I was part of Stalin's circle when he mentioned the Rosenbergs with warmth," Khrushchev said. "I cannot specifically say what kind of help they gave us, but I heard from both Stalin and [Vlachyslav M.] Molotov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Rosenbergs provided very significant help in accelerating the production of our atomic bomb."

In 1995, NSA released Venona cables showing that Soviet intelligence officers who were running the atomic ring in 1944 referred to Julius Rosenberg by the CODE NAMES Antenna and Liberal. A cable noted that Ethel Rosenberg knew "about her husband's work," and, although she "does not work," she was "a devoted person."

## ●● ROTE KAPELLE

see RED ORCHESTRA

## ●● ROTOR

EDWARD H. HEBERN developed the first CIPHER machine to make use of rotors to provide random encipherment.

The famed ENIGMA cipher machine contained interchangeable wheels or rotors and several plug connectors. The rotors—which could be replaced—were the key to the almost innumerable permutations that were available to encipher a message. The rotor settings could be rapidly changed—up to several times per day—to further complicate codebreaking efforts.

The early Enigma machines had three rotors, increased to four and five in later machines used during World War II. In addition, extra rotors could be provided for substitutions. The U.S. SIGABA also worked on the rotor principle.

## ●● ROWLANDS

see GEOFFREY PRIME

## ●● ROYAL MITRE

see RICHARD C. SMITH

## ●● ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

(RCMP)

Canadian agency responsible for COUNTERINTELLIGENCE until the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984.

There has always been more to the Mounties than officers in scarlet tunics and broad-brimmed hats. As a national police organization, the RCMP was charged with investigating acts of subversion against Canada. The role of plain-clothes Mounties was always veiled in secrecy. When the Yukon gold rush began in 1896, some Canadian government officials wondered if the parade of miners and camp followers was really a U.S. plot to get Americans into Canada and annex part of it. Canada sent AGENTS—presumably Mounties in disguise—into the United States to hunt for a conspiracy. There was none.

Prior to World War II, Canada's intelligence activities were vested in the Army and Navy. Then COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE and CRYPTOGRAPHY entered Canada via HERBERT O. YARDLEY, who had run the U.S. codebreaking BLACK CHAMBER. In 1941 Yardley established in Canada the Examination Unit of the National Research Council. During the war Canadian intercept stations worked closely with their U.S. and British counterparts, tracking and transcribing German and Japanese communications.

The RCMP's major intelligence role during World War II was to aid Canadian WILLIAM STEPHENSON, head of the BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION (BSC), the COVER for North American operations of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The RCMP provided security for Stephenson

and aided him in setting up and maintaining Station M, a highly secret base on the north shore of Lake Ontario. There the BSC ran a laboratory for forging documents and mail. Certain letters mailed by German AGENTS in North America to ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES in Spain and Portugal were intercepted and sent to Station M, where they were doctored to thwart or compromise the agents.

The most famous RCMP case came in Sept. 1945 when IGOR GOUZENKO, a CIPHER clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, defected with his pregnant wife and their child. Gouzenko provided information showing that the Soviets were running an extensive spy NETWORK in North America. Hunted by NKVD men from the embassy, Gouzenko went into hiding, guarded by the RCMP. When his wife went to the hospital to have their baby, she posed as the wife of a Polish farmer; a Mountie, posing as her husband and speaking broken English, accompanied her. Stephenson subsequently sent the baby girl a layette.

The RCMP, meanwhile, publicly staged a manhunt for Gouzenko to deceive the Soviets into believing that Gouzenko was still at large. Then, in Feb. 1946, Mounties began a series of arrests that led to 20 spy trials in Canada and the breakup of the U.S.-British-Canadian ATOMIC SPY RING (see FRED ROSE).

After that mammoth espionage investigation, the RCMP was reorganized so that a unit, modeled on Scotland Yard's SPECIAL BRANCH, handled counterintelligence and countersubversion. The government rejected a proposal for the creation of a National Bureau of Investigation, similar to the CIA.

Canadian counterintelligence operations were relatively rare considering the number of Soviet intelligence OPERATIVES in the country. During the 1961-1962 debriefings of Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY, a Soviet DEFECTOR IN PLACE, he said that the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, considered Canada "a happy hunting ground for intelligence collection." After Penkovsky's execution in 1963, the CIA decided to allow transcripts of his debriefings to be published, without public CIA sponsorship. In deference to Canadian sensibilities, the CIA removed the remark about Canada from the transcripts that were the basis for the bestseller *The Penkovskiy Papers* (1965).

But the RCMP did outwit the KGB in 1978 when Igor Vartanian, a KGB officer under cover as the Soviet Embassy's first secretary for sports and cultural affairs, attempted to recruit a Mountie. The Mountie reported the approach and was told to become a DOUBLE AGENT. He strung Vartanian along by passing "carefully screened nonsensitive information or completely fabricated material," according to a Canadian government report on the scam. When the RCMP had enough evidence, the Canadian government expelled Vartanian and 10 other KGB officers under diplomatic cover and told two on leave in the Soviet Union that they should stay there.

Civil rights violations during internal security investigations in the 1970s—mail tampering, unauthorized wiretaps, BLACK BAG JOBS—led to the establishment of a special government commission on RCMP illegal activities. In 1981 the commission recommended that intelli-

gence responsibilities be taken away from the RCMP and given to a separate security service. Politicians and the RCMP resisted the idea until 1984, when legislation created the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

The CSIS was chartered to collect intelligence with the purpose of preventing "threats to the security of Canada," including espionage, sabotage, and "foreign-influenced activities." The CSIS allows the use of "intrusive" SURVEILLANCE, including wiretaps and surreptitious searches of citizens whose activities are "intended ultimately to lead to the destruction by violence of the constitutionally established system of government in Canada."

Like the CIA and MI6, the CSIS does not have law enforcement powers. When the CSIS wants someone arrested, it must turn to a special unit of the RCMP.

## OO RPV

REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLE

## OO RS-70 VALKYRIE

RECONNAISSANCE and strike aircraft proposed by the U.S. Air Force as a means of saving the B-70 Valkyrie, a supersonic, high-altitude strategic bomber. The B-70 was essentially stillborn because of the high procurement and maintenance costs for such a large and complex aircraft. Also, the plane's flight conditions were very poor except at its designed maximum speed of Mach 3 at 70,000 feet, and the Soviet Union had been building up high-altitude bomber defenses.

Development of the B-70 began in late 1954 when Gen. Curtis LeMay, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, requested the development of a successor to the B-52 bomber with as high a speed as possible. North American Aviation was awarded a contract for the aircraft's development in Dec. 1957. The design evolved rapidly.

In Nov. 1959, during a meeting to discuss defense programs, President Eisenhower told the Air Force Chief of Staff that "the B-70 left him cold in terms of making military sense." The president also noted that if the B-70 were allowed to reach the production stage, it would not be available for eight or ten years, by which time missiles would be the primary strategic retaliatory weapon. On Dec. 29, 1959, the Air Force reluctantly made the decision to procure only a single prototype XB-70 for technology development. However, the B-70 program underwent a resuscitation a few months later as the 1960 presidential campaign rekindled interest in strategic weapons. In Aug. 1960 the Eisenhower administration increased the program to 13 prototype and test aircraft, making the B-70 a weapon system moving toward production.

The program continued after President Kennedy entered the White House in Jan. 1961. The first XB-70 had still not flown when, later that year, the Air Force redesignated the aircraft as a Reconnaissance Strike Bomber (RSB-70 and, subsequently, RS-70). Under the RS-70 concept, 60 aircraft would be procured to carry out reconnaissance of enemy targets during a nuclear missile

attack and, if required, attack them immediately with air-to-surface missiles. (Desperate to keep the B-70 effort alive, the Air Force also looked into the possibility of employing the B-70 as a transport aircraft.)

Even within the Air Force, however, there were serious questions about proceeding with the B-70. The penultimate blow came in April 1961, when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara directed that the program be reduced back to prototypes without weapon systems. McNamara questioned both the technical feasibility of such an aircraft and believed that strategic missiles were more viable than long-range bombers. On Jan. 31, 1963, he told Congress: "The RS-70, by carrying air-to-surface missiles, would provide only a very small increase in over-all effectiveness. In my judgment, this increase is not worth the large additional outlay of funds estimated at more than \$10 billion above the \$1.35 billion already approved" (and allocated to the B-70).

The B-70 was the heaviest aircraft ever to fly when the first prototype took to the air on Sept. 21, 1964; the second aircraft flew in 1965. The latter aircraft achieved a sustained speed of Mach 3 for 32 minutes.

The second aircraft was destroyed in a midair collision with an F-104 fighter during a "photo shoot" on June 8, 1966, and the flight test program was halted. Thus ended a most ambitious reconnaissance aircraft. (The first XB-70 was transferred to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and flew until Feb. 4, 1969.)

As a bomber, the B-70 was to have a takeoff weight of 521,056 pounds (including 273,000 pounds of fuel). The aircraft would have a bomb bay for two nuclear weapons fitted between the massive intakes for six turbojet engines clustered under the rear of the fuselage; later it was proposed that guided missiles would be released from the bay. No defensive guns were to have been fitted. The plane was to be flown by a two-man crew. The B-70 was a precursor of supersonic transport designs with a large delta wing, small canards forward, a needle nose, and the turbojet engines nested under the wing.

Also see NM-1.

## OO RSHA

Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Central Security Office), the Main Nazi secret police organization. The RSHA, as it was known for its German initials, was established in 1939 to unite all German police security organizations, including the GESTAPO and the SD. The chief of the RSHA was REINHARD HEYDRICH. When he was assassinated in June 1942 by British-trained Czech AGENTS, he was succeeded by ERNST KALTENBRUNNER.

Office III supervised the action groups' (Einsatzgruppen) task forces, whose innocuous label hid their sinister purpose: They were extermination units that killed two million men, women, and children in occupied countries, usually by shooting them and throwing them into pits.

Office VI of the RSHA supervised activities against Jews and was headed by Adolf Eichmann.

## OO RU

Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie, the intelligence directorate of a Soviet-Russian military formation.

## OO RUFF

U.S. CODE WORD for reports and evaluations based on photography from the CORONA series of SATELLITES.

## OO RUPEE

British CODE WORD for COUNTERINTELLIGENCE material provided by Soviet Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY. Also see ARNIKA.

## OO RUPP, REINER

(b. 1945)

Employee of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) who spied for East Germany from 1977 to 1989. He and his wife provided the East Germans—and, through them, the Soviet Union—with copies of an estimated 10,000 documents. Their espionage, said a German prosecutor, "could have lost NATO a war."

Rupp, born in West Germany, was recruited into the MFS (Stasi), the East German intelligence agency, in 1968, while a student. He was told to continue his studies and await further instructions. In 1970, while in Brussels, he met British-born Ann-Christian Bowen. A secretary at the Ministry of Defence in London, in 1968 she had been posted to Brussels with the British military mission to NATO. At that time, the Stasi was targeting secretaries in NATO and West German political and military offices. The Stasi called its handsome male AGENTS "Romeos," but Rupp claimed to have genuine feelings for the British secretary.

They fell in love, and Rupp told her he had been recruited by the Stasi. By then, she had endorsed his anti-American and anti-Vietnam War sentiments. She also accepted his espionage activities and accompanied him to East BERLIN for training, where she, too, agreed to spy. They were married in 1972.

She smuggled NATO documents out of headquarters in her handbag; some of the documents were stamped COSMIC, the highest NATO secrecy classification. At home Rupp photographed them with a camera supplied by the Stasi, and she brought them back the next day. He received instructions in CODE on a radio also supplied by the Stasi. To their HANDLERS, he was Topaz and she was Turquoise.

In 1977 Rupp began working in NATO's international economics division; he, too, began bringing home documents to photograph. Ann-Christian Rupp continued to spy until 1980, when the first of their three children was born. She later said that she had become disillusioned with communism and somehow felt that motherhood and espionage did not mix. The couple's Stasi handlers accepted her decision. Rupp continued spying, but, as Ann-Christian later said, "We had constant discussions and I was nagging him to stop."

Rupp began having doubts, ironically because he could see in the documents he was copying that NATO plans were defensive; after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 it was his turn to be disillusioned. He told his wife that he had stopped spying, but he was lying. Money may have had something to do with his decision. The Stasi was paying him about \$1,500 a month, and even as the Berlin Wall was coming down, he kept spying.

After reunification of the two Germanys in Oct. 1990, Ann-Christian read that Western intelligence officials, sifting through Stasi files, were searching for a spy CODE-NAMED Topaz. With the aid of an informer, German COUNTERINTELLIGENCE finally tracked down Rupp and arrested him and his wife in July 1993 when they traveled to Germany to visit his relatives.

"I did wrong, and I'm prepared to pay for it," Rupp said in Nov. 1994, when he was convicted of treason and sentenced to 12 years in prison. Ann-Christian received a 22-month suspended sentence.

## ● ● RUSSIA-USSR

For centuries Russian rulers—whether czars, commissars, or modern communist leaders—have used an all-powerful secret police to find and punish internal enemies. The roots of the KGB and its post-Cold War successors can be found in the domestic police and spy apparatus of Russian czars, beginning with the black-clad cavalrymen of the OPRICHNINA, created by Ivan the Terrible in 1565. Russians were spared an organized secret police from the abolition of the Oprichnina in 1572 until 1697, when Czar Peter I—Russia's first "modern" ruler—established the PREOBRAZHENSKY OFFICE, which could question and torture every Russian citizen, regardless of rank or station.

Beginning late in the 19th Century, the czar's secret police ORGAN was the OKHRANA, whose OPERATIVES included specialists trained to investigate political crimes, including some set up by the Okhrana to frame subversives. In 1887 the secret police executed Aleksandr Ulyanov, the son of a school inspector, for plotting to assassinate the czar. Aleksandr's brother later went into exile and—taking the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin—would someday avenge his brother's death.

There was virtually no foreign intelligence collection under the czars, as evidenced in part by the catastrophic Russian military failures in the 1904–1905 war with Japan. Nor was the Okhrana an effective COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agency against the foreign AGENTS in Russia. When Russia was rebuilding its shattered navy after the Russo-Japanese War, SIDNEY REILLY, a sometime British AGENT, operated freely in the capital of St. Petersburg, simultaneously helping German firms obtain large contracts and informing the British Admiralty about German warship designs.

Anti-czarist movements, fanning popular disgust over the conduct of the war against Japan, launched the Revolution of 1905, which was ruthlessly put down by troops.

Russia's entry into World War I revived the revolutionary movement. Riots, sparked by food shortages and antiwar sentiments, challenged the government and the Okhrana. Facing defeat in the field and rioting at home, Czar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate in the spring of 1917, and for a brief moment, Russia had a form of democratic parliamentary government.

But this situation was unacceptable to Lenin and his Bolshevik Party, which sparked a revolution against the fledgling parliamentary government. This time, revolution could not be put down. Lenin called for Russian withdrawal from the war and urged "all power to the soviets"—the workers' and soldiers' councils that would form the provisional government.

In Oct. 1917, the Bolsheviks seized Petrograd (as St. Petersburg had been renamed in 1914), and soon took Moscow and other cities as well. As czarist generals and armies resisted, the revolution catapulted the nation into civil war, with the Reds demanding a dictatorship of the proletariat and their opponents calling for a return to the Romanov monarchy. These so-called White Russians soon found foreign allies.

The British, desperate to keep Russia in the war against Germany, used Reilly and other agents to find some way to overthrow the Reds. Reilly and a British diplomat-spy, BRUCE LOCKHART, were implicated in a plot that went awry. When Lenin was shot and grievously wounded, the act was blamed, perhaps rightly, on the British, who were trying to thwart the Bolsheviks. Reilly claimed to have 60,000 anti-Bolsheviks ready to do Britain's bidding. In this climate of plotting and intrigue, Lenin created the CHEKA—a police organization to combat counterrevolutionaries and to punish "spies, traitors, plotters, bandits, speculators, profiteers, counterfeiters, arsonists, hooligans, agitators, saboteurs, class enemies, and other parasites."

Cheka "press gangs" rounded up thousands of men and women to work on fortifications and other projects during the fighting against the Germans before the Bolshevik capitulation. Later, the Cheka impressed workers for other labor projects, some for use against the White Russian and Allied forces during the Russian civil war, which lasted into 1920.

To head the Cheka, Lenin chose FELIKS DZERZHINSKY, a political agitator from a Polish noble family who had once been imprisoned by the Okhrana. He commanded the Bolshevik headquarters during the revolution and took charge of guarding Lenin and other party leaders.

"We stand for organized terror," Dzerzhinsky said of the Cheka. "Terror is an absolute necessity during time of revolution.... The Cheka is obliged to defend the revolution and conquer the enemy even if its sword does by chance sometimes fall upon the heads of the innocent."

The Cheka quickly grew strong and ruthless, leading the massacre of "enemies of the people." The Foreign Department of the Cheka sought counterrevolutionaries beyond Russian borders, especially the large numbers of former White officers and officials, as well as active White Russian political émigrés who fled to BERLIN and

Paris. One of the Cheka's most successful operations was THE TRUST, an organization ostensibly run by monarchists. Lured back to Russia in the belief that the Trust would restore the czar, many Russians died or were imprisoned.

By 1925, the Cheka (later named GPU—the General Political Administration—and then OGPU—Unified State Political Administration) had by some estimates executed more than 250,000 enemies of the Bolshevik leadership and imprisoned 1,300,000 people. They and thousands of others were being exiled to the first Soviet prison communities in Siberia and other remote areas.

Renaming the Cheka the GPU marked the start of a series of name changes for the state security apparatus, which, regardless of its official name, was also always called the ORGAN:

	<i>State Security</i>	<i>Combined</i>	<i>Internal Security</i>
1917-1922	—	Cheka	—
1922-1923	—	GPU	—
1923-1934	—	OGPU	—
1934-1941	—	NKVD	—
1941	NKGB	—	NKVD
1941-1943	—	NKVD	—
1943-1946	NKGB	—	NKVD
1946-1953*	MGB	—	MVD
1953	—	MVD	—
1954-1960	KGB	—	MVD
1960-1966	—	KGB	—
1966-1968	KGB	—	MOOP
1968-1992	KGB	—	MVD

\* In 1947-1951 the KI handled certain aspects of foreign intelligence.

Regardless of name, from Cheka to KGB the purpose of these organs was the same: to protect Soviet leaders from all enemies, foreign and domestic. The Soviet leader who made most murderous use of them was Josef Stalin, who in 1924 had emerged from the power struggle to succeed Lenin. To stay in power, especially in his first few years as dictator, he used the organs as his personal killing machine. One of his key managers of terror was GENRIKH G. YAGODA, a pharmacist. He may have used his professional skill to kill Lenin, who, after being severely wounded in the assassination attempt, died in 1924 after a series of heart attacks.

### THE PURGES BEGIN

On Dec. 1, 1934, Sergey Kirov, a founder of the Bolshevik Revolution, was assassinated by a former CHEKIST. This was the opening shot in the series of massive purges initiated by Stalin. Yagoda, as head of what was then the NKVD, took charge of the investigation of Kirov's assassination and initiated the flood of arrests that followed.

NIKOLAY YEZHOV, a former Red Army political commissar, was appointed NKVD chief in Sept. 1936 and continued the purges with increased fervor, extending the murder wave from political leaders to the military.

Yezhov lasted until 1938. Known as the "blood-thirsty dwarf," he condemned so many people that jails and prison camps filled to overflowing and the NKVD strained its resources to the breaking point.

Three of the five marshals of the Soviet Union were executed for helping "enemies" or engaging in counter-revolutionary activities. Scores of senior Army and Navy officers and thousands of lesser officers were arrested and executed. Three thousand senior NKVD officials were denounced as former czarist police spies, thieves, and embezzlers, and then executed. Purges also decimated the ranks of the GRU, the Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE service.

Ezhov's successor was LAVENTRY BERIA, who had been head of the secret police in Stalin's native Georgia. Soon after his appointment, Beria became the first chief of the secret police to become a candidate (nonvoting) member of the ruling Politburo. At the time there were ten full, voting members, including Stalin and the newly appointed Nikita Khrushchev.

Beria was infamous as a policeman and as a lecher. He regularly picked up young girls on the street and took them to his office, where he forced them to commit sodomy and then raped them. Increasing SURVEILLANCE in foreign countries of the few remaining old Bolsheviks, Beria targeted Leon Trotsky, who had been Stalin's rival to succeed Lenin. Assassins dispatched by Beria killed Trotsky in Mexico in Aug. 1940.

Beria sent his predecessor Yezhov (who had once planned to arrest Beria) to a psychiatric institute, where soon afterwards he was found hanging from a window bar. Beria's NKVD executioners killed survivors of the Yagoda-era NKVD leadership, as well as many from the Yezhov period. Some killed themselves.

Soviet intelligence was especially ravaged. Agents working outside the Soviet Union were recalled to Moscow, where they were arrested and shot. Among those who unwittingly traveled home to their deaths was YAN BERZIN, an early director of Soviet military intelligence. Many others who refused the recall were tracked down and killed. WALTER KRIVITSKY, NKVD RESIDENT in the Netherlands, fled to the United States, where assassins found him. An NKVD resident in Turkey hid in Belgium and was killed. The chief of intelligence in the Far East succeeded in reaching safety in Manchuria, where he defected to the Japanese Kwantung Army. ALEKSANDR ORLOV, recalled while serving the Cheka in the Spanish Civil War, chose exile in the United States.

Karl Ramm, a friend of master spy RICHARD SORGE, returned from Shanghai to his death. Sorge reportedly refused to return and performed brilliantly in Japan, where the Japanese later arrested him for espionage and executed him. The purges continued until Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. (See BARBAROSSA.)

### WORLD WAR II

When war began, Beria became one of Stalin's most important lieutenants. Internally, his secret police took on increased responsibilities—both to protect the Krem-

lin leadership and to ensure the loyalty of the armies fighting the Germans. Externally, Beria broadened foreign intelligence gathering. He assigned NKVD operatives to Soviet diplomatic delegations in Britain, Canada, and the United States.

A Soviet purchasing commission was established in the United States to speed the transfer of arms to the Soviet Union. Like an older, still functioning purchasing unit, AMTORG, the wartime commission, grew to more than 1,000 employees and became a collection point for stolen military and industrial secrets.

Beria's most valuable work involved stealing secrets for the Soviet effort to build an atomic bomb. Beria was eventually given management of the Soviet internal research and development program, while as an international spymaster, he managed the ATOMIC SPY RING in the United States, Canada, and Britain.

Early in the war the NKVD was responsible for internal security in the Soviet Union, as well as for ensuring the loyalty of the Army. A new COUNTERESPIONAGE organization was formed: SMERSH, an abbreviation of the words *smert shpionam*, meaning "death to spies." Smersh meant terror to all military men who even thought for a moment of defection or not giving their utmost for the motherland. Among the NKVD officials who served in Smersh and went on to senior positions in Soviet intelligence was Col. Gen. IVAN SEROV, who transferred to the NKVD after surviving the purges of the GRU. Serov liquidated anti-Soviet inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and was personally involved in the KATYN MASSACRE.

Stalin did not trust his capitalist allies, and the feeling was mutual. U.S. and British leaders so distrusted Stalin that details of D-DAY were kept from him. Some Allied officials wanted no information whatsoever passed to Stalin. But under a compromise, British and U.S. military missions in Moscow were told to inform Stalin about the date but not the place of the invasion. He was told that the landings would be around June 1, 1944. (However, soon after the Normandy landings, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied commander in Western Europe, asked Stalin to have the Red Army go on the offensive to help relieve German pressure on his invasion beaches.)

The Soviet Union used espionage and DISINFORMATION persistently during the war. Besides the atomic bomb spies, two British INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY and JOHN CAIRNCROSS, also passed on information to the Soviets. Meanwhile, Soviet disinformation and propaganda specialists gave little publicity to U.S. aid, consistently diminished U.S. combat victories, and even attributed the liberation of Paris to the Red Army and French communist partisans.

Soviet intelligence organs ran several brilliant operations that supplied intelligence from the German High Command (see LUCY SPY RING and RED ORCHESTRA). But Stalin usually suspected or ignored the high-grade intelligence he was getting. Several military deception operations were also successful (see MAX and SCHERHORN).

After the war, Beria directed atomic bomb development, while continuing to run the state security and in-

telligence organs. Beria regarded himself as Stalin's heir and secretly prepared himself for the role by placing his men in key places. On the night of March 1, 1953, Beria met alone with Stalin at the dictator's dacha at Kuntsevo. A short time later, Stalin suffered a stroke and died on March 5.

Beria began making moves to take over the government while joining Stalin's other heirs in the collective leadership. He was able to have Georgi Malenkov, whom he could influence, join him and Nikita Khrushchev in a ruling troika. Perhaps Beria joined forces—temporarily—believing that the country was not yet ready for another dictator from Georgia. Meanwhile, liberation forces stirred in Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary.

Beria consolidated his police powers under a super-MVD organ, but on June 26 he was seized at the Kremlin, secretly tried, and just as secretly executed on Dec. 23, 1953.

Col. Gen. Serov, deputy chief of military intelligence (GRU) and one of the conspirators, became chairman of the newly established KGB. Serov and YURI ANDROPOV, the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, in 1956 deceived the rebellious Hungarian leaders by first leading them on and then capturing, torturing, and executing them. In Dec. 1958 Serov became chief of the GRU and presided over unbridled corruption. This turned into a boon for Western intelligence agencies, as GRU officers, fed up with the corruption, became DEFECTORS IN PLACE, providing valuable intelligence.

## THE SPY WAR

When World War II ended in Aug. 1945, Soviet intelligence had new areas in which to operate, for the war bestowed upon the Soviet Union vast tracts of land and large populations taken from Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Japan. Before the war, the Soviet Union was the largest country in the world, covering one-seventh of the earth's surface. After the war, Soviet-controlled territory covered one-sixth of the planet.

In the 1920s, when the Soviet Union did not yet have diplomatic relations with the United States, Amtorg, a so-called purchasing agency, served as Moscow's eyes and ears in America. That organization was the beginning of an espionage NETWORK that would take root and flourish in the coming decades. When the United States recognized the Soviet regime in Nov. 1933, Maxim Litvinov, the commissar for foreign affairs, cynically agreed to end what were diplomatically called communist propaganda activities in the United States. A former spymaster in Britain, Litvinov of course was lying. He knew that Soviet espionage efforts had an ambitious goal: PENETRATION of the U.S. government, with the aid of American communists. (See ELIZABETH BENTLEY and WHITTAKER CHAMBERS.)

Soviet espionage against the West continued unabated during World War II, but U.S. officials did not realize its dimensions until just after the war ended, when IGOR S. GOUZENKO, a CIPHER clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, defected. Gouzenko provided the first revelations about the atomic spy ring, which involved

British scientists KLAUS FUCHS and ALAN NUNN MAY, along with JULIUS ROSENBERG and other American traitors.

Soviet intelligence used three methods of operating in the United States and Britain. First, members of the Communist Party, particularly in the United States and Britain, were drawn to spy for the Soviet Union for idealistic reasons (see AMERASIA CASE, CAMBRIDGE SPY RING). Second, Soviets worked as LEGALS—diplomats under COVER, or GRU and KGB officers in trade missions or acting as correspondents for the Soviet news agency Tass. The third source of espionage was ILLEGALS, Soviet citizens trained in SPY SCHOOLS to adopt new identities and live in the United States (see RUDOLF ABEL and RUDOLPH HERRMANN) or in Britain (see GORDON LONSDALE and MORRIS COHEN).

The GRU had run highly successful espionage operations against Germany during the war (see LUCY SPY RING, RED ORCHESTRA, RICHARD SORGE). After the war Soviet intelligence activities grew rapidly in Europe, setting up new branches in the Soviet occupation zone. Soviets established spy agencies and trained local OPERATIVES throughout the zone, which encompassed eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, eastern Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Subverting democratic governments and installing Moscow-approved surrogates, the Soviet Union transformed all but Austria into satellites and, with the addition of Albania, welded them into what was known in Cold War terms as the Eastern Bloc, arrayed against the West. East confronted West at one particular flash point: Berlin, divided into East Berlin and West Berlin, teeming with spies and MOLES. Under the four-power zone system, Berlin was watched by four intelligence systems, with the United States, Britain, and France aligned against the Soviet Union.

The first crisis came in June 1948 when the Soviets, hoping to force the Western powers to abandon the city, cut off all air, land, and river traffic, besieging more than two million residents of Berlin. The Allies—as the Americans, British, and French still called themselves—stood firm. An airlift of Allied aircraft brought food, medical supplies, and even coal into the city, and the crisis gradually eased.

East and West also faced off in VIENNA, the longtime spy center of Europe, where the four-power system continued until occupation forces withdrew from Austria in 1955. But it was Berlin that became the setting for real crisis—and for fictional espionage, dramatized by JOHN LE CARRÉ in *The Spy Who Came In from the Cold* (see MOVIES and LITERARY SPIES).

The creation of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) gave Soviet intelligence a new TARGET, and over the years a number of NATO spies were unmasked. A lesser-known, non-NATO target was Sweden, where the GRU was especially active, because of its location and ease of penetration. Swedish Air Force Col. STIG WENNERSTROM was a GRU agent for 15 years. According to a 1984 study, the KGB and GRU at that time had 80 officers in Sweden, along with 160 intelligence officers from Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. This did not include “tourist” and “cultural” exchange groups.

The KGB and GRU had close, if not controlling, ties to Eastern Bloc intelligence services. Agents of East Germany’s MFS (Stasi) worked in tandem with Soviet counterparts. The same was true in Bulgaria, which developed a reputation for WET JOBS. (See GEORGI MARKOV.)

Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turk who shot Pope John Paul in May 1981 in a well-organized assassination plot, implicated the Bulgarian secret police. VICTOR SHEYMOV, a KGB DEFECTOR in 1990, linked the plot to the KGB. A Soviet spokesman branded the story a lie, pointing out that Sheymov, who defected in 1980, was not proffered by the CIA as a witness to Italian authorities investigating the assassination attempt.

## KHRUSHCHEV’S COLD WAR

Nikita Khrushchev, who had approved and supported Stalin’s purges in the Ukraine, emerged from the power struggle after Stalin’s death as first secretary of the party. In Feb. 1956, in a secret speech at the 20th Party Congress, he was strong enough to challenge Stalin’s memory, denouncing the dictator for his crimes and for fostering “a cult of personality.” (The MOSSAD, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, managed to get a copy of Khrushchev’s speech and promptly passed it to the CIA.)

While Khrushchev reduced Soviet conventional military forces, he emphasized the development of nuclear weapons, first to be delivered against the West by jet bombers and then by long-range ballistic missiles. With an “iron curtain” closing off most accurate sources of information about Soviet technology and military developments, first President Truman and then Eisenhower authorized limited OVERFLIGHTS of the Soviet Union by U.S. planes (some flown by British crews); some British CANBERRAS also flew these missions. Eisenhower approved the development of the U-2 high-altitude spyplane and SATELLITES to determine the dimensions of Soviet weapons programs. From 1956 to 1960, U-2s overflowed the Soviet Union, followed by RECONNAISSANCE satellites.

Khrushchev, preaching “peaceful coexistence” but threatening, “we will bury you,” triggered crises that twice took the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. On both occasions, Western intelligence failed to forecast the Soviet moves.

In June 1961 Khrushchev declared that he would turn East Berlin over to East Germany, cutting West Berlin off from the West. President Kennedy called up 250,000 military reservists and activated several mothballed Navy ships. The immediate crisis eased. Then, in August, with Western leaders getting no advance warning from intelligence sources, the Soviets and East Germans began swiftly erecting a wall and other barriers along the length of Germany’s East-West border.

In the fall of 1962, again without any knowledge on the part of Western intelligence agencies, Khrushchev began to emplace ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, provoking the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. Although U.S. intelligence agencies had initially failed, they rallied in the crisis. U-2 spyplanes and then low-flying F8U CRUSADER and F-101 VOODOO photo planes obtained definitive photographic evidence of the missile emplacements.

Also valuable was the intelligence on missiles being provided by Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY, a GRU defector in place.

After a confrontation that threatened a nuclear exchange (with the U.S. intelligence services not realizing that nuclear warheads were already ashore in Cuba), Khrushchev backed down and the missiles were withdrawn. His retreat weakened his hold on the Kremlin and he fell from power in Oct. 1964. Under Leonid Brezhnev, détente with the West alternated with a hard line—the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the SECRET WORLD the work of spies went on, but the work was slowly evolving.

Soviet legals under diplomatic or commercial cover concentrated on getting industrial and technical secrets, such as tank armor and antisubmarine detection systems. No longer was the Soviet Union interested in infiltrating the U.S. government or recruiting ideological agents. The Soviets got offers of secrets from WALK-INS, many of them U.S. servicemen, who offered secrets for cash.

Soviet spies sometimes worked in the heart of the capitalist world. In 1961 the Soviets founded an engineering company in France run by a naturalized Frenchman. The company did French defense work for 14 years before French intelligence discovered that it was a front for getting information about NATO's early-warning network and French military and commercial aircraft technology. In 1965 France expelled the manager of Aeroflot in Paris for stealing secrets of the Concorde, the joint Anglo-French supersonic aircraft. Soviet agents manipulated corporate executives to get what the Soviet Union needed. The Japanese Toshiba Corp. and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, a state-controlled Norwegian firm, worked together, under Soviet persuasion, to sell a Leningrad (St. Petersburg) shipyard the expertise for manufacturing advanced propellers for submarines.

Soviet diplomatic delegations became so infested with spies that the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats became routine. When OLEG GORDIEVSKY the senior KGB officer at the Soviet Embassy in London, defected in Sept. 1985, he gave the British Security Service (MI5) a list of names; Britain immediately expelled 25 Soviet diplomats, charging them with espionage. The Soviets retaliated by expelling 25 Britons, including correspondents and businessmen, from the Soviet Union. Between 1970 and 1985, Britain expelled 144 Soviets under diplomatic cover. In contrast, the United States expelled only six Soviet intelligence officers. The large difference was attributed to the fact that in the United States the FBI preferred to keep Soviet agents under SURVEILLANCE in order to identify their American contacts.

Brezhnev died after a long illness, in Nov. 1982. He was succeeded by YURI ANDROPOV, former head of the KGB. (Andropov shares with GEORGE BUSH and CHAIM HERZOG the rare distinction of becoming a head of state after being the head of a major intelligence agency.) Slick KGB propagandists portrayed Andropov as a sophisticated statesman, ignoring his role as a ruthless suppressor of the Hungarian and Czech uprisings. Ailing through his short reign, he was succeeded by an even sicker Kon-

stantin Chernenko, whose death in March 1985 brought a new-style Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

### GLASNOST SPYING

Through this series of rapid leadership changes, the Soviet intelligence apparatus remained intact. The arrest in Aug. 1986 of American correspondent NICHOLAS S. DANILOFF was a classic KGB frame-up, staged in retaliation for the FBI arrest of GENNADI ZAKHAROV, a Soviet intelligence officer under cover at the UNITED NATIONS, a spy nest for Soviet legals.

After the Daniloff-Zakharov incident was settled, Gorbachev, who was campaigning to reform the Soviet government through *glasnost* (open criticism) and *perestroika* (restructuring or economic reform), met with President Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland. As the two leaders began a cautious relationship, the spy war went on. Within the U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1985 was labeled the YEAR OF THE SPY following the revelation of more than 20 major spy cases, most of them walk-ins. The Reagan administration expelled 55 Soviet diplomats for spying.

One of Gorbachev's most powerful supporters was Gen. VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV, head of the KGB and unconvinced about *glasnost* or *perestroika*. When the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded in April 1986, the KGB routinely tried to keep the world's worst nuclear reactor accident a state secret. Not until fallout reached Scandinavia was the world alerted. Wide swaths of the Belarus and Ukraine republics were contaminated by radioactivity. Government reaction was slow and initially ineffective.

While Gorbachev was seeking stronger economic ties with the West, Chebrikov attacked the West for infiltrating the *glasnost* atmosphere, saying that "our political, military, and economic interests have suffered damage." After Chebrikov's outburst the newspaper *Izvestia* interviewed a cartographer who said that the KGB had long ago ordered the falsification of maps. On maps "almost everything was changed—roads and rivers were moved, city districts were tilted," he said. Fake maps seem silly in an age of SATELLITES, but they symbolized the KGB's rigid style. In Oct. 1988 Gorbachev removed Chebrikov.

Chebrikov's successor was VLADIMIR KRYUCHOV, who watched with suspicion and dread as Gorbachev created a full-time parliament, proclaimed multicandidate elections, began the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, and stood by as communist regimes fell, along with the Berlin Wall. In Aug. 1991 Kryuchov and other hard-liners attempted to overthrow Gorbachev. Thousands of Russians took to the streets, defying tanks to protest the attempted coup. Boris Yeltsin, a critic of Gorbachev's go-slow reforms, had been elected president of the Russian Republic in June in the first popular election in Russian history. Standing on a tank in a Moscow street in Aug. 1991, he became the symbol of defiance and emerged as a hero. To him would belong the future of Russia, for after Dec. 1991 there no longer was a Soviet Union.

As head of the new Russian Federation, Yeltsin abolished the KGB, replacing it with the SVR, Foreign Intelligence Service, and FSK, Federal Security Service, and setting up agencies for presidential and communications security. The SVR, which reported directly to Yeltsin, publicly warned that a new kind of spy war had begun. The SVR charged that Western intelligence agencies were using bribes and payoffs to obtain state secrets. In May 1996 Russia expelled four British diplomats after charging that Britain was running a spy ring out of the British Embassy. Britain responded by expelling four Russian diplomats.

As for the SVR, Western intelligence officials believed that the agency had too little money to spy abroad. But the GRU, funded through the military services, still had funds available, and its overseas NETWORK of legal ATTACHÉS continues to seek out Western secrets.

By the mid-1990s the poor economic situation in Russia, the lengthy civil war in Chechnya, frustration over crime, and other factors had led to a growth in reactionary forces in the Russian parliament and on the political scene in general. In this environment, the role and powers of the SVR and FSK intelligence services were ominously being strengthened.

However, the internal turmoil in Russia during the summer of 1996 led to serious challenges to Yeltsin's re-election as President. After the June 16, 1996, presidential election, Yeltsin faced a runoff contest with Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist Party candidate. In the inter-

val before the July 3 vote, Yeltsin ousted several hard-liners from his leadership. Most were senior Defense and Army officials; also fired were:

Mikhail Barsukov—head of the Federal Security Service (FSK). His career was in the Kremlin's guard unit; he had been appointed commander of the Kremlin guards in Dec. 1991, was a staunch supporter of Aleksandr Korzhakov (below), and became head of the FSK in 1995. (He has been described as strict, taciturn, and unpopular with his peers and subordinates.)

Aleksander Korzhakov—the head of the Presidential Security Service (SBP), previously part of the KGB. His career was also in the Kremlin guard, and he was assigned as head of presidential security in 1993. (Korzhakov had been described as the second most powerful man in Russia, a close friend and tennis partner of Yeltsin.)

In the same period, on July 2, 1996, Yeltsin signed a decree to merge the Federal Protection Service (FSO) and the Presidential Security Service (SBP)—the new agency to be called the State Protection Service (GSO). The new GSO is under Lt. Gen. Yuri Krapivin. The reorganization, coupled with the June firings and the ascendancy of Alexander Ivanovich Lebed, an outspoken lieutenant general of airborne troops, as Yeltsin's top security adviser, brought a new, centralized direction to Russian internal security activities. (Lebed had ranked third in the June 16 election, garnering 14.5 percent of the vote; Yeltsin had 35 percent and Zyuganov captured 32 percent of the vote.)

Yeltsin won reelection in July 1996.

# S



## ● ● 2ND SIGNAL SERVICE BATTALION

U.S. Army unit that provided personnel for signal intercept stations around the world during World War II.

The battalion was originally activated on Jan. 1, 1939, as the 2nd Signal Service Company, under the Army's Chief Signal Officer. It was assigned several officers and 101 enlisted men. Prior to that the Army's SIGNAL INTELLIGENCES SERVICE (SIS) had been dependent for radio intercepts on Signal Corps units at Fort Monmouth, N.J.; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; the Presidio, San Francisco, Calif.; Fort Shafter, Oahu, Hawaii; Fort McKinley in the Philippines; and Quarry Heights in the Panama Canal Zone.

The formation of the company placed all SIS intercept operations under centralized control. Initially, the 2nd Signal Service Company headquarters was at Fort Monmouth, but in Nov. 1939 it was moved to Washington, D.C., to be collocated with SIS. With war beginning in Europe, SIS operations were expanded, but there was a continued shortfall of men as the Army was growing rapidly and highly trained radio personnel were in short supply. For example, on the eve of U.S. entry into the war on Dec. 7, 1941, the 2nd Signal Service Company detachment in the Philippines was authorized 24 enlisted men; it had but 16.

When the United States went to war on Dec. 7, 1941, the SIS had 45 officers assigned and the 2nd Company had 177 enlisted men—44 officers and 28 enlisted in Washington, and 1 officer and 149 enlisted with detachments elsewhere, including an intercept school detachment at Fort Monmouth. (There were also 109 civilians assigned to SIS.)

By the spring of 1942 there were 15 Army intercept detachments (the one in the Philippines had been evacuated to Australia) with more than 700 personnel. In April 1942 the company became the 2nd Signal Service Battalion. In July 1942 SIS and the battalion's headquarters moved to ARLINGTON HALL in Arlington, Va., a suburb of Washington, although the headquarters constituted little more than a military personnel section for the enlisted men (and later women) of the Army's intercept service.

Detachments were sent to Army listening posts throughout the world to intercept German and Japanese communications and to monitor U.S. military communications to ensure that they maintained COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY procedures. There was also a school detachment, which was moved from Fort Monmouth to Vint Hill Farms, Va., in Oct. 1942.

The SIS and 2nd Battalion were essentially unified on Nov. 19, 1942, when Col. Frank W. Bullock, who had been head of SIS since the previous April, assumed command of the battalion as well. (He was actually "triple-hatted," also being the commanding officer, Arlington Hall Station.)

Recruiting qualified personnel was a continuing problem. For example, by early 1943, of the 521 enlisted men sent to the Vint Hill Farms intercept station in Virginia, 28 were found to be illiterate and hence unacceptable for communications intercept work. Soon enlisted women (WACs) were being assigned to the battalion—11 female officers and 800 enlisted were initially requested.

There were major morale problems among the enlisted men assigned to Arlington Hall. Many had the same assignments as SIS and 2nd Battalion officers and SIS civilians, who were being paid considerably more

money. "There was, in fact, so it seemed, no correlation between the rank a worker held and his accomplishments," read the official battalion history. "Naturally, many enlisted men felt that they were being treated unfairly. Efforts were made to solve this problem but without complete success. One solution was, of course, to send outstanding [enlisted] men to Officer Candidate School, but the quota was small." In addition, although it was difficult to give enlisted men direct commissions, 58 enlisted Japanese linguists were made 2nd lieutenants.

When the war ended in Aug. 1945, the 2nd Battalion maintained intercept detachments at several locations within the United States and on Guam, as well as in Asmara (Eritrea), New Delhi, Alaska, and Hawaii. Under battalion control were 792 officers, 2,704 enlisted men, and 1,214 enlisted women—more than 4,700 Army personnel—the largest "battalion" in the Army, the head of the intercept service and battalion being a brigadier general. (These numbers do not include 5,661 civilians employed by Army communications intelligence at the end of the war and 17,000 officers and enlisted men engaged in SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE activities under the command of theater commanders.)

OO S

SECRET

OO S-2

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER for a U.S. Army unit. Also see G-2.

OO SAFE HOUSE

Innocent-looking house maintained by an intelligence service for conducting clandestine or covert activities, such as the interrogation or hiding of a DEFECTOR.

JOHN LE CARRÉ [p], in his best-selling novel *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier Spy* (1974), wrote of the thoughts of Peter Guillam as he entered a safe house:

Safe houses I have known, thought Guillam, looking round the gloomy flat. He could write of them the way a commercial traveller could write about hotels: from your five-star hall of mirrors in Belgravia, with Wedgwood pilasters and gilded oak leaves, to this two-room scalp-hunters' shakedown in Lexham Gardens, smelling of dust and drains, with a three-foot fire extinguisher in the pitch-dark hall. Over the fireplace, cavaliers drinking out of pewter. On the nest of tables, sea-shells for ash-trays; and in the grey kitchen, anonymous instructions to "Be Sure and Turn Off the Gas Both Cocks". . . . He pressed the button and heard the clunk of the electric lock echoing in the stairwell. He opened the front door but left the chain till he was sure Toby was alone.

Le Carré continued:

There was tea on a tray: Guillam had prepared it, two cups. To safe houses belongs a certain standard

of catering. Either you are pretending that you live there or that you are adept anywhere; or simply that you think of everything. In the trade, naturalness is an art, Guillam decided. . . .

### OO SAFFORD, CAPT. LAURENCE F.

(b. 1893 d. 1973)

Pioneer in U.S. Navy CRYPTANALYSIS and founder of the Navy's codebreaking organization.

A 1916 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Safford served at sea and in 1924 reestablished the Navy's COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) unit to monitor Japanese naval communications. Located within the Office of Naval Communications with the COVER designation of Research Desk, the unit was given the Navy code OP-20-G, with OP indicating the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 20 indicating Navy communications, and G the seventh unit within that office. Subsequently, the Research Desk was renamed the Communications Security Group. The initial staff of the COMINT unit consisted of Lt. Safford and four civilians. Their first task was to solve Japanese diplomatic codes because those messages were readily available.

After again serving at sea from 1925 to 1929, Safford returned to cryptologic duties for three more years before going back to sea. He took command of OP-20-G in 1936 and remained in cryptology work for the remainder of his Navy career. From 1949 to 1951 he was special assistant to the Director of the ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY, after which he retired from active service.

In 1958 Congress awarded Safford \$100,000 for his wartime inventions in lieu of patents.

### OO SAINT

Planned U.S. SATELLITE Inspector (SAINT) that was to inspect Soviet satellites to determine their purpose and whether they were carrying weapons.

The SAINT program was approved for development in mid-1960. It was initially planned to have a television camera and radar; later models might have infrared, x-ray, and radiation sensors to determine more particulars of the TARGET satellite. The SAINT satellites were to be launched into orbit and, using their own propulsion system once in orbit, maneuver to within about 50 feet of target satellites. The information derived from the SAINT's sensors would be sent by data link to a ground station.

Some Air Force proponents of SAINT hoped that later models would also be fitted with a kill mechanism.

This satellite to spy on other satellites was not developed. It was canceled in Dec. 1962 for lack of funds and conceptual shortcomings. And neither the Eisenhower nor Kennedy administrations showed any interest in placing weapons in space by arming such an inspection system.

### OO SALON KITTY

German SD establishment in which, according to German spy chief WALTER SCHELLENBERG, "important vis-

itors from other countries could be ‘entertained’ in a discreet atmosphere and . . . offered seductive feminine companionship. In such an atmosphere the most rigid diplomatic might be induced to unbend and reveal useful information.”

Salon Kitty was set up in a large house in a fashionable district of BERLIN. It is described in *The Schellenberg Memoirs* (1956):

Double walls were built for the incorporation of microphones. These were connected by automatic transmission to tape recorders which would record every word spoken throughout the house. Three of our department’s technical experts, bound by oath, were put in charge of his apparatus. The ostensible owner of the house was provided with the necessary domestic and catering staff for the establishment to be able to offer the best service, food, and drink.

The women of the establishment were recruited from “the most highly qualified and cultivated ladies of the *demi-monde*.” And, according to Schellenberg, “quite a few ladies from the upper crust of German society were only too willing to serve their country in this manner.”

The salon was highly successful in garnering secrets from its clients, mostly foreign diplomats. Occasionally it was used by Nazi leaders, particularly REINHARD HEYDRICH, when, of course, the microphones were turned off.

## OO SALYUT

Soviet manned orbiting laboratory, employed for scientific research as well as military activities, including RECONNAISSANCE. The *Salyut 1* was placed in orbit on April 19, 1971, the world’s first space station. On June 7, a spacecraft successfully docked with *Salyut 1* and transferred three crewmen who operated the laboratory until June 29.

(After departing the space station, the three cosmonauts died of asphyxiation during reentry when a hatch was jarred open. Space suits were not even carried on the mission; they would be on all future flights to Salyut space stations. Because of the need to provide space suits, crews being shuttled to the spacecraft were reduced from three to two for the next decade.)

While the *Salyut 1* remained in orbit less than six months, it was followed by similar manned space stations, the last—*Salyut 7*—being placed in orbit on April 19, 1982. The giant, 21-ton spacecraft had an orbit 294 miles above the earth. (It remained in orbit until early 1991.)

The Salyuts were almost continuously occupied, as spacecraft ferried men and supplies to the orbiting stations. The laboratory commander is believed always to have been a military officer, although civilians did serve as accompanying flight engineers. These laboratories enabled the Soviet Union to accumulate several times more manned space flight time than did the United States.

Soviet officials stated that cosmonauts in these space stations used visual observations, cameras, spectrometers, and multispectral electro-optical sensors in their ob-

servations of Earth. The U.S. government publication *The Soviet Space Challenge* (1987) stated that these observations have “applications for reconnaissance and targeting.”

Based on known experiments, the Salyut laboratories Nos. 1 through 3 and 5 are generally considered to have been military operations, while Nos. 4, 6, and 7 were civilian operations, although there was obvious overlap. For example, the Soviets conducted radar tests of submarine detection from *Salyut 7*.

The word Salyut means “salute,” a tribute to the first manned space flight by Yuri Gagarin, which occurred ten years before the launch of *Salyut 1*.

The Salyut space stations have been succeeded by the MIR series, first orbited in 1986. A similar MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY planned by the United States was never launched.

## OO SAM

CODE NAME of a British mission to Moscow in Aug.–Sept. 1941 to form a link between the British intelligence services and the Soviet NKVD.

The British delegation to Moscow was from the SOE (Special Operations Executive), led by Brig. GEORGE HILL, a former Special Intelligence Service (MI6) officer. Investigative reporter CHAPMAN PINCHER, in his *Too Secret Too Long* (1984) wrote: “The selection of Hill was extraordinary because the Soviets knew that he had been involved with another spy, Sidney Reilly, in an abortive effort to assassinate members of the Bolshevik Committee after the Russian Revolution.” (See SIDNEY REILLY.)

The Sam mission was able to obtain Soviet agreement for full collaboration in subversion and propaganda in all countries outside the Soviet Union and British Commonwealth. As a result of this agreement, an NKVD officer was officially assigned to London, while the British military mission to Moscow provided a conduit for intelligence. However, the British gained little as a result of the Sam mission and the ensuing agreements. Indeed, the British government complained that not even TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE about captured German weapons was being provided. However, the SOE liaison in Moscow was allowed some contact with Russians and was occasionally permitted to visit areas where other British officers were not welcome.

In contrast, the British provided the Soviets with significant assistance, including intelligence derived from ULTRA, although the source was not officially revealed. But JOHN CAIRNCROSS and other Soviet spies in Britain were already revealing Ultra to the Soviets, along with other intelligence the British considered too sensitive to pass to Moscow.

The NKVD also proposed that the British make parachute drops of NKVD AGENTS into German-held territory to make contact with Soviet prisoners and other groups in Western Europe. The British agreed, and several NKVD agents were brought into Britain by SUBMARINE, given some training, and dropped into occupied Europe.

Meanwhile, other Soviet agents were hard at work in Britain stealing secrets. Also see CAMBRIDGE SPY RING.

## ●● SAMOS

The SATELLITE and Missile Observation System (SAMOS) was a U.S. Air Force RECONNAISSANCE satellite. Unlike the CORONA photographic satellite, which returned film canisters to earth, SAMOS was designed with on-board film processing; the resulting pictures were line-scanned and then relayed to a ground station via a television-type downlink.

SAMOS—like Corona—was derived from the Weapon System (WS) 117L project and the PIED PIPER competition among commercial firms for a reconnaissance satellite. The satellite was initially named Sentry and, subsequently, SAMOS.

The Air Force was able to fund development of SAMOS at the same time as the CIA was developing Corona because there was major congressional support for satellite programs in the late 1950s, a time of concern over the so-called missile gap between the United States and Soviet Union. However, the SAMOS downlink technology was not sufficiently mature. In later satellites the film would, as in Corona, be ejected from the satellite and its parachute snatched in flight by special recovery aircraft.

In addition to funding questions, the issue of control of SAMOS was a major concern at the time. Whereas Corona was a CIA project, the Air Force initially considered SAMOS its own. Several senior government officials, however, believed that reconnaissance satellites were national assets and not the “property” of individual armed services. The SAMOS situation was largely resolved on Aug. 25, 1960, when the highly classified NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO) was established. Hidden within the Air Force staff in the Pentagon, the NRO was a Department of Defense agency but part of the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY and thus under direction of the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, (i.e., the head of the CIA). The Air Force provided most of the support for the NRO.

When SAMOS was moved under the NRO, Air Force headquarters, which provided the COVER for the NRO, could thus exercise a high degree of management over the project. But the project was outside the standard Air Force chain of command and, significantly, Gen. Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command, was not involved in control of the satellite.

The first attempted launch of a SAMOS satellite on Oct. 11, 1960, failed when a power cable linking the launch tower to the Agena booster rocket failed to separate, ripping out a piece of the satellite. An attempt to launch the SAMOS 1 on Oct. 11, 1960, went badly when the second-stage Agena booster rocket failed. The SAMOS 2 launch on Jan. 31, 1961, was successful. It was able to transmit photos down to a U.S. ground station for nearly a month. It required several months to analyze the pictures, which were of poor quality compared to the Corona film. The satellite weighed 4,190 pounds and had orbited 295 to 346 miles above the earth.

By the time of the first successful SAMOS launch, the Corona satellites had been delivering useful photography for more than five months.

The next two attempts to launch SAMOS satellites also failed. Then came a string of successes, interspersed

with only a few failures. Of 31 attempts through Nov. 27, 1963, all but five were successful. However, wrote WILLIAM E. BURROWS in *Deep Black* (1986):

Resolution was another matter, though. Some observers have noted that resolution progressed from twenty feet [the size of a ground object that could be observed] to about five as the program advanced. Others, including the CIA's Herbert Scoville, Jr., have asserted that SAMOS never really yielded useful pictures.

Still, SAMOS data was used by President Kennedy in his deliberations during the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS of 1962.

The SAMOS satellites were not given a KEYHOLE designation; however, the basic SAMOS camera system was used in the unsuccessful LANYARD program as the KH-6.

## ●● SANITIZE

To delete specific material or revise a report or other document to prevent the identification of intelligence sources and collection methods.

## ●● SAPPHIRE

CODE NAME for a spy ring said to have operated within SDECE, the French intelligence agency. The report came in Dec. 1961 from ANATOLY GOLITSYN, a KGB AGENT who defected to the U.S. CIA.

The Sapphire MOLES, Golitsyn said, had penetrated the government of Charles de Gaulle, the military headquarters of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) in Paris, and SDECE itself. At the recommendation of CIA counterintelligence chief JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, President Kennedy wrote to de Gaulle, telling him of the revelation. The CIA station chief in Paris handed the letter to de Gaulle personally.

De Gaulle, suspecting a CIA-engineered plot against him, reacted by ordering the SDECE to break off relations with the CIA. When Angleton saw no French reaction to the Sapphire accusations, he ordered a BLACK BAG JOB (a surreptitious entry) into the French Embassy in Washington to get code books so that he could read diplomatic traffic and see exactly what the French were doing. This break-in—when discovered—led to the recall of the SDECE station chief in Washington.

The Sapphire case formed the plot of a novel, *Topaz* (1967) by Leon Uris, which was later made into a film (see MOVIES). The book was so authentic that some observers believed that the CIA had fed Uris the information. A French INTELLIGENCE OFFICER successfully sued Uris and the film company. Uris made his legal experiences the subject of another book, *QB VII* (1970).

Among the Sapphire spies was Georges Pâques, a NATO press secretary whom French SURVEILLANCE operatives had seen passing material to a Soviet HANDLER. He gave diplomatic and military secrets to the Soviets to ease international tension, Pâques claimed at his trial. He said that his handlers had shown him a letter from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev saying that he had been guided



The Soviet shipyard at Severodvinsk (Molotovsk) in northern Russia, photographed (at left) on Feb. 10, 1969 by a U.S. Corona spy satellite (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY); at right, the same yard in Aug. 1941, photographed by a high-flying German reconnaissance aircraft.

during the BERLIN crisis of 1961 by NATO documents provided Pâques had. He was sentenced to life, later reduced to 20 years, for treason.

VENONA intercepts showed that André Labarthe, a scientist in the French Air Ministry, was a Soviet agent in the 1940s. French intelligence believed that he had recruited Pâques in Algiers in 1944.

## ●● SASHA

see YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

## ★ ●● SATELLITES

Satellites are probably the most important source of STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE and, to some degree, TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE and TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE in the latter half of the 20th Century. Describing the significance of

photographic satellites, President Johnson, in March 1967, declared:

I wouldn't want to be quoted on this, but we've spent \$34 or \$40 billion dollars on the space program. And if nothing else had come out of it except the knowledge we've gained from space photography, it would be worth ten times what the whole program has cost. Because tonight we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off. We were doing things we didn't need to do. We were building things we didn't need to build. We were harboring fears we didn't need to harbor.

The earliest known efforts to investigate the collection of information from space occurred in 1946–1947 when former German V-2 missiles, which were being test-



launched by the U.S. Army, were fitted with a small camera. The camera, provided with a heater to protect it from high-altitude cold and a parachute to return it to earth, took photos from a peak altitude of just over 100 miles. (When the V-2 missile supply was exhausted in 1947, cameras were fitted to high-altitude research BALLOONS to continue testing, although they were limited to an altitude of little more than 100,000 feet. The balloon concept was later employed in a strategic RECONNAISSANCE role over the Soviet Union.)

The first major step toward U.S. development of reconnaissance satellites came from a 1954 recommendation of the Rand Corp. that the Air Force pursue such craft. Later that year—unknown to Rand and known to very few in the Air Force—President Eisenhower gave the CIA approval to develop the U-2 spyplane for OVERHEAD reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower's support for the U-2—and subsequently for satellites—originated from his concern over Soviet developments of strategic nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States with a nuclear version of the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. In 1954 Eisenhower had asked JAMES R. KILLIAN, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to chair a panel to look into the potential of long-range, strategic missile developments. Some 50 distinguished scientists and engineers from academia,

laboratories, and the government were assembled to look into various aspects of strategic offensive weapons, strategic defense, and strategic intelligence technologies. EDWIN H. LAND of Polaroid fame chaired a subpanel on intelligence.

The panel's 1955, highly classified report began: "We *must* find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross under-estimation of the threat."

The panel urged development of the U-2, which would become operational in 1956 and was expected to have a useful life of only two years because of Soviet air-defense developments. A satellite was considered a promising follow-on project. Eisenhower embraced the panel's recommendations and established a continuing relationship with Killian, who served as his science adviser, and Land, who would have considerable influence on U.S. spyplane and satellite development.

In 1956 the U.S. Air Force initiated the project Weapon System (WS) 117L to develop a series of reconnaissance satellites. U.S. concern over Soviet bomber development in the mid-1950s led to an increased interest in satellites, with President Eisenhower approving the CORONA photographic satellite, to be developed by the

CIA, and the SAMOS, to relay television pictures taken from film, for development by the Air Force.

Even as those projects were being given the green light, in Jan. 1956 the Soviet government approved the high-priority development of a reconnaissance satellite, the ZENIT. Despite the openness of American society, Soviet military and political leaders believed that much of the U.S. defense buildup was hidden.

Both nations conducted research into missile development, with both countries building on the knowledge of German scientists and material taken at the end of World War II. Still, the West was shocked when, on Aug. 3, 1957, an R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile rocketed several thousand miles from its launch pad to hit the earth in Soviet Siberia. In guarded words, the Soviet news agency *Tass* announced that a "super-long distance intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket flew at an . . . unprecedented altitude . . . and landed in the target area." (Not for another 16 months would a U.S. Atlas intercontinental missile be tested over its full range.) Then, three months later, on Oct. 4, an R-7 rocket booster placed the world's first satellite in orbit, the *Sputnik 1*. Although it weighed 184 pounds, the satellite was 166 pounds heavier than the first U.S. satellite, which would not be placed into orbit for another three months. Larger Soviet satellites followed, accelerating U.S. concern over Soviet weapons accomplishments and giving rise to the "missile gap" controversy, as well as demands for better intelligence.

The first successful U.S. Corona satellite photographic mission took place in Aug. 1960. That one mission provided more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all 24 U-2 spyplane flights over the Soviet Union. The satellite had exposed 3,000 feet of film showing 1.6 million square miles of territory.

That same month the rivalry between the Air Force and CIA for control of satellite programs—and hence the most important strategic intelligence available—was resolved with the creation of the highly-secret NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE within the Department of Defense. The Air Force's SAMOS satellite flew its first successful mission in Jan. 1961, but the quality of its photography—sent to earth via a television-type data link—was poor in contrast to the photos that Corona parachuted back to earth.

The Corona photographic satellite would soon carry "piggyback" an ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) package. In contrast, the first Soviet reconnaissance satellite, the Zenit, had an ELINT as well as a photographic capability from the outset. The first successful Zenit flight—given the mission designation *Cosmos 7*—was flown in July 1962.

More advanced photographic and ELINT satellites would follow these pioneers in space intelligence. And more specialized intelligence satellites would follow: The U.S. MIDAS and its follow-on DSP satellites provided early warning of ballistic missiles launches—and had some capability to detect high-performance aircraft. The Soviet RADAR OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE (RORSAT) would be the first satellite deployed for ocean RECON-

NAISSANCE. Teamed with the ELINT Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT) vehicles, the nuclear-powered RORSAT would detect Western warships on the high seas.

The concept of putting man in space for intelligence collection as well as for research purposes was also proposed in both the United States and Soviet Union. But the U.S. MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY was aborted, whereas the Soviet SALYUT series and the follow-on MIR "space stations" have supported a variety of military programs, including intelligence collection. The combination RORSAT/EORSAT satellites and, possibly, the Salyut/Mir operations may also have contributed to Soviet antisubmarine warfare by enabling the detection of submarines.

The belated U.S. space shuttle program has produced some intelligence collection, albeit intermittent, of much shorter duration, and undoubtedly at greater cost. Further, the openness of the shuttle program has limited its military role except as a satellite-launching vehicle. The shuttle also introduced a severe limitation on U.S. satellites. The shuttle was sold to Congress and the public on the basis of being a more efficient method of placing satellites in orbit and servicing them. But it is more difficult to launch a shuttle to put a satellite into orbit than simply to fire one aloft on a rocket booster; after the *Challenger* disaster on Jan. 28, 1986, further shuttle flights were grounded until Sept. 1988.

An attempt to launch a classified U.S. satellite on April 18, 1986, failed. Not until Sept. 5, 1986, was another U.S. military satellite placed in orbit. In contrast, the Soviets retained the rocket booster as the means of orbiting satellites, allowing them considerably more flexibility. During crises and conflicts the Soviets have been able to orbit more reconnaissance satellites rapidly, as they did during the Argentine-British war over the Falklands in 1982, and the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

In the late 1980s another aspect of satellite intelligence came to the fore when the French SPOT satellite, first orbited in Nov. 1986, was employed to produce photography for commercial sale. Heretofore, relatively little satellite photography had reached the public, and none from satellites with the fine resolution of SPOT's cameras had done so. Indeed, U.S. spy satellite photography could not even be used in the Secretary of Defense's top-level publication *Soviet Military Power*, published from 1981 onward as the official view of the Soviet military threat. (Later issues did use purchased SPOT photography.)

A few satellite photos did reach the public. SAMUEL L. MORISON gave copies of classified satellite photos to the magazine *Jane's Defence Weekly*, and Air Force Lt. Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze compromised security when he used satellite photos to show new Soviet fighter aircraft to arouse support for new U.S. Air Force aircraft.

The availability of SPOT photography and the end of the Cold War brought new pressure on the U.S. government to make high-resolution photography available. In 1993 R. JAMES WOOLSEY, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI), told Congress that the government would end its blanket opposition to the sale of "remote sensing"

images able to spot objects on the ground as small as 3 1/4 feet (i.e., one meter).

The U.S. government always feared that release of satellite photos would reveal how the satellites worked. But it was obvious that the Soviets knew how reconnaissance satellites worked, both from their own experience and from espionage. WILLIAM P. KAMPILES, a CIA employee, sold the Soviets the KH-11 manual for only \$3,000, providing technical data on the latest U.S. spy satellite (see KEYHOLE). Adm. STANSFIELD TURNER, DCI at the time, later wrote, "The CIA's security procedures were surprisingly lax." Telling about the Kampiles case in *Secrecy and Democracy* (1985), Turner related, "When we learned that one was missing, we also found we could not account for thirteen others!" It was not known how many of those KH-11 manuals had found their way into Soviet hands.

Nonintelligence satellites have also been developed and orbited—for communications, navigation, mapping, monitoring earth resources, weather reconnaissance, research, and attacking enemy satellites. The release of SPOT photography and the subsequent U.S. sale of satellite photos—which American firms believed was a \$1 billion business—provided the opportunity for more accurate maps, better environmental and crop predictions, more accurate news coverage, and other benefits.

However, the intelligence collection satellites must be considered in a separate, transcending category. JEFFREY RICHELSON, in his comprehensive *America's Secret Eyes in Space* (1990), wrote:

On the one hand, the photo-reconnaissance satellite has been a partner to the atomic and nuclear weapons whose use could devastate the civilized world. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have relied on their reconnaissance satellites to locate and identify targets to be attacked in the event of war. At the same time, those satellites have played a significant role in preventing the occurrence of war and permitting arms limitation agreements. In the first year of their operation, the Corona satellites helped dispel America's fear of Soviet strategic superiority that had haunted many Americans since the launch of Sputnik.

Since then, they have allowed knowledge to prevail over fear in assessing Soviet capabilities. And the arms limitation agreements of the past, present, and future would not be possible without such devices to verify compliance. In the future, they may be significant in helping curb the spread of ballistic missiles and atomic weapons to a variety of Third World countries. Also see OVERHEAD.

## OO SATTLER, JAMES FREDERICK

(b. 1938)

MOLE for the East German intelligence service in the United States. Born in New York City, Sattler attended

the University of California at Berkeley and later studied in East and West Germany and in Poland. Fluent in German, he traveled frequently to Europe, teaching, doing research, and attending international conferences, for a time working for the Atlantic Institute for Foreign Affairs in Paris.

In the early 1970s Sattler began working in Washington, D.C., as a foreign policy analyst for the Atlantic Council of the United States, a foreign policy organization that focused on the political and military problems of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. At times U.S. government officials used the council as a sounding board for potential plans.

Sometime about 1973, Sattler was unmasked as a spy by an East German INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who had defected to West Germany and had named several AGENTS, including Sattler, whose information had been supplied to the KGB.

Sattler had been recruited in 1967, some six years before his activities were revealed. On learning that the defector had named Sattler, the FBI asked Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, who knew Sattler, to ask him if he would be interested in becoming a DOUBLE AGENT. After admitting his espionage activities to Lehman, Sattler fled to Mexico, where he tried in vain to get help from the Soviet Embassy.

Sattler then briefly returned to Washington, where the Department of Justice, using a little-known federal law, ordered him to *register as a spy*. On March 23, 1974, Sattler filled out Form GA-1, issued by the Department of Justice's Internal Security Section. Sattler checked Yes to this question: *Do you have knowledge of the espionage, counterespionage or sabotage tactics of a foreign government or foreign political party?* He then provided a description of his life as a spy:

Since 1967, I have transmitted to my principals in Berlin, GDR, information and documents which I have received from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and from individuals in institutions and government agencies in the Federal Government of Germany, United States, Great Britain, Canada, and France.

I photographed a portion of this information with a microdisc camera and placed the microdiscs in packages which I mailed to West Germany which I know were subsequently received by my principals in Berlin, GDR. Other documents and information I photographed with a Minox camera and personally carried the film to my principals in Berlin or handed them to a courier. The microdisc camera was given to me by my principal.

Sattler admitted receiving approximately \$15,000 for his services as well as an "honor decoration" issued by the Ministry for State Security of East Germany.

U.S. COUNTERESPIONAGE agents then reportedly TURNED Sattler long enough to track his communications system, which ran from Washington to Canada to West Germany to East Germany and, finally, to Moscow.

Sattler disappeared shortly after he signed the statement admitting that he was a spy. Lehman believed that had Sattler not been discovered, by the 1980s he "could have been anything. . . . An Assistant Secretary of Defense—or maybe State—by now."

## ●● SATYR

British program to uncover the mysteries of the highly sophisticated microphone found in the Great Seal of the United States that hung above the ambassador's desk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Planted by the Soviets and discovered by the United States in 1952, the BUG had apparently revealed many American secrets to Soviet intelligence.

The bug was revealed by SWEEPERS making a routine check of the ambassador's office prior to a visit by the U.S. Secretary of State. But U.S. technicians were unable to comprehend the workings of the device. The microphone was activated and powered from a distant location, using microwave beams.

Accordingly, it was taken to Britain, where electronics specialist PETER WRIGHT examined the device and was able to discern its secrets. But it took him 18 months—in an effort given the CODE NAME Satyr—to produce a British prototype of the device for use in British COUNTERESPIONAGE activities.

## ●● SAVAK

Iranian secret police and intelligence agency since 1956, which ended with the Islamic revolution that culminated in Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's flight out of the country on Jan. 16, 1979.

Savak is a contraction of the Farsi words Sazamane Etelaat va Amniate Kechvar (Security and Intelligence Organization). Long feared and hated, the Savak institutionalized the shah's personal opposition to any political challengers while he modernized the country. The agency was known to have arrested, tortured, and murdered thousands of opponents to the shah's regime.

While the U.S. CIA maintained a major station in Iran, with an estimated 50 to 75 personnel, the CIA did not conduct espionage activities against Iran. Rather, it relied on the Savak for information on internal matters, which contributed to the failure of the CIA to predict the overthrow of the shah's government.

An indication of the close CIA-Savak cooperation can be seen in a secret memorandum to the U.S. ambassador, dated June 2, 1974, referring to a CIA report on the "Soviet intelligence presence in Iran." The report said there were 67 "identified" Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS in Teheran, including three in the Soviet Hospital and one in the Aeroflot office. Besides those officers, the CIA report said, there were probably more, including "young officers serving their first familiarization tours in Iran which is a traditional assignment post of Soviet intelligence apprentices." Copies of the report were given to the Savak and the shah.

The CIA's major presence in Iran began in 1953, when KERMIT ROOSEVELT and fewer than 30 American, British, and Iranian AGENTS mounted an operation that brought down the government of the leftist government of Mohammed Mossadegh. The Savak was established in 1956 with the help of the CIA and Israel's MOSSAD.

The shah permitted the CIA to operate freely in Iran to conduct intelligence collection against the Soviet Union. Also in Iran was a major NSA electronic listening post, as well as a massive U.S. military staff to help the Iranian armed forces employ new air, ground, and naval weapons. All of these U.S. activities, however, were monitored by the Savak and its army of informers. As unrest with the shah's regime grew at home and abroad in the 1970s, the Savak undertook some operations in the United States against dissident students.

At the end of its existence, the Savak had an estimated 5,000 officers and employees, supported by many thousands of informers. When Islamic fundamentalists took over the country, the Savak's headquarters in Teheran was attacked and the agency's files looted. Gen. Nematollah Nassiri, the third and last head of the Savak, was shot at his headquarters.

In Feb. 1979 the Islamic assembly approved a bill abolishing the Savak and establishing a National Intelligence Center, without police powers.

See also ALI NAGHI RABBANI.

## ●● SBP

The Russian Presidential Security Service. Formerly the Ninth Chief Directorate of the KGB, the SBP was established as an independent government agency on Dec. 17, 1993.

In addition to providing security for top Russian officials and the guard force for the Kremlin, the SBP supervises top-level government communications and executive aircraft (formerly the 235th Air Squadron), operates and protects underground command centers, maintains the special underground train system that connects key government facilities in the Moscow area, and protects other "strategic facilities."

The head of the SBP from 1993 to June 1996 was Maj. Gen. Aleksandr V. Korzhakov, formerly with the KGB's Ninth Chief Directorate.

(See RUSSIA-USSR.)

## ●● SCALP HUNTER

British slang for INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS who specialize in defections and in differentiating genuine DEFECTORS from fakes and plants. They help to identify potential defectors and, if necessary, arrange for intimidation or entrapment.

## ●● SCARBECK, IRWIN C.

American Foreign Service Officer accused in 1961 of passing secrets to Eastern European communist nations. He was then second secretary in the U.S. Embassy in

Warsaw. Tried and convicted, he was sentenced to 30 years. In 1963 the sentence was reduced to ten years.

## ●● SCARLET PIMPERNEL

Fictional spy in the adventure novel *The Scarlet Pimpernel* by Hungarian-born English author Baroness EM-MUSKA ORCZY. First published in 1905, the novel tells the story of the leader of the League of the Scarlet Pimpernel, a band of young Englishmen pledged to rescue the innocent aristocratic victims of the Reign of Terror that followed the French Revolution. The novel's hero—Sir Percy Blakeney—outwits his French revolutionary opponents through his courage and ingenious disguises, identifying himself in his secret rescue missions by a signet ring with the image of a scarlet pimpernel blossom.

The story was made into a classic film in 1935 starring Leslie Howard, Merle Oberon, and Raymond Massey. Howard played the Englishman who led a double life, saving innocent victims of the French Revolution while pretending to be a foppish, poetry-spouting gentleman back home in England.

## ●● SCHELLENBERG, BRIGADEFÜHRER WALTER

(b. 1910 d. 1952)

German intelligence official and, after the dissolution of the ABWEHR in 1944, head of the foreign operations of the unified German intelligence service.

Schellenberg's intelligence career began in 1933 with the SS, initially working in COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. In June 1941 he became head of Department IV, or foreign intelligence, of the RSHA, with the rank of SS Brigadeführer. (He was the youngest general in the SS at the time.) Schellenberg personally directed and participated in the VENLO INCIDENT, the attempt to kidnap the Duke of Windsor from Portugal (Operation WILLI), the RICHARD SORGE case, the CICERO operation, and the attempt to "sell" Jews and other concentration camp inmates as the end of the war neared. From mid-1944 Schellenberg took over the duties of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence organization.

Describing Schellenberg, intelligence historian DAVID KAHN wrote in *Hitler's Spies* (1978) that he "was a boyish, charming SS brigadier, who looked well in his black SS uniform with silver trim. . . . his brains, his flair, and his loyalty" had gained him Department IV at the age of 31. Hugh Trevor-Roper was highly critical of Schellenberg in *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947): "Among the universally parochial minds of the SS, Schellenberg . . . enjoyed an undeserved reputation. . . . he was in fact a very trivial character."

Schellenberg was a confidant of HEINRICH HIMMLER and REINHARD HEYDRICH, who was his immediate superior, and he had regular contact with Adolf Hitler. After Heydrich's assassination, Schellenberg was considered as a candidate for head of the RSHA, but he was rejected as too young and too unorthodox, at least from a Nazi perspective. When ERNST KALTENBRUNNER was named head of the

RSHA, Schellenberg was given direct access to Himmler, although nominally he was Kaltenbrunner's subordinate.

As World War II neared its climax in Europe, Schellenberg attempted to influence Himmler, urging him to begin negotiations with neutral representatives to arrange a surrender to the Western allies; Schellenberg hoped that Himmler would succeed Hitler as head of the German state. He also worked toward the protection and release of concentration camp inmates. He was dismissed as chief of Department IV by Kaltenbrunner on April 30, 1945, as Himmler was vilified by Hitler because of his efforts to negotiate with the West. Schellenberg then joined the government of Grand Adm. Karl Dönitz, who had succeeded Hitler that night. When the war ended a week later, Schellenberg was in Sweden attempting to negotiate a German surrender.

At the Nuremberg war crimes trials Schellenberg was acquitted of all but two charges—being a member of the SS and SD, which the international tribunal declared to be criminal organizations, and executing Russian prisoners without trial. But the court considered Schellenberg's belated efforts to aid concentration camp prisoners as mitigation and he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Shortly after his release in June 1951 he completed *The Schellenberg Memoirs*; he died less than a year later of liver disease.

## ●● SCHERBIUS, ARTHUR

German inventor of the ENIGMA machine, the first practical mechanical device for ENCIPHERING messages. He based the machine on ROTORS that changed position every time a letter key was depressed to provide a different, randomly selected letter substitute. Intended for commercial use, its formal name was the "Glow-lamp Ciphering and Deciphering Machine Enigma." The machine was first exhibited in 1923 but did not meet with immediate success.

BORIS HAGELIN took over the machine, making improvements. Scherbius went bankrupt and died before the machine entered mass production in the late 1920s for the Swedish and German armed forces.

## ●● SCHERHORN

Soviet DECEPTION operation in World War II in which the German armed forces were tricked into believing that 2,500 troops were trapped behind Soviet lines at the Berezina River.

Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) Heinrich Scherhorn was the alleged commander of the trapped troops who, on Aug. 19, 1944, made radio contact with the German High Command detailing the unit's plight. From that date until Scherhorn's last message on April 4, 1945, the German armed forces and SS expended considerable effort—men, aircraft, and equipment—in efforts to rescue the troops. There are reports that two SS groups were sent in to help effect a rescue of the Scherhorn group, and that OTTO SKORZENY, who had rescued Benito Mussolini, was planning to mount an operation to save Scherhorn in March 1945.

So appealing and heroic were the radio messages from Scherhorn that Adolf Hitler promoted the group commander to oberst (colonel) and awarded him the Knight's Cross. All the officers mentioned in the radio messages were also promoted! In reality, Scherhorn and some 200 of his men had been captured by the Soviets during the Belorussian offensive in the summer of 1944. Scherhorn began sending messages under Soviet guidance.

Like Operation MAX, Scherhorn's activities demonstrated the Soviet expertise in such deception.

## ●● SCHLESINGER, JAMES R.

(b. 1929)

Briefly the U.S. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, from Feb. 1973 to July 1973, after which he served as Secretary of Defense until Nov. 1975 and as Secretary of Energy from Aug. 1977 to Aug. 1979.

An economist and expert in energy and national security matters, Schlesinger had earned his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University. He was subsequently a consultant to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and professor at the University of Virginia before becoming director of strategic studies at the Rand Corp. from 1963 to 1969.

Entering government, Schlesinger served as assistant and acting director of the Bureau of the Budget (later changed to the Office of Management and Budget) from 1969 to 1971. While there he drew up a plan to revamp the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. He was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973, when President Nixon appointed him DCI. Nixon, who never liked or trusted the CIA, had fired Schlesinger's predecessor, RICHARD HELMS, for not being more helpful to him in the WATERGATE affair.

Schlesinger was directed to remake the CIA. He did so by authorizing compilation of the FAMILY JEWELS list (although WILLIAM E. COLBY presented them to Congress) and firing more than 1,000 CIA personnel (out of an estimated 15,000), invoking a "20 years and you're out" edict. He seemed uncomfortable at the CIA, and Nixon sent him to the Defense Department.

Among Schlesinger's earliest moves at the Pentagon was to direct an extensive analysis of U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons development, seeking to understand how and why the two super-powers developed their nuclear arsenals. He also oversaw the final withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam.

Schlesinger's tenure at the Defense Department ended abruptly as part of the so-called Halloween massacre, the critics' term for the executive branch reorganization in early Nov. 1975, when President Ford not only fired Schlesinger but also fired Colby as DCI and replaced him with GEORGE BUSH. Schlesinger declined an appointment as chairman of the Export-Import Bank but was later named Secretary of Energy.

## ●● SCHLUGA, BARON AUGUST

(b. 1841 d. 1917)

Spy who served Prussia and Germany from 1866 to World War I.

Born in Hungary, in what was then the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Schluga studied at the Polytechnical Institute in VIENNA and joined the Austrian Army. He fought bravely at the battle of Magenta in the Italian War of 1859 and was destined for a General Staff post. But he resigned to become part of the Austrian landed gentry.

Posing as a journalist, he managed to get into Austrian Army headquarters in 1866 while Helmuth Count von Moltke, chief of the Prussian General Staff, was preparing for war against Austria. Schluga brought Moltke the Austrian ORDER OF BATTLE, immeasurably helping Moltke defeat the Austrians in seven weeks.

Schluga, operating out of Paris, served Moltke again prior to the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). By then designated Agent 17, he delivered intelligence to the military ATTACHE in the Prussian Embassy in Paris. His spymasters did not even know where he lived, let alone how he got his information. Once more his intelligence helped produce a Prussian victory.

From 1870 to 1914 Agent 17 was a SLEEPER, never activated by his German superiors (Prussia had now been absorbed into the imperial Germany). His spymaster was Maj. WALTER NICOLAI, who headed the General Staff's intelligence bureau, known as III b. Nicholai got a trickle of intelligence from Schluga in the years of peace. Then, just before World War I began, Schluga passed to Germany the plan for the major deployments scheduled on the fifth day of French mobilization. Some military historians rank this intelligence as the greatest coup ever achieved by a spy in an enemy country.

German commanders failed to exploit the intelligence, however. Schluga, 73 and in ill health, slipped into Germany after the war began. After a rest, he returned to Paris in May 1915 and regularly sent intelligence messages via COURIERS to Switzerland.

Schluga's stream of intelligence was almost too good, historian DAVID KAHN wrote in *Hitler's Spies* (1978). Schluga "whether consciously or not, repeatedly emphasized French weaknesses in character and in government." This reinforced the belief of Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the General Staff of the German field army, that the French lacked the "will and ability to attack. Consequently, in the summer of 1915 he discounted clear indications of a threatening offensive.... But finally the authoritative tone of the heavy [Allied] guns overruled the spy. Falkenhayn moved to repel the Allied advance."

Schluga, the dean of German spies, kept his sources and methods secret even from his superiors. He sent his final report in March 1916 and then made his way to Germany, where he died a year later.

## ●● SCHMIDT, HANS-THILO

(b. 1888 d. 1943)

The German who gave the Allies the keys to the German ENIGMA CIPHER machine. Historian DAVID KAHN called him "... the spy who most affected the Second World War." The secrets he provided enabled the Poles to break the Enigma ciphers, knowledge they then shared with the French and British.

BERLIN-born Schmidt's father was a professor at the Charlotten School and his mother was a baroness. It is unknown whether or not the younger Schmidt served in World War I. After the war he owned a chemical factory, which failed in the inflation-ridden Germany of the 1920s. His brother, Rudolf Schmidt, a professional soldier, was second in charge of the Signal Corps unit that handled cryptology for the Army and Ministry of Defense—the CHIFFRIERSTELLE.

Thus, Schmidt was able to obtain a position as a civilian clerk who, according to Kahn's *Kahn on Codes* (1983), "distributed cipher material and supervised its destruction when it went out of force." He remained with the Chiffrierstelle after his brother left in Oct. 1929. Just over a year before Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, on Dec. 1, 1931, Schmidt joined the Nazi Party.

Sometime between then and Oct. 1932, still in the Chiffrierstelle, Schmidt offered to sell Enigma secrets to the French. Sources vary as to exactly when the first documents were passed to Capt. GUSTAVE BERTRAND, head of the decoding staff of French intelligence. Bertrand immediately shared the documents with the Poles, who had the best codebreaking effort in Europe at the time, and the British. The Poles record having documents in hand on Dec. 7, 1931, although most sources cite a 1932 hand-over of material as the first. (The British made no use of the material at the time.)

The material from Schmidt was invaluable, according to Kahn:

His reason was money. A weakling, a hedonist, a dissolute, he wanted the money for his women [he was married] and high living. But perhaps there was also an unacknowledged motive for his treason. His father had attained the highest nongovernmental status a civilian could get. His mother was a noblewoman. His brother was rising in the army, Germany's most prestigious institution. He himself was a failure. Perhaps he wanted to revenge himself on his family by doing something that would undermine the society that had conferred so much upon them and that, if discovered, would destroy them.

In 1934 Schmidt transferred to the newly established Forschungsamt—Research Office—an intercept and code-breaking activity. From there he continued his treason, providing valuable cryptographic material to Bertrand. Given the CODE NAME Asché, he met with the French 19 times during the seven years of his treason, mostly in Switzerland but also in other places (including Paris in Aug. 1938, where he was wined and dined by the French).

Schmidt passed to the French—and, through Bertrand, to the Poles and British—not only information on the Enigma machine but also reports of German code-breaking successes against the French and other countries. His espionage continued until war enveloped Europe in Sept. 1939. He continued his work at the Forschungsamt until Nov. 1942. At that time the Germans took into custody a man named Lemoine, a former German who had become a French citizen and worked with French intelligence. To save himself, he revealed Schmidt, among others.

The GESTAPO then arrested Schmidt, and he was executed in July 1943. (His brother, a highly successful general specializing in armored warfare, was relieved of his command and ousted from the Army.)

## ●● SCHULMEISTER, KARL

(b. 1770 d. 1853)

Spymaster for Napoleon Bonaparte, who called him "the emperor of spies." Born in Alsace, the son of a Lutheran clergyman, he spoke French, German, and Hungarian and had a talent for disguise.

Schulmeister was a SECRET AGENT in 1804. The following year he became a full-scale spy for Napoleon. France was at war with Austria, and Schulmeister was sent to VIENNA in disguise in 1805 to spy out enemy movements. In the guise of a Hungarian nobleman he became a member of the staff of Austrian Gen. Karl Mack and provided false information on the French Army. This information supposedly led to Mack's defeat by Napoleon at Ulm in Oct. 1805.

Schulmeister, however, is known to have received money from both France and Austria. Exposed and arrested, he was rescued when the French occupied Vienna. He became commissioner of police in Vienna.

He also sent spies for Napoleon against the Prussians and Russians, reportedly placing one of his AGENTS in the headquarters of Czar Alexander I. He continued to serve Napoleon until 1809, when Napoleon married the Austrian Archduchess Marie Louise. Austrian anger over Schulmeister's brutality in Austria forced Napoleon to retire him. Schulmeister expected a major decoration for his services, but Napoleon reputedly told him, "Gold is the only suitable reward for spies."

Schulmeister rejoined Napoleon after his escape from Elba.

When the Austrians invaded Alsace in 1814, they took care to destroy Schulmeister's estates there. Following the French defeat at Waterloo in 1815, Schulmeister was one of the first of Napoleon's supporters to be arrested. He saved himself by paying a huge ransom. He never regained his wealth, and lived out the rest of his life in Alsace.

## ●● SCHWARTZ, LT. COMDR. MICHAEL

U.S. Navy officer accused of providing secrets to the Saudi Arabian government.

Schwartz was investigated for illegally disclosing the classified information while he was assigned to the U.S. military training mission in Saudi Arabia between Nov. 1992 and Sept. 1994. He was specifically charged with mishandling classified documents, making a false statement, and espionage. After a date was set for a general court-martial, Schwartz requested a separation from the Navy in lieu of going to trial.

He was allowed to leave the Navy in Dec. 1995 with an "other than honorable" discharge.

**OO SCIENTIFIC LIAISON BUREAU**

see LAKAM

**OO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL (S&T) INTELLIGENCE**

Information or intelligence relating to foreign scientific or technical research and development. These include developments in basic and applied research, scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations related to foreign military systems, weapons, and other matériel as well as industrial and manufacturing aspects of weapons development.

**OO SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE**

The effort to obtain early warning of the adoption of new weapons and methods by potential or actual enemies. This is the definition used by British scientist R. V. Jones, who was involved in the anticipation of German technical developments during World War II.

In his superb book, *The Wizard War* (1978), Jones outlined how a fundamentally new weapon proceeds:

- (1) general scientific research of an academic or commercial nature
- (2) someone in close touch with a military service, and who is aware of service requirements, thinks of an application of the results of academic research
- (3) ad hoc research and small-scale trials are performed in a service laboratory
- (4) large-scale trials are undertaken
- (5) adoption by the service

Dr. Jones pointed out that the first stage is generally public, and common knowledge to all progressive countries. The later stages are more difficult to observe, and "the only method of dealing with [them] is by direct espionage, or the observations of indiscretions by research personnel. . . ."

He then observed that information leaks out in five ways:

- (1) accidental indiscretions, including deciphered message, of which there are always a large number, and if these are pieced together a valuable impression may be gained
- (2) indiscretions encouraged by alcohol and/or mistresses (i.e., sex)
- (3) information that cannot be kept secret and yet can give useful information to an enemy (e.g., HIGH-FREQUENCY DIRECTION FINDING of radio transmissions, loss of equipment in combat)
- (4) direct observation by AGENTS—"Such a method is difficult and hazardous, and comparatively little is obtained; its value is large."
- (5) information obtained from disaffected nationals (i.e., DEFECTORS)—"Frequently this is unreliable and must always be checked."

Jones was head of Scientific Intelligence on the British Air Staff and scientific adviser to the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) from 1939 to 1946.

**OO SCIF**

SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY

**OO SCRANAGE, SHARON**

A clerk for the U.S. CIA in Ghana from May 1983 to May 1984, charged in July 1985 with espionage and LEAKING secrets to the government of Ghana. After her return to the United States, Scranage admitted to the FBI that she had given her former Ghanaian lover, Michael Soussoudis, the names of CIA employees and informants in Ghana.

Soussoudis, a first cousin of the leader of Ghana, Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings, was arrested on July 10 during a visit to the United States. He was charged with espionage and sentenced to a 20-year prison term on Nov. 25. His sentence was suspended immediately on condition that he leave the country within 24 hours. In effect he was exchanged by American authorities for the release from jail in Ghana of eight men who allegedly worked for the CIA.

In Nov. 1985 Scranage was sentenced to five years in prison. This sentence was reduced to two years in April 1986, allowing her to be released after serving 18 months.

**OO SCYTALE**

Earliest known device for CRYPTOLOGY. Invented by the Spartans, it consisted of letters written on a strip of cloth or leather in an apparently random manner, with the coded message hidden by superfluous letters. It revealed a message when wrapped around a rod or staff of a specific size.

**OO SD**

Sicherheitsdienst (German security service), the intelligence collection and espionage section of the SS. As described by SS chief HEINRICH HIMMLER, the SD's task was to "discover the enemies of the National Socialist concept." Through a vast network of informers and AGENTS throughout Germany and conquered Europe, the SD worked closely with the GESTAPO to seek out and destroy Germany's political and ethnic enemies.

SD thugs also carried out the Nacht und Nebel Erlass (Night and Fog Decree), which Hitler issued in Dec. 1941 as a way of preventing the creation of martyrs by public execution. Under this operation, citizens of occupied countries were taken to Germany secretly to "vanish without leaving a trace." The decree stated "no information [could] be given as to their whereabouts or their fate." The Germans had a word for what happened to the tens of thousands of victims: They were *vernebelt*, "transformed into mist."

The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal that tried German war criminals after the war accused the SD, as well as the SS and GESTAPO organizations, of "the persecution and extermination of the Jews, brutalities and

killings in concentration camps, excesses in the administration of occupied countries, the administration of the slave labor program and the mistreatment and murder of prisoners-of-war."

Also see REINHARD HEYDRICH.

## ★ OO SDECE

Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contreespionnage (External Documentation and Counterespionage), the French intelligence agency that became a powerful, uninhibited organization both inside and outside France.

The SDECE was founded as a replacement for the DGEC, an intelligence service fostered by Gen. Charles de Gaulle. When he resigned as interim President of France in Jan. 1946, the SDECE emerged as the replacement for the DGEC. At the same time, Gaullist ANDRÉ DEWAVRIN was replaced by Henri Ribiére, a socialist and confidant of the Secretary of the Interior.

Officially, the DGEC was merely renamed. In reality, the change was drastic, for the DGEC had been an internal security agency, notorious for tapping phones and opening the mail of people under SURVEILLANCE by the government. The new charter for the SDECE forbade it to operate inside France, giving it only the mission to "seek, outside national boundaries, all information and documents which might inform the government." The SDECE was officially under the Ministry of Defense, but in reality it was controlled by the President through an adviser.

The SDECE was known as *la piscine*, "the swimming pool," because its Paris headquarters was near a public swimming pool. The SDECE had a COUNTERINTELLIGENCE section devoted to protecting itself and other French intelligence agencies from MOLES. The SDECE was strictly prohibited from launching counterintelligence operations in France, except for those it conducted toward foreign embassies. Any domestic security operations, said its charter, "will rest with a special division of the Department of the Interior." As was usual in France, the power of one intelligence agency was curbed by giving power to another agency.

In Indochina immediately after World War II, the SDECE tried to create a local resistance organization, modeled on the French Resistance of World War II. Working at first with Nationalist China's CENTRAL INVESTIGATIONS AND STATISTICS BUREAU, the SDECE ferreted out suspected communists and tried to organize a French-style underground in the jungles of Indochina. Later, when the communists took over China in 1949, Nationalist Chinese officers fled to Indochina and worked for the SDECE. The attempts at producing an anticommunist underground failed to keep the Vietminh from driving the French out of Indochina.

In Indochina, as in Algeria, the SDECE had an intelligence rival, the DEUXIÈME BUREAU, the French MILITARY INTELLIGENCE organization. In France, the SDECE frequently clashed with the SÛRETÉ GÉNÉRALE, the police criminal investigation organization that, unlike the SDECE, had the power to arrest.

In Sept. 1949 Sûreté investigators uncovered a complex plot involving the Army chief of staff and another general who, for political reasons, had given secret documents to an SDECE informer. He in turn had given them to the Vietminh. The story was quashed, but the Paris correspondent of *Time* magazine learned of it. French intelligence wiretappers intercepted the dispatch to *Time* in New York City and the French government asked the U.S. State Department to stop publication, creating a new crisis in U.S.-French relations only months after the founding of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO).

The "scandal of the generals" hurt the Army and the SDECE. But the SDECE's little-known CRYPTOGRAPHIC division maintained a high reputation for having broken several Soviet codes, providing the Counterintelligence Division with a steady stream of intelligence.

The SDECE Action Service trained Army volunteers as saboteurs to parachute into enemy territory in Indochina. By the 1950s the SDECE had its own airport at Persan-Baumont near Paris. From here a number of exiles from communist-controlled Eastern Europe were parachuted in to act as AGENTS for NATO intelligence services. But because of the penetration of the SDECE by Soviet-trained French communists, security forces in the drop zones were alerted, and none of the agents was ever heard from again.

An innocuously named Geographic Division collected political, military, and economic information on TARGETS selected on the basis of questionnaires the SDECE sent to government departments. The requests could range from a request to get information on U.S. aerospace companies to one asking for a plan to get rid of Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi.

The SDECE had a reputation for bizarre operations, such as removing fuel from Soviet aircraft that landed in France to analyze it for antifreeze ingredients. SDECE operatives were also implicated in anesthetizing Soviet COURIERS traveling on the Orient Express; the operatives then rifled through the documents the couriers were carrying. Through a liaison between the SDECE and the CIA, in 1952 France gave a posthumous Legion of Honor medal to Joseph Kennedy, Jr., to help then Sen. John F. Kennedy win French-American votes in Massachusetts. The little favor arranged by the SDECE would pay off when Kennedy became President.

As France became embroiled in wars against insurgents in Indochina and North Africa, the SDECE expanded its intelligence role to encompass BLACK BAG JOBS, kidnapping, and murder. The "era of political assassinations," as a French INTELLIGENCE OFFICER described it, began in 1958, during a profound crisis stemming from the war in Algeria between the French Army and Algerian insurgents. The parliament made de Gaulle Prime Minister and gave him the power to rule by decree for six months.

His new power extended to the SDECE, whose Action Service got its orders from the de Gaulle administration. Assassins hired and trained by the SDECE were supposedly members of a terrorist group called the Red

Hand. They assassinated an Algerian politician in a drive-by shooting and killed an arms dealer by blowing up his Mercedes. Both murders occurred in West Germany, and there was speculation that Gen. REINHARD GEHLEN, the head of BND, the West German intelligence agency, was allowing the SDECE to operate with immunity in his country.

"Dozens of assassinations were carried out," P. L. Thyaud de Vosjolo wrote in a 1970 autobiography, whose title, *LAMIA*, was his operational CODE NAME. "Besides the use of guns or knives, more sophisticated methods had been perfected. Carbon dioxide guns ejecting small syringes had been purchased in the United States—but the SDECE people substituted the tranquilizing drug with a lethal poison. The victim showed all the symptoms of having suffered from a heart attack." Victims included arms dealers, intellectuals, French supporters of Algerian nationalism, and leaders of liberation movements in French territories in Africa.

Between 1956 and 1961 hijackers recruited by the SDECE boarded six ships and seized their cargoes, allegedly bound for Algerian rebels. Another ship was blown up in Hamburg Harbor with a French naval mine. The Swiss attorney general committed suicide in March 1957 after word leaked that he had helped the SDECE by giving agents transcripts of telephone taps and other Swiss intelligence data. In Algeria, Deuxième Bureau officers with military units ordered the killing of suspected insurgents and the burning of villages deemed to house anti-French sympathizers.

The SDECE plotted to kill Ahmed Ben Bella, a veteran of the French Army in World War II who had become a leader of the Algerian insurgents. After failing to kill him, the intelligence agency tried another scheme to silence him. In Oct. 1956 an aircraft carrying Ben Bella to an Arab League meeting in Tunis was diverted to Algiers, where French soldiers boarded the aircraft and kidnapped Bella, keeping him in prison until the French-Algerian conflict ended.

Under a new constitution giving additional powers to the presidency, de Gaulle was elected President in 1959. The war dragged on, and SDECE assassinations continued. In 1961, when de Gaulle decided to end the Algerian civil war by granting Algeria independence, conspiratorial Army officers threatened to take over the French government.

Teams of assassins, including Vietnamese recruited by SDECE veterans of Indochina, were sent to Algeria to terrorize or kill opponents of Gaullist policy. To get rid of the assassins, called *les spéciaux*, Gaullist officials in Jan. 1961 ordered the blowing up of the headquarters of the assassins in Algeria. The incident, like many French intelligence operations, was leaked to the newspapers.

The SDECE's reputation for murderous "actions" reverberated throughout the French-Algerian conflict, which ended in 1962 after seven years of fighting, in which some 100,000 Algerians and 10,000 French soldiers were killed. With the end of the colonial wars, SDECE officers concentrated on counterintelligence in France. But the internal security of the SDECE came into

question in Dec. 1961 when a KGB defector claimed that the Soviets had deeply penetrated the agency. (See SAPPHIRE.)

The already blemished SDECE became enmeshed in another scandal in Oct. 1965, when Mehdi Ben Barka, a left-wing Moroccan political leader, disappeared from a Paris street. Two SDECE agents picked up Ben Barka and handed him over to the Moroccans for torture and questioning. Although Ben Barka's body was never found, he is assumed to have been killed and his body smuggled out of France.

In 1970, in an attempt to clean up the SDECE, de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, appointed Count ALEXANDRE DE MARENCHES head of the agency. When Marenches took over the SDECE, he said, "Some agents were running drugs and guns; others were engaged in kidnapping, murder, and the settling of the most bloody scores." With the end of de Gaulle's tenure, cooperation sharply increased between the SDECE and the CIA. In 1975, for example, the two services worked with Zaire officials to get arms to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

Linked to the SDECE since the 1950s had been the Service d'Action Civique (SAC), an organization of about 8,000 de Gaulle followers who broke up anti-de Gaulle meetings and in general acted as a "dirty tricks" arm for the SDECE. Marenches concentrated on cleaning out SAC connections in the agency. He got rid of about half of the SDECE's 1,000 employees and modernized its collection and analysis procedures.

When socialist François Mitterrand was elected President in 1981, he replaced Marenches with Pierre Marion, former head of Air France and an aerospace company. French newspapers reported that the hard-line right-wing leaders of the SDECE refused to hang up portraits of Mitterrand. With Marion's appointment came a change in name. The SDECE became the DGSE, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (General Directorate of External Security).

## ●● SEBOLD, WILLIAM G.

(b. 1902 d. ? )

German-American who became a DOUBLE AGENT for the United States.

German-born, Sebold served in the German Army during World War I and arrived in the United States in 1922 aboard a merchant ship. He jumped ship in Galveston, Tex., changed his name from Wilhelm G. Debowski to William G. Sebold, and eventually became a naturalized American citizen. He traveled to California and found work at the Consolidated Aircraft Corp. in San Diego. In 1939, when Sebold went to Germany to visit his family, he quit his job, but his place of employment was still on his passport, and it was spotted by German intelligence.

Maj. NIKOLAUS A. RITTER, the ABWEHR officer in charge of espionage against the United States and Britain, recruited Sebold as a spy, using as BIOGRAPHIC LEVERAGE his police record as a petty smuggler. If his criminal record and an illegal entry were exposed, he would certainly be deported from the United States. He was also



William G. Sebold (left) with one of his agents in his office, set up by the FBI specifically for photographic surveillance. The clock and the calendar help to document the meetings with Nazi spies. (FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)

well aware that if he refused, he would endanger his mother, brothers, and sister in Germany.

Sebold began his espionage career in a SPY SCHOOL in Hamburg. A boarding house where only English was spoken served as a "training barracks." He learned to operate a radio transmitter, received a new U.S. passport as "Harry Sawyer," and was given the names and addresses of four German AGENTS in New York. He was to radio their intelligence to Hamburg, using the CODE NAME Tramp, or arrange for it to be placed on MICRDOTS and mailed to ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES in Shanghai, Portugal, and Brazil. His contacts included Frederick Duquesne, the leader of a spy NETWORK, and HERMAN LANG, who worked for the Norden Co., which manufactured the TOP SECRET Norden bombsight.

Before leaving Germany, Sebold went to the U.S. Consulate in Cologne and reported what had happened. He agreed to become a double agent. The FBI paid him \$50 a week and had him set up an office. The walls were painted white for better photography by a hidden camera, and a wall clock and calendar were placed so as to be in scenes filmed by the camera.

Following German instructions, but secretly aided by the FBI, Sebold set up a shortwave radio on Long Island and, beginning in May 1940, transmitted to Germany almost every day. Then, in Jan. 1942, less than a month after the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK and America's entry into World War II, the FBI struck, rounding up 33 German spies. (See DUQUESNE SPY RING.)

## OO SECOND BUREAU

see DEUXIÈME BUREAU

## OO SECOND STORY

U.S. Air Force effort in 1958 to obtain CIA funding for the development of RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES. The CIA subsequently took over the project, which was given the name CORONA.

## OO SECRET

(S)

U.S. security CLASSIFICATION for national security information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be expected to result in *serious damage* to national security, such as a disruption of international relations, or the impairment of the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance. This is the second-highest U.S. security classification.

The other U.S. security classifications are CONFIDENTIAL and TOP SECRET.

## OO SECRET AGENT

Person acting clandestinely as a spy or saboteur; also called an undercover agent. *Secret Agent Man* was a popular British TELEVISION series of the 1960s. Patrick McGoohan played the secret agent with aplomb.

## OO SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS)

see MI6

## OO SECRET OFFICE

English government office from the late 1600s until 1847 for the interception of domestic and foreign mails. The formal establishment of the office was a result of the government's need for better intelligence, beginning with the Commonwealth period (i.e., rule of Oliver Cromwell, 1649–1658) onward.

The organization, attached to the Post Office, subsequently became known as the Secret Office and was headed by the Foreign Secretary. The mail intercept effort was given legal status under various acts of Parliament that enabled the secretaries of State to issue warrants to the Postmaster General to open and examine letters for communications that could do damage to the state.

The Secret Office was staffed for most of its life by the BODE FAMILY, which was brought to England from Hanover in 1732 to work in the office with the agreement that their children would enjoy the patronage of the government. The Bode family provided most of the Secret Office staff until its abolition. When the senior Bode retired in 1784, he was succeeded by Anthony Todd, who retained Bode's three sons in the office. When Todd retired in 1791 or 1792, he was succeeded by his nephew, Mr. Madison; his successor in 1799 was William Bode.

Periodically, government officials would direct the Secret Office to pay special attention to mails to or from certain individuals. The intelligence gleaned from the mails was, at times, brought directly to the attention of the throne. For example, a letter from the Earl of Holderness to Todd on June 18, 1757, stated: "I have laid before His Majesty your letter of last night, with its enclosure, and the King commended this fresh instance of your constant diligence and attention to His service."

In 1844 the office became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry after revelations of the interception of letters to and from Giuseppe Mazzini, an Italian nation-

alist living in England. It is believed that Mazzini placed small seeds in his letters and determined that his mail had been opened when they were missing upon arrival. He persuaded Thomas Duncombe, a radical member of Parliament, to call the matter to the attention of Parliament.

An inquiry and debate followed, with William Bode, head of the Secret Office, giving testimony to both houses of Parliament. The practice of intercepting mail by general warrant, as opposed to an express warrant, was condemned.

The office was abolished by Lord Palmerston, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on Jan. 1, 1847, and the staff was pensioned off. Numerous appeals against this injustice to the Bode and Todd Families followed. Subsequently, additional payments were made.

Also see JOHN WALLIS, JOHN WILKINS, and EDWARD WILLES.

## ●● SECRETS ACT

see OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

## ●● SECRET SERVICE

Generic term for a nation's intelligence service.

An English secret service dates back to 1573, when Sir FRANCIS WALSINGHAM established an intelligence organization for Queen Elizabeth I (see MI6).

In the United States the Secret Service is *not* an intelligence organization, the service having been established by Congress in 1865 as an agency of the Department of the Treasury to fight counterfeiting of U.S. currency. After the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, the Secret Service was given the additional duty of protecting the U.S. President and, subsequently, other U.S. government officials and former presidents. Those roles and other activities relating to the illegal use or handling of currency remain the mission of the Secret Service, which in 1994 had 4,500 employees.

There is a myth that there was a U.S. Secret Service with intelligence responsibilities, especially during the American Civil War. The fiction exists in part because detective ALLAN PINKERTON, in his memoir *Spy of the Rebellion* (1888), called himself the chief of the United States Secret Service; LAFAYETTE C. BAKER did the same, calling his memoir *The History of the United States Secret Service* (1867).

## ●● SECRET SERVICE BUREAU

The British Secret Service Bureau was established in 1909 under the War Office. This was the first modern British intelligence organization. In 1910 the bureau's Foreign Section was placed under the aegis of the Admiralty, while the Home Section remained under the War Office. The first head of the Secret Service Bureau was Navy Capt. Sir MANSFIELD CUMMING.

By the end of World War I the Foreign Section had been moved to the Foreign Office and was known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with the designation of MI6, (i.e., MILITARY INTELLIGENCE department No. 6).

(Cumming served as head of MI6 from 1910 until his death in 1923.)

The Home Section of the Secret Service Bureau evolved into the Security Service, with the designation MI5.

## ●● SECRET WORLD

Term for the espionage or spy "business." Bruce Page and his colleagues wrote in *The Philby Conspiracy* (1969):

The trouble is that a man can hold almost any theory he cares to about the secret world, and defend it against large quantities of hostile evidence by the simple expedient of retreating behind further and further screens of postulated inward mystery. Secret services have in common with freemasons and *mafiosi* that they inhabit an intellectual twilight—a kind of ambiguous gloom in which it is hard to distinguish with certainty between the menacing and the merely ludicrous. In such circumstances the human affinity for myth and legend easily gets out of control.

## ●● SECRET WRITING

A spy's classic method of communication. Secret writing is probably as old as writing itself. Although now overshadowed by radio and other modern communication techniques, secret writing endures.

The CIA once gave recruited AGENTS or a WALK-IN a "secret writing carbon," apparently ordinary writing paper, impregnated with a chemical. A secret writer put the CIA paper on top of another piece of paper and, using a pen, pencil, or typewriter, wrote on the CIA paper. The writing was invisibly transferred to the second piece of paper. CIA INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS handling agents or walk-ins were instructed:

(a) have him print his address in his homeland where he can receive mail, and then have him address an envelope to *himself*;

(b) establish an SW [secret writing] indicator (name or phrase);

(c) issue and explain carefully scorch or water-developed SW system and explain that a letter with further instructions in SW will be mailed to him from inside his country. . . .

The instructions, compromised in the 1970s and presumably changed since, said the walk-in would be sent "secret messages" on the back of innocent-looking letters mailed by the CIA. The messages could be developed by soaking the letter in water or over heat. "If a gas stove is to be used," the instructions said, "it is suggested that a clean frying pan be placed over the open flame. . . ."

The simplest secret writing uses organic inks: milk, vinegar, lemon juice, even urine. These inks dry invisibly and can be developed by applying heat. Espionage agencies have produced many inks made of chemicals that could be developed only by a specific chemical.

During World War II the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), under the COVER of the BRITISH SECURITY

CO-ORDINATION had established a highly secret mail-interception operation in Bermuda—opening, checking, sometimes tampering with the letter inside, and then resealing the envelope. There, at other censorship stations, letters were checked for several kinds of invisible ink. A multibrush device was run down the suspected page, each brush dipped in different chemical-detection fluid. For a time Germans thwarted such detection by splitting a sheet of paper, writing the secret message in invisible ink on the inside of one of the split sides, and then restoring the paper. Thus, no chemicals appeared on the outside of the paper. For reading, the paper is split again; it is easier the second time.

As DAVID KAHN pointed out in *The Codebreakers* (1967), “The chief difficulty with secret inks was their inability to handle the great volume of information that spies had to transmit in a modern war.” This problem led to increasing use of MICRODOTS.

## OO SÉCURITÉ MILITAIRE

see DST

## OO SECURITY CHECK

Term for BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION, the process that determines whether a person or firm should have access to classified information (i.e., SECURITY CLEARANCE).

## OO SECURITY CLEARANCE

Access given to military personnel, government employees, and contractor personnel to work with classified information in the performance of their assignments.

In the United States the Department of Defense has three levels of clearance: From least to most access, they are CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The clearance RESTRICTED DATA is given by the Department of Energy (formerly Atomic Energy Commission). The classification FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY is *not* a security classification, although many in the U.S. government do not realize this.

At the start of 1985—during the DECADE OF THE SPY—there were 2.8 million U.S. government employees who had security clearances; in addition, millions of U.S. military personnel and contractor personnel had clearances.

## OO SECURITY RISK

Person considered by authorities as likely to undertake actions that could threaten the security of a country. The term became popular in the United States during the 1950s because of the anticommunist antics of Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

On Feb. 9, 1950, McCarthy told a West Virginia audience, “I have here in my hand a list of 205 . . . a list of names [the number later changed to 57] that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.”

McCarthy’s accusation rocked the government, ushering in the era of “McCarthyism”—government and congressional investigations of persons presumed to be communists or subversives. When his hunt reached the U.S. Army, his credibility evaporated. The Senate passed a resolution of censure against him in Dec. 1954 for conduct “contrary to Senate traditions.” The censure effectively ended his political career. Not one communist in government was identified through the extensive McCarthy-dominated investigations.

But throughout the United States, people who had been heard criticizing the government, or had been found reading a book or magazine article about the Soviet Union, or had refused to sign loyalty pledges were called “security risks.”

## OO SECURITY SERVICE

see MI5

## OO SELECT COMMITTEE

see UNITED STATES

## OO SEMICHASTNY, VLADIMIR YEFIMOVICH

(b. 1924)

Head of the KGB from Nov. 1961 to April 1967. Semichastny, like his mentor and predecessor, ALEXANDR SHELEPIN, was involved in a number of embarrassing incidents involving the KGB. For example, he sanctioned the arrest of Professor Frederick Barghoorn of Yale University when he was visiting Moscow in Oct. 1963. Semichastny hoped that by charging Barghoorn as a spy he could induce the United States to release IGOR IVANOV, arrested that month by the FBI for espionage.

Barghoorn was a personal friend of President Kennedy and was not involved in any illegal activities—as was forcefully stated by Kennedy at a press conference. The Soviets were humiliated and quickly released Barghoorn. (Ivanov was allowed to leave the United States in 1971.)

Subsequently, Semichastny participated in the ouster of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Oct. 1964, an act that undoubtedly led to his being retained by the new Soviet leadership. There are some indications that Leonid Brezhnev, who led the coup against Khrushchev, wanted to assassinate him, but Semichastny refused to allow KGB participation.

During his tenure Semichastny attempted to create a new public image of the KGB, permitting an article to appear in the newspaper *Izvestia* that included an interview with “a senior KGB officer” (himself); in the article he stated “. . . many young Party and Komsomol [youth League] workers have joined the KGB and none of the people who, during the time of the personality cult [of Josef Stalin], took part in the repressions against innocent Soviet people is now in the Service.” More articles and books on the security ORGANS appeared, and Soviet spies became heroes in print—RUDOLF ABEL, GOR-

DON LONSDALE, HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, and RICHARD SORGE.

Brezhnev finally replaced Semichastry on May 18, 1967, as part of a Kremlin power shuffle. YURI ANDROPOV, the new chief of the KGB, had the task of rebuilding the image and effectiveness of the service.

### OO SENIOR

U.S. Air Force CODE NAME prefix for classified electronic projects; also used for some other classified programs (such as SENIOR BOWL).

Recent Senior projects include Senior Spear, a COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) system for U-2R aircraft; Senior Stretch, a COMINT system for the U-2R; Senior scout, a SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) system for the C-130H Hercules aircraft; Senior Hunter, a system for supporting EC-130E aircraft fitted for psychological warfare broadcasts; and Senior Warrior, a U.S. Marine Corps version of the Senior Scout SIGINT system.

### OO SENIOR BOWL

CODE NAME for the mating of modified B-52 strategic bombers with the D-21 unmanned RECONNAISSANCE aircraft. The two aircraft were mated for four spy missions over China, none of which was successful.

### OO SENSITIVE

Information or material that requires a high degree of security protection.

### OO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

(SCI)

Intelligence that requires special controls for restricted handling within COMPARTMENTED channels. This intelligence is available only to persons with a NEED TO KNOW regardless of the level of SECURITY CLEARANCE that they hold. This material also requires special storage facilities. Early SCI intelligence was related to COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

SCI is sometimes mistakenly used as representing Special Compartmented Intelligence.

### OO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY

(SCIF)

U.S. term for a facility—a room or larger working space—that is especially constructed for handling TOP SECRET and SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION. The room's walls, floor, and ceiling have special materials to prevent BUGS from being placed on adjacent structures to monitor conversations or equipment in the room. Special telephone and power lines defeat wiretaps. A SCIF has no windows and is equipped with other special security features.

### OO SENTRY

see SAMOS

### OO SERAPH

British SUBMARINE that carried out a number of intelligence and special operations during World War II, one under the nominal command of an American officer. The *Seraph*, completed in June 1942, went on her first operation in support of the planned North African invasion when, during the last two weeks of Sept. 1942, the submarine carried out a periscope RECONNAISSANCE of the Algerian coast. This was the *Seraph*'s first combat mission, under the command of Lt. N. L. A. (Bill) Jewell.

After this mission the *Seraph* returned to Gibraltar where, instead of being given orders to operate against the German and Italian forces in the Mediterranean, the submarine was assigned to Operation Flagpole: carrying Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's deputy, Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, to North Africa for secret negotiations with Vichy French officers. Loaded with folding canoes, submachine guns, walkie-talkie radios, and other supplies, the submarine embarked Clark, two other Army generals, U.S. Navy Capt. Jerauld Wright, several other officers, and three British commandos. (Wright subsequently reached the rank of full admiral.)

With this party on board, the *Seraph* sailed to the Algerian coast. There the collapsible canoes were launched to carry Clark and his party ashore on the night of Oct. 20. His meeting helped to reduce French opposition to the landings (although the French were not told that troop ships were already at sea and that the landings would commence within a few days).

After some problems and delays, the *Seraph* finally came to within 300 yards of the beach on the morning of Oct. 23 to embark her passengers. Because of the importance of returning them to Eisenhower's headquarters at Gibraltar as soon as possible, the Americans were transferred at sea to a PBY Catalina flying boat.

A few days later Lt. Jewell received orders to sail to the coast of southern France to secretly take aboard Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud. The general was to be asked to follow the Anglo-American troops into North Africa to gain support for the Allies from the French colonies. But Giraud would not travel in a British submarine, so strong were the anti-British feelings among Frenchmen at the time. Capt. Wright embarked in the *Seraph* as nominal commanding officer of the submarine, which was temporarily transferred to the U.S. Navy. Lt. Jewell remained on board to actually direct operations (Wright not being a submariner).

The Giraud party was picked up from the town of Le Lavendou by the *Seraph* on the night of Nov. 5–6 and transferred at sea to a PBY for the flight to Gibraltar.

The *Seraph* finally sailed on her first war patrol in the Mediterranean on Nov. 24, 1942. She was soon called upon to join other submarines in carrying U.S. and British commandos for reconnaissance operations in the Mediterranean. In Dec. 1942 the *Seraph* torpedoed and damaged an Italian merchant ship, which was sunk later