

At Fort Meade NSA operates a huge printing plant and a state-of-the-art factory to produce computer chips for its massive array of computers. The agency also runs the National Cryptologic School and procures all U.S. government secure communications devices. In 1993 NSA contracts in Maryland alone totaled more than \$700 million. The agency's annual budget is highly classified, but estimates hover around \$3.5 billion, not including the intercept satellites paid for and operated by the NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

NSA codebreaking is concentrated at Fort Meade; the heart of the effort is a supercomputing facility staffed by one of the largest concentrations of mathematicians in the world. NSA employs some 20,000 people in Fort Meade and elsewhere in Maryland, making it the state's largest employer. Perhaps as many as 100,000 others—mostly military personnel—work for the agency around the world. Civilians who work for NSA live restricted lives. Lest they give secrets while under anesthesia, they must go to dentists cleared by NSA's Security Office. Overseas visits are limited. Notification must be given if an employee or a relative marries a foreigner.

Although a Department of Defense agency, NSA's tasks are assigned by the DCI, operating under instructions from the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and advice from the NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD. The director of NSA—always a three-star admiral or general with an intelligence background—can offer services from a large menu.

In response to a request for a "watch" on a certain country, NSA can intercept local and long-distance telephone conversations, including those made from automobiles; messages to and from a country's capital to its embassies; messages from other countries referring to the targeted country; radio communications of the country's armed forces; specific or indirect references to words and phrases (such as "nuclear" or "explosives") in various languages; background reports on what has been intercepted in previous weeks, months, or years; profiles of the country's leaders, based on what they have been saying on the telephone.

An actual account of how NSA responds unfolded during investigations into the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the mastermind of the project, said that NSA arranged "some very specific, targeted intelligence collection that would give us, almost instantly, exactly what was happening very, very accurately." This included "detailed information on what these people [fellow conspirators in the selling of arms to Iran] were saying to each other, and the plans they were making."

While the agency is secretive about its accomplishments, over the years some have been revealed: conversations between Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and high-ranking officials, picked up from his limousine radio-telephones; Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega talking to his mistress; information leading to the identity of Libyans involved in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988; telephone taps that pinpointed the location of Colombian drug lord Pablo Es-

cobar, killed by Colombian security forces in Dec. 1993.

NSA AND THE LAW

The FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT and other laws pertaining to NSA restrict its eavesdropping to foreign communication. The legislation has been interpreted to mean that one end of the communication can be in the United States—as long as the other end is in another country. The targeting of Americans is prohibited and, if any Americans' names are picked up in intercepts, the names must be deleted from transcripts and cannot be passed on to the CIA, FBI, or other government agencies. In such transcripts, a name is replaced with "U.S. person."

NSA regulations on carrying out the law are TOP SECRET. But this much is publicly known: If NSA or the FBI believes that a domestic intercept is vital to national security, the agency must obtain a warrant from the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (FISC). The court has never refused a request. By law, the court must annually tell Congress how many warrants are requested and approved, but details about the warrants remain secret. In 1994, for example, NSA and the FBI went to the court for warrants 576 times and received 576 warrants.

NSA does not need a warrant for monitoring foreign targets in the United States, such as the overseas communications of embassies. But it must get a warrant for a foreign target outside an embassy. When Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide lived in Washington after being driven into exile in 1991, for example, the law would have required an FISC warrant to tap his phone and BUG his apartment because he was in contact with Americans.

An example of what happens when an American is on the line came when Congressman Michael D. Barnes's calls to Nicaraguan officials were intercepted by NSA during the Reagan administration's efforts to topple the Nicaraguan government. "Reporters told me right-wingers were circulating excerpts from phone conversations I'd had," Barnes told *The Baltimore Sun* for that newspaper's special report on NSA. Barnes said that WILLIAM J. CASEY, then DCI, showed him an NSA-intercepted cable from the Nicaraguan Embassy. The cable reported a meeting between embassy officials and a Barnes aide. Casey told Barnes he should fire the aide. Barnes said he did not object to being recorded. But he told the *Sun* that such incidents were a reminder of the potential for the abuse of NSA's eavesdropping capability.

The laws aimed at controlling NSA eavesdropping stemmed from 1975 congressional investigations of NSA DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE operations (see SHAMROCK). For 30 years, under secret agreements with telegraph companies, U.S. eavesdropping agencies got copies of international telegrams. An offshoot of the Shamrock operation, MINARET, put about 1,600 Americans on a "watch list," automatically intercepting their international telephone calls or cables. Among those on the watch list were the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., actress Jane Fonda, folk singer Joan Baez, and pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock.

During the Shamrock operation NSA produced files on 75,000 Americans.

Since the end of the Cold War, NSA, like other intelligence agencies, has sought a new mission by providing ELINT about terrorists and drug traffickers. The agency also wants to make sure that it can keep on intercepting. Beginning with a campaign during the Bush administration, both NSA and the FBI have been urging the installation of a "clipper chip" in telephones and computers to make it easier for the government to eavesdrop on encrypted communications. Computer and telecommunications firms oppose the idea, as do privacy advocates. But Microsoft Corp., reportedly at NSA's behest, designed its Windows programs so that encryption would be difficult.

NSA DIRECTORS

The two directors of the AFSA are usually included among NSA directors because they were involved in the transition of the interception-codebreaking agency from an armed forces entity to a national one partly outside the military chain of command. They are Rear Adm. Earl E. Stone, July 1949–July 1951, and Maj. Gen. Ralph J. Canine, July 1951–Nov. 1952, when NSA was founded.

The subsequent directors were:

Nov. 1952–Nov. 1956	Lt. Gen. Ralph J. Canine, USA
Nov. 1956–Nov. 1960	Lt. Gen. John A. Samford, USAF
Nov. 1960–June 1962	Vice Adm. Laurence H. Frost, USN
July 1962–May 1965	Lt. Gen. Gordon A. Blake, USAF
June 1965–July 1969	Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, USA
Aug. 1969–July 1972	Vice Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler, USN
Aug. 1972–Aug. 1973	Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, USAF
Aug. 1973–July 1977	Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., USAF
July 1977–March 1981	Vice Adm. BOBBY RAY INMAN, USN
April 1981–April 1985	Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
May 1985–July 1988	Lt. Gen. WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA

Aug. 1988–April 1992

Vice Adm. WILLIAM O.

STUDEMAN, USN

Vice Adm. John M.

McConnell, USN

Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. Minihan,
USAF

May 1992–

Feb. 1996–

●● NSC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

●● NSG

NAVAL SECURITY GROUP

●● NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE

(NUCINT)

Intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources. These sources include nuclear and thermonuclear detonations, as well as beta emissions from nuclear weapons.


The first major NUCINT operation occurred on Sept. 3, 1949, when a U.S. Air Force B-29 SUPER FORTRESS RECONNAISSANCE aircraft flying from Japan to Alaska detected the first signs of a Soviet nuclear test. The Air Force had been directed on Sept. 16, 1947, to establish and operate a reconnaissance system to determine the time and place of all large explosions that might occur anywhere in the world, and to do so in a manner that would absolutely determine whether they were of nuclear origin.

●● NUGGET

British term for the "bait" to be offered to a potential foreign DEFECTOR—money, political asylum, sex, or a career opportunity in the West.

●● NURSEMAID

Russian term for the security service (previously KGB) officer who accompanies delegations on trips to the West to prevent anyone from becoming a DEFECTOR. Such nursemaids (*nyanki* in Russian) are especially vigilant because if a member of the delegation defects, the security officer is vulnerable to imprisonment or, in extreme cases, execution for his failure.



OO OB

ORDER OF BATTLE

OO OB'EDINYONNOYE GOSUDARSTVENNOYE POLITICHESKOYE UPRAVLENIYE

OGPU; see CHEKA

OO ODESSA

Secret organization of former German SS officers founded after World War II that became a major target of Western intelligence agencies. Odessa's main function was the arranging of escapes of SS officers wanted for war crimes. The name Odessa is a German acronym from Organization der Entlassene SS Angehörige (Organization for the Release of Former SS Members). The Odessa had agents throughout Germany who, through an underground known as Die Spinne (the spider) arranged for ex-SS officers to escape or elude Allied hunters.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials believe that Odessa engineered the escape to South America of Adolf Eichmann, the SS "expert" on Jews; Josef Mengele, the SS physician who performed heinous experiments on inmates of Auschwitz; and other, lesser-known SS officers. Existence of the organization became known to Allied occupation officers immediately after the war. One of the founders was believed to be OTTO SKORZENY, the daring German special operations commander.

SS officers reportedly smuggled huge sums out of Germany to finance the escapes. Fleeing SS men were

provided with false identities and passage out of Germany at the end of the war. One major terminal of the Odessa escape route, according to Israeli intelligence, was Buenos Aires, Argentina.

The organization gained popular notoriety after publication of Frederick Forsyth's suspense novel *The Odessa File* (1972), subsequently made into a 1974 movie starring Jon Voight, Maria Schell, and Maximilian Schell.

OO ODOM, LT. GEN. WILLIAM E.

(b. 1932)

Outspoken director of the NSA from May 1985 to July 1988, known as a hard-liner with the nickname "Zbig's superhawk" when he was military assistant to President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

A 1950 graduate of the Military Academy, Odom later earned a master's degree (1962) and doctorate (1970) in political science from Columbia University. He also specialized in the Russian language in Army schools, took parachute and ranger training, and attended the Army Command and General Staff College.

His assignments included the U.S. military liaison mission to Soviet forces in Germany in 1964-1966 and a spell as assistant Army ATTACHE in Moscow in 1972-1974. In Vietnam he worked in pacification planning programs in 1970-1971. He also held several teaching assignments at the Military Academy, in West Point, N.Y.

When Brzezinski became President Carter's national security adviser in Jan. 1977, he named Odom as his military assistant; the two had met at Columbia University.

In that role Odom was involved in planning responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the capture of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and the holding of Americans as hostages.

Early in 1981 he left the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and in Nov. 1981 became the Army's ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE). While in that position he was promoted to major general in 1982 and to lieutenant general in 1984.

Odom became head of NSA in May 1985. A year later, concerned about the attention that would attend the planned trial of Soviet spy RONALD PELTON, a former communications specialist at NSA, Odom called for press censorship. He feared that intelligence collection methods would be revealed and proposed a public warning to the news media to restrict their reporting of the case. He also wanted the warning to include a threat of prosecution for reporters who ignored the advice. (Of course, the Soviets already knew any secrets that Pelton could reveal in an open trial.) The warning was issued, but without any threat of prosecution.

Odom also criticized officials of the Reagan administration for leaking sensitive information to the news media, saying that the administration was responsible for far more leaks to the press than Congress: "There's leaking from Congress . . . there's more leaking in the administration because it's bigger. I'm stuck with the consequences of it."

He continued, in a meeting with military reporters on Sept. 2, 1987, "Leaks have damaged the [communications intelligence] system more in the past three to four years than in a long, long time." His bottom line: "Just deadly losses."

Odom left NSA and retired from the Army on Aug. 1, 1988.

OO OFEK

The first Israeli SATELLITE. The Ofek (Hebrew for "horizon") was developed to provide SURVEILLANCE of Arab missile and other weapon developments and deployments. The satellite effort—given the CODE NAME Precious Stone—was an outgrowth of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Israel suffered a major surprise attack when the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal. Subsequently, Egyptian tactics in the Sinai battles were very costly to the Israelis (see ISRAEL, AGRANAT COMMISSION).

Maj. Gen. MEIR AMIT, a former head of AMAN, Israeli MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, and the MOSSAD, and subsequently head of the General Satellite Corp., explained the need for Israel to have a spy satellite: "If you are fed from the crumbs of others according to their whims, this is very inconvenient and very difficult. If you have your own, independent capability, you climb one level higher."

The first Ofek satellite was launched from the Negev Desert on Sept. 1988. Carried aloft by a three-stage, Israeli-produced Shavit ("comet") rocket, the satellite weighed 155 pounds. An experimental vehicle, the *Ofek-1* entered an orbit 250 to 1,150 miles above the earth.

The *Ofek-2* satellite was lifted into orbit on April 3, 1990. With a similar orbit, this 160-pound vehicle has been described as the progenitor of a camera-carrying satellite. Both the *Ofek-1* and *Ofek-2* decayed out of orbit after about four months. Additional Ofek satellites have been launched.

Israel is also working on a civilian communications satellite, called Amos.

OO OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

(ONE)

CIA unit that produced NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIEs), seen by their creators as the ultimate intelligence PRODUCT.

The guiding genius of the ONE was Sherman Kent, whose career traces the modern evolution of U.S. intelligence. Before the U.S. entry into World War II, Kent joined the research and analysis branch of the COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION, the precursor of the wartime OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS). In Jan. 1943 he became the chief of OSS research and analysis for Europe and Africa. After the war and the abolition of the OSS, Kent worked briefly in the State Department's BUREAU OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE. In 1950 he joined the CIA, becoming deputy to William L. Langer, a peacetime diplomatic historian and Kent's wartime boss. Langer was the first chief of the newly created ONE.

The ONE replaced the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which had been a focal point of criticism since the founding of the CIA in 1947. (Originally called the Office of Research and Evaluation, the ORE changed its name, but not its initials, after the State Department complained that it had the mission of research and evaluation.) In 1949 the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ordered a reorganization of the CIA. Rear Adm. ROSCOE HILLENKOETTER, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) at first resisted, but he was forced to comply in 1950 after the CIA—specifically, its analytical arm, the ORE—failed to foresee North Korea's invasion of South Korea.

Hillenkoetter's successor as DCI, Army Lt. Gen. WALTER BEDELL SMITH, abolished the ORE and created the ONE and the BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES (BNE), which was to provide independent intelligence analysis. Smith remembered Langer and Kent from World War II and brought them in to redesign the CIA's analysis system around the ONE. Smith wanted the ONE to become "the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery."

Langer went back to Harvard in Jan. 1952 and Kent, a Yale man, took over the ONE. He was head of the ONE and chairman of the BNE from 1952 to his retirement in 1967. Kent "is a larger than life figure," wrote J. Kenneth McDonald, chief of the CIA history staff, in 1994. His tenure "was a major formative influence on the way that the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community prepare and present National Intelligence Estimates."

Kent often sounded like a haughty academician lecturing to undergraduates. "Let things be such that if our

policy-making master is to disregard our knowledge and wisdom, he will never do so because our work was inaccurate, incomplete, or patently biased. Let him disregard us only when he must pay greater heed to someone else. And let him be uncomfortable—thoroughly uncomfortable—about his decision to heed this other,” Kent wrote in a classified retrospect essay in 1968. He and his ONE had an “aura of Olympian detachment,” CIA historian Donald P. Steury wrote in 1994 in an introduction to a collection of declassified Kent essays on NIEs. At some point, Steury added, the ONE “crossed the line between scholarly objectivity and intellectual arrogance.”

In 1962, when the Soviet Union decided to put nuclear missiles into Cuba, Kent’s vaunted NIEs concluded that it would not happen. A special NIE issued in Sept. 1962 said that the placing of missiles in Cuba “would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.” DCI JOHN A. MCCONE, relying on instinct, nevertheless ordered U-2 spyplane flights over Cuba and got evidence showing the Soviets were doing just what the NIE had said they would not do.

The ONE was on the path to oblivion when Kent retired in 1967. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s national security adviser, did not like the product. The board was abolished in 1973 with the appointment of 12 National Intelligence Officers within the CIA who would provide specialized areas of expertise. The UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD largely continues the functions of the Board of National Estimates.

OO OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

(ONI)

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence was the first agency in American history established to collect information on the military affairs of foreign governments. It was founded on March 23, 1882, “to collect and record such naval information as may be useful to the [Navy] Department in wartime as well as in peace.” The first Chief Intelligence Officer, Lt. THEODORUS B. M. MASON, held the post from June 1882 to April 1885. (The position was changed to DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE in 1911.)

By the time the United States entered World War I in April 1917, ONI had become responsible for the protection of naval ships and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Until the 1920s the ONI was also responsible for Navy information and historical activities. The two latter functions subsequently became independent Navy offices.

Late in World War II ONI also became responsible for OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, a function previously assigned to the operating fleets.

Naval intelligence was considered a staff function within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations until late 1992. It originally had the organization code OP-16 (OP for Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 16 indicating naval intelligence); this was later changed to OP-92. In the major Navy headquarters reorganization of 1992, ONI became N-2, a major staff office, bringing it more closely into alignment with the position of the in-

telligence organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commands, and the other military services.

See NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S.

OO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

(OSS)

U.S. World War II intelligence and sabotage agency. President Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services on June 13, 1942. Placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the OSS replaced the Office of COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION, a quasi-intelligence organization. Roosevelt named WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, who had been coordinator of information, director of the new intelligence agency.

Donovan, who had recently visited London and been extensively briefed by the British intelligence services, roughly modeled the OSS on the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The SOE operated raiding groups and supported resistance and guerrilla activities in German-occupied countries.

The OSS was manned by both military personnel—assigned from the services—and civilians. Donovan recruited a great variety of Americans: university professors such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; lawyers, including future Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg; and advertising men, journalists, and writers (including Gene Fodor, originator of the Fodor Guides); film makers (John Ford); and economists (for such matters as analysis of German war production in terms of good air-raid targets). David K. E. Bruce, director of OSS European operations, went on to become U.S. ambassador to France (1949–1952), West Germany (1957–1958), and the United Kingdom (1961–1969)—the only person to hold three major U.S. ambassadorships.

Cookbook author Julia Child served in the OSS in Washington, D.C., and later in China. Child recalls that the outfit was called “Oh! So Secret!” Others, because of the notables in the OSS ranks, said it meant “Oh, So Social.” Both labels were appropriate; Donovan was a graduate of Columbia University and its law school (Franklin D. Roosevelt was a classmate), and his agency was both secret and filled with men and women listed in the social registers.

The first overseas operations of the OSS were in Europe and North Africa. His “theater headquarters” in London were established at 72 Grosvenor Street, near the American Embassy. Under a formal agreement with British intelligence officials, the OSS did not launch independent missions from Britain. In the beginning, OSS strength lay in North Africa, where it had gathered intelligence in advance of the American-British landings in Nov. 1942. The first of many OSS forays into Europe originated from North Africa, where OSS officials had recruited two AGENTS who set up an intelligence NETWORK in German-occupied southern France. When U.S. and British forces invaded southern Italy in 1943, OSS agents preceded them.

Later, the OSS generated joint missions with the British. To aid French Resistance units, JEDBURGH teams

of three persons—an American, a Briton, and a Free French soldier—were dropped into France. The Jedburghs were dropped after the Normandy invasion, as were OSS Operational Groups, known as Donovan's "private army." These units of four officers and about 30 men, all of whom spoke at least passable French, worked behind the lines and often engaged in fire fights with German troops.

As the Allied armies advanced across Europe, OSS agents were parachuted into Germany, equipped with small transmitter-receiver radios (see JOAN ELEANOR). By the end of the war the OSS had placed nearly 200 agents in Germany; many were German prisoners of war who were given fake identification papers and specific assignments, for example, to locate V-1 "buzz" bomb sites and find out the effects of air raids on BERLIN.

Learning the scope of SOE operations in landing agents from small naval craft, Donovan sought his own navy, which he established on Dec. 3, 1943. He acquired several submarine chasers and motor torpedo boats, which he employed to ferry and supply agents, and to pick up captured material. Movie star Sterling Hayden, a captain in the Marine Corps, commanded an OSS flotilla of 14 sailing craft that ran supplies through the German blockade to Yugoslav partisans. (Hayden later served with the OSS in Germany, winning the Silver Star.)

Donovan himself went ashore on the Normandy beaches on June 7, 1944, the day after the D-DAY landings. He looked around, and departed. Donovan also flew into an advanced base in Burma, 150 miles behind Japanese lines—the only time he was behind enemy lines.

The OSS developed independent operations in neutral countries, with operatives in Lisbon, Stockholm, Madrid, Istanbul, and Bern. ALLEN W. DULLES, head of OSS operations in Switzerland, established contacts with anti-Hitler Germans and worked on surrender overtures.

The OSS was organized into five divisions:

SI: Secret Intelligence—intelligence collection and espionage. (Originally referred to as SI/B after the initial of its division chief, David K. E. Bruce.)

SO: Secret Operations—sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activities. (Originally referred to as SO/G after the initial of its division chief, M. Preston Goodfellow.)

R&A: Research and Analysis (known as the "Chairborne Division")—analyses of various conventional and secret operations, such as determining the effect of Allied bombing on German-occupied Europe.

MO: Morale Operations—BLACK PROPAGANDA efforts, such as operating fake German radio stations from Britain, ostensibly manned by (nonexistent) anti-Nazi groups.

X-2: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE—for protecting U.S. intelligence activities.

X-2 was intended to neutralize the German "stay-behind" networks working behind advancing Allied lines in Italy and France. It was set up by James R. Murphy, a lawyer who had worked with Donovan in the Department of Justice, and George K. Bowden, a tax law specialist. Also in X-2 was JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, destined to become one of the nation's premier spy hunters.

Of the other war theaters, OSS agents operated in the China-Burma-India area, often in collaboration with British forces. In China the OSS Detachment 202 developed plans for entering Japanese-controlled Indochina to garner intelligence. The proposal was approved—as was the suggestion to provide assistance to groups opposing the Japanese.

The last French troops under arms had evacuated Indochina in the spring of 1945, seeking refuge in China. In early June 1945, 25 French officers and about 100 Vietnamese colonial troops were assigned to the OSS. They were to be provided with U.S. arms and equipment and infiltrated back into Indochina. Most of their operations were unsuccessful because the Vietnamese refused to help the French. Indeed, at least one French-U.S. patrol was led into an ambush by the local communist forces, the Viet Minh.

At least one U.S. officer met with Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh leader, to discuss operations against the Japanese. Ho made it clear that the French would not be welcomed back. But the American was, and for two months he trained Viet Minh for attacks against Japanese lines of communications.

(Some American arms were provided to the Viet Minh; they would be a small fraction of those used in their war with the French that began in 1946.)

The major result of the OSS-Viet Minh cooperation was the rescue of several U.S. Army Air Forces and Navy fliers shot down over the area. The prestige of the Viet Minh therefore increased, but the French began to distrust the Americans. In Aug. 1945 a small OSS force entered southern Indochina, but the war ended before any operations were initiated.

THE OPPOSITION

The OSS did not operate in either the Pacific Ocean Area, which was under Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, or the Southwest Pacific Area, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Nimitz's theater initially consisted of jungle islands and barren coal atolls, where OSS operatives would have been useless. The Australian-New Zealand COAST-WATCHERS operated on many jungle islands in both Pacific theaters, performing OSS-type RECONNAISSANCE.

In MacArthur's theater the OSS was not welcome. MacArthur felt that his own ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU provided the best capability for gathering intelligence, supporting Philippine resistance, and carrying out other activities in his theater. Further, the OSS came too late and offered him too little—and it was run by Donovan, someone outside of MacArthur's control.

Many senior Army and Navy INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS also opposed the OSS, which they felt was invading their areas of responsibility and at times taking their best people. For example, although the Army and Navy had large networks of listening stations to intercept enemy communications, the OSS began establishing its own listening posts (see FBQ CORPORATION); two were set up in 1942, but the Joint Chiefs shifted them to the Army SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

Another enemy of Donovan was J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI. He, too, had plans for expanding his COUNTERESPIONAGE activities overseas and saw the OSS as a rival. While unable to stop Donovan, he was able to convince President Roosevelt that his agents should represent U.S. intelligence interests in South America during the war.

Donovan also sought to establish ties, and possibly exchanges, with the NKVD, the principal Soviet intelligence service. He personally went to Moscow in Dec. 1943 in an effort to set up this relationship; there was an OSS-NKVD agreement for liaison over their respective operations in areas of interest to both countries. An NKVD liaison officer was to be sent to Washington.

This effort was stopped by the Joint Chiefs, with some advice to do so from Hoover. On Feb. 15, 1944, Hoover wrote to the Attorney General: "I think that the establishment of a recognized unit of the NKVD in the United States will be a serious threat to the internal security of the country. In addition, I do not think there is any real purpose or justification for the establishment of such an agency here."

THE END OF A SERVICE

As the war was ending, Donovan proposed a post-war intelligence agency based on the OSS to President Roosevelt. But Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, before he took action on the matter. The new President was too busy to look into the issue and had some dislike for Donovan. The OSS was officially abolished by President Truman's executive order of Oct. 1, 1945; it ceased to exist on Jan. 12, 1946, when Donovan stepped down.

When the OSS was abolished, many of the 1,362 employees of Research and Analysis and the Presentation Branch (which prepared maps and other briefing documents) were transferred to the State Department as the Interim Research and Intelligence Service; many of the other 9,028 people in the OSS were assigned to the War Department's newly created Strategic Service Unit (SSU). Brig. Gen. John Magruder, who had been Donovan's deputy, was named director of the SSU. Magruder retired in early 1946 and was succeeded by his executive officer, Lt. Col. William W. Quinn, who had coordinated OSS intelligence for the U.S. Seventh Army.

One of Quinn's first moves was the appointment of Angleton as director of counterintelligence in Italy. There Angleton met several Jews who were to play important roles in Israeli intelligence after that state was established in 1948. (See REUVEN SHILOAH.)

When Truman signed his 1945 order abolishing the OSS, he did note that the United States needed "a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program." But knowing that Nimitz and MacArthur had made no use of the OSS, and fearing Donovan's proposed highly centralized intelligence establishment, he moved on his own track toward a postwar intelligence community. But much of the OSS was to reemerge in Truman's July 1947 establishment of the CIA.

Among the future DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE would be four veterans of the OSS: Allen Dulles, WILLIAM COLBY, RICHARD HELMS, and WILLIAM CASEY.

OO OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

British law passed in 1889 to enable the government to withhold information on official activities, regardless of subject or importance, by claiming that the information was secret. A new act passed in 1911 permitted individuals to be prosecuted for publishing information prejudicial to the safety of the state. The act was amended in 1920 and 1939.

Also see D NOTICE, GEORGE BLAKE, TYLER G. KENT, LITERARY SPIES, and PETER WRIGHT.

OO OFF-LINE SYSTEM

CIPHER machine not connected to any other system; it produces an enciphered tape that can be delivered by hand or by mail or transmitted by another machine.

OO OGGINS, ISAIAH H.

American prisoner identified by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Sept. 1992 as an American who had been arrested and executed for espionage in the Soviet Union.

Oggins was arrested on espionage charges in 1939 and sent to a Soviet prison. He was to have been freed after World War II when VIKTOR ABAKUMOV, head of the MGB (see NKVD, SMERSH), advised Soviet dictator Josef Stalin that the American should be "liquidated." He was executed in 1946.

Russian official Dmitri Volkogonov said in 1992 that the case was "a tragedy . . . worthy of Shakespeare," and that Oggins was not a spy.

OO OGORODNIK, ALEKSANDR D.

(b. ? d. 1977)

Spy for the CIA in the Global Affairs Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1970s. He is believed to be the first major U.S. AGENT placed in a senior Moscow position since Col. OLEG PENKOVSKY.

JOHN BARRON, author of *KGB Today* (1983), wrote that Ogorodnik approached the CIA in 1974, while he was serving in the Soviet foreign service in Canada. He passed on "hundreds" of classified documents to the CIA until he was caught photographing some of them in 1977. After admitting his guilt, he requested a favorite pen with which to write his confession. The pen held poison, which Ogorodnik swallowed. He died immediately.

OO OGORODNIKOVA, MAJ. (?) SVETLANA

(b. 1951)

Soviet KGB agent arrested in the United States in 1984 in a plot to obtain classified documents from her lover, FBI agent RICHARD MILLER. She later pleaded guilty to espionage charges, as did her husband, Nikolay.

Nikolay, a Ukrainian Jew born Nikolay Wolfson, fought in World War II beginning at age 11 and was captured by the Germans. Released, he became a street tough and, after four burglaries, was sent to prison for 14 years.

Released in 1968, he married Svetlana. In 1970 they were given permission to emigrate to Israel with their young son. But in VIENNA they appeared to change their minds, going instead to the United States as political refugees. They settled in West Hollywood. Svetlana distributed Soviet magazines, worked off and on as a day nurse, and boasted of her connections with the Soviet Consulate. She also carried out the suspiciously improbable feat of traveling back and forth to the Soviet Union. Nikolay worked as a meat packer. Their son, Matvei, spent his summers at a Communist Party youth camp on the Black Sea and his parents talked of sending him to a military school in the Soviet Union.

Svetlana had come to the attention of the FBI in 1982 when agent John E. Hunt asked her to become an informer on the Russian community in the area. She tantalized the FBI by sometimes giving bits of information about pro-Soviet activity among the émigrés. The FBI field office kept track of her because, whatever she was, she obviously was not like the ordinary Russian émigrés. An attractive, slim, dark-eyed blonde, she soon became involved in a romantic relationship with Hunt. FBI records show that Hunt had 55 meetings with Svetlana in 1982 and 1983. One of these meetings consisted of a visit to a Los Angeles physician. Hunt said that the purpose of the visit was to have Svetlana examined for "a rare blood disease." Svetlana said that Hunt took her to the physician for an abortion. She strongly implied that Hunt was the father, apparently not knowing that the agent had had a vasectomy in 1960. (Hunt, at age 52, retired from the FBI in 1984.)

In 1984 Miller was assigned to work with Svetlana. He, too, was soon involved with her. He recalled an Aug. 1984 drive on a Los Angeles freeway:

Oh, for me it was extraordinary. . . . I had never drunk before in my life. She had brought some margaritas and cognac. That cognac is the awfullest tasting stuff in the world. I thought—I thought, 'Man, this is my chance to be worldly,' and I was gonna just take the opportunity. And we were driving up I-5, just singing songs, and having a great old time throwing bottles out the window. I tried to stop her from throwing the bottles out the window.

The trip ended at the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. Miller, a 47-year-old agent with an incredibly bad record for much of his 20 years in the bureau, apparently forgot that he himself would be under surveillance by FBI agents when he visited the Soviet Consulate. Soon after the boozy trip up I-5, the FBI learned, apparently through an informer, that Miller and Svetlana were having an affair. The FBI began tracking the pair, videotaping Miller's meetings with Svetlana, tapping phone calls, quietly checking Miller's case load, and simultaneously building a case against Svetlana, who was believed to be working for the KGB.

Svetlana said she tried to resist Miller's sexual advances and submitted only "because he scared me." Miller said in response, "Let's put it this way. I was more inclined toward lovemaking than she was."

She also claimed that she was a KGB major and she promised Miller \$65,000 in gold and money if he would spy for the KGB. She introduced her husband to him as "Wolfson," the KGB treasurer for the operation. Miller may not have known that Wolfson actually was Svetlana's husband.

Miller was given specific tasks: to learn the whereabouts of KGB Maj. STANISLAV LEVCHENKO, a DEFECTOR, and to locate Victor Belenko, a Soviet pilot who had flown a MiG-25 to the West in 1976. Both of them had been condemned to death in absentia in the Soviet Union and presumably would be targets for KGB assassins.

On Sept. 27, 1984 Miller told his immediate superior, P. Bryce Christensen, the head of the office's COUNTERESPIONAGE squad, that for months he had been working on his own to penetrate the KGB by becoming a DOUBLE AGENT. He claimed that he had revealed his association with Svetlana because he wanted FBI help in arranging a trip to VIENNA with her. The FBI believed that he had somehow discovered that he was under FBI surveillance.

Miller and the Ogorodnikovs were arrested on the night of Oct. 3. Brought to trial with Miller, Svetlana and Nikolay pleaded guilty to espionage in a deal that resulted in an 18-year sentence for Svetlana and an eight-year sentence for Nikolay. (They sent their son back to the Soviet Union.) During plea-bargain negotiations, Svetlana agreed to testify at Miller's trial. But she told confusing, often contradictory stories about her involvement with Miller and failed a POLYGRAPH test.

After three months the judge in Miller's case declared a mistrial in Nov. 1985. It was the first U.S. government espionage trial in history not to have ended in a conviction. Miller was found guilty in a second trial.

Nikolay was released from prison in Jan. 1990, having served five years of his sentence. He became a hotel bus driver and won a Los Angeles Police Department commendation for capturing a gunman trying to hijack his bus. But in Oct. 1991 he was arrested as the Immigration and Naturalization Service tried to have him deported.

OO OGPU

see CHEKA

OO OIC

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

OO OKHRANA

Russian secret apparatus during the czarist era. Russian secret police operatives can be traced back even beyond the era of Peter the Great (czar from 1672 to 1725), the founder of "modern" Russia. The term Okhrana, which dates from about 1881, was used to identify the political police—specialists trained to investigate political crimes, in some cases crimes set up by Okhrana agents to provoke arrests.

A Prussian, Wilhelm Stieber, helped to reorganize the existing Russian Secret Service into the Department of State Protection, subsequently called Okhrannoye Ot-

dyelyenye, or Okhrana. Although Czar Alexander I could not trust Stieber, a foreigner, to be involved in state security, he paid Stieber well for his services, especially for his advice on organizing an external spy system to track down subversives who had left Russia and were plotting against the monarchy from abroad. (Alexander was killed in St. Petersburg in 1881 by a bomb thrown by a revolutionary.)

The Okhrana had its own secret CODES and communications systems, independent of the Interior and Foreign Ministries and military establishments, a large force of investigators, and numerous paid AGENTS to keep watch on potentially subversive societies. A principal tactic of the Okhrana was infiltration of the numerous subversive groups in Russia.

However, as British intelligence historian RICHARD DEACON wrote in *A History of the Russian Secret Service* (1972):

The revolutionary societies were quick to detect any lack of diligence by the Okhrana and equally swift in combating the watchfulness of the Okhrana by ruses of their own. The leaders of these secret societies kept their true identities hidden far better than did the Okhrana agents more often than not. Their true names were hidden not only from the Okhrana but from their own rank and file, using nicknames or code-names.

Among the numerous agents and DOUBLE AGENTS who served the Okhrana was a secret revolutionary named Josef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili. He later changed his name to Stalin.

Foreign intelligence collection by Okhrana was virtually nil except for SURVEILLANCE of Russians living abroad who might have been a threat to the czarist regime; the only foreign office of the Okhrana was located in the Russian Embassy in Paris. That the Okhrana was ineffective in collecting intelligence on potential enemies of Russia was evidenced in part by the catastrophic Russian military failures in the 1904–1905 war with Japan and in World War I.

For thirty-six years the Okhrana was active; it was feared, but was relatively ineffective when “enemies of the state” harassed and then, in 1917, overthrew the Romanov dynasty.

Also see OPRICHNINA and ROMAN MALINOVSKY.

OO OLDFIELD, SIR MAURICE

(b. 1915 d. 1981)

Highly successful Director-General of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) from 1973 to 1978.

Oldfield was the son of a tenant farmer and the first head of MI6 to come from such a background. After graduating from Manchester University in 1937, he entered the Army in 1941, joining the South Staffordshire Regiment. He subsequently transferred to Military Intelligence Corps, where as a corporal in field security he was automatically commissioned as a full lieutenant on April 13, 1943. He was sent to the Middle East, where British

intelligence sought to halt German espionage inroads into the area.

At the end of 1946 Oldfield was a major with the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel and several decorations for his wartime service. At that point he began to work for MI6, mostly at the London headquarters known as BROADWAY. His first overseas duty for MI6 was on the staff of the British commissioner-general for Southeast Asia from 1950 to 1953, and he was in Singapore again from 1955 to 1958.

Oldfield was station chief in Washington, D.C., from 1960 to 1964, as new reports surfaced that the British intelligence services were infiltrated by Soviet MOLES. (See CAMBRIDGE SPY RING.) Returning to London for the next decade, Oldfield was named Director-General of MI6 in 1973.

On Oct. 13, 1975, the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army attempted to kill Oldfield by leaving a 30-pound bomb wedged between the railings and the windowsill of Locket's Restaurant in London. Oldfield lived in the same building and was at home that evening. The bomb was defused by explosives experts about three minutes before it was due to explode.

He remained Director-General until Oct. 2, 1979. Upon his retirement, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher appointed him coordinator of British security and intelligence in Northern Ireland.

In March 1980 he admitted to being a HOMOSEXUAL and at the end of May asked the Prime Minister to relieve him of his post because of ill health. He was considered to have been highly successful as head of MI6, especially in forging strong relationships with the U.S., French, and Israeli intelligence services.

In *Who's Who in Espionage* (1984), Ronald Payne and Christopher Dobson described Oldfield as “a bespectacled man with chubby face, a cheerful manner and a lively sense of humour, he was tough, though opposed to violence. Indeed, it is unlikely that he had any experience of the rough stuff of espionage.”

There were stories—which were inaccurate—that Oldfield was the model for the JOHN LE CARRÉ [p] character GEORGE SMILEY [f].

OO ONE

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

OO ONE-TIME PAD

An unbreakable CIPHER when used properly. Used improperly by the Soviet NKVD during World War II, it opened up much of the story of Soviet espionage efforts against the United States.

The one-time pad contains thousands of groups, usually of five digits. Each group represents a single word or a phrase. Then, to ensure security, the person using the pad next transposes or converts the numbers of his enciphered message to another set of digits by using a specific, but randomly chosen page of the pad (i.e., double or SUPERENCIPHER process). The key to the pages and lines used on the pad would precede the encrypted message.

The one-time pad takes various forms, from a thick booklet the size of a postage stamp to a scroll about the size of a cigarette butt. The important feature is that the pad must be small, so that it can be easily concealed. The booklets can be very thick, several hundred pages, and sometimes in two colors, to distinguish enciphering and deciphering sections. The "printing" is often a form of reduced photography.

Further, the "paper" of the one-time pad can be made of cellulose nitrate or some other highly flammable material that enables its rapid destruction. During World War II the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES and the British Special Air Service employed "pads" printed on silk handkerchiefs, printed with 600 cipher groups.

In theory there are but two copies of a specific one-time pad: one for the AGENT or diplomat, and one for the official with whom the agent or diplomat communicates.

CRYPTOGRAPHY historian DAVID KAHN cites 1918 as the year one-time pad ciphers were invented. In 1930 the Soviet Union began to employ the one-time pad for messages from its overseas diplomatic and intelligence officials, and subsequently agents, making their communications invulnerable to deciphering. The one-time pads were to be used only once.

The U.S. Army's SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE and successor agencies were able to intercept, but not decrypt, messages sent by Soviet officials in New York to Moscow beginning in 1939. Not until Feb. 1, 1943, did the Army begin a major effort to decipher these messages under the VENONA program. During World War II the cryptographic material production office of the NKVD apparently reused some of the pages from one-time pads, and these were used by Soviet LEGALS and ILLEGALS in the United States in their communications with Moscow.

Because of the duplication of one-time pad pages, the Army obtained some minor decrypts of messages in 1943. The situation was more favorable for the code-breakers in 1944, even more so in 1945. Finally, in the summer of 1946 major breakthroughs were made, opening up the wartime spying efforts of the Soviet Union against the United States.

One-time pads continued in use into the Cold War era. Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara was carrying sheets of a one-time pad cipher when he was killed in Bolivia in 1967.

Also see ATOMIC SPY RING.

OO ONI

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

OO ON-THE-ROOF GANG

Slang for U.S. Navy and Marine personnel trained for radio TRAFFIC ANALYSIS and CRYPTANALYSIS prior to World War II. The term was derived from the steel-reinforced concrete block house on the roof of the sixth wing of the Main Navy Building on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C., where classes were held.

The training program began in 1928, when specially selected Navy and Marine radiomen were assigned to a

three-month course in radio intercept, as well as training in the Kata Kana Morse code used by the Japanese.

The first class, with seven students, convened in Oct. 1928. In total, 25 classes were conducted through 1941, each with four to eight students. A total of 176 men attended the classes.

On the eve of World War II, members of the On-the-Roof Gang were assigned to Navy radio intercept and cryptanalysis teams in the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, Shanghai, Bainbridge Island near Seattle, and Washington, D.C. Seventy of these personnel were evacuated from station CAST in the Philippines before the islands were overrun by the Japanese in early 1942. Seven were captured by the Japanese when Guam was taken in Dec. 1941, although the Japanese never learned of their activities. (Those in Shanghai were evacuated before the war began.)

During the war these men carried out a variety of naval activities, listening to Japanese radio communications and taking down Morse code messages. They were often able to identify specific Japanese radiomen by their use of the Morse code key and could thus identify specific ships and commands sending messages, an invaluable asset in TRAFFIC ANALYSIS.

Several of the gang were commissioned, and two reached the rank of Navy captain.

These personnel were also called "roofers."

OO OP-20-G

see NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

OO OLEKSY, JOZEF

Polish Prime Minister forced to resign on Jan. 24, 1996, after a military prosecutor launched a formal probe into allegations that he had spied for the Soviet Union. The investigation also looked into allegations that two former Soviet diplomats in Poland were also spies.

Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz announced he had decided to undertake an investigation after reports that Oleksy—at the time Interior Minister—passed information to Soviet intelligence. Oleksy denied the allegations by outgoing Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski that he had spied for Moscow from the time he was a provincial communist official in the 1980s until 1995, when he was speaker of democratic Poland's parliament.

Oleksy admitted to having had social contact with the two Soviet diplomats who later proved to be senior KGB officers but denied giving them information. Oleksy and his political party claimed that the spy allegations had been cooked up by Polish security AGENTS on behalf of an opposition embittered over former President Lech Walesa's Nov. 1995 election defeat by Oleksy's fellow ex-Communist Aleksandr Kwasniewski. Walesa applauded the prosecutor's decision to investigate Oleksy.

Oleksy had become Prime Minister 11 months earlier, the seventh prime minister in the six years since the collapse of communism in Poland.

Under Polish law the spying offenses considered in the preliminary investigation carry a sentence ranging from five years in prison to death.

OO ON-LINE SYSTEM

A CRYPTOSYSTEM that is connected directly to a radio or telephone so that encryption and transmission are virtually simultaneous.

OO OPEN CODE

A CRYPTOGRAPHIC system that employs an external text that has a real meaning, used in an attempt to disguise the hidden meaning.

OO OPEN SKIES

Treaty signed in March 1992 between the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France and a number of former republics of the Soviet Union to permit RECONNAISSANCE aircraft to conduct OVERFLIGHTS of their territory to photograph military installations. Subsequently, other members of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION and former Warsaw Pact members joined the Open Skies agreement, with 42 nations having signed by 1996.

The Open Skies concept can be traced to a proposal made by President Eisenhower at the summit meeting in Geneva with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in July 1955. That proposal, inspired by a young Harvard political scientist named Henry Kissinger (later U.S. Secretary of State), was to have been a reciprocal program permitting U.S. and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft to overfly each other's territory as well as exchange blueprints and plans for fixed military installations. The British and French representatives at the meeting immediately supported Eisenhower's proposal.

Khrushchev scornfully dismissed the proposal as a U.S. attempt at sanctioned aerial espionage. Eisenhower, in his *Mandate for Change* (1963), recalled Khrushchev saying that "the idea was nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the USSR. . . ." The Soviet leader didn't even mention it in his account of the Geneva meeting in his memoirs *Khrushchev Remembers* (1970).

That proposal, rejected by the Soviet Union, was subsequently used by the U.S. government in part as a rationale for the U-2 spyplane overflights of the Soviet Union and the employment of SATELLITES to spy on the Soviet Union. The current overflight treaty began with talks between representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1989. It permits unarmed aircraft to fly over the entire territory of the participating nations.

The U.S. Air Force is carrying out the U.S. inspections, flying OC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, adapted from the C-135 STRATOTANKER. The aircraft carries a flight crew, relief crew (because of the distance of the flights), and foreign representatives. The first of several OC-135 aircraft became operational in late 1993. (Also see RIVET JOINT.)

The plane employed by Russia for Open Skies reconnaissance is the Tupolev Tu-154M, a large trijet aircraft similar to the Boeing 727. Fitted with synthetic-aperture radar, the modified Tu-154M is to enter service in 1999. As a prelude to the Russian overflights of the United

States, in June 1995 a Tu-154 fitted with an aerial camera and infrared sensors, commanded by a former East German Air Force pilot, carried out a training mission over the United States.

OO OPEN SOURCE

Intelligence derived from sources available to the public, especially from the news media. In the late 1980s the abbreviation-obsessed U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY began using the acronym OSINT for Open Source Intelligence.

OO OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

(OPINTEL)

Intelligence employed in planning operations within regional theaters or areas of operations. The term operational intelligence was used by the U.S. Navy through the 1980s for the intelligence provided to naval operating forces. Intelligence at this level is now considered to be TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE.

OO OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

(OIC)

British Admiralty activity in World War II to "collect, co-ordinate, analyse and disseminate information from every possible source which could throw light on the intentions and movements of German maritime forces, naval, air, and mercantile." It was the key to British use of ULTRA decrypts and other forms of intelligence that were applied to the Battle of the Atlantic from 1939 to 1945, the worldwide campaign against German U-boats.

By 1936 British NAVAL INTELLIGENCE was no longer responsible for CRYPTANALYSIS, that responsibility having been transferred to the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL (see ROOM 40). In June 1937 the DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, Rear Adm. J. A. G. Troup, chose Paymaster Lt. Comdr. NORMAN DENNING to organize an intelligence center of the type that Room 40 had become at the end of World War I.

Denning began with one clerical assistant in a section named the Operational Intelligence Centre, which became the coordinating center for all information related to the war at sea from any source and had total responsibility for analysis and evaluation. The OIC was authorized in 1938 to disseminate its findings within the Navy. This was a major change in procedure from that of Room 40 in World War I.

Patrick Beesly, a key member of the OIC, wrote in *Very Special Intelligence* (1977):

. . . no maritime operation, whether it was something on the scale of Operation Neptune (the Invasion of France) or the landing of an agent in Brittany, a commando raid in Norway or an attack on a German convoy off the Low Countries, ever took place without preliminary and detailed consultation between its planners and some member of the staff of O.I.C. The painstaking analysis of the

German U-boat building programme, the reconstruction from the original small fragment of the German Naval [map] grid and then the solution of the transpositions which the U-Boat Command sought to disguise references to it, the selection of the best areas for Bomber Command's four-year minelaying campaign: all this required continuous and often laborious work without which little else would have been clear or effective operational action possible.

OO OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC)

Actions to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information concerning planned, ongoing, or completed operations.

Also see COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY.

OO OPERATIONS SECURITY

Similar to OPERATIONAL SECURITY; in the communications area operations security can include the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting possible indications about the planning and execution of military operations and other activities.

Also see COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY.

OO OPERATIVE

Another term for AGENT.

OO OPINTEL

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

OO OPRICHNINA

Police force established by Russia's Ivan the Terrible in 1565. Designed to suppress internal enemies, the Oprichnina was a distant predecessor of the later CHEKA, NKVD, and KGB.

Ivan the Terrible, the first grand duke of Muscovy to be crowned czar, established the Oprichnina as a force of 6,000 cavalrymen, dressed in black, riding black horses, their saddles carrying the symbol of a dog's head and broom to symbolize their mission—to sniff out and sweep away traitors to the state. The term *oprichnina* could be translated as "outriders," indicating that they were outside or above the law.

The Oprichnina was responsible for many atrocities during its seven-year reign of terror. Indeed, the entire city of Novgorod, one of the oldest in Russia, was laid to waste by the Oprichnina during a five-week massacre in 1570. Novgorod, the second city of Russia at the time, was suspected by Ivan the Terrible of collaborating with the enemy state of Lithuania. Tens of thousands were killed in the city.

Members of the Oprichnina received grants of land, their territory eventually comprising about one-half the territory of Muscovy.

The force was abolished about 1572.

OO OPSEC

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

OO ORCON

CODE WORD used during the Carter administration to indicate material denied to contractors. Derived from the term "originator controlled," the material could not be made available to any individual or agency without the approval of the originator.

Also see NONCONTRACT.

OO ORCZY, BARONESS EMMUSKA

(b. 1865 d. 1947)

Creator of one of the most popular fictional spies of her era, the SCARLET PIMPERNEL.

Hungarian-born, she came to London with her family at age 15. There she learned English, the language in which she did all of her writing. First published in 1905, *The Scarlet Pimpernel* was the story of the leader of the League of the Scarlet Pimpernel, a band of young Englishmen pledged to rescue the innocent aristocratic victims of the Reign of Terror in Paris during the French Revolution. (The story was made into a film in 1935.)

She used the novel's hero—Sir Percy Blakeney—in a dozen other novels, foremost among them *The Elusive Pimpernel* (1908) and *The Way of the Scarlet Pimpernel* (1933). Several detective novels and plays also came from her imaginative mind.

OO ORDER OF BATTLE

(OB)

Intelligence describing the identity, strength, command structure, and disposition of enemy military forces. Variations of the term in U.S. usage include Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) and, previously, Soviet Order of Battle (SOB).

OO ORGAN

Russian-Soviet term for state security organizations such as the CHEKA, NKVD, or KGB.

OO ORIENTAL GODDESS

Machine at BLETCHLEY PARK that worked out settings for the BOMBES so that they could process settings for breaking into the CIPHERS generated by ENIGMA machines.

OO ORLOV, MAJ. ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOVICH

(b. 1895 d. 1973)

Senior Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER in the 1920s and 1930s, who became a fugitive in the United States to escape the Stalinist purges. He was one of the highest ranking Soviet intelligence officials ever to defect to the West.

Orlov was born Leiba Lazarevich Feldbin in the Belarusian town of Bobruysk. He served in the Red Army during the Russian Revolution, Civil War, and Russo-Polish War, commanding guerrilla units and working in Army COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. His efforts led to his being called to the attention of the Russian intelligence chief FELIKS DZHERZHINSKY.

From 1921 to 1923 Orlov completed law school at the University of Moscow and then served as an assistant prosecutor. In this role he worked with the state security ORGANS. In 1924 he returned to full-time intelligence work with the OGPU. Late in 1925 he was made a brigade commander of Frontier Troops in Transcaucasia, the move being made because of his earlier experience in guerrilla warfare. Some 11,000 troops under his command policed the Soviet borders with Persia (Iran) and Turkey.

In mid-1926 Orlov began his foreign intelligence work with an assignment as the OGPU RESIDENT in Paris. He continued to serve abroad and from 1933 was an ILLEGAL in several European cities. In 1932 he made a covert trip to the United States (using a Soviet passport in the name Lev Leonidovich Nikolayev). He fraudulently acquired a U.S. passport in the name of William Goldin, supposedly an Austrian-born immigrant to the United States.

Orlov went to Britain in July 1934 to become RESIDENT in London, directing Soviet intelligence activities there. He used his American COVER to start a refrigerator sales firm that served as a front for his espionage activities, including running the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING. In Oct. 1935 a chance meeting in London with an old acquaintance who recognized Orlov forced him to return quickly to Moscow. There he monitored Soviet spy operations abroad and was responsible for directing the intelligence and counterintelligence faculty of the Central Military School in Moscow, where NKVD personnel were trained.

From 1935 he held the rank of major in State Security (the equivalent of one-star military rank). That same year his book *Tactics and Strategy of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence* was published for use by Soviet intelligence schools, establishing him as a dominant authority in the field.

In Sept. 1936 he went to Madrid as the NKVD resident in Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939). Reportedly, on the eve of his departure, a young NKVD operator with whom he was having a love affair, Galina Voitova, shot herself in front of the LUBYANKA because Orlov had left her and refused to divorce his wife.

Soviet MOLE HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, using the cover of a British journalist while in Spain, called Orlov "A man of action." In his book *My Silent War* (1969), Philby wrote: "He was energetic—I would even say a desperately energetic character. For instance he liked to always go about armed—probably as the result of his desperate energy and extravagantly romantic attitude towards his profession." At times Orlov even carried a submachine gun concealed under his trenchcoat, the traditional garb of spies of that era.

As NKVD resident in Spain, Orlov was charged with both intelligence collection and counterintelligence for Soviet forces in Spain as well as supervision of the flow of Soviet arms to the front and the Republican forces fighting Gen. Francisco Franco. Orlov also began building a secret police force under NKVD control within areas of Spain controlled by the Republicans; Orlov's mechanism for this was the Servicio de Investigación Militar, which he established and supervised. An Orlov-established SPY SCHOOL in Spain trained numerous future spies, among them American MORRIS COHEN. Orlov was the senior Soviet official in Spain during this period.

Recalled to Moscow in July 1938, Orlov balked, fearing that he would be executed; Stalin was killing early Bolsheviks as well as Soviet officials who had served overseas. Orlov fled from Spain that month with \$30,000 from the station safe and traveled via Canada to the United States, bringing his wife and 14-year-old daughter. (Already ill, the girl died shortly after their arrival in the United States.) Orlov used the American passport that he had acquired during his 1932 visit.

In the United States, Orlov and his wife lived almost entirely on those funds until the publication of his book in 1953 (see below). Reportedly, Orlov blackmailed Stalin by threatening to expose the Soviet spy NETWORK in the West if attempts were made to assassinate him.

In a letter to the head of the NKVD, Orlov explained his flight:

My sole purpose now is to survive to bring up my child until she comes of age. Always remember that I am no traitor to my Party or my country. No one and nothing will ever make me betray the cause of the proletariat and of Soviet power. I did not want to leave my country any more than a fish wants to leave water, but the delinquent activity of criminal people has cast me up like a fish on ice.

* * *

I have not only been deprived of my mother country, but the right to live and breathe the same air as the Soviet people. If you leave me alone, I will never embark on anything harmful to the Party or the Soviet Union.

Orlov lived as a fugitive in the United States from 1938 until 1953, his presence in the country unknown to American officials. He revealed himself in 1953—the year in which Stalin died—in a series of articles in *Life* magazine and through his book *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (1952). Orlov published additional books on Stalin's crimes and another on Soviet intelligence, *A Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (1962), based on the textbook he had written for use by the NKVD and Soviet military schools.

Playing a game with the U.S. intelligence services, Orlov told half-truths, even before congressional investigating committees. He continued to shield the identity of Soviet intelligence AGENTS in the West, never revealing a single agent's name during his 45 years in the United

States. KGB officials met secretly with Orlov twice after his defection, in 1969 and 1971.

The Soviet intelligence files on Orlov have largely been published in the book *Deadly Illusions* (1993) by JOHN COSTELLO and former KGB officer Oleg Tsarev.

Orlov's code name within the Soviet intelligence system was Schwed ("Swede"); he mainly used the name Igor Konstantinovich Berg after he fled to the United States.

OO **OSHIMA, GEN. HIROSHI**

(b. 1886 d. 1975)

Japanese ambassador to Nazi Germany during World War II who unwittingly provided the Allies with invaluable COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. Oshima "was our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe," wrote Gen. George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, during the war.

Oshima was the son of a prominent Japanese family, his father having served as War Minister from 1916 to 1918. Following his graduation from the military academy in 1905, Oshima had a successful Army career.

In 1934 he became Japanese military ATTACHE in BERLIN, with the rank of colonel. He spoke almost perfect German and was soon befriended by the influential Joachim von Ribbentrop. At the time, Adolf Hitler ostensibly used the Foreign Ministry for his foreign relations. In reality, Hitler fostered what became known as Dienststelle Ribbentrop (Ribbentrop Bureau), a competitive foreign office operated by the ambitious ex-champagne salesman. (The bureau, which had more than 300 employees, was abolished when Hitler appointed Ribbentrop Foreign Minister in 1938.)

Under Ribbentrop's guidance, Oshima met privately with Hitler in the fall of 1935. With the support of the Nazi leadership and the Japanese Army General Staff, Oshima progressed rapidly while in Berlin, attaining the rank of lieutenant general and being appointed ambassador to Berlin in 1938.

In late 1939 he was recalled to Japan, returning via the United States. Following requests from Germany for his return, Oshima returned to Berlin in early 1941. He dedicated his efforts until the end of the war in Europe to close relations between Germany and Japan, including military cooperation in the Indian Ocean area. American journalist William L. Shirer wrote that Oshima "often impressed this observer as more Nazi than the Nazis."

His close relationship with Hitler and Ribbentrop gave him unequaled access for a foreigner to German war plans and national policy. He made visits to the Russian Front and the German coastal defenses in France (the Atlantic Wall), and he met periodically with Hitler. All information that he gathered he duly reported by radio to Tokyo in the PURPLE diplomatic CODE—and thus almost simultaneously to American codebreakers.

The U.S. intercept effort and the MAGIC decoding effort garnered virtually all of Oshima's communications with Tokyo: approximately 75 during the 11 months of 1941, some 100 in 1942, 400 in 1943, 600 in 1944, and

about 300 during the just over four months of 1945 that Germany was at war. For example, one Purple intercept decoded on Jan. 19, 1942, told how Ribbentrop had agreed to supply daily intelligence reports to Oshima, which he would send on to Tokyo. He warned that "any leakage of these reports due to our fault would be of grave consequence, so all handling of these reports should be strictly secret."

While some of his predictions were wrong—Oshima predicted that Britain would capitulate to Germany before the end of 1941—his reporting of the Nazi leadership's plans and policies and his factual data were invaluable to the Allies. For example, on June 6, 1941, he advised Tokyo that Germany would invade the Soviet Union on June 22 (see BARBAROSSA).

As the war progressed and Germany began to retreat, Oshima never lost his confidence in eventual German victory. Finally, on April 14, 1945, Oshima was forced to abandon Berlin. He and most of the remaining Japanese diplomatic staff traveled to the mountain resort of Bad Gastein. Less than a month later Germany surrendered and Oshima and his staff were taken into custody. They were brought to the United States by ship, arriving on July 11. After interrogation and internment in a resort hotel in Pennsylvania, Oshima was returned to Japan.

Back home he briefly enjoyed freedom in his devastated country. But on Dec. 16, 1945, he was arrested and charged as a war criminal. After a delayed trial, he was found guilty of conspiring against peace by an Allied tribunal in Nov. 1948. His sentence was life imprisonment.

He was paroled in late 1955 and granted clemency less than three years later. Oshima died in 1975, not knowing that he had provided the Allies with invaluable intelligence during the war.

OO **OSINT**

Open Source Intelligence; see OPEN SOURCE

OO **OSS**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OO **OSTER, GENERALMAJOR HANS**

(b. 1888 d. 1945)

Extremely anti-Nazi chief of staff of the ABWEHR, Germany's intelligence agency. He was hanged for his part in the abortive July 1944 plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

The son of a Protestant churchman, Oster fought in World War I as a General Staff officer and then joined the Reichswehr, the small Army Germany was allowed under the Versailles Treaty that followed World War I.

From 1933 on he served in the War Ministry; as a colonel he became head of the Second Department of the Abwehr, which dealt with administration and financial matters and kept the lists of German intelligence AGENTS.

In *The Abwehr* (1984) historian Lauran Paine observed that Oster had ". . . a high sense of honour, abhorred corruption, was contemptuous of politicians and,



Gen. Hiroshi Ōshima with Adolf Hitler in Berlin in 1939; Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop stands between them. (NATIONAL ARCHIVES)

when Nazi excesses became not isolated instances but a deliberate part of government policy . . . often, and not very prudently, denounced them." Paine continued, "He was a serious man, observant, practical, and realistic."

As war approached in Europe in 1939, Oster became chief of staff to Vice Adm. WILHELM CANARIS, head of the Abwehr. Concerned about German war preparations, he passed information to the Allies on German intentions to invade Norway and Denmark. Later he sought to protect Jews in occupied countries through various Abwehr operations.

Following a search of Abwehr offices by the GESTAPO that revealed planned meetings with the Vatican concerning possible negotiations to end the war, Canaris dismissed Oster from the Abwehr on April 15, 1943. Canaris told his staff to have no further contact with Oster, who was henceforth assigned to the reserves and, although allowed to wear his uniform, remained under virtual house arrest at his BERLIN and Dresden homes.

Under close watch by the Gestapo at the time of the bomb plot against Hitler on July 20, 1944, Oster was arrested the following day and imprisoned (as was Canaris). He was hanged on April 9—a month before the war ended—at Flossenbürg concentration camp. (Canaris was hanged the same day.)

OO OTHER WORK

Russian slang for espionage activities of INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS working under the COVER of staff at the UNITED NATIONS.

OO OTT, AIRMAN 1ST CLASS BRUCE

U.S. airman arrested at Beale Air Force Base in California in Jan. 1986 for attempting to sell material on the SR-71 BLACKBIRD spyplane to two FBI agents posing as Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. He had called the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco—known to the FBI as "KGB West"—with an offer to sell secrets.

The FBI intercepted the call and set up a phony meeting. Ott told a man he believed to be a Soviet AGENT that he wanted to be a long-term MOLE and hoped to shape his Air Force career to serve the KGB. He gave the disguised FBI agent a copy of the recall roster for the 1st Strategic RECONNAISSANCE Squadron and a handwritten list of promised secret documents that he could deliver. Ott wanted to be paid \$600 immediately—to get back his repossessed car.

At a subsequent meeting, after Ott handed over other documents, he said that he wanted a total of \$165,000 for the secrets he would deliver. The FBI gave him \$400, and after he accepted the money they added a pair of handcuffs.

When arrested, Ott began babbling: "Thanks for catching me before this got out of hand. . . . You caught me red-handed. . . . I'm going to be a model prisoner. How much time do you think I'll get?" He was court-martialed and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

OO OVAKIM, MAJ. GEN. GAIK BADALOVICH

(b. 1898 d. ?)

The NKVD RESIDENT in New York City in the 1930s. Ovakim arrived in the United States in 1933 and operated under COVER of the AMTORG commercial organization.

Educated as an engineer, Ovakim specialized in INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. In *The FBI-KGB War* (1986), FBI agent Robert J. Lamphere and author Tom Shachtman wrote: "He was often referred to as 'the wily Armenian,' and it was a measure of his slipperiness that it was never completely clear whether or not he really was an Armenian." Ovakim was small—five-foot seven, 165 pounds.

According to Lamphere and Shachtman, his espionage recruits were scattered across the United States and into Mexico and Canada. He was responsible for recruiting JULIUS ROSENBERG and his wife, Ethel, into the ATOMIC SPY RING in 1938. He also met with and passed on orders for the assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico to Ramón Mercader. (The act, carried out on Aug. 20, 1940, resulted in Trotsky's death from his wounds the following day.)

In May 1941 the FBI arrested Ovakim and charged him with being a foreign business representative who had not registered as such with the Department of Justice. In jail, Ovakim claimed diplomatic immunity and that he was merely a purchasing agent for weapons who, for political reasons, had been unable to negotiate any major transactions. The Soviet Embassy paid his bail of \$25,000 for his release.

Several of his AGENTS had been identified, and the FBI hoped to bring him to trial. However, since a half dozen Americans were being detained in the Soviet Union, an agreement was reached in which Ovakim was allowed to leave the United States in late July 1941. (Of the six Americans, three never reached the United States; before they could depart, Germany invaded the Soviet Union and two fell into German hands; the third was kept in a Soviet prison.)

Arriving back at NKVD headquarters in Moscow, he was head of the American desk when, in 1944, he approved a cable sent to the United States that permitted HARRY GOLD, an NKVD COURIER, to meet with DAVID GREENGLASS, a soldier working at the atomic bomb laboratory in Los Alamos, N. Mex. Gold was from one espionage CELL and Greenglass from another being run by the NKVD. The implications of this breach in TRADECRAFT were significant, and Ovakim was demoted.

He was dismissed from the KGB (successor to the NKVD) in about 1956, after the death of spy chief LAVENTRY BERIA and Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of the excesses of the late dictator Josef Stalin.

OO OVERFLIGHT

Mission by a spyplane—carrying cameras or SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE equipment or both—over an enemy country, usually to collect STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. Such flights are distinct from TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE collection, which involve flights over enemy forces.

The term overflight came into use in the Cold War, and the first Western overflights of the Soviet Union were made in 1952 by U.S. B-47 STRATOJET and British CANBERRA reconnaissance aircraft, the latter at the request of the U.S. government.

OO OVERHEAD

The use of AIRCRAFT and SATELLITES to provide photographic and other intelligence about TARGET countries.

William E. Burrows wrote in *Deep Black* (1986): "Overhead reconnaissance and surveillance mechanisms and those who operate them are charged with three basic responsibilities. They are supposed to discover and keep track of every military and economic development throughout the world that can impact in one degree or another upon the United States and its allies."

Also see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

OO OVERLORD

see D-DAY

OO OVERT INTELLIGENCE

Information collected openly from public or open sources such as newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Also called OPEN SOURCE intelligence.

OO OWEN, WILLIAM JAMES

Probably the only member of the House of Commons to be charged in this century with betraying secret information of potential use to an enemy. A Labour "backbencher," he was charged with violating the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS on Jan. 23, 1970, following a convoluted effort by Eastern Bloc intelligence agencies to subvert him.

Elected to Parliament in 1954 and appointed to the Defence Estimates Committee in Feb. 1960, he was persuaded to work for improved British relations with East Germany. In 1964 to become director of a tourist agency, Berolina Travel. In that position he visited East Germany several times and made a trip to the Soviet Union. He was befriended by a Czech commercial ATTACHÉ, Robert

Husak. Subsequently, the Czech government paid him £2,300, entertained him, and gave him presents.

In return, Husak sought information about Owen's fellow members of Parliament, seeking those who would be vulnerable to blackmail. Owen also had access to classified information, but it is not clear if any was passed on to foreign INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

He was arrested in Jan. 1970 and resigned from the House of Commons that April. Owen was tried and acquitted, with the court directing him to pay £2,000 toward legal costs. After being acquitted, Owens revealed his dealings with Czech intelligence.

He was given the CODE NAME Lee by Czech intelligence.

OO OXCART

see A-12 OXCART

OO OZAKI, HOZOJI

(b. 1901 d. 1944)

Japanese author, journalist, and spy for the Soviet Union. Ozaki was the principal Japanese confederate of Soviet spy RICHARD SORGE.

Born in Tokyo but raised on Formosa (now Taiwan), where his father was a newspaper editor, Ozaki attended Tokyo Imperial University, graduating in 1925. The following year he joined the staff of the Tokyo newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*. He moved to the *Osaka Asahi* in 1927 and in 1929 became a correspondent in Shanghai, where he met Soviet spy Richard Sorge in 1930. He kept in contact with Sorge when the Soviet—under the COVER of a German journalist—went to Japan in 1933.

Ozaki was one of Japan's principal representatives to the Institute of Pacific Relations Conclave held at Yosemite National Park, Calif., in 1936. A year later he was appointed a member of a high-level, policy-planning "brain trust" that advised the Prime Minister. He was thus in a key position to pass on high-level secrets to Sorge, motivated by his belief that the Japanese form of government had to be overthrown for the good of the country.

He was arrested on Oct. 14, 1941, tried for treason in 1943, and sentenced to death. He was executed by hanging, with Sorge, on Nov. 7, 1944.



P

● ● P2V NEPTUNE

Principal U.S. Navy land-based maritime antisubmarine/RECONNAISSANCE aircraft for two decades after World War II. The Neptune was flown extensively on reconnaissance flights off the Pacific coasts of China and the Soviet Union, with several being attacked by hostile fighters.

The Neptune was useful for patrols along the Soviet and Chinese peripheries because of its long endurance and reliability. Flown by U.S. Navy patrol squadrons from 1947 until the early 1970s, the plane was also flown by several other nations. During the Vietnam War the Navy flew 24 modified Neptunes over land areas in an effort to monitor electronic SURVEILLANCE devices dropped along Viet Cong supply trails (designated AP-2 and OP-2) and four others for night attacks on supply lines (AP-2). The Army used some Neptunes as specialized ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) platforms in Vietnam (RP-2E), while the Air Force too flew seven aircraft in an electronic role (RB-69).

Although Neptunes were not converted to specialized ELINT aircraft, as were the A3D SKYWARRIOR and P-3 ORION, they were fitted with some "black boxes" for ELINT collection, and made extensive use of hand-held cameras for reconnaissance.

The regular flights along the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union and China led to four Neptunes being shot down from 1951 to 1955, three by Soviet fighters and one by Chinese interceptors. Other Neptunes were "buzzed" and chased. (See AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.)

The Lockheed-developed Neptune was fitted with twin reciprocating engines, supplemented in later models

by two turbojet engines in pods that could give them a "burst" speed for closing with submarine contacts. The Neptune had an internal bomb bay for depth bombs and torpedoes, and could carry rockets under the wing for attacking surfaced submarines. (Twelve early P2V-3C Neptunes were fitted to carry atomic bombs and could be launched from aircraft carriers for strikes against land targets; they had to be loaded aboard the carriers by crane!) Early Neptunes had various combinations of 20-mm cannon and .50-caliber machine guns for self-defense. The normal crew was eight men.

The XP2V-1 made its first flight on May 17, 1945. The following year a P2V-1 named *Truculent Turtle*, stripped for long-distance flight, established a record, nonrefueled flight of 11,236 miles in 55 hours, 17 minutes. (The record was broken in 1962 by an Air Force B-52H strategic bomber—which flew 11,377 miles without refueling.) The normal range for the P2V-5 variant, built in the greatest numbers, was 3,200 miles; top speed was 353 mph.

A total of 1,099 P2Vs were produced by Lockheed from 1945 through 1962; 89 additional aircraft (P-2J) were produced in Japan by Kawasaki.

The P2V designation was changed to P-2 in 1962.

● ● P3V ORION

Principal U.S. Navy antisubmarine/maritime RECONNAISSANCE aircraft since the mid-1960s. In addition to being flown in those roles by the U.S. Navy and 11 other navies and air forces, the U.S. Navy flies 12 extensively modified EP-3 aircraft in the ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) role.

Succeeding the P2V NEPTUNE as the Navy's primary land-based patrol aircraft, the Orion first flew operationally during the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS of Oct. 1962 to monitor Soviet and Eastern Bloc merchant ships en route to Cuba. During the Vietnam War several squadrons served in Operation Market Time, which monitored communist junk and sampan traffic. It was not unusual for the aircraft to come under small-arms fire from communist guerrillas during these missions, many of which were flown at night.

The Lockheed-developed aircraft was adapted from the L-188 Electra airliner. It is powered by four turboprop engines, has an internal bomb bay for depth bombs, torpedoes, and mines, and can carry additional weapons—including antiship missiles—on wing pylons. No defensive guns are fitted to the aircraft, which has a normal crew of ten. Sensors include radar, magnetic anomaly detection, infrared, and droppable sonar buoys.

The ELINT-configured EP-3 aircraft have direction finders, radar signal analyzers, and various communication intercept and recording systems in place of antisubmarine equipment.

The P-3C variant currently in U.S. Navy service has a maximum speed of 473 mph and a mission radius of 1,550 miles with 13 hours on station. (The aircraft is not fitted for in-flight refueling.)

The first flight of a modified Electra airframe took place on Aug. 19, 1958, and the first YP3V-1 on Nov. 25, 1959. Orions began joining the Fleet in Aug. 1962. A total of 551 Orions were delivered to the U.S. Navy in addition to foreign deliveries; more than 100 additional aircraft were built in Japan (which also flies the EP-3 ELINT variant).

The Orion's designation was changed from P3V to P-3 in 1962.

Also see VQ SQUADRONS.

●● P4M-1Q MERCATOR

U.S. Navy land-based maritime RECONNAISSANCE/antisubmarine aircraft that was employed almost exclusively in the ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) role. At least two were attacked by Soviet and Chinese fighters while on ELINT flights off the Asian coast, one being lost with all 16 crewmen on board.

The aircraft, developed by the Glen L. Martin Co., was one of several attempts in the 1940s to combine piston and jet engines in a single aircraft to provide maximum range with high speed. While the P4M lost out to the P2V NEPTUNE for the maritime patrol role, it was employed in the ELINT role from 1951 to 1960.

The P4M-1 entered service with a single patrol squadron in 1950, but the decision was made to complete and convert most of the 21 Mercators to the P4M-1Q ELINT configuration. The first ELINT aircraft flew that year, and the aircraft took over from older naval aircraft flying spy missions along the periphery of the Soviet Union and China (see PB4Y-2 PRIVATEER).

The specialized ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (VQ) Squadron 1 was established at Iwakuni, Japan, on June 1, 1955, flying P4M-1Q aircraft; VQ-2 was established

on Sept. 1, 1955, at Port Lyautey, Morocco, with the P4M-1Q. (See VQ SQUADRONS.)

Periodically, Soviet and Chinese fighters would "buzz" the aircraft as they flew off the coast, just outside the 12-mile limit, monitoring radar and communications transmissions. On Aug. 22, 1956, a P4M-1Q was shot down over the Shengszu Islands, 37 miles off the coast of China, while on a night mission. Of the 16 men on board, all were killed; several bodies were found by U.S. search aircraft. On June 16, 1959, another P4M-1Q was attacked by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan, 85 miles east of Wonsan, North Korea. The damaged plane returned to Niho Air Base in Japan. The plane's tail gunner was seriously wounded.

The P4M-1Q planes were withdrawn from the VQ role in 1960.

The aircraft had two piston engines and two jet engines housed in combination nacelles on each wing. The aircraft had a streamlined shape and was rated at 410 mph (with both piston and jet engines) with a range of 2,265 miles at a slower cruising speed. In the ELINT role no bombs or torpedoes could be carried, but the planes had four 20-mm cannon and two .50-cal. machine guns for protection. The crew numbered 13.

The prototype XP4M-1 first flew on Sept. 20, 1946. All 21 production aircraft were delivered in 1950.

●● PADDING


Additional words added to the beginning and end of a CODE message to confuse enemy decryption efforts in the event of interception. The padding is not supposed to relate directly to the context of the message.

An example of incorrect padding that *did* relate to the text and hence create confusion occurred on Oct. 25, 1944, during the naval battle for Leyte Gulf. A message sent by Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, the theater commander, to Adm. William F. Halsey, the Third Fleet commander, read: TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG [addressee] WHERE IS RPT [repeat] WHERE IS TASK FORCE 34 RR [end] THE WORLD WONDERS. "Turkey trots to water" and "the world wonders" were both padding; however, because Halsey believed that the latter phrase related to the message, he took it as a rebuke from Nimitz and dispatched Task Force 34 on a fruitless chase of Japanese surface ships.

●● PAG

Device developed by the German Air Force in World War II for parachuting AGENTS behind enemy lines. The PAG—for Persönen-Abwurf-Gerät (personnel drop device)—was a metal and wood canister that could hold three agents, strapped in a rigid, horizontal position, and their equipment. While the pod was mounted under a wing, the agents could communicate with the pilot of the carrying aircraft by a telephone connection.

In his book *KG 200: The True Story* (1979), Luftwaffe pilot P. W. Stahl wrote:



PAG parachute capsule. (COURTESY JANE'S PUBLISHING CO. LTD.)

The use of the PAG simplified an operation in several ways. For one thing, it was possible to fix the landing point more accurately than when agents would leave the aircraft separately with their own individual parachutes: on the ground, especially, and especially in a 'blind' terrain, they now did not have to search for each other. Secondly, all their additional equipment was on the spot. But the main reason that led to the development and operational use of these streamlined containers was to lessen the danger of injuries during parachute jumps at night in an unknown area.

The only drawback, Stahl continued, was the problem of disposing of the canister, which was some 12 feet long.

See KG 200.

●● PAINVIN, CAPT. GEORGES

Leading Allied cryptologist of World War I, who was able to break the German ADFGX CIPHER. Painvin, originally trained as a paleontologist, was head of the French Cipher Bureau on March 5, 1918, when the ADFGX cipher was first intercepted by the French Army.

For the next three and a half months Painvin and his colleagues struggled with the cipher. The bureau's ability to eventually decipher the German communications in the ADFGX cipher enabled the Allies to defeat a German assault in June 1918, saving Paris from the German assault and turning the tide of the campaign on the Western Front.

The effort was physically exhausting for Painvin. He lost 33 pounds during the spring of 1918, working entire days without leaving his desk. He then spent six months in the hospital recovering from the effort.

In 1919, when American codebreaker HERBERT O. YARDLEY arrived in France, Painvin entertained him, but Yardley was never given access to the secrets of the Cipher Bureau. Painvin left the Army after the war and had

a very successful business career and served as president of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris. Yet, he wrote, the cipher breakthroughs left "an indelible mark on my spirit, and remain for me one of the brightest and most outstanding memories of my existence."

The story of how Painvin broke into the ADFGX cipher was not revealed until 1966.

●● PAISLEY, JOHN A.

(b. 1923 d. 1978)

Former CIA official who mysteriously disappeared. His body was found floating in Chesapeake Bay on Oct. 1978, a bullet wound in his head and 38 pounds of scuba diving-belt weights around his body.

At the time of his disappearance, the CIA described him as a relatively low-ranking employee who had retired in 1974. In fact, he had been deputy director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research. Unofficial sources said he helped plan the U-2 spyplane and the SAMOS and KH-11 spy SATELLITE systems. (See KEYHOLE.) He also reportedly was a CIA liaison officer between the White House and the agency at the time of WATERGATE. (This information led to speculation that he was "Deep Throat," the anonymous source of the Watergate information obtained by *Washington Post* reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. Both denied that Paisley was Deep Throat.)

Paisley had an eventful career, but the CIA would not officially describe his assignments. Reportedly he worked with NSA when the highly classified spy satellites were developed. He also acted as the agency liaison to the B TEAM, which evaluated the CIA in 1976, and he is believed to have been involved in the complex intelligence operations that led to the death of NICHOLAS G. SHADRIN and the interrogation of YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO, a controversial Soviet DEFECTOR.

On Sept. 24, 1978, Paisley, who was still working for the CIA as a contractor, sailed his 31-foot sloop *Brillig* out of his dock at Solomons, Md. The next day the sloop was

found aground near Point Lookout, Md., at the mouth of the Potomac River, 78 miles southeast of Washington, D.C. Investigators, who included CIA security officers, found a briefcase containing a CIA report that Paisley was working on, as well as a suitcase containing radio equipment and telegraph keys and a single, hollow-core 9-mm bullet. No gun was found, and there were no traces of blood.

On Oct. 1 a decomposing body with a bullet hole behind the left ear floated to the surface about .15 miles north of Point Lookout; the body had not sunk because internal gases overcame the weight of the scuba belts. The body was identified as Paisley's by dental records.

A life insurance company held up payment of \$100,000 to his widow because of reports that the body was not Paisley's. Six months after his death, however, the money was paid to Mrs. Paisley, from whom he had been estranged. The FBI also identified his body and said his death was a suicide. But a lawyer hired by Mrs. Paisley to investigate the death said, "Jumping off a boat with a gun in hand, pulling the trigger while in the water, is, to be charitable about the matter, a weird way to commit suicide."

Rumors persisted that Paisley, who was fluent in Russian, had been spying for the Soviets and was murdered. The Senate Intelligence Committee investigated the death and in April 1980 reported that it had uncovered "no information which would detract from [his] record of outstanding performance in faithful service to his country." The committee did not release the full report, which dealt with the question of whether Paisley killed himself or was murdered.

OO PANAY

The first U.S. warship sunk by enemy action in the 20th Century. The gunboat *Panay* was carrying considerable SECRET material, much of it related to Japanese military activities in China, when she was sunk by Japanese bombers in 1937.

The *Panay* was one of several shallow-draft river gunboats built in the 1920s to protect American interests in China. She was to patrol the Yangtze River against pirates and warlords interfering with commercial shipping. The *Panay*, 191 feet long with a standard displacement of 474 tons, was armed with two 3-inch guns and several machine guns. Often the *Panay* would provide armed guards for Western craft traveling the river. After the Japanese invaded China, in Nov. 1937 the U.S. river gunboats evacuated most of the American Embassy staff from the capital of Nanking (now Nanjing). The *Panay* remained to take off the last Americans when the situation in Nanking became untenable.

On Dec. 11 the last Americans from the embassy came on board the *Panay*, as did several newsmen and a few foreigners. Also on board were a Japanese bombsight and several classified Japanese documents, as well as the ship's own code material. She moved upriver to avoid becoming involved in the fighting around the capital. The senior Japanese naval commander in Shanghai was informed of this movement, a precaution taken to avoid accidental attacks by Japanese forces.

On Dec. 12 Japanese naval aircraft were ordered by the Army commander in the area to attack "any and all ships" in the Yangtze above Nanking. Knowing of the presence of the *Panay* and the merchant ships, the Navy command questioned the order. Still, at 1:27 that afternoon nine Japanese naval bombers began attacking the *Panay*. The weather was good, visibility was clear, and the ship had two large American flags spread out on her awnings to aid aircraft recognition.

The aerial bombardment continued until the ship sank in shallow water at 3:54 P.M. Three U.S. sailors and an Italian on the ship were killed, and 43 other Navymen and 5 civilians were wounded. Shortly before the ship sank, Japanese officers came aboard to search the ship, apparently seeking classified material that had not been jettisoned by the crew.

A formal protest was immediately lodged with the Japanese government. The Japanese accepted responsibility, although they claimed that the attack was unintentional. The Japanese government paid an indemnity of \$2.2 million in April 1938, officially ending the incident. The U.S. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE held an urgent conference to determine what classified material might have been compromised in the *Panay*'s loss, and it was later revealed that the ship's officers had not destroyed all classified papers on board.

(On the same day as the *Panay* was sunk, two American merchant ships were attacked and Japanese Army artillery shelled the British gunboat *Ladybird* and took her into custody.)

OO PANFILOV, MAJ. GEN. ALEKSEI PAVLOVICH

(b. ? d. 1942)

Chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from July 1941 to July 1942. As a colonel he had commanded a mechanized brigade in the successful 1938 campaign against the Japanese at Lake Khasan on the Soviet-Manchurian border. He was executed during a purge in 1942. Little is known in the West about his career.

OO PÂQUES, GEORGES

see TOPAZ

OO PAROL

Russian intelligence term for password.

OO PARTY PIECE

Highly successful British Security Service (MI5) break-in (black bag job) operation against the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1955. A telephone tap on a Mayfair apartment in London, where the party membership files were known to be kept, revealed when the apartment would be empty and a latchkey left under the doormat.

MI5 operatives quickly went to the apartment and made a wax impression of the key. Then, when the occupants were away for the weekend, operatives entered the

apartment, picked the locks on file cabinets, carted away their contents to be photographed, and then carefully set them back in place.

The files—numbering 55,000 items—revealed the complete membership of the Party, recruitment techniques, and other details.

● PAVEMENT ARTIST

Intelligence slang for a tail or stakeout.

● PB4Y-2 PRIVATEER

U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft flown extensively in an ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) role at the beginning of the Cold War. A PB4Y-2 on an ELINT mission off the coast of Latvia was attacked by Soviet fighters over the Baltic Sea on April 8, 1950, the first spy-plane known to be shot down by the Soviets. That plane had a crew of ten, none of whom survived, although there were reports of some being captured by the Soviets. The plane was unarmed.

The PB4Y-2 was a version of the B-24 Liberator heavy bomber, extensively modified for maritime patrol and antisubmarine operations. The Privateer was distinguished by its tall tail fin, which replaced the familiar twin-tail configuration of the B-24. The PB4Y-2 also had a seven-foot fuselage extension forward of the wing. It was a four-engine, high-wing aircraft with distinctive gun turret “blisters” on the after fuselage. It was normally heavily armed, with 12 .50-cal. machine guns. The internal weapons bay could hold 8,000 pounds of bombs. When modified for the ELINT role, most or all of the guns were removed.

The Privateer had a maximum speed of 237 mph and a maximum range of 2,800 miles. The aircraft's crew normally numbered 11 men.

The prototype PB4Y-2, one of three B-24D bombers converted by Convair into the PB4Y-2 configuration, flew on Sept. 20, 1943. Deliveries to the fleet began in March 1944 and continued through Oct. 1945, when 736 newly built Privateers were delivered to the Navy, a few of them flown by the Marine Corps. A transport version was also produced as the RY-3, of which 46 went to the U.S. Navy and 27 to Britain. After the war the Coast Guard flew the Privateer as the P4Y-2G and several were transferred to the French Navy for the war in Indochina.

● PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, was a military catastrophe for both the Americans and Japanese. The air strike—Americans called it a “sneak” attack—killed 2,403 Americans and wounded 1,104; the U.S. Pacific Fleet was crippled, and 75 percent of the aircraft on the airfields around Pearl Harbor were destroyed. The Japanese lost only 27 carrier-based aircraft plus five midget submarines. The planes, however, did not attack the dry docks or fuel storage tanks. If these had been destroyed, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have had to shift its

base to the West Coast, seriously delaying U.S. offensive actions in the Pacific.

The attack was the most serious intelligence failure in American history. But it also demonstrated the limitations of Japanese STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, for no warning had been given to Japanese political leaders that such an attack would unify Americans against Japan and cause them to demand the destruction of the Japanese Empire.

Almost immediately, U.S. investigations began into what went wrong in the months, weeks, and hours before the attack.

U.S. intelligence organizations had provided a great deal of information that could have alerted political and military leaders to an impending attack on Pearl Harbor. But the intelligence did not add up to a warning of specific Japanese intentions. The story of ignored intelligence began in Aug. 1941, when DUSKO POPOV, a German spy who had become a DOUBLE AGENT for British intelligence, arrived in New York City from neutral Portugal. With him he carried a German espionage aid: MICRODOTS, which reduced a page of information to the size of the period ending this sentence. One of the microdots listed instructions from German intelligence, acting on a request from Japan: Go to Hawaii and get information on “Naval Strong Point Pearl Harbor.”

British intelligence officials revealed Popov’s mission to the FBI, which obtained a copy of the microdot. J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI, dismissed Popov as a “Balkan playboy” and refused to let him go to Hawaii. Hoover thus ignored the intelligence potential of the Pearl Harbor microdot.

The incident became an enduring example of how uncoordinated and unsophisticated U.S. intelligence was on the eve of America’s entry into the war. But at the same time U.S. CRYPTANALYSIS was superb. A military cryptologist team under WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN had already broken the Japanese PURPLE CODE in an operation known as MAGIC. In Nov. 1941 Japanese special envoys Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu arrived in Washington, D.C., to negotiate an easing of tension between Japan and the United States. Because of penetrations into Japanese diplomatic codes, senior U.S. officials could read communications between the envoys and Tokyo.

Acting upon Magic intercepts of Japanese messages, on Nov. 27, the Navy Department sent Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the fleet commander at Pearl Harbor, a message beginning, “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.” The dispatch said that “an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.” Also on Nov. 27, the War Department sent the Army commander in Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Walter Short, a dispatch warning “hostile action possible at any moment. If hostility cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.”

Kimmel, not wishing to arouse Hawaii’s civilian population, did not raise the fleet’s readiness status. Short, in charge of Hawaiian defenses, reacted to his warning by taking precautions against sabotage. This response stemmed from the belief that Hawaii’s Japanese and Japanese-Americans could not be trusted and in war

would turn against the United States. (The Army particularly subscribed to the fear of sabotage by people with Japanese blood. In the mid-1930s Lt. Col. George S. Patton, then chief of ARMY INTELLIGENCE in Hawaii, drew up a plan to seize 128 leaders of Hawaii's Japanese community and hold them as hostages in the event of a U.S.-Japanese war.

Short, following Army doctrine in response to a threat of sabotage, massed aircraft in wingtip-to-wingtip aggregations to make them easier to guard. Short's move also hastened the planes' destruction when Japanese planes struck at the airfields around Pearl Harbor.

Eleven days after the Dec. 7 attack, President Roosevelt appointed a board of inquiry, known as the Roberts Commission for its chairman, Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. The commission concluded its closed-door investigation on Jan. 23, 1942, and declared that Kimmel and Short had failed to exhibit the qualities expected of high command. Already relieved of their duties, they were given no new assignments, and soon retired.

The next six investigations, under Army or Navy auspices, were also secretly conducted. Not until the war ended could concern about military security give way to a resolve to air the facts about the Pearl Harbor disaster publicly. A joint congressional investigation began on Nov. 15, 1945, and continued through six months of hearings that produced 15,000 pages of testimony.

Both the majority and minority reports issued in July 1946 again put the primary blame on Kimmel and Short. This time the reasons for the conclusion were specific: The admiral and general had failed to heed the warnings sent to them from Washington; they had failed to alert their forces properly; they had not coordinated what defenses they did mount; they had not employed their personnel and equipment as well as they should have in anticipating the attack or in defending against it. The committee concluded that Kimmel and Short had made "errors of judgment" and were not guilty of "dereliction of duty."

The congressional investigation did not end the questions about Pearl Harbor. In 1945 U.S. codebreaking was still not fully revealed; many Magic intercepts would not be declassified for decades. In 1945, with many careers not yet ended, the bickering between military intelligence bureaucracies continued to obscure what was known by whom—and when it was known.

The Navy had set up a network of radio interception stations to monitor Japanese military communications (see NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE). Communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii were considered low priority because they contained so many messages that were entirely commercial. One such message, sent to the consulate on Sept. 24, 1941, should have received more attention. It divided Pearl Harbor into five sectors and requested that the location of warships be indicated on a grid of the harbor. In later investigations, this became known as the "bomb plot" message; *plot* meant "grid," not "conspiracy," but the true definition was lost in the quest for conspiracy. Unknown to U.S.

codebreakers, it was addressed to TAKEO YOSHIKAWA, a Japanese Navy spy working under COVER as a vice consul.

Distribution of decrypted Japanese messages was irregular. Many were routinely available in the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and to senior people in Washington, but not at the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

Looming over all the investigations and conspiracy theories was a general misunderstanding of just what "warnings" had gone to the military commanders at Pearl Harbor. As Roberta Wohlstetter, in her lucid and penetrating book *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (1962), pointed out, "There is a difference . . . between having a signal available somewhere in the heap of irrelevancies, and perceiving it as a warning; and there is also a difference between perceiving it as a warning, and acting or getting action on it. The distinctions, simple as they are, illuminate the obscurity shrouding this moment in history."

The Nov. 27 warnings to Kimmel and Short had been preceded by other warnings going back to at least April. But warnings about war were not warnings about an attack on Pearl Harbor. Neither in Washington nor in Pearl Harbor was there unqualified expectation of an attack at Pearl Harbor.

Kimmel and Short were denied access to the intelligence community's highly secret decryptions of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. The intelligence bureaucracies wanted to hold tightly the secrets their codebreaking unveiled. Magic was guarded so zealously that few people ever saw an original message. The war warnings might have been better understood by Kimmel and Short if they had seen the diplomatic messages. But it does not seem likely that higher-grade intelligence would have changed their perceptions of how to respond.

One specific intercepted Tokyo-Washington message said that if Japan-U.S. relations were "in danger," Tokyo would broadcast on feigned weather broadcasts the words "east wind rain." Conspiracy theorists contend that the words were broadcast on Dec. 5, but, mysteriously, the "warning" was not given to Kimmel and Short. In fact, according to the congressional report, Wohlstetter's research, and other studies, there is no evidence that such a message was ever transmitted.

The Pearl Harbor attack cast a long shadow over future U.S. intelligence activities. After World War II, when the U.S. armed forces' focus was on the Soviet Union, strategists worried about a "Pearl Harbor attack," usually referred to as "a bolt from the blue." This fear and the need to integrate fully all available intelligence was a key factor in President Truman's decision in 1947 to create the CIA.

The Rand Corp., created by the newly established U.S. Air Force to analyze strategic concepts, developed surprise-attack scenarios. In the late 1950s Roberta Wohlstetter, then a Rand consultant, began writing her book about the Pearl Harbor attack. All her sources were unclassified, most of them being the 39 volumes of congressional hearings published in 1946. According to the terms of her SECURITY CLEARANCE, she had to submit her manuscript to the Department of Defense for review.

From there it went to NSA—which classified it and ordered all copies of the manuscript destroyed. When she asked why, the answer was that she did not have sufficient clearance to be told.

By way of possible explanation, she later said, "If something is written about codes, they [NSA] get uptight." Another possibility, she said, was that her conclusion—leaders were hampered by too much information, too much "noise"—did not coincide with one Pentagon official's belief in the theory that President Roosevelt had known about the Japanese attack in advance and had allowed the Japanese to strike. "So he sent the manuscript to the agency where they classify everything," she said. Not until the Kennedy administration brought a new leadership into the Pentagon in Jan. 1961 was the book cleared for publication.

When *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* finally appeared, it received stellar reviews. It remains a classic examination of the Pearl Harbor attack—as well as a primer on how, even in the best of intelligence worlds, things can go wrong. "We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it," Wohlstetter concluded. "No magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work without it."

● PELTON, RONALD W.

Former NSA intelligence analyst who sold the Soviet Union his incredibly detailed recollections of what he had learned during 14 years at the U.S. electronic espionage agency.

Pelton attended Indiana University, where he took a one-year Russian-language course. He joined the U.S. Air Force in 1960 and was sent to Pakistan, where he was assigned to a SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE agency, eavesdropping on Soviet communications. After being discharged in 1964, he worked for a time as a television repairman and then went to work at the NSA in 1965.

Pelton's capture and conviction as a spy brought to its conclusion a tantalizing case that began when an FBI telephone tap picked up a call to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 14, 1980. The caller told a Soviet diplomat, "I come from—I, I, I am in, with the United States Government."

"Ah, huh, United States Government. . . . Maybe you can visit," the diplomat said.

The caller agreed to go to the embassy the next night—"so that it will be dark when I come in."

But at 2:32 p.m. on Jan. 15, the caller phoned the embassy and said he would be there in two minutes. The FBI had expected more warning. "We saw him go in, saw his back side, and we could not identify his exit," FBI director WILLIAM H. WEBSTER said later.

The tape of the calls was filed away, and nothing more on the case developed until Aug. 1985, when VITALY YURCHENKO, a KGB officer, defected to the United States. He redefected three months later, but among the bits of information he gave was a remark about having met a former NSA employee in Washington, D.C., in 1980. When FBI agents interviewed Yurchenko, they

learned that the man had red hair. Starting with a list of about 500 names, FBI agents found a few suspects. The trail led them to Pelton when NSA employees identified his voice on the 1980 tape.

Pelton had worked as an intelligence analyst for NSA for 14 years by 1979. He had piled up so many debts that he was forced to declare bankruptcy. Knowing that this could endanger his SECURITY CLEARANCE for SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION relating to signals intelligence, he resigned. A few months later he dialed the Soviet Embassy and became a WALK-IN.

He showed Yurchenko proof of his former NSA employment and demonstrated what coworkers at NSA called a photographic memory, an ability to summon up bits of information from many sources and produce a mosaic of intelligence. Pelton was the author of an NSA eavesdropping encyclopedia that listed some 60 Soviet signals that the agency's listening posts regularly intercepted, analyzed, and decrypted.

Yurchenko accepted Pelton as a genuine walk-in and listened to his major disclosure: The United States was using SUBMARINES to tap an underwater communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk between Soviet installations on the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Soviet eastern coast. The project was code-named IVY BELLS.


A bearded Pelton had entered the embassy through the front door. Yurchenko had him shave off his beard. Dressed in bulky work clothes, Pelton slipped out of a side door with a group of Soviet employees. The group entered the van that regularly shuttled workers between the embassy and an apartment complex used as a Soviet residence.

On Oct. 15 the FBI got permission from the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT for electronic SURVEILLANCE. Agents tapped Pelton's business phone and the phone on his girlfriend's apartment in the Georgetown section of Washington, and put a BUG in the apartment and an electronic tracking pod on Pelton's car. No incriminating information turned up on the taps. All the FBI had was a voice on a tape and a recollection from a Soviet defector who redefected.

All the FBI could do was try to make Pelton incriminate himself. On Nov. 24, Pelton agreed to talk to FBI agents David Faulkner and Dudley Hodgson, who played him the tape of the 1980 conversations with someone at the Soviet Embassy. Thinking that the FBI wanted him to become a DOUBLE AGENT, he cautiously talked about co-operating. Pelton said he had gone to VIENNA in April 1985, but the person he was supposed to meet had not appeared. Quite casually Hodgson asked how much money was involved. Caught off-guard, Pelton replied that he could not remember whether the amount was \$30,000 or \$35,000 in addition to about \$5,000 in expense money.

Pelton rattled on about his meetings in Vienna, saying that he spent as long as eight hours a day, three or four days at time, writing answers to written questions about the NSA.

Arrested on the basis of what he told the FBI agents, Pelton was indicted for espionage and put on trial. Ironically, he had to agree, for the good of the country, not to



Ronald Pelton.

reveal in court the secrets he was accused of selling to the Soviet Union. He agreed not to use any of the NSA CODE NAMES for the projects he had worked on, sold to the Soviets, or discussed with the FBI. He could look at the FBI report that recounted his conversation with Faulkner and Hodgson. The report itself was classified.

Although there was no evidence other than the conversation with the agents, a jury found him guilty in June 1986. The judge, saying that Pelton's sellout had done

"inestimable damage," sentenced him to three concurrent life sentences.

OO PENETRATION

The recruitment of AGENTS from within, or the planting of agents or monitoring devices (bugs) within a TARGET organization to gain access to its secrets or to influence its activities.

●● PENKOVSKY, COL. OLEG

(b. 1919 d. 1963)

Officer of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, who, as a DEFECTOR IN PLACE, passed secrets to the United States and Britain from April 1961 until Aug. 1962. Information he supplied during the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS helped President Kennedy assess Soviet intentions.

The son of a czarist army officer who had fought the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War (1917–1920), Penkovsky attended an artillery school, was commissioned as an officer in the Red Army in 1939, and fought briefly in Jan. 1940 during the Soviet war against Finland. After the German invasion of June 1941, he was stationed in Moscow as a political officer with some intelligence duties. He volunteered for combat and served in antitank units in the 1944–1945 campaigns against the Germans. Immediately after the war he married a general's daughter. In 1948 Penkovsky graduated from the two year course at the Frunze Military Academy (i.e., war college), where he learned English, and was then sent to the Military-Diplomatic Academy to study STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

In 1955 he went to Turkey as assistant military ATTACHÉ. Angry about his treatment by a superior, he anonymously reported him to Turkish intelligence. This was a mild foreshadowing of what he would later do as a spy for the West. Again posted to Moscow, in 1958–1959 he was sent to the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy for a course on rockets and missiles. Penkovsky hoped to return to a combat unit, but was kept in the GRU and was scheduled for attaché assignment in India. But his father's anti-Bolshevik past still haunted his career, and he was not sent. Penkovsky's defection was fueled by resentment over the way he was being treated.

Penkovsky's attempts to make contact with Westerners were frustrating. One night in Aug. 1960, he handed a letter to two American tourists in Moscow and asked them to get it to the U.S. Embassy. "I have at my disposal very important materials on many subjects of exceptionally great interest and importance to your government," the letter said. "I wish to pass these materials to you immediately...." Although he did not sign the letter, he provided enough clues for CIA analysts to identify him as Penkovsky, who had made friends with an American officer when both were military attachés in Turkey.

The CIA tried unsuccessfully to make contact, through a nervous, inexperienced INTELLIGENCE OFFICER operating under thin diplomatic COVER at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Then Penkovsky approached British and Canadian businessmen in Moscow. Penkovsky's GRU assignment was liaison between Western businessmen and the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work. In the ranks of both the businessmen and the Soviets were intelligence officers trying to exploit East-West contacts, which were then rare. Penkovsky by this time was a full colonel working under cover on the committee.

The British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) had learned of Penkovsky's approach to a British businessman who had an informal relationship with MI6. Offi-

cials in both MI6 and the CIA were split over whether Penkovsky was an AGENT PROVOCATEUR. Complicating matters was the fact that the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING had deeply penetrated the British intelligence establishment; HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY was suspected by some American and British officials and could give away a defector in place.

Although the Americans still distrusted British security, they also did not want to use the U.S. Embassy in Moscow as an outpost for running Penkovsky; the State Department did not countenance elaborate intelligence operations. RICHARD HELMS, the CIA's director of clandestine operations, decided that the CIA and MI6 should try to run Penkovsky jointly. Meanwhile, Penkovsky had given GREVILLE M. WYNNE, a British businessman, a packet, which Wynne delivered to the British Embassy, and a letter, which Wynne carried when he flew out of Moscow in April 1961.

A few days later, Penkovsky arrived in London as head of a delegation from the Soviet research committee. A complex system was set up for running Penkovsky: a CIA-MI6 team, operating out of London, would run Penkovsky; Wynne, acting as a COURIER between London and Moscow, would be the CUTOUT to MI6. In the first CIA-MI6 debriefing, Penkovsky suggested that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev might soon send missiles to Cuba, which had just successfully repulsed an American-sponsored invasion. (See CUBA.) His reports on specific Soviet weapons and military matters—code-named IRON-BARK—astonished his debriefers.

His CIA-MI6 HANDLERS stroked his ego, photographing him in the uniforms of the U.S. Army and the British Army with the insignia of colonel. The CIA gave him the CODE NAME Hero; to MI6 he was Yoga.

Penkovsky had long lists of gifts that he wanted for himself, his wife and children, and influential friends—from ballpoint pens and watch straps to 60-year-old cognac and a ladies' gold watch. "I consider, as your soldier, that my place during these troubled times is on the front line," he said in a letter to ALLEN W. DULLES the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. "I must remain on this front line in order to be your eyes and ears. . . ."

The intelligence services first obtained information from him by exhaustive debriefing sessions on his trips leading the committee delegation to London and Paris. In Moscow, exchanges of material took place in parks and doorways, where he met Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of Roderick Chisholm, an MI6 officer under cover at the British Embassy. The mother of three children, she had been an MI6 secretary before she married. Her children and her visits with them to a park were her cover. There were also exchanges between a CIA officer under cover in the U.S. Embassy. Penkovsky's handlers gave him a camera, rolls of film, and instructions; he gave them exposed rolls of films and documents he had hand-copied.

He produced so much material that the CIA set up a team of 20 translators and analysts to handle it; MI6 had ten officers working on the documents Penkovsky photographed. The CIA gave President Kennedy information from Penkovsky, believing that he was providing the thoughts and plans of Soviet military and political leaders.

In the summer of 1961, Penkovsky sent word that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was planning to declare a separate peace with East Germany, setting off a crisis over divided BERLIN. Penkovsky was right, although Khrushchev did not carry out the threat. The spy also provided photographs of documents describing Soviet missiles and showing that Khrushchev's boasts of missile production had been exaggerated.

The "missile gap" was not what Kennedy thought it was: There were far more U.S. missiles than Soviet ones. The CIA's BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES in the fall of 1961 lowered the number of nuclear missiles, using Penkovsky's information and photographs from a new source of intelligence, SATELLITES.

When the Cuban missile crisis erupted in the fall of 1962, U-2 spyplanes flying over Cuba photographed suspected missile sites. Analysts checked the photos against manuals on SS-4 medium-range missiles provided by Penkovsky, gave to President Kennedy "unmistakable evidence" of missiles in Cuba when he made his brink-of-war speech to the nation on Oct. 22.

The CIA was so convinced of Penkovsky's high-level access that he was given specific instructions on how to signal if he knew that the Soviet government "intends to go to war." He had set up a DEAD DROP for important exchanges in the foyer of a Moscow building (see TRADE-CRAFT). On Nov. 2, 1961, a CIA officer at the U.S. Embassy received a telephone signal—a "silent call"—that an urgent message had been left at the dead drop. When the officer was reaching for the drop, he was seized by four KGB men and arrested.

The officer, protected by diplomatic immunity, was expelled. Wynne was arrested in Budapest on Nov. 2 and turned over to KGB officers who flew him to Moscow and jailed him in the LUBYANKA. Penkovsky had been arrested on Oct. 22, unknown to Western intelligence.

At a show trial in May 1963, Penkovsky's espionage was fully revealed, as was Wynne's courier work. Penkovsky was sentenced to death, Wynne to three years in prison and five in a labor camp. Penkovsky's execution was announced on May 17, 1963. In April 1964 Wynne was exchanged in a SPY SWAP for GORDON LONSDALE and Peter and Helen Kroger (see MORRIS COHEN).

After Penkovsky's death, the CIA decided to make some of his revelations public in a BLACK PROPAGANDA operation that would reveal Soviet intentions but not reveal that the CIA was the source. PETER DERIABIN, a KGB COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officer who had defected in 1954, had become a CIA consultant. Deriabin, who had once worked for Penkovsky's father-in-law, edited the transcripts of Penkovsky's taped debriefings in London and Paris. A CIA-censored version of the transcripts was given to Frank Gibney, a former *Life* magazine writer and *Newsweek* editor. Gibney, who had collaborated with Deriabin on *The Secret World* (1959), was writing speeches for President Johnson in the summer of 1964 when he got the sanitized transcripts.

Given assurances by a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL aide that the book was "in the national interest," Doubleday published *The Penkovsky Papers* (1965), a best-seller, with editions in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden,

Korea, and Japan. Deriabin was credited as the translator, but the CIA provenance was not acknowledged. In a preface to a 1982 edition of the book Gibney revealed its CIA origins.

The subjects addressed by Penkovsky ranged far and wide; in *The Penkovsky Papers* his "edited" commentary included the "missile gap":

Khrushchev often boasts about the Soviet missiles or spreads all kind of propaganda about them. Often a new-model missile is still only in the testing stage—in fact, the tests may have proved unsuccessful—but there he is, already screaming to the entire world about his "achievements" in new types of Soviet weapons. The idea of Khrushchev and the Presidium of the Central Committee is to demonstrate somehow Soviet supremacy in the nuclear field by any possible means: by launching new *sputniks*, by nuclear explosions, etc.

On the Soviet system the Penkovsky account declares:

I am joining the ranks of those who are actively fighting against our rotten, two-faced regime, known by the name of Dictatorship of the Proletariat or Soviet Power. Yes, it is a dictatorship, not of the Proletariat, but of a small group of persons. It deceives my countrymen while they, being innocent, give their lives for this dictatorship, without knowing the entire truth. And they will probably never learn it, unless I or people like myself tell them the truth. . . . I am joining the ranks of a new army, the true people's army. I know that I am not alone; we are many. But we are still afraid of each other and we act only as individuals.

Penkovsky spoke to debriefers for some 140 hours, producing about 1,200 pages of transcripts. He delivered 111 rolls of film. A CIA assessment said that this was "the most productive classic clandestine operation ever conducted by CIA or MI6 against the Soviet target." Other evaluations were less enthusiastic. JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, the CIA counterintelligence chief, called Penkovsky "an anarchist and a crank who for some obscure reason is trying to get us into a war with Russia." Penkovsky had suggested, in his initial meeting with the CIA-MI6 team, that the West hide tactical atomic bombs in certain places in Moscow and, if a war started, detonate them to wipe out key Soviet officials. There was also speculation about the authenticity of Penkovsky's defection. But any doubt about the Soviet view of his espionage was dispelled when IVAN SEROV, head of the GRU, was demoted to major general and fired; he reportedly killed himself. Some 300 GRU and KGB officers and military officers were recalled, and a purge reached down as far as officers in artillery and rocket units. Author JOHN LE CARRÉ, often cynical about intelligence accomplishments, gave this assessment: "The information which Penkovsky provided and Wynne purveyed led, there is little doubt, to the greatest moral defeat suffered by either side in the cold war: Khrushchev's decision to withdraw his rockets from Cuba."

Responsibility for the betrayal of Penkovsky has never been publicly acknowledged by Western intelligence officials.

At the time Penkovsky was nearing exposure there were at least two Soviet spies operating in Britain: JOHN VASSALL and FRANK BOSSARD. While there is no evidence that they had direct knowledge of the Penkovsky case, they could have picked up a rumor and could have reported the sudden series of CIA-MI6 meetings in London.

As Deriabin and Jerrold L. Schecter point out in *The Spy Who Saved the World* (1992), still another Soviet spy in British intelligence, GEORGE BLAKE, may have provided the Soviets with the key years before. Blake had served with Charles R. Chisholm in Berlin and would have told the Soviets that he was an MI6 intelligence officer.

The KGB put both Chisholm and his wife under surveillance as soon as Chisholm was posted to the British Embassy in Moscow. A Soviet counterintelligence officer, quoted anonymously in the book, said, "Twice, at the end of 1961 and in 1962 [Soviet] Counterintelligence saw Mrs. Chisholm, while walking, stop to enter the entrances of apartment houses. Soon they saw a stranger nearby who appeared to be very nervous and trying to discover if there was surveillance of him. . . . That stranger was Penkovsky." The officer then showed a videotape of Chisholm-Penkovsky meetings. The KGB had suspected Penkovsky for months before his arrest, but for reasons still unknown he was allowed to continue spying for the West.

OO PENTAGON PAPERS

More than 4,000 pages of official documents that detail the start of United States involvement in the Vietnam War (see VIETNAM). The "papers" were excerpts from an official, 7,000-page study that included many TOP SECRET and SECRET documents. A photocopied version of the study had been given to *The New York Times* by Daniel Ellsberg, a former Department of Defense official. (*The Washington Post* later also obtained a copy of the study.)

Ellsberg had transferred from the Pentagon to the State Department to become an adviser at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the Johnson administration. In Vietnam he worked for EDWARD G. LANSDALE, a CIA officer who considered Ellsberg a supporter of the war. In 1969, he returned to the Rand Corp., which did secret work for the Department of Defense. Ellsberg, a hawk who had become disillusioned over the war, was indicted for espionage and conspiracy, as was a fellow Rand worker, Anthony Russo. The charges were later dismissed by a federal judge because of government misconduct.

The Pentagon Papers cover American involvement in Vietnam from the early 1940s to March 1968. Considerable material on U.S. intelligence operations in Southeast Asia is included in the papers. The papers are based on an eighteen-month Department of Defense effort, including access to CIA and State Department files, to document the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The study was initiated by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in June 1967.

When *The New York Times* began publishing the papers on June 13, 1971, President Nixon initially did not object to their publication, as they mostly reflected actions undertaken by earlier, Democratic administrations. However, his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, persuaded Nixon to oppose the revelation of past U.S. diplomatic secrets because of the impact such an act would have on future American relations with foreign nations.

When the government succeeded in delaying newspaper publication, Sen. Mike Gravel convened a special meeting of his Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on the night of June 29, 1971, and entered the papers—all 4,100 pages—into the official record of the subcommittee. This act placed them in the public domain. Subsequently the *Post*, *Times*, and other newspapers continued publishing excerpts from the Pentagon Papers. They were later commercially published in book form in four volumes. Gravel wrote in his introduction to the volumes:

No one who reads this study can fail to conclude that, had the true facts been made known earlier, the war would long ago have ended, and the needless deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans and Vietnamese would have been averted. This is the great lesson of the Pentagon Papers. No greater argument against unchecked secrecy in government can be found in the annals of American history.

The Pentagon Papers tell of the purposeful withholding and distortion of facts. There are no military secrets to be found here, only an appalling litany of faulty premises and questionable objectives, built one upon the other over the course of four administrations, and perpetuated today by a fifth administration.

The Pentagon Papers show that we have created, in the last quarter century, a new culture, a national security culture, protected from the influences of American life by the shield of secrecy.

OO PERFORATED SHEET

Piece of paper with about 1,000 holes cut according to a predetermined pattern used to work out settings for the ENIGMA CIPHER machine prior to the development of the BOMBA and BOMBE calculating machines.

OO PERI, MICHAEL A.

Former U.S. Army ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE specialist who in 1989 pleaded guilty to committing espionage while he was stationed in West Germany as an intelligence specialist in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the U.S. Army's V Corps. Authorities said that Peri defected to East Germany with classified computer equipment—and then returned less than a month later.

"I really didn't have a plan," Peri said at a hearing on the charges. "My primary reason was to leave behind all the frustrations and problems at work. Everything had

been wrong. I wasn't enjoying myself. I wanted to start over somewhere else."

Peri was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

●● PERKINS, MASTER SGT. WALTER T.

U.S. Air Force intelligence specialist who was arrested in 1971 on his way to deliver TOP SECRET air defense plans to a KGB officer in Mexico.

Perkins was stationed at the Air Defense Weapons Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., when he made the offer. His contact with the Soviets was detected by U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officials.

Perkins said he had thought that he could swap secret documents for American prisoners of war in North Vietnam. In a prosecution conducted by the Air Force, he was sentenced to three years in prison.

●● PETERSEN, JOSEPH S., JR. (b. 1914)

NSA codebreaker who provided documents to the Netherlands.

A graduate of Loyola University with a master's degree in science from St. Louis University, Petersen spent most of World War II as an Army specialist in CRYPTANALYSIS under WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN, working on Japanese diplomatic CODES. He became friendly with Col. J. A. Verkuyl, a Dutch liaison officer who was also a cryptologist.

After the war Petersen joined the ARMY SECURITY AGENCY (which became the NSA in 1952) and sent Verkuyl concepts about cryptology that Petersen thought might be helpful to Dutch government cryptologists. He also sent information on how U.S. codebreakers had penetrated Dutch codes and CIPHERS. NSA security learned of Petersen's correspondence with the Dutch, and on Oct. 1, 1954, he was fired. Eight days later he was arrested—the first person to be charged with violating a new federal statute protecting COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

Petersen pleaded guilty to violating the statute, thus keeping sensitive cryptologic information from being aired in a trial. Sentenced to seven years in prison, he was released on parole in 1958.

●● PETERSON, MARTHA

CASE OFFICER for the CIA arrested by the KGB in 1977 while she was serving under diplomatic COVER in Moscow.

Peterson, listed as a vice consul in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was caught servicing a DEAD DROP used by ALEKSANDR D. OGRODNIK (who had been discovered and apparently used the drop while under SURVEILLANCE). When Peterson was arrested the United States, following diplomatic custom, did not acknowledge her guilt but did acquiesce in her expulsion the day after her arrest.

CIA officials privately expressed outrage at the rough way in which KGB interrogators had handled Peterson. "She was not shown the usual courtesy expected by an intelligence officer," a retired CIA officer recalled. "They roughed her up—not injuring her, but playing

rough." CIA debriefers later speculated that Peterson, whose husband also worked at the embassy, had embarrassed the KGB embassy watchers, who had not spotted her as an intelligence officer. When they belatedly did so, they took out their anger and frustration on her. "Unlike many intelligence officers," the retired CIA man said, "she had been 'living her cover' closely, working as a consular official, mostly on visa applications. People figured that the KGB had not spotted her as an intelligence officer for a long while, and someone was mad as hell."

The Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*, in a long report on Peterson, said that her dead drop was a crevice in a bridge over the Moscow River near the Luzhniki sports stadium. She was portrayed depositing gold, Russian currency, and cameras. The newspaper also claimed that she had left ampules of poison to be used by one of her agents to kill a Soviet citizen who was impeding CIA espionage. (Ironically, Ogorodnik, while under questioning, killed himself with poison.) Accompanying the story was a photograph showing her with a U.S. Embassy official at a table spread with the objects said to have been found in the dead drop.

●● PETRIE, SIR DAVID (b. 1879 d. 1961)

Director-General of the British Security Service (MI5) during most of World War II.

Petrie began his career in the Indian Police, becoming assistant director of criminal intelligence. He was director of the Indian Intelligence Bureau from 1924 to 1931. Although his intelligence experience was confined to India, in 1940 Prime Minister Winston Churchill chose him to succeed Maj. Gen. Sir VERNON KELL, the founder and first head of MI5. Churchill had an unfounded belief that Britain was infested with saboteurs and subversives known collectively as the FIFTH COLUMN.

Churchill fired Kell after MI5 failed to find fifth columnists. The firing was triggered by an explosion of a gunpowder factory in Waltham Abbey in Jan. 1940. The explosion was later judged to be an accident, not an act of sabotage. When he was appointed, Petrie was given a three-tier commission—2nd lieutenant, acting colonel, and local brigadier—in the Army Intelligence Corps.

Petrie recruited intellectuals, eccentrics, and a motley crew of wartime operatives who performed brilliantly. Under him, the DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM was developed—a scheme that TURNED German AGENTS, who sent a stream of false intelligence to the the ABWEHR, German MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, while under MI5 control.

Petrie reorganized MI5 and brought in technical expertise. He also established a closer liaison with the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). He served until April 1946.

●● PETROV, VLADIMIR M.

A senior KGB officer who defected in Australia in April 1954. Under questioning by the Australian INTELLI-

GENCE OFFICERS, he gave details about the 1951 escape of British DEFECTORS DONALD MACLEAN and GUY BURGESS. Petrov said a THIRD MAN was involved, and British newspapers seized on the term, eventually pinning the label on HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY.

Petrov joined Soviet intelligence (OGPU) in 1933 as a CIPHER clerk. During World War II he was stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, and in 1951 he was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Australia.

After the execution of LAVRENTY BERIA in Dec. 1953, Petrov had been implicated in Beria's plot to seize control of the Soviet government following the death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. When Petrov was recalled to Moscow, he defected while in Sydney. He exposed the Soviet espionage NETWORK in Australia, as well as details about Soviet CRYPTOLOGY.

●● PFIAB

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

●● PHELIPPE, THOMAS

CIPHER and CODE expert in the employment of Sir FRANCIS WALSINGHAM, who ran an extensive intelligence organization for Queen Elizabeth I.

England's first great cryptologist, as early as 1538 he was in Paris working for Walsingham, corresponding with Walsingham's spies and breaking into secret communications that were sent to him. He created secure ciphers and codes for English AGENTS and broke those of state enemies, including those used by supporters of Mary Stuart (Queen of Scots). He was skilled in solving ciphers originally written in French, Italian, Latin, and—to a limited extent—in Spanish as well as English.

The only known physical description of Phelippes was written by Mary Stuart; she described him as having blonde hair and a beard, and being "of low stature, slender every way, eated in the face with small pocks, of short sight, thirty years of age by appearance."

Ironically, it was probably Phelippes' work that brought about the death of Mary Stuart. Walsingham, through his spies and interception of Mary Stuart's mail, was able to learn of a plot to assassinate Queen Elizabeth. But Walsingham lacked the names of the six young men who were to kill the queen. A letter sent by Mary Stuart on July 17, 1586, to one of her former pages, ANTHONY BABINGTON, was intercepted by Walsingham and found to contain an enciphered message.

Walsingham apparently had Phelippes add a postscript before it was resealed and sent on to Babington. The postscript—in the same cipher—asked for "the names and qualities of the six gentlemen which are to accomplish the designment."

Walsingham, however, decided to arrest Babington before he could respond. Babington and the six young men fled but were caught and condemned to death within a month. The letters that Phelippes had deciphered were used to convict Mary Stuart, who was convicted of high

Philby, Harold A. R. (Kim)

treason. She was beheaded on Feb. 8, 1587. American historian DAVID KAHN wrote in *The Codebreakers* (1968):

There seems little doubt that [Mary Stuart] would have died before her time, the politics of the day being what they were. But there seems equally little doubt that cryptology hastened her unnatural end.

●● PHILBY, HAROLD A. R. (KIM)

(b. 1912 d. 1988)

Master Soviet spy who served as a longtime MOLE in British intelligence, betraying his country, his class, and countless victims of Cold War operations that he divulged. The THIRD MAN in the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING, he met two other members—GUY BURGESS and DONALD MACLEAN—at Cambridge in the 1930s. (See also ANTHONY BLUNT and JOHN CAIRNCROSS.)

He was the son of Harry St. John Philby, an explorer and adventurer who went to India as assistant commissioner in the Punjab and married there in 1910. Philby's best man was Lt. Bernard Montgomery, who later became one of the most famous British generals of World War II. (For a time in that war, St. John Philby, an

Harold (Kim) Philby. (UPI/BETTMAN)



avowed fascist, would be interned as a potential enemy of Britain.)

During World War I, before Iraq became a country, the ancient land was still known as Mesopotamia. British MILITARY INTELLIGENCE sent St. John Philby into "Mespot," as the British called it, to pit the tribesmen of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia against tribes that favored the Turks. He succeeded brilliantly, becoming a confidant of King Ibn Saud. He was considered an "honorable correspondent"—one of a number of upper-class Britons who provided information, or even went on missions, for Britain's MI6.

The Philbys' first child, Harold Adrian Russell Philby, was born in India. He was nicknamed KIM, after Rudyard Kipling's spy hero. Philby attended his father's school, Westminster, and in 1929 went to Trinity College, Cambridge, to read history before taking the civil service examination. At Cambridge he was recruited by Soviet intelligence. "I was given the assignment to infiltrate COUNTERESPIONAGE however long it took," he later wrote. ". . . How, where, and when I became a member of the Soviet intelligence service is a matter for myself and my comrades."

He left Cambridge in 1933 and went to VIENNA, where on Feb. 24, 1934, he married Alice ("Litzi") Friedman, a communist being hunted down by the police. By marrying Philby she received a British passport. At the time, Philby was portraying himself as an anticommunist and a supporter of General Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War. But he had made many friends among the communists and socialists in Vienna.

After a stint of writing for a liberal monthly, Philby continued his journalistic career by covering the Spanish Civil War for *The Times* of London. He was with the Nationalist forces of Franco and presented himself publicly as pro-fascist. He left Spain in 1939 and separated from Litzi because he was developing a new right-wing image and could not have a communist wife.

Philby claimed that after Spain he was again recruited for espionage work—this time by MI6. But according to British intelligence sources, Philby applied to get into MI6 and was aided by his father, who contacted "C," traditionally anonymous head of the Secret Intelligence Service (Sir STEWART MENZIES at the time). Despite the security problems that his marriage might cause, Philby was accepted into the intelligence service. In Sept. 1941 he was offered an executive post in Section V, the counterespionage part of SIS, "the heart of the secret world," as he described it.

Taking command of the Iberian subsection of Section V, he worked closely during the war with the SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE (SOE), which ran resistance groups and guerrilla activities in German-occupied countries. Among his agents were MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE and GRAHAM GREENE. Philby's performance in directing operations in Spain, Portugal, North Africa, and Italy won him high praise. Menzies took a liking to him. Fellow officers speculated that he might someday become C.

In Oct. 1944 he was assigned to head a new part of SIS, Section IX, which was to out communist penetration AGENTS. His appointment, Philby later wrote, "by any-

one's standards was a grotesque mistake to make." In 18 months Philby expanded the one-man, one-room section into a department that filled a whole floor and employed more than 30 people.

Philby came perilously close to being unmasked in Aug. 1945, when KONSTANTIN VOLKOV, an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER for the NKVD became a DEFECTOR. Volkov, whose COVER was vice consul at the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul, contacted his opposite number at the British Consulate and offered information on Soviet moles in the British government. He said two were in the Foreign Office and one was head of a counterintelligence agency in London. He warned that neither his information nor his offer to defect should be cabled to London because the Soviets had broken the British diplomatic CODES (which was not true).

Volkov's claim about moles was sent to London by diplomatic pouch and arrived a week later at MI6, reaching the desk of Philby—who realized that he was one of the moles Volkov was about to name. "I stared at the papers rather longer than necessary to compose my thoughts," Philby later wrote in his self-serving memoir, *My Silent War* (1968). Through a combination of luck and conniving, Philby managed to replace another intelligence officer who was to have gone to Istanbul. By the time Philby got to Istanbul, Volkov had vanished and was never heard of again. Apparently, Philby had contacted his Soviet HANDLER in London to pass on the information about Volkov's defection, dooming the would-be defector to execution.

Philby had better control of the situation when another defection occurred in Sept. 1945. IGOR GOUZENKO, a CIPHER clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, defected and began telling Canadian intelligence officials what he knew. While Gouzenko was being debriefed in Canada, the MI6 officer attending the briefing sent his daily reports to Philby, who was able to pass what Gouzenko was telling to the Soviets. Although Gouzenko's information led to the exposure of Col. NIKOLAI ZABOTIN, ALLAN NUNN MAY, and others, Philby escaped exposure.

In 1945 Philby received the Order of the British Empire for his wartime intelligence work. He had been nominated by Menzies. On the way back from Buckingham Palace after the investiture, Philby remarked to his companion, JAMES JESUS ANGLETON of the CIA, "What this country needs is a good stiff dose of socialism." As Angleton later recounted, he was stunned by the remark and filed it away.

In 1946, Philby married Aileen Furse, whom he had met in 1940 and with whom he had been living for some time. She had worked at BLETCHLEY PARK. They had three children while they lived together, and Aileen was pregnant when they married. (To marry, Philby had to be divorced from Litzi Friedman. MI5 tracked her down to East BERLIN, where she was living with a Soviet agent; she herself had spied for the Soviets while she lived in Britain. Knowledge of Litzi's background did not affect Philby's security clearance.)

At the end of 1946 Philby was posted to Istanbul as MI6 chief there to get field experience. During his two years in Turkey he sent some agents into Soviet

Turkestan, to their doom. While in Istanbul, he was asked by his Soviet handler about an FBI investigation involving the British Embassy in Washington. This was an oblique reference to what had been triggered by an operation code-named VENONA, to break Soviet coded messages intercepted some time before. Decryption had indicated that a Soviet spy was working in the British Embassy.

After two years in Istanbul, Philby was sent to Washington, D.C., as MI6 liaison officer to the CIA and the FBI, one of the most sensitive postings in British intelligence. This, he later wrote, was "the era" of a spy roster he named—ALGER HISS, JUDITH COPLON, KLAUS FUCHS, HARRY GOLD, DAVID GREENGLASS, "and the brave" JULIUS [and Ethel] ROSENBERG. Philby was also liaison officer to Canadian intelligence, enabling him to keep track of the ongoing investigations prompted by Gouzenko's disclosures.

Prior to his departure for Washington in 1949 Philby was briefed by Sir MAURICE OLDFIELD, who now had Philby's old job as head of Section IX. Oldfield told Philby about the Venona operation and also about the ATOMIC SPY RING investigation.

In Washington he was given relatively unencumbered access to U.S. intelligence agencies (but not U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, which was shared with the British through another channel). Philby became a particular confidant of Angleton, who by then was head of the CIA's Office of Strategic Operations. The two men met weekly to exchange secrets over lunch at Harvey's restaurant in Washington (a place also favored, coincidentally, by J. EDGAR HOOVER). "Our close association was, I am sure, inspired by genuine friendliness on both sides," Philby later wrote. "Our discussions ranged over the whole world. . . . Who gained most from this complex game I cannot say. But I had one big advantage. I knew what he was doing for the CIA, and he knew what I was doing for SIS. But the real nature of my interest was something he did not know."

Earlier in his career, Angleton had served with the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) in Rome. There he had met Teddy Kollek, who was conducting Rome-to-Palestine missions for what would become Israeli intelligence. Kollek had been in Vienna in 1934, when Philby married Litzi Friedman, and may have witnessed the wedding. Kollek, who subsequently became mayor of Jerusalem, visited Washington in 1949 and almost certainly met with his old friend Angleton. Years later, this led to speculation that Kollek told Angleton about Philby's communist connections in the 1930s, alerting Angleton to the possibility that Philby was a DOUBLE AGENT. Under this theory, Angleton made use of Philby while Philby was thinking he was making use of Angleton. But American intelligence authorities of the era strongly deny this possibility.

Meredith Gardener, a U.S. codebreaker, also had contact with Philby in his role as liaison officer. Gardener, the key man in the Verona codebreaking, showed Philby some of the decrypted material and said that the suspected mole was in the British Foreign Office. Philby realized that Donald Maclean would soon be exposed and warned the KGB.

He also cabled the SIS in London, reminding officials that two Soviet defectors—Volkov and WALTER KRIVITSKY—had hinted that a high-ranking Foreign Office official from a good family had been a Soviet agent since the 1930s. This reminder would almost certainly intensify suspicions about Maclean. But Philby coolly reasoned that, after Maclean escaped, security officials would look back at Philby's warning and believe that he had not collaborated with Maclean.

Burgess and Maclean escaped to the Soviet Union in May 1951. (For details, see DONALD MACLEAN entry.) Philby immediately came under suspicion by both his own colleagues and U.S. intelligence. He drove to a desolate spot in Virginia and buried the camera, tripod, and other paraphernalia he had used to copy documents. Philby, now feeling "clean as a whistle," braced for the crisis, which he believed he could wriggle out of because British and American intelligence officials would hesitate to move against him without high-level orders from their superiors.

Angleton, however, was suspicious enough of Philby to convince WALTER BEDELL SMITH, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, to ask the SIS to recall Philby because he was no longer acceptable to the CIA. Hoover agreed with Smith—a rare happening. Philby returned to London while Aileen, pregnant with their fifth child, remained in Washington.

In London, security officials seized Philby's passport and questioned him about his friendship with Burgess. Asked about Maclean, Philby said he did not know him and had in fact only met him twice since Cambridge. Despite these disavowals, he was dismissed in July, given £2,000 in severance pay, and promised £2,000 more in monthly payments over the next three years.

His passport was returned, and with the help of C (Adm. Sir HUGH SINCLAIR) Philby got a job as a correspondent in the Middle East for *The Observer* and *The Economist*, despite the fact that British newspapers were hinting that defector VLADIMIR M. PETROV, talking about the Burgess-Maclean escape, had named Philby as "the third man"—a phrase that would reverberate for years. On Oct. 25, 1955, a member of Parliament asked Prime Minister Anthony Eden about Philby's role as the "third man." Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan, who succeeded Eden as Prime Minister, publicly cleared Philby in the parliamentary debate that followed.

Philby had been a highly effective Soviet ASSET. While he was in Washington, for example, he learned of Anglo-American attempts to overthrow the communist government in Albania by sending in hundreds of guerrillas, first in an amphibious landing, then by parachute. The Soviets passed Philby's information on to the Albanians, who killed nearly all of the guerrillas. The rest were imprisoned. None escaped.

When Philby, seemingly cleared, went off to Beirut as a correspondent, his employers were not told that his work would be cover for *reemployment* by MI6. Incredibly, he went back to work as an agent, for the KGB also made contact with him in Beirut. (According to his handler, most of Philby's reports were valuable political observations rather than intelligence tidbits.) When

Nicholas Elliott, an old friend from MI6, was appointed head of station in Beirut, Philby became one of his trusted agents as well!

In Beirut Philby was reunited with his father. Philby's wife and five children remained in England, where on Dec. 11, 1957, Aileen died of heart problems complicated by tuberculosis. Philby had been carrying on an affair with Eleanor Brewer, wife of Sam Pope Brewer, *The New York Times* correspondent in Beirut. She divorced Brewer, married Philby in London in Jan. 1959, and returned to Beirut with him and his children.

In Dec. 1961 the net again closed around Philby. ANATOLY GOLITSYN, a KGB officer, defected to the CIA, which shared his disclosures with British intelligence officers. When they debriefed Golitsyn in the summer of 1962, they became convinced that Philby was a spy. In 1961 a turncoat British intelligence officer, GEORGE BLAKE, had been sentenced to 42 years for spying, and Philby could assume that a similar fate awaited him if he tried to make a deal.

Sometime late in 1962, MI6 decided it had enough evidence to confront Philby and possibly wring a confession from him. Nicholas Elliott, then in London, volunteered to carry out the mission. At the confrontation in Jan. 1963, Elliott told Philby, "I'm offering you a lifeline, Kim. Immunity from prosecution if you co-operate." Philby returned next day with a two-page typewritten confession. For three days Elliott recorded more admissions, then returned to London, wondering if Philby would commit suicide.

But Philby escaped. KGB operatives in Beirut smuggled him aboard an Odessa-bound Soviet freighter. The Soviet government waited until July 3, 1963, to announce that he had been made a citizen of the Soviet Union and was living in Moscow. Later Philby became the first holder of the Order of the British Empire to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner. He worked for the KGB and, according to some Soviet reports, played a role in the rise to power of KGB chief YURI ANDROPOV. He also spent time writing *My Silent War*.

Eleanor Philby joined her husband in Moscow in Sept. 1963. In 1964, after returning from a visit to the United States, she discovered that Philby was carrying on an affair with Melinda Maclean. In May 1965 Eleanor returned to the United States. She wrote *The Spy I Loved* (1968) shortly before she died.

Melinda left Philby in 1966 and eventually returned to the United States. Through GEORGE BLAKE, a fellow British spy, Philby met a beautiful Russian woman, Rufina Ivanova, who was about 20 years his junior. They were married in Moscow in Dec. 1971.

In March 1988, in an interview with *The Sunday Times* of London, he said, "Although life here has its difficulties, I feel I belong and I never want to live anywhere else. It's my country and I served it more than 50 years. I want to be buried here. I want to rest where my work has been." Two months later, on May 11, he died of heart disease. He was buried in Kuntsevo military cemetery in Moscow, with the honors of a KGB general.

In a clever work of fiction, *The Blue List* (1989), British spy writer NIGEL WEST weaves a tale that Philby

was actually a TRIPLE AGENT, in fact working for Britain against the Soviet intelligence services.

In 1990 the Soviet government issued a POSTAGE STAMP honoring Philby as part of a series of KGB heroes.

●● PHOENIX

U.S. operation, run from 1967 to 1971, to identify and destroy the communist apparatus in South Vietnam. Phoenix was a combined effort of the CIA, the U.S. Army, the Special Branch of the South Vietnamese Police, and South Vietnam's Central Intelligence Organization. But the CIA dominated through the U.S. aspect of the program, called ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation).

ICEX was to collect information on what was called the "Vietcong infrastructure" and to "neutralize" it. Robert W. Komar, a CIA INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ran that effort, which he renamed Phoenix. His deputy, who in 1968 took over Phoenix, was WILLIAM E. COLBY who in 1973 became DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. (In Vietnam his COVER was director of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support for the Agency for International Development.)

According to the CIA, in the period 1968–1971 Operation Phoenix granted amnesty to 17,000 suspected communists; 28,000 were captured and 20,587 killed. Most of those killed died in military combat operations, their deaths being "credited" to Phoenix. The rest were killed by police or other security forces.

●● PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

(PHOTINT)

Intelligence based on conventional photography. In modern times PHOTINT is a subset of IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE.

PHOTINT had its beginnings as an important intelligence activity in World War I, especially when the photographs were taken from an AIRCRAFT. In World War II aerial photography reached greater levels of significance, with photography from SUBMARINES also gaining prominence. German-made cameras were the best available. Indeed, during photo missions by the U.S. submarine *Nautilus* in the Pacific during World War II the Navy found that purpose-built cameras for taking pictures through submarine periscopes were not as good as the hand-held German Primarflex. Because it was impossible for the U.S. Navy to purchase the Primarflex during the war, officials advertised in photography magazines for donations. As a result, ten Primarflex cameras were contributed to the Navy for use on photo missions.

In the post-World War II era photography has remained as important for intelligence services as have ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE and other specialized information-gathering means. The Cold War accelerated the development of wide-angle, high-speed cameras that could be effectively used from high-flying aircraft such as the CANBERRA, B-36, U-2, A-12 OXCART, SR-71 BLACKHAWK, BEAR, and MYSTIC.