

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



An Encyclopedia

of Covert Ops,

Intelligence Gathering,

and Spies

JAN GOLDMAN, EDITOR

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency

**An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops,
Intelligence Gathering, and Spies**

VOLUME 1

Jan Goldman, Editor



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Preface

An encyclopedia is a publication that provides information on many subjects or on many aspects of a specific subject. Readers use the encyclopedia for a quick reference. *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies* provides quick reference but also goes beyond this simple definition. This encyclopedia contains more than a record of alphabetically arranged entries. What makes this an extraordinary publication is how the reader is given an encapsulation of information along with the supporting evidence for further research. *The Central Intelligence Agency* will begin the demystification of a subject that is typically surrounded by ambiguity.

This two-volume publication focuses on a government agency that has often been shrouded in secrecy and misperception. During the history of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), previous authors have sought to portray the organization's work as threatening the workings of a democratic state and as the necessary requirement of a sovereign world power. The purpose of this book is to state objectively and with clarity the history of the CIA through those categories best known to this organization.

However, *The Central Intelligence Agency* is not just a history or description of the CIA; rather, these volumes are *about* the CIA. In other words, this publication is about the people, events, actions, and decisions that have been associated with this organization. This publication discusses how the CIA carried out covert operations and intelligence gathering and describes the people responsible for espionage operations who worked both for and against America's national security interests. Also covered are those tasks that this organization does uniquely for the government, such as participating in secret operations, stealing information, and conducting espionage.

The encyclopedia contains 216 alphabetically arranged entries. Each entry places its topic in a historical context, contains cross-references to other entries as well as documents in the encyclopedia, and concludes with a bibliography of additional print and electronic information resources. An important feature is the inclusion of 98 primary documents that relate to entries. For high school and college students doing research as well as for interested public librarian patrons, these documents provide a rare glimpse into the CIA and into the task of conducting primary research on the agency. Rather than having someone describe or reference an important document, readers can quickly access the document themselves. Note that the documents sometimes spell names and terms differently, both between

documents and as spelled in the entries; an example is Usama versus Osama when referring to Osama bin Laden. The encyclopedia also includes a timeline of CIA history, a general bibliography of important sources of information on the CIA and the general topic of espionage, and a detailed subject index to provide easier access to the information in the entries. Together, these two volumes provide both a wealth of information and an excellent tool for understanding the world of secret operations, intelligence collection, and espionage.

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Washington, D.C.

Introduction

Government secrecy is a contentious issue and, without a doubt, will continue to be so far into the future. The tension between a government's need to keep secrets and the public's need to be informed is exacerbated in a democratic society. One of the largest stories of 2013 was the leaking of classified government documents exposing U.S. mass surveillance operations. However, spying is as old as this country.

Every presidential administration needs intelligence to develop policy, and at no time is this need more important than during war. In 1942 during World War II, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was formed. The OSS—the forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—had a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information. After World War II the OSS was abolished, but the need for intelligence did not abate, and President Harry Truman soon recognized the need for a postwar centralized intelligence organization. To make a fully functional intelligence office, Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 establishing the CIA. The National Security Act charged the CIA with coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence affecting national security.

The CIA is one of the most controversial agencies in the U.S. government. Born out of the Cold War, the CIA's purpose during that period was to safeguard U.S. citizens by monitoring and reporting on the Soviet Union, also known as the "Communist Threat." Depending on political or ideological viewpoints, the CIA has been characterized as a "necessary evil," "flawed and destructive," "the spearhead of democracy," and "the most important agency" in the U.S. government. Of course, all of these proclamations are the result of the media—whether newspapers, journals, television shows, novels, or movies. Each of these media outlets provides the American public with a distorted picture of this agency, its mission, and the people associated with the work of this organization. However, rather than determining the media's perspective of the CIA, it is much more important to understand the interaction between the CIA and the media. In 1977, it was revealed that the CIA had secretly paid journalists to provide cover for CIA operations. Columnists and commentators could be counted on to perform a variety of under-cover tasks for the agency. Reportedly, several media outlets, such as the *New York Times* and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), had a policy of providing assistance to the CIA whenever possible.

For example, over the years, the network provided cover for CIA employees, supplied outtakes of news film to the CIA, gave the agency access to the CBS news film library, and allowed reports by CBS correspondents to the Washington and New York newsrooms to be routinely monitored by the CIA. Once a year during the 1950s and early 1960s, CBS correspondents joined the CIA hierarchy for private dinners and briefings. At *Newsweek*, the CIA engaged the services of several foreign correspondents and stringers under arrangements approved by senior editors at the magazine.

In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence documented more than 50 cases of the use of journalism cover by the CIA since its founding in 1947. Ultimately, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 stated that it was the policy of the United States that no element of U.S. intelligence could use any individual for intelligence-collecting purposes. However, the act also stated that this policy could be waived by the president of the United States if necessary “to address the overriding national security interest of the United States.” And so the debate continues. Some critics argue that the independence of journalists should not be compromised, without exception, while others contend that international threats to American security requires the CIA to have the option and ability to count on all Americans for their support, regardless of their profession.

The intention of *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies* is to clarify the role and missions of the CIA by specifically focusing on the work that this agency has done over the years. These volumes are not intended to be a history of the CIA, nor is this encyclopedia intended to be an organizational road map to how this organization was built and to the people responsible for making decisions during the CIA’s history. Given the sensitive nature of the work involved and the political nature of how this government entity is viewed, this encyclopedia is an attempt to be both factual and a window into some of the past achievements and failures of this very secretive organization. At the heart of this encyclopedia is a focus on covert operations, intelligence gathering, and the people involved in both of these operations, whom we generally call “spies.”

Covert Operations

A covert operation (also known as covert ops) is an operation that is planned and executed to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. Covert operations are intended to be conducted without anyone knowing who sponsored or carried out the operation. An example of a covert operation might be a business that is developed for the sole purpose of collecting information rather than making a profit.

Some people get covert operations confused with clandestine operations. Although similar in some aspects, there is a difference between the terms. In a covert operation the identity of the sponsor of the operation is concealed, while in a clandestine operation the operation itself is concealed. Put differently, clandestine means “hidden,” while covert means “deniable.” In other words, a clandestine

operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 is a perfect example of a clandestine operation. The team trained in secrecy, and very few individuals knew about the raid. If any of the information was released beforehand or leaked, then bin Laden would have had enough time to leave Abbottabad before the helicopters landed. After our forces killed him, we told the world that it was us who popped him in his home because the need for secrecy had ended.

Covert operations are employed in situations where it would be disadvantageous if anyone knew that the U.S. government was openly working against a target. Sometimes these operations are generally illegal or in violation of the laws of the sponsoring country. Covert operations may include sabotage, assassinations, support for coups d'état, or support for subversion. This encyclopedia includes information on almost 50 such covert operations.

Under U.S. law, the CIA must lead covert operations unless the president finds that another agency should do so and properly informs Congress. Normally, the CIA is the U.S. government agency legally allowed to carry out covert action. The CIA's authority to conduct covert action comes from the National Security Act of 1947. In 1984 President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, which defined covert action as "special activities, both political and military, that the U.S. government could legally deny." The CIA must have a presidential finding issued by the president of the United States to conduct these activities. These findings are then monitored by the oversight committees in both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. Consequently, some people believe that the CIA receives more oversight from Congress than any other agency in the federal government.

Intelligence Gathering

The CIA is one of the principal intelligence-gathering agencies of the U.S. government and is responsible for collecting information about foreign governments, corporations, and individuals. Collection analysts focus more on how intelligence is collected rather than on the intelligence issue. They evaluate which systems produce the most valuable and relevant information to answer questions from policy makers and others in the intelligence community. To gather intelligence, the United States has the following basic intelligence sources: human-source intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).

The CIA throughout its history has been involved in almost every element of intelligence gathering. The development of new organizations since the agency was established has allowed the CIA to focus exclusively on HUMINT, which is derived from human sources and is the oldest method for collecting information. To the public, HUMINT is synonymous with espionage and clandestine activities.

HUMINT is used mainly but not solely by the CIA. HUMINT is also used by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Briefly, the other methods of intelligence gathering include SIGINT, which is the interception of signals whether between people, between machines, or a combination of both. The National Security Agency (NSA) is responsible for collecting, processing, and reporting SIGINT. IMINT can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) manages this source of intelligence gathering. The NGA is also responsible for GEOINT. This type of intelligence gathering includes imagery and mapping data produced through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. GEOINT is typically gathered from commercial satellites, government satellites, and reconnaissance aircraft or by other means, such as maps.

The Department of Defense is responsible for MASINT. This source of scientific and technical intelligence employs a broad group of disciplines, including nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. For example, MASINT can identify distinctive radar signatures created by specific aircraft systems or the chemical composition of air and water samples.

OSINT includes reviewing publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form, including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, and commercial databases. While OSINT collection responsibilities are broadly distributed throughout the intelligence community, this encyclopedia delves into the early years of OSINT when the CIA operated the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Nevertheless, it is the human element of intelligence that can be the most difficult to control. This type of intelligence involves the use of spies by the agency for U.S. national security and the use of spies by others against the agency and this country's national security interests.

Spies

Spies conduct espionage. Of course, this is done without the permission of the holder of the information. Espionage is inherently clandestine and is a subset of intelligence gathering. It is crucial to distinguish espionage from intelligence gathering, since the latter may not necessarily involve espionage. Spies are one of the most effective methods for gathering data and information. This is the job of the spy. Both the United States and its enemies have had some excellent spies.

In 1778 when General George Washington needed to know where the British troops would be gathering for their next attack, he sought assistance from Nathan Hale. The men whom Hale mentored to be effective spies were dubbed the Culper Ring. Ultimately Hale was caught and hanged but not before uttering the famous line "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." Today, a statue of Hale stands in front of CIA headquarters in Virginia.

In 2010, the 16 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community established the National Clandestine Service (NCS). The NCS serves as the clandestine arm of the

CIA and the national authority for the coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine operations. According to the CIA,

- We are an elite corps of men and women shaped by diverse ethnic, educational, and professional backgrounds.
- We conduct our clandestine mission worldwide.
- We collect actionable human intelligence (HUMINT) that informs the U.S. president, senior policymakers, military, and law enforcement.

Unfortunately for the CIA and the United States, some of the people whom the agency trusted with the nation's secrets were untrustworthy. Listed in this publication are dozens of double agents. A double agent is a CIA employee whose primary aim is to spy on the enemy (and in most cases during the Cold War the enemy was the Soviet Union) but who is in fact a member of the enemy country spying on the CIA.

The study and writing of the CIA's history requires the use of original or primary sources. Primary sources can be first-person accounts of an action or decision. The U.S. Supreme Court decides the constitutionality of cases brought before the Court. However, anyone can read the U.S. Constitution, which is a primary source. It is the document itself that can give us insight into what the authors were thinking rather than having it interpreted for us. Of course, government documents are traditionally considered important, but we rarely know or understand the impact or significance of these documents until additional primary sources are examined.

The second volume of this set contains 98 documents. From the classified document of how to develop invisible ink written at the turn of the 20th century to the documents found in Osama bin Laden's hideaway, each document tells a story. Indirectly, these documents can be used to understand the forces that provide the context of the growth and sustainability of the U.S. government's most secret organization. Most of the documents were classified at the secret or top secret level, but all the documents have been declassified by the government. Readers can use these documents to further their own research.

The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies is not about the history of the CIA but instead is an encyclopedia of entries and documents on covert operations and spies. It is through these subjects that we can better assess the CIA's historical significance and impact on U.S. policy. Ultimately, this encyclopedia seeks to strip away the cover of secrecy to allow the history and documents of the CIA to speak for themselves, and it will be up to the reader to develop his or her own point of view.

Jan Goldman, EdD
Washington, D.C.

Timeline of Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Activities, 1939–2015

1939

President Roosevelt assigns responsibility for investigating espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Military Intelligence Services of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

1940

May 25

President Franklin Roosevelt signs Executive Order 8248 establishing the Office for Emergency Management. This new office will be responsible for “the clearance of information with respect to measures necessitated by the threatened emergency” as well as maintaining liaison between the president and the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission and finding facilities in meeting the threatened emergency.

1941

July 11

President Franklin D. Roosevelt appoints William J. Donovan as coordinator of information, a prototype of an intelligence service. Donovan was a prominent lawyer who won the Congressional Medal of Honor as an army colonel in World War I.

December 7

The Japanese attack the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In response, the United States enters World War II. Several days later, the FBI is authorized to act against dangerous enemy aliens and to seize enemy aliens and contraband (e.g., short-wave radios, weapons, ammunition, explosives, etc.).

1942

June 13

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is established by President Roosevelt. The new organization is led by William J. Donovan.

August 13 Four German saboteurs come ashore from a U-boat on the beach near Amagansett, Long Island. Within the week, a second team of German saboteurs lands in Florida. Some saboteurs surrender, and within two weeks the FBI captures the others.

 The Manhattan Project is formed to secretly build the atomic bomb. U.S. naval intelligence breaks the Japanese Navy’s JN-25 code, providing intelligence from the Battle of Midway to the end of World War II.

1943

Lockheed establishes its advanced development programs headquarters at Palmdale, California. Over the years that follow, this facility, known as the “Skunk Works,” is the birthplace of such spy aircraft as the U-2 and the SR-71.

 The U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service, a forerunner of the National Security Agency, formally begins a program code-named VENONA to break encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications.

1944

Joseph Stalin orders the creation of Department S, which will use American scientists as Russian spies. Britain’s MI6 establishes a section devoted to Soviet espionage and subversion; unfortunately, its director is Harold (Kim) Philby, a Soviet agent.

1945

October 1 President Harry S. Truman’s Executive Order 9621 abolishes the OSS, and operations are transferred to its successor, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).

1946

January 22 President Truman signs an executive order establishing the CIG to operate under the direction of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). Truman names Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, U.S. Naval Reserve, as the first director of central intelligence (DCI), and he is sworn in the following day. The NIA will be abolished, and the DCI will eventually lead the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

1947

July 28 The National Security Act, supporting instructions that include the development of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the National Security Council (NSC), is signed.

- September 18 The NSC and the CIA replace the NIA and CIG.
December 19 The NSC gives the CIA orders to conduct its first covert operation, influencing the general elections in Italy to prevent a communist victory. The operation is successful, resulting in victory for the Christian Democrat Party in 1948.

1948

An NSC directive creates the Office of Policy Coordination to conduct covert operations for the CIA. Former Wehrmacht officer Reinhard Gehlen is recruited to carry out espionage against Russia in Eastern Europe and then later warns the CIA about the coming blockade of Berlin but is ignored.

1949

Judith Coplon becomes the first U.S. citizen convicted as a spy, a conviction that is later reversed because of illegal FBI wiretaps.

The CIA-sponsored Radio Free Europe begins broadcasting to Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe.

- June 20 The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides special administrative authorities and responsibilities for the CIA and the director.

1950

- October General Walter Bedell Smith becomes the DCI and institutes the concept and practice of developing national intelligence estimates, a framework and mechanism for the production of reliable intelligence.

1952

- January 2 The CIA Directorate of Intelligence is established.
August 1 The CIA Directorate of Plans is established.
November 4 The National Security Agency (NSA) is established.

1953

- August Operation AJAX, conducted by British and American intelligence, deposes Iraqi prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and restores Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the throne.
December Skunk Works starts up to modify F-104 aircraft to fly the maximum possible altitude for aerial high-altitude reconnaissance.

1954

- November John Foster Dulles, Charles Wilson, and Allen Dulles meet with President Dwight D. Eisenhower to get approval for \$35 million to purchase 20 high-altitude aircraft (known as the U-2).

1955

- August 4 President Dwight D. Eisenhower signs a bill authorizing \$46 million for construction of the CIA headquarters building.
- December The U.S. Air Force launches Project GENETRIX, a surveillance operation using balloons over communist countries. The unsuccessful effort comes to an end three months later.

1956

- July 5 The first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union occurs.

1959

- President Dwight D. Eisenhower approves a secret program, proposed by the CIA, to depose communist Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
- November 3 The cornerstone of the CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia, is laid.

1960

- The NSA begins intercepting messages and communications revealing the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, including the installation of air defense systems and missile capabilities.
- May 1 A Soviet missile shoots down an American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk. The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, is retained and tried by the Soviet Union as a spy. After nearly two years, Powers is exchanged for a captured Soviet spy. Soviet outrage over the incident leads to the collapse of the Paris summit on the discontinuation of nuclear weapons trials.

1960

- September NSA cryptographers William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell defect to the Soviet Union and issue the first public relations as to the NSA’s mission.

1961

- The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and later the Defense Intelligence Agency are both established.
- April 17 Cuban exiles organized and armed by the CIA invade Cuba in a failed attempt to overthrow the leftist leader Fidel Castro. The event becomes known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, in reference to the small bay off the southern coast of Cuba where the invasion commenced.

September 20 The first employees move into CIA headquarters from various offices in the Washington, D.C., area.

1962

The first Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) teams are commissioned.

October 15–28 The Cuban Missile Crisis, precipitated by the CIA discovery in Cuba of Soviet-made medium-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, brings the world to the brink of nuclear war. The United States blockades Cuba for 13 days until the Soviet Union agrees to remove its missiles. The United States also agrees to remove its missiles from Turkey. The crisis marks the first time that the NSA creates an around-the-clock command center.

1963

August 5 The Directorate of Science and Technology, the arm of the CIA responsible for technological development, is created.

December 1 President Lyndon B. Johnson receives the first President's Daily Brief (PDB) from the CIA.

1966

July 4 President Lyndon Johnson signs the Freedom of Information Act, which limits the ability of U.S. federal government agencies to withhold information from the public by classifying that information as secret.

1967

July 9 The CIA launches the PHOENIX Program to fight the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam.

1969

October 1 CIA activity in Laos, termed by critics a “secret war,” is exposed.

1971

June 15 A spy satellite called Hexagon carrying a KH-9 camera is launched.

1972

Five men ultimately discovered to have ties to anti-Castro forces, the CIA, and the White House are arrested inside the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C.

Known as a “plumbers” team, the intelligence operatives carry electronic surveillance equipment and cameras. A subsequent cover-up of the break-in, destruction of taped conversations related to the cover-up, and revelations of a history of political dirty tricks form the core of the Watergate Scandal that ultimately leads to criminal prosecutions of top officials and President Richard Nixon’s resignation in August 1974.

1973

March 1 The Directorate of Plans becomes the Directorate of Operations.
September General Augusto Pinochet, with the support of the CIA, overthrows Marxist president Salvador Allende in Chile. Allende dies either by suicide (according to Pinochet) or by murder (according to Allende’s supporters).

1974

Congressional oversight in intelligence begins with the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Act, which requires the president to submit plans for covert actions to Congress. The *New York Times* publishes a report concerning a CIA domestic intelligence campaign involving interception of mail delivered by the U.S. Postal Service.

1975

January 4 President Gerald R. Ford signs Executive Order 11828 creating the U.S. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, also known as the Rockefeller Commission. Chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, the commission submits its report on CIA domestic activities to the president on June 6, 1975.

January 27 The Senate establishes its Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church (D-ID). The Church Committee investigates the nation’s intelligence activities for 15 months and is disestablished upon submission of its final report to the public on April 26, 1976.

February 19 The House establishes its Select Committee on Intelligence to investigate allegations of “illegal or improper” activities of federal intelligence agencies. Its first chairman, Representative Lucien Nedzi (D-MI), is later replaced by Representative Otis G. Pike (D-NY). On January 29, 1976, two days before the committee is scheduled to conclude its activities, the House votes to withhold public dissemination of the committee’s final report.

1977

July 14

The House of Representatives establishes the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSI). Chaired by Representative Edward P. Boland (D-MA), the committee differs from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in that it has oversight jurisdiction over the CIA but shares legislative oversight authority over all other intelligence agencies with several other House committees.

August 4

President Jimmy Carter announces a reorganization of the intelligence community, creating a high-level committee chaired by the DCI to set priorities for collecting and producing intelligence and giving the DCI full control of budgeting as well as operational tasking of intelligence collection.

1978

January 24

President Jimmy Carter signs Executive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” which restructures the U.S. intelligence community and provides explicit guidance on all facets of intelligence activities. In Executive Order 12065, Carter calls for a review of national security records after 20 years with an eye toward declassification.

1980

The Intelligence Oversight Act replaces the armed services committees with intelligence committees as the principal arm of legislative oversight of the CIA in both houses of Congress.

1981

October 20

President Ronald Reagan reconstitutes the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and names 19 distinguished citizens outside of government to serve on the board.

December 4

President Reagan signs Executive Order 12333, which clarifies ambiguities of previous orders and sets clear goals for the intelligence community in accordance with law and regard for the rights of Americans.

1982

June 23

President Ronald Reagan signs Public Law 97-200, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act imposing criminal penalties on those who reveal the names of covert intelligence personnel.

December

Congress passes the Boland Amendment to the War Powers Act of 1973 forbidding the CIA and the Department of Defense to support anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.

1983

April 18 The U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon is bombed. Sixty-three people, including the CIA's Middle East director, are killed and 120 are injured in this 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack.

1984

The Islamic Jihad kidnaps and later murders CIA station chief William Buckley in Beirut, Lebanon.

October 15 President Ronald Reagan signs the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act of 1984, which exempts the CIA from the search and review requirements of the Freedom of Information Act with respect to operational and other sensitive files that cannot be released because of operational or security considerations.

1985

In 1985 in what is called the Year of the Spy, several high-profile espionage cases and arrests occur.

May The John Walker Spy Ring is arrested. Former U.S. Navy personnel John Walker, Jerry Whitworth, Arthur Walker, and Michael Walker are convicted of or plead guilty to passing classified material to the Soviet Union.

May 27 The first annual memorial ceremony commemorates CIA employees who have died in the line of duty.

November 21 Jonathan Jay Pollard, a navy intelligence analyst, is arrested for spying for Israel.

November 23 Larry Wu Tai Chin, a former CIA analyst, is arrested on charges of spying for the People's Republic of China since 1952.

November 25 A third major spy, former NSA employee William Pelton, is arrested and charged with selling military secrets to the Soviet Union.

1986

Clayton Lonetree, the only U.S. marine convicted of espionage, turns himself in to the CIA. He is later convicted of spying for the Soviet Union.

1987

Worried that the Soviets are winning the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. government decides to use the CIA to train Afghanistan freedom fighters and arm them with surface-to-air Stinger missiles. The Soviets are forced to stop using the attack helicopters that

were being used to devastating effect. Supporters for the rebels claim that the Stingers turned the tide of the war and led directly to Soviet withdrawal.

1994

February Aldrich Ames, a 30-year CIA veteran, and his wife, Maria del Rosario Casas Ames, are arrested on espionage charges for selling secrets to the former Soviet Union.

1995

Concerned by revelations that agents of the CIA have committed human rights violations in Guatemala, the CIA draws up guidelines prohibiting the agency from hiring agents with records of human rights violations.

1997

September 1 The CIA celebrates its 50th anniversary.

1999

April 1 The CIA headquarters is dedicated as the George Bush Center for Intelligence.

2001

June 1 The CIA announces a major realignment of its support functions by replacing the Directorate of Administration with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Information Officer (CIO), Global Support, Human Resources, and Security Mission Support Offices.

September 11 Terrorist attacks are launched via hijacked airliners at the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in northern Virginia; another hijacked plane crashes in Pennsylvania.

October 26 President George W. Bush signs the USA PATRIOT Act into law, giving the FBI and the CIA broader investigatory powers and allowing those agencies to share with one another confidential information about suspected terrorists. Under the act, both agencies can conduct residential searches without a warrant and without the presence of the suspect and can immediately seize personal records. The provisions are not limited to investigating suspected terrorists and can also be used in criminal investigations related to terrorism. The USA PATRIOT Act also grants the FBI and the CIA greater latitude in using computer tracking devices such as the Carnivore to gain access to Internet and phone records.

2002

- October 13 The National Clandestine Service, replacing the Directorate of Operations, is created to oversee the CIA's operational activities and carry out the task of coordinating clandestine human intelligence collection community-wide.
- November A CIA-operated Predator drone fires a missile that kills Osama bin Laden's top lieutenant in Yemen, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi.
- December 1 President George W. Bush signs the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which restructures the intelligence community, abolishes the positions of DCI and DDCI (deputy director of central intelligence), and creates the position of director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2003

- February 17 CIA operatives capture Egyptian cleric Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (Abu Omar) in Milan and later transfer him to Egypt, where he is jailed, tortured, and released. In 2005 an Italian judge orders the arrest of 13 American suspects on charges of kidnapping. In 2009 Nasr asks for 10 million euros (nearly \$15 million) in damages from the American and Italian defendants charged in his abduction.
- March 1 CIA operatives capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, responsible for planning the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. During the seizure it is revealed from captured files that Al Qaeda was developing a biochemical weapons program. Later that month in Najaf, Iraq, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, a high-ranking Shiite cleric and son of one of the religion's most prominent spiritual leaders, is hacked to death at the shrine of Imam Ali by a crowd during a meeting of reconciliation. Majid al-Khoei had been given as much as \$13 million by the CIA to develop support for U.S. policies in the region.
- June 12 Lewis "Scooter" Libby, chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, is provided the identity of CIA officer Valerie Plame Wilson in a conversation with Cheney.
- June 21 In Afghanistan, Abdul Wali, a detainee held at a U.S. base, dies following two days of interrogation. In 2006 Passaro, a former CIA contractor, is convicted in North Carolina of assaulting Abdul Wali with a metal flashlight and sentenced to eight and a half years in prison.
- June 23 *New York Times* reporter Judith Miller meets with Lewis "Scooter" Libby, chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney, who gives her information about CIA operative Valerie Plame Wilson.
- July 6 Joseph Wilson, former American ambassador, criticizes the George W. Bush administration for the way it used intelligence to justify the

- war in Iraq. Wilson alleges that President Bush had falsely accused Iraq of trying to buy uranium from Niger. Two White House officials soon call at least six Washington journalists and tell them that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame Wilson, is an undercover CIA agent.
- July 14 Columnist Robert Novak identifies Valerie Plame Wilson as a CIA officer.
- September 29 The Justice Department launches a full-blown criminal investigation into who leaked the name of CIA officer Valerie Plame Wilson, the wife of former ambassador Joseph Wilson, and the next day President Bush directs his White House staff to cooperate fully. The White House denies that Bush's top political adviser, Karl Rove, had leaked a CIA agent's identity to retaliate against an opponent of the administration's Iraq policy.
- September 30 In Afghanistan, CIA operatives William Carlson and Christopher Glenn Mueller are ambushed and killed near the village in Shkin in Paktika Province while tracking terrorists.
- October Donald Rumsfeld approves a CIA request to hold a suspected Iraqi terrorist in secret and shield his detention from the Red Cross.

2004

- The CIA hires Blackwater USA, located in North Carolina, as part of a secret program to locate and assassinate top operatives of Al Qaeda. Blackwater USA, later renamed Xe Services, helps with planning, training, and surveillance until the unsuccessful program is canceled.
- February 5 CIA director George Tenet acknowledges that U.S. spy agencies may have overestimated Iraq's illicit weapons capabilities.
- June 3 CIA director George Tenet resigns for "personal reasons" amid a controversy over intelligence lapses about suspected weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the 9/11 attacks.

2005

- The CIA destroys at least two videotapes documenting the interrogation of two Al Qaeda operatives, including Abu Zubaydah, dating back to 2002. CIA lawyers had told federal prosecutors in 2003 and 2005 that the CIA did not possess recordings of interrogations. The tapes were destroyed on the order of Jose Rodriguez Jr., head of the CIA's clandestine service. In 2010 it is made public that Porter J. Goss, director of the CIA at the time, approved the Rodriguez decision shortly after the tapes were destroyed.
- October 13 U.S. intelligence officials announce the establishment of the National Clandestine Service to run CIA operations and coordinate activities with the Pentagon and the FBI.

November 2–3 The *Washington Post* reports that the CIA has been hiding and interrogating Al Qaeda captives at a secret facility in Eastern Europe as part of a covert global prison system that has included sites in eight countries and was set up after the 9/11 attacks. European Union officials say that they will investigate a report that the CIA set up secret jails in Eastern Europe to interrogate top Al Qaeda suspects. At least 10 nations deny that the prisons are in their territory. Human Rights Watch in New York says it has evidence indicating that the CIA transported suspected terrorists captured in Afghanistan to Poland and Romania.

2006

April 26 The CIA fires Mary McCarthy, a top intelligence analyst, who admits leaking classified information about a network of secret CIA prisons. She had provided information that contributed to a *Washington Post* story in 2005 disclosing secret U.S. prisons in Eastern Europe.

June 7 Swiss senator Dick Marty, the head of an investigation into alleged CIA clandestine prisons, says that 14 European nations colluded with U.S. intelligence in a “spider’s web” of secret flights and detention centers that violated international human rights law. Marty asserts that at least 7 European governments were complicit in the transports.

September 6 President George W. Bush acknowledges that the CIA subjected dozens of detainees to “tough” interrogation at secret prisons abroad and that 14 remaining detainees have been transferred to the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

2007

January The National Intelligence Board is established, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence takes over responsibility for the President’s Daily Brief from the CIA.

April 3 It is reported in the media that CIA and FBI agents hunting for Al Qaeda militants in the Horn of Africa have been interrogating terrorism suspects from 19 countries held at secret prisons in Ethiopia, which is notorious for torture and abuse.

June 8 A European investigator issues a report saying that the CIA ran secret prisons in Poland and Romania from 2003 to 2005 to interrogate detainees in the Global War on Terror.

August 9 Newly declassified documents state that Canadian intelligence officials suspected that Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian citizen detained by the U.S. government in 2002 as a terror suspect and deported, had been sent to a third country for torture as part of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program. Arar was detained in

September 2002 by U.S. authorities during a flight stopover in New York while returning home to Canada from a vacation in Tunisia.

2008

Many nonfictional CIA books are released this year including Hugh Wilford's *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America*, an account of the CIA's postwar front groups; former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer's *Marching toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq*; Ron Suskind's *The Way of the World*, in which he claims that the White House in 2003 ordered the CIA to forge a backdated handwritten letter from Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, head of Iraqi intelligence, to Saddam Hussein; and John Diamond's *The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq*.

2009

- February 18 In Ecuador, U.S. diplomat Mark Sullivan is declared a persona non grata and told to leave the country under claims that he had directed CIA operations in Ecuador.
- March 6 According to documents filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in a lawsuit over the government's treatment of detainees, the CIA destroyed a dozen videotapes of harsh interrogations of terror suspects. The 12 tapes were part of a larger collection of 92 videotapes of terror suspects that the CIA destroyed.
- April 16 President Barack Obama announces his decision not to prosecute CIA operatives who used interrogation practices described by many as torture. He condemns the aggressive techniques, including waterboarding, shackling, and stripping, used on terror suspects while promising not to legally pursue the perpetrators.
- June 23 CIA director Leon Panetta learns of a nascent CIA counterterrorism program within the CIA and terminates it. The next day he calls an emergency meeting with the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to inform them of the program and that it was canceled. Former vice president Dick Cheney had directed the CIA in 2001 not to inform Congress about the nascent counterterrorism program, which developed plans to dispatch small teams to kill senior Al Qaeda terrorists.
- December 4 The *New York Times* reports that the White House has authorized the CIA to expand the use of unmanned aerial drones in Pakistan to track down and strike suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda members.
- December 30 In Afghanistan, eight CIA employees and a Jordanian intelligence officer are killed when a suicide attack occurs at a CIA base at the edge of Khost Province, an area near the border with Pakistan that

is a hotbed of insurgent activity. The attack is carried out by Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a physician from Jordan and an Al Qaeda triple agent. The attack is one of the deadliest days in the CIA's history.

2010

- August 18 The CIA opens a counterproliferation center to combat the spread of dangerous weapons and technology, a move that comes as Iran is on the verge of fueling up a new nuclear power plant.
- August 21 Roland Haas, a Georgia-based former U.S. Army Reserve intelligence officer, is found dead from a gunshot wound that pierced his femoral artery. In 2007 Haas had authored *Enter the Past Tense: My Secret Life as a CIA Assassin*. Several former CIA officials denounce the book as a hoax.
- August 27 The *Washington Post* reports that the CIA is making payments to a significant number of officials in Afghan president Hamid Karzai's administration. The newspaper also cites a former CIA official as saying that the CIA payments to Afghan officials were necessary because "the head of state is not going to tell you everything" and because Karzai often seems unaware of moves that members of his own government make.
- September 22 A U.S. official in Washington confirms reports that the CIA is running an all-Afghan paramilitary group in Afghanistan that has been hunting Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militant targets for the agency. A security professional in Kabul familiar with the operation says that the 3,000-strong force was set up in 2002 to capture targets for CIA interrogation. Al-Jazeera cameraman Mohammad Nadir is arrested in Kandahar. In Helmand Province, a Danish soldier is killed and another is wounded by a homemade bomb.
- October 22 Glenn Shriver of Detroit, Michigan, pleads guilty to trying to get a job with the CIA in order to spy for China and to hiding contacts and money that he got from Chinese intelligence agents. Shriver acknowledges that he met with Chinese officials about 20 times beginning in 2004 and that he received a total of about \$70,000 from Chinese intelligence officers. His plea agreement calls for a sentence of 48 months in prison.
- December 18 Pakistan's top spy agency denies that it helped unmask the CIA's station chief in Islamabad, dismissing speculation that it was retaliation for a U.S. lawsuit linking the Pakistani intelligence chief to the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. The station chief in Islamabad has operated as a virtual military commander in the U.S. war against Al Qaeda and other militant groups hidden along the Pakistani-Afghan border. His recall was made public a day earlier.

2011

- March 30 U.S. officials reveal that the CIA has sent small teams of operatives into rebel-held eastern Libya while the White House debates whether to arm the opposition. The British government says that Libyan foreign minister Moussa Koussa has arrived in Britain from Tunisia and resigned.
- May 1 Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, is killed by American military and CIA operatives who track him to a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
- June 15 In another hacker attack, a group known as Lulz Security is able to take down the public website of the CIA. The group announces the attack at 6:00 p.m. by sending out a message on Twitter. Service is restored at the CIA website later in the evening, and sources at the agency say that no sensitive files were breached.
- August 23 It is revealed in the media that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the New York Police Department has been targeting Muslim communities in ways that would run afoul of civil liberties rules and that these operations have benefited from unprecedented help from the CIA. Police used informants, known as mosque crawlers, to monitor sermons even when there was no evidence of wrongdoing.
- September 5 Pakistan military intelligence officers with CIA assistance in Quetta arrest three members of Al Qaeda believed to have been tasked by Osama bin Laden with targeting American economic interests around the world.
- October The CIA's inspector general completes an investigation into the relationship between the CIA and the New York Police Department after media reports show that the police collaborated with the CIA to set up operations that scrutinized Muslim communities. The investigation faulted the CIA for sending an officer to New York with little or no oversight. The investigation clears the CIA of any wrongdoing. Some U.S. lawmakers express concerns about the assignment, while others praise it.
- November 21 Hezbollah, a Middle East terrorist group, exposes in the media several spies in Lebanon who were reportedly working for the CIA.
- November 26 Pakistan accuses NATO helicopters and fighter jets of firing on two army checkpoints in the country's northwest and killing 24 soldiers. Afghan troops who come under fire while operating near the Pakistani border call in the NATO air strikes. Islamabad retaliates by closing the border crossings used by the international coalition to supply its troops in neighboring Afghanistan. The Pakistani government demands that U.S. troops vacate within 15 days an air base that the CIA is suspected of using for unmanned drones.

2012

- January 23 Former CIA officer John Kiriakou is accused of leaking secrets to the media and attorneys defending detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
- January 27 It is announced that the CIA will no longer have an agent located with the New York Police Department.
- February 10 Vladimir Nesteretsk is convicted in Russia for giving the CIA information on strategic missiles and their launch sites.
- April 22 Under a plan approved by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, case officers from the new Defense Clandestine Service will work more closely with counterparts from the CIA at a time when the military and the CIA are increasingly focused on similar threats.
- September 11 The consulate in Benghazi, Libya, comes under attack. A six-person rescue squad from the CIA's Global Response Staff arrives from their base a mile away. CIA officers are attacked by a rocket-propelled grenade and small arms. Sporadic attacks continue for about another hour. CIA reinforcements arrive on a 45-minute flight from Tripoli. In the end, four Americans are killed.
- December 13 The European Court of Human Rights rules in favor of Khaled el-Masri, a German man who says that the CIA illegally kidnapped him and took him to a secret prison in Afghanistan in 2003. The court says that the government of Macedonia violated el-Masri's rights repeatedly and orders the Macedonian government to pay 60,000 euros in damages.

2013

- January 25 CIA veteran John Kiriakou is sentenced to 30 months in prison for leaking a covert officer's identity to a reporter.
- January 26 Iran arrests Slovak national Matej Valuch and accuses him of spying for the CIA. On February 8, Valuch is released and returns home.
- February 1 In Italy, a Milan appeals court vacates acquittals for a former CIA station chief and two other Americans and instead convicts them for the 2003 abduction of an Egyptian terror suspect from a Milan street as part of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program. The court sentences former CIA Rome station chief Jeffrey Castelli to seven years and handed sentences of six years each to Americans Betnie Medero and Ralph Russomando. All three are tried in absentia at both levels.
- February 12 A Milan appeals court convicts two former Italian spy chiefs for their role in the kidnapping of a terror suspect as part of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program. The court sentences Nicolo Pollari, the former head of Italian military intelligence, to 10 years and sentences Marco Mancini, a former deputy and head of counterintelligence, to 9 years. Three other Italian agents also are convicted and handed 6-year sentences. All of the convictions can be appealed.

- May 20 Edward Snowden, a former CIA employee and subsequently a contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA) flees the United States and begins leaking highly classified information about the activities of the CIA and NSA. He has reportedly gained access to nearly two million potentially sensitive documents. Snowden eventually secures asylum in Russia. In June 2014, federal prosecutors will charge Snowden with violating the 1917 Espionage Act and theft of government property. Just days after that, the State Department revokes his passport.
- October 15 Numerous press reports allege that the CIA was responsible for the murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in Mexico in 1985. Camarena was allegedly killed because he threatened to disrupt CIA drug trafficking activities, the proceeds of which were being used to fund the Nicaraguan Contras. The revelation is one of a string of recent embarrassing revelations concerning CIA activities.
- November 1 Leader of the Pakistan Taliban is killed in a CIA drone strike. A U.S. official confirms the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, head of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Danday Darpakhel village of North Waziristan, Pakistan. Reportedly 4 other individuals also die in the attack, including two other top-level TTP officials.

2014

- January 15 The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee issues a report on the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that left four Americans dead, including Ambassador Chris Stevens. The report faults the State Department and intelligence agencies for failing to thwart the attack and says it was “preventable.” The report takes both the State Department and the intelligence community to task for failing to upgrading security despite warnings of a possible attack.
- June 11 The CIA resumes its drone campaign in Pakistan with a missile strike that kills at least four people at a compound in the tribal district of North Waziristan. The latest campaign follows a brief moratorium against drone strikes in Pakistan, which had protested the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles on its territory.
- July 31 Under pressure from Congress, the CIA is forced to admit that it had previously gained illegal access to computers used by congressional staffers and U.S. senators who sat on the Senate Intelligence Committee. The revelation is particularly embarrassing for the agency because CIA director John Brennan had previously stated—under oath—that the CIA had in fact not engaged in such activity. Nevertheless, the U.S. Justice Department takes no action in the matter.

- August 1 Recorded Future, Inc., a web-based technology company with strong ties to the CIA, reports that because of the security leaks perpetrated by U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden, Al Qaeda has begun engaging in increasingly complex encryption efforts for its internet communications. This revelation provides more ammunition for Snowden's critics and seems to prove that his leaks have indeed imperiled U.S. national security.
- August 11 U.S. officials confirm that the United States is directly providing weapons to Kurdish forces that have begun to make gains against Islamic militants in northern Iraq. Previously, the United States had insisted on only selling arms to the Iraqi government in Baghdad. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters had been losing ground to Islamic State (ISIS) militants. Reportedly the CIA has charge of the supply operation.
- November 21 After nearly two years of hearings and investigations, the Republican-led House Select Committee on Intelligence releases its long-awaited report on the deadly September 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The report finds that the U.S. military and the CIA responded appropriately during the attacks. The panel also finds no intelligence failure prior to the attacks.
- December 9 The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee releases a long-awaited, 6,000-page report on CIA activities since the 2001 terror attacks on the United States. Although heavily redacted, the report exposes the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques and its efforts to conceal the use of such techniques. The report also reveals the use of extralegal "black box" sites and the mistaken torture of prisoners who were not in fact terrorists.

2015

- January 25 A CIA drone strike in Pakistan inadvertently results in the deaths of an American, Warren Weinstein, and an Italian, Giovanni Lo Porto, who were being held hostage there by terrorists. The incident underlines the peril of conducting drone warfare in a hostile, foreign environment.
- January 26 Jeffrey A. Sterling, a former CIA employee, is convicted of violating the Espionage Act. He is convicted on nine felony counts that tie him to the release of classified, top-secret information relating to a CIA program designed to compromise Iran's nuclear program in the 1990s. Sterling's lawyers, who argue the entire case was based solely on circumstantial evidence, plan to appeal the ruling.
- March 3 General David Petraeus, former director of the CIA who resigned his post in November 2012 because of an extramarital affair, pleads guilty to one count of unauthorized removal and retention of classified information while he was serving in Afghanistan as

- commander of the International Security Assistance Force. A judge later sentences Petraeus to two years' probation and a \$100,000 fine.
- March 6 The CIA announces that it will create a stand-alone digital espionage division after acknowledging that it has lost ground in the rapidly burgeoning field of digital and web-based spying. The new division will not only be capable of matching wits with increasingly sophisticated terrorists, but it will also be able to better detect hacking and digital spying by foreign governments.
- June 16 U.S. government officials report that the leader and founder of Al Qaeda in Yemen, Naser Abdel-Karim Wahishi, was killed in a CIA drone strike. This is a major loss for Al Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate and is touted as the most important strike against Al Qaeda since the 2011 killing of Al Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden.
- July 24 David Cohen, deputy director of the CIA, asserts that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies are confident that they will be able to detect any cheating by Iran on the nuclear deal that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015.
- October 26 The whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks reveals the latest of a batch of files pilfered from CIA director John Brennan's personal e-mail account. The files date to 2008, at which time Brennan was head of a private intelligence company. The leaked information provides sensitive information about Brennan's dealings with the Barack Obama presidential campaign as well as personal information and security clearance information for numerous individuals.



Afghanistan

Over the past 40 years or so, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has focused much attention on and directed many resources toward Afghanistan. That nation has endured virtually 35 years of uninterrupted conflict and civil war, beginning in earnest with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. After Muhammad Daud Khan overthrew the Afghan monarchy in 1973 and installed himself as president, the United States sought to strengthen ties with the new Afghan government, principally as a way to counter Soviet influence there. Thus, the U.S. government began funneling modest financial support to Daud's regime, nearly all of which was covert in nature. To ensure the secrecy of this aid, the CIA, together with the U.S. State Department, worked behind the scenes to direct financial resources to the Afghan government.

After Daud was ousted by Afghan communists (who were loosely allied with the Soviets) in April 1978, the CIA began to focus more attention on Afghanistan in hopes of thwarting a complete Soviet takeover of that country. During late 1978 and into 1979, the CIA conducted a broad overview of Afghanistan's internal affairs. The resulting report concluded that intertribal and interethnic turmoil was on the rise in Afghanistan, especially after the communist takeover; it also asserted that there was growing resistance to the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on religious, tribal, and ethnic grounds.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979, ostensibly to prop up the fledgling communist government there and to ensure its pro-Soviet orientation, the CIA began organizing a major effort to help fund various antigovernment mujahideen groups. The plan was to destabilize the Afghan government and imperil the Soviets' occupation. This covert CIA program, known as Operation CYCLONE, would be among the CIA's longest and costliest covert operations in its history.

In 1980 during the Jimmy Carter administration, U.S. aid to Sunni mujahideen groups amounted to about \$30 million per year. U.S. aid to Afghanistan increased dramatically during the Ronald Reagan administration. By 1987, the peak year of support, the Americans were providing nearly \$630 million per year. It is estimated that between 1979 and 1992, the United States provided some \$3 billion to the mujahideen. Much of the U.S. aid was funneled through Pakistani intelligence services, such as the Special Services Group and Inter-Services Intelligence. The Pakistani government itself also provided millions of dollars of support to the Sunni mujahideen groups. Although Britain extended only nominal monetary aid,

its intelligence services worked closely with the Pakistanis and Americans to help distribute arms and other supplies. In addition to Pakistan, Great Britain, and the United States, several other nations also provided aid to the Sunni mujahideen. These included Saudi Arabia (which provided the greatest amount of financial support after the United States), Egypt, China, Kuwait, and Libya. These nations provided monetary support, training, and/or military equipment and hardware.

The United States was very careful not to send many of its own intelligence or military officers to the region for fear of being discovered by the Soviets or the Afghan government. At most, the CIA had perhaps only a dozen agents in the area at any one time. Nevertheless, various State Department and CIA officials visited Pakistani border areas to assess the progress of Operation CYCLONE. In 1986, the Americans began shipping large quantities of FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to the mujahideen. The shoulder-fired missiles are credited with turning the tide of the war decisively against the Soviet Union and the DRA. Within a year, the Soviets were engaged in serious negotiations to extricate themselves from the conflict.

Between 1987 and 1993, another \$4 billion of U.S. aid was allocated for Afghanistan, although the CIA's Operation CYCLONE was gradually phased out after the Soviets exited Afghanistan in 1989. It is estimated that American funding helped train at least 80,000 Afghan rebels between 1979 and 1993.

Despite legitimate claims that the foreign aid to the mujahideen tipped the Soviet-Afghan War in their favor and played a key role in forcing the Soviets from Afghanistan, there are a number of critics who have claimed that American aid may have done more harm than good, at least in the long term. Pakistan tended to support only particular insurgent commanders and rebel groups. The Pakistanis greatly favored Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, for example, so much of the foreign aid that was funneled through Pakistan went to their forces exclusively. Hekmetyar was responsible for committing atrocities against Afghan civilians and was known to be an associate of Osama bin Laden, who later went on to form the terrorist group Al Qaeda. Haqqani also associated with bin Laden and other extremist foreign Islamists in Afghanistan and may well have protected bin Laden from other insurgent groups. Although the U.S. government has steadfastly denied that any of its support to the mujahideen ended up in the hands of bin Laden and other extremists, there is no way of knowing this for certain.

Operation CYCLONE was just a relatively small part of American strategy to roll back Soviet influence in Asia and the Middle East during the 1980s. However, the impact that it had on Afghanistan over the long term was certainly more pervasive. It helped fund and prolong civil war in Afghanistan, which raged from 1989 until 1996, and aided the rise of the Taliban to power in 1996. In short, the Soviet-Afghan War and the foreign support it engendered unleashed more than 35 years of bloodshed and war in Afghanistan, which continue to the present day. On the other hand, as some observers have suggested, U.S. support for the mujahideen may well have contributed to the thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations beginning in the mid-1980s and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the United States, which were perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the United States and other allies launched Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM in October 2001, which was designed to topple the Taliban government and drive Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. The Taliban had given Al Qaeda aid and refuge between 1996 and 2001. It is worth noting here that neither the CIA nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation had any reliable advance knowledge of the September 11 attacks and therefore had not taken any concrete measures to avert them or disrupt them.

Nevertheless, the CIA was at the forefront of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, having largely devised the initial plan of attack and having provided CIA operatives to take part in some of the early combat. The agency's Special Activities Division (SAD) was intricately involved in the early phases of the war. SAD mobilized, trained, and armed the Northern Alliance, which fought alongside U.S. and coalition forces, and worked closely with the U.S. Special Operations Command. Indeed, in late 2001 about 100 CIA operatives, most of them on horseback, served with several hundred U.S. Army rangers and special forces soldiers, also on horseback, to flush out Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan's rugged mountain areas. Among the most famous of these encounters was the December 2001 fighting at Tora Bora, located in eastern Afghanistan adjacent to the Pakistani border. Ironically perhaps, the CIA had helped to heavily fortify and militarize that area during the 1980s as it aided the mujahideen. In late November 2001, CIA agent Michael Spann became the first U.S. casualty of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

The CIA has been credited with aiding in the prompt overthrow of the Taliban regime, with very few U.S. or coalition casualties. However, the CIA's subsequent activities relating to ENDURING FREEDOM and the Global War on Terror have been decidedly mixed. Reports about CIA use of so-called black box sites around the globe, where terror suspects—including Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners from Afghanistan—have been subjected to torture and all manner of mistreatment, have caused a firestorm of controversy in recent years. A number of prisoners captured in Afghanistan since 2001 have been housed at the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp in Cuba, where they have been denied basic humanitarian rights and where the use of coercive interrogation and mistreatment has also been reported. The CIA has also reportedly been involved in operations there too. In addition, the CIA has been criticized for having failed to predict or deter the Afghan insurgency, which has become increasingly problematic since 2007.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cold War and the CIA; Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War; Tora Bora; Wilson, Charlie; Document 98

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Agee, Philip (1935–2008)

Philip Burnett Franklin Agee was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent from 1957 until 1968 and, later, a controversial whistle-blower who revealed a number of CIA activities. Most controversially, Agee exposed some 250 alleged CIA agents and operatives in a blockbuster book he published in 1975.

Agee was born on July 19, 1935, in Tacoma, Florida, and earned a bachelor's degree from the University of Notre Dame in 1956. He then briefly attended the University of Florida College of Law, but in 1957 after being recruited by the CIA, he joined the organization as a case worker. He was posted to numerous locales, including Washington, D.C.; Ecuador; Uruguay; and Mexico. While he was assigned to Mexico City in the late 1960s, he became increasingly disillusioned with U.S. policies in Latin America and the CIA's role in the region. After having witnessed the Mexican government's brutal suppression of the October 1968 Tlatelolco protests prior to the 1968 Olympics that were to be held in Mexico City, Agee made up his mind to leave the CIA. At the time, the U.S. government tacitly supported the Mexican government's actions.

There have been allegations that Agee did not voluntarily resign, however, and that he had been forced out of the CIA because of reckless personal conduct. Other allegations posited that in 1973 Agee had approached the Soviet spy agency, the KGB, in Mexico and had offered to provide it with secret CIA information, which the KGB supposedly turned down because it did not trust Agee's motives. Until the end of his life Agee vigorously denied these various allegations, which have never been completely substantiated.

Agee remained in Mexico for several years before moving to London. It was there that he wrote his bombshell book, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, in which he detailed what he had seen and witnessed during his 11 years with the agency. An appendix in the book also revealed the identities of some 250 alleged CIA agents and operatives, which outraged CIA and U.S. government officials. At the same time, Agee claimed that the CIA had him under close surveillance during his time in London. In 1977 the British government, under pressure from Washington, deported Agee. He subsequently took up residence in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and West Germany but was deported from all of those nations. He ultimately ended up in Cuba, which welcomed his presence as a great propaganda victory.

In 1979 the U.S. government permanently revoked Agee's passport, by which time he had begun work on *Covert Action Quarterly*, which was designed to expose CIA activities worldwide. Agee always maintained that his activities were never designed to be treasonous and were in fact a product of his moral conscience, which had been deeply troubled during his CIA tenure. During 1978–1979, Agee published two books about CIA covert activities in Europe and Africa, both of which exposed the identities of other CIA operatives. In 1987 he published a memoir, *On the Run*, that detailed his nomadic life since leaving the CIA in 1968. By the early 1990s, Agee was splitting his time between Cuba and Germany (he had married a German woman and thus received a German passport).

In 1992, a Cuban defector and former Cuban intelligence operative alleged that the Cuban government had paid Agee \$1 million for his information on CIA activities in that country. Agee vehemently denied the claim and said that he had never worked for any other intelligence agency. Meanwhile, President George H. W. Bush, who ran the CIA in the mid-1970s, had accused Agee of having revealed the identity of Richard Welch, the CIA station head in Athens, Greece. That revelation, Bush asserted, contributed to Welch's 1975 assassination. Welch sued Bush's wife, former first lady Barbara Bush, when she included her husband's accusation in her 1994 autobiography. As per the terms of the legal settlement that ended the libel case, Barbara Bush removed mention of the Welch accusation from all future editions.

In the last years of his life, Agee operated a website in Cuba dedicated to helping American citizens skirt the travel ban on Cuba and permitting them to visit the island nation legally. Agee died in Havana, Cuba, on January 7, 2008. He remains a deeply polarizing and controversial individual, however.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cuba; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Welch, Richard

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Air America

Air America's origins can be traced to the need by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for air transport capability to conduct covert operations in Asia in support of U.S. policy objectives. In August 1950 the CIA secretly purchased the assets of the Civil Air Transport, an airline started in China after World War II by General Claire L. Chennault (of Flying Tiger fame) and Whiting Willauer. The Civil Air Transport continued to fly commercial routes throughout Asia, acting in every way as a privately owned commercial airline. At the same time, under the guise of CAT Incorporated, the airline provided airplanes and crews for secret U.S. intelligence operations from Tibet to Indonesia. On March 26, 1959, largely because of administrative problems connected with doing business in Japan, the name of CAT Incorporated was changed to Air America.

Air America took an increasingly prominent role in Southeast Asia as the United States became more deeply involved in the growing conflict in the region. Although the airline developed extensive operations in South Vietnam, providing air transport for CIA activities in the country, Air America played an even more important role in Laos, where it became a key element in U.S. assistance to the Royal Lao government in its struggle against the communist Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies.

The growth of Air America in Laos began early in 1961 after Washington approved a CIA recommendation to arm and train Hmong tribesmen as a counterweight to communist forces in the northern part of the country. With the Hmong scattered on mountainous terrain surrounding the strategic Plaine des Jarres, CIA paramilitary specialist James W. Lair recognized that effective communications would be essential for successful operations. Air America, he believed, would have to develop both a rotary-wing and short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability to assist Laotian guerrilla forces.

Air America had only four helicopters at the beginning of 1961 but expanded that March when President John F. Kennedy ordered the U.S. Marine Corps to transfer 14 UH-34s to the CIA's airline. At the same time, Air America acquired a small fleet of single-engine Helio Courier aircraft that were able to use the short, primitive airstrips that dotted the mountainous areas of Laos. From less than a dozen Victor sites, as they were known in 1961, the STOL program grew to encompass more than 100 Lima sites by late 1964 and more than 400 by the early 1970s.

Air America quickly became involved in the war in Laos, supplying arms and ammunition to the 9,000 Hmong tribesmen who had been trained by the CIA and air-dropping rice to the tens of thousands of refugees who had been displaced by the fighting. On May 30, 1961, the airline suffered its first casualties when helicopter pilots Charles Mateer and Walter Wizbowski crashed in bad weather while attempting to land supplies to a besieged Hmong garrison at Padong, a mountain-top position adjacent to the Plaine des Jarres.

Air America's operations declined sharply following the signing in Geneva of the Declaration of the Neutrality of Laos on July 23, 1962. Helicopter flight operations, for example, went from a monthly average of 2,000 before the agreement to 600 by early 1963.

The truce in Laos, however, proved temporary. Full-scale fighting broke out again in March 1964 as communist forces attacked government positions on the Plaine des Jarres. Washington declined to commit U.S. combat forces to the war; instead, it expanded the role of the CIA in Laos in an effort to avoid a major confrontation with North Vietnam in an area of clearly secondary importance. North Vietnam also controlled the level of violence in the country. As CIA analysts recognized, while Hanoi had the capability of overrunning most of Laos in short order, the North Vietnamese were mainly interested in protecting their supply routes to South Vietnam and did not wish to destroy the general framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement.

Nonetheless, within this general context of restraint, a nasty guerrilla war took place in Laos over the next four years. Air America embarked upon an expansion program as it assumed a paramilitary role in support of CIA-led forces. In addition to providing air transport for the Hmong, Air America also took responsibility for search-and-rescue operations as the U.S. Air Force began to fly combat sorties in the country.

The character of the war began to change in 1968 and 1969 as the North Vietnamese introduced major new combat forces into Laos. Air America's role in the war continued to grow as the fighting increased in intensity. By the summer of 1970, the airline

was operating in Laos some two dozen twin-engine transports, another two dozen STOL aircraft, and some 30 helicopters. Air America had more than 300 pilots, copilots, flight mechanics, and air freight specialists flying out of Laos and Thailand. During 1970 Air America air-dropped or landed in Laos 46 million pounds of foodstuffs, mainly rice. Helicopter flight time reached more than 4,000 hours a month during the year. Air America crews transported tens of thousands of troops and refugees, flew emergency medevac missions, and rescued downed airmen throughout Laos. The crews also inserted and extracted road-watch teams, flew nighttime airdrop missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, spent long nights at high altitudes monitoring sensors along infiltration routes, conducted a highly successful photoreconnaissance program over northern Laos, and engaged in numerous clandestine missions using night-vision glasses and state-of-the-art electronic equipment.

Air America's operations became increasingly hazardous during the early 1970s as the enemy launched a series of major offenses in the country. Although CIA-led forces were able to delay a final communist victory, they could not prevent it. In February 1974 a cease-fire agreement was signed, leading to the formation of a coalition government for Laos. On June 3, the last Air America aircraft crossed the border from Laos into Thailand. "The departure of AAM from Laos," the airline's operations office in Vientiane informed Washington, "was without incident although some lumps are visible in the throats of those who put so much of themselves into the operation over the years . . . We grieve for those missing and dead



Vietnamese refugees sit aboard an Air America aircraft, the CIA's charter airline, as it carries more than 100 refugees from Nhatrang to Saigon on March 30, 1975. (AP Photo)

in Laos and regret that they too could not have enjoyed today.” The war had cost the lives of 97 crew members lost as a result of enemy action and operational accidents.

Air America continued to fly in South Vietnam as it had since the early 1960s. The airline went on to take a major part in the final evacuation of the country in April 1975. Indeed, one of the most enduring images of the final days in Saigon is a photograph of an Air America helicopter loading passengers atop the Pittman Apartments.

Even before the departure of U.S. troops from Vietnam, Air America’s fate had been decided. On April 21, 1972, CIA director Richard Helms had ended a lengthy debate within the CIA over the continued need for a covert airlift capability and ordered the agency to divest itself of ownership and control of Air America and related companies. Air America would be retained only until the end of the war in Southeast Asia. On June 30, 1976, Air America closed its doors and returned \$20 million to the U.S. Treasury.

William M. Leary

See also Helms, Richard; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in; Documents 34, 35

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Air Reconnaissance

Visual observation from a strategically high location has been a fundamental aspect of gathering intelligence throughout human history and warfare. With the invention of air travel and camera technologies as well as the launching of man-made satellites, air reconnaissance eventually became possible and has been utilized by various nations and their agencies, including the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Contemporary state-of-the-art imagery intelligence unites human technological development in imagery, air and space travel, and communications to create better and more useful reconnaissance—a clear view from a high vantage point that becomes available to analysts virtually instantaneously.

World War I marked the beginning of air reconnaissance with the unification of the airplane and the camera. By World War II a few decades later, military commanders were able to utilize photographic reconnaissance intelligence from both high-altitude bombers, such as the B-17 and B-24, and high-speed interceptor aircraft. Following World War II, the beginning of the Cold War led to the Soviet Union dropping the Iron Curtain, which cut off direct access to Eastern Europe and

the Soviet Union. As a result, the U.S. Air Force initiated aerial photographic and electronic intelligence reconnaissance missions along the borders of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

By the mid-1950s, camera and film technologies had rapidly advanced beyond the ceiling at which existing aircraft could fly. New aircraft was needed that could fly high enough outside of the maximum altitude range of Soviet interceptor jets and surface-to-air missiles. Lockheed Aircraft Company's Clarence Johnson accepted the challenge and developed the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft for the CIA. The U-2 carried two types of cameras, one of which was a special long focal length spotting camera able to resolve objects 2 to 3 feet across from a 70,000-foot altitude. The other camera carried by the U-2 was a tracking camera capable of producing a continuous strip of film of the entire flight path. Air reconnaissance from the CIA's use of the U-2 in the 1950s and 1960s provided significant strategic photographic intelligence on the Soviet Union's bomber force, missile forces, atomic energy programs, and air defense systems.

Following the U-2's development, CIA management again worked with Lockheed Aircraft Company's Clarence Johnson to develop an entirely new type of reconnaissance aircraft, mainly due to the awareness that Soviet countermeasures would soon catch up with the slow-flying U-2. This led to the development of the A-12, which could fly at the extremely high speed of 2,000 miles per hour and at an altitude of 90,000 feet. The A-12 utilized the best stealth (radar-absorbing) technology at the time. During the Vietnam War, the decision was made to substitute the A-12 for the U-2s being used for photographic reconnaissance over North Vietnam following the increased use of surface-to-air missiles around Hanoi. The SR-71, the U.S. Air Force's two-seater version of the A-12, eventually replaced the A-12 in use.

Further advances in technology eventually allowed for reconnaissance to be gathered from space in addition to the air. In February 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the CIA to develop a satellite capable of recording its images on film and returning the film to the surface for analysis. Known as the CORONA Program, the first successful launch of a CORONA satellite occurred in August 1960. The first images from the CORONA satellite were inferior to those from the U-2, but the CORONA satellite's images eventually improved in clarity. The CORONA Program lasted 14 years and was invaluable to the U.S. strategic understanding of the Soviet Union. Among other revelations, the CORONA Program located all Soviet intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missile sites as well as all Soviet warship and submarine bases.

In December 1976 the Kennan, or KH-11, satellite was launched, which was considered the next technological breakthrough in space reconnaissance. The problem with previous film-return satellites was that they could not provide intelligence quickly enough for incidents of short duration, for it could take days to weeks for the film to reach the desks of photo interpreters. The KH-11's camera system solved this problem, converting visible light into electrical charges that were in turn transmitted as data to ground stations to be converted into photographs. This resulted in near real-time imagery, and because the images were digital, they could be enhanced further with additional processing once received.

Between 1961 and 1996, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), which was managed by the CIA and staffed with personnel from the agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and military intelligence divisions, handled most of the U.S. air and space reconnaissance interpretation activities. Prior to the use of computers, photo interpreters in the NPIC used light table and magnification equipment to scrutinize photographs from the air and space. However, when the KH-11 satellite became operational, the NPIC began utilizing computers that scanned the stream of incoming imagery from the satellites and stored the information for comparison with future intelligence.

Reconnaissance from airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, and satellites has advanced beyond ordinary photography in modern times. Ordinary photography can only produce an image in daylight and cannot penetrate heavy cloud cover. To compensate for this, air and space reconnaissance has utilized infrared and radar technologies. Infrared sensors define objects by their temperature differences and are capable of producing images at night. Radar technologies send out radio waves that are bounced back to the emitter, and as such radar is capable of producing images both at night and through cloud cover.

Andrew Green

See also CORONA Program; Eisenhower, Dwight David; National Photographic Interpretation Center; Powers, Francis Gary; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in; Documents 25–27, 29, 40

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AJAX, Operation (1953)

Operation AJAX (also known as Operation TAPJAX and Operation BOOT) was a secret operation carried out by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that secured power for Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran when Iran's popular nationalist government was dominated by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.

Mossadegh was born in Tehran and was educated in law at Lausanne University, and he held several posts in Iranian government ministries in the 1920s. He retired in 1925 but returned to politics in 1944. Mossadegh was a devoted nationalist who directed his attacks at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which he believed had exploited the Iranian economy for 50 years.

When Mossadegh became prime minister of Iran, he nationalized the oil industry, a monopoly largely owned by British Petroleum (BP), and prepared a plan to compensate the previous owners with funds from the profits of the oil sales. Both the Conservative and non-Conservative governments in Great Britain wanted BP, one of seven oil companies that controlled the world's oil industry, to maintain its monopoly and feared that the loss would cripple British prestige in the Middle East at a time when Arab nationalism ran high. The British took their case to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice but lost. Russia hailed Mossadegh's success and urged the Iranian Tudeh Party (communists) to support him.

The British foreign secretary, the minister of defense, and the BP chairman proposed military intervention. British prime minister Clement Attlee would not agree; instead, an embargo was put on Iranian oil, and Iranian funds in British banks were frozen.

At first the United States wanted little to do with the problem in Iran, experiencing problems itself at the time with oil industry cartels. President Dwight D. Eisenhower supported Mossadegh's attempt to make his country independent politically and economically in 1953. In time the British embargo crippled the Iranian economy, and the Americans feared that the Soviets would seek further influence in Iran.

The CIA, with support from the British SIS, planned to support the shah and undermine Mossadegh's weakening control of the Iranian government. On August 8, 1953, Eisenhower gave the CIA permission to bring about the downfall of Mossadegh. With help from the U.S. embassy in Tehran, nonpartisans were brought to the city and encouraged to riot by liberally distributing \$100,000 in cash among them. The shah's loyal general, Fazlollah Zahedi, arrived to manage the coup, arrested Mossadegh (who appeared to have escaped), and had him jailed.

The most important U.S. actors in the coup were Allen Dulles, CIA head; Kermit Roosevelt, chief of the CIA Plans Directorate's Near East and Africa Division; the American ambassador in Tehran; and the former chief of the New Jersey State Police, H. Norman Schwarzkopf Sr., a CIA military specialist attached to the American embassy who from 1942 to 1948 served the internal security needs of the shah.

Under Kermit Roosevelt's direction, the CIA arranged for Iran's newspapers to publish proshah and anti-Mossadegh articles; print "true" stories that had been fabricated, with cartoons and interviews that had never taken place; bribe members of the Iranian militia; spread false rumors about Mossadegh's government; produce fake documentation of secret agreements between the Iranian Tudeh Party and Mossadegh; find individuals who pretended to be communists and behaved accordingly; mislead Iranian religious officials into believing that their lives were in danger and their homes were to be torched; incite rioters to burn down newspaper offices that supported Mossadegh; and bribe the army chief to take over from Mossadegh.

After his arrest, Mossadegh was condemned by the shah for supporting communism, committing treason, and pursuing a doctrine of negative equilibrium for Iran's economy. Mossadegh was jailed for three years and in 1956 was placed under house arrest until his death in 1967.

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See also Dulles, Allen; Roosevelt, Kermit, Jr.; Document 24

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Alec Station

Alec Station was the U.S. government–sanctioned Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program designed to hunt down and capture or kill Osama bin Laden. Two members of the Bill Clinton administration—National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Richard Clarke, the national coordinator for counterterrorism—met in late 1995 with the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) to discuss the need for a unit to concentrate solely on bin Laden. Soon afterward the director of the CIA, George Tenet, approved just such a unit. The plan called for Alec Station to run only a couple of years before merging completely with the CTC, but as bin Laden became a greater and greater threat, Alec Station continued its operations for more than a decade.

When the CIA began Alec Station on January 8, 1996, bin Laden was mostly known as a financier of terrorism. Soon afterward it became apparent that he had declared open warfare against the United States and its allies, and the campaign against him was stepped up. Mike Scheuer, a veteran CIA agent, was placed in charge of the program when it was founded; although the formal title of the program was the Usama Bin Laden Issue Station (UBL), it soon took the name Alec Station after Scheuer's adopted Korean son, Alec. Alec Station functioned as a subunit of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center. Sponsors of this program set it up as an inter-agency unit running agents from both the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The plan was for this unit to fuse intelligence disciplines into one office—including operations, analysis, signals intercepts, overhead photography, and covert action. As the unit developed, its strength lay in analysis. It started out as a small unit with a staff of only about 15 analysts, mostly young women. It was not considered a choice assignment. Alec Station was a low-profile operation and was at first housed outside Langley until it moved to the CTC.

By 1998, Scheuer was convinced that bin Laden posed an ongoing danger to the United States but had difficulty convincing his superiors—partly because of his difficult personality, which managed to alienate even those who agreed with him.

After Scheuer learned that bin Laden had attempted to acquire nuclear materials, he had difficulty making his superiors accept the information and use it to inform others in the government. Scheuer believed that bin Laden constituted a clear and present danger and became increasingly frustrated by the lack of action taken toward bin Laden.

Scheuer also had difficulties with the FBI. Although Alec Station had been set up as an interagency operation, the FBI often refused to share information with the CIA. The most notorious member of the FBI in this regard was John O'Neill, the FBI's top counterterrorism expert. O'Neill possessed a notebook captured from an Al Qaeda operative that he refused to turn over to Alec Station for a year. In another instance, an FBI agent was caught raiding CIA files with the intent of taking their contents back to the FBI. Scheuer has claimed that Alec Station sent 700–800 requests for information to the FBI but never received answers to any of them.

Alec Station planned to capture bin Laden after he moved to Afghanistan in May 1996. For the first time, the CIA knew where bin Laden and his family lived—in the Tarnak Farm compound 12 miles outside Kandahar. Beginning in 1997, plans were made with Afghan tribal leaders to kidnap bin Laden and take him to an Arab country or the United States for trial. The CIA even staged four rehearsals for the operation in late 1997 and early 1998. Then on May 29, 1998, Tenet called off the operation. Scheuer's reaction was swift. He complained that the CIA had enough intelligence against bin Laden and Al Qaeda to eliminate both, and he couldn't understand why the U.S. government had failed to take the chance to do so. The Clinton administration responded that it feared collateral damage and any negative publicity that might follow a less than perfect operation.

It was only after the bombings on August 7, 1998, of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa that the attention of the Clinton administration was redirected toward bin Laden. On August 20, 1998, the United States launched an attack on an Al Qaeda Afghanistan training camp near Khost and on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, in which 79 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Sea. However, warnings from Pakistani sources made certain that bin Laden escaped the missiles, and the Sudanese plant turned out to be a harmless pharmaceutical plant. Several other plans were made to either capture or kill bin Laden, but they were canceled each time because of one difficulty or another. Most cancellations were caused by a lack of confidence in intelligence sources and information.

The most promising opportunity was in February 1999. CIA agents learned that bin Laden was going to join a number of sheikhs from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at a desert hunting camp in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Satellite pictures identified the camp on February 9. CIA operatives confirmed bin Laden's presence and requested a missile strike. Over the next several days, the Clinton administration debated a missile strike without deciding before learning that members of the UAE royal family were also present at this camp. Because of foreign policy complications with the UAE (a provider of gas and oil supplies), nothing happened, and Scheuer was furious. His e-mails expressing his unhappiness traveled around government circles.

Tenet removed Scheuer from his position as head of Alec Station in the spring of 1999. Scheuer's inability to work with superiors and the FBI led to his dismissal. His critics intimated that he had become dysfunctional because of his vendetta against bin Laden. CIA analysts at Alec Station blamed O'Neill for the firing of Scheuer because the dispute had reached the level of the agency heads of the CIA and the FBI—Tenet and Louis Freeh, respectively. Scheuer's replacement was a key assistant on Tenet's staff and a Middle East specialist but lacked Scheuer's drive. By this time, Alec Station had grown from 12 analysts to 25. Most of these analysts were women, something that hurt their credibility in the male-dominated CIA. There was a feeling in the CTC that others in the CIA ridiculed members of Alec Station for their zeal in tracing the actions of bin Laden.

The status of Alec Station became more precarious after September 11, 2001. Some of the criticism directed against the CIA for failing to uncover the 9/11 plot descended on Alec Station, and Scheuer reappeared as a senior analyst at Alec Station after September 11. Members of Alec Station adamantly insisted that little if any connection existed between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, something they communicated to Tenet. However, this stance made them enemies in the George W. Bush administration, which wanted the CIA to provide justification for the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Hussein. Those in the CIA who opposed the invasion became enemies. Personnel were transferred out of Alec Station until only 12 analysts remained. Scheuer protested this action, resigning from the CIA on November 12, 2004. Not long afterward, the CIA disbanded Alec Station entirely.

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See also Afghanistan; Counterterrorism Center; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Documents 73, 75, 87, 95–96

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Al Harethi Drone Strike

On November 3, 2002, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engineered a targeted assassination of high-ranking Al Qaeda leader Qaed Salim Sinan al

Harethi as part of the ongoing Global War on Terror. The attack occurred in Yemen's northern province of Marib, about 100 miles east of the Yemeni capital of Sana'a, and was carried out using a Predator drone (a remote-controlled unmanned aerial vehicle). The drone fired an AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missile into an automobile in which al Harethi and five associates, believed to be lower-ranking Al Qaeda leaders, were riding. The missile strike killed all six people, including al Harethi.

The al Harethi drone strike was notable for several reasons. First, it marked the first known use of a Predator drone for a targeted killing outside Afghanistan; second, it was the first drone attack in Yemen; and third, it was the first occasion in which a U.S. citizen was killed by the U.S. government during the ongoing Global War on Terror. One of al Harethi's associates who died with him was Kamal Derwish, an American citizen of Yemeni ancestry. The intended target of the attack, however, was al Harethi, not Derwish. Al Harethi was a close confidante of Al Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden and was believed to have been responsible for the October 12, 2000, attack against USS *Cole*. That assault had taken place in the Yemeni port of Aden and resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors and the wounding of 39 others. Al Harethi had been at the top of the CIA's kill list since that time. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, the U.S. government dramatically expanded its efforts to target and kill terror suspects such as al Harethi.

The CIA, working with Edmund Hull, America's ambassador to Yemen at the time, had been planning the drone attack for some time. Indeed, it was Hull who helped gather intelligence on al Harethi's whereabouts and paid local tribesman in return for information on his location and activities. Yemen's government, however, was not pleased with the drone attack because Washington had not coordinated its efforts with Yemeni intelligence or military officials. Yemeni leaders were also angry that members of the George W. Bush administration had made the attack public, apparently in violation of an earlier agreement that the U.S. government would not claim responsibility for the drone assault.

The drone attack also created controversy in the United States because Derwish, who was among those killed, held U.S. citizenship. Derwish was by no means an altar boy, and American authorities had strong evidence that he had been operating an Al Qaeda sleeper cell outside Buffalo, New York. Nevertheless, some critics of the attack argued that Derwish's constitutional rights were abrogated because he was effectively killed by the U.S. government without being charged with any crime and without due process of law. Bush administration officials countered that Derwish was active as an enemy combatant against American interests, in a foreign country no less, and therefore had ceded any constitutional rights he might otherwise have enjoyed. Furthermore, the White House asserted that the president had broad latitude to wage the Global War on Terror, given to him by the U.S. Congress after the September 11, 2001, attacks, and that authority empowered him to engage in covert operations against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations anywhere in the world. U.S. drone attacks against terrorists and suspected terrorists rose

steadily after the al Harethi attack and accelerated even more rapidly under the Barack Obama administration.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Drones; War on Terror and the CIA

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Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973)

Salvador Allende Gossens was a left-wing politician and the president of Chile from 1970 to 1973. Born on July 26, 1908, in Valparaíso, Chile, Allende was of middle-class origins. He trained as a physician but never practiced medicine. He was a cofounder and eventually the standard-bearer of the Chilean Socialist Party and also served in its militia as a young man. Allende went on to serve as cabinet minister and president of the Chilean Senate.

Allende ran for president four times, finally winning a plurality by 39,000 votes as leader of Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), a leftist coalition, on September 4, 1970. He had been a thorn in the side of several U.S. presidential administrations, as policy makers feared that an Allende presidency would bring about a communist state, open to Soviet influence in the region and a threat to American interests in Chile.

President Richard M. Nixon was a particularly vociferous opponent of Allende and publicly stated as much after the 1970 election. The Chilean Constitution stipulated that the Chilean Congress must choose the president if no candidate won by a majority. Behind the scenes, U.S. ambassador Edward M. Korry tried unsuccessfully to assemble a consensus to deny Allende the presidency. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covertly provided weapons to right-wing conspirators to foment a coup, which was also unsuccessful. Allende was inaugurated on November 3, 1970.

As Allende instituted socialist programs and established diplomatic ties with Cuba’s communist leader Fidel Castro, Washington simultaneously attempted to squeeze the Chilean economy while secretly giving some \$7 million to Allende’s political adversaries.

Nixon pursued a clandestine economic policy to destabilize the Chilean government, and in September 1973, with support from the CIA, General Augusto Pinochet seized power and attacked the presidential palace with tanks, bombs, and rockets. Allende refused to resign. He was supported by the police and the

presidential guard, and while he held out for two hours, the palace was set ablaze around him. His doctor said that he appeared to have committed suicide; others are certain that he died at the hands of Pinochet's soldiers. Pinochet emerged as the leader of the military junta and ruled Chile until 1989.

James F. Siekmeier

See also Chile; Cuba; Documents 30, 45–47

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Alwān, Rāfid Ahmed

See "Curveball"

Ames, Aldrich (1941–)

Aldrich Ames was born on June 25, 1941, and attended George Washington University in Washington, D.C. He was a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official who walked into the Soviet embassy on April 6, 1985, and offered his services as a spy. In return, he sought \$50,000. He had recently remarried, and his divorce left him with significant debt. To establish his value and credibility to the Soviets, Ames provided the names of 2 CIA moles operating within the embassy. On May 15, 1985, Ames was told that he would receive his \$50,000. One month later and without seeking any monetary compensation, he provided the Soviets with the names of virtually all of the Soviet agents working for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) informed Ames that for this information it had put aside \$2 million



Former CIA counterintelligence officer and analyst Aldrich Ames is led away in handcuffs after being convicted of spying for the Soviet Union in 1994. (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive)

for him. The Soviet Union acted quickly on this information. Published estimates put the number of compromised agents at 25. It is presumed that 10 were executed. Numbered among those was General Dimitri Polyakov of Soviet military intelligence who had spied for the United States for 20 years and provided information on Soviet strategic missiles and chemical and biological warfare programs.

Ames began working for the CIA's Directorate of Operations in 1968. His first overseas assignment came the following year when he was posted to Turkey and given the assignment of recruiting communist intelligence officials and diplomats as spies. He returned to Washington in 1972, having received an unfavorable performance evaluation. Ames next went to New York City, where he was placed in charge of the CIA's office that conducted operations against foreign targets. From there he went to Mexico City, where once again he was tasked with recruiting Soviet

spies. In Mexico his marriage began to fail and he became a heavy drinker, leading once more to poor performance evaluations. His next assignment brought him back to Washington, D.C., where he headed the Soviet branch of the CIA's counterintelligence group. There he supervised CIA assets inside the Soviet Union and had access to highly secret information regarding CIA activity directed against Soviet intelligence agencies from outside the Soviet Union. In that position, he would help debrief Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko in 1985. A highly placed KGB official, Yurchenko provided the names of two KGB penetrations into the U.S. intelligence community: Edward Lee Howard and Ronald Pelton. Ames's career would next take him to Rome, where he served as Soviet branch chief. While in Rome, he continued to provide the Soviet Union with shopping bags full of secret material for which he received cash payments ranging from \$20,000 to \$50,000. It is estimated that from 1985 to 1993 Ames and his second wife, Rosario Casas Dupuy, spent almost \$1.4 million, while his annual salary was only \$69,843.

The CIA was slow to react to the loss of agents for several reasons. On the one hand, it attributed its losses to either the actions of a captured Soviet agent, Edward Lee Howard, or bad luck. More fundamentally, critics point to lax internal security procedures, disregard for poor performance evaluations, a failure to appreciate the potential significance of Ames's spending patterns, and an inability to believe that the CIA could have been penetrated. The CIA authorized a mole hunt in October 1986 when it set up a special task force. The initial focus of these efforts was on a communications breach rather than espionage. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began a probe that same year but ended it in 1987. The CIA probe continued but at a reduced pace. It was only in late 1989 that suspicion began to center on Ames, who had just paid cash for a \$540,000 home. Still, it was December 1990 before a formal investigation was begun and March 1993 when the CIA firmly established that it had been penetrated. In June of that year, a wiretap was placed on Ames's home phone and his CIA office was searched. That search uncovered 144 secret and 10 top secret documents that were unrelated to his work. Ames was arrested on February 21, 1994, one day before he was to leave for the Soviet Union as part of a CIA team that would meet with Soviet intelligence officials on the international narcotics trade.

On April 24, 1994, Ames pled guilty to espionage. In return for his cooperation, he received a life sentence with no chance of parole, and Rosario received a five-year sentence. Ames is currently in prison.

Glenn P. Hastedt

See also Howard, Edward Lee; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Yurchenko, Vitaly; Documents 68–70, 72

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Angleton, James (1917–1987)

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton was born on December 9, 1917, in Boise, Idaho. Angleton moved with his family to Dayton, Ohio, and then to Milan, Italy, when his father purchased the Italian National Cash Register franchise in 1931. James Angleton received his preparatory education in England and then enrolled at Yale University in 1937, graduating in 1941.

During World War II Angleton served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and during 1944–1945 he headed the OSS branch in Italy. In 1947 he became an early member of the newly formed CIA under spymaster Allen Dulles, who appointed him head of the Counterintelligence Staff in 1954.

In December 1961, Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) officer Anatoliy Golitsyn defected and reported to U.S. authorities that the CIA had been penetrated by the KGB. This was easy to believe, because several moles had already been uncovered in the British and West German intelligence services. Angleton was impressed with what Golitsyn had to say, more so than some other officials in the CIA. Golitsyn visited London and told roughly the same story about Britain's security service, MI5. This created a mild furor that resulted in an investigation of the deputy director of MI5, Graham Mitchell, and even the director, Sir Roger Hollis, as possible KGB moles. Mitchell's probe was quickly dropped, but the probe for Hollis continued even after his retirement in 1965. Two former members of MI5, Arthur Martin and Peter Wright, failed to convince MI5 that Hollis was a Soviet



James Angleton served as head of counterintelligence at the CIA from 1954 to 1974 during the height of the Cold War. On September 25, 1975, he was called to answer questions before the Senate Intelligence Committee concerning the CIA's cover-up of an illegal domestic mail opening operation. Angleton resigned shortly after the extent of these illegal activities became public. (AP Photo)

mole. Wright's career autobiography, *Spycatcher*, contains much material on the Hollis issue and became a best seller in the United States in 1987.

In February 1964 another defector from the KGB, Yuri Nosenko, arrived in the United States. He had supplied information to the CIA for several years but waited until January 1964 to defect. He arrived in Washington as some 40 CIA officers were under investigation as possible mole candidates, but Nosenko's statements often conflicted with those of Golitsyn. Angleton regarded Nosenko as a KGB plant and had him incarcerated in a small house near Williamsburg, Virginia, for 1,277 days, with 292 of these devoted to hostile interrogation. Nosenko, however, gained a certain measure of CIA support.

Angleton's activities had greatly destabilized the CIA's organization and purpose. In September 1973, William Colby replaced James Schlesinger as director of the CIA. Colby was determined to be rid of Angleton and restore CIA morale. Angleton was forced to resign just before Christmas 1974, and Nosenko was released. Many in Angleton's counterintelligence unit were reassigned or released. Angleton died of cancer on May 11, 1987, in Washington, D.C.

Ernie Teagarden

See also Colby, William; Golitsyn, Anatoliy; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Nosenko, Yuri; Documents 10, 17, 22

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Animal Farm

Following the death of English author George Orwell on January 21, 1950, officials from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hoped to buy the rights to his notable book *Animal Farm* (1945). The rights to this work were owned at the time by his widow Sonia Brownell Orwell. The CIA hoped to produce an animated film with a strong anticommunist tone. The book was already well known for its antitotalitarian message that many people associated with Stalinism.

The CIA Office of Policy Coordination, responsible for covert operations for the U.S. government, sent two officials to secure the screen rights to *Animal Farm*. Howard Hunt, who later gained infamy for his role in the Watergate break-in, was the leader of this operation, along with his contact in Hollywood, Carleton Alsup,

the brother of journalist Joseph W. Alsop. Carleton Alsop was working undercover at Paramount Studios. Both Hunt and Alsop went to England to obtain the rights to the film by negotiating with Orwell's widow.

Having secured the rights to the book for a script, Hunt chose Paramount Studio's Louis De Rochemont to produce the film. De Rochemont was known for his political films, such as the anti-Nazi film *The House on 92nd Street* (1945) and *Lost Boundaries* (1949), a motion picture that discussed racial issues in the United States.

Animal Farm was produced in England and completed in April 1954. It was the first animated feature to be developed in that country. The film's ending was altered to show that only the pigs in the film had become corrupt and that the other animals had successfully overthrown their regime. Moreover, there is no mention of humans at all in the film version.

Animal Farm did favorably at the box office and was well reviewed. However, some critics suggested that people read the book to see what was not included in the film. The film was distributed abroad by the U.S. Information Agency through overseas libraries affiliated with their organization.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also Cold War and the CIA; Mass Media (Information) Operations

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Arab-Israeli War of 1967

See Six-Day War

Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo (1913–1971)

As president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán faced great extremes. He took office at the height of the country's most hopeful era of democratic reform and worked to promote further innovations. Yet he was also president during the most shameful of the U.S. government's interventions in Latin America, which not only forced Arbenz to flee for his life but visited a tragedy of dramatic proportions on Guatemala, sending the country into decades of turmoil and despair.

Arbenz was born in Quezaltenango, Guatemala, on September 14, 1913. His father was a Swiss German who came to Central America in 1901 to open a pharmacy. His mother was a *ladina* (mixed European and Indian) woman. While

Arbenz was still young his father became addicted to morphine, and his habit caused the family business to go bankrupt. The family was forced to move to a small house on the outside of town.

When Arbenz finished high school in 1932, he was unable to attend a regular university because of his family's financial problems. Although he had no desire to go into the military, he enrolled in the national military academy, Escuela Politecnica, for the sake of his education. He was a very good student there and received many honors for his academic performance. He was also highly respected by both his classmates and the officers who ran the school.

Arbenz graduated in 1935 and was commissioned as a junior officer in the Guatemalan Army. His first assignment was at Fort San José, where he helped supervise soldiers who were responsible for escorting convicts serving forced labor. He soon was transferred to the army garrison at San Juan Sacatepequez and was later summoned back to the Escuela Politecnica in March 1937 by the officers there who admired his knack for academics. He served as an instructor there, teaching a variety of subjects to the cadets.

In 1938 Arbenz met María Vilanova, who came from a wealthy family in El Salvador, was very cultured, and had been educated in the United States. The two were married the following year. They shared many ideas about politics and social issues and would profoundly influence one another throughout their marriage.

Arbenz's intelligence and pedagogical abilities were rewarded in 1943 when he was promoted to captain and was made commandant of cadets, the third-highest position in the academy. The next year, he began plotting with other reform-minded officers and activists against dictator Jorge Ubico, who had controlled Guatemala for decades. Political pressure led to Ubico's resignation in July 1944, but when the military then circumvented the democratic process and imposed General Federico Ponce Vaides as provisional president, Arbenz and the reformists were outraged. Arbenz resigned his army



Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (shown here on the left in 1954) took office at the height of the country's most hopeful era of democratic reform and worked to promote further innovations. (Bettmann/Corbis)

commission and continued the political fight. In October, Arbenz and two close allies seized power from Ponce and established themselves as the provisional ruling junta. The democratic elections that followed led to the election of the reformist Juan José Arévalo as president.

The election of Arévalo was a great milestone in the history of Guatemala, where the social structure had changed little since the colonial period. Most of the country's indigenous peoples lived in complete isolation from political processes and thus had no way to protect their rights, yet they were vulnerable to forced labor and other forms of repression. Arévalo enacted a series of important reforms that abolished forced labor, improved education, organized social security, and allowed labor—both urban and agrarian—to organize into unions. Many foreign companies, including the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which was used to having its own way in Guatemala, were inconvenienced by these improvements for the Guatemalan people and refused to honor the new laws of the country.

Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala in 1951 and worked hard to maintain the momentum of the Arévalo years. After taking office on March 15, Arbenz launched a large and sweeping reform program. In addition to a public works program through which he intended to build a network of roads, a Caribbean port, and a hydroelectric plant, he was also committed to introducing radical agrarian reform. In 1952 along with several communist leaders, he formulated a law that would nationalize large amounts of unused land. Large landowners held title to lands they never cultivated, while thousands of peasants did not have enough land to feed their families. After Decree 900 was approved by Congress on June 17, the Guatemalan government could legally expropriate huge tracts of excess land held by corporations and wealthy estate owners in order to redistribute it to people anxious to make the land productive. Within two years, the government seized what was the equivalent of 25 percent of all the arable land in Guatemala.

Although Arbenz received no financial or military support from the Soviet Union, he worked closely with Communist Party labor organizers and met with other communist advisers. Though his land reform program followed a fairly common pattern, his own Marxist beliefs enabled his opponents to target the reform as a communist plot, and officials in the U.S. government began to describe Guatemala as a Soviet satellite state.

One of the reasons that U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles was so interested in branding the Arbenz regime as communist was because of the financial interests that his family held in the UFCO. Compensation for the enormous amount of unused land held by the UFCO became a heated issue. The company demanded that it be reimbursed at the market value, while the Guatemalan government was only willing to pay what the company itself had declared for tax purposes. Since the company had been undervaluing the land to minimize its taxes for years, it was caught in a bind that could only be resolved through force.

Dulles involved the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Guatemalan politics in order to maintain the profits of the U.S. corporation. Since the CIA was headed at the time by the brother of one of the UFCO's lawyers, the two institutions joined forces in 1953 to attempt to get rid of Arbenz. At the same time as they

launched a media campaign in the United States to paint Arbenz as an enemy, the CIA began a campaign of psychological warfare to turn the Guatemalan people against him.

Though the U.S. government was involved in a completely illegal campaign to remove a democratically elected president from office, there were also important divisions in Guatemala that made this possible. Landowners, other conservatives, and large factions in the army were all opposed to the reforms that had been enacted by Arévalo and Arbenz and to the ways that these reforms had empowered the common people in the country. The CIA trained and armed an invasion force of 300 men in neighboring Guatemala and placed the force under the command of an ex-colonel from the Guatemalan Army, Carlos Castillo Armas. In 1954 when the CIA sent the rebels into Guatemala, the Guatemalan military refused to defend the country against the invasion force. With increasing pressure from the U.S. government and the mounting threat of civil war, Arbenz resigned his presidency on June 27 and returned to his home at Casa Pomona.

Armas seized power with the support of the U.S. government on July 7, and by September 1 he had secured himself as the full military dictator of the country, thus beginning a period of ruthless military dictatorship that would last until the end of the Cold War. Arbenz, who had to eventually take refuge in the Mexican embassy, was finally assured by Armas on September 11 that he would be allowed to travel to the airport safely so that he could emigrate. On that day, Arbenz fled with his family to Mexico after a degrading full body search at the airport.

While vacationing in Europe soon afterward, Arbenz was suddenly no longer welcome to return to Mexico, as the Mexican government had decided that sheltering Arbenz was not in its political advantage. After spending a year in Prague and visiting other cities in Europe, Arbenz managed to gain asylum in Uruguay, where he settled in 1957, only to move to Cuba three years later after the Cuban Revolution.

Arbenz thought that he might serve some useful purpose in Cuba, the only country in the Americas with a Marxist government. Yet the Cubans used Arbenz as a symbol of failure, making him feel useless and humiliated. He went to France in 1965 after his eldest daughter shot herself (as his father had done in 1934). Deeply shaken by the event, Arbenz spent five years in France until finally being allowed to return to Mexico in 1970, as he wanted to live the rest of his life near Guatemala.

Arbenz died in Mexico City on January 27, 1971.

Christopher Borhani

See also Dulles, Allen; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Guatemalan Intervention; Document 72

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ARTICHOKE, Operation (1951–1953)

Operation ARTICHOKE (also referred to as Project ARTICHOKE) was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) project that researched interrogation methods and arose from Project BLUEBIRD on August 20, 1951, run by the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence. A memorandum by Richard Helms to CIA director Allen Welsh Dulles indicated that ARTICHOKE became Project MKULTRA on April 13, 1953.

Operation ARTICHOKE was an offensive program of mind control that gathered information together with the intelligence divisions of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In addition, the scope of the project was outlined in a memo dated January 1952 that asked “Can we get control of an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against fundamental laws of nature, such as self-preservation?”

The operation began in October 1951 at the CIA's secret Camp King near Oberursel, Germany. The operation studied hypnosis, forced morphine addiction (and subsequent forced withdrawal), and the use of other chemicals, among other methods, to produce amnesia and other vulnerable states in subjects. At the time, these were considered accepted and cruel interrogation techniques. CIA interrogators sought to manipulate the minds of Russian spies whom the CIA had captured. It was hoped that interrogators could debrief the spies and then be able to erase their memory of what had happened to them. Unfortunately, CIA experimentation with drugs was not limited to foreign spies; it also was used on U.S. Army personnel and American citizens. During Operation ARTICHOKE, a fake brothel in New York City would spike patron's drinks with LSD. CIA personnel would then observe their subjects' reactions to specific questions. Of course, the experimental subjects were never informed, nor was their consent obtained.

The secrecy of Operation ARTICHOKE was broken on December 22 when the *New York Times* published an article claiming that the CIA had violated its charter and had conducted illegal domestic intelligence operations against antiwar protesters (Operation CHAOS) and other dissidents during President Richard Nixon's administration.

Early in January 1975, President Gerald Ford established the U.S. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, also known as the Rockefeller Commission and chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, to inquire into the charges made by the *New York Times*. In five months the commission's report was released and concluded that the CIA had kept within its statutory authority but had undertaken some activities that it should not undertake again. Some of the activities had actually been at the behest of presidents. Some activities were dubious, others were unlawful, and in 1973 and 1974 the CIA had taken action to end such activities. Out of this sensational reporting came the case of Frank Olson, which until then had been secret.

The Rockefeller Commission's report embarrassed the CIA when the report told the circumstances surrounding Olson's suicide. The commission reported that

Olson had been administered LSD without his knowledge in 1953 during a test program conducted by the CIA and the U.S. Army. The Olson family was shocked at the commission's reporting of Frank Olson's death. At the time, they understood, so Olson's son stated in 2001, that their father had fallen to his death and that it had been an accident. In his memoirs, former CIA director William Colby recalls having been given a 693-page report of possible violations or questionable activities in regard to the CIA's legislative charter. The report is often referred to as the CIA's "Family Jewels." Among the activities in the report were "some of the bizarre and tragic cases where the Agency experimented with mind-control drugs, including one of a CIA officer who, without his knowledge, was given LSD, which caused a deep depression and eventually his death." Frank Olson's son was never satisfied with the account of his father's death. During the 1990s Olson's son investigated his father's death and consequently exposed the existence of Operation ARTICHOKE. In the aftermath of this exposure, a report that was produced came to the conclusion that Frank Olson had died to protect the secrecy of Operation ARTICHOKE.

Jan Goldman

See also BLUEBIRD, Project; Colby, William; MKULTRA, Project; Olson, Frank; Rockefeller Commission; Documents 23, 48, 49, 74

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Assassination

Assassination is a covert action undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as an executive action, to kill foreign leaders and provide plausible deniability to the U.S. government. Despite any number of conspiracy theories, every CIA plot to assassinate a foreign leader failed or was abandoned.

Like the instigation of physical terror and kidnapping, assassination serves a double purpose. While political opponents are temporarily or permanently removed from the scene, violence itself is used to create fear and hatred, often discrediting or undermining one entity against another. This is what has been referred to as the

essence of forced disintegration, by which the political and social structure of the state is split apart. The use of executive action (more commonly referred to as assassination) is something that the CIA has never admitted to, but it is known that several attempts were made on Fidel Castro either by CIA personnel or by CIA-backed assassins (such as the Mafia).

Less well known, however, are the attempts (and successes) at lower-level assassinations (not prime political figures)—with paramilitary operations such as the PHOENIX Program in Vietnam, the promotion of selected targeting and other initiatives aimed at revolutionary or guerrilla movements at the command-and-control level. The death squads run throughout Central America by the CIA during the early 1980s followed similar lines.

In 1975 Congress and the Church Committee investigated alleged CIA plots to assassinate Castro (Cuba), Ngo Dinh Diem (Vietnam), Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic), and Rene Schneider (Chile). The committee found that the CIA initiated plots to assassinate Castro and Lumumba. While Lumumba and Diem were assassinated, the final report found no conclusive evidence to tie the CIA to the killings, despite earlier plotting. The committee was also unable to state with certainty whether any plots were authorized by U.S. presidents.

The CIA plot to kill Lumumba involved the use of poisons. The agency actually sent poisonous materials to the Congo in 1960, but they were never used. The CIA also made elaborate plans to kill Castro that included the use of poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a biochemical-contaminated diving suit, all of which never made it out of the laboratory. Some evidence indicates that the CIA recruited the Mafia to carry out the plan in Cuba.

The Church Committee report inflamed American public opinion and resulted in reforms at the CIA and the institution of congressional oversight of intelligence activities. President Gerald R. Ford's 1976 Executive Order 11905 prohibits the assassination of foreign leaders, and President Ronald Reagan reiterated that prohibition in Executive Order 12333. Executive orders were amended by succeeding presidents beginning in 1998 to reinterpret and relax these prohibitions to enable targeting terrorists.

Assassination was also a favored practice of the Soviet intelligence services and their satellites—usually conducted against dissidents from communist countries (such as Georgi Markov of Bulgaria, infamously assassinated in 1978 on London's Waterloo Bridge by a lethal ricin dose delivered by a sharpened umbrella) in exile or those who helped support them and their activities. The Israeli government has made extensive use of assassination against not only its opponents in the Arab world (such as Hamas bomb maker Yahya Ayyash, known as "The Engineer," assassinated by mobile phone bomb in 1996) but also those who were suspected of helping their enemies (such as Gerald Bull, the Canadian designer of the Iraqi supergun, assassinated in Brussels in 1990). The apartheid South African government made extensive use of assassination as a covert tool furthering state policies not only within South Africa but across the frontline states of Southern Africa and even as far abroad as London, Brussels, and Paris, where members of the African

National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements in exile as well as other players in the antiapartheid movement worldwide were assassinated with extreme professionalism and success. Indeed, as an example of the success of covert paramilitary activities, the apartheid government's use of assassination (alongside other covert activities) was probably one of the best, forcing the ANC to first withdraw its presence (military bases, offices, and representatives) farther from South Africa's borders in Southern Africa and then to acknowledge an inability to overthrow the apartheid government by force or revolution and seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict as a result. Israel's assassination activities to this day against Palestinian militants would appear to have had a similar success, at the least in eliminating a considerable cadre of paramilitary technical expertise from among the ranks of the various Palestinian terrorist and militant groups.

Jan Goldman and Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Church Committee; Cuba; Lumumba, Patrice; PHOENIX Program; Documents 59, 71, 75–77

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A-12 Blackbird

The A-12 Blackbird was a high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft intended by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for missions over the Soviet Union. This aircraft was the first of the Blackbird aircraft, forerunner of the SR-71, and is similar in size, capabilities, and configuration to its successor. The A-12 was never used in its intended role; manned overflights were banned by a Soviet-U.S. treaty negotiated after Francis Gary Powers's U-2 was shot down years before the A-12 was operational.

Development of the A-12 was spurred by a CIA decision to seek a replacement aircraft for the U-2, an effort code-named Operation OXCART. The aircraft manufacturers Boeing, Convair, and General Dynamics all began work on a replacement aircraft design with CIA funding. Project ARCHANGEL, undertaken at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, was funded by the CIA as the follow-on to the ANGEL program that produced the U-2. ARCHANGEL called for the development of an aircraft that could fly higher and faster than the U-2 and provide advanced imagery collection capabilities. Work on the design was undertaken by the famed Skunk Works

division of Lockheed. As designs evolved each improved design was numbered sequentially, and eventually design A(rchangel)-12 was sufficiently advanced by early 1960 for the CIA to place an order for an initial 12 aircraft. The prototype made its first flight in 1962 and broke the sound barrier with a speed of 1.1 Mach on its second test flight. Flight testing continued through 1963, as the more powerful Pratt & Whitney J58 engines replaced the J57. With the new engines the A-12 achieved its operational design speed in excess of 3.2 Mach. Delivery of the last of the contracted A-12s was made in 1964.

President Lyndon Johnson famously revealed tantalizing details of the super-high altitude and sound-breaking speed of the secret A-12 with a misdirection play. Johnson said in his remarks that “the performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today,” hiding the real designation of the aircraft and also obscuring its secret test flight base by claiming that the aircraft was flying from Edwards Air Force Base instead of Groom Lake (Area 51). This was part of elaborate efforts to guard the secrecy of the A-12 that included cash payments for the silence of accidental observers of the aircraft and a steak and lobster dinner for base security guards.

The aircraft was initially assigned an operational role in 1966, as an A-12 BLACK SHIELD unit was stationed at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. The first combat flight mission of the A-12 was conducted over North Vietnam in 1967 to image surface-to-air missile sites. In 1968 an A-12 flew a photo mission over North Korea to image the captured U.S. ship *Pueblo*. Subsequent A-12 missions were flown to collect evidence of a feared North Korean attack on South Korea. In 1967 both the A-12 and the newly arrived SR-71 were matched in a fly-off competition to select the best aircraft for future production. The SR-71 won the competition. Lockheed was directed to destroy the tooling and fixtures for the A-12, and that aircraft was retired from service.

Designed and built with a unique construction of titanium monocoque and super-high-temperature plastics, the A-12 was capable of achieving 3.3 Mach and could fly at altitudes above 75,000 feet. Six of the 15 aircraft manufactured were lost in flight. The remaining aircraft are now exhibited at museums across the United States, and 1 is on exhibit at CIA headquarters.

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See also GUSTO, Project; Powers, Francis Gary; Documents 20, 40

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AZORIAN, Project (1974)

Project AZORIAN was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operation to raise a sunken Soviet ballistic missile submarine from a depth of more than 16,500 feet.

At some point in mid-March 1968 the *K-129*, a Soviet submarine carrying three ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, sank at a depth of 16,500 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean approximately 1,500 miles northwest of Hawaii while on a typical peacetime patrol. The cause of the accident responsible for the sinking of the submarine is unknown. The classified hardware aboard included two nuclear-tipped Type 53-58 torpedoes, three R-21 ballistic missiles, and communications and encryption systems. The value of recovered codebooks was diminished because of code changes across the Soviet fleet once the loss of *K-129* became clear. Examination of the *K-129* wreckage could reveal much about the state of Soviet marine engineering, weapon systems, metallurgy and welding, and ship construction.

Despite an extensive search of the area in the spring of 1968, the Soviets were unable to locate the submarine. It is largely believed that the U.S. Navy was able to pinpoint the location of the wreck using the SOSUS underwater sonar system, a system of underwater listening stations strategically placed along Soviet submarine patrol routes. However, no official account has been released describing how the CIA came to know the resting place of the *K-129*.

Once the location and depth of the *K-129* was confirmed, the CIA initiated one of its largest and most secret operations of the Cold War. The CIA believed that raising the submarine could yield a potential treasure trove of information, including the missiles, codebooks, decoding machines, and other communication technology. In August 1969, President Richard Nixon personally approved the plan.

By October 1970, the engineers employed by the CIA determined that the only possible way to lift the 1,750-ton submarine was by slipping a specially designed iron claw around it and then slowly raising it to the surface using hundreds of segments of pipe raised with winches on a specially modified ship. The technology for an underwater salvage operation at this depth did not exist before the CIA sponsored its invention. Before Project AZORIAN, the deepest underwater salvage operation was at a depth of 245 feet.

With President Nixon's approval, the CIA was tasked with exploring the feasibility of the mission. On July 1, 1969, the Directorate of Science and Technology launched Project AZORIAN by appointing John Parangosky to head the Special Project Staff managing the effort. Ernest "Zeke" Zellmer served as Parangosky's deputy and ran day-to-day activities.

In November 1971, work began on the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*, the ship that the CIA commissioned for this operation, at a shipbuilding yard in Chester, Pennsylvania. The cover story was that the ship was to be used for deep-sea mineral exploration. Billionaire Howard Hughes lent his name to the project to extend the mining cover. The *Hughes Glomar Explorer* was a 63,000-ton vessel measuring more than 600 feet from bow to stern. It was custom designed and built for the sole purpose of retrieving the *K-129*. The *Hughes Glomar Explorer*'s design included a massive compartment in its hull open to the ocean below and calculated

to house the submarine and the equipment necessary to raise it so that the entire salvage operation might be conducted without any observation from Soviet planes or satellites.

On June 7, 1974, President Nixon gave the CIA permission to launch the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* from Long Beach, California. On July 4, 1974, the ship began the process of lowering the claw nearly three miles to the ocean floor. For the first two weeks of the salvage process, the ship was shadowed by two Soviet naval vessels and overflown numerous times by helicopters. At one point the CIA mission director ordered the consolidation of all classified materials and constructed a plan to defend the ship until that material could be destroyed. Ultimately the Soviets left the area. It took eight days to lift the submarine into the hull of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*.

Despite two weeks of surveillance by Soviet naval vessels, lifting operations began on August 1, 1974. Eight days later a 38-foot section of the submarine was recovered. That section contained the remains of some of the crew members, two nuclear torpedoes, various items of intelligence value, and the ship's bell. Ninety percent of the *K-129* crumbled during the lift and sank to the ocean floor. The next day the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* sailed for Hawaii, never to return.

On September 4, 1974, the remains of the Soviet sailors were given a dignified and respectful burial at sea. The ceremony was conducted in both Russian and English. Honors were rendered for the deceased. The ceremony was meant to be in accordance with Russian naval tradition. The event was recorded on videotape. Upon release of the videotape years later, the reactions of Russians were mixed. Many felt that the remains should have been returned for burial ashore. Some family members were probably comforted by the respect shown to the dead.

Investigative reporters Jerry Cohen and William Farr were the first to uncover the covert project with a front-page story in the February 8, 1975, issue of the *Los Angeles Times*. Seymour Hersh, Jack Anderson, and other journalists followed with further revelations containing both facts and inaccuracies. One account placed the recovery operation in the Atlantic Ocean rather than the Pacific.

The cost-effectiveness of the enterprise was challenged in the media. Cost overruns almost led to the termination of the project in 1974, but the potential intelligence value argument prevailed. At the cost of \$500 million, the intelligence gained was minimal. Atomic missiles and cryptological equipment were the grand prizes but were lost during the lift. While the materials collected were of minimal value, the project did maintain its covert nature while the recovery was being conducted. The project was acknowledged as a major engineering feat.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, a new relationship between the United States and Russia was beginning to form. Diplomatic overtures might reduce the post-Cold War malaise. In October 1992, CIA director Robert M. Gates visited President Boris Yeltsin and presented him with two historic artifacts: the videotape record of the burial at sea and the Soviet naval flag that shrouded each of the submariners in turn. On August 30, 1994, Ambassador Malcolm Toon returned the bell to the Russian government while attending U.S.-Russian committee meetings

on the fate of missing personnel from both sides. At last, some measure of closure came to Project AZORIAN and the case of the *K-129*.

John Newman

See also Hersh, Seymour; Documents 56–58

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B

Baltch, Ann

See Garber, Joy Ann

Barnett, David (1933–1993)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official David Henry Barnett was indicted in 1980 for selling the details of an important CIA undercover operation, code-named Habrink, to the Soviet Union. Barnett's case was the first public case of a CIA official selling secrets to the Soviet's Committee for State Security (KGB).

A 1955 graduate of the University of Michigan, Barnett joined the CIA in 1958. He served as an analyst with U.S. Army intelligence units in South Korea and Washington, DC. From 1965 to 1967, Barnett worked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, as a staff officer in the Directorate of Operations, the department that ran the agency's global covert activities. In 1967 Barnett was assigned to a diplomatic post in Indonesia, where he recruited local Soviet officials to spy for the United States.

Barnett resigned his position in 1970 to open an antiques-exporting firm in Indonesia but continued to do occasional contract work for the CIA. In late 1976 Barnett had debts over \$100,000; his business was on the verge of bankruptcy, at which point he offered to sell classified information to the KGB. Barnett handed over complete details of Habrink to the KGB, including CIA information on the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile and the Whiskey-class diesel-powered submarine. In addition, he revealed the names of over 30 CIA intelligence officers as well as the identities of informants recruited by the CIA. The KGB paid Barnett \$92,000 for his information and in 1977 persuaded him to apply for staff positions on the Senate and House Intelligence Oversight Board. Barnett was never hired to work on either board, but in January 1979 he was rehired by the CIA as a contract agent. He abruptly resigned 13 months later.

In April 1980 during a meeting with KGB agents in Vienna, Austria, Barnett was spotted by U.S. agents. Upon his reentry into the United States, he was questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at which time he cooperated by answering questions about other questionable agents and entered a guilty plea. Barnett received an 18-year sentence but was paroled in 1990. He died on November 19, 1993.

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See also Cold War and the CIA; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 62

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Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961)

The Bay of Pigs Invasion was an unsuccessful 1961 operation in Cuba led by Cuban exiles who were covertly supported by the U.S. government. Trained since May 1960 in Guatemala by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the approval of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and supplied with arms by the U.S. government, the rebels of Brigade 2506, as they were called, intended to foment an insurrection in Cuba and overthrow the communist regime of Fidel Castro, who had deposed the U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959.

Planning for the ill-fated operation began during the last days of the Eisenhower administration in 1960. President Eisenhower had soured on Castro after the Cuban leader nationalized a number of Cuban companies and began leaning toward the Soviet orbit of influence. There were also rumors of Cuban involvement in attempts to invade Panama, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. In 1960 the United States turned down Castro's request for economic aid and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. After the American rejection, Castro met with Soviet foreign minister Anastas Mikoyan to secure a \$100 million loan from the Soviet Union. U.S. policy makers thus decided that Castro was becoming too close to the Soviets and should be overthrown.

In the spring of 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert operation to send small groups of American-trained Cuban exiles to work in the Cuban underground as insurgents to overthrow Castro. By the autumn the plan, now called Operation PLUTO, had evolved into a full-fledged invasion by exiled Cubans and included U.S. air support. The invasion forces deployed to Guatemala to train for the operation.

When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he could have called off the invasion but chose not to do so. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower's handling of the Cuban situation and so did not find it politically expedient to back down from the invasion. Kennedy was also anxious to prove his hawkish stance toward the Soviets during a period of heightened Cold War tensions. But the new president was not well served by the CIA or its director, Allen W. Dulles, whom Kennedy inherited from the Eisenhower administration. Despite evidence that Kennedy was leery about the Bay of Pigs operation, the CIA built a convincing case in support of it that was later determined to be highly suspect. The agency grossly underestimated the effectiveness of Castro's forces and overplayed the extent to which Cubans would rally behind the invasion force.

On April 17, 1961, an armed force of approximately 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba, although the invasion had technically commenced two days earlier when American B-26 medium bombers with Cuban markings bombed four Cuban airfields. The assault began on April 17 at 2:00 a.m. when a team of frogmen went ashore with orders to set up landing lights to guide the main landing force. Between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m., two battalions of exiles armed with American weapons came ashore at Playa Giron, while another battalion landed at Playa Largas. They hoped to find support from the local population and intended to cross the island to attack Havana. Cuban forces reacted quickly, and Castro ordered his air force to halt the invaders. Cuban aircraft promptly sank the invading force's command-and-control ship and another supply vessel carrying an additional battalion. Two other ships loaded with supplies, weapons, and heavy equipment foundered just offshore. In the air, Cuban T-33 jets shot down 10 of the 12 slow-moving B-26 bombers that were supporting the invaders. President Kennedy, on the recommendation of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other advisers, decided against providing the faltering invasion with official U.S. air support.

Lacking supplies or effective air cover, the invaders were hammered by Cuban artillery and tank fire. Within 72 hours, the invading force had been pushed back to its landing area at Playa Giron, where the troops were soon surrounded by Castro's forces. A total of 114 exiles were killed, while the remainder of the invasion force either escaped into the countryside or were taken captive. In all, 1,189 captured exiles were tried in televised trials and sentenced to prison.



Members of Castro's militia in the Escambray Mountain area of Cuba during the ill-fated US backed Bay of Pigs invasion, 1961. Under the Freedom of Information Act, information about the Bay of Pigs invasion is some of the most requested information held by the CIA. (Three Lions/Getty Images)

Cuban exiled leader José Miro Cardona, president of the U.S.-backed National Revolutionary Council, blamed the failure on the CIA and Kennedy's refusal to authorize air support for the invasion. In December 1962, Castro released 1,113 captured rebels in exchange for \$53 million in food and medicine raised by private donations in the United States.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion provoked anti-American demonstrations throughout Latin America and Europe and further embittered U.S.-Cuban relations. The poorly planned and executed invasion greatly embarrassed President Kennedy and subjected him to heavy criticism at home. More important, it led directly to increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the invasion, Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev exchanged messages regarding the events in Cuba. Khrushchev accused America of being complicit in the invasion and warned Kennedy that the Soviets would help defend Cuba if necessary. Kennedy replied with an equally strong warning against any Soviet involvement in Cuba. Although the crisis quickly passed, it set the stage for increased Soviet military aid to Cuba, which ultimately led to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

The failure of the invasion led to the resignation of Dulles and opened the way for closer scrutiny of U.S. intelligence gathering. Some historians have speculated that the aborted operation made the White House highly suspicious of the intelligence community and therefore more willing to question the experts, contributing to Kennedy's successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis that followed.

James H. Willbanks

See also Cuba; Dulles, Allen; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Documents 30, 32, 33, 35, 36

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Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949)

On December 22, 1947, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence memorandum warned President Harry Truman that the Soviets would try, through obstructionism and harassment, to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. On December 26 and 30, the CIA's analysis was seconded by similar missives from the State Department in Washington, followed by a cable from the ambassador to Moscow, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith.

The first serious crisis of the Cold War was precipitated by the Soviet Union's attempt to cut off access to West Berlin, which lay within Soviet-occupied eastern Germany. As part of the Potsdam Agreements, Germany and Berlin were divided into occupation zones by the victorious World War II Allies (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain), reaffirming principles laid out earlier at the Yalta Conference. Although the provisions of the agreement allocated occupation sectors of Berlin to the other three Allies, no formal arrangements had been made for access to Berlin via the Soviet zone.

After the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West began to deteriorate steadily, as demonstrated by disputes in the United Nations, Winston Churchill's March 1946 "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech), U.S. emphasis on Soviet containment, Soviet hostility toward the Marshall Plan, and a growing Western commitment to consolidate occupation zones in western Germany to form a single independent state. The Soviets, who had been invaded by Germany twice in the first half of the 20th century, were alarmed at the prospect of a reunited, independent Germany.

In late 1947, discussions on the fate of Germany broke down over Soviet charges that its former allies were violating the Potsdam Agreements. After the decision of the Western powers to introduce a new currency in their zones, on March 20, 1948, the Soviets withdrew from the Four-Power Allied Control Council, which controlled Berlin. Ten days later guards on the eastern German border began slowing the entry of Western troop trains bound for Berlin. On June 7 the Western powers announced their intention to proceed with the creation of a West German state. On June 15 the Soviets declared the Autobahn entering Berlin from West Germany closed for repairs. Three days later all road traffic from the west was halted, and on June 21 barge traffic was prohibited from entering the city. On June 24 the Soviets stopped all surface traffic between West Germany and Berlin, arguing that if Germany was to be partitioned, Berlin could no longer be the German capital.

Located 110 miles inside the Soviet occupation zone, West Berlin from the start of the Cold War had been a Western outpost deep within the communist bloc, a hotbed of intelligence operations by both sides, and the best available escape route for East Germans fleeing communism and Soviet control. President Truman was convinced that abandoning Berlin would jeopardize control of all of Germany. He further believed that the Soviets were determined to push the Western powers out of Berlin, thereby discrediting repeated American assurances to its allies and the rest of Europe that it would not allow Berlin to fall.

A military response to the blockade was initially considered but rejected, as the Western powers lacked the manpower to counter the massive Red Army's numerical and strategic advantage. Thus, the United States, working with its European allies, undertook to supply West Berlin via air corridors left open to them in a post-war agreement. The Berlin Airlift began on June 24, 1948, and continued uninterrupted for the next 324 days. Western fliers, under the leadership of U.S. Air Force lieutenant general Curtis LeMay, made a total of 272,000 flights into West Berlin, delivering thousands of tons of supplies every day.



Berliners watch a C-54 land at Tempelhof in 1948 during the Berlin airlift. The airlift was a massive transfer of essential supplies flown into Germany during 1948 and 1949 by British and U.S. forces after the Soviet Union prohibited ground access to West Berlin. (AP Photo/APN)

The airlift was at first meant to be a short-term measure, as Allied officials did not believe that it could support the whole of Berlin for any length of time. The situation in the summer and autumn of 1948 became very tense as Soviet planes buzzed U.S. transport planes in the air corridors over East Germany, but the Allies only increased their efforts to resupply the German city once it became apparent that no resolution was in sight. The Soviets never attempted to shoot down any of the Western aircraft involved in the airlift, no doubt because such a provocation might well result in war.

Hundreds of aircraft were used to fly in a wide variety of cargo items, including more than 1.5 million tons of coal. By the autumn, the airlift, called by the Americans Operation VITLES, was transporting an average of 5,000 tons of supplies a day. At the height of the operation on April 16, 1949, an aircraft landed in Berlin every minute around the clock.

The airlift was an international effort. Airplanes were supplied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but there were also flight crews from Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. The three main Berlin airfields involved in the effort were Tempelhof in the American sector, Gatow in the British zone, and Tegel in the French sector. The British even landed seaplanes on the Havel River.

The airlift gained widespread public and international admiration, and on May 12, 1949, the Soviets, concluding that the blockade had failed, reopened the borders in return for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, perhaps believing

that they could have some influence on the Western Allies' proposed plans for the future of Germany. Even though the Soviets lifted the blockade in May, the airlift did not end until September 30 because the Allies sought to build up sufficient amounts of reserve supplies in West Berlin in case the Soviets blockaded it again. In all, the United States, Britain, and France flew 278,118 flights transporting more than 2.3 million short tons of cargo. Thirty-one Americans and 39 British citizens, most of them military personnel, died in the airlift.

In the end, the blockade was not only completely ineffective but also backfired on the Soviets in other ways. The blockade provoked genuine fears of the Soviets in the West and introduced even greater tension into the Cold War. Instead of preventing an independent West Germany, the blockade actually accelerated Allied plans to set up the state. The blockade also hastened the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an American–West European military alliance.

James H. Willbanks

See also Berlin Spy Carousel; Berlin Tunnel; Smith, Walter Bedell; Documents 20, 22, 26

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Berlin Spy Carousel

The Berlin Spy Carousel was an elaborate spy operation run by two academics residing in East Berlin between 1966 and 1989. The two scholars, Hu Simeng and her husband Horst Gasde, eventually provided espionage services for three different nations—China, East Germany, and the United States. The couple met and married in China while Hu pursued studies in Western languages and Gasde was studying Chinese.

Upon completion of their education, Hu and Gasde moved to East Berlin, where Gasde was employed as a faculty member at Humboldt University. Before long, he also began working for the East German intelligence service and was tasked with recruiting visiting Chinese students, who were instructed to spy on China when they returned to their homeland. Their information was then funneled through Gasde to East German intelligence officials. Gasde then secured for his wife a position in which she was instructed to spy on Chinese nationals in East Germany,

including the Chinese diplomatic community, and report on their activities to East German intelligence operatives. However, unbeknownst to East German intelligence officials, Hu had already been recruited by the Chinese to conduct espionage against the East Germans, effectively making her a double agent. Initially, only Gasde knew of his wife's double dealing.

Hu artfully embraced her role as a double agent by claiming to the East Germans that she was spying against her home nation because she deplored the Chinese government, particularly after the start of the 1966–1969 Cultural Revolution. At the same time, she told her Chinese handlers that she was spying against East Germany because she believed that its government and that of the Soviet Union were ineffectual communist regimes that had abandoned true Marxism. Both sides found it relatively easy to believe her because of the ongoing Sino-Soviet split, which had poisoned relations between communist China and the Soviet Union and its European satellite states.

The couple's espionage activities proved quite lucrative. Hu and Gasde not only lived an uncharacteristically luxurious lifestyle but were also permitted to travel practically without limitations. Eventually Hu told both Chinese and East German authorities that the other side had asked her to engage in espionage, which both sides encouraged. Both Hu and Gasde fed their handlers reams of worthless information, creating a carousel of disinformation passing from one party to the other.

East German intelligence operatives decided to infiltrate U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in East Berlin in 1978 and recruited Hu to begin that effort. Before long after posing as a disaffected communist, she agreed to become a spy for the CIA, making her a triple agent. To maintain her charade, she would pass on bogus information to the CIA, based on misinformation she was receiving from both the Chinese and East Germans. The CIA, meanwhile, seemed not to know that she was already a double agent and therefore did not question the information she was providing. Eventually Gasde also began working for the CIA, which was similarly unaware of his other espionage activities.

The end result of this internecine spy drama was a veritable merry-go-round of disinformation exchanging hands among the Chinese, East Germans, and Americans. Hu and Gasde successfully maintained the Berlin Spy Carousel until late 1989, at which time the Berlin Wall came down and East and West Germany began moving toward unification. The spy arrangement was not fully uncovered until 1990, at which time the CIA stopped employing the couple. Sometime after that the KGB, the Soviet spy agency, attempted to recruit Hu and Gasde, but they turned down the offer.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Tunnel

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
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Berlin Tunnel

The Berlin Tunnel was a joint intelligence-gathering operation between the United States, where it was known as Operation GOLD, and Great Britain, where it was known as Operation STOPWATCH. The project involved digging a tunnel beneath Berlin so that underground cables carrying Soviet communications could be tapped. Berlin was an attractive location not only because of Soviet control over East Berlin but also because prior to the war as the capital of Germany it was a hub point for communications from such East European capitals as Warsaw, Poland, and Bucharest, Romania.

Intelligence collectors began to focus on patching into these cables in 1952, as this form of communication increasingly was replacing wireless communication as the delivery system of choice. Such a program was already in place in Vienna, but Berlin's topography made the project far more difficult. The estimated cost was more than \$6.5 million. The project was approved by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles on January 20, 1954. Construction began the following month and was complete in late February 1955. The volume of information intercepted was significant.



Electronic equipment used to monitor telephone lines are found inside a tunnel that lies under Berlin, Germany, in the Soviet-occupied zone, seen here on April 24, 1956. It was a joint American-British intelligence operation. (AP Photo)

Some 40,000 hours of telephone conversations were recorded, along with 6 million hours of teletype traffic. The existence of the tunnel was revealed on April 21, 1956.

Two aspects of the Berlin Tunnel project have long been controversial. The first deals with the origins of the plan. Some accounts credit Reinhard Gehlen, who was a key figure in Nazi Germany's intelligence system and was helping the United States establish a West German intelligence organization, with the idea. Other accounts reject this view, noting that Great Britain had begun tapping cables in Vienna in 1948 and that the Russians had a tap in place on a cable in Potsdam that was used by the U.S. military, so it was not an entirely new idea.

The second debate is over the value of the intelligence obtained. The plan was compromised. According to U.S. intelligence, the British were briefed that George Blake was uncovered as a Soviet spy in 1961. Blake reportedly relayed this information to his superiors. One line of reasoning argues that because of this, all of the information intercepted has to be suspect and must be treated either as insignificant or disinformation. A second line of reasoning argues that Blake was such a valuable agent that the Russians were not willing to jeopardize revealing his identity by doing anything to draw attention to the fact that the tunnel was known to them. Therefore, the information obtained was probably legitimate. This line of reasoning also indicates that the public revelation that the tunnel existed was an accident and not intended by the Soviet Union.

Glenn P. Hastedt

See also Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Spy Carousel; Dulles, Allen; Documents 20, 22

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bin Laden, Osama, Killing of

See Osama bin Laden, Killing of

Bird & Sons

An air carrier that operated in Southeast Asia for the U.S. government between 1960 and 1965 and also from 1970 to 1975. Bird & Sons was owned by William H. Bird, a construction contractor who had been based in the Philippines following World War II. In 1959 Bird received a contract to construct an all-weather runway

at Wattay Airport in Vientiane, Laos. The following year, he acquired a Twin Beechcraft and began an air division of his company.

Bird & Sons grew in response to the expanding American role in Laos. By 1965, the company was operating 22 aircraft and had 350 employees. It flew primarily short takeoff and landing (STOL) airplanes into tiny airstrips throughout Laos under contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Bird & Sons had the distinction of introducing to Southeast Asia the Swiss-manufactured Pilatus Porter, the most capable STOL aircraft used during the war.

Bird & Sons also flew clandestine missions for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA operations personnel valued the flexibility offered by Bird & Sons, which often could respond more promptly to urgent requests than the CIA's own proprietary airline, Air America, a much larger and more bureaucratic organization. In addition, the CIA admired the piloting skill and personal discretion of Robert L. Brongersma, Bird & Sons' operations manager, who flew many of the most sensitive covert missions.

In September 1965 Bird sold his air division to Continental Air Lines for \$4.2 million. The agreement included a five-year no-competition restriction. In 1970 after the restriction lapsed, Bird returned to air transport operations. His new company, Birdair, flew helicopters in northern Thailand and Laos, mainly for the USAID medical program, until 1975.

William M. Leary

See also Air America; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr. (1909–1994)

Richard Mervin Bissell Jr. was the chief administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration and head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Plans from 1958 to 1962. Born on September 18, 1909, in Hartford, Connecticut, Bissell graduated from Yale University in 1932 with a BA degree in history and then studied at the London School of Economics before returning to Yale in 1933 and graduating from there in 1939 with a doctorate in economics.

During World War II Bissell served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), beginning his career in intelligence. After the war he worked in the Department of War Mobilization and Reconversion from 1945 to 1946 and then joined the Economic Cooperation Administration in 1948, later becoming its head. Bissell joined the CIA in 1954 and was named head of the Directorate of Plans (or covert operations) in 1958.

The operations of the Directorate of Plans were soon dubbed “Black Operations” for their clandestine mandate to eradicate world leaders unfriendly to the United States. Bissell and his deputy, Richard Helms, engineered the ouster of Guatemala's

Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 and later became nearly obsessed with overthrowing Cuban leader Fidel Castro after his 1959 revolution. During Bissell's tenure with the CIA, he was also instrumental in the development of the U-2 spy plane and the CORONA spy satellite. It was, however, the unsuccessful 1961 Bay of Pigs operation for which Bissell gained the most notoriety.

In March 1960, CIA director Allen W. Dulles was tasked with devising a strategy to remove Castro from power, a mission that he turned over to Bissell and Helms. Code-named Operation MONGOOSE, the plan called for a paramilitary invasion of Cuba that involved nearly 400 CIA officers as well as some 1,400 Cuban exiles, who were to carry out the attack itself. Bissell and Helms devised and organized the strategy, which ultimately ended in disaster. The invasion force, trained and armed by the CIA, landed at Cuba's Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961. Before long they had been routed by Castro's forces, blowing the cover on the operation and greatly embarrassing the John F. Kennedy administration. The Bay of Pigs fiasco effectively ended Bissell's CIA career, as he was forced to leave the agency in February 1962. He subsequently worked for a think tank and then held positions in a number of private corporations. Bissell died in Farmington, Connecticut, on February 7, 1994.

Valerie Adams

See also Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Dulles, Allen; Helms, Richard; MONGOOSE, Operation; Documents 3, 4, 9, 26, 27, 30, 36, 59, 71

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Blackmail

Coercion used to collect information or to recruit a foreign agent. Blackmail typically involves a threat to reveal a shameful secret and is sometimes used in human intelligence-collection operations. The target of the blackmailer is usually a person who knows or is in a position to acquire closely held information of intelligence value. The blackmailer secures the unwilling cooperation of the target by threatening to expose that person to criminal prosecution, shame, retribution, or ridicule.

Nevertheless, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officers are wary of using blackmail because it rarely works and is generally avoided as an employable tactic. This is because a person who is under the pressure of blackmail will be a recalcitrant agent likely producing unreliable intelligence, and this is likely not supportive of a long-term operational relationship. Sexual blackmail, or sexpionage, is

rumored to have been a common CIA and Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) technique to secure foreign agents. Both male and female prostitutes have allegedly been used to compromise foreign officials and business travelers, and their liaisons were recorded for that purpose. During the Cold War the CIA is reputed to have used this technique to recruit agents from among Soviet athletes, officials, seamen, tourists, and even East German soldiers. Other sources claim that a CIA-run call girl and call boy ring provided consorts for officials living in or traveling to Washington, D.C. The CIA is also said to have recruited pornographic filmmakers in Hollywood to use body doubles of foreign heads of state to make politically damaging films. One such phony film reportedly targeted Indonesia's President Sukarno in an attempt to force him to crack down on that country's communist party.

Other CIA blackmailing schemes have involved the use of elaborate ruses. In one purported case, the CIA poured funds into a Swiss bank account in the name of a liberal Australian state official and threatened to expose his inexplicable and therefore suspect wealth if he failed to drop his investigations into the CIA's involvement in Australian banks. Black bag jobs, the illegal entry into a home or an office, are sometimes undertaken to acquire information useful for blackmail.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Documents 40, 50, 57, 69

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Blowback

Blowback refers to the unintended consequences of an action or operation by a government. The term is used most often when talking about covert operations, such as the destabilization of hostile governments or assassinations. The blowback that results from a foreign government's involvement in domestic affairs may cause serious hostility toward that government.

Originally, blowback was a slang term for the harmful effects on friendly forces when operations did not go as planned. The term is believed to have originated when wind changes during nuclear tests caused radioactive materials to fall on U.S. troops during Operation UPHOT KNOTHOLE in May 1953. The intelligence community started using it for unexpected results of an operation. The term "blowback" first appeared in print in March 1954 in *Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952–August 1953*. This secret document by the Central Intelligence Agency warned of Iranian hostility if U.S. involvement in the coup was revealed. Eventually, the blowback came in 1979

when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown and replaced by a fundamentalist Islamic government hostile to the United States.

During the Cold War and after, the U.S. government authorized many covert operations to promote American interests around the world. In 1954, for example, the elected government of Guatemala was overthrown to protect U.S. business interests. The repression that followed led to insurgencies and murder squads. Other operations in Latin America included the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. The regime of Augusto Pinochet that succeeded Allende was guilty of many human rights abuses. U.S. intelligence agencies also supported Operation CONDOR, which led to the kidnapping and disappearance of thousands of leftists throughout Latin America by military governments. Guerrilla movements have resulted in many Latin American countries because of the repression and have directed much hostility toward the United States.

Critics of U.S. policy, such as political scientist Chalmers Johnson, see terrorist attacks on Americans as blowback for U.S. foreign policy, which has led to a vicious cycle of reprisals and further attacks. Support for repressive rulers who serve U.S. interests, such as in Saudi Arabia, has led to attacks on U.S. interests. In 1998, for example, Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In response, the Bill Clinton administration launched cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. The deaths caused by the cruise missiles led many others to join with Al Qaeda in revenge. The attacks of September 11, 2001, have been one of the best-known examples of blowback. Since 2003, a number of fighters have joined terrorist groups because of U.S. activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Tim J. Watts

See also Afghanistan; Allende Gossens, Salvador; Chile; Document 24

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BLUEBIRD, Project (1950–1955)

Project BLUEBIRD, initiated on April 20, 1950, was the first Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) behavior modification program. The primary goal of this program was to develop and refine control over the mind and human behavior for the purposes of espionage, counterespionage, and the clandestine manipulation of global politics.

Project BLUEBIRD stemmed from the 1946 Operation PAPERCLIP, which was authorized by President Harry Truman. This project involved exploiting German scientists for American resources. Between 1945 and 1955, at least 765 scientists, engineers, and technicians were brought to the United States under PAPERCLIP. In December 1947, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal lobbied for the CIA to begin

psychological warfare operations in Europe. One of these operations investigated by the CIA was mind control.

Projects BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE included a great deal of work on the creation of amnesia, hypnotic couriers, and a so-called Manchurian candidate. In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Projects ARTICHOKE and BLUEBIRD were administratively rolled over into MKULTRA on April 3, 1953.

BLUEBIRD conducted practical research that included the exploration of the following questions:

- Is it possible to create by posthypnotic control an action contrary to a person's basic moral principles?
- Is it possible to create, in a matter of hours, a hypnotic condition in an unwilling subject to such a degree that he or she will perform an act for the benefit of the CIA?
- Is it possible to guarantee total amnesia under any and all conditions?
- Is it possible to alter a person's personality?

The ultimate goal of mind-control experiments is to gain control over human behavior. For the purposes of espionage, counterespionage, and influence in global politics, this could be useful in making enemy combatants disclose information during interrogation, protecting secret information by erasing memories, making spies more resistant to interrogation because secret information is held by hidden identities, and making people more prone to influence, social control, and suggestion. These operations involved the detailed, systematic creation of specific amnesia barriers, new identities, and hypnotically implanted codes and triggers.

In addition to being potential couriers and infiltration agents, the subjects could effectively function as hypnotically controlled cameras. They could enter a room or building, memorize materials quickly, leave the building, and then be amnesic for the entire episode. The memorized material could then be retrieved by a handler using a previously implanted code or signal without the amnesia being disturbed. Hypnosis was not the mind-control doctors' only method for creation of controlled amnesia, however. Drugs, magnetic fields, sound waves, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and many other methods were studied under BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE.

Abigail Sessions

See also ARTICHOKE, Operation; MKULTRA, Project; Documents 48–53

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Book of Honor

The *Book of Honor* lists Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees, represented by a 23-karat gold leaf star, who died in the line of duty. The entries are chronologically ordered, dating back to 1950 when the first CIA officer, Douglas Mackiernan, died in service to his country while crossing into Tibet. Next to the star is the name of the CIA officer written by a skilled CIA calligrapher with a dip pen and black sumi ink. However, many of the stars are not followed by a name. This occurs when the identity of the officer must remain a secret to protect CIA tradecraft. As of 2010, there were 102 stars in the book, with 62 entries accompanied by a name.

The original book, created in 1974, was 25 inches by 9 inches with a Moroccan Levant leather cover embossed with a 22-karat gold CIA seal. By 2004 the book was nearly full, and a larger book was created. Other than its size, the second book, measuring 20 inches by 32 inches, is an exact duplicate.

The Book of Honor sits on display in front of the Memorial Wall at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. When the second book was made, another case was needed to accommodate its larger size. Harold Vogel, the master stone worker who also created the Memorial Wall, and his apprentice, Tim Johnston, designed a Carrara marble case for the book. The case was made large enough to contain the original book underneath the duplicate.

Ryan Connoles

See also Air America; Alec Station; Buckley, William F.; Double Agents; 5412 Special Group; Roosevelt, Kermit, Jr.; Wilson, Valerie Plame

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BOOT, Operation

See AJAX, Operation


Boyce, Christopher (1953–)

Christopher Boyce was an American spy who sold communications information to the Soviet Union from 1975 to 1977. Born in Santa Monica, California, on February 16, 1953, Boyce was hired at the TRW Defense and Space Systems Group in 1974 with the help of his father Charles Boyce, a retired Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent. Christopher Boyce started out working in Classified Material Control, which only provided access to U.S. government information at the “classified” level. After a few months at the job, Boyce received clearances from the FBI, the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency. This allowed him to work in a special room known as the Black Vault. This room was a classified communications center containing encrypted messages up to the top secret level as well as their corresponding codes.

It was during this time working in the Black Vault that Boyce became disillusioned with the U.S. government. He was against U.S. intervention in Vietnam, but this was not uncommon. He was also disgusted with the U.S. government's involvement, conducted by the CIA, in the overthrow of Chile's government, led by Salvador Allende. In the end, what set Boyce on the path to betraying his country was when he started reading telex messages—secret messages called TWXs sent by the government—that showed that the United States was not sharing certain information with the Australian government pertaining to Rylite and Argus intelligence projects. This intelligence concerned Chinese and Russian military bases and missile launches. The U.S. government had signed an executive agreement with the Australian government to share this information if the activity occurred within range of Australia. Boyce couldn't believe that the U.S. government was treating its allies this way.

In 1975 Boyce decided to vent his discontent by betraying his country. He enlisted his childhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, to transport and sell to the Russian embassy in Mexico City information that Boyce stole using a small Minox camera to take photographs of classified documents. Lee was able to establish a relationship with a Soviet official named Vasily Okana. Over the course of two years, Boyce and Lee sold thousands of documents and were paid about \$77,000. Boyce adopted the code name Falcon, after his love for falconry, and Lee became known as Snowman, in reference to his cocaine and heroin dealing. At one point Boyce told Lee that he wanted to stop the operation, but Lee, who enjoyed the easy money, threatened to tell Boyce's father. Eventually they were both



Christopher Boyce (on the left) walks handcuffed, with a law enforcement official, to his arraignment in the Federal Building in Los Angeles, California. (AP Photo)

caught. The Mexican police arrested Lee on January 6, 1977, after he was seen throwing an object over the wall of the Russian embassy. He was accused of killing a Mexican police officer. Lee possessed a top secret microfilm of designs for a CIA satellite called Pyramider, which would be used for worldwide communications between CIA agents, and he confessed to the espionage. Boyce was arrested on January 16, 1977, and was convicted on May 14, 1977, of espionage. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

Boyce escaped from Lompoc Prison on January 21, 1980. During this time, he robbed 17 banks in Idaho and Washington. He began to study aviation, with the plan to eventually fly to Russia. Boyce was arrested again on August 21, 1981, while eating a burger at a restaurant called the Pit Stop.

On March 14, 2003, at the age of 50, Boyce was released from prison on parole, which will last until August 15, 2046. He married Kathleen Mills, a paralegal who worked on getting Lee released from prison in 1998 and then turned her attention to helping Boyce. Boyce's exploits were made famous in Robert Lindsey's book *The Falcon and the Snowman*, which was also made into a movie.

Ryan Connoles

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Chile; Falcon and Snowman; Lee, Andrew; Document 74

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Brigade 2506

The name for the group of Cuban exiles trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow the communist government of Fidel Castro in the botched operation known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion on April 17, 1961.

The 2506 Brigade was formed in March 1960 when President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved of the CIA plan to overthrow the Cuban government by recruiting anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the Miami area and training them for assault landing and guerrilla warfare. CIA director Allen Dulles proposed the plan to President Eisenhower during a meeting of the 5412 Special Group, which was a government committee responsible for approving covert operations at the time.

The CIA established training camps in Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana to train the recruits in demolitions, small-arms weaponry, and guerrilla tactics and later moved them to Guatemala. The exiles were all given numbers, but to make the force seem larger than it really was, each soldier was given a number, starting with the number 2500. In May 1960 the CIA began to recruit anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the Miami area. In November 1960, with 430 men in training, the leaders of the brigade were chosen, and the group was named Brigade 2506, using the

membership number of Carlos (Carlyle) Rafael Santana Estevez, who had died in a training accident in September 1960.

On April 17, 1961, about 1,400 members of the brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and were immediately engaged by Castro's forces. After running out of ammunition and not receiving the ground and air support they were expecting, the brigade surrendered to Cuban troops on April 19. The Cuban Army captured the remaining 1,183 brigade members.

In 1962 James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer, successfully negotiated with the Cuban government for the return of the 2506 Brigade members, beginning on December 23, 1962, in exchange for \$53 million worth of drugs, medical equipment, cash, and other supplies, donated by private sympathizers. The brigade members were reunited with family and friends at Dinner Key Auditorium in Miami, Florida. Then on December 29, 1962, President John F. Kennedy met with the survivors at Miami's Orange Bowl, where the brigade presented him with its flag that one of the members had hidden while imprisoned and then smuggled out of Cuba. President Kennedy declared that the flag would be returned to the brigade when Cuba was freed.

Approximately 2,680 names are known for members of the brigade. Approximately 1,334 men traveled on the seaborne force, and approximately 1,297 of them actually landed in Cuba along with an additional 177 airborne paratroops. An estimated 114 drowned or were killed in action, and 1,183 were captured, tried, and imprisoned.

Members of Brigade 2506 continued to fight for their cause with peaceful methods. They formed the Bay of Pigs Combatants Association, headquartered in Miami, and organized marches and pickets to protest the Cuban government. The association runs the Bay of Pigs Museum & Library of Brigade 2506, also located in Miami.

Ryan Connole

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Donovan, William; Dulles, Allen; Eisenhower, Dwight David; 5412 Special Group; Documents 30, 59

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Buckley, William F. (1928–1985)

William Francis Buckley was a U.S. Army officer and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Beirut, Lebanon, who was kidnapped by Islamic extremists in 1984. He died while in captivity in 1985.

Buckley was born on May 30, 1928, in Medford, Massachusetts, and subsequently joined the U.S. Army. An intrepid soldier, he served in the Korean War, during which he earned a Silver Star for valor; he later served during the Vietnam War, earning two Purple Hearts, the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry, and the Combat Infantry Badge. In Vietnam, Buckley was a senior adviser to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese Army). While continuing to serve in the U.S. Army, Buckley also began working as an operative for the CIA. Because of the sensitive and covert nature of some of his work, however, much of his career with the CIA remains classified.

During the late 1970s, Buckley became one of the CIA's first officers to focus his attention on the mounting threat of terrorism, particularly in the volatile Middle East. Buckley was instrumental in helping to establish the Incident Response Team and the Counterterrorism Group, which served as the precursor to the present-day U.S. Counterterrorism Center. During the early 1980s, he held covert assignments in Pakistan and Syria. After the April 18, 1983, Beirut embassy bombing that killed 61 Americans, including many diplomatic and CIA personnel, Buckley volunteered to serve as the CIA station chief in war-torn Beirut. He was publicly presented as the political officer at the American embassy, which was a cover for his CIA position.

One of Buckley's first and primary tasks in Beirut was to reconstruct the CIA's covert network of agents in Lebanon, which had been decimated by the April 1983 embassy bombing. In this he was largely successful. In the immediate aftermath of the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut that resulted in 307 deaths, including some 240 U.S. servicemen, the Islamic Jihad organization, which took credit for the bombing, erroneously claimed that it had killed the CIA's station chief in Beirut during the attack. This report, while false, made it clear that Buckley was a target of both the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, an allied terrorist group.

After the October bombing, Buckley discounted the likelihood that he would be harmed by terrorist groups operating within Lebanon and continued his activities as before. However, on March 16, 1984, Hezbollah operatives, having kept Buckley under close surveillance, kidnapped him as he left his apartment complex for work. Buckley's kidnapping caused much angst in Washington, and within three weeks of his disappearance CIA director William J. Casey began to plot a scheme to ransom him. This effort resulted in President Ronald Reagan's signing of a presidential directive that would ultimately give birth to the Iran-Contra Affair, which linked the release of U.S. hostages being detained by Iranian-backed Lebanese terror groups with support for Nicaraguan rebels fighting against their country's communist regime.

Unfortunately for Buckley, the scheme did not result in his release. Buckley was reportedly tortured and forced to sign a 400-page document in which he allegedly

admitted to his various CIA assignments and activities. On October 5, 1985, the Islamic Jihad organization announced that it had executed Buckley. U.S. officials, however, had strong reason to believe that Buckley had died months earlier, perhaps on June 3, 1985, of a heart attack, likely precipitated by the torture to which he had been subjected. In December 1991, Buckley's remains were identified and returned to the United States for interment. Buckley was subsequently buried at Arlington National Cemetery; his memory and sacrifice are also honored at the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, where his name is on the Memorial Wall.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Casey, William; Iran-Contra Affair

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Casey, William (1913–1987)

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1981 to 1987. Born in Queens, New York, on March 13, 1913, William Joseph Casey graduated from Fordham University in 1934 and from St. John's School of Law in 1937. During World War II, he served as a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) helping to supervise its operations in Europe.

Following the war, Casey became a successful tax lawyer in the firm of Hall, Casey, Dickler, and Howler. He then became active in venture capitalism, becoming quite wealthy. A conservative Republican, Casey served in President Richard Nixon's administration as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (1973–1974). Casey then headed the Export-Import Bank (1975–1976) before returning to private law practice, this time with the firm of Rogers and Wells.

A longtime acquaintance of Republican governor Ronald Reagan, Casey directed Reagan's successful 1980 presidential campaign and was rewarded with the appointment in 1981 as director of the CIA, where he succeeded Admiral Stansfield Turner. One of Reagan's most trusted advisers, Casey played a key role in the president's foreign policy, especially regarding the Soviet Union. Casey also worked to improve morale and benefits at the CIA but at the same time tried to reduce congressional oversight.

Casey had a singular passion for covert operations, and many of his undertakings were highly controversial, even illegal. In 1985 he authorized the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent anti-American Hezbollah cleric. President Reagan signed off on the operation. The ayatollah escaped unharmed from the car bomb designed to kill him that, however, killed 85 people and wounded another 175.

Casey also supervised covert assistance to the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet occupation, and he was the principal architect of the arms-for-hostages deal that became known as the Iran-Contra Affair and had been approved by both President Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush. The Iran-Contra Affair involved the sale of U.S. arms to Iran in return for money that was used to support the Contra rebels fighting to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. This action was undertaken in contravention of U.S. law. Subsequent congressional investigations concluded that Casey had also manipulated intelligence data to fit certain decisions.

Casey suffered a serious stroke in December 1986 shortly after the Iran-Contra Affair became public. He resigned in January 1987 and died of brain cancer in

Glen Cove, New York, on May 7, 1987, without revealing details of the Iran-Contra Affair.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also Iran-Contra Affair; Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was a significant step in the solidification of the status of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an independent agency within the executive branch. Effective June 20, 1949, the act gave the CIA the statutory authority to perform administrative tasks such as entering into contracts for supplies and services, paying for the travel expenses of employees, and renting facilities for agency use. Significantly, the CIA was permitted to spend money allocated to it without regard to the laws and regulations that normally govern the expenditure of government funds.

The act also exempted the CIA from federal laws requiring government entities to list in the Official Register of the United States all persons occupying administrative and supervisory positions and authorized the director of central intelligence, the attorney general, and the commissioner of immigration to admit 100 persons into the United States irrespective of their inadmissibility under other laws if their admission was deemed essential to furthering the national intelligence mission.

Many provisions of the act had been proposed for years. After ordering the dissolution of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) effective October 1, 1945, President Harry S. Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946 under the direction of the director of central intelligence. The director of central intelligence reported to the National Intelligence Authority, consisting of the secretary of state, the secretary of war, and the secretary of the navy. The CIG would be funded by contributions from these three departments. Admiral Sidney Souers, the first director of central intelligence, complained that the Central Intelligence Group lacked the legal foundation to contract for the services required to fulfill its mission. For one thing, the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1945 prevented agencies that had been in existence for more than one year from spending money appropriated by Congress unless this money was specifically appropriated for that agency. Therefore, after January 1947 the various departments could not provide unvouchered funds to the CIG.

The second director of central intelligence, U.S. Army general Hoyt Vandenberg, pushed hard for legislation that would permit the CIG to function without having to rely solely on other government departments to provide personnel and funds. However, attempts to include such provisions in the National Security Act of 1947 were resisted by members of the Truman administration who did not want to jeopardize the main goal of the National Security Act, which was to unify the military departments. Although the National Security Act provided the CIA with a statutory foundation, it added little to the presidential directive of 1946 that created the CIG. Relatively few provisions of the National Security Act were devoted to the functions and administration of the CIA.

In January 1949 a report titled *The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence*, written by future director of central intelligence Allen Dulles along with William Jackson and Mathias Correa, was submitted to the National Security Council. The report noted that the CIA appeared to be well funded through appropriations intended for the CIA but disguised as appropriations to other departments. The report concluded that there was no need for changes in the existing budgetary arrangements. Nevertheless, director of central intelligence Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter continued previous arguments that the CIA needed stronger statutory authorities. Due to increasing pressure on the Truman administration and Congress to counter what was seen as virtually unimpeded Soviet activism in Eastern and Southern Europe, there was relatively little resistance to the proposed legislation.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 extended to the CIA most of the powers to make purchases and contracts for supplies and services that the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 had granted to the military departments. The Central Intelligence Agency Act included provisions that facilitated the transformation of the CIA into an organization capable of conducting clandestine and covert operations overseas. However, the act did not further define the mission of the CIA or set limitations on its activities. As before, this was left to directives issued by the president and the National Security Council.

Christopher Vallandingham

See also National Security Act of 1947; Documents 2–6

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Central Intelligence Agency Information Act of 1984

The Central Intelligence Agency Information Act (CIAIA) of 1984 carved out a significant exception for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with regard

to certain requirements under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Signed by President Ronald Reagan on October 15, 1984, the CIAIA exempted certain CIA operational files from being searched in response to FOIA requests received by the CIA. The CIAIA was just one of the few pieces of new legislation favorable to intelligence agencies enacted during the first Reagan administration.

The explicit purpose contained in the CIAIA was to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to regulate public disclosure of information held by the CIA. The CIAIA amended the National Security Act of 1947 by adding Title VII, "Protection of Operational Files of the Central Intelligence Agency Exemption of Certain Operational Files from Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure." This amendment authorized certain CIA operational files, such as those from the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Office of Security, to be designated as exempt from the search requirements of the FOIA. Designation of such files as exempt was left solely to the director of central intelligence with little or no oversight. The CIAIA required the director to review the exemptions then in place at least once every 10 years to determine whether the exemptions could be removed from any category of exempted files.

Three categories were specified in the CIAIA for designating CIA files as operational and therefore exempt from FOIA search requirements. The files in the first category were those of the Directorate of Operations, which documents the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations as well as information exchanges with foreign governments or their intelligence services. The files in the second category were those of the Directorate of Science and Technology, which documents the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. The files in the third category were those of the Office of Security, which documents investigations conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources.

Another major purpose of the CIAIA was to expedite the CIA's review of information qualifying for release under the FOIA. Under the CIAIA, the CIA was relieved of the task of having to search its files and review records contained within those files that would result in little, if any, released information under the FOIA. As a result, the CIA was able to devote its resources to files that were more likely to result in released materials, thus allowing FOIA requests for records with a higher likelihood of being released to be processed much faster.

Additionally, the CIAIA sought to encourage the CIA to implement a program to systematically review information of historical value for declassification and release. In consultation with the archivist for the United States, the librarian of Congress, and suitable representatives of the historical discipline selected by the archivist, the CIAIA required the director of central intelligence to submit a report to Congress detailing the feasibility of such a systematic review of CIA information. On May 29, 1985, the director submitted a report to Congress stating that such systematic review was feasible and described the CIA's new Historical Review Program created for that purpose. The goal of the CIA's new program was the

release to the public of inactive records, appraised as permanently valuable, through the National Archives and Records Administration.

Andrew Green

See also Freedom of Information Act; Documents 2, 10, 18, 62, 63

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Central Intelligence Group

In the autumn of 1945, President Harry Truman abolished the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). It had been created in 1942 to provide for a more centralized intelligence effort during World War II. After the demise of the OSS, President Truman transferred intelligence and personnel from the former OSS to the State Department. However, soon after and under pressure from the military, he redirected the resources away from the State Department. Critics suggested that covert action should not fall under the auspices of the diplomatic branch.

In January 1946, Truman announced the creation of the National Intelligence Authority. This body would have coequal representation with the State Department, the War and Navy Departments, and the president's military chief of staff. It was this body that would direct U.S. intelligence policy. The Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created under the National Intelligence Authority with the primary responsibility of implementing the organization's decisions. However, due to an overlap of intelligence personnel and resources, the CIG did not receive its own personnel but instead could utilize staff from other intelligence agencies.

Truman's presidential directive created the position of director of central intelligence (DCI) at the head of the CIG. Sidney W. Souers was appointed to this position but only held it from January until June 1946. Specific tasks assigned to the CIG included the coordination, planning, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence. The CIG was also given authority to collect overt (public) intelligence. Souers was replaced by Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, who served from June 1946 until May 1947. Under Vandenberg, the CIG expanded into clandestine information collection as well. Vandenberg, in turn, was replaced as DCI by Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who served from May 1947 until October 1950. It was under his watch that the 1947 National Security Act, which created the Central Intelligence Agency, was passed. That

act formally dissolved both the National Intelligence Authority and the CIG.

Glenn P. Hastedt

See also Office of Strategic Services; Documents 3, 4

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CHAOS, Operation (1967–1973)

Domestic intelligence operation conducted in the United States between 1967 and 1973 and designed to identify and monitor antiwar organizations and individuals and to provide information on persons of interest traveling abroad. In 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), responding to a directive from President Lyndon B. Johnson, began operating an internal surveillance program that was tasked with uncovering potential links between the antiwar movement and foreign governments. Richard Helms, CIA director from 1966 to 1973, launched the initiative and gave broad authority to his chief of counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, to conduct surveillance and gather information on individuals and organizations that might have had ties to overseas governments. To carry out his mandate, Angleton used a wide variety of already-in-place CIA personnel and operations, including the use of foreign agents and offices.

Upon the advent of the Richard M. Nixon administration in 1969, all domestic surveillance relating to dissent and antiwar activities were brought under the CHAOS umbrella. Nixon had a visceral dislike for the counterculture and antiwar movements and was convinced that enemies of the United States—and even of his administration—had infiltrated these activities and were giving them aid and support. Soon some 60 CIA agents working abroad were conducting surveillance on U.S. citizens abroad, using electronic eavesdropping as well as physical surveillance to gather information on “persons of interest.” Clandestine surveillance in the United States also picked up in the early 1970s. Operation CHAOS kept close tabs on groups such as Women Strike for Peace, Students for a Democratic Society, and the Black Panthers, among many others.

The purview of Operation CHAOS quickly spun out of control, however, and the CIA began conducting surveillance on groups and individuals who did not have any direct links to the antiwar movement. The women’s liberation movement had become a target by the early 1970s, as had the Jewish organization B’nai B’rith. Indeed, the CIA even targeted the Israeli embassy to determine

if B'nai B'rith had any links to the Israeli government. Reportedly, the agency was so intent on monitoring correspondence from the Israeli embassy that it formed its own bogus trash-removal company, which allowed it to sort through discarded mail.

In his first report to President Johnson in November 1967, Helms reported that Operation CHAOS had found no substantial links between anyone in the antiwar movement and foreign governments. The five reports that succeeded this one all drew the same basic conclusion, yet the CIA's activities were not only extended but broadened, especially during Nixon's first term. By the time CHAOS was ended in 1973, it is estimated that the CIA had compiled 7,000 files on individual Americans and 1,000 files on various groups and organizations. Furthermore, a list of some 300,000 Americans had been compiled, presumably as "persons of interest," although there was little information on them. All of this domestic espionage had been conducted without Americans' knowledge or permission.

As the Watergate Scandal unfolded in 1973, laying bare the excessive secrecy and dirty tricks of the Nixon White House, Operation CHAOS was liquidated. Indeed, the Nixon administration feared that if the operation was revealed, the administration's already tenuous hold on power might be undermined entirely. But CHAOS did not stay secret for very long. On December 22, 1974, just four months after Nixon's forced resignation from office, the investigative reporter Seymour Hersh revealed the basic outlines of Operation CHAOS in the *New York Times*. In the immediate aftermath of the Watergate Scandal, the revelation sparked bipartisan outrage and triggered several investigations.

The following year, U.S. representative Bella Abzug (D-NY) conducted an investigation via the House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. The revelations coming from the hearings were troubling to all and triggered a larger investigation, the U.S. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (also known as the Rockefeller Commission), chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. After the specifics of Operation CHAOS and other CIA activities had come to light, the government and especially the CIA attempted to downplay the impact of the CIA's programs on civil liberties. Dick Cheney, then President Gerald R. Ford's deputy chief of staff, warned that the commission should resist congressional attempts to encroach on executive branch prerogatives. George H. W. Bush, CIA director in the last days of the Ford administration, downplayed the commission's findings, saying only that Operation CHAOS "resulted in some improper accumulation of material on legitimate domestic activities."

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Angleton, James; Helms, Richard; Rockefeller Commission; Documents 48, 49, 53, 65

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Cherkashin, Victor (1932–)

A classic example of Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) involvement in on-site activity in the United States is seen in the story of Victor Ivanovich Cherkashin. He was born in 1932 in the village of Krasnoe, which is located in the Kursk region of Russia. Cherkashin's father was an officer in the Navodnyy Komissariat Vnutremikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD), which was both the public and secret police organization of the Soviet Union during the early part of Joseph Stalin's regime. This organization was directly responsible for the activities of the Gulag system of forced labor camps involving political repression and imprisonment as well as extrajudicial executions, mass deportations of entire nationalities, political assassinations, espionage, and other tyrannical activities.

Victor Cherkashin attended railway engineer school and graduated in 1952. He then accepted employment from the Ministerv Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Ministry of State Security), which was the organization that succeeded the NKVD and performed the duties of the Soviet secret police from 1946 through 1953.

After his training, Cherkashin was assigned to the Second Directorate of what was by then the KGB. The KGB was the national security agency of the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1991 and was arguably the premier intelligence and secret police organization in the world during that time period.

The Second Directorate primarily dealt with domestic counterintelligence matters and performed the duties of an internal security and political force. In addition, the Second Directorate was responsible for combating foreign intelligence-gathering operations within the Soviet Union. Cherkashin was assigned to work counterintelligence matters against the British and was stationed in Moscow.

In 1963 Cherkashin was transferred to the First Directorate of the KGB, which was the organization responsible for external intelligence-collection activities as well as the recruitment and training of covert agents. During his time in the First Directorate, Cherkashin's postings included Australia, Lebanon, India, West Germany, and Moscow. He was sent to Washington, D.C., where he served from 1979 to 1986.

It was during Cherkashin's tour in Washington that he oversaw the recruitment of Ronald Pelton, a former National Security Agency employee who volunteered to spy for Moscow in 1980. In 1985 Cherkashin was also in charge of the recruitment and handling of the Central Intelligence Agency spy Rick Ames, and in 1986 Cherkashin was the handler for Robert Hanssen.

Additionally, Cherkashin managed to deceive Valery Martynov, a KGB agent who was also working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, into returning to Moscow under the guise of escorting the defector Vitaly Yurchenko. The unsuspecting Martynov flew into Moscow, where he was promptly arrested and was then executed on May 28, 1987.

In 1986 Cherkashin returned to KGB headquarters in Moscow. In retrospect, it seems as though his career peaked in Washington, D.C. When the Soviet Union

dissolved in 1991, he retired from the KGB and created his own private security company in Moscow.

Abigail Sessions

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); National Security; Yurchenko, Vitaly

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Chile

South American nation covering 292,258 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of Montana. Chile, which had a 1945 population of approximately 5.9 million, borders Argentina to the east, Peru and Bolivia to the north, and the Pacific Ocean to the west.

Chile's historic and commercial ties with Germany influenced its neutrality during World War II. Not until 1943 did the country sever its relations with the Axis powers, and not until 1945 did it declare war on Japan. This diplomatic reorientation was linked to the fact that Chile wanted to participate in the creation of the United Nations. After the war, Chile aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States. In 1947 Chile signed the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and in 1952 it signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. Chile received U.S. aid to purchase military matériel as well as military training. Chile broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1947, and communists were forced to leave the government. In 1954 Chile also supported the American intervention in Guatemala, despite domestic opposition.

By the end of the 1950s, two facts determined Chilean diplomacy. First, the reunification of communists and socialists under the Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front) created concerns within Chilean political parties and abroad when Salvador Allende nearly won the 1958 elections. Second, the 1959 Cuban Revolution raised fear that communism might spread throughout Latin America. However, Jorge Alessandri, president during 1958–1964, pursued a twofold policy toward Cuba. He abstained from the votes suspending it from the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962 and imposing sanctions. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, however, Alessandri decided to support President John F. Kennedy's

Cuban quarantine. Although Alessandri abstained again from votes sanctioning Cuba in 1964, Chile finally broke relations with the regime of Fidel Castro that year.

A special chapter in U.S.-Chilean relations began in 1963 when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) embarked on a covert operation in Chile to short-circuit Allende's triumph in the 1964 elections. The CIA sent more than \$2 million to support the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei. The money was primarily used for propaganda, including a leaflet that showed Soviet tanks in Czechoslovakia and warned what could happen to Chile if Allende won. The CIA covert operation continued until 1973, when President Allende was overthrown by a military coup. Despite the American involvement in Chile, Frei, who served as president until 1970, adopted a more independent foreign policy, especially toward Latin America. In 1965 Chile condemned the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic, criticized the United States for its unilateral actions, and refused to support the empowerment of the OAS to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation. As part of his economic program, Frei authorized the government purchase of 51 percent of Chile's copper mines. Although the American mining interests protested, the U.S. government declined to intervene.

The 1970 presidential elections revived CIA activity in Chile. The CIA spent millions of dollars to support an anti-Allende campaign. Allende won the election, but because he did not obtain the majority of votes, his confirmation remained in the hands of the Chilean Congress. For two months, the United States embarked on an aggressive campaign to keep Allende from power. These efforts included bribes to congressmen, economic pressure, and the encouragement of a military coup. Nevertheless, Allende was elected by the Chilean Congress.

Allende's foreign policy showed little change from that of Frei. Allende continued to support the principles of self-determination and nonintervention, and he established relations with Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). He also advanced the nationalization of copper companies and the American-owned International Telephone and Telegraph Company and embarked on agrarian reform. The United States responded by imposing an economic boycott, which included the suspension of aid from the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. On September 11, 1973, after three years of socialist government, Allende was overthrown by the Chilean military. That day, General Augusto Pinochet began one of the most repressive regimes in the history of the Americas.

The new military government quickly restored relations with the United States. Soon, U.S. economic aid began to flow to Chile. But these good relations came to an end when human rights abuses became publicly known. In 1976, the U.S. Congress approved an embargo on arms sales and limited economic aid to Chile. In domestic affairs, the so-called Chicago Boys—Chilean economists influenced by the free market ideas of the University of Chicago School of Economics—instituted a new economic program that reduced inflation and opened the economy to foreign investment. Such policies resulted in an amazing economic boom.

In the 1980s, international pressure to democratize Chile led Pinochet to modify the constitution and call for democratic elections in 1989. They took place that December. Patricio Alwyin, the candidate of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), won 54 percent of the vote. Alwyin was sworn in as president in March 1990, but Pinochet remained commander in chief of the army until 1998, when he became a senator. Chile has since been led by democratic governments, and by 2014 it was considered one of Latin America's most affluent and politically stable nations. Pinochet, meanwhile, was arrested in 2004 on myriad charges of human rights violations and other crimes. He was set to stand trial but died in 2006 before legal proceedings could begin. At that time, he had been charged with some 300 crimes.

Carina Solmirano

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Cold War and the CIA; Cuba

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Church Committee

The Church Committee, led by Idaho senator Frank Church, was a congressional committee in the 1970s that investigated U.S. intelligence operations and abuses. The Church Committee's hearings revealed many misuses of government power and failure by Congress to oversee intelligence agencies. A number of recommendations were made by the committee with the goal of making intelligence operations more transparent and answerable to the legislative branch. Secret intelligence operations since 9/11, however, indicate that many of the Church Committee's warnings about excessive government secrecy threatening freedoms have come true.

Prompted in part by the excesses of the Watergate Scandal, the U.S. Senate established an 11-member committee on January 27, 1975, to investigate allegations of misconduct by U.S. intelligence agencies. Officially titled the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, the group was better known as the Church Committee, named after its chairman. Over the next nine months, the committee interviewed more than 800 government officials, held 21 public hearings, and met 250 times in executive session. They found that U.S. intelligence agencies had exceeded their legal authority numerous times since World War II. Their leaders had used the



Senator Frank Church (D-ID) served from 1957 to 1981. Church was instrumental in investigating the CIA in the mid-1970s as chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which established some oversight of the intelligence community. (Library of Congress)

cloak of government secrecy to prevent bodies responsible for oversight, such as Congress, from meeting their obligations.

The committee eventually wrote and published 14 reports outlining how intelligence agencies had operated outside the law. Many of these acts had taken place outside the United States. In countries such as Cuba, Chile, and Congo, U.S. agents had used bribery, threats, and murder to remove opponents of U.S. Cold War policies. While revelations such as attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro were sensational, more Americans were dismayed to realize the extent of intelligence operations against U.S. citizens. Presidential administrations since World War II had routinely authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) to keep American citizens under surveillance. Break-ins and wiretaps for

national security purposes were relatively commonplace, with no prior authorization by courts. The committee also found that systematic surveillance programs had taken place. Project Shamrock, for example, began in 1947 and included the copying of all telegrams sent from the United States to international organizations. The telegrams were processed to find out which ones contained intelligence information or appeared to be encoded.

Church blamed excessive secrecy for part of the abuses. He believed that even the best intentions could be corrupted by power without accountability. One result of his committee's work was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. A secret court was established to issue warrants allowing domestic wiretapping operations. Surveillance of communications with groups and individuals outside the United States was overseen by the FISA court.

Despite the success of FISA, the legacy of the Church Committee's reforms was mixed. The legislation ensured congressional oversight while constraining the power of the executive in its use of covert action. Both houses of Congress set up permanent intelligence oversight committees to review proposals for covert action

generated by the executive branch. The Gerald Ford administration feared that Congress would pass legislation tying the executive branch's hands with regard to the formulation and implementation of foreign and military policy. As such, Ford issued Executive Order 11905 prescribing more executive department oversight of CIA activities and prohibiting the use of a number of intelligence activities, among them "political assassinations." The executive order was replaced in 1981 with Executive Order 12333 by the administration of Ronald Reagan.

The Reagan administration managed to avoid complying with the strictures of the reforms during the 1986–1989 Iran-Contra Affair, in which Reagan officials secretly and against the will of Congress sold U.S. weapons to Iran and transferred the proceeds to the Nicaraguan Contras fighting the leftist Sandinista government. One reason the Reagan administration was able to pursue its covert action agenda without significant congressional oversight was that the reforms inspired by the Church Committee focused on restraining CIA and FBI activities, not those of the National Security Council, which ran the contra covert actions.

Although Congress was critical of covert action in the 1970s, in the 1980s some members of Congress began to embrace covert action. One key instigator of this newly assertive covert action program was Representative Charles Wilson (D-TX). Instead of attempting to restrain the executive in its use of covert action, Wilson convinced many in Congress of the necessity of such action in the case of Afghanistan.

An important aspect of the proceedings and the reforms that flowed out of them is that they marked the first time (at least in recent world history) that a legislative body had successfully investigated the covert action activities of its own government.

Although the Church Committee's work has been commended for bringing attention and reforms to government transparency, some Americans at the time felt that the committee had harmed the U.S. government's ability to gather intelligence. Such prominent citizens as Bing Crosby accused committee members of treason. Others believe that subsequent changes in the intelligence community led to a decline in U.S. ability to gather human intelligence and put more emphasis on technology. Some critics have gone so far as to blame the intelligence failures leading to 9/11 on recommendations made by the Church Committee. After the 9/11 attack, the NSA was authorized by President George W. Bush under authority of a resolution passed by Congress permitting military action to monitor any electronic communications where one party is reasonably believed to be outside the United States.

James F. Siekmeier and Tim J. Watts

See also Cuba; Chile; Guatemalan Intervention; Iran-Contra Affair

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Clandestine Services

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) houses the Directorate of Operations (DO), which is responsible for clandestine operations and services. Clandestine services are highly covert international operations that are designed to ensure the national security of the United States through the gathering of intelligence that is actionable by the president and other informed policy makers. The DO is the espionage arm of the CIA organization that provides the intelligence to the Directorate of Information (DI) for analysis.

Clandestine services are traditionally at the forefront of any information-gathering and intelligence-specific encounters between the United States and other entities. This means that the identities and actions of covert operations members are classified and highly secretive. They can be posted anywhere in the world to gain intelligence and thus spend the majority of their time in the job in foreign locations that could be politically, socially, and economically unstable. It is notoriously difficult to obtain official information on the DO and its specific actions unless that information has been declassified.

Clandestine operation members fall into three categories of officers: operations or case officer, collection management officer, and staff operations officer. The operations or case officer is responsible for the entire undercover intelligence-gathering operation. The collection management officer acts as the medium between the operations officer and the wider clandestine services community. They ensure the correct dissemination of the intelligence, including to whom, and work closely with policy makers. The staff operations officer functions as a manager and is responsible for providing support to those dealing with officers within the field. The DI is not involved with covert operations by the DO; instead, the DI relies on the passing of intelligence to its directorate, which then starts to analyze it. This is to further ensure the integrity of both the intelligence and the covert officer's identity.

The initial clandestine training traditionally takes place on a CIA-owned ranch, commonly referred to as “the Farm,” in Virginia. The entire process is usually broken into distinct sections: spotting, assessing, developing, and delivering. Tradecraft methods are taught, including the various initial intelligence-gathering techniques and information evaluation. Those working within the clandestine division are

usually college graduates who are bilingual or even multilingual. The operations or case officers work either in cover for status (legitimate employment) or in cover for action (covert). To encourage intelligence gathering, officers are assigned such things as passports, citizenship records, and official employment. All cover can be verified by employers and other interested persons. In effect, officers become different people with a history that appears solid and uneventful.

Without intelligence supplied through covert means, the United States would have difficulty formulating the appropriate foreign and domestic policies. Intelligence gathered in clandestine operations is usually called human source intelligence (HUMINT) and is considered the domain of the CIA, as opposed to electronics intelligence, which is viewed as the domain of the National Security Agency. HUMINT is considered to be one of the most direct and efficient ways of obtaining intelligence.

Clandestine operations and services are global in scope and have been used by the CIA to gather information in the field that is not otherwise obtainable through traditional diplomatic relations.

Samaya L. Sukha

See also Electronic Intelligence; Human Intelligence; Documents 16, 19, 26, 72

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Coercive Interrogation

Methods of interrogation meant to compel a person to behave in an involuntary way or reveal information by use of threat, intimidation, or physical force or abuse. In particular, coercive interrogation has been used during the U.S. Middle East wars to obtain information from prisoners, especially those being held as terrorists. Coercive interrogation has been labeled by numerous individuals and organizations as inhumane torture and war crimes that violate international law. In addition, coercive interrogation has been criticized by many for being ineffective; critics contend that it leads to false confessions.

There are various techniques of interrogation that can be described as coercive, including but not limited to sleep deprivation, food deprivation, ceaseless noise, sexual abuse, forced nakedness, cultural humiliation, exposure to extreme cold, prolonged isolation, painful postures, beatings, and waterboarding. Waterboarding, a highly controversial interrogation method, involves positioning a victim on his back, with the head in a downward position, while pouring water over the face and head. As water enters the nasal passages and mouth, the victim believes that drowning is imminent. Waterboarding is a favored interrogation technique because it leaves no visible marks on the victim and can be very effective in extracting confessions.

Records indicate that during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military generally abided by international law concerning treatment of civilian and military detainees. However, there is ample evidence that Iraqis tortured American prisoners of war by employing numerous coercive interrogation techniques. Coercive interrogation became a much larger issue during the George W. Bush administration after the Global War on Terror began in 2001. Although many international agreements signed by the United States forbid torture, President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and his administration have supported the use of coercive interrogation in the Global War on Terror, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush administration acknowledged a need for new interrogation techniques.

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration worked to gain support for coercive interrogation techniques and began to change the definition of torture to better suit its needs. Numerous senior officials believed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had to employ coercive interrogation techniques to deal with Al Qaeda suspects and other terrorists. The administration now began to devise arguments for going against prevailing prescriptions vis-à-vis torture. First, Bush believed that as commander in chief he could use the inherent powers given to him in the U.S. Constitution to stretch U.S. policy to best protect the citizens of the United States. The administration had argued repeatedly that terrorism is a major threat that cannot be fought with conventional means. Also, the White House repeatedly stated that coercive interrogation is not torture in the strict sense of the word. Most legal scholars on the subject disagree with this assessment.

Beginning in 2004, accounts surfaced of Iraqi prisoners being abused by U.S. soldiers in the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. Pictures showing U.S. military personnel abusing and violating prisoners by various means proved highly incendiary. Some methods used included urinating on prisoners, punching prisoners excessively, pouring phosphoric acid on prisoners, rape, forcing prisoners to strip nude and attaching electrodes to their genitals, and photographing prisoners in compromising positions to humiliate them. Eventually 17 soldiers and officers were removed from duty because of the Abu Ghraib scandal; some eventually faced criminal charges and trial.

The situation was compounded when the CIA was accused of having destroyed evidence of the torture of civilian detainees in 2005. There were apparently two videotapes (subsequently destroyed) that contained images of Al Qaeda suspects

being tortured. By 2007, the CIA admitted to some use of coercive interrogation. However, the agency admitted that this had happened rarely and that techniques such as waterboarding were used fewer than five times. In a television interview in December 2008, Vice President Cheney admitted that he has supported the use of waterboarding. More allegations of CIA-sponsored torture surfaced, but the Bush administration stuck to its support of coercive interrogation techniques, asserting that they were not cruel and unusual and therefore did not constitute torture. Nevertheless, under considerable pressure Bush signed an executive order in July 2007 forbidding the use of torture against terror suspects; it did not, however, specifically ban waterboarding.

In early 2008, waterboarding was again a hot topic as Congress considered an antitorture bill designed largely to limit the CIA's use of coercive interrogation. The bill, which was passed in February 2008, would have forced the CIA to abide by the rules found in the *Army Field Manual on Interrogation (FM 34-52)*. The manual forbids the use of physical force and includes a list of approved interrogation methods; waterboarding is not among them.

Arizona senator John McCain, who had been brutally tortured as a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War and had already engaged in a war of words with the Bush White House over the use of torture, voted against the bill. McCain, in defending his vote, argued that the CIA should have the ability to use techniques that are not listed in *FM 34-52*. He argued that there are other techniques available that are effective and not cruel and unusual. He continued to claim, however, that waterboarding is torture and illegal. Bush vetoed the February 2008 bill, and its proponents did not have the requisite votes to override it.

Arthur M. Holst

See also Rendition; September 11 Attacks; Torture; War on Terror and the CIA; Document 98

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Colby, William (1920–1996)

William Egan Colby served as a U.S. ambassador; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Saigon (1959–1962); deputy to the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) (1968–1972); and director of the CIA (1973–1976). Born on January 4, 1920, in St. Paul, Minnesota, Colby graduated from Princeton University in 1940. He obtained a commission in



William Colby, shown here in 1973, was director of the CIA during 1973–1976. Earlier Colby had headed CORDS, the umbrella organization for U.S. pacification efforts in South Vietnam. (AP Photo)

the U.S. Army and in 1943 began working with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Colby's involvement with this organization, which included parachuting agents into Europe and assisting resistance forces during World War II, led to a 33-year intelligence career.

In 1947 Colby earned a law degree from Columbia University, and in 1950 he joined the CIA. In 1959 he became CIA station chief in Saigon. For the next three years Colby and other CIA officials experimented with various forms of security and rural development programs for the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). From their endeavors, the Citizens' (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs), the Mountain Scout program, and the Strategic Hamlet project emerged in 1961. The following year Colby became chief of the CIA's Far East Division, a position he held until 1968. This new appointment forced him to concentrate not only on Southeast Asia—including Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia—but also on China and other areas, such as the Philippines. In this new office he began to stress pacification as the key to overcoming communist aggression in Vietnam. In 1965, indirectly connected with Colby's emphasis on the people's war along with other factors, CIA analysts established the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). The program was intended to measure certain factors in the villages in South Vietnam. These elements contributed to identifying the progress of pacification in the countryside. Despite this, an aggressive pacification strategy did not emerge until 1968.

In 1968 Colby returned to Vietnam and, with ambassadorial rank, succeeded Robert Komer as deputy to the COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later changed to Rural) Development Support (CORDS). While serving in this post, Colby oversaw the accelerated pacification campaign, initiated in November 1968. That effort focused on enhanced security and development within South Vietnam's villages and included such components as the PHOENIX Program and the People's Self-Defense Force.

From 1969 to 1970, planning for the pacification and development shifted from the Americans to the South Vietnamese in accordance with the Richard Nixon administration's policy of Vietnamization. In 1971, the program shifted to a more self-oriented role for the villages of South Vietnam. A year later Colby returned to Washington, D.C., to become executive director of the CIA. From May 1973 until his retirement in November 1976, he served as its director.

Colby assumed leadership of the CIA during the worst crisis in its history, triggered by that agency's assistance of E. Howard Hunt in his illegal break-ins associated with the Watergate Scandal. Colby's predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, had ordered the compilation of a list of CIA actions that might have violated its charter. Colby inherited that list and revealed to Congress the agency's involvement in domestic surveillance, plots to kill foreign leaders, use of humans as guinea pigs in mind-control experiments, and other violations of the CIA's charter. He believed that revealing to Congress the agency's unsavory side helped to save it from congressional abolition. This action earned Colby admiration from many in Congress and the public but the enmity of many Cold War hawks and an end to his tenure as director in 1976.

In retirement, Colby maintained that the United States and South Vietnam might have won the war if only they had fought the CIA's kind of war and countered communist guerrilla tactics. In his 1989 memoir, he argued that the Americans fought the wrong kind of war with incorrect strategy, tactics, and soldiers. He claimed that in the early 1970s Vietnamization was succeeding and that pacification was building the base for a South Vietnamese victory, culminating in the defeat of the 1972 communist offensive, with U.S. air and logistical support but no ground assistance. He believed that this chance for victory was thrown away when the United States sharply reduced its military and logistical support and then withdrew its commitment to the South Vietnamese government during negotiations in Paris. The final straw came when Congress dramatically cut aid to South Vietnam, making inevitable the 1975 communist victory.

Colby also spoke out against the nuclear arms race and, in 1992, for cutting the defense budget by 50 percent and diverting the money to social programs. Colby drowned in a canoeing accident off Rock Park, Maryland, on April 27, 1996.

R. Blake Dunn

See also PHOENIX Program; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Cold War and the CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the primary U.S. intelligence agency during the Cold War. Congress established the CIA in July 1947 to centralize and coordinate intelligence and espionage activities in reaction to the deepening Cold War. Early on, the CIA's main focus was on the Soviet Union and its satellites. The CIA assumed primary responsibility not only for intelligence collection and analysis but also for covert actions. Its origins can be traced to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II that had conducted espionage, intelligence analysis, and special operations from propaganda to sabotage. The main impetus for the creation of the CIA came from the investigation into Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. President Harry S. Truman vowed to prevent a repetition of this massive intelligence failure.

On January 22, 1946, Truman signed an executive order forming a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) modeled after the OSS. Its mission was to provide analysis and coordination of information about foreign threats and to undertake advantageous policy initiatives. Truman signed the National Security Act on July 26, 1947, replacing the CIG with the new CIA as an independent agency operating within the Executive Office.

Truman appointed legendary OSS spymaster William "Wild Bill" Donovan to serve as the first CIA director. The CIA's primary function was to advise the National Security Council (NSC) on intelligence matters and make recommendations for coordination of intelligence activities. To accomplish these goals, the CIA was to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence and perform other services in accordance with NSC directives. Because Congress was vague in defining the CIA's mission, broad interpretation of the act provided justification for subsequent covert operations, although the original intent was only to authorize espionage. The CIA director was responsible for reporting on intelligence activities to Congress and the president. Power over the budget and staffing only of the CIA meant that no director ever exerted central control over the other 12 government entities in the U.S. intelligence community.

Known to insiders as "The Agency" or "The Company," the CIA consisted of four directorates. The Directorate of Operations supervised official and nonofficial agents in conducting human intelligence collection, covert operations, and counter-intelligence. The Directorate of Operations was divided into geographic units and also contained the Center for Counterterrorism. The Directorate of Administration managed the CIA's daily administrative affairs and housed the Office of Security.

Created in 1952, the Directorate of Intelligence conducted research in intelligence sources and analysis of the results. It produced the President's Daily Brief and worked with the National Intelligence Council in preparing estimates and studies. The Directorate of Science and Technology, created in 1963, was responsible for development and operation of reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, operation and funding of ground stations to intercept Soviet missile telemetry, and analysis of foreign nuclear and space programs. It also operated the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which monitored and analyzed all foreign media outlets.

During its first years, the CIA had difficulty prevailing in bureaucratic battles over authority and funding. For example, the State Department required CIA personnel abroad to operate under a U.S. ambassador. Walter Bedell Smith, who replaced Donovan in 1950, was an effective director, but the CIA's power increased greatly after Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, became director in 1953. An 80 percent increase in the agency's budget led to the hiring of 50 percent more agents and a major expansion of covert operations.

The CIA played a key role in the overthrow of allegedly radical governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. With the advice of CIA operative Edward G. Lansdale, Philippine secretary of national defense Ramon Magsaysay during 1950–1954 crushed the Hukbalahap Uprising in his country. CIA agents in South Vietnam infiltrated the Michigan State University Advisory Group that trained police and administrators during 1955–1962 as a basis for nation building. In Laos, the CIA operated Air America and supported rightist politicians, while Donovan, who became U.S. ambassador to Thailand, organized Thai paramilitary units to fight communist forces in neighboring countries.

President John F. Kennedy lost confidence in the CIA after the disastrous Bay of Pigs Invasion, which failed to oust Cuba's Fidel Castro in 1961. The CIA nonetheless continued to devise imaginative but somewhat improbable schemes to assassinate or discredit Castro, efforts suspended during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1961, however, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer began providing the CIA with information on Soviet strategic capabilities, nuclear targeting policies, and medium-range ballistic missiles that would prove critical in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The CIA also penetrated the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry and General Staff, the GRU, and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB). But its covert activities—especially its operations to kill Castro and its involvement in the murders of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem and later Congo's Patrice Lumumba—soon caused much of the world community to view the agency as a sinister force. Although the agency instigated a rebellion in Indonesia that failed to topple Sukarno's regime in 1958, claims that it engineered his ouster in 1965 were false.

As direct American military action in Indochina grew, covert operations became less important, but by 1968 they witnessed a resurgence in the PHOENIX Program that called for assassination of communist operatives. Debate continues over CIA involvement in the 1970 coup in Cambodia but not on its role in ousting Chile's Salvador Allende in 1973.

In 1975, public revelations of CIA assassination plots and an illegal operation to spy on American citizens protesting the Vietnam War led to the creation of the

President's Intelligence Oversight Board as well as an intelligence committee in each house of Congress. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter increased oversight of the CIA and reduced its budget but reversed course after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the CIA had failed to predict the 1979 rebellion overthrowing Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran.

During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the CIA used its renewed power and clout to undermine communist regimes worldwide, providing support for Afghan rebel forces that included Osama bin Laden. Ignoring statutory limits, the CIA also participated in the secret sale of arms to Iran and used the proceeds to fund covert actions against Nicaragua's leftist government. In 1991 Congress passed a new oversight law to prevent another instance like the Iran-Contra Affair.

In 1991, the CIA correctly forecast a coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. But the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union beginning in August 1991 came as a complete surprise. Two and a half years later in February 1994, the arrest of CIA agent Aldrich H. Ames for selling secrets for many years to the Soviets and compromising operatives provided critics with more evidence to back charges that the CIA had prolonged rather than helped to win the Cold War.

James I. Matray

See also Afghanistan; Air America; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Chile; Donovan, William; Dulles, Allen; Guatemalan Intervention; Iran-Contra Affair; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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COMINT

See Communications Intelligence

Communications Intelligence

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the various other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community classify intelligence according to type. Classifying

intelligence in this manner simplifies, shortens, and facilitates the communicating, reporting, analysis, and evaluation of raw intelligence gathered by the various intelligence agencies and aids in the development of new intelligence-gathering techniques.

The CIA, other intelligence agencies, and the U.S. military widely employ the use of acronyms to simplify and ease communications (verbal, written, and electronic) concerning a wide range of technological or complex topics and/or lengthy identifiers, titles, or agencies. The classifications of the various general types of intelligence are no different. The more common classifications of types of intelligence include HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), COMINT (communications intelligence), ELINT (electronic intelligence), and IMINT (image intelligence). All of the intelligence agencies of the United States engage in one or more of these different types of intelligence, with some agencies focusing or specializing more heavily on one of them.

COMINT is a subspecies of SIGINT that concerns communications between people, such as actual conversations or text messages. Thus, COMINT is different from ELINT, also a subspecies of SIGINT, which does not concern communications between people. Characteristics that define COMINT include the identity of the persons initiating and receiving the communications, the location of the persons initiating and receiving the communications, the organizational associations of the initiator and receiver of the communications, the methods and/or frequencies of the communications, and, most important, the substance of the communications. In the past Morse code was frequently used, but with the advent of modern communications technology Morse code is essentially obsolete. However, sometimes special operations units employ it.

Even though the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) were founded after World War II, COMINT was employed by the military since the time telephone and radio communications were used by military units. During both World War I and World War II, militaries would attempt to intercept the communications of the opposing forces to obtain both tactical and strategic advantages. However, COMINT was not limited to just electronic communications. Couriers and carrier pigeons were used in early wars to communicate with other military units. Capturing a courier with his messages or intercepting a carrier pigeon was often considered an intelligence bonanza for the intelligence gained. However, such COMINT activities were not limited to wartime. During times of peace, countries frequently attempted to intercept the communications of foreign countries to obtain political and economic advantages.

The U.S. intelligence community consists of 17 agencies: the CIA, the NSA, the Department of Homeland Security (which includes the Secret Service), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (which handles domestic counterterrorism), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Coast Guard Intelligence, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Department of the Treasury, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA is quite involved in the gathering of COMINT, which

is illustrated by the use of what are euphemistically called “bugs.” Bugs are secretly installed transmitters in specific locations that record and/or transmit the conversations at those locations. Another method of gathering COMINT is the use of telephone taps. These methods are also used by the FBI in counterintelligence operations. However, these examples are generally focused on individual people, small groups, or parts of an organization. Concerning large-scale COMINT operations, the primary agency that employs technical equipment for COMINT is the NSA. The NSA has numerous facilities around the world to monitor communications between people. The NSA and other intelligence agencies have developed and employed data-mining programs that monitor and evaluate all communications on the Internet, seeking certain key words such as “terrorist,” “assassinate,” “explosives,” etc. Performing this function requires a number of supercomputers, which the NSA has. In actual numbers of personnel employed and budget, the NSA is the largest intelligence-gathering organization in the United States. The NSA’s huge budget is due to not only the number of people it employs but also the incredible amount of money spent on the development, purchase, deployment, and operation of highly sophisticated supercomputers, satellites, and COMINT equipment. It has been estimated that the NSA has advanced electronic equipment that is at least two generations beyond what is available in the commercial market. The NRO is primarily responsible for the design, construction, and operation of spy satellites and coordinates satellite imagery and aerial surveillance from the various intelligence agencies. The DIA, through the use of COMINT and ELINT, is also heavily involved in COMINT and maintains an electronic order of battle on the forces of foreign nations. An order of battle is a compendium of units and commanders in a particular region or area. COMINT and ELINT help to identify and locate these units and commanders.

Although COMINT is extremely important to the intelligence function of the United States, COMINT is also probably the easiest intelligence capability to abuse. Extensive employment of electronic surveillance and COMINT against American citizens, which is illegal without probable cause that they have been engaging in certain activities, has resulted in a number of embarrassments for the intelligence community. In the 1970s, the NSA was criticized and investigated for intercepting the communications of social activists. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was widely revealed that the NSA had been engaging in COMINT operations against other nations, to include friendly nations, using a system called ECHELON, resulting in an investigation by the European Union and a scandal and political nightmare for the United States. In 2006 it was exposed that the NSA had been engaging in illegal surveillance of the telephone conversations and Internet e-mail of American citizens and had enlisted the help of a number of the telecom corporations to do so, without obtaining the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. The scandal resulted in Congress enacting a law granting ex post facto protection to the telecoms that had assisted the NSA, as the NSA was essentially immune from legal action. Thus, despite the laudable goals of COMINT, there has been a not insignificant amount of abuse that may yet affect the employment of COMINT. Although the CIA was not involved in many of the problems involving COMINT and the NSA, the CIA was

heavily criticized and investigated by the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee for illegal surveillance of American citizens during the 1970s.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Electronic Intelligence; Human Intelligence; Image Intelligence; Signals Intelligence; Documents 25–29

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CONGRESS, Operation (1950–1979)

Operation CONGRESS was a series of projects funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that centered on many artistic and cultural activities around the world during the Cold War. Funding was secret, and after Operation CONGRESS was discovered in 1967, the organization for funding was renamed and otherwise changed, but by 1979 it was no longer viable.

The decision to include culture and art in the U.S. Cold War arsenal was taken as soon as the CIA was founded in 1947. Dismayed at the appeal that communism still had for many intellectuals and artists in the West, the new agency set up a division, the Propaganda Assets Inventory, that at its peak could influence more than 800 newspapers, magazines, and public information organizations.

Late in June 1950 just days before the Korean War began, 4,000 people were invited to meet in Berlin to hear some of the West's noted intellectuals speak. Among them were James T. Farrell, Tennessee Williams, Carson McCullers, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Sidney Hook, Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, and Jules Romains. Two intellectuals who chose not to attend were Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

The conference focused on art, artists, citizenship, peace, freedom, science, totalitarianism, and the relations between these activities and systems of thought. Opposition to communism became central to their discussions. The conference arose from Western opinion that the Soviets were generously funding their intellectuals and that the West should do the same. Only the United States had the funds to pursue this policy. The Berlin conference was funded by the CIA, and in 1951 the CIA arranged to set aside \$200,000—equivalent to \$2.5 million in 2012—for the administration of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, with headquarters located in Paris.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom’s policy was to support left-wing views and activities that were not based on or supportive of communism as an alternative to non-pro-Western or non-anti-American viewpoints. Eventually this policy would fail, because the noncommunist Left members were not reliable supporters of any accepted or correct political cause. They could soften their resistance to pro-Soviet interests and attitudes, especially those involving selected humanitarian issues, and still be taking a view opposed to that of the United States. In time this would lead the CIA to nurture noncommunist left-wing activists who sabotaged U.S. activities against Cuba and in Latin America and Vietnam.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, officially known as Operation CONGRESS, also gave the CIA the ideal front for promoting its covert interest in Abstract Expressionism. The Congress for Cultural Freedom would be the official sponsor of touring exhibitions. Its magazines would provide useful platforms for critics favorable to the new American painting style, and no one—the artists included—would be any the wiser.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom put together several exhibitions of Abstract Expressionism during the 1950s. One of the most significant exhibitions, *The New American Painting*, visited every big European city in 1958–1959. Other influential shows included *Modern Art in the United States* (1955) and *Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century* (1952).

Because Abstract Expressionism was expensive to move around and exhibit, millionaires and museums were called into play. Preeminent among these was Nelson Rockefeller, whose mother had cofounded the Museum of Modern Art in New York. As president of what he called “Mummy’s museum,” Rockefeller was one of the biggest backers of Abstract Expressionism (which he called “free enterprise painting”). His museum was contracted to the Congress for Cultural Freedom to organize and curate most of its important art shows.

In April 1967 a U.S. magazine, *Ramparts*, published the results of its investigation into CIA covert activities and revealed the CIA’s role in funding the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Shortly afterward, many U.S. societies, trusts, fraternities, and other groups that had benefited from CIA funding were perceived to be possible CIA fronts and organizations.

The CIA had sponsored the Congress for Cultural Freedom from its beginning and subsidized many learned and intellectual magazines around the globe, such as *Encounter* in Britain and *Quadrant* in Australia. Editors and trustees who controlled the magazines were not always aware that funds came to them from the CIA, probably because the Ford Foundation and other philanthropic organizations would

channel CIA funds where they could be used. Because some trustees knew the CIA's role and others did not, control of the publications split, and many editors and trustees resigned when they learned that they had been unwittingly serving the CIA.

Late in April 1967, the General Assembly of the Congress for Cultural Freedom confirmed reports that the CIA had funded the work of the organization. The Congress for Cultural Freedom said that it was proud of its own achievements since 1950, claimed that its activities had been free of any CIA influence and that its members' intellectual integrity had not been impaired, and condemned the CIA for its deceptions in general and for its poisoning of intellectual discussion in particular.

Arthur Koestler was among many intellectuals who said that it did not matter where the money came from. Lionel Trilling and Mary McCarthy merely accepted the money, while others asserted that the CIA's activities were a benign necessity of the Cold War and that by comparison with its military coups, the CIA's intellectual coups were rarely effective in changing people's minds. Hannah Arendt and Angus Wilson believed that the CIA had discredited intellectuals with its deceptions and secrecy.

After 1967, the CIA continued to fund associations and forums that were once connected with the Congress for Cultural Freedom. However well the funding source was hidden, the international influence of the Congress for Cultural Freedom rapidly declined. It was renamed the International Association for Cultural Freedom, and the Ford Foundation, which had earlier brokered millions of dollars for philanthropic funds for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, provided all financing and gave intellectuals the perceived independence that they believed their organization had once held. Even so, in January 1979 the International Association for Cultural Freedom dissolved itself, and one of the CIA's means of providing intellectuals with cultural freedom disappeared.

In her account of the CIA's influence on intellectuals, Francis Saunders writes, with irony, that it was the same set of people who had been raised on classical literature and educated at America's foremost universities who, after World War II, recruited Nazis, manipulated democratic elections in foreign lands, administered LSD to subjects without their informed consent, opened their citizens' mail illegally, funded dictatorships, and plotted assassinations—all in the interest of securing an empire for the United States. This use of irony for criticism meets resistance in the works of CIA apologists Richard Bissell and William Colby.

Jan Goldman

See also *Animal Farm*; Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Colby, William; Documents 11, 14, 28, 36, 66

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Contractors

Secrecy is one of the primary tools of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Without secrecy, the CIA simply could not accomplish its mission. There are many ways to help ensure secrecy. One method employed by the CIA is the use of contractors and proprietaries. Contractors are private individuals or organizations hired by the CIA to accomplish certain tasks. Depending upon the type of task, the contractor's link to the CIA may be public or secret. Proprietaries are usually organizations that are created by the CIA or private entities to secretly accomplish certain intelligence missions. Accordingly, any connection between proprietaries and the CIA must necessarily be kept secret. There can be overlap between contractors and proprietaries.

Proprietaries frequently take the form of international business companies or corporations to facilitate working overseas, which is within the jurisdiction of the CIA, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation being responsible for counterintelligence within the United States. Proprietaries are usually owned and/or controlled by the CIA through secret means. To help maintain their cover, proprietaries engage in normal commercial operations in addition to their intelligence missions. It is not uncommon for employees of proprietaries to not even be aware of the CIA connection or the intelligence missions being executed by it. This helps maintain the secrecy of the operation. The most famous proprietary of the CIA was Air America, a "private" airline that operated from the 1950s to the 1970s, primarily in Southeast Asia, supporting CIA covert and intelligence missions and U.S. military operations throughout the Vietnam War. Given this format of organization, many employees of proprietaries may be contractors for the CIA.

There are several different classifications of contractors. Contractors can be individuals or organizations. There are several different types of individual contractors. One type is the consultant. Consultants generally do not take an active part in CIA operations but are retained to prepare a study or report on specific topics, which usually concern issues of technology or politics. Although most such reports and studies are classified, the level of secrecy applied to them is usually less than the security classifications of specific intelligence operations. Another type of individual contractor is the hired agent. This type of contractor is employed by the CIA, usually on a term or project basis, but not as a permanent employee. Such a contractor would usually not be granted any official powers that would accrue to a permanent agent of the government, but the status as a contractor would usually be sufficient for that person to obtain the cooperation of other agencies. Most individual contractors are former CIA intelligence officers or military veterans from

special operations units, such as the U.S. Army Green Berets or the U.S. Navy SEALs. The reason for this focus is that such personnel are already trained and generally proven in battle or covert operations.

A number of criticisms have been brought against the use of individual contractors for intelligence work for the CIA. These criticisms include the high cost (individual contractors are usually paid several times what a CIA officer would be paid for the same work), lack of security (there is much less supervisory control over individual contractors than over CIA officers), lack of accountability (it is more difficult to bring individual contractors, who are usually working in foreign countries, to justice), and lack of professionalism. However, the drawbacks of using individual contractors are frequently the reasons why they are used. The first and most important reason is plausible deniability. If an individual contractor is caught engaging in illegal activities in a foreign country, then the U.S. government and the CIA can more easily deny any involvement, thereby lessening political fallout, or blowback. Blowback, as employed by the CIA, refers to the unanticipated and undesired consequences of the discovery of covert or intelligence operations by the United States in a foreign country. For example, assume that a CIA agent was caught attempting to arrange a political assassination in a foreign country (this example is not speculative, as the CIA has been involved in at least the attempted assassinations of various foreign leaders, such as Fidel Castro of Cuba). In such a situation, the blowback might take the form of a retaliatory attempt to assassinate an American leader. The second reason is the limitation of liability. Government officers, to include intelligence agents of the CIA, can be held accountable for war crimes under domestic and international law. Indeed, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was formed to address the issue of war crimes by individuals. However, private individuals, such as private contractors for intelligence and military agencies, do not have the same level of liability. Furthermore, after the creation of the ICC, the United States made treaties with more than 100 countries of the world in exchange for huge amounts of financial, economic, and military aid for promises never to bring any U.S. personnel to the ICC for war crimes. Thus, the employment of individual contractors by the CIA helps to minimize the political and criminal liability of the United States and CIA officers but also helps maintain secrecy, as such incidents would not be subject to the widespread publicity of war crimes trial in The Hague. An example of this problem is the issue of individual contractors employed by the United States for the interrogation of prisoners, such as what occurred at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay. Despite several attempts, victims of the torture have generally been unable to bring their torturers to justice. As to the problem of professionalism, it is much easier to ensure the training and quality of full-time employees as opposed to contractors. With contractors, the CIA has much less control over the training of personnel. With the pay for contractors being so high, the CIA and other intelligence organizations have had a problem retaining competent personnel who are leaving the public sector for the much more profitable private sector.

Hired agents, at least initially, were used for highly dangerous missions for which the CIA wanted minimal potential for exposure in the event of capture or

failure. However, by the time of the advent of the wars in Iraq, the CIA underwent a significant paradigm change. Contractors were and still are being hired to perform tasks that would previously have only been performed by a permanent CIA intelligence officer. These tasks included the handling of sensitive documents, the evaluation of information, the interrogation of prisoners, and the planning and execution of intelligence missions and even the supervising of regular CIA officers. It is estimated that the outsourcing of intelligence operations in the United States is approximately \$50 billion per year. The CIA is estimated to have spent between 50 percent and 60 percent of its annual budget each year since 9/11 on for-profit contractors.

Much of the CIA's human intelligence comes from recruited foreign agents. Such agents are frequently disaffected military, government, or intelligence officers who are willing to reveal their country's secrets. Their betrayal can be for any one of a number of reasons, to include political ideology, a need for money, or blackmail. Recruited foreign agents are generally not classified as contractors, as recruited foreign agents are considered intelligence sources, whereas contractors are considered to be employees engaging in activities to facilitate intelligence and covert operations.

The second type of contractor is organizational contractors. Organizational contractors are hired by the CIA to accomplish such tasks as research or actual intelligence operations. Organizational contractors include private corporations (such as the RAND Corporation), research institutes, and major universities. Usually, this type of organizational contractor is focused on particular issues. This type of organizational contractor generally does not engage in any covert or intelligence operations.

Some private organizational entities are hired specifically to engage in covert and intelligence operations. With the huge difference in pay between the CIA and private companies, many highly competent CIA professionals are leaving the CIA to work for private intelligence organizations. An example of one such private corporation is Blackwater (now Xe). Blackwater was hired by the U.S. government, including the CIA, to handle various security, military, and intelligence operations in the Persian Gulf. Illustrative of the power of the private intelligence organizational contractors, even after Blackwater was exposed for engaging in various questionable if not illegal activities, it was still employed as a contractor after some superficial changes, such as a name change. One U.S. Navy admiral has been attributed with borrowing President Dwight D. Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex to warn against the "intelligence-industrial complex." With the greatly increased reliance on supercomputers, spy satellites, and high-tech intelligence equipment by the CIA and its sister intelligence organizations, this warning must be taken as being of immediate significance. With the high percentage of contractors involved in intelligence operations for the U.S. government, it appears to be only a matter of time (if it has not happened already) before the intelligence services are as compromised as the military, with Halliburton as an example.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Cuba; Human Intelligence; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in; Documents 42, 56, 62, 98

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Contras

The term “Contras” is a label that was given to various paramilitary forces trained and funded by the United States to challenge Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista regime. The 1979 overthrow of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua resulted in a government committed to socialism and openly allied with Cuba. This government, headed by President Daniel Ortega and leaders of the Sandinista Liberation Front, promised radical social and political reforms. Fearing that leftist and communist regimes would spread revolution across Central America, U.S. president Ronald Reagan created an anti-Sandinista force, known as the Contras. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under authority granted to it by National Security Decision Directive 17 of November 23, 1981, coordinated the establishment of a force of local combatants capable of carrying out attacks in Nicaragua. The rebels received both overt and covert financial and military support from the U.S. government through the CIA.

The Contra program had three active fronts. Mercenaries, many of whom were displaced soldiers and officers from the national guard of the deposed Somoza dictatorship, trained in Honduras. Their units, organized as the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force), launched raids into northern Nicaragua beginning in August 1981. Also, Miskito Indians were encouraged to wage their own resistance movement along Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast. Inside neighboring Costa Rica, a more heterogeneous collection of opposition groups, ranging from ex-Somoza followers to disaffected Sandinistas, formed the Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance) in 1982 and put pressure on the new Nicaraguan government from the south.

The Contras helped drain the military resources of the Sandinista government. By 1984, Contra forces numbered more than 10,000 men. Their leaders promised to overthrow the Sandinista government with help from the United States.

The Contras soon became the target of international protest. Comparing their operations to earlier U.S. interventions in Guatemala and Cuba, the Sandinista government and sympathetic supporters in Canada and Europe challenged the U.S. effort, both in the United Nations (UN) and the World Court. In 1986, the International Court of Justice ruled against the United States and urged it to cease all support. U.S. officials countered that the court had no jurisdiction in the matter, and the U.S. government ignored the verdict.

In the United States, revelations of human rights abuses mobilized opposition to the Contras in Congress. Congress first banned, under the December 1982 Boland Amendment, any funding from the CIA or the Department of Defense for the Contras, and in October 1984 Congress voted to forbid support from any government agency for the Contras. Relying on intermediaries, such as Argentine military officers, to provide training and matériel, the Reagan administration sustained the program for five more years.

To circumvent the congressional restrictions, the Reagan administration developed alternative funding sources, including an exchange of military equipment designated for use by the Israeli Army for cash from Iran. Revenue generated by inflating the price of missiles, spare parts, and other matériel provided profits that staff members in the U.S. National Security Agency diverted to the Contra forces. In 1986, Lebanese press sources revealed this scheme. This forced the Reagan administration to form a special commission, led by former senator John Tower, to investigate and report on the affair in December 1986. Congress conducted its own investigation. The Iran-Contra Hearings concluded in March 1988 with indictments of Oliver North and John Poindexter, who had helped organize the prohibited support of the Contras from their positions within the government.

Despite efforts of Central American leaders to broker a regional peace and despite the Contras' lack of support in Nicaragua, the program remained a core component of U.S. policy in Central America throughout much of the 1980s. The Sandinistas' electoral defeat in 1990 ended their control of the Nicaraguan government. With the *raison d'être* of the Contras gone, UN peacekeeping forces supervised the disarmament of the Contras.

Daniel Lewis

See also Cuba; Iran-Contra Affair; Tower Commission; Document 74

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Copeland, Miles (1916–1991)

Miles Axe Copeland Jr. was a jazz musician, an author, and a longtime U.S. intelligence operative who worked for the Strategic Services Unit and, after 1947, for

its successor organization, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Copeland became an expert in Middle East politics and spent virtually his entire career assigned to CIA posts in that region.

Copeland was born on July 16, 1916, in Birmingham, Alabama. After briefly attending college, he dropped out to pursue a career as a musician, eventually becoming a trumpeter and arranger for the very popular swing/jazz group known as the Glenn Miller Orchestra. When World War II began in 1939, Copeland enlisted in the U.S. National Guard. He was introduced to U.S. intelligence guru William “Wild Bill” Donovan sometime thereafter, and even though the two men became fast friends, when the United States entered the war in late 1941, Copeland did not serve in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a linear predecessor of the CIA. Instead, he was recruited by and served in the Counterintelligence Corps and was stationed principally in London, where he was involved in top-level military intelligence operations. He reportedly participated in the planning for Operation OVERLORD (1944), which involved the opening of a second front against Nazi German forces in France. After the war’s conclusion, Copeland immediately joined the Strategic Service Unit, which continued the work of the OSS. When the CIA was established in 1947, he became a political officer in that organization.

Most of Copeland’s post–World War II intelligence career unfolded in the Middle East. In 1953, he played a key role in engineering the ouster of Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh, whose nationalization policies were deemed antithetical to British and U.S. interests. That same year Copeland took a break from the CIA, securing a position with the famed management consultant firm Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Soon returning to the CIA full-time, Copeland next cultivated close ties with Egypt’s new leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Copeland served as a de facto senior adviser to the Nasser regime and directed millions of dollars of U.S. aid to Egypt. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, Copeland was a key player in American mediation of the conflict, as the United States tacitly supported Nasser’s position vis-à-vis France and Great Britain. Copeland firmly believed that British dominance in the region had to give way to American dominance as a way to offset Soviet designs on the Middle East and its strategic oil industry. When Nasser began to pivot toward the Soviets, however, Copeland became involved in various operations designed to destabilize Nasser’s government and assassinate the Egyptian leader, all of which failed.

In 1958 when Iraq’s king, Faisal II, was ousted during a coup d’état, Copeland played a sizable role in helping to reorder Iraqi politics, which included laying the groundwork for the Iraqi Baath Party. That group would eventually become dominated by the ruthless Saddam Hussein, whose government went on to provoke two wars involving the United States—one in 1991 and a second one in 2003. Hussein was deposed during the second conflict.

Copeland was stationed in Beirut until 1968, at which time he reportedly retired from the CIA (although there were persistent rumors that he continued to work for the agency long after that). While in retirement, Copeland wrote several books on intelligence, foreign policy, and national security topics. He was also a frequent contributor to the *National Review* and several other politically oriented

periodicals and authored a memoir. In the aftermath of the Watergate Scandal of the mid-1970s, Copeland was an unabashed defender of the CIA, even taking on congressional opponents of the agency who sought to rein in its power.

Copeland died on January 14, 1991, in Oxfordshire, England.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Donovan, William; MKULTRA, Project; Office of Strategic Services

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CORONA Program (1959–1972)

The first successful reconnaissance satellite program operated by the United States, providing photographic coverage of otherwise denied areas, especially in the Soviet Union. The CORONA Program grew out of an earlier U.S. Air Force program known as WS-117L.

The U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency collaborated in developing the CORONA system, and in 1961 the U.S. government placed this collaborative effort under the covert National Reconnaissance Office, which reported to the secretary of defense and controlled the developing reconnaissance satellite programs. During the first few years of the program as part of the cover story involving scientific research missions, the U.S. government publicly identified the system as DISCOVERER. Additionally, a number of the early launches of the Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile rocket with an Agena second-stage vehicle did carry scientific payloads.

The CORONA reconnaissance system captured images on film and returned the film from orbit in a capsule—referred to as a bucket—that was captured in midair by an aircraft as the bucket descended by parachute. After a series of partial or complete failures beginning in January 1959, the first successful CORONA mission, publicly identified as Discoverer XIV, was flown on August 18, 1960. In August 1964, system capability was enhanced with the addition of a second film-return canister, allowing more complicated missions and a more timely return of imagery. The CORONA system provided an effective means of photographic intelligence collection, helping ensure that the United States was not surprised by technical developments, new combat capabilities, or force deployments. The reconnaissance photography also provided important material for military planning and the

development of accurate maps. The last CORONA mission, the 145th launch, was flown in May 1972. In 1995, CORONA imagery was declassified and made available through the National Archives and the U.S. Geological Survey for use in environmental research.

Jerome V. Martin

See also AJAX, Operation; Documents 25–27, 29, 40

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Counterterrorism Center

In 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) decided to create a new section to fight international terrorism. This decision came shortly after intelligence failures in Lebanon had led to the deaths in October 1982 of 241 U.S. marines when their barracks was bombed and the kidnapping and killing of CIA section chief William Buckley in 1982. President Ronald Reagan pressed CIA director William J. Casey to do something about terrorism.

Casey soon approached Duane R. “Dewey” Clarridge, a respected veteran field officer, to make a recommendation as to how the CIA could most effectively fight terrorism. Clarridge recommended an interdisciplinary center in the CIA that had an international reach and could utilize all the capabilities of the agency. Part of its mission was to launch covert actions against known terrorists, so the Special Operations Group was transferred to the Counterterrorism Center (CTC). The CTC was to be a section staffed by 100 persons with representation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Casey accepted Clarridge’s recommendation and appointed him as its head. Instead of the original plan for a staff of 100, however, Casey authorized it at a staffing of 250. The CTC became operational in February 1986.

Clarridge’s first target as head of the CTC was the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). In the 1970s and 1980s the ANO, named after its leader, was the most violent terrorist group in operation and had become the number one terrorist threat. The CIA was able to recruit a source within the ANO, and this individual provided inside information. Much of it appeared in a State Department publication, *The*

Abu Nidal Handbook. After this information became public, Abu Nidal became so concerned about penetration of his organization that he ordered the execution of a large number of his followers in Libya. This purge ended the effectiveness of the ANO.

The next target was Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon. Hezbollah, which the United States considers a Shia terrorist organization, was blamed for complicity in the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, and factions that became a part of Hezbollah had taken hostage a number of Westerners. Among these was William Buckley, the CIA agent in Lebanon who had died from harsh treatment. The campaign against Hezbollah was less successful, although it involved attempted assassinations of the leadership. Efforts to launch covert operations were also hampered by the Lebanese position that the organization was no more terrorist than any other during the Lebanese Civil War period and was the only effective force in battling the Israeli and Israeli-proxy occupation of southern Lebanon.

Clarridge soon became frustrated by the lack of support for the CTC. His role in the Iran-Contra Affair also led his superiors in the CIA to question his judgment. He maintained that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North had misled him in the exchange of hostages from Iran for weapons to be used by the opposition Contras to fight against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Clarridge's goal had been to make the CTC a proactive force against terrorism. Instead, he found that his new boss CIA director William Webster, who had assumed control of the CIA on May 26, 1987, was averse to risk. This lack of support led Clarridge to leave the CTC later in 1987.

Clarridge's successor, Fred Turco, picked the next major target for the CTC as the Peruvian Shining Path organization. Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor, had founded the Maoist terrorist group in 1970, and it had opened a war against the Peruvian government. The CTC provided the Peruvian police with sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment and training that enabled them to capture Guzmán in a Lima suburb in September 1992.

The CTC's activities assumed more importance in 1993. By this time the new head of the CTC was Winston Wiley, who had assumed the position in November 1992. Two events mobilized this activity. First was the murder of two CIA employees in Langley, Virginia, by Mir Amal Kasi on January 25, 1993. Believing that the CIA was responsible for countless Muslim deaths, Kasi opened fire with an AK-47 assault rifle just outside of CIA headquarters, killing the CIA employees in their automobiles. Kasi was from Baluchistan, and he managed to escape back to Pakistan, where he promptly disappeared. A special CIA unit was set up to locate and capture him; he was finally apprehended on June 15, 1997.

An even bigger task was the investigation of the conspiracy behind the February 23, 1993, World Trade Center bombing. While the domestic investigation was left up to the FBI, the CTC established a subunit to gather intelligence about the bombing. Information was slow to surface, and at first the CTC suspected that it had been a state-sponsored terrorist operation, with Iraq, Libya, and Iran as the prime suspects. Over time the intelligence analysts came to realize that it was an

independent operation led by Ramzi Yousef. In a combined CIA-FBI operation, Yousef was captured in Islamabad, Pakistan, on February 7, 1995.

The CTC continued to target terrorist groups. First under Geoff O'Connell and then under J. Cofer Black, the CTC planned counterterrorist operations. Black's target was Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Black was also able to count on an expanded CTC. The CTC had grown from only 20 analysts in 1986 to 340 people, of whom more than a dozen were FBI agents, by early 2001. Despite the additions, the staffing of the CTC was too low to handle the volume of information flowing into it. Not surprisingly, the leaders and the staff of the CTC were caught unawares on September 11, 2001.

American pressure on Sudan had led bin Laden to move from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996. Bin Laden, his family, and retainers traveled to Afghanistan by aircraft on May 18, 1996. The staff of the CTC thought that this presented a golden opportunity to capture bin Laden in transit. A proposal to do so was given to President William J. Clinton but never received presidential approval. Members of the CTC were furious over this lost opportunity.

Throughout the late 1990s, analysts in the CTC monitored bin Laden's activities from sources within Afghanistan. The problem was that bin Laden was constantly moving, so tracking him was almost impossible. There was also an ongoing and unresolved debate in the Clinton administration about whether it was legal to assassinate bin Laden. Attorney General Janet Reno made it plain to George Tenet, head of the CIA, and Geoff O'Connell, head of the CTC, that any attempt to kill bin Laden was illegal. All schemes thus involved capturing bin Laden first and killing him only in self-defense.

Another problem was the issue of collateral damage in an attack on bin Laden. Isolating him from civilians was almost impossible. Members of the CTC wanted to proceed with covert action regardless of the likelihood of collateral civilian losses.

In the middle of the debate over bin Laden, the U.S. Navy destroyer *Cole* was attacked while anchored in the harbor in Aden, Yemen, on October 12, 2000. The attack killed 17 American sailors and wounded scores more. This incident caught the CTC by surprise. It thus took a while for the analysts to find the evidence connecting this attack with Al Qaeda, but the evidence was indeed found. CTC staffers sought retaliation, but the American military was reluctant to undertake any such operations and so advised the White House. To the leadership of the CTC, the only option was to support Afghan leader General Ahmad Shah Massoud and his war against the Taliban. But the Clinton administration was reluctant to do this and forbade the CTC from increasing aid to him. The Clinton administration left office in 2001 with the problem of bin Laden and Al Qaeda unresolved.

Counterterrorism analysts continued to be frustrated by the inaction of the George W. Bush administration toward terrorism. Reports indicated increased activity by Al Qaeda, but the problem was that there was no evidence of what kind of operation it might undertake or where. A series of warnings came out of the CTC that Tenet took to President Bush and other prominent administration figures. These warnings coincided with similar warnings from the FBI. Some of them even

made the case that Al Qaeda operatives might carry out an operation in the United States. What weakened these frequent warnings was the lack of specific details. The Bush administration listened to the warnings, noted the lack of specifics, and took no action. Bush wanted more specific intelligence before he would authorize any action.

Tenet now ordered the CIA to round up suspected Al Qaeda members to gather information on what the organization was planning. This tactic had two purposes: to gather intelligence and to delay Al Qaeda missions. Several Al Qaeda plots were uncovered, and a massive amount of intelligence material arrived at the CTC. The problem was that there were not enough translators and analysts to handle the mass of material. Frustration was high among the intelligence analysts because they were fearful that important information was being overlooked. In mid-July 2001, Tenet ordered the CTC analysts to search back in CTC files and in current information on bin Laden's major plots. He was suspicious that bin Laden might be targeting the United States for a terrorism mission. Tenet took what information the CTC had uncovered and presented the report titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in United States" to President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6, 2001. In early September the Bush administration began to consider a plan to attack terrorism, especially bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but there was no sense of haste.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, resources poured into the CTC. By the summer of 2002, Tenet had expanded its staff to 1,500. This number of workers was able to handle 2,500 classified electronic communications a day and could produce 500 terrorist reports a month.

The CTC was also given the responsibility for the interrogations of important Al Qaeda prisoners. A series of secret interrogation centers was established in friendly countries. Meanwhile, top Al Qaeda prisoners were kept at an interrogation center, Bright Lights, the location of which was not known even to analysts in the CTC. These interrogations are ongoing, with some of the information making it back to intelligence circles. There have also been reports of CIA interrogators using questionable interrogation techniques and torture, including the controversial waterboarding process. The FBI refuses to have anything to do with these interrogations. Several news reports have confirmed this information, and CIA agents have become increasingly uncomfortable about their legal position over these interrogations. This nervousness about interrogation techniques led to controversy in December 2007 when news surfaced that the secret tapes of CIA interrogations had been destroyed in 2005. This action was defended by the head of the CIA, Michael V. Hayden, but there have been congressional efforts to hold hearings on whether this action was illegal.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also Alec Station; Buckley, William F.; Casey, William; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Documents 73, 75–88, 91–96, 98

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Cuba

The Spanish-American War (1898) marked a watershed in relations between Cuba and the United States, as it greatly enhanced American influence on the island. However, the event was controversial because Cuban independence fighters saw the island's newfound freedom as an outcome of their 30-year struggle against Spain, whereas many Americans saw Cuban independence as an American victory. The result was an uneasy compromise by which Cuba became an independent republic with limitations to its sovereignty embodied in the 1901 Platt Amendment, an appendix to the Cuban Constitution authorizing U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs at its own discretion. Cuba became a politically independent state on May 20, 1902.

The duality of opinions as to Cuban sovereignty was at the heart of the crisis that brought down the Cuban republic. For the first half of the 20th century, the United States set the standards to which the Cuban population aspired. In this context, the crisis of the Cuban economic model of dependence on the sugar industry was accompanied by a sympathetic attitude in Washington toward anticommunist dictators.

General Fulgencio Batista's military coup on March 10, 1952, occurred only two months before an election in which nationalist forces were within reach of the presidency. In the context of McCarthyism in America, the destruction of the Cuban democracy by Batista's rightist junta did not generate significant opposition in Washington. Indeed, the United States backed Batista as an ally in the Cold War. For its part, the Cuban authoritarian Right manipulated the West by presenting itself as a bulwark against communism. In practice, the Batista government was actually undermining democracy with its repressive policies. And all along, Batista's regime did little to improve living standards for poor Cubans, while the middle class and elites enjoyed a close and lucrative relationship with American businesses.

A potent popular insurrection against Batista's regime had grown in the eastern and central parts of Cuba by 1958. The leaders of the revolution, Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, questioned Cuban dependence on the United States as

well as market economy principles. They perceived their movement as part of a developing-world rebellion against the West and as a natural ally of the communist bloc.

The United States was not prepared to deal with the charismatic and doctrinaire Castro. After his takeover, the United States underestimated the profound grievances provoked by American support for the Batista regime. Some of Castro's early measures—such as land reform, the prosecution of Batista's cronies (with no guarantee of due process), and the nationalization of industries—were overwhelmingly popular but at the same time met stiff U.S. resistance.

Against this backdrop Castro approached the Soviet Union for support, and in February 1960 a Soviet delegation led by Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba and signed a trade agreement with Castro's government. The Soviets then began to replace the United States as Cuba's main trade and political partner. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev soon promised Cuba new machinery, oil, consumer goods, and a market for Cuban products now subject to American sanctions.

In April 1961 U.S.-Cuban relations collapsed completely, thanks to the abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The assault was condemned to failure, given Castro's popularity and the lack of U.S. air support for the rebel force. The botched attack only encouraged closer relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Khrushchev subsequently proposed installing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba to ensure a better bargaining position with the United States and as a means of offering protection to Cuba. Castro was elated. Khrushchev naively assumed that the missiles could be installed without U.S. detection. U.S. intelligence quickly discovered the activity, however, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous confrontation between the two superpowers of the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy declared a naval quarantine against the island in October 1962. For nearly two weeks the world stood at the edge of a nuclear abyss. In the end, Kennedy and Khrushchev worked out an agreement in which the Soviets withdrew the missiles in return for U.S. promises not to invade Cuba and to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

The end of Kennedy's quarantine did not conclude the strife between Cuba and the United States, however. In addition to an embargo that continues to this day, the United States launched additional covert operations against Castro's government. The most important one, Operation MONGOOSE, included 14 CIA attempts to assassinate Castro. American hostility was reinforced by the Cuban revolution's transformation from a nationalist rebellion against authoritarianism to a totalitarian state aligned with the Soviet Union, with serious shortcomings in civil and political liberties.

The solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis also created serious strains between Havana and Moscow. Cuba's foreign policy was made in Havana, and therefore Castro refused to accept Moscow's or Beijing's directives. In 1968 he cracked down on a group of Cuban communists, accusing them of working with Soviet

agents in Havana. In the end, he used the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia against the Prague Spring to broker a compromise by which Cuba preserved its autonomy but promised not to criticize the Soviet Union publicly.

In Latin America, the Cuban government actively supported revolutionary movements with leftist or nationalist agendas, especially those that challenged American hegemony in the region. But the 1960s witnessed successive failed Cuban attempts to export revolution to other countries. Guevara's 1967 murder in Bolivia concluded a series of subversive projects encouraged by Havana. Cuban revolutionary attempts were part of Cubans' core revolutionary beliefs and were also a response to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Havana by all the Latin American countries except Mexico.

Castro sent 40,000 troops to Angola to support the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola government in its struggle against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola forces backed by South Africa and the United States. Cuba also dispatched troops to aid the pro-Soviet government of Ethiopia. In all, Cuba deployed more than 300,000 troops or military advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, Syria, and South Yemen.

In 1977, Castro sent 17,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia to support dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in his territorial conflict with Somalia. This development, despite the progress in several bilateral issues, represented a major blow to the prospect of improved Cuban-U.S. relations, as did Castro's support for the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s.

In 1988 Castro withdrew Cuban troops from Angola and reduced the Cuban military presence in the Horn of Africa. The collapse of the communist bloc beginning in 1989 was a major catastrophe for Castro's government, as Cuba lost its major benefactors. At the same time, the international community, particularly Latin America and the former communist countries, adopted general norms of democratic governance opposed to the goals and behavior of the Cuban leadership. Without Soviet backing, Cuba adjusted its economy and foreign policy to survive in a world that was no longer safe for revolution.

More than 20 years after the Cold War wound down, Castro remained one of the last leaders of the old-style communist order.

Arturo Lopez-Levy

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Guevara, Che; MONGOOSE, Operation; Documents 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 59

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Cubela, Rolando (1932–)

Rolando Cubela Secades was a onetime Cuban revolutionary and supporter of Cuban leader Fidel Castro who later worked as an operative for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There is evidence that Cubela may also have been a double agent, working for both the U.S. and Cuban intelligence communities.

Cubela was born in Cienfuegos, Cuba, in 1932 and as a young man became disenchanted and angered by the corrupt Fulgencio Batista regime. By 1955 Cubela had emerged as a leader in the Student Revolutionary Directorate and became involved in a plot to assassinate a top-level official in the Batista regime. This successful assassination forced Cubela to flee to the United States later in 1956, although he had returned to his homeland by 1958. He then became involved in military activities spearheaded by Castro, eventually becoming a high-ranking commander in Castro's revolutionary army. After Castro ousted Batista in 1959, Cubela was given a position in the new government and was tasked with leading the youth arm of Castro's revolutionary regime.

By 1960, however, Cubela had become disillusioned with the Castro regime, believing that it had forsaken its revolutionary ideology and was morphing into a communist dictatorship. That same year he met an old acquaintance, Carlos Tepedino, who was working as a CIA operative. That meeting apparently encouraged Cubela to seek employment with the CIA. He attempted to defect to the United States in March 1961, but instead the CIA agreed to employ him as a spy and requested that he remain in Cuba to gather intelligence. Given the code name AM/LASH, Cubela began working as an undercover operative for the CIA in Cuba.

In the early fall of 1963, Cubela traveled to Brazil, where he met with CIA operatives; during this meeting, Cubela apparently agreed to assassinate Castro. The following month Cubela again met with CIA officials, this time in Paris, to lay plans for Castro's murder. At that time, several CIA agents voiced their objections over using Cubela as the hit man, believing that he might be a double agent also working for Castro. Nevertheless, on November 22, 1963, the same day that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, CIA operatives again met with Cubela in Paris and provided him with a fountain pen equipped with a needle designed to inject Castro with a poison that would kill him instantly. For reasons that remain obscured by secrecy, Cubela was never able to carry out the assassination using the poison pen. Years later, however, declassified CIA documents verified a number of unusual U.S. plots to kill Castro, which included poison cigars, exploding clam shells, and other unlikely modes of assassination.

In late 1964 Cubela suggested assassinating Castro with a high-powered rifle, and some reports suggest that the CIA provided Cubela with a rifle and silencer

in February 1965. By June 1965, however, fearing that Cubela was indeed a double agent who had been leaking news of U.S. assassination plots to Castro, the CIA severed all ties with Cubela. At the same time, there were reports—which have never been completely substantiated—that Cubela was clandestinely allied with U.S. Mafia kingpin Santo Trafficante, who was paying Cubela for information that Trafficante could pass on to Castro. Trafficante at the time was working feverishly to reestablish his lucrative entertainment and gambling racket in Havana, which Castro had abruptly ended after seizing power. Because of this alleged connection with Trafficante, there have been persistent rumors that Cubela played some unknown role in Kennedy's assassination, although none has ever been confirmed.

In the winter of 1966, Castro ordered Cubela arrested for conspiracy to assassinate him. This may have been an attempt to convince the Americans that Cubela had not been a double agent. A trial was hastily arranged in early March 1966, and Cubela was predictably found guilty and sentenced to death. In a somewhat unusual move, however, Castro intervened and commuted Cubela's sentence to 25 years in prison. This development led some observers to suggest that Castro had used Cubela as a decoy and was not willing to see him executed because he had indeed been working for Cuban intelligence. Some reports later suggested that Castro had routinely sent reading material to Cubela while he was imprisoned.

Cubela was released in 1979, well before his full sentence was scheduled to end. Sometime thereafter, the Castro government permitted Cubela to leave Cuba—another mysterious development. Cubela eventually settled in Spain, where he continues to live as of this writing.



Rolando Cubela Secades served as Commandant in Fidel Castro's rebel army and was involved in a plot to kill Castro in 1963. (Lester Cole/Corbis)

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Guevara, Che

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“Curveball” (1968–)

The CIA cryptonym “Curveball” was given to Rāfid Ahmed Alwān, an Iraqi citizen who defected from Iraq in 1999. He claimed that he had worked as a chemical engineer at a plant that manufactured mobile biological weapon laboratories as part of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. His allegations were subsequently shown to be false. Despite warnings from the German Federal Intelligence Service questioning the authenticity of the claims, the U.S. government utilized them to build a rationale for military action in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On November 4, 2007, the television program *60 Minutes* revealed Curveball’s real identity. In a February 2011 interview, Alwān “admitted for the first time that he lied about his story, then watched in shock as it was used to justify the war.”

The U.S. intelligence community, led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), produced a national intelligence estimate (NIE) in the autumn of 2002. This NIE assessed with “high confidence” that Iraq “has” biological weapons and that “all key aspects” of Iraq’s offensive biological warfare program “are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.” Like the intelligence community’s assessment of Iraq’s chemical warfare program, this judgment stood in contrast to previous assessments that had concluded that Iraq *could* have biological programs.

This new assessment was based primarily on information that was largely received from a single human source. The single source was a chemical engineer code-named Curveball. Curveball was handled by Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service. However, Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service could not verify his reporting, considered him a “flake,” and would not permit U.S. agents direct access to him. Lack of access to the source clearly complicated efforts to ascertain the truthfulness of Curveball’s reporting. Unfortunately, between January 2000 and September 2001, Department of Defense human intelligence personnel disseminated nearly 100 reports from Curveball regarding mobile biological warfare facilities. By the spring of 2000, this information was provided to senior policy makers. In December 2000 the intelligence community produced a special intelligence report based on Curveball reporting, noting that while it could not confirm that Iraq had produced biological agents, “credible reporting from a single source suggest[s]” that Iraq had done so. Reliance on a single human source of intelligence on occasion can be very valuable, especially if that source has direct access to specific information and his or her

judgment and performance have proven reliable in the past. Such was the case in the early 1960s with the information provided by Russian colonel Oleg Penkovsky.

For 18 months Penkovsky supplied U.S. intelligence with highly valued information, including information that enabled President John F. Kennedy to deal effectively with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Unfortunately, Curveball was not a credible source. Questions about his reliability were well known before the United States went to war with Iraq, and he had no significant track record of good judgment or accurate reporting. Equally unfortunate, Defense Intelligence Agency human intelligence personnel made no attempt to determine Curveball's veracity. In the end, unsurprisingly, his reporting was found to be unreliable.

In early 2011, former secretary of state Colin Powell said that U.S. intelligence officials were terribly wrong in their handling of Curveball, who admitted that his claims on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had been falsified. Powell said that it had become clear over the years that Curveball was "totally unreliable." Powell went on to note that "The question should be put to the CIA and the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] as to why this wasn't known before the false information was put into the NIE sent to Congress, the president's State of the Union address," and Powell's February 5, 2003, presentation to the United Nations that presented the case for the United States to invade Iraq.

In February 2011, Curveball confessed to lying in an effort to help bring down Saddam Hussein's regime. "I had the chance to fabricate something, to topple the regime, I did this, and I am satisfied, because there is no dictator in Iraq anymore," he told reporters.

Jan Goldman

See also Penkovsky, Oleg; Documents 89, 90, 95

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Cyber Security

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made investing in technology to prevent and fight cyber threats one of its main priorities in a five-year strategic plan known as CIA 2015. The move is in line with a government-wide ramp-up in cyber security efforts across all agencies that have responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure in the United States, to include the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Security Agency.

The goal of CIA 2015 is to ensure that the agency remains in step with current national security challenges, such as cyber threats and so-called dangerous technology. Industry experts agree that the threat of cyber attacks on the United States is on the rise, and a majority of senior government officials believe that a major attack is imminent.

CIA involvement in cyber security includes protecting information infrastructure across government agencies and throughout the private sector. In particular, the CIA disseminates cyber threat assessments on foreign cyber threats to key infrastructure-sector stakeholders, including elements of the private sector including telecommunication agencies.

In early 1998, U.S. military systems were subjected to an electronic assault, noted as “Solar Sunrise.” The incident galvanized the U.S. intelligence agencies to coordinate their efforts. During February 1–26, 1998, a number of computer attacks were detected that appeared to be originating from, among other places, the Middle East. At least 11 attacks were launched on a number of U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force computers worldwide. The intruders hid their tracks by routing their attack through computer systems in the United Arab Emirates. They accessed unclassified logistics, administration, and accounting systems that control and manage military forces. The United States at the time was preparing for military action in the Persian Gulf region, given that tension was high because of Iraqi noncompliance with United Nations inspection teams. The United States was about to enter Iraq. This timing raised concern in the United States that the intrusions were the initial stages of a cyber attack by a hostile nation. The military, the CIA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were all involved in the investigation. In the end, it was found that two young hackers in California had carried out the attacks under the direction of a hacker in Israel, himself a teenager. They gained privileged access to computers using tools available from a university website and installed sniffer programs to collect user passwords. They created a backdoor to get back into the system and then used a patch available from another university website to fix the vulnerability and prevent others from repeating their exploit. Unlike most hackers, they did not explore the contents of the victim computers.

In 2009, the CIA uncovered apparent election-rigging schemes in Venezuela, Macedonia, and Ukraine that call into question the security of electronic voting and the legitimacy of election results. The CIA began monitoring electronic voting in foreign countries based on fears that foreign nationals could hack into electronic voting systems in the United States.

Jan Goldman

See also Data Mining; National Security; Documents 1, 97

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D

Dark Alliance Series (1996–)

Gary Webb, a Pulitzer Prize–winning investigative journalist, wrote his 1996 “Dark Alliance” series of articles for the *San Jose Mercury News* that were later published as a book. In the three-part series, Nicaraguan Contras, some of whom had been supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were the actual drug runners, but the CIA was allegedly aware of the drug deals and was complicit in the shipments. This story created a firestorm in the media, despite denials from Washington. A California congresswoman attacked the CIA, and other politicians were quick to get on the bandwagon.

Webb investigated Nicaraguans linked to the CIA-backed Contras, who had allegedly smuggled cocaine into the United States. Their smuggled cocaine was distributed as crack cocaine in Los Angeles, with the profits funneled back to the Contras. Webb also alleged that this influx of Nicaraguan-supplied cocaine sparked and significantly fueled the widespread crack cocaine epidemic that swept through many U.S. cities during the 1980s. According to Webb, the CIA was aware of the cocaine transactions and the large shipments of drugs into the United States by Contra personnel. Webb charged that the Ronald Reagan administration shielded inner-city drug dealers from prosecution to raise money for the Contras, especially after Congress passed the Boland Amendment, which prohibited direct Contra funding. Webb’s reporting generated fierce controversy, and the *San Jose Mercury News* backed away from the story, effectively ending Webb’s career as a mainstream media journalist.

Agency officials will contend that the intelligence community—especially the CIA—has been victimized by its involvement in the antidrug campaign. In 1996 an enterprising reporter for a newspaper in San Jose, California, wrote a front-page article in which he claimed that the CIA was responsible for bringing drugs into black and Latino areas of Los Angeles.

This was just the last in a series of such allegations that had floated around Washington for years. In fact, the CIA and the oversight committees of Congress had investigated each of the allegations, and no credible evidence of CIA drug running was discovered. Director of the CIA William Webster promised that he would assist in the prosecution of any CIA or other intelligence personnel who were involved in drug dealing, but again no evidence surfaced. As usual in such cases, the allegations were front-page news, whereas the results of the investigations hardly made it into print at all.

Webb was eventually forced to resign, and the paper issued an apology for running the story without more careful scrutiny. The story was hard to kill, however, and the reporter wrote a book detailing his charges, although his case remains

pretty weak according to reviewers. Finally, the CIA's inspector general issued a report on the subject that showed that intelligence managers did make some mistakes in dealing with the Contras suspected of drug dealing but that the managers were certainly not supporting drug smuggling.

In 2004 Webb was found dead from two gunshot wounds to the head, which the coroner's office ruled a suicide.

Jan Goldman

See also Contras; Iran-Contra Affair; Document 74

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Data Mining

Data mining is a process that attempts to make sense of structured or unstructured data found within data sets, and in some cases entire databases, so as to provide a more contextualized foundation for further processing and analysis. Part of a broader information process that focuses on turning raw data into useful information and intelligence via automated methods, data mining is more specifically defined as an algorithm-based computer-executed process that aims to extract or discover relevant patterns from a given data set. Though sometimes considered separate, data mining can also be viewed as an automated data analysis method within the larger body of information discovery processes in that it helps draw meaningful baseline inferences or contextualized structure from information based on subject- or pattern-based queries. Data mining systems and processes can also be used in conjunction with biometric scanners, devices, and databases.

President George W. Bush's 2003 initiative to create the data-mining Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was intended to close the seam between the analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism. The center has access to all intelligence information from raw reports to finished analytic assessments available to the government. The TTIC is a cross-agency integration of terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad to form the "most comprehensive possible threat picture."

The TTIC is comprised from elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Counterterrorism Division, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of Defense. The TTIC is headed by a

senior U.S. government official appointed by and reporting to the CIA director with input from the FBI director, the attorney general, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of homeland defense.

The TTIC plays the lead role in overseeing shared databases and for maintaining an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists that will be accessible to federal and nonfederal officials and entities. President Bush's decision to put overall control of the program under the CIA was an apparent rebuff of the FBI's struggling efforts to create its own data-mining program. The CIA has been sharply criticized by Congress for the program's cost overruns and lack of oversight management.

Jan Goldman

See also Cyber Security; National Security; Document 97

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Dawe, Amos (ca. 1935–)

Amos Dawe was an unwilling Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) agent and clever Hong Kong businessman who was drawn into a KGB plan to get control of U.S. technology in Silicon Valley, California.

Dawe's origins are obscure. He entered the Hong Kong stock market scene in January 1973 at the seemingly innocuous Kowloon Stock Exchange soon after it opened for business. It was widely held that he controlled 200 companies in six Asian nations, but in truth he had bribed his auditors, and only a few people knew that he was almost bankrupt. The KGB secretly agreed to support Dawe and finance his future commercial plans but only if he would travel to the United States and purchase banks in Silicon Valley. Dawe reluctantly agreed.

With the source of funds well concealed, Dawe began work in 1974, entering many American company boardrooms and learning their secrets. Late in 1975 when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was told what Dawe was doing, it countered with an equally clever scheme, Operation SILICON VALLEY. In October 1975 the CIA leaked what it knew to a Hong Kong journalist; in his newsletter he told how the Narodny Bank was secretly attempting to bring down international commerce with the help of Dawe and a Singapore bank manager. Immediately U.S. bankers were alarmed.

In 1974 Dawe negotiated the purchase of three banks: the Tahoe National Bank, the First National Bank of Fresno, and the Westlands Bank. However, in his bid to acquire a fourth bank the CIA had discovered the scheme and, through the Hong Kong journalist, had informed all America's bankers of the KGB's plan to use Dawe to control international commerce.

Dawe returned to Asia and disappeared. He was later found close to death after a beating by Thai gangsters. In 1978 he returned to California expecting the Americans to prosecute him. He turned himself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The U.S. government did not charge him, but investors wanted to sue him. In 1982 Dawe disappeared in Hong Kong and has not been seen since. There is speculation that the KGB might have killed him as an example to others seeking to turn against the KGB. U.S. intelligence analysts believe that Dawe may be hiding in Europe or Canada after changing his appearance.

Jan Goldman

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB)

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Dead Drop

Espionage, by definition, is a covert activity. It logically follows that a spy needs a covert method of communication with his or her case agent. A dead drop is a method of espionage tradecraft used to secretly pass messages or items. The actual dead drop is simply an agreed-upon location where a spy (or the spy's contact) can leave a message without actually meeting in person, maintaining operational security. In contrast to this, a live drop is when the two parties meet in person for the exchange of information or items.

A dead drop is typically used in conjunction with a signpost, which is a place to leave a signal that a message has been dropped. The signpost does not necessarily have to be near the dead drop itself. It may be anything from a chalk mark on a wall, a piece of gum on a lamppost, or perhaps a magazine or a newspaper on a park bench or even a plant in the person's window.

There are two categories that dead drops fall into: covert and overt. A covert dead drop uses a drop that is concealed from everyday line of sight. An example of this is the dead drop spike. Approximately six inches long, it has a removable top so that a spy can conceal messages inside this waterproof and mildew-resistant spike. This spike can be pressed into soft ground to be picked up later by the contact (or vice versa). There are a multitude of techniques that a spy can use to hide messages and also to signal that a drop had been made. More examples of a dead drop location are a loose brick in a wall, a hole in a tree, a spot under a rock, or a library book. The essential quality in a dead drop is that the

item must be able to be picked up without attracting attention from any adversaries who may be watching. An overt dead drop is a drop that is disguised as an everyday item that would not be given a second thought if noticed by a passerby.

One of the most famous uses of dead drops was by Aldrich Ames, a mole inside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who spied for the Russians in the late 1980s. Ames used chalk to mark up a mailbox located at 37th and R Streets in northwestern Washington, D.C., as a signpost for his Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) handlers. He would make a horizontal chalk mark above the USPS logo.

Robert Hanssen repeatedly used a dead drop site in Foxstone Park, Virginia, including on the day of his arrest on February 18, 2001. He would place a piece of white tape on a park sign as his signpost. He then followed his usual dead drop routine and took a garbage bag full of classified material and taped it to the bottom side of a wooden footbridge over the creek. He was observed doing this by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, and after he made his drop on February 18, he was arrested for espionage.

A more recent example of a dead drop is from 2006. On January 23 of that year, the Russian Federal Security Service accused British intelligence of using wireless dead drops concealed inside hollowed-out rocks to collect intelligence from agents in Russia. Allegedly, the agent delivering the information would approach the rock and transmit data wirelessly into it from a handheld device, and then the British handlers would pick it up in the same way at a later time.

Abigail Sessions

See also Documents 1, 70

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Deutch Rules

The Deutch Rules, otherwise known as the Torricelli Principle, is an unofficial label used to refer to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) guidelines dealing with the recruitment as CIA assets of individuals having records of serious criminal or human rights violations. The Deutch Rules were named after John Deutch, the

director of central intelligence who asked CIA general counsel Jeffrey Smith to draft the guidelines. Issued in 1995, the Deutch Rules were the first CIA-wide attempt to establish a procedure by which human rights concerns were incorporated into the approval process for human intelligence sources.

Although the guidelines were classified, Smith has indicated that they required, prior to recruiting individuals who had serious criminal or human rights problems, that the CIA case officer recruiting the asset had to notify CIA headquarters. While a reporting requirement predated the 1995 guidelines, the amount of information required to be sent to headquarters under the new guidelines substantially increased. At headquarters, a determination would be made as to whether the value of the intelligence that might be obtained from a particular asset outweighed the risks to the United States that resulted from dealing with the asset. Smith stated that one of the primary purposes behind the guidelines was to provide case officers with some measure of protection. Upon approval of the asset, CIA case officers could then rely on full support from CIA headquarters to work with that individual.

The problems associated with dealing with unsavory individuals were well known to the CIA as well as to other agencies within the U.S. government, including the



CIA director John Deutch, for whom the Deutch Rules are named, testifies on Capitol Hill on February 22, 1996. (AP Photo/Dennis Cook)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Years of experience in attempting to penetrate criminal organizations such as the Mafia and drug cartels in South America had given the FBI and the DEA invaluable insight into what were workable guidelines for such activities. Until the media revelations in the mid-1970s about CIA misdeeds and the ensuing congressional investigations, relatively little attention had been given to the human rights implications of CIA activities. As the U.S. government became more sensitive in general to human rights issues, this concern eventually filtered down to the CIA. In a message sent to CIA stations in Central America in 1988, the Latin America Division within the CIA's Directorate of Operations urged CIA case officers in the region to be mindful of the need to respect human rights during their work, as should those individuals whom the CIA recruited as assets. Failure to do so could potentially undermine the CIA's mission in the region, especially since critics of CIA activities in Central America were using human rights violations as a political weapon against the CIA.

In March 1995 a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives, Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, leaked to the press the identity of a CIA asset in Guatemala who had been implicated in the murders of Michael DeVine, a U.S. citizen, and guerrilla leader Efraim Bamaca Velasquez, who was married to a U.S. citizen. A week later, President Bill Clinton directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) to investigate the murders. In April 1995 the investigation was broadened to encompass a longer list of U.S. citizens who had been killed or tortured or had disappeared in Guatemala since 1984.

The IOB, whose report was released in June 1996, highlighted the need to establish clear guidelines on the recruitment and retention of assets with criminal records and histories of human rights violations. The IOB praised the guidelines that the CIA had instituted in 1995, stating that the guidelines struck an appropriate balance by generally barring the use of such assets unless senior CIA officials determined, on a case-by-case basis, that the national security value of such assets warranted their use. The report listed a number of costs that might result from using these assets, including undermining the U.S. government policy of promoting human rights throughout the world, tarnishing the reputation of the intelligence community in the eyes of Congress and the general public, and worsening the ethical climate within the intelligence community itself.

As guidelines were developed and implemented, policy makers within the executive branch, senior officials within the intelligence community, and congressional leaders were well aware that infiltrating secretive criminal and terrorist groups often required relying on individuals who were criminals and terrorists themselves. Although the guidelines were viewed as an important step toward greater accountability for intelligence activities, there was concern that the guidelines would actually discourage the recruitment of these individuals. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence urged the director of central intelligence to monitor the impact of the guidelines on the recruiting efforts of case officers in the field.

In 1999 Congress established the National Committee on Terrorism, charged with reviewing the laws and practices in place to fight terrorism, evaluating their effectiveness, and suggesting changes. The committee believed that the 1995 guidelines had a negative impact on the morale of CIA case officers and their willingness to recruit assets with criminal backgrounds or those having records of serious human rights violations. As a result of the guidelines, case officers had become overly risk averse and had become too reliant on information provided by the intelligence services of other countries. The committee urged the director of central intelligence to repeal the guidelines.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the 1995 guidelines were mentioned in the media as one of the reasons that the CIA had not penetrated Al Qaeda and prevented the attacks. However, not everyone was convinced that the guidelines were the source of the problem. Former CIA inspector general Frederick Hitz said that blaming the guidelines provided an easy excuse for CIA shortcomings in the field. Another former high-ranking CIA official, Paul Pillar, asserted that all the requests for recruiting and retaining individuals with criminal and human rights issues had been approved during his tenure at the CIA. The former CIA general counsel who drafted the guidelines believed that if case officers in the field viewed the guidelines, rightly or wrongly, as an obstacle to their aggressive recruiting of criminals and terrorists, then the guidelines should be adjusted.

In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002, Congress urged the director of central intelligence to repeal the guidelines. As amended, the guidelines no longer required approval by the director of central intelligence before an asset with criminal and human rights problems could be recruited, pushing the authority to approve these assets down to the deputy director for operations.

Christopher Vallandingham

See also Human Intelligence; Documents 2, 18, 45, 50–52, 54, 63, 66, 95

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Disinformation

Information that is false or inaccurate, leaked to the opposition in such a way that they believe that it was obtained undetected and is true and valuable. Disinformation is a tactic used by intelligence agencies, militaries, government, etc., to alter the course of an event or action in their favor. A good disinformation tactic includes some truth, which is the best way to create a believable untruth.

Disinformation tactics can be used for a variety of reasons, such as disguising one's objectives by making the opposition think that something else is happening or providing support for false conclusions. The goal of disinformation is to manipulate what the opposition thinks without them knowing it. The Normandy Invasion of World War II included a disinformation operation named Operation FORTITUDE. British intelligence was able to convince the German Army that a large force was going to invade France in the Pas-de-Calais, while only a minor force would invade Norway. This disinformation in this tactic was carried out through a variety of means, which included an army of props, such as inflatable tanks, set up across the English Channel in Kent, England, where the main invasion force was supposed to start the invasion; controlled leaks through diplomatic channels; and the use of German agents spreading false information to German intelligence agencies. The operation was a major success and was pivotal to winning the war.

During the Cold War, disinformation was a common tactic that the U.S. and Soviet governments utilized against each other, especially by their intelligence agencies. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB), the Soviet Union's intelligence agency, spread disinformation with a book titled *Who's Who in the CIA*, written by Julius Mader and published in East Germany in 1968. It was a list of about 3,000 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents posted in 120 different countries. Only about half of the names were actually CIA agents, and the others were only U.S. diplomats or other officials. The book was intended to hinder U.S. activity abroad by portraying U.S. officials as CIA agents. The CIA retaliated by assisting John Barron, an American journalist, in writing *KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Agents*, published in 1979. This book listed approximately 1,600 alleged KGB agents.

Ryan Connole

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Documents 11, 12, 15, 66

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Domestic Spying

Between 1940 and 1973, two agencies of the federal government—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—covertly and illegally opened and photographed first-class letter mail within the United States. These agencies conducted a total of 12 mail-opening programs for lengths of time varying from 3 weeks to 26 years. More than 215,000 pieces of mail and telegrams were intercepted, opened, and photographed; the photographic copies of these letters, some dated as early as 1955, were indexed and filed and are retained even today. Information from this and other mail-opening programs—sanitized to disguise its true source—was disseminated within the federal establishment to other members of the intelligence community, to the attorney general, and to the president of the United States.

The stated objective of the CIA programs was the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information; that of the FBI programs was the collection of counterespionage information. In terms of their respective purposes, 7 of the 12 mail-opening programs were considered to have been successful by CIA and FBI officials. One CIA project and 3 of the FBI programs concededly failed to obtain any significant relevant information. Another CIA operation—clearly the most massive of all the programs in terms of numbers of letters opened—was believed to have been of value to the agency by some officials but was criticized by many others as having produced only minimally useful foreign intelligence. Despite two unfavorable internal reviews, this program nonetheless continued unabated for 20 years.

While all of these programs responded to the felt intelligence needs of the CIA and the FBI during the Cold War of the 1950s and early 1960s, once in place they could be—and sometimes were—directed against the citizens of the United States for the collection of essentially domestic intelligence. In the 1960s and early 1970s, large numbers of American dissidents, including those who challenged the condition of racial minorities and those who opposed the war in Vietnam, were specifically targeted for mail opening by both agencies. In one program, selection of mail on the basis of “personal taste” by agents untrained in foreign intelligence objectives resulted in the interception and opening of the mail of senators, congressmen, journalists, businessmen, and even a presidential candidate.

The first mail-opening program began shortly before the United States entered World War II, when representatives of an allied country’s censorship agency taught six FBI agents the techniques of chamfering (mail opening) for use against Axis diplomatic establishments in Washington, D.C. The program was suspended after

the war but was reinstituted during the Cold War in the early 1950s; the method was similar, but the targets were new. Shortly after this program was reinstituted, the CIA entered the field with a mail-opening project in New York designed to intercept mail to and from the Soviet Union. Between 1954 and 1957, the FBI and the CIA each developed second programs, in response to postwar events in Asia, to monitor mail entering the United States from that continent, and the CIA briefly conducted a third operation in New Orleans to intercept Latin and Central American mail as well. The technique of chamfering was most widely used by the FBI during 1959–1966. In these years the FBI operated no fewer than six programs in a total of eight cities in the United States. In July 1966 J. Edgar Hoover ordered an end to all FBI mail-opening programs, but the FBI continued to cooperate with the CIA, which acted under no such self-restriction, in connection with the CIA's New York project. In 1969 a fourth CIA program was established in San Francisco and was conducted intermittently until 1971. The era of warrantless mail opening was not ended until 1973, when, in the changed political climate of the times, the political risk—the so-called flap potential—of continuing the CIA's New York project was seen to outweigh its avowed minimal benefit to the agency.

All of these mail-opening programs were initiated by agency officials acting without prior authorization from a president, an attorney general, or a postmaster general; some of them were initiated without prior authorization by the directors or other senior officials within the agencies themselves. Once initiated, they were carefully guarded and protected from exposure. The record indicates that during the 33 years of mail opening, fewer than seven cabinet-level officers were briefed about even one of the projects. Only one president may have been informed, and there is no conclusive evidence that any cabinet officer or any president had contemporaneous knowledge that this coverage involved the actual opening—as opposed to the exterior examination—of mail. The postal officials whose cooperation was necessary to implement these programs were purposefully not informed of the true nature of the programs; in some cases, it appears that they were deliberately misled. Congressional inquiry was perceived by both CIA and FBI officials as a threat to the security of their programs. During one period of active investigation, both agencies contemplated additional security measures to mislead the investigators and protect their programs against disclosure to Congress. Only in rare cases did the CIA and the FBI even inform one another about their programs.

Many of the major participants in these mail-opening programs, including senior officials in policy-making positions, believed that their activities were unlawful. Yet the projects were considered to be so sensitive that no definitive legal opinions were ever sought from either the CIA's general counsel or the attorney general. The record is clear, in fact, that the perceived illegality of mail opening was a primary reason for closely guarding knowledge of the programs from ranking officials in both the executive and legislative branches of the government.

The CIA was called upon to spy on American citizens in the 1960s. The antiwar protests that flared up as the Vietnam War escalated led President Lyndon B.

Johnson to believe that the peace movement was being directed by the Soviet Union. The FBI dealt with the antiwar New Left as it had with communists in the 1950s. Using its Counterintelligence Program and traditional investigative techniques, FBI agents worked to disrupt perceived domestic terrorist groups. Investigations of individuals and organizations that threatened violent activities were carried out, and in some cases FBI agents infiltrated such groups and attempted to disrupt their activities even when little or no evidence existed that they were involved in unlawful activities. The FBI's efforts were revealed to the public and to Congress following the burglary of an FBI office in Pennsylvania by radicals. As a result, the FBI came under fire for violations of First Amendment rights. Much more serious was the seven-year domestic surveillance operation undertaken by the CIA. Authorized by President Johnson and code-named Operation CHAOS, the program sent CIA operatives to infiltrate peace groups in the United States and Europe. An extensive computerized index of some 300,000 individuals and groups was assembled, and detailed dossiers were compiled on more than 7,000 citizens. Even the National Security Agency was directed to eavesdrop on American citizens. Despite its best efforts, the CIA was unable to establish a link between the peace movement and Moscow.

Jan Goldman

See also CHAOS, Operation; National Security; Documents 14, 17, 18, 21

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Donovan, William (1883–1959)

The head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), William “Wild Bill” Joseph Donovan was also known as the “Father of American Intelligence” and the “Father of Central Intelligence.” Born on January 1, 1883, in Buffalo, New York, Donovan graduated from Columbia University with a law degree in 1907 and afterward practiced law in Buffalo. He also served as a captain in the New York National Guard. Donovan was stationed along the Mexican border in 1916 when the guard was called up to

assist in the unsuccessful effort to capture notorious Mexican bandit and revolutionary leader Pancho Villa.

After the United States entered World War I, Donovan was sent to Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces. As a major, he commanded the 1st Battalion of the 69th New York Infantry Regiment in the 45th Infantry Division. Donovan took part in the September 1918 Saint-Mihiel Offensive. Then a lieutenant colonel, he was wounded but refused evacuation and stayed to lead his men. His actions brought him the Medal of Honor and the nickname “Wild Bill.”

After the war, Donovan returned to Buffalo to practice law. From 1924 to 1929, he was an assistant U.S. attorney general. He ran unsuccessfully for state political office and in 1929 moved to New York City. Much interested in international affairs, Donovan undertook several overseas missions for the Rockefeller Foundation and the Franklin D.

Roosevelt administration. Donovan tried to convince Roosevelt and others that the United States needed an intelligence-gathering organization similar to that run by the British. His efforts finally led to his appointment in July 1941 as head of the Office of Coordinator of Information, which after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor became the OSS. The OSS gathered intelligence, conducted propaganda and sabotage, and assisted partisans.

After World War II, Donovan lobbied President Harry S. Truman to set up a permanent intelligence organization. Truman initially rejected this step, but the coming of the Cold War led in 1947 to the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), loosely modeled on the OSS.

Donovan did not have an official role in the newly formed CIA. However, with his protégé Allen Dulles and others, Donovan was instrumental in its formation. Because he had led the OSS during World War II, his opinion was especially influential as to what kind of intelligence organization was needed as a bipolar postwar world began to take shape. Although Donovan was a force to be reckoned with, his



William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan founded the OSS, a precursor to the CIA, during World War II. He is the only American to win all four of his country’s highest decorations: the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Security Medal. (Library of Congress)

idea for consolidating intelligence met with strong opposition from the State, War and Navy Departments and J. Edgar Hoover. President Truman was inclined to create an organization that would gather and disseminate foreign intelligence, while Donovan argued that the new agency should also be able to conduct covert action. Truman was not a fan of this, but Donovan's arguments prevailed and were reflected in the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

Donovan's hope of heading the CIA was not realized, although he briefly returned to government service as ambassador to Thailand during 1953 and 1954. Donovan died on February 8, 1959, at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.

Graham T. Carssow

See also Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949; National Security Act of 1947; Office of Strategic Services; Documents 2–18

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Dooley, Thomas A., III (1927–1961)

Physician, U.S. naval officer, humanitarian, and ardent anticommunist. Thomas Anthony Dooley III was born on January 17, 1927, in St. Louis, Missouri. After graduating from St. Louis University High School in 1944, he attended Notre Dame University and later that year joined the U.S. Navy's corpsman program and was assigned to a naval hospital in New York. He returned to his studies at Notre Dame in 1946. Two years later he entered St. Louis University Medical School, graduating in 1953.

Dooley promptly reenlisted in the navy, serving a medical internship as a lieutenant. In 1954 the navy assigned him to the attack cargo ship *Montague*, which that year participated in the evacuation of refugees from North Vietnam and their transportation to South Vietnam as part of what was known as Operation PASSAGE TO FREEDOM. He also served for a time as an interpreter and medical officer for a preventative medicine unit at the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. Dooley was also involved in the supervision of the building and then maintenance of refugee camps in Haiphong until May 1955, when the operation ended and the Viet Minh took over that city.

While Dooley worked in the Haiphong camps, Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, who headed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office in Saigon,

recognized his potential as an intelligence operative and recruited him to work for the agency. Lansdale saw Dooley as a symbol of U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation and encouraged him to write about his refugee camp experiences. Lansdale also asked Dooley to gather intelligence information. According to the Pentagon Papers, Dooley's activities significantly aided in this effort. Apparently, the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and several other agencies conducted fund-raising campaigns for the refugees that would be described in Dooley's books.

Late in 1955 Dooley returned to the United States, and in 1956 he published his first book, *Deliver Us from Evil: The Story of Viet Nam's Flight to Freedom*. It became a best seller and won Dooley international recognition. It also instantly established him as a strong anticommunist. Dooley was awarded the navy's Legion of Merit, the youngest Medical Corps officer to be so honored, and he received the highest national decoration of the Republic of Vietnam government in South Vietnam. During a promotional tour for the book in 1956, however, the navy accused him of having participated in homosexual activities and forced him to leave the service.

After Dooley resigned from the navy, he convinced the International Rescue Committee to sponsor a bush hospital in Nam Tha, Laos. At Nam Tha during the summer and fall of 1957, Dooley wrote his second book, *The Edge of Tomorrow*. Early in 1958 he established a second hospital in Laos at Muong Sing, near the Chinese border, and later that year he founded the Medical International Cooperation Organization (MEDICO), which established 17 medical programs in 14 countries. As he provided medical care to Lao refugees, Dooley also collected intelligence, reported civilian movements to the CIA, and provided cover for U.S. Army special forces medics posing as civilian doctors.

In August 1959 doctors at New York Memorial Hospital operated on Dooley for malignant melanoma, a rapidly spreading cancer. In October he went on the lecture circuit, raising nearly \$1 million for MEDICO. In 1960 he published his third book, *The Night They Burned the Mountain*, detailing his experience in Laos. In early January 1961, Dooley flew back to New York Memorial Hospital; his cancer had spread to his lungs, spleen, heart, and brain. He died at the hospital on January 18, 1961, a day after his 34th birthday.

After Dooley's death many of his admirers requested that the Roman Catholic Church canonize him, and his friend Father Maynard Kegler accepted the task of compiling and presenting research about Dooley's life to the church. While researching Dooley's life, Kegler discovered nearly 500 CIA files through the Freedom of Information Act that revealed that Dooley had provided the CIA with information on villagers' sentiments and troop movements around his hospitals in Laos in the mid and late 1950s.

When President John F. Kennedy launched the Peace Corps in 1961, he invoked Dooley's name as an example of selfless dedication to the cause of freedom and humanitarian relief around the world. Dooley was also posthumously awarded the Congressional Gold Medal for his work.

Kathleen Warnes

See also Freedom of Information Act; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Double Agents

A double agent is someone who engages in clandestine activity for two or more intelligence or security services. The agent provides information about one or about each to the other. These agents knowingly withhold information from one agency or service at the behest of the other. These agents have an active relationship with both sides, which makes them different from other types of spies. Double agent operations are run to protect and enhance national security by providing current counterintelligence about hostile intelligence and security services and about clandestine subversive activities.

The value of a double agent's services is highly dependent on his or her skill level and personal abilities. Potentially, a double agent may eventually learn the operational techniques, security practices, training methods, and identities of other members of an adversary's service. A double agent may also serve as a way that a provocation can be used against a person, an organization, or an intelligence or security service. A provocation in this case might be used to identify members of the other service, diverting that service to less important objectives, wasting assets and facilities, creating dissension within its ranks, inserting disinformation or false data into files, forcing a service to publicize activities that it wanted to keep secret, or even bringing public discredit upon it, making it look unorganized. Finally, the double agent may even provide a channel for recruitment or for a defection operation against the adversary.

These operations are generally acknowledged as one of the most complex and demanding counterintelligence activities that an intelligence service can engage in. Such operations not only involve an extremely capable case officer who has a thorough knowledge of the area, culture, and customs and language in addition to having a full knowledge of the double agent's past and current behavior problems but also require a very clever and psychologically and emotionally stalwart agent.

The case officer who directs the double agent should also have a strong ability for complex analytical reasoning and a thorough understanding of the local espionage laws as well as the adversary's own intelligence service. The duplicitous nature of a double operation also makes it imperative for the case officer to have good control over the agent's communications, especially those with the adversary.

The acquisition of an appropriate double agent may be opportunistic, such as from a walk-in or talk-in, or it may be the result of a careful and deliberate follow-up of leads. Given the complexity of a double operation, the decision to run a double agent must be well planned and organized. By the very nature of the opportunistic candidates, this would be much more difficult.

When deciding whether or not to run a double agent, there are four essential questions that need to be answered.

Has he told you everything? A candidate must be thoroughly interviewed and vetted, including administering a polygraph, following leads, and checking files. The two areas of possible concealment that must be carefully investigated (because once a double agent is recruited he or she cannot be unrecruited) are prior intelligence ties and side communications with other agencies.

Does he have stayability? Stayability refers to a candidate's ability to maintain his or her access to the counterintelligence target for an undetermined length of time in addition to the candidate's psychological stamina. A double agent must be able to function under constant and often escalating pressure.

Does the adversary trust the potential double agent? According to the Central Intelligence Agency, indications of adversary trust can be found in the level of the communications system given to the candidate, the length of the agent's services, and the type and extent of the training provided to him or her.

Can you control the agent's communications both ways? Depending on geographical locations, controlling an agent's communication with his or her own agency can be difficult and often risky. Controlling communications with the adversary is even more difficult but is imperative.

There are generally three different types of double agents. The first type, a walk-in or talk-in, is an agent who appears in person or perhaps sends an intermediary or calls or writes a letter acknowledging that he or she works for a hostile intelligence service and offering to turn against it. The second type is an agent detected or doubled. This is when an intelligence service discovers an adversary's agent and offers him or her a job as a double. In this situation, it is more likely than not that the agent was not doubled under duress but instead had a shift or change in loyalties. An agent is redoubled when the doubling for another agency has been detected by the agent's original sponsor, and he or she is persuaded to once again reverse affections (essentially a double cross). The third type is a provocation agent, and there are two types of provocation agents. The active provocateur is sent by Service A to Service B to tell Service B that he or she works for Service A but wants to switch sides. Passive provocation is when Service A surveys the intelligence terrain via Service B and as a result selects those individuals who have access to sources. Service A recruits from those individuals and then waits for Service B to follow suit.

Abigail Sessions

See also Documents 61, 65, 68–70

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Drones

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Some of these UAVs have also been armed with air-to-ground missiles (AGMs). These long-dwelling, low-speed aircraft are difficult to hear or detect and yet can launch a supersonic missile. The aircraft have been used in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia.

Drones were originally developed in the 1990s by the CIA and the U.S. Air Force as ISR platforms for deep penetration of operational areas and forward aerial observation. The aircraft were designed for long range and carried a variety of sensors, including full motion video imaging. The CIA's drone aircraft is the Predator, and early versions were equipped with cameras and other sensors. These aircraft in the RQ-1 series were used for long-range ISR missions, and a later model, MQ-1 (Reaper), was upgraded with wing-mounted pylons and equipped to carry two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or other munitions. Later-model Predators are also equipped with a laser designator that permits ground crews to identify targets for other aircraft and provide guidance for manned aircraft. MQ-1 versions of the aircraft use the laser designator package to range targets for the Hellfire and other munitions.

Joint CIA-Pentagon Predator flights began in 2000 over Afghanistan in a hunt for terrorist chieftain Osama bin Laden. The flights originated from a secret base in Uzbekistan. Flight testing during the 60-day AFGHAN EYES project was hugely successful, providing remarkably clear real-time imagery, and thus quickly gained the backing of Richard A. Clark, the chief counterterrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council. Cofer Black, head of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, and Charlie Allen, head of CIA collection operations, also supported the program. Unarmed flights continued, but by early 2001 testing of Hellfire-armed Predators



Crew members aboard the battleship *Wisconsin* prepare a Pioneer remotely piloted vehicle for launch during Operation *DESERT STORM* in January 1991. Pioneers helped spot targets for *Wisconsin's* guns, and on one occasion Iraqi troops signaled their surrender to an orbiting unmanned vehicle. (United States Navy)

was under way, and the aircraft proved to be a stable and accurate launch platform for missiles. The CIA immediately added the armed MQ-1 aircraft to its growing inventory.

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States secured permission from host countries, likely Pakistan and Uzbekistan, to operate armed Predators over Afghanistan. The first armed missions over Afghanistan began in October 2001. Reaper attacks in Afghanistan began in 2002, and by 2004 Reapers were operational out of Shamsi Airfield in Pakistan, attacking Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Area along the Afghan-Pakistani border. CIA Predators and Reapers also operate out of bases in Yemen, and a Hellfire missile attack there killed Qaed Senyan al-Harhi, the Al Qaeda mastermind behind the boat bomb attack on USS *Cole*.

The Reaper attacks have not been without controversy. While Hellfire missiles launched from Reapers have killed a number of prominent Al Qaeda leaders and militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there have also been civilian casualties in Reaper strikes. Some casualties have resulted from faulty intelligence or incorrect assessments of real-time imagery from the drone's imaging sensors. Other casualties result from militants and Al Qaeda leaders seeking to cover their tracks by living among a civilian population.

The Predator unmanned aircraft system usually consists of four aircraft with sensors, a ground control station, and satellite uplink communications. The entire system is portable; its largest component is the ground control station van, and that element is designed to roll onto a C-130 Hercules aircraft. Built for conventional takeoff and landing from a hard-surface runway, the Predator can be remotely piloted via satellite link after takeoff. While early versions of the Predator were flown by a ground control crew located at the takeoff and recovery site, current versions can be remotely piloted from any location. CIA drones are reportedly flown by mission teams located at agency headquarters in Langley.

The aircraft has extended range and loiter capability with up to 24 hours of flight time. A mission with a flight of 400 nautical miles to and from the target area, for example, would allow Predator 14 hours of loiter on station. The Predator has a wingspan of 49 feet, weighs more than 2,250 pounds fully loaded, has a top speed of 135 miles per hour and a cruise and loiter speed of 81–103 miles per hour, and can fly as high as 25,000 feet.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Afghanistan; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Predator Drone; Documents 25, 94

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Drug Trafficking

The Cold War played a direct and prominent role in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Indeed, the financing of many anticommunist covert operations, such as those led by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), relied on the drug economy of various proxy states in which drug trafficking was often condoned and even encouraged. Specific historical cases illustrate how the anticommunist agenda of the CIA played a decisive role in spurring the global illicit drug trade. These include the French Connection and the role of the Corsican Mafia against communists both in France and in Southeast Asia (Laos and Vietnam), the propping up of the defeated Chinese Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalists) in northern Burma, the Islamic mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan, and the Contras in Nicaragua.

The United States, as the leader of the global struggle against communism, largely used its special services and intelligence agencies to conduct covert

operations worldwide. To contain communism, however, local aid was needed and was widely found in local criminal organizations. In the early 1930s, organized crime kingpins Charles “Lucky” Luciano and Meyer Lansky trafficked heroin exported from China to support Jiang Jieshi’s KMT in the civil war there. In 1936 Luciano was jailed, and trafficking in Chinese heroin was considerably disrupted by World War II.

It was during World War II that the American Office of Naval Intelligence cooperated with Luciano. He was to be freed after the war provided that he order his thugs to watch U.S. docks and ports to protect them from Nazi saboteurs. The Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA, thus used Mafia assistance in the Allied invasion of Sicily. Such activities initiated what was to be a long-term feature of covert operations led by American intelligence services when consent of the U.S. Congress could not be obtained: the enlistment of nefarious groups engaged in illicit activities in order to wage secret wars through both proxies and alternative funding. Basically, drug traffickers were useful to special services and politicians and relied on such connections to expand their activities.

Luciano was freed in 1946 and was sent to Sicily, where he was to cooperate with the CIA. Indeed, to counter the growing communist influence in France and Italy, the CIA turned to the Mafia and condoned its drug trafficking activities. The CIA soon asked Luciano to use his connections in France to break the strikes led by socialist unions in Marseille’s docks, from which arms and supplies were sent to Indochina. The sometimes violent assistance of Corsican mobsters in cracking down on the unions was notably motivated by their involvement in the opium business in Indochina and in the smuggling of raw opium from Turkey to Marseille, where it was refined into heroin for export to the United States. Luciano took advantage of such high refining capacities and helped turn Marseille into the heroin capital of Europe. These Marseille syndicates, dubbed the French Connection, supplied the American heroin market for two decades.

The CIA most significantly influenced the drug trade in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Latin America. Its anticommunist covert operations benefited from the participation of some drug-related combat units who, to finance their own struggle, were directly involved in drug production and trafficking. Considering the involvement of different groups in the drug trade (for example, the Hmong in Laos, the KMT in Burma, and the mujahideen in Afghanistan), their CIA backing implied that the agency condoned the use of drug proceeds and considerably increased opiate production in Asia. However, no evidence has surfaced to suggest that the CIA condoned or facilitated the exportation of heroin to the United States or Europe, as happened with the Nicaraguan Contras.

In October 1949 the communists defeated the KMT in China, and in the years that followed they cracked down on what was then the world’s largest opium-production network. Opium production then shifted to the mountainous and frontier areas of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where KMT remnants had fled and had become deeply involved in drug trafficking. Beginning in 1951, the CIA supported the KMT in Burma in an unsuccessful effort to assist it in regaining a foothold in China’s Yunan Province. Arms, ammunition, and supplies were flown

into Burma from Thailand by the CIA's Civil Air Transport (CAT), later renamed Air America and Sea Supply Corporation, created to mask the shipments. The Burmese Army eventually drove the KMT remnants from Burma in 1961, but the latter resettled in Laos and northern Thailand and continued to run most of the opium trade.

CAT not only supplied military aid to the KMT but also flew opium to Thailand and Taiwan. There is no doubt that the CIA sanctioned both the KMT's opium trade and the use of CAT and later Air America aircraft in that trade. The KMT would eventually increase its role in the opium trade after the CIA withdrew its financial and logistical support, and Burma eventually became one of the world's two main opium producers.

Following the 1954 French defeat in Indochina, the United States gradually took over the intelligence and military fight against communism in both Laos and Vietnam. The United States also took over the drug trafficking business developed by the French by buying the opium produced by the Hmong and Yao hill tribes to enlist them in counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Minh. To meet the costs of this war, the French Service de Documentation Extérieur et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counterespionage Service) allied itself with the Corsican syndicates trafficking opium from Indochina to Marseille in order to take over the opium trade that the colonial government had outlawed in 1946. The CIA ran its secret army, composed largely of Hmong tribesmen led by General Vang Pao, in Laos. Air America would fly arms to the Hmong and take their opium back to the CIA base at Long Tieng, where Vang had set up a huge heroin laboratory. Some of the heroin was then flown to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), where part of it was sold to U.S. troops, many of whom became addicts. After the Americans pulled out of Vietnam in 1975, Laos became the world's third-largest opium producer.

However, Vietnam was not the only battleground of Cold War drug operations. The CIA launched a major new covert operation in Southwest Asia in the early 1980s to support Afghanistan's mujahideen guerrillas in their fight against Soviet occupation. U.S. president Ronald Reagan was determined to counter what he viewed as Soviet hegemony and expansionism, a goal shared by his CIA director, William Casey. To support the mujahideen with arms and funds, the CIA resorted to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that chose which Afghan warlords to back and used trucks from Pakistan's military National Logistics Cell (NLC) to carry arms from Karachi to the Afghan border. However, the ISI not only chose Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a leading opium trafficker, as its main beneficiary but also allowed NLC trucks to return from the border loaded with opium and heroin. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, U.S. aid to the mujahideen stopped, and the internecine conflict that ensued in the country favored an increase in opium production in order to maintain rival warlords and armies. Afghanistan eventually became the world's biggest opium-producing country, a situation that still existed in 2007.

In Europe and in Southeast and Southwest Asia, the Cold War saw many drug-related covert operations and secret wars in which the CIA clearly and deliberately

ignored evidence of drug production and trafficking by its allies. South America, however, was not to be excluded, and when Reagan vowed to topple the pro-Marxist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, Vice President George H. W. Bush approved the creation of the anti-Sandinista Contra force to which the CIA allied itself. Of course, the CIA had full knowledge that the Contras were involved in drug trafficking and that the planes bringing them arms were returning to the United States loaded with cocaine. However, the Boland Amendment of December 8, 1982, effectively cut off funding to the Contras. This led the Reagan administration to undertake arms-for-drugs deals that involved illegal weapon sales to Iran.

Illicit drug production and trafficking increased during the Cold War. During this period, the U.S. government was less interested in waging the so-called war on drugs begun in 1971 than in using drug traffickers to support its wars abroad. Indeed, had the CIA cracked down on drug trafficking during the Cold War, it would have forgone valuable intelligence sources, political influence, and much-needed funding for its covert and sometimes illegal operations. Ironically, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union or its intelligence service, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), resorted to drug sales to fund activities during the Cold War.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

See also Afghanistan; Air America; Cold War and the CIA; Contras; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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
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Dulles, Allen (1893–1969)

Allen Dulles was an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative from 1942 to 1945 and director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961. Born in Watertown, New York, on April 7, 1893, Allen Welsh Dulles obtained BA and MA degrees in international law from Princeton University and in 1916 joined the U.S. Foreign Service. Assigned first to Vienna, by the time the United States entered World War I Dulles was in Berne, Switzerland, where he nurtured U.S. embassy contacts with Austro-Hungarian and Balkan exiles. He served on the U.S. delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and in various positions overseas, but in 1926 financial considerations caused him to join the prominent New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, where his brother John Foster Dulles was a leading



Allen Welsh Dulles played a major role in the creation and organization of the CIA and served as the first civilian director from 1953 to 1961. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library)

partner. Allen Dulles remained deeply interested in foreign affairs, focusing on international business and becoming active in the New York–based Council on Foreign Relations.

A strong supporter of American intervention in World War II, in 1942 Dulles joined the OSS, the newly created American intelligence agency headed by Colonel William J. Donovan, and spent most of the war based in Berne in neutral Switzerland. Here Dulles ran a network of intelligence agents in Germany who brought him clandestine copies of numerous secret documents. In the spring of 1945 Dulles helped to negotiate the surrender of Germany's remaining forces in northern Italy, an operation independently initiated by American and British forces that alarmed Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who feared that his allies intended to negotiate a separate peace with Germany, and that has sometimes therefore been

perceived as the opening move of the Cold War.

By 1944 the prospect of communist and Soviet expansion in Europe troubled Dulles. Shortly after Dulles returned to the United States in the summer of 1945, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS. Dulles remained a strong advocate of a permanent U.S. foreign intelligence service, and he helped to draft the 1947 National Security Act that created the CIA.

From 1950 Dulles was CIA deputy director, and from 1953 to 1961 he served as the agency's third director. He deliberately publicized his agency's existence and accomplishments and was responsible for building its permanent headquarters in Langley, Virginia. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1953 appointment of John Foster Dulles as secretary of state, a post that he held until his death in 1959, further enhanced the CIA director's official influence.

Among the CIA's better-known successes under Allen Dulles was the Anglo-American construction of a tunnel in Berlin that for more than a year (1955–1956) allowed Western intelligence operatives to eavesdrop on Soviet military communications. Besides analyzing intelligence, under Dulles the CIA mounted extensive

covert operations, among them successful antileftist coups against the governments of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Dulles later authorized a similar effort to overthrow the radical new regime headed by Fidel Castro in Cuba. In March 1961 a poorly planned U.S.-backed invasion attempt by Cuban exiles landing at the Bay of Pigs ended in a highly publicized failure, a major international humiliation for the United States. President John F. Kennedy publicly accepted full responsibility but privately blamed Dulles, who resigned a few months later. In the early 1970s congressional investigations uncovered evidence on some of the CIA's past excesses overseas during the Dulles years that severely damaged the organization's reputation.

Dulles subsequently served on the Warren Commission that investigated Kennedy's assassination, undercutting the credibility of its testimony when he admitted that in the interests of what they considered to be national security, CIA operatives might well lie even when giving evidence before the commission. In retirement, Dulles wrote several books on intelligence. He died in Washington, D.C., on January 29, 1969.

Priscilla Roberts

See also Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Eisenhower, Dwight David; National Security Act of 1947; Documents 3, 9, 20, 24, 26, 37

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E

ECHELON System

The ECHELON system sifts through millions of messages each day, analyzing their contents, voiceprints, and subject matter. The National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States created the ECHELON system in coordination with Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in 1948. Connected through intercept stations around the world, ECHELON captures satellite, microwave, cellular, and fiber-optic communications traffic, sending the communications through NSA computers for analysis. Critics have increasingly accused the United States of using ECHELON to spy on foreign companies to the advantage of U.S. companies.

Led by the United States, the ECHELON system provides invaluable information from around the world. Shrouded in secrecy, the system analyzes sensitive data that is important to the national security of the United States and its allies. Information uncovered by ECHELON has been used to catch terrorists, prevent attacks, and protect vital national interests.

In addition to the ECHELON system's political and security uses, the vast communication-intercepting qualities of the system have been accused of increasingly using obtained information to the advantage of U.S. companies. In January 1993 President Bill Clinton established the National Economic Council, which feeds intelligence to U.S. companies in certain areas. The European Union (EU) and various corporations have accused the United States of economic espionage in highly publicized cases. In 1994, intercepted telephone calls caught a French firm bribing Brazilian officials for preference in a deal against a U.S. company. After reporting the fraud, the U.S. company received the contract.

Other alleged instances of spying include the Central Intelligence Agency spying on Japanese auto manufacturers to the benefit of American automobile companies as well as spying on Asian trade conferences.

Members of the EU have increasingly accused the United States and Great Britain of spying for economic gain. Parliament members have alleged that ECHELON has cost European businesses more than \$20 billion due to the United States feeding information to select companies. Despite calls of wrongdoing, the secretive nature of the ECHELON program places the majority of its work beyond scrutiny. The national security priority of ECHELON prevents further release of information on its specifics or actual use.

Jan Goldman

See also CORONA Program; Data Mining; Electronic Intelligence; IVY BELLS, Operation; Signals Intelligence

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Eclipse Group

The Eclipse Group is a private intelligence agency that is run by Duane “Dewey” Clarridge, Kim Stevens, and Brad A. Patty. Clarridge, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had been the head of the CIA’s Latin American operations and was the first chief of the CIA’s counterterrorism center in Langley, Virginia. Stevens is a retired U.S. diplomat who served in Bolivia and Italy. Patty was a civilian adviser to the U.S. Army’s 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team in Iraq from 2007 to 2009 prior to his position with the Eclipse Group.

The Eclipse Group allegedly relies on private sources of funding, although in interviews Stevens continuously declines any discussion on the operation’s financing or its client list, which he says is proprietary knowledge. He does, however, state that the Eclipse Group has more than 20 clients but fewer than 50 clients, including several intelligence agencies in Europe.

Current operations for the Eclipse Group supposedly include obtaining information and intelligence related to the politics of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Public commentary on the activities of this group say that operations such as this are how the U.S. government is able to sidestep increased congressional oversight in foreign affairs. There is increasing media hostility alleging that the U.S. government is covertly delegating certain hazardous and controversial operations to private contractors such as the Eclipse Group.

Clarridge has repeatedly declined interviews but issued a statement on his group, comparing it to the Office of Strategic Services (the World War II-era precursor to the CIA): “O.S.S. was a success of the past. . . . Eclipse may possibly be an effective model for the future, providing information to officers and officials of the United States government who have the sole responsibility of acting on it or not.”

Mark Mazzetti of the *New York Times* is a reputed U.S. intelligence adversary and has made repeated attempts to expose and discredit the Eclipse Group. In a 2011 article he states that Clarridge’s operation is a prime and chilling example “of how private citizens can exploit the chaos of combat zones and rivalries inside the American government to carry out their own agenda.”

Abigail Sessions

See also Afghanistan; Contractors; Front Organizations; Office of Strategic Services

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Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890–1969)

U.S. Army general and president of the United States from 1953 to 1961. Born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890, Dwight David Eisenhower grew up in Abilene, Kansas, and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1915. In 1952 the Republican Party, desperate to choose a candidate who would be assured of victory, turned to Eisenhower. As a candidate, he promised to end the Korean War but otherwise continued President Harry S. Truman's Cold War policies. Eisenhower won the November elections, defeating Democrat Adlai Stevenson.

Some early scholars of the Eisenhower presidency suggested that Eisenhower ceded responsibility for foreign policy to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but as more archival material became available, it became apparent that Eisenhower was in fact quite actively engaged in foreign policy decisions. Under Eisenhower, U.S. defense commitments around the world solidified into a network of bilateral and multilateral alliances.

In March 1953 Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died, to be replaced first by a triumvirate of Soviet



Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower at his headquarters in the European theater of operations during World War II in February 1945. (National Archives)

officials headed by Georgy Malenkov and then in 1955 by Nikita Khrushchev. Stalin's death may well have facilitated efforts to end the Korean War, although Soviet proposals in 1953 to neutralize and reunite all of Germany proved fruitless. As president, Eisenhower fulfilled his campaign pledge to end the Korean War, seemingly threatening to employ nuclear weapons unless an armistice agreement was concluded.

Alarmed by the increasing destructiveness of nuclear armaments, Eisenhower was the first president to attempt, albeit rather unsuccessfully, to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. British prime minister Winston Churchill, in office when Eisenhower first became president, strongly urged Eisenhower to reach such understandings. Eisenhower's efforts began with his "Atoms for Peace" speech of December 1953, which developed into his Open Skies Proposal at the 1955 Geneva Conference and evolved into lengthy negotiations for a treaty to restrict atmospheric nuclear testing, which by the time the 1959 Geneva Conference was held seemed likely to be successful.

In February 1956 Khrushchev repudiated much of Stalin's legacy, including his personality cult and his use of terror against political opponents, a move suggesting that the potential existed for a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. Soon afterward, Khrushchev expressed his faith that it might be possible for the East and West to attain a state of peaceful coexistence with each other. Progress toward this end was patchy, however. From 1958 until 1961, Khrushchev made repeated attempts to coerce and intimidate the Western powers into abandoning control of West Berlin.

In September 1959 after a protracted Geneva conference on disarmament, Khrushchev visited the United States, a trip that included an address to the United Nations, an apparently fruitful meeting at Camp David, a stay on Eisenhower's Maryland farm, and a presidential tour of the nearby Gettysburg battlefield. The much-vaunted Spirit of Camp David, however, soon evaporated. In May 1960, a long-planned summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev ended in fiasco after Russian artillery shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory on May 5 shortly before the meeting began. Eisenhower took full responsibility for this event but refused to yield to Khrushchev's demands that the United States apologize and cease all such overflights. In response, Khrushchev angrily canceled the summit.

Shortly afterward, the Soviet Union issued a statement threatening to intervene should there be any further Western threats to Middle Eastern countries. The United States, suspicious of any Soviet initiative that might jeopardize Western control of Middle Eastern oil, responded promptly in January 1957 with the Eisenhower Doctrine, pledging American military and economic assistance to any Middle Eastern country that sought to resist communism. Except for Lebanon and Iraq few nations welcomed this doctrine, since most countries in the region believed that they had more to fear from Western imperialism than from Soviet expansionism. In 1958 Egypt and Syria encouraged Pan-Arab sentiment by their brief union in the United Arab Republic. Civil war broke out in Lebanon as Muslims sought to replace the predominantly Christian government with an Arab state. Eisenhower responded by landing U.S. marines on Beirut's beaches to restore order.

As president, Eisenhower was generally cautious in risking American troops in overseas interventions. He boasted proudly that during his presidency no American soldier lost his life in combat duty. Despite Republican claims during the 1952 presidential campaign that they would roll back communism across Eastern Europe, when workers rose against Soviet rule in East Berlin in June 1953 and again when Hungarians attempted to expel Soviet troops in the autumn of 1956, Eisenhower refused to intervene. Although he would not recognize the People's Republic of China, he reacted cautiously in the successive Taiwan Straits crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, leaving ambiguous the likely U.S. reaction to a Chinese attack on the Guomindang-held offshore Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu islands.

In 1954 Eisenhower declined to commit American forces in Indochina after French troops were defeated at Dien Bien Phu. When the 1954 Geneva Accords ending the First Indochinese War and temporarily partitioning Vietnam until countrywide elections could be held were announced, Eisenhower refused to recognize them. His administration encouraged the government of the southern Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in its refusal to hold the elections mandated for 1956 and provided military and economic assistance to bolster its independence. Eisenhower justified these actions by citing the domino theory—that if the United States permitted one noncommunist area to become communist, the infection would inevitably spread to its neighbors.

Eisenhower also relied heavily on covert activities, authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to back coups in both Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954, respectively, and encouraging the CIA to undertake numerous other secret operations. These included plans for an ill-fated coup attempt against Cuba's communist leader, Fidel Castro.

Rather ironically, in his Farewell Address of January 1961 Eisenhower warned that Cold War policies tended to undercut the democratic values that the United States claimed to defend. He also expressed his concern that high levels of defense spending had created a military-industrial complex with a vested interest in the continuation of international tensions. Nevertheless, Eisenhower himself contributed to its development by engaging the United States in the Space Race and mounting a major educational and industrial drive to enable the United States to surpass Soviet scientific achievements.

After leaving office in 1961, Eisenhower backed American intervention in Vietnam, an area that he specifically warned his successor John F. Kennedy not to abandon. In retirement, Eisenhower wrote two volumes of presidential memoirs. He died in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 1969.

Priscilla Roberts

See also AJAX, Operation; Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Cuba; Dulles, Allen; Powers, Francis Gary; Documents 25, 26, 31

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Electronic Intelligence

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the various other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community classify intelligence according to type. Classifying intelligence in this manner simplifies, shortens, and facilitates the communicating, reporting, analysis, and evaluation of raw intelligence gathered by the various intelligence agencies and aids in the development of new intelligence-gathering techniques.

The CIA, the other intelligence agencies, and the U.S. military widely employ the use of acronyms to simplify and ease communications (verbal, written, and electronic) concerning a wide range of technological or complex topics and/or lengthy identifiers, titles, or agencies. The classifications of the various general types of intelligence are no different. The more common classifications of types of intelligence include HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), COMINT (communications intelligence), ELINT (electronic intelligence), and IMINT (image intelligence). All of the intelligence agencies of the United States engage in one or more of these different types of intelligence, with some agencies focusing or specializing more heavily on one of them.

ELINT is a subspecies of SIGINT that concerns electronic signals that are not communications or that identify the source and nature of an electronic signal. ELINT is a first line of electronic intelligence gathering. For example, an ELINT monitor might detect an unknown sophisticated electronic signal coming from a location within a foreign nation that had theretofore never been known to have any military or intelligence operations. Once such a signal is detected, the detection would be referred to either a more sophisticated COMINT station (to intercept, decrypt, and analyze the conversation) or to a more sophisticated MASINT (measurement and signal intelligence) station to try to identify the source and nature of the electronic signal. MASINT is a subspecies of ELINT. For example, each radar system employed by the various countries of the world has a specific electronic signature. When that particular signature is detected in a certain location, it is then reasonably concluded that the radar system associated with that signature is operating at that location. The same process is used for identifying and locating other foreign military and intelligence equipment. When a previously unknown electronic signal is detected, this is a cue for the detecting agency to engage in further intelligence operations to identify that particular electronic signal with the unknown signal.

Even though the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) were founded after World War II, ELINT was employed well before their founding during the war. The

United States employed ELINT especially in the air war against the Axis forces to determine the location of radar units. At that time, ELINT was handled by the various branches of the military.

The U.S. intelligence community consists of 17 agencies: the CIA; the NSA; the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Secret Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which handles domestic counterterrorism; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Army Intelligence; Navy Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence; Marine Corps Intelligence; Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of State; the Department of Energy; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Department of the Treasury; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although the CIA is somewhat involved in the gathering of ELINT, the primary agency that employs technical equipment for ELINT is the NSA in conjunction with the NRO.

In actual numbers of personnel employed and budget, the NSA is the largest intelligence-gathering organization in the United States. The NSA's huge budget is due to not only the number of people it employs but also the incredible amount of money spent on the development, purchase, deployment, and operation of highly sophisticated supercomputers, satellites, and ELINT equipment. It has been estimated that the NSA has advanced electronic equipment that is at least two generations beyond what is available in the commercial market. The NRO is primarily responsible for the design, construction, and operation of spy satellites and coordinates satellite imagery and aerial surveillance from the various intelligence agencies. The DIA, through the use of ELINT and COMINT, is also heavily involved in ELINT and maintains an electronic order of battle on the forces of foreign nations. An order of battle is a compendium of units and commanders in a particular region or area. ELINT and COMINT help to identify and locate these units and commanders.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Communications Intelligence; Human Intelligence; Image Intelligence; Signals Intelligence

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ELINT

See Electronic Intelligence

Extraordinary Rendition

See Rendition

F

Falcon and Snowman

Falcon and Snowman are the popular names for Christopher John Boyce (Falcon) and Andrew Daulton Lee (Snowman), two longtime friends who passed information on American satellite surveillance systems to the Soviet Union during the mid-1970s. Boyce and Lee grew up in the wealthy California neighborhood of Palos Verdes, south of Santa Monica. Lee began using drugs in high school and established a profitable career as a drug dealer, moving from marijuana to cocaine, which earned him his nickname of Snowman. Boyce, dubbed Falcon because of his devotion to the sport of falconry, dropped out of several colleges before going to work for the Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge Corporation (TRW) in 1974. TRW contracted with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate Project RHYOLITE, a satellite system that intercepted telephone calls and satellite transmissions and could pinpoint the location of radar stations and air defense units.

Boyce operated the encryption machines in the Black Vault, the ultrasecure communications hub that exchanged messages between CIA headquarters and the satellite receiving station in Australia. In the course of his duties, Boyce discovered that the CIA was concealing information about an improved version of Project RHYOLITE, code-named ARGUS, from the Australians and was attempting to manipulate the Australian elections. Boyce later claimed that such revelations, combined with disillusionment over the Vietnam War, inspired him to become a spy. However, Boyce, a notorious risk taker, may have been partially inspired by a fellow employee who entertained him with fantasies about ways to smuggle secrets out of TRW and sell them to the highest bidder. In late January 1975, Boyce encountered Lee at a party in Palos Verdes and made his old friend a business proposition, outlining a scheme to sell secrets to the Russians for as much as \$50,000 a month. Boyce provided Lee with encryption cards used to encode communications routed through the Black Vault and instructed him to fly to Mexico City and give the material to the guards at the Soviet embassy. The guards passed Lee on to Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) officer Vasily Ivanovich Okana, who, excited at the chance to have access to the U.S. electronic surveillance network, trained Lee in basic espionage techniques.

Although at first very nervous about becoming a spy, Lee became enchanted by his new profession, living lavishly at Mexican resorts, reading espionage novels, and bragging to fellow drug dealers that he worked for the CIA. He also began to distrust Boyce, fearing that he was holding back information and costing him potential revenue. Boyce distrusted Lee as well, convinced, correctly, that Lee was

not splitting the money he got from the Russians equally. Notwithstanding their growing concerns about each other, Boyce and Lee maintained their espionage partnership for a year and a half, providing the Soviets with messages from CIA stations around the world, photographs of satellites awaiting launch, and operational details of the RHYOLITE and ARGUS systems. However, despite repeated urging from the Russians, Boyce refused to betray the broadcast frequencies of the RHYOLITE satellites. The material supplied by Boyce alerted the Soviets to the extent of American surveillance, allowing them to block military transmissions during a critical phase in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, which may have contributed to the collapse of negotiations in March 1977.

Although reluctant to have any direct contact with the Soviets, Boyce eventually agreed to a face-to-face meeting in Mexico City with KGB officer Boris Alexei Grishen. Boyce told Grishen that he feared exposure and wished to leave TRW. Grishen suggested that Boyce, at Soviet expense, return to college, pursue a degree in political science or history, and seek a job with the U.S. government. Boyce understood that Grishen was proposing that he become a deep-cover agent, or mole, and accepted the proposition, along with \$5,000. Distressed at the thought of losing his profitable business, Lee convinced Boyce to smuggle out one last batch of documents. Boyce chose the plans for the Pyramider satellite network, a global communication system designed by TRW but never developed.

In his greed to make a final score, Lee egregiously violated his contact protocol and was arrested by Mexican police, who discovered the Pyramider papers on him and deported him. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested him at the border and on January 16, 1977, arrested Boyce as well. Tried separately, Boyce and Lee were both convicted of espionage and sentenced to 40 years in prison at the Lompoc Federal Penitentiary. Lee adapted to prison life easily, becoming a chaplain's assistant and a member of the tennis team. Boyce had no intention of adjusting and escaped on January 21, 1980. The U.S. Marshals Service launched a worldwide manhunt for him that spread from South America to Australia and South Africa without result, as Boyce had gone to northern Idaho, where he assumed a false identity and concealed himself among the dislocated, casually employed population around the town of Bonner's Ferry.

Boyce divided his time between raising marijuana plants in the mountains and robbing banks in Washington, Idaho, and Montana. For a brief time he obtained employment in a greenhouse, since renamed Falcon Floral in his honor. Boyce's thrill seeking and risk taking eventually betrayed him. Eager for notoriety, he revealed his true identity to others, even showing off his picture in a copy of the Robert Lindsey book *The Falcon and the Snowman*. Fearing capture, Boyce decided to flee to the Soviet Union. He moved to Washington State, bought a boat, and began taking flying lessons, apparently planning to sail to Alaska and then fly to Siberia. Before he could complete his plans, one of his bank-robbing accomplices betrayed him to the U.S. Marshals Service, which arrested him in Port Angeles, Washington, on August 21, 1981. He received 3 additional years for escaping from prison and 25 additional years for bank robbery. Because of fears that he would attempt escape again or be harmed by other prisoners, Boyce was

sent to the maximum security prison in Marion, Illinois, to serve out his 65-year sentence.

Vernon L. Pedersen

See also Boyce, Christopher; Lee, Andrew; Document 74

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“Family Jewels” (Mid-1970s)

“Family Jewels” is a list of potential Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) illegalities. The list would become involved in congressional oversight hearings in the wake of the Watergate Scandal in the mid-1970s. James Schlesinger, director of central intelligence (DCI) from February to May 1973, ordered in May the compilation of a list of CIA actions that may have been improper or outside the CIA’s charter. This list consisted of 693 pages describing potential violations.

Schlesinger’s immediate motive for ordering the creation of the “Family Jewels” list was Howard Hunt’s break-in of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, psychoanalyst of Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg had leaked the Pentagon Papers, leading to increasing controversy over the Vietnam War. Hunt had used CIA equipment in the break-in with the intention of collecting materials to be contributed to a CIA file on Ellsberg for the White House. Anxious that he not be surprised by further revelations of CIA impropriety, Schlesinger created the “Family Jewels.”

Watergate burglar and former CIA worker James McCord hinted to the CIA that the agency had organized the Watergate break-in, and agents were told by the CIA’s general counsel that they were not obligated to volunteer information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Justice Department. This “distancing” strategy had helped steer the CIA clear of the Watergate mess.

The information in “Family Jewels” relieved Schlesinger’s successor, William Colby. He had anticipated more damning indiscretions than the collection outlined. In an interview with *New York Times* reporter Seymour Hersh, Colby discovered that some of the items on the “Family Jewels” list were known to the reporter. Colby later wrote that he tried to convince Hersh that the items he was aware of were unrelated to one another. The primary conclusion that Hersh drew from the article was that his leads had been confirmed. Hersh’s December 22, 1974, article titled “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. against Antiwar Forces” in the *New York Times* addressed the CIA’s targeting of domestic dissidents.

Congress, eager after the Watergate Scandal to extend the reach of its investigative oversight, formed the Senate Church Committee and the House Pike Committee. An earlier investigative commission, chaired by Vice President Nelson

Rockefeller, had been limited in its scope to the CIA's domestic activities. Future president Ronald Reagan sat on the Rockefeller Commission, and future vice president Walter Mondale was a member of the Church Committee.

The Rockefeller Commission, with its domestic jurisdiction, examined Operation CHAOS. CHAOS, included in "Family Jewels," spanned from 1967 to 1974. It was a domestic spying program seeking to determine what connections if any the antiwar movement had to foreign entities. Handled by the Counterintelligence Staff section of the CIA, CHAOS was effectively compartmentalized so as to isolate much of the CIA itself from being aware of the program.

While CHAOS dealt with the possibility of foreign influence, the domestic spying involved made it highly controversial and led to its compartmentalization. CHAOS did not find evidence of foreign influence on the anti-Vietnam War movements within the United States. In its last two years CHAOS shrank, and it turned from analyzing the antiwar movement to combating international terrorism.

"Family Jewels" mentioned the National Security Agency (NSA) twice. One of these references was that the CIA had requested that the NSA observe the communications of U.S. citizens who were active in the antiwar movement. Operations MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE were found by congressional investigations to have studied activist groups and their "leadership, funding and activities." It was also found that these operations provided information to the CHAOS project. Information was organized in a computer system known as Hydra. Although 300,000 Americans were indexed in the system, files were kept for less than 3 percent of this number. Colby ended CHAOS in March 1974.

Also within the Rockefeller Commission's authority was the study of a series of mail-intercept operations conducted by the CIA. Mail destined for the Soviet Union was subject to scrutiny. As with CHAOS, this was surveillance done domestically that had a connection to the foreign realm. Most notable was Project HUNTER, which from 1958 until 1973 examined mail through New York. When the CIA closed HUNTER, the FBI, to which the CIA had passed disseminated information, declined to assume responsibility for the project.

Another jewel studied by the Rockefeller Commission was the death of CIA agent Frank Olson. Without his knowledge, Olson was given LSD in a cooperative CIA-U.S. Army program named MKULTRA, intended to discover if the drug might have some use by enemy forces. In 1953 Olson committed suicide, and his death was dealt with as a line-of-duty death. The commission's report was the first that Olson's family learned of the peculiar circumstances of his death.

Beyond the information leaked to Hersh was that the "Family Jewels" also catalogued assassination attempts against Cuba's communist ruler Fidel Castro. When asked by CBS journalist Daniel Schorr if the CIA had committed assassinations within the United States, Colby replied that no CIA assassinations had been conducted in the United States. Colby's answer inadvertently further inflamed controversy because it implied that the CIA had assassinated figures abroad. Colby wrote in his memoirs that the CIA never succeeded in its attempts, such as those on Castro. Nevertheless, the implication coupled with the presence of the attempts on Castro's life listed in "Family Jewels" contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust

between Congress and the CIA. Colby’s past involvement in the PHOENIX Program, which targeted Viet Cong leaders for assassination during the Vietnam conflict, undercut the credibility of his denial of the existence of assassination projects.

The “Family Jewels” project was the indirect result of Richard Nixon’s desire to consolidate U.S. intelligence activities. He made a directive that the DCI have “an enhanced leadership role.” As DCI, Richard Helms tried unsuccessfully to establish the DCI’s authority over all intelligence branches. This had led to conflict with the Defense Department. Schlesinger’s effort to assert control over the intelligence community included the creation of the “Family Jewels” list. Another aspect of his efforts was a 7 percent reduction of CIA staff, accomplished through officers being fired, retired, or forced to resign.

Although “Family Jewels” did not offer a flattering image of the CIA, it did indicate that improprieties may have been more limited than public imagination of them. The list included domestic wiretapping but also indicated that this had been stopped when President Lyndon Johnson ordered its end in 1965. The CIA’s program of intercepting mail was mostly limited to contemporary and former CIA employees. Nixon’s creation of the “plumbers” could suggest that the CIA was perhaps unwilling to cooperate in those illegal activities.

In its investigations, the Church Committee largely examined issues, such as assassination programs and mail searches, with ramifications to civil liberties. The Pike Committee’s focus was on the quality of the intelligence being collected and examined. The Pike Committee emerged after a committee headed by Democratic representative Lucien Nedzi of Michigan was scuttled. Nedzi was on the Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, and other House Democrats suggested that he was therefore too closely connected to intelligence issues.

Colby vowed to cooperate fully with the investigations, but they were nonetheless marked by contention between Congress and the CIA. Pike insisted on and received access to the complete “Family Jewels” collection after his staff had been given a sanitized version. According to CIA agent Scott Breckinridge, Pike’s motive in demanding the full list was to assert his authority. A flap occurred when the Pike Committee released information including the phrase “and greater communications security,” which the CIA believed compromised its intelligence in Egypt. Although the average reader would not notice anything significant in the phrase, the CIA asserted that trained and alert security agents would.

In his memoirs, Colby wrote that as DCI he sought to cooperate and provide information to investigators but that he wanted the CIA to be able to excise potentially sensitive portions of the committee reports before the reports became public. This too caused friction between Pike and the CIA.

In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, the CIA had organized the “Family Jewels” list as a means of determining how much wrongdoing lay in the CIA’s past. Colby tried to convince the committee chairmen that the CIA would respect its proper boundaries in the future. However, Watergate had created an investigative impulse in Congress that caused it not to accept mere reassurances of future propriety without increased congressional oversight.

Nicholas M. Sambaluk

See also CHAOS, Operation; Church Committee; Colby, William; Helms, Richard; Hersh, Seymour; MKULTRA, Project; Olson, Frank; Rockefeller Commission; Documents 48–55, 59, 62

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Farfield Foundation

The Farfield Foundation was a philanthropic cultural organization founded in New York City in 1952 that was actually a front for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA used this entity in its cultural war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War through the covert funding of groups and individuals, particularly artists, writers, and musicians. The cultural war consisted of using American cultural forms to convince Europeans that these were superior to Soviet artworks and literature and more indicative of U.S. values, such as democracy, free expression, and right of dissent. Soviet art and literature were commissioned and heavily controlled by the government, and any work that was deemed inappropriate or subversive was censored. The artist or author responsible for the work was liable to be sent to the Gulag.

Former Museum of Modern Art managing director Tom Braden was put in charge of the CIA office that directed the cultural aspects of the Cold War, known as the International Organizations Division (IOD). The IOD indirectly managed these affairs through foundations, conferences, journals, art exhibitions, and musical competitions held discretely at home and abroad. In this manner, American cultural forms were disseminated throughout Western Europe in areas where communist parties were popular among much of the public. The genre of Abstract Expressionism was heavily supported by the Farfield Foundation and was heavily exhibited during the 1950s and 1960s.

The CIA believed that segments of modern American culture, particularly the avant-garde art and music prevalent at the time, that had anticommunist and politically Left characteristics could work against the allure of Stalinism in Western Europe, still recovering from World War II. Stalinist culture was slowly being associated with totalitarian art forms, which some artists found oppressive. Other organizations, while not fronted by the CIA, were also believed to have attained CIA funds for these ends.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom and its U.S.-based chapter, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, were the main beneficiaries of the Farfield Foundation. These organizations were also CIA-fronted philanthropic groups. These groups also funded artists, writers, and organizations believed to be useful in anticommunist efforts.

The Farfield Foundation operated in secret partly due to domestic reasons. Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist efforts of the early 1950s created suspicion of modern art and literature. McCarthyism created a culture of suspicion that viewed anything subversive as a threat, including much of the cultural production being supported by the CIA through the Farfield Foundation. Despite the threat posed by McCarthy's witch hunts, the Farfield Foundation continued its efforts in using subversive arts in its fight against the Soviet Union.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also *Animal Farm*; Cold War and the CIA; Mass Media (Information) Operations

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Favaro Affair (1975–)

In October 1975 the Favaro Affair, named after Australian businessman Frank Favaro (1935–2000), forced Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam into a conflict with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the control of its activities.

During the lead-up to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975, the ASIS paid Favaro for information on local political developments. He appeared to favor the policies of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), a right-of-center group in Timor that sought integration with Indonesia. The UDT failed to seize power in Timor during an attempted coup on August 11, 1975.

Favaro wanted to be paid more for work he had done for the ASIS, and he wrote a demanding letter to Whitlam and to Australia's minister for foreign affairs. The letter drew Whitlam's attention to what the ASIS was doing in East Timor. The leaking of Favaro's identity in late 1975 led to a confrontation between Whitlam and ASIS director William T. Robertson. Whitlam fired Robertson without notifying the Australian government. It also appeared in the press that the ASIS had apparently employed an Australian agent in Timor who could have been involved in the failed coup, interfering in East Timor's internal affairs. At a more important

level, this raised the question of whether or not the government had executive power over Australia's security services.

In the end, the Whitlam Labour government was dismissed shortly afterward amid speculation that the dismissal had been influenced partly by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities in Australia. Whitlam denied this until 1988, when he said he thought that the CIA had probably been involved in the dismissal of his government. There has been no evidence that the CIA was involved.

Jan Goldman

See also Whitlam Coup

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FBI Relations

Bureaucracy often threatens the efficiency of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations. Typically, both agencies are reluctant to share information with each other for fear of losing control of the information. Part of this fear is an incompatibility of function between the two institutions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had the task of bringing lawbreakers to justice and thus approaches a case by accumulating evidence that could stand up in a court of law. On the other hand, CIA agents are less interested in prosecuting than in intelligence gathering. CIA officials want to follow the leads to see where they would go. This means that both agencies are usually unwilling to share crucial information because such sharing might compromise law enforcement or intelligence sources.

Jan Goldman

See also Alec Station; Counterterrorism Center; Documents 5, 7, 17

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5412 Special Group

The National Security Council (NSC) 5412/2 Special Group, often referred to simply as the Special Group or the 5412 Special Group, was an initially secret but later public subcommittee of the NSC responsible for coordinating government covert operations. Presidential Directive NSC 5412/2, issued December 28, 1954, assigned responsibility for coordination of covert actions to representatives of the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the president.

A major issue that the 5412 Special Group discussed was the assassination of Fidel Castro, the dictator of Cuba. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Allen Dulles first presented plans for a covert operation to assassinate Castro on June 13, 1960. After a few further discussions, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved of a covert operation to carry this out, which later became known as the Bay of Pigs operation.

During the John F. Kennedy administration, the Special Group was concerned over the role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo. Lumumba, who served briefly as premier of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm by U.S. policy makers. They perceived his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States. Soon thereafter the CIA station officer in Leopoldville, Republic of the Congo, was told that senior U.S. government officials were interested in the removal of Lumumba and that this was an urgent and prime objective. The Special Group decided to use the CIA's clandestine service to formulate a plot to assassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point that lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were delivered by the CIA to the Congo station. There is no evidence that these instruments of assassination were actually used against Lumumba.

In early 1961 the CIA's deputy director for plans was instructed to establish what was referred to as an "executive action capability," which was understood to mean the ability to kill selected individuals. While the instruction was stated in general terms without specifying a particular target, it was very much in the time period of the mounting program against Castro and his regime.

In 1962 the Special Group made an important shift in emphasis from covert to overt counterinsurgency. This was partially the result of simple practicality. The Bay of Pigs Invasion demonstrated that there was an inverse relationship between the requirements of military victory and the need to preserve plausible denial. After 1962, the emerging preference for U.S. policy makers was that Americans become directly involved in the internal security planning and training of Third World nations. In subsequent meetings held after its formation, the Special Group

would offer a host of recommendations in support of assistance for riot-control instruction, police training, and civil engineering projects. The Special Group continued to be replaced throughout the years by committees with similar duties, a few of which were the 303 Committee and the 40 Committee.

Jan Goldman

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Dulles, Allen; Lumumba, Patrice; 303 Committee; Documents 30, 37

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Ford Foundation

Founded in 1936 through bequests and gifts from Henry and Edsel Ford, the Ford Foundation is one of the largest philanthropic organizations in the world. According to its mission statement, the foundation works to strengthen democracy, eliminate poverty and injustice, promote global cooperation, and advance human achievements.

Although the foundation has supported social reforms throughout its history, it has also been associated with the U.S. intelligence community. This association was especially close during the Cold War, particularly in the 1950s. Paul Hoffman, who assumed the presidency of the foundation in 1951, was a liberal Republican who favored covert activities as part of the Cold War strategy of containment. Under his tenure the foundation established the East European Fund, which would operate until 1956. Financed solely by the Ford Foundation, the East European Fund dealt with political refugees from the Soviet Union, ostensibly working for their resettlement in the West and providing aid for them. However, this subsidiary of the Ford Foundation was also used to identify and recruit noncommunist intellectuals who would work in anti-Soviet propaganda and psychological warfare campaigns. Monies were also granted to create a research institute in which refugee scholars could study the Soviet system.

Another project funded by the Ford Foundation was the Chekhov Publishing House, which published Russian-language literature banned in the Soviet Union. Designed to provide Russian émigrés with alternative sources of literature other than that coming out of the Soviet Union, the publishing house existed to help strengthen and foster anti-Soviet feelings within the Russian émigré community. An antileftist magazine, *Perspectives*, was also funded by the Ford Foundation. This publication was unsuccessful and eventually went bankrupt.

Hoffman's successors Richard Bissell, who became president of the Ford Foundation in 1952, and John McCloy, who succeeded Bissell in 1954, continued to maintain the organization's ties with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Bissell left the foundation in 1954 to assume a position as special assistant to Allen Dulles, then head of the CIA. The close relationship and interchange of personnel was a central feature of the relations between the CIA and the Ford Foundation in these years. McCloy maintained a unit within the foundation to facilitate the use of the organization as a conduit for CIA funds. Former CIA agents who went to work for the Ford Foundation often continued a close association with the CIA.

The association between the foundation and the CIA would continue into the 1960s. Typical of the support it gave to anticommunist intellectuals was the foundation's funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), which received some \$2 million between 1957 and 1966. Covert funding from the CIA was also being funneled to the CCF during these years. The CCF sponsored international conferences for antileftist intellectuals and published numerous cultural journals such as *Encounter*. When the foundation's connection to the CIA was exposed by the *New York Times* in 1967, the foundation gradually reduced its financial support of the CCF but now became the sole source of funding, as the CIA's clandestine financing was cut off by the Lyndon Johnson administration. Although further study is needed regarding the CIA–Ford Foundation association, there can be little doubt of their connection and focus on political and psychological warfare during the most intense of the Cold War years.

A. Gregory Moore

See also Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Dulles, Allen; Documents 11, 14, 28

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Foreign Broadcast Information Service

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), administered by the Directorate of Science and Technology within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), operated from 1947 until 2005, at which time it was renamed the Open Source Center. The FBIS and its successor agency were tasked with collecting and translating publicly accessible news and information sources from non-English-speaking nations around the world. These sources included radio and television broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, government press releases and statements, and foreign databases.

The genesis of the FBIS can be traced back to World War II. In February 1941, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration established the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS), which was administered by the Federal Communications Commission. Initially, the FBMS was designed to monitor, transcribe, and translate radio programs being transmitted by Germany, Italy, and Japan. In 1945, the FBMS was taken over by the U.S. Army. As a result of the 1947 National Security Act, the FBMS was transferred to the CIA, which had been established by the act. At that time, the FBMS was renamed the FBIS. In 1967, the FBIS mandate was expanded to include foreign television outlets and print media.

The FBIS maintained about 20 stations around the world, most of which operated in conjunction with U.S. embassies or consulates. A few were attached to U.S. military commands, but these were the exception rather than the rule. Daily reports with accompanying translations were provided for eight regions around the globe, covering topics such as political affairs, economics, social issues, scientific and technological news, military developments, and environmental issues. The stations located in foreign nations did not operate covertly and were established with the host government's knowledge and permission.

The FBIS was staffed with in-house CIA or U.S. diplomatic employees; foreign nationals were also employed as private contractors. There were more than 700 recipients of the FBIS's daily reports, most of whom were in the U.S. intelligence establishment; however, a sizable number of government, diplomatic, and military policy makers also received them. The FBIS did not collect or report on all foreign news sources—it concentrated only on sources that were of benefit to the CIA and other intelligence groups. FBIS reports were not distributed to civilians chiefly because of copyright issues from the original source material.

In 1997 amid a concerted effort to lower government spending and balance the federal budget, Congress targeted the FBIS for a major budget reduction. However, several concerned interest groups, led by the Federation of American Scientists, prevailed upon congressional leaders to spare the FBIS from the budget ax. In 2005 the FBIS became part of the Open Source Center, also administered by the CIA. The center has an expanded mandate, which includes former FBIS functions as well as the gathering and translating of publicly accessible gray literature, which generally includes unpublished material within academia and the sciences.

The FBIS and its predecessor and successor agencies have provided highly valuable services not only for the CIA and the larger U.S. intelligence community but also for high-level decision makers within the U.S. government and military. These services have become even more valuable since the start of the Global War on Terror beginning in 2001.

There has been only one publicly known controversy involving the FBIS. In 1985, longtime FBIS employee Larry Wu-tai Chin was charged with espionage and tax evasion for having sold secret U.S. documents to the Chinese government and then hiding the income of those sales from the Internal Revenue Service. Chin admitted to the espionage but committed suicide in prison while awaiting sentencing. He had been engaged in espionage for the Chinese government since 1952.

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See also National Security Act of 1947; Open Source Center

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Freedom of Information Act

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) marked a reaction to the growing inclination and power of the executive branch of the federal government to withhold information from the public. Signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson on September 6, 1966, the FOIA created processes by which citizens could request the partial or full disclosure of documents generated and held by the executive branch. However, the original law contained a number of exemptions that allowed the government wide latitude in deciding what was and was not subject to release, and these exemptions have been the source of most of the controversy surrounding the FOIA.

Since its original enactment, the FOIA has undergone a number of amendments, reflecting changing political and social concerns. For example, the Privacy Act amendments of 1974 gave individuals the right to examine and correct information held by executive branch agencies. This change in the FOIA came in reaction to disclosures of domestic intelligence-gathering operations conducted by the Richard Nixon administration. In 1982, a renewed Cold War moved President Ronald Reagan to issue an executive order that greatly expanded the ability of federal agencies to withhold information under Exemption 1 of the original act, which dealt with national security issues. In his second term, President Bill Clinton rescinded much of the Reagan administration's tightening of the FOIA, leading to the declassification of thousands of documents of interest to historians of the post–World War II United States.

The Global War on Terror has inspired its own series of changes to the FOIA. For example, just weeks after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush issued an executive order severely limiting access to the records of former presidents. The next year Congress amended the act yet again, this time restricting the ability of “other than U.S. parties” to use the FOIA. Shortly after entering office, President Barack Obama revoked his predecessor's order concerning presidential records. However, in late 2009 President Obama issued another executive order providing for the retroactive classification of documents requested under the FOIA if review concluded that the documents should have been secret.

At the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the most requested documents (as listed by their titles and the dates they were written) filed under the FOIA include the following:



Cuban militiamen and members of the Revolutionary Army celebrate their victory over American mercenaries at Playa Giron, in what became known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Under the Freedom of Information Act, documents about the invasion is among the most requested information held by the CIA. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

- The Israeli Attack on the USS *Liberty* (June 13, 1967)
- Warning of War in Europe (June 27, 1984)
- US Intelligence and Vietnam (December 1, 1984)
- The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART (April 1, 1992)
- CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952–1954 (June 1, 1995)
- The CIA’s Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affairs (January 1, 1996)
- Police Officers Spot UFO; Rapid Reaction Force Alerted (June 25, 1996)
- Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks (December 4, 1998)

Clarence R. Wyatt

See also Osama bin Laden, Killing of; September 11 Attacks; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in; Documents 42, 66, 71, 81–85

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Front Organizations

The extensive development and use of front organizations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provides examples of covert political activities. The use of front organizations by the CIA was widespread throughout the whole of the Cold War. The vast majority of these fronts were direct appendages of the agency.

The CIA's approach to fronts was generally to use a variety of corporate fronts, usually referred to as either "proprietarys" or "Delaware Corporations," that took many different guises and forms throughout the Cold War, depending on geography, mission, and time. Indeed, it could be argued that the post-Cold War growth in private security and military companies operating internationally—and the role that they fill not only for their client governments or corporations in the developing world but also in the contracts that they undertake on behalf of Western governments—are a direct descendant of such organizations. However, throughout the Cold War and as far back as the U.S. government's use of Vinnell Corporation in Mexico in the early 1930s and World War II (later described by a CIA official as "our own private army in Vietnam"), such private security and military companies provided the same type of service that was secured through these fronts under very similar circumstances of plausible deniability and ease of use far from the public's eye.

The most well-known type of proprietary was the air corporations, including Air America. Double-Chek Corporation, listed as a brokerage firm in Florida government records, was in reality a recruiting front for pilots flying against Cuba after 1959; many of the pilots flying B-26s out of Central America against Cuba were recruited by a company called Caribbean Marine Aero Corp. (Caramar), a CIA proprietary. More recent examples include Summit Aviation, which was linked to the CIA during the 1980s with operations in El Salvador and Honduras, and St. Lucia Airways, which although the company denies it was conclusively tied to the Iran-Contra operations (along with several other such fronts) as well as to operations in Angola and the Congo (Zaire).

Other types of fronted activities include the use of United Business Associates (Washington, D.C.) to fund corporate development in the developing world. The organization's charter indicated that it was to "offset the Communists from moving in." As a direct continuation of previous U.S. activities, the CIA was supported by the United Fruit Company in developing plans to carry out the 1953 coup against Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala but never followed through. Finally, one of the best-known front organizations of the CIA was Zenith Technical Enterprises, a

Miami-based corporation used to organize, direct, fund, and carry out Operation MONGOOSE, the CIA's war against Fidel Castro.

The CIA also used social and educational organizations such as the National Student Association, which the CIA had funded (to 80 percent of the National Student Association's budget) between 1952 and 1967. However, philanthropic foundations are the most effective conduit for channeling large sums of money. A U.S. congressional investigation in 1976 revealed that nearly 50 percent of the 700 grants in the field of international activities by the principal foundations were funded by the CIA. By the late 1950s the Ford Foundation possessed more than \$3 billion in assets. The foundation had a record of close involvement in covert actions in Europe, working closely with CIA officials on specific projects. CIA officer Richard Bissell was president of the foundation in 1952. In his two years in office, he met often with the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, and other CIA officials. In 1954 Ford Foundation president John McCloy fully integrated his organization with CIA operations. The foundation's funding of CIA cultural fronts was important in recruiting noncommunist intellectuals who were encouraged to attack the Marxist and communist Left. Many of these noncommunist leftists later claimed that they were "duped" and that had they known that the money was coming from the CIA, they would not have lent their names and prestige.

Jan Goldman

See also Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Dulles, Allen; Ford Foundation; Document 21

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G

Garber, Joy Ann (1919–1963)

Joy Ann Garber was a Russian spy, a sleeper, who worked in the United States with her husband from late 1958 to October 1963. Garber, also known as Ann Baltch and Bertha Rosalie Jackson, was born in Poland. Trained as a hairdresser, she married Alexander Sokolov (b. 1919) in Germany. He was trained as a communist spy in Moscow. They went to Russia, and Joy was trained in preparation for their espionage work in Central America and Europe.

At the end of 1958 they went to the United States and lived separate lives, in separate apartments, in New York City. Sokolov took the identity of Robert Baltch, raised in Pennsylvania. The two staged a meeting, at which Joy Garber decided to date Robert Baltch regularly, and in April 1959 she “married” him. Now she was Ann Baltch, who worked as a hairdresser, and had a husband, Robert, who was a language teacher. For seven years the two lived in the Bronx as sleepers. Ann took a beautician’s course. After April 1960 the couple moved to Baltimore, Maryland, where Robert again taught languages and Ann was a beautician.

During those seven years Kaarlo Toumi, a shipyard worker who spied for the Soviets, was recruited to be a double agent for the Central Intelligence Agency while continuing with his work for the Soviets. The Baltches were seen by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents at one of Toumi’s dead drops. Thereafter they were kept under surveillance. They were found to have changed their residence more frequently than expected, and they bought a cabin in the countryside where they kept a transmitter for sending information to Moscow.

In November 1962 the couple moved to an apartment in Washington, D.C., where Robert continued teaching languages. By now the FBI was monitoring the Baltches closely. In May 1963 it was clear that they were using a dead drop beneath a Long Island railway bridge for contacting the Soviet personnel officer of the Soviet United Nations delegates. By June the Baltches knew they were being watched. They prepared to leave but were arrested and tried for espionage. The Soviets claimed never to have heard of them.

The Baltches were released on a legal technicality. Evidence from the eavesdropping was not admissible in court. They were swapped for two Americans in a Soviet prison. In 1963 they flew by Air India to Prague and disappeared.

Jan Goldman

See also Legal Restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency

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Gee, Elizabeth Ethel (1915–1984)

Elizabeth Ethel Gee was a member of the Portland Spy Ring headed by Konon Molody, also known as Gordon Lonsdale. Gee's father was a blacksmith in Hampshire, England. She had a private school education and in her 40s was still living with her elderly parents when she fell in love with a Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) spy, Harry F. Houghton.

In 1959 a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent working in Polish intelligence identified two spies inside British intelligence services, and one of them

had a name that sounded like Houghton's.

Houghton had been recruited into the KGB after World War II in Warsaw and was reactivated by the Soviets when he was posted to England. In 1958 he met Ethel Gee. She worked in the records office at Great Britain's Portland Naval Base. In 1959 Houghton bought a cottage, and Gee helped him decorate it in the hope that they would marry. Houghton introduced Gee to Gordon Lonsdale, also known at the time as Alex Johnson, who persuaded her to work on espionage with Houghton. Code-named Asya, Gee brought documents from the record office to her home on Friday evenings. Houghton photographed the documents, and Gee returned them on Monday morning.



Ethel Gee receives a kiss from fellow spy Harry Houghton after being released from prison on May 15, 1970. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Houghton's estranged wife reported to MI5 that her husband, employed at Portland's Underwater Weapons Research Establishment, had run off with a woman. MI5 officers watched Houghton as he went every month to Gee in London. At a rail station each time he gave Gordon Lonsdale, a Canadian businessman, a bag in return for an envelope. Michal Goleniewski, a CIA mole in the Polish Intelligence Service, had led MI5 to Gordon Lonsdale. Outside a theater in London in January 1961, Houghton, Gee, and Lonsdale were arrested. In Gee's shopping bag were many secret documents from Portland. Additional arrests, as part of this spy ring, included Peter and Helen Kroger (alias Morris and Lona Cohen), professional spies working for the Soviets. They were the core members of the Portland Spy Ring.

At her trial Gee protested her innocence, maintaining her claim that she believed that Lonsdale was an American. In the course of the trial, however, she finally admitted that "In the light of what transpires now, I have done something terribly wrong, but at that time I did not think I had done anything criminal."

Houghton and Gee were both sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 1961. The professional spies were given longer sentences but were exchanged early on for captured British agents and citizens. Gee and Houghton served 9 years and were released in May 1970. They married a year later, and Elizabeth Gee Houghton died in 1984.

Jan Goldman

See also Goleniewski, Michael

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Gehlen, Reinhard (1902–1979)

Reinhard Gehlen was a German Army general who provided the West with valuable information on Russian military resources and personnel at the end of World War II. The information was held and controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until Gehlen's organization became the core of the secret services of West Germany.

Born on April 3, 1902, in Erfurt, Gehlen completed his secondary education in Erfurt and joined the German Army as a cadet in 1921. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1923. Promoted to captain following graduation from the

Army Staff College, he became a general staff officer and held a variety of staff positions.

In April 1942 without any prior experience in intelligence work, Gehlen became head of the Foreign Armies East Department. After initial failures at estimating enemy capabilities, he reorganized his department and created his own espionage organization and a comprehensive information bank on the Soviet Union. He also took a leading role in recruiting more than 100,000 Soviet prisoners of war into the Russian Liberation Army to fight on the German side.

Gehlen's intelligence information was generally accurate, and he directed an extensive network of agents throughout Eastern Europe. In autumn 1944 he was preparing to transfer the military intelligence service to U.S. authorities in case Germany lost the war. In December 1944 he won promotion to general major (equivalent to U.S. brigadier general). Adolf Hitler disliked Gehlen's accurate but gloomy assessments of Germany's military prospects on the Eastern Front and dismissed him from his post on April 10, 1945. At the time Gehlen had plans to take his whole intelligence organization over to the Americans. During the Russian advance on Germany, he preserved his archives and kept them in a mine shaft in Bavaria, hidden from the Russians, until he negotiated their use by the CIA. Gehlen correctly believed, even before war ended, that the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union would not last. It was not long after the war that Joseph Stalin prevented Russian-occupied East European countries from regaining their independence, even if it would risk war with the West.

In 1945 after the defeat of Hitler, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, chief of the U.S. Intelligence Forces of Occupation, had Gehlen taken out of a prisoner-of-war camp. Sibert did not inform his superiors until August 1945, when he had tangible evidence of the information that Gehlen had secreted. It was not until February 1946 that the Americans agreed to use Gehlen to work for them against the Soviets.

In May 1949 the newly formed CIA made a secret agreement with Gehlen's secret service. It was to be a German organization, not a part of the CIA, with contact through liaison officers. Its aim was to collect intelligence on the nations in the Eastern bloc; once a government was established in Germany, Gehlen's secret service would be the responsibility of that government, and all previous agreements with the United States would be canceled. No secret service missions were to run contrary to Germany's national interest. Gehlen's organization received its first funding, US\$3.4 million. Gehlen's first task was to move his agents into the Eastern bloc nations and establish his organization inside the Soviet Union. The organization grew and contributed much to the U.S. foreign policy in Europe.

Until 1956, Gehlen and his so-called Gehlen Org—his organization's informal title—were funded by and under the control of the CIA. The Gehlen Org served and created espionage organizations around the world: Egypt, Israel, Britain, the United States, South America, the Congo, Tanzania, Afghanistan, and France.

When his organization became the West German Secret Service, the BND, Gehlen was its president (1956–1968). During this time he conducted espionage

operations against the West as well as the communists. Many scandals reduced the influence of his work and lowered his respect among those who believed he was their ally. While Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, praised Gehlen's work, U.S. Army chiefs decried his activities.

After the national uprising of 1953 in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the initially favorable situation of sources for the BND sharply diminished, and Gehlen sought to compensate for the lack of agents with enhanced technical reconnaissance. He retired in April 1968. Gehlen died in Berg am Starnberger See on June 8, 1979.

Heiner Bröckermann

See also Berlin Spy Carousel; Berlin Tunnel; Double Agents; Dulles, Allen

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Gladio Network (1945–Early 1990s)

Secret counterinsurgency and paramilitary network established at the end of World War II in most West European nations and operating until the early 1990s. Stay-behind networks, which included the Italian arm known as Gladio, were formed to carry out resistance in the event of a Soviet military invasion. On the one hand, such organizations aimed at carrying out postinvasion guerrilla warfare in case of a Soviet attack on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country; on the other hand, they were designed to stabilize Western nations through intervention in domestic politics to prevent the communists from coming to power. Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and most other NATO member states established these networks, which were ready to intervene if necessary.

The first such network was established in Belgium as early as 1944, but it was only after the end of World War II that the stay-behind system became a clandestine West European-wide network. The network was conceived as a collective security system by the U.S. government working in cooperation with friendly intelligence agencies. The stay-behind network was placed into operation in 1948 by the National Security Council (NSC) and was funded by the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) and supervised by CIA personnel, working in close cooperation with their European counterparts.

West European governments were moving in a similar direction. The 1948 Brussels Treaty created the Clandestine Committee of the Western Union (CCWU), based in Paris. In 1951 the CCWU was transformed into the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC). The CPC was linked to NATO in coordination with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). It was under this umbrella that the NATO states organized and coordinated the stay-behind network.

In the beginning, organization and supervision of the networks was divided between the United States and the United Kingdom. The British were responsible for operations in Belgium, France, Holland, Norway, and Portugal, whereas the Americans took responsibility for Sweden, Finland, and the remaining countries of Western Europe not covered by the British. Nevertheless, it was not until 1957 that the secret network became a fully integrated system. The CPC established two subcommittees, one of which was the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) that became responsible for coordinating the stay-behind structures in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The ACC's main duties were to produce policies for the network and to further develop its clandestine capabilities as well as bases located in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Those recruited for the network, no matter what their national origin, were supposed to organize clandestine bases and plan operations. The network had both wartime and peacetime duties. In peacetime organizers were to recruit and train personnel, whereas in wartime they planned stay-behind operations in conjunction with SHAPE.

The most famous example of the stay-behind network was in Italy. Officially set up during 1956–1958, it was known as Gladio. There operating bases and trained units were created as a result of a partnership between the CIA and the Italian secret services with the aim of preventing Soviet aggression and also internal communist subversion. It was only in 1990 that the Italian government dismantled Gladio and that a parliamentary commission declared it clandestine and illegal.

In the 1980s the ACC organized yearly international exercises. According to published sources, the last ACC meeting was held in October 1990. Since then, the network has been disbanded in most West European countries. In the early 1990s, many governments formally admitted existence of the network and dismantled it.

Simone Selva

See also Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949; Central Intelligence Group; Dulles, Allen; Office of Strategic Services; RED SOX, Operation

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Glomar Explorer

U.S. salvage vessel built for Operation JENNIFER to recover a sunken Soviet submarine. On April 11, 1968, the Soviet Golf-class (NATO designation) ballistic missile submarine *K-129*, carrying three ballistic missiles, broke up and sank some 750 miles northwest of Hawaii while on patrol in the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) learned of the incident and the submarine's location through underwater listening devices. When Soviet ships attempted without success to find the submarine, it was clear that only the Americans knew its location. The CIA then decided to attempt Operation JENNIFER, the recovery of the Soviet submarine from the ocean floor at a depth of some 16,500 feet (3 miles). The *Glomar Explorer* was specifically built for that purpose.

Built by Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Chester, Pennsylvania, for Global Marine and launched in 1972, the 51,000-ton *Glomar Explorer* was purportedly constructed as a deep-sea mining vessel to recover manganese nodules from the ocean floor. It had a large interior well to house *Hughes Mining Barge 1*. Commonly known as *HMB-1*, this was a submersible barge designed to carry the large claw for the recovery effort and also to house and hide the submarine when recovered. The cost of all this came to some \$200 million.

The *Glomar Explorer* displaced 50,500 tons and was some 619 feet in length with a beam of nearly 116 feet. The large center well, or moon pool, provided access to the sea and accommodated the robotic claw. The vessel incorporated technological innovations, including both thrusters and a heave compensator, to limit the motion of the ship during salvage operations.

The ship went to sea in late June 1974 and began operations on July 4. It soon located the sunken submarine. The Soviets watched the operation during the next month but did not attempt to interfere. Accounts differ sharply as to JENNIFER's success. Some hold that only the forward 38 feet of the submarine was actually recovered, with two nuclear-tipped torpedoes, encoding equipment, and the bodies of eight Soviet seamen (which were then buried at sea). Other reports dispute even this success. Efforts to secure information regarding CIA involvement in the salvage operation have been denied under Freedom of Information Act restrictions.

In any case, the operation was blown in 1975 when the news media learned of it. The *Glomar Explorer* was transferred to the navy and designated *AG-193*. It was then laid up at Suisun Bay, California. The government tried to sell the ship without success, and it remained in mothballs until 1996, when Global Marine leased the vessel for a 30-year period, converting it to drill for oil off the West African coast at a maximum depth of 7,800 feet. *HMB-1* was also laid up but was converted in the 1990s from a submersible barge into a covered floating dry dock to serve as the mother ship for the stealth ship *Sea Shadow*.

The Glomar Doctrine, which allows government agencies to respond to requests under the Freedom of Information Act by refusing to confirm or deny the existence of the records that have been requested, was named after the *Glomar Explorer*. The

CIA has been accused of seriously abusing the Glomar Doctrine, usually in cases involving counterterrorism programs such as those involving targeted killing.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also Cold War and the CIA; Freedom of Information Act

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Goleniewski, Michael (1922–1993)

Michael Goleniewski was a Polish-born Cold War–era spy who at one point worked simultaneously for Polish, Soviet, and American intelligence services. His career as a triple agent was later eclipsed by his highly improbable claim that he was Czarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, the son of Czar Nicholas II of Russia, who was reportedly murdered in 1918 along with the rest of his family.

Goleniewski was born on August 16, 1922, in Nieswiez, Poland (modern-day Belarus), and served in the Polish Army, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel by 1955. He was educated at the University of Poznan, where he earned an undergraduate degree; in 1956 he received a master's degree in political science from the University of Warsaw. By the mid-1950s Goleniewski was also active in Poland's intelligence apparatus, having served as deputy head of military intelligence before heading the Polish Secret Service's technical and scientific intelligence bureau during 1957–1960. At some point in the 1950s the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, recruited Goleniewski, who provided the Soviets with top secret intelligence on the Polish military and government. This effectively made him a double agent.

In 1959 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited Goleniewski to become an informant, and he soon began providing information to the CIA on both Soviet and Polish affairs. He was given the code name “SNIPER”; meanwhile, the British intelligence agency known as MI5 dubbed him “LAVINIA.” That same year, Goleniewski told the CIA that a Polish-hired spy had infiltrated the British Royal Navy—that individual was Harry Houghton. Houghton was promptly placed under surveillance and arrested by British authorities in January 1961. Goleniewski also uncovered another mole, this one a Soviet agent who had infiltrated MI5 itself. When the mole, who turned out to be George Blake, told the KGB about Goleniewski, Goleniewski fled and went to the United States, where he requested asylum. Soon thereafter Blake and Houghton were arrested in Great Britain. Goleniewski also revealed other KGB moles, including a U.S. diplomat and a Swedish military officer.

In the summer of 1963, the U.S. Congress enacted special legislation that conferred U.S. citizenship on Goleniewski; at the time, it is believed that he remained

employed in some capacity by the CIA. However, soon thereafter he began making claims that he was the son of Czar Nicholas II, which caused much embarrassment for the CIA. In 1964, the CIA placed Goleniewski on the retired list and provided him with a lifelong pension. Goleniewski lived the remainder of his life in relative obscurity but never stopped claiming that he was the son of Russia's last czar. His claim strained all credulity because among other things, Alexei Nikolaevich was born 18 years prior to Goleniewski's previously stated birth year of 1922. Goleniewski died in New York on July 12, 1993.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cold War and the CIA; Gee, Elizabeth Ethel; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB)

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Golitsyn, Anatoliy (1926–)

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn is among the most controversial Soviet defectors to the United States. His accusations concerning Soviet infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) set off a prolonged search for Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) agents that many supporters of the agency argue crippled the agency and led to more self-inflicted harm than any KGB agent could have accomplished.

Golitsyn defected to the United States in Helsinki, Finland, in 1961, apparently to avoid a demotion for poor performance. In addition to identifying several low-level Soviet agents operating in the West and some new information on Kim Philby, Golitsyn argued that the CIA had been infiltrated by Soviet agents. Moreover, he asserted that false defectors would appear in an attempt to discredit him and protect Soviet moles. The head of the CIA's counterintelligence unit, James Angleton, became a strong believer in Golitsyn's story and gave him access to CIA operational files in an attempt to uncover these individuals. Angleton's faith in Golitsyn led him to reject the legitimacy of Yuri Nosenko, a high-ranking Soviet defector who asserted that no such mole existed. Angleton treated Nosenko as a double agent when others believed his argument and saw Golitsyn as the provocateur. A similar split befell British intelligence as a result of Golitsyn's assertion that British prime minister Harold Wilson was a KGB agent.

Over time Golitsyn's adherence to conspiracy theories directed at him personally and to the West more generally took on an extreme character. He maintained that the Sino-Soviet split, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union's conflict with Josip Tito of Yugoslavia were little more than disinformation campaigns. In 1994 Golitsyn asserted that perestroika was little more than a myth to keep the KGB in power and to lull the West into a false sense of security.

Glenn P. Hastedt

See also Angleton, James; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Nosenko, Yuri; Documents 40, 64, 98

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Goss, Porter (1938–)

Politician, intelligence operative, Republican congressman (1989–2004), and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 2004 to 2006. Porter Johnston Goss was born on November 26, 1938, in Waterbury, Connecticut, to a well-to-do family. His early education was at the exclusive Fessenden School in West Newton, Massachusetts, and the equally elite Hotchkiss High School in Lakeville, Connecticut. He attended Yale University, graduating in 1960.

Most of Goss's early career was with the CIA, specifically with the Directorate of Operations, which carries out the clandestine operations of the agency. Goss worked as a CIA agent in the Directorate of Operations from 1960 to 1971. Most of his activities in the CIA are still classified, but it is known that his area of operations included Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe. In 1970 while he was stationed in London, health problems led him to resign his post.

Goss began his political career in 1975, serving as mayor of Sanibel City, Florida, from 1975 to 1977 and again during 1981–1982. In 1988 he ran for the U.S. House seat in Florida's 13th congressional district and retained it until 1993. In 1993 he became the congressional representative from Florida's 14th congressional district and held this seat until September 23, 2004, when he resigned it to head the CIA. During his 16 years in Congress, Goss served on specialized committees that had oversight on intelligence. Although he had always been supportive of the CIA, he endorsed legislation in 1995 that would have cut intelligence personnel by 20 percent over a 5-year period as a budget-cutting measure. Goss served as chair of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence from 1997 to 2005, and he helped to establish and then served on the Homeland Security Committee.

Throughout his political career, Goss defended the CIA and generally supported budget increases for it. He also was a strong supporter of CIA director George Tenet.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks brought Goss to the political forefront. He and his colleague and friend U.S. senator Bob Graham (D-FL) began to call for a bipartisan investigation into the events surrounding September 11. Both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives there was reluctance to proceed, however. Opposition was even stronger in the George W. Bush administration against such an investigation. Most feared that an investigation would invite finger-pointing and be tainted by politics. This fear on both the Republican and Democratic sides slowed down the creation of a joint House-Senate intelligence inquiry, and the length of time provided to produce a report was unrealistically short. Despite the short time span—and reluctance or refusal to cooperate on the parts of the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the White House—a valuable report was finally issued, with sections of it censored.

Goss ultimately opposed the creation of the September 11 Commission and many of its recommendations. Like many of his fellow Republicans, he was fearful that the commission would become a witch hunt against the Bush administration. Even after it was apparent that the commission was bipartisan, Goss opposed its recommendations on intelligence matters. His biggest concern was the report's recommendation to create the position of national intelligence director, whose job would be to oversee all intelligence agencies. As a conservative Republican, Goss defended the Bush administration in its Global War on Terror and was a severe critic of what Goss called the failures of the Bill Clinton administration.

The Bush administration noted Goss's loyalty. When George Tenet resigned as director of the CIA on June 3, 2004, Goss was nominated to become CIA director. Despite opposition from some Democratic senators, Goss won confirmation on September 22, 2004. During his confirmation hearings, he promised that he would bring change and reform to the CIA.

Goss's tenure as head of the CIA provided a mixed record. He began on September 24, 2004, with a mandate for change, but the top leadership of the CIA showed reluctance to accept him. These leaders were already distressed by how the CIA had been made a scapegoat for past mistakes by both the Clinton and Bush administrations. Several of Goss's top subordinates, particularly his chief adviser Patrick Murray, clashed with senior CIA management, leading three of the CIA's top officials to resign. An attempt by Goss to make the CIA more loyal to the Bush administration also brought criticism. His memo to CIA staff that it was their job "to support the administration and its policies" became a cause of resentment. Finally, Goss's promotion of his friend Kyle Dustin "Dusty" Foggo from the ranks to a high CIA position and his links to former congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham, who was convicted of accepting bribes, lowered morale in the CIA.

Eventually, Goss lost out in a power struggle with his nominal boss, John Negroponte. One of the reforms called for in the final report of the September 11 Commission was coordination of intelligence efforts. This recommendation led to the creation of the position of director of national intelligence and the appointment

of Negroponte, a career diplomat, to that post. Goss and Negroponte had disagreements about how to reform intelligence gathering. Goss was reluctant to transfer personnel and resources from the CIA to the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Counter Proliferation Center. These disagreements led to Goss's surprising resignation on May 5, 2006, after only a 19-month tenure. His replacement was Negroponte's principal deputy director for national intelligence, U.S. Air Force general Michael Hayden.

Since his 2006 resignation, Goss has retired from public life. He owns and operates an organic farm in Virginia.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of; Tenet, George

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Guatemalan Intervention (1954)

The Guatemalan intervention of 1954 was a covert U.S.-sponsored coup against the Guatemalan regime of Jacobo Arbenz, whose policies were deemed communistic and a threat to U.S. interests. The 1954 intervention in Guatemala represented a successful covert operation backed by the United States and engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a region that had often witnessed direct U.S. military intervention in the early 20th century.

At the beginning of the Cold War, Latin America ranked low on the list of U.S. priorities. In fact, when the newly created CIA evaluated Soviet aims in Latin America in late 1947, it concluded that there was almost no possibility of a communist takeover anywhere in the area. At the same time, there existed a major disagreement over hemispheric priorities between the United States and Latin America. While the United States stressed strategic concerns, Latin American nations constantly pressed the United States to help promote economic development. Although the United States was primarily concerned with promoting stability in the area, it did not automatically oppose major change, as its substantial support for revolutionary Bolivia in the 1950s demonstrated.

The evolving situation in Guatemala, however, provoked a much different American response. U.S. policy makers' concerns with Guatemala began in 1944 upon the overthrow of longtime dictator General Jorge Ubico. The succeeding administrations of Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951), an educator, and Arbenz (1951–1954), a reform-minded army colonel, implemented a nationalist, reformist program. These reforms soon led to a conflict between the government and foreign-owned companies, especially the powerful United Fruit Company (UFCO),

an American-owned corporation. These companies had influential friends and lobbyists in Washington, and the U.S. government was increasingly concerned about the growing influence of communists in Guatemala, especially in the labor movement and in the agrarian reform program. Arbenz's new labor policy led the UFCO to pressure the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions.

The first CIA effort to overthrow the Guatemalan president—a CIA collaboration with Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza to support a disgruntled general named Carlos Castillo Armas and code-named Operation PBFORTUNE—was authorized by President Truman in 1952. As early as February of that year, CIA headquarters began generating memos with subject titles such as “Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations” outlining categories of persons to be neutralized “through Executive Action”—murder—or through imprisonment and exile. The “A” list of those to be assassinated contained 58 names.

Early in the Arbenz presidency, Guatemala became the first major laboratory for what would later become known as political destabilization. The CIA and the State Department, headed by Allen W. Dulles and John Foster Dulles, respectively, brothers who had ties to the UFCO, undertook a disinformation campaign that undermined Arbenz's legitimacy among the country's upper and middle classes and especially the armed forces. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had the CIA overthrow Arbenz's government by secretly organizing a military coup.

A shipment of Czechoslovak arms to Guatemala in May 1954 provided the United States with “evidence” that Arbenz was tilting toward the Soviet bloc and therefore had to be removed from power.

The CIA had already begun arming and training a group of Guatemalan exiles, led by Guatemalan colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, in late 1953. On June 18, 1954, this force of approximately 150 men invaded Guatemala from neighboring Honduras. Supporting the invasion force were three aircraft based in Nicaragua and flown by civilian pilots, most of whom were U.S. citizens or CIA operatives. The key to the intervention's success was neither the rebel force nor the CIA but rather the attitude assumed by the regular Guatemalan Army, which refused to mount any significant opposition to the invasion. When Arbenz took matters into his own hands and tried to arm his civilian supporters, the army prevented the move and instead forced the resignation of Arbenz on June 27. A military junta appointed Armas provisional president on July 7. Armas indicated the direction that his regime would take when he returned the UFCO lands expropriated under Arbenz. The U.S. government responded by recognizing the new government on July 13 and by providing military, economic, and technical aid to the new regime.

The Arbenz government had initially hoped for international support in the crisis. Guatemala twice appealed to the United Nations Security Council to end the fighting but received only a watered-down resolution calling for an end to any actions that might cause further bloodshed. The Organization of American States (OAS) responded to the Guatemalan situation on June 28, the day after Arbenz resigned. The OAS Council called for a meeting of foreign ministers in Rio for July 7, although the rapid consolidation of power by Armas ended the crisis, and the Rio meeting was never held.

The decision by the Eisenhower administration to intervene in Guatemala was influenced by the earlier (August–September 1953) CIA-backed coup in Iran, which had toppled a nationalist regime and restored the pro-American Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power. The lessons of Iran were applied to Guatemala. The lessons of Guatemala would in turn be applied to Cuba with disastrous results during the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961. The United States had successfully kept the Guatemalan crisis a hemispheric issue to be handled by the OAS, but the American role in Arbenz's ouster violated one of the most important provisions of the OAS Charter: the prohibition on intervention. The Eisenhower administration clearly believed that the Guatemalan operation was a major victory in the Cold War and that such covert operations offered an effective and inexpensive way of dealing with similar problems in the future. The intervention itself did little to promote peace or stability in Guatemala. Armas was assassinated in July 1957, and bitter political divisions and the socioeconomic issues behind them continue to haunt Guatemala in the 21st century.

Don M. Coerver

See also Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Dulles, Allen; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Document 71

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Guevara, Che (1928–1967)

Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna was an Argentine Marxist revolutionary and contributor to the doctrine of revolutionary warfare. Born on June 14, 1928, to a middle-class family in Rosario, Argentina, he trained as a medical doctor at the University of Buenos Aires, graduating in 1953. That same year he traveled throughout Latin America witnessing the early months of the Bolivian National Revolution and the last months of the October Revolution in Guatemala during the

reign of Jacobo Arbenz. America's covert 1954 operation that ousted the leftist Arbenz from power radicalized Guevara, as did his later encounter in Mexico with several Cuban revolutionaries, including Fidel Castro. Guevara subsequently joined Castro's expedition to Cuba in December 1956 and fought with his July 26 Movement until it triumphed in January 1959.

Guevara became Cuba's first president of the National Bank and then minister of industry in Cuba's early postrevolutionary government, where he espoused unorthodox Marxist economic ideas about the scope and timing of economic transformation. His notion of the "New Man" and his advocacy of centralized planning and the urgency of abolishing capitalist influences pitted him against more orthodox Marxist and Soviet advisers. Guevara's line won out in the early and mid-1960s, leading to a reliance on moral rather than material incentives and experiments with the abolition of currency. What was sometimes called Sino-Guevarism climaxed in the disastrous Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest Campaign of 1968. Following this, Cuba's economic policy retreated from Guevarista utopianism.

Guevara left Cuba in 1965, possibly because of disagreements with its political leadership and certainly because of a long-standing commitment to promoting worldwide revolution. In his early years in Cuba, he had been a proponent of the heretical political and military ideas of what became known as *foco* theory. The *foquistas*, including the French philosopher Régis Debray, challenged the orthodox communist emphasis on parliamentary and legal struggle, advocating instead the establishment of rural peasant-based centers (*focos*) to foment revolutionary commitments.

Guevara traveled to the Congo in 1965 and then to Bolivia in 1966. It is now believed that his project to initiate an insurrection there was prompted by a desire to use Bolivia as a focus for the transformation of neighboring countries rather than by a belief in the viability of making revolution in Bolivia itself, where a major social revolution had begun in 1952. Guevara's overwhelming goal was to provide a diversion that would weaken U.S. resolve and resources, which at the time were dedicated to waging war in Vietnam.

The *foquistas* were aware that postrevolutionary Cuba would increase American efforts to prevent more revolutions by modernizing Latin American militaries and developing modernization and reform projects such as the Alliance for Progress. But they underestimated the speed with which sections of the Bolivian armed forces would be transformed by U.S. aid and training once Guevara had located to Bolivia.

Guevara's revolutionary expedition was also handicapped by tense relations with the Bolivian Communist Party and its leader, Mario Monje, who was offended by Guevara's insistence on maintaining leadership of the revolutionary *focos*. There was also little peasant support for the Guevarista force, which was made up of both Bolivian recruits and experienced Cuban revolutionaries. Difficult terrain also complicated the revolutionaries' work, and eventually they split into two groups.

The most controversial issue surrounding the collapse of Guevara's efforts in Bolivia is whether or not Cuban support for the guerrillas was satisfactory. Some Guevara biographers have suggested that Soviet and Cuban relations with the

revolutionaries were partly shaped by Soviet annoyance at the impact that the new revolutionary front might have on its relations with the United States. Thus far, there is no conclusive evidence to support this line of argument.

A Bolivian Army unit captured Guevara in the Yuro ravine on October 8, 1967, and summarily executed him the next day at La Higuera, Villagrande. One of his hands was removed to facilitate identification by U.S. intelligence. A copy of Guevara's diaries was smuggled to Cuba, where it was published (along with an edition brokered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) as his *Bolivian Diaries*. Guevara's body was uncovered in an unmarked site in Bolivia in 1997 and, together with the remains of a number of other Cuban revolutionaries who died in Bolivia, was repatriated to Cuba for interment in a monument in Santa Clara City.

Barry Carr

See also Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Documents 30, 38

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Gulf of Tonkin Incident (1964)

On August 4, 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson announced to the world in a radio speech an alleged attack by North Vietnamese naval patrol boats on two U.S. destroyers—USS *Maddox* and USS *Turner Joy*—and stated that America would not allow such attacks to occur without a response. The result of the reported incident and Johnson's speech was the enactment of the Southeast Asia Resolution (more commonly known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution) by the U.S. Congress, which granted Johnson the authority to engage in military operations in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war. The alleged attack conveniently came at a time when Johnson wished to expand military operations in South Vietnam to help stem the spread of communism from North Vietnam but needed political support to do so. However, even though the ruse was successful, even at that time the reality of the alleged attack was questioned and has today been essentially revealed as fictional.

During the early stages of the Vietnam War, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was conducting numerous covert operations against North Vietnam, which included landings and attacks along the North Vietnamese coast. Just prior to the incidents in question, some of these covert operations were being executed along the coast of North Vietnam as part of Operation Plan 34-ALPHA, which was part of another secret program named DESOTO that was designed to gather electronic intelligence from the North Vietnamese employing U.S. Navy ships. USS *Maddox* was



In early August 1964, USS *Maddox* steamed along North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin gathering intelligence when the ship came under attack by torpedo boats. The incident prompted President Lyndon B. Johnson to order retaliatory air strikes and to ask Congress to authorize the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resulting in a new, more aggressive phase of the war. (Library of Congress)

apparently conducting signal intelligence operations off the coast of North Vietnam under DESOTO that were not directly related to the covert operations being executed at that time. In 1964 the Department of Defense assumed control of the program, although CIA personnel continued to be involved.

The official story was that on August 2, USS *Maddox* reported that it was under attack from three North Vietnamese Navy patrol boats while in international waters. USS *Maddox* returned fire and was supported by aircraft from a U.S. aircraft carrier, USS *Ticonderoga*. The engagement was reported to have resulted in damage to the three patrol boats and several North Vietnamese casualties, with only light damage to one plane and the destroyer. Then on August 4 only a few hours after several raids on the North Vietnamese coast, it was reported that the destroyers, USS *Maddox* and USS *Turner Joy*, were attacked without provocation by several more North Vietnamese Navy patrol boats, resulting in an extensive battle.

Based on this official story, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed. However, during the conferences before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Service Committees, there was resistance on several issues, including the “coincidental” presence of DESOTO missions when CIA-backed covert missions were being executed, raising the obvious inference that the DESOTO missions were involved in the covert operations and that they may have been providing cover for them.

Over the years, information has been revealed indicating that the official account was not accurate. In November 2001, the LBJ Library and Museum released some tapes of conversations between Johnson and Defense Secretary John McNamara

discussing using the staged Tonkin Gulf Incident as a pretext to expand the war in Vietnam. Additionally, in late 2005 the National Security Agency (NSA) released previously classified archives that included documents showing that NSA agents had skewed the intelligence to show that the North Vietnamese Navy patrol boats had attacked. Furthermore, the CIA has released numerous formerly classified documents, including Operation Plan 34-ALPHA, concerning its covert operations during the Vietnam War. Moreover, additional information has been revealed in books by McNamara, who admitted that nothing happened on August 4 and that the United States was essentially provoking North Vietnam.

The August 2 incident apparently occurred when USS *Maddox* was within the 12-mile limit of waters claimed by North Vietnam, which the United States did not recognize. When North Vietnamese Navy patrol boats approached to within 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired some warning shots, which precipitated the military engagement between the two sides. There are documents that support the proposition that the United States repeatedly violated the 12-mile limit claimed by North Vietnam in an effort to provoke the North Vietnamese.

There was allegedly a second incident on August 4 in which it was reported that the North Vietnamese Navy intentionally attacked the destroyers USS *Maddox* and USS *Turner Joy*. This was the incident that spurred Johnson to take action and request authorization for expansion of military operations against North Vietnam. Subsequently revealed classified documents provide substantial evidence that the NSA had either intentionally falsified or, at the least, grossly and negligently reported intelligence about the alleged attack. Indeed, an NSA historical study acknowledged that there were no North Vietnamese Navy vessels in the area on August 4 where the attack was alleged to have occurred.

From the information now available, a number of authorities accept the proposition that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was what is considered to be a false-flag operation. False-flag operations are incidents manufactured by a nation to justify a war against another nation where no such justification actually exists. One of the most famous false-flag operations was at the start of World War II in which Adolf Hitler announced an attack by Polish troops to justify the start of World War II whereas in fact he had arranged for concentration camp inmates to be dressed in Polish uniforms and then taken to the Polish border and executed and photographed in an attempt to deceive the world into believing that Poland had attacked Germany. Although much of the information currently available on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident shows that the CIA was not directly involved in the presentation of the nonexistent August 4 attack, there is evidence showing CIA involvement in the covert operations against North Vietnam related to or concurrently executed with the DESOTO operations that formed the environment for the incident. Further questions are raised when considering the CIA's involvement in the reporting of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which subsequently proved to be false, as justification for the invasion of that country. History tends to repeat itself.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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GUSTO, Project (1950s)

The 1950s presented a significant challenge to the U.S. intelligence program, as the Soviet Union proved to be an extremely difficult target for traditional espionage operations. In 1954 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contracted the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to build the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The U-2 had the ability to fly at the unprecedented height of 70,000 feet, which was beyond the range of Soviet fighters and missiles. This capability allowed the U-2 to take detailed photographs of Soviet military facilities.

The U-2's development began under the direction of a group headed by Richard Bissell of the CIA. In June 1956 the aircraft was operational, but its weaknesses were already apparent. Initially, CIA project officers estimated that the U-2 would be able to fly safely over the Soviet Union for two years before it became vulnerable to Soviet air defenses. However, the Soviets tracked the U-2 from its first mission. The aircraft remained operational for several years, but efforts were already under way to make it less vulnerable.

After a year of discussion with aviation companies beginning in the late summer of 1956, the CIA focused its attention on building a jet that could fly at extremely high speeds and altitudes while incorporating state-of-the-art techniques in radar absorption or deflection. This project was code-named GUSTO. In the autumn of 1957, Bissell established an advisory committee to help select a design for the U-2's successor. Chaired by Polaroid chief executive Edwin Land, the committee met seven times between November 1957 and August 1959. The two most prominent firms involved in the process were Lockheed, which already was investigating designs for the U-2's replacement, and Convair, which was building a supersonic bomber for the U.S. Air Force, the B-58 Hustler.

The goal of Project GUSTO was to develop a reconnaissance aircraft with a reduced radar cross-section (RCS) so that it would be less detectable. Reducing the RCS would mean that radars guiding the missiles would have less time to track the aircraft, thus complicating the attack. In August 1957, efforts turned to examining supersonic designs, as research analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. Between 1957 and 1958, a multitude of proposals were submitted that were constantly refined and adapted to the needs of the project.

The design that was selected for production was proposed by Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, who proposed an aircraft that would be able to dominate the skies for not just one or two years but for a decade or more. Johnson presented the Archangel I design, which had the capability of cruising at Mach 3 for extended periods of time, allowing it to evade detection more easily. The downfall of the Archangel I was that it was not designed for reduced RCS. A series of Archangel designs were presented, and in December 1958 after hearing the recommendations of the committee, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved further funding for the U-2’s successor. By 1959, final designs were submitted for development.

On August 29, 1959, the selection panel chose Lockheed’s A-12 design, despite the fact that Convair’s design had the ability for reduced RCS, which the A-12 did not. The A-12 was chosen, but Lockheed was given a January 1, 1960, deadline to demonstrate that it could reduce the aircraft’s RCS. The CIA awarded Lockheed a four-month contract of \$4.5 million to continue with antiradar studies, structural tests, and engineering designs. Project GUSTO was then terminated and renamed OXCART, which is the name that the final aircraft eventually took on. On January 26, 1960, the CIA ordered 12 A-12 aircrafts. After this selection, the production took place under the code name OXCART. The A-12 was produced from 1962 through 1964.

Abigail Sessions

See also A-12 Blackbird; Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Documents 26, 27, 29, 40, 42

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Handwriting Analysis

Graphology is the study and analysis of handwriting through slant, pressure, and many other features. It is a projective technique that some scholars argue can be used to profile human behavior in the areas of psychology, social skills, thinking styles, work habits, and even possibly ways of dealing with stress. Handwriting analysis can be used to compare different personalities and determine their potential for compatibility, their problem-solving and interpersonal skills, how they might fit into an integrated team, and how well they may react under pressure. The concept behind graphology is that handwriting is essentially a visual representation of the human brain's complex neurological systems, offering insight to the trained interpreter. Handwriting is generally acknowledged to have a physiological link to the brain, and proponents of this field of study believe that one's personality, thinking processes, imagination, emotional responsiveness, defense mechanisms, and fears are all reflected in one's handwriting.

There are three basic approaches to graphology: the holistic approach, the integrative approach, and the symbolic approach. The holistic approach begins with an intuitive reaction to the handwriting, based on the overall appearance. Then it deduces an individual's type and uses that for the graphological report. Essentially, a profile is created based on form, movement, and space. The second approach is the integrative approach, which begins with registering what the characters of the handwriting are and building a graphological profile from them. This approach concedes that specific stroke structures, or clusters of structures, relate to specific personality traits.

The final approach, symbolic analysis, looks at specific elements within handwriting and assigns them various meanings (as symbols). Graphology uses at least 300 different handwriting features in the interpretation process, although no single sample of handwriting will show all 300 features. Graphologists hold that the different features and the interactions between them provide the basis for analysis. The following are examples of some of the handwriting features that a graphologist may examine:

- *Slant*: A right slant indicates a response to communication. If the handwriting is generally upright, this indicates independence. A tendency to slant toward the left shows emotion and reserve.
- *Size*: Large-sized handwriting can indicate extraversion or a pretense of confidence, whereas small-sized handwriting indicates the opposite.

- *Pressure*: Heavy pressure indicates commitment and taking things seriously. Light pressure shows sensitivity to atmosphere and empathy to people.
- *Upper or lower zone*: Tall upper strokes indicate ambition or perhaps unrealistic expectations. Reasonably proportioned upper and lower zones indicate using imagination in a sensible way. Straight strokes in the lower zone show impatience and possibly avoidance of confrontation.
- *Word spacing*: Wide spaces between words indicate a person needing space, whereas narrow spaces between words indicate a desire to be with others.
- *Line spacing*: Wide-spaced lines of handwriting show a wish to remain aloof, and closely spaced lines indicate someone who enjoys being close to the action.
- *Angle*: An angled middle zone is the analytical style with sharp points as opposed to curves. This person will be less nurturing and more pragmatic.
- *Wavy line*: Wavy lines are usually written by people who are mentally mature and skillful.
- *Thread*: These writers are mentally alert and adaptable but can also be elusive and lacking patience. They are responders rather than initiators.
- *Garland*: This looks like cups or troughs in the rounded letters, indicating helpfulness and a desire to be involved.
- *Arcade*: When the middle zone of writing is humped and rounded at the top like a series of arches, this indicates independence, protectiveness, loyalty, and trustworthiness.

While the validity of graphology is debatable and any determination about a person's suitability for a job or personality structure as a whole should be made in combination with many other resources, it is generally acknowledged that there are some scenarios in which handwriting analysis could prove useful. For example, when there is limited access or when the person is dead, out of reach for a personal interview, or perhaps is unwilling to talk and be tested, a graphological profile may prove to be a satisfactory substitute. Generally speaking, a competent graphologist could make a reliable estimate on such character traits as a disposition to talk too much, emotional stability under stress, aggressiveness, tenacity, resistance, and rebelliousness. These character traits (among others) would be of utmost importance in clandestine operations.

One example of how graphology has been utilized in the world of counterespionage and counterintelligence is in the case of Adolf Tolkachev. In 1978 the handwriting experts in the Office of Technical Service in the Central Intelligence Agency analyzed a handwritten note by Tolkachev prior to their first meeting with him. The report observed that the writer was of above average intelligence and was purposeful and self-confident and had a healthy degree of self-discipline and also had good organizational abilities and attention to detail. They found him to be both

intellectually and psychologically well equipped to be a successful and versatile asset.

Abigail Sessions

See also Invisible Ink; Document 1

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Hekmati, Amir (1983–)

Amir Mirzaei Hekmati is a U.S.-born Iranian American and a former U.S. marine. Hekmati graduated from high school in Michigan and enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps. After he left the Marines Corps in 2005 as a rifleman, he reportedly worked for the security contractor BAE Systems from March to August 2010, before leaving to work for another contractor in Qatar. BAE Systems is among the world's largest military contractors, and Hekmati's employment was verified by company spokesman Brian Roehrkasse, who also stated that Hekmati left the company to take a civilian position within the U.S. government.

On August 29, 2011, the Iranian government allegedly detained Hekmati, who was reportedly visiting his relatives in Iran. After two weeks in Iran, he was detained without explanation. No charges were brought at the time of his arrest, although later reports stated that he was accused of being an intelligence operative for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and is being held in Iran on death row. According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Hekmati's conviction is the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that an American citizen has been sentenced to death. The espionage charges against Hekmati were similar to previous prosecutions against Americans who were sentenced to jail and later freed.

Iranian television broadcast Hekmati's alleged confession in which he stated that he was sent by the CIA into Tehran to infiltrate the Iranian Intelligence Ministry. He elaborated that his mission was to turn over some useful information to the Iranians, letting them think that it was useful intelligence. In the video he also stated that he worked for the military's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and for Kuma Games, which is a computer games company. Hekmati stated that Kuma received funding from the CIA to design and make special films

and computer games to change the public's mind-set about U.S. presence and activities in the Middle East.

While both Hekmati's family and the CIA deny any affiliation between Hekmati and the CIA, the Iranians state that Hekmati was trained in military intelligence for 10 years by the U.S. Army before being sent to Iran as a double agent for the CIA. According to ABC News, Hekmati's military service records show that he served in the U.S. Marines Corps but has never served in the U.S. Army and has had no military intelligence training.

Despite the military records and the CIA's denial of Hekmati's involvement, Hekmati did possess an identification card (which was broadcast during his confession on Iranian television) with writing in English, identifying Hekmati as an "army contractor." In the video there are also several photos of Hekmati in military uniform, together with U.S. Army officers.

The death sentence for Hekmati was handed down at a time when Iran's nuclear activities were causing heightened tensions between Iran and the United States due to Iran's uranium enrichment and the United States strengthening sanctions against Iran. Regardless of the intricacies of the case, Hekmati may possibly be seen as a potential bargaining chip in the efforts to fend off stricter U.S.-imposed sanctions that could threaten Iran's oil industry.

Swiss diplomats, representing U.S. interests in Iran, have been unsuccessful in their attempts to gain access to Hekmati. Since his arrest in August 2011, Hekmati had been held without access to his family, a lawyer, or consular assistance in violation of international law. Additionally, according to representatives for Amnesty International, he was also denied a fair trial, with no access to a lawyer or diplomatic assistance—also in violation of international law.

Hekmati's family continues to negotiate with the Iranian government with the help of the U.S. State Department. Victoria Nuland, spokeswoman for the State Department, has acknowledged that the discussions are complicated, as they involve debates over both intelligence and technological matters.

Abigail Sessions

See also Contractors; Iran-Contra Affair; Roosevelt, Kermit, Jr.

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Helms, Richard (1913–2002)

Career U.S. intelligence officer and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1966–1973. Born in St. Davids, Pennsylvania, on March 30, 1913, Richard McGarrah Helms graduated from Williams College in 1935 and worked for United Press in Europe during 1935–1937. Returning to the United States, he became director of advertising for the Indianapolis Times Publishing Company.

In 1942 Helms resigned from this position and enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Owing to his fluency in German, he was invited to join the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943, where he worked with future CIA director Allen W. Dulles. Helms remained with the OSS in Germany after the war and became part of the CIA when it was established in 1947.

During the late 1940s and 1950s, Helms was stationed in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. He also served several years at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. As his influence and stature grew during the 1960s, he became involved in CIA activities that were at least questionably unethical; these included planning assassination attempts on Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the overthrow of Republic of Vietnam president Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, who was subsequently murdered in a generals' putsch in 1963.



CIA director Richard Helms prepares to go before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that investigated intelligence operations, in May 1973. Four years later, he became the only CIA director convicted of misleading Congress. (AP Photo/Henry Griffin)

After a stint as CIA deputy director during 1965–1966, Helms was appointed director of the CIA in 1966 by President Lyndon Johnson. As such, Helms continued to engage in questionable endeavors. Under his direction, the CIA supported more than 100 research projects focused on mind control, including experimentation involving illegal drugs on human subjects. He also supported aggressive CIA activities in Vietnam. Under Helms, the CIA engaged in domestic surveillance operations. He launched operations designed to investigate the relationships between American dissidents and foreign governments and to target peace movements and radical college organizations, although these operations were a serious violation of the CIA's charter. These lasted until the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973.

Helms also became increasingly concerned over the emergence of left-wing movements in Latin America. In 1973 he directed the CIA-sponsored coup d'état against Salvador Allende, the popularly elected president of Chile. Allende was assassinated, and Chile came to be governed by a rightist military junta under General Augusto Pinochet.

President Richard M. Nixon, under fire for the Watergate Scandal, refused to reappoint Helms as CIA director in 1973, allegedly because Helms refused to involve the CIA in Watergate. Helms then became U.S. ambassador to Iran, a post he held until 1976. In 1977, Congress investigated Helms's part in the fall of the Allende regime and determined that he was guilty of perjury for failing to truthfully answer questions posed by Congress. He was fined \$2,000 and given a two-year suspended sentence. He then became a consultant for international business. Helms died in Washington, D.C., on October 23, 2002.

William T. Walker

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Chile; Church Committee; Cuba; Dulles, Allen; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Lumumba, Patrice; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Hersh, Seymour (1937–)

Controversial Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author, vocal critic of the Iraq War, and in 2004 among the various sources who publicized the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Seymour Myron Hersh was born in Chicago on April 8, 1937. His parents were Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, and he grew up in a working-class inner-city neighborhood.

Hersh graduated from the University of Chicago in 1959 and began his long journalism career as a police reporter in Chicago, working for the City News Bureau. Not long after, he joined United Press International (UPI) and by 1963 had become a UPI correspondent covering both Washington, D.C., and Chicago. Hersh soon earned a reputation as a hard-driving investigative reporter. In 1968 he served as Senator Eugene McCarthy's press secretary during the senator's unsuccessful bid for the 1968 Democratic presidential nomination. After that, Hersh became a reporter based in Washington, D.C., for the *New York Times*. It was here that he became internationally renowned for his investigative reporting.

In November 1969, it was Hersh who first revealed the story of the March 1968 My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against South Vietnamese civilians. His scoop also included the bombshell that the Pentagon had engaged in a purposeful campaign to cover up evidence of the massacre to ensure that it did not become public knowledge. For his reporting of the incident and its aftermath, Hersh received the Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for 1970.

In early 1974, Hersh had planned to publish a story on Project JENNIFER, the code name for a CIA project to recover a sunken Soviet Navy submarine from the floor of the Pacific Ocean. It has since been revealed that the government offered a convincing argument to delay publication in early 1974—exposure at that time, while the project was ongoing, “would have caused an international incident.” The *New York Times* eventually published its account in 1975, after a story appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*, and included a five-paragraph explanation of the many twists and turns in the path to publication. It is unclear what, if any, action was taken by the Soviet Union after learning of the story.

Later that year, Hersh revealed some of the contents of the “Family Jewels” list in a front-page *New York Times* article in December 1974, in which he reported that “The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States according to well-placed Government sources.”

Hersh made it his business to seek out stories that he knew would be hard to break and that would generate a maximum amount of attention. In 1986, three years after a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 jetliner was blasted out of the sky by Soviet jet fighters, Hersh published a book in which he alleged that the incident—coming as it did at the height of the renewed Cold War—was caused by Soviet stupidity and provocative U.S. intelligence operations that had been sanctioned by the Ronald Reagan administration. Later, Hersh's conclusions were somewhat vindicated by the subsequent release of classified government documents. Hersh's critics on the Right, however, were outraged by his allegation that the tragedy had been brought about by U.S. policy.

Hersh continued his investigative reporting, often working independently of any publication or news agency so that he could be free to pursue those stories that most interested him. He did, however, develop a long-standing relationship with *New Yorker* magazine, for which he has frequently provided articles and opinion pieces. In August 1998 Hersh once more drew the ire of the political establishment by blasting the Bill Clinton administration for authorizing the bombing of a

suspected chemical weapons factory in Sudan, which Hersh concluded was in fact an important pharmaceutical-manufacturing facility. The bombing was in retaliation for the bombings of U.S. embassies by Al Qaeda terrorists, who were believed to be operating in Sudan.

The Iraq War, which began in March 2003, drew Hersh's attention and scrutiny. Since that time, he has launched numerous in-depth investigations into various events and developments in Iraq and into the George W. Bush administration's interest in pursuing regime change against Syria and Iran. In the spring of 2004, Hersh published a series of articles illuminating the extent of the prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq's Abu Ghraib Prison. This unleashed a torrent of media attention, the release of photos showing prisoner abuse, and a major congressional investigation. Hersh also alleged that prisoners had been tortured in other holding facilities, including those in Afghanistan and at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. That same year he also wrote that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 had been based on faulty intelligence about Iraq and that Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had purposely misused prewar intelligence to manufacture a justification of war. Hersh was intensely disliked by the Bush administration, and some military analysts were not permitted to cite him. Richard Perle, a leading neoconservative and frequent adviser to the Bush White House, termed Hersh a journalistic "terrorist." In March 2007 Hersh excoriated the Bush administration's surge strategy, alleging that it would only embolden Sunni extremists in Iraq.

Beginning in January 2005, Hersh began publishing a series of articles in which he alleged that the U.S. government was clandestinely preparing to launch preemptive air strikes against suspected nuclear weapons facilities in Iran. The Bush administration denied that such operations were being contemplated but did not deny that contingency plans existed. In 2006, Hersh wrote that the United States was preparing to use a nuclear bunker-busting bomb against Iranian nuclear facilities. This provoked a vehement denial from the White House and the Pentagon. President Bush termed Hersh's allegations "wild speculation." In late 2007, Hersh drew the ire of many Democrats when he asserted that Senator Hillary Clinton's hawkish views on Iran were related to the large number of donations her presidential campaign had received from American Jews.

Hersh has sharply criticized both Democratic and Republican administrations. In 1997 he was criticized in some circles for a book he published on President John F. Kennedy. Critics pointed to the book's evidentiary value, its dubious allegations that Kennedy had been married before he wed Jacqueline Bouvier, and its claim that the president had a long-standing relationship with Chicago mob boss Sam Giancana.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also "Family Jewels"; Document 93

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Howard, Edward Lee (1951–2002)

In June 1986, Edward Lee Howard became the first-known Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer to defect to the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB). Howard, an army brat who was raised in New Mexico, graduated from the University of Texas in 1972. Upon graduation, he served in the Peace Corps and went on to receive an MBA from American University. He was briefly employed at the U.S. Agency for International Development before the CIA's Directorate of Operations hired him in January 1980. In the autumn of 1981 Howard's wife, Mary, joined him at the CIA, and she too was trained for clandestine work. In 1983 Howard failed a series of polygraph tests about his past illegal drug use and was fired by the CIA. Disgruntled by his dismissal, he disclosed the identity of his CIA contact in the U.S. embassy in Moscow after making an angry phone call over a KGB-tapped line.

Upon Howard's return home to New Mexico, he descended into a downward spiral of drinking while working for the state in Santa Fe. He was arrested for a firearms violation in 1984 and was later paroled. By 1985, Howard was identified by Vitaly



Edward Lee Howard walks in Moscow, where he fled after providing classified information on CIA activities. He died in 2002, reportedly from a broken neck after a fall at his Russian home. (AP Photo/Tanya Makeyeva)

Yurchenko (a KGB defector) and CIA case officer Aldrich Ames as a KGB source code-named Robert in the CIA. Using his CIA training, Howard evaded the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and fled the United States for the Soviet Union before he could be arrested. After Howard's escape his wife told the FBI that she now knew he had gone to Vienna in 1984 and had been paid for classified documents. It appears that he probably did leave a note at the Soviet embassy in 1983. In 1984, probably in July, the Soviets had accepted him as a possible defector, funded his flight to Europe, and received valuable documents. His reward was money put into a Swiss bank account. The CIA found that it contained possibly US\$150,000. Also, his wife took the FBI to a small box of gold and money hidden in the desert near their home.

The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee inquired into the Howard case; privately one of the members admitted that the committee would never find the truth and observed that the CIA was limiting the information it was prepared to give. Inside the CIA, at least two investigations were made.

In exchange for asylum, Howard supposedly turned over the names of CIA officers serving in Moscow and a top Soviet scientist who specialized in stealth technology. After Howard's flight, Yurchenko redefected to the Soviet Union, and Ames was convicted of spying for the Soviets in 1994. These events cast doubts on Howard's level of participation. On July 12, 2002, Howard was found dead with a broken neck after apparently falling down steps in his Russian dacha.

Lazarus F. O'Sako

See also Yurchenko, Vitaly

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HT-LINGUAL, Operation (1952–1973)

HT-LINGUAL is the crypt for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mail-opening and mail-cover program from 1952 to 1973. Operation HT-LINGUAL began in 1952 to find out if illegal Soviet agents in the United States were communicating with the Soviet Union through the U.S. mail, if reading these letters might possibly reveal useful information, or if any of the letter writers might be recruitable into U.S. espionage.

The operation was kept under the control of James Angleton, who ran it until 1973 when William Colby was appointed the director of CIA. *New York Times* journalist Seymour Hersh warned Colby that he had found out about the secret Operation HT-LINGUAL and would publish what he knew in December 1973, declaring it a massive espionage program directed against U.S. citizens and therefore a violation of the CIA's Charter.

In 1990 the CIA reported that it destroyed most of its formal HT-LINGUAL records. However, the CIA did retain a few working files, including files on Lee Harvey Oswald (President John F. Kennedy's assassin) from the HT-LINGUAL project. Information was collected on Oswald in 1959 when press reports from Moscow announced that he had renounced his U.S. citizenship and applied for Soviet citizenship.

Like Operation CHAOS, Operation HT-LINGUAL was investigated by the U.S. Congress in the summer of 1975 by the Church Committee, a special U.S. Senate committee headed by Senator Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho.

Jan Goldman

See also Angleton, James; CHAOS, Operation; Church Committee; Hersh, Seymour

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Hughes-Ryan Amendment

Passed in 1974, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment established requirements for the approval and reporting of covert actions prior to the expenditure by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of appropriated money for operations in foreign countries. Coauthored by Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa and Representative Leo Ryan of California, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment formed part of a larger piece of legislation that amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The amendment did not apply to CIA operations that solely involved the gathering of intelligence or military operations initiated by the United States.

Prior to the use of appropriated funds for a covert action, the president of the United States was required to report to various congressional committees that the covert action was important to the national security of the United States. The Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives were both explicitly included in the list of committees that were entitled to notification. Senator Hughes stated that the amendment did not imply that covert actions required prior congressional approval, nor did it imply that Congress disapproved of covert action in general. He viewed his amendment as a temporary measure in anticipation of a permanent arrangement between the executive and legislative branches regarding oversight of covert actions.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment came at a time when Congress had decided to take a more active role in scrutinizing the actions of the executive branch in matters of foreign affairs and national security. For many, the national security rationale for conducting various intelligence operations too easily became a convenient cover for a variety of activities that violated the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens or represented an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. News accounts about CIA intervention in Chilean politics in the 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in the overthrow of the government of President Salvador Allende, helped press Congress toward action. While some members of Congress questioned the justifiability of covert action during times of peace, the more urgent concern was that Congress was funding covert actions without knowing the number or nature of the covert actions that were actually being conducted by the CIA. By requiring that the president report to members of Congress the description and scope of each covert action, it was hoped that the CIA would be less likely to conduct covert actions that would not withstand outside scrutiny.

Although the Hughes-Ryan Amendment eventually passed, a number of senators voiced concern that this reporting requirement would undermine the secrecy that was absolutely essential for covert action, since the amendment would increase the number of members of Congress who were informed about the activities of the intelligence community. Prior notification of covert action also gave Congress a powerful weapon to use against the executive branch should a member of Congress wish to use this knowledge as a bargaining chip. Since notification was required before the expenditure of appropriated funds, Congress could potentially suspend funding for a covert action with which it disapproved. By doing so, Congress could intrude into the implementation of foreign policy whose primary responsibility, many believed, was given by the U.S. Constitution to the president.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was the only statutory provision for intelligence oversight until the passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981. Embedded in the Intelligence Authorization Act were provisions that had been passed previously by the U.S. Senate in a separate piece of legislation known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. The Intelligence Oversight Act significantly modified the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and shifted the oversight provisions to a newly created chapter of the National Security Act of 1947. The new legislation limited the notification requirements for a “significant anticipated intelligence activity” to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. The act made clear that notification did not denote that prior approval of Congress was necessary before initiating the activity in question. Additionally, the president, in extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States, could further limit the members of Congress who were notified.

The remnants of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment—Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—were repealed by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. Although the original Hughes-Ryan Amendment no longer exists, provisions dealing with the approval and reporting of covert actions have

been expanded and elaborated in greater detail in subsequent amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.

Christopher Vallandingham

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Chile; Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980; National Security Act of 1947; Documents 45, 49, 51, 52

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Huk Rebellion (1947–1952)

The Huk Rebellion was viewed by the United States as a serious communist threat to a corrupt but friendly Philippine government. Military aid, advice, and reforms led to a government victory and the end of the gravest threat to that nation’s stability.

By the 1930s, traditional forms of agriculture in the Philippines broke down. Landowners with large holdings forced peasant farmers to surrender major portions of their crops as rent. Peasant leagues were formed, most with communist and socialist leadership. When Japanese forces occupied the Philippines, those



Luis Taruc, rebel leader of the Huks in the Philippines (center with newspaper) and founder of the communist struggle in the Philippines, poses with other peasant militants in this undated photograph. (Bettmann/Corbis)

peasant leagues formed the basis of guerrilla groups known as the Hukbalahap, or Huks. Their acknowledged leader was Luis Taruc. The Huks actively assassinated Japanese officials and Philippine elites who collaborated with them. By the end of World War II, the Huks controlled much of central Luzon and hoped for a role in the government of the Philippines.

The Philippines became an independent country on July 4, 1946. Elections for a new government based on the U.S. model were held in April 1946. The election process was bloody and corrupt. Manuel Roxas, a wealthy landlord and suspected collaborator, became president. Taruc was elected to the House of Representatives but was denied his seat. His attempts to negotiate with Roxas and with Roxas's successor, Elpidio Quirino, failed. Taruc rebuilt the wartime Huk units, which the Philippine Army had refused to accept, and opened a terrorist campaign in 1947.

The Huks appealed to peasants with a program of land reform. The Huk Rebellion was focused in central Luzon, the richest farming region in the Philippines. The national police, the Philippine Constabulary, was poorly trained and unable to stop the Huks' hit-and-run attacks. The standard 90-man police unit was routinely defeated by larger Huk forces.

By 1948, the U.S. government was concerned with what it feared was a communist insurgency in the Philippines. Millions of dollars and tons of military supplies were sent to the Philippines. By 1950, most of central Luzon was under Huk control. The U.S. government pressured President Quirino to appoint Ramon Magsaysay as minister of defense. Magsaysay had led a guerrilla unit against the Japanese and was pro-American. He was advised by Colonel Edward Lansdale, psychological warfare expert for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group under General Leland S. Hobbes directed military aid and support to the Philippine armed forces.

Results were soon obvious. The Philippine Constabulary was merged with the Philippine Army, and battalion-sized strike forces soon became the norm. More important, government intelligence improved. In October 1950, the top leadership of the Communist Party in the Philippines was captured just before a planned attack on Manila. Lansdale persuaded Magsaysay to offer bounties for dead Huks. The minister also removed the most corrupt and ineffective military leaders. Propaganda among the peasants began to turn them against the Huks. Widely publicized yet limited land reforms offered alternatives to the Huk program. Abuses were rapidly corrected by Magsaysay with wide media coverage. Ultimately, the Huks lost the vital support of the peasants.

By mid-1952, the rebellion was in decline. Congressional elections in 1951 were bloody but were regarded as essentially honest, which gave the Philippine government more credibility. Magsaysay was easily elected president in 1953, and he initiated further reforms. In 1954 Taruc surrendered, and the Huk Rebellion finally ended.

Tim J. Watts

See also Lansdale, Edward

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Human Intelligence

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the various other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community classify intelligence according to type. Classifying intelligence in this manner simplifies, shortens, and facilitates the communicating, reporting, analysis, and evaluation of raw intelligence gathered by the various intelligence agencies and aids in the development of new intelligence-gathering techniques.

The CIA, the other intelligence agencies, and the U.S. military widely employ the use of acronyms to simplify and ease communications (verbal, written, and electronic) concerning a wide range of technological or complex topics and/or lengthy identifiers, titles, or agencies. The classifications of the various general types of intelligence are no different. The more common classifications of types of intelligence include HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), COMINT (communications intelligence), ELINT (electronic intelligence), and IMINT (image intelligence). All of the intelligence agencies of the United States engage in one or more of these different types of intelligence, with some agencies focusing or specializing more heavily on one of them.

Essentially stated, HUMINT is the information directly gathered by human assets. There are any number of possible HUMINT sources. HUMINT was the classical method of intelligence gathering since the first employment of spies. Examples of such sources include observations by military personnel specially trained in intelligence gathering (such as the U.S. Army's Long Range Surveillance Units or the U.S. Marines Corps' Force Recon Units); observations by and conversations involving cooperating diplomatic personnel on assignment in foreign nations (a majority of cover stories for CIA intelligence officers involve diplomatic postings); information obtained from foreign nationals working in foreign military, diplomatic, or intelligence agencies (subverting foreign nationals in these positions is one of the primary goals of the CIA's National Clandestine Service); information obtained from commercial personnel in foreign nations (economic espionage is not limited to corporations and does include government intelligence agencies, as economic information can be and frequently is a matter of national security); and information obtained from scientific personnel (advances in science and technology are crucial to national security, especially when the technological

abilities of an intelligence agency, such as the National Security Agency [NSA] and the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] are considered).

The U.S. intelligence community consists of 17 agencies: the CIA; the NSA; the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Secret Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which handles domestic counterterrorism; the Defense Intelligence Agency; Army Intelligence; Navy Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence; Marine Corps Intelligence; Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of State; the Department of Energy; the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Department of the Treasury; the NRO; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA is the primary employer of HUMINT techniques in the U.S. intelligence community. However, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security use the technique extensively in their counterintelligence duties. The Department of State, in large part because of its unique employment of diplomats, has greater access to foreign intelligence than do many other intelligence operatives and thus employs HUMINT techniques. The DEA in its international fight against illegal drugs and international cartels employs HUMINT techniques through the use of informants. Furthermore, the military employs HUMINT for the gathering of military intelligence, especially during times of war.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Communications Intelligence; Electronic Intelligence; Image Intelligence; Signals Intelligence; Document 16

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HUMINT

See Human Intelligence

Huston Plan

Plan advanced by the Richard M. Nixon administration to coordinate intelligence-gathering agencies in order to control so-called subversive elements within the United States during the Vietnam War. The plan was named for one of its sponsors, administration staffer Tom Huston. Formally known as the “Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan: Analysis and Strategy,” the Huston Plan was developed in June 1970 in response to the antiwar demonstrations that erupted in the wake of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. The plan called for the formation of a permanent interagency intelligence committee to coordinate domestic intelligence gathering by elements of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

A variety of methods were to be used to carry out unrestricted domestic surveillance, including wiretaps, infiltration of subversive groups, mail opening, electronic surveillance, and break-ins, to gather information on individuals and groups believed to be an internal threat to the United States.

Although the plan was highly illegal, President Richard M. Nixon initially approved it on July 14. After FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General John Mitchell voiced their objections to the plan’s illegality, Nixon withdrew his approval. Although the Huston Plan was never implemented, a new Intelligence Evaluation Committee as well as the CIA’s Operation CHAOS were later established for the purpose of gathering internal intelligence. The Huston Plan offered a preview of things to come. Illegal efforts to stamp out criticism of Nixon’s Vietnam policy and plug information leaks ultimately resulted in the Watergate Scandal and the president’s downfall in 1974.

Cynthia Northrup

See also Church Committee; Foreign Broadcast Information Service; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Hypnosis

Hypnosis is defined as a special state of altered consciousness in which select capacities within a individual’s mind are emphasized while other capacities fade into the mind’s background. While under hypnosis, an individual experiences a strong fixation, absorption, and induction into a trancelike state, requiring the individual to have his or her conscious, critical abilities suspended as the individual becomes increasingly absorbed into his or her personal experiences. For instance,

individuals under hypnosis can be deeply absorbed into dreams or hallucinations of nonexistent people or numbed to painful dental procedures without any kind of painkilling medications. It is estimated that 9 out of 10 people can be successfully hypnotized.

The framework of hypnosis involves obtaining the individual's permission, stimulating the individual's interest, and narrowing his or her attention. A hypnotized individual is directed to turn his or her consciousness inward. The practice of hypnosis involves a quality of selective concentration to the extent that individuals become so absorbed in and focused on the experience that they lose the sense of an outer, generalized reality. In other words, hypnotized individuals can become very resistant to outer distractions and interruptions. Furthermore, the sense of time can be dramatically distorted while under hypnosis. For example, a childhood memory originally lasting 5 minutes can seem to last an entire day or a 20-minute plane ride can seem to last an eternity, and at times a hypnotized individual can subjectively experience moving forward or backward in time.

An important aspect of hypnosis is that it creates two types of attentional absorption, which are both highly resistant to outer distractions and interruptions. The first type is selective attention, typically used for problem solving on a precise skill level, such as weight loss and smoking cessation. Selective attention increases the intensity of the specific experience that a hypnotized individual observes. For instance, staring at a swaying pocket watch can intensify the sensation of and impact on movement in the hypnotized observer. The second type is expansive attention, which permits an entire range of stimuli and associations to be received by the hypnotized individual through a stream of consciousness, such as the sensation of riding a motorcycle at high speed. Expansive attention increases the individual's receptivity to a stream of consciousness of feelings and memories. For example, hearing a favorite song can stimulate a full range of memories, feelings, and nostalgia in a hypnotized individual.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) experimented in part with hypnosis in what was known as Operation ARTICHOKE. The operation involved interrogation tactics that focused on the potential use of biological warfare weapons, hypnosis, drugs, brainwashing, and torture on humans to gain accurate intelligence from enemy detainees. The operation was conducted by the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence.

Events that led to Operation ARTICHOKE occurred in 1945 in occupied Nazi Germany. Survivors of the Nazi concentration camps informed the U.S. government and its allies about drug experiments performed by camp doctors on fellow inmates. In response, the U.S. government launched Operation DUSTBIN to ascertain the findings of the doctors' experiments. Under Operation DUSTBIN, both U.S. and British forces extensively interrogated camp doctors and other Nazi scientists, such as Gerhard Schrader and Werner von Braun. Kurt Blome, one of the Nazi doctors interrogated, was spared from death at the Nuremberg Trials to assist in Operation DUSTBIN. U.S. officials were concerned that the Soviets might use biological weapons, such as anthrax, and Operation DUSTBIN was the U.S. response in preparation for such an event.

Six years later in October 1951 following Operation DUSTBIN, Operation ARTICHOKE was under way at the CIA's secret Camp King near Oberursel, Germany. The operation utilized harsh interrogation tactics, including hypnosis, drugs, and torture, to manipulate the minds of captured Soviet spies to gain top secret intelligence as well as to erase the memory of interrogation from the spies' minds. One of the doctors at Camp King during Operation ARTICHOKE was Blome, previously spared at the Nuremberg Trials.

In addition to experimenting with drugs and hypnosis on U.S. Army personnel, the CIA also experimented on ordinary citizens during Operation ARTICHOKE. One instance of citizen experimentation involved establishing a fake brothel in New York City's Greenwich Village, luring men in with actual prostitutes, and spiking their drinks with LSD prior to talking with them about topics such as security and crime. These citizens were never informed of the experiments, and their consent was never obtained.

Andrew Green

See also ARTICHOKE, Operation; Documents 48, 53

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IARPA

See Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency

Image Intelligence

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the various other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community classify intelligence according to type. Classifying intelligence in this manner simplifies, shortens, and facilitates the communicating, reporting, analysis, and evaluation of raw intelligence gathered by the various intelligence agencies and aids in the development of new intelligence-gathering techniques.

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In modern intelligence operations, IMINT encompasses imagery obtained from spy planes conducting aerial photography and spy satellites orbiting Earth. Modern spy satellites are reported to be so accurate that they can provide photographs of a matchstick on the ground from many miles in space. The two most well-known aerial photography spy planes are the U-2 and the SR-71 Blackbird, which was the successor to the U-2. One of the most well-known satellite programs of American intelligence was the Keyhole satellite program, which was started in the 1970s. Satellite spying was started in the late 1950s shortly after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik.

IMINT has essentially existed since the creation and development of the camera. IMINT came to the forefront with aerial photography in World War I, when balloons were used to obtain photographs of enemy positions. Photographs of military equipment (such as tanks, ships, and airplanes), military installations (missile launcher sites), important government personnel, and top secret facilities have all been goals of the intelligence-collection process.

The U.S. intelligence community consists of 17 agencies: the CIA; the National Security Agency (NSA); the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Secret Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which handles domestic counterterrorism; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Army Intelligence; Navy Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence; Marine Corps Intelligence; Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of State; the Department of Energy; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Department of the Treasury; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although the CIA and the NSA are heavily involved in the gathering of IMINT, the primary agency concerning IMINT is the NRO. The NRO is part of the Department of Defense and is responsible for the design and development for and the coordination, collection, and analysis of IMINT from aerial photography and satellite imaging. The NRO works closely with the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, and the military intelligence agencies. The NRO was formed in 1961 and assumed many of the responsibilities concerning IMINT from the CIA and the NSA.

There have been problems with IMINT beyond the expected technical issues of being able to develop sufficient technology to provide clear and accurate images from long distances. One of the most infamous problems was the U-2 incident in 1960. Francis Gary Powers, a spy plane pilot for the CIA, was shot down over the Soviet Union while engaged in aerial photography of sensitive Soviet installations. The Soviet Union captured Powers and the U-2 plane, which was almost intact, and this resulted in a serious political embarrassment for the United States. Powers was eventually returned to the United States in a spy swap after being tried and convicted in the Soviet Union of espionage.

Currently, the U.S. intelligence community and the military are greatly expanding their IMINT programs. With the use of highly sophisticated unmanned drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), IMINT is obtained and returned to the agencies in real time, greatly increasing the value of the IMINT obtained. However, there have been steps taken by various agencies of the U.S. government to expand the use of these drones to domestic law enforcement, which raises the issue of privacy and the employment of intelligence assets against American citizens. This was the basis for the Church Committee hearings in the 1970s against the CIA and the FBI.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Communications Intelligence; Electronic Intelligence; Human Intelligence; Signals Intelligence; Documents 25, 27, 29

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IMINT

See Image Intelligence

Information Operations

See Mass Media (Information) Operations

Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

See Kirkpatrick Report

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA), created in 2006, is the consolidation of three organizations of the U.S. intelligence community: the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, the National Security Agency's (NSA) Disruptive Technology Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's National Technology Alliance. The IARPA combines the advanced technological research of the intelligence community's various agencies into one single research organization. The purpose of the IARPA is to engage in high-risk research that has the potential for high rewards. Essentially, the IARPA is the real-life equivalent to the fictional "Q" of the famous James Bond spy movies who was the head of development of technology applicable to intelligence and espionage.

Although formed based on components of the CIA and the NSA, the IARPA is not part of nor does it report to either the CIA or the NSA. However, the IARPA does provide services to both the CIA and the NSA. The IARPA is part of the U.S. intelligence community and reports directly to the director of national intelligence, who also oversees the CIA and the NSA.

The IARPA is located at the University of Maryland and consists of three major offices: the Office of Incisive Analysis, the Office of Safe and Secure Operations, and the Office of Smart Collection. The main function of the Office of Incisive Analysis is to maximize insight from the information collected in a timely manner for the various intelligence agencies. The purpose of the Office of Safe and Secure Operations is to develop counters to the capabilities of the adversaries of the United States that threaten the ability of the United States to operate freely and effectively within the electronic network. The Office of Smart Collection is responsible for developing technology to improve the value of collected information. However, the IARPA's mission is not limited to just technology and the hard sciences but is also concerned with the development of paradigms concerning the social sciences.

The IARPA does not have a permanent staff of scientists but instead has a staff of program managers. Also, the IARPA does not have its own laboratories but instead contracts with independent individuals to conduct research and development at universities and laboratories, including both academia and industry. Once a program is established to research and develop a certain idea, scientific and technological staff will be employed to conduct the operations. The anticipated time for each program is from three to five years.

To start a program, the IARPA will advertise and call for proposals on a particular subject. Examples of some of these calls for proposals include the Babel Program, Automated Low-Level Analysis and Description of Diverse Intelligence Video (ALADDIN), and the Fuse Program. The Babel Program is research into developing a program that will provide translations of new languages within one. ALADDIN is intended to develop software that is capable of analyzing massive amounts of video. The Fuse Program's goal is the development of automated methods for the systematic, continuous, and comprehensive assessment of new technology. The IARPA is also working on a research project concerning the forecasting of future world events called the System for Prediction, Aggregation, Display, and Elicitation.

Once the IARPA approves a proposal, it generally awards a grant to cover the costs and expenses. As the type of projects that the IARPA seeks are high risk and high reward, the grants can be quite generous, running into the millions of dollars.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Document 42

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Intelligence Analysis, Politicized

See Politicized Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980

Enacted on September 21, 1980, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 requires U.S. government agencies to report covert actions to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This was an amendment to the Hughes-Ryan Act, which required up to eight congressional committees to be informed.

The Hughes-Ryan Act, a 1974 federal law that amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, was named for its coauthors, Senator Harold E. Hughes (D-IA) and Representative Leo Ryan (D-CA). The Hughes-Ryan Act required the president of the United States to report all covert operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to one or more congressional committees within a set time limit. This amendment sought to monitor CIA and Defense Department covert actions. The Hughes-Ryan Act prohibited the use of appropriated funds for covert operations unless and until the president issues an official finding that each such operation is important to national security. These findings are then sent to the appropriate congressional committees. The legislation was meant to ensure that the intelligence oversight committees within Congress were told of CIA actions within a reasonable time limit.

The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 provided that the directors of each of the intelligence agencies keep the oversight committees “fully and currently informed” of their activities, including “any significant anticipated intelligence activity.” Detailed ground rules were established for reporting covert actions to Congress in return for the number of congressional committees receiving notice of covert actions being limited to the two oversight committees.

Andrew Green

See also Hughes-Ryan Amendment; Documents 2, 15–19

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Intelligence versus Law Enforcement

The spies-and-cops formulation was first laid out by Stewart D. Baker, a lawyer and general counsel for the National Security Agency (NSA) from 1992 to 1994, writing in the journal *Foreign Policy*. Baker used the term “spies” to mean intelligence officers in general, although Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers would never refer to themselves that way. Likewise, Baker thought of any kind of law enforcement officials as “cops,” although that is not the way Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents think of themselves. They are investigators, not police officers, although they do have the power to arrest and carry weapons. Since Baker’s article appeared, CIA officers have begun to use the same terminology, even if it is technically incorrect. It is a handy way, however, to think about the differences between intelligence and law enforcement.

Michael Turner, a former CIA analyst and now a professor of international relations, has described some of the cultural differences between cops and spies. CIA officers, especially those who work in the Clandestine Service, have always been reluctant to share information, even within the CIA. Turner says that this cloak-and-dagger mentality is pervasive and stems from a fear that somehow the identity of recruited agents—the real spies—or other sources will be compromised if reports from agents are turned into intelligence analysis. If Clandestine Service officers are reluctant to share intelligence with their counterparts in the CIA’s analysis directorate, it is no wonder that they are even more reluctant to share with outsiders such as the FBI.

The FBI also wants to protect sources but for different reasons. The FBI wants to eventually make court cases, and divulging information might compromise evidence that could be used to obtain a conviction. According to officials at the Department of Justice, rules of evidence prevented FBI agents from sharing information with intelligence if that information was to be taken before a grand jury. The USA PATRIOT Act has relaxed that restriction, but old habits die hard, especially in large bureaucracies. The old problems persist: intelligence officers want to exploit sources, and law enforcement personnel want to make arrests and obtain convictions. The two goals are incompatible.

The operational and methodological differences between intelligence and law enforcement in general are strong largely because of differences in the end goals of the two communities. Much of what the FBI wants in criminal cases is evidence, gathered and protected according to specific rules but available to the defense in disclosure. The CIA does not want evidence, which is case specific, but instead wants intelligence that can identify problems and warn of threats. Under these circumstances, there should be no question about why the two agencies operate with different rules and according to different methods or why there is a divide between intelligence and law enforcement at many levels.

Although many law enforcement agencies—from the FBI to state and local police—have intelligence units, the kind of information they seek is different from that sought by intelligence agencies such as the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. When the CIA recruits sources, it wants

to establish a controlled, secret, and continuing relationship so that it can obtain information not available through other methods.

The CIA wants an agent who has good access to the information, is reliable, and can maintain a clandestine relationship over time. In such a relationship, the CIA will eventually be able to determine if the agent has such qualities, but sometimes the information may be less than perfect, subject to the agent's biases and contacts, and may conflict with other source data. Above all, the agency has to protect the identity of the agent; revelation could mean arrest, torture, or death. Thus, the CIA often keeps its activities secret to protect sources as well as the methods of gathering intelligence.

The FBI typically works in an entirely different fashion toward a different goal. Its sources have to be protected too, but they are usually targeted toward solving a crime. Eventually the identity of the sources may have to be revealed in court, although there are some cases where a penetration of a group may last over time. The methods used to obtain the information may also come under the scrutiny of a court. In fact, the FBI might have to demonstrate in court that the information was obtained according to legal rules. FBI agents have to be prepared to appear at trial and testify for the prosecution. This would be completely unacceptable to intelligence officers working undercover, because once their cover was blown, they could no longer operate as intelligence collectors.

Jan Goldman

See also CHAOS, Operation; Church Committee; Domestic Spying; National Security; Documents 5, 7

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Invisible Ink

On April 19, 2011, the formula for invisible ink was released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as part of a group of six World War I-era documents. The documents for invisible ink, 30 years older than the agency, were the oldest classified documents still held by the CIA.

The documents—dating from 1917 and 1918—described World War I “secret ink” recipes and instructions on how to open sealed letters covertly. The documents were released due to a decade-long fight by historians and scholars who used Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, lawsuits, and numerous appeals to government classification committees to declassify the documents.

In 1999 the CIA rejected an FOIA request to release the six documents, asserting that doing so could be expected to damage national security. In 2002 CIA

officials claimed that several of the six documents from 1917 and 1918 contain German recipes for invisible ink that would risk compromise of intelligence methods and would allow terrorist groups to develop more sophisticated methods of secret writing. The CIA also claimed that the recipes remain viable for use by the agency.

One document lists chemicals and techniques to create invisible ink for what is referred to as “secret writing.” Another document, from June 1918 and written in French, provides the formula that Germans apparently used for invisible writing during World War I. The six documents were first held by the Office of Naval Intelligence during World War I, and at least one document was obtained from the French. The intended recipients of the documents remains unclear.

One document listing seven formulas is on Commerce Department letterhead, and a chemist at the Bureau of Standards recommends that some of the invisible ink solutions be used with a quill pen rather than a steel pen because of the risk of corrosion. Another document in the collection was intended to teach U.S. postal inspectors how to detect secret ink. The pamphlet, listing 50 possible scenarios in which invisible ink could be employed, was prepared by a handwriting expert in San Francisco.

Any material describing secret writing falls under the control of the CIA. The documents were exempt from declassification as recently as 1978, although some had been downgraded from secret to confidential. Some of the methods to expose the invisible ink include carrying a solution absorbed into an ironed handkerchief or a starched collar.

One of the recipes for invisible ink is as follows:

- Put a tablespoon of starch into a tumbler of water and boil it. Allow the water to cool and then add 10 grams of nitrite of soda, a lawn fertilizer available in garden centers.
- Soak a handkerchief or starched shirt collar and allow it to dry.
- Add the material to water and the chemicals will be released, creating invisible ink.
- Write a message with it, ideally with a quill.

The person who receives the message should apply iodide of potassium, used in disinfectants and chemical hair treatments, to make it visible. Today, invisible ink is considered obsolete by digital encryption provided by information technology.

Jan Goldman

See also Freedom of Information Act; Handwriting Analysis; Document 1

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Iran-Contra Affair (1986–)

Irangate, better known as the Iran-Contra Affair, centered on a secret deal in 1986 between Iran and the U.S. government for the release of U.S. hostages taken during the civil war in Lebanon. The deal was handled in part by the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), William Casey, who actively sought the release of one of the hostages, William Buckley, the CIA's station chief in Beirut, Lebanon. Among others involved in the deal were U.S. Army lieutenant Oliver L. North and Terry Waite, a British citizen. In return for the release of the hostages, the U.S. government provided arms to the Iranians. The scandal known as Irangate arose from this deal and the additional U.S. profits made from the deal, which were used to fund the Contras in Nicaragua with secret White House approval. Congress had previously banned legitimate funds to the Contras.

The events leading up to Irangate began seven years earlier in 1979 in Nicaragua. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Sandinistas) rose to power in Nicaragua after successfully revolting against the dictatorship of Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza. Soon thereafter, a terrorist group of counterrevolutionaries known as the Contras formed in opposition to the Sandinistas. Due to the communist government of the Sandinistas, U.S. president Ronald Reagan announced on May 4, 1983, that the United States officially backed the Contras, although the U.S. government had been previously arming the Contras covertly through CIA recruitment. Despite the Sandinistas winning the political election in 1984, the U.S. government continued to support the Contras.

However, the 1984 Boland Amendments cut off U.S. funding to the Contras. Furthermore, in April 1985 Congress officially rejected President Reagan's request for funds to support the Contras. To continue providing support to the Contras, Reagan used covert techniques, including the diversion of funds gained from the secret sale of arms to Iran in exchange for the release of U.S. hostages. This secret deal with Iran began with Ya'acov Nimrodi, an Israeli businessman, and his partner Al Schwimmer, an American Jewish billionaire who founded the Israeli aircraft industry. Nimrodi and Schwimmer were authorized by the Israeli government to provide Iran with Lau antitank missiles and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles from Israel's stockpiles. Schwimmer then played a key role in persuading the Reagan administration to sell arms to Iran as well through a secret agreement between the U.S. government and the Israeli Defense Ministry in 1985. Through this secret agreement, Israeli arms went to Iran through Nimrodi, and the U.S. government replenished the supplies that Israel transferred to the Iranians.

Part of the U.S. deal with Iran was that Iran was to apply pressure to the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon to release U.S. and other Western hostages. Previously in the summer of 1984, Iranian Shia supporters in Lebanon had kidnapped several hostages, including David Jacobsen, a U.S. citizen. Due to an intervention by Waite, a representative of Great Britain's archbishop of Canterbury, Jacobsen was freed on November 2, 1986. At the time, the U.S. government denied any involvement in the release, but a source in Beirut reported that North, a member of the National Security Council, had made the deal with the Iranians using Waite as a



Reagan meets with (left to right) Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State George Shultz, Attorney General Ed Meese, and Chief of Staff Don Regan in the Oval Office on November 25, 1986. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

pawn. It was becoming clear that the Reagan administration was completely aware of attempts to free the hostages by means of unsanctioned arms sales to Iran.

President Reagan later admitted in November 1986 that 18 months of secret diplomacy had helped free the U.S. hostages, including a deal that provided small amounts of arms to Iran. However, the deal produced a large profit, part of which was covertly given to the Nicaraguan Contras previously cut off from U.S. support by Congress and the Boland Amendments. Instrumental in these deals was North, military aide to the National Security Council, who became deeply involved with Casey for the release of Buckley. Between 1984 and 1986, Robert McFarlane and Vice Admiral John Poindexter violated the Boland Amendments by approving support for the Contras and having such operations conducted outside the authority of the National Security Council staff, with North serving as the action officer.

News of these deals with Iran and the Contras, which the media later dubbed Irangate, began to surface in the media in late 1986 after President Reagan's admission. During this time Poindexter and North each resigned, and Reagan announced a review of the National Security Council, claiming that he had not been fully informed of the covert deals. News of Irangate revealed that in addition to violating the Boland Amendments by redirecting monies paid by Iran to the Contras, the U.S. government's deep involvement in arms sales to Iran also breached other U.S.

laws. One such law prohibited the sale of U.S. arms for resale to a third country listed as a terrorist nation, and at the time the U.S. government was publicly calling for a global ban on arms sales to Iran. Furthermore, the deals were conducted without Congress's knowledge, which breached a law requiring sales above \$14 million to be reported to Congress.

In June 1986 the World Court stated that President Reagan had broken international law by supporting the Contras. Once news of Irangate erupted, Casey tried to distance himself and the CIA from the illegal activities. Casey may have attempted to conceal evidence of his involvement as well as alleged CIA involvement in Irangate from Congress. Congress later reported in November 1987 that the definitive responsibility for Irangate's corruption and deception rested with Reagan, emphasizing that he should have been fully aware of the Iran-Contra deals.

Andrew Green

See also Buckley, William F.; Casey, William; Contras

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Italian General Election of 1948

Beginning with the 1948 Italian elections in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded heavily the Christian Democrats, between 1948 and 1975 more than \$75 million was spent by the CIA on Italian elections, \$10 million for the 1972 elections alone. The CIA reportedly funded more than \$1 million to Amintore Fanfani, the secretary-general of the Christian Democrats, in the 1970 elections. At the same time, more than \$800,000 was given to General Vito Miceli, leader of the neofascist Italian Social Movement and former head of Italian military intelligence, to ensure success. Even following the Church Report (1976), U.S. president Gerald Ford approved an additional \$6 million for the next election.

The Christian Democracy Party defeated the left-leaning Popular Democratic Front and the Italian Socialist Party. The Christian Democrats then formed a government that excluded communists who had been in government from 1944 to 1947. CIA funds went to centrist and right-wing candidates in the run-up to the general elections, and by some accounts more than \$1 million and as much as \$10 million was spent to support these candidates. Agency operatives in Italy engaged in a massive letter-writing campaign, provided funding to publish books and articles, and also broadcast warnings of the dire results of a communist victory. Millions of special postcards were mailed from the United States that carried

warnings about a communist takeover and the dissolution of the church. Another black propaganda operation produced forged letters intended to discredit communist candidates. The attempts to sway public opinion were coupled with overt threats to suspend American aid to war-ravaged Italy and even to cut off gifts sent by Americans to their relatives in Italy.

The CIA operation was a clandestine effort prompted by fears of a communist victory in the election and a subsequent alignment of Italy within the Soviet sphere of influence. The operation was also conducted in the face of similar efforts by the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security, KGB), although the scale and sophistication of the CIA effort—and the plausible deniability it afforded the U.S. government—ensured that the Soviet efforts would go for naught.

Revelations of the CIA's involvement in the Italian general elections first came to light during the Pike Committee hearings. Leftist coalitions would not win an Italian general election for the next 48 years.

The KGB was also active in this regard. In general, foreign communist parties were used as auxiliaries by the KGB as well as recruiting grounds in foreign countries (there is no evidence found to indicate that the CIA recruited within these communist parties, although logically this would have often been the case). For example, a great deal of the activities of the French Communist Party were directed from Moscow and were used as a means of penetrating the French government. Moscow Centre's instructions to its stations in this regard states that the main thrust of active measures was to achieve political influence and penetration, such as in Denmark. Overall, although there is indication of attempts made to influence the socialist parties in Western Europe, in general (with the possible exception of the British Labour Party) there has been little success by the KGB in influencing any noncommunist party in Western Europe.

In the developing world, the use of political parties was significantly different. Whereas in Europe influence over political parties was carried out purely along ideological lines, in the developing world a different pattern emerged. It appears that the CIA operated under the belief that if a party was not aligned with Washington and was not helped along toward that end, then it would automatically fall into Moscow's camp. As is clearly evident with hindsight, nothing could have been further from the truth. Indeed, as the example of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959–1960 provides, there were clear cases where such parties were scorned by the CIA or even pushed into the KGB/Soviet camp through CIA action or inaction. Historian John Prados refers to these CIA-supported parties as “third force” political movements—generally noncommunist (preferably anticommunist) but also not fascist and politically moderate (usually Christian Democrats). In Latin America they were usually associated with established oligarchies, and in Africa and Asia they were usually associated with tribes. In instances where no third force existed, one was created. Examples include the Committee for the Defense of National Interests (Laos), the Committee for a Free Albania, Holden Roberto in Angola, and Mobutu Sese Seko in the Congo. The problem that emerged with these groups was that usually such minorities did little to satisfy general, popular

aspirations and often led to further upheaval and, as in Laos, additional obligations for U.S. support. They were generally perceived as agents of American power.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Documents 20, 26, 28, 30

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IVY BELLS, Operation (1975–1980)

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy and the National Security Agency (NSA) had intercept operators on submarines who watched Soviet nuclear tests from as close to the sites as they could get. The operators in the submarines would also record shore-based transmitters and collect Soviet fleet communications. In 1975, a covert submarine operation code-named IVY BELLS succeeded in tapping a Russian communications cable running from the Kamchatka Peninsula to Vladivostok in the Sea of Okhotsk. The submarine eventually attached a pod with monitoring equipment, from which it could periodically pick up the recorded communications rather than have to sit on the sea bottom and record them directly. The operation lasted until a former NSA employee compromised it around 1980.

After declaring personal bankruptcy and leaving his NSA job in 1979, Ronald William Pelton began to sell what he knew to the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB). Given his earlier access to a wide range of highly classified projects, the Russians were happy to pay him even for information that was not completely current. Pelton was accused of exposing Operation IVY BELLS and of revealing an operation involving the U.S. embassy in Moscow, a joint operation with the British, and other operations involving Soviet signals and intercepted communications. Pelton was convicted on June 5, 1986, and sentenced to life in prison. Four days before Pelton was arrested, Jonathan Jay Pollard and his wife were picked up in front of the Israeli embassy. They had been turned away in an attempt to find shelter from U.S. authorities. A civilian counterintelligence analyst for the Naval Investigative Service, Pollard had been selling classified information to the Israeli Defense Ministry's scientific intelligence unit.

The use of submarines as platforms for electronic and other spying missions continues. For example, the submarine USS *Memphis* was eavesdropping on a naval exercise in the Barents Sea on August 12, 2000, when the Russian submarine

Kursk suffered a fatal internal explosion and sank, killing all aboard. The disaster was electronically recorded by the *Memphis*.

Jan Goldman

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Signals Intelligence

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Jackson, Bertha Rosalie

See Garber, Joy Ann

Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11

The first in-depth U.S. government attempt to study the intelligence failures leading up to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Representative Porter J. Goss (R-FL), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, agreed on the need for a joint committee of the two houses to study intelligence gathering before September 11, which became the genesis of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11. The joint inquiry committee was convened during February 14–December 10, 2002. For the inquiry to be successful, Graham and Goss agreed that it had to be bipartisan and would need to have the full support of the congressional leadership and the George W. Bush administration.

Despite assurances of support, however, the committee ran into opposition from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the White House. There was also little enthusiasm in Congress for the probe. It took Congress five months to announce the inquiry and another four months before the committee began to function.

The joint inquiry committee finally received its mandate in early 2002, and the cochairs, Bob Graham and Porter Goss, announced its beginning on February 14, 2002. The committee had a 10-month deadline to accomplish its task of evaluating the intelligence record prior to September 11, 2001. In the first months, investigators for the joint inquiry began to compile evidence. Hearings began in June 2002. Those hearings in June, July, and the first half of September were held in closed sessions. In the second half of September, there were open hearings. Hearings in October alternated between open and closed. A final report of the Joint Inquiry appeared on December 10, 2002, but only 24 of the more than 800 pages were released to the public.

Eleanor Hill, a lawyer and former Pentagon inspector general, was the staff director for the committee. She had not been the first choice of the committee, but its first choice, L. Britt Snider, had run into difficulty because of his friendship with George Tenet, the director of the CIA. Hill was recommended by Sam Nunn, a former U.S. senator from Georgia, to Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL). Hill was a partner in the law firm of King and Spalding when she was offered the job working with the joint inquiry committee.

Hill's job was to supervise the creation of a variety of staff reports that pointed out intelligence-gathering deficiencies. Her crew had to comb through the 150,000 pages of documents from the CIA and a like number of documents from the FBI. Most of the difficulty was in obtaining access to the documents in the first place. Members of the staff also conducted intensive interviews and attended briefings.

Hill reported to the joint inquiry committee on all aspects of the intelligence picture before September 11. Among her reports to the committee was one on the FBI's failure to react to the Phoenix Memo (a memo sent from an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, in July 2001 warning about the use of civilian flight schools by potential terrorists) and the refusal of FBI headquarters to authorize a search warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui's possessions. Hill also reported that the intelligence community had received at least 12 reports of possible terrorist attacks before September 11 but that nothing had been done about them.

A controversy developed when there was a leak of closed-session testimony from General Michael V. Hayden, director of the National Security Agency (NSA). The testimony was about the fact that the NSA had intercepted two Al Qaeda messages on September 10, 2001, indicating that something would happen on September 11, but these fragmentary messages were not translated until September 12, 2001. Despite the classified nature of this material, first the *Washington Times* and then the Cable News Network (CNN) learned of it and publicized it widely. Other newspapers also picked up the story. This leak led Vice President Dick Cheney to attack the joint inquiry committee as the source of the leak; he also reprimanded both Goss and Graham by telephone. This incident produced negative publicity for the committee and led Goss and Graham to invite the FBI to investigate the leak. Nothing came of the investigation, but it gave critics of the committee more ammunition. It also further clouded an already tense relationship between the inquiry and the Bush administration.

Cooperation from the CIA and the FBI was minimal. Only four CIA witnesses testified, including George Tenet. None of the key FBI agents appeared before the committee. Not surprisingly, Senator Shelby complained about the lack of cooperation.

The Bush administration had doubts about the joint inquiry committee from the beginning but was more than unhappy about the final report. The administration wanted the final report to be a validation of its position that there was no way September 11 could have been avoided, meaning that no one was responsible. As soon as the White House realized that the joint inquiry committee did not subscribe to this view, all cooperation ceased.

Officials in the White House worked to block the release of the full report, wanting instead to classify parts of the material retroactively. Consequently, the issuance of the full report was delayed, and significant parts of it were classified as secret. Most notable of the blacked-out sections was the section concerning Saudi citizens on American soil on September 11. Even the September 11 Commission had difficulty gaining access to the full report, but in the end it did come out.

In the final analysis, the failure to obtain key documents negatively impacted the 37-member joint inquiry committee. The staff had reviewed almost 500,000 pages of documents from intelligence agencies and other sources. Approximately 300 interviews had been conducted, and 600 people had briefed the committee about intelligence matters. There had been 13 closed sessions and 9 public hearings.

Once the classified report was rendered on December 20, 2002, the battle began over the classified parts of the report. The first agency to look at it was the CIA. The CIA classified whole sections of the report, including material that had already appeared in the media. This wholesale reclassification proved too much for the joint inquiry committee's staff. In a meeting with representatives from the CIA, the FBI, and the NSA, the staff went over the report page by page, reclaiming much of the material. The final obstacle was the White House, whose representatives wanted large parts of the report classified. The most notable section blacked out by the White House consisted of 27 pages that dealt with the relationship of the Saudi government to the September 11 conspirators. White House representatives wanted the changes to the report to be hidden, but the final unclassified version of the report has those areas shaded in black. On July 24, 2003, the final unclassified report appeared.

Although there were gaps in the report because of documents that were never produced, the joint inquiry committee did document the failures of U.S. intelligence agencies. Both the CIA and the FBI received specific criticism. The staff did uncover new information, including the Phoenix Memo, the Moussaoui debacle, warnings about possible use of aircraft as weapons, failures to monitor known Al Qaeda operatives, and lack of coordination between the CIA and the FBI, to name only some of the new information. The joint inquiry committee's most important recommendation was for the creation of a cabinet-level position, a director of national intelligence, to coordinate all American intelligence agencies and their activities, a post that was formed in 2005.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also Goss, Porter; September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of; Tenet, George

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K

Kampiles, William (1954–)

William Peter Kampiles was an entry-level employee of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who in 1977 sold a classified manual detailing the workings of a new American spy satellite to Soviet intelligence officials. Kampiles claimed that he did so in hopes of becoming a double agent for the CIA; he was, however, tried and convicted for espionage and served a lengthy prison term.

Kampiles was born in 1954 and reared in the Hegewisch neighborhood of Chicago. He earned an undergraduate degree at Indiana University and was fluent in Greek. In his senior years of college, the CIA recruited Kampiles chiefly because of his facility in Greek. In 1976, he began his career with the agency and was assigned to a low-level position at CIA headquarters outside Washington, D.C. Kampiles quickly grew tired of his unexciting job and decided to hatch a scheme whereby he would initiate contact with the Soviet KGB in hopes of infiltrating it and proving to the CIA his potential capabilities as a double agent. He then stole the classified manual for the U.S. KH-11 spy satellite, which then represented state-of-the art technology; abruptly resigned his CIA position; and flew to Greece. Once in Athens, he contacted Soviet intelligence officials there and sold them the manual for \$3,000.

After Kampiles returned to the United States, he met with his old CIA supervisors and let them know what he had done. At the time, he assumed that the CIA would reward him for his misdeed and make him a double agent. Instead, in the summer of 1978 Kampiles was arrested at his home in Munster, Indiana, and charged with espionage. He was tried and convicted in a U.S. federal court in Hammond, Indiana, in November 1978. Despite his lawyers' plea for leniency, Kampiles received a 40-year prison term, which was subsequently reduced to 19 years. During the trial, the CIA was embarrassed when it was forced to admit that as many as 11 other manuals for the spy satellite remained unaccounted for.

By the mid-1990s, lawyers representing Kampiles began to lobby for his early release. They based their request on several mitigating circumstances, arguing that Kampiles had committed a "youthful misguided act" and had willingly admitted his actions before he was ever charged with a crime. Furthermore, they asserted that unlike most others charged with espionage, Kampiles had committed a solitary act and was never involved in a long pattern of criminal misbehavior. They also claimed that Kampiles had received an unduly harsh sentence. In late 1995, Kampiles's lawyers, citing their client's remorse, petitioned a parole board to reduce his sentence. By then, a key U.S. prosecutor in the case came to support that

position, asserting that 17 years was an adequate penalty for the crime committed. On December 16, 1996, Kampiles left a federal prison as a free man, having served 18 years of his 19-year prison term.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cold War and the CIA; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 66

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Kent, Sherman (1903–1986)

Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of National Estimates (ONE) (1958–1968) and regarded by many as the “father of intelligence analysis.” Born in Chicago, Sherman Kent was the son of a U.S. congressman and attended Friends School in Washington, D.C. He undertook college prep studies at the Thacher School and attended Yale University, earning his PhB (1926) and PhD (1933) before joining the faculty at that university as assistant professor in 1936 with a specialization in European and especially French history.

In 1941 on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II, Kent took a leave of absence from Yale to join the fledgling Office of Coordinator of Information, which was later to become the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He was assigned to the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the OSS and took the lead in collecting and analyzing information to develop strategic surveys of countries of interest to various government agencies. His efforts and leadership later paved the way for the development of routine intelligence reporting in support of the Allied invasion of North Africa, a process that would today be regarded as intelligence preparation of the battle space. When the R&A was reorganized in early 1943, Kent was the logical choice to head up the Europe-Africa and Near East Divisions. A tireless worker and an expert at organization, he also believed in the value of personal observations and traveled to R&A field offices in Cairo, Naples, and Tripoli as well as Algiers, Corsica, Sicily, and Tunis to make firsthand assessments of operations.

With the alignment of the R&A with the Office of Research and Intelligence at the State Department after the end of World War II and after serving as that office's first director, Kent became an instructor at the National War College, aided in the design of the new curriculum there, and began his work on a book on strategic intelligence. He then returned to Yale and was promoted to the rank of full professor in 1947. With the publication of *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* in 1949, Kent argued that intelligence should provide both data and analysis

to others who would shape policy and decision making. His argument helped to frame the contemporary intelligence debate and established the fundamental concepts intended to prevent the politicization of intelligence. The importance of the separation—and the connection—between the intelligence analyst and the policy maker was to become a lasting theme in his professional lectures and writing on the subject of intelligence.

Kent returned to Washington in 1950 to begin work with the newly formed CIA. Paired with his former OSS colleague Harvard historian William L. Langer, Kent developed a new ONE and later became its chief. Working with a small staff that never numbered more than a dozen senior experts and fewer than three dozen regional and functional area specialists, Kent and ONE produced more than 1,500 national intelligence estimates (NIEs) for U.S. presidents and senior foreign affairs policy makers. These NIEs set a standard for thoroughness and clarity and underscored the importance of the rigorous use of analytic tradecraft. During his tenure with the CIA, Kent was widely regarded for his expert knowledge of French culture, history, and politics. He accompanied President Dwight Eisenhower to the Big Four Summit in Paris (1960) and represented the CIA in briefings to French president Charles de Gaulle during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).

Kent is highly regarded for his work in identifying and codifying analytical tradecraft and methods for intelligence analysts. He also believed that intelligence was a scholarly discipline and, further, that each generation of professional analysts carried the responsibility to inform and educate the next generation. He was the founding editor of *Studies in Intelligence*, a professional journal of tradecraft, history, theory, doctrine, and technique. In 2000 the CIA established the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis dedicated to the professional development of intelligence analysts and their tradecraft.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Dulles, Allen; Handwriting Analysis; Office of Strategic Services; Politicized Intelligence Analysis; World Intelligence Review

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Kilim Affair (1984)

The Kilim Affair is a little-known but embarrassing fiasco that involved the recruitment of a Russian spy in Australia.

Early in 1984, Australian intelligence sought to recruit a member of the Soviet embassy staff in Bangkok, Thailand. Ron Ford, a counselor at the Australian embassy, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sought to recruit Soviet official Alexandre Kilim. The recruitment included providing Kilim with money and the choice of living in Australia or the United States. However, Soviet officials found out about this failed attempt and publicly protested. The Australian government replied immediately, stating that Kilim had tried to recruit an official in the Australian embassy. The Australian government also denied any connection with any security agency in Bangkok, to include the CIA and British intelligence, MI6.

Reportedly, information indicated that Kilim was about to accept Australia's offer to be a spy, but the Soviets found out and decided to set up a public confrontation to give Australian intelligence bad publicity and reveal its agents. The Kilim fiasco embarrassed the Australian government in Canberra. There is no indication that the CIA was directly involved in this poorly executed attempt to recruit a spy.

Jan Goldman

See also Blackmail

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Kiriakou, John (1964–)

John C. Kiriakou is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent who was the first U.S. government official to admit that the CIA employed waterboarding (considered by many to be a form of torture) during interrogations of enemy combatants after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States. In 2012, he was charged with disclosing classified material to journalists and revealing the name of a covert CIA agent. Later that year, Kiriakou pleaded guilty to one charge of passing classified information to the media and was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

Kiriakou was born on August 9, 1964, in Sharon, Pennsylvania, and graduated from George Washington University in 1986. He subsequently joined the CIA, learned Arabic, and became a specialist on Iraq. From 1994 until 1996, he was stationed in Bahrain before being posted to CIA headquarters, where he once again worked as an Iraq analyst. In 1998, he was made a counterterrorism officer, serving in Athens, Greece. After the September 11 attacks, Kiriakou became chief of the CIA's counterterrorist operations in Pakistan, a very important post at the time. Kiriakou was reportedly involved in planning or executing numerous raids in

which senior Al Qaeda leaders were killed or apprehended. In 2002, he was reassigned to a domestic post and voluntarily left the CIA in 2004.

Kiriakou subsequently became a senior manager in a large accounting firm, where he specialized in forensic- and intelligence-related accounting. From September 2008 until March 2009, he worked as a terrorism consultant for ABC News. In March 2009, he became senior investigator for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and held that post until 2011, when he became a managing partner of a private counterterrorism consulting firm. From April 2011 until April 2012 he again worked for ABC as a counterterrorism consultant.

Kiriakou first became the target of government investigations in early 2008 following a December 2007 television interview in which he asserted that the CIA had engaged in the waterboarding of an aide to Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. This was the first instance in which a government official had publicly admitted that the CIA engaged in waterboarding, which Kiriakou later argued was a form of torture. Kiriakou attracted even more scrutiny after he published a memoir in 2010 titled *The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA's War on Terror*. That book had disclosed even more information, much of it relating to the CIA's role in the Global War on Terror.

After conducting a lengthy investigation, on January 23, 2010, U.S. federal prosecutors charged Kiriakou with revealing classified information to the media, including the naming of a covert CIA agent. He was formally indicted on April 5, 2012, on one count of violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, three counts of disregarding the Espionage Act, and one count of making false statements to government officials. The last count concerned an interview he had with the CIA's Publication Review Board before his 2010 book was published. The CIA board claimed that Kiriakou had misled it by not fully divulging all of the details of his book prior to publication.

Kiriakou pleaded not guilty to all charges on April 13, 2012, and was freed on bail. In September 2012, a federal district court in Virginia commenced closed-door hearings involving Kiriakou's pending case, which were necessary to prevent the possible leaks of additional classified information. After agreeing to a plea deal, on October 22 Kiriakou pleaded guilty to one count of passing classified information to the media and was sentenced to a 30-month prison term, which he began serving in late February 2013. In February 2015, he was released from a federal prison but confined to his home in Arlington, Virginia, for three months.

Kiriakou's case became highly controversial and was part of the Barack Obama administration's crackdown on government officials who leaked classified information to the press. Kiriakou's supporters have claimed that he was singled out because his revelations had deeply embarrassed the CIA and the U.S. government as a whole, which did not wish to admit to employing techniques such as waterboarding. Some former CIA officials even asked Obama to commute Kiriakou's sentence, but to no avail. Many viewed Kiriakou not as a turncoat but rather as a whistle-blower who engaged in a brave campaign to unveil CIA abuses. At least some of Kiriakou's revelations were confirmed—and made public—in the U.S.

Senate Intelligence Committee Report on CIA Activities, released in December 2014.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Senate Torture Report; September 11 Attacks; Sterling, Jeffrey A.; Torture; War on Terror and the CIA

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Kirkpatrick Report

The *Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation* was the official title of the report submitted by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) inspector general Lyman Kirkpatrick in October 1961 evaluating the “Central Intelligence Agency’s ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means of a covert paramilitary operation,” more commonly known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The report focused on the planning and organizational phases of the operation but did not provide a detailed analysis of the military phases of the operation. Additionally, the report did not critique the decisions and actions taken by officials not employed by the CIA.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion, officially designated Operation ZAPATA by the CIA, is named after the English translation of Bahía de Cochinos, where the CIA-backed invasion of Cuba took place in April 1961. The CIA began planning to undermine and eventually overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro soon after he took over power in Cuba in early 1959. The initial plan, which was officially adopted by the U.S. government in March 1960, involved different forms of covert action, including the insertion of a paramilitary force consisting of Cuban exiles into Cuba to organize, train, and lead anti-Castro resistance groups within Cuba. Due to the plan’s reliance on covert action, efforts were made to conceal direct U.S. involvement.

Attempts to infiltrate personnel and supplies into Cuba by air and sea met with mixed results. Due to the growing military capability of the Cuban government, the efficiency of Cuba’s internal security forces, and the absence of strong dissident forces within Cuba willing to fight against the Castro regime, there was a shift in planning by the summer of 1960 toward a more conventional military assault on Cuba by a force of Cuban exiles. On April 17, 1961, nearly 1,500 Cuban exiles began an amphibious assault on beaches in the Bay of Pigs, accompanied by limited air strikes on Cuban airfields. Counterattacks by Cuban government forces and the lack of sufficient supplies ultimately doomed the invasion force.

The failure of Operation ZAPATA was a major embarrassment to the CIA and the John F. Kennedy administration. President Kennedy moved quickly to ask for the resignations of several top CIA officials, including the Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles and Director of Plans Richard Bissell. Within days after the invasion, Dulles asked Kirkpatrick to conduct an internal investigation of the Cuba operation. The Kirkpatrick Report identified a wide variety of shortcomings and errors made in the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs Invasion ranging from inadequate equipment to scarcity of Spanish linguists. According to the report, “The fundamental cause of the disaster was the Agency’s failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States, the top-flight handling which it required—appropriate organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel, and full-time direction and control of the highest quality.” The report concluded that even with better planning and resources, Operation ZAPATA would have had little chance of success against Castro’s military forces, which were being supplied by Soviet bloc countries.

The report evaluated various aspects of the planning, organizing, and training of the operation leading up to the invasion of April 17 and noted that authority for the operation was fragmented. There was no single high-level CIA official who had command authority over all aspects of the project. One vital component of the operation, the CIA’s aviation branch known as the Development Projects Division, insisted on remaining outside of the organizational structure of the operation. As the plan transformed from a paramilitary action into a military action, this fragmentation of authority became critical, as it violated unity of command principles deemed essential for effective military operations.

In 1960 the CIA did not possess the equipment or expertise necessary to sustain a guerrilla force in a foreign country. To prevent military equipment from being traced back to the United States, the most modern weaponry was not issued, and the CIA was frequently left with equipment that was obsolete or in disrepair. The lack of clear training guidelines and proper facilities at training camps in the United States and Central America and the frequent shift in operational objectives made the creation of an effective fighting force difficult, if not impossible. Long periods of inactivity at the camps and the resulting aggravation, dissension among the Cuban exiles who increasingly felt isolated from the planning for the operation, and mistreatment and disdain with which the Cuban exiles were often treated by the CIA and members of the U.S. military were all identified by the Kirkpatrick Report as factors that decreased the likelihood of success.

The flurry of CIA activity in such places as Miami and Guatemala in support of the operation attracted the attention of U.S. journalists and the intelligence services of other countries and severely undermined any future attempt by the U.S. government to deny involvement in the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The report stated that once the covert nature of the operation was blown and the mission became a military one, responsibility for Operation ZAPATA should have shifted away from the CIA.

Relatively few copies of the Kirkpatrick Report were made at the time of its release six months after the failed invasion. The report was not well received by the

high-level officers in the CIA who were permitted to read it. Originally classified top secret, the Kirkpatrick Report was declassified and released in 1998.

Christopher Vallandingham

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba

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Koecher, Karel (1934–)

Karel Frantisek Koecher is a former Czech-born intelligence operative who worked as a spy for the Soviet spy apparatus known as the KGB. He also worked as a double agent for both the KGB and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the early 1980s. He was later identified as a KGB mole and became part of a Cold War spy exchange between the Soviets and Americans in 1986. Koecher was reportedly one of the few Soviet moles who successfully infiltrated the CIA.

Koecher was born on September 21, 1934, in Bratislava (modern-day Slovakia). After joining the Czech Communist Party in 1960, he joined the Czech intelligence bureau two years later. He eventually also began working for the KGB. Because he was fluent in English, the Soviets quickly recognized Koecher as a valuable asset and decided to send him to the United States. Working undercover as a graduate student, Koecher and his wife immigrated to New York in 1965, where he later earned a doctorate in philosophy from Columbia University. In 1971, he became a naturalized citizen. Meanwhile, he continued to be paid by the KGB. In 1973, Koecher secured a position as a translator for the CIA and was granted a high-level security clearance. Koecher's position proved to be a treasure trove of information for the KGB, and he became one of the agency's most valuable moles.

Koecher's career with the KGB came to an abrupt end in 1975, however, when high-level KGB officials suspected him of being a double agent (at the time, however, he in fact was not). Koecher subsequently left his job at the CIA and entered academia. In 1981 or so with the Cold War entering a more dangerous phase, the KGB decided to rehire Koecher, who then secured part-time work with the CIA. Sometime shortly after Koecher agreed to spy for the CIA, which would make him a double agent; by now, the CIA suspected Koecher of spying for the Soviets but nevertheless believed that it could use him to its advantage. However, before agreeing to engage in espionage for the CIA, Koecher requested and received immunity from prosecution for treason or espionage. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) played a major role in securing that promise of immunity.

By 1984, the CIA and the FBI had decided to disengage with Koecher because he seemed untrustworthy. On November 27, 1984, as Koecher and his wife were

about to board a plane for Switzerland, the couple was arrested in New York. American officials charged him with espionage and his wife as a material witness. However, the FBI's previous promise of immunity and its unwillingness to grant Mrs. Koecher access to a lawyer greatly complicated the case. In the end, Koecher's wife refused to testify against her husband; Koecher, meanwhile, claims that he was nearly assassinated while in prison awaiting trial.

In the meantime, U.S. and Soviet intelligence officials were working quietly behind the scenes to arrange a spy swap that would involve Koecher and his wife, among several others. Koecher agreed to plead guilty to espionage to avoid further embarrassment for the FBI and the CIA. U.S. prosecutors, however, agreed that his sentence would be commuted so long as he left the United States permanently. In West Berlin on February 11, 1986, Koecher, his wife, and several others held by Western governments were exchanged for several hostages being held by the communist bloc nations.

Upon his return to Czechoslovakia, Koecher received much adulation and was granted special privileges. However, after the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, he faded into obscurity. As of this writing, Koecher continues to reside in the Czech Republic.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cold War and the CIA; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 66

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Komer, Robert (1922–2000)

Robert William Komer was deputy to the commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) (1967–1968). Born February 23, 1922, in Chicago, Komer graduated from Harvard University in 1942 and, following army duty in World War II, received an MBA at Harvard in 1947. He worked at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the analytical side from 1947 to 1960 and then was a senior staff member at the National Security Council (NSC) between 1961 and 1965.

One of the first to join the CIA in 1947, Komer analyzed and interpreted data for recommendations on problems in the Middle East and became the expert on that area for the NSC staff in the White House. Also, he provided background advice for the negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians over the latter's control of western Iran. In March 1966 Komer was used by the White House as a troubleshooter in Vietnam, and his brash and abrasive style was valuable in getting the

White House staff to understand and accept the village pacification program for winning the war. He wanted a solution to the problem of how the military and the civilians in the war could cooperate.

A hard-driving army man and CIA veteran, Komer was sent to Saigon in 1967 to run the pacification program. The assignment, close to President Lyndon B. Johnson's heart, was to parallel the strictly military effort of the United States. "He was about the best thing that had happened to the Vietnam War at that date," former CIA director William Colby wrote in his 1978 memoirs.

Soon Komer proposed that responsibility for support of pacification be assigned to the U.S. military establishment in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), with a civilian deputy running it. He had in effect written his own job description, although it took Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's backing for the idea to gain acceptance. In March 1967 the decision was announced to put the CORDS program under William C. Westmoreland, with Komer as his deputy. In May 1967



Robert W. Komer prepares to talk to reporters after a meeting with President Johnson at the White House on November 21, 1967. Komer was the chief of the newly created CORDS, a controversial program by the CIA, to win the "hearts and minds" of South Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. CIA director William Colby testified that the program resulted in almost 21,000 deaths. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Komer, given the personal rank of ambassador, headed for Vietnam to undertake his new duties.

Komer spent several years at the RAND Corporation (1969–1977). Between 1977 and 1979, he worked on North Atlantic Treaty Organization affairs as a Pentagon official, and from 1979 to 1981 he was undersecretary of defense for policy. On April 9, 2000, Komer died of a stroke in Arlington, Virginia.

Lewis Sorley

See also Colby, William; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB)

The Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) was the main Soviet security and intelligence agency from March 13, 1954, to November 6, 1991. During this period, the KGB operated as an agency and even a ministry. Its tasks included external espionage, counterespionage, and the liquidation of anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary forces within the Soviet Union. The KGB also guarded the borders and investigated and prosecuted those who committed political or economic crimes.

Soviet security forces have a long history dating back to the pre-1917 czarist period. Communist predecessors of the KGB were the All-Russian Extraordinary Commissary against the Counterrevolution and Sabotage (also known by its Russian acronym, Cheka), the Main Political Department, and the Joint Main Political Department (OGPU) headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, also known as the Knight of the Revolution, during 1917–1926. The name “Cheka” suggested that it was to be only a temporary body, but the agency became one of the principal pillars of the Soviet system. In 1934 the OGPU merged into the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), with Genrikh Yagoda (1934–1936), Nikolai Yezhov (1936–1938), and Lavrenty Beria (1938–1945) as its chiefs. Under Yezhov and Beria, the NKVD carried out brutal purges within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). NKVD officers, for example, murdered Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940.

During the rule of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, the security apparatus had achieved almost unrestricted powers to harass, arrest, and detain those who were perceived as class enemies. The Soviet Union thus became a police state in which millions of innocent victims suffered arbitrary and brutal terror. Official figures



Collage of two photos taken on January 20, 1938, at the Kremlin in Moscow of the new Soviet government (from left, first row): Andrey Zhdanov, theoretician of Stalinism; A. Andreev; Mikhail I. Kalinin, president of the Soviet Central Executive Committee (1919–1938) and of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1938–1946); Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet foreign minister (1939–1949, 1953–1956) and an uncompromising champion of world sovietism; Yossif V. Dzhughashvili, known as Joseph Stalin and the “Man of Steel,” Soviet head of state (1879–1953); Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, head of state after Stalin’s death; Lazar M. Kaganovich; Nikolay I. Yezhov; Anastas I. Mikoyan, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers (1955–1964); and Nikolay Yezhov. (AFP/Getty Images)

suggest that between January 1935 and June 1941, some 19.8 million people were arrested by the NKVD and an estimated 7 million were subsequently executed.

Following World War II, in 1946 the NKVD was raised to a state ministry under Beria, who became a member of the Politburo. After the deaths of Stalin (March 1953) and Beria (December 1953), the security services were again reorganized, and on March 13, 1954, the secret police was renamed the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*. There were a half dozen principal directorates.

The First Directorate was responsible for foreign operations and intelligence-gathering activities. The Second Directorate carried out internal political control of citizens and had responsibility for the internal security of the Soviet Union. The Third Directorate was occupied with military counterintelligence and political control of the armed forces. The Fifth Directorate also dealt with internal security, especially with religious bodies, the artistic community, and censorship. The Ninth Directorate, which employed 40,000 persons, provided (among other things) uniformed guards for principal CPSU leaders and their families. The Border Guards Directorate was a 245,000-person force that oversaw border control. Total KGB manpower estimates range from 490,000 in 1973 to 700,000 in 1986.

The KGB helped and trained the security and intelligence agencies in other communist countries and was also heavily involved in supporting wars of national liberation in the developing world, especially in Africa. The Soviet Union also maintained a close alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization, providing it with arms, funds, and paramilitary training. The KGB mostly avoided direct involvement with terrorist operations but played an important role in directing aid to these

groups and producing intelligence reports on their activities. Scandals concerning defectors and moles plagued the KGB throughout its existence, but the agency also scored notable successes, such as the recruitment of the Cambridge Five in Great Britain, atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, and Aldrich Ames, a KGB mole within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Under Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev, the terror lessened considerably. Both the security police and the regular police were subjected to a new legal code, and the KGB was made subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the KGB was allowed to circumvent the law when combating political dissent. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s the KGB waged a campaign against dissidents such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who became worldwide symbolic figures of communist repression. In July 1978 the head of the KGB received a seat on the Council of Ministers.

The KGB had a considerable impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policy making. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, became CPSU leader in 1982. Under Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies during 1985–1990, Soviet citizens' fears of the KGB diminished, which signaled the erosion of the Soviet system. The KGB was dissolved in November 1991 following the August coup attempt against Gorbachev, which was engineered by KGB chief Colonel General Vladimir Kryuchkov. Its successor organization, the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service), bears great resemblance to the old security apparatus.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also Documents 41, 61, 72

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Kopatzky, Aleksandr (1922–1982)

Aleksandr Grigoryevich Kopatzky was a double agent who probably was more inclined to serve the Soviets than the West. His nickname was confused by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with the code name of a much sought-after double agent.

Aleksandr ("Sasha") Grigoryevich Kopatzky was born in 1922 in Kiev. In August 1941 he was a Russian intelligence officer. The Germans captured him in 1943 and, while he was recovering from injury, persuaded him to join German intelligence.

Early in 1945 Kopatzky served with the German Wehrmacht as it fought against the Red Army. Imprisoned after hostilities in the former Dachau concentration camp, Kopatzky was asked to work for the American-German Intelligence Unit that had been established in 1946.

Two years later Kopatzky married the daughter of a former Nazi officer and then in 1949 visited the Soviet military center in Baden-Baden. Kopatzky was taken in secret to East Berlin and from then on undertook espionage for the Soviets. He penetrated an anti-Soviet immigrants' organization in Munich that was linked with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was recruited into the CIA in 1951.

However, Kopatzky augmented his CIA salary generously by working for the Soviets. The Soviets gave him the code names ERWIN, HERBERT, and later RICHARD. In one operation he personally arranged for an Estonian CIA agent to be handed over to Soviet intelligence, and for 10 years he endangered other CIA intelligence operations in Germany.

Kopatzky was rewarded well with money and gold watches. He worked at the CIA's West Berlin station and sought women sex workers to become CIA agents and spy on Soviet soldiers. This work gave him many chances to sabotage CIA operations, identify many U.S. and East German intelligence agents, and mislead the CIA as to who was and was not an agent working for Russia.

Kopatzky's name was changed to Igor Orlov to conceal his identity after charges of drunken driving and to make it easier for him to get American citizenship. Three years later his CIA cover was blown in Berlin, so he was shipped to Washington for more training and returned to operations in Austria.

In the 1960s the CIA suspected Kopatzky of being a Soviet double agent, and early in 1961 he was put under close investigation. He appeared to quit espionage and started a gallery for framing pictures in Alexandria, Virginia.

In 1965 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was searching for secure evidence to convict Kopatzky. He was observed entering Washington's Soviet embassy. Apparently the Soviet plan was to make a hero of him in Moscow, but his wife would not leave America.

The FBI never had any secure evidence for conviction. In 1978 the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) ceased communicating with Kopatzky. He died in 1982 while he was watching an adaptation of a le Carré spy novel on TV.

Jan Goldman

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 65

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L

Lansdale, Edward (1908–1987)

U.S. intelligence expert and the father of modern American counterinsurgency doctrine. Born in Detroit, Michigan, on February 6, 1908, Edward Geary Lansdale dropped out of the University of California, Los Angeles, only a few credit hours short of graduation. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Lansdale entered the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1943, the army reinstated his UCLA Reserve Officers' Training Corps commission and assigned him to military intelligence.

The end of the war in the Pacific found Major Lansdale in Manila. In 1947, he transferred to the newly established U.S. Air Force. After assignments in the United States, Lansdale was sent back to the Philippines in 1951, this time on loan to a new governmental intelligence and covert action group, successor to the OSS and forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), known as the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).

His next assignment, now under CIA authority, took Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale to newly divided Vietnam in June 1954. As chief of the covert action Saigon Military Mission (SMM), Lansdale was charged with weakening Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam in northern Vietnam while helping to strengthen Bao Dai's southern State of Vietnam as a noncommunist nation. Within weeks Lansdale became a principal adviser to Ngo Dinh Diem, who was simultaneously premier, defense minister, and commander of the military. Diem accepted many of Lansdale's ideas, including urging northerners to move south, bribing sect leaders to merge their private armies into Diem's or face battle with him, instituting service organizations and a government bureaucracy, planning reforms, and in October 1955 offering himself and a new constitution as an alternative to the tired administration of Bao Dai. A lopsided and manipulated vote for Diem ensued. While Lansdale worked with Diem in the south, part of his SMM team labored in northern Vietnam, with largely mixed and insignificant results, to carry out sabotage and to effect a psychological warfare campaign against the communist government there.

Lansdale was a close personal friend of Diem and was one of the very few men to whom Diem listened. Most Westerners found Diem aloof and unresponsive and given to lengthy lectures. Lansdale did not share that view. His relationship with Diem bypassed normal channels of diplomatic relations, causing many U.S. leaders to view Lansdale with distrust. Yet Lansdale's record of success in the Philippines, his early accomplishments in Vietnam, and his own network of friends and contacts in high places prevented his enemies from dismissing either him or his ideas.

Lansdale's influence lessened with Diem's growing reliance on his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Lansdale returned to the United States in early 1957 and served both the Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy administrations as deputy director of the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Lansdale also sat as a member of the U.S. Intelligence Board. On occasional visits to Vietnam he maintained his friendship with Diem. Lansdale's views often conflicted with the findings of others who were ready to give up on Diem and were contesting vigorously on behalf of their own government agencies in Vietnam.

In the waning days of the Eisenhower administration Lansdale, now a brigadier general, worked with the Operations Coordinating Board of the U.S. Intelligence Board that oversaw CIA efforts to overthrow Cuba's Fidel Castro. Lansdale argued against such actions. In 1961 and 1963 as assistant to the secretary of defense for special operations, Lansdale served as executive officer for the president's Special Group, Augmented, charged with overthrowing Castro, a plan known as Operation MONGOOSE. After several intelligence forays to Central and South American countries, Lansdale retired from the air force in October 1963 as a major general. President Lyndon Johnson recalled Lansdale to government service between 1965 and 1968, sending him to Vietnam with the rank of minister to work on pacification problems. Lansdale's influence was less than in previous years, and his authority was not clearly defined. He accomplished little, and those years were for Lansdale a time of great frustration. He published his memoirs in 1972. Lansdale was allegedly the inspiration for Graham Greene's 1955 novel *The Quiet American*, something that both men repeatedly denied. Plagued by ill health and living quietly in retirement, Lansdale died in McLean, Virginia, on February 23, 1987.

Cecil B. Currey

See also Cuba; Dulles, Allen; MONGOOSE, Operation; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Law Enforcement versus Intelligence

See Intelligence versus Law Enforcement

Lee, Andrew (1952–)

Andrew Daulton Lee was an American drug dealer who became a messenger for the spy Christopher John Boyce and was caught in Mexico City. Lee graduated

from Palos Verdes High School in 1970. He came from a wealthy family, and while at school and later in college he befriended Boyce. They both had a common interest in falconry. Nevertheless, Lee dropped out of college; he had been drawn to taking drugs. To conceal his failing grades while in school, he tampered with his report card before bringing it home.

In time, Lee found it necessary to peddle drugs to ensure that he could afford his habit. In October 1971 he was arrested for selling drugs to high school students. He received a suspended sentence and promised to return to college. He failed to quit taking drugs, could not get a job to help him pay for the habit, and returned to drug dealing. In 1974 he was arrested and jailed, and after a year he was released for good behavior.

In January 1975 Boyce suggested that Lee sell secret documents, which Boyce could photocopy at his workplace, to the Soviets at their Mexico City embassy. Lee contacted the officials at the Soviet embassy and offered the Soviets valuable information, including reading Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) communications between its various stations and headquarters. The material revealed the CIA's vital daily code systems and activities worldwide. For more than a year Boyce and Lee profited by turning over classified information to the Soviets.

On March 15, 1976, Lee went to Vienna, taking with him a roll of film containing cipher messages between CIA headquarters and its receiving stations around the world as well as the technical record describing secret plans for the new Argus communications system.

For \$75,000, Boyce agreed to make a final delivery of secret plans on the CIA satellite network for its spy program over China and the Soviet Union. On January 5, 1977, Lee landed in Mexico City on his last courier mission, carrying an envelope containing more than 415 film negatives. But he was late with the delivery in Mexico City and missed his meeting with his Soviet handler.

Lee's ambition to create a major espionage business coupled with his excessive drug use strained his relationship with Boyce. Lee, desperate to regain the Soviets' attention, was observed by Mexican law enforcement officers tossing something over the Soviet embassy gates. The officials thought that the object was a bomb and that Lee was a terrorist. He was arrested by Mexican police and taken to the police station. When the police searched his pockets and found film (from a Minox spy camera that Boyce used to photograph documents) and a postcard (used by the Soviets to show the location of a drop zone), they produced pictures of the same location that was on the postcard showing officers surrounding a dead man on the street. Mexican police tried to implicate Lee in the murder of a policeman, a charge that Lee denied. The police dragged Lee away and tortured him.

It was not long before the Federal Bureau of Investigation caught Boyce, and both men were convicted of spying. Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment on July 18, 1977. In 1985 Hollywood would produce *The Falcon and the Snowman*, a film directed by John Schlesinger about Boyce (played by Timothy Hutton) and Lee (played by Sean Penn). The film is based on the 1979 book *The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage* by Robert Lindsey and

features the song “This Is Not America,” written and performed by David Bowie and the Pat Metheny Group.

Jan Goldman

See also Boyce, Christopher; Falcon and Snowman

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Legal Restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency

Given the complexity and variety of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), restrictions on these activities that appear in the form of statute or executive order are relatively few. In many cases, these restrictions apply to the entire intelligence community even when the original purpose of establishing these restrictions was to curb CIA excesses.

The most fundamental restrictions on CIA activities date back to the creation of the CIA. The National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, banned the CIA from exercising police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers and internal security functions within the United States. The act does not delineate internal security functions, and internal security has been variously interpreted as applying only to internal threats posed by U.S. citizens or, alternatively, internal threats posed by both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens. There were two main reasons for this restriction. First, preventing the CIA from conducting law enforcement and internal security functions in the United States would help avoid a potential conflict with the mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Second, this restriction would help allay any fear that the CIA would become an American version of the infamous Gestapo political police force that operated in Germany and in lands occupied by German forces during World War II.

Historically, covert action and other non-intelligence-gathering activities, from the Bay of Pigs Invasion to the use of unmanned drones in the Global War on Terror, have caused more problems for the CIA than the gathering of intelligence. In the aftermath of the Watergate Scandal and a series of newspaper articles about CIA activities, both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives formed committees to investigate CIA activities. The most prominent of the committees was the Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. The Church Committee explored such allegations as CIA involvement in assassination attempts against foreign leaders, including Fidel Castro, president of

Cuba, and Patrice Lumumba, prime minister of the Republic of the Congo; experimentation with mind-altering drugs on U.S. citizens; interception of mail in the United States; and the overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Iran, and Chile. The multivolume report released by the Church Committee helped fuel the argument that the CIA needed closer supervision and more clear guidelines for its activities.

Under pressure from Congress to set guidelines for intelligence activities or face legislative action to establish these guidelines, President Gerald Ford opted to issue Executive Order 11905, which was then replaced by Executive Order 12333 that was issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Perhaps the most notable of the restrictions on CIA activities found in Executive Order 12333 was the ban on assassination by or on behalf of the U.S. government. Another restriction banned the CIA from conducting electronic surveillance within the United States except for training, testing, or taking countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance. The CIA was also limited in its ability to conduct physical surveillance of Americans within and outside the United States and its ability to infiltrate organizations within the United States and was banned from conducting research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.

Further restrictions on CIA activities were frequently in response to reports of abusive practices. In 1991, the CIA was banned from engaging in covert action to influence public opinion and the political process within the United States. In 1996, the CIA was banned from using journalists as assets to gather intelligence without express permission from the president or the director of national intelligence. In 1999, Congress reaffirmed the policy that the CIA was prohibited from engaging in drug trafficking, regardless of the potential value of such activity to enhance national security. In 2009, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13491, which extended to all U.S. government employees, including those of the CIA, the limitations on interrogation techniques found in the *Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations*.

Some restrictions on CIA activities have been self-imposed. For instance, after the story broke that a CIA asset in Guatemala had killed a U.S. citizen in 1991, the CIA made it more difficult for case officers to recruit assets who had past histories of human rights violations. However, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the resulting perception that the inability of the CIA to penetrate the terrorist plot was partially due to risk aversion within the CIA, Congress ordered the CIA to remove self-imposed limits on recruiting assets with past histories of human rights violations.

Christopher Vallandingham

See also Intelligence versus Law Enforcement; Documents 2, 5, 13, 16, 17, 21

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Lockheed

Maryland-based Lockheed, a defense contractor that developed weapons, space-based defense systems, military aircraft, missiles, and spy satellites, was one of several firms that helped make California a center of the aerospace and defense industries. Submarine-launched Trident missiles, the F-16 fighter jet, the U-2 spy plane, and the C-5 transport plane are just a few of Lockheed's products. Lockheed merged with Georgia-based Martin Marietta in 1995 to become part of a new firm called Lockheed Martin, which quickly became the world's primary defense contractor.

Brothers Allan and Malcolm Loughead (pronounced Lockheed, which they later changed their name to) founded Lockheed Aircraft in Santa Barbara, California, in 1916. Lockheed's first designer was John Northrop, who later founded the Northrop Corporation, a major military contractor based in Los Angeles. In 1926 Northrop designed the Vega, the famous airplane flown by Amelia Earhart. The success of the Vega allowed Lockheed to move to Los Angeles, where



Workers finish wings and tail fins for warplanes at the Lockheed Corporation in Burbank, California, on March 27, 1940. Lockheed was responsible for building the CIA spy plane known as the U-2, which had its first overflight on July 4, 1956. (Fox Photos/Getty Images)

it was purchased by the Detroit Aircraft Company in 1929. The company soon went bankrupt, however, and in 1932 Lockheed was purchased by three partners who revived the company with a long line of successful products, including the U-2 spy plane and the SR-71 Blackbird. The Lockheed A-12 was a reconnaissance aircraft built for the Central Intelligence Agency. The A-12 was produced from 1962 through 1964 and was in operation from 1963 until 1968. The single-seat design, which first flew in April 1962, was the precursor to both the U.S. Air Force YF-12 interceptor and the famous SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft. The final A-12 mission was flown in May 1968, and the program and the aircraft were retired in June of that year.

In the late 1960s, many financial problems and scandals plagued Lockheed. The government contract for its Cheyenne attack helicopter was canceled, the U.S. Air Force's C-5A went grossly over budget, and Lockheed's commercial airline business faced dire financial straits. Fortunately for Lockheed, in 1971 the government granted the company a \$250 million loan guarantee to keep it from bankruptcy. Lockheed then abandoned its construction of commercial airliners in the mid-1970s after a scandal over bribes to foreign officials racked the company. By the 1980s, Lockheed's fortunes had rebounded with the production of Trident ballistic missiles and the F-117A Stealth fighter. Lockheed also contributed to the Hubble space telescope, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space shuttle program, and the ill-fated Star Wars missile-defense program.

Lockheed was hit hard by shrinking defense contracts in the late 1980s, and in 1988 the company shut down a plant in Watts (a Los Angeles neighborhood) that had employed thousands. In 1990 Lockheed's main airplane factory in Burbank closed, and some 5,500 engineering, production, and support jobs disappeared. Lockheed was not the only defense contractor to see its fortunes plummet—all over California, companies like Lockheed were forced to lay off thousands of workers. More than 80 percent of Lockheed's sales had been made to the U.S. government, and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s meant a sharp decrease in defense spending.

As a result, Lockheed began to seek out commercial contracts and in 1992 signed with Motorola to develop satellites for its Iridium communications project. Also in 1992, Lockheed bought the military aircraft unit of General Dynamics. A year later Lockheed contracted with NASA to provide support for the agency's repair project on the Hubble space telescope. In 1994 Lockheed, along with two Russian aerospace companies, was hired to launch broadcast satellites for a major European venture called Societe Europeenne des Satellites.

In 1995 Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta, an aerospace, electronics, and nuclear systems giant that had been around since 1917. The consolidation, which created Lockheed Martin, gave both companies a larger resource base and a subsequent advantage over competitors; in its first year alone, Lockheed Martin won 60 percent of its bids. Although the company is based in Maryland, there are 939 facilities in the United States as well as locations in 56 nations. Lockheed Martin has 130,000 workers throughout its five business segments, which include

aeronautics (based in Fort Worth, Texas), electronics systems (based in Bethesda, Maryland), space systems (based in Denver), integrated systems and solutions (based in Gaithersburg, Maryland), and information and technology systems (based in Cherry Hill, New Jersey). Its \$31.8 billion enterprise consists of 62 percent from the U.S. Department of Defense, 16 percent from civil (local) governments/U.S. Homeland Security, 18 percent international business, and 4 percent from domestic commercial businesses.

Kellie Searle

See also A-12 Blackbird; Powers, Francis Gary; Documents 26, 27, 31

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Lovestone, Jay (1897–1990)

Jay Lovestone was a shadowy character and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent within the personal world of James Angleton (1917–1987), head of the CIA counterintelligence operations.

Born in Lithuania in 1897, Jacob Liebshtein immigrated with his parents to the United States at the age of 10 and settled on New York's Lower East Side. Caught up in the fervor of the Russian Revolution, he forsook Judaism, took the name Jay Lovestone, and became a member of the American Communist Party.

After breaking from communism, in the early 1940s Lovestone linked up with American Federation of Labor (AFL) leader George Meany, in time Meany's foreign policy adviser and liaison to the CIA.

Beginning in 1955, Angleton used Lovestone as a paid CIA agent. Angleton controlled Lovestone via the head of the Israel desk in the CIA. Lovestone would give the CIA information about trade union affairs worldwide and would be paid for that information through Angleton's lawyer in New York. Lovestone received not only a salary from the CIA but also subsidies for his New York office from secret funds under Angleton's control. Lovestone would also distribute CIA funds for Angleton around the world.

Lovestone retained a talent for intrigue and a conspiratorial mind-set that led him to collaborate for more than 20 years with Angleton. Often incurring the antipathy of CIA handlers and other labor leaders, the abrasive but effective Lovestone helped splinter off noncommunist union organizers from Moscow-controlled insurgents in France and Italy and established free trade unions as a bulwark against Joseph Stalin in West Germany. Angleton received Lovestone's reports, marked

them “JX,” and numbered them. To others in the CIA it became evident the Lovestone reports were overvalued, tending toward gossip more than valuable intelligence, and often reported on people who were unimportant.

In 1974 Lovestone was ousted from his AFL-CIO post when his continuing involvement with the CIA was exposed. CIA director William Colby felt ambivalent about Lovestone’s reports and ended the CIA’s connection to him, much to Angleton’s distress, not long before Colby forced Angleton to retire.

Jan Goldman

See also Angleton, James; Colby, William; Document 66

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Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

Patrice Lumumba was the first prime minister of the independent Republic of the Congo in Africa and was killed six months after taking office. His death was linked to the Cold War policies and the intelligence community under President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Lumumba was born in Katako Kombe and became a trade unionist and a postal clerk in the colonial civil service of the Belgian Congo. In 1958 he established the Mouvement National Congolais. On June 20, 1960, as soon as the Belgian Congo was declared a republic, internal political strife began. At the independence ceremony, King Baudouin of Belgium celebrated the granting of his colony’s independence with a catalog of Belgium’s contributions to the Congo over the last 80 years of colonial government and presented Prime Minister Lumumba, age 34, with Belgium’s Order of Leopold. In reply, Lumumba denounced the 80 years of Belgian colonial domination as unrelenting, insulting, and naked racism. Eleven days later a civil war began as the army mutinied and as riots, raping, and looting spread. United Nations (UN) soldiers arrived in mid-July, and Lumumba declared martial law. Belgian troops were parachuted in to establish control. In early August civil war began, and UN troops were under siege. More UN troops arrived in the Congo, and Swedish soldiers replaced the Belgian troops by mid-August.

Early in September the Soviets promised help to the Congo, and Lumumba dismissed the new president, Joseph Kasavubu, whose military leader, Joseph Mobutu, had the support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Kasavubu immediately fired Lumumba. However, Lumumba refused to leave and ordered his troops to invade Katanga. The tension was felt in the UN, and the Russians demanded that the secretary-general of the UN resign.



Congo premier Patrice Lumumba (center, in business suit) arrives in New York on July 24, 1960, to present the problems of his strife-torn nation before the UN Security Council at the UN headquarters. (AP Photo)

Meanwhile, in the United States the president and a special group that authorized covert operations agreed that in their plans for the Congo, getting rid of Lumumba would be an option given his support from the Soviet Union. According to reports that later surfaced, in the 1960s CIA operative Sidney Gottlieb arrived in the Congo with a vial of poison that was to be placed on Lumumba's toothbrush. Lumumba's body was never found. There was certainly a plot to have him killed, but whether he was killed on orders from the CIA is not known.

Nevertheless, when Lumumba finally was killed in January 1961, no one was surprised when fingers started pointing at the CIA. A Senate investigation of CIA assassinations 14 years later found no proof that the agency was involved, but suspicions linger. Today, new evidence in the book *The Assassination of Lumumba*, published in Belgium by sociologist Ludo de Witte, declares that Belgian operatives directed and carried out the murder and even helped dispose of the body. Belgian authorities admit that de Witte's account appears accurate.

When Lumumba arrived in Katanga on January 17, accompanied by several Belgians, he was bleeding from a severe beating. Later that evening he was killed by a firing squad commanded by a Belgian officer. A week earlier he had written

to his wife: “I prefer to die with my head unbowed, my faith unshakable, and with profound trust in the destiny of my country.” Lumumba was 35 years old.

Four days later Belgian police commissioner Gerard Soete and his brother cut up the body with a hacksaw and dissolved it in sulfuric acid. In an interview on Belgian television in 2000, Soete displayed a bullet and two teeth that he claimed to have saved from Lumumba’s body. Either way, Lumumba’s death served its purpose: it bolstered the shaky regime of a formerly obscure colonel named Joseph Mobutu. During his three-decade rule, Mobutu would run his country, bursting with natural resources, into the depths of poverty. It took a civil war to oust him, and the Congo has seen little peace since.

Jan Goldman

See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Documents 19, 63

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M

Masri Case

Khaled el-Masri was born in Kuwait on June 29, 1963, and became a German citizen in 1994 after seeking asylum in the country. In 2003 el-Masri was the target of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition operation—a clandestine abduction of an individual suspected of involvement in terrorist activities by the CIA—and was taken to a detention facility located outside the United States for interrogation. The CIA released el-Masri after discovering that it had mistakenly identified him, and he later filed lawsuits in the United States and internationally. The Masri Case has become a well-known case concerning the state secrets doctrine.

While el-Masri was traveling by bus from Ulm, Germany, to Skopje, Macedonia, on December 31, 2003, Macedonian police detained him at the Tabonovce border crossing because his name was similar to Khalid al-Masri—an individual with known ties to the Hamburg Al Qaeda cell where one of the 9/11 hijackers came from—and because the police suspected that his German passport was a forgery. The police took him to Skopje and held him in a hotel for 23 days. During this time, they contacted the CIA station in Skopje and said that they had Khalid al-Masri. The station chief was away on holiday, so the deputy chief was in command. He contacted the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) with the news, and a debate ensued on their course of action. Some people wanted to wait and see if the German passport was a fake or not, but the head of the CTC's Al Qaeda unit pushed for a rendition and won the argument.

On January 23, 2004, Macedonian authorities released el-Masri to a CIA rendition team, who flew him to a CIA prison near Kabul, Afghanistan, known as the "Salt Pit." El-Masri claimed that he was beaten, drugged, repeatedly interrogated, kept in an unclean cell, and denied the ability to make any outside contacts. While in prison, el-Masri went on a hunger strike but was force-fed after 27 days of not eating. A forensic analysis conducted on a hair sample revealed that el-Masri was malnourished during his detention.

In March 2004, the CIA's Office of Technical Services determined that el-Masri's passport was genuine, meaning that he was innocent. CIA director George Tenet learned of this mistake in April and brought the issue to the attention of Condoleezza Rice, the national security director for the George W. Bush administration, in May. She ordered el-Masri's release but two weeks later had to issue the order again because the CIA had not released him yet. On May 28, 2004, after



Khaled el-Masri reads German newspapers covering his alleged abduction by the CIA in Stuttgart, southwestern Germany, on December 6, 2005. (AP Photo/Thomas Kienzle)

el-Masri had been imprisoned for five months, the CIA flew him to Albania and released him on the side of a road. He was picked up by Albanian guards and escorted to the Mother Teresa Airport in Tirana, where he caught a flight back to Germany. Earlier in May, Ambassador Daniel R. Coats met with German interior minister Otto Schily and told him of the CIA's mistake, said they were going to release him shortly, and asked that the German government stay quiet, even if el-Masri went public.

El-Masri, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), filed a lawsuit (*El-Masri v. Tenet*) on December 6, 2005, with the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, seeking damages in excess of \$75,000 against former CIA director George Tenet, 3 corporations that leased the crew and airplanes that the CIA used to fly el-Masri to Afghanistan, 10 unnamed CIA employees, and 10 unnamed employees of the defendant corporations. The U.S. government filed a Statement of Interest on March 8, 2006, requesting to intervene as a defendant claiming the state secrets privilege. The U.S. government asserted that the civil case could not proceed because it would result in the disclosure of information revealing privileged state secrets—in this case, CIA methods and operations. The

court granted the request on March 9, and the U.S. government officially became a defendant on March 13 and moved to dismiss the claim. On May 12 the court granted the U.S. government's request and dismissed the case.

The ACLU appealed the court's decision in November 2006, stating that the court misapplied the state secrets doctrine. The ACLU argued that although some information in the case pertained to the doctrine, the information central to the case was already in the public domain. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision. The ACLU then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (*El-Masri v. United States*, No. 06-1613), but the Court decided on October 9, 2007, not to hear the case. On April 9, 2008, the ACLU petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), stating that rendition operations violate the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and that the U.S. government needed to publicly apologize for violating el-Masri's rights. The IACHR accepted the petition but has not issued a ruling.

El-Masri has also sought justice in other countries. German prosecutors initiated an investigation into the matter in June 2004 and filed indictments against 13 CIA officers on December 31, 2007, but they were never arrested. In May 2010, Spanish prosecutors asked a judge to issue international arrest warrants for members of the CIA rendition team that picked up el-Masri. The Spanish prosecutors started the investigation because the CIA rendition team stopped in Spain on the way to Macedonia and were suspected of using false passports. On January 24, 2009, el-Masri filed a civil suit for damages against the Macedonian Ministry of Interior for its participation in detaining him and handing him over to the CIA. In September 2009 on behalf of el-Masri, the Open Society Justice initiative even brought the issue before the European Court of Human Rights, which communicated the case to the Macedonian government in October 2010 requesting information. El-Masri has continued to seek justice, but there has been no definitive progress in any of the courts. In December 2012 the European Court of Human Rights vindicated el-Masri's account of his ill treatment and unanimously found that Macedonia had violated his rights under the European Convention by transferring him to U.S. custody and the CIA's rendition techniques, which amounted to torture.

Ryan Connole

See also Counterterrorism Center; Masri Case

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Mass Media (Information) Operations

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used networks of several hundred foreign individuals to provide intelligence to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. This occurred through the use of individuals who provided the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, publishers, and other foreign media outlets.

While Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—established in 1949 and 1951, respectively, and run by the CIA until the early 1970s—operated overtly, the hand of the U.S. government was covert to make it more effective. Other examples of CIA use of radio propaganda include the Voice of Liberation radio used during the coup in Guatemala in 1954; Radio Nejat (Liberation) out of the Front for the Liberation of Iran, to which the CIA reportedly paid \$100,000 per month in 1982; and Radio Swan, established under the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation in Miami against Cuba from 1960 (this later became Radio Americas and Vanguard Service Corp., respectively, after the Bay of Pigs Invasion) until 1969.

The CIA used similar methods but not to the same extent. In 1953, Allen Dulles expressed the desire to use the press for both intelligence collection and propaganda. The CIA relied on U.S. journalists who would want to become part of a vast network of reporters, magazines, electronic media, and other media personnel to supplement official information to promote current U.S. policies—including covert propaganda and psyops—through quiet channels. Though most did so unknowingly, the CIA did use journalists directly—both American and foreign nationals—in clandestine relationships of one sort or another with the CIA.

The CIA also funded and covertly supported newspapers, journals, and other print media around the world. Some, such as its funding of *Der Monat* (West Germany), *Encounter* (the United Kingdom), and the *Daily American* (Rome), was within the context of direct rivalry with the Soviets. Others, such as *El Mercurio* (Chile) and *Elimo* and *Salongo* (Angola), were to promote CIA interests in a specific region of the globe in support of other operations—for example, during the Vietnam War the CIA allegedly wrote whole articles for *The Economist* on the war. Numerous books were also published with covert CIA funding and support, including *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* and *The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China*.

Jan Goldman and William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Documents 12, 15, 21, 66, 91

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McCarthy, Mary O. (1945–)

Mary O'Neil McCarthy was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence analyst dismissed in 2006 after admitting to disclosing classified information to the media related to black sites. Black sites are CIA secret prisons on foreign soil.

Prior to her work in intelligence, McCarthy attained a BA and an MA in history from Michigan State University as well as a PhD in history and an MA in library science from the University of Minnesota. From 1979 to 1984 she worked for BERI, S.A., as a risk assessment specialist for multinational corporations. She then worked as an instructor at the University of Minnesota and served as director of the Social Science Data Archive at Yale University.

McCarthy began work for the CIA in 1994 as an analyst specializing in Africa for the Directorate of Intelligence. From 1991 to 1994, she served as deputy national intelligence officer for warning. Thereafter, she served as national intelligence officer for warning from 1994 to 1996. From 1996 to 1998, McCarthy served as director of intelligence programs on the National Security Council staff.

In 1998, McCarthy was appointed special assistant to the president and senior director for intelligence programs. In 2001, she became a visiting fellow in international security for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In 2005, she returned to the CIA to work under the Office of the Inspector General.

In 1998, McCarthy opposed the U.S. bombing of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. The factory was suspected by U.S. intelligence of manufacturing chemical weapons. After the bombing, Sudan claimed that the factory only produced pharmaceuticals and demanded an apology from the U.S. government. The 9/11 Commission Report showed that after reviewing the intelligence in 2000, National Security Council staff determined that al-Shifa was used in chemical weapons development. The memo signed by McCarthy showed that she had changed her views on the matter and supported the bombing of the factory.

McCarthy was dismissed on April 21, 2006, after being accused of disclosing classified information to the press. According to the CIA, McCarthy admitted to "unauthorized contacts with the media and discussion of classified information" after taking a polygraph test. She had allegedly leaked classified information to *Washington Post* reporter Dana Priest. Priest was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for her exposé on CIA black sites. Information for this work was believed to be attained from McCarthy. This information discussed CIA black sites in Eastern Europe.

While McCarthy's attorney maintained her innocence, the CIA has maintained that an employee had discussed certain unclassified items regarding official CIA classified information. Her attorney has confirmed that it was indeed McCarthy who had been the dismissed employee. The CIA has not confirmed this fact to this day. McCarthy has denied her involvement in any leaks to the press in regard to black sites.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also War on Terror and the CIA

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MERLIN, Operation (2000)

In his book *State of War*, author and intelligence correspondent for the *New York Times* James Risen claims that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chose a defected Russian nuclear scientist to provide deliberately flawed nuclear war-head blueprints to Iranian officials in February 2000. Risen wrote in his book that President Bill Clinton had approved the operation and that the George W. Bush administration endorsed the plan. However, Operation MERLIN backfired when the nervous Russian scientist noticed the flaws and pointed them out to the Iranians, hoping to enhance his credibility and protect himself against retaliation by the Iranians while still advancing what he thought was the CIA plan to use him as a double agent inside Iran. Instead, Operation MERLIN may have accelerated Iran's nuclear program by providing useful information once the flaws were identified. In late 2010, former CIA officer Jeffrey Alexander Sterling was indicted for allegedly being a source for some of the information in Risen's book.

In February 2000, a Russian scientist walked Vienna's winter streets carrying the blueprints for a Russian-designed nuclear weapon. The blueprint specifically focused on the trigger for such a bomb. The Russian had defected to the United States years earlier. The CIA had given him the nuclear blueprints and sent him to Vienna to sell them or simply give them to the Iranian representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With the Russian doing its bidding, the CIA appeared to be assisting Iran in its path to a nuclear weapon. The dangerous irony was not lost on the Russian—the IAEA was an international organization created to restrict the spread of nuclear technology. The Russian was a nuclear engineer employed by the CIA, which had arranged for him to become an American citizen with a salary of \$5,000 a month. The code name for this operation was MERLIN.

The Russian's assignment from the CIA was to pose as an unemployed and greedy scientist who was willing to sell his soul—and the secrets of the atomic bomb—to the highest bidder. The plan had been laid out for the defector during a CIA-financed trip to San Francisco, where he had meetings with CIA officers. Senior CIA officials talked the Russian through the details of the plan. He was to give the Iranians the blueprints of a trigger for a nuclear bomb. Operation MERLIN was supposed to stunt the development of Tehran's nuclear program by sending Iran's weapons experts down the wrong technical path. The CIA believed that once

the Iranians had the blueprints and studied them, they would believe that the designs were usable and would start to build an atom bomb based on the flawed designs. But Tehran would get a big surprise when its scientists tried to explode their new bomb. Instead of a mushroom cloud, the Iranian scientists would witness a disappointing fizzle. The Iranian nuclear program would suffer a humiliating setback, and Tehran's goal of becoming a nuclear power would have been delayed by several years. In the meantime, the CIA, by watching Iran's reaction to the blueprints, would have gained a wealth of information about the status of Iran's weapons program, which has been shrouded in secrecy.

After their trip to San Francisco, the case officer handed the Russian a sealed envelope with the nuclear blueprints inside. The Russian was told not to open the envelope under any circumstances. He was to follow the CIA's instructions to find the Iranians and give them the envelope with the documents inside. Keep it simple and get out of Vienna safe and alive, the Russian was told. But the defector had his own ideas about how he might play that game.

Operation MERLIN was one of the most closely guarded secrets in the Clinton and Bush administrations. It is not clear who originally came up with the idea, but the plan was first approved by Clinton. After the Russian scientist's fateful trip to Vienna, however, Operation MERLIN was endorsed by the Bush administration, possibly with an eye toward repeating it against North Korea or other dangerous states.

Several former CIA officials say that the theory behind MERLIN—handing over tainted weapon designs to confound one of America's adversaries—is a trick that has been used many times in past operations, stretching back to the Cold War. But in previous cases, such Trojan horse operations involved conventional weapons; none of the former officials had ever heard of the CIA attempting to conduct this kind of high-risk operation with designs for a nuclear bomb. The former officials also said that these kind of programs must be closely monitored by senior CIA managers in order to control the flow of information to the adversary. If mishandled, they could easily help an enemy accelerate its weapons development. That may be what happened with MERLIN.

Iran has spent nearly 20 years trying to develop nuclear weapons and in the process has created a strong base of sophisticated scientists knowledgeable enough to spot flaws in nuclear blueprints. Tehran also obtained nuclear blueprints from the network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and so already had workable blueprints against which to compare the designs obtained from the CIA. Nuclear experts say that they would thus be able to extract valuable information from the blueprints while ignoring the flaws.

Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, who served in the CIA between 1993 and 2002, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in January 2011 and was charged in a 10-count indictment with disclosing national defense information and obstruction of justice.

Jan Goldman

See also Wilson, Valerie Plame

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MKULTRA, Project (1953–1972)

Project MKULTRA, a top secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation exploring various mind-control, interrogation, and behavior modification techniques, officially began on April 13, 1953, and continued until 1972. As part of this operation, scientists conducted human experimentation with the administration of LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), psilocybin (dimethyltryptamine), mescaline (trimethoxybenzeneethanamine), and other drugs to induce hypnotic states in an attempt to facilitate the extraction of information from resistant interrogation subjects.

MKULTRA operation first gained public notoriety in 1945 through the investigative efforts of the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee. However, attempts to uncover the facts surrounding the operation were hindered by the fact that in 1973, CIA director Richard Helms had ordered all documents concerning the project destroyed. As a result of a 1977 Freedom of Information Act request, a cache of 20,000 surviving documents was discovered. This led directly to the 1977 Senate hearings.

As early as 1945, several precursor programs to MKULTRA had been developed by various other government agencies. For example, the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency developed Operation PAPERCLIP (1945) whose mission was to recruit Nazi scientists who experimented with mind control. Project CHATTER (1947), Project BLUEBIRD (1950), and Project ARTICHOKE (1951) were other precursor programs that experimented with mind control, enhanced interrogation techniques, and behavior-modification methods.

On April 13, 1953, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb signed Project MKULTRA into effect by order of CIA director Allen Dulles. The creation of this project was in response to alleged Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war. The CIA also maintained an interest in being able to manipulate foreign leaders. One 1955 MKULTRA document refers to the study of an assortment of mind-altering substances. Some examples from this document are as follows:



Dr. Harry L. Williams (left) administers LSD 25 (lysergic acid diethylamide) to Dr. Carl Pfeiffer, chairman of Emory University's Pharmacological Department, to produce effects similar to those experienced by schizophrenics. Dr. Pfeiffer uses the microphone to record his journey through lunacy. Project MKULTRA supported research at almost 50 colleges and universities, mostly through front organizations, although sometimes school officials were aware of the CIA's involvement. (Bettmann/Corbis)

- Substances designed to promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the point where the recipient would be discredited in public.
- Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise enhance its usefulness.
- Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand privation, torture and coercion during interrogation and so-called “brain-washing.”
- Physical methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of time and capable of surreptitious use.
- A material which will cause mental confusion of such a type that the individual under its influence will find it difficult to maintain a fabrication under questioning.

- A “knockout pill” which can surreptitiously be administered in drinks, food, cigarettes, as an aerosol, etc., which will be safe to use, provide a maximum of amnesia, and be suitable for use by agent types on an ad hoc basis.

Once Project MKULTRA was initiated, experiments included administering LSD to CIA employees, military personnel, doctors, other government agents, prostitutes, mentally ill patients, and even members of the general public to study their reactions. Oftentimes the drugs were administered without either knowledge or informed consent of the subject. Other drugs that were used were temazepam, teroin, morphine, MDMA (Ecstasy), mescaline, psilocybin, scopolamine, marijuana, alcohol, Sodium Pentothal, and ergine. In 1964 MKULTRA was renamed Project MKSEARCH, which attempted to produce a perfect truth serum. In 1972 Dr. Gottlieb ended MKSEARCH, stating that such research had become less relevant to current clandestine operations.

At least one death resulted from these experiments. It is known that 44 American universities and colleges, 3 prisons, 12 hospitals, and 15 research foundations or pharmaceutical companies participated in MKULTRA.

Some notable subjects who participated (either knowingly or unknowingly) in these experiments were Harold Blauer, a professional tennis player; Wayne Ritchie, a former U.S. marshal; Candy Jones, an American fashion model; the mobster James “Whitey” Bulger, who volunteered for testing while in prison; and author Ken Kesey, who volunteered while he was a student at Harvard University.

Abigail Sessions

See also ARTICHOKE, Operation; BLUEBIRD, Project; Church Committee; Dulles, Allen; Helms, Richard; Rockefeller Commission; Documents 23, 48, 49, 53, 98

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MOBY DICK, Project (1947–1956)

MOBY DICK was the covering code name for top secret project WS-119L, or U.S. Air Force–Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) balloon reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union during the 1950s. In 1951 the air force began utilizing large

polyethylene Skyhook balloons that had been developed beginning in 1947. These balloons were capable of flying at altitudes of up to 100,000 feet and remaining aloft for days. They were very large, about 300 feet in length with a flaccid length of 430 feet. Each balloon carried aloft a 600-pound gondola containing photographic equipment and tracking instruments.

The U.S. Air Force unclassified Project MOBY DICK, and it began in 1951 with the stated intention of studying stratosphere wind trajectories from three-day Skyhook flights. This was actually a cover for top secret project WS-119L, alternately known as Project GOPHER, GRAYBACK, MOBY DICK HI, GENTRIX, and GRANDSON. Its goal was photographic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. The large number of test flights gathering trajectory data led to frequent sightings as the balloons ascended from their primary launch site of Alamogordo Air Force Base in New Mexico and from New Jersey and Long Island. These gave rise to frequent unidentified flying object (UFO) sightings, which the CIA encouraged in the expectation that the spate of UFO reports in the United States would then simply extend to the Soviet Union.

The first WS-119L mission occurred in November 1955. The balloons, launched first in Western Europe and then in Turkey, were carried eastward for three days until they had crossed over the People's Republic of China (PRC). Once past the PRC, a ballasting system lowered the balloons to some 28,000 feet. The gondolas were then released on parachutes and retrieved on the ground or in the air by aircraft. Some balloons were also launched from the Pacific.

Some of the balloons came down prematurely in the Soviet Union, however, leading to diplomatic protests by Moscow to Washington. MOBY DICK produced only marginally significant data and was phased out in 1956. It was replaced by the Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also Image Intelligence; MONGOOSE, Operation; National Photographic Interpretation Center

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MOCKINGBIRD, Operation (Late 1940s–1976)

In the late 1940s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began a secret project called Operation MOCKINGBIRD. The goal of this project was to buy influence behind the scenes at major media organizations throughout the country and to put journalists and reporters on the CIA payroll.

In 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Operations, which was soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The OPC was considered to be the espionage and counterintelligence branch of the CIA and was funded by siphoning off funds intended for the Marshall Plan.

Wisner was directed to create an organization that was focused on propaganda; economic warfare; sabotage; antisabotage; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups; and support of indigenous anticommunist elements in threatened countries. In response, he established Operation MOCKINGBIRD and created a network to influence the domestic American media. Wisner recruited Philip Graham of the *Washington Post* to run the project within the industry. During the 1950s, Wisner and Graham recruited journalists, reporters, and publishers to become spies and disseminators of propaganda. Wisner's campaign of media manipulation became known as "Wisner's Wurlitzer."

By the early 1950s, MOCKINGBIRD had recruited members in the most respected and renowned papers and broadcasting companies in the country, including the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, *TIME* magazine, and CBS. Additionally, more than 50 overseas newspapers were controlled by the CIA, including the *Rome Daily American*, the *Manilla Times*, and the *Bangkok Post*. MOCKINGBIRD became an effective technique for sending journalists overseas to engage in espionage activities for the CIA. Domestically, American news organizations became influential disseminators of propaganda.

In 1951, Allen Dulles persuaded Cord Meyer to join the CIA, and Meyer then became MOCKINGBIRD's principal operative. In August 1952 the OPC was further developed into the newly named Directorate of Plans (DPP). Wisner became the head of the DPP, and Richard Helms became his chief of operations. Operation MOCKINGBIRD was under the DPP.

After 1953 the network of media manipulation was overseen by CIA director Dulles, and Operation MOCKINGBIRD had influence in more than 25 American newspapers and wire agencies, with approximately 3,000 CIA employees engaged in propaganda efforts during this time. The journalists wrote articles commissioned by Wisner, and occasionally the CIA would even provide them with classified information to assist them.

With such influence and control over the American media, the CIA was able to report on stories of its choosing and also to restrict newspapers from reporting certain events. Additionally, Wisner was always looking for ways to help convince the American public of the dangers of communism. Another objective of Operation MOCKINGBIRD was to influence the production of commercial films. In 1954 Wisner arranged for funding for the production of the movie *Animal Farm*.

During the 1960s, the activities of Operation MOCKINGBIRD were made known to the American public through the works of authors such as David Wise and Thomas Ross, who published the book *The Invisible Government* in 1964. The authors of this book claimed that the CIA had a major influence on American foreign policy, including the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran (1953) and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), and that the CIA played a role in the Bay of

Pigs operation, the attempts to remove President Sukarno in Indonesia, and the covert operations taking place in Laos and Vietnam. John McCone, the director of the CIA, unsuccessfully attempted to have the book censored.

There was further exposure of Operation MOCKINGBIRD's activities in 1972 when Meyer was accused of interfering with the publication of the book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* by Alfred W. McCoy. The book criticized the CIA's involvement with the drug trafficking operations in Southeast Asia.

Representatives for the CIA testified in front of the Church Committee in 1975 and admitted that at the peak of MOCKINGBIRD's activities there were at least 400 journalists on the CIA payroll in at least 25 media organizations. On January 30, 1976, George H. W. Bush became the director of the CIA and instituted a new policy stating that "Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contract relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." In 1976 Operation MOCKINGBIRD was officially shut down, although many critics speculate that the CIA continued its campaign of media manipulation.

Abigail Sessions

See also *Animal Farm*; Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Church Committee; Dulles, Allen; Documents 44, 45

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MONGOOSE, Operation (1961–1963)

Operation MONGOOSE was a U.S. covert operation, begun in 1961, to overthrow the Cuban government and assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Following the failed April 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion, communications between Castro and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev increased dramatically. Castro requested additional Soviet military support, and the Kremlin acted on his appeal. Within a year Moscow had approved a \$148 million arms package, although Khrushchev stalled the support.

After a clandestine meeting between Richard Goodwin, President John F. Kennedy's representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in

Uruguay, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara on August 22, 1961, in which Goodwin laid out ways that Cuba could improve relations with the United States, he reported that he saw Guevara’s views as a sign of a deteriorating Cuban economy and impatience with Moscow. As a result, various U.S. agencies began discussing programs to sabotage the Cuban economy, and Kennedy began exploring options to eliminate Castro. Kennedy’s brother, U.S. attorney general Robert Kennedy, did not want to involve the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because of the Bay of Pigs debacle. In November 1961 the attorney general approached President Kennedy with a plan that would establish an interagency project against Cuba that would not rely on CIA experts. On November 30, President Kennedy named Brigadier General Edward Lansdale chief of operations for the project.

The interagency committee, known as the Special Group, included Robert Kennedy and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon. With the inclusion of Dillon and Attorney General Kennedy, the group’s name was changed to the Special Group Augmented (SGA). SGA members were CIA director John McCone, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson from the State Department, Roswell Gilpatric from the Defense Department, General Lyman Lemnitzer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Maxwell D. Taylor. Also in attendance at meetings, although they were not members, were President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

In February 1962, Khrushchev finally agreed to provide arms support to Cuba after receiving intelligence reports that the White House was planning to destroy Castro.

Lansdale devised a two-phase plan to implement Operation MONGOOSE. The plan included paramilitary, sabotage, and political propaganda programs. The SGA ordered an intensification of sabotage and intelligence activity, while President Kennedy continued to waver on the necessity of military action. Without the support of U.S. forces, the stability of Operation MONGOOSE began to weaken. Instead, the CIA turned to the Mafia for assistance in assassination plots, and Lansdale used his experience in psychological warfare to devise strategies for propaganda. Plans for sabotage and counterintelligence included the injection of untraceable poison into Castro’s favorite brand of cigars, the poisoning of Castro’s food and drinks, the retrofitting of Castro’s fountain pen with a hidden needle capable of injecting a lethal toxin, air-dropping anti-Castro propaganda over Cuba, spraying a television studio where Castro was about to appear with a hallucinogenic drug to undermine his popularity, contaminating Cuban sugar, and counterfeiting Cuban money and ration books.

In the spring of 1962, Robert Kennedy asked the SGA to consider the role of the Soviet Union as a factor in determining the outcome of MONGOOSE. The group did not, however, act on this directive, as the idea of a Soviet military base on Cuba was too remote to consider. Yet only a few months earlier, Khrushchev had agreed to begin building up Cuban forces. Ultimately, the SGA’s nonchalance was a factor in the development of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

Lansdale’s project was shut down in October 1962 following the Cuban Missile Crisis, but similar CIA psychological warfare projects against Castro

continued well into 1963. These operations failed to win over a skeptical Cuban population.

Lacie A. Ballinger

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Guevara, Che; Lansdale, Edward; Documents 36, 37

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MOSES, Operation (1984–1985)

Operation MOSES was a covert operation undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) working in conjunction with the United States and Sudan to evacuate Jews from Ethiopia during 1984–1985. The operation was named for the biblical Old Testament figure Moses, who led the Jews out of Egypt.

Since 1980, the Israeli government had supported the secret smuggling of Ethiopian Jews (known as Beta Israel) into Israel via Sudan to escape the repressive Marxist regime of dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. Most of the refugees had walked out of Ethiopia into Sudan, and by 1982 approximately 2,500 had made it to safety. The Sudanese government tacitly agreed to grant the Ethiopian Jews access to their borders, as it opposed the Mengistu regime and hoped to garner aid from the United States. In 1983 the Israelis secretly airlifted hundreds of Beta Israel out of Sudan in Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft.

The situation in the Sudanese refugee camps, where the Jews were placed, became increasingly intolerable as more and more arrived. Hundreds died on the long treks to the camps, and many more perished in the squalid conditions while awaiting transport. Matters reached a crisis in late 1984 as famine gripped all of Sudan. Conditions in the refugee camps deteriorated all the more because the hard-pressed Sudanese government could not feed its own people, let alone the refugees. In an unprecedented show of mutual cooperation, the Israelis reached an agreement with the Sudanese government, brokered by the U.S. embassy in Khartoum and with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for a large-scale airlift of all Jewish refugees from Sudan. The mission was code-named Operation MOSES.

First, young Ethiopians who had managed to reach Israel were trained by agents from Mossad (Israel’s intelligence agency) and sent back to Ethiopia to encourage the Falashas to come to Israel via the Sudan. But too many died on the way. Next, a camp was established clandestinely in the Sudan as a safe haven for the travelers.

This was achieved by bribing the Sudanese government and its security services, getting help from the United Nations, and forming a Kenyan escape route. This procedure was effective until the government in Nairobi shut down the flow of Falashas for fear of hostility from other Arab and African nations. Mossad and the CIA established a dummy travel company, Navco, with a village for scuba-diving tourists. The Falashas came to the village as bogus tourists. Frogmen would take them to boats offshore, and then the Falashas sailed up the coast to an airport and were then flown to Israel. The local officials decided that the secret emigration would have to be curtailed.

The operation began on November 21, 1984, as Hercules transports of the Israeli Air Force began flying into Sudan to begin the rescue of the 8,000 refugees. On the ground, IDF troops were met by Sudanese soldiers and mercenaries who assisted them with the operation. It is believed that at least 4,000 refugees had died on the trek from Ethiopia to Sudan, and many more would perish in the camps if they were not removed immediately. It was certainly unheralded for a Muslim government to assist the State of Israel, and when the media published the story, Arab governments applied pressure on Sudan to cease the operation. Sudan closed its airspace to Israel, and the last MOSES flight took place on January 5, 1985. In the end, some 8,000 Ethiopian Jews had been safely airlifted from Sudan. Approximately 1,000 Beta Israel were left behind in Sudanese camps but were later airlifted out by the U.S. Air Force through an agreement with Sudan in a mission dubbed Operation JOSHUA.

Operation MOSES was so successful that when the Mengistu regime fell in 1991 and civil war broke out in Ethiopia, the Israelis were able to fly directly to Addis Ababa and rescue the remaining 14,000 Beta Israel in Operation SOLOMON. Upon reaching Israel, the Ethiopian refugees had to undergo intensive education in training camps, some for as long as two years, to learn Hebrew and function in an industrialized society. Unfortunately, many Beta Israel were unable to assimilate into Israeli society and remain to this day a depressed, undereducated, and unemployed segment of the population.

Rod Vosburgh

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Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War

Afghan resistance fighters who fought against the Soviet-backed Kabul government and Soviet troops during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) were collectively known as the mujahideen. They were an alliance of seven Sunni political factions and eight Shiite organizations as well as Muslim volunteers from various North African and Middle Eastern countries. Initially trained and funded by Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence, and then later by the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and other Sunni Muslim nations, the mujahideen fought the Soviet Union to a bloody stalemate, forcing it to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1989.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, and the subsequent intervention in Afghan domestic politics in support of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan had the unintended consequence of galvanizing a disparate Islamic opposition into a grassroots resistance movement. Indeed, the Soviet invasion triggered a backlash among Afghans that crossed kinship, tribal, ethnic, and geographic lines. This backlash gave the conflict an ideological dimension by linking the Islamic insurgency with the goal of national liberation when mullahs issued declarations of jihad against the Soviet invaders. Islam and nationalism became interwoven as an Islamist ideology replaced tribal affiliations.

At the onset of the Soviet-Afghan War, the mujahideen were divided along regional, ethnic, tribal, and sectarian lines. Mobilization was linked to allegiances of the tribal *lashkar* (fighting force), as the mujahideen were loosely organized tribal militias under the command of traditional leaders at the local level. Membership was fluid, fluctuating by the season and by family commitments, with no coordinated central command structure. Mujahideen commanders owed their position to social standing, education, leadership ability, and commitment to Islam.

Seven major Sunni mujahideen factions based in neighboring Peshawar, Pakistan, came to dominate the political and military landscape. These were Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan, Jamiat-i-Islami, Hezb-i-Islami, Harakat-i-Inquilabi Islami, Mahaz-ye Nijate Milli Afghanistan, and Jabhe-ye Nijate Milli Afghanistan. In addition to the Sunni mujahideen factions, there were also Shia mujahideen organizations. These were Shura, Nasr, the Revolutionary Guards, and Hezbollah. The other organizations were either splinter factions or groups that joined larger movements. In March 1980 the Sunni mujahideen factions created an umbrella organization, known as the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, to lobby for international recognition and support.

In the early days of the occupation, the Soviets waged classic large-scale armored warfare in Afghanistan. The mujahideen responded with traditional mass tribal charges. Disorganized, having limited military equipment and training, and facing overwhelming military superiority, the mujahideen were easily defeated in early skirmishes with the Soviet Army in 1980 and 1981. As desertions

and defections of Afghan Army units began to increase, however, the mujahideen military capacity increased. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert action worked through the Pakistani intelligence services to supply Afghan rebel groups with weapons. Fighting between CIA-funded Afghans and the Russians continued through 1988.

By 1982, the mujahideen began to counter Soviet offensives with a change in tactics and increased firepower. Unable to pacify the countryside, Soviet troops deployed in strategic areas, occupying cities and garrison towns and controlling supply routes. This allowed the mujahideen to roam freely throughout the countryside and launch raids and ambushes at will. Having an insufficient number of troops to pursue the mujahideen, the Soviets attempted to deprive them of their base support by depopulating the countryside. Villages, crops, and irrigation systems were destroyed, while fields and pastures were mined. Undeterred by the loss of their support, the mujahideen continued to sabotage power lines, pipelines, and government installations and also knocked out bridges, assaulted supply convoys, disrupted the power supply and industrial production, and attacked Soviet military bases throughout 1982 and 1983.

As the war broadened, the mujahideen appealed for arms and ammunition to counter the overwhelming Soviet military superiority. In 1983 the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the PRC became major contributors to the mujahideen cause. Money and weapons were funneled through Pakistan for distribution to the various Sunni mujahideen factions. The mujahideen were now able to counter the Soviet military superiority with increased firepower.

In the spring of 1986, a combined Soviet-Afghan force captured a major mujahideen base in Zhawar, Pakistan, inflicting heavy losses. It was also at about this time when the mujahideen acquired antiaircraft missiles as well as ground-to-ground rockets (the U.S. Stinger and the British Blowpipe) that altered the course of the war. The mujahideen were now able to take down Soviet helicopters, especially the heavily armored Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter, and airplanes. By the time Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the spring of 1989, the mujahideen were content to allow them an orderly retreat as they themselves readied to attack Kabul and replace the Soviet-backed government there. Many historians today credit the mujahideen, at least in part, for the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The war cost the Soviet state billions of dollars that it did not have and called into question the wisdom of the government. The CIA ended its aid in 1992, and the pro-Russian government in Kabul fell. In the final stages of that struggle, the Taliban began to emerge as a major force in Afghan politics and subsequently drove the Northern Alliance from Kabul, confining the remnants of the original rebel alliance to a small enclave in the northeastern part of the country. The fundamentalist leader Osama bin Laden, though getting his start in the CIA-funded war of the 1970s and 1980s, did not become a prominent fugitive in Afghanistan until he returned to the country as the Taliban's guest in 1996.

Keith A. Leitch

See also Afghanistan; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Documents 73, 75

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N

National Intelligence Council

The center for midterm and long-term intelligence planning within the U.S. intelligence community. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) officially began operating in 1979. Its origins date back to 1947, when the U.S. government reorganized the nation's intelligence services via the National Security Act and created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The director of central intelligence (DCI) had the responsibility of ensuring that all intelligence data was properly evaluated and shared among appropriate U.S. government organizations. Toward that end, Congress gave the DCI a permanent staff. However, intelligence estimates continued to be flawed. Consequently, acting in his capacity as DCI, in 1950 General Walter Bedell Smith created the Board of National Estimates. It was charged with preparing and disseminating assessments of both international trends and foreign threats to American interests. The Board of National Estimates operated as a council composed of experts in the various fields of intelligence and oversaw the production of National Intelligence Estimates.

In 1973, DCI William J. Colby reformed the way in which the board produced the National Intelligence Estimates. Colby was persuaded that the board had become too insular and out of touch. He thus eliminated the Board of National Estimates, replacing its council of experts with regional and functional specialists called national intelligence officers. These officers had the responsibility of drafting the National Intelligence Estimates. The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the analytical branches of the national intelligence community provided the national intelligence officers with staff and research support. In 1979 the national intelligence officers became the National Intelligence Council (NIC), with the mission of reporting directly to the DCI.

The NIC's mission is to serve as the intelligence community's center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking. The NIC's overall mission is to manage the intelligence community's estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise from inside and outside the government. The NIC speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the entire intelligence community and is charged with five formal functions: supporting the director of national intelligence (DNI) in his or her role as head of the intelligence community, acting as a focal point for receiving and responding to queries from policy makers, broadening the intelligence community's perspective by reaching outside of the intelligence community to engage experts in academia and the private sector, assisting the intelligence community in responding to the changing requirements from policy makers, and

leading the intelligence community in the production of National Intelligence Estimates and related products.

The NIC's National Intelligence Estimates are considered the most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. They contain comprehensive judgments regarding the likely course of future events of the entire intelligence community, an entity that after 2004 consists of the CIA; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; U.S. Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy intelligence; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Department of Homeland Security; the Department of Energy; and the Treasury Department. The NIC's stated goal is "to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information—regardless of whether analytic judgments conform to U.S. policy."

The formal structure of the NIC has a chairman, a vice chairman, a counselor, and a director of strategic plans and outreach. There are seven national intelligence officers assigned to geographic regions: Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, Russia and Eurasia, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Six national intelligence officers deal with specific areas of concern: economics and global issues, military issues, science and technology, transnational threats, warnings, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and proliferation. By the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the NIC reports directly to the DNI and represents the coordinated views of the entire intelligence community.

Throughout its history, the NIC's process of creating National Intelligence Estimates has been fraught with uncertainty and subject to controversy. By definition, estimates are speculative. Estimates were performed when analysts often did not know something with precision or confidence. Effective estimates rely on sound data—a problematic foundation given the active efforts of other nations to conceal their plans—and careful analysis. Because the estimates are used by the executive branch to craft policy and by political parties to evaluate presidential choices, the analysts who craft the National Intelligence Estimates have frequently been subject to political pressures.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks followed by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, two NIC publications represented the council's efforts to provide U.S. policy makers with an assessment of how the world would evolve and to identify opportunities and negative developments that might require policy actions. "Mapping the Global Future 2020" sought to depict what the world would look like in 2020. "Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed" sought to provide a fresh examination of how global trends would unfold. The NIC, like other organizations within the intelligence community, came under scrutiny for its perceived failings in providing actionable information that may have prevented the September 11 attacks. But in fairness, the failings pervaded the entire intelligence apparatus as well as the FBI. The NIC again came under scrutiny after it became apparent that prewar intelligence concerning Iraq's

WMD was either faulty or misrepresented. No WMD were found after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, even after a 16-month search.

More recently, the NIC released a comprehensive report in December 2012 titled “Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds.” This report attempted to lay out a scenario that might unfold in the year 2030, taking into account the 2011 death of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the splintering and localization of Al Qaeda, and the rise of radicalism in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, which had experienced (or were still experiencing) great political turmoil and/or civil war.

James R. Arnold

See also Colby, William; September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of

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National Photographic Interpretation Center

The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) was a subsection of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Science and Technology that produced imagery reports, instructional materials, and items in support of military efforts. The NPIC employed an estimated 1,200 workers, many of them image interpreters and archivists. It is no longer existent, and its work is now done by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

In January 1961 President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the establishment of the NPIC, putting together the three major military branches’ assets to more efficiently handle intelligence. Its major function was analysis of photographic images obtained by aircraft and satellites. Skilled specialists extracted valuable information from photographs showing enemy installations and construction sites. The NPIC existed unofficially prior to 1961, deciphering images taken from U-2 spy planes used to gather information about the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s.

NPIC findings were critical in collecting the necessary information that implicated Cuban-Soviet cooperation prior the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. NPIC analysis attained global attention when the John F. Kennedy administration declassified and made public some of the images showing Soviet missiles in Cuba as well as construction sites associated with them.

After the development of spy satellites, the NPIC used photographic data collected from the satellites to scrutinize Soviet nuclear development and other



Aerial spy photograph shows a medium-range ballistic missile base in San Cristobal, Cuba, in October 1962. Labels detail parts of the missile base during the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

foreign actions that threatened U.S. national security. The NPIC remained a crucial intelligence-gathering organization through much of the Cold War, with many of its findings used to devise intelligence reports for U.S. strategic planning abroad.

The NPIC was absorbed by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in 1996 when it was established. In 2003, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to better reflect its functions.

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See also Cuba; Image Intelligence; Documents 26–30

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National Security

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was originally formed by the National Security Act of 1947, signed by President Harry Truman. The CIA is responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior U.S. policy makers. Its mission is the collection, analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence to assist the president and senior U.S. government policy makers in making decisions relating to national security. The first step in that process is the identification of what specific issues concern national security. Thus, understanding the term “national security” and the underlying values, purposes, and goals is essential for an understanding of the CIA and its mission and activities.

The term “national security” is used quite broadly in different contexts and has been subject to many different definitions and applications. Indeed, it has been recognized by a number of authorities as being an ambiguous phrase that has been subject to manipulation for political purposes, often later proven to be not only without merit but both dangerous and destructive to society and law. A primary example of such manipulations is the McCarthy era during the 1950s when Senator Joseph McCarthy whipped the nation into a state of social and political hysteria concerning the Red Scare and communism, resulting in the unnecessary and tragic destruction of the lives of many loyal citizens.

However, national security is not a new concept. In the modern world with the recognition of international law—or the law of nations as it was known in 1625 with the publication of Hugo Grotius’s seminal work *On the Law of War and Peace*—each nation was recognized as an independent sovereign entity, separate and distinct from other nations, with the power to control its own internal affairs without interference by other nations. This was formal recognition of the most basic aspect of national security—the protection from external interference with the internal affairs of a nation—and is the essence of the concept of sovereignty. Thus, the concept of physical territorial security was recognized.

In American politics, this principle is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, which provides for the common defense of the nation. Alexander Hamilton, writing in *The Federalist Papers*, recognized that safety from external dangers was a prime consideration of the national government. In modern times, the territorial integrity and political independence of all nations are recognized principles of international law, as codified in the United Nations (UN) Charter, Articles 2 and 4. But physical security is not the only aspect of national security.

In the modern world, numerous other factors have been recognized as falling within the ambit of national security. These include military forces, citizens, natural resources, and political ideals. Under the rubric of national security, a nation has the right to safeguard its military forces even if they are located outside that nation’s national borders. The United States has entered into numerous treaties with other nations where its forces are located, known as status of forces agreements.

The same is true for the protection of that nation’s citizens. Citizens are entitled to a certain degree of protection from their nation even when they are traveling in other nations, although that protection may be limited by various other factors,

such as treaties and whether or not that citizen committed any crimes in the foreign nation. It is interesting to note that when citizens, especially if they are agents of the CIA, are caught spying in a foreign nation, they usually have no protections unless they are present as diplomats. An example of such a situation is when U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960 while taking espionage photographs. He had no political protections and was tried and convicted for espionage by the Soviet Union.

The issue of resources is more problematic. The United States has declared that its access to certain natural resources is also a matter of national security. There are two basic categories of natural resources that fall within this claim. The first is strategic resources. Strategic resources are those that fulfill a significant military function. For example, some modern weapons cannot be constructed without certain rare earth minerals. It is the position of the United States that access to these rare earth minerals is so important to the security of the United States that it reserves the right to use force (or covert actions such as those executed by the CIA) to maintain this access. This policy is known as the Carter Doctrine after President Jimmy Carter, who after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan declared that the United States would use force to protect the Middle Eastern oil fields. The second category is those resources that are essential to the American economy. These resources are called economic resources. The most obvious economic resource is oil. As shown by the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, the United States will not be able to maintain its position politically, economically, or even militarily in the world if it does not have access to oil. The major problem with these two types of natural resources is that the foreign nations that have them are also interested in maintaining their control over their own natural resources for a variety of reasons. Accordingly, intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, are frequently called upon to provide information concerning these resources in foreign nations and possibly even to engage in covert actions to help ensure access to them as a matter of national security.

National security, of course, also concerns knowing the military capabilities of foreign nations, especially those foreign nations hostile to the United States. It is vitally important for the United States to be prepared to meet and defeat the military forces of hostile foreign nations, and the most common method of doing so is employing espionage, which is the province of the CIA and various other intelligence agencies. One primary focus of this type of national security concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only a few nations in the world have nuclear weapons, and the United States wants to keep other nations (and terrorist groups) from obtaining them because of the additional threat to national security that such weapons pose. As nations attempting to develop nuclear weapons try to keep their activities secret, it falls to such intelligence agencies as the CIA to not only discover what is happening but also to prevent the development of such nuclear weapons by foreign nations.

Because national security concerns obtaining information from foreign nations through espionage, it obviously also concerns preventing such espionage from occurring within the United States. However, as a general matter, internal security

is not within the authority of the CIA and instead falls within the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Another aspect of national security is world peace. It has been generally accepted that revolutions, rebellions, and wars involving other nations can be a threat to the national security of other nations that are not involved in the conflict. The threats can include large numbers of refugees coming across international borders, internal factions supporting one side of the conflict, disruption of domestic commercial enterprises, and military conflicts causing damage, whether intentionally or unintentionally, within the noninvolved nations. Thus, it is apparent that foreign conflicts can be a threat to national security. The problem is how to handle such threats. History is rife with examples of nations invading and interfering in the internal affairs of foreign nations. However, the UN Charter prohibits the interference in domestic relations by other nations, which includes civil wars, unless the approval of the UN Security Council is obtained. Thus, intelligence agencies such as the CIA can be used to obtain information about these types of conflicts but can also be used to attempt to address such problems.

Yet another aspect of national security involving foreign nations is their political systems. Although the UN Charter grants to each member nation the right of self-determination, which includes that nation's choice of political systems, the more powerful nations of the world ignore this principle of international law. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States reserves the right to essentially control the affairs of Central and South America from interference by Europe and Asia (which in modern times includes communism). In contrast, the former Soviet Union had the Brezhnev Doctrine, which prohibited Western influence in the communist bloc nations of Eastern Europe. As a matter of national security, both the United States (through the CIA) and the Soviet Union (through the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti [Committee for State Security, KGB]) influenced, subverted, and overthrew various governments of foreign nations to help ensure that those nations remained friendly. The same idea applies to the economic systems of foreign nations. The United States considers any communist nation and its associated economic policies to be a threat to the United States and takes active steps to undermine such nations. A primary example of these actions, in the name of national security, is the relationship between the United States and Cuba. For decades the CIA unsuccessfully attempted to topple Fidel Castro and change the Cuban form of government.

Paradoxically, it is interesting to note that the United States considers it illegal to attempt to interfere in U.S. internal politics. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court even formally recognized in the case of *United States v. Robel* that national defense includes the defense of American values and ideals. Thus, national security does concern American political and economic ideals. Problems arise, however, when the ideals of foreign nations conflict with American ideals. In such situations, the CIA is often called upon to attempt to not only gain knowledge of the opposing nations but also to neutralize any threats to America.

National security also includes the advancement of knowledge. Certain fields of science and technology, including physics, mathematics, computer science, and

nuclear engineering, have strict limitations placed upon what can be published. Violation of these restrictions can result in long jail terms.

The illegal international narcotics drug trade is so pervasive in modern society, permeating government, finance, and social institutions, that it has been labeled a national security threat. The drug trade has become a problem of such magnitude that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prohibits military involvement in civilian criminal law enforcement, has been ignored, and the military, especially the U.S. Coast Guard, is now heavily involved in the interdiction of drug smuggling.

With the terror attacks of 9/11 and the rise of Al Qaeda, the scope of what is considered to be of national security concern has significantly expanded. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and subsequent legislation greatly expanded the powers of the various intelligence and security agencies of the United States and significantly expanded the scope of what is within the realm of national security. Now national security concerns include transportation, through the Transportation Security Administration; communication, through various data mining techniques by the National Security Administration; energy production, through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Security; and even what is being taught in schools, colleges, and universities. National security is pervasive in American society. Many previously unquestioned civil rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are being limited in the interest of national security.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also National Security Act of 1947; Powers, Francis Gary; Documents 12, 13, 15–17, 19, 26, 45, 63, 94

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National Security Act of 1947

Legislation effecting sweeping organizational changes in U.S. military and foreign policy establishments signed into law on July 26, 1947, by President Harry S. Truman. The National Security Act of 1947 was a critical step in preparing America to wage the deepening Cold War. Specifically, the act created the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the U.S. Air Force (the third branch of the U.S. armed forces). Congress amended the act in 1949, providing the secretary of defense with more power over the individual armed services and their secretaries.

Soon after World War II ended, the uneasy alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union began to degenerate, and a long-standing ideological and military confrontation between the two superpowers quickly set in. By late 1946, the Truman

administration had adopted a defense policy that became known as containment. This policy sought to contain Soviet influence and the spread of communism throughout the world. It was this mind-set that prompted passage of the National Security Act.

The CIA emerged from the World War II Office of Strategic Services and smaller postwar intelligence operations. Its first director was Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. The existing War and Navy Departments were folded into the DOD, whose first secretary was James V. Forrestal. The new U.S. Air Force, which became a free-standing entity, was built from the existing U.S. Army Air Corps. The NSC's chief role was to coordinate and prioritize information it received from other agencies and to advise the president on national security issues based on analysis of that information. At the time there was no provision made for a national security adviser, a post that came into being under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953. Taken in its totality, the National Security Act provided for a powerful, well-coordinated system that linked national security with foreign policy and military decision making.

The NSC was created to coordinate national security policy. The act also created the position of secretary of defense and unified the separate military departments (the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the newly created U.S. Air Force) under this position. The JCS was created to serve as the principal military advisory board to the president and the secretary of defense. Finally, the CIA was established with the director of central intelligence (DCI) as its head. At the time of its creation, the CIA was the only agency charged with a "national" intelligence mission.

The statutory language regarding the authorities and functions of the new CIA was left intentionally vague. In part this reflected the bureaucratic sensitivities involved in specifying in the law the DCI's roles and missions in regard to other agencies, and in part it reflected the desire to avoid wording that other governments might find offensive. Thus, there was no mention of "espionage" or "spying" in the statute, nor was there any wording to suggest that covert actions (i.e., secret operations to influence political conditions in other countries) were part of the new agency's charter. Rather, the CIA was authorized to perform "services of common concern" to other intelligence agencies as may be determined by the NSC and to perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time-to-time direct." (The NSC did, in fact, issue directives in 1947 and 1948 providing specific authority for the CIA's operational and analytical functions.)

The act also included an express prohibition on the CIA having any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions," reflecting the congressional and public desire to ensure that a U.S. "Gestapo" was not being created and to preserve the Federal Bureau of Investigation's primacy in domestic matters. The law also made the DCI responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Bevan Sewell

See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; National Security; National Security Council Directive 4-A; National Security Council Directive 10/2; National Security Decision Directive 17; Documents 2–19

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National Security Council Directive 4-A

On December 14, 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) adopted National Security Council Directive 4-A (NSC 4-A), which bestowed responsibility upon the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for covert psychological operations. On December 22, 1947, the CIA established the Special Procedures Group within its Office of Special Operations (OSS) to carry out psychological operations granted by NSC 4-A.

In an undated draft directive to then Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the NSC suggested that in light of the vicious psychological efforts of the Soviet Union and its affiliates to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, the foreign information activities of the U.S. government should be supplemented by covert psychological operations in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security. Under the authority of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC ordered the director to initiate and conduct covert psychological operations. The design of such psychological operations was to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities that constituted a threat to world peace and security or were designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.

NSC 4-A therefore vested supervision over psychological operations in the director of central intelligence, who was charged with ensuring that such operations were consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign information activities. This supervision required the director to obtain approval by a panel designated by the NSC of all policy directives and major plans for psychological operations. Furthermore, such supervision required the director to coordinate operations with the senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in each respective area directly affected by psychological operations.

Previously in October 1947, Hillenkoetter had made a recommendation to policy makers concerning the crucial need for psychological operations. Soon thereafter, the secretaries of defense, the army, the navy, and the air force, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made their own recommendations regarding the appropriate agency to carry out psychological warfare. Their November 4, 1947, proposal suggested that propaganda of all kinds was a function of the State Department and that an assistant secretary of state in consultation with the director

of central intelligence and a military representative should be responsible for psychological operations. President Harry S. Truman approved the joint proposal on November 24, 1947, thereby assigning psychological coordination to the secretary of state.

However, primarily due to objections from Secretary of State George Marshall, President Truman's decision was soon reversed. Marshall believed that such activities would potentially embarrass the State Department and discredit U.S. foreign policy if exposed as State Department actions. Furthermore, out of concern for the success and credibility of the U.S. government's June 1947 European economic recovery program, Marshall objected to the State Department's direction of covert action, including psychological operations. Due in part to the success of Marshall's objections, the NSC thus adopted NSC 4-A.

The CIA, as opposed to the State Department and the military, offered numerous advantages as the organization to execute covert psychological operations. In 1947, one-third of the CIA's personnel had served with the OSS during World War II. Such personnel had experience in wartime operations and could quickly develop and implement programs for covert operations. In addition, the CIA's overseas logistical apparatus gave it a ready capability to assume control over covert psychological operations.

The CIA had no need to approach Congress for separate appropriations, for it contained a system of unvouchered funds for its clandestine collection mission. Thus, the CIA's assumption of covert psychological operations under NSC 4-A was a logical choice in light of the unwillingness of other departments to assume the risks involved in covert activities.

Andrew Green

See also National Security; National Security Act of 1947; National Security Council Directive 10/2; National Security Decision Directive 17; Documents 15–19, 21

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National Security Council Directive 10/2

The National Security Council (NSC) adopted National Security Council Directive 10/2 (NSC 10/2) on June 17, 1948, which officially authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct covert operations. NSC 10/2 authorized a significant increase in the range of covert operations directed against the Soviet Union, including political and economic warfare as well as paramilitary

activities. NSC 10/2 superseded the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which was thereby canceled.

“Covert operations,” as defined in NSC 10/2, included all activities conducted or sponsored by the U.S. government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups in such a manner that U.S. responsibility would not be evident to unauthorized persons. If such covert operations were to be uncovered, the U.S. government would have the ability to plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. The NSC 10/2 definition of “covert operations” further included any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, and subversion against hostile states. The definition specifically excluded armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counterespionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

The concept behind NSC 10/2 was articulated a month earlier in May 1948 by director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff George F. Kennan, who advocated for the development of a covert political action capability. International events at the time, such as the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and communist-inspired strikes in France and Italy, gave credence to Kennan’s concept. The fear of war with the Soviet Union precipitated a series of interdepartmental intelligence estimates on the likelihood of a Soviet attack on the United States and its allies. Although the estimates concluded that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union would start a war, policy makers at the time shared a degree of suspicion and fear of the Soviet Union. Kennan proposed that the State Department issue a directorate for overt and covert political warfare whereby the director of a Special Studies Group would be under State Department control but not formally associated with the department. The Special Studies Group director would instead have concealed funds and personnel elsewhere, and the director would have a staff of eight people consisting of State Department and Department of Defense representatives.

Soon thereafter, the NSC endorsed Kennan’s concept by adopting NSC 10/2. In addition to authorizing an expansion in covert activities, NSC 10/2 established the Office of Special Projects (OSP) within the CIA under the authority of Section 102 (d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 to plan and conduct covert operations. During wartime, NSC 10/2 directed the OSP to coordinate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to plan and prepare for the conduct of covert operations. Although the OSP’s budget and personnel were appropriated within the CIA’s allocations, the director of central intelligence had little authority in determining the OSP’s activities. Instead, NSC 10/2 directed that the OSP be headed by the chief of the OSP, who was to be nominated by the secretary of state, acceptable to the director of central intelligence, and approved by the NSC. Although NSC 10/2 stated that the chief of the OSP shall report directly to the director of central intelligence, policy guidance came to the OSP chief from the State Department and the Department of Defense, bypassing the director of central intelligence.

NSC 10/2 also included three responsibilities for the director of central intelligence. First, the director was made responsible for ensuring that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and

military policies and with overt activities through designated representatives of the secretary of state and the secretary of defense. The NSC was charged with resolving disagreements between the director and the representatives of the secretary of state and secretary of defense over these plans. Second, with regard to wartime covert operations, the director was made responsible for ensuring that plans for such operations were drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the JCS. These plans were required to be accepted by the representative of the JCS as consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations. Third, the director was made responsible for informing U.S. government agencies of any covert operations that may affect them.

Andrew Green

See also National Security; National Security Act of 1947; National Security Council Directive 4-A; National Security Decision Directive 17; Documents 15–19, 21

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National Security Decision Directive 17

The National Security Decision Directive on Cuba and Central America, also known as National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD 17), was signed by President Ronald Reagan on November 23, 1981. Reagan made several of the decisions contained in NSDD 17 based on discussions at the National Security Council meeting on November 16, 1981. NSDD 17 in part authorized covert operations backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to undermine the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and the directive also increased economic and military assistance to the Central America region. U.S. strategy toward Central America was formalized in NSDD 17 and other associated implementing decisions signed by President Reagan at the end of 1981.

NSDD 17 characterized U.S. policy toward the Americas as strong support for nations that embrace the principles of democracy and freedom for their people in a stable and peaceful environment. More specifically, NSDD 17 made it U.S. policy to assist in defeating the insurgency in El Salvador at the time. Additionally, NSDD 17 declared it U.S. policy to oppose actions by Cuba and Nicaragua to introduce into Central America heavy weapons, troops from outside the region, trained subversives, or arms and military supplies for insurgents.

In support of the policies declared within it, NSDD 17 authorized several decisions made by President Reagan. NSDD 17 created a public information task force

to inform Congress and the public of the critical situation in the Central America region and authorized approximately \$250 million to \$300 million in economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean countries. Furthermore, NSDD 17 formalized the agreement to use the majority of the \$50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras, and the directive also authorized military training for indigenous units and leaders both in and out of the United States. With regard to Nicaragua specifically, NSDD 17 authorized support for democratic forces in Nicaragua and called for continued trade and credit to Nicaragua so long as the Nicaraguan government permitted the private sector to operate effectively.

Through NSDD 17 and associated implementing decisions, President Reagan decided that U.S. troops would not intervene directly in Central America. It was clear that the White House, the Defense Department, and Congress had no desire to use U.S. troops to cut off support from Cuba for Central American revolutions, which would have risked confrontation with the Soviets. Driven by political pragmatics, the decisions authorized under NSDD 17 were the result of the collision of the U.S. determination not to lose El Salvador and other Central American countries to communism, given post-Vietnam War reluctance to direct intervention and the use of force.

U.S. involvement with the Nicaraguan Contras had begun in late 1981. Prior to President Reagan's signing of NSDD 17, CIA director William Casey had flown to Buenos Aires to discuss CIA coordination with Argentina's military regime. Argentinean Army chief of staff Leopoldo Galtieri told Casey that the Argentines' biggest concern was whether the United States would continue its support and not abandon the Contras prematurely. Once the Argentines were reassured of continued U.S. support, the CIA began providing logistic and financial support to the Contras, while the Argentines were in charge of their training and operations.

Through NSDD 17, the CIA became the senior patron of an undocumented but explicit relationship between the United States, Argentina, and Honduras. Although the CIA support program did not fully begin until 1982, by 1984 more than 6,000 Contra fighters had crossed the Nicaraguan border, where they occupied vast amounts of territory and threatened several important towns. Their effectiveness was in part due to U.S. funding for arms and ammunition and CIA logistical support.

Andrew Green

See also Casey, William; Contras; National Security; National Security Council Directive 4-A; National Security Council Directive 10/2; Documents 15–19, 21

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Nicholson, Harold James (1950–)

Harold James “Jim” Nicholson is the spy who was sentenced twice. Nicholson graduated from Oregon State University in 1973 and entered the U.S. Army as a lieutenant to fulfill his Reserve Officers’ Training Corps commitment. His last army job was as a captain responsible for tactical intelligence matters at Fort Ord, California, before joining the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1980.

Nicholson was considered the perfect covert agent—so successful and quietly professional that his own bosses never thought he could become a security risk. For 23 years, he worked in the intelligence community. However, in the last 5 years of his career at the CIA, he began selling secrets to the Russians. In 1991 Nicholson’s marriage started to disintegrate, and he took on the demands of a full-time single father. He began having an affair with a woman in Thailand and faced growing financial burdens. About that time, he also told some colleagues that he was dissatisfied with his CIA assignments.

It was not long before Nicholson began trading classified secrets to the Russians for as much as \$180,000. The possibility that one of the CIA’s rising agents—CIA director John M. Deutch called Nicholson one of the agency’s “leading officers”—might have spied for Moscow caught the agency’s senior managers totally off guard. Nicholson is the highest-ranking CIA employee ever to be charged with espionage.



CIA officer Harold Nicholson was convicted of selling U.S. intelligence to Russia for \$300,000 and was sentenced to 23 years 7 months of imprisonment on June 5, 1997. He reportedly sold the identities of all the U.S. intelligence officers stationed in Russia as well as the identities of his trainees at the CIA school. (AP Photo/Central Intelligence Agency)

The 1994 divorce created significant financial pressure for Nicholson. In an initial property settlement, Nicholson's wife got \$4,300 in cash, an additional \$2,000 for legal fees, and \$6,000 to pay off a credit union loan on her 1991 Volkswagen Golf. Nicholson also assumed travel costs for the children and was ordered to pay \$650 in monthly alimony. About that time his long run of overseas assignments came to an end, driving up his cost of living. In June 1994 right before Nicholson left Malaysia for an assignment in Virginia, he received his first payment of \$12,000 from the Russians. From 1994 to 1996, Nicholson trained new CIA recruits and sold their identities and other secrets to the Russians. In 1996 on a trip to Singapore, he was tailed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigators who had grown suspicious because Nicholson appeared to fail routine security questions during polygraph tests a few months before in 1995. In Singapore, Nicholson stayed at the Shangri-La Hotel in a \$300-a-night room. One day he waltzed out on what the FBI affidavit called a "surveillance detection run." He window-shopped, using the reflections to look for followers, and backtracked and ducked in and out of a subway station. That should have been child's play for a man who taught elementary spy techniques—how to steal mail, use disguises, and evade pursuit—to new agents. But Nicholson apparently didn't see the FBI agents on his tail, and the next day he followed a similarly circuitous route. At the subway station he met up with a Caucasian man, and they hopped into a car with diplomatic plates registered to the Russian embassy. During and after the trip, Nicholson spent or deposited \$20,000 and gave his son \$12,000 for a car. Nicholson considered himself smart but not appreciated by his employers, and his spying might have been his way of revenge, getting back at the system in some way. In February 1997 Nicholson was sentenced to 24 years in prison for providing the post-Soviet Union intelligence service of the Russian Federation with national defense information, including photographic negatives, between June 1994 and his arrest on November 16, 1996.

On January 17, 2011, Nicholson admitted to using his youngest son, Nathaniel, to collect a "pension" from Russian agents while serving time in federal prison in Oregon. Nathaniel Nicholson was sentenced in December to five years on probation after making a deal with prosecutors to help build the case against his father. Jim Nicholson could have been released in June 2017 at the age of 66. Instead, he will be in prison—and likely will remain in solitary confinement—until at least 2025.

Nicholson admitted to using his son to collect more than \$47,000 from Russian officials in Mexico, Peru, and Cyprus for past spy work. Between October 2006 and December 2008, Nathaniel met with representatives of the Russian Federation six times, including twice at a consulate in San Francisco.

At the first meeting at the Russian consulate, Nathaniel presented three pieces of paper slipped to him in prison by his father. They included a letter of introduction, a photograph of Jim and Nathaniel at the prison, and a request for money. Nathaniel told prosecutors that if he were caught visiting the consulate, he had a cover story: he would say that he was asking the Russians about architecture. At a second meeting at the consulate Nathaniel received \$5,000 in \$100 bills, according to his plea agreement. That set off Nathaniel's globe-trotting tour, which included stops in Mexico City, where he met with Vasilii Fedotov, known to the FBI as a former

high-ranking officer with the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB). Fedotov gave Nathaniel \$10,000 in \$100 bills.

Jim Nicholson told Nathaniel to distribute the money among his grandparents and siblings and not to deposit more than \$500 at a time.

Jan Goldman

See also Ames, Aldrich; Deutch Rules

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Nosenko, Yuri (1927–2008)

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko was a Soviet defector who had worked as an intelligence officer for the KGB. He defected to the United States in 1964 but had been in contact with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since 1962. His defection proved controversial, however, and he endured several years of imprisonment and harsh treatment because some in the American intelligence establishment believed that he was a double agent.

Nosenko was born on October 20, 1927, in Nikolaev in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine (modern-day Mykolaiv, Ukraine). His father, Ivan, was a high-ranking official in the Soviet government. The younger Nosenko studied at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, graduating in 1950. He joined the KGB in 1953. Nosenko reportedly moved rapidly through the ranks of the Soviet intelligence agency, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel by the early 1960s. In 1962 while he was attached to a Soviet diplomatic post in Geneva, Switzerland, Nosenko first approached CIA operatives there. In need of money, he offered to sell to the CIA certain information about Soviet espionage activities. The CIA accepted the offer and paid Nosenko for his information, but Nosenko remained employed by the KGB; that agency, meanwhile, did not initially know of his activities.

For a time, Nosenko worked in Moscow while spying for the CIA. However, in late 1963 or early 1964, he believed that his cover within the KGB had been revealed. He then asked to defect to the United States. Some observers have suggested that he sought to defect because he had an affinity for U.S. culture and was in dire financial straits. Whatever the case, Nosenko defected in the winter of 1964

and immediately began feeding the CIA vast amounts of highly useful information. Indeed, he provided the agency with a list of KGB moles who had infiltrated U.S. and Western embassies and revealed the presence of electronic bugs planted by the Soviets in the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

Most critically, Nosenko provided credible information that Lee Harvey Oswald, the man who had murdered President John F. Kennedy in November 1963, had not been employed by the Soviet government or the KGB. Nosenko had personally reviewed Oswald's KGB file during the time Oswald had lived in the Soviet Union (1959–1962) and stated that Kennedy's assassin was deemed too unstable to be employed as a spy or an intelligence operative. The timing of this was crucial, as the Warren Commission, the group established to investigate the Kennedy assassination, was in the midst of compiling its findings vis-à-vis the murder. Although Nosenko was never mentioned in the report, which was released in September 1964, it is assumed that his information about Oswald was incorporated into it. The report concluded that Oswald had acted alone and had not been part of a larger conspiracy. That development certainly prevented U.S.-Soviet relations from badly deteriorating and may have helped prevent war between the two superpowers.

Only months after Nosenko's defection, however, some CIA operatives, most notably CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton, concluded that Nosenko's stories were untrue and that he was part of an elaborate KGB ruse to embarrass the CIA. CIA officials then decided to detain Nosenko and subject him to intense interrogation in hopes that he would crack and provide information on the KGB's real motives.

From 1964 until 1967 Nosenko was imprisoned at Camp Peary in Williamsburg, Virginia, where he spent virtually all of his time in solitary confinement. He was fed starvation rations, was not permitted to read, and was forbidden from going outside. He was also repeatedly interrogated and subjected to multiple polygraph tests. None of these tactics yielded any new information.

Finally, in 1967 the CIA concluded that Nosenko had been generally telling the truth and had not been acting as a double agent. CIA officials subsequently gave Nosenko a new name and identity and a check for \$80,000 and relocated him to an undisclosed location somewhere in the American South. Occasionally, the CIA would fly Nosenko to its Virginia headquarters, where he gave lectures to U.S. intelligence officers.

In 1978, CIA director Stansfield Turner publicly admitted to a congressional committee that Nosenko's imprisonment and treatment had been "beyond the bounds of propriety or good judgment." Nevertheless, some observers continued to question Nosenko's true motives and wondered why he would have left his family members behind to defect to the United States, with no plans to ever see them again or to relocate them. At least one former KGB officer who is now an American citizen, Oleg D. Kalugin, has stated that the KGB would never have permitted Nosenko to be a double agent because his information would have been deemed unreliable, and the agency risked great embarrassment if Nosenko's identity had been revealed.

In the summer of 2008 just weeks before Nosenko's death, several high-level CIA officials visited him, presenting him with an American flag and a letter from CIA director Michael V. Hayden. The letter thanked Nosenko for his service to America, but it was also a tacit admission of regret for the way in which the CIA had treated him in the 1960s. Nosenko died on August 23, 2008, in an undisclosed location.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Angleton, James; Cold War and the CIA; Golitsyn, Anatoliy; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 42

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Office of Strategic Services

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was a U.S. foreign intelligence agency and forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The OSS was created in June 1942 and disbanded on October 1, 1945. President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the OSS at the urging of Colonel William J. Donovan, a prominent lawyer and former U.S. assistant attorney general who served in the U.S. Army during World War I, winning the Medal of Honor, and then took an interest in intelligence matters. At the beginning of World War II, Donovan, who had close connections with like-minded British intelligence operatives and with Roosevelt, persuaded the president that the United States needed a centralized civilian-run intelligence agency that would report directly to the White House. In July 1941 before the United States entered the war, Roosevelt established for this purpose the Office of Coordinator of Information, headed by Donovan. A few months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, this agency metamorphosed into the OSS, which was to report directly to the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The OSS undertook a wide variety of activities. In the United States, Donovan recruited academics for research and analysis functions. The OSS also mounted numerous covert activities, operating in both the European and Pacific theaters of war. Ultimately the OSS employed several thousand personnel. It had particularly close links with British intelligence services, which Donovan regarded as providing a desirable model for a potential U.S. agency. OSS European operations were based in London and headed by Colonel David K. E. Bruce, who subsequently became U.S. ambassador to France, West Germany, and Britain. OSS operatives (one of the more flamboyant ones was Allen W. Dulles, who spent the war in Switzerland cultivating contacts in Germany and Italy) infiltrated Axis-occupied territory, aiding resistance groups and providing the U.S. military with firsthand intelligence. In the Asian theater, OSS agents worked closely with nationalist forces in China and Indochina, and as the war drew to a close they reported favorably though unavailingly to Washington on both the Chinese communist movement led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and its Vietnamese counterpart headed by Ho Chi Minh.

Despite its successes, the OSS attracted fierce criticism from the American military, particularly General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Southwest Pacific; military espionage operatives; and other rival intelligence agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Donovan's forthright style did little to allay such tensions. The OSS recruited its operatives disproportionately from the American social elite to which Donovan belonged, winning it the nickname "Oh

So Social” and enabling detractors to denigrate its accomplishments. Immediately after the war ended, in September 1945 President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS, ignoring Donovan’s forceful pleas to establish a centralized U.S. intelligence agency. Within a few months, however, rising Cold War tensions led Truman to reverse this decision. The OSS was the de facto precursor of the CIA, established by presidential executive order in 1946 and, more formally, by an act of Congress in 1947. Many CIA operatives, including several influential directors—among them Allen W. Dulles, Richard Helms, and William Colby—began their intelligence careers as OSS agents. The CIA’s subsequent heavy reliance on covert operations was another legacy that can be traced directly to its World War II OSS heritage.

Priscilla Roberts

See also Donovan, William; Dulles, Allen; Documents 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13

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Olson, Frank (1910–1953)

Frank Rudolph Olson was an American bacteriologist and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who died under suspicious circumstances in 1953. Years after his death, the CIA admitted that it had given the drug LSD to Olson without his knowledge or permission. Nine days after receiving the drug, the CIA alleged, Olson committed suicide by jumping from a New York City hotel. Some observers including his family, however, contend that Olson was beaten and pushed out of the window to keep him from revealing CIA secrets.

Olson was born on July 17, 1910, in Hurley, Wisconsin, and received his BS and PhD degrees from the University of Wisconsin. He served on the faculty at Purdue

University before entering the U.S. Army Chemical Corps during World War II. After the war, he was employed as a civilian contractor for the U.S. Army's Biological Warfare Laboratories located at Camp Detrick (present-day Fort Detrick), Maryland. There he was involved in establishing America's clandestine biological weapons program. Sometime in the early 1950s, Olson began to work directly for the CIA as a member of its Technical Services Staff (TSS). At the time, the TSS was working on a secret project to develop the use of psychotropic drugs that could be used for both military and intelligence applications (part of the larger MKULTRA program).

By 1953 the CIA was attempting to evaluate the use of LSD, a powerful psychedelic drug that can produce vibrant hallucinations and other potentially dangerous psychological symptoms. According to the story told by the CIA, Olson was given a dose of LSD, without his knowledge or consent, in mid-November 1953. The drug caused Olson to suffer from crippling paranoia, delusions, and other psychotic symptoms. According to the CIA, Olson was sent for evaluation to a physician in New York City who is suspected to have been a CIA employee. That physician recommended that Olson be admitted to a psychiatric facility for treatment and recovery. Before that could occur, however, on November 28, 1953, Olson hurled himself out of a 10-story window and fell to his death. The CIA claimed—then and now—that Olson suffered a nervous breakdown and committed suicide. Some have suggested that Olson had tried to resign his post just prior to his death but that the CIA sought to prevent that by silencing him for good.

Until 1975, Olson's family knew nothing of the backstory to his death and assumed that he had indeed been mentally ill and committed suicide. In 1975, however, when the independent Rockefeller Commission began investigating CIA activities in the late 1940s and 1950s, the CIA was forced to admit that it had drugged Olson with LSD without his knowledge nine days before he committed suicide. When Olson's family declared its intention to sue the CIA, the U.S. government recommended a \$750,000 settlement, which the family accepted.

The Olson case received new scrutiny beginning in 1994, when Olson's sons had their father's body exhumed for reburial in a new location. At that time the Olsons decided to have a second autopsy performed, the results of which varied markedly from the one performed by the government almost 40 years before. All but one of the new medical examiners concluded that Olson's injuries had occurred before he died, not as a result of the fall. This conclusion suggested that Olson had been severely beaten prior to his fall and that the CIA was perhaps complicit in a preplanned murder rather than a tragic experiment gone awry.

In 1996, the Olson family asked New York City's district attorney to reopen the case and investigate the possibility of murder, but the office demurred, claiming that there was not enough compelling evidence to revisit the case. The district attorney's office did, however, change the cause of Olson's death from "suicide" to "unknown." This did not put an end to rampant speculation that Olson was murdered or, at the very least, was a victim of CIA malfeasance that brought about a preventable death. Indeed, to this day Olson's death remains mysterious and controversial. In 2012 Olson's sons tried to sue for compensatory damages, but a U.S. district court judge dismissed the suit in July 2013, pointing out that the family had

agreed to end the case when it received the \$750,000 settlement in the mid-1970s. Tellingly, the judge concluded that “the public record supports many of the allegations (in the family suit), farfetched as they may sound.”

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also ARTICHOKE, Operation; MKULTRA, Project; Rockefeller Commission; Document 49

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Open Source Center

The Open Source Center is an intelligence-collection unit at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The focus of the Open Source Center is to analyze and manage open-source intelligence (OSINT). OSINT refers to information that is publically available.

The incentive to create the Open Source Center came from a recommendation by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the WMD Commission). The commission recommended that the CIA establish a mechanism to maximize the use of OSINT such as newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, Internet news, and other public information from foreign countries. The WMD Commission stated that “many open source materials may provide the critical and perhaps only window into activities that threaten the United States.”

In November 2005, Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte and CIA director Porter J. Goss announced the creation of the Open Source Center to be based at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The deputy director of national intelligence commented that “just because the intelligence is stolen does not make it better.” The principle aim of the Open Source Center is to make the most use of readily available intelligence so as to focus clandestine assets where they might produce intelligence more effectively. Ideally, analyzing OSINT should provide the national security community with a broad contextual picture of an issue at a relatively low cost.

OSINT analysts at the CIA are recruited for foreign-language aptitude, area knowledge, and specific subject matter expertise so that they can appreciate subtle changes in tone and attitude toward the United States, politicians, and current events. The electronic intelligence-gathering process at the Open Source Center involves the use of computers and specialized software to filter web pages for information. Blogs have recently become an important source for OSINT because they provide a first-person perspective of current social conditions, perspectives, and attitudes on the ground in a foreign country. Information is also purchased for commercial databases.

The Open Source Center has been successful in the discovery and disclosure of technological advancements in foreign countries as well as in providing information about the spread of avian flu.

John Newman

See also Mass Media Operations; Document 66

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
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Osama bin Laden, Killing of

Osama bin Laden, leader of the Islamist terrorist group Al Qaeda, was killed in Pakistan on May 1, 2011 (May 2 Pakistani time), by a U.S. special forces unit. The operation was code-named Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR and was ordered by President Barack Obama. It was executed as a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation by a crack U.S. Navy SEAL team. After the raid in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, U.S. forces took bin Laden's corpse to Afghanistan to identify the remains. Subsequently, they buried bin Laden at sea within 24 hours of his death. Aspects of the killing, related to legal and ethical qualms about the nature of bin Laden's death and how he was not taken alive while unarmed, were raised by non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International.

Information retrieved in 2002 contributed to the U.S. intelligence community's efforts to locate bin Laden, resulting in the Abbottabad operation. Al Qaeda couriers were a priority early on for CIA interrogators. In 2002, they had attained uncorroborated information about an Al Qaeda courier. From 2004 to 2006, CIA interrogators learned the name of this Al Qaeda courier. They also speculated that he was part of bin Laden's inner circle. By 2007, officials knew the courier's name as al-Kuwaiti, though it was believed that this was not his real name. A 2010 wire-tapped conversation of another suspect was retrieved that included al-Kuwaiti. CIA operatives identified and located al-Kuwaiti in August 2010. They then followed him back to the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was in hiding. This courier and a relative, believed to be either a cousin or a sibling, were both killed in the May 1 raid by U.S. forces. In June 2011, Pakistani officials identified the courier as Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed from Pakistan's Swat Valley region.

The CIA used surveillance photos and intelligence reports to determine the identities of the inhabitants of the Abbottabad compound where the courier was going. By September 2010, the CIA had come to the conclusion that the compound was specifically constructed to hide a person of significance and deemed it likely



Aerial image provided by the CIA shows the Abbottabad compound in Pakistan where American forces in Pakistan killed Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. (AP Photo/CIA)

to be bin Laden. These officials concluded that he was likely residing there with his youngest wife.

The compound, built in 2004, was a three-story building that was located at the end of a narrow road in Abbottabad. The city of Abbottabad is approximately 100 miles from the Afghan border to the east of Pakistan. The compound is 0.8 miles southwest of the Pakistan Military Academy. There was no landline telephone or Internet service to the compound. Moreover, the residents burned their trash, unlike their neighbors who placed their garbage outside for collection.

The CIA led the surveillance and intelligence gathering related to the compound. Other U.S. government agencies, including the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the U.S. Department of Defense also played significant roles in the overall operation. According to the *Washington Post*, “The [intelligence-gathering] effort was so extensive and costly that the CIA went to Congress in December [2010] to secure authority to reallocate tens of millions of dollars within assorted agency budgets to fund it, U.S. officials said.” The CIA rented a

house in Abbottabad that was used to observe the compound over a number of months. The CIA team gathered intelligence on the compound from informants and through other means to confirm the identities and movements of the residents. This safe house was abandoned after the U.S. operation to kill bin Laden. The NGA assisted the Joint Special Operations Command in creating mission simulators for U.S. pilots. The agency also analyzed data from an RQ-170 drone in relation to the raid on the compound before, during, and after the operation and developed three-dimensional renderings of the compound, created schedules describing residential traffic patterns, and assessed the characteristics of the compound's residents.

A process called red teaming was used by the CIA on the collected intelligence to review the circumstantial evidence independently so as to better scrutinize whether bin Laden was in fact residing in the compound. An administration official stated that "We conducted red-team exercises and other forms of alternative analysis to check our work. No other candidate fit the bill as well as bin Laden did." The duplicate analysis was determined to be necessary, because "Despite what officials described as an extraordinarily concentrated collection effort leading up to the operation, no U.S. spy agency was ever able to capture a photograph of bin Laden at the compound before the raid or a recording of the voice of the mysterious male figure whose family occupied the structure's top two floors."

At 1:00 a.m. local time, U.S. Navy SEALs from the Red Squadron of the Joint Special Operations Command's U.S. Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) led the attack on the compound. The DEVGRU SEALs operated in two teams of about a dozen members armed with assault rifles and machine guns as well as other equipment necessary for the operation, such as body armor and night-vision goggles. They had flown into Pakistan from a staging base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The operation was put under CIA control because the United States was not legally at war with Pakistan. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment transported the two SEAL teams into the city in two modified Black Hawk helicopters. One of the two helicopters was severely damaged in a crash landing when they arrived at the compound, but no one on board was seriously hurt. The helicopter was blown up after the mission to protect classified equipment from getting into the hands of Pakistani forces.

The SEALs found the unarmed Osama bin Laden on the third floor of the main building after shooting and neutralizing several compound defenders. After bin Laden was shot and killed, his body was retrieved by the team to be taken in for identification. The raid took approximately 40 minutes altogether. Much of that time involved killing defenders and moving through the compound room to room through various floors looking for bin Laden. Three other men and a woman were killed in the operation in addition to bin Laden. The individuals killed were bin Laden's adult son, bin Laden's courier (Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti), al-Kuwaiti's brother Abrar, and Abrar's unarmed wife Bushra. Their bodies were left at the compound and collected by Pakistani authorities. Two helicopters—one an original Black Hawk used in the operation and the other a reserve Chinook to replace the one damaged in the landing—quickly departed the scene with both SEAL

teams and bin Laden's corpse. U.S. officials shared information of the operation with Pakistan after the raid was over.

Jan Goldman

See also Afghanistan; War on Terror and the CIA; Documents 74, 77–88, 97

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P

Panetta, Leon (1938–)

In June 2011, the Senate confirmed Leon Panetta's nomination as secretary of the Department of Defense. He was sworn in on July 1, 2011, and served until February 27, 2013. Panetta had previously served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under President Barack Obama, as White House chief of staff and director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under President Bill Clinton, and as a member of the U.S. Congress.

Leon Edward Panetta was born in Monterey, California, on June 28, 1938, the son of Italian immigrants. He graduated magna cum laude in political science from the University of Santa Clara and received his law degree from the same school, where he was editor of the law review. He entered private practice in 1963 and during 1964–1965 served in the U.S. Army as a commissioned officer.

Panetta was initially a Republican but was fired from his post as director of civil rights at what was then the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1970 after proceeding with plans to resolve more than 600 school desegregation cases; the Richard Nixon administration wanted to see the cases postponed in efforts to attract support from southern Democrats. Panetta's ouster was also spurred by opposition he encountered at the highest levels of the Nixon administration. Although Panetta has continued to be fiscally conservative, the events spurred a change in his political allegiance, and he became Democratic New York City mayor John Lindsay's coordinator of state and federal aid.

In 1971, Panetta returned to private legal practice in California. He ran for Congress as a Democrat in 1976 and won the seat, steadily improving his majority during the time he held the seat, representing central California. During his tenure in Congress, Panetta served as chair of the House Budget Committee and as a member of the Agriculture Committee. Despite his reputation for frugality and honesty, he was caught up in the House banking scandal of 1992 after he was found to have written two overdrafts on his account at the House bank. He attributed the checks to sloppy bookkeeping.

Panetta remained in Congress until 1993, when he was confirmed as director of the OMB. During his short tenure at the OMB, he focused his attention on efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit. Clinton later moved Panetta to the White House chief of staff post in the hope that his position as a Washington insider would enhance administration relationships with the legislative branch. Panetta was also credited with bringing more order to the daily operations of the White House than had been present under his predecessor. He stepped down in November 1996,

choosing not to serve a second term, and was replaced by Erskine Bowles. From 2000 to 2003, Panetta served as chair of the Pew Oceans Commission. In 2006, he was selected to serve on the bipartisan Iraq Study Group. Panetta and his wife Sylvia have also directed the Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy.

On January 9, 2009, President-elect Obama named Panetta as his choice to head the CIA. The announcement initially sparked some concerns, since Panetta had no background in intelligence; however, his advocates believed that he was well qualified for the position, citing his policy management skills and his foreign policy experiences during his time in the Clinton White House and with the Iraq Study Group. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Panetta said that he would not be involved in the everyday intelligence operations at the CIA, though he made it clear that his would be the final word at the agency: “I anticipate focusing primarily on ensuring policy and procedure is handled correctly, rather than intervening personally in the details of operational planning or the production of individual pieces of analysis. But let me assure you, the decisions at the CIA will be mine.” Panetta was confirmed by the Senate on February 12.

When Panetta took the helm at the CIA, the organization was on shaky ground after its use of harsh interrogation techniques and extraordinary rendition in pursuit of the Bush administration’s Global War on Terror. Panetta said at his Senate confirmation hearings that he would continue the rendition practice but would only consider enhanced interrogation techniques in “a ticking bomb situation.” When the Department of Justice (DOJ) sought in 2009 to determine whether CIA agents’ interrogation techniques had broken the law, Panetta worked to curb the DOJ’s investigation, citing previous investigations into the matter and legal flaws in some of the cases against the agents. Panetta had previously argued in his Senate confirmation hearing that CIA agents should not be prosecuted for using interrogation methods that the DOJ had authorized. Although the DOJ was ultimately allowed to pursue its investigation, Panetta’s efforts helped narrow the scope of the investigation.

As director, Panetta worked to build trust with Congress by sharing more information with the body than previous CIA officials had, and he increased the CIA’s use of predator drones in bombing missions in Afghanistan. Shortly after taking office, Obama instructed Panetta to make tracking and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden his top priority, and Panetta ultimately ran the 2011 operation that resulted in Navy SEALs killing bin Laden at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. On May 1 Obama announced that bin Laden had been killed, just days after announcing that Panetta was his pick to replace retiring secretary of defense Robert Gates. On June 21, the U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed Panetta for the post. He stepped down as CIA head on June 30 and was sworn in as Obama’s second secretary of defense the following day.

One of Panetta’s primary objectives as head of the Pentagon was to pave the way for the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding gays and lesbians in the U.S. military. Within months the policy was rescinded, and gay and lesbians were permitted to serve openly in all branches of the armed services. He also repeatedly warned during his tenure in office that the U.S. defense budget should not be cut more than \$400 billion over a 10-year period, asserting that an amount

exceeding that figure would precipitate problems in the military and weaken America's ability to respond to a variety of military threats. He largely succeeded in holding the line on such cuts. In 2012, Panetta warned that Iran must not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons and that any attempt to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz would elicit a military response by the United States. In January 2013, Panetta also set in motion plans to allow women to hold combat positions at all levels within the U.S. armed forces. This initiative was later codified into policy.

Panetta decided to leave government service in February 2013 with the advent of the second Obama administration. Exhausted after years of dedicated service in stressful, high-level posts, Panetta longed to return to his home in California. In retirement he has given a number of speeches, has been involved in numerous academic and environmental organizations, and published *Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace* in 2014.

Jan Goldman

See also Coercive Interrogation; Drones; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Rendition; Torture; Document 98

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Paramilitary Operations, Covert

The term "paramilitary" can have several meanings, depending on the context within which it is used. Generally speaking, a paramilitary unit is defined as a unit that engages in military functions but is not part of the formal military organization of a recognized government and operates against a domestic group of people or against a domestic government or foreign government. For example, from 1963 to 1973, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the Meo tribesmen in Laos against the communist Pathet Lao government. Other countries where this type of covert action has reportedly taken place include Ukraine, Poland, Albania, Hungary, Indonesia, China, Oman, Malaysia, Iraq, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, North Korea, Bolivia, Thailand, Haiti, Guatemala, Cuba, Greece, Turkey, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, to mention but a few. CIA foreign activities, especially under President Ronald Reagan, developed, and the CIA deployed its covert paramilitary capability under the umbrella of the Cold War environment.

Currently, the CIA has four major administrative components: the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Directorate of

Support, and the National Clandestine Service. Generally, paramilitary operations by the CIA are conducted under the auspices of the National Clandestine Service.

Paramilitary operations are the most direct method of covert action and, as a practical matter, can become so widely known that they become overt actions. However, secrecy of the covert actions at the time of their execution is usually the required norm. At the extreme end of covert operations, paramilitary operations involve regime change and the overthrow of foreign governments. This type of operation usually involves the recruiting, training, supplying, advising, and directing of indigenous groups to revolt and overthrow their current government. This can and does involve both civilian intelligence operatives and military soldiers. In fact, many CIA operatives are retired military or are on loan to the CIA from the military.

For example, one of the specific missions of the CIA and the special forces in the Vietnam War involved the Laotian Hmong tribesmen. The CIA and the special forces recruited, trained, supplied, advised, and directed the Hmong tribesmen against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Another example occurred in the 1960s, when the United States, through the CIA and the special forces, trained, supplied, and advised the Cuban exiles who landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in a failed attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro. In both of these examples, at least initially, the presence of U.S. forces in Laos was a secret and the U.S. support of the Cubans was to be kept secret, although both were eventually publicly revealed.

Although paramilitary operations are used by the CIA, as a general matter their employment is limited to extreme situations where other methods have failed. The potential for blowback, which is the term used by the CIA to describe the retaliation by the victims of CIA operations, is much greater when paramilitary methods are used.

Paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA have been and will likely continue to be an important part of executing foreign policy for the U.S. government. A primary example of the cooperation between civilian intelligence agencies and special operations military units is the 2011 raid into Pakistan that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. Although the raid was executed by the Navy SEALs, there is little doubt that the CIA had an extensive hand in formulating and planning it.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Blowback; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in; Documents 19, 63, 93, 94

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Penkovsky, Oleg (1919–1963)

Soviet spy and double agent. Born in Ordzhonikidze in the Caucasus on April 23, 1919, the only son of a military officer, Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky attended Soviet artillery school and was commissioned in 1939. His World War II record was exemplary, and in 1945 he was sent to the Frunze Military Academy and after that to the Military-Diplomatic Academy. In 1955 he was assigned as a military attaché to the Soviet embassy in Ankara, Turkey. In 1956 he returned to Moscow to study the science surrounding rockets and missiles. In 1960 he was appointed to the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research. By this time he had become disillusioned with communism and fearful that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev would precipitate a nuclear disaster. Penkovsky was also informed that because of his father's past as a loyal soldier, he would never be promoted to the rank of general.

Penkovsky first offered his services as a double agent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in August 1960 but received a less than enthusiastic response. He then turned to Britain. An initial contact with Greville Wynne, a British businessman with a tangential relationship with MI6, led to Penkovsky's delivery of a packet of secret Soviet material in April 1961, the contents of which were shared with the CIA. The CIA and MI6 then agreed to jointly approach Penkovsky when he arrived in London on April 20, 1961, as head of a Soviet trade delegation. From that point on, he provided secret material either via Wynne, when visiting the West as a member of a Soviet trade group, or on park benches in Moscow to Janet Chisholm, wife of undercover MI6 officer Rodrick Chisholm. Soon Penkovsky was passing on a large amount of highly classified information.

Data on Soviet missile production provided by Penkovsky gave the West a realistic evaluation of the true strength of Soviet missile forces and revealed as illusory the so-called missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. The information was unambiguous; the United States was far ahead. Information provided by



Examples of spy paraphernalia, submitted as evidence at Oleg Penkovsky's espionage trial, include pages from a code book (top) and cameras, cassettes, and code books (bottom). (AP Photo)

Penkovsky assisted greatly in verification in September 1962 when U-2 reconnaissance aircraft detected missile site construction in Cuba. Penkovsky's material helped President John F. Kennedy in dealing with Khrushchev and bringing about the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

On October 22, 1962, Penkovsky was arrested by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) and confessed to his spying activities. He was tried, found guilty, and executed in Moscow on May 16, 1963. Wynne was seized a few weeks later. Imprisoned, he was exchanged in April 1964 for Gordon Lonsdale, a Soviet double agent then being held in a British prison. How Penkovsky was detected remains a mystery. He may have been discovered with Janet Chisholm during routine surveillance. He may have been betrayed by a double agent. Some have also suggested that

Penkovsky was simply too careless. Nevertheless, most espionage experts consider him the most important Soviet spy for the West in the Cold War era.

Ernie Teagarden

See also Cold War and the CIA; Cuba; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB)

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Peterson, Martha (ca. 1945–)

Martha D. Peterson was a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and the first female CIA case officer to be assigned to an intelligence post in Moscow, then

the capital of the Soviet Union (now Russia). In 1977, Peterson was apprehended by agents from the Soviet spy agency the KGB and interrogated for several days before being released. In 2012 Peterson published a book about her CIA career, including her 1977 detention.

Peterson was born circa 1945 and was raised in Darien, Connecticut. She attended Drew University (in Madison, New Jersey), where she met her first husband, John Peterson. He served a tour of duty in Vietnam as a special forces officer and then returned to the United States in 1969. Meanwhile, Martha earned an undergraduate degree in sociology in 1967 and a master's degree two years later. John and Martha married on Christmas Day 1969. Soon thereafter, John joined the CIA and was sent to Laos, where he was engaged in covert activities against North Vietnamese forces. Martha, meanwhile, worked part-time for the regional CIA office in Southeast Asia as a secretary. On October 19, 1972, John was killed in a helicopter crash while on a mission. Encouraged by friends, Martha Peterson decided to join the CIA as a full-time employee. Entering the CIA's career training program in July 1973, she quickly became an undercover case worker. At the time, the field of intelligence gathering and espionage was largely a man's world. That fact, however, worked to Peterson's benefit, as she would be able to work undercover without raising the same suspicions as a male CIA agent. In 1975 she was posted to Moscow, where she held a diplomatic position with the U.S. embassy. However, her real mission was to act as a CIA case worker engaged in espionage against the Soviet government.

Within months of her posting to Moscow, Peterson was selected to become the chief contact person for Soviet diplomat Aleksandr Ogorodnik, whom the CIA had recruited as a spy. Ogorodnik's CIA code name was "TRIGON," and although Peterson never met him in person, the two exchanged numerous packages planted at predetermined drop-off spots throughout Moscow. Ogorodnik, who held a high-level post in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, provided the CIA with many classified Soviet documents. He would typically leave film taken of Soviet documents and other messages at a secluded location, camouflaged in old tin cans and other innocuous packages. Peterson would then retrieve the drop-off and take it back to her CIA supervisors; many times, she would leave messages, new film, and other items for Ogorodnik to pick up at a later time.

At some point the KGB became aware of Ogorodnik's activities and arrested him on July 13, 1978. Ogorodnik committed suicide before he could be interrogated, however, having swallowed a cyanide pill previously provided to him by the CIA. Two days later, Peterson was ambushed by a group of KGB agents as she arranged a drop-off for Ogorodnik. At the time, the CIA had not known about Ogorodnik's apprehension and death. Peterson was detained and interrogated for three days before she was released owing to her diplomatic immunity. The Soviets made the arrests public, and Peterson was ordered to never return to the Soviet Union. The following year Peterson remarried, but she remained in the CIA, where she helped train agents how to react if they were arrested while undercover. Peterson retired from the CIA in 2003 and moved to North Carolina. In 2012, she published a memoir titled *The Widow Spy*.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cold War and the CIA; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Philby, Kim (1912–1988)

Harold Adrian Russell “Kim” Philby was a member of the Cambridge Group of spies. His betrayals cost the lives of hundreds of agents and provided the Soviets with an enormous number of American and British secrets. Philby was born on January 1, 1912, in Ambala, India, the son of Harry St. John Philby, and was nicknamed “Kim” after Rudyard Kipling’s famous fictional character.

In 1929 Kim Philby entered Cambridge University. With the Great Depression growing, he was drawn into socialist politics and joined the Cambridge University Socialist Society. In 1933 he completed his studies at Cambridge and moved to Vienna, where he joined underground communists. While in Vienna, Philby married Alice “Litzi” Friedman, a communist on the run from the police. In 1934 he returned to Great Britain with her. Not long afterward he was recruited as a Soviet spy and given the long-term assignment of getting into the British secret service. His short-term assignment was to go to Spain, where civil war raged between fascists and communists.

Philby was a reporter for the *Times of London* and went to Spain, where he pretended to be a supporter of General Francisco Franco’s nationalists. Philby was given the Red Cross of Military Merit by the nationalists. He also cut all visible ties to his former communist associations and separated from his wife. With his right-wing cover, Philby successfully joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6, with the aid of Guy Burgess, who was also a KGB agent.

During World War II, Philby was head of a subsection of the SIS that directed resistance groups in Nazi-occupied Europe. His work was viewed as excellent, so in 1944 he was put in charge of a new section of British counterintelligence, a unit (Section Nine) tasked with uncovering communist moles within British intelligence.

Section Nine was small at first, but Philby built it into an organization that was in charge of all intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert operations against the Soviet Union and other communists. He was thus able to protect the KGB’s important assets and himself. However, all would have been lost with the defection to the British of KGB agent Konstantin Volkov in Turkey, because Volkov knew the names of numerous British agents serving the communists. Philby was able to delay Volkov’s debriefing, which gave the KGB time to murder Volkov, thus eliminating the threat of exposure.

In 1946 Philby married Aileen Furse. The marriage, however, required a divorce from Litz. At the time she was living in East Berlin with a Soviet agent known to British intelligence. The divorce and her association with Philby should have rendered him a security risk; however, an investigation that might have exposed him did not occur.

In 1947 Philby was posted to Istanbul. There he was able to betray several anti-communist groups, which were subsequently exterminated. In 1949 he was assigned to the British embassy in Washington, D.C., as the liaison officer between the SIS and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). With his CIA connection, Philby was able to give the Soviets numerous American secrets about its military intentions, relations with allies, atomic research, and covert operations against communists.

In late 1950 Philby learned that David Maclean, another KGB agent and an old friend of Philby's from Cambridge days, was about to be exposed. Philby used Guy Burgess to alert Maclean. Together the two escaped to Moscow. Because Burgess went to Moscow with Maclean, he brought suspicion on Philby, who had been an active friend of Burgess. After a long investigation, British intelligence was convinced but unable to prove that Philby was a KGB agent. However, Philby stoutly denied that he was a spy. In the end his reputation was undone, and he was asked to resign.

Philby then went to work again as a journalist for *The Observer* and *The Economist*. And then to the surprise of many he was rehired by the SIS, of which he remained a member until 1963. He also continued to provide the KGB with intelligence, only mostly overt political information at this time.

In 1957 Philby was stationed in Beirut, Lebanon, where his wife, Aileen, died of heart problems. In 1958 he married Eleanor Brewer, ex-wife of a *New York Times* correspondent. In 1961 Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB officer, defected to the West, where he provided proof of Philby's espionage activities. Golitsyn's information stimulated a new investigation of Philby. In late 1962 he was confronted with the evidence against him and seemed to be prepared to give a complete confession. However, on January 23, 1963, he fled Beirut on a cargo ship bound for Russia.

In the Soviet Union, Philby learned Russian, became a Soviet citizen, and eventually was promoted to the rank of KGB general. He gave the Soviets every detail of every agent he had ever met, the organizational structure and function of the British and American intelligence organizations, the physical layouts of every facility where he had worked, and every detail he could remember no matter how trivial. The secrets that he gave were very damaging and took years to assess.

In 1963 Eleanor Philby joined him in the Soviet Union, but she never adjusted. She left in 1965 after Philby began an affair with David Maclean's wife. Eleanor died in 1968. Philby then married in 1971 his fourth wife, Rufina Ivanova, a Russian 20 years younger.

Philby worked for Soviet intelligence after his defection. In 1965 he received the Order of Lenin. Philby died on May 11, 1988. He was buried with full military honors in Kuntsevo Cemetery in Moscow.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also Angleton, James; Golitsyn, Anatoliy; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 66

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PHOENIX Program

The PHOENIX Program was used to identify and eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) in South Vietnam. The VCI represented the political and administrative arm of the insurgency in South Vietnam and logistically supported Viet Cong operations, recruited new members, and directed military activities against allied forces.

Initially, the South Vietnamese intelligence apparatus and elimination forces proved inadequate at gathering intelligence. Hence, in May 1967 Robert Komer, whom President Lyndon Johnson chose to oversee pacification efforts in South Vietnam, arrived in Vietnam to head U.S. Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). This organization combined U.S. and Vietnamese civilian and military intelligence and pacification programs and was placed within the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), chain of command.

Supervised by CORDS, financially supported by and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a new program, Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX), began building district intelligence and operations coordinating centers (DIOCCs) to collect, disseminate, and forward information to field units. Additional centers were also built at the province level.

In early 1968, questions were raised regarding whether the CIA in Vietnam had violated the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). To justify the legality of ICEX, William Colby, chief of the CIA's Far East Division, sought and obtained a decree signed by President Nguyen Van Thieu formally establishing an organization named Phuong Hoang to assume ICEX operations. The name Phuong Hoang (meaning phoenix) was chosen because of its symbolic meaning. It became the deadliest weapon against the VCI. With renewed fervor, American and South Vietnamese personnel began collecting and analyzing data while concurrently arresting and executing targeted individuals.

The DIOCCs circulated to every district and province in South Vietnam blacklists of known VCI operatives so that PHOENIX Program forces could arrest and interrogate these individuals. The blacklists consisted of four rankings from A to D, with A being the most wanted. District and province intelligence centers distributed these lists to PHOENIX Program field forces, who would then apprehend or neutralize the individuals. These forces included Vietnamese units such as the

National Police, the National Police Field Force, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and U.S. Navy SEALs. Ideally, the targeted individual was captured and transported to a provincial interrogation center and eventually charged with crimes and then tried and imprisoned or “rallied” to the anticommunist cause. In cases of successful capture and interrogation, interrogation personnel—namely CIA advisers and their Vietnamese counterparts—would send the intelligence up the chain of command for analysis by DIOCC and CORDS officials. In actuality, however, many suspected Viet Cong were killed in firefights or summarily executed.

With the advent of Vietnamization and the withdrawal of American personnel, the PHOENIX Program suffered. Also, public pressure generated by news reports led to congressional interest in the program. Reporters described the PHOENIX Program as essentially an assassination program. This culminated in the program coming under congressional investigation, and in 1971 William Colby, then deputy to the MACV commander for CORDS (and future director of the CIA), appeared before a House committee to explain it.

Another factor in the program’s demise was the 1972 Easter Offensive. This People’s Army of Vietnam invasion of South Vietnam forced the South Vietnamese government to focus its military strength against conventional rather than unconventional forces. Hence, in the spring of 1972 the National Police assumed responsibility for the PHOENIX Program, and by December 1972 the United States ended its role in the program.

Despite the media’s negative reports, top-ranking CIA officials as well as Viet Cong and Democratic Republic of Vietnam leaders claim that the PHOENIX Program was a success. According to available sources, from 1968 to 1972 captured Viet Cong numbered around 34,000; of these 22,000 rallied to the South Vietnamese government, while those killed numbered some 26,000.

Proof of the PHOENIX Program’s success could be seen in Quang Tri Province during the 1972 Easter Offensive. For the first time there were front lines, behind which civilians and troops could move freely at night. Most bridges in rear areas did not have to be guarded as in the past. And when communist forces took northern Quang Tri Province, they were unable to find trustworthy sympathizers at the village level.

R. Blake Dunnavent

See also Assassination; Colby, William; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Plumbers, Watergate (1971–1972)

Special investigative unit established to stop security leaks during the Richard M. Nixon administration. Several members of the unit later conducted clandestine missions against the Democratic Party. Members of the group were involved in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office and the Watergate break-in.

The group was organized out of the Nixon White House in 1971 but was later associated with the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP). The name of the group comes from its purpose: to stop leaks of national security information. The Plumbers reported to Nixon's chief of staff John Ehrlichman and included in their ranks E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA agent; G. Gordon Liddy; presidential assistant Egil "Bud" Krogh Jr.; and David Young, assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The group's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) liaison was John Paisley, assigned to the CIA's Office of Security and who likely had a hand in recruiting Hunt as well as specifying objectives for the Plumbers.

The Plumbers got their start with the release of the Pentagon Papers to the *New York Times*. Pentagon Papers leaker Ellsberg was targeted for harassment and repudiation, and the burglary of his psychiatrist's office was part of an attempt to gather information that might discredit Ellsberg. The Plumbers also targeted Teddy



E. Howard Hunt Jr., convicted Watergate conspirator, retired CIA official, White House consultant, and a member of the Plumbers assigned to stop leaks to reporters, in January 1973. (AP Photo)

Kennedy for the Chappaquiddick Affair and probed President John Kennedy's role in the assassination of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem.

Members of the Plumbers and their association with both the White House and CREEP came to light during the investigations following the botched Watergate break-in at the Democratic National Committee campaign headquarters. All of the Plumbers were subsequently arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for various felonies, including burglary, conspiracy, and wiretapping, and all served time in prison.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Document 57

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Political Operations, Covert

Covert political action can be grouped into three stages. The first stage is the infiltration and penetration of the country's political process or party. The second stage is the forced disintegration of the political process or of a political party. The third stage involves the subversion and defection of party members leaving the political process or the political party. In this process, infiltration is defined as the deliberate/planned penetration of political and social groups within a state by agents of an intervening power for manipulative purposes, while subversion is defined as the undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the victimized state and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor. The most obvious case of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement with developing world political parties is that of Chile.

After fears that Chilean president Salvador Allende would become another Fidel Castro for the United States to deal with, a psyops action was authorized that started in 1963 and lasted until Allende was deposed in 1973. Consequently, the CIA intervened in every election in Chile during that time. During the Popular Unity coalition government in Chile, the Christian Democrats and the National Party were funded with more than \$4 million from the CIA.

Covert political action has often provided the central desired outcome in a covert action where other activities—such as paramilitary or propaganda activities—have also been deployed. In some senses, therefore, covert political action can be seen as the strategic covert action (encompassing propaganda/disinformation, direct political influencing, paramilitary support, and use of social organizations where

related to the Cold War confrontation) and other activities intended to attain a political outcome.

Clearly, the types of covert political operations are wide ranging and include those operations most often undertaken. These methods include the following: advising foreign political leaders; developing relationships with influential individuals; providing financial support or other assistance to foreign political parties; assisting private organizations, such as labor unions, youth groups, and professional associations; and undertaking covert propaganda with the assistance of foreign media organizations and individual journalists.

Jan Goldman

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Chile; Documents 19, 45, 63

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Politicized Intelligence Analysis

Chiseled over the main entrance to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Langley, Virginia, are the words “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.” It is expected that analysts within the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community provide objective, thoughtful intelligence untainted by the personal preferences of supervisors or those of the policy makers themselves. In accomplishing this task, it is paramount that analysts clearly understand policy maker needs. Understanding those needs requires a dialogue between analysts and their supervisors and policy makers. However, on occasion and sometimes with significant adverse consequences, intelligence can and does get politicized.

Politicization of analysis involves the deliberate distortion of analytical judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence and can occur in several ways. For example, intelligence products can be forced to conform to policy makers’ views or to the pressures by management to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Politicization of analysis can occur more subtly as a product of efforts on the part of management or policy makers to encourage changes in tone or emphasis or limit the expression of alternative viewpoints made during the normal review or coordinating processes. In addition, analysts themselves may intentionally skew their views in order to support the options or policy outcomes preferred by policy makers. Such actions may stem from a variety of motives, including an effort to be supportive, career interests, or outright pandering. Finally, analysts have sometimes gone overboard to prove the policy maker wrong. Some

years ago, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates noted that “there is sometimes a strong impulse on the part of intelligence officers to show that a policy or decision is misguided or wrong, to poke an analytical finger in the policy eye.”

Following his confirmation as director of central intelligence in 1991, Gates appointed a task force to examine the issue of the politicizing of intelligence. The task force reported that half of those interviewed in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence said that “forcing intelligence to conform to a view higher up the chain of command occurs often enough to be of concern.” Indeed, during his confirmation hearings, several intelligence analysts accused Gates himself of politicizing intelligence while serving as deputy director of intelligence under Director William Casey. In 1985 Gates had a meeting with Casey. Casey, not one to divorce himself from politics, expressed the view that the Soviet Union had been behind the 1981 attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Following the meeting, Gates commissioned a paper that was to assemble all the evidence the CIA had that supported the view that the Kremlin was in fact behind the assassination attempt. Nor was former director of central intelligence Richard Helms (1966–1973), according to some in the CIA, loath to overlay intelligence with politics. However, Helms is reported to have rarely entered the fray until a deadline was looming. More often than not, Helms would often approve one version or another without an explanation, allowing some people to believe that he was making an arbitrary decision. Later on during his term as director of central intelligence and as the United States was preparing to secretly invade Cambodia and interdict supplies funneled from China through Cambodia to Vietnam, Helms decided not to pass on to the president a CIA report that warned of dangers of invading Cambodia. Helms said that he didn’t pass the information on because President Richard Nixon and his adviser for national security, Henry Kissinger, had made up their minds, and the report would have just angered them.

More recently, the issue of politicized intelligence has arisen with regard to Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programs. The President’s Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction noted that “there is no doubt that analysts operated in an environment shaped by intense policymaker interest in Iraq.” The commission also noted that some analysts were affected by the “conventional wisdom” that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction “and the sense that challenges to it—even refusal to find its confirmation—would not be welcome.” The result may have been a subtle and even subconscious self-inflicted psychological pressure on the part of analysts and their supervisors to conform, which in turn may well have led to an altering of tone or emphasis in reporting and a suppression of alternative views. In 2012, the CIA reportedly removed references to Al Qaeda in the talking points that it drafted for U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice in what critics say is part of a broad pattern of politicization of intelligence under the Barack Obama administration. Current and former intelligence and policy officials say that the politicization in the case of the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, appears to have involved policies that were designed to minimize the threat posed by Islamist terrorists prior to the November 6, 2012, presidential election as an attempt to not hurt the president’s chances of reelection.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Documents 89, 90

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Polyakov, Dmitri

See Top Hat

Popov, Pyotr (1923–1960)

Pyotr Semyonovich Popov was a Soviet military intelligence agent who worked for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1960. He provided American officials with reams of highly useful classified information regarding the Soviets' military organization, capabilities, and espionage operations within the United States and Western Europe. Soviet authorities uncovered his activities in 1959 and executed him for treason in 1960.

Popov was born in July 1923 in the Soviet Union. Virtually nothing is known about his early life and career, but by 1953 he was a lieutenant colonel in the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which was part of the Soviets' military intelligence establishment. While working as a case officer in a Vienna, Popov decided to offer his services to the CIA. On January 1, 1953, he initiated contact with the agency by placing a letter into a car belonging to a U.S. diplomatic employee in Vienna. In it, Popov identified himself as a Soviet intelligence officer who wanted to meet with an American intelligence officer to discuss the possibility of working for the CIA. The CIA soon met with Popov and agreed to employ him as a U.S. spy. Popov claimed that he decided to betray his country because he was angered by the Soviet government's mistreatment of Russian peasants.

Over the course of the next six years Popov passed to the CIA hundreds of top-secret Soviet documents, which among other things detailed the precise organization of the Soviets' military command, the operational details of the GRU, and the names of individuals and their activities associated with Soviet espionage operations in Western Europe. During this time, Popov's American handler was the CIA's famed case officer George Kisevalter, with whom Popov quickly established a close personal

and professional bond. Popov also informed CIA operatives about the Soviets' use of so-called illegals both in Europe and the United States. These individuals were Soviet spies who were dispatched to foreign nations, where they remained under deep cover for extended periods of time, permitting them to infiltrate public and private organizations that were involved in clandestine activities. By 1955 or so, the GRU had placed Popov in charge of recruiting and placing illegals in Western countries, which gave him even more information to pass on to his CIA handler. It is believed that eventually, one of the illegals he recruited tipped off GRU officials about his activities.

In late 1958 the GRU deactivated Popov, already suspecting that he had been working for the CIA. After finding incriminating evidence in Popov's apartment, Soviet intelligence officials arrested him on October 16, 1959. He was summarily tried and convicted of espionage and sentenced to death in January 1960. Sometime in early 1960, he was executed. There are some observers who claim that Popov was exposed by the British double agent George Blake; others allege that the KGB intercepted an encrypted letter sent from the CIA to Popov sometime in 1958 or 1959.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cold War and the CIA; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Document 66

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Powers, Francis Gary (1929–1977)

Francis Gary Powers, a U-2 spy plane pilot downed over Russia on May 1, 1960, was captured, tried, and given 10 years in a Russian prison. Powers had made U-2 spy flights along the borders of Turkey, Afghanistan, the southern Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, and the Soviet Union between 1956 and May 1, 1960. Assured that Powers's plane could not be recovered, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued plausible denial, identifying the aircraft as a weather collector. Nevertheless, in May it was obvious that America was using U-2 aircraft to spy on Russia, much to America's embarrassment.

In 1950, Powers volunteered for the U.S. Air Force. He was recruited into the U-2 spy plane program, trained for seven months, and then sheep-dipped (the process whereby the true identity of equipment or individuals is camouflaged or disguised) to provide the plausible deniability that a government needs if its clandestine missions fail. Powers signed on with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was

sworn to secrecy; the penalty for breaking the secrecy was a fine of \$10,000. He was paid \$2,500 a month for intelligence work, \$1,800 more than his normal salary. He was in the 10-10, the CIA code name for his reconnaissance unit; to the public he was apparently employed by NASA to conduct high-altitude aerial reconnaissance.

The flights would go east from Incirlik, Turkey, on to Tehran, and then south of the Caspian Sea, north to Afghanistan, on to Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan, and then return to Incirlik. Emergency airfields were at Meshed and Tehran.

On April 9, 1960, a U-2 spy plane of the 10-10 unit crossed the southern national boundary of the Soviet Union in the area of the Pamir Mountains and flew over four Soviet top secret military sites. The plane was detected by the Soviet military, which allowed the military to be ready for the next flight. Thus, on May 1, 1960, Powers prepared for his flight at the Peshawar airport in Pakistan. For this flight he was ordered to fly from Peshawar over the Aral Sea and land at Bodø, Norway. When crossing the Soviet Union he would photograph missile-launching sites and other important military establishments. Powers flew to 65,000 feet and then into Soviet airspace. During his flight the plane was hit, and the wings and tail fell off. He had in the aircraft a lethal dose of curare for suicide if tortured, a silenced pistol, cartridges, a dagger, an inflatable rubber boat, maps of Eastern Europe, signal flares, Russian money, rings, and wristwatches. Powers parachuted to safety and was captured at about 11:00 a.m. 150 meters away from where he had landed. He was helped out of his parachute, detained as a foreigner, and disarmed.

Powers was tried for espionage on August 17, 1960. He gave personal information to the presiding judge, said that he understood his rights and did not challenge the court as established, and had no objections to make and nothing to say. He said that he understood the charge and pleaded guilty. Under examination, he told about his work, denied having been tortured, and said, in his own words, that he had been well treated. Powers gave many details of how he had been recruited and trained and about his contract with the CIA and his conditions of employment. He was held in prison for two years and on February 10, 1962, was exchanged for Rudolph Abel. Unlike the crew of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downed in July 1949 over the Bering Sea, Powers was not met as a hero by the U.S. president.

In January 1963, Powers and his wife were divorced. Powers married a CIA colleague, left the CIA for California, and worked for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation as a test pilot. Five years later he published his *Operation Overflight*, and Lockheed fired him. A Los Angeles radio station employed Powers to fly Cessnas—and later a helicopter—and report on weather and traffic. On August 1, 1977, his craft ran out of fuel, and he and his crew died in the crash. The crash again raised the question of his competence as a flyer. President Jimmy Carter allowed Powers to be buried at Arlington National Cemetery, with CIA approval.

In May 2000 Powers was posthumously awarded military honors, exactly 40 years after his capture. The Powers family was presented with his Prisoner-of-War Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross, and National Defense Service Medal.

Jan Goldman

See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Documents 30–35

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
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Predator Drone

The Predator is a medium-altitude, long-range, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Air Force as an antiterrorist weapon. Developed by the U.S. Air Force in the 1990s for long-range reconnaissance missions, the Predator is about the size of a small SUV and is powered by a 101-horsepower propeller-driven engine that gives it a top speed of 135 miles per hour. It holds enough fuel to travel more than 750 miles. Its ability to hover in an area gives it an advantage over faster reconnaissance aircraft. When equipped with a pair of Hellfire antitank missiles, the Predator also becomes an effective lethal weapon. The Hellfire missile is an air-to-ground missile about five and a half feet long that weighs just over 100 pounds and can be fired from attack helicopters and the Predator.

The Predator is remotely controlled. A three-person team—a pilot and two sensor operators—operates the Predator from a ground-control station that can be thousands of miles away. Controls for the system resemble those used in ultrasophisticated model aircraft and advanced video games. The Predator has a TV camera, an infrared camera, and a system that enables it to penetrate smoke and clouds.

The Predator has great potential for use against terrorists, particularly in remote areas, but its development was slowed by interagency gridlock. Both the CIA and the U.S. Air Force wanted to gain control of the Predator program. Leaders of the



A 3D rendering of an MQ-1 Predator UAV looking for bad guys in Afghanistan. (A. J. Tooley/Dreamstime.com)

CIA envisaged it as a counterterrorism weapon, but the U.S. Air Force saw it as a reconnaissance asset. This infighting hindered the development of the program. Early versions of the Predator were used in Bosnia, and it was finally sent to Afghanistan in September 2000. President Bill Clinton authorized its use in Afghanistan to hunt down Osama bin Laden.

Unfortunately, soon after it arrived in Afghanistan, one of the Predators crashed. It was suspected that news of its capabilities or the possible capture of one of the aircraft caused the Predator program to be shelved for improvements. Despite its obvious capabilities for neutralizing leaders of Al Qaeda, the Predator program remained shut down until after September 11, 2001.

Revival of political fighting between the CIA and the U.S. Air Force caused most of the delay. The CIA still wanted to use the Predator as a weapon, and the U.S. Air Force insisted that it be chiefly restricted to reconnaissance missions. The addition of the Hellfire antitank missile system sacrificed the Predator's ability to see through smoke and clouds. There was also argument about who would pay the \$1 million price for each Predator. The George W. Bush administration finally ruled that the Department of Defense would pay for the Predators, ending this part of the controversy.

A Predator-fired missile killed senior Al Qaeda officials, including Mohammad Atef, in the early stages of the overthrow of the Taliban regime during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Slow communications when seeking approval for a strike

saved Mullah Omar and most of the Taliban from a Predator attack on October 7, 2001. Then in October 2002, a Predator launched its Hellfire missiles at a car carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi and Ahmed Hijazi as well as four other Al Qaeda operatives on a road in Marib Province, Yemen. Al-Harithi had been part of the plot to attack USS *Cole* in October 2000. A National Security Agency communications satellite intercepted a phone call from al-Harithi, and the Predator tracked the car before launching its missile. The car was destroyed with all its passengers except one who escaped. This was exactly the type of mission that the CIA had envisaged for the Predator system.

Despite this success, the Predator program has come under the operational control of the U.S. Air Force after a decision made by the Bush administration. The CIA selects the target, but after the Predator is in flight, operational control is turned over to air force personnel in the United States. The job of completing a Predator's mission requires a task force of about 55 people to pilot the aircraft, check sensors, monitor communications, and manage the mission. Besides these personnel requirements, the Predator needs enough equipment for its ground control station that the equipment has to be hauled around by a C-130 transport aircraft. Despite this heavy logistical load, Predators have been commonly used in fighting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Predators have also been used against militants in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Unfortunately, Predator missile strikes have also killed a number of civilians, leading to rising anti-American sentiment among local populations.

In 2002 a new version of the Predator, Predator B, appeared in the inventory of the U.S. military. Predator B is a larger model than its predecessor and has a more powerful jet engine. It lacks some of the loitering capability of the Predator but can fly twice as high and is much faster. Because it can carry a heavier armament package, the Predator B is more a hunter-killer than its earlier model. A third UAV, the MQ-1C Grey Eagle, became operational in 2009, with weaponized versions deployed to Afghanistan in late 2010.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also Afghanistan; Drones; Documents 93, 94

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Presidential Finding

A presidential finding is an executive directive that authorizes covert action. Presidential findings are similar in scope and intent to the better-known executive orders. Findings are classified because they include information about planned operations.

At its heart, the presidential finding is intended to make the U.S. president accountable for the use of covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The term itself derives from the language of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 and added the noun “finding” to the bureaucratic language of the U.S. intelligence community. The act passed during congressional hearings into allegations that the CIA was spying on American citizens and planning covert operations to assassinate foreign leaders. The amendment to the act prohibited funding CIA covert operations “unless and until the President finds that each such operation” is important to national security and requires timely reporting of the nature and scope of the operation to the appropriate committees of Congress.

The changes in the law governing approval of covert actions make clear that such acts belong to the president who approves them. Thus, plausible deniability no longer exists—presidents may no longer disclaim any knowledge of covert actions. If they have no knowledge of an operation, this means that it was not approved, that no appropriated funds can be spent on that operation, and that any funds spent on an unapproved covert action would represent the misappropriation of government funds. This is a powerful disincentive against rogue operations. In addition, while presidential findings technically only provide notice of a covert action and are not a request for approval, Congress’s authority to authorize and appropriate public funds provides a ready tool for closing down an unpopular operation.

Congress has acted only rarely to stop a planned covert action after receiving a presidential finding. However, presidential findings came under close scrutiny during the investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair. President Ronald Reagan had signed a series of findings that authorized covert action and even the sale of arms to Iran but failed to notify Congress. The language of Reagan’s first finding authorizing covert actions against the Nicaraguan government was so vague as to justify violent actions by the Contras and the CIA and to enable the CIA to work with other nations such as Honduras to undermine the Sandinistas. One such presidential finding that authorized the sale of highly sophisticated Hawk missiles to Iran in 1985 was even signed retroactively in 1986. Several other presidential findings were held in secret until the arms deals were exposed in 1986–1987.

In response to the scandal and mounting congressional pressure, Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 266 prohibiting National Security Council staff from conducting covert operations. He also signed NSDD 286 prohibiting the use of “oral Findings” and “retroactive Findings” as the legal authority for covert actions. In 1991 Congress and President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Intelligence Oversight Act. It required all future covert actions to be authorized in advance by written presidential finding and also required that no finding may authorize intelligence agencies to break U.S. laws or the U.S. Constitution, that findings must reveal the name of third-party countries that participate in U.S. covert actions, and that all findings must be sent to the Intelligence Committees of the U.S. Congress.

Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both signed presidential findings that authorized covert action against terrorism worldwide. Bush signed a secret presidential finding in 2006 authorizing the CIA to carry out nonlethal covert operations against Iran. These operations had reportedly been proposed by the CIA to the administration and were designed to spread propaganda and disinformation about Iran, manipulate Iran’s currency, interfere with Iran’s financial transactions, and in particular interfere with efforts by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to purchase technology or equipment for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. It should be noted here that the term “nonlethal operations” means that CIA officers cannot use deadly force in carrying out these particular operations, but there are other presidential findings authorizing lethal force in counterterrorism and in nonproliferation efforts, which could possibly apply to Iran. Moreover, covert operations carried out by the U.S. military do not require a presidential finding, so the military may possibly use deadly force without presidential authorization.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Hughes-Ryan Amendment; Documents 93, 94

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Q

Qala-i-Jangi Uprising

Uprising by Taliban prisoners that resulted in a fierce battle between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, which was being assisted by American and British forces. The Qala-i-Jangi Uprising unfolded from November 25 to December 1, 2001. Qala-i-Jangi (House of War) is a sprawling 19th-century fortress surrounded by massive mud-baked crenellated walls nearly 100 feet high. It is located just west of Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan and served as the personal headquarters of Northern Alliance commander General Abd al-Rashid Dostum. The compound contained stables and an armory and ultimately became a prison for hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters after coalition forces captured Mazar-i-Sharif in November 2001 as part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The resulting clash was one of the bloodiest episodes of the Afghanistan War.

To understand the reasons for the uprising, it is important to understand how the fortress's prisoners had been captured. On the previous day, November 24, a substantial number of Taliban fighters had surrendered to Northern Alliance forces under General Dostum following air strikes and a coalition assault on the northern city of Kunduz. Dostum negotiated a deal whereby most Afghan prisoners were to go free and the 300 foreign fighters were to be handed over to Dostum. Nobody informed the foreign fighters of the arrangement, however, and these men had surrendered expecting to be released. Now they found themselves betrayed and transported by flat-bed trucks to Qala-i-Jangi, where they now expected to be tortured and murdered. Significantly, their captors had failed to conduct thorough body searches, and some of the prisoners had managed to conceal weapons.

In two incidents that occurred shortly after the detainees arrived at the fort, prisoners detonated grenades and killed themselves as well as two Northern Alliance officers, Nadir Ali Khan, who had recently become chief of police in Balkh Province, and Saeed Asad, a senior Hazara commander. The angry Uzbek captors meanwhile herded the prisoners into overcrowded cells in the basement of the stables in the fortress compound without food, water, or sanitary facilities, there to join other Taliban prisoners who had been taken earlier. Despite the above incidents, security was not increased.

The next morning, a full-scale battle broke out. The exact circumstances of how the fighting began late the next morning remain unclear. As the detainees filed out of the building, the handful of Uzbeks who served as their guards made them sit on the ground in rows and began to bind their hands behind their backs. Meanwhile, other guards took the prisoners in small groups to the courtyard before two Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents: Johnny “Mike” Spann, a former U.S. Marine Corps captain, and Dave Tyson. The two Americans were conducting interrogations to gather intelligence on Al Qaeda and the whereabouts of the organization’s leader, Osama bin Laden. Suddenly, some of the prisoners made use of what concealed weapons they had and rushed and overcame the guards. While Tyson managed to escape the onslaught, Spann fell to his attackers and was kicked, beaten, and shot to death. He thus became the first American to die in combat in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Intense firefights followed as some of the foreign fighters used arms taken from their captors to try to take control of the fort, while others remained bound in the courtyard. Foreign fighters remaining in the cells were released. Three tried to escape through a drain underneath a wall, only to be shot by Northern Alliance guards outside the fort. Others stormed a small armory and there seized mortars, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, AK-47 assault rifles, and other weapons and ammunition.

Northern Alliance forces then reorganized and mounted a counterattack, which killed many of the Taliban. Two Northern Alliance tanks, which were outside the fort, began to pound the prisoners’ positions. In the meantime Tyson, who had joined with a trapped German film crew in another part of Qala-i-Jangi, managed to contact the American embassy in Tashkent with a plea for help. Early in the afternoon, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) team of British Special Boat Service (SBS) and American Special Operations Forces (SOF) arrived at the fortress in a pair of Land Rovers and engaged the Taliban fighters. One SOF team member directed air support in the form of McDonnell Douglas (Boeing) F-18 Hornet aircraft, which dropped several 500-pound bombs that missed the armory but forced the Taliban fighters to take refuge in the stable’s cellar. At dusk on that first day of fighting, Tyson and members of the film crew managed to escape by climbing over one of the fortress walls. Because the QRF team did not know of their escape, the SBS team leader organized a rescue force, which braved Taliban fire only to find that Tyson was gone.

Over the next days, coalition forces attempted to subdue the stubborn Taliban fighters. Northern Alliance forces directed fire from tanks as well as mortars at the besieged, who continued a tenacious resistance. During the melee, a misdirected 2,000-pound bomb dropped by an American aircraft destroyed a tank and killed or injured several coalition soldiers. This was followed by another strike and an air-to-ground attack conducted by a Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunship. Finally, with the surviving prisoners running out of ammunition and having nothing to eat but horseflesh, about 100 Northern Alliance troops, joined by SBS and SOF teams, mounted an assault on what remained of the Taliban defenses. With resistance apparently over, some of the Afghan soldiers reportedly looted the bodies of the fallen prisoners, only to discover them booby-trapped.

There were still Taliban fighters who had been driven underground beneath the rubble of the ruined stables. These were dispatched with rifle fire, rockets, and grenades. Northern Alliance fighters also poured oil into the basement and lit it. Ultimately Dostum’s men flooded the underground hiding places with ice-cold

water, finally forcing the surrender of those who remained alive. Some 86 prisoners were taken including the so-called American Talib, John Walker Lindh.

For his activity, Lindh was later tried, convicted, and assessed a 20-year prison sentence. Many of his comrades were later transferred to Camp X-Ray at the American detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Besides Spann, the only American to die in the uprising, the coalition suffered 40 to 50 combat deaths and a similar number wounded. The Taliban death toll has been variously estimated at 200 to 500, many of these being foreign fighters determined to fight to the death.

The action at Qala-i-Jangi has been the subject of some controversy. Some critics charged that a massacre took place; others, such as Amnesty International, questioned the proportionality of the force employed against the revolting prisoners and demanded an investigation. The U.S. and British governments refused, claiming that their forces had acted according to the rules of engagement and international law.

George L. Simpson

See also Afghanistan; War on Terror and the CIA

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R

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

U.S. government-sponsored international radio broadcasts transmitted to communist nations and other authoritarian regimes. During the Cold War, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcast uncensored news and information to audiences in the Soviet bloc in an attempt to weaken communist control over information and to foster internal opposition. Radio Free Europe broadcast to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania and in the 1980s to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Radio Liberty transmitted in Russian and some 15 other national languages of the Soviet Union.

Unlike other Western broadcasters, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty concentrated on developments within and about their target countries not covered by state-controlled domestic media. They acted as surrogate home services, reporting on actions of the authorities and relaying views of dissidents and opposition movements. Notwithstanding repeated technical interference such as jamming, broadcasts generally reached their intended audiences. Evidence of the impact of the broadcasts on the eventual collapse of the communist regimes was corroborated in the testimony of leaders such as Czech president Vaclav Havel after 1989.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were conceived by George F. Kennan of the U.S. Department of State and Frank G. Wisner, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Policy Coordination, in 1949 as instruments to utilize Soviet and East European émigrés in support of American foreign policy objectives. The broadcast organizations were founded as nonprofit corporations ostensibly supported with private funds but were in fact funded by the U.S. government through the CIA until 1972. The first official broadcast took place on July 4, 1950. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty initially adopted more confrontational editorial policies and used more aggressive language than other Western broadcasters. By the mid-1950s, however, as U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc became more conciliatory, the networks emphasized the need for liberalization and evolutionary system changes. In so doing, they broadcast news and information about domestic politics and economic issues as well as cultural and historical traditions normally suppressed by communist authorities. Over time they evolved into saturation home services, seeking large audiences by broadcasting almost around the clock and by incorporating programs on Western music, religion, science, sports, youths, and labor issues.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty faced the considerable challenge of operating as surrogate home services in information-poor environments. The networks



Thubten J. Norbu, brother of the Dalai Lama, speaks over Radio Free Europe in 1959. (Library of Congress)

monitored state-controlled print and electronic media and frequently interviewed travelers and defectors in field bureaus around the world. In addition, the networks cultivated ties with Western journalists and other visitors to communist countries and received information from regime opponents, often at great personal risk to the informants, within their target countries. This information was gathered to support broadcasts, but Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty research reports also served many Western observers as their major source of information about the communist bloc.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty programs were produced in Munich, West Germany, and broadcast via shortwave transmitters operating on multiple frequencies and high power to overcome jamming and other fre-

quency-disruption tactics. The networks enjoyed substantial operational autonomy and were highly decentralized in function. Émigré broadcast service directors with intimate knowledge of their audiences were responsible for most broadcast content, within broad policy guidelines and under American management oversight.

The communist authorities devoted major resources to countering Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts. In 1951, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin personally ordered the establishment of local and long-distance jamming facilities to block Western broadcasts. Eastern bloc authorities also launched propaganda, diplomatic, and espionage campaigns intended to discredit the broadcasts and also jailed individuals providing information to either network. Ironically, the same authorities relied on secret transcripts of the broadcasts for information they could not obtain from local media that they themselves controlled.

After 1971 direct CIA involvement in the networks ended, and they were then openly funded by congressional appropriation through the Board for International Broadcasting. The network corporations were merged into a single entity, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Incorporated, in 1976.

The networks established intimate contact with their audiences during the 1970s and 1980s, as new waves of immigration strengthened broadcast staffs and

dissidents and as other regime opponents, emboldened by the Helsinki Final Act (1975), began to challenge the communist system. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty provided a megaphone through which independent figures, denied normal access to local media, could reach millions of their countrymen via uncensored writings. The networks were able to document large audiences and acted as the leading international broadcaster in many target countries. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, many East European and Russian leaders testified to the importance of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts in ending the Cold War. Operating today from Prague in the Czech Republic, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcasts to the southern Balkans, most of the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq in support of democratic institutions and a transition to democracy.

A. Ross Johnson

See also Wisner, Frank; Documents 11, 14, 36, 37

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Reagan Doctrine

The Reagan Doctrine was a cornerstone of President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy and a major contributory factor to the administration's greatest scandal, the Iran-Contra Affair. Although best articulated in 1985 by Reagan, the Reagan Doctrine was evident during earlier stages of his presidency. The doctrine proposed U.S. assistance for anticommunist forces who challenged the Soviet Union or its clients. Reagan lauded these freedom fighters and linked their plight to the traditional U.S. mission of promoting self-determination. Policy makers hoped to minimize U.S. casualties and expenses through the use of proxies and small paramilitary units. Soviet leaders perceived the Reagan Doctrine as a signal of a more aggressive prosecution of the Cold War. At best an economic strategy, the doctrine carried with it, however, the potential to embroil the United States in civil wars of little relevance to the national interest.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed the Reagan Doctrine in such hot spots as Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. This policy worked well in Afghanistan, where U.S.-backed mujahideen guerrilla fighters inflicted heavy losses on Soviet forces and the Kremlin experienced a Vietnam-style quagmire of its own. In Angola, the anticommunist rebels became a liability for the Reagan administration as they destroyed U.S. oil facilities and accepted support from South Africa's apartheid regime. Meanwhile, the Angolan government increasingly cooperated with U.S. oil companies and investors.

The Reagan Doctrine received the greatest attention in Central America. The United States helped train and equip a 17,000-man Salvadoran army to wage a counterinsurgency against a guerrilla force roughly a quarter its size. The slaughtering of political opponents and a rigged election compelled U.S. officials to install a moderate government that ultimately failed to bring peace or democracy to El Salvador.

In Nicaragua, the Reagan White House championed the Contras, who were fighting against the revolutionary socialist Sandinista regime. Reagan likened the Contras to America's founding fathers, despite reports of atrocities committed in the name of the Contras. Washington authorized CIA training for Contras and the construction of military bases in neighboring Honduras to facilitate rebel operations. In 1983 the CIA mined Nicaraguan ports and launched clandestine attacks on oil facilities and airports. Congress suspended military aid to the Contras in 1984, which prompted Reagan officials to explore covert avenues of assistance and to solicit private donations.

A preoccupation with applying the Reagan Doctrine to Nicaragua dovetailed with U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In 1985, White House officials used Israelis as intermediaries to secretly supply military hardware to the Iranian government in the hope of securing the release of 15 Americans held hostage in the region. This pipeline operated for 14 months, during which time a few captives were released and other people were kidnapped. In November 1986 the story of the arms-for-hostages deal broke in the American press. President Reagan was compelled to admit to attempts made to influence those whom he called "moderates" in the Iranian government. The Central American connection emerged three weeks later when U.S. attorney general Edwin Meese disclosed that the proceeds from the Iranian arms sales had been clandestinely diverted to the Contras in violation of the 1982 Boland Amendment, which had banned any spending for the overthrow of the Sandinista government.

In 1987, Congress held hearings into what the media dubbed the Iran-Contra Affair, with U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Oliver North, a National Security Council aide, emerging as the star witness. North vigorously defended the Reagan Doctrine despite having admitted to illegally shredding government documents and misleading Congress. Eleven members of the Reagan administration pled guilty or were convicted of charges stemming from the Iran-Contra Affair. Reagan claimed ignorance of the financial conduit to the Contras. The Reagan Doctrine aimed to avoid another Vietnam War but ultimately became associated with the sort of executive branch deception and hubris that had made that war so controversial.

Jeffrey D. Bass

See also Contras; Iran-Contra Affair; Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War; Document 62

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Recorded Future, Inc.

Recorded Future, Inc., is an Internet-based technology company that engages in Internet data gathering and provides statistical modeling to predict future trends and events. Among many other things, the firm monitors Internet communications of many kinds including coded chatter, which is sometimes employed by terrorist groups to communicate among themselves and to set up terrorist plots. Recorded Future was established in 2009 and was partly funded by Q-Tel, an investment entity backed in part by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Recorded Future is nevertheless privately held, with headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts; it also maintains offices in Arlington, Virginia (just outside Washington, D.C.), and Gothenburg, Sweden.

Recorded Future offers services to a variety of public and private entities, but its usefulness in the ongoing Global War on Terror has meant that the U.S. government—in particular the CIA and the National Security Agency—has been among its largest clients. The company employs what it describes as a “temporal analytics engine” to monitor the Internet in real time and then extract and organize Internet data so that current and future trends can be predicted with considerable levels of accuracy. The engine scrutinizes and organizes more than 600,000 open web sources (some 5 billion events) in seven languages in order to identify actors, potential new vulnerabilities, and possible new threats, both on the Internet and in real life. Thus, identifying cyber threats, including hacking, is also part of the firm’s services. Recorded Future has the capability of fine-tuning its analyses to fit the very specific parameters of its clients, be they entire industries, individual corporations, or government agencies.

Because of the delicate nature of its work, the size of the company’s workforce is not known with any certainty. Nor is it clear exactly how much capital Q-Tel provided, although most believe that the Q-Tel investment was less than \$10 million. Google Ventures was also a major initial investor in Recorded Future. In the summer of 2011, the company accurately predicted the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, which formally commenced on September 17, 2011. That same year, Recorded Future confirmed Israeli allegations that the Hezbollah terrorist group had obtained long-range missiles by analyzing the communications of Hezbollah leaders.

In 2014, Recorded Future reported that because of the security leaks perpetrated by U.S. whistle-blower Edward Snowden, Al Qaeda had begun engaging in increasingly complex encryption efforts for its Internet communications. This revelation provided more ammunition for Snowden’s critics and seemed to prove that his leaks had indeed imperiled U.S. national security. Given the ongoing threats associated with terrorism, the services provided by Recorded Future will no doubt continue to be critical to its public and private clients.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Cyber Security; Data Mining

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Recruitment, Central Intelligence Agency

The term “spy” refers to agents who are recruited by intelligence officers of a foreign intelligence agency. Such agents, or spies, are recruited by intelligence officers to engage in espionage and betray their country. The intelligence officers who consort with spies are generally referred to as case officers.

The recruitment process is generally a three-stage process: spotting, development, and recruitment. The first two stages should be completed before the asset can be given the recruiting pitch. The first stage—spotting—is the process of identifying people, or assets, who may have access to intelligence information or who are otherwise attractive for some support role. In spotting a potential asset, there are generally three types of people, commonly referred to as access agents, who may present an opportunity for recruitment: persons with access to technology, persons with access to knowledgeable people, and persons in allied intelligence agencies.

Another group of people who are of interest in terms of recruitment for espionage are those who present themselves for recruitment. The U.S. Army defines three classes of people who may present themselves: defectors, asylum seekers, and walk-ins. The U.S. Army defines a walk-in as a person who seeks to provide information to the United States (for any of a variety of motivations) and appears willing to accept recruitment in exchange for some form of compensation or assistance.

Emotional attachment or affinity/love can also play a part in the identification of possible human intelligence assets. True friendship or romance can be a valuable weakness that a case officer could potentially exploit in the recruitment process. John Anthony Walker, for example, spied against the United States for financial motivations, but he recruited friends and family members into his spying ring. Another example is Rosario Ames, the wife of Aldrich Ames, who was brought into her husband’s espionage activities.

The second stage of the recruitment process is the development stage. During this stage, the case officer focuses on establishing a relationship with the asset, in preparation for the actual recruitment pitch. If the case officer decides to make a formal recruitment, during this phase he or she will get the target accustomed to meeting in increasingly obscure locations and at unusual times. This phase also serves the purpose of countersurveillance and is essentially a grooming process whereby the target becomes increasingly more involved in treasonous activity, the purpose being that the target’s activities become harder and harder to justify and explain away if he or she is ever caught. At the culmination of the development phase, the asset has ideally become sympathetic to the case officer’s country, and then the case officer makes the direct recruitment pitch.

The three different recruitment approaches are a direct approach by a case officer who has some existing access and rapport with the potential recruit, an indirect approach through an access agent, and a cold approach. The cold approach is the least attractive option for recruitment.

Recognizing and understanding a person's motivations for spying can be crucial in deciding whether or not to pursue that individual for recruitment. The motives for spying are varied but generally fall into one of the following categories: money or greed, revenge or disaffection, blackmail or hostage situations, appeal to émigrés' national pride, exploitation of an emotional involvement, false flag approaches, exploitation of an American's naïveté, sex, and ideology.

Abigail Sessions

See also Ames, Aldrich

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Red Cell Report

The Red Cell Report issued by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was a short top secret briefing that analyzed how the perception of the United States as an exporter of terror might damage America's image abroad and how that perception might hamper U.S. efforts to wage the Global War on Terror. The report—titled *What If Foreigners See the United States as an “Exporter of Terrorism”?*—was one of thousands of documents purposely made public in February 2010 by the international whistle-blower website known as WikiLeaks. The CIA established the Red Cell sometime after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the United States in order to provide specialized analyses of international trends and events that could impact the United States and U.S. national security as a whole. The Red Cell was designed so that CIA analysts could think outside the box, thereby increasing the agency's ability to foresee and head off future terror plots against the United States and U.S. interests around the world.

The February 2010 Red Cell Report did not provide any actual classified information per se, nor did it offer any ideas that had not already been discussed publicly. The report analyzed several cases that could be interpreted as U.S.-exported terrorism—these included U.S.-supported Jewish, Muslim, and even Irish nationalist terrorism. One of the more infamous of such cases involved David Healey. Healey is a naturalized U.S. citizen who was involved in the Lashkar-i-Taiba terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, in November 2008 in which more than 160 people were killed. Healey was apprehended in 2009 and was charged with having helped Lashkar-i-Taiba set up the deadly attack. The Red Cell Report concluded that perceptions abroad of America as an exporter of terrorism, combined with its actions that have violated international law during the Global War on Terror, might make other nations—even those considered U.S. allies—less willing to cooperate with U.S. officials in the fight against terror.

While the Red Cell revelations and conclusions were neither new nor particularly insightful, they did suggest that the CIA was taking care to monitor the effects of the tactics employed by the George W. Bush administration to wage the Global War on Terror. Some of the more controversial of these tactics included U.S. drone attacks against alleged terrorists in foreign nations, extraordinary renditions, indefinite detainment of terror suspects without due process, and enhanced interrogation techniques. Thus, the real importance of the document suggested that some elements within the Bush administration were perhaps troubled by the ramifications of the Global War on Terror.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Counterterrorism Center; September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of; Document 98

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RED SOX, Operation (1949–1959)

Numerous published accounts have indicated the existence of secret U.S.-trained émigré groups in the 1950s identified as part of Operation RED SOX (also known as Operation RED CAP). James Angleton and Frank Wisner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ran Operation RED SOX. The operation involved the illegal return of defectors and émigrés to the Soviet Union as agents. Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovakian paramilitary operatives were trained for covert projects to undermine the Soviet government in their homelands. The CIA dispatched agents, mostly by air, into the Soviet Union and surrounding nations under the aegis of Operation RED SOX.

It has never been officially confirmed whether any groups of this kind played a part in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. At the time, the CIA had a copy of Soviet president Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 denouncing Joseph Stalin's regime and personality. The speech was made public at the behest of the CIA head, with presidential approval, on June 4, 1956. In Eastern Europe, the excitement created by the speech spread to Hungary, and in October the students took to the streets; Radio Free Europe encouraged the rebels.

Although small psychological warfare and paramilitary units came into being in the early 1950s and occasional reconnaissance missions took place at that time, the prospects for penetrating into Hungary deteriorated by 1953 when stepped-up controls by Hungarian security forces and poorly trained agents made cross-border operations essentially untenable. The Russian Army invaded Hungary, and street fighting left 30,000 Hungarians dead. The United States would not send in troops. Operation RED SOX enjoyed almost no success. Indeed, the chief of the Soviet Russia Division in the Directorate of Plans wrote in 1957 that it had been "strewn with disaster." More agents survived who were sent overland than those inserted by blind drop; of the latter, apparently only 3 ever managed to leave the country alive.

Meanwhile, according to declassified documents at the National Security Archive, the intelligence produced by this operation as a whole was "pitifully small, and the anticipated intelligence support apparatus, grafted on . . . underground resistance organizations, died aborning." Not even the overland operations produced anything substantial, involving as they did shallow, short-term penetrations of "largely uninhabited . . . border areas." The result was that "no REDSOX agent ever succeeded in passing himself off successfully as a Soviet citizen and penetrating, even briefly, into the Soviet heartland." Operation RED SOX was considered a failure and was halted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959.

Jan Goldman

See also Angleton, James; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Wisner, Frank

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Rendition

A legal term meaning "handing over." As applied by the U.S. government, rendition has been a controversial method for fighting terrorism. Overseen by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), its use was approved by Presidents William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.

There are two forms of rendition: ordinary and extraordinary. Ordinary rendition occurs when a terrorist suspect is captured in a foreign country and then turned

over to the United States. The individual is then transported to the United States or held at a foreign site for interrogation. Extraordinary rendition is the turning over of a suspected terrorist to a third-party country for detainment and questioning. Often, the suspect is wanted by the third-party country as well for past offenses or crimes.

The first use of ordinary rendition occurred in 1986, during the Ronald Reagan administration, in regard to a suicide bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, the previous year. Fawaz Yunis had participated in the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian aircraft, during which three Americans were killed. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and U.S. Navy SEALs seized him in a boat off the Lebanese coast.

Rendition as a policy lay largely dormant until the rise of more terrorism in the early 1990s. One such rendition involved the capture of Ramzi Yousef and his transportation to the United States. Yousef had been implicated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

By the mid-1990s, there was a need for rules to standardize rendition. Michael Scheuer, then the head of the Bin Laden Issue Station (code-named Alex, or Alec Station) in the CIA, drew up the guidelines for a new rendition program in 1996. He ultimately ran the rendition program for 40 months.

The intent of the rendition program was to dismantle and disrupt the Al Qaeda terrorist network and detain Islamic terrorists. Because the Clinton administration and the FBI did not want the captives brought to the United States, where the legal process gave them significant protection, the CIA focused on Al Qaeda suspects who were wanted in a third country. In the early years most of the extraordinary renditions were to Egypt, where torture and other illegal methods of interrogation were in use.

The CIA has always been ambivalent about rendition. It has justified the practice with the contention that when allied governments had intelligence on terrorists that could not be used in a court of law, rendition was sometimes the only way to neutralize the terrorists. For renditions, the CIA has frequently used paramilitaries organized into teams and operating under the supervision of a CIA officer.

The rendition program has been effective, but it includes the danger that the information gathered is frequently tainted by torture. Moreover, international law prohibits the forced return of any person, regardless of the crime, to a foreign location where that person would be subject to torture or mistreatment. Michael Scheuer has maintained that he warned the lawyers and policy makers about the dangers of turning over Al Qaeda suspects to foreign countries.

In the George W. Bush administration, the CIA continued to handle rendition cases. Whereas rendition cases were infrequent in the Clinton administration, they became numerous during the Bush administration, especially after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Approximately 100 suspected Al Qaeda operatives were captured and turned over to foreign governments for interrogation from 1996 to 2008. In recent years, a white Gulfstream V jet has been used to move prisoners around to various countries. Egypt, Afghanistan, and Syria have been principal destinations, but at least 14 European states have knowingly cooperated with the

United States. Several East European states are thought to have housed CIA detention centers.

In one case, two Egyptians were seized in Sweden and sent to Egypt. Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed al-Zery were radical Islamists, and they had sought political asylum in Sweden. On December 18, 2001, American agents seized both of them and placed them on a Gulfstream jet bound for Cairo, Egypt. The Swedish government cooperated after its representatives were assured that Agiza and Zery would not be tortured.

Once it was learned that both Agiza and Zery had indeed been tortured, there was a major political outcry in Sweden against the Swedish government and the United States. Egyptian authorities determined that Zery had no contacts with terrorists, and he was released from prison in October 2003. Agiza was less fortunate because he had been a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and close to its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. An Egyptian court subsequently sentenced Agiza to 25 years in prison.

Rendition has become more controversial after public revelations regarding several cases. The first such case was that of the radical Islamist cleric Abu Omar (full name Hassan Osama Nasr), who lived in Milan, Italy, under political refugee status. Omar had been under investigation for terrorist-related activities and support of Al Qaeda when the CIA, with the assistance of Italian security personnel, seized him on the streets of Milan on February 17, 2002. He was taken to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization base near Aviano, Italy, and then flown to Egypt on February 18. There, Omar was offered a deal to be an informant. After he refused he was sent to a prison, where he was tortured. Italian authorities became incensed over this rendition, and a judge charged 25 American CIA operatives and 2 Italian security officers with abduction. The Italian government requested extradition of the CIA operatives and initiated court proceedings in 2008. The trial coincided with continuing popular Italian opposition to the Iraq War.

Two other cases of rendition also caused unease among U.S. allies. One was that of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen from Ottawa and a software engineer. Arar arrived at JFK Airport in New York on an American Airlines flight from Zurich, Switzerland, on September 26, 2002, when U.S. authorities detained him. They were acting on inaccurate information given to them by the Royal Mounted Canadian Police that Arar was a member of Al Qaeda. After interrogation and a stay at the Metropolitan Detention Center, he was flown to Jordan on October 8, 2002. CIA operatives then transferred him to Syria. In Syria, he was imprisoned and intensively interrogated for nearly a year. It took intervention by the Canadian government to win Arar's release in October 2003, after more than 10 months in captivity. Since then, Arar has been seeking to sue both the U.S. and Canadian governments.

Another noteworthy case was the December 2003 rendition of Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen. El-Masri was born in Kuwait but raised in Lebanon. In 1985 he immigrated to Germany, where he became a German citizen in 1994. He took a vacation in Skopje, Macedonia, but was arrested at the Macedonian border on December 31, 2003, because his name resembled that of Khalid al-Masri, the

mentor of the Al Qaeda Hamburg cell. CIA agents took el-Masri into custody on January 23, 2004, shortly after Macedonian officials had released him. He was sent to Afghanistan, where he was tortured during lengthy interrogations. El-Masri went on a hunger strike for 27 days in the confinement camp. American officials determined that he had been wrongfully detained, and he was released on May 28, 2004. He was dumped on a desolate road in Albania without an apology or funds to return home. German authorities have initiated legal proceedings against CIA officials for their handling of El-Masri.

Numerous cases of torture were verified, and they made rendition a difficult policy to justify. Most of the rendition cases came during the first two years following the September 11 attacks; there were fewer of them after that time. Political fallout regarding rendition cases, however, continues both in the United States and among its allies. Despite the Obama administration's general discomfort with rendition, the practice continued after January 2009, when Obama took office. To lend the practice more legitimacy, however, in late 2009 after a thorough review, the Obama administration reportedly changed the rules of rendition. Employing torture was now forbidden, but it is important to note that the United States cannot prevent other nations from engaging in torture, even in the case of suspects it intends to subject to rendition. It is believed that rendition continues to occur but with considerably less frequency than in the early and mid-2000s.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also Coercive Interrogation; September 11 Attacks; Torture

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Rockefeller Commission

The Rockefeller Commission, formally known as the President's Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities with the United States, was a special committee established by President Gerald R. Ford on January 4, 1975. Its principal goal was to investigate and report on the domestic activities of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence-gathering and federal law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). President Ford named Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as chairman of the commission, which was soon named for him. Other notable members included C. Douglas Dillon (former U.S. treasury secretary), labor leader Lane Kirkland, Ronald Reagan (outgoing governor of California), and David W. Belin. Belin, who was the commission's executive director, had been a staffer for the 1964 Warren Commission, which investigated the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In addition to investigating the domestic activities of the CIA, the FBI, and similar agencies, the Rockefeller Commission also conducted a limited investigation into several inconsistencies found in the Warren Commission Report, including whether or not CIA operatives had been involved in the assassination. Ford felt obliged to establish the Rockefeller Commission after reports of CIA and FBI abuses had been made public and as Congress prepared to launch its own investigation into CIA activities. Clear evidence that CIA operatives had been involved in the 1973–1974 Watergate Scandal, which brought down the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, also compelled Ford to delve into these activities with some urgency.

The most immediate catalyst to the establishment of the commission was an exposé published by the *New York Times* in December 1974. The article offered compelling evidence to suggest that the CIA had been involved in a number of nefarious activities, including medical experimentation on American citizens without their express knowledge or consent. Meanwhile, in the Democratically controlled U.S. Senate, a much broader investigation into CIA activities—both domestic and international—was also taking shape. That inquiry was begun on January 27, 1975, and would soon be dubbed the Church Committee after its chairman, Senator Frank Church (D-ID). As it turned out, the Church Committee would quickly supersede the Rockefeller Commission in scope and importance, although the Church Committee's report incorporated many documents and conclusions from the Rockefeller Commission.

The Rockefeller Commission's report detailed CIA abuses that included mail tampering, illegal surveillance of domestic groups and individuals deemed “subversive,” and the existence of Project MKULTRA, a mind-control program during the 1950s and 1960s that experimented with the use of psychotropic drugs during interrogations. At least one victim of MKULTRA was CIA employee Frank R. Olson, who was given the drug LSD without his knowledge in 1953. Only days later he allegedly committed suicide during a psychotic episode (some believe that he may have been killed to prevent him from talking). The Rockefeller Commission report also provided evidence of the improper use of the CIA and the FBI by the Nixon White House to cover up the Watergate Scandal.

The Rockefeller Commission also studied the famed Zapruder film, which had not been seen by the public until 1975. The Zapruder film was the only known film that showed President Kennedy's murder in Dallas in 1963. It attempted to investigate why the film depicted a violent rearward motion of the president's head, even though the shooter was allegedly in back of Kennedy and the bullet was

thought to have entered the back of the president's head. In 1964, the Warren Commission concluded that Kennedy was indeed shot from behind by a lone gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was not part of a wider conspiracy. Many Americans did not believe the Warren Commission's report, however, and the release of the Zapruder film only increased that disbelief. The Rockefeller Commission did not, however, reconcile these details. The commission also attempted to determine if two CIA agents—E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis—had been in Dallas near the presidential motorcade in Dallas. The final report claimed that their presence could not be completely affirmed or denied.

Many observers dismissed the Rockefeller Commission as a weak knee-jerk response to revelations that had painted the CIA in a negative light. These observations are by no means inaccurate. The committee's report tilted very little new ground and by and large did not reveal many details that were not previously known. Nor did it shed any new light on the Kennedy assassination. Indeed, critics of the commission claim that it was principally an effort to stymie further attempts to delve more deeply into the misdeeds of the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, the Church Committee, which conducted a much more broad and thorough inquiry, did incorporate many of the documents and files reviewed by the commission into its own far-reaching report.

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See also Church Committee; MKULTRA, Project; Olson, Frank; Documents 50–56, 63, 64

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Roosevelt, Kermit, Jr. (1916–2000)

Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt Jr. was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent and field operative who orchestrated the coup that restored Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran to the Peacock Throne in 1953. Roosevelt was born in Buenos Aires, the son of a noted banker and the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. A graduate of the Groton School and Harvard University, Kermit Roosevelt was a teacher before joining the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. His wartime service in the OSS took him throughout the Middle East.

In 1950 Roosevelt was recruited by the CIA and was assigned to the Office of Policy Coordination before becoming chief of the Near East and Africa Division of the CIA in 1953. At that time, the political situation in Iran jeopardized American and British interests in the country. Iran's parliament, under the charismatic leadership of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, voted unanimously in 1951 to nationalize the country's oil industry. Shortly after that vote Mossadegh, an ardent nationalist, was

elected as Iran's prime minister. Britain demanded restoration of oil rights, and Mossadegh refused despite the strain on Iran's economy caused by the British embargo of Iranian oil exports. Failing to negotiate restoration of its oil rights in Iran, Britain sought U.S. support to topple Mossadegh in a coup.

By 1953 with the tacit endorsement of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, which feared that Iran's vast oil reserves would become available to the Soviets, the CIA was working with Britain's MI6 and planning a coup in Iran. That same year Roosevelt took up residence in Tehran under an assumed name and began to implement Operation AJAX (sometimes referred to as TPAJAX), a CIA and British MI6 covert action plan of clever black propaganda, carefully planned bribery, and street riots staged by U.S. operatives. The plan was to culminate in the shah's dismissal of Prime Minister Mossadegh with the support of Iranian military forces loyal to the shah. The plan, however, went awry, and the shah fled Tehran for safety in Baghdad and later in Italy.

Indefatigable and resilient, Roosevelt quickly planned and implemented a second coup attempt. While some reports suggest that Roosevelt had by this time been ordered to leave Iran, he continued to work an extensive network of shah loyalists and make bribes from accounts replenished with British and American money. The second attempt was successful, and the shah returned to the Iranian throne in August 1953. Mossadegh was toppled, arrested, and prosecuted in a show trial and was confined to solitary imprisonment for three years and house arrest for life. A grateful shah is reputed to have told Roosevelt, "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army—and you."

Widely regarded at the time as one of the CIA's Cold War triumphs, the coup ushered in an Iranian government friendly to the United States, prevented Iran from falling under the sphere of Soviet influence, and ensured the flow of Iranian oil to the West. Roosevelt was secretly awarded the National Security Medal and was lauded as the hero of the coup. In his autobiography, he claimed that the coup was undertaken to prevent the communist Iranian Tudeh Party from coming to power under the sway of Moscow, although contemporary historians find little to support this claim. Roosevelt left the CIA after rejecting a request that he lead a coup against Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Roosevelt also warned the CIA not to attempt future such operations unless they were vital to U.S. national security. He then pursued a career as an executive for Gulf Oil from 1960 to 1970 and later was a Washington lobbyist for foreign governments. Roosevelt was the cofounder of the African Wildlife Federation. He spent his later years in a retirement home in Cockeysville, Maryland, and died of a stroke in 2000.

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See also AJAX, Operation; Office of Strategic Services; Documents 24, 60

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Senate Torture Report

A 6,000-page report released by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee on December 9, 2014, that exposed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks and during the Global War on Terror in general. Large portions of the report were heavily redacted for national security purposes, and some of the report's details merely repeated already-disclosed information. Nevertheless, the report proved highly controversial not only for its \$40 million cost and five-year investigative duration but also because of its details on the CIA's use of coercive interrogation with terror suspects and the CIA's alleged activities intended to cover up such conduct.

The Senate report broadly concluded that the CIA's use of coercive interrogation, which many have termed as torture, has been generally ineffective as well as more widespread than had been previously acknowledged. The document also concluded that the CIA has routinely misled the American people, Congress, and even the president about its interrogation techniques. The report went on to assert that the CIA has repeatedly and purposely overstated the results of such techniques, including the thwarting of terror attacks and the location of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Additionally, the document revealed the existence of a series of so-called black box sites located across the globe where the CIA has subjected terror detainees to various kinds of coercive interrogation, which may be easily interpreted as torture by another name.

The report claimed that the CIA resorted to waterboarding of detainees to the point of near death; depriving prisoners of sleep for as long as 180 continuous hours; beating and humiliating suspects; forcing detainees to remain in horribly uncomfortable "stress positions" for many hours, even when they had broken bones; and subjecting prisoners to "rectal feeding," or the forced administration of pureed food into the rectum. One vignette detailed the death of an internee from hypothermia after he had been shackled to a concrete floor with almost no clothes in temperatures as low as 25 degrees.

The Senate report, which described waterboarding as "near-drowning," went on to allege that many terror suspects were subjected to torture without being given the opportunity to answer interrogators' questions. Even worse, 26 of 119 detainees who were tortured had been wrongfully held. Two of the 26 were known CIA informants. An entire section of the report examined CIA director Michael Hayden's myriad and allegedly deliberate lies to cover up the fact that 26 prisoners had been

detained and tortured by mistake. That same section blamed Hayden for the purposeful destruction of 98 videotapes depicting the waterboarding of prisoners.

President Barack Obama ended many of these practices after taking office in 2009, but when the report was unveiled he nevertheless defended U.S. intelligence officers as “patriots.” At the same time, he stated clearly that the torture of prisoners—civilian or military—was “inconsistent with our values as a nation.” Earlier in the Obama administration, U.S. attorney general Eric Holder had appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the CIA’s activities, but he determined that there was no legal basis with which to charge CIA interrogators or agency officers.

Not surprisingly, the CIA took exception to much of the Senate report, asserting that it had not misled Congress or government officials and insisting that while its interrogation program had “shortcomings,” it had indeed helped prevent terror attacks. Former president George W. Bush patently denied that he had ever been misled by the CIA, and former vice president Dick Cheney lambasted the Senate committee’s efforts as grossly partisan, wildly inaccurate, and harmful to America’s image and national security. Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee promptly issued a 160-page dissent of the document. Indeed, only a few Republicans in Congress supported the release of the report—one of them was Senator John S. McCain, himself a victim of torture during the Vietnam War. He asserted that torture “actually damaged our security interests, as well as our reputation.”

The release of the report also placed current CIA director John Brennan in the hot seat. Democratic senator Carl Levin planned to demand that Brennan fully declassify a March 2003 CIA cable that patently discounted any link between Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda prior to the September 11 attacks. The Bush administration cited this link—both before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq—as one of the primary reasons for going to war against Hussein’s regime. While many congressional Republicans decried the \$40 million price tag for the report as excessive and wasteful, intelligence committee Democrats countered that the CIA itself was to blame for the massive cost overruns because it repeatedly tried to stymie the work of the committee and stonewalled on the release of “thousands” of allegedly incriminating documents. Democratic senator Mark Udall, a member of the intelligence committee, took aim not only at the CIA but also the Obama administration, charging that the White House continued to obfuscate the truth and demanding that Obama terminate officials responsible for the CIA’s activities.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Coercive Interrogation; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Torture; War on Terror and the CIA; Document 98

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September 11, 2001, Attacks

See September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of

September 11 Attacks

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) record prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks was emblematic of the pressures placed upon it in a changing world. Its central problem was the transition from the Cold War to international terrorism and then to stateless terrorism that could strike the United States at any time. Surveillance against terrorism in the continental United States was the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but the CIA had responsibility for international intelligence gathering. In any case, the CIA's record was found to be lacking.

The leaders of the CIA had over the years limited human intelligence assets. In the early and mid-1990s, the CIA had reduced its human intelligence capability through a staff reduction of 20 percent. By the late 1990s the agency lacked the agents, the language skills, and the organizational flexibility to spot a conspiracy in the making.

Instead, the CIA depended on intelligence reports from friendly intelligence services and political departments. Even when it had a human intelligence source, the CIA was slow to react to warnings coming from that source. A case in point is that the CIA had an aggressive agent in Germany monitoring the activities of the Hamburg cell, but no additional resources were placed at his disposal.

Bureaucracy often threatened the efficiency of CIA operations. Its agents were reluctant to share information with the FBI for fear of losing control of the case. Part of this fear was an incompatibility of function between the two institutions. The FBI, which had the task of bringing lawbreakers to justice, approached a case by accumulating evidence that could stand up in a court of law. CIA agents were less interested in prosecuting than in intelligence gathering. They wanted to follow the leads to see where they would go. This meant that the CIA was unwilling to share crucial information because such sharing might compromise intelligence sources.

The decision by John Deutch, director of the CIA from 1995 to 1996, to call for prior approval from CIA headquarters before recruiting any person with a criminal or human rights problem as an intelligence asset made it difficult for the CIA to recruit intelligence agents. This decision came after a controversy involving the CIA's employment of a paid informant in Guatemala who had been involved in the



Plane hijacked by Al Qaeda terrorists flies into World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. (Rob Howard/Corbis)

murders of an American innkeeper and the Guatemalan husband of an American lawyer. Hundreds of paid informants were dismissed from the rolls of the CIA. Almost all of the human intelligence assets in the Middle East were terminated in this purge. This restriction was still in place on September 11, 2001.

The CIA had been monitoring the activities of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda through its Counterterrorism Center. CIA agents had been able to recruit 30 Afghans operating under the codeword GE/SENIORS to monitor bin Laden's activities in Afghanistan since 1998. They each received \$10,000 a month for this mission. Numerous times during the Bill Clinton administration analysts in the Counterterrorism Center and its Alec Station unit proposed operations to neutralize bin Laden using Afghan agents or missile attacks, but none of these operations received approval. Part of the

problem was that bin Laden was so elusive, traveling at irregular times. There was also the fear of collateral damage that would outrage domestic and international public opinion. The Clinton administration became paralyzed by indecision caused by its lack of confidence in CIA intelligence and the ongoing political difficulties of the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

George Tenet, who succeeded Deutch, was able to make the transition from the Clinton administration to the George W. Bush administration. Tenet had been constantly warning both administrations about the danger of bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Although the Clinton administration came to recognize the truth of the terrorism threat, the Bush administration was slow to accept it until September 11, 2001. Tenet had been able to establish a good working relationship with President Bush but was unable to get him to act quickly on Al Qaeda. After September 11, however, the Bush administration left nothing to chance in fighting terrorism.

According to the CIA inspector general's *Summary Report Conclusions on CIA's Efforts against Al Qaeda*, "Agency officers from the top down worked hard" against Al Qaeda but "did not always work effectively and cooperatively." While

finding no “silver bullet” or single intelligence lapse that might have prevented the 9/11 attacks, the report identified numerous “failures to implement and manage important processes” and “follow through with operations.” The report said that Tenet bears “ultimate responsibility” for the CIA’s lack of a unified, strategic plan for fighting Al Qaeda. The intelligence community “did not have a documented, comprehensive approach” to Al Qaeda, the document said, and Tenet “did not use all of his authorities” to prepare one.

According to Seymour Hersh in *Chain of Command*, not having a documented and comprehensive approach unleashed the CIA to undertake covert action against terrorists with no restrictions except deniability on the part of the president. The support for the Northern Alliance led to the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ended safe sanctuary for bin Laden and the other leaders of Al Qaeda. But bin Laden and most of the leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were able to escape. Part of the reason for the escape was the reluctance of the Bush administration to commit American forces until it was too late.

In the middle of the hunt for bin Laden and the wiping out of Al Qaeda’s leadership, the Bush administration decided that Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction were greater threats. Even prior to 9/11, it was known in the CIA that the Bush administration was eager to overthrow Hussein. Their reasoning was that deposing Hussein and establishing a favorable government in Iraq would produce a base of support in the Middle East for the United States, because it was apparent that there was no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Extreme pressure from the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, for the CIA to produce intelligence justification to go to war with Iraq resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among CIA analysts. Many of them believed that an Iraqi war would hinder the hunt for bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. The analysts believed that the United States should concentrate exclusively on Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda network. Those analysts who were too vocal with their dissatisfaction were fired, transferred, or severely criticized. Despite warnings from these CIA analysts about the lack of concrete intelligence, Tenet assured President Bush and his advisers that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

The failure to find these weapons of mass destruction ended Bush’s confidence in Tenet. In the meantime, the rank and file of the CIA had become critics of the Bush administration. They issued a series of intelligence reports that contradicted or were critical of the premises of the Bush administration’s occupation of Iraq. Many of these reports were leaked to the news media.

After Tenet’s resignation, Bush appointed former Florida congressman Porter Goss to head the CIA. Goss had worked for the CIA in the 1960s, but most of his knowledge of the CIA came from his seven years as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Bush gave Goss a mandate to bring the CIA back to the president’s political team. A short time after Goss came into Langley headquarters, senior CIA officials began to leave in droves. In April 2005 the CIA inspector general’s report surfaced. The report presented detailed criticism of the performance of more than a dozen former and current CIA officials. Goss

quashed the recommendation that there be accountability boards to recommend personnel actions against those charged in the report.

Despite this action, the clash between Goss's team and CIA veterans reached epic proportions. In the long run, however, it was Goss's inability to work with his nominal boss, John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, that led to his demise. President Bush asked for and received Goss's resignation on May 5, 2006. Goss's successor was U.S. Air Force four-star general Michael Hayden, the former head of the National Security Agency and the number two person under Negroponte. In February 2009 following Barack Obama's inauguration as president, Hayden was replaced by Leon Panetta.

The CIA played the central role in gathering the intelligence that led to the raid on the Abbottabad compound that resulted in bin Laden's death on May 1, 2011 (May 2 Pakistani local time). Beginning in August 2010, CIA operatives spent months tracking a lead that eventually allowed them to positively identify one of bin Laden's couriers, who in turn led them to suspect the compound, located in a suburb of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, as bin Laden's likely hiding place. With Obama's final approval in late April 2011 and under the direction of Panetta, the CIA organized and oversaw the raid on the compound, which was carried out by elements of the U.S. Navy SEALs.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also Alec Station; Counterterrorism Center; Hersh, Seymour; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; September 11 Attacks, Warning of; Documents 73, 75–88, 94–96

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September 11 Attacks, Warning of

By the spring of 2001, the level of information on possible terrorist threats and planned attacks increased dramatically. In March 2001 Richard Clarke, then National Security Council counterterrorism coordinator, informed National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that he thought there were terrorist cells, including Al Qaeda, operating in the United States.

Shortly thereafter, Rice was briefed on the activities of Abu Zubaydah, a senior Al Qaeda figure. In the weeks that followed, then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet issued warnings that Abu Zubaydah was planning an operation in the near future. By May 2001 many more reports were written, including a report by a walk-in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) claiming that there was a plan to launch attacks on London, Boston, and New York. In mid-May there was a phone call to a U.S. embassy that warned of a possible attack by bin Laden supporters on the United States using high explosives. Later that month there was a report that terrorists might hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. There were reports of possible attacks in Israel, Yemen, and Italy.

By midsummer, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait were added to the list of warnings. In June there was a report that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (who later confessed to having masterminded the 9/11 attacks) was recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet with colleagues already there to conduct terrorist attacks on Osama bin Laden's behalf. Then there was the information that led to the late June advisory that there was a high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Other reports warned of imminent attacks by bin Laden.

In early July, the CIA briefed Attorney General John Ashcroft on Al Qaeda, warning that preparations for multiple attacks were in the late stages, if not already complete, and that a significant attack was imminent. On August 6 in response to questions raised by President George W. Bush on several occasions to his intelligence briefers as to whether any of these threats pointed to attacks on the United States, an article was inserted into the president's daily intelligence brief titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." The article indicated that bin Laden had wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the United States since 1997, had Al Qaeda members in the United States, and was planning to exploit an operative's access to the United States to mount a strike and that FBI information indicated patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.

What is evident is that prior to the 9/11 attacks there was no dearth of information about the possibility of an attack, although some intelligence analysts asked whether all these threats might be a deception. As Tenet later noted, "the system was blinking red." What were missing were the specifics. There were no targets, no timing, and no evident method of attack identified in the gathered information. And information that might have led to answers to some of those questions often found itself at the bottom of a pile of information, some of which related to information

of more immediate concern to already overworked intelligence staffs, or were embedded in databases maintained by separate agencies.

Jan Goldman

See also September 11 Attacks; Documents 76–86

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Shackley, Theodore G. (1927–2002)

Theodore “Ted” G. Shackley was an expert in U.S. clandestine operations in Cuba, Chile, and Vietnam. Following the government investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the mid-1970s, he retired and established his own security consulting firm.

In 1945 at age 18, Shackley joined U.S. Army intelligence largely because his grandmother had made him relatively fluent in Polish. He worked in counterintelligence in Berlin and Nuremberg and was recruited into the CIA in 1951. Shackley appeared to others to be cold, efficient, unusual in his manner, and self-centered. His nickname was the “Blond Ghost.”

After the Bay of Pigs disaster, President John F. Kennedy created a committee—the Special Group Augmented—charged with overthrowing Fidel Castro’s government. At a meeting of this committee at the White House on November 4, 1961, the decision was made to call this covert action program for sabotage and subversion against Cuba Operation MONGOOSE. In early 1962 Shackley joined this project and was involved in delivering supplies to Johnny Roselli as part of the plan to assassinate Castro. Shackley was also responsible for gathering intelligence and recruiting spies in Cuba.

In 1966 Shackley was sent to Laos, where drug dealing was ever present in recruiting tribesmen to attack the enemy supply lines. Heroin was the basic currency and also was being used by U.S. troops. When Lyndon B. Johnson ceased using the Laotians he sent Shackley to Saigon, where he was chief of station from 1968 to 1973.

The CIA had been disgraced when it did not predict the Tet Offensive (1968), so Shackley began to emphasize intelligence gathering as much as clandestine operations. But he preferred reports to be more positive than depressing, and this may have contributed to the failure of President Richard Nixon’s administration to get accurate estimates of how military operations in Vietnam were progressing. Shackley’s term as chief of station coincided with the period when John A. Walker

Jr., who worked for the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) during 1968–1985, was so effective in keeping the North Vietnamese well informed about U.S. air strikes and naval movements.

In 1969 Shackley became chief of station in Vietnam and headed the PHOENIX Program. This involved the killing of noncombatant Vietnamese civilians suspected of collaborating with the National Liberation Front. In a two-year period, the PHOENIX Program murdered 28,978 civilians.

In the early 1970s after his return to Washington, Shackley was made part of the operation that was to undermine the elected Chilean government and assist the military coup of 1973 that brought Augusto Pinochet to power. After Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford brought in George H. W. Bush as director of the CIA. This was followed by Shackley being appointed as deputy director of operations, second-in-command at the agency. After leaving the CIA in September 1979, Shackley formed his own company, Research Associates International, that specialized in providing intelligence to business. Shackley died in Bethesda, Maryland, in December 2002. His autobiography, *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA*, was published in April 2005.

Jan Goldman

See also Bay of Pigs Invasion; Cuba; Iran-Contra Affair; MONGOOSE, Operation

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SIGINT

See Signals Intelligence

Signals Intelligence

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the various other agencies in the U.S. intelligence community classify intelligence according to type. Classifying

intelligence in this manner simplifies, shortens, and facilitates the communicating, reporting, analysis, and evaluation of raw intelligence gathered by the various intelligence agencies and aids in the development of new intelligence-gathering techniques.

The CIA, the other intelligence agencies, and the U.S. military widely employ the use of acronyms to simplify and ease communications (verbal, written, and electronic) concerning a wide range of technological or complex topics and/or lengthy identifiers, titles, or agencies. The classifications of the various general types of intelligence are no different. The more common classifications of types of intelligence include HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), COMINT (communications intelligence), ELINT (electronic intelligence), and IMINT (image intelligence). All of the intelligence agencies of the United States engage in one or more of these different types of intelligence, with some agencies focusing or specializing more heavily on one of them.

SIGINT is actually a general term that encompasses several more specific sub-classifications of intelligence: cryptology or cryptanalysis (code breaking), direction finding and location, ELINT, and COMINT. The general difference between COMINT and ELINT, as subspecies of SIGINT, is that COMINT concerns actual communications between people, whereas ELINT concerns electronic signals that are not communications or that identify the source and nature of an electronic signal. Cryptology or cryptanalysis includes the science of code breaking. Modern-day codes are extremely complex, frequently based on prime numbers, and require the use of supercomputers and highly advanced algorithms to break them because of astronomical possible combinations in codes. Direction finding and location, on the other hand, is rather simple in that a signal is detected from two receiving stations widely separated by location. The direction of the signal to each station is then tracked back and triangulated to determine the location of the transmitting station. Even more basic, the mere detection of a signal can provide information concerning the presence of a military or intelligence unit or operation that was previously unknown.

SIGINT operations are conducted by humans, but the actual intelligence gathering is a function of technical equipment, such as radio receivers and transmitters or any piece of military or intelligence equipment that emits an electromagnetic field that can be detected by technical means. The intelligence-gathering equipment for SIGINT is not limited to just radios and includes satellites, spy planes, electronic espionage ships, and, in the past, weather balloons. Two historical examples of SIGINT operations that failed spectacularly are the seizing of USS *Pueblo* by the North Koreans in 1968 and the Israeli attack on USS *Liberty*, a spy ship, in 1967.

The U.S. intelligence community consists of 17 agencies: the CIA; the National Security Agency (NSA); the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Secret Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which handles domestic counterterrorism; the Defense Intelligence Agency; Army Intelligence; Navy Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence; Marine Corps Intelligence; Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of State; the Department of Energy; the

Drug Enforcement Administration; the Department of the Treasury; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although the CIA is involved in the gathering of SIGINT, the primary agency that employs technical equipment for SIGINT, to include code breaking, is the NSA. In actual numbers of personnel employed and budget, the NSA is the largest intelligence-gathering organization in the United States. The NSA's huge budget is due to not only the number of people it employs but also the incredible amount of money spent on the development, purchase, deployment, and operation of highly sophisticated supercomputers, satellites, and SIGINT equipment. It has been estimated that the NSA has advanced electronic equipment that is at least two generations beyond what is available in the commercial market. The NRO is also involved with SIGINT, as it is the NRO that designs, builds, and operates satellites, which are a significant source of SIGINT. Another frequent user of SIGINT is the military, where SIGINT techniques are used in various military intelligence agencies. For example, the location of opposing military forces and the interception of military communications are extremely important intelligence functions, and without them successful military operations would be severely hindered.

From the 1970s through the 1990s, there was a focus on SIGINT to the extent that HUMINT resources and techniques were ignored and allowed to wither. However, with the advent of the 21st century, there has been a general acknowledgment that SIGINT does have limitations and that HUMINT still has an important place in the gathering of intelligence.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Communications Intelligence; Electronic Intelligence; Human Intelligence; Image Intelligence; Documents 25–27, 29

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Six-Day War (1967)

The Six-Day War, also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, pitted Egypt and its Syrian and Jordanian allies against Israel. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts proved remarkably accurate in their assessments of the timing, duration, and outcome of the war. The assessments were pivotal in shaping U.S. foreign policy before and during the conflict.

The run-up to the war began in the spring of 1967 as Egypt maneuvered to build wartime alliances in the Middle East and isolate Israel. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser signed a mutual assistance agreement with Syria. He then expelled a United Nations peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and pushed Egyptian forces across the Sinai toward the Israeli border. Egypt next occupied the heights overlooking the Strait of Tiran and closed that international waterway to Israeli shipping. By the end of May 1967, Jordan had also signed a military defense pact with Egypt and permitted both Egyptian and Iraqi troops to move into Jordanian territory. Israel faced the prospect of war on several fronts.

Alarmed by these developments and ever mindful of Soviet support for Egypt, President Lyndon B. Johnson demanded an assessment of the deepening crisis from CIA director Richard Helms. Helms was able to respond immediately to the president's demands for timely and accurate assessments of the situation. The CIA formed its Directorate of Intelligence Arab-Israeli Task Force early in 1967, and by the time the crisis was heating up in May, the task force was already producing two daily situation reports. In addition, the CIA Office of Current Intelligence had for several months been keeping a running tally of the military capabilities and readiness of both sides.

The most influential report that Helms provided to the president at their first meeting during the crisis, however, was the top secret "Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities" study. In that study, CIA analysts had determined that Israel would win the coming war and moreover that Israel could defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts or hold on any three fronts while mounting a major offensive on the fourth. Johnson, however, soon after received a brief from Israeli ambassador Abba Eban that forecast dire consequences for Israel in any conflict with the allied Arab nations. Eban brought estimates from Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, that showed that the Soviet-backed Arab forces badly outnumbered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Johnson now had reports from intelligence services that were wholly contradictory.

Helms took the Mossad report and had the CIA rebuttal available within hours. The CIA Office of National Estimates (ONE) rejected the Mossad assessment and correctly saw it as part of an attempt by Israel to solicit more U.S. military supplies, gain approval for Israeli military initiatives, force U.S. intervention with Nasser, and pressure the American president to make a public commitment to Israel. The ONE also correctly gauged Moscow's posture. ONE analysts, contrary to those in Tel Aviv, concluded that the Soviets would avoid direct military involvement in any coming conflict, as Moscow did not have the capability to intervene and feared a direct confrontation with the United States. Johnson now demanded

that the newest CIA estimate be reviewed again, this time with input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Helms had a coordinated assessment from the Board of National Estimates and the Defense Intelligence Agency ready the next day that reaffirmed the original estimate. Despite the political pressure being brought to bear to have CIA assessments align with those of the Mossad, the memorandum “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States” made the right call. The memorandum stated that Israel would prevail in any coming conflict and, presciently, that Israeli armored forces would breach the Egyptian lines and reach the Suez Canal within days. An additional memorandum issued the same day made a straightforward assessment that Moscow had not encouraged the Egyptian provocations and, moreover, would not intervene with its own forces even in the face of an Arab defeat.

On the basis of these coordinated assessments, Johnson declined to airlift additional supplies to Israel or even make a statement of public support for Israel. In his later memoirs, Johnson recalled telling Ambassador Eban that “all of our intelligence people are unanimous that if the UAR [unmanned armed rocket] attacks, you will whip hell out of them.”

Ironically, Johnson’s decision—made in an attempt to prevent any further escalation of the crisis—likely spurred Israel to strike the first blow in the Six-Day War. CIA analysts had prepared an estimate on June 2 that showed that Israel would strike the first blow of the war within days. Helms reported this to the president. On June 5, the IDF mounted a preemptive air strike on Egyptian airfields that wiped out the numerically superior Egyptian Air Force on the ground. Later IDF attacks decimated other Arab air forces on the Israeli fronts. With virtual air superiority now on all fronts, the IDF mechanized and armored forces were able to breach Arab defenses quickly and within days had taken the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. CIA analysts had been proved right. The wartime gains made by Israeli forces shape Israel’s current borders and influence the geopolitics of the region to this day.

A few years after leaving the CIA, Helms said of the agency’s analysis of the 1967 war, “When you come as close as that in the intelligence business, it has to be regarded pretty much as a triumph.” The CIA’s timely and accurate intelligence before and during the war had won Helms, literally and figuratively, a place at the president’s table—perhaps the most precious commodity that a CIA director could possess. It also is one of the most perishable commodities, a painful lesson that several directors since Helms have had to relearn, to their and the CIA’s detriment.

Ralph L. DeFalco III

See also Helms, Richard

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SLAMMER, Project (1985–)

In 1985, a collaboration of U.S. intelligence agencies embarked on a 10-year study to determine the motivations of individuals convicted and imprisoned for espionage against the United States. The team in charge of this project consisted of federal agents as well as government psychologists and psychiatrists. Project SLAMMER focused on interviewing 30 incarcerated spies in an effort to determine motivations as well as the methods by which they committed these crimes. Among those interviewed were Aldrich Ames, members of the Walker Spy clan, William Kampiles, Jonathan Pollard, and Jeffrey Carney. The project was under the Personnel Security Committee of the Advisory Group/Security Countermeasures, with numerous personnel from the different organizations participating.

Many of the reports generated by Project SLAMMER were highly classified at the conclusion of the study, but general conclusions of this study were that people spy for some combination of emotional gratification and remuneration. Psychologists and other counterintelligence professionals were able to conclude that among all the SLAMMER data, common patterns of behavior did emerge.

On April 12, 1990, the researchers sent an interim report to Central Intelligence Agency management. This report detailed the behavioral changes and common personality patterns that were associated with acts of espionage. The researchers found that heavy drinking, drug dependence, signs of depression or stress, extramarital affairs, and divorce are all warning signs of a potential security problem.

Additionally, Project SLAMMER psychologists found that there were two prevalent personality styles observed among the participants: (1) highly manipulative, dominant, and self-serving and (2) passive, easily influenced, and lacking in

self-esteem. Among both personality styles, participants were male, immature, and demonstrated an inability to cope with problems, and many also displayed antisocial and narcissistic personality styles.

According to psychological standards, people with antisocial personalities have a tendency to reject the normal rules and standards of society, focusing only on immediate gratification with little interest in the future and no ability to learn from the past; are often manipulative and possess a great deal of charm; and have the ability to talk their way out of trouble.

A narcissistic personality is characterized by the following traits: unmerited feelings of self-importance, self-esteem, feelings of entitlement, and a general lack of empathy for others. Those with narcissistic personality traits may turn to a foreign intelligence agency to satisfy emotional needs if they felt rejected or devalued by their own government.

The previously mentioned interim report also stated that most of the participants partly based their decisions to betray their country on their belief that coworkers would not turn them in. Many of the participants also disclosed that a traumatic event was the impetus for their eventual decision to commit espionage. Furthermore, while financial motivations did appear at the top of the list (specifically, 52 percent of the offenders listed financial reward as their primary motivation), most received relatively little money as payment. Other reasons that the subjects listed were disgruntlement or revenge, ingratiation, coercion, ideology, and thrills or intrigue.

Abigail Sessions

See also Kampiles, William; Document 65

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Smith, Walter Bedell (1895–1961)

In May 1950, President Harry Truman selected Walter Bedell Smith as director of central intelligence (DCI), the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Since the post had been established in 1946 there had been three directors, none of whom had wanted the job. However, before Smith could assume the post on October 7, there was a major intelligence failure. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, which started the Korean War, took the Truman administration entirely by surprise and raised fears of a third world war.

On October 10 Smith was asked to prepare estimates for the Wake Island Conference between the president and General Douglas MacArthur. Smith insisted that the estimates be simple, readable, conclusive, and useful rather than mere background. They reflected the best information available, but unfortunately one estimate concluded that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea, another major intelligence failure.

Smith is credited with redeveloping the CIA's estimative intelligence, a function that it had done well during the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) period but had lain dormant upon the OSS's demise. Estimative intelligence looks to the future, attempting to foresee problems of concern to the president. With Truman's approval, Smith created the Board of National Estimate reporting to the DCI, led by the same Harvard history professor, William Langer, who had put together a similar document for General William Donovan during World War II. Professor Langer managed to convince men from the nation's best universities to work for him and Smith.

Smith also made it clear that covert action and special operations existed in a chain of command extending from the DCI and in coordination with the other espionage capability that the DCI oversaw for the president, the Office of Special Operations (OSO).

The OSO's responsibility was to gather foreign intelligence information by secret means (i.e., classic espionage). If the CIA did not take the field to secretly oppose Soviet propaganda, backdoor electioneering, and subversion in Western Europe, several of the most important U.S. allies might have been in jeopardy. Furthermore, intelligence activity that connoted action was very much in the American character. This type of activity drew many adherents in the early CIA both because there was a perceived need (as the constant stream of national security directives from the president and the National Security Council attested) and because, if successful, you could see the results.

At the same time, the slow, painstaking process of recruiting spies to report on happenings behind the Iron Curtain and in the Soviet Union itself had to be undertaken. In the late 1940s and 1950s this was difficult and dangerous work and was new to Americans, very few of whom spoke the relevant languages (Russian, Polish, Czech, and Hungarian).

Smith is remembered in the CIA as its first successful DCI and one of its most effective who redefined its structure and mission. The CIA's expansive covert action program remained the responsibility of Frank Wisner's quasi-independent Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), but Smith began to bring the OPC under the DCI's control. In early January 1951 he made Allen Dulles the first deputy director for plans, to supervise both the OPC and the CIA's separate espionage organization, the OSO. By consolidating responsibility for covert operations, Smith made the CIA the arm of government primarily responsible for them.

Smith wanted the CIA to become a career service. There were no schools for intelligence training, and staffs had little to do in peacetime. Career officers therefore tended to avoid such work unless they aspired to be military attachés. Smith consolidated training under a director of training and developed a career service program.

When Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed supreme Allied commander, Europe, in 1951, he asked for Smith to serve as his chief of staff again. Truman turned down the request, stating that operating the CIA was a more important post. Eisenhower therefore took Lieutenant General Alfred Gruenther with him as his chief of staff. When Eisenhower subsequently recommended Gruenther's elevation to four-star rank, Truman decided that Smith should be promoted also. However, Smith's name was omitted from the promotion list. Truman then announced that no one would be promoted until Smith was, which occurred on August 1, 1951. Smith retired from the U.S. Army upon leaving the CIA on February 9, 1953. Smith suffered a heart attack and died at his Washington, D.C., home on August 9, 1961. At the request of his widow, Mary Eleanor Smith, his grave site was placed close to General George Marshall's grave in section 7 of Arlington National Cemetery.

Jan Goldman

See also Donovan, William; Office of Strategic Services; Wisner, Frank; Documents 12, 13, 15

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Snepp, Frank (1943–)

Journalist and principal analyst of North Vietnamese political affairs for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Frank Warren Snepp III was born on May 3, 1943, in Kinston, North Carolina. He graduated from Columbia College and then spent two years at Columbia University's School of International Affairs. In 1968 he joined the CIA, becoming an analyst at the U.S. embassy in Saigon from 1969 to 1971; he then returned to Saigon in October 1972. Snepp was critical of the rule in South Vietnam of Republic of Vietnam president Nguyen Van Thieu.

When it became clear that Saigon might fall to the Vietnamese communists in 1975, Snepp was one of those charged with organizing the evacuation of the city; he was one of the last to leave the U.S. embassy during Operation FREQUENT WIND, which saw 1,373 U.S. citizens and 5,595 Vietnamese and third-party nationals evacuated during April 29–30, 1975.

As with many other U.S. personnel who served in South Vietnam, Snepp was disappointed with the delayed, hurried U.S. evacuation that had left behind so many loyal U.S. allies. In 1977 he published *Decent Interval*, his account of the fall of South Vietnam. The CIA tried to prevent Snepp from publishing the book, but Snepp claimed that his rights under the First Amendment were being violated and that the CIA had ruined his career. The American Civil Liberties Union supported Snepp, and the book was published by a major press, Random House. The CIA, however, won a court case that allowed it to collect the book royalties. Among other things, *Decent Interval* indicted the Gerald Ford administration for its botched handling of the evacuation.

Snepp had left the CIA in 1976 before the book was published and became a freelance journalist. By the late 1980s, he was teaching journalism and law at California State University–Long Beach. In 1999 he wrote a second book, *Irreparable Harm*, that detailed his battle to get his first book published and excoriated the CIA for trampling on his rights and those of many Americans. He now works for KNBC-TV in Los Angeles and in 2006 won a Peabody Award for his investigative report “Burning Questions.”

Justin J. Corfield

See also Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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Spann, Johnny (1969–2001)

A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer, Johnny Micheal “Mike” Spann was the first American killed in combat during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, which started with the October 7, 2001, invasion of Afghanistan.

Born on March 1, 1969, in Winfield, Alabama, Spann graduated from Winfield High School in 1998. He received a bachelor's degree in criminal justice and law enforcement from Auburn University in 1992. While attending college, he joined the U.S. Marine Corps in 1991 and upon graduation entered the Officers Training School at Quantico, Virginia. He became an artillery officer specializing in directing air and naval firepower toward the enemy on the ground. Spann served as a marine for eight years, rising to the rank of captain. His military career included stations in Okinawa and Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Spann was a member of the 2nd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company and was the

second-in-command for a joint exercise expedition in Latin America and Africa called UNITAS beginning in March 1997.

In 1999 Spann joined the Special Activities Division, a paramilitary unit within the Directorate of Operations of the CIA. He graduated from the National Clandestine Service basic training program in 2000 and was sent to Afghanistan in 2001 shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to begin the search for Osama bin Laden. Spann, along with other CIA officers and special forces troops, aided the Northern Alliance army—also known as the United Islamic Front, which was the group fighting to usurp the Taliban—with their siege of Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan in November 2001. During this time, approximately 300 Taliban soldiers surrendered to the Northern Alliance and were taken to the fortress Qala-i-Jangi.

On November 25, 2001, Spann, along with fellow CIA operative Dave Tyson, arrived at the fortress to interrogate the prisoners and determine if there were any Al Qaeda operatives among them. One of the prisoners they spoke to was John Walker Lindh, an American from California, later referred to as the “American Taliban,” who traveled to Afghanistan and wound up fighting for the Taliban. Lindh remained silent the entire time. He was later sentenced to 20 years in prison in the United States. Spann and Tyson conducted the interrogation with a group of prisoners, pulling one away from the group at a time. During this interrogation, the group of prisoners began a riot by attacking the CIA officers and Northern Alliance guards. Rather than fleeing, Spann held his ground and opened fire with his pistol at the Taliban prisoners. The prisoners overpowered and killed Spann and the guards and then raided a weapon cache before the rest of the Northern Alliance soldiers trapped them in the southwestern part of the fortress. Tyson was able to escape to the main building along with a German television crew, who caught much of the battle on video. American and British special forces teams, along with Northern Alliance soldiers, opened fire on the Taliban forces and called in multiple air strikes. The fighting took place for seven days, ending on December 1, 2001, with the flooding of the basement where the remaining Taliban rioters were holed up. Spann’s body, which was booby-trapped with a grenade that had to be disarmed, was located after the fighting.

Spann became the 79th star on the CIA’s Memorial Wall, which honors CIA officers killed in the line of duty, and his name was written in the *Book of Honor*. He was awarded the CIA’s Intelligence Star for “a voluntary act or acts of courage performed under hazardous conditions or for outstanding achievements or services rendered with distinction under conditions of grave risk.” The Intelligence Star is equivalent to the Army’s Silver Star. The CIA also awarded Spann the Exceptional Service Medallion for “injury or death resulting from service in an area of hazard.” Spann’s body was buried at Arlington National Cemetery in December 2001 with full military honors. He left behind his wife and three children. On November 19, 2002, his hometown dedicated a park to him, named Johnny Micheal Spann Park, and Auburn University created the Johnny Micheal Spann Memorial Scholarship in his honor.

Ryan Connoles

See also Book of Honor

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Special Activities Division

The Special Activities Division (SAD) is a section within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Clandestine Service. SAD handles all covert operations undertaken by the CIA and is subdivided into two agencies. The first is SAD/SOG, which handles tactical paramilitary operations, military threat assessment, and intelligence gathering in hostile nations; the second is the Political Action Group (PAG), which oversees covert political activities. Since its inception in 1947, the CIA has maintained SAD, which has been involved in a number of high-profile operations. These include the 1953 Iranian coup, the 1954 Guatemalan coup, and the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion. SAD has also conducted extensive operations in Korea (in the 1950s), Vietnam (1960s–1970s), Afghanistan (1980s), Nicaragua (1980s), Somalia (1990s), Yemen (2000s), Syria (2000s), and Afghanistan (2000s). One of the most notable operations coordinated by SAD was the May 1, 2011, raid on Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan. Bin Laden was killed during the ensuing fight. Among the more noteworthy SAD/PAG agents are E. Howard Hunt (who became embroiled in the 1970s Watergate Scandal), William Francis Buckley, Kermit Roosevelt Jr. (President Theodore Roosevelt’s grandson), and David Atlee Phillips.

SAD/SOG is responsible for intelligence gathering in hostile nations and is engaged in military threat assessment that is conducted covertly in other nations. SAD/SOG agents, who work strictly undercover, typically carry no articles that might identify them as Americans, and if their cover is revealed, the U.S. government might deny their existence and any knowledge of their activities. SAD/SOG is considered to be the most secretive of all U.S. government agencies. A major part of SAD/SOG’s activities involve unconventional warfare, political assassinations and targeted killings, sabotage, the training and equipping of foreign guerrilla forces, special reconnaissance missions, and ambushes and raids, such as the one that resulted in bin Laden’s death in 2011. SAD/SOG provides the U.S. president with an additional option while dealing with foreign threats that cannot be subdued by using traditional military operations or diplomacy. SAD/SOG’s paramilitary operatives, who often work with traditional military forces, are fully trained as special forces soldiers as well as CIA case officers. A SAD/SOG mission can be directly ordered by the president or the National Security Council at the behest of the president.

SAD/PAG conducts covert missions that include psychological operations (including black propaganda) as well as cyber warfare, economic warfare, and political influence peddling in foreign nations. Many SAD/PAG agents work

undercover but simultaneously hold public positions in foreign countries. Thus, a SAD/PAG agent might be a covert CIA station chief in a foreign nation while holding the public position as a political officer in a U.S. embassy. Applying covert influence in the political realm in order to prompt political changes in a foreign country is one of the more important functions of SAD/PAG.

SAD's profile has increased markedly since the start of the Global War on Terror in 2001. Indeed, it has been in the vanguard of antiterror operations around the world. SAD/SOG officers were among the first U.S. forces to enter Afghanistan in October 2001 after the U.S. government decided to overthrow the Taliban regime there. SAD/SOG played a major role in the hunt for Al Qaeda leaders and helped coordinate U.S. military operations with the Afghan Northern Alliance. Because the Global War on Terror is being waged against terrorist groups rather than nations with distinct military forces, SAD/SOG has been at the forefront of operations that move SAD/SOG agents into and out of nations in which regular U.S. military forces cannot operate. This includes countries such as Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Pakistan, among others.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Afghanistan; Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Buckley, William F.; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in; War on Terror and the CIA; Documents 24, 25

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Special Projects, Office of

While authorizing a sweeping expansion in covert activities, National Security Council Directive 10/2 (NSC 10/2) established the Office of Special Projects, soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to replace the Special Procedures Group. As a CIA component, the OPC was an anomaly. The OPC's budget and personnel were appropriated within CIA allocations, but the director of central intelligence (DCI) had little authority in determining the OPC's activities. Responsibility for the direction of the OPC rested with the office's director, designated by the secretary of state. Policy guidance—decisions on the need for specific activities—came to the OPC director from the State and Defense Departments, bypassing the DCI. The organizational arrangements established in 1948 for the conduct of covert operations reflected both the

concept of covert action as defined by U.S. officials and the perception of the CIA as an institution. Both the activities and the institution were regarded as extensions of the State Department and the military services. The departments (essentially the National Security Council) defined U.S. policy objectives, covert action represented one means of attaining those objectives, and the CIA executed the operations.

Although the OPC was considered a component of the CIA, the OPC's internal operations varied from other offices within the CIA. The OPC's personnel and finances were appropriated within the CIA's allocations, but the DCI had little to no authority in determining the office's activities. Instead, responsibility for the direction of the OPC remained with the OPC's director, who was to be designated by the secretary of state.

Furthermore, policy guidance, such as decisions regarding the need for particular activities, was handed down from the State and Defense Departments directly to the OPC's director, in effect bypassing the DCI. The policies handed down by the State and Defense Departments were threefold: economic, political, and psychological. Such policy guidance became increasingly general, allowing the maximum opportunity for project development in the OPC. Frank G. Wisner became the OPC's first director in August 1948, having been nominated by the secretary of state. Formally affiliated with the Office of Strategic Services, Wisner had just returned to the United States from Europe, where he served as a deputy to the assistant secretary of state for occupied areas.

Wisner had worked undercover and had become well acquainted with top U.S. and foreign diplomats and military personnel in addition to senior officials in the Harry S. Truman administration. Wisner preferred psychological tactics, believing that pro-Western propaganda could control and defeat procommunist propaganda. Officials elsewhere in the CIA preferred economic policies to Wisner's psychological tactics, considering such tactics to be mere gimmickry. The OPC became operational in September 1948, and by October 1948 Wisner had a wide variety of projects for the office, including propaganda, support for resistance movements, economic warfare, the establishment of anticommunist front organizations, and the founding of networks of stay-behinds. The office's initial projects centered on four principal operational areas: labor union activities, refugee programs, media development, and political action. Such projects concentrated geographically on Western Europe.

The goal of the OPC's initial projects was to sabotage Soviet attempts to push Russian expansion into Western Europe, for Western Europe was considered the most vulnerable to communist intrusion. These projects were designed by operatives in the field who also evaluated the projects' results. OPC personnel were second-in-command in U.S. embassies, aiming to be friendly with government leaders and to cultivate informal relationships with senior government officials. Rather than going through diplomatic channels, OPC personnel went around them because they considered diplomacy to be inefficient.

By 1952, the OPC had evolved into a vastly different organization from that originally envisioned by its creators when it merged with the Office of Special Operations, the CIA's clandestine collection component. The OPC had increased

its operations to include worldwide covert operations and had achieved its own institutional independence. The OPC's evolution was due significantly to the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, when the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the commencement of paramilitary operations in China and Korea.

The OPC's participation in the war effort led to its transformation from an organization established to provide the capability for a small number of informal operations to an organization that conducted continuous, ongoing operations on an enormous scale. The OPC's transformation is abundantly clear from the comparative figures between 1949 and 1952. In that three-year period, the OPC's personnel went from 302 to 2,812, its budget figure went from \$4.7 million to \$82 million, and the number of overseas stations with OPC personnel assignments went from 7 to 47.

In addition to the Korean War, several other factors contributed to the OPC's sudden transformation. First, policy direction for the office consisted of condoning and fostering activity without presenting control and scrutiny. Most U.S. officials at the time considered the Soviet Union to be an aggressive force, and the OPC's operations were initiated and subsequently justified by this shared perception. Second, the OPC's activities had to satisfy the vastly different policy objectives handed down from the State and Defense Departments. The State Department emphasized political action and propaganda activities to support its diplomatic objectives, whereas the Defense Department requested paramilitary activities to sustain the Korean War effort and to counter communist-associated guerrillas. These distinct policy objectives required the OPC to develop and sustain different operational capacities, such as manpower and support material.

The third factor leading to the OPC's sudden expansion was its organizational structure that fostered an internal demand for projects. The CIA's decision to assume covert political operations and to place responsibility for them in an office separate from the State and Defense Departments required this office to have a permanent structure. To train and pay personnel, maintain overseas stations, and carry out specific projects, the OPC needed regular funding that could not be provided on an unstructured basis. Such funding had to be budgeted for in advance, which required ongoing activities to justify future allocations.

The OPC has continued to evolve since its transformation in the early 1950s. The OPC is now known within the CIA as the present-day Directorate of Operations. Focusing its operations mostly on terrorism, the Directorate of Operations represents the intelligence community's lead operational asset in combating international terrorism.

Andrew Green

See also National Security Council Directive 10/2; Wisner, Frank; Documents 19, 62, 63

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Spying, Domestic

See Domestic Spying

STARGATE, Project (1970s–1995)

Between 1969 and 1970, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that the Soviet Union was engaged in psychotronic research, known as remote viewing. Remote viewing is a technique that postulates that once in a certain state of mind, a person can view people, places, and things in the past, present, and future. The initial research program funded by the CIA was called Project SCANGATE, and in 1972 the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) began its own research program that was overseen by the CIA and the U.S. Army. Army funding for SCANGATE ended in late 1985, and the unit was renamed SUN STREAK. Under the auspices of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the program then transitioned to the Science Applications International Corporation in 1991 and was again renamed, this time as STARGATE. This program was intended to investigate the application of the paranormal phenomenon of remote viewing.

In 1995, a defense appropriations bill directed that the program be transferred to the CIA, which was then instructed to conduct a review of the program. The American Institutes for Research (AIR) was contracted by the CIA to evaluate the program. On November 28, 1995, a final report was released to the public. The final recommendation by AIR was to terminate STARGATE's efforts. The CIA concluded that there was no case in which remote viewing had provided data used to successfully guide intelligence operations.

STARGATE (or SCANGATE) had early successes in the 1970s and early 1980s with a group of six psychics known as "The Naturals." This program created a set of protocols designed to make the research of clairvoyance and out-of-body experiences more scientific. According to experts, psychic ability had nothing to do with being a remote viewer. Researchers claimed that anyone is capable of remote viewing with proper training and development. The CIA and the DIA wanted to collect a team of people for STARGATE who seemed to have a higher level of this ability.

There were several different types of remote viewing: standard remote viewing; remote influencing, which is the technique of influencing another's thoughts in

such a way that the target (person) has no idea he or she is being influenced by an outside source; biolocation remote viewing, which is the process of splitting your consciousness so as to essentially be in two places at the same time; and remote action, which is the process of physically moving a living being.

Officially, STARGATE had two separate units. The first was an operational unit, which was intended to train and perform remote viewing in intelligence-gathering activities. The operational program had two components. The first was for foreign assessment or analysis of the paranormal research being conducted by other countries. The second component was the use of remote viewing as a technique for gathering intelligence information.

The second unit of STARGATE was a research program maintained separately from the operational unit and was initiated in response to CIA concerns about reported Soviet investigations of psychic phenomena. The research program had three broad objectives: to provide scientifically compelling evidence for the existence of the remote viewing phenomenon, to identify causal mechanisms that might account for or explain the observed phenomenon, and to identify techniques or procedures that might enhance the utility of the information provided by remote viewing.

The initial efforts of Operation STARGATE focused on a few gifted individuals, such as New York artist Ingo Swann. The SRI referred to such individuals as “empaths,” and they were trained and taught to use their talents for psychic warfare. The minimum accuracy required for a remote viewer was said to be 65 percent. Over a period of more than two decades, approximately \$20 million was spent on STARGATE and its related activities. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s there were 23 remote viewers employed, with approximately \$11 million budgeted to the program. From 1990 to 1995 there were 3 psychics working for the CIA at Fort Meade whose services were made available to other government agencies when requested.

Abigail Sessions

See also Document 48

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Sterling, Jeffrey A. (ca. 1967–)

Jeffrey Alexander Sterling is a U.S. lawyer and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who was tried and convicted in January 2015 for violating the Espionage Act. He was convicted on nine felony counts that tied him to the release of classified top secret information relating to a CIA program designed to compromise Iran's nuclear program in the 1990s.

Sterling was born in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, circa 1967 and graduated from Millikin University in Decatur, Illinois, in 1989. Three years later he received a law degree from Washington University and then entered the CIA in May 1993. By 1995 he had become an operations officer in the Iran Task Force, part of the CIA's Near East and South Asia Division. By the late 1990s Sterling was deeply involved in a CIA mission to penetrate Iran's nuclear program, and he was the chief handler of a Russian émigré who was an undercover agent tasked with passing faulty information to Iranian nuclear scientists.

In 2000, Sterling's career with the CIA became rocky after he filed a complaint alleging that his superiors had engaged in racial discrimination. The CIA soon revoked Sterling's top security clearance and in March 2001 put him on administrative leave. Following two failed attempts to reach a settlement with Sterling, the CIA terminated his employment on January 31, 2002. After Sterling decided to take his case to court, a judge dismissed it after determining that it would not be possible to go forward without revealing classified U.S. government information. On appeal, a U.S. district court upheld the dismissal in 2005.

Meanwhile, Sterling was placed under government surveillance. After journalist James Risen published *State of War* in 2006, which revealed numerous CIA activities including the top secret plan to sabotage Iran's nuclear program, the U.S. government began building a case against Sterling, suspecting him as the individual who leaked that information to Risen. In 2003, Sterling had revealed to the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee certain details of the CIA plan, which he alleged was poorly handled and may have actually aided the Iranians' nuclear ambitions. The CIA and federal prosecutors believed that Sterling had divulged the top secret information as payback for his failed discrimination case against the CIA.

Sterling was indicted in December 2010. Federal prosecutors claim that they had detected numerous e-mails and phone records showing that Sterling and Risen were in frequent contact between 2002 and 2004. They did not, however, know what was discussed in those communications, but they claim that because Sterling had been involved in the Iran plot, he must have given information to Risen, who later published it in his 2006 book. Prosecutors demanded that Risen testify, thus revealing his sources, but Risen refused. He took his case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, however, which refused to hear it, meaning that he could either testify or be jailed. In the end, U.S. attorney general Eric Holder said that his prosecutors would go forward with Sterling's case without requiring Risen to testify.

After three days of deliberations, on January 26, 2015, Sterling was convicted of passing government secrets to Risen. The entire case was circumstantial;

prosecutors could not produce any hard evidence proving that Sterling had indeed divulged secrets to Risen. Instead, they argued that Sterling, who is African American, was embittered by his alleged treatment by the CIA and decided to exact revenge by leaking top secret information to Risen. Sterling's lawyers, who said that the whole case was based on suspicion, immediately moved to have the verdict set aside. Failing that, they claimed that they would appeal. The trial, coming as it did on the heels of WikiLeaks and the Edward Snowden affair, demonstrated that the Barack Obama administration was engaged in an unprecedented crackdown on government employees who leak classified information to the public without authorization.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Kiriakou, John; Senate Torture Report; September 11 Attacks; Torture; War on Terror and the CIA

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Stockwell, John R. (1937–)

John R. Stockwell is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who became a critic of U.S. government policies after serving in the CIA for 13 years.

As a U.S. marine, Stockwell was a CIA paramilitary intelligence case officer in three wars: the Congo Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Angolan Civil War. In 1975 he was awarded the CIA Medal of Merit for keeping his post open until the last days of the fall of Saigon in Vietnam. That same year, Stockwell was promoted to the CIA's chief of station and National Security Council coordinator, managing covert activities during the first years of the bloody Angolan War of Independence. Two years later he resigned.

Stockwell testified before several congressional committees, citing deep concerns for the methods and results of CIA paramilitary operations in Third World countries. In 1978 he wrote the exposé *In Search of Enemies*. Stockwell claimed that the CIA was counterproductive to national security and that its "secret wars" provided no benefit for the United States. The book was a detailed insider's account of major CIA covert actions.

In 1978 Stockwell appeared on the popular American television program *60 Minutes* and claimed that CIA director William Colby and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had systematically lied to Congress about the CIA's operations. The U.S. government filed a lawsuit against Stockwell that was eventually dropped. Stockwell is a founding member of Peaceways and ARDIS

(Association for Responsible Dissent), an organization of former CIA and government officials who are openly critical of the CIA's activities.

Jan Goldman

See also Colby, William; Vietnam War, Covert Operations in

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STOPWATCH, Operation

See Berlin Tunnel

STRAGGLE, Operation

Operation STRAGGLE was an abortive, clandestine U.S. effort to overthrow the Syrian government in the fall of 1956. The plan, which was coordinated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), sought to replace the left-leaning Syrian government with a rightist, military-dominated government that would be supported—in part—by the United States. In the end, Operation STRAGGLE had to be aborted before it was set into motion because of the Suez Crisis, which precipitated a brief war between Egypt, Israel, France, and Great Britain.

Throughout the early and mid-1950s, Syria was plagued by great political instability. Several different governments rose and fell in short order, which worried U.S. policy makers, who feared that the Soviets would capitalize on Syrian chaos and bring it into their orbit of influence. By 1956 Syrian conservatives, mainly high-ranking military officers, believed that Syria was moving toward the implementation of a socialist or communist state. Some of these conservatives managed to convince U.S. policy makers of this trend, including U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, his brother Allen Dulles (director of the CIA), and President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In early 1956, rightist Syrian military officers suggested that they could mount a coup against the Syrian government—with U.S. support—and thereafter install a reliable anticommunist government that would be loyal to the United States and Western interests. Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers, who were inclined to use covert operations to achieve political and geostrategic ends, quickly warmed to the idea, and planning for Operation STRAGGLE began in earnest.

The CIA played a key role in the planning of the operation. Its implementation would include not only covert U.S. operatives but also Turkish and British

intelligence operatives. The plan was to foment rebellions in Damascus and other major Syrian cities. Conservative elements within the Syrian Army would then move in to quash the unrest; meanwhile, Syria's borders with Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq would be sealed off to prevent other nations from intervening in the conflict. Once that was accomplished, Syrian Army officers would arrest Syrian government officials and declare a coup d'état. The United States, Great Britain, and other Western countries would then promptly recognize Syria's new government. The CIA not only was engaged in the planning of the operation but also funneled money to Syrian military officers in order to set the plan in motion.

Operation STRAGGLE was scheduled to begin on October 25, 1956; however, it was postponed until October 30. On October 29 Israel invaded Egyptian territory, setting off the Suez Crisis. By then, news of Operation STRAGGLE had been leaked to the Syrian government, and the plan was aborted. U.S. decision makers decided that even if the Syrian government had not been tipped off, the Suez Crisis would have made implementation of the operation impossible. In 1957, the CIA again attempted to arrange a coup in Syria (Operation WAPPEN), but that too had to be scrapped because of news leaks. That aborted mission compelled the Syrian government to place the American embassy under round-the-clock surveillance and also to expel several CIA operatives from the country, restructure the military to limit the power of rightist officers, and eventually expel most Western ambassadors. As a result, the likelihood of a Syrian coup supported by outside interests was greatly diminished. To this day, the United States has been unable to penetrate the Syrian government with force sufficient enough to engineer a change in government.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Dulles, Allen; WAPPEN, Operation

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Swift Project

A secret U.S. government program to trace the financial records of people suspected of having ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Within weeks of the events of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration launched the project, which has come to be known as the Swift Project. It was named after the Brussels banking consortium Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial

Telecommunication (SWIFT). The SWIFT consortium serves as a gatekeeper for electronic transactions among 7,800 international institutions and is owned by a cooperative of more than 2,200 organizations. Every major commercial bank, brokerage house, fund manager, and stock exchange used its services. Because of the top secret nature of the program, precise details, including the date of implementation, are not known precisely.

The Bush administration entrusted the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Treasury Department to set up and run the Swift Project. Legal justification for the implementation of this project was the president's emergency economic powers. American agents used computer programs to wade through huge amounts of sensitive data from the transactions of SWIFT. Treasury officials maintained at the time and since that the Swift Project was exempt from U.S. laws restricting government access to private financial records because the cooperative was classified as a messaging service, not a bank or financial institution. This allowed the U.S. government to track money from bank accounts of suspected terrorists to a source in the United States or elsewhere in the world. It was information of this type that allowed American officials to locate and capture Radwann Isamuiddin Hambali, the operations chief of the Indonesian terrorist group Jemah Islamiyya, in Thailand.

News of the Swift Project became public in 2006 and has been identified with the surveillance of American citizens by the U.S. government. Members of the Bush administration, especially Vice President Dick Cheney, sharply denounced the media's revelation of the program. Despite considerable negative publicity, the Bush administration continued to use the Swift Project to track the financial records of organizations and people suspected of giving money to Al Qaeda.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also September 11 Attacks; War on Terror and the CIA

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TAPJAX, Operation

See AJAX, Operation

Team A–Team B Exercise

The Team A–Team B Exercise, also known as the Team B Exercise, was a 1976 experiment in competitive analysis in which a team of outside experts (Team B) was tasked with evaluating the findings of the 1975 national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Soviet strategic objectives (NIE 11-3/8) produced by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts (Team A). This exercise generated significant controversy between opposing views of Soviet capabilities and intentions.

The roots for this experiment stemmed from Albert Wohlstetter, a professor at the University of Chicago. In his foreign policy article titled “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” he accused the CIA of underestimating Soviet missile deployment.

Conservatives, who viewed the Soviet Union as a greater threat, began attacking the CIA’s analysis. This led the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) of the Gerald Ford administration to ask the CIA to approve a comparative assessment of Soviet capabilities in past NIEs. CIA director William Colby denied the request. In 1976 George H. W. Bush became the director of the CIA, and the PFIAB made another request, which Bush approved.

Team B consisted of three teams, each focusing on a specific topic that included Soviet low-altitude air defense, Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile accuracy, and Soviet strategic policy and objectives. It was the third team mentioned that generated the most controversy. Team B members included Professor Richard Pipes, Professor William Van Cleave, Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, Dr. Thomas Wolfe, General John Vogt, Ambassador Foy Kohler, the Honorable Paul Nitze, Ambassador Seymour Weiss, Major General Jasper Welch, and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz.

The Team B report, declassified in 1992, found that the CIA’s NIEs misperceived the Soviet threat due to a reliance on “hard” data, not taking into consideration the “soft” data concerning Soviet concepts. The report claimed that this caused the CIA analysts to fall into a cognitive trap called “mirror-imaging,” meaning a tendency for an analyst to assume that the opposition thinks and reacts like himself. The findings of Team B tended to greatly escalate the threat of the Soviet Union.

The report had a significant impact on the public. Conservative hawks used the report to fuel the idea that if the United States did not start rearming, the Soviet Union would surpass it in nuclear ability. This was later called the “window of vulnerability” and led to a massive arms build-up in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Team B Exercise has also received a large amount of criticism, with skeptics stating that most, if not all, of its findings turned out to be wrong. In 1978, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated that the report was completely inaccurate and significantly overestimated Soviet capabilities.

Ryan Connoles

See also Colby, William

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Tenet, George (1953–)

George John Tenet was a career U.S. government employee, intelligence officer, and director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1997–2004 who was heavily involved in the war in Afghanistan in 2001 (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) and the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). Born on January 5, 1953, in Flushing, New York, Tenet was raised in Little Neck, Queens, New York, and earned a bachelor’s degree in 1976 from Georgetown University in international relations. He received a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs in 1978.

Tenet began work in the U.S. Senate in 1982 on various staffs, including that of Pennsylvania senator John L. Heinz III. From 1985 to 1988, Tenet was a staff member for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and then served as its staff director from 1988 to 1993. That same year, he was tapped to serve on newly elected President William J. Clinton’s national security transition team. From 1993 to 1995, Tenet served the Clinton White House as the National Security Council’s senior director for intelligence programs. In July 1995 Tenet began serving as deputy director of the CIA, a post he held until he was nominated and confirmed as the CIA director in 1997. Although tradition has usually seen the CIA director replaced with the advent of a new presidential administration, in 2001 the incoming George W. Bush administration opted to keep Tenet in that post.

Tenet and the CIA had become aware of potential terrorist plots to attack the United States before September 11, 2001, especially by the militant organization known as Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Despite his knowledge of such threats, Tenet was unsuccessful in his attempts to have either the Clinton or Bush administrations take concrete action against such groups. Following the

September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, many observers blamed the failure to avert the attacks on the CIA.

In October 2001, an international force led by the United States launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan with the goal of capturing bin Laden, destroying the Al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the September 11 attacks, and removing the Taliban regime, a fundamentalist Muslim government in control of Afghanistan that had refused U.S. demands to move against Al Qaeda.

Tenet's CIA played a large role in the operational control of the war in Afghanistan. While largely successful in bringing down the Taliban and reducing the capabilities of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Tenet and the CIA were criticized for not capturing bin Laden. Tenet was also accused of authorizing torture as part of U.S. interrogation methods of captured Al Qaeda members during the conflict. Although the CIA admitted the use of harsh interrogation techniques, Tenet denied any allegations that the CIA had authorized torture. Many American law experts disagreed with the CIA, however, and stated that the techniques did amount to torture.

The Bush administration, meanwhile, became increasingly concerned about Iraq's capability to produce and deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Tenet repeatedly attempted to convince Bush of the vast means available to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to attack his own people, neighboring countries, and other Iraqi enemies, such as the United States, with WMD. In an exchange depicted in Bob Woodward's 2004 book *Plan of Attack*, Tenet persuaded Bush that he could convince the American people about the threat of WMD. Indeed, Tenet described the case regarding Iraq's possession of such weapons as a "slam dunk." Many observers have harshly criticized Tenet over the use of that phrase. Tenet has since stated that the term was taken out of context and that the words had "nothing to do with the president's decision to send American troops into Iraq." Tenet affirms that the decision to do so had already been made.

The apparent absence of WMD in Iraq, which had been the initial and primary motivating factor in the invasion of Iraq, deeply embarrassed the Bush administration. As the insurgency in Iraq began by late 2003, legions of critics pointed to the glaring miscalculation of the presence of WMD. This in turn seemed to feed the growing antiwar faction, both in Congress and among the general public. Under increasing fire, Tenet tendered his resignation as CIA director on June 3, 2004, citing "personal reasons" for his decision. He then went to work for a British defense technology company. Tenet has also served on several corporate boards, and in 2008 he became a managing director for Allen & Company, an investment firm.

On December 14, 2004, President Bush awarded Tenet the Presidential Medal of Freedom, which only stirred up more controversy. In April 2007, Tenet released his book *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*. In it, he unsurprisingly attempted to polish his image and also accused the Bush White House of having misconstrued his counsel as well as prewar intelligence. The book, however, has been sharply criticized by those inside and outside of the intelligence establishment, who claim that the former director played fast and loose with the facts.

Gregory W. Morgan and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Afghanistan; September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of; Weapons of Mass Destruction; Document 98

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Third Arab-Israeli War

See Six-Day War

303 Committee

The 303 Committee was the name given to the interagency Special Group during President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. The Special Group was the interagency government committee in charge of covert operations.

Covert operations authorized by the Special Group fell into two categories. The first type of covert operations was focused on intelligence collection. The second type focused on covert action—the process of attempting to influence and direct the internal affairs of foreign countries.

Before the Special Group was formally created, the function of directing covert operations was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) Luncheon Group. The OCB Luncheon Group consisted of members from various departments of the government whose purview touched on foreign policy. According to one commentator, during the days of the OCB Luncheon Group, the subject of intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign countries leading to actual covert operations was the subject of lunchtime discussion by a casually assembled group of experts.

President Dwight Eisenhower authorized during his second term the creation of the Special Group to provide a higher degree of control to covert operations than the informal structure provided by the OCB arrangement. The members of the Special Group included the president's assistant for national security, the deputy secretary of defense, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During Eisenhower's presidency the Special Group was known as the 54/12 Group, after the presidential directive that created it. During Johnson's presidency, the Special Group was known as the 303 Committee, after the room number in the Executive Office Building where it met. At the beginning of Richard M. Nixon's administration, a memo originating from the 303 Committee concerning consideration of covert action in Greece was leaked to the *Washington Post*. This action

led the 303 Committee to be renamed the 40 Committee, this time taking its name from the serial number of the document that outlines its members and their responsibilities.

Prior to 1974, the Special Group was able to authorize covert action across the globe with minimal oversight from Congress. In 1974 in response to the perception that the CIA's operations abroad and domestically were becoming excessive and clouded by executive defenses of plausible deniability, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, that required disclosure of planned covert operations to certain committees in Congress.

John Newman

See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hughes-Ryan Amendment; Documents 36, 37

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Tibet

A provincial-level administrative region of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1951, officially known as the Xizang Autonomous Region, with the capital at Lhasa. Tibet covers an area of 461,700 square miles and is located in southwestern China. It is bordered on the south by Myanmar, India, Bhutan, and Nepal; on the west by India; and on the east and north by the PRC. Tibet had a 1945 population of some 4–5 million people.

With the introduction of Indian Buddhism in the 7th century, Tibet grew into an independent theocracy. In the 17th century, the Yellow Hat sect gained supremacy and practiced Lamaism, a hierarchical organization of Tibetan Buddhist monks (lamas). Atop the hierarchy was the Dalai Lama, both the spiritual and political head of Tibetans. Just below him was the Panchen Lama.

Isolated Tibet was forced to open itself to the world in 1904 by the British, who sought to secure a trade route to China and erect a buffer against Russian expansion into British India, bordering on the south of Tibet. In 1907 Britain, Russia, and

China agreed on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and pledged noninterference in Tibetan affairs. Tibet declared its independence in late 1911 after the overthrow of China's ruling Qing dynasty. Although the two post-Qing successors, the nationalist Chinese (1912–1949) and the Chinese communists since 1949, refused to acknowledge Tibetan independence, Tibet's resumption of Lamaism remained undisturbed, strengthening Tibetans' visions of lasting independence.

A year after the PRC's birth in October 1949, Chinese communist leaders sent 80,000 troops into Tibet in October 1950. Unable to defend his people, the 14th Dalai Lama unsuccessfully appealed to the United Nations (UN), the United States, Britain, and India for assistance. In May 1951, the Tibetan government reluctantly accepted the PRC's 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, which instituted a joint Chinese-Tibetan authority. This promised Tibetans apparent autonomy.

To modernize and continue the socialist revolution, during the early 1950s PRC officials implemented a number of measures that brought Tibetan autonomy into question. These modernization efforts included land reform, heavy industrialization, the introduction of secular education, the opening of Tibet through construction of nationwide communication networks, and a purge of anti-PRC officials. Tibetans found these measures antithetical to their traditional practices of feudalism and socioeconomic simplicity and threatening to Tibetan homogeneity. Tibetans, who considered themselves a unique race, responded with a series of anti-Chinese revolts, transforming the Tibet question into an interethnic dispute between Tibetans and the Han Chinese.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capitalized on Tibetan disaffection to advance American strategic interests. In early 1956, the CIA began to provide military training to Tibetan rebels. In autumn 1957, the CIA launched a covert operation by air-dropping into Tibet U.S.-trained Tibetan rebels along with American-made weapons and radios. This Tibetan-CIA operation led to a full-scale rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959. Chinese leaders deployed 40,000 troops to put down the rebellion, resulting in nearly 8,700 Tibetan deaths and the exile of the Dalai Lama to India. To resolve the Tibet question, the PRC named the 10th Panchen Lama as Tibet's acting head while concurrently preparing Tibet as an autonomous administrative region. In 1965, the PRC replaced Tibet's theocracy with a Chinese communist administration, making it an Autonomous Region.

With CIA assistance, the Dalai Lama and 80,000 followers settled in northern India, where they founded the Government of Tibet in Exile at Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama internationalized the Tibet question by appealing to the UN, successfully securing two Tibet resolutions in 1961 and 1965 denouncing the PRC's violation of human rights in the March 1959 rebellion. Since then the Dalai Lama has pursued an active posture in international affairs, championing Tibet's independence and self-determination, human rights, and peace and freedom.

After 1959, the Americans reversed their previous indifference to the Tibet question and publicly supported Tibetan independence. The CIA remained active in Tibet chiefly in intelligence gathering, especially concerning the PRC's nuclear program in neighboring Xinjiang Province. In Tibet the anti-Chinese movement



This Tibetan mother and child were among refugees waiting for ferry transportation across the Brahmaputra River near Tezpur, in the Assam area of India on November 20, 1962. Before the Chinese cease-fire proposal, invading Chinese communist troops had pushed back Indian defenders who evacuated civilians from northern border areas. (AP Photo)

continued after the 1959 rebellion, and the PRC has responded with periodic crackdowns. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) marked the low point of the Tibetan-Chinese relationship, during which religious practices were condemned, monasteries were destroyed, and monks and nuns were persecuted. This triggered a massive exodus of Tibetans to India, Nepal, and Bhutan.

Two breakthroughs regarding the Tibet question were realized in the 1970s. First, to facilitate the Sino-American rapprochement, the CIA diminished its assistance to Tibetan rebels beginning in 1969. This ended altogether in 1974. Shortly before the establishment of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations, in 1978 the U.S. government recognized Tibet as part of China, thus reducing the issue to an internal Chinese affair. Second, PRC leaders moderated their policy toward Tibet after 1976. On the one hand, the government implemented a number of reforms to modernize Tibet, intending to win Tibetans' approval by raising their living standards. To curb Tibetan rebels, the PRC allowed a certain degree of religious freedom while also relocating huge numbers of Han Chinese to Tibet, intending to keep Tibetans under control through assimilation. The Tibetan cause attracted support and publicity from a number of international celebrities, such as the

American movie star Richard Gere. In the 1990s, a dramatic dispute over which of two young boys was the rightful candidate to succeed as Panchen Lama, the second most influential Tibetan Buddhist figure, damaged Sino-Tibetan relations.

On the other hand, the PRC signaled its willingness to resolve the Tibet question with the Tibetan government in exile. Negotiations between the PRC and the Dalai Lama's exiled government began in 1979 but broke off in 1988 due to irreconcilable differences. In the early 21st century, the Tibet question remained unresolved.

Debbie Yuk-fun Law

See also Cold War and the CIA

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Top Hat

Top Hat was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) code name given to the spy General Dmitri Polyakov (1921–1988), a high-ranking officer in the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (GRU), the Soviet Union's military intelligence agency. Polyakov was called the “jewel in the crown” of the secret agents recruited by the CIA during the Cold War. He was executed by the Soviet Union for treason in 1988.

Polyakov was born in the Ukraine in 1921. During World War II he was a decorated artillery officer. After the war, he accepted employment with the GRU as a spy.

Early in his military career, Polyakov was assigned to the Soviet mission to the United Nations (UN) in New York, where he directed Soviet espionage activities using the UN as cover. During his second tour in New York in 1961, he approached the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and offered to change sides. Over the next 30 years, Polyakov's briefing transcripts and photocopies of secret documents would fill 25 drawers at the CIA.

The extensive list of information provided by Polyakov included the identity of moles Frank Bossard, a researcher in guided missile technology, and Jack Dunlop, a courier for the National Security Agency. Polyakov provided the crucial documents that allowed the CIA to predict the Sino-Soviet split. He also supplied information on more than 5,000 Soviet programs that were using Western technology to improve Soviet military capabilities, including technical data on Soviet antitank missiles that allowed U.S. forces to defeat those missiles in the Persian Gulf War.

in 1991. Further intelligence offered by Polyakov consisted of more than 100 issues of classified Soviet strategic journals detailing potential Soviet strategies in a war with the West.

During his relationship with the CIA, Polyakov refused to accept more than \$3,000 a year, and even that amount usually took the form of power tools, shotguns, or fishing gear. He maintained that he was providing the intelligence to benefit the Soviet Union, not the United States. Polyakov considered himself a Russian patriot and had grown disillusioned with the corruption of the Soviet system.

In January 1990 the Soviet state-controlled newspaper *Pravda* reported that Polyakov had been arrested and executed. Initially the CIA attributed his arrest to several references to his existence in the U.S. press over the years that permitted the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) to piece together his identity. Other analysts believed that the publicity surrounding his execution was intended to mask Soviet shortcomings in Lithuania and Azerbaijan and to serve as a warning to the West not to take advantage of the Soviets during this troubled time. However, eventually the FBI determined that information about Polyakov's activities was sold to the Soviets by Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Hazen Ames.

Operation TOP HAT was a research project at Fort McClellan, Alabama, in September 1953 involving the deliberate exposure of U.S. Army Chemical Corps personnel to biological and chemical warfare agents, including mustard and nerve gases. The goal of the research was to test the effectiveness of decontamination procedures. Operation TOP HAT was a U.S. Army experiment and involved neither the CIA nor Polyakov.

John Newman

See also Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Paramilitary Operations, Covert

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Tora Bora

Tora Bora is a mountainous and geographically remote region of eastern Afghanistan located directly north of the Afghan-Pakistani border running more than 15 miles through the White Mountains. Tora Bora means “black dust.” Although Tora Bora formally denotes a region of Afghanistan, it is commonly associated with the fortified cave complex used by mujahideen fighters in the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and by Al Qaeda and the Taliban during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001.

An area with a largely undocumented military history, the Tora Bora region possesses ties to unconventional military forces dating back to the early 1900s. The poorly developed infrastructure and complex logistical supply chains leading to

the region offered guerrilla forces refuge from direct action. The geographic effectiveness of Tora Bora, an area with peaks in excess of 14,000 feet, was heightened by its immediate proximity to neighboring Pakistan.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contributed substantially to the fortification and militarization of Tora Bora. Contributing matériel, weapons, and advisory services, the CIA used Tora Bora as a training and logistics hub. The remoteness of this region enhanced the ability to train, equip, and deploy forces outside of Soviet-controlled areas. Tora Bora also served the mujahideen throughout the Soviet occupation and remained uncompromised throughout the Soviet withdrawal.

In the 1990s, Tora Bora again became an area of significance as the Taliban turned the military complex there into a training and housing area for jihadists. Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born leader of Al Qaeda, also used Tora Bora as a training camp and base of operations. Although it was connected to many terrorist acts throughout the 1990s, Tora Bora escaped direct action until 1998. In reprisal for the August 7, 1998, U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, which had been perpetrated by Al Qaeda, President William J. Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against alleged terrorist camps in Tora Bora. These strikes were part of Operation INFINITE REACH (August 28, 1998), which witnessed the bombing of both Tora Bora and targets in Sudan. However, the operation resulted in only limited tangible impact to camp operations in Tora Bora.

These actions aside, the December 2001 pitched battle between the U.S.-led coalition forces and the combined Taliban and Al Qaeda forces will likely define Tora Bora's history for the foreseeable future. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush deployed military forces to Afghanistan in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Beginning in November 2001, coalition forces destroyed Taliban and Al Qaeda units throughout Afghanistan in all but the most remote regions. As part of a final effort to avoid annihilation or surrender, Taliban and Al Qaeda forces understandably converged on the Tora Bora region.

Supported by substantial airpower that relied heavily on precision-guided weapons, the U.S.-led coalition conducted military action against the units defending Tora Bora for much of December 2001. With the assistance of Afghan troops, U.S. special operations forces led a focused and decisive campaign against the Tora Bora defenders. In less than two weeks, the coalition had secured the Al Qaeda complex and surrounding areas. Bin Laden, however, was not found and remained at large until he was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs on May 1, 2011, in Pakistan.

Former CIA officer Gary Berntsen, who had charge of the CIA effort to capture or kill bin Laden, claimed in his book *Jawbreaker* (2005) that his group had pinpointed bin Laden's location in Tora Bora and that had the military personnel he requested, who were available, been committed, bin Laden would not have escaped.

The U.S. operations against Tora Bora represented the first effective integration of precision airpower in support of special operations forces in a full-scale and independent military operation. Most analysts agree that the decision to rely heavily on poorly trained and inadequately equipped Afghan allies rather than committing

larger numbers of U.S. special operations forces permitted the Al Qaeda leadership to escape. This called into question the feasibility of combined operations by advanced Western military forces with partners in the developing world. Finally, questions remain about the feasibility of conducting direct action against an enemy that lacks both a geographic and a political epicenter.

Scott Blanchette

See also Afghanistan; Osama bin Laden, Killing of; September 11 Attacks

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Torricelli Principle

See Deutch Rules

Torture

Throughout human history, torture has been used as a tool for extracting information through interrogation, for coercive purposes, and as a punishment for the commission of crimes. Torture has been employed by religious organizations and has sometimes been sponsored and condoned by various governments. In 1987 the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) came into existence, which contained a comprehensive definition of torture. Article 1 of UNCAT defined torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” The definition did not include pain or suffering arising only from or related to lawful sanctions.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has experimented with and used torture tactics throughout its history. In the 1950s, the CIA experimented in part with torture in what was known as Operation ARTICHOKE. Operation ARTICHOKE was a

secret CIA operation concerning interrogation tactics that focused on the potential use of biological warfare weapons, hypnosis, drugs, brainwashing, and torture on humans to gain accurate intelligence from enemy detainees. This operation was carried out by the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence.

In recent times, the CIA has utilized torture in its program of rendition. Rendition was not actively in use until the rise of terrorism in the early 1990s. The program has been an arguably successful but controversial means of fighting terrorism, and Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have approved it.

There are two forms of rendition: ordinary rendition and extraordinary rendition. Ordinary rendition arises when a terrorist suspect is captured by a foreign nation and then turned over to U.S. custody. The suspect is then either transported to U.S. soil or held at a foreign location for interrogation. The other form of rendition is extraordinary rendition, which involves the turning over of suspected terrorists to a third-party nation for detainment and interrogation. In most cases, the suspect is wanted by the third-party nation for past crimes or offenses. Typically, extraordinary rendition involves the seizure of those suspected of involvement in or collaboration with terrorism and sending them to certain third-party nations that practice torture for interrogation. For all renditions, the CIA usually uses paramilitary officers organized into teams under a CIA handler's supervision.

In 1996 Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA's Alec Station, created guidelines for a new rendition program, which he ran for 40 months. Scheuer's new program was approved by President Clinton. The purpose of the new rendition program was to dismantle and disrupt the Al Qaeda terrorist network and detain those suspected of terrorism. The Clinton administration did not want suspected terrorists brought to U.S. soil where, the administration believed, the U.S. legal system gave them too much protection, so the CIA focused on terrorist suspects wanted for crimes in third-party nations. Early on in the rendition program most suspected terrorists were taken to Egypt, where harsher methods such as torture were condoned and used in interrogations.

The CIA has been cautious about using rendition due to the negative perception that it generates. Although the program has been arguably effective, there is always the possibility that the intelligence extracted has been tainted by the use of torture. In addition, international laws prohibit the forced return of suspects, regardless of their crimes, to foreign nations where they would be mistreated or tortured. Rendition critics usually refer to the program as torture by proxy. Scheuer claims that he warned CIA lawyers and policy makers about the potential dangers of handing over terrorist suspects to foreign nations that practice torture.

Despite the criticism, the CIA justifies the rendition program by contending that when allied nations have intelligence on terrorists that cannot be utilized in a court of law, rendition is the only means to neutralize such terrorists. Although rendition was infrequently used in the Clinton administration, its use became much more frequent in George W. Bush's administration in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

In response, Italian, German, Swedish, and other European nations were reported to be investigating whether the CIA broke foreign local laws by seizing terrorist suspects on European soil and transporting them to countries sympathetic

to torture, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan. Swedish authorities have claimed that at least one plane linked to the CIA landed in France twice between 2002 and 2005 and also that planes landed in Sweden three times since 2002. Furthermore, on December 1, 2005, *The Guardian* reported that navigation logs showed that more than 300 CIA-operated flights had passed through European airports as part of a network potentially linked to the rendition program and the possible torture of suspected terrorists.

Andrew Green

See also ARTICHOKE, Operation; Documents 75, 88, 91, 92, 98

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Tower Commission

The Tower Commission was formed in 1986 to investigate the Iran-Contra Affair. In the early and mid-1980s, a conservative group of rebels called the Contras in the nation of Nicaragua had been attempting to overthrow the socialist Sandinista government. During this time period, the United States, under the Ronald Reagan administration, engaged in various activities to support the Contras, which included the provision of funding, arms, and military advisers. The two primary officials involved in this support were Vice Admiral John Poindexter and Lieutenant Oliver North of the National Security Council, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, it came to light that the Contras had engaged in numerous acts of kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder while conducting a campaign of terror against the civilian population. Furthermore, it was revealed that the CIA had been mining Nicaraguan harbors, which was an act of war, and had been publishing a comic book manual to teach the Contras how to murder local politicians and take control of villages.

As a result of the outrage and public outcry against American support, Congress enacted what is known as the Boland Amendment, a series of laws enacted from 1982 to 1984 that prohibited the funding of the Contras. At this time, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ruled Iran, and sales of arms to Iran by the United States was prohibited. Also at this time, several extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East were holding hostages from Western nations.

As a result of the prohibition, North and Poindexter, with the help of the CIA, started to circumvent the Boland Amendment and continue providing support for the Contras through secret means. However, the resources available for this

purpose were limited. Accordingly, a search for other sources of covert assistance for the Contras was begun.

Concurrent with this situation was the problem of hostages in the Middle East. A number of Islamic groups with ties to Iran, including Hezbollah, had been engaged in taking hostages from Western countries in Beirut and other locations. During this time, Israeli intelligence notified the National Security Administration that an exchange of weapons for the hostages might be arranged. As a result, North began to engage in negotiations with Iran through intermediaries for the release of hostages in exchange for hundreds of advanced TOW (antitank) missiles and the payment of millions of dollars. The actual transfer of the weapons and the funds was handled by the CIA through intermediaries with the assistance of Israel. The transfers met with some success, and some hostages were released.

During the mid-1980s, these two situations came together. A plan was created to continue the sale of weapons to Iran for hostages and funds and then use the profits from the sale of weapons to fund the Contras. North estimated that the sale would net \$12 million for the Contras. The plan called for the establishment of secret bases in El Salvador, which bordered Nicaragua, by the CIA through which support could be channeled.

Initially, the plan appeared to be working. However, the situation began to unravel when several mishaps occurred that revealed the plan. One of the middle men in the arms transfer had apparently cheated Iran and was threatening to expose the deal. Also, a CIA contact operative was captured when one of the resupply flights to the Contras was shot down in Nicaragua. Under questioning, the CIA contract operative admitted the CIA's involvement. With these fiascos, what was subsequently known as the Iran-Contra Affair became public knowledge.

The political fallout was immediate. On October 25, 1986, President Reagan ordered the creation of a Special Review Board, which was subsequently known as the Tower Commission, to investigate the matter. The commission consisted of Senator John Tower, former secretary of state Edmund Muskie, and former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

During the course of the investigation by the Tower Commission, several other investigations were being conducted simultaneously by other government agencies. The investigation was seriously impeded by the shredding of thousands of documents of North, Poindexter, and other Reagan administration officials. The final report of the Tower Commission was delivered on February 26, 1987. Throughout the commission's report there were numerous references to how the CIA assisted and facilitated the events. North testified that he thought he saw Poindexter shred a presidential order authorizing the participation of the CIA in the affair. Although the president was heavily criticized for allowing the events to occur and continue, the Tower Commission failed to find that the president had any actual knowledge of or ordered the actions, despite subsequent information revealed in various books.

As a result of the Tower Commission's investigation, 14 officials of the Reagan administration, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, were indicted for various crimes. Eleven of them were convicted, with some of the convictions reversed on appeal and others pardoned by the next president, George H. W. Bush.

Interestingly, some of the persons who were indicted and/or convicted and pardoned were subsequently given positions in succeeding presidential administrations.

In May 1985 according to the commission, White House officials were “actively involved” in the CIA’s preparation of a document known as a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which concluded that the Soviet Union was in a position to capitalize on the instability of the Tehran regime after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Although the Tower Commission report does not mention his name in connection with the document, Senior Intelligence Analyst Robert Gates, who would later become director of the CIA, at the time was primarily responsible for all intelligence estimates produced by the CIA.

According to the Tower Commission, the CIA permitted the views of White House policy makers to influence the judgment of the agency professionals who prepared the report. Under normal procedures, intelligence reports are the raw material from which policy decisions are made, and the policy makers have no role in preparing them.

In addition, the commission noted that the intelligence report contains what it described as “the hint that the United States should change its existing policy and encourage its allies to provide arms to Iran.” Intelligence estimates prepared by the CIA usually make no policy recommendations.

This mixture of policy and intelligence functions, which normally is prohibited, was viewed with alarm by the Tower Commission. The report states that “It is critical that the line between intelligence and advocacy of a particular policy be preserved if intelligence is to retain its integrity and perform its proper function.” The report also states that “In this instance, the CIA came close enough to the line to warrant concern.”

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Church Committee; Contras; Iran-Contra Affair; Rockefeller Commission; Document 62

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TRACK TWO, Operation (1970–)

Operation TRACK TWO was a U.S. government operation carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow Chilean president Salvador Allende Gossens. Allende had sought the presidency of Chile four times, and finally in

September 1970 he won election with a narrow 36 percent majority. He represented a left-wing coalition, the Alliance of Popular Liberty, and introduced procedures to convert Chile into a socialist state, the first attempt to establish a Marxist nation in South America. Allende's election concerned President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, who viewed Allende's electoral victory as a geopolitical move by the Soviets and wanted Allende removed from power due to his left-wing policies. At the time, Operation TRACK TWO was compared to the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco.

During the 1970 Chilean election, Chilean Army chief of staff Rene Schneider, along with the Chilean parliamentary opposition, gave Allende his support. In addition to implementing a clandestine economic policy aimed at destabilizing the Chilean government, Nixon and Kissinger decided that Schneider should be kidnapped, believing that this would in turn lead to a coup. A coup would then leave General Augusto Pinochet—Nixon and Kissinger's preferred military leader—in power. These plans to end communism in Chile were to be carried out by the CIA in an operation code-named Operation TRACK TWO.

Unknown to Edward Korrey, U.S. ambassador to Chile, who believed that Allende posed no threat to the United States, CIA operatives in Santiago were ordered to overthrow Allende and ensure that any links to the U.S. government were hidden. Colonel Paul Wimert, a U.S. military envoy, assembled a hit squad among Chile's right-wing army officers to carry out the coup, including General Roberto Viaux. Kissinger later claimed that he ordered the hit squad to abort Operation TRACK TWO on October 15, 1970, but the following day the CIA faxed orders to its operatives in Santiago maintaining the overthrow of Allende in a coup.

Weapons and ammunition were delivered by diplomatic pouch to Santiago on October 19, 1970, and on October 22 Schneider was killed. The Chilean hit squad was compensated with \$250,000 given to Wimert for the killing. Nixon and Kissinger's plan misfired, mainly due to Allende's army support and the rise of the opposition Christian Democratic Party. However, the U.S. government's policy on Allende's presidency remained unchanged, and for several years following Schneider's death the U.S. government arranged economic chaos and social disorder among Chilean citizens.

In September 1973 with CIA support, General Pinochet seized power and attacked Allende's presidential palace with bombs, rockets, and tanks. Allende, however, refused to resign and was supported by the police and the presidential guard. Although Allende held out against the attack for two hours, his palace was eventually set ablaze around him. He eventually died in his palace by suicide according to his personal surgeon, Dr. Patricio Guijon Klein. However, other sources claim that Allende was murdered by Pinochet's soldiers. With strong support from high-level Catholic Church officials, conservative politicians, and army generals headed by Pinochet, law and order were restored to the streets of Santiago.

General Pinochet then became the new Chilean president, but his administration was marred by human rights violations. The United States and other Western powers, however, viewed Pinochet as Chile's savior. In June 1976 Kissinger visited Chile to speak at a conference on Chile's human rights violations. Kissinger spoke

with Pinochet privately, revealing that he was required to take a public stand on human rights violations that would appease the U.S. Congress. Kissinger did this so that the level of U.S. aid to Chile under Pinochet's administration would remain uncut.

Andrew Green

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Bay of Pigs Invasion; Chile; Documents 45–47

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V

Vietnam War, Covert Operations in (1960–1963)

Vietnamese individuals recruited and contracted as intelligence agents by the South Vietnamese government from 1960 to 1963 were trained, equipped, and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct covert intelligence operations inside North Vietnam. The concept of this operation, as retired U.S. Army major general John Singlaub testified, was “to introduce these intelligence assets into North Vietnam to perform basically three missions. First, was to collect positive intelligence on the North Vietnamese in North Vietnam. The second was to conduct limited and very specific sabotage activities. And finally their mission would be to become a cadre for a resistance operation against the North Vietnamese communist regime.”

In January 1964, President Lyndon Johnson approved a plan to employ covert operations to put pressure on North Vietnam to reduce its ability to conduct war in South Vietnam. The covert action programs during the Vietnam War were known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A and included unconventional warfare operations north of the 17th Parallel as well as in Cambodia, Laos, and China. The covert actions also included psychological operations and direct-assault missions and raids on economic and strategic targets in North Vietnam. Responsibility for the conduct of these operations transferred from the CIA to the Department of Defense (DOD) in January, 1964, when the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Special Operations Group (MACVSOG) was formed.

Despite signs that several of the teams were compromised and captured, the DOD continued the operations. It is estimated that between the spring of 1964 and October 1967, MACVSOG lost 240 more agents inside North Vietnam and scores of agents in adjacent Laos and Cambodia. None were released from North Vietnamese prison camps or reeducation centers in 1973 when known American prisoners were repatriated under the terms of the Paris Peace Accords.

Later, MACVSOG became known as the Studies and Observation Group (SOG). SOG was a joint service of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps and operated as an unconventional warfare task force. The official mission of SOG was to evaluate the success of the military adviser program in South Vietnam. In truth, this mission was a cover for highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia. SOG was under the direction of the special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1966 more than 2,000 Americans served in SOG, most of them U.S. Army special forces, personnel from the U.S. Air Force 9th Special Operations Wing,

Navy SEALs, and Marines Force Recon or from some 8,000 South Vietnamese and Montagnard troops. MACV-SOG's area of responsibility included Burma, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the southern provinces of China, including Hainan Island. SOG was divided into several groups, each with a special mission.

The Maritime Studies Group (OPLAN 37) conducted commando raids along North Vietnam's coast and the Mekong Delta, including involvement in the Tonkin Gulf Incident. In the summer of 1964, OPLAN 37 began to conduct raids on the North Vietnamese coast as a part of the Johnson administration's program to gradually increase pressure on North Vietnam. The raids employed South Vietnamese PT boats along the coast, with the United States providing logistical support. In retaliation, North Vietnam attacked the destroyer *Maddox* with torpedo boats on August 2, 1964, in the midst of another series of covert action missions known as DE SOTO. Operation DE SOTO called for U.S. Navy vessels to run close to the North Vietnamese coast to locate and evaluate onshore radar and to collect electronic intelligence. The attack on the *Maddox* forced Johnson to ask Congress for a resolution in support of his Southeast Asia policy. On August 7 Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The Air Studies Group (OPLAN 32, OPLAN 34) specialized in dropping and recovering special intelligence teams into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam; providing close air support to other SOG units on the ground; and conducting combat search-and-rescue missions. The Psychological Studies Group (OPLAN 39) conducted psychological warfare operations against North Vietnam.

The biggest of these units was the Ground Studies Group (OPLAN 35), which carried out the largest variety of missions, including ambushes, raids, tracking of prisoners of war, assassinations, kidnappings, search-and-rescue missions, and long-range reconnaissance patrols, especially in Laos and later in Cambodia. OPLAN 35 teams conducted their first missions in 1966. Over the following six years, small teams from OPLAN 35 conducted hundreds of classified missions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. As the strategic importance of the trail grew, MACV increased operations to interdict the flow of men, weapons, and supplies. OPLAN 35 expanded dramatically to become MACV-SOG's largest operational section. The primary mission of OPLAN 35 had been to identify targets and call in air strikes, with typical targets including equipment and vehicles, troop concentrations, and roads and bypasses. The highly trained and motivated teams soon began to carry out a variety of other activities, however, with new missions including direct attacks on North Vietnamese Army storage facilities and other targets in addition to laying mines.

In 1967 SOG reorganized its ground strike elements into three field commands: Command and Control North in Da Nang, responsible for special unconventional warfare missions into Laos and North Vietnam; Command and Control Center in Kontum, responsible for classified unconventional warfare operations in the triborder region of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam; and Command and Control South in Ban Me Thout, responsible for clandestine unconventional warfare mis-

sions inside the Viet Cong–dominated area in South Vietnam and Cambodia. MACV-SOG was deactivated on April 30, 1972.

Tal Tov

See also PHOENIX Program; Documents 34, 93

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W

WAPPEN, Operation (1957)

Operation WAPPEN was a failed attempt by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in August 1957 to install a friendly government in Syria. In February 1954, Syrian president Adib Shishakli was overthrown by the Baath Party working in conjunction with the Syrian Communist Party. While president, Shishakli sought friendly relations with the West, permitting Syria to receive both military and financial aid from the U.S. government. He was open to the idea of resettling a significant number of Palestinian refugees within Syrian borders and also appeared to be receptive to Washington on the subject of a peace treaty with Israel. Before a final agreement could be reached between Washington and Shishakli, he was overthrown in a bloodless coup and forced to flee the country into Lebanon.

With Shishakli removed, Washington began to fear a rising Soviet influence in Syria. Shishakli had been active in suppressing communist demonstrations and keeping the Syrian Communist Party in check. Soon after his removal the Syrian public elected the first Communist Party deputy in the Arab world, and Syria's political stance became increasingly anti-West. By June 1956, Washington confirmed that the Soviet Union was pouring arms and tanks into Syria, raising serious concerns that the Syrians planned to make airfields and other military bases available for Soviet occupation.

In 1957 Washington was able to confirm the presence of 24 Soviet fighter jets, 130 Soviet tanks, and approximately 100 Soviet technicians within Syria. That summer the Syrian defense minister signed a \$500 grain-for-weapons deal in Moscow. Washington began to fear more and more that Syria was becoming the Soviet Union's focal point in the Middle East. Days after the grain-for-weapons agreement, Operation WAPPEN was authorized.

Howard Stone, an architect behind an earlier CIA coup in Iran, was dispatched to Damascus to serve as the new station chief. He had been laying the groundwork for a Syrian coup for several months prior to Operation WAPPEN's formal authorization. Stone promised millions of dollars and positions of power in a new Syrian government to attract officers in the Syria Army. Shishakli assured the CIA that he was ready to reclaim power.

The coup did not occur as planned. Several of the officers whom Stone had approached reported the plan to their superiors. Abdul Hamid Serraj, the chief of the Syrian intelligence service, responded quickly. Stone's would-be revolutionaries accepted his money and then went on television and announced that they had been paid by Americans to overthrow the government. Serraj ordered the army to surround the American embassy and had Stone arrested. During interrogation, Stone confessed

his involvement in the plot and revealed everything he knew. He was denounced as an American spy posing as a diplomat and expelled from Syria. Stone was the first American diplomat to be expelled from an Arab nation. Washington's public response was to characterize the Syrian accusations as baseless and deny any involvement on the part of the United States. Additionally, Washington expelled the Syrian ambassador. Shishakli was sentenced to death in absentia for his involvement.

On the heels of the failed operation, Washington considered direct military involvement in Syria based on the conclusion that Syria's takeover by the communists was inevitable. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, deployed jets in Turkey, and placed the Strategic Air Command on alert. Gradually Eisenhower backed off his aggressive stance toward Syria at the urging of the British and due to veiled threats from the Soviets.

Ultimately Syria aligned itself with Egypt instead of the Soviet Union, forming the United Arab Republic. The United Arab Republic became the prime conduit of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. Charles Yost, the American diplomat sent later into Syria in an attempt to restore relations, described Operation WAPPEN as a "particularly clumsy CIA plot."

John Newman

See also Dulles, Allen; Eisenhower, Dwight David; STRAGGLE, Operation

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War on Terror and the CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) record prior to September 11 was emblematic of the pressures placed upon it in a changing world. The CIA's central problem was the transition from the Cold War to international terrorism and then to stateless terrorism that could strike the United States at any time. Surveillance against terrorism in the continental United States was the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but the CIA had responsibility for international intelligence gathering. In any case, its record was found to be lacking.

The leaders of the CIA had over the years limited human intelligence assets. In the early and mid-1990s the CIA had reduced its human intelligence capability through a staff reduction of 20 percent. By the late 1990s the agency lacked the agents, the language skills, and the organizational flexibility to spot a conspiracy in the making. Instead, the CIA depended on intelligence reports from friendly intelligence services and political departments. Even when it had a human intelligence source, the CIA was slow to react to warnings coming from that source.

A case in point is that the CIA had an aggressive agent in Germany monitoring the activities of the Hamburg cell, but no additional resources were placed at his disposal.

Bureaucracy often threatened the efficiency of CIA operations. Its agents were reluctant to share information with the FBI for fear of losing control of the case. Part of this fear was an incompatibility of function between the two institutions. The FBI had the task of bringing lawbreakers to justice and approached a case by accumulating evidence that could stand up in a court of law. CIA agents were less interested in prosecuting than in gathering intelligence. They wanted to follow the leads to see where they would go. This meant that the CIA was unwilling to share crucial information because such sharing might compromise intelligence sources.

The decision by John Deutch, director of the CIA from 1995 to 1996, to call for prior approval from CIA headquarters before recruiting any person with a criminal or human rights problem as an intelligence asset made it difficult for the CIA to recruit intelligence agents. This decision came after a controversy involving the CIA's employment of a paid informant in Guatemala who had been involved in the murders of an American innkeeper and the Guatemalan husband of an American lawyer. Hundreds of paid informants were dismissed from the rolls of the CIA. Almost all of the human intelligence assets in the Middle East were terminated in this purge. This restriction was still in place on September 11, 2001.

The CIA had been monitoring the activities of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda through its Counterterrorism Center. CIA agents had been able to recruit 30 Afghans operating under the code name GE/SENIORS to monitor bin Laden's activities in Afghanistan since 1998. They each received \$10,000 a month for this mission. Numerous times during the Bill Clinton administration analysts in the Counterterrorism Center and its Alec Station unit proposed operations to neutralize bin Laden using Afghan agents or missile attacks, but none of these operations received approval. Part of the problem was that bin Laden was so elusive, traveling at irregular times. There was also the fear of collateral damage that would outrage domestic and international public opinion. The Clinton administration became paralyzed by indecision caused by its lack of confidence in CIA intelligence and the ongoing political difficulties of the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

George Tenet, who succeeded Deutch, was able to make the transition from the Clinton administration to the George W. Bush administration. Tenet had been constantly warning both administrations about the danger of bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Although the Clinton administration came to recognize the truth of the terrorism threat, the Bush administration was slow to accept it until September 11, 2001. Tenet had been able to establish a good working relationship with President Bush but was unable to get him to act quickly on Al Qaeda. After September 11, however, the Bush administration left nothing to chance in fighting terrorism. According to Seymour Hersh in *Chain of Command*, the administration unleashed the CIA to undertake covert action against terrorists with no restrictions but deniability to the president. The support for the Northern Alliance led to the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ended safe sanctuary for bin Laden and

the other leaders of Al Qaeda. But bin Laden and most of Al Qaeda's and the Taliban's leaders were able to escape. Part of the reason for the escape was the reluctance of the Bush administration to commit American forces until it was too late.

In the middle of the hunt for bin Laden and the wiping out of Al Qaeda's leadership, the Bush administration decided that Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction were greater threats. Even prior to the September 11 attacks it was known in the CIA that the Bush administration was eager to overthrow Hussein. Their reasoning was that deposing Hussein and establishing a favorable government in Iraq would produce a base of support in the Middle East for the United States, because it was apparent that there was no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Extreme pressure from the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, for the CIA to produce intelligence justification to go to war with Iraq resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among CIA analysts. Many of them believed that a U.S.-led war in Iraq would hinder the hunt for bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. CIA analysts believed that the United States should concentrate exclusively on Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda network. Those analysts who were too vocal with their dissatisfaction were fired, transferred, or severely criticized. Despite warnings from these CIA analysts about the lack of concrete intelligence, Tenet assured President Bush and his advisers that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The failure to find these weapons of mass destruction ended Bush's confidence in Tenet. In the meantime, the rank and file of the CIA had become critics of the Bush administration. They issued a series of intelligence reports that contradicted or were critical of the premises of the Bush administration's occupation of Iraq. Many of these reports were leaked to the news media.

After Tenet's resignation, Bush appointed former Florida congressman Porter Goss to head the CIA. Goss had worked for the CIA in the 1960s, but most of his knowledge of the CIA came from his seven years as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. President Bush gave Goss a mandate to bring the CIA back to Bush's political team. A short time after Goss came into Langley headquarters, senior CIA officials began to leave in droves. In April 2005 the CIA inspector general's report surfaced that presented detailed criticism of the performance of more than a dozen former and current CIA officials. Goss quashed the recommendation that there be accountability boards to recommend personnel actions against those charged in the report. Despite this action, the clash between Goss's team and CIA veterans reached epic proportions. In the long run, however, it was Goss's inability to work with his nominal boss John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, that led to Goss's demise. President Bush asked for and received Goss's resignation on May 5, 2006. His successor was U.S. Air Force four-star general Michael Hayden, the former head of the National Security Agency and the number two person under Negroponte. In February 2009 following Barack Obama's inauguration as president, Hayden was replaced by Leon Panetta.

The CIA played the central role in gathering the intelligence that led to the raid on the Abbottabad compound and resulted in bin Laden's death on May 1, 2011 (May 2 Pakistani local time). Beginning in August 2010, CIA operatives spent months tracking a lead that eventually allowed them to positively identify one of bin Laden's couriers, who in turn led them to suspect the compound, located in a suburb of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, as bin Laden's likely hiding place. With Obama's final approval in late April 2011 and under the direction of Panetta, the CIA organized and oversaw the raid on the compound, which was carried out by elements of the U.S. Navy SEALs. Although the Obama administration has attempted to distance itself from the more extreme measures associated with counterterrorism, it has acquiesced in the continuation of extraordinary renditions, which are typically conducted by the CIA.

Since 2009, leading congressional leaders, including former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, charged the CIA with repeatedly lying to Congress or misrepresenting facts to Congress concerning the Global War on Terror and other matters relating to national security. These have included the use of waterboarding and an alleged program to assassinate suspected terrorists abroad including leaders of foreign governments, which Congress had previously forbidden. In July 2014, the CIA was again embarrassed when it was forced to admit that it had spied on U.S. senators by hacking the computers of those senators who sat on the Intelligence Committee.

Stephen E. Atkins

See also Alec Station; Counterterrorism Center; Goss, Porter; September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of; Tenet, George; Document 98

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Watergate Plumbers

See Plumbers, Watergate

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The modern world has produced numerous wonders that have greatly improved the quality of life, such as advanced medical care, public utilities systems, automobiles, air travel, higher education, and nearly instantaneous worldwide communications. However, technology is not always used to benefit humanity. Unfortunately, the modern world has also witnessed the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMD are those weapons that can cause mass casualties and/or destruction on a vast scale, as opposed to conventional weapons that focus on a single soldier, a single armored vehicle, or a limited area such as conventional munitions delivered by artillery or bombs dropped by airplanes. Examples of WMD include the complete destruction of a major city, which was demonstrated by the dropping of the atomic bombs by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II; the widespread death or disabling of numerous military personnel, which was demonstrated by the use of chemical weapons such as mustard gas by both sides engaged in World War I; and the employment of biological weapons, which have the potential to devastate an entire population and have thankfully not been used on a wide scale at this time. Given the potential destructiveness of WMD, there is absolutely no question that they are one of the most important aspects of national security, as WMD can provide even small nations that have few military forces with the ability to bring large militarily powerful nations to their knees.

WMD have gone through a number of stages and classifications by acronyms. Early in the 20th century, WMD were generally classified as chemical or biological warfare. After World War II, WMD were classified as CBR (chemical, biological, and radiological) warfare. During and after the Vietnam War, WMD were classified as NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) warfare. Currently, WMD are classified as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) warfare. The reason for this latest change is to acknowledge the difference between actual nuclear weapons and conventional bombs that merely spread radioactive material (dirty bombs).

The mission of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as it was once stated on its website, reads as follows: “We are the first line of defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go. We carry out our mission by: Collecting information that reveals the plans, intentions and capabilities of our adversaries and provides the basis for decision and action. Producing timely analysis that provides insight, warning and opportunity to the President and decision makers charged with protecting and advancing America’s interests. Conducting

covert action at the discretion of the President to preempt threats or achieve U.S. policy objectives.” Thus, given the destructive potential of WMD, it is clear and indisputable that some of the primary targets of CIA operations are the intentions, development, possession, capability, deployment, and potential and actual employment of WMD by foreign countries and terrorist groups.

The CIA consists of four major components: the National Clandestine Service, the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Directorate of Support. Generally speaking with regard to WMD, the Clandestine Service is tasked with gathering information, the Directorate of Science and Technology is tasked with evaluating the technical capabilities of the information gathered, and the Directorate of Intelligence is tasked with evaluating the information gathered and disseminating it to the appropriate government agencies. Of course, there are many more aspects to the procedures involved and each directorate’s responsibilities—this is merely a simplified explanation of how the information is processed.

Within the CIA, there is a formal structure to address the issue of WMD: the CIA Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC). WINPAC addresses not only WMD but also the delivery systems for such weapons, which includes cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and rockets.

The CIA, by law, is generally prohibited from conducting operations within the borders of the United States. Authority to prevent, investigate, and prosecute foreign intelligence operations (counterintelligence) within the United States is within the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In contrast, the CIA is empowered to conduct foreign intelligence operations, which would necessarily include determining the intentions, development, possession, capability, deployment, and potential and actual employment of WMD. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City, there was minimal cooperation between these two agencies. However, subsequent to 9/11, there were a number of administrative changes to the intelligence community to facilitate easier and greater sharing of information, especially concerning WMD.

There have been a number of exposés, books, and studies published on the history and failures of the CIA. However, very few address the CIA’s involvement with WMD except for the widely publicized situation involving the Iraq War. The actual practices and procedures of the CIA and even its organization of activities concerning WMD are highly classified. Thus, the reason for the lack of publicly available information is evident—it is simply too sensitive to be allowed into the public domain.

The major WMD-related incident concerning the CIA that has become widely publicized is the reliance of the administration of President George W. Bush on highly questionable intelligence that Iraq was developing and possessed WMD. Based on this reliance, the Iraq War was launched. Unfortunately, subsequent events showed that Iraq had no WMD and was not developing them, which led to intense criticism of the CIA and its ability to accurately and forcefully report critical information concerning WMD and also whether the CIA could withstand political pressure to ignore, alter, or even falsify such intelligence.

However, current public events have shown the involvement of the CIA concerning WMD through occasional announcements and newspaper reports. Pakistan, an Islamic state and a nuclear power, is suspected of being involved in the transfer of nuclear weapons to other states and is considered a potential source of nuclear weapons for terrorist groups. North Korea is a nuclear power, and the CIA is watching it very closely because of the potential that North Korea may launch an attack, which might include nuclear weapons, on South Korea, as the Korean War has never been formally ended with a peace treaty. Iran is currently suspected of actively developing nuclear weapons, which is a great concern to the United States because of the large concentration of oil and American business interests in the Middle East.

One of the more problematic issues concerning WMD is the portability and ease of development of certain types of WMD. For example, a number of years ago shortly after the fall of the Soviet empire, it was reported that the former Soviet Union had lost control of a number of backpack nukes, which were small nuclear weapons that could fit into a suitcase. Stopping the employment of such weapons by terrorist groups was a high priority of the CIA. Even more insidious is the development and employment of biological agents. Biological weapons, if they are sufficiently lethal and highly contagious, can devastate a population. Historical examples of the effectiveness of a disease are the Influenza Pandemic of 1918, in which 50 million to 100 million people died, and the Black Plague of the 14th century, which resulted in the deaths of more than 100 million people. Modern-day examples of potential biological weapons include Ebola and anthrax. The CIA's mission includes attempting to discover and prevent any employment of such biological weapons, especially by terrorist groups. This is a difficult task, because biological weapons are much easier to fabricate than nuclear weapons.

Regardless, the CIA is the primary first-line defense for the protection and national security of the United States concerning WMD. Without accurate and timely foreknowledge concerning WMD and other nations, the national security of the United States would be most likely fatally compromised.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also Documents 32, 43, 73, 89, 90

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Webster, William (1924–)

U.S. attorney, judge, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from 1978 to 1987, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1987 to 1991. William Hedgcock Webster was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on March 6, 1924. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Navy. After the war and his return to the United States, Webster earned his undergraduate degree from Amherst (Massachusetts) College in 1947. Two years later, he received a law degree from Washington University in St. Louis.

From 1949 to 1959, Webster practiced law with a successful St. Louis law firm. In 1960 he began a long career in public service when he began serving as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, a post he held until 1961. Thereafter he returned to private practice, and from 1964 to 1969 he sat on the Missouri Board of Law Examiners.

From 1970 to 1973, Webster served as U.S. federal judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. In 1973 he was appointed judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, a post he retained until 1978. In 1978 President Jimmy Carter tapped him to become the sixth director of the FBI. Webster's tenure with that agency was marked by efficient and effective leadership that helped stabilize it following the disruptive post-Watergate years and its transition from the long reign of director J. Edgar Hoover, which had ended with the latter's death in 1972.

In 1987, Webster left his post with the FBI to become the director of the CIA; he is the only individual to have held the directorship of both organizations. His appointment by the Ronald Reagan administration proved that he was able to function well under both Democratic and Republican administrations. Webster succeeded controversial CIA director William Casey, who died unexpectedly in May 1987 after a brief battle with brain cancer. Casey's death meant that he was never able to testify in the congressional hearings surrounding the Iran-Contra Affair, a scheme in which the CIA had been involved in selling weapons to Iran, the proceeds of which were illegally funneled to the anticommunist Contras in Nicaragua.

Webster moved quickly to mitigate the damage to the agency caused by the Iran-Contra Affair allegations and proved to be a far less visible and controversial director than Casey. Webster did continue Casey's policy of arming the mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan toward the tail end of the Soviet-Afghan War.

Webster retired from public service in September 1991 and was succeeded by Robert Gates as CIA director. Webster returned to private law practice, becoming a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. He has been the recipient of many prestigious honors and awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991. He retired from active practice in 2005 but still maintains a presence in the firm. He also served as vice chairman of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) from 2002 to 2006, and in 2006 he became chairman of the HSAC.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Afghanistan; Casey, William; Iran-Contra Affair

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Welch, Richard (1929–1975)

Richard Skeffington Welch was a covert U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who was assassinated in 1975 after his cover had been exposed. His assassins were members of a radical leftist group in Greece. Welch was the first CIA officer to be assassinated while in the line of duty.

Welch was born on December 14, 1929, in Hartford, Connecticut. He attended Harvard University, where he studied classics and became fluent in ancient and modern Greek. His studies imbued him with a deep appreciation of Greek culture, which he indulged for the remainder of his life. After his 1951 graduation, he joined the CIA. His first assignment was at CIA headquarters; his first overseas assignment took him to Athens, where he remained from 1952 until 1959. Subsequent assignments took him to Cyprus (1960–1964) and Guatemala (1965–1967). Welch was named chief of station in Guyana in 1967 and remained in that post until 1969. From 1972 until 1975, he was chief of station in Peru. Named chief of station in Greece (Athens) in 1975, Welch assumed his new responsibilities in the summer of that year.

At the time of Welch's last assignment, Greece was a nation in turmoil, having just exited a period of politically inspired violence and repressive dictatorship. Welch, however, was excited about his assignment because it coincided with Greece's return to civilian, constitutional rule. Shortly after Welch's arrival in Athens, his cover as a covert CIA operative was revealed in a magazine published in East Germany; at that time, the radical Greek leftist group Revolutionary

Organization 17 November (17N) began conducting surveillance on Welch. The Marxist group was rabidly anti-American and may have been receiving support from communist regimes in Europe.

On the evening of December 23, 1975, Welch was ambushed by five 17N members and shot in the head at close range. He died almost instantly. Welch's assassination shocked the U.S. intelligence establishment and outraged the Gerald R. Ford administration, which made arrangements for Welch to be interred in Arlington National Cemetery. In a significant way, however, Welch's murder helped revive the flagging fortunes of the CIA, which had been buffeted by serious allegations of abuse of power and illegal activities during the 1975 Church Committee investigation. In 1982 the U.S. Congress passed the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which was a direct result of the Welch assassination. The legislation made it a punishable felony to reveal the identity of covert U.S. intelligence agents. George H. W. Bush, who headed the CIA during 1976–1977 and later served as vice president and president, alleged that the notorious CIA whistleblower Philip Agee had blown Welch's cover; Agee, however, vehemently denied having done so.

Not until 2003 were some of the perpetrators of Welch's murder brought to justice, but because Greece's 20-year statute of limitations on murder had already lapsed, they were convicted for other crimes. The alleged ringleader of the Welch assassination, Alexandros D. Giotopoulos, was sentenced to multiple life terms for a laundry list of other crimes and killings. A second participant was found guilty of having been a member of a terrorist group, but his conviction was overturned on appeal in 2007 when it was determined that his crime had exceeded the statute of limitations. A third alleged participant in Welch's murder was acquitted of lesser charges.

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See also Agee, Philip; Buckley, William F.

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Whitlam Coup (1975)

An alleged coup involving the conspiracy theory that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved, more or less directly, in the dismissal of the Australian prime minister Edward Gough Whitlam in December 1975. Whitlam was prime minister from 1972 to 1975. His federal government was the first Australian Labor Party administration in more than 25 years.



During Australia's constitutional crisis of 1975, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam addresses reporters outside the Parliament building in Canberra after his dismissal by Australia's governor-general on November 11, 1975. Kerr named opposition leader Malcolm Fraser to lead a caretaker government until elections in December. (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

On being elected, Whitlam immediately ended military conscription, ordered Australian troops out of Vietnam, and freed imprisoned draft evaders. Later he banned racially segregated sporting teams from playing in Australia; introduced equal pay for women; raised welfare benefits; established a national health service; doubled spending on education; abolished university fees; ended censorship; reformed divorce laws; made legal aid a right; advanced the causes of Aborigines, women, and immigrants; set up ethnic radio networks; elevated the arts generally; furthered the film industry; scrapped royal patronage of public honors; and replaced the Australian anthem. A conspiracy theory states that the CIA played an important role in a coup to oust Whitlam. However, the only actual direct piece of evidence of CIA involvement in the 1975 dismissal comes from Chris Boyce (of Falcon and Snowman fame) who claimed during his espionage trial that the whole reason he decided to start spying against the United States was because of a misdirected CIA message he received that acknowledged the involvement of the CIA. Additionally, Boyce discovered that the CIA was not honoring agreements with

Australia by concealing information available from the U.S. secret bases in Australia.

Some folks pointed to the similarity of the destruction of Salvador Allende's government in Chile in 1973. CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton was concerned at the time with intelligence operations with Australia. Australia was a highly important part of the CIA's worldwide intelligence-collection effort, as it had thousands of CIA employees stationed there, and Australia was considered a vital part of the early warning and nuclear war-fighting system.

Whitlam also said that he wanted no further vetting or harassing of his staff by the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO). The ASIO's informal and powerful authority derived from a treaty between secret services in England and the United States and involved a profound and secret pact of loyalty. Informally, according to respected observers, Australia's intelligence agencies operated as if their headquarters were in Langley, Virginia, inside the CIA.

Whitlam planned to reformulate Australia's alliance with the United States. The Australian governor-general had once been a member of a CIA-funded cultural organization, and he entertained members of the defense and intelligence communities in Australia but never allowed their names to appear on a formal guest list. He had also had briefings with the U.S. ambassador. By October 1975, internal political scandals about Australia's budget put the government in jeopardy. To solve the problem, Australia's opposition leader in Parliament wanted an election, the third in three years. Whitlam refused.

According to the Whitlam Coup conspiracy theory, the CIA then acted quickly to bring Whitlam's government down so as to protect CIA interests. Why? Whitlam had threatened not to extend the leases on the U.S. secret bases; in response, the CIA worked to persuade others with vested interests to get rid of him.

The conspiracy theory suggests that in London the CIA chief discussed the problem with heads of the British secret services and suggested that the delicate alliance between Britain and the United States was in jeopardy, especially since MI6 had secret bases in Australia too. By November 10, Whitlam learned how concerned CIA chiefs were that Australia might damage the integrity of its relations with America and the United Kingdom. The CIA demands were sent to Australia's governor-general, who would later falsely deny having had any contact with U.S. or other secret services.

On the day Whitlam was to announce his policy regarding the CIA and the U.S. bases, the governor-general fired him and appointed the opposition leader to form a caretaker government; the opposition leader then called the general election he had wanted. Whitlam lost the election.

When the conspiracy theory was aired, it was derided vigorously as a paranoid, left-wing theory. Even Whitlam refused to accept the idea that the CIA might have had a hand in his downfall. William Colby, once the head of the CIA, stated in 1981 that "We have never interfered in Australian politics."

Jan Goldman

See also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Angleton, James; Boyce, Christopher; Chile; Colby, William; Falcon and Snowman

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Wilson, Charlie (1933–2010)

Charles Nesbitt Wilson was a longtime Texas Congress member who played a key role in escalating the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. Taking advantage of his position on the powerful House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Wilson helped funnel billions of dollars in funds and weapons to the Afghan rebels to enable them to defeat the Soviet Union.

Wilson was born in Trinity, Texas, on June 1, 1933, to Charles Edwin Wilson and Wilmuth Wilson. After graduating from Trinity High School in 1951, Charlie Wilson briefly attended Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas. In 1952 he accepted an appointment to enter the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Although Wilson earned more than his share of demerits while at the academy, he managed to graduate in 1956. He spent the next several years experiencing the Cold War firsthand as a gunnery officer on a destroyer that regularly chased Soviet submarines.

In 1960 while still on active duty in the U.S. Navy, Wilson felt drawn to public service after working as a volunteer on John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign. Wilson decided to go on leave from the navy and throw his hat in the political ring, running for state representative for his home district in Texas. He won the election and served in the Texas state legislature for the next 12 years, establishing a reputation as a liberal Democrat for being pro-choice and supporting Medicaid and the Equal Rights Amendment. In 1972, Wilson overcame a drunk driving arrest to win the election to represent Texas's Second District in the U.S. House of Representatives.

During Wilson's first year in Congress, he became a strong supporter of the Israeli cause and visited Israel during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Over the next decade, he remained one of Israel's most ardent proponents in Congress, despite the fact that he had very few Jewish constituents in his district. In the late 1970s, Wilson also took up the cause of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Nicaraguan government, which was embroiled in a guerrilla war with the leftist National Liberation Front, more commonly known as the Sandinistas, for control of the country. Wilson pressured Congress into restoring the multimillion-dollar U.S. aid package to Somoza's government, which had been cut by President Jimmy Carter's administration because of the Nicaraguan dictator's poor human rights record.

In 1976 with the help of his influential Jewish connections, Wilson had maneuvered his way onto the powerful Appropriations Committee, which is responsible for deciding how the government's annual budget is spent. He soon earned a seat

on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, one of several subcommittees that carry out the work of the Appropriations Committee. Wilson's role on that subcommittee made him 1 of 12 congressional members who decided how much money the State Department could spend abroad. After being reelected for the fourth time in 1980, Wilson gained a spot on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which controlled the purse strings of both the CIA and the Pentagon. Around that time he became fascinated with the plight of the people of Afghanistan, who were suffering greatly following the Soviet invasion of that country in late December 1979.

Wilson took a trip to Pakistan in October 1982 that included a visit to the refugee camps outside Peshawar, the center of Afghan resistance. The camps, filled with more than 2 million Afghans who were barely surviving with little food and no running water, inspired him to do everything he could to support the mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet Union. Back in the United States, Wilson swung into action. Despite his much deserved reputation as a hard-partying womanizer that had often gotten him into trouble and earned him the nickname "Good-Time Charlie," by the early 1980s Wilson had assembled an impressive list of friends in Congress, many of whom owed him favors for supporting their individual pork barrel projects. He began cashing in on many of those favors to gain the support needed to drastically increase U.S. financial aid to the Afghan rebels.

Over the next several years while working closely with CIA agent Gust Avrakotos, Wilson used the aid money and his diverse international connections to supply the mujahideen with a variety of weapons to take down the vaunted Soviet war machine. Perhaps the most crucial of these weapons was the Stinger surface-to-air missiles that the CIA began shipping to the mujahideen in 1986. Up to that point, Soviet aerial supremacy in the form of jet fighters and helicopter gunships had devastated the Afghan rebels and provided vital logistical support to Soviet forces. The Stinger missiles helped even the playing field by forcing Soviet aircraft to fly higher to avoid being shot down, greatly minimizing their effectiveness. That same year the Soviet Union began pulling troops out of Afghanistan, and by February 1989 all Soviet military forces had left the country.

The CIA recognized Wilson's key role in Afghanistan by bestowing on him its Honored Colleague award, marking the first time it had ever been given to someone outside the agency. Wilson remained in Congress until he retired in January 1997. For the next eight years he worked as a lobbyist on Capitol Hill, with Pakistan as his primary client. In 2003, George Crile published the book *Charlie Wilson's War* that chronicles the Texas Congress member's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan conflict. The book was followed four years later by a movie of the same name that featured Tom Hanks in the title role.

Wilson died on February 10, 2010, of cardiopulmonary arrest at the age of 76.

Padraic Carlin

See also Afghanistan; Cold War and the CIA

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Wilson, Edwin (1928–2012)

Edwin Paul Wilson was an employee of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) who was tried and convicted of having sold illegal weapons and explosives to Libya in the early 1980s. After having spent years in prison, he was released in 2004 after it was determined that the CIA and government prosecutors had falsified documents and withheld evidence during Wilson's 1983 trial.

Wilson was born on May 3, 1928, in Nampa, Idaho, and graduated from the University of Portland in 1953. He then entered the U.S. Marine Corps and saw combat during the end of the Korean War. Wilson was discharged from the service in 1956 after suffering a leg injury and entered the CIA as an agent. Because of his military background, he soon became involved in military-related activities. In 1964, the agency asked Wilson to create a maritime consulting business so that it could better monitor international shipping. Wilson earned significant income from this venture, and before long he had established dozens of businesses that served as front organizations for the CIA. These ventures made Wilson a very wealthy man. In 1971, apparently with the blessing of the CIA, Wilson became an intelligence operative for the ONI and continued to create and run numerous business fronts from which he personally benefited.

In 1976 Wilson, now a multimillionaire, decided to retire from the ONI under circumstances that remain unclear. By then he owned a 2,338-acre estate in northern Virginia, where he lavishly entertained high-ranking government officials. He also owned homes and/or real estate in Geneva, England, Libya, Mexico, Lebanon, and North Carolina. Sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s the CIA rehired Wilson, who was sent to Libya to monitor events there and to conduct surveillance on a dangerous Venezuelan terrorist who had sought refuge in the country. In Libya, Wilson became involved in several illicit weapons deals with the Libyan government and private Libyan citizens, although it still remains unclear if he did so on his own or as part of a CIA operation. At about the same time, a shipping company owned by Wilson was implicated in a scam in which it had grossly overcharged the U.S. government for transporting military goods to Egypt.

The scam triggered an intense government investigation into Wilson and his activities, which soon proved to be his undoing. He was arrested in 1982, and over the next 2 years he was tried in four separate federal trials. Among the most serious charges against him was a murder-for-hire plot against his ex-wife and a

smuggling enterprise that resulted in the illegal sale of weapons and explosives to Libya. During the smuggling trial, Wilson claimed that he had been tasked with arranging the weapons sales by the CIA. In the end, he was found guilty and sentenced to a total of 52 years in prison, which included punishment for the murder plot and other lesser charges. During the trial for weapons smuggling, the CIA provided false testimony, claiming that Wilson had not been an agency employee when the smuggling took place. This was not true, as Wilson had indeed been a CIA operative at the time.

In the years after his conviction, Wilson and his attorneys worked diligently to obtain government records under the Freedom of Information Act, and by the early 2000s they had gathered enough evidence to prove that the CIA and prosecutors had suppressed exculpatory evidence and had knowingly given false testimony. In 2003 a federal judge in Texas vacated the smuggling conviction, concluding that both prosecutors and the CIA had lied during the trial. Wilson was released from prison in 2004 and thereafter lived a quiet life in Washington state. He lost his immense wealth, however, and subsisted on a small social security pension until his death in Seattle on September 10, 2012. At the time of his death, Wilson's lawyers were still working to have his other convictions set aside.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Freedom of Information Act; Documents 90, 91

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Wilson, Valerie Plame (1963–)

Valerie Plame Wilson is a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert officer whose identity was leaked to the press in 2003, precipitating a long and contentious incident. Valerie Elise Plame was born on April 19, 1963, in Anchorage, Alaska, the daughter of a career U.S. Air Force officer. She graduated from Pennsylvania State University in 1985 and began her career with the CIA that same year as a new trainee. Because of the clandestine nature of the CIA and Plame's work, few details on her 20-year career with the agency are known. What is known is that she worked in various posts, usually with a dual role: a public position and a covert one in which she concentrated on weapons proliferation and counterproliferation activities. The CIA sponsored her graduate studies, which resulted in a master's degree from the London School of Economics in 1991 and another master's degree from the College of Europe (Belgium) that same year.

Plame met Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV at a party in Washington, D.C., in 1997. The following year they were married. At the time of their courtship, Wilson was working in the West Wing as special assistant to President Bill Clinton and senior director of African affairs for the National Security Council. Wilson retired from government service in 1998 and began his own international management and consulting company.

In February 2002, the George W. Bush administration and the CIA sent Wilson on a mission to Niger, where he was to ascertain the accuracy of reports that Iraq had attempted to purchase enriched (yellowcake) uranium from that nation. Wilson was well placed to do this, given his extensive experience dealing with Saddam Hussein in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Upon Wilson's return, he stated in a report that there was no credible evidence that any Iraqi official tried to engage Niger in a scheme that would have resulted in the transfer of enriched uranium to Iraq. Nevertheless, the Bush administration continued to press this claim, and it was specifically mentioned in President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address. The Niger-Iraq connection was used as a major pretext for the war against Iraq, which commenced in March 2003.

Outraged by the Bush administration's continuing claims concerning the Niger-Iraq connection, Wilson wrote an op-ed piece that appeared in the *New York Times* on July 6, 2003. The article revealed his trip to Niger the year before and laid bare the administration's theory on the validity of the reports coming from Niger. Wilson also asserted that the White House had knowingly exaggerated the Iraqi threat so as to legitimize its pretext for the Iraq War. Predictably, Wilson's article angered the Bush administration and, if Wilson and Plame Wilson's allegations are true, triggered a deliberate attempt to discredit and sabotage them both, a plan that involved the West Wing and the staffs of both Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney.

On July 14, 2003, the syndicated conservative newspaper columnist Robert Novak wrote an article to counter Wilson's letter. In the *Washington Post*, Novak revealed that Wilson's wife was a CIA operative whose job was to work on issues of weapons proliferation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). That revelation, which presumably came from someone high up in the Bush administration, caused an instant sensation, as it is illegal for a government official to knowingly reveal the identity of a covert CIA officer. Besides sparking an acrimonious political atmosphere between Republicans and Democrats and between supporters of the war and antiwar activists, the revelation about Plame Wilson's identity triggered a federal investigation in the Department of Justice. The Wilsons immediately alleged that the leak was a purposeful attempt to retaliate against Ambassador Wilson for his op-ed piece.

After a tortuous investigation, a federal grand jury indicted Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, on several charges, including lying under oath and obstruction of justice. He was found guilty in March 2007, but Bush quickly commuted his sentence. No other Bush administrations officials were indicted or convicted in the Plame Wilson incident, but the investigation left a dark cloud over the White House during a time in which the Iraq War was going very badly.

Interestingly, no one was actually indicted or convicted for having perpetrated the leak in the first place, although it has to be assumed that someone within the Bush administration, with top secret clearance, did so. Some Bush supporters claim that Plame Wilson's clandestine activities were already known in Washington and that Wilson's op-ed piece was politically motivated and designed to discredit the president.

Wilson and Plame Wilson later brought a civil suit against those who were thought to be directly involved in the leak, including Cheney himself, but the case was denied on jurisdictional grounds. That case is now on appeal. Plame Wilson left the CIA in December 2005. She caused a stir in 2006 when it was reported that she was about to receive \$2.5 million for her memoir. That figure, however, has never been verified by her or her publisher. Her detractors asserted that she was using the incident for personal gain. Others, however, argued that she had a right to tell her side of the story and that it might shed more light on the case. Plame Wilson encountered some difficulty with the CIA, which insisted that certain passages in her manuscript be rewritten before the book could be published. In October 2007 Plame Wilson's book, titled *Fair Game: My Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House*, was finally released. Despite the tantalizing title, the book did not shed any significant new light on the Plame Wilson incident. Plame Wilson then embarked on a major speaking tour, promoting her book and relaying her side of the story.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Documents 89, 90

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Wisner, Frank (1909–1965)

Frank Gardiner Wisner oversaw the early development of the covert action capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Born in Laurel, Mississippi, on June 23, 1909, Wisner was educated at Woodberry Forest School in Orange, Virginia, and the University of Virginia. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy six months prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After working in the navy's censor's office, Wisner obtained a transfer to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

In June 1944, the OSS sent Wisner to Turkey on his first assignment. In August he was transferred to Romania, where his principal responsibility was to spy on the

Soviet Union. Although most U.S. officials still considered Joseph Stalin an ally during World War II, Wisner's experiences in Romania convinced him that conflict with the Soviet Union was imminent. Henceforth, he became increasingly involved in anti-Soviet policy initiatives.

In 1947, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson recruited Wisner into the State Department's Office of Occupied Territories. On June 18, 1948, National Security Council Directive 10/2 established the Office of Special Projects, and Wisner was appointed its first director. Soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), this organization became the covert operations branch of the CIA. With James Angleton, Wisner ran Operation RED SOX (also known as Operation RED CAP).

In August 1952, the OPC was merged with the CIA's espionage branch to form the Directorate of Plans (DPP). Wisner was appointed to head the DPP. As deputy director for plans, Wisner oversaw operations that resulted in the overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.

Wisner had expected widespread anticommunist revolt in many Eastern bloc countries, and the Hungarian defeat appeared to affect him deeply. Also, it seems that he contracted hepatitis and left work to recover. Wisner went to Vienna at the end of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and later traveled to Rome. Close to a nervous breakdown, he withdrew from his post for health reasons, and Richard Bissell Jr. took over as deputy director for plans.

When Wisner returned to work he was made station chief in London, but he fell ill again and suffered serious nervous disorders. In 1958 he was committed to a private mental hospital and diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive psychosis. His files in the CIA were destroyed because they appeared to be more like the rambling of a man out of his mind. In mental torment, Wisner killed himself with a shotgun on October 29, 1965. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Derek A. Bentley

See also Angleton, James; Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Office of Strategic Services; RED sox, Operation; Documents 18, 22, 24, 45, 71

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Woodruff, Freddie, Murder of

On August 8, 1993, Freddie Woodruff, the regional affairs officer for the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia, was assassinated while riding in a car on a sparsely traveled road on the outskirts of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. Woodruff, however, was also a longtime Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent and at the time of his death was probably the CIA's station chief in Tbilisi, although the CIA has never explicitly admitted that in public. Indeed, in the years since Woodruff's shooting, the CIA has remained largely closemouthed about the incident. Over the last two decades, there has been considerable controversy about the details of Woodruff's murder, both in Georgia and the United States. The alleged perpetrator, Anzor Sharmaidze, was a former Soviet soldier who was reportedly drunk when he accidentally discharged a rifle, killing Woodruff as he passed by. Sharmaidze was promptly apprehended, convicted, and sentenced to a lengthy prison term.

From the start, Woodruff's death seemed very improbable. He died almost instantly from a gunshot wound to his head; indeed, the manner and efficiency of his death seemed to be more of a well-planned assassination rather than a random gun discharge by an inebriated ex-soldier. Sharmaidze denied having had anything to do with Woodruff's shooting. Prosecutors, on the other hand, argued that Sharmaidze was drunk and discharged his rifle at about the same time that Woodruff's car was passing by. The resulting gunshot, they alleged, hit Woodruff squarely in the head and caused his death. Others have alleged that Russian operatives in Georgia at the time were responsible for Woodruff's assassination. Still others have claimed that Sharmaidze was made a scapegoat for the crime to avoid any embarrassment for the Georgian government, which was then headed by a state council under the leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister who would serve as president of Georgia from 1995 until 2003.

At the time of Woodruff's shooting, Georgia was embroiled in a virtual civil war, and both the United States and Russia were vying for power and influence in the newly independent former Soviet republic. Some observers have suggested that Russian intelligence agents engineered the assassination in order to prevent the Americans from gaining a significant toehold in Georgia. At the time, Russia's intelligence community was badly demoralized and split between those who supported the pro-Western government of President Boris Yeltsin and those who abhorred Yeltsin's pro-Western orientation. The Georgian government quickly settled on Sharmaidze as the unwitting assassin to placate the United States as well as the Russians. At the time, there was no mention in public of potential

Russian involvement in the murder. A few observers have posited that Chechen separatist guerrillas killed Woodruff in order to embarrass the Russian and Georgia governments.

By 2008, a number of alleged witnesses claimed that they had been intimidated and even tortured to compel them to give testimony against Sharmaidze. That same year, Sharmaidze was released from prison amid virtually no publicity. He has not, however, been absolved of the murder charge, even though the Georgian government has reopened the case. Neither other individuals nor any foreign governments have yet to be named as conspirators or perpetrators, however. Former CIA director James Woolsey, who flew to Tbilisi to claim Woodruff's body, has remained skeptical of these various conspiracy theories. Those claiming Russian involvement have pointed out that just days before his death Woodruff had met with CIA double agent Aldrich Ames, who in 1994 was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union and Russia for many years. The meeting, however, could have been mere coincidence, since the two men had known each other for a long time and had both worked for the CIA. In 2008, an article in the *Wall Street Journal* claimed that Woodruff's murder may have served as the "opening shot" in a renewed Cold War between the Americans and Russians.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Buckley, William F.; Welch, Richard

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World Intelligence Review

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), since its creation after the end of World War II, has expanded in its scope, size, and activities. Changes to the missions of the CIA have been caused by the political, economic, social, and military circumstances occurring in the world, with a focus on the underlying goal of the national security of the United States.

One of the major functions of the CIA is the timely preparation and dissemination of accurate intelligence to the various agencies of the U.S. government to facilitate the timely and competent completion of their duties and responsibilities. If the intelligence is not accurate, the results for the United States can be disastrous. An example of faulty intelligence by the CIA includes the information concerning Iraq and its purported development and possession of weapons of mass

destruction, which led to the Iraq War and serious political repercussions for the George W. Bush administration and the CIA. If the intelligence is not timely then it is almost useless, except possibly for investigations after the fact into the causes of the event in question that should have been prevented.

A historical example of untimely intelligence resulting in a disaster is the attack on Pearl Harbor, starting World War II. It has been suggested that the United States had sufficient information to warn the U.S. military forces in Hawaii of the impending attack to allow them to prepare but failed to do so. That terrible result is now history. If the intelligence is not disseminated, then it is practically useless. An example of intelligence in the possession of the CIA that was not disseminated was the knowledge of certain terrorists in the United States who later participated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. If that intelligence had been disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 9/11 terrorist attacks might have been prevented. However, this dissemination must be done in secret so that the interests of the United States are not compromised.

One of the four major administrative components of the CIA is the Directorate of Intelligence. The Directorate of Intelligence is tasked with correctly analyzing raw intelligence, formatting it into a coherent report, and then timely disseminating it to the appropriate agencies of the U.S. government. The CIA publishes several different such intelligence reports. However, the most important report that the CIA prepares and disseminates is the daily World Intelligence Review (WIRE).

WIRE is published electronically and distributed to select high-level government and military officials and agencies. The information in WIRE is the most accurate and timely summation of events, analysis of policy issues, and potential threats in the world to the national security of the United States that the CIA has to offer. A report can include analysis of military capabilities of foreign countries, analysis of military policy of foreign countries, reporting of technological capability of foreign countries, analysis of political policy of foreign countries, analysis of economic resources of foreign countries, evaluation of foreign leaders, identification of foreign threats, and the probability of future events. Thus, WIRE is very sensitive and highly classified. Distribution is very restricted.

One of the major benefits of WIRE is that it provides a consistent report of intelligence matters to the various organs of the U.S. government. This helps prevent government agencies from taking conflicting positions or actions due to conflicting intelligence concerning these issues, which could result in political or military disasters. Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks of such a system of intelligence distribution is that when errors are made, they tend to adversely affect all of the operations of the government. Regardless, the overall effect of a single consistent position concerning important intelligence issues, as published in WIRE, appears to have generally served the United States well with a few notable exceptions, such as the purported Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

William C. Plouffe Jr.

See also September 11 Attacks; September 11 Attacks, Warning of

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WS-119L

See MOBY DICK, Project

Y

Young, George Kennedy (1911–1990)

George Kennedy Young was the outspoken and unconventional vice chief of the British secret intelligence service MI6 and an early chairman of the Berlin Tunnel project, the joint SIS–Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operation STOPWATCH/GOLD.

Young was educated at Dumfries Academy and St. Andrew's University, where he studied modern languages; later at Yale he graduated with an MA in political science. He was a socialist reformer who opposed Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Adolf Hitler during World War II. Early in World War II, Young recruited double agents in East Africa who assisted in discovering German agents in Italy. He also worked to reduce Nazi extermination camps in Europe. At the end of the war, Young returned to journalism and became the British United Press correspondent in Berlin, where he spied on the Russian Army for MI6.

Young was certain that in Albania, Operation VALUABLE had failed because of Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) infiltrators. When he was deputy director of British intelligence, he dismantled the operation and spread the trainees around the world. Also, while in London he was frustrated to find that clandestine operations and the establishment of reliable knowledge were not valued in the Foreign Office. Young lost respect for the use of diplomacy against the spread of Soviet influence in Europe.

In 1953 Young took charge of the British side of Operation AJAX and helped the CIA topple Mohammad Mossadegh in Iraq but could not persuade the Americans to help in getting rid of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt.

Young opposed the handling of the Suez Crisis, developed close relations with Israel's Mossad, and supported Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran in establishing his secret police. In 1961 it was made clear to Young that largely because he was so outspoken, he would never reach the top of MI6, so he retired to become a banker with Kleinwort Benson. In 1962 he wrote *Masters of Indecision*, an attack on how Whitehall did its work.

Jan Goldman

See also AJAX, Operation; Document 24

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Yurchenko, Vitaly (1936–)

Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) officer who defected to America, but then changed his mind and returned to the Soviet Union. As a KGB officer, Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko worked in Moscow, responsible for all clandestine operations in the United States and Canada (1975–1980). Then for the next five years he was the chief of a KGB counterintelligence directorate (1980–1985); its purpose was to find moles inside the KGB.

In his 25 years of service to the KGB, Yurchenko held multiple posts with a variety of duties. As deputy chief of the third department of the Third Chief Directorate in 1960, he recruited and handled foreign agents. From 1975 to 1980, Yurchenko ran the security of Russia's embassy in Washington, D.C. Back in Moscow, he was responsible for uncovering double agents and leaks within the KGB.

In 1960 Yurchenko joined the KGB's Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate after having served in the Soviet Navy. He was an operations officer and deputy chief of the KGB's special department for the Black Sea Fleet until December 1968 and was then transferred to Egypt as the Soviet adviser to the Egyptian Navy in Alexandria. Afterward he spent three years as the deputy chief of the Third Chief Directorate and was responsible for recruiting foreigners to Soviet intelligence and for putting Soviet spies into Western intelligence agencies.

In 1975 Yurchenko was a security officer at the Soviet embassy in Washington. His task was to ensure that Soviet citizens and establishments in the United States were secure and to find any vulnerable members of the Soviet staff who might be easily exploited by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He returned to Moscow in 1980. In 1985 he was put in charge of legal KGB residencies in the United States and Canada.

On April 1, 1985, Yurchenko entered the U.S. embassy in Rome and requested political asylum. The CIA handled the defection. As part of the defection process, Yurchenko passed a polygraph test and was debriefed by Aldrich Ames, who, ironically, was currently spying for the Soviet Union.

Yurchenko warned the CIA that Oleg A. Gordievsky, who had been a spy for England inside the KGB for many years, was in danger of being caught. This helped the British to arrange the immediate exfiltration of Gordievsky in September.

Yurchenko also identified Ronald Pelton, a KGB agent who had earlier worked in the Canadian Security Service. Yurchenko warned the CIA about a chemical dust that was being used to track CIA agents, and he also gave information on Nicholas Shadrin, a U.S. double agent whose real name was Nikolai Artamonev and who had died while being abducted by the KGB in 1975.

Yurchenko said that a former CIA agent who had not been permitted to go to Moscow due to drug abuse and was code-named Robert had been spying for the KGB. It was obvious that Yurchenko was talking about Edward Lee Howard, who, Yurchenko said, had been to Vienna in 1984 with classified comments for the KGB. Howard left the United States late in September. He also told the CIA how valuable to the KGB the espionage of John A. Walker Jr. had been.

Yurchenko was offered a fully furnished home, \$1 million, and a salary of more than US\$60,000 a year. He seemed uneasy, missed his teenage son, showed little interest in or respect for his interrogators or guards, and appeared to have defected because the Soviet system exasperated him. Also, he said that he wanted to meet his former mistress, whom he had loved in Washington in the late 1970s and now was in Canada with her husband.

The CIA arranged a secret meeting in September. The woman was the attractive mother of two and a qualified pediatrician. Yurchenko proposed that she defect with him and that they settle in the United States. She declined, and he seemed most disappointed. Yurchenko's stomach was ulcerated, and he was annoyed that his defection had been leaked to the press along with most of the details of his interrogation. To placate Yurchenko, it seems that the CIA sent him to a physician for his stomach pains and arranged for him to have a private dinner with William Casey.

While eating lunch at a restaurant in Washington, D.C., on November 2, 1986, Yurchenko left his CIA handler to go for a walk outside, which ended close by at the Soviet Union embassy. His whereabouts were unknown until November 4, when the Russians held a press conference at their embassy. In accented English, Yurchenko publicly declared that he did not defect from his country. He claimed that the CIA kidnapped him while in Rome and brought him to the United States, where he was held captive and tortured in a safe house in Fredericksburg, Virginia. He said that he was so heavily drugged that he did not know what he had said to the CIA, and he also said that he had never heard of Edward Lee Howard until reading his name in the papers. Yurchenko claimed that fat, stupid guards had violated his privacy; forced him to speak English; and prevented him from contacting his family. He mentioned a dinner with William Casey and the million-dollar job offer.

Yurchenko also said that he escaped due to a lax in security. The CIA received heat from Washington for its handling of Yurchenko, and the agency agreed to appoint an independent expert to review its actions.

There are several thoughts as to why Yurchenko returned to the Soviet Union. Some believe that he was really a double agent sent to learn the CIA's debriefing tactics. Another story was that he thought he was dying of stomach cancer, with only weeks to live, and wanted to spend the rest of his time with his former mistress. New medical records showed that he did not have stomach cancer. He

became depressed and decided to return to his home country. Finally, others believe that Yurchenko grew homesick and feared for the safety of his family, so he decided to return to the Soviet Union. The truth of his double defection remains uncertain.

Ryan Connoles

See also Ames, Aldrich; Casey, William; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Philby, Kim

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Z

ZAPATA, Operation

See Bay of Pigs Invasion

Zelikow Memo

The Zelikow Memo was a formerly classified document authored by Philip D. Zelikow in February 2006. Zelikow, who was then serving as legal counsel to U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, voluntarily wrote the memo to voice his opinion concerning certain activities undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while waging the Global War on Terror. Zelikow made clear his concern with certain interrogation tactics employed against enemy combatants who were in U.S. custody. The George W. Bush administration successfully blocked the release of the memo, but the U.S. State Department eventually released it to the public on April 3, 2013, under a Freedom of Information Act request.

The Zelikow Memo took issue with particular enhanced interrogation techniques employed by the CIA against captured enemy combatants. Many have asserted that enhanced interrogation is tantamount to torture. In particular, Zelikow focused on waterboarding, dousing, walling, cramped confinement, forced stress positions, and cold and heat exposure. He argued that these tactics would not likely stand up to the scrutiny of federal courts because they could be construed as having violated the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Other less severe tactics, including open-handed slapping, sleep deprivation, nudity, and all-liquid diets were more likely to be sustained as constitutional by federal courts, Zelikow concluded.

When testifying before Congress in May 2009 during the early months of the Barack Obama administration, Zelikow made clear that he had written a memo cautioning officials against the use of enhanced interrogation techniques in February 2006. He claimed that he did so because the Bush administration continued to employ such techniques even though President Bush had signed the so-called McCain Amendment in December 2005. That amendment prohibited cruel and inhuman punishment of enemy combatants worldwide. At the time, the Office of Legal Counsel within the U.S. Department of Justice had ruled that certain enhanced interrogation techniques nevertheless remained constitutional, despite the existence of the McCain Amendment. Upon learning of this, Zelikow stated

that he felt obliged to provide the secretary of state with an opposing, alternative position regarding certain CIA tactics.

Zelikow went on to suggest that the White House—led by Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff—immediately sought to suppress his memo and destroy all copies of it. The State Department, however, retained several copies but did not release them to the public at that time. The February 2006 memo, along with several other memos provided to Congress by Zelikow, clearly demonstrated that there were internal divisions within the Bush administration over the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. After Zelikow’s congressional appearance in 2009, the National Security Archive website sued for release of the 2006 memo under the Freedom of Information Act. Even under Obama, the State Department sought to delay the release of the document. Indeed, it was not released until April 3, 2012. The release of the document reinvigorated the long debate over the use of enhanced interrogation techniques by the U.S. government and led some to question whether these techniques continued to be employed in secret, despite public assurances that they had been suspended.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also Coercive Interrogation; Rendition; Torture; War on Terror and the CIA; Document 98

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Zenith Technical Enterprises

A front company operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for broadcasting propaganda and collecting radio transmissions during 1962–1968. The University of Miami South Campus, the former home of Richmond Naval Air Station, was the site of the CIA’s signals intelligence covert operation against Cuba. The 1,571-acre property between Coral Reef and Eureka Drives was a site for communications operated under U.S. Army cover after leasing it from the University of Miami. Officially, it was known as the JMWAVE facility. Eventually the CIA directed its entire operation in southern Florida from this site under the cover of a fake corporation known as Zenith Technical Enterprises. This site was reportedly the largest CIA field station in the world. It is estimated that more than 400 CIA operatives worked out of this facility.

Jan Goldman

See also Documents 11, 14, 28, 36, 37

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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



An Encyclopedia

of Covert Ops,

Intelligence Gathering,

and Spies

JAN GOLDMAN, EDITOR

The Central Intelligence Agency

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**An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops,
Intelligence Gathering, and Spies**

VOLUME 2: DOCUMENTS

Jan Goldman, Editor



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1940s

1. Secret Writing: Formula for Invisible Ink (1917)

Classification: Secret

On April 19, 2011, the formula for invisible ink was released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as part of a group of six World War I-era documents. The documents for invisible ink, 30 years older than the agency, were the oldest classified documents still held by the CIA. The documents—dating from 1917 and 1918—described World War I “secret ink” recipes and instructions on how to open sealed letters covertly. One document lists chemicals and techniques to create invisible ink for what is referred to as “secret writing.” Another document, from June 1918 and written in French, provides the formula that Germans apparently used for invisible writing during World War I. The six documents were first held by the Office of Naval Intelligence during World War I, and at least one document was obtained from the French. Who the intended recipients of the documents were is unclear. Any material describing secret writing falls under the control of the CIA. The documents were exempt from declassification as recently as 1978, although some had been downgraded from secret to confidential. Some of the methods to expose the “invisible ink” include carrying a solution absorbed into an ironed handkerchief or a starched collar.

One Recipe for Invisible Ink

1. Put a tablespoon of starch into a tumbler of water and boil it. Allow the water to cool and then add 10 grams of nitrite of soda, a lawn fertilizer available in garden centers.
2. Soak a handkerchief or starched shirt collar and allow it to dry.
3. Add the material to water and the chemicals will be released, creating invisible ink. Write a message with it, ideally with a quill.
4. The person who receives the message should apply iodide of potassium, used in disinfectants and chemical hair treatments, to make it visible.

Source: "CIA Declassifies Invisible Ink Recipes and Other Spy Documents from World War I," History, <http://www.history.com/news/cia-declassifies-invisible-ink-recipes-and-other-spy-documents-from-world-war-i>.

2. Legal Problems in Establishing a New Intelligence Agency (1945)

Classification: Secret

In a memorandum written by James Edward Doyle, an assistant counselor to Secretary of State James Byrnes, is the legal advice of establishing a permanent intelligence agency after World War II. According to this document, Doyle doubts that without war an intelligence agency cannot be justified and is probably illegal. Additionally, the current intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), can be abolished by the president at any time and at which time the military would maintain all of its functions to collect and analyze information. The document concludes that the proposed new intelligence agency should come under the secretaries of state, war, and the navy. The agency should be created by executive order, based on the authority of the president as chief executive and commander in chief.

Memorandum from the Assistant to the Counselor (Doyle) to Secretary of State James Byrnes

Washington, August 21, 1945

SUBJECT: Preliminary Survey of Legal Problems Involved in Establishing New Intelligence Agency

1. Future reliance upon the First War Powers Act to support an executive order transferring functions among agencies is probably illegal. Section 1 of Title I (the reorganization Title) contains the proviso: "That the authority by this Title granted shall be exercised only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war." It is difficult to see how any reorganization at this time could meet this requirement.

2. Even if this hurdle could be surmounted, a transfer which depended upon the First War Powers Act for validity would be short-lived. Title I is to remain in force during the war and "for six months after the termination of the war, or until such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution or the President may designate." And upon termination of Title I, all agencies, departments and offices "shall exercise the same functions, duties, and powers as heretofore or as hereafter by law may be provided, any authorization of the President under this Title to the contrary notwithstanding."

3. OSS can be abolished by the President at any time. It was established by Presidential letter of July 11, 1941, under the name of the Office of the Coordinator

of Information. On June 13, 1942, by Presidential Military Order it was renamed OSS and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs.

4. If OSS were abolished, its functions would revert to the Joint Chiefs, or to the Army and Navy separately. The present functions of OSS are (a) to collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the Joint Chiefs, and (b) to plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs.

Recommendation: The proposed new intelligence agency, answerable to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, should be created by executive order, based upon the Constitutional authority of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. No mention of the First War Powers Act should be made. The general theory underlying the order should be that State, War, and Navy all possess inherent and traditional authority to engage in intelligence operations, and that it is no usurpation of Congressional authority to amalgamate these functions in a single agency over which the three Departments will continue to exercise an equal measure of control.

Source: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 1,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d1>.

3. Seeking a Replacement for the Office of Strategic Services, Memorandum from Donovan to Truman (1945)

Classification: Secret

In a memorandum from Office of Strategic Services (OSS) director William Donovan to President Harry Truman, Donovan informs the president that he has written to Bureau of the Budget director Harold Smith that the OSS should meet its deadline of shutting down. Donovan outlines the necessity of establishing a new central intelligence agency to replace the OSS. In the first attachment to the memo Donovan, speaking as a “private citizen,” discusses the “immediate necessity” of setting up another agency to do intelligence work, since “it is more difficult to do so in peace than in time of war.” In the second attachment Donovan outlines 10 principles of the importance of establishing a centralized intelligence agency. First and foremost is that the United States is the only major power not to have a coordinated foreign secret intelligence system. However, Donovan’s principles seek to establish how intelligence should be incorporated into government agencies and coordinated by a single agency. Given the domestic intelligence abuses that occurred overseas by the Axis powers, Donovan states in his third principle that “an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions either at home or abroad.” On the other hand, in the sixth principle Donovan believes

that this agency should be the sole agency for intelligence and counterintelligence operations overseas.

Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to President Truman

Washington, August 25, 1945

I enclose copy of letter I have sent to the Director of the Budget, advising him that the liquidation of OSS should be complete about January 1, 1946, and pointing out the necessity of designating an agency to take over its functions and its assets.

Also, I enclose a Statement of Principles which I believe should govern the establishment of a central intelligence agency.

This matter you have stated you wished to explore with me before coming to a decision. I hope you may find time to discuss it before I leave for Germany on the War Crimes Case within the next two weeks.

Donovan

Attachment 1: Letter from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Smith)

Washington, August 25, 1945

MY DEAR MR. SMITH: In answer to your communication of August 23, 1945 [Note: There is an August 25 letter on the same subject, Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-801, Item 27] in reference to further reduction of personnel; we are working under what is in effect a liquidation budget. Within its provisions we have taken steps to terminate many of our operational (as distinct from intelligence) activities and to reduce the remaining parts to a size consistent with present obligations in the Far East, in the occupation of Germany and Austria, and in the maintenance of missions in the Middle East and on the Asiatic and European continents.

As our liquidation proceeds it will become increasingly difficult to exercise our functions so that we have found it necessary to set up a liquidating committee with procedures and controls to provide for the gradual elimination of our services in step with the orderly reduction of personnel. [Note: See also the letter from Donovan to Smith, August 29, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 51, Records of the Office of Management and Budget, Series 39.19, OSS Organization and Function.]

It is our estimate, however, with the strictest economy of manpower and of funds the effectiveness of OSS as a War Agency will end as of January 1, or at the latest February 1, 1946, at which time liquidation should be completed. At that

point I wish to return to private life. Therefore, in considering the disposition to be made of the assets created by OSS, I speak as a private citizen concerned with the future of his country.

In our Government today there is no permanent agency to take over the functions which OSS will have then ceased to perform. These functions while carried on as incident to the war are in reality essential in the effective discharge by this nation of its responsibilities in the organization and maintenance of the peace.

Since last November, I have pointed out the immediate necessity of setting up such an agency to take over the valuable assets created by OSS. Among these assets was the establishment for the first time in our nation's history of a foreign secret intelligence service which reported information as seen through American eyes. As an integral and inseparable part of this service there is a group of specialists to analyze and evaluate the material for presentation to those who determine national policy.

It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence system. It is more difficult to do so in time of peace than in time of war.

It is important therefore that it be done before the War Agency has disappeared so that profit may be made of its experience and "know how" in deciding how the new agency may best be conducted.

I have already submitted a plan for the establishment of a centralized system. [Note: Apparent reference to Donovan's memorandum to Roosevelt, November 18, 1944 ("The Donovan Plan").] However, the discussion of that proposal indicated the need of an agreement upon certain fundamental principles before a detailed plan is formulated. If those concerned could agree upon the principles within which such a system should be established, acceptance of a common plan would be more easily achieved.

Accordingly, I attach a statement of principles, the soundness of which I believe has been established by study and by practical experience.

Sincerely,
William J. Donovan

Attachment 2: Paper by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan)

Principles—The Soundness Of Which It Is Believed Has Been Established By Our Own Experience And A First-Hand Study Of The Systems Of Other Nations—Which Should Govern The Establishment Of A Centralized United States Foreign Intelligence System.

The formulation of national policy both in its political and military aspects is influenced and determined by knowledge (or ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions and policies of other nations.

All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent worldwide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of

their Governments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.

The defects and dangers of this situation have been generally recognized. Adherence to the following would remedy this defect in peace as well as war so that American policy could be based upon information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions, capabilities and developments as seen and interpreted by Americans.

1. That each Department of Government should have its own intelligence bureau for the collection and processing of such informational material as it finds necessary in the actual performance of its functions and duties. Such a bureau should be under the sole control of the Department head and should not be encroached upon or impaired by the functions granted any other Governmental intelligence agency. Because secret intelligence covers all fields and because of possible embarrassment, no executive department should be permitted to engage in secret intelligence but in a proper case call upon the central agency for service.

2. That in addition to the intelligence unit for each Department there should be established a national centralized foreign intelligence agency which should have the authority:

- A. To serve all Departments of the Government.
- B. To procure and obtain political, economic, psychological, sociological, military and other information which may bear upon the national interest and which has been collected by the different Governmental Departments or agencies.
- C. To collect when necessary supplemental information either at its own instance or at the request of any Governmental Department by open or secret means from other and various sources.
- D. To integrate, analyze, process and disseminate, to authorized Governmental agencies and officials, intelligence in the form of strategic interpretive studies.

3. That such an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions either at home or abroad.

4. That since the nature of its work requires it to have status it should be independent of any Department of the Government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias of an operating Department). It should be under a Director, appointed by the President, and be administered under Presidential direction, or in the event of a General Manager being appointed, should be established in the Executive Office of the President, under his direction.

5. That subject to the approval of the President or the General Manager, the policy of such a service should be determined by the Director with the advice and assistance of a Board on which the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Treasury should be represented.

6. That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence, should be authorized, in the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espionage, counter-espionage and those special operations (including morale and psychological) designed to anticipate and counter any attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action.

7. That such a service should have an independent budget granted directly by the Congress.

8. That it should be authorized to have its own system of codes and should be furnished facilities by Departments of Government proper and necessary for the performance of its duties.

9. That such a service should include in its staff specialists (within Governmental Departments, civil and military, and in private life) professionally trained in analysis of information and possessing a high degree of linguistic, regional or functional competence, to analyze, coordinate and evaluate incoming information, to make special intelligence reports, and to provide guidance for the collecting branches of the agency.

10. That in time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of such agency in areas of actual and projected military operations shall be coordinated with military plans, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or if there be a consolidation of the armed services, under the supreme commander. Parts of such programs which are to be executed in the theater of military operations shall be subject to control of the military commander.

Source: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 3," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d3>.

4. Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of Its Activities to the State and War Departments (1945)

Classification: No classification markings

In this memorandum between officials of the Bureau of the Budget, duties and responsibilities are discussed as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) transferred to the State Department and the War Department. The memo give the date of establishment of the OSS as June 13, 1942, and outlines the missions of this

organization to collect and analyze strategic information as well as to plan and operate "special services" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is proposed that OSS functions be divided between these two departments.

Memorandum from the Assistant Director for Administrative Management of the Bureau of the Budget (Stone) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Smith)

Washington, August 27, 1945

SUBJECT: Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments

This memorandum is for your use in discussing with Judge Rosenman and Mr. Snyder the question of the disposition of OSS and its activities.

The Problem

OSS was established by Military Order of June 13, 1942 and was placed under the "jurisdiction" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the terms of this Order, OSS was directed to:

- a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With the close of the war, the question arises as to the disposition of OSS as an agency and the continuation or termination of its activities.

Discussion

During the war OSS has engaged in two broad kinds of activities: (1) the production of intelligence, represented chiefly by the Research and Analysis Branch; and (2) activities of an operational nature known within OSS as Strategic Service Operation.

If our previous recommendation to the State Department for the establishment of an Office of Research and Intelligence is accepted, that Department will require a considerable group of trained analysts in the field of economic, political, and geographic intelligence. By general agreement, the Research and Analysis Branch (RA) of OSS has performed very creditably in these intelligence fields during the war and its personnel is available for transfer to the State Department. There is the advantage also of obtaining for State a going concern which can continue its work with a minimum of interruption and confusion. In fact, RA has done a considerable amount of work for State during the war and many informal relationships now exist.

It is generally admitted that State lacks proper presentation facilities. This condition will be further aggravated if RA should be transferred to State to become a part of its Office of Research and Intelligence. It seems to us that Presentation should also be transferred to State.

The remaining activities are not easily described but with a few exceptions are of a nature that will not be needed in peacetime. The main problems are the presentation of the records and experience gained, the completion of some of the OSS assignments overseas, and the orderly liquidation of its overseas activities. Problems also will arise with respect to the return and reassignment or separation of the civilian and military personnel involved. The War Department seems the proper agency to take care of this job. (This does not resolve the recent intelligence problem which requires further review.)

Action Recommended

1. That you present a proposal to the Committee. A "Reconversion Committee" consisting of John W. Snyder, Samuel I. Rosenman, and Harold Smith undertook the disposal of war agency functions. Bureau of the Budget officials, with Smith's concurrence, had agreed that the research and analysis function of OSS should be transferred to the Department of State to transfer the Research and Analysis and Presentation Branches to the State Department and the remaining OSS activities to the War Department for salvage and liquidation. A tentative draft order for this purpose is attached. This order is not in final form and should be used for discussion purposes only.
2. If the decision of the Committee is favorable, clearances should be made with Acheson in State and McCloy in War as the receivers of the transferred activities. We are prepared to submit to State the necessary documents in the form of a draft departmental order and directives which will facilitate the reception of the transferred activities.
3. Prior to the issuance of the Order, clearances should be made with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy as interested parties.

Source: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 4," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d4>.

5. Hoover Wants the FBI to Be the Dominant Intelligence Agency (1945)

Classification: Personal and Strictly Confidential

In a memo to U.S. attorney general Tom Clark, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director J. Edgar Hoover expresses concerns as to the establishment of a new intelligence agency. Hoover admits that he received information that General

William Donovan is about to outline a proposed new intelligence agency. Hoover is seeking assistance in promoting the FBI's role in intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere only when he states that "it appears obvious that the Secretary of State is not adequately or fully informed as to the nature, scope or effectiveness of the Bureau's operations in this field." Hoover states as proof of his organization's effectiveness in intelligence work that its program has been "completely successful" and that "not a single incident has arisen in which the Government of the United States was subject to any unfavorable or unfortunate publicity." Hoover does not see the need for an additional new intelligence agency and believes that the FBI and the military have "ample authority" under present statutes to do such work. He points out that any additional funding for this new agency would be counterproductive, since funding of an "international espionage organization" would result in publicity that would curtail the organizations' effectiveness. To prove this point, Hoover says that while the British and Russian governments are ostensibly discontinuing their intelligence services following the war or even denying the existence of such organizations, funding and operations continue at a rapid pace. Finally, Hoover does not want to come out directly against the establishment of any new intelligence agency, but if one needs to be created, the FBI is the most qualified to do it.

Memorandum From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to Attorney General Clark

Washington, August 29, 1945

Apropos of our conversation yesterday, I am attaching hereto a suggested draft of a letter to the Secretary of State relating to the matter of continuing the Special Intelligence Service operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, however, there have been certain developments in this situation in the last twenty-four hours, about which I wanted to advise you.

I have ascertained that General William Donovan has recently seen President Truman and is writing him a letter with reference to a proposed program for the operation of a World-wide Intelligence Service. It is reasonable to assume, I believe, that the plan which General Donovan will advance to the President will be similar to the one which he has heretofore advocated and about which I have advised you in detail.

From outside sources I have learned that Colonel Frank McCarthy, new Assistant Secretary of State, has discussed the FBI's operation of the Western Hemisphere Intelligence Service with Secretary of State Byrnes. From the statements made by Mr. Byrnes to Colonel McCarthy, it appears obvious that the Secretary of State is not adequately or fully informed as to the nature, scope or effectiveness of the Bureau's operations in this field.

Collaterally, I have received information that the State Department is engaged in the establishment of an intelligence organization to be operated by and entirely within the State Department's control but on a world-wide basis. Apparently the planning of this program has reached an advanced stage.

I think, consequently, in view of these additional developments, that time is of the very essence in reaching a decision as to the future of the SIS program. As I have told you previously, I am not seeking for the Federal Bureau of Investigation the responsibility for world-wide intelligence system. I am firmly convinced, however, in light of our experiences during and even before the current world war, that the future welfare of the United States necessitates and demands the operation of an efficient, world-wide intelligence service. It is a fact, as you well know, that the SIS program operated by the Bureau in the Western Hemisphere has been completely successful. The program has produced results which were beyond our hope and expectations when we went into this field and these results were brought about without the slightest friction in the countries where we operated. Not a single incident has arisen in which the Government of the United States was subject to any unfavorable or unfortunate publicity. I think this is a rather remarkable achievement when you consider the fact that hundreds of agents operated both undercover and as open representatives of the Government of the United States throughout the Western Hemisphere, conducting thousands of investigations resulting in the acquisition, assimilation and distribution of great quantities of intelligence information. It seems to me, therefore, that taking for granted the recognition of the need for a world-wide intelligence service, it is most logical that the system which has worked so successfully in the Western Hemisphere should be extended to a world-wide coverage. As I have advised you in previous memoranda, such a step can be accomplished without the necessity for any legislative enactment creating operating agencies or empowering them to act. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military and Naval Intelligence have ample Authority under the present operating statutes to extend the Western Hemisphere coverage to a world-wide organization. This, of course, negatives the necessity for seeking through legislative channels earmarked or otherwise readily identifiable funds for the carrying on of these operations. If, on the other hand, the General Donovan plan or even the plan presently under consideration by the State Department is accepted, it will be necessary to seek Congressional authority for the program and to obtain funds which will be earmarked for and otherwise identified as being for the operation of an international espionage organization. The resulting publicity from such a step will, of course, materially curtail the effectiveness of the proposed program. Such publicity will serve to notify other nations of the program proposed to be carried out by the United States, but other nations will not similarly publicize their own intelligence operations, to the point where the United States will be in a position of advertising its intelligence organization while other nations will operate on a most secretive basis. As a matter of fact, it is well known that the British and Russian Governments, while ostensibly discontinuing their intelligence services or even denying the existence of such organizations in individual countries, are actually intensifying their coverage.

I feel very strongly that there is a need for the establishment and operation of a world-wide intelligence service. While I do not seek this responsibility for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I do believe that upon the basis of our experience of the last five years we are well qualified to operate such a service in conjunction with parallel operations of the Military and Naval Intelligence upon the same general basis as these operations have been carried on in the Western Hemisphere. I think that time is of the essence in reaching a decision upon this matter and,

consequently, I urge that you personally take the matter up with Secretary of State Byrnes as soon as possible.

Respectfully,
John Edgar Hoover

Source: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 5," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d5>.

6. It's Time to Grow Up and Establish a New Intelligence Agency (1945)

Classification: No classification markings

In a letter from Office of Strategic Services (OSS) director William Donovan to the president's special counsel Samuel Rosenman, Donovan is concerned that his organization's assets are going to be lost to other government organizations. He calls the transfer of these assets "absurd and unsatisfactory." Donovan is clearly worried that these actions will hamper the government's attempt to develop an "adequate intelligence system" to replace the OSS.

Letter of OSS Director William Donovan to Samuel Rosenman, President's Special Counsel

Washington, September 4, 1945

DEAR SAM: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to the Bureau of the Budget concerning the liquidation of the Office of Strategic Services.

Since the above meeting with the Budget Bureau, I have submitted a liquidation budget for presentation to the Congress.

I understand that there has been talk of attempting to allocate different segments of the organization to different departments. This would be an absurd and unsatisfactory thing to do. The organization was set up as an entity, every function supporting and supplementing the other.

It's time for us to grow up, Sam, and realize that the new responsibilities we have assumed require an adequate intelligence system.

Increasingly the President will see the need and I hope a new agency will be set up to take over a very useful legacy.

Sincerely,
William J. Donovan

Source: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 6," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d6>.

7. Hoover Gets Personal to Stop the Establishment of a New Intelligence Agency (1945)

Classification: Personal and Strictly Confidential

In a letter from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Tom Clark, Hoover discusses receiving information that John Magruder will be selected to become the director of the new intelligence agency (later designated as the Central Intelligence Agency). Hoover says that Magruder has "allegedly even gone to the extent of advising a large business enterprise with foreign holdings and international interests that he would 'look out for their interests' in the foreign field when he takes over his new post of duty." It was no secret that Hoover saw the new intelligence agency as a threat to the FBI and that this letter to the attorney general was an attempt to discredit the possible nomination to lead this new agency.

Memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to Attorney General Clark

Washington, September 6, 1945

I have received information today from two independent outside sources relating to General William Donovan's plans for the perpetration [perpetuation] of his dynasty within the Office of Strategic Services by the continuation of his agency under another name in the world-wide intelligence field, which I thought would be of interest to you. These sources advise that General Donovan has already selected his candidate to head up the new organization and that his selection is Brigadier General John Magruder. Another and independent source has quoted Donovan as stating that he has submitted John Magruder's name to Bob Hannegan to head up the new world-wide intelligence organization and that Hannegan has approved Magruder for this post.

John Magruder is an Army officer who during the course of his Army service was at one time chief of the intelligence branch of the War Department General Staff, was Assistant Military Attaché in China and was Chief of a Military mission to China in 1942. In addition, Magruder served in the Philippine Islands and was Military Attaché in Bern, Switzerland. Magruder has served for some time under General Donovan as Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

John Magruder married Helen Schurman, who is the daughter of Jacob Gould Schurman, who has held various diplomatic posts, including the post of Ambassador to China, Ambassador to Germany and various other positions intimately associated with the State Department. In addition, my sources state that Mrs. John

Magruder is reported to be the niece of Jacob L. Crane, deceased, who held various posts within the State Department. General Donovan's selection of John Magruder, I have been advised, was prompted in some degree by the good will and support which are attached to Magruder by a certain clique in the State Department because of their pleasant relationships with Mrs. Magruder's father and her uncle. This clique consequently is reported to be strongly supporting John Magruder for the new post as head of the World-wide Intelligence Service.

General Donovan's selection of John Magruder and the reported approval of his selection by Bob Hannegan is another of Donovan's deadly died-in-the-wool secrets which appear, however, to be matters of general knowledge. Two independent sources have advised me today that Brigadier General John Magruder has confided in certain persons that he has been selected for the post of head of the intelligence service and he has allegedly even gone to the extent of advising a large business enterprise with foreign holdings and international interests that he would "look out for their interests" in the foreign field when he takes over his new post of duty.

Although, as I have indicated, this information is allegedly very, very confidential, I have every reason to assume from the source from which I received it that ultimately this information will appear in the press.

Respectfully,
John Edgar Hoover

Source: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 8," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d8>.

8. Donovan Asks President Truman to Maintain an Intelligence Organization after World War II (1945)

Classification: No classification marking

During World War II the United States had built a formidable intelligence and covert action agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1944 its chief, William J. Donovan, formally urged President Franklin D. Roosevelt to create a permanent worldwide intelligence service after the war ended. President Roosevelt made no promises, and after Roosevelt's death (and the German surrender) President Harry Truman felt no compulsion to keep the OSS alive. America's commanders in the Pacific had no use for Donovan and the OSS, and Truman himself feared that Donovan's proposed centralized peacetime intelligence establishment might one day be used against Americans.

In this letter from Donovan to Truman, Donovan expresses his concern that rather than have one agency, the functions of a single intelligence agency will be

transferred and divided among several agencies. According to Donovan, for intelligence to be effective, it must be integrated within one organization. Donovan is clearly lobbying for a follow-on agency after the war to replace his organization.

Memo from Donovan to President Truman

Office of Strategic Services

Washington, D.C.

September 13, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. I understand that it has been, or will be, suggested to you that certain of the primary functions of this organization, more particularly, secret intelligence, counter-espionage, and the evaluation and synthesis of intelligence—that these functions be severed and transferred to separate, and in your own interest as the Chief Executive, that you will not permit this to be done.

2. Whatever agency has the duty of intelligence should have it as a complete whole. To do otherwise would be to add chaos to existing confusion in the intelligence field. The various functions in intelligence. One is dependent upon the other.

William J. Donovan
Director

Source: Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA under Harry Truman*, CIA Cold War Records Series (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 3.

9. Executive Order 9621 Terminating the Office of Strategic Services (1945)

At the end of World War II, President Harry Truman ordered the termination of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to be effective on October 1, 1945. At the same time, several of the OSS's functions were to be transferred to other departments. Truman relocated the Research and Analysis Branch in the Department of State and transferred to the War Department the Secret Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Branches, which became the Strategic Services Unit.

Executive Order 9621

TERMINATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES AND
DISPOSITION OF ITS FUNCTIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes, including Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There are transferred to and consolidated in an Interim Research and Intelligence Service, which is hereby established in the Department of State, (a) the functions of the Research and Analysis Branch and of the Presentation Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (provided for by the Military Order of June 13, 1942), excluding such functions performed within the countries of Germany and Austria, and (b) those other functions of the Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter referred to as the Office) which relate to the functions of the said Branches transferred by this paragraph. The functions of the Director of Strategic Services and of the United Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the functions transferred to the Service by this paragraph, are transferred to the Secretary of State. The personnel, property, and records of the said Branches, except such thereof as is located in Germany and Austria, and so much of the other personnel, property, and records of the Office and of the funds of the Office as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine to relate primarily to the functions transferred by this paragraph, are transferred to the said Service. Military personnel now on duty in connection with the activities transferred by this paragraph may, subject to applicable law and to the extent mutually agreeable to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, continue on such duty in the Department of State.

2. The Interim Research and Intelligence Service shall be abolished as of the close of business December 31, 1945, and the Secretary of State shall provide for winding up its affairs. Pending such abolition, (a) the Secretary of State may transfer from the said Service to such agencies of the Department of State as he shall designate any function of the Service, (b) the Secretary may curtail the activities carried on by the Service, (c) the head of the Service, who shall be designated by the Secretary, shall be responsible to the Secretary or to such other officer of the Department of state as the Secretary shall direct, and (d) the Service shall, except as otherwise provided in this order, be administered as an organizational entity in the Department of state.

3. All functions of the Office not transferred by paragraph 1 of this order, together with all personnel, records, property, and funds of the Office not so transferred, are transferred to the Department of War; and the Office, including the office of the Director of Strategic Services, is terminated. The functions of the Director of Strategic Services and of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the functions transferred by this paragraph, are transferred to the Secretary of War. Naval personnel on duty with the Office in connection with the activities transferred by this paragraph may, subject to applicable law and to the extent mutually agreeable to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, continue on such duty in the Department or War. The Secretary of War shall, whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest, discontinue any activity transferred by this paragraph and wind up all affairs relating thereto.

4. Such further measures and dispositions as may be determined by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to be necessary to effectuate the transfer or redistribution of functions provided for in this order shall be carried out in such manner as the Director may direct and by such agencies as he may designate.

5. All provisions of prior orders of the President which are in conflict with this order are amended accordingly.

6. This order shall, except as otherwise specifically provided, be effective as of the opening of business October 1, 1945.

Harry Truman
THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 20, 1945

Source: "From COI to CIG: Historical Intelligence Documents," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no3/pdf/v37i3a10p.pdf>.

10. Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy Outlining His Vision of an Intelligence Organization in the United States (1946)

In a letter to the secretaries of state, war, and the navy, President Harry Truman outlines his vision of the new intelligence agency.

Letter of President Truman to Secretaries of State, War, and Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 22, 1946

To: The Secretary of State,
The Secretary of War, and
The Secretary of the Navy

1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons

shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

- a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.
- b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of our Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
- c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
- e. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive.

5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such

intelligence information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.

9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directive.

10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods.

Sincerely yours,
Harry Truman

Source: Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA under Harry Truman*, CIA Cold War Records Series (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 29–32.

11. The State Department Declines an Offer to Take Control of Foreign Radio Broadcasts (1946)

The Department of State, in a memorandum to the director of central intelligence, refuses to assume responsibility for propaganda operations after World War II. It is recommended by Department of State officials that the War Department take control of the Foreign Broadcast Information Services, which eventually ended up as the organization that would become the Central Intelligence Agency.

Department of State Memo to the Director of Central Intelligence

May 27, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: THE PRACTICABILITY OF STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATION OF FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service)

As a result of the discussion during the meeting of the Intelligence Advisory board on May 9, 1946, and a subsequent conference with representative of the Central Planning Staff of CIG and G-2, the Department has made a careful study of the practicability of its taking over the operations of FBIS from the War Department. The Department concludes:

- a. That it is not practicable for it to assume responsibility for the operation of FBIS.
- b. That it concurs with the Director of Central Intelligence in the view that the War Department should properly continue to have responsibility for the operation of FBIS, at least during fiscal 1947.
- c. That a comprehensive program for the relocation of the facilities used by FBIS should be undertaken to improve the coverage of broadcast intelligence.
- d. That direction of the monitoring effect should be assumed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and that the Department is prepared to collaborate closely with the Director in that connection.
- e. That the service provided by FBIS is of great value and that the Department will be ready to support budget requests for FBIS.

WILLIAM L. SANGER

(Special assistant to the Secretary of State)

Source: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service: History, Part I, 1941–1947," Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/FBIS_history_part1.pdf.

12. Proposed Enabling Legislation for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency (1946)

Classification: No classification marking

On December 2, 1946, Director of Central Intelligence Hoyt Vandenberg issued a proposed draft of the legislation for the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

Washington, December 2, 1946

SUBJECT: Proposed enabling legislation for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency

Transmitted herewith is a proposed draft of enabling legislation for the Central Intelligence Agency. It is somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than the draft submitted last July.

The current draft has been expanded in the light of the experiences of the last ten months and the administrative facilities available. However, it does not materially change the interdepartmental relationships conceived in the original Presidential letter of January 22, 1946.

Section 1 (a) of the current draft consists of Findings and Declaration.

Section 1 (b) Consists of the Purpose of Act.

Section 2 consists of Definitions, as it was felt, in line with your Memorandum to General Vandenberg of July 12, 1946.

Section 3 (a) sets forth the Organization of the National Intelligence Authority, and delineates its powers. This is also in line with your Memorandum of July 12.

Section 3 (b) sets forth the Organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. The salaries have been set on a level established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. [Note: Approved August 1, 1946.] It was felt that this was necessary in order to attract the highest caliber of personnel to the Agency. In addition subsection (5) has been included in order to avail ourselves of experienced, retired personnel of the Armed Forces. The language is similar to that of Public Law 718 (79th Congress) [Note: Approved August 10, 1946.], which made similar provisions for the Veterans' Administration.

Section 3 (c) establishes the Intelligence Advisory Board.

Section 4 sets forth the Functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Section 5 has been omitted. It is thought to include, at a later date, a section on Control of Information, somewhat similar to Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This has been delayed, pending receipt of information as to the position to be taken by the Department of Justice on revisions to the Espionage Laws recommended by the War and Navy Departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Section 6 contains the General Authority, including a provision for termination of employment of personnel in the interests of the United States. This is similar to a provision in the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1947 (Public Law 470, 79th Congress, p. 14). [Note: Approved June 29, 1946.]

Section 7 is the section on Appropriations.

Section 8 is the section on Separability of Provisions.

Section 9 is the Short Title.

There is also included herewith a copy of your Memorandum for General Vandenberg, dated July 12, 1946, Subject: Proposed Bill for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency, and a Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence containing comments addressed to your Memorandum. [Note: Memorandum, Houston to Vandenberg, July 16, 1946 (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers).]

For the Director of Central Intelligence:

E.K. Wright

Colonel, GSC

Executive to Director

Enclosure

A BILL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY AND A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Declaration of Policy

Sec. 1. (a) Findings and Declaration.

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive and continuous program which will effectively accomplish the national intelligence mission of the United States by supplying the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, and such other governmental officials as shall be appropriate, with foreign intelligence of the highest possible caliber. To accomplish this mission, a central intelligence agency is required by the United States. This agency shall insure the production of the foreign intelligence necessary to enable the appropriate officials of the Government to be informed fully in their dealings with other nations, and to enable these officials to formulate national policies and plans which this Government is to pursue in order to avert future armed conflicts and assure the common defense and security of the United States. The accomplishment of this service is the national intelligence mission of the United States.

Experience preceding, during, and following two World Wars has proven that the uncoordinated decentralization of the collection, research, and dissemination of foreign intelligence information among many departments and agencies of the Government is unsatisfactory. In an attempt to remedy this situation in times of national crises, emergency means have repeatedly been adopted. These experiences have shown the need for a permanent, centralized, intelligence agency so that all the foreign intelligence sources and facilities of the Government may be utilized to the fullest extent in the production of foreign intelligence, and so that their greatest potentialities may be realized most efficiently and economically, with a resultant elimination of unproductive duplication and unnecessary overlapping of functions in the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United States.

Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that in order to strengthen the hand of the Government in formulating national policies and conducting relations with other nations, and subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the foreign intelligence activities, functions, and services of the Government be fully coordinated, and, when determined in accordance with the provisions of this Act, be operated centrally for the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United States.

Section 1. (b) Purpose of Act.

It is the purpose of this Act to carry out the policies set forth in Section 1 (a) by providing for the execution, among others, of the following major programs relating to intelligence:

(1) A program for the centralized operation of such foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government as the National Intelligence Authority determines can so be performed most effectively, efficiently, and economically.

(2) A program for the planning and development of all foreign intelligence activities of the Federal Government, and including the coordination of those activities of the departments and agencies of the Government designed for the production of foreign intelligence.

(3) A program for the collection of foreign intelligence information by any and all means deemed effective.

(4) A program of evaluation, correlation, and interpretation of the foreign intelligence information collected, in order to produce intelligence for the President and the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

(5) A program for dissemination to the President and the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government of the intelligence produced.

(6) A program for the full administration and implementation of the above.

Definitions

Sec. 2. As used in this Act.

(1) The term “foreign intelligence” shall be construed to mean the product of the timely evaluation, correlation, and interpretation of foreign intelligence information.

(2) The term “foreign intelligence information” shall be construed to mean all data pertaining to foreign governments or areas, which may affect the foreign policy or the national defense and security of the United States.

(3) The term “research” shall be construed to mean a process of evaluation (selection), correlation (synthesis), and interpretation (analysis) of intelligence information for the production of intelligence.

(4) The term “evaluation” shall be construed to mean a process of systematic and critical examination of intelligence information for the purpose of determining its usefulness, credibility, and accuracy.

(5) The term “correlation” shall be construed to mean a process of synthesis of intelligence information with all available related material.

(6) The term “interpretation” shall be construed to mean a process of determining the probable significance of evaluated intelligence information.

Organization

Sec. 3 (a) National Intelligence Authority.

(1) There is hereby established a National Intelligence Authority (hereinafter called the Authority) of five members. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy shall be members of the Authority. The President shall designate a fourth member of the Authority to serve as his personal representative thereon. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the

Navy, and the personal representative of the President shall constitute the sole voting members of the Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence, hereinafter provided for, shall sit as the fifth member of the Authority, as a non-voting member thereof. The Secretary of State shall serve as Chairman of the Authority.

(2) The members of the Authority shall hold their positions thereon by virtue of their respective offices. The members of the Authority shall serve without compensation for this service and shall perform this service in addition to such other activities, public or private, as they may engage in.

(3) In the absence of the Secretaries of State, War, or the Navy, the appropriate Acting Secretary shall sit as a member of the Authority. If the personal representative of the President is absent, the Secretaries (or Acting Secretaries) of State, War, and the Navy shall constitute a quorum of the Authority.

(4) The Authority shall hold such meetings, conduct such hearings, and receive such reports as may be necessary to enable it to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Authority shall meet at least once each month.

(5) The Authority shall be served by a Secretariat, consisting, of a Secretary and such other technical, administrative, and clerical assistance as the Authority shall deem necessary. The Central Intelligence Agency, hereinafter provided for, shall be responsible for furnishing the Secretariat with personnel. The Secretariat of the Authority shall also serve as the Secretariat of the Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter provided for, performing the same duties for this Board as for the Authority.

(6) The Authority shall determine policies and objectives for, and supervise and direct, the Central Intelligence Agency, hereinafter provided for, in the planning, development, and coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government, as well as in the conduct of those foreign intelligence operations performed centrally, in such manner as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

(7) The Authority shall have the right to transfer responsibilities and authorities in the field of foreign intelligence between departments and agencies of the Government.

(8) Policies approved by the Authority in relation to the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, insofar as they affect the national defense and security, shall govern the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the Government.

(9) If the decisions of the Authority on matters set forth in Sec. 3 (a) (6) and (7) of this Act are not unanimous, the Authority shall refer the matter to the President, whose decision shall be final.

Sec. 3 (b) Central Intelligence Agency.

(1) There is hereby established a Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter called the Agency), with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at the pleasure of the President. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$17,500 per annum.

(2) There shall be a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, appointed from civilian or military life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at the pleasure of the President. The Deputy Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$15,000 per annum. The Deputy Director shall be authorized to sign such letters, papers, and documents, and to perform such other duties as may be directed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and to act as Director in the absence of that officer, or in the case of a vacancy in the office of Director.

(3) The functions of the Agency, as outlined in Sec. 4 of this Act, shall be performed by the appropriate offices of the Agency. Each office shall be under the direction of an Assistant Director, who shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 per annum. The Assistant Directors shall be not less than four (4) and not exceed six (6) in number.

(4) Any officer of the Department of State, or of the Foreign Service of the United States, and any commissioned officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Army Air Forces, may be assigned to or detailed for duty with the Agency; and such service shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the Department of State, the Foreign Service of the United States, the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Army Air Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade, notwithstanding the provisions of Title 10 U.S. Code, Sec. 576 and Public Law 724, 79th Congress, approved August 13, 1946, and entitled "An Act to improve, strengthen, and expand the Foreign Service of the United States and to consolidate and revise the laws relating to its administration," or any other law pertaining to such pay and allowances. Any such officer of the Department of State, the Foreign Service of the United States, or commissioned officer on the active list shall receive, while serving in a position established in Sec. 3 (b) of this Act, the State Department, the Foreign Service, or the pay and allowances payable to an officer of his grade and length of service, and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the difference between the salary set forth for such position in Sec. 3 (b) of this Act and the amount of such State Department, Foreign Service, or military pay and allowances.

(5) Notwithstanding section 2 of the Act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 205), as amended (5 U.S.C. 62), or section 6 of the Act of May 10, 1916 (39 Stat. 120), as amended (5 U.S.C. 58, 59), the Director of Central Intelligence may appoint to, and employ in, any civilian office or position in the Agency, and pay, any retired commissioned officer, or retired warrant officer, of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service. The retired status, office rank, and grade of retired commissioned officers, or retired warrant officers, so appointed or employed and, except as provided in section 212 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 406), as amended (5 U.S.C. 59a), any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade, shall be in no way affected by reason of such appointment to

or employment in, or by reason of service in, or acceptance or holding of, any civilian office or position in the Agency or the receipt of the pay thereof.

Section 3. (c) Intelligence Advisory Board.

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board, (hereinafter called the Board), consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of those civilian and military intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national defense and security, as determined, from time to time, by the National Intelligence Authority.

(2) Members of the Board shall serve without compensation for this service and shall perform this service in addition to such other activities, public or private, as they may engage in.

(3) The Intelligence Advisory Board shall be served by a Secretariat, as provided for in Section 3 (a) (5) of this Act.

(4) Any recommendation of the Agency which is approved unanimously by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Board, and which they have the existing authority to execute, may be put into effect without action by the Authority.

(5) Any recommendation of the Agency which does not receive such unanimous concurrence shall be submitted to the Authority for decision, together with the dissenting opinions.

Functions

Sec. 4. Functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(a) In order to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission of the United States, the Agency shall, under the supervision and direction of the Authority:

1. Develop and recommend to the Authority establishment of over-all policies, plans, requirements, objectives, and procedures to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission and to implement the provisions of this Act;
2. Coordinate such of the foreign intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national defense and security;
3. Collect foreign intelligence information originating outside the continental limits of the United States by any and all means deemed effective;
4. Give timely evaluation, correlation, and interpretation to foreign intelligence information;
5. Disseminate national intelligence to the President and appropriate departments and agencies of the Government;
6. Operate such foreign intelligence services as the Authority determines can best be performed, or be more efficiently or economically accomplished, centrally;

7. Administer the personnel and logistical needs of the Agency, including the procurement, training, and supervision of the Agency's personnel, its budgetary requirements and disbursement of funds, and the provision of administrative and logistical support for the foreign activities of the Agency;
8. Be responsible for fully protecting sources and methods used in the collection of foreign intelligence information received by the Agency;
9. Provide for the internal security of the Agency, including the complete security of its policies, plans, requirements, objectives, procedures, operations, and personnel;
10. Formulate and promulgate integrated security policies and procedures pertaining to the safeguarding of classified information and matter of the various departments and agencies of the Government, in the interest of the national defense and security; and
11. Perform such other functions and duties relating to foreign intelligence as the President or the Authority may direct.

(b) The responsibility and authority of the departments and agencies of the Government to collect, evaluate, correlate, interpret, and disseminate departmental intelligence shall not be affected, except to the extent that the Authority may relieve them of such responsibility and authority pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 3 (a) (8) of this Act.

(c) As required in the carrying out of the provisions of this Act, there will be made immediately available on a continuing basis to the Agency all intelligence, information, and such facilities as may be necessary, in the possession of the various departments and agencies of the Government.

(d) To the extent recommended by the National Intelligence Authority, the intelligence operations of the departments and agencies of the Government shall be open to inspection by the Agency in connection with its planning functions.

(e) The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or functions, nor shall it have any functions concerning the internal security of the United States except as specifically authorized by Secs. 4 (a) (8) (9) and (10) of this Act.

General Authority

Section 6. In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to:

(1) Procure necessary services, supplies and equipment without regard to the provisions of Section 3709, Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5), as amended, upon certification by the Director, or an official designated by him for that purpose, that such action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable, and partial and advance payments may be made under contracts for such purpose;

(2) Pay quarters and cost of living allowances or in lieu thereof a salary differential to employees having permanent station outside the continental limits of the United States;

(3) Transfer to and receive from funds available to other departments or agencies of the Government such sums as may be authorized by the Bureau of the Budget, either as advance payment or reimbursement of appropriation, for the performance of any of the functions or activities authorized in this Act, and any other department or agency of the Government is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law concerning transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard to limitations of other appropriations;

(4) Order to the continental United States on leave of absence any officer or employee of the Agency upon completion of two (2) years continuous service abroad, and pay travel expenses incident thereto of employees and their dependents to their place of residence in the United States and return. Such leave will not exceed sixty (60) calendar days, and will be exclusive of time actually and necessarily spent in travel and awaiting transportation;

(5) Reimburse other Government departments and agencies for services of personnel assigned to the Agency, and other departments and agencies are hereby authorized so to assign or detail any officer or employee for duty with the Agency;

(6) Exchange funds without regard to Section 3651 Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543);

(7) Authorize couriers designated by the Director to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting the national defense and security;

(8) Establish advisory boards to advise with and make recommendations to the Agency on administration, legislation, operations, policies, research, and other matters;

(9) Make such studies and investigations, obtain such information, and hold such hearings as the Agency may deem necessary or proper to assist it in exercising any authority provided in this Act, or in the administration or enforcement of this Act, or any regulations or directives issued thereunder; and

(10) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his absolute discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

Appropriations

Section 7. Appropriations:

(a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.

(b) Within the limits of such appropriations, the Director is authorized to employ persons and means and made [make] expenditures, at the

seat of government and elsewhere, for personal services, rent, travel expenses, preparation and transportation of the remains of officers and employees who die abroad or in transit, while in dispatch of their official duties, to their former homes in this country or to a place not more distant for interment, and for ordinary expenses of such interment; rental of news-reporting services; purchase of or subscription to law books, books of reference, periodicals, newspapers, commercial and trade reports; purchase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction, cryptographic, duplication and printing machines, equipment and devices, and radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment and devices including telegraph and teletype equipment; purchase, maintenance, operation, repair and hire of motor-propelled or horse-drawn passenger-carrying vehicles and other vehicles, aircraft, and vessels of all kinds; printing and binding; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms.

(c) The Acts appropriating such sums may appropriate specified portions thereof which may be expended, (A) without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons in the Government service; (B) for objects of a confidential nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.

Separability of Provisions

Section 8. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

Short Title

Section 9. This Act may be cited as the “Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1947”.

Source: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 201,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d201>.

13. Establishing the CIA: An Excerpt from the National Security Act of 1947 (1947)

The National Security Act of 1947 was officially signed by President Harry Truman on July 26, 1947. The 94-page document includes 1,102 sections. Each section focuses on a particular aspect of national security and varies in length. For example, Section 101 focuses on the National Security Council, Section 103(B) focuses on the National Intelligence Council, Section 107 focuses on the National Security Resources Board, and Sections 701–705 focus on the “Protection of Operational

Files” at the various intelligence agencies. However, it is Section 104 that establishes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Section 104(A) that provides the duties and responsibilities of the director of the CIA, giving the agency and the person in charge of this agency its legal powers. The National Security Act of 1947 was updated as recently as August 3, 2007.

Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 104. [50 U.S.C. 403-4] (a) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—There is a Central Intelligence Agency. (b) FUNCTION.—The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the responsibilities specified in section 104A(c).

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEC. 104A. [50 U.S.C. 403-4a]

(a) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—There is a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) SUPERVISION.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(c) DUTIES.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—

1. serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
2. carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection (d).

(d) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—

(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;

(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence;

(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and

(4) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.

(e) TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF CIA EMPLOYEES.—

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the Director deems the termination of employment of such officer or employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.

(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of Personnel Management.

(f) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.—Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means.

Source: “National Security Act of 1947,” U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence, <http://intelligence.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf>.

14. CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda- and Commando-Type Functions (1947)

Classification: Top Secret

This memorandum from General Counsel Lawrence Houston to Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter is one of the first official documents that discusses the possibilities of engaging in propaganda and working with resistance groups as activities for the new intelligence agency.

Memo from General Counsel Lawrence Houston to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

September 25, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions

1. A review of the National Security Act reveals two provisions which might be construed as authority for CIA to engage in black propaganda or the type of activity known during the war as S.O., which included ranger and commando raids, behind-the-lines sabotage, and support of guerrilla warfare. section 102 (d) (4) provides that it shall be the duty of the Agency to *perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies* such additional services of common concern as the National security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. Section 102 (d) (5) provides that the Agency shall perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may direct. Taken out of context and without knowledge of its history, these sections could bear almost unlimited interpretation, provided the service performed could be shown to be of benefit to an intelligence agency or related to national intelligence.

2. Thus, black propaganda, primarily designed for subversion, confusion, and political effect, can be shown incidentally to benefit positive intelligence as a means of checking reliability of informants, effectiveness of penetration, and so forth. Even certain forms of S.O. work could be held to benefit intelligence by establishment of teams in accessible areas and by opening penetration points in confusion following sabotage or riot. In our opinion, however, either activity would be an unwarranted extension of the functions authorized in sections 102 (d) (4) and (5). This is based on our understanding of the intent of Congress at the time these provisions were enacted.

3. A review of debates indicates that Congress was primarily interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and originally did not propose any overseas collection activities for CIA. The strong move to provide specifically for such collection overseas was defeated and, as a compromise, Sections 102 (d) (4) and (5) were enacted, which permitted the National Security Council to determine the extent of the collection work to be performed by CIA. We do not believe that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage. A bitter debate at about the same time on the state Department's Foreign Broadcast Service tends to confirm our opinion. Further confirmation is found in the brief and off-the-record hearings on appropriations for CIA.

4. Aside from the discussions of normal departmental expenses for CIA as a whole, approval was given to the unvouchered funds requested by the Director of Central Intelligence mainly for specific purpose of conducting clandestine intelligence operations outside the united States. We believe that there was no intent to use either the vouchered or unvouchered funds for M.O. or S.O. work. Either of these activities would require establishment of a new branch of office, employment of considerable personnel, the procurement of huge quantities of all types of goods and materials, and large sums for expenses of administrative support and incidentals. We believe this would be an unauthorized use of the funds made available to CIA. It is our conclusion, therefore, that neither M.O. nor S.O. should be undertaken by CIA without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and the expenditure of funds for those purposes.

5. There is, however, one function now being properly performed by CIA which is so closely related to the matters discussed above as to be mentioned in connection therewith. An important by-product of the clandestine intelligence function is the acquisition of extensive information on plans in Western Europe for establishment of resistance movements in the event of further extension of Communist control. These plans include training of agents and W/T's, organizing groups, providing outside contacts, and every other form of resistance. It is on such group that M.O. and, particularly, S.O. would depend for most efficient function.

6. It is felt that this body of information might be the basis for consideration by the National Security Council, or a sub-committee thereof, in order to form a basic policy of cooperation with planned or actual resistance movements and to assign the implementation of such policy to the proper agency or body. If such implementation were then assigned to CIA, it would, we feel, still be necessary to go to Congress for authority and funds.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

Draft Directive to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, undated.

TOP SECRET

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.

2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence, under authority of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.

3. In order to insure that such psychological operations are in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad, the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with:

- a. Obtaining approval of all policy directives and major plans for such operations by a panel to be designated by the National Security Council.
- b. Coordination of operations with the senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in each area which will be directly affected by such operations.

4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret techniques, sources or contacts.

Source: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 241,” U.S. State Department, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d241>.

15. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (1947)

Classification: No classification markings

National Security Council Intelligence Directive 1 of December 12, 1947, establishes the position of U.S. director of central intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This committee consists of representatives from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The Intelligence Advisory Committee is to act as advisers to the U.S. director of central intelligence. Additionally, the directive outlines the role of the U.S. director of central intelligence in coordinating intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and information dissemination policies of the U.S. intelligence community. Finally, the directive calls for intelligence cooperation within the intelligence community.

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

December 12, 1947

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the respective intelligence chief's from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic

Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be established to advise the Director or Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence Agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed.

2. To the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) or the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representative designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence material of the various Federal Departments and Agencies relating to the national security as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the over-all government intelligence structure. Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

- a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and Agencies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the National Military Establishment, the Director of Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.
- b. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented with their intelligence organizations.
- c. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to insure full and proper implementation of Council directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the Department and Agencies as provided in paragraph b. Where disagreement arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one or more members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee over such directives, the proposed directive, together with statements of non-concurrence, shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided in paragraph a.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence. In so far as

practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes. . . .

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such Government Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial substantially differing opinions.

6. Whenever any member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee obtains information that indicates an impending crisis situation, such as the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, or a condition which affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems to be required, he shall immediately furnish the information to the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as well as to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence shall immediately convene the Intelligence Advisory Committee. After receiving the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members, the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly prepare and disseminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

7. When Security Regulations of the originating Agency permit, the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments or Agencies intelligence or intelligence information which he may possess when he deems such dissemination appropriate to their functions relating to the national security.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common concern to these Agencies as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

9. The intelligence organizations in each of the Departments and Agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available to them.

10. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization, including the CIA, shall be made available under security regulations of the Department or Agency concerned to the others for consultation.

11. The intelligence organizations within the limits of their capabilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be required by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other Departments or Agencies.

12. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements with the respective Departments and Agencies to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of each Department.

Source: “National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, Washington, January 19, 1950: Duties and Responsibilities,” Federation of American Scientists, <https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsqid01.htm>.

16. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5: Espionage and Counterespionage (1947)

Classification: Top Secret

National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 (NSCID 5) assigns the U.S. director of central intelligence responsibility for conducting espionage, counterespionage, and covert operations for intelligence collection of foreign intelligence. NSCID 5 directs the U.S. director of central intelligence to coordinate information dissemination of intelligence regarding covert operations, counterespionage, and espionage to the intelligence community. This is the only National Security Council intelligence directive that applies to covert operations.

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5

Washington, December 12, 1947

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security, except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal counterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall not be construed to preclude the counterintelligence activities of any army, navy or air command or installation and certain agreed activities by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities.

4. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an IAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate their activities with the organized covert activities.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such intelligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest therein.

6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely to overt intelligence activities unless otherwise specified.

Source: "National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, Washington, December 12, 1947: Espionage and Counterespionage Operations," Federation of American Scientists, <https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nscid05.htm>.

17. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7: Domestic Exploitation (1948)

Classification: Secret

National Security Council Intelligence Directive 7 of February 12, 1948, outlines the responsibilities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for developing intelligence sources in American corporations and nongovernmental organizations. The directive also outlines CIA policies for foreign intelligence and intelligence collection in the United States.

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7

Washington, February 12, 1948

DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purpose enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other nongovernmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

- a. Determine the foreign intelligence potential of sources so that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploitation upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence agencies. For this purpose, CIA will maintain a central index of non-governmental sources in the United States.
- b. Establish uniform procedures and standards for security clearance of all contacts in this field, and arrange such clearances.
- c. Establish uniform procedures to insure that the interests of organizations and individuals contacted will not be jeopardized.
- d. Collect through the establishment of field offices within the United States, foreign intelligence information required in the interests of the national security or by the individual intelligence agencies.
- e. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence agency representatives and non-governmental sources within the United States whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of a member agency to secure technical or other foreign intelligence information.
- f. Obtain the agreement of responsible policymaking officials of American organizations having a foreign intelligence potential before establishing and maintaining contacts within that organization.
- g. Inform the intelligence agencies of the prospective departure from or return to the United States of selected American citizens having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the agencies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or interrogation.
- h. Disseminate to the appropriate agencies all foreign intelligence information obtained through this program. Reports produced by the agencies shall be identified as such, unless the originating agency stipulates to the contrary.

Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agencies shall:

- a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field offices, if they so desire and within their capabilities, representatives to serve their interests under the direction of the CIA managers. Member agencies may, at their discretion, establish active working liaison between their Regional Offices and CIA Field Offices.
- b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for collection all their requests for foreign intelligence information to be obtained from nongovernmental sources within the United States.
- c. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved direct contacts by agency representatives with nongovernmental sources, identifying such sources by CIA code number.

- d. Obtain, to the maximum extent possible, from their departments and agencies the foreign intelligence information which the departments and agencies have received as a by-product of the normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States in connection with non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent possible, the information to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing for source security and for appropriate dissemination.
- e. Obtain, in so far as is practicable and within existing security regulations, from their departments and agencies information concerning business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States having foreign intelligence potential, which the department or agency possesses or subsequently acquires, and make the information available to the Central Intelligence Agency.
- f. Nominate representatives to serve on a committee, under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodically to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with this program.

Further to implement this undertaking, the National Security Resources Board and the components of the Military Establishment, other than the components represented on the IAC, shall furnish directly to the CIA, to the maximum extent possible, all foreign intelligence information which is received as a by-product of their normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States, in connection with non-intelligence activities.

Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the established relationship of the Departments and Agencies with business concerns, other non-governmental organizations, and individuals in the United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligence information. Nor shall it affect the normal interchange of documents between libraries of the departments and other libraries, or the development of research projects with individuals or non-governmental institutions.

Source: “National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7, Washington, February 12, 1948: Domestic Exploitation,” Federation of American Scientists, <https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nscid07.htm>.

18. Problems Arising under the National Security Act of 1947 (1948)

In a letter dated May 7, 1948, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) general counsel Lawrence Houston states that the National Security Act of 1947 does not clearly authorize the director of central intelligence to direct the CIA to conduct either covert operations or espionage.

Letter of CIA General Counsel to CIA Director

The Director

May 7, 1948

General Counsel

National Security Act of 1947

1. The following notes are submitted in connection with a discussion of problems arising in operation under the National Security Act of 1947:

- a. From an administrative point of view, the primary difficulty experienced was lack of detailed enabling legislation to support CIA's unusual administrative problems. It was thought, and properly so, that so much detail should not be put in legislation of the broad policy nature of the National Security Act. This problem has now been met by submission to the Congress of detailed enabling legislation. It is believed that this Bill, as submitted, will have the support of all the executive departments and substantial support in Congress.
- b. It has been generally agreed in most discussions that it would be desirable, if feasible, to have CIA's basic authorization provide for a Deputy Director as well as a Director. Such a provision was discussed again in connection with the CIA enabling act, and it was decided that in view of the current attitude towards military appointments, no such provision would be submitted. A check indicated that no practical difficulties have arisen, or are expected to arise, for lack of statutory authority for a Deputy Director.
- c. In its performance of the intelligence functions outlined in the National Security Act, the primary difficulty experienced by CIA has been in certain weakness of language in paragraph 102 (d) concerning the meaning of coordination of intelligence activities. Where the Act states "it shall be the duty of the Agency to advise the National Security Council . . . (and) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities" it has been strongly argued that this places on the Director a responsibility merely to obtain cooperation among the intelligence agencies. This weakness of language and the ensuing controversy might have been eliminated by the insertion after the phrase "it shall be the duty of the Agency" the following words: "and the Director is hereby empowered" or some other such phrase indicating the intent of Congress that the Director was to have a controlling voice in the coordination, subject to the direction of the National Security Council.
- d. The collection functions of CIA are provided for only in the general provision, "to perform, for benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally and to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the National security as the

National Security Council may from time to time direct.” It is known that Congress intended by these phrases to insure control of clandestine intelligence by CIA but considered that security aspects prevented its being spelled out in the language of the law. Lack of such specific direction may be considered a weakness in the National Security Act of 1947 that deserves further consideration by the Congress.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

Source: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 234,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50/Intel/d234>.

19. Establishing Covert Operations: National Security Council Directive 10/2 (1948)

Classification: Top Secret

On June 17, 1948, the National Security Council (NSC) adopted National Security Council Directive 10/2 (also known as NSC 10/2), which officially authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct covert operations. NSC 10/2 authorized a significant increase in the range of covert operations directed against the Soviet Union, including political and economic warfare as well as paramilitary activities. “Covert operations,” as defined in NSC 10/2, included all activities conducted or sponsored by the U.S. government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups in such a manner that U.S. responsibility would not be evident to unauthorized persons. The concept behind NSC 10/2 was articulated a month earlier in May 1948 by George F. Kennan, director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, who advocated for the development of a covert political action capability. International events at the time, such as the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and communist-inspired strikes in France and Italy, gave credence to Kennan’s concept. The fear of war with the Soviet Union precipitated a series of interdepartmental intelligence estimates on the likelihood of a Soviet attack on the United States and its allies. Soon thereafter, the NSC endorsed Kennan’s concept by adopting NSC 10/2. In addition to authorizing an expansion in covert activities, NSC 10/2 also established the Office of Special Projects (OSP) within the CIA under the authority of Section 102 (d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 to plan and conduct covert operations. NSC 10/2 also included three responsibilities for the director of central intelligence. First, the director was made responsible for ensuring that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies. In addition, the NSC was charged with resolving

disagreements between the director and the representatives of the secretary of state and secretary of defense over these plans. Second, with regard to wartime covert operations, the director was made responsible for ensuring that plans for such operations were drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These plans were required to be accepted by the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations. Third, the director was made responsible for informing U.S. government agencies of any covert operations that may affect them.

National Security Council Directive 10/2

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

Special security precautions are being taken in the handling of this report. For this reason it is suggested that each member of the Council may wish to return his copy for filing in the Office of the Executive Secretary, where it will be held available upon request.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Executive Secretary

Distribution:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Resources Board

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counterespionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operations reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counterespionage operations under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:

- a. A new office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.
- b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.
- c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.
- d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:
 1. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Security of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.
 2. Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.
 3. Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.
- e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.

- f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.
4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.
5. As used in this directive, “covert operations” are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct actions, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counterespionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.

Source: Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA under Harry Truman*, CIA Cold War Records Series (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 213–216.

20. Possible U.S. Courses of Action If the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade (1949)

Classification: Top Secret

The Berlin Blockade was an attempt by the Soviet Union to block Allied access to the German city of Berlin in 1948 and 1949. Ultimately, the Berlin Blockade turned out to be a total political failure for the Soviet Union, and the West managed to turn it into a major victory. This event was one of the first major conflicts of the Cold War, and the lessons of the Berlin Blockade were kept in mind during future episodes of tension between the Soviet Union and the Western world. Nevertheless, the U.S. intelligence community was tasked with determining the possibilities that the Soviet Union might try again to impose another blockade.

Report to the National Security Council

A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by the Secretary of Defense

On

Possible U. S. Courses of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade

June 1, 1949

POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES THE BERLIN BLACKADE

1. This report is submitted in accordance with the Council's direction of May 17, 1949 (NSC Action No. 215-b). It has been prepared in conjunction with the Department of state, which concurs in it.

2. Alternative U. S. courses of action have been studied, based upon the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attached as Appendix A.

3. It is recommended, in the event that the U.S.S.R. re-imposes the blockade of Berlin, that:

- a. The airlift be continued at full operational capacity.
- b. The counter-blockade be re-imposed.
- c. No attempt be made to establish a land supply route to Berlin by the use of armed motor convoys or otherwise.
- d. No attempt to "probe" the blockade to determine Soviet intentions be made. This is considered to be impracticable, to risk a serious loss of prestige and involvement in hostilities.

4. As interim measures, while the Council of Foreign Ministers is in session and thereafter unless clear written agreement is reached providing definitive arrangements for adequate rail, road and water access to Berlin, it is recommended that:

All efforts, including the airlift, be made to increase the reserve stocks of supplies in Berlin.

The airlift system be kept in a state of readiness for full operation.

All measures requisite for the reinstitution of the counter-blockade be kept in readiness.

If a satisfactory agreement for access to Berlin is not reached at the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is recommended that the Soviets be informed that any re-imposition of the blockade of Berlin will be considered to be a matter of the gravest concern to the United states; further, that the United kingdom and France be urged to join in a similar warning.

STUDY ON THE POSSIBLE UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

1. In considering the possible United States courses of action in the event the USSR re-imposes the Berlin blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have necessarily taken account of the fact that conditions attending the assumed re-imposition of the Berlin blockade cannot be accurately known in advance. Since it is manifest that the seriousness of disagreement at the Council of Foreign Ministers, prior to re-imposition of the blockade, can only be conjectured, the conclusions and recommendations contained herein should be subject to later re-examination based on all of the circumstance during and at the conclusion of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and on such indications as there may then be as to the probable motives and intentions of the USSR in re-imposing the blockade.

2. If the Council of Foreign Ministers fails to reach agreement and the Soviets re-impose the Berlin blockade, it follows that their decision to take this step would have very serious implications. It is, therefore, essential from the standpoint of national security to give full consideration to these implications. Thus, we should not assume that the next blockade would be intended only to resume the same nuisance position as has existed for the last ten months. We should realize, rather, that the new blockade may be more severe and that its basis might be a determination to force us out of Berlin by taking any steps necessary to make the airlift abortive or, perhaps, to bring about a major war issue.

3. If the Soviets do have in mind, in resuming the Berlin blockade, the creation of a really critical major issue, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that they would hope to cause the situation to develop in such a manner as to place upon the United States the responsibility for the initiation of any actual hostilities. If this is the case, then our continuation of the airlift would impose that responsibility upon the Soviets. On the other hand, our resorting to steps involving force would risk our falling in with their plans.

4. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the diplomatic field is not within their purview, the possible implications of the re-imposition of the Berlin blockade are so serious and potentially far-reaching that they believe that every practicable effort should be made to forestall such a situation. One approach might be to formalize at the Council of Foreign Ministers our right for access to Berlin. It might be said that this would not be worth trying because such formalization will not be needed if the Council of Foreign Ministers reaches satisfactory over-all conclusions while, if not, the effort would naturally fail. It may, nevertheless, be worth undertaking if handled as a point at issue in the early sessions and, in any case, to probe diplomatically the Soviet intention. It might also be worth-while, if there are indications that the Soviets intend to resume the blockade, to take strong prior diplomatic action, extending even, if attendant circumstances warrant, to a warning that blockade resumption would be considered an unfriendly act.

5. Returning, however, to the basic assumption that the Soviets have re-imposed the Berlin blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the airlift be continued or, if at that time it has been discontinued, that it be resumed and that our own blockade be re-imposed. (Present plans call for continuation of the Berlin airlift until stockpiles in Berlin reach the level of 1 March 1948. The present airlift should not be discontinued unless and until there is satisfactory indication that possibility of blockade resumption is remote.) The airlift is neither a sole nor a final action with respect solution of a new Berlin blockade problem. It is, however, an essential immediate step and, in fact, it is the only practicable step short of great risk of hostilities or decision to leave Berlin.

6. There is now no question as to the practicability of the airlift provided Soviet action does not seriously interfere. The Acting Secretary of the Army's study for the Secretary of Defense, dated 18 May 1949, on the "Support of Berlin Throughout Indefinite Period of Blockade" concludes essentially that the Berlin airlift can be continued indefinitely provided that adequate funds are made available upon request. The study further concludes that the cost will be high and that the "Military Implications Involved, in Continuing and Augmenting the Operation of the Airlift" will become more pronounced in proportion to the additional concentration of effort towards maintenance of our position in Berlin. Airlift, however, is the best solution of the problem as long as airlift remains practicable.

7. An alternative solution, not recommended, might be to attempt to establish a land supply route by the use of armed motor convoys. This was thoroughly considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after the Berlin blockade was first imposed and the conclusion then reached is still considered sound, that such an attempt would be fraught with the gravest military implications, including the risk of war, and would probably prove ineffective even if faced only with passive interference.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time further concluded that to attempt to supply Berlin by force would be justifiable only if:

- a. Every other solution had first failed or been discarded;
- b. Current evaluation indicated that the effort would be likely to succeed;
- c. The United States had first determined that risk of war in the near future and for the Berlin cause was acceptable; and
- d. All possible time had first been gained and used for adequate preparation for the attempt to supply by force and for full-out major war action in support thereof if war resulted.

9. In view of the implications as to Soviet determination and intentions implicit is a reimposition of the Berlin blockade, the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 8 above are believed to be even more valid now than when they were first reached. In simplest terms it cannot, from the military viewpoint, be justifiable to place dependence on any assumption that the Soviets in resuming the Berlin blockade would

merely be bluffing. Further, even a bluff should be called only if we are prepared for a showdown.

10. With reference to alternative number three as contained in DELSEC 1784 of 22 May 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe there would be nothing gained by such a plan. In the first place any re-institution of the Berlin blockade would now in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be dangerously close to an act of war, and, if the “probing” were then to follow there would be likelihood that the incidence of the war should be laid at the door of the United States. Consequently, they believe that by so-called “probing” much would be risked extending from serious loss of prestige to the distinct possibility of involvement in hostilities even though they assume that the plan is not intended to include the use of force. If it is intended to involve even minor use of force, their comments in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 above regarding the armed convoy proposal are fully applicable; otherwise, probing could be expected to prove only the already known fact that the Soviets had re-imposed the blockade. A demonstration of Soviet intentions would thus not be accomplished, while our prestige would suffer and needless risk of minor incidents, susceptible of development into actual hostilities, would be the only result.

11. The only other possible alternative, if the Berlin blockade is re-imposed, would be to yield our position there. Based on present circumstance and future probabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not now recommend such a step. The National Security Council on 22 July 1948, reiterated the determination of the United States to remain in Berlin in any event. Developments since that date have fully justified this determination. If, however, it becomes evident that the supply of Berlin cannot be continued by the use of force, serious consideration should then be given as to whether to risk war by resort to force or whether to evacuate U.S. forces from Berlin. At such time the effects of evacuating Berlin should be carefully reconsidered in the light of the adverse military situation. The improvement which a withdrawal from Berlin would make in our immediate military position is obvious, there is no assurance that the effects of such a move in reducing the threat of war would be lasting.

12. The overriding point that becomes manifest from consideration of the foregoing study as a whole is that blockade reimposition would raise anew, and perhaps more forcibly, all the military questions with respect to war imminence and war readiness that arose with the first blockade. In summary the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that in the event the Soviets re-impose the blockade of Berlin the airlift should be reinstituted or continued. Further serious consideration should be given at that time to the application of additional economic sanctions over and above the counter-blockade, and the taking of the strongest diplomatic action.

Source: “A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Possible U.S. Courses of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockage: June 1, 1949,” George Washington University National Security Archive, Cold War Documents Series, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-4/06-01.htm>.

1950s–1960s

21. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 12: Avoidance of Publicity (1950)

Classification: Top Secret

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 12 of 1950 authorizes all executive departments and agencies involved in intelligence to keep their communications classified. Only the head of each department or agency can grant exceptions.

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 12

Washington, January 6, 1950

AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITY CONCERNING THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 101 and 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and in accordance with Section 7 of NSC 50, the National Security Council hereby authorized and directs that the following policy be established, since any publicity, factual or fictional, concerning intelligence is potentially detrimental to the effectiveness of an intelligence activity and to the national security:

1. All departments and agencies represented by membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall take steps to prevent the unauthorized disclosure for written or oral publication of any information concerning intelligence or intelligence activities. The head of each department or agency will determine his channel for granting such authorization as may be necessary.
2. The sense of the above directive shall be communicated to all other executive departments and agencies as an expression of policy of the National Security Council.
3. In cases where the disclosure of classified information is sought from the Director of Central Intelligence, and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, the question will be referred to the National Security Council.

Source: “National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 12, Washington, January 6, 1950: Avoidance of Publicity Concerning the Intelligence Agencies of the U.S. Government,” Federation of American Scientists, <https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nscid12.htm>.

22. Soviet Capability to Conduct a Surprise Attack on the United States (1951)

Classification: Top Secret

A three-year estimate of the Soviet Union’s ability to weaken or destroy the military capabilities of the United States by surprise or clandestine attack, chemical or biological warfare, sabotage, or civil disturbance recommends protective measures.

Special Estimate: Soviet Capabilities for a Surprise Attack on the Continental United States Before July 1952

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in producing the section of this estimate covering Direct Military Attack. The section on Clandestine Attack with Weapons of Mass Destruction is based on NIE-31, published 4 September 1951. The section on Subversive Operations, Sabotage, and Civil Disturbances was prepared by and has the approval of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 10 September 1951.

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities for weakening, disrupting or destroying the war potential of the United States by a surprise attack against the Continental United States before July 1952.

ASSUMPTIONS

For the purpose of this estimate it is assumed that:

- a. A Soviet surprise attack on the US would be designed to cause the maximum possible reduction in the capability of the US to wage offensive war.
- b. The scale and nature of the Soviet effort against the US would not be significantly affected by possible simultaneous Soviet military campaigns in other areas.
- c. The USSR would not avoid employing any weapon and tactic because of US capabilities for retaliation in kind.

DISCUSSION

DIRECT MILITARY ATTACK

Air Attack

1. Atomic bombardment with long-range aircraft is the most effective among the various types of potential surprise air operations against the US within Soviet capabilities during the period considered in this estimate.
2. Other possible types of surprise air attack, such as conventional bombing with high explosives, guided missiles launched from Soviet-controlled territory and the employment of free balloons will not constitute a serious threat during the period of this estimate. Although chemical and biological weapons might be delivered by long-range aircraft, these weapons are better suited to clandestine or sabotage attack. It is considered unlikely that the USSR will possess a hydrogen bomb during the period of this estimate.

Long Range Bombardment

3. The TU-4 is the only Soviet bomber in operational use known to be capable of reaching the US with an atomic bomb from present Soviet bases. Considering present estimates of production and present TO & E strength of about 600–700 TU-4 type aircraft, it is estimated that approximately 1,000 TU-4's will be in units by mid-1952. Although the Soviets have displayed a new bomber, little is known about this aircraft, and it is unlikely that it will appear in operational numbers by mid-1952.

Range of Missions

4. It is believed that operations of Soviet Long Range Aviation would include night and bad weather missions. The following long-range operations could probably be carried out with TU-4 aircraft carrying a bomb load of 10,000 pounds:
 - a. One-way missions, from potential staging bases in northeast Siberia and from bases in the Murmansk and Baltic areas, could reach any important target in the US. There is no evidence that the Soviets have in fact developed aerial refueling techniques. However, one aerial refueling would extend the range of a one-way mission and enable Soviet planes to reach any important target in the US even from interior launching bases.
 - b. Two-way missions from Velkal (in Eastern Siberia) could be carried out against the small segment of the US northwest of Seattle. One aerial refueling would extend this radius to include an arc passing through Los Angeles, Denver, and Minneapolis. Two aerial refuelings would extend this radius to include an arc running from Galveston to Cape May.

Combat Crew Proficiency

5. Soviet Long Range Aviation has no background of combat experience such as that acquired by the UK and the US strategic air forces during World War II. An intensive training program to overcome weaknesses in long-range navigation, instrument and high altitude flyings and electronics techniques has been under way for some time. Soviet crews could be assisted by planted navigational aids and, if they were successful in gaining tactical surprise, could use US radio and other navigational aids to facilitate navigation, target location, and bomb aiming. Although it is estimated that Soviet blind bombing equipment and all-weather flying capabilities are not up to US standards, it is believed that Soviet combat crew proficiency and equipment performance are such as to permit an attempt by the USSR to carry out strategic air attacks against the US.

Atomic Attack

6. The limiting factor in the scale of atomic attack would be the stockpile of bombs available to the USSR for use against the US. The atomic stockpile for 1951 and 1952 has been estimated as follows:

Mid-1951	45
Mid-1952	100

The above stockpile figures must be considered as uncertain for the following reasons:

1. The number and/or size of the production facilities postulated in this estimate may be incorrect. The minimum program, which is not inconsistent with the information available, would provide a stockpile of about one-half the number of weapons (shown in the table.) On the other hand, from the information available at the present time, the possibility that additional or expanded production facilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be precluded.
2. (The type of weapon postulated for calculating the stockpile figures may be incorrect. It is possible by changing the weapon design to substantially increase or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile, given a certain quantity of fissionable material. Such changes, however, alter the kilo tonnage yield of the individual weapons accordingly.

Atomic weapons available to the USSR during the period of this estimate can be expected to develop from 30 to 70 kilotons TNT explosive power. Their weight would probably be between two and five tons; diameter three to five feet; and length four and a half to seven and a half feet (if a non-ballistic case is used, the length is the same as the diameter). The possession of aircraft, trained crews, and base facilities would permit an attempt by the USSR to deliver against the US the

full stockpile of atomic bombs that will be available in the period covered by this estimate.

Airborne and Amphibious Attack

7. The USSR will not be capable of launching an invasion of the US by mid-1952. However, during the period of this estimate the USSR will have limited airborne and even more limited amphibious capabilities for attack against the US.

8. It is estimated that the USSR would be capable of seizing selected areas, including airfields, in western Alaska and the Aleutians by amphibious, airborne, or combined airborne-amphibious operations. Approximately 4,000 airborne and 6,000 seaborne forces might be employed in initial attacks.

9. Because of the problems of resupply, the distances involved, the deficiencies of the Soviet surface fleet, and the lack of adequate routes leading out from probable objective areas, large-scale Soviet amphibious and/or airborne operations against the Alaska Peninsula, Fairbanks-Anchorage area or eastern Alaska are believed impracticable. However, the seizure and retention of areas in western Alaska, specifically of the Seward Peninsula or adjoining areas or parts of the Aleutian Islands is within Soviet capabilities. It is also within Soviet capabilities to execute harassing raids, employing surface lift, airlift, or submarines against Alaska.

10. Airborne operations against the US, although considered unlikely, could take the form of attacks by specially trained assault and sabotage teams against important and difficult bombing targets.

Naval Attack

Surface Fleet

11. During the period under consideration, the capability of the Soviet surface fleet and merchant marine for weakening, disrupting, or destroying the war potential of the US by surprise attack against the continental US will remain very limited.

- a. The Soviet coastal warfare force of minor combatant vessels, while numerically large, is entirely unsuited for a surprise transoceanic attack.
- b. Although the heavier Soviet surface forces are being strengthened at an appreciable rate in the form of new long-range cruisers and destroyers, they lack the requisite strength and vital carrier-borne air striking power and support for any large-scale transoceanic surprise attack. The USSR will be totally lacking in aircraft carriers during this period.
- c. The present character of the Soviet Merchant Marine, a heterogeneous collection of vessels, many obsolescent, and critically lacking in tankers, largely precludes the possibility of its employment in any large-scale transoceanic surprise attack.

- d. The USSR presently lacks the advance base facilities or mobile logistic support requisite for an attack against the US. Any attempt to establish advanced bases in the immediate future would eliminate the element of surprise.

Submarines

12. During the period up to July 1952, the USSR will have an estimated total of 370 submarines, of which 104 will be capable of launching a direct attack against the US. The probable courses of action of Soviet submarines are the following:

- a. Attacks on merchant shipping and naval vessels.
- b. Offensive minelaying along shipping routes and in the approaches to principal harbors.
- c. Landing of saboteurs and agents.
- d. Launching of guided missiles and rockets against coastal targets.
- e. Small-scale raiding or other diversionary operations.

CLANDESTINE ATTACK WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

13. Clandestine attack (For the purpose of this estimate, the term “clandestine attack” does not include either surprise attack by undisguised military forces or the employment of conventional sabotage) with atomic, chemical and biological weapons offers a high potential of effectiveness against a limited number of targets, particularly when employed concurrently with, or just prior to, the initiation of full-scale hostilities. Only atomic, chemical and biological weapons have been discussed, since the state of development of other conceivable weapons of mass destruction is such that their employment during the period of this estimate is considered most unlikely.

Clandestine Atomic Attack

14. The USSR is capable of clandestine delivery of atomic weapons by disguised aircraft, merchant ships and submarines, smuggling, and guided missiles.

Disguised Aircraft

15. Because of its resemblance to the US B-29, the Soviet TU-4 could be disguised with US markings and employed in small numbers for clandestine atomic attacks on high priority targets. The capabilities of TU-4 aircraft discussed in connection with overt air attack (paragraphs 3–5 above) apply to clandestine attack as well.

Merchant Ships

16. The USSR is capable of utilizing merchant ships to deliver atomic weapons into key US harbors. An atomic weapon could be laid as an underwater mine or detonated in the hold of a ship.

17. Laying an atomic weapon as a mine would require encasing the weapon in a watertight container and might also require special laying equipment. The USSR is capable of meeting these requirements as well as providing an accurate time-delay mechanism to permit laying the weapon several days, weeks, or months in advance of D-Day.

18. Detonation of an atomic weapon in the hold of a ship would not involve any special engineering problems.

Smuggling

19. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable material, could be broken down into relatively small components which could be smuggled separately into the US. Unusual handling precautions would not be required and radiation detection would be most improbable. Assembly of the bomb would present certain difficulties but none of an insuperable character.

20. Although it would be theoretically possible to manufacture clandestinely within the US all the components of an atomic weapon with the exception of the fissionable material, it would be difficult to procure and process the necessary material.

21. Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, components for an atomic bomb or, less probably, even an assembled bomb could be consigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives in the US as household effects or supplies without fear of official inspection by US authorities. In addition, no government agency is specifically charged with the responsibility for observing the off-loading, processing, and disposition of such shipments. This method would require the closely coordinated effort of several individuals in the US to acquire the weapon and deliver it to the target area.

22. It is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb through Customs as a commercial shipment, and many types of imports from the Soviet Satellites could be used as a "cover" for such an act. Furthermore, the number of importing firms in the US is so large that the appearance of a new firm or a change in the imports of an old firm would not automatically arouse the suspicion of the Customs authorities. Theoretically, there are numerous methods by which the USSR could endeavor to circumvent thorough Customs inspection; however, they would involve elaborate arrangements as well as the existence within the US of an efficient organization to establish dummy corporations, subvert employees of bonded carriers, etc. These requirements greatly increase the risk of detection.

23. A more serious threat, well within Soviet capabilities is the smuggling of an atomic bomb, especially if disassembled, from a Soviet port into an isolated section of the US. Such an operation could involve the transfer of a bomb from a Soviet-controlled merchant vessel or submarine to a small boat which would bring it ashore. Here it could be loaded into a truck for assembly and subsequent delivery to the target area.

Guided Missiles

24. It is estimated that the USSR has V-1 type missiles with ranges of at least 100 miles which could be launched from merchant ships or submarines. Such missiles could operate at low altitudes and could have considerably better accuracy than the German operational missiles of World War II. While there is no conclusive evidence that the USSR has an atomic warhead suitable for use in a ship-launched guided missile, the construction of such a warhead is estimated to be within Soviet capabilities.

Clandestine Chemical Warfare Attack

25. The Chemical Warfare (CW) agents most likely to be used for clandestine attack are the G-series nerve gases, primarily because of their extreme high toxicity. The USSR probably has sufficient quantities of the G-series nerve gases (GA and GB) for fairly extensive clandestine attacks.

26. Clandestine nerve gas attack is well suited for employment against personnel in key installations when the objective is immediate incapacitation of a high percentage of the personnel. Nerve gas could be released within a building by means of an aerosol bomb similar to those used for insecticides and equipped with a time mechanism. It would also be feasible to attack buildings by spraying nerve gases in the vicinity.

27. The USSR could attempt to bring nerve gases into the US by any of the methods of smuggling already discussed in connection with clandestine atomic attack, viz., diplomatic immunity, smuggling through Customs, or introduction at a point outside Customs surveillance. In all instances, the successful smuggling of nerve gas or of the complete aerosol dispensers would be considerably easier than the smuggling of atomic weapons. Nerve gas could be easily disguised as one of any number of commercial exports from the Soviet orbit transmitted in a diplomatic pouch.

Clandestine Biological Warfare Attack

28. It is estimated that the USSR is capable of producing a variety of BW agents in sufficient quantities for extensive clandestine employment against man, animals, and plants.

29. Many types of BW agents are well suited for clandestine attack, and could be employed by the USSR even well in advance of D-Day as part of an over-all plan to impair the military effectiveness of the US. In contrast to clandestine attack with atomic and chemical weapons, clandestine employment of certain BW agents would entail much less risk of identification as enemy action.

- a. Very small amounts of these agents would be required initially. Such amounts would be almost impossible to detect when being brought into this

country under the cover of diplomatic immunity or through smuggling operations. In addition, it would not be difficult to have some BW agents procured and cultured locally by a trained bacteriologist.

- b. The effects of BW agents are not apparent until hours or days after dissemination.
- c. The results of many BW agents resemble natural outbreaks of disease, and it would be difficult to connect clandestine employment of such agents with a hostile act.

BW Attack Against Personnel

30. It is likely that the only anti-personnel BW agents which the USSR would employ prior to D-Day would be those causing diseases common to the US, since the outbreak of an unusual disease would probably arouse suspicion as to its source. The statistics of the Public Health Service on the incidence of various diseases in the US are made public and undoubtedly are known to the USSR.

31. In clandestine attack, it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient concentrations of BW agents to produce large numbers of casualties in urban areas. However, BW agents could be employed clandestinely to incapacitate key individuals and personnel in vital installations. Dissemination of some airborne BW agents within a building probably would cause casualties among a large portion of the personnel. Similar results probably could be obtained from agents disseminated outside of a building and carried into the building by air currents soon after dissemination.

BW Attack Against Livestock

32. In a clandestine attack against animals, foot and mouth disease constitutes the most serious threat to this country. The disease is highly contagious, and there is a relatively long period during which an animal with this disease is capable of infecting other animals before the symptoms become apparent to anyone but an expert. Individual herds could easily be attacked, but more widespread dissemination could be initiated by infecting animals in "feeder" stockyards. Widespread outbreaks of disease could also be brought about by contaminating the anti-toxins, vaccines, and other biologicals manufactured in the US for the inoculation of animals.

BW Attack Against Crops

33. It is estimated that the USSR might possibly employ some form of cereal rust in a clandestine BW attack against US crops. However, such attack is unlikely because of the uncertainty that this disease would spread over a wide area. It is considered that attacks with other BW agents such as blights, insects, and chemical growth regulators would be impracticable.

SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS, SABOTAGE, AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Groups and Individuals Available for Soviet Subversive Purposes

34. To aid in its attempts to disrupt and frustrate our defensive and counter-offensive efforts in the circumstances of a surprise attack, the USSR has a very formidable ally within our own camp: the Communist Party, USA. The members of that organization, now estimated at 37,000, by virtue of their total devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the Soviet “fatherland,” are committed to defend the USSR “unswervingly,” with all means at their disposal and at any price.

35. Other potential sources upon which the USSR may draw (or from which it may obtain spontaneous aid) are Communist sympathizers, Communist front organizations, some Trotskyites, anti-US nationalistic groups, and persons otherwise disaffected. Additional potential sources of manpower for aid in subversive purposes are members of Soviet and Satellite diplomatic, consular, commercial, industrial, press, academic and “cultural” establishments and missions, and UN personnel.

36. Although the Communist Party, USA is well known for its highly-developed “monolithic” organizational apparatus, and for its Bolshevik “iron discipline,” the recent arrests of top leaders, and the forced hiding of others, have unquestionably caused some disruption in the previously smooth-running Party machine. Further arrests may be expected to cause additional damage to that apparatus and to its subversive potential. However, while it is realized that such action limits that potential, it still remains a threat with which to reckon.

Communist Organizational Tactics in the Present Period

37. The Communist Party, USA has always conducted some of its activities on an underground basis, but since 1947, that basis has been enlarged considerably through the taking of elaborate “security measures” designed to provide additional cover for its activities. Now, since the indictment of the National Board members (17 July 1948), and especially since the Supreme Court decision (4 June 1951) upholding the conviction of the 11 National Board members, the Party has gone even farther underground. A Soviet surprise attack would surely complete the “descent.”

38. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that Communists have no desire to go (or remain) wholly underground, except as a last resort; they find such a condition stifling and stagnating. They deem continued contact with “the masses” to be essential even in the face of what they call “a reactionary drive to destroy our Party.” Their Leninist principles call for an orderly retreat to regroup their forces for a later offensive. They are mindful of what their Soviet masters declare to be “the most important rule of Bolshevik tactics in periods of retreat, namely, to combine illegal with legal work within the various legally existing workers’ societies and unions. . . .” Thus, their organizational and tactical principles proper to this situation call for a combination of:

- a. underground (“illegal”) operation, to preserve the Party from destruction, and
- b. aboveground (“legal”) activity, carried on through fronts and infiltrated organizations and institutions of all types, with a view to endeavoring to influence “the masses” along Communist lines.

39. Accordingly, it may be expected that in the future—prior to a surprise attack and also in the event one takes place—Communist activity will be directed toward more than mere self-preservation. The Party will continue to attempt to carry out its general task of intensifying the class struggle during this, the “eve of the proletarian revolution.” Furthermore, these attempts to accomplish Communist purposes may be more difficult to detect and to frustrate than in the past, because of their increased subtlety and heavier disguise. The wire from the charge to the detonator will be longer, more tenuous, and more deeply buried than before.

Communist Action to be Anticipated in Event of Soviet Surprise Attack.

40. In the event of a surprise attack, the Communist Apparatus may be expected to make coordinated attempts immediately to destroy:

- a. our will to resist, and
- b. our means of resisting.

41. Psychological warfare directed toward the destruction of our will to resist (or toward causing fatal hesitation or confusion in repelling the attack and launching the counter-offensive) might take the form of widespread circulation (effected, e.g., through newspapers with “forged” mastheads and titles, broadcasts over seized radio stations, etc.) of false reports and rumors concerning: the strength and initial successes of the enemy; the destruction and/or capture of important cities; the slaughter of millions of military and civilian citizens by means of both powerful and insidious weapons; the surrender of important units of our Armed Forces; the existence of total confusion among our military and Government leaders; and the unmasking (forced or spontaneous) of Communists in high military and Government posts. Such efforts, if successful, might cause seriously disruptive civil disturbances, such as race riots, a revolutionary situation on the home front, and a lowering of military and civilian morale.

42. To destroy our means of resisting the attack, Communists may be expected to attempt the sabotage of our vital installations and industries. Our highly complex mode of production, with its heavily interdependent operations, offers many opportunities for causing the partial and temporary paralysis of the whole. The long-standing Communist “concentration policy”—the recruitment (and placement) of members in basic and key industries, particularly “the heavy industries and those of a war character”—has contributed to Communist capabilities with respect to sabotage. Not all Communist sabotage attempts will be directed, of course, toward

open, physical destruction. They are well aware that serious damage can be effected over a long period by fomenting labor disputes over real or alleged grievances, and by carrying out a slow-down maneuver under the guise of a fight against “speed-up.” (Communist Party members are now being instructed that although it is desirable that they support by agitation the grievances of workers in industrial plants, the members themselves must be kept in the background in such agitation.)

43. Counter-acting the Communist threat, the campaign waged by many major labor unions to expel Communists from their ranks has contributed to the limitation of the Party’s sabotage potential. In addition, increased public enlightenment concerning the Communist threat to our security has undoubtedly resulted in greater vigilance on the part of American workers with respect to the cunning tactics of their Communist fellow-employees.

Protective Measures

44. Being well aware of the grave threat to our internal security which the Communist Party, USA and related forces constitute, Federal intelligence agencies have taken extensive measures to limit, and if possible, destroy the destructive potential of that Party. The most important of these measures are the following:

- a. The arrest and prosecution of top leaders of the Party.
- b. An apprehension and detention program based on constant investigation to identify those persons whose activities indicate they are a potential danger to the internal security, and who should be immediately “immobilized” in a time of emergency.
- c. Investigation of the character, loyalty, and associations of Atomic Energy Commission applicants and employees, and of all persons having access to restricted AEC data.
- d. Facilitating the protection of resources, premises, utilities and industrial facilities essential to support a war-time industrial mobilization program, through furnishing of information to appropriate authorities concerning subversive activities, investigation of individuals having access to highly classified information, investigation of possible sabotage, furnishing of technical advice, and assistance in formulating policies, standards and procedures for protective measures.
- e. Development of informants in basic and in vital industries and facilities with a view to identifying those persons who are a potential danger to the security of those establishments.
- f. Constant, vigorous investigation of subversive groups, and of fronts and “covers” under which Communists may seek refuge and from which they may attempt to continue their “legal,” aboveground activities.
- g. Measures to insure security and loyalty of government employees, military and civilian, including investigations under the Loyalty of Government Employees Program set out in Executive Order 9835.

- h. The coordination and free exchange of information among all Federal agencies concerning matters of mutual interest.

Source: “Special Estimate: Soviet Capabilities for a Surprise Attack on the Continental United States before July 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000269249.pdf.

23. Operation ARTICHOKE (1953)

Classification: Top Secret

Operation ARTICHOKE was a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation that centered on the possible use on humans of biological warfare weapons, drugs, hypnosis, brainwashing, and torture to get accurate information from enemy suspects. However, this secret operation also included testing drugs on unsuspecting U.S. Army personnel and citizens, which makes the final word of this memo—“volunteers”—almost ludicrous. The document author and recipients are unknown.

Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT: Visit to Project

1. On this day the writer spent the day observing experiments with Mr. [REDACTED] on project [REDACTED] and in planning next year’s work on the project. (Mr. [REDACTED] has already submitted his proposal to the [REDACTED]).
2. The general picture of the present status of the project is one of a carefully planned series of five major experiments. Most of the year has been spent in screening and standardizing a large group of subjects (approximately 100) and the months between now and September 1 should yield much data, so that those five experiments should be completed by September 1. The five experiments are: (N stands for the total number of subjects involved in the experiment.)

Experiment 1—N-18 Hypnotically induced anxieties to be completed by September 1.

Experiment 2—N-24 Hypnotically increasing ability to learn and recall complex written matter, to be completed by September 1.

Experiment 3—N-30 Polygraph response under Hypnosis, to be completed by June 15.

Experiment 4—N-24 Hypnotically increasing ability to observe and recall a complex arrangement of physical objects.

Experiment 5—N-100 Relationship of personality to susceptibility to hypnosis.

3. The work for next year (September 1, 1953 to June 1, 1954) will concentrate on:

Experiment 6—The morse code problem, with the emphasis on relatively lower I.Q. subject then found on University volunteers.

Source: “File:ARTICHOKULTRADRAFT111.tif,” Wikipedia, <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ARTICHOKULTRADRAFT111.tif#file>.

24. Operation AJAX: Summary of Preliminary Plan to Overthrow Premier Mossadegh of Iran (1953)

Classification: Secret

In a cable from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials in Cyprus to CIA headquarters in the United States, a summary is provided of the operational plan for the overthrow of Premier Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran. The operation became known by its code name TAPJAX (or Operation AJAX). The plan discusses the enlistment of assistance by Iranian general Fazlollah Zahedi between the CIA officials in Cyprus and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The plan was simple: the general would whip the public into an anti-Mossadegh/anticommunist frenzy, and then at the height of protest Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi would return, seize power, and instate Zahedi as prime minister. CIA agents even posed as communists and assaulted Muslim religious leaders in an attempt to speed up the process. Several options are discussed in this preliminary plan, which provides step-by-step guidance of possible alternatives to getting the shah in power. Ultimately, on August 19, 1953, the CIA arranged for (and paid) thousands of people, including notorious Iranian mobsters, to take over the streets of Tehran and storm Mossadegh’s residence. From a purely strategic American point of view, the coup was a complete success. Approximately 800 people were reportedly killed in the riots that day.

Summary of Preliminary Plan Prepared by SIS and CIA Representatives in Cyprus

I. Preliminary Action

A. Interim Financing of Opposition

1. CIA will supply \$35,000 to Zahedi.
2. SIS will supply \$25,000 to Zahedi.
3. SIS indigenous channels Iran will be used to supply above funds to Zahedi.
4. CIA will attempt subsidize key military leaders if this necessary.

B. *Acquisition Shah Cooperation*

1. *Stage 1:* Convince the Shah that UK and US have joint aim and remove pathological fear of British intrigues against him.
 - a. Ambassador Henderson call on the Shah to assure him of US-UK common aid and British support him not Mossadeq.
 - b. Henderson to say to Shah that special US representative will soon be introduced to him for presentation joint US-UK plan.
2. *Stage 2:* Special US representative will visit the Shah and present following:
 - a. *Presentation to the Shah*
 1. Both governments consider oil question secondary.
 2. Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.
 3. Present dynasty best bulwark nation sovereignty.
 4. While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States.
 5. Mossadeq must go.
 6. US-UK financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.
 7. Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.
 - b. *Demands on the Shah*
 1. You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.
 2. If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.
 3. If not, Shah's dynasty will fall and US-UK backing of you will cease.
 4. Who do you want to head successor government? (Try and maneuver Shah into naming Zahedi.)
 5. Warning not to discuss approach.
 6. Plan of operation with Zahedi will be discussed with you.

II. *Arrangement with Zahedi*

- A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor government with US-UK support.
- B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in office.
 1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal *firman*.
 2. Military coup.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If successful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action. If it fails, military cup will follow in matter of hours.

III. *Relations with Majlis*

Important for quasi-legal effort. To prepare for such effort deputies must be purchased.

- A. Basic aim is to secure 41 votes against Mossadeq and assure quorum for quasi-legal move by being able to depend on 53 deputies in Majlis. (SIS considers 20 deputies now not controlled must be purchased.)
- B. Approach to deputies to be done by SIS indigenous agent group. CIA will backstop where necessary by pressures on Majlis deputies and will provide part of the funds

IV. *Relations with Religious Leaders*

Religious leaders should:

- A. Spread word of their disapproval Mossadeq.
- B. As required, stage political demonstrations under religious cover.
- C. Reinforce backbone of the Shah.
- D. Make strong assurances over radio and in mosques after coup that new government faithful Muslim principles. Possibly as quic pro quo prominent cleric Borujerdi would be offered ministry without portfolio or consider implementing neglected article constitution providing body five *mullahs* (religious leaders) to pass on orthodoxy of legislation.
- E. [REDACTED] should be encouraged to threaten direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies.

V. *Relations with Bazaar*

Bazaar contacts to be used to spread anti-government rumors and possibly close Bazaar as anti-government expression.

VI. *Tudeh*

Zahedi must expect violent reaction from Tudeh and be prepared to meet with superior violence.

- A. Arrest at least 100 Party and Front Group leaders.
- B. Seal off South Tehran to prevent influx Tudeh demonstrations.
- C. Via black leaflets direct Tudeh members not to take any action.

VII. *Press and Propaganda Program*

- A. Prior coup intensify anti-Mossadeq propaganda.
- B. Zahedi should quickly appoint effective chief of government press and propaganda who will:
 - 1. Brief all foreign correspondents.
 - 2. Release advance prepared US and UK official statements.
 - 3. Make maximum use Radio Tehran.

VIII. *Relations with Tribes*

- A. Coup will provoke no action from Bakhtiari, Lurs, Kurds, Baluchi, Zolfaghari, Mamassani, Boer Ahmadi, and Khamseh tribal groups.
- B. Major problem is neutralization of Qashqa'i tribal leaders.

IX. *Mechanics of Quasi-Legal Overthrow*

- A. At this moment the view with most favor is the so-called “[REDACTED] plan”—whereby mass demonstrators seek religious refuge in Majlis groups. Elements available to religious leaders would be joined by those supplied by bazaar merchants, up to 4,000 supplied by SIS controlled group, and additional elements supplied through CIA.
- B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows:
 - 1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq and USSR. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to all fabricated documents proving secret agreement between Mossadeq and Tudeh.
 - 2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to the evidence of illegally issued paper money. CIA might have capability to print masses excellent imitation currency which would be overprinted by this message.
- C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success, the coup would be mounted later that evening.

Source: “Appendix A: Initial Operation Plan for TPAJAX as Cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters on 1 June 1953; Summary of Preliminary Plan Prepared by SIS and CIA Representatives in Cyprus,” George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/appendix%20A.pdf>.

25. Using Cameras from Aircraft to Spy on the Soviet Union (1954)

Classification: None

This letter, written in Edward Land's capacity as chairman of the intelligence committee of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Technological Capabilities Panel, urged the reluctant Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to pursue development of a special high-altitude aircraft to overfly the Soviet Union and obtain detailed photographs of Soviet installations. The ultimate result would be a joint program by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Air Force that was first known as AQUATONE by the CIA. The program resulted in the development (by Lockheed's Skunk Works) and deployment of the U-2 aircraft, which remains in operation today. Land is best known as the scientist, inventor, and cofounder of the Polaroid Corporation. Among other things, he invented inexpensive filters for polarizing light, a practical system of in-camera instant photography. His Polaroid instant camera, which went on sale in late 1948, made it possible for a picture to be taken and developed in 60 seconds or less.

Letter of Edward Land to CIA Director Allen Dulles

November 5, 1954

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I am not sure that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for the contemporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence—and choosing such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to start.

With best wishes,
Edwin H. Land
Edwin H. Land, Chairman

1 Attachment Report

A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE —A SUMMARY OPPORTUNITY

Collection of large amounts of information at a minimum of risk through prompt development of a special high altitude airplane. Assurance of thousands of photographs that will yield critical analysis of vast Soviet complexes. Protection of mission by decisive attitude advantage over Soviet interception. This protection good for only a few years, thus assured only through very prompt action.

OBJECTIVES

Providing adequate locations and analyses of Russian targets including, those newly discovered.

More accurate assessment of Soviet Order of Battle and of early warning indicators, thus improving our defenses against surprise attack.

Appraising Soviet guided missile development (through photos of test range, etc.).

Improving estimates of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons and of their capacity to produce them.

Disclosing new developments which might otherwise lead to technological surprise.

Appraising Soviet industrial and economic progress.

ORGANIZATION

Secret task force under Central Intelligence Agency with strong Air Force staff assistance to equip and carry out entire mission up to point where flow of useful new intelligence is established. Task force to include top experts selected from Government agencies, armed services, universities and industry to provide for most effective application of science and technology toward fulfillment of this objective.

VEHICLE

Special “powered glider” CL-282 aircraft proposed by Lockheed. ALTITUDE—70,000 feet. SPEED—500 kt. RANGE—3,000 n.mi. GROSS WEIGHT—15,000 lbs. TAKE-OFF DISTANCE—1,200 feet.

CREW—lone pilot in heated, pressurized suit. AVAILABILITY—four aircraft for field use in 17 months assured by Lockheed.

CAMERAS

Standard Trimetrogon for charting entire overflown strip. Focal lengths from 12–48 inches to be used in multiple mounts for main work load. Special long focal length spotting camera for detailing concentrated areas down to objects as small as a man. Clear identification of Roads, Railroads, Power Lines, Industrial Plants, Airfields, Parked Aircraft, Missile Sites and the like within a strip 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long per flight.

SCHEDULE

New intelligence to start flowing within twenty months.

COST

\$22,000,000 to initial flow of significant intelligence. (Includes procurement of design, development and test of six CL-282 aircraft, training and operation of special task force and initial logistic support.)

November 5, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence

For many years it has been clear that aerial photographs of Russia would provide direct knowledge of her growth, of new centers of activity in obscure regions, and of military targets that would be important if ever we were forced into war. During a period in which Russia has free access to the geography of all our bases and major nuclear facilities, as well as to our entire military and civilian economy, we have been blocked from the corresponding knowledge about Russia. We have been forced to imagine what her program is, and it could well be argued that peace is always in danger when one great power is essentially ignorant of the major economic, military, and political activities within the interior zone of another great power. This ignorance leads to somewhat frantic preparations for both offensive and defensive action, and may lead to a state of unbearable national tension. Unfortunately, it is the U.S., the more mature, more civilized, and more responsible country that must bear the burden of not knowing what is happening in Russia. We cannot fulfill our responsibility for maintaining the peace if we are left in ignorance of Russian activity.

While aerial photography could be the most powerful single tool for acquiring information, it has until now been dangerous to fly over Russia. Up till now, the planes might rather readily be detected, less readily attacked, and possibly even destroyed. Thus no statesman could have run the risk of provocation toward war that an intensive program of overflights might produce. The Air Force has, for a long time, studied a program of overflight as a natural aspect of its Reconnaissance mission and has, in recent months, considered several proposals for airplanes designed for this purpose. While it is important that such research and development continue in the Air Force, for the present it seems rather dangerous for one of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight.

On the other hand, because it is vital that certain knowledge about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guide missile sites be obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake (with the Air Force assistance) a covert program of selected flights. Fortunately a jet-powered glider has been carefully studied by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This manufacturer proposes to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up, building, secret testing and field maintenance of this extraordinary and unorthodox, vehicle, making it feasible for a CIA task force to undertake this vital activity. Such a task force requires highly specialized and able guidance in procurement and operation (by Air Force officers for aircraft, by scientists for photographic and electronic equipment).

The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach of present Russian interception and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 lbs.), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were detected and identified.

Since the proposed mission of this plane is first of all photographic, and only secondarily electronic, a word should be said about the information expected from the photographs, as well as about the effects of the cloud cover over Russia. Photographs are appended that demonstrate the large information content of pictures taken from these great altitudes. A single mission in clear weather can photograph in revealing detail a strip of Russia 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long. Cloud cover will reduce completeness, of course, but clouds are not a serious obstacle because one can afford to wait for good weather; alternate routes over clear areas can be selected in flight; and finally, the number of intelligence targets accessible during a single mission is so large that even a partial sampling would yield an extraordinary amount of intelligence.

The opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years, because the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses for the 70,000 foot region. We therefore recommend immediate action through special channels in CIA in procuring the Lockheed glider and in establishing the CIA task force. No proposal or program that we have seen in intelligence planning can so quickly bring so much vital information at so little risk and at so little cost. We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them go efficiently and safely, and that no amount of fragmentary and indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such positive information as can thus be provided.

It is recommended that

- a. The Central Intelligence Agency establishes an initial task force to complete any necessary feasibility studies in a few weeks and that, assuming successful completion of the studies, the following further actions be taken.
- b. A permanent task force, including Air Force supporting elements, be set up. It would provide guidance on procurement, to effect requirements and plan missions in view of priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissemination of the resulting information in a manner consistent with its special security requirements.

- c. The procurement of a coordinated system from Lockheed, consisting of CL-282 aircraft with photographic and electronic equipment be authorized.
- d. Such high altitude overflights be authorized in principle.

Source: “Letter, Edwin Land to Allen Dulles, November 5, 1954 w/att: Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence; Subject: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence—A Summary, November 5, 1954,” George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-03.pdf>.

26. Justification for Spying on the Soviet Union (1957)

Classification: Top Secret/Codeword [Only 10 copies were distributed.]

This report assesses that accurate intelligence on Soviet guided missiles, long-range bombers, and nuclear weapons production would allow the United States to prepare for Soviet attack and that targets deemed critical by the intelligence community are susceptible to penetration by the U.S. AQUATONE spy plane development program.

Report on Justification for Spying on Soviet Union

February 20, 1957

JUSTIFICATION FOR PENETRATION

1. The most accurate intelligence obtainable on the Soviet ability and readiness to launch an attack against the US will give you the basis for fixing the speed and effort of our preparations to counter the US against such attack.
2. For the most part, this involves how accurately we estimate Soviet development and capability with reference to three matters:
 - a. Guided missiles
 - b. Long range bombers
 - c. Nuclear weapons production.
3. We must admit that our estimates on these matters are based upon fragmentary evidence. We cannot with authority today provide the information which will enable you to judge whether missile development in the USSR surpasses our own. We cannot say with authority whether the USSR is placing greater emphasis on guided missiles or on long range aircraft. Our nuclear weapons stockpile estimates admit

to a significant margin of error and could be failing to detect a large scale Soviet expansion in this field.

4. The implication of our ignorance can be of extraordinary consequence in terms of national defense.

5. Because of this, the intelligence community has defined certain highly critical targets [REDACTED] urgently needed for accurate estimating and for pinpointing subsequent collection. These targets have not been adequately penetrated to date. They are, however, now susceptible to penetration by AQUATONE.

6. We must bear in mind that we will talk only about places and things which we suspect or have positive evidence exist. The instance of our stumbling onto [REDACTED] which has revealed a possible technological breakthrough either in guided missiles or atomic energy or both, creates the nightmare of how many more ominous installations exist and where.

7. I would like to call attention to [REDACTED] targets bear upon these problems. My comments on them will suggest why we think they are important, what we should see if we go there, and what we will learn. Attached herewith listed separately are targets bearing upon guided missiles, long range aircraft, and nuclear weapons, each with an explanation of why it was chosen, what we will see or may see if we go there, and what we will learn.

Source: "CORONA: America's First Satellite Program," CIA Library, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/corona.pdf>.

27. Proposing Project CORONA: Purpose, Cost, and Responsibilities (1958)

Classification: Top Secret

The CORONA Program was a series of American strategic reconnaissance satellites produced and operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Science & Technology with substantial assistance from the U.S. Air Force. The CORONA satellites were used for photographic surveillance of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other areas beginning in June 1959 and ending in May 1972. This memorandum from CIA deputy director for plans Richard Bissell to CIA director Allen Dulles proposes this project. The Directorate for Plans reportedly controlled more than half of the CIA's budget and was responsible for what became known as the CIA's black operations (i.e., covert operations.)

Project CORONA Proposal

April 15, 1958

Project CORONA

1. *Purposes:* Project CORONA contemplates the covert development and subsequent operational use of a short-lived reconnaissance satellite from which, at the completion of its mission, a recoverable capsule containing exposed film is separate for return and pick up in a preselected ocean area. Prior to the initiation of this project, the development of such a system had been started by the Air force as a part of Weapons System 117L but was officially cancelled early in March. Thus, CORONA involves the picking up and carrying through covertly of a program already undertaken together with technical modifications therein as indicated below.

2. *Configuration:* Taking advantage of arrangements already made by the Air Force, the basic vehicle for project CORONA will be a two-stage rocket consisting of the same second stage that is being built by Lockheed for WS-117L with a Thor booster as the first stage. The pod contains a twenty-four inch focal length camera and a recoverable capsule into which the exposed film feeds as the camera separates. Either the whole second stage of the vehicle, or possibly only the pod containing the payload, will be stabilized after it is in orbit and will serve as a platform from which the camera continuously looks downward to the earth and take pictures by scanning at the right angles of the path. This configuration is expected to yield a resolution of about twenty feet on the ground which should be sufficient to permit structures to be distinguished from one another and to allow the detection and identification of such major reconnaissance targets as missile sites under construction, previously unobserved communities, or other major installations in the areas hitherto inaccessible to reconnaissance such as the Soviet far north.

3. *Program:* It is proposed that twelve vehicles in the above configuration be produced. Although it has not yet been possible to establish a firm schedule of delivery dates, it appears probable that the first firing can be no later than June of 1959. It is tentatively planned to schedule firings initially at the rate of one a month but to achieve a faster rate, perhaps as high as two per month, as soon as possible. Assuming that this timing can be achieved the twelve firings should be completed in the spring of 1960. It must be assumed that by no means all of these vehicles will be successfully orbited, operate without malfunction and be recovered. At a later date it may be desirable to consider whether this program should be extended with or without further technological improvement.

4. *Modification of Earlier Plans:* The configuration briefly described above differs from that contemplated in the program originally launched by the Air Force. The earlier plan called for sin stabilization of the pod containing the payload, a six inch focal length camera without image motion compensation, and a very short

exposure time. Such a configuration could be available as much as six months sooner and would involve somewhat less technological risk (because of its reliance on a proven method of stabilization) than the one presently proposed. On the other hand, it would require the use of fast film which results in grainy photography and would yield a resolution of only sixty feet on the ground. To carry through the development of the modified configuration in parallel would have obvious advances but would add four or five million dollars to the total cost of the program. This would complicate the problem of maintaining cover, the balance it is believed that (a) effects should be concentrated on the development of the more sophisticated modified version and (b) that the earlier availability date of the original configuration does not justify the cost in terms of funds and effort of continuing its development in parallel with modified configuration.

5. *Administration:* CORONA is being carried out under the authority of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency with the support and participation of the U.S. Air Force. ARPA has authorized, and will exercise general technical supervision over the development of the vehicle. Detailed supervision of vehicle development is being performed by the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division acting as agent for ARPA. The Ballistic Missile Division is responsible also for the provision of necessary ground facilities, which are in any case required for the WS-117L program. CIA is participating in supervision of the technical development, especially as applied to the actual reconnaissance equipment, is undertaking all procurement that must be handled covertly, and has general responsibility for cover and for the maintenance of security. In the operational phase, actual missile launchings will be carried out at Cooke Air Force Base by technical staffs of the companies concerned. Tracking will be carried out from stations being established by the Ballistic Missile Division. Recovery will be accomplished by a Navy task force. The line of command for these field activities of launching, tracking, and recovery will be through the Ballistic Missile Division. Subject to approval by the appropriate political authorities, the general schedule of launchings will be determined by the availability of vehicles and launching facilities. Specific timing within this schedule will be determined so far as possible on the basis of weather prevailing over target areas. For both cover and control purposes, weather will be reported through an already existing CIA channel and firing dates will be selected by the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. *Cover and Security:* As noted above the initial step taken to place this undertaking a truly covert basis was the cancellation of the program already started by the Air Force as a part of its WS-117L development. The cover and security arrangements already made or contemplated are as follows:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. Since actual missile firings attract public attention, a cover explanation will be required during the operational phases to explain plausibly the decent or more launchings that will take place and the recovery operations which will

be carried out by the Navy and will involve considerable numbers of Naval personnel. [REDACTED]

- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]

7. *Procurement:* Of the total procurement required for CORONA, as large a proportion as possible will be handled relatively overtly as a part of the WS-117L and other programs. In accordance with this general plan, both the Thor booster, which is produced by Douglas for a number of military applications, and the Lockheed second stage vehicle, which (as noted above) is being developed for WS-117L, will be procured by the Air Force. The Thor boosters will be allocated from a group of deliveries already earmarked for certain miscellaneous Air Force programs (including re-entry tests and biomedical programs). The second stage vehicles will be allocated from production already scheduled for the WS-117L program. Only the pods containing reconnaissance equipment and the recoverable film cassettes will be procured covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency. Production of only the cover items will be compartmented in the several companies. The responsibility for systems integration and final assembly will rest with Lockheed. Arrangements are being made which will permit Lockheed's production, testing, and the bulk of its check-out activities to be compartmented and securely carried out up to the moment when the reconnaissance pod is substituted for a biomedical or instrumented nose cone payload.

8. *Financing:* The total cost of the program herein outlined, assuming that it will be limited to twelve vehicles, is estimated at approximately [REDACTED].

- a. Of this amount, covert procurement of the payload would account for approximately seven million dollars as follows:

Recoverable Capsules	[REDACTED]
Cameras	[REDACTED]
Payload Pod and assembly costs	[REDACTED]
TOTAL	7.0 million dollars

It is proposed that these costs be financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, subject to obtaining the funds from the Agency's reserve.

- b. The largest part of the [REDACTED] total represents the cost of the Thor boosters and the Lockheed second stage vehicles. A rather arbitrary allowance of [REDACTED] per completed vehicle has been included for these items which therefore account for [REDACTED] dollars of the total. Since these will be procured in connection with other programs, as noted above, they will be financed in the same way as these other programs. For the most part they will be financed by ARPA through the Air Force as elements of the WS-117L and biomedical programs. There is some question, however, concerning the allocation of the cost of Thor boosters. In any case the

whole cost of the basic vehicles will be funded within presently approved programs.

- c. In addition to the foregoing costs for development and procurement of hardware there will be significant operational costs. Moreover certain ground facilities, including especially two new launching pads at Cooke AFB and certain tracking facilities, will be built sooner than they would otherwise be needed. It would be difficult to make a meaningful estimate of costs of this character properly chargeable to CORONA and no such estimate has been attempted. The ground facilities required for CORONA would in any case be needed for WS-117L. Certain operational costs may properly be treated as developmental costs for WS-117L and certain operational costs (for example part of the cost of search and recovery) are not truly additional costs since they represent the use of military resources already in being. These costs must in any event be charged to other programme for reasons of cover and will be absorbed by these programs.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (15 Apr 58)

Source: "CORONA: America's First Satellite Program," CIA Library, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/corona.pdf>.

28. An Opportunity to Spread Propaganda (1960)

Classification: Confidential

This memo recounts conversations with Colombian citizens seeking U.S. financial support for an organization to promote anticommunist propaganda and create an "informal 'spy' network" to inform the U.S. and Colombian governments about extremist activities.

Memorandum of Conversation

October 31, 1960

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alberto SARRIA M.
Mr. Jaime BAQUERO SANZ

Mr. John Berta

SUBJECT: Group of Colombian Professional Men Request U.S. Assistance in Formation Anti-Communist Organization

On October 31, I was visited by a Colombian named Alberto SARRIA M., age 29 years. He gave his office address as Avenida 28, No. 22-30 and 22-32; telephone:

45-05-11. Mr. Sarria stated that he is a lawyer and that he is a member of a group of about ten professional men who are alarmed by the inroads of Communism in Colombia, especially among the intellectuals, and want to do something about it. He stated that his group had a specific plan of action which he would be happy to discuss at length. He stated that in general his group hopes to promote the distribution of anti-Communist propaganda and to create an informal “spy” network which would inform this Embassy and the Colombian Government of what was going on among the extremist elements in Colombia. He stated that his group had good contacts and could obtain worthwhile information. When asked if he had contacted the Colombian Government regarding his “spy” proposal, he replied in the negative.

Mr. Sarria stated that his group did not have the economic resources to undertake the propaganda program they had in mind and asked if the U.S. Government could supply a monthly sum to assist their group. When asked Mr. Sarria what amount of money he felt his group needed monthly, he was unable to state even an approximate amount. I continued that while I appreciated the anti-Communist attitude of Mr. Sarria, I did not believe that financial assistance would be possible since it would not be proper for the Embassy to involve itself in and support an organization of the nature proposed. I also questioned the effectiveness of a group that would be supported by U.S. Government funds if such financial support became known outside the group. I stated that we would discuss the matter with my chief upon his return to Colombia, and on a later date would be happy to explain to Mr. Sarria my chief’s views.

On Wednesday, November 2, 1960, Mr. Sarria returned to the Embassy, this time in the company of a young man, a Mr. Jaime BAQUERO Sanz, who stated that he is a lawyer, a former Secretary General or Private Secretary of the Minister of Justice from 1954 to 1955, and is the Rector Founder of the “Institutos Technicos Unidos”, an organization with offices on Carrera 10, No. 22-79, 3rd Floor. Mr. Sarria handed me the two type written documents attached which purport to explain the group’s program and objectives. These documents reveal that the group calls itself the Accion Civil Anti-Comunista. After a brief private conversation with Mr. Vaky, I talked with the visitors, indicating to them again my doubts that any financial assistance could be granted, and that Mr. Vaky expressed these same doubts. When asked how long ago they got the idea of creating this organization, they replied that they started thinking about it a year ago. To indicate the bipartisanship of their group, Mr. Baquero told me that he is a Conservative and that Mr. Sarria is a liberal. I told them that Mr. Vaky would be unable to see them today, but that if either or both of them wished to return on Monday, Mr. Vaky would be happy to talk with them. They replied that both of them would return Monday.

Source: “Group of Colombian Professional Men Request U.S. Assistance in Formation Anti-Communist Organization,” Digital National Security Archive (subscription), Item Number CD00038, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/quick/displayMultiItemImages.do?Multi=yes&queryType=quick&QueryName=cat&&ResultsID=144EF001F71&QueryName=cat&ItemNumber=3&ItemID=CCD00038>.

29. Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (1961)

Classification: Top Secret/Special Handling

This letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Central Intelligence Agency director Allen Dulles confirms an agreement with respect to the setting up of a National Reconnaissance Program and the arrangements for dealing with both the management and operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on a covert basis.

Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to CIA Director Allen Dulles

September 6, 1961

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

Re: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program

Dear Mr. Dulles:

This letter confirms our agreement with respect to the setting up of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the arrangements for dealing both with the management and operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on a covert basis.

1. The NRP will consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom.
2. There will be established on a covert basis a National Reconnaissance Office to manage this program. This office will be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency acting jointly. It will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have direct control over all elements of the total program.
3. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective: within the Department of Defense, by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; within the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Deputy

Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned duties. The Under Secretary of the Air Force will be designated Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and delegated full authority by me in this area.

4. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of the NRP, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approvals. The management and conduct of individual projects or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as the operational agency.

5. A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance Office will be established.

6. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board.

7. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the United States Intelligence Board.

8. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite systems it will be necessary to apply the revised public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure maximum protection.

9. The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.

10. Management control of the field operations of various elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the Department of Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the designated project officers for each program and, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the Deputy Director (Plans) to appropriate elements of the Central Intelligence Agency. Major program elements and operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances require by the Special Group under NSC 5412.

11. If the foregoing is in accord with your understanding of our agreement, I would appreciate it if you would kindly sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter.

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Source: “Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, Re: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, September 6, 1961,” George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/st14.pdf>.

30. The Cuba Project: Plans to Overthrow the Cuban Government (1962)

Classification: Top Secret/Sensitive

In the 1950s, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, led a guerrilla movement against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Batista lost the confidence of the Cuban people and on January 1, 1959, fled the country. Castro became premier of the new government. Aided by the United States, a Cuban exile army was trained for an invasion. In April 1961, Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion was a huge failure. Less than a year later, the Cuba Project was intended to be another attempt to overthrow the Cuban government. The plan included insurrections to provoke the overthrow of Castro in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would be responsible for establishing opposition groups and recruiting intelligence sources.

Plan for the Cuba Project

Program Review by
Brig Gen. E.G. Lansdale,
Chief of Operations
January 18, 1962

THE CUBA PROJECT

I. OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the objective and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in supporting a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the *foreignness* (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a *political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba*, with its own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). *It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people*, and make this fact known to the outside world. It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movement will capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt. Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will appeal for help to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, if possible, in concert with other Western Hemisphere nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoples' revolt. Such support to include military force, as necessary.

III. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation re Cuba. The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85.61) of 28 November 1961 contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April.

The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based on the hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba), due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February.

It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on which to base firm estimates and operations.

IV. INITIAL PHASE

(30 Nov 61–18 Jan 62)

A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project

Status: The President's directive of 30 November 1961 was implemented by creating a U.S. operations team, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations, and with tasks promptly assigned. His immediate staff is Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secretaries and Agency Directors are:

State—Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch)

CIA—Helms

Defense—Brig. Gen. Craig

USIA—Wilson

B. Intelligence Support

Status: CIA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate Cuban refugees in the USA (1,700–2,000 arriving per month) and on 16 January approved a program increasing the staff at the Opa Locka Interrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 people to 34. CIA will build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). Special, intelligence assets will be exploited more fully. The Cuba project needs far more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CIA will require further assistance from Defense and other U.S. organizations in this intelligence effort, and is submitting specific qualifications for personnel on 19 January.

C. Political platform for peoples' movement inside Cuba.

Status: State has sketched in a broad outline. CIA is to produce the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will operate inside Cuba are willing to risk their lives, and upon which popular support can be generated.

D. Nucleus for popular movement

Status: To date, CIA has been unable to produce the necessary political action agents' for this purpose. Upon re-evaluation of its capabilities, CIA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight to ten Cuban political action agents by 15 February, from among Cubans available in the United States. The minimum need for the Project to be effective is 30 such political action Cubans and CIA is tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S. and Caribbean area.

E. Deployment of nucleus

Status: CIA is tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba where political action groups can be established. Initial selection and plans for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana and localities in the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive prior consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on this must be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acquired.

F. Diplomatic actions

Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OM resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer OAS relief directly to the Buffering Cuban people (similar to U.S. relief to Russia, 1919–20) is being considered, as a means to reach the Cuban people sympathetically without going through their Communist government. The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA, and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA.

The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Project, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. This is yet to be initiated by State and must be vigorously pressed.

G. Economic warfare

Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the planning stage under State leadership. State is basing future economic actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on the outcome of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions. 15 February is set for a report on implementing plans, so that actions can be initiated. CIA was unable to undertake action to sabotage the sugar harvest, which commences about 15 January, and upon which Cuba's one-crop sugar economy depends. (Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking and cane fields was explored.)

H. TV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana. TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstration.

I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc shipments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban in transport) are not expected until mid-1962.

[REDACTED PARAGRAPH]

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political psychological factor in a people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly operations through the Church to reach the women and families and through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place.

L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.

V. Target Schedule

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico, [REDACTED], etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points, 15 February target date.

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 February. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a “name” defector to be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the *key* to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project.

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the “underground,” assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project’s goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project’s political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

C. Economic

Task 11: State to prepare recommendations to the President on U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (If the minimum result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.)

Task 12: State to plan, with Commerce and other U.S. agencies, on how to halt the *diversion* of *vital* items in the Cuban trade. Due date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly Canada, and Mexico, is to be explored by State.

Task 13: State, with Commerce and others involved, to plan on how to nuke “positive list” items to Latin America be subject to the same licensing procedural as applied to such shipments to other parts of the free world. Due 15 February.

Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend present export controls of technical data (petrochemical, communications equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Due 15 February.

Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendations on issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950 forbidding U.S. owned vessels to engage in trade with Cuba.

Task 16: State plan due by 15 February on feasible extension of U.S. port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on this).

Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harassing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (stately for security reasons), if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports.

Task 18: CIA to report on possibility of cooperation of AFL-CIO with the International Transport Federation to refuse to handle cargo for or from Cuba. Due by 15 February.

Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.)

Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain the discreet cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions. (Commerce to assist on this.)

Task 22: State to report by 15 February on status of plans to gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps to isolate Cuba from the West.

Task 23: State to report by 15 February on status of actions undertaken with Japan, which has comparatively significant trade with Cuba, along lines similar to those NATO nations.

Task 24: CIA to submit plan by 15 February on disruption of the supply of Cuban nickel to the Soviet Union. CIA will specifically consider how to block the Soviets from re-opening their supply of nickel from Canada. (Canadian contract was terminated when the Cuban supply became available to the Soviets.)

D. Psychological

Task 25: USIA to submit plan by 15 February for the most effective psychological exploitation of actions undertaken in the Project towards the end result of awakening world sympathy for the Cuban people (as a David) battling against the Communist regime (as a Goliath) and towards stimulating Cubans inside Cuba to join “the cause.”

Task 26: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for a psychological campaign to provoke a relaxing of police state control within Cuba. This is to include effective means of publicly indicting “people’s criminals” for justice after liberation of Cuba (not only individual top officials, but members of the Vigilancia, etc.).

Task 27: CIA and USIA will report on progress as of 15 February in developing identification of the popular movement inside Cuba, as with songs, symbols, propaganda themes.

Task 28: By 15 February CIA will report on plans and actions for propaganda support of the popular movement inside Cuba. Included will be exactly what is planned for use by the movement inside Cuba, and feasibility of using smuggled food packet (such as the “I Shall Return” cigarette packets to Philippine guerrillas in World War II) as morale boosters in generating the popular movement.

E. Military Action

Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S. military force to support the Cuban popular movement, including a statement of condition under which Defense believes such action would be required to win the Project’s goal and believes such action would not necessarily lead to general war. Due 28 February.

Task 30: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba, including timing proposed for the actions and how they affect the generation and support of a popular movement, to achieve the Project goals.

Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required support by Defense as early as possible after its plans firm up. Requests for all major needs are expected by 23 February.

Task 32: Defense will submit plan for “special operations” use of Cubans enlisted in the U.S. armed forces. Due 28 February.

VI. Future Plans

By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to permit a firm timetable to be constructed. Since the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the Project thought to be appropriate organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S. organizations are mainly in the initial inventory and development of capabilities phase concerning assigned tasks, a precise operational timetable as of today would be too speculative to be useful.

CIA has alerted Defense that it will require considerable military support (including two submarines, PT boats, Coast Guard type cutters, Special Forces trainers, C-54 aircraft, F-86 aircraft, amphibian aircraft, helio-couriers, Army leaflet battalion, and Guantanamo as a base for submarine operations). Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular movement, illusory and actual, which will create, a political climate which can provide a framework of plausible excuse for armed intervention. This is not in conformity with the Presidential directive now governing Project tasking. Actually, the role of creating the political climate and plausible excuse for armed intervention would be more properly that of State and Defense, if such an objective becomes desirable.

Distribution List:

1. The President
2. The Attorney General
3. The Military Assistant to the President, General Taylor
4. The Secretary of State (and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson)
5. The Secretary of Defense (and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)
6. The Director, Central Intelligence
7. The Director, USIA
8. The Department of State Project Officer, Assistant Secretary Woodward and Mr. Hurwitch
9. The Department of Defense Project Officer, Brig. Gen. Craig, (who will inform The Chairman, JCS)
10. The CIA Project Officer, Mr. Helms
11. The USIA Project Officer, Deputy Director Wilson
- 12–14. Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Source: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963: Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962, Document 291," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d291>.

31. Debriefing of Francis Gary Powers (1962)

Classification: Top Secret

On May 1, 1960, a U.S. U-2 unarmed reconnaissance plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers, who was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was shot down by Soviet military authorities 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union near Sverdlovsk. In a long speech on May 5, Soviet president Nikita Khrushchev referred to an overflight by a U.S. plane as an "aggressive act" and then announced that a U.S. spy plane had been shot down deep in Soviet territory. In another long speech on May 7, Khrushchev said that the pilot was alive and that Soviet authorities had recovered parts of the airplane. Powers was tried and convicted of espionage by the Soviet Union. He was sent back to the United States in exchange for Soviet spies held by American officials. In the transcript below, Powers describes what it was like to be shot down in his aircraft.

Debriefing of Francis Gary Powers

Tape: #2

Date: 13 February 1962 16:26 Hours

Time: 16:28 Hours

Present: [REDACTED]

25X1A9a: Frank, breaking off for a moment we had at the end of the previous tape we had you on the ground and ah people were I helping you out of your parachute and out of your helmet. Let's break off at that point for a moment and raise this question. Did you then or did you subsequently gain any information as to the approximate location where you hit the ground?

Powers: The only thing that I could see for sure is I estimated ah, I'd say, 25 miles or more south almost directly south I think of Sverdlovsk, maybe a little to the east. But on the south of that city. If I had a map that had more detail maybe I could pick it out because there was a collective farm. And there was ah several miles away from that place they ah took me to a ah larger village. But pretty primitive place, but ah much larger than the one I came down here and kept me there for a while and maybe I can find it on the map, ah it would show.

25X1A9a: Now how about the plane, does that lay on the same area or ah—

Powers: Ah, never saw any part of the plane except ah one piece floating down as I came down by parachute. I don't know for it hit from my relative position.

25X1A9a: Could you say for certain that the plane disintegrated in the air—both wings came off?

Powers: I will say for certain this is what it seemed like to me. First the tail came off, because this particular airplane ah, requires an altitude ah, nose-up trim. And ah, if the—you should lose the tail it would nose over forward because the nose wants to drop. And that's what it did. The nose dropped, and I can only assume that the wings came off because the airplane couldn't possibly have spun as fast as it did with the wings on. But I don't know whether they came off immediately—I don't even know how long all this took, but it seemed pretty fast. Nose went down and ah, I could feel something happening but I didn't know what was happening, but I know the tail was off at this time. Cause I could never have gotten in that position ah, with the tail intact, and the control cables were not connected because——

25X1A9a: Have you an estimate of how long it took you to get down from the time of the orange flash, from the time that you got to the ground?

Powers: I have no idea of time. I know that ah, I was going pretty fast ah, in that airplane because that altimeter was going around very fast. I seemed to be thinking ah fairly clearly here at this time, but I had for a while there a fixed idea of——on the ejection seat. Later on, I stopped to think and then started to try and climb out which I did but it—it came down ah fast. That's all I can say. The time I—I—I couldn't—I have no idea.

25X1A9a: Then from the time of the orange flash ah your—your plane was out of control and as far as you were concerned ah—ah there was no forward progress of the plane there ah—ah that is operational flight?

Powers: Lets see. I heard or felt something—nothing loud nothing ah violent, but some sort of a sensation. I—I can't say that—that I heard it and I can't say that it . . . I only felt . . . just seemed like everything just stopped. And looked up immediately and there was the orange flash. And while I was had looked up and saw this orange flash the right wing started ah—well it started to turn to the right. I turned the wheel to the left and the right wing came up. This well seconds maybe from what I set that amount of time and then the nose started going down, and I pulled back on the stick. And no, it was just loose. So no . . . no connection to the control services and ah nose going down faster. I mean it started sort of slow and then this went over. And when it got—and it almost all, the nose ah pointing directly to the earth ah, something started happening to the airplane. I . . . I can't say that the wings came up then, but I don't see how they could stayed on there. And I assumed that that is where they came off, and if this involvement that was there, I don't know what they are, but it ended up as I

said before ah, with the nose pointing toward the sky, not straight up, but at an angle of 45 degrees or so I would think. All I could see looking up of the canopy sitting there, was sky and going round—ah and it continued doing that until I got out of the airplane, and when I did get out, I was thrown right over the nose. The G-forces just pushed me—right on I went right directly over the nose of the airplane. And it just seemed like I was floating. I'd never been in a parachute before.

25X1A9a: Now lets go back into into the air and discuss the matter of altitudes of your flight. (ah, just one minute)

Interr: By any chance did you look at your watch?

Powers: Ah, lets see. I had the times that I turned on this ah. Well see we—you know how our maps are put up I think with ah, turning points and I had recorded that, and I did know that time—one time but I can't remember. I estimated one or two minutes after that. But I can't, I can't recall what it was.

25X1A9a: If we found a duplicate map, or could reconstruct a duplicate map, could we come pretty accurate on the time?

Powers: We could come within, well now I don't know how accurate it would be but it—lets say within a half an hour or less. I'm sure less than a half hour—much maybe even less than fifteen minutes. I can't remember how much I was ah, ahead of schedule or behind schedule or—right on schedule at these places. But the navigation had gone along fairly good for I was pretty close to ah—what my—ah ah—maps and flight planning ah told me had to be at that time. So it, its not many many minutes either side of what following the flight plan would effect it.

25X1A9a: Alright. Lets discuss altitudes ah, to the best of your recollections Frank.

Powers: Starting at the beginning of the flight?

25X1A9a: Well yeah, as to what your programmed altitudes were and ah, what your recollections were.

Powers: Now briefing on that was to climb according to ah, the regular schedule we had to carry in the climb which I did, and ah, climb to 70,000 feet—level—stay at 70,000 feet the entire flight. But the airplane will not with a full fuel load would not climb to ah, 70,000 feet immediately. It takes normal a half-hour or so, or I don't know exactly how much time—I can't recall. But I was at 70,000 feet I think shortly after crossing the Russian border. I don't remember exactly where I got the ah, altitude, but I remained at 70 the entire flight until this happened.

25X1A9a: And you would say then that you were at 70,000 on this when this occurred?

Powers: When ah, thats what my altimeter ah, showed and the altimeter was set on a—a sea level ah, well ah . . . I even forgot the term. But 29.92 ah ah was set in my altimeters at sea level pressure.

25X1A9a: Barometric pressure time?

Powers: Yes, ah huh. And it was indicating 70,000 feet. So any error that it might have had would be the only.

25X1A9a: Well now, was that the ceiling of the plane?

Powers: No, No, I could have possibly got up to, when the plane was hit, I say hit when the accident happened the explosion occurred ah, I could possibly get it up above 72,000 feet because I had retarded the power so I could remain at 70,000 as instructed to.

25X1A9a: There was no danger of any—any ah ah—damage or over temp or anything by reading above 70?

Powers: No, no that would be impossible because I had already for a long time had been pulling back the power so that as the fuel burned out I could remain at 70,000.

25X1A9a: What was the ultimate ah ceiling of the plane and with ah minimum fuel oil?

Powers: Minimum fuel I could have gotten up to approximately—minimum fuel approximately 75,000 feet. But with the load I had at the time, I'd say maybe about 72. At that time. Maybe even 73, but somewhere in between those two was my estimate then.

25X1A9a: What's your best estimate of what actually happened ah?

Powers: Well after I had seen those ah condensation trails that I mentioned earlier I kept ah through my drift sight scanning all around looking for those things. And those are the only two I saw. I saw nothing—I don't know what a rocket would look like that was ah being launched if one was launched at me. Ah, but I saw no smoke no nothing like that no trails being counted. But ah this happened shortly after making a turn, and the turn took ah a minute or two I don't know how long. And during that turn I wasn't scanning the sky. So maybe something could have happened during that time I don't know. And I wouldn't have seen it. But after ah rolling out; on course and lining up on my flight line I didn't scan back behind me look around, I was busy getting lined up so that I would be right where they wanted me to be on this particular flight. They this is—this is. Well are you familiar with the way the maps are drawn up ah. The red lines meant that this was a stay as close as course as possible because this was important. Well this was a red line. And I wanted to stay on course. So I didn't look around, but spent my time lining up and then recording the time and so forth. But ah I reached this point and ah had to record altitude, oxygen, ah ah temper ah EGT ah engine readings and stuff like that. And that's what I was doing when the explosion. Now I feel myself that the explosion was external of the aircraft. I don't know what ah—ah I've never been in an aircraft that has had an internal explosion. But I feel that ah ah it would definitely be ah—the pilot would definitely feel something violent I don't know. It took a metal he'd feel some sort of vibrations or something. And there was nothing like this. I seem to maybe got a little boost like a little push from behind.

And there was another thing that I noticed when ah they took me to review the wreckage of the aircraft, I paid particular attention to or I tried to the paint on the tail section. And I could see no signs of ah of ah where it had been hot or burned. And I was thinking that if the tail came off by itself and maybe made could . . . it could have made a flash in the sky, maybe burning or something, it would have ah shown ah signs of being very hot as it came out over the tail pipes and so forth. But there was none of this. I noticed also when I reviewed the wreckage that there were ah several holes in the wings. I don't know where they could have been from fragments or something or when it hit the ground.

25X1A9a: Holes all the way through the wings or ah?

Powers: Well I only saw I think one side of the wings. And through the aluminum. Ah through one edge anyway and I can't remember whether they was all through or not. They had it in this building in this park in Moscow. But I am almost 100% convinced that it was an external explosion. That's—I don't know how it got there or anything else. But there was one other thing that ah might be important. After these people had gotten well lets see, you wanted to talk about the altitude ah. . . .

25X1A9a: Well go ahead and talk about it.

Powers: After these people had ah helped me get out of this ah parachute and helmet and took my gun, knife and so forth, ah this one arm seemed to more or less take charge, all of them in civilian clothes—most of them fairly young. Some of them I'd say the group man who took me to this ah center were, all ah between twenty-five and say forty-forty-five years of age. But one of them took charge, or seemed to and he asked me about science if there were two of us. And I said no there is only one. And he pointed up and I looked up and I think there was another parachute coming down. But it was high. I don't know how long it took me to get through this ah ah—to get out of that ah chute and get the helmet off—it didn't take very long just a few minutes. But this was a way up there ah and I'd almost swear that it was a parachute. Now I have no idea what it could be because there was no other parachute—couldn't be from my airplane. My thoughts were then later that ah maybe it was ah a rocket that they had launched. Now this was just my thinking trying to explain that. And they were had a chute that opened to let the burn-out stage, or whatever it is down. But ah that's just something that entered my mind I have no idea what it was. But I'm almost positive it was a parachute. They loaded me in a car and took me away and I never did see what it was.

25X1A9a: But you can say with certainty that there was—that you didn't come down in stages, you didn't come down say 10,000 feet or fell off or . . .

Powers: No, I came straight down, straight down. This is something that ah was mentioned to me before and ah I don't understand ah ah I think [REDACTED] mentioned it ah on the way over. And I cannot

understand this thing he said about ah the airplane descending this way and this way and this way because it wasn't my airplane that did it. At 70,000 feet the airplane fell apart and came straight down as far as I know. I don't know what kind of a shine it cut through the sky as it was falling, but it seemed to me straight down.

25X1A9a: Now just—just so we will have the record complete on this sound, how can you say for certain that you were at 70,000 feet? What is your recollection of your actual knowledge of that?

Powers: Well that was my assigned altitude and I was staying on that and after rolling out—see I had to record these things ah on these flight lines so that they will know the altitude. And I was doing this when the explosion occurred and I was on altitude on the flight line when everything was finished.

25X1A9a: In other words, this the altimeter was said . . .

Powers: The altimeter said it was that. And it wasn't ah, all, I don't know how much of air but there's not much air in the altimeter there. So depending on the ah ah atmospheric pressure I was close to 70,000 feet. But my altimeter said 70,000.

25X1A9a: Now of course I have access to the same information I think that [REDACTED] was making reference to. And ah there is ah some information to indicate ah that you may have been in the vicinity of 69 or 70,000 and then for some reason unexplained went to ah close to 74,000.

Powers: No I didn't climb.

25X1A9a: After which you came down to approximately 60,000.

Powers: Nope.

25X1A9a: And then with a fast decent, about 3500 feet a minute, came down to 37,000 and leveled off. There was absolutely none of that at all.

Powers: It, it came straight down. There was no leveling or nothing. It disintegrated at that altitude or very shortly under I don't know. Ah I don't know how far ah when the nose pointed down how far it went down before the wings came off. But it couldn't have gone far. And it came down.

25X1A9a: When you saw the plane in Gorki Park the tail section was separated from the fuselage?

Powers: And it was in good condition. Ah the tail section was by itself—ah they had the engine I think by itself—and there were pieces scattered all around—the two wings were each by themselves—ah there wasn't much left of ah or that I couldn't see anything left of the front section of the airplane. The ah cockpit and the equipment. They had part of the canopy part of the ah front of the ah canopy and the canopy that I ah ejected off so that I could climb out to head that—it was broken. But ah it was pretty much smashed up—that section.

25x1A9a: Well new, Kelly Johnson is going to go into this with you in much more technical detail than we are qualified to do probably tomorrow

afternoon or something like that. But, but ah just for our information here can you relate this this crack-up this this disintegration of the plane ah with a possible flame out of the engine. Was there a flame out immediately coincident to this or were you aware of that or is the question at all pertinent?

Powers: I can't remember exactly. But I can remember seeing some time that the rpm were going down. But I don't know when this was or anything else. But I could see ah that the engine was floating down. I don't know before it disintegrated—while it was disintegrating—or even while I was following. I don't know.

Interr: At the moment of the flash now, this orange flash, this thing was running in order and as far as your controls were concerned it was on schedule the whole flight routine and everything was routine and normal.

Powers: Everything, Everything was perfect right then . . .

Interr: As programmed you were believing . . .

Powers: The only thing was that I was flying manual and not on auto but that's the only thing. And it was flying smooth and easy very smooth.

25X1A9a: Could a malfunction of the auto-pilot have—cause—ah be ah approximate or immediate cause of an internal explosion?

Powers: As far as I know, no. Besides that the auto-pilot was cut off and had been cut off for several minutes. I don't know exactly how long, but 10 to 15, 20 minutes. Ah and I'd been flying the plane.

25X1A9a: Now as to the sighting of the destructor mechanism and your inability to do so, were you aware of what the destructor mechanism on the plane was?

Powers: Well only what I was told.

25X1A9a: What was your understanding?

Powers: It had a ah delay of 70 seconds—this particular airplane. I'm almost positive it was 70 seconds because we usually had the delay written on it. There were two switches. An "R" and I think the other was labeled destruct. And it could be re-cycled by turning it off if ah, if ah you ah you didn't want to do it any particular time by just flipping the switches back down—giving it a little time it would re-cycle itself and you could start all over again. But ah, I didn't want to—I started to do it immediately. That was the first thought that came into my mind—destruct it. I reached up for it—I even had my hand on the switch and I thought, well I better see if I can get out. So I didn't flip the switch. And then I tried to work with this ejection seat and get back into a position where I could eject myself. And I couldn't do that and it's as I said before from then on.

25X1A9a: Well now, let me get this clear. Am I, am I—were the two manual operations here, one was, one was an arm to arm the destruction mechanism and the other one was to flip the switch to start the 70 second cycle?

Powers: Yes. One of them you could flip and you could leave it flipped all the time. I think that was—that was the arm switch. And I don't know exactly how the mechanism worked—it was explained but I can't remember exactly how it worked. But you could arm it and everything was alright. But 70 seconds after getting the I think it was labeled destruct switch it was supposed to explode. They varied in different airplanes the times of the ah ah the times that laid between the flipping of the switch and the ah explosion.

25X1A9a: And what was the purpose of that destructor mechanism to destroy the equipment or the plane itself?

Powers: The equipment. Well I don't know how much of the plane it would destroy, but ah my understanding was the equipment it was to destroy. And in destroying that it would of course destroy some of the airplane too. And the ah explosive itself is located in the equipment bay. Back behind the pilot ah I don't know how far.

25X1A9a: You had some briefing on that?

Powers: Yes ah, we had gone over that ah in meetings before this. But it's been so long now that I can't remember just how this thing worked. But here is something that ah they told me during the investigation of this—ah there in Moscow and they were lying to me, and I knew were lying to me but all they told me that ah this was hooked up so that when I pulled the ejection seat that it would destroy the airplane and me too. Well later on this is ah they let me read these findings that their so called experts ah in studying this found out and the experts didn't know anything about this. It was just a trick to make me turn against the CIA in this little bit. But I knew they were lying.

25X1A9a: Well now one other point on this on this ejector. Lets see, you stated that the G-forces had you pulled forward to a point where your legs wouldn't clear and all that—I understand that, but tell me with regard to the seat how much clearance did you have if you were in position ah

Powers: Very little.

25X1A9a: Had you gone through dry runs on this event?

Powers: Well never, never going out but ah actually how much was but there's pretty small there. And the ejection seat was added to the airplane after the airplane was ah already designed and built. And ah I was convinced that I could make it alright but one or two of the pilots who were taller longer legs and so forth, ah didn't think they could get out without hitting their legs. I've heard them mention that's all.

25X1A9a: So if you were out of position in your seat why the chances are that ah if you ejected anything that was not in position would be shaved off?

Powers: Well that that's my impression. It ah, well ah this is metal across the front top of the canopy. And ah if your legs are sticking or knees were sticking out a little too far they would hit that metal. And I don't know what they would do. But I had made up my mind to use that thing

anyway if I couldn't climb out if I got closer I would—I couldn't climb out and pull it and take the chance of whatever happened. But I was too far forward to use it safely.

Interr: Gary, may I ask you a question or two?

Powers: Sure.

Interr: Ah, I'll go back to this orange flame. When you first see this, is it above or in front of you or behind. Do you have anything in that way?

Powers: Oh ah, I didn't see an explosion. I just saw a light.

Interr: All around.

Powers: All around. Ah well see I was looking out the front. And well I could see out the sides also and everything just orange.

Interr: See that that's what point I'm trying to make. You have a wind screen don't you in the bubble—I mean you can see forward up the fuselage to the front end of the plane can't you?

Powers: Yes.

Interr: So you can look ahead?

Powers: Yes.

Interr: Now, at the point of this orange effect, it's ahead of you above you and around you but completely.

Powers: That's what it seemed like to me. It just seemed like the whole sky was orange.

Interr: You didn't get the impression that something orange was behind you?

Powers: No. I just saw everything was orange.

Interr: So it couldn't have been something explosive ahead of you or some—this was an orange fire or something is there much up at head as there was at the back it was like . . .

Powers: I couldn't—I couldn't see behind see.

Interr: Well I meant out the sides.

Powers: Out the sides. Well it seemed to me to be just about the same in every direction. But I know I looked straight out the front. And I don't know how much I glanced to the sides. But I had the impression that it was all around. Anywhere I looked it that it was orange.

Interr: And then it disappears.

Powers: No. Then I got to ah messing with the controls. And I forgot about that. When ah the wings started to drop and ah the nose started to drop. But it seems to me that it did disappear. I don't remember ever seeing it again when when this thing started coming.

Interr: And you don't remember seeing something like that ah in the sky as you flipped and flopped and . . .

Powers: No, there is nothing like that again. But the only time I remember seeing it is right after this ah explosion and I either heard or felt, which I ah don't know which. Ah I looked up I saw it and then started trying to ah control the airplane that was veering a little bit. And ah I don't remember seeing it again. But ah of course I looked back down. And I guess it must have disappeared or I don't I don't know.

- Interr:** Was there anything in the construction of the aircraft ahead of your seat as the pilot that was explosive?
- Powers:** I think there was ah a destruction device in a ah recording outfit in the nose—I'm not sure. I can't remember exactly. But for ah recording ah the ah radar signals or something that could be picked up. I think there was one in there—small one just to destroy that particular cell that was also connected to this ah ah destruction device. I can't be sure.
- Interr:** Your general sensation was almost like a push . . .
- Powers:** Yes ah that . . .
- Interr:** Not a shutter from the front upon you?
- Powers:** No, uh ah. Just it seemed like ah a little boost—Not much. I felt no ah ah turbulence no nothing just seemed like just a little exhilaration. And it might just have been my imagination I don't know but I can remember feeling something.
- Interr:** You certainly didn't feel anything suddenly retarding you?
- Powers:** No, no.
- Interr:** If there was a push it was that way?
- Powers:** That way right, from behind. And I don't know whether it's because of the position of this orange that I saw but I had the impression that it was behind and on my right. And I don't know where I got this impression. But when I was thinking about it that that's where it seemed to be.
- Interr:** When the wing flipped down and then you say you saw it peel off or give away or ah . . .
- Powers:** Well the right wing just dropped like it was making a turn to the right. Just a little bit. And I ah immediately corrected and it came back up.
- Interr:** Now that that wing didn't give the impression of being hit?
- Powers:** I felt no impact or anything.
- Interr:** That's what I ah . . . and the wing it dropped?
- Powers:** It just it just seemed like the airplane was turning. Ah one wing went up and the other went down. I ah but it seemed like I was about to make a turn to the right.
- Interr:** Not like it was belted around and not going down that's what it is . . .
- Powers:** No no uh ah.
- Interr:** Nothing gives you the impression that that wing had been hit by a blast and knocked down?
- Powers:** No it just seemed to be a normal ah ah type turn.
- Interr:** But then you corrected . . .
- Powers:** Yes and it ah responded to the controls. And it didn't move too much it just went down a little bit and ah this is normal in flying you can't hold things level all the time.
- Interr:** But then almost immediately your nose . . .
- Powers:** Either immediately after or while this was coming back up the nose started going down. But it was—I remember the wing going down

and bringing it back up and the nose going down and trying to bring it up and it wouldn't come. And I don't remember that orange light any more after that first time I looked out and everything looked orange and then trying to level out and so forth.

Interr: As you moved down in your in that odd inverted position, the plane was not flaming or smoking or anything was it as far as you could recall it?

Powers: I would say there was no fire connected with . . .

Interr: No fire connected with it. In other words it's like this that a dead bird in the air—it wasn't billowing smoke or . . .

Powers: If it was I knew nothing about it.

Interr: And then . . .

Powers: I feel sure that the engine stopped at this ah was stopping as this ah maneuver started taking place. Because I can remember somewhere along that the ah rpm gauge was going down. But I can't remember exactly when I noticed that. There was some—when the nose dropped there was some very violent maneuvers. I've never experienced anything quite like it. I don't know exactly what happened there. And it didn't take long. But it ended up in that inverted position going around and I think it was going around clockwise. Wait a minute now—I was upside down. Ah well anyway when I opened the canopy it flew off to the left. So that probably meant that I was going counter-clockwise ah ah looking at it from the top say.

Interr: Now you have a face mask on and that fogged up at once I take it.

Powers: No, ah well when the canopy came off uh ah. The cold air hit it and it was . . .

Allen: Would you please go ahead and explain to this ah to us that at no time did you suffer any blackout or unconsciousness at all from the period just preceding the orange flash until you were on the ground? For record purposes.

Powers: No, there was no period to my knowledge that I was not I was in any way unconscious or anything. I can remember even now very vividly all that happened during this time. And ah—ah at that time it was very plain to me. The ah flash occurred—I made corrections on the airplane—the nose went down—it made some violent maneuvers—and started spinning and I knew it was going on all the time. What was going on all the time.

Allen: At any point on the trip, had you any feeling of nausea or any giddiness or light-headedness or did you go the whole way in good health?

Powers: I was feeling good. In fact ah I felt real good as soon as the weather cleared and I could see the ground. Because I knew I was getting ah some good stuff. And I ah felt good.

25X1A9a: In the decent when you were in the parachute coming towards the earth, you mentioned that the only thing that you saw coming down

- was what appeared to be a flat object which may possibly have been one of the wings at a considerable distance?
- Powers:** It ah was something flat falling like ah I don't know whether you would call it a leaf or maybe a flat piece of wood like a flat piece of wood that tumbles as it falls. And depending on the distance away from me would be the size if it was a long way away, which I couldn't tell, it would have been big enough to be a wing. If it was closer it could have been a smaller piece. So I don't know what that was.
- 25X1A9a:** And nothing else was observed by you on your way down—no smoke, debris anything except this one little fragment which seemed to be spinning down.
- Powers:** The only thing that I can remember seeing is that one piece. And it was just flipping.
- 25X1A9a:** And there was no . . .
- Powers:** No smoke no no fire no nothing.
- 25X1A9a:** And did you see anything that would indicate to you an explosion, such as a plane plowing into the ground or anything?
- Powers:** No I didn't see that. But one of the ah witnesses that they called at the trial said that he heard an explosion when the ah ah stuff hit the ground ah I don't know which part he was talking about. He said it sounded like an explosion I don't know. And some of my ah little parts of my maps were scorched. So there had been a fire ah on the ground but there ah was no fire in the cockpit while I was ah in it.
- Interr:** And to the best of your knowledge there was never any over temp in the engine?
- Powers:** No definitely not because I had retarded the throttle to maintain 70,000 feet so that I wouldn't climb higher and the engine was running below ah max viable temperature.
- Interr:** I think: that ah I think answers my as far as . . .
- Interr:** That's as far as we can go for right now. Suppose we adjourn and ah consider after dinner if we want to take this up this evening. Ah well it depends on you. I would think maybe get a fresh start in the morning since we got a late start this afternoon.
- Powers:** Well it's up to you.
- Interr:** Well we'll make decisions after dinner and see how we feel.
- Powers:** Fine.
- Interr:** We are concluding Tape # 2—Tuesday the 13th which started at 16:26 and is stopping at 17:18. Present at this time are Mr. Powers, [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
- 25X1A9a:** [REDACTED] had stepped out of the room a few minutes previously. This is all there is to this tape.

Source: "Debriefing of Francis Gary Powers, February 1962," All World Wars, Draco Books, <http://draco-books.com/Debriefing-of-Francis-Gary-Powers.html>.

32. First Memorandum on Probable Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba (1962)

Classification: Top Secret

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a dangerous moment in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The crisis grew out of political changes in Cuba. In the 1950s, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, led a guerrilla movement against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Batista lost the confidence of the Cuban people and on January 1, 1959, fled the country. Castro became premier of the new government. The United States subsequently embargoed trade with Cuba, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began covert operations to topple Castro. In 1960 Castro openly embraced communism and signed Cuba's first trade agreement with the Soviet Union. In April 1961 Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion was a debacle, in part because U.S. air support that had been promised was not provided. The exile army was captured. Convinced that the United States would attempt another invasion, Castro asked Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union for nuclear missiles. Khrushchev agreed to what would be the first deployment of nuclear weapons outside the Soviet Union. President John F. Kennedy at first did not believe that the Soviets would follow through on their promise. On October 14, 1962, however, photographs taken by reconnaissance planes showed that missile sites were being built in Cuba. This is the first memorandum to the president confirming that nuclear missile sites were being built for multiple-rocket ballistic missiles (MRBM) in Cuba.

Probable Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba Memo

October 16, 1962

Central Intelligence Agency

Memorandum: Probable Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba

1. Photography of 14 October 1962 has disclosed two areas in the Sierra del Rosario mountains about 50 n.m. west southwest of Havana which appear to contain Soviet MRBMs in the early stages of deployment. A third area, about five and ten miles east of the first two, respectively, appears to be a military encampment. The first site includes 14 large tents, 15 smaller tents and 75 vehicles of a number of different types. The most significant vehicles at this site are six canvas-covered trailers of 80 feet in overall length which are of the general size and configuration of those used to transport the Soviet SS-3 (700 n.m. ballistic missile) and SS-4 (1100 n.m. ballistic missile). These trailers, of which eight more are located at the second site, are believed to be larger than those required to transport the Soviet SS-2 (350 n.m. ballistic missile).

2. The second site is 5 n.m. east of the first, and in addition to the eight trailers, contains four specially configured vehicles or pieces of equipment which could be used for missile erection in a field environment. At the time of photography, one of the trailers was in juxtaposition with one of those possible erectors. This site also contains 17 large tents, 20 small tents, 10 large trucks, 16 small trucks and 12 unidentified pieces of large equipment. No other missile associated equipment, much as instrumentation or propellant storage, have been detected. No facility to store nuclear warheads can be identified at any of those three installations.

3. The dimensions of the trailers indicate that either the SS-3 or SS ballistic missile systems are involved. Both of these systems are road-mobile and can be deployed with no heavy construction work for launch pads, etc. Both the SS-3 and SS-4 are single stage vehicles which will carry a 3,000 lb. warhead to a maximum range of 700 n.m. and 1100 n.m. respectively. The SS-3 system requires liquid oxygen as an oxidant, while the SS-4 employs storable propellants. From a logistic and operational standpoint it would be more advantageous to deploy the SS-4 system to Cuba.

4. We do not have evidence from shipping coverage or other sources to indicate definitely when the missile units arrived in Cuba. From the extensiveness of the present activity, we judge that equipment may have begun to arrive during September. At the time of the 14 October photography, a column of trucks and equipment was visible on a road within one of the installations. Although we cannot be sure, it seems likely that the bulk of the personnel and equipment were shipped from the USSR as an integrated road mobile unit, suitable for field deployment. The times required to reach operational readiness could then be quite short. Assuming that the necessary fueling and handling equipment is available, that communications are being installed, and that warheads are in Cuba or en route, an operational MRBM capability could probably exist in Cuba within the next few weeks.

5. The Soviet leaders' decision to deploy ballistic missiles to Cuba testifies to their determination to deter any active US intervention to weaken or overthrow the Castro regime, which they apparently regard as likely and imminent. This estimate of US intentions prompted Moscow's statement of 11 September which warned that an attack on Cuba would lead to a general nuclear conflict. The Soviets presumably believe that the presence of these missiles, which they expect would quickly become known to the US government, will significantly increase the costs and risks of any US action against the Cuban regime. They also probably believe that the missiles will reinforce the deterrent link between Cuban and Berlin which was implicit in the 11 September Soviet statement and in subsequent private conversations. Moscow clearly is seeking to portray Berlin as a hostage for Cuba.

6. The Soviet leaders must have anticipated that sending missiles to Cuba would create many complications for their efforts to bring the Western powers into cautious deliberations on the Berlin and German questions. Although they apparently expect a fairly prolonged period of maneuver and negotiation on Berlin after the US elections, this willingness to accept the risks involved in deploying missiles to Cuba does not in itself prevent any other indications regarding future

Berlin tactics. It does, however, underscore the importance Moscow attaches to demonstrating the alleged shift in the world balance of power in favor of the bloc which, in the Soviet view, will eventually oblige the West to come to an accommodation on Berlin.

ANNEX: Strategic Considerations

1. In weighing their decision to install ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Soviet leaders must have considered the military utility of these weapons with and without nuclear warheads, the targets in the US and elsewhere which they could reach, and the strategic value of deploying missile forces of various sizes in Cuba.

2. Because of their type of guidance and relative inaccuracy, ballistic missiles have utility against fixed targets of known location, and not against such targets as convoys or naval forces at sea. The Soviet 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles, whose CBP's are estimated to be in the 1 to 1.5 n.m. range, could conceivably be employed with HE warheads against large military centers and urban areas. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would see any advantage in deployment for this purpose, but they might regard this threat as contribution to the deterrence of Latin American support for US or Cuban refugee operations against the Castro regime.

3. Deployed 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads would augment Soviet strategic striking power by virtue of their ability to reach a number of American targets with warheads having yields which are not significantly smaller than those of current Soviet ICBMs. From the present base area in Cuba, 700 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads could reach eastern US targets within an arc including Savannah and New Orleans, including 7 SAC bomber and tanker bases and at least one important naval base. (The 350 n.m. missiles could reach bomber bases in Florida of which there are only two.) The 1,100 n.m. missiles would threaten a much more significant number of critical military targets, including 18 SAC bomber and tanker bases, and ICBM base, and three major naval bases. In addition, such targets as the Panama Canal and US bases as far east as Puerto Rico could be reached. Both of those missiles have ranges sufficient to reach many US populations, industrial and administrative center—including, in the case of the 1,100 n.m. missile, Washington, D.C. Installations of importance to the US atomic energy and space programs also would be within range of Cuban-based 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles.

Source: Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 139–143.

33. Timing of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba (1962)

Classification: Top Secret

On October 22 the Cuban Missile Crisis began to ease as 12 Soviet ships on their way to Cuba were diverted or halted, on orders from Moscow. However,

construction on the missile sites continued. Nevertheless, intelligence analysts were still trying to figure out the Soviet Union's intentions—why they would place missiles in Cuba at this time.

Memo on Timing of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Current Intelligence

22 October 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Timing of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba

1. The Soviet decision to embark on the current military buildup in Cuba probably was made in April 1962. The decision paralleled political and economic moves which greatly strengthened the Soviet-Cuban relationship. The program probably was planned and set in motion during the period April through June. In the second week of July the first shipments of materiel began to leave Soviet ports, accompanied by passenger ships carrying military personnel. These units arrived in Cuba during the last week in July and by 1 August work had begun at several locations in Cuba.

2. Prior to April 1962 the USSR's policy toward Castro's self-proclaimed adherence to Communism was still unclear and its support of Cuba was within the bounds of "normal" Soviet trade and aid policy, i.e., ties governed by long-term credit agreements and Cuba's ability to pay. In early April, however, Moscow chose to acquiesce in Castro's assertion of his authority over the so-called "old Communists" and to acknowledge the "socialist" character of the Cuban regime. Shortly thereafter, negotiations for the bloc to come to the aid of Cuba's faltering economy were initiated, and in early May agreements were signed for the bloc to provide additional amounts of foodstuffs, consumer goods, raw materials, and other badly needed imports. A decision to undertake the current military buildup probably was made along with these economic and political moves. In return, agreement evidently was reached for stationing Soviet strategic forces on the island.

3. The buildup in Cuba has been taking place in stages which can be distinguished reasonably well. The first deliveries of men and equipment arrived in late July and through most of August they appear to have been primarily of equipment for SAM and coastal defense missile installations. Work started first in western Cuba gradually, spread throughout the island. Eight of the 12 Komar guided missile boats were delivered in August, as well as some land armaments. We cannot determine precisely when the first equipment for MRBM/IRBM installations arrived, but available information suggests work on the first site began about 29 August and the first missiles of this kind probably arrived in the first half of September. Two top-level meetings between the Cubans and Khrushchev were held in this period; one when Raul Castro visited Moscow in July at the start of the shipments and one in late August–early September when Che Guevara traveled to the USSR.

4. Since early September, military shipments probably have included equipment for all the missile installations as well as aircraft and land armaments. Most of the 39 or more MIG-21s arrived during the first week of September. Two shipments of IL-28 bombers—22 aircraft in all—appear to have arrived in late September, and a third shipment may be en route. There is no sign of a slowdown in the military shipments; about 20 Soviet vessels are en route with probable military cargoes, and one or two are leaving Soviet ports almost daily.

Source: Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 269–270.

34. A Review of CIA-Owned Airlines (1962)

Classification: Top Secret

This classified secret memorandum provides a review of five airlines that were operated covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1962. Additionally, the memorandum provides a brief history of the CIA's purchase of aircraft from China for the sole purpose of denying the Chinese communists the aircraft after they assumed power in 1949. Although Air America is the most widely known name for CIA air transportation activities, this memorandum also provides a chart of the relationship between it and its four other civil air activities.

Memo Reviewing Five CIA-Operated Airlines

November 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Marvin L. Evans, Assistant General Counsel

SUBJECT: Review of Air Support Activities:—

- A. The Pacific Corporation
- B. Air America, Inc.
- C. Air Asia Company Limited
- D. Civil Air Transport Company Limited
- E. Southern Air Transport, Inc.

1. We respond to your request dated 15 August 1962. (Paragraph numbers utilized below are those in your request).

2. (a) In 1950 the Agency purchased all of the assets of Civil Air Transport, a partnership that had been operating on the Chinese Mainland. This purchase was proposed and sponsored by the Far East Division, DDP, and was principally for the purpose of denying the Chinese Communists the aircraft and other assets of Civil

Air Transport. The Chinese Communists were at that time completing their takeover of the Mainland. These assets were used as investment in kind in what has become the above-listed family of Companies At the outset operational use of aircraft and personnel was of secondary importance, but the continued political instability of the Far East has provided sufficient target for the Agency to have determined during periodic reviews that the continued operation of the project was desirable.

(b) The original date of project approval was 21 October 1949. Tab II [not included in this printing] lists detailed Agency expenditures from inception through August 31, 1962 for capital investment in the Corporations and for charges for standby airlift capability.

(c) FY 1963 projected budget for the project is [REDACTED] and FY 1964 is [REDACTED].

(d) Numbers of personnel are:—

[REDACTED] . . .

(f) Detailed itemizing of the balance sheet value of the operating property and equipment, totaling [REDACTED] net, broken down as flight equipment, ground property and equipment, leasehold improvements, land and construction in progress is attached as Tab V [not included in this printing]. The Company leases a four-story office building in Taipei and occupies some 200,000 square feet of shop space at Tainan, about one-half of which is owned. Further, sales offices, operations offices, and certain living facilities for personnel are leased at [REDACTED] major cities in the Far East. Annual real estate rentals approximate [REDACTED]

(g) The Company contracts its services in an overt manner and at competitive prices to the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force and to USAID for a variety of flying and maintenance engineering activities throughout the Far East. Source of revenue for a sample 12-month period is presented in Tab VI [not included in this printing]. The USAF has stated on a number of occasions that it regards the Companies' engineering shops, skilled personnel and fleet of aircraft to be an important emergency resource positioned in the Far East. Further, 4 C-118/DC-6AB aircraft are allocated and fully equipped for CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet)

(j) The top Company in this project is The Pacific Corporation (formerly The Airdale corporation), which was organized under the laws of the State of Delaware on July 10, 1950. Although its articles of incorporation are broad enough to authorize it to engage in practically any business activities (about eight typewritten pages), it was formed particularly for the purpose of overtly acquiring the entire capital stock of Air America, Inc. Air America (formerly called CAT Incorporated), a Delaware corporation also organized on July 10, 1950, in turn was organized to

overtly conduct and to carry on, directly and through domestic and foreign subsidiary and affiliated companies, a scheduled Chinese flag airline contract U.S. and foreign flag airlift, and contract maintenance engineering activities in the Far East and in other parts of the world.

(k) These Companies buy and sell materials and services in an overt manner trading with more than 700 U.S. domestic and foreign corporations. Among these are Southern Air Transport, Inc., [REDACTED]. In the case of Southern Air Transport, Inc. personnel and a substantial quantity of maintenance and other services are provided and in fact the entire general management of Southern Air Transport, Inc. Including its Latin American Headquarters is supervised by Air America from Washington.

(l) . . . The first seven items which represent 12.1% of the total are services performed for, CIA at competitive prices. No element of subsidy is involved. The remaining 87.9% of total revenue is from the overt non-Agency sources . . .

[REDACTED], Managing Director

Source: “Memo: Review of Air Support Activities,” Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/AirAmerica/C05261526.pdf>.

35. Memorandum: Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles/Weapons in Cuba (1962)

Classification: Top Secret

This memorandum, written about a month after the Cuban Missile Crisis concluded, discusses the withdrawal of the 42 missiles from Cuba to the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note in the document the statement “We cannot exclude the possibility that more actually arrived, and that some therefore remain, but we think that any such number would be small.” It should be noted that in October 2012—on the 50th anniversary of the crisis—it was revealed that unknown to the U.S. government at the time, there were 100 other nuclear weapons still on the island and in the hands of Fidel Castro. The Soviets were frantic to recover them and eventually did return all the missiles.

Memo on the Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles in Cuba

November 29, 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba

NOTE

This memorandum assesses our evidence concerning the number of Soviet missiles deployed to and subsequently withdrawn from Cuba, the chances that Soviet missiles remain in Cuba, and the situation and outlook with respect to rates of withdrawal of IL-28s and other significant Soviet weapons in Cuba.

CONCLUSION

The Soviet claim to have delivered only 42 missiles to Cuba, and to have now withdrawn these, is consistent with our evidence. We cannot exclude the possibility that more actually arrived, and that some therefore remain, but we think that any such number would be small. Available evidence also warrants the conclusion that the Soviets are preparing to withdraw the IL-28s.

1. The Soviets almost certainly intended to deploy substantially more than the 42 missiles which they acknowledged and have withdrawn. We reach this conclusion from the following factors:

- a. Nine sites with four launchers each have been identified in Cuba. The Soviets normally provide two missiles for every MRBM and IRBM launcher and, since several of the launchers already had two, we believe that they intended to provide two each for the others, or a total of 72 for the 38 launchers identified. Of these, 48 would be MRBMs, of which, we identified 33, and the remainder would be IRBMs, of which we have no evidence that any had reached Cuba by 22 October.
- b. The pattern of the nine identified sites strongly suggests that at least one more was planned to form a pair with the ninth. In addition, there is some evidence suggesting that the Soviets planned a third deployment area, in eastern Cuba, to follow upon those in the western and central parts of the country.
- c. Among the Soviet ships which turned back from the Cuba run, upon announcement of the US quarantine, were five of the seven which we know to have been capable of carrying missiles. Thus, the buildup was still in progress on 22 October.

2. It remains to ask whether the Soviets did in fact succeed in bringing more than 42 missiles to Cuba. A review of our information from all sources, presented in detail in Annex A, leads us to believe that they probably did not. This estimate is based on the following factors.

- a. Our analysis indicates the missiles were shipped in one piece—less only warheads—on the transporter in a package about 68 feet long as hold cargo.
- b. Of the Soviet dry cargo ships involved in the Cuban arms buildup, only seven ships have hatches which would allow stowage of this missile package. We

have reasonably good data on the size of these ships. Because of the time in port for both the loading and unloading, apparent Soviet loading practice in deliveries to Cuba, and the size of the ships, we believe the most probable load was six to seven missiles per ship. More would have required extensive shoring between decks and this does not appear to have occurred.

- c. These ships made 13 voyages to Cuba during the July–October buildup. The information concerning six of the voyages indicates that they almost certainly must have carried strategic missiles. The other seven, because of their arrival times and evidence of non-missile cargoes, cannot be so identified, but one or more of them may have delivered missiles.
- d. Reconstruction of the apparent timetable of the buildup, correlation of photography (both over Cuba and of a number of the ships en route) with all other sources, and analysis of reporting by ground observers all argue against our having wholly missed likely ships other than the seven identified, or other voyages than the thirteen.

3. We can in this way account for at least 36 missiles—six on each of six voyages. The Soviet claim of 42 is consistent with our evidence, but we cannot rule out a somewhat higher number, primarily because of the possibility that two or more of the seven other voyages delivered missiles. The analysis of these thirteen voyages in Annex B inclines us to accept a figure not much higher than the 36 we can account for.

4. Sources inside Cuba have provided numerous reports in recent weeks claiming that strategic missiles have been retained in Cuba and concealed from aerial reconnaissance. Most of these sources are untested, and some of their reports are manifestly erroneous. Checks by other methods, including photographic intelligence, have failed to produce clear confirmation of any of these reports, but we are not able to disprove some of them. Specifically, at Mayari Arriba—about 40 miles northwest of Guantanamo—we have identified both from photography and ground sources a Soviet installation which may be missile associated. We have not, however, identified any equipment which can be associated with strategic missiles.

5. Since the foregoing evidence is not fully conclusive, we must also consider whether the Soviets would wish to secrete strategic missiles in Cuba. It is doubtful, in our view, that they would do so for strictly military reasons. In the first place, our shipping analysis leaves little room for a number of remaining missiles large enough to be strategically significant at some later date. Such missiles could not participate in an all-out Soviet surprise attack without great risk that preparations would be detected by the US and the entire strategic plan compromised. Neither could the Soviets count on being able to use them in a retaliatory second strike.

6. In contemplating concealment, the Soviets would be aware of great risk. They would foresee that, if the US found out, a second Cuban crisis would ensue which would be unlikely to leave the Castro regime intact. Such a renewed crisis would

find the Soviets in an even, more disadvantageous position than before to protect their interests or avoid humiliation.

Jet Bombers

7. We have confidence in our estimate, based on repeated high- and low-altitude photography over Cuba and photography of deck cargo en route to Cuba, that no more than 42 IL-28s were delivered before the quarantine began. Photography of 25 November indicates that 20 IL-28 fuselage crates remained unopened at San Julian air base and that some of the remaining 13 which had previously been partially or fully assembled were being dismantled. Photography indicates that the other nine crates, located at Holguin airfield, were still unopened on 25 November and had been removed to an undetermined location on 27 November.

8. The Soviets could easily ship out all these aircraft by mid-December. Shipping suitable for this purpose is continually available, and almost any four of the Soviet dry-cargo vessels in the Cuban trade could carry the entire number. Those still in crates could be moved to ports in a day or two, and the remainder could be disassembled and moved to ports by the agreed date.

Other Soviet Forces

9. Other Soviet weapon systems in Cuba include surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense missiles, Komar missile boats, and fighter aircraft. In addition, the equipment for four armored combat groups (including possibly 6–10,000 men) remains on the island. We have no evidence of any preparations in Cuba to withdraw these elements. At least four months and on the order of 100 voyages by Soviet ships were required to move these forces to Cuba, and their removal would require an equally large effort. The SA-2 system and the armored combat groups are the bulkiest of these elements, and might require several months for return to the USSR.

Source: Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 357–360.

36. Operation MONGOOSE: Propaganda Balloon Operation Plan (1963)

Classification: Top Secret/Sensitive

A covert operation in the early 1960s to overthrow the Cuban government and assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro included paramilitary, sabotage, and political propaganda programs. In this report, one such program is described. The program included the establishment of a seaborne balloon-launching facility for

the infiltration of anti-Castro and anti-Soviet propaganda into Cuba. The report includes method, costs, and risks involved in such an action.

Operation MONGOOSE Memo

September 17, 1963

Subject: Operation MONGOOSE—Propaganda Balloon Operation Plan

Reference: Memo to Brigadier General Lansdale dated 17 September 1963, Subject Request for Approval to Establish a Propaganda Balloon Delivery Capability

A. MISSION

To establish a seaborne propaganda balloon launching facility for the infiltration of anti-CASTRO, anti-Soviet propaganda into Cuba.

B. METHOD

1. Helium-inflated balloons will be launched at night from a foreign flag ship in international waters at least ten miles off the coast of Cuba. The ship will avoid the use of United States ports to the extent practicable and will particularly avoid the Miami area. The ship will be chartered by a Cuban exile sponsor respected by and politically acceptable to a broad segment of the Cuban exile community. He will also have the private financial means to establish the facility without causing question in the exile community as to how the funds were raised. He will be well known to all anti-CASTRO groups and above particular politics. The Agency has selected a candidate who meets the above particulars. Although he has not yet been approached to undertake such an operation, he has in the past indicated a willingness to collaborate with the United States in support of anti-CASTRO activities. After the proposal is accepted by the sponsor, arrangements will be made for the sponsor to charter the proper type of vessel. He will also be placed in contact with a cleared firm that specializes in balloon technology. A commercial contract will then be drawn between the firm and the sponsor in which the firm agrees for a specified fee to provide and install balloon launching equipment on the ship, and train the members of the crew and other personnel in balloon launching techniques. In addition, the firm will agree to provide the balloons, helium and other supplies on a regular basis to the sponsor. For the secure and efficient conduct of the operation, the sponsor will deal only with the one cleared commercial firm. All supplies required for the operation are commercially available. The helium which is produced at a plant in [REDACTED] will be loaded on the vessel in Galveston, Texas or some other Gulf port. The legal aspects involved in loading helium on board a foreign flag ship in a U.S. port are being studied by the Legal Counsel's office and will be taken into consideration when the final arrangements are formalized.

2. The Cuban sponsor either personally or through his delegate will establish contact with all politically acceptable anti-CASTRO exile groups believed to have some assets or following in Cuba and offer the facility for their use. Within the above framework, priority shall be accorded the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC). In order to avoid contributing to division within the CRC, the means of communication shall be made available to the CRC as an entity and not to any of its components individual, except in unusual cases which will be agreed upon at the working level.

3. The sponsor will set certain guidelines (provided by the Agency) which must be met by the contributing groups if their propaganda is to be delivered by balloon. Upon receipt of the propaganda, provided it meets the specified guidelines, the sponsor will assume responsibility for its delivery. Every effort will be made by the Agency to insure that the guidelines are met, but it may not be possible in view of the extent of Cuban exile participation.

a. The following themes will be emphasized:

1. Return of the Revolution to its original acceptable aims.
2. The betrayal of the Revolution by CASTRO and the Communists.
3. Expose the contradictions between promises and performance.
4. The takeover of Cuba by Soviet Bloc Communists.
5. Appeal to the masses to cooperate with the resistance.
6. Call upon the population to commit specific acts of administrative harassment, passive resistance and simple sabotage to thwart the actions of the Communist regime and generally promote the “gusano libre” (free worm) symbol which has become synonymous with resistance to the CASTRO regime.

b. Within the stated limitations, the following types of propaganda will be rejected:

1. Propaganda which attempts to interpret U. S. policy regarding the liberation of Cuba or a specific Latin American country's policy regarding the liberation of Cuba.
2. Propaganda which is directed at or which will contribute to the petulant quarreling amongst or between Cuban exile or resistance groups.

As far as practicable, the propaganda will be prepared upon the initiative of the Cuban exile groups. If necessary to keep the propaganda offensive moving, the Agency will through its contacts with exile groups and cleared Cuban exiles, assist the offensive by providing timely ideas, themes, news items and technical assistance. Propaganda may also be prepared for Soviet and other Bloc personnel stationed in Cuba.

4. The Cuban sponsor and perhaps a person designated by him will be the only non-Americans in direct contact with the Agency on this project. The Cuban sponsor will be responsible for chartering a foreign flag vessel with the necessary crew to carry out the operation. The ship's basic crew will be augmented by a meteorologist, two radio operators, and one radar tracker. The Agency will assist the sponsor to obtain the ship, crew and specialists. The training necessary for the conduct of the operation will be provided by a cleared commercial firm which specializes in balloon technology. Contact will be maintained by an Agency official who will be in direct contact with the Cuban sponsor or his representative. The Cuban sponsor and his representative will be the only persons witting of U. S. Government interest.

C. TECHNICAL CAPABILITY

Technical studies have been made which confirm the feasibility of balloon operations in this area. A launching vessel would cruise at night in a westerly direction approximately ten miles off the northern coast of the country. The balloons would be carried over Cuba by the low altitude easterly trade winds which prevail in that area. Meteorological studies indicate that the easterly trade winds in the Caribbean are among the most constant of any area in the world. Balloons can be launched at the rate of twenty per hour per station with a four pound payload per balloon. Four stations will afford a launching, capability of eighty balloons per hour. As presently planned the target for at least the first launching is the Matanza-Havana area.

Depending on the type of paper used as well as the format and size of the leaflets, it is estimated that each balloon can deliver on target a payload of between 2,000 and 4,000 copies of a given leaflet. Assuming two balloon launching operations per month and the release of approximately 500 balloons per operation, it is estimated that between 2,000,000 and 4,000,000 leaflets can be dropped over Cuban targets each month. In addition, a wide variety of novelty items such as "gusano libre" pins, toy balloons in the shape of the "gusano libre", small plastic phonograph records, decals, stickers, etc. are readily available. The number of these which can be delivered on target during a launching operation will, of course, depend upon the weight and size of such items.

D. COSTS AND LEAD TIME

It will cost approximately \$50,000 to establish the balloon launching capability. This includes the purchase of launching, communications, and meteorological equipment and the training of personnel to conduct these operations. It will take another two months to establish an operational capability. Subsequently, it will cost \$22,000 per month for the first six month period to launch 1,000 balloons per month exclusive of the propaganda material to be delivered. Each balloon ready for launching, including the balloon itself, timer, ballast and helium, but exclusive of

the propaganda material to be delivered, costs approximately \$15.50. The one-time cost of outfitting the chartered vessel is estimated at approximately \$10,000. The recurring monthly costs for operation of a type of vessel as will be required for this operation amounts to approximately \$11,000.

E. RISKS AND SECURITY EVALUATION

Regardless of the launching facility used or the attribution of sponsorship, charges of U. S. involvement, tacit approval, or outright sponsorship will undoubtedly be generated. It is possible, particularly if the propaganda balloon missions have the desired impact in Cuba, that the Government of Cuba will react strongly and bring charges against the U. S. before the United Nations, or other regional and international forums. Judging from past experience with Communist reactions in other areas of the world, the Cubans will probably accuse the United States of harboring and abetting criminals who violate Cuban air space with propaganda balloons causing a menace to aviation, burning cane fields, injuring children, and damaging buildings and homes. It is the view of the Operations Group (MONGOOSE) that these charges can be handled.

To reinforce the cover and weaken the anticipated Cuban Government's charges after the first balloon operation, the sponsor will be urged to hold a press conference or press interview outlining his effort to help the anti-CASTRO cause and pointing out the technical features of the operation which renders the operation relatively harmless to individuals or property.

As non-inflammable helium and mechanical timing devices are used, it is impossible to start fires with these balloons. The material, polyethylene, and the design of the balloon are such that whatever the malfunction, including puncture by gun fire, the balloon will not become a free falling body, but instead flutters to the ground. There is a remote possibility that a child could be insured by a free falling timer which weighs two-tenths of a pound, and empty cardboard container which carries the leaflets or by a four pound bundle of leaflets, but this malfunction must include severance of the nylon cords which tie the payload and timer to the balloon. As previously stated, these are remote possibilities as the timer and empty cardboard container are carried out to sea by the balloon.

With regard to aircraft, a variety of tests have been conducted to ascertain the menace balloons can be to aircraft in flight. During the extensive tests conducted by CIA during the 1950's, it proved to be impossible to fly a propeller-driven aircraft into an unmoored balloon. The Federal Aviation Agency now even permits the launching of free meteorological balloons with a ten pound payload in congested air traffic areas in which commercial jet aircraft fly. In any case, as an added precaution, it is contemplated that the propaganda balloons will be launched only during those hours of the night when there are no scheduled commercial aircraft in flight over Cuba.

Source: “Operation Mongoose—Propaganda Balloon Operations Plan,” Digital National Security Archive (subscription service), http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnas&rft_dat=xri:dnas:article:CCU00449.

37. 303 Committee Request for Additional Funding to Support Broadcasts (1966)

Classification: Secret/Eyes Only

On September 8, 1966, The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) requested funding from the 303 Committee for radio broadcasts into China and Tibet. During this time, the CIA radio used a network of radio stations known as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to assist in its psychological operations. Additionally, the CIA proposed adoption of the findings of the Panel on U.S. Government Broadcasting to the Communist Bloc urging the continuation of the solicitation of private corporate donations.

Memo Requesting Funding for the 303 Committee

September 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The 303 Committee

SUBJECT: Reaffirmation of Existing Policy on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

1. SUMMARY

The chairman of the 303 Committee, Mr. Walt Rostow, on August 10, asked CIA to present a paper to the Committee on the findings of the Panel on U.S. Government Broadcasting to the Communist Bloc as they pertain to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. He further asked to see evidences of effectiveness of the radios, CIA's plans for modernization of the radio's technical facilities, and CIA's reply to the Bureau of the Budget request to show what the effects on Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty would be of: a) holding at the FY 1967 budget level for five years, and b) reducing by [REDACTED] over a five-year period from the FY1967 level.

This paper presents the information requested and proposes that the 303 Committee approve the sections of the report of the Panel on U.S. Government Radio Broadcasts to the Communist Bloc, dated 28 April 1966, dealing with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and reaffirm Radio Free Europe's mission as a non-attributed U.S. radio broadcasting to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria and Radio Liberty's mission as a non-attributed radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union. It also proposes that the 303 Committee endorse CIA's plans to

implement certain of the specific suggestions of the Panel, CIA's modernization proposal, and review CIA's analysis of the effects of the BOB alternatives.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Objectives of Radio Free Europe

Since its inception in 1950, the basic objective of Radio Free Europe has been and continues to be to keep the communist regimes from achieving or maintaining a monopoly over communications with the people of Eastern Europe and in this way to limit the capabilities of the regimes and USSR for exploiting the political, military and economic resources of the area for their own purposes. This is done primarily by encouraging evolution toward open, self-governing societies, in Eastern Europe, capable of mutually beneficial relationships with the Western European community of free nations as well as with the United States. For evidences of effectiveness of RFE see Attachment A [not included in this printing].

b. Objectives of Radio Liberty

The original proprietary cover committee, later the American Committee for Liberation, now the Radio Liberty Committee, was organized in 1951 on the recommendation of the State Department with the primary political function of consolidating several USSR émigré groups into a useful political force. In 1953 the Jackson Committee recommended that the unattributed radio become the principal task of the ACL with a concomitant decrease in non-radio activities. Since that time Radio Liberty has evolved from simple, hardline anti-Communism to become a sophisticated voice of opposition in the effort to break the Soviet monopoly on news and information in the USSR.

3. Problem

When the 303 Committee was considering [REDACTED] Radio Proposal in November 1965, McGeorge Bundy; then-Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, appointed a panel consisting of [REDACTED] to evaluate the U.S. covert broadcasting effort. After a six-month survey the panel was unanimous in its judgment that the need to maintain Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in a period of liberalization and intellectual ferment was greater than ever.

4. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. The missions of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as the major non-official Western radios challenging communist efforts to secure a monopoly on information and ideas in Eastern Europe were reaffirmed by the Special Group on 31 August 1961. This position was again reapproved on 15 August 1963 by the Special Group when it agreed that no change in existing policy on Radio Free Europe or Radio

Liberty was desirable. On 12 December 1963 the Special Group further agreed that Eastern Europe was still a target for the heaviest concentration of political-psychological operations and that the Free Europe Committee, Radio Free Europe, the American Committee for Liberation, and Radio Liberty should continue.

b. In light of the Panel's suggestions . . . , which CIA accepts in their entirety, (with one partial exception relating to RFE's fund-raising campaign . . .) CIA is prepared to:

1. Present to the BOB for approval a plan for modernization of facilities of both radios at a total cost over a three year period of [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] being required in FY 1968 CIA considers that the technical improvements recommended are the minimum required if Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are to retain a competitive position in international broad casting to the Soviet Bloc. This position was arrived at only after a thorough review of the International Broadcasting field and a study of all conceivable alternatives
2. Undertake a program for improved research on and increased broadcasting by Radio Liberty to nationality groups in the Soviet Union.
3. Implement the panel's suggestion that "given the increasing importance . . . of international communications in shaping international relations, and given the relative insignificance of the cost of these radio operations compared to the costs of weaponry; there should be greater generosity in funding them."
4. Advise the Bureau of the Budget that the implementation of either of their suggested alternatives would result in the inability of these policy instruments (RFE and RL) to carry out current policy directives. Both organizations have a built-in cost factor that increases [REDACTED] percent per year, due primarily to wage increases resulting from union negotiations and the rising cost of living in overseas locations. While management economies and elimination of low priority items can absorb approximately [REDACTED] percent there remains [REDACTED] percent that must come out of operations. After three tight budget years in which both radios have eliminated low priority items any further absorptions must come at the expense of operations. Over a period of five years the effect of either alternative would be a decline in effectiveness, elimination of high priority activities and disintegration of employee morale. Because modernization of the facilities of both radios is essential, absorption of capital expenditures under either alternative would further degrade the level of operations
5. Decrease the emphasis on mass solicitation of funds, but to continue the RFE fund-raising effort the corporate field in view of its continued success.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the 303 Committee approve the sections of the report of the Panel on U.S. Government Radio Broadcasts to the Communist Bloc as they pertain to Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe with the one exception.

b. That the 303 Committee approve CIA's modernization proposal and its plans to implement certain suggestions of the Panel . . .

Source: "CIA Submittal to 303 Committee, Reaffirmation of Existing Policy on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty," Wilson Center, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/docs/doc135_19660908.pdf.

38. Official Confirmation of the Death of Che Guevara (1967)

Classification: Limited Official Use

Ten days after Che Guevara's capture, U.S. ambassador to Bolivia Douglas Henderson transmitted confirmation of Guevara's death to Washington. The evidence included autopsy reports and fingerprint analysis conducted by Argentine police officials on Guevara's amputated hands. His hands had been cut off to provide proof that he was actually dead. Under the supervision of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent Gustavo Villoldo, Guevara's body was then secretly buried at a desolate airstrip at Villagrande, where it was only discovered in June 1997. The various death documents, notes Ambassador Henderson, leave "unsaid the time of death," which was "an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours."

Confirmation of the Death of Che Guevara

TO: Department of State

DEPART. PASS: ASUNCION, BUENOS AIRES, BRASILIA, LIMA, MONTEVIDEO, RIO DE JANEIRO, SANTIAGO, USCINCSO

FROM: Am embassy LA PAZ

DATE: October 18, 1967

SUBJECT: Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED: On October 16, 1967, the High Command of the Bolivian Armed Forces released the following communiqué, together with three annexes, on the death of Che Guevara:

In accordance with information provided for national and international opinion, based on documents released by the Military High Command on October 9, and subsequently, concerning the combat that took place at La Higuera between units of the Armed Forces and the red group commanded by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, as a result of which he, among others, lost his life, the following is established:

Ernesto Guevara fell into the hands of our troops gravely wounded and in full use of his mental faculties. After the combat ended, he was transferred to the town of La Higuera, more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8, where he died as a result of his wounds. His body was transferred to the city of Vallegrande at 4 p.m. on Monday October 9, in a helicopter of the Bolivian Air Force.

Two medical doctors, Dr. Moises Abraham Baptista and Dr. Jose Maria Cazo, director and intern respectively of the Knights of Malta hospital, certified the death and recorded the autopsy ordered by the military authorities of Vallegrande.

With regard to the identification of the deceased and the authentication of the diary that belonged to him, the government requested the cooperation of Argentine technical organizations, which sent three experts, one handwriting specialist and two fingerprint specialists, who verified the identity of the remains and certified that the handwriting of the campaign diary, captured by our troops, coincides with that of Ernesto Guevara.

The campaign diary and the book of doctrine (libro de concepciones) are documents that contain an account of activities, from the date of his entry (into the guerrilla area) until October 7, and (justify) the judgments that this chief of subversion, the members of the guerilla bands, and the people, both in this country and abroad, who collaborated with them, deserved. As a consequence, they are documents exclusively for the use of the military.

2. By this means the Military High Command considers complete all information relating to the death of Che Guevara. La Paz, October 16, 1967. END UNCLASSIFIED.

BEGIN CLASSIFIED. *Comment:* The reports provide further documentary proof that the guerrilla chieftain, who was reportedly fatally injured in battle against the Bolivian Armed Forces on October 8, was indeed Ernesto Che Guevara. The documents do little, however, to resolve public speculation on the timing and manner of death. It will be widely noted that neither the death certificate nor the autopsy report state a time of death (the examining physicians are said to have told journalists that Guevara died a few hours before their examination late in the afternoon of October 9). Moreover, the communique also leaves unsaid the time of death, indicating simply that it occurred sometime between 8 p.m. October 8, and the transfer of the body to Vallegrande at 4 p.m. the following afternoon. This would appear to be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours. Some early reports last week also indicated that Guevara was captured with minor injuries while later statements, including the attached autopsy report, affirm that he suffered multiple and serious bullet wounds.

We doubt that the communique will satisfactorily answer these questions and are inclined to agree with the comment by *Presencia* columnist *Politicus* that these discrepancies, now that the identity of the body is generally accepted, are “going to be the new focus of polemics in the coming days, especially abroad.” END CLASSIFIED.

Enclosures:

Annex 1 (Death Certificate)

Annex 2 (Autopsy Report)

Annex 3 (Argentine Police Report)

Communique of Argentine Embassy

Spanish texts of above (clippings)

Annex No. 1—Death Certificate

The death certificate signed October 10, 1967 by Drs. Moises ABRAHAM Baptista and Jose MARTINEZ Cazo, Hospital Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, dictates that on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived DOA an individual who military authorizes said was Ernesto GUEVARA Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities. Preservative was applied to the body.

Annex No. 2—Autopsy Report

The autopsy report signed October 10, 1967 by Drs. ABRAHAM Baptista and MARTINEZ Cazo, indicates that the body recognized as that of Ernesto Guevara was 40 years of age, white race, approximately 1.73 meters in height, brown curly hair, heavy curly beard and mustache, heavy eyebrows, straight nose, thin lips, mouth open teeth in good order with nicotine stains, lower left pre-molar floating, light blue eyes, regular physique, scar along almost whole left side of back. A general examination showed the following wounds:

Bullet wound in left clavicular region egressing through shoulder blade.

Bullet wound in right clavicular region fracturing same, without egress.

Bullet wound in right side, without egress.

Two bullet wounds in left side, with egress through back.

Bullet wound in left pectoral between 9th and 10th ribs, with egress on left side.

Bullet wound in lower third part of right thigh.

Bullet wound in lower third part of left thigh in seton.

Bullet wound in lower right forearm with fractured ulva.

The thorax cavity when opened showed that the first wound lightly injured the apex of the left lung. The second injured the sub-clavic vessel, the bullet lodging itself in the second vertebra. The third tranversed the right lung lodging itself in the 9th rib. The left lung was slightly damaged by bullet no. 4. Wound no. 5 transverse the left lung in a tangential trajectory. Thorax cavities, especially the right, presented abundant blood collection. The opened abdomen showed no traumatic lesion, only expansion due to gases and citric liquid. The cause of death was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhaging.

Annex No. 3—Argentine Police Report

On Saturday, October 14, 1967, three officials of the Argentine Federal Police (Investigations), one a handwriting expert and the other two fingerprint experts, at the request of the Bolivian Government, visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to collaborate in a matter of identification. They were shown a metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid solution, apparently formaldehyde.

The fingerprint experts tried the “Juan Vucetich” system used in Argentina of making papillary sketches of the fingers, but the liquid caused the fingertips to wrinkle making tracing impossible. They then proceeded to take fingerprint impressions on polyethylene sheets and in some cases on pieces of latex, these to be sent to the Identification Department of the Argentine Police for further examination.

The experts then compared the fingerprints with the copy of the prints made from Guevara’s Argentine identity record No. 3.524.272, establishing beyond doubt that both prints were from the same person. Also checked were prints taken from Guevara at Vallegrande on October 9, with the same result.

The handwriting expert then examined two notebooks in good condition. The title page of one read “1967” and its reverse “Carl Kippel—Kaiserstrasca 75—Frankfurt a.M” and “Harstellung Baier & Schosider—Neillbreum A.N.” This book shows handwriting beginning under the date of January 1, 1967 and continuing until October 7, 1967. Considering the period of the writing, the writing itself, and the “signatures,” the expert decided they were suitable for formal extrinsic and intrinsic comparisons in the handwriting identification system. The expert also examined statistically the handwriting characteristics of the notebook inscribed “Elba 66509” containing 44 pages of handwriting. There was sufficient regularity of characteristics to determine that they were the same as those reproduced in identify record. Copies of the material will forward to the Argentine Police for further study.

Signed by Esteban Belzhauser and Juan Carlos Degado.

Annex No. 4—COMMUNIQUE OF THE ARGENTINE EBMASSY AT LA PAZ

The technical commission detailed by the Argentine Government at the request of the Bolivian Government to prove the identity of the remains of Ernesto Guevara has proceeded to make a comparison of the item that were provided by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces with those that were in the hands of Argentine police authorizes. From the fingerprint and handwriting skill practiced by the technicians, in accordance with scientific procedures currently in use, it develops that the items compared correspond in an irrefutable manner to Ernesto Guevara, thereby agreeing with the report issues by the Bolivian authorizes

La Paz, October 16, 1967

Source: "State Department Cable, *Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara*, October 18, 1967," George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/docs/doc10.pdf>.

39. The Soviet Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia (1968)

Classification: Confidential

In a complete surprise to U.S. intelligence analysts, on August 20, 1968, more than 500,000 troops, mostly from the Soviet Union, poured across the borders in a blitzkrieg-like advance. The invasion was meticulously planned and coordinated. By dawn on August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia was an occupied country. This report seeks to provide an understanding of motives behind the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Memo on the Soviet Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

21 August 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Soviet Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia

1. Between the end of the Cierna-Bratislava meetings and yesterday's invasion nothing happened inside Czechoslovakia to support Moscow's claim that these meetings were a great victory for Communist orthodoxy. Neither was there a notable recrudescence in Czechoslovakia of the "antisocialist" trends which brought on the Warsaw meeting and its harsh ultimatum. Thus, we doubt that a rising sense of alarm in Moscow is the essential explanation for Soviet intervention.

2. The Soviet politburo on its return to Moscow did not summon the Central Committee to report on the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, but instead issued a communique in the name of the entire politburo saying that those meetings were a good piece of work. The Soviet leaders seem shortly thereafter to have scattered for their usual summer holidays. The Soviet press stood down its attacks on Czechoslovakia. The appearance given was that Moscow was willing at least to give the Czechs—presumably chastened by the nearness of their approach to the brink—a respite. What went on in Czechoslovakia during the short span of time since Cierna proved only that the Czechs had not understood Cierna to mean that they should put their reform movement into reverse.

3. It is not likely that the Soviets, even though they have persistently underestimated the strength of reformist spirit in Czechoslovakia expected miracles to be done by Dubcek in three weeks' time. Even if Dubcek had promised them, there was no chance he could deliver. What, then, brought the Russians, after they had decided to step back at Cierna, to give the signal yesterday to crush the Czechoslovaks?

4. It may be some time before we can answer this question with any assurance. On the strength of what we know now, the most likely explanation appears to be that, under the impact of internal pressures within the leadership and of importuning from its anxious allies in Eastern Europe, the Soviet decision at Cierna to give Dubcek and company more time became unraveled. This would suppose—as there seems some reason to suppose—that the Soviet politburo when it went to Cierna was divided in mind, and that the standoff reached there derived mostly from Soviet irresolution. The fragile balance in the Soviet leadership which produced the Cierna agreement has, in the space of less than three weeks, been upset in favor of those who may all along have wanted the toughest kind of policy and have made use of the time and developments since Cierna to undo the agreement.

5. If, indeed, the political scales in Moscow have been in such precarious balance, it would not have needed a great shock to upset them, but only the absence of solid signs that developments in Prague were going Moscow's way. There were few of these. In the short time available to Dubcek his efforts to demonstrate that he could insure the unquestioned domination of the Communist party had not been impressive. Czechoslovak information media remained unruly and unrepentant. There was no indication that non-Communist political elements—for example, the Club of Committed Non-Party People and the revived Socialist party—were being forced to take cover. Despite the renewed pledges of fidelity to CEMA given at Cierna, there continued to be much talk in Prague of broader economic ties with the West.

6. The visits to Prague of Tito and Ceausescu were all too visible reminders that the ranks of independent Communist states were swelling. And, finally, with preparations moving ahead rapidly for the party congress scheduled to open on 9 September, it was becoming clear that the congress might sound the death knell over the Czechoslovak party conservatives, Moscow's last hope for a brake on reformism in Prague. The congress would have meant not a check on the momentum of the Czechoslovak reform movement, but its confirmation. In addition, the cost of maintaining the mobilization of massive intervention forces may have created pressures in the leadership to use these forces or disband them.

7. Despite the smoothness of the Soviet military operation in Czechoslovakia, a number of Soviet political actions suggest that the decision to execute the plan of intervention came at a fairly late stage. Among these were Dobrynin's approach to the President, the convening of the Central Committee in the midst of the top

leaders' vacation, the flimsiness of the legal base for Soviet action, and the failure to surface quickly an alternative leadership in Prague. Thus it would appear that Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia did not follow naturally from the Cierna meeting but represents, instead, a scrapping of the position arrived at there.

Source: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Fifty Years of Informing Policy: Expanded Edition Containing Declassified Documents (Washington: DC: U.S. Government Publication, 1997), 51–53.

40. Spotting Photo Fakery (1969)

Classification: Confidential/No Foreign Dissemination

Dino Brugioni, one of the founders of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Photographic Interpretation Center, discusses the explosive topic of photo fakery and manipulation. Brugioni analyzed aerial reconnaissance photography to determine the activities at Auschwitz-Birkenau from June 1944 to January 1945. His first experience with photo fakery occurred shortly after the CIA hired him in 1948. He noted in his book Photo Fakery that “it became immediately apparent to me, even as a neophyte in the intelligence game, that the Soviets had embarked on a massive program of misinformation during the war years.” On reviewing still photos, he found that the Soviets had used heavy brush techniques to delete details of their weapons. Reviewing Soviet newsreels, he found that many battle scenes had been deliberately staged; often, dramatic scenes of one battle would be superimposed to show up in films of other battles. In this article for the CIA’s journal, Brugioni explains that there are four different techniques for faking photos: removing details, inserting details, photomontage, and false captioning.

Article Entitled “Spotting Photo Fakery” by Dino A. Brugioni

When Soviet troops moved into Czechoslovakia in August 1968, television viewers in Poland were shown film apparently depicting the enthusiastic welcome the invaders received from the Czechoslovaks. The Polish audience was not told that it was in fact seeing a re-run of a film strip dating from 1945. This simple deception was an example of “photo fakery.” Here we will look at other, somewhat more subtle photographic methods often employed. Although an expert job of fakery may defy detection even by another expert, there are some telltale signs anyone should look for.

Photo fakery as practiced by the Communists is usually employed to display their actions in a pleasing light, and to portray their countries and their leaders to the best advantage. It is also used as a form of propaganda support for the ongoing campaign against the United States and its allies. In any specific case, the intention is often revealed by detection of what may have been hidden, eliminated, or altered.

Visual Evidence

Photography has long been recognized as an important source of intelligence. Like other kinds of sources, however, photographs can be forged, faked, or otherwise altered to suit the purposes of the originator. Notwithstanding, the notion is still fairly widespread that a photograph of a given item is sufficient proof that the item in fact existed in the state shown by the photograph. This simple view can no longer be accepted. As a matter of fact, the art of faking photographs is as old as photography itself. Thus, portrait photographers discovered many years ago that removal of wrinkles and skin blemishes pleased customers. Although the public has perhaps become more skeptical than it used to be of “before and after” pictures or other photographic gimmicks employed in advertising, these devices have certainly not entirely disappeared.

Early techniques for altering photographs were relatively simple, but recent advances in optics, in the manufacture of film, and in laboratory processing have permitted great refinement of old techniques, and provided versatile and effective tools to propaganda, psychological warfare, and intelligence agencies. Some attempts at photo fakery are still amateurish and obvious, but the best work these days is subtle and sophisticated.

Properly used, a faked photograph can be a more effective and subtle weapon than a forged document. In propaganda or intelligence work, it can lead an adversary to wrong conclusions or cause him to dissipate his energies. The fact is that the veracity of photographs is rarely questioned. Intelligence analysts are accustomed to being critical of documentary intelligence, and as a matter of course attempt to establish its veracity and the credibility of its sources. Unfortunately; no similar critical attitude is generally applied in the appraisal of photography. Indeed, most analysts would probably not consider themselves qualified to make technical judgments of this nature. No manual on faking photography is known to this author, and manuals that treat the art of altering or retouching photography are concerned almost exclusively with techniques for enhancing the artistic or purely technical values of photography, and not with detecting alteration of the original negative or other manipulations for purposes of deception.

The purpose of this article is to warn intelligence analysts against accepting photographic evidence of Communist origin uncritically and to provide a few practical suggestions on how those lacking technical expertise can detect fakery in photography. The examples here presented have been selected from those collected in the course of research over the years by the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and other U.S. intelligence components. It is worth noting that Communist photographic forgeries were brought to the attention of the U.S. Senate as recently as 1961, and have been the object of continuing interest on the part of successive Directors of Central Intelligence.

Kinds of Faked Photographs

There are four kinds of faked photographs, distinguished by differing techniques: montages; retouched photographs; and retouched montages. The fourth category—false

captioning—differs from these in that tampering with the photograph itself is not a necessary ingredient of the fake.

A montage can be made either with photographic prints, resulting in what is known as a “paste-up” montage, or it can be made with negatives. The negative montage is the more effective of the two. Montages are widely used commercially for producing trick or artistic effects, assembling murals, and for advertising purposes. Extensive use is made of montages for portraying, and generally exaggerating, the industrial and scientific accomplishments and the military might of the Soviet Union and its allies—and others—as well as for many other propaganda and deception purposes. On occasion, photographs are altered for security reasons.

A retouched photograph differs from a montage in that only one photograph is used. By applying airbrushed paint or solvents, or by scraping, and by a variety of other techniques, the technician alters details, or obliterates portions of a photographic image. It is possible to tone down or disfigure images, and even to create an image that was not on the original negative. Since a hand brush or an airbrush is frequently used for this purpose, the terms “brushed-in” and “brushed-out” are often used in connection with retouching, even though many other artistic and laboratory techniques are used.

The third and most common type of fake photograph combines retouching and montage. In this type of photograph, an attempt is made by means of retouching techniques to soften the sharp edges of the cutouts usually apparent in a montage and to blend the varying tones and textures of the cutouts into a unified whole.

The falsely captioned photograph differs from the other groups of fake photographs in that the photograph usually is not altered. Proper captioning of a photograph normally includes descriptive data regarding the “who-what-where-when” of the subject. Photographs in Communist publications, however, are frequently printed with misleading or completely false captions, and the date of the photograph is often omitted entirely. About the only way to unmask this kind of deception is to compare suspect examples with prints of known veracity. Where a date has been provided, however, close scrutiny of details will sometimes detect anachronisms that give the show away.

[Two photograph] appeared in a Czechoslovak aircraft journal with captions indicating that they were scenes in a Czechoslovak jet engine factory. Actually, at least one is a retouched photograph of a factory in the United States. An artist has provided the technician on the right with coveralls, and a Czechoslovak “no smoking” sign has been added, but note the different tone and texture of these added items.

Faking Techniques

Many technical factors have to be considered in the difficult task of creating a successful fake photograph. Details, perspective, and the relative sizes of objects and the distances between them must be kept in scale to produce a convincing result. Because of the inherent limitations of the camera lens, objects at different distances from the camera are in varying degrees of focus and have different tones and textures. Tone is the tint, shade, or hue of an object. In black and white

photography, tone is the relative lightness or darkness of the shades of gray in the scene. Texture is the arrangement, size, and quality of the constituent parts of an object; it is the quality by which one determines that an object is rough or smooth, firm or loose.

Since retouching or the creation of a montage usually results in inconsistent variations of tone and texture, the technician will frequently reproduce a fake by the halftone process. This is a technique of representing shadings by dots produced by photographing an object (or, for instance, a montage) through a fine screen. By subjecting retouched photographs and montages to the halftone process, dots are substituted for continuous tone imagery, and this more or less eliminates break lines and variations in tone and texture. Most newspaper reproductions of photographs are produced by this process, and practically everyone is aware that the sharpest lines and strongest contrasts of a glossy print are softened and blurred in newspaper reproductions.

Shadows of objects are present in most photographs, and in creating a convincing fake, the technician must make all shadows fall in the same direction and be consistent in relative size and shape with the objects photographed. The technician must also account for any motion or action and corresponding reaction represented on the photograph, and all elements of the photograph must be consistent in this respect. Obviously, smoke does not blow in different directions from the stacks of adjacent factories. Finally, the creator of the fake must make sure that his masterpiece as a whole is all of a piece. He must insure, that is, that elements added to or redacted from the photograph do not result in incongruity; a soldier does not wear naval insignia, nor does a watchmaker have pipe wrenches on his workbench.

The means of detecting a fake as described here are effective only when the faker has been careless or in the occasional instances when the original unchanged photograph is available for comparison. As noted, however, a good fake photograph is remarkably difficult to make, and the alert intelligence officer armed with a knowledge of what to look for can often avoid being taken in.

Clues to the Detection of Fake Photographs

The first and most obvious clue to fake photography is its source. The intelligence officer should have the same ingrained skepticism of photographs that he has of other documentation from Communist sources. Imbued with this basic skepticism, he should look for the following clues.

Clues to a montage. Since the final product of a montage made from prints is another photograph, the result cannot possess quite the same textures and tones of objects as depicted in the originals. Thus, such a “paste-up” montage will often appear flat and gray as compared with an original photograph. The montage made with negatives, while retaining much of the quality of the originals, still presents problems to the technician when he attempts to blend tones and combine textures. Hence, on negative montages, certain images tend to stand out from other images in the photograph. To detect either type of montage, the intelligence officer should look for identical images in the photograph. He should also look at the corners of

images for match or join lines, the result of improper illumination at the time the montage was photo copied. The artist often fails to remove crop lines which indicate the presence of two or more photographs.

Combining two or more photographs in a montage often results in incongruities violating principles of action and reaction or technical consistency. This is the clue to the fake in . . . [an action-reaction montage]: not one person in the large crowd depicted is looking up at three helicopters flying a few feet over their heads, nor does there appear to be any prop wash.

Clues to retouching. To detect this type of fake, the intelligence officer should look for flat unbroken lines where objects appear to have been removed from the picture. In doing this, the artist often fails to remove parts of objects and to add an appropriate texture to the area. Such clues are visible in the retouched photograph of a hangar . . . The uncluttered gray area in the depth of the hangar on the right is in sharp contrast to the clutter in the rest of the hangar and is a clue to “brush-out” retouching, possibly to delete items for security purposes. A careless technician has provided positive evidence of retouching here by failing to brush out the stabilizers of two aircraft that have otherwise been redacted.

Placing a retouched photograph under magnification often reveals the marks of the artist’s brush or artificial discoloration. When something is added to this type of photograph, the telltale features may be abrupt texture breaks and a flat, painted appearance. The perpetrators of photographic fakery often forget the shadows in retouching or in montages, and the tip-off to the intelligence officer can be an object which does not cast a shadow, shadows falling in different directions, abnormal tonal contrasts in shadows, or shadow-object ratios which do not match. Shadows falling in opposite directions are a clue to deception . . . In . . . [a] photograph of an alleged Communist Chinese amphibious exercise, shadows from the door of the landing ship in the left background fall to the right, but shadows on the amphibious tank in the foreground fall to the left.

Scale and proportion. Scale is the ratio of image size to the actual size of an object. If the size of one object in a photograph is known, the relative sizes of other objects can be determined by photogrammetric methods. When the size of one object appears to be out of proportion to the sizes of surrounding objects, the photograph should be suspect as a fake. Faulty proportion is the tip-off to the fake shown [in a photograph of missiles] . . . The missiles . . . are identified as SA-2 surface-to-air missiles known to be 35.6 feet in length. If scale and proportion in this montage were correct, the marching men on the right would have to be pygmies. A crop line, characteristic of a montage, is apparent along the top of the shrubbery partially concealing the missiles.

Depth of focus. The terms depth of focus, depth of field, and depth of definition refer to the characteristics of lenses, and relate to size of the area within which details are sharply defined in front of and beyond an object focused on . . . [T]he aircraft and the peasant shown . . . [in one photograph] are some distance apart but in the same sharp focus. At the lens setting which would give this depth of focus, the distant foliage should also be sharply defined. The fact that the foliage is instead blurred indicates that more than one negative was used to make this print. The

intelligence officer should compare the sharpness of objects in the foreground and background of photographs for indications of fakery.

Halation, as a clue. Halation is the fog or halo in a photograph around the image of a highly reflective surface or light source. It is caused by lights in a night photograph or by reflectors or curved surfaces in bright sunlight. A faked photograph may show halation around one object and not around similar objects oriented in the same direction with respect to the sun. In the case of a night scene, halation may appear around some lights but not others. Thus in . . . [one photograph], the tip-off is duplicate halation montaged to make this Chinese oil field appear larger. Perspective and scale are also faulty since the supposedly more distant items in the top half of the picture are the same size as those in the lower half.

Conclusions

Every intelligence officer should be aware that photography can be, and sometimes is, faked before its dissemination. Viewing Communist source photographs with a critical eye, the analyst can detect and take steps to neutralize a good deal of this kind of deception. A basic knowledge of the concepts and mechanics of faking photography as presented here can thus pay worthwhile dividends to our total intelligence effort.

Source: Dino A. Brugioni, "Spotting Photo Fakery," *Studies in Intelligence* 13(1) (Winter 1969): 57–67. Accessed at Center for the Study of Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol13no1/html/v13i1a05p_0001.htm.

1970s–1980s

41. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko: Defector Summary (Early 1970s)

Classification: Secret/Eyes Only

A defector summary of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, held in a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prison in the United States to determine whether he was a legitimate defector or a Russian intelligence plant, wraps up involvement with this individual.

Defector Summary of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, an officer of the KGB, defected to a representative of this Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country on 12 February 1964. After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Clinton, Maryland, from 4 April 1964 where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed “jail” in a remote wooded area at [REDACTED]. The SR Division was convinced that he was dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at [REDACTED] in an effort to convince him to “confess.”

This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency’s position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for Nosenko’s further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

Nosenko was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer,

Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that Nosenko was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution [REDACTED]. He is currently under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states while I regret my three years of incarceration, I have no bitterness and now understand how it could happen.

Source: "The CIA's Family Jewels," George Washington University National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf.

42. The OXCART Story (1970s)

Classification: Secret

In 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plans to build a successor to the U-2 aircraft that would fly higher and several times faster than the U-2. The OXCART program would yield an aircraft capable of flying at 100,000 feet at a speed of about Mach 3.1 (2,170) mph. The plane would not make its first operational flights until 1967, and the program would be terminated in 1968. The aircraft never flew over Soviet territory due to the success of satellite reconnaissance programs as well as the fear by some U.S. leaders of taking the risk of any overflights.

The Oxcart Story

THE OXCART STORY

One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off in an aircraft the likes of which had never been seen before. A casual observer would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two enormous jet engines, its long, sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in flight. He might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet. Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the formidable problems attending its design and construction.

There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators, and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leaked.

The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of inspired perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so long shrouded has lifted a bit, and the purpose of this article is to give some account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it left a legacy of technological achievement which points the way to new projects. And it became the progenitor of a similar reconnaissance vehicle called the SR-71, whose existence is well known to press and public.

The U-2 dated from 1954, when its development began under the direction of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the aircraft became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first flights over Soviet territory revealed that the air defense warning system not only detected but tracked it quite accurately. Yet it remained a unique and invaluable source of intelligence information for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk.

Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active career, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to reduce the vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it would become less susceptible to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem. Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable.

Eventually, in the fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross-section. This analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth serious consideration. Therefore, from this time on, attention focused increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely high speeds as well as at great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar-absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were informed of the general requirement, and their designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. From the fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective schemes.

Bissell realized that development and production of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. To secure the necessary funds for such a pro-

gram, high Officials would have to receive the best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold.

Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities on aerodynamics and one physicist, with E. M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman. Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six times, usually in Land's office in Cambridge. Lockheed and Convair designers attended during parts of the sessions. So also did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned with research and development, together with one or two of their technical advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil. Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and cooperation.

As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to track by radar. They recommended that the President be asked to approve in principle a further prosecution of the project, and to make funds available for further studies and tests. The President and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James Killian, were already aware of what was going on, and when CIA officials went to them with the recommendation of the panel they received a favorable hearing. The President gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project took on the code name GUSTO.

Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete, and on 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave final approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way. The next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs. On 20 August 1959, specifications of the two proposals were submitted to a joint DOD/USAF/CIA selection panel:

<i>Lockheed</i>	<i>Convair</i>	
Speed	Mach 3.2	Mach 3.2
Range (total)	4,120 n.m.	4,000 n.m.
Range (at altitude)	3,800 n.m.	3,400 n.m.
<i>Dimensions</i>		
Length	102 ft.	79.5 ft
Span	57 ft.	56 ft.
Gross Weight	110,000 lbs.	101,700 lbs.
Fuel Weight	64,600	62,000 lbs.
First Flight	22 months	22 months

The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was named OXCART. On 3 September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs, and on 30 January 1960 gave the green light to produce 12 aircraft.

Pratt and Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been involved in discussions of the project and undertook to develop the propulsion system. Their J-58 engine, which was to be used in the A-12, had been sponsored originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and was to be capable of a speed of Mach 3.0. Navy interest in the development was diminishing, however, and the Secretary of Defense had decided to withdraw from the program at the end of 1959. CIA's requirement was that the engine and airframe be further developed and optimized for a speed of Mach 3.2. The new contract called for initial assembly of three advanced experimental engines for durability and reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental flight testing in early 1961.

Lockheed's designer was Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, creator of the U-2, and he called his new vehicle not A-12 but A-11. Its design exhibited many innovations. Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a multitude of extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is highly sensitive to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic efficiency. Small mistakes in predicting these values can lead to large errors in performance. Models of the A-11 were tested and retested, adjusted and readjusted, during thousands of hours in the wind tunnel. Johnson was confident of his design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly, still less whether it would fulfill the extremely demanding requirements laid down for it.

To make the drawings and test the model was one thing; to build the aircraft was another. The most numerous problems arose from the simple fact that in flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed the skin of the aircraft would be subjected to a temperature of more than 550 degrees Fahrenheit. For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly used in aircraft production would stand this temperature, and those which would do so were for the most part too heavy to be suitable for the purpose in hand.

During the design phase Lockheed evaluated many materials and finally chose an alloy of titanium B120, characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures. Titanium was also scarce and very costly. Methods for milling it and controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 percent had to be rejected, and it was not until 1961, when a delegation from headquarters visited the officials of that company, informed them of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, that the problems were solved.

But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to immense difficulties in machining and shaping the material. Drills which worked well on aluminum soon broke into pieces; new ones had to be devised. Assembly-line production was impossible; each of the small OXCART fleet was, so to speak, turned out by hand. The cost of the program mounted well above original estimates, and it soon began to run behind schedule. One after another, however, the problems were solved, and their solution constituted the greatest single technological achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth it became practicable, if expensive, to build aircraft out of titanium.

Since every additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation was out of the question. The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own cooling apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply, and other necessities for survival. The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the greater part of the aircraft, would heat up to about 350 degrees, so that special fuel had to be supplied and the tanks themselves rendered inert with nitrogen. Lubricating oil was formulated for operation at 600 degrees F., and contained a diluent in order to remain fluid at operation below 40 degrees. Insulation on the plane's intricate wiring soon became brittle and useless. During the lifetime of the OXCART no better insulation was found; the wiring and related connectors had to be given special attention and handling at great cost in labor and time.

Then there was the unique problem of the camera window. The OXCART was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera, which would look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the whole system depended upon achieving complete freedom from optical distortion despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected. Thus the question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to high temperature, but of assuring that there should be no unevenness of temperature throughout the area of the window. It took three years and two million dollars to arrive at a satisfactory solution. The program scored one of its most remarkable successes when the quartz glass was successfully fused to its metal frame by an unprecedented process involving the use of high frequency sound waves.

Another major problem of different nature was to achieve the low radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the greatest radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrites, high-temperature absorbing materials and high-temperature plastic structures was undertaken to find methods to reduce the return. Eventually the vertical tail section fins were constructed from a kind of laminated "plastic" material—the first time that such a material had been used for an important part of an aircraft's structure. With such changes in structural materials, the A-11 was redesignated A-12, and as such has never been publicly disclosed.

To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly built one of these, and as early as November 1959, transported it in a specially designed trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from the Burbank plant to the test area. Here it was hoisted to the top of a pylon and looked at from various angles in radar. Tests and adjustments went on for a year and a half before the results were deemed satisfactory. In the course of the process it was found desirable to attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side of the fuselage, and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of these protuberances on his design. In flight tests, however, it later developed that they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle, and years afterward Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport embodied similar structures.

Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be of quite extraordinary competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the aircraft itself, but also because of the particular qualities needed in men who were to fly intelligence missions. Brigadier General Don Flickinger of the Air Force, was designated to draw up the criteria for selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson and from CIA Headquarters. Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were to be between 25 and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit prescribed that they be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in weight.

One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the business at Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its runway was too short. The ideal location ought to be remote from metropolitan areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation; easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 8,000 foot runway. There was no such place to be found.

Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered but none provided the necessary security and annual operating costs at most of them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead, a very secluded site was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel accommodations and POL storage, and its long-unused runway was inadequate, but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction program could provide sufficient facilities. Lockheed estimated what would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and shop space, housing for personnel, and runway specifications. Armed with the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction and engineering plan.

Construction began in earnest in September 1960, and continued on a double-shift schedule until mid-1964. One of the most urgent tasks was to build the runway, which according to initial estimates of A-12 requirements must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5,000 feet long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The new one was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring over 25,000 yards of concrete. Another major problem was to provide some 500,000 gallons of PF-I aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities nor means of transporting fuel existed.

After considering airlift, pipeline, and truck transport, it was decided that the last-named was the most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than eighteen miles of highway leading into the base.

Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected on the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early 1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons. Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that

had to be provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of Aircraft No. 1 in August 1961.

The facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not. Originally promised for delivery at the end of May 1961, the date first slipped to August, largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and fabricating titanium. Moreover, Pratt & Whitney found unexpectedly great trouble in bringing the J-58 engine up to OXCART requirements. In March 1961, Kelly Johnson notified Headquarters:

"Schedules are ill jeopardy on two fronts. One is the assembly of the wing and the other is in satisfactory development of the engine. Our evaluation shows that each of these programs is from three to four months behind the current schedule."

To this Bissell replied:

"I have learned of your expected additional delay in first flight from 30 August to 1 December 1961. This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from May to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 December that the titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome. I trust this is the last of such disappointments short of a severe earthquake in Burbank."

Realizing that delays were causing the cost of the program to soar, Headquarters decided to place a top-level aeronautical engineer in residence at Lockheed to monitor the program and submit progress reports.

Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt & Whitney informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J-58 engine in terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for Aircraft No. 1 by now had slipped to 22 December 1961, and the first flight to 27 February 1962. Even on this last date the J-58 would not be ready, and it was therefore decided that a Pratt & Whitney J-75 engine, designed for the F-105 and flown in the U-2, should be used for early flights. The engine, along with other components, could be fitted to the A-12 airframe, and it could power the aircraft safely to altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6.

When this decision had been made, final preparations were begun for the testing phase. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962. These included eight F-101's for training, two T-33's for proficiency flying, a C-130 for cargo transport, a U-3A for administrative purposes, a helicopter for search and rescue, and a Cessna-180 for liaison use. In addition, Lockheed provided an F-104 to act as chase aircraft during the A-12 flight test period.

Meanwhile in January 1962, an agreement was reached with the Civil Aeronautics Board that expanded the restricted air space in the Vicinity of the test area. Certain CAB air traffic controllers were cleared for the OXCART Project; their function was to insure that aircraft did not violate the order. The North American Air Defense Command established procedures to prevent their radar stations from reporting the appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar scopes.

Refueling concepts required prepositioning of vast quantities of fuel at certain points outside the United States. Special tank farms were programmed in California, Eielson AFB Alaska, and at strategic locations overseas. Since the A-12 used specially refined low vapor pressure fuel, these tank farms were reserved exclusively for use by the OXCART Program. Very small detachments of technicians at these locations maintained the fuel storage facility and arranged for periodic quality control fuel tests.

At the Lockheed Burbank plant, Aircraft No. 1 (serially numbered 121) received its final tests and checkout during January and February 1962, and was partially disassembled for shipment to the site. It became clear very early in OXCART planning that because of security problems and the inadequate runway, the A-12 could not fly from Burbank. Movement of the full-scale radar test model had been successfully accomplished in November 1959, as described above. A thorough survey of the route in June 1961, ascertained the hazards and problems of moving the actual aircraft, and showed that a package measuring 35 feet wide and 105 feet long could be transported without major difficulty. Obstructing road signs had to be removed, trees trimmed, and some roadsides leveled. Appropriate arrangements were made with police authorities and local officials to accomplish the safe transport of the aircraft. The entire fuselage, minus wings, was crated, covered, and loaded on the special-design trailer, which cost about \$100,000. On 26 February 1962, it departed Burbank, and arrived at the base according to plan.

First Flights

Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and installation of the J-75 engines began. Soon it was found that aircraft tank sealing compounds had failed to adhere to the metals, and when fuel was put into the tanks numerous leaks occurred. It was necessary to strip the tanks of the faulty sealing compounds and reline them with new materials. Thus occurred one more unexpected and exasperating delay in the program.

Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day, in accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes. As in all maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight.

On 30 April 1962, just under one year later than originally planned, the 121 officially lifted her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at 170 knots, with a gross weight of 72,000 pounds, and climbed to 30,000 feet. Top speed was 340 knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable. Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier on its second official flight, 1 May 1962, reaching Mach 1.1. Again, only minor problems were reported.

With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram of

congratulation to Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had been triumphantly passed, but there remained the long, difficult, and sometimes discouraging process of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.

Aircraft No. 122 arrived at base on 26 June, and spent three months in radar testing before engine installations and final assembly. Aircraft No. 123 arrived in August and flew in October. Aircraft No. 124, a two-seated version intended for use in training project pilots, was delivered in November. It was to be powered by the J-58 engines, but delivery delays and a desire to begin pilot training prompted a decision to install the smaller J-75's. The trainer flew initially in January 1963. The fifth aircraft, No. 125, arrived at the area on 17 December.

Meanwhile the OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the Cuban missile crisis. U-2's had been maintaining a regular reconnaissance vigil over the island, and it was on one of these missions in October that the presence of offensive missiles was discovered. Overflights thereafter became more frequent, but on 27 October a U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force pilot on a SAC-directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high-altitude surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The OXCART program suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its achievement of operational status became one of the highest national priorities.

At the end of 1962 there were two A-12 aircraft engaged in flight tests. A speed of Mach 2.16 and altitude of 60,000 feet had been achieved. Progress was still slow, however, because of delays in the delivery of engines and shortcomings in the performance of those delivered. One of the two test aircraft was still flying with two J-75 engines, and the other with one J-75 and one J-58. It had long since become clear that Pratt & Whitney had been too optimistic in their forecast; the problem of developing the J-58 up to OXCART specifications had proved a good deal more recalcitrant than expected. Mr. McCone judged the situation to be truly serious, and on 3 December he wrote to the President of United Aircraft Corporation:

"I have been advised that J-58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control production problems. . . . By the end of the year it appears we will have barely enough J-58 engines to support the flight test program adequately. . . . Furthermore, due to various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude. Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained flight at design conditions which is so necessary to complete development."

By the end of January 1963, ten engines were available, and the first flight with two of them installed occurred on 15 January. Thenceforth all A-12 aircraft were fitted with their intended propulsion system. Flight testing accelerated and contractor personnel went to a three-shift work day.

With each succeeding step into a high Mach regime new problems presented themselves. The worst of all these difficulties—indeed one of the most formidable in the entire history of the program—was revealed when flight testing moved into speeds between Mach 2.4 and 2.8, and the aircraft experienced such severe roughness as to make its operation virtually out of the question. The trouble was

diagnosed as being in the air inlet system, which with its controls admitted air to the engine. At the higher speeds the flow of air was uneven, and the engine therefore could not function properly. Only after a long period of experimentation, often highly frustrating and irritating, was a solution reached. This further postponed the day when the A-12 could be declared operationally ready.

Among more mundane troubles was the discovery that various nuts, bolts, clamps, and other debris of the manufacturing process had not been cleared away, and upon engine run-up or take-off were sucked into the engine. The engine parts were machined to such close tolerances that they could be ruined in this fashion. Obviously the fault was due to sheer carelessness. Inspection procedures were revised, and it was also found prudent at Burbank to hoist the engine nacelles into the air, rock them back and forth, listen for loose objects, and then remove them by hand.

On 24 May 1963, while on a routine training flight, one of the detachment pilots recognized an erroneous and confusing air speed indication and decided to eject from the aircraft, which crashed 14 miles south of Wendover, Utah. The pilot was unhurt. The wreckage was recovered in two days, and persons at the scene were identified and requested to sign secrecy agreements. All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week during investigation of the accident. A plugged pilot static tube in icing conditions turned out to be responsible for the faulty cockpit instrument indications—it was not something which would hold things up for long.

Loss of this aircraft nevertheless precipitated a policy problem which had been troubling the Agency for some time. With the growing number of A-12's, how much longer could the project remain secret? The program had gone through development, construction, and a year of flight testing without attracting public attention. There was also a realization that the technological data would be extremely valuable in connection with feasibility studies for the SST. Finally, there was a growing awareness in the higher reaches of the aircraft industry that something new and remarkable was going on. Rumors spread, and gossip flew about. Commercial airline crews sighted the OXCART in flight. The editor of *Aviation Week* indicated his knowledge of developments at Burbank. The secrecy was thinning out.

The President's Announcement

In spite of all this, 1963 went by without any public revelation. President Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after taking office, and directed that a paper be prepared for an announcement in the spring of 1964. Then at his press conference on 24 February, he read a statement of which the first paragraph was as follows:

"The United States has successfully developed an advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A-11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards

Air Force Base in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advance technology in our military and commercial program.”

The President went on to mention the “mastery of the metallurgy and fabrication of titanium metal” which has been achieved, gave credit to Lockheed and to Pratt & Whitney, remarked that appropriate members of the Senate and House had been kept fully informed, and prescribed that the detailed performance of the A-11 would be kept strictly classified.

The President’s reference to the “A-11” was of course deliberate. “A-11” had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all witting personnel in government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was considerable speculation about an Agency role in the A-11 development, but it was never acknowledged by the government. News headlines ranged from “US has dozen A-11 jets already flying” to “Secret of sizzling new plane probably history’s best kept.”

The President also said that “the A-11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their capabilities as long-range interceptors.” It was true that the Air Force in October 1960, had contracted for three interceptor versions of the A-12, and they were by this time available. But at the moment when the President spoke, there were no A-11’s at Edwards and there never had been. Project officials had known that the public announcement was about to be made, but they had not been told exactly when. Caught by surprise, they hastily flew two Air Force YF-12A’s to Edwards to support the President’s statement. So rushed was this operation, so speedily were the aircraft put into hangars upon arrival, that heat from them activated the hangar sprinkler system, dousing the reception team which awaited them.

Thenceforth, while the OXCART continued its secret career at its own site, the A-11 performed at Edwards Air Force Base in a considerable glare of publicity. Pictures of the aircraft appeared in the press, correspondents could look at it and marvel, stories could be written. Virtually no details were made available, but the technical journals nevertheless had a field day. The unclassified Air Force and Space Digest, for example, published a long article in its issue of April 1964, commencing: “The official pictures and statements tell very little about the A-11. But the technical literature from open sources, when carefully interpreted tells a good deal about what it could and, more importantly, what it could not be. Here’s the story. . . .”

Going Operational

Three years and seven months after first flight in April 1962 the OXCART was declared ready for operational use at design specifications. The period thus devoted

to flight tests was remarkably short, considering the new fields of aircraft performance which were being explored. As each higher Mach number was reached exhaustive tests were carried out in accordance with standard procedures to ensure that the aircraft functioned properly and safely. Defects were corrected and improvements made. All concerned gained experience with the particular characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the vehicle.

The aircraft inlet and related control continued for a long time to present the most troublesome and refractory problem. Numerous attempts failed to find a remedy, even though a special task force concentrated on the task. For a time there was something approaching despair, and the solution when finally achieved was greeted with enormous relief. After all, not every experimental aircraft of advanced performance has survived its flight testing period. The possibility existed that OXCART also would fail, despite the great cost and effort expended upon it.

The main burden of test flights fell upon Lockheed pilots, and some of the aircraft that became available at the site were reserved for the most advanced testing. At the same time, however, the detachment pilots were receiving training and familiarizing themselves with the new vehicle. In the course of doing so, they contributed a good many suggestions for improvements, and their own numerous flights shortened the time required for the test program as a whole. Indeed, one feature of OXCART development was this intimate collaboration between designer, test pilots, operational pilots, and CIA officials, all of whom worked together with great effectiveness.

A few dates and figures will serve to mark the progress of events. By the end of 1963 there had been 573 flights totaling 765 hours. Nine aircraft were in the inventory. On 20 July 1963 test aircraft flew for the first time at Mach 3; in November Mach 3.2 (the design speed) was reached. The longest sustained flight at design conditions occurred on 3 February 1964; it lasted for ten minutes at Mach 3.2. By the end of 1964 there had been 1,160 flights, totaling 1,616 hours. Eleven aircraft were then available, four of them reserved for testing and seven assigned to the operational detachment.

The record may be put in another way. Mach 2 was reached after six months of flying; Mach 3 after 15 months. Two years after the first flight the aircraft had flown a total of 38 hours at Mach 2, three hours at Mach 2.6, and less than one hour at Mach 3. After three years, Mach 2 time had increased to 60 hours, Mach 2.6 time to 33 hours, and Mach 3 time to nine hours; all Mach 3 time, however, was by test aircraft, and detachment aircraft were still restricted to Mach 2.9.

As may be seen from the figures, most flights were of short duration, averaging little more than an hour each. Primarily this was because longer flights were unnecessary at this stage of testing. It was also true, however, that the less seen of OXCART the better, and short flights helped to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings. Yet it was virtually impossible for an aircraft of such dimensions and capabilities to remain inconspicuous. At its full speed OXCART had a turning radius of no less than 86 miles. There was no question of staying close to the airfield; its shortest possible flights took it over a very large expanse of territory.

The first long-range, high-speed flight occurred on 27 January 1965, when one of the test aircraft flew for an hour and forty minutes, with an hour and fifteen minutes above Mach 3.1. Its total range was 2,580 nautical miles, with altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet.

Two more aircraft were lost during this phase of the program. On 9 July 1964 Aircraft No. 133 was making its final approach to the runway when at altitude of 500 feet and airspeed of 200 knots it began a smooth steady roll to the left. Lockheed test pilot Bill Parks could not overcome the roll. At about a 45 degree bank angle and 200 foot altitude he ejected. As he swung down to the vertical in the parachute his feet touched the ground, for what must have been one of the narrower escapes in the perilous history of test piloting. The primary cause of the accident was that the servo for the right outboard roll and pitch control froze. No news of the accident filtered out.

On 28 December 1965 Aircraft No. 126 crashed immediately after take-off and was totally destroyed. The detachment pilot ejected safely at an altitude of 150 feet. The accident investigation board determined that a flight line electrician had improperly connected the yaw and pitch gyros—had in effect reversed the controls. This time Mr. McCone directed the Office of Security to conduct an investigation into the possibility of sabotage. While nothing of the sort was discovered, there were indications of negligence, as the manufacturer of the gyro had earlier warned of the possibility that the mechanism could be connected in reverse. No action had been taken, however, even by such an elementary precaution as painting the contacts different colors. Again there was no publicity connected with the accident.

The year 1965 saw the test site reach the high point of activity. Completion of construction brought it to full physical size. All detachment pilots were Mach 3.0 qualified. Site population reached over 1,800. Contractors were working three shifts a day. Lockheed Constellations made daily flights between the factory at Burbank and the site. And officials were considering how and when and where to use OXCART in its appointed role.

Targeting the OX

By early 1964 Project Headquarters began planning for the contingency of flights over Cuba under a program designated SKYLARK. Bill Parks' accident in early July held this program up for a time, but on 5 August it was directed that SKYLARK achieve emergency operational readiness by 5 November. This involved preparing a small detachment which should be able to do the job over Cuba, though at something less than the full design capability of the OXCART. The goal was to operate at Mach 2.8 and 80,000 feet altitude.

In order to meet the deadline set, camera performance would have to be validated, pilots qualified for Mach 2.8 flight, and coordination with supporting elements arranged. Only one of several equipments for electronic countermeasures (ECM) would be ready by November, and a senior intra-governmental group, including representation from the President's Scientific Advisor Committee,

examined the problem of operating over Cuba without the full complement of defensive systems. This panel decided that the first few overflights could safely be conducted without them, but the ECM would be necessary thereafter. The delivery schedule of ECM equipment was compatible with this course of action.

After considerable modifications to aircraft, the detachment simulated Cuban missions on training flights, and a limited emergency SKYLARK capability was announced. With two weeks notice the OXCART detachment could accomplish a Cuban overflight, though with fewer ready aircraft and pilots than had been planned.

During the following weeks the detachment concentrated on developing SKYLARK into a sustained capability, with five ready pilots and five operational aircraft. The main tasks were to determine aircraft range and fuel consumption, attain repeatable reliable operation, finish pilot training, prepare a family of SKYLARK missions, and coordinate routes with North American Air Defense, Continental Air Defense, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All this was accomplished without substantially hindering the main task of working up OXCART to full design capability. We may anticipate the story, however, by remarking that despite all this preparation the OXCART was never used over Cuba. U-2's proved adequate, and the A-12 was reserved for more critical situations.

In 1965 a more critical situation did indeed emerge in Asia, and interest in using the aircraft there began to be manifest. The Director of the Office of Special Activities briefed senior officials on a scheme which had been drawn up for operations in the Far East. The project was called BLACK SHIELD, and it called for the OXCART to operate out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In the first phase, three aircraft would stage to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice a year, with about 225 personnel involved. After this was in good order, BLACK SHIELD would advance to the point of maintaining a permanent detachment at Kadena. Secretary Vance made \$3.7 million available to be spent in providing support facilities on the island, which were to be available by early fall of 1965.

Meanwhile the Communists began to deploy surface-to-air missiles around Hanoi, thereby threatening our current military reconnaissance capabilities. Secretary McNamara called this to the attention of the Under Secretary of the Air Force on 3 June 1965, and inquired about the practicability of substituting OXCART aircraft for U-2's. He was told that BLACK SHIELD could operate over Vietnam as soon as adequate aircraft performance was achieved.

With deployment overseas thus apparently impending in the fall, the detachment went into the final stages of its program for validating the reliability of aircraft and aircraft systems. It set out to demonstrate complete systems reliability at Mach 3.05 and at 2,300 nautical miles range, with penetration altitude of 76,000 feet. A demonstrated capability for three aerial refuelings was also part of the validation process.

By this time the OXCART was well along in performance. The inlet, camera, hydraulic, navigation, and flight control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability. Nevertheless, as longer flights were conducted at high speeds and high temperatures, new problems came to the surface, the most serious being with the

electrical wiring system. Wiring connectors and components had to withstand temperatures of more than 800 degrees Fahrenheit, together with structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Continuing malfunctions in the inlet controls, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were in many cases attributable to wiring failures. There was also disturbing evidence that careless handling was contributing to electrical connector failures. Difficulties persisted in the sealing of fuel tanks. What with one thing and another, officials soon began to fear that the scheduled date for BLACK SHIELD readiness would not be met. Prompt corrective action on the part of Lockheed was in order. The quality of maintenance needed drastic improvement. The responsibility for delivering an aircraft system with acceptable reliability to meet an operational commitment lay in Lockheed's hands.

In this uncomfortable situation, OSA's Deputy for Technology went to the Lockheed plant to see Kelly Johnson on 3 August 1965. A frank discussion ensued on the measures necessary to insure that BLACK SHIELD commitments would be met, and Johnson concluded that he himself spend full time at the site in order to get the job done expeditiously. Lockheed President Daniel Haughton offered the full support of the corporation, and Johnson began duty at the site next day. His firm and effective management got Project BLACK SHIELD back on schedule.

Four primary BLACK SHIELD aircraft were selected and final validation flights conducted. During these tests the OXCART achieved a maximum speed of Mach 3.29, altitude of 90,000 feet, and sustained flight time above Mach 3.2 of one hour and fourteen minutes. The maximum endurance flight lasted six hours and twenty minutes. The last stage was reached on 20 November 1965, and two days later Kelly Johnson wrote Headquarters:

"Overall, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be successfully deployed for the BLACK SHIELD mission with what I would consider to be at least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deployment days. Actually, considering our performance level of more than four times the U-2 speed and three miles more operating altitude, it is probably much less risky than our first U-2 deployments. I think the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."

An impressive demonstration of the OXCART's capability occurred on 21 December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Parks flew 10,198 statute miles in six hours. This flight established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft. With the readiness of the aircraft confirmed, a formal proposal was made that OXCART be deployed to the Far East.

After examining the matter, the proposal was not approved. It was agreed, however, that short of actually moving aircraft to Kadena all steps should be taken to develop and maintain a quick reaction capability, ready to deploy within a 21-day period at any time after 1 January 1966. There the matter remained, for more than a year. During 1966 there were frequent renewals of the request for authorization to deploy OXCART to Okinawa and conduct reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam. All were turned down.

Meanwhile, of course, flight testing and crew proficiency training continued. There was plenty of time to improve mission plans and flight tactics, as well as to prepare the forward area at Kadena. New plans shortened deployment time from the 21 days first specified. Personnel and cargo were to be airlifted to Kadena the day deployment was approved. On the fifth day the first OXCART would depart and travel the 6,673 miles in five hours and 34 minutes. The second would go on the seventh and third on the ninth day. The first two would be ready for an emergency mission on the eleventh day, and for a normal mission on the fifteenth day.

BLACK SHIELD

About May of 1967 prospects for deployment took a new turn. A good deal of apprehension was evident in Washington about the possibility that the Communists might introduce surface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam, and concern was aggravated by doubts as to whether we could detect such a development if it occurred. The President asked for 8 proposals on the matter and once again CIA suggested that the OXCART be used. Its camera was far superior to the U-2 and its vulnerability was far less. The State and Defense members of the Committee decided to re-examine the requirement and the political risks involved. While they were engaged in their deliberations, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Helms, submitted another formal proposal to deploy the OXCART. In addition, he raised the matter at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch" on 16 May, and received the President's approval to "go." Walt Rostow later in the day formally conveyed the President's decision, and the BLACK SHIELD deployment plan was forthwith put into effect.

On 17 May airlift to Kadena began. On 22 May the first A-12 (Serial No. 131) flew nonstop to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. Aircraft No. 127 departed on 24 May and arrived at Kadena five hours and 55 minutes later. The third, No. 129, left according to plan on 26 May 1967 and proceeded normally until in the vicinity of Wake Island the pilot experienced difficulties with the inertial navigation and communications systems. Under the circumstances, he decided to make a precautionary landing at Wake Island. The prepositioned emergency recovery team secured the aircraft without incident and the flight to Kadena resumed next day.

On 29 May 1967, the unit at Kadena was ready to fly an operational mission. Two hundred and sixty personnel had deployed to the BLACK SHIELD facility. Except for hangars, which were a month short of completion, everything was in shape for sustained operations. Next day the detachment was alerted for a mission on 31 May, and the moment arrived which would see the culmination of ten years of effort, worry, and cost. As fate would have it, on the morning of the 31st heavy rain fell at Kadena. Since weather over the target area was clear, preparations continued in hopes that the local weather would clear. When the time for take-off approached, the OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway, and took off while the rain continued.

The first BLACK SHIELD mission followed one flight line over North Vietnam and one over the Demilitarized Zone. It lasted three hours and 39 minutes, and the

cruise legs were flown at Mach 3.1. Results were satisfactory. Seventy of the 190 known SAM sites in North Vietnam were photographed, as were nine other priority targets. There were no radar signals detected, indicating that the first mission had gone completely unnoticed.

Fifteen BLACK SHIELD missions were alerted during the period from 31 May to 15 August 1967. Seven of the fifteen were flown and of these four detected radar tracking signals, but no hostile action was taken against any of them. By mid-July it had been determined with a high degree of confidence that there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam.

Operations and maintenance at Kadena began with the receipt of alert notification. Both a primary aircraft and pilot and a backup aircraft and pilot were selected. The aircraft were given thorough inspection and servicing, all systems were checked, and the cameras loaded into the aircraft. Pilots received a detailed route briefing in the early evening prior to the day of flight. On the morning of the flight a final briefing occurred, at which time the condition of the aircraft and its systems was reported, last-minute weather forecasts reviewed, and other relevant intelligence communicated, together with any amendments or changes in the flight plan. Two hours prior to take-off the primary pilot had a medical examination, got into his suit, and was taken to the aircraft. If any malfunctions developed on the primary aircraft, the back-up could execute the mission one hour later.

A typical route profile for a BLACK SHIELD mission over North Vietnam included a refueling shortly after takeoff, south of Okinawa, the planned photographic pass or passes, withdrawal to a second aerial refueling in the Thailand area, and return to Kadena. So great was the OXCART's speed that it spent only 12 1/2 minutes over North Vietnam in a typical "single pass" mission, or a total of 21 1/2 minutes on two passes.

Once landed back at Kadena, the camera film was removed from the aircraft, boxed, and sent by special plane to the processing facilities. By late summer an Air Force Center in Japan carried out the processing in order to place the photo-intelligence in the hands of American commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of completion of a BLACK SHIELD mission.

Between 16 August and 31 December 1967, twenty-six missions were alerted. Fifteen were flown. On 17 September one SAM site traced the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful with its Fan Song guidance radar. On 28 October a North Vietnamese SAM site for the first time launched a single, albeit unsuccessful, missile at the OXCART. Photography from this mission documented the event with photographs of missile smoke above the SAM firing site, and with pictures of the missile and of its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment appeared to perform well against the missile firing.

During the flight of 30 October 1967, two sites prepared to launch missiles but neither did. During the second pass at least six missiles were fired at the OXCART, each confirmed by missile vapor trails on mission photography. The pilot saw these vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations. Post-flight inspection of the aircraft revealed that a piece of metal had penetrated the lower right wing fillet area and lodged against the support structure of the wing tank. The fragment was not a

warhead pellet but may have been a part of the debris from one of the missile detonations observed by the pilot.

The SR-71

In late 1962, the Air Force ordered a fleet of A-11's from Lockheed, which upon being finished as two-seated reconnaissance aircraft would be named SR-71. The first flight was made in December 1964 and the SR-71 became operation in 1967. The fact that these aircraft were ordered eased the path of OXCART development, since it meant that the financial burden was shared with the Air Force, and the cost per aircraft was somewhat reduced by producing greater numbers. In the longer run, however, the existence of SR-71 spelled the doom of OXCART.

Ending

In spite of all the efforts to save the program, the Secretary of Defense on 16 May 1968 reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the OXCART Program and store the aircraft. This decision was confirmed by the President on 21 May 1968 during his weekly luncheon meeting with his principal advisers.

Early in March 1968, USAF SR-71 aircraft began to arrive at Kadena to take over the BLACK SHIELD commitment, and by gradual stages the A-12 was placed on standby to back up the SR-71 project Headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possible date to begin redeployment, and in the meantime flights of A-12 aircraft were to be limited to those essential for maintaining flying safety and pilot proficiency. After BLACK SHIELD aircraft arrived in the US they would proceed to storage. Those already at base were placed in storage by 7 June.

Postscript

In summary: the OXCART Program lasted just over ten years, from its inception in 1957 through first flights in 1962 to termination in 1968. During this period a total of 22 operational missions had been flown over hostile territory.

Lockheed produced 15 OXCARTS, three YF-12-A's, and 31 SR-71's. Five OXCARTs were lost in accidents; two pilots were killed, and two had narrow escapes. In addition, two F-101 chase planes were lost with their Air Force pilots during OXCART's testing phase.

The main objective of the program—to create a reconnaissance aircraft of unprecedented speed, range, and altitude capability—was triumphantly achieved. It may well be, however, that the most important aspects of the effort lay in its by-products—the notable advances in aerodynamic design, engine performance, cameras, electronic countermeasures, pilot life support systems, antiradar devices, and above all in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. Altogether it was a pioneering accomplishment.

Source: George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/>.

43. Introducing Nuclear Weapons into the United States (1970s)

Classification: Top Secret

This report assesses capabilities of foreign nations to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the United States and estimates the likelihood of such introduction.

Report on the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the U.S.

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities of foreign nations to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and to estimate the likelihood of such introduction over the next few years.

THE ESTIMATE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In considering the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US leaders or any nation would have to weigh any possible advantages against the grave consequences which would follow from discovery. Despite all precautions there would always be risk of detection arising not only from US security measures but also from the chance of US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent, or sheer accident. The enemy leaders would almost certainly judge that use of this tactic would be regarded by the US as a warlike act, if not as a cause for war, and that it would precipitate an international political crisis of the first magnitude.

2. We believe, therefore, that no nation would consider this course except possibly in the context of planning an attack on the US, of deterring the US from an attack on itself, or conceivably as an act of deception designed to embroil the US with a third power. It is inconceivable to us that any nation would plan an attack which relied on the clandestine introduction of sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war. Any plans for their use, we believe, would envision the use of limited quantities to achieve results unattainable by other means.

3. Only four foreign nations—the USSR, the UK, France, and Communist China—have developed and tested nuclear weapons. Beyond these, only India and Israel may do so over the next several years. We can foresee no changes in the world

situation so radical as to motivate the UK, France, or any of the potential nuclear powers to attempt to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the US. For this reason, the balance of this discussion will be concerned only with the remaining nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

II. SOVIET AND CHINESE CAPABILITIES

4. Both the USSR and Communist China can produce nuclear weapons which could be adapted for clandestine introduction into the US. We estimate that the Soviets have a broad spectrum of weapons ranging from 150 pounds in weight and yielding .25–15 KT up to very large ones having yields of many megatons and weighing thousands of pounds. Current Chinese weapons are probably fairly large and would probably require more detailed assembly and check out after being brought in than would Soviet designs. The Chinese have introduced plutonium into their weapon design and could have a composite weapon weighing about 1,200 pounds with a yield of 50 KT; they could have a weapon in the megaton range weighing about 3,000 pounds. To date the Chinese have not to our knowledge tested a gun-assembly weapon. With their present technology they could develop one yielding about 20 KT and weighing 500–1,000 pounds but because of the heavy requirements of such weapons for U-235, they probably will not do so.

5. Nuclear weapons with weights of up to a few thousand pounds could be brought across US borders by common means of transport without great difficulty but not without some risk. The difficulties and risks of introducing larger weapons into the US, even in a disassembled state, are probably sufficiently great to seriously discourage such attempts. Such devices could be carried in by fishing boats or similar small craft to which transfer had been made at sea. Any weapons could be brought into US waters in merchant ships and detonated without removal from the ship.

6. Soviet capabilities to introduce nuclear weapons secretly are much greater than Chinese. We believe that if either country undertook such a program, they would rely on their own agent organizations rather than on political sympathizers in the US. Soviet intelligence services have assigned a high priority to the development of espionage and sabotage capabilities in the US and presumably have formed an organization for the latter purpose. Should the Soviets undertake the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, they almost certainly would employ the highly trained and reliable agents of these services. They could also employ diplomatic personnel and could bring in weapons or weapon components under diplomatic cover. The large diplomatic establishments in Canada and Mexico could serve as bases for the operation. There are no Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments in the US, Canada, or Mexico. Their absence precludes the use of diplomatic cover for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components and the use of secure diplomatic communications for planning and control of such an operation; it also makes more difficult the introduction and control of agents. Nevertheless, the Chinese could introduce agents under the guise of bona fide immigrants. . . .

8. In considering Soviet and Chinese capabilities, we have also considered the possibility that a third country might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this highly unlikely on two counts. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. And if they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

III. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

9. If the Soviets or Communist Chinese have considered the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, they have almost certainly been influenced by the same general considerations: the element of risk, the opportunities for clandestine introduction, and the results that could be achieved. The two countries, however, occupy vastly different strategic positions vis-a-vis the US. The Soviets and Chinese, therefore, might see the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons in a somewhat different light.

10. *The USSR.* The Soviet leaders, like those of the US, must take account of the possibility of general war in their military planning. In such planning, the Soviets would consider the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, if at all, only as a supplement to the main attack by their large strategic attack forces. Because they have already achieved an assured retaliatory capability, they would probably consider a clandestine emplacement effort as potentially useful only in support of a deliberate or pre-emptive Soviet attack and directed toward delaying or reducing a US retaliatory attack. Possible targets might include important government headquarters, key military command and control facilities, missile detection and tracking radars, and possibly some alert forces. The Soviets would recognize, however, that even if such an effort were successful, it could not prevent US retaliation or reduce it to what they would consider an acceptable level.

11. In considering clandestine attack as a supplement to other weapons, the Soviets would have to weigh their ability to initiate such attack rapidly, with little preparation, and in close coordination with the main weight of attack. Thus, in a pre-planned attack clandestinely introduced weapons would have to be in position at the time the attack was launched. In the case of a pre-emptive attack the circumstances would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery of such weapons after a decision to pre-empt. To prepare for this contingency beforehand, the Soviets would have to accept the risk of maintaining weapons in the US for an indefinite period of time. These difficulties would not obtain if the USSR decided deliberately to initiate general war in a period of low tension; weapons could be introduced into the US a relatively short time before use. But the Soviets would have to consider the risk of jeopardizing the element of surprise on which this course of action relies, and that discovery would have severe and unpredictable repercussions, possibly including a pre-emptive attack which would be disastrous

for the USSR. For these reasons, we think it highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

12. *Communist China.* The Chinese have no capability at present to attack the US with nuclear weapons. They probably have an ICBM system in the early stages of development, which could become operational several years from now. In the interim, they might see some advantages in clandestinely introducing and emplacing nuclear weapons in the US. Inasmuch as they could not deliver such an attack on a scale sufficient to achieve a decisive military objective, their object would presumably be to deter the US from a course of action that gravely threatened their national security. Consequently, the most likely targets would be population centers.

13. Clearly, the Chinese would also see grave disadvantages in such a move.

So long as the US was unaware of their existence, the concealed weapons would have no effect upon its actions. Indeed, the risk of their discovery would be an ever present, continuing danger to the Chinese themselves. Once the Chinese announced that nuclear weapons were emplaced in the US, the announcement would touch off an intensive search and extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the Chinese could not be sure that the US would in fact be deterred. On the one hand, the US might consider such an unverified announcement as a mere bluff. On the other it might take the clandestine introduction of such weapons as a *casus belli* and, having taken such actions as it could to safeguard its population, launch a devastating nuclear attack on China. In any case, the US would almost certainly seek to render the clandestinely introduced weapons unusable by threatening and preparing to deliver a devastating retaliatory attack in the event of their use. It is conceivable that some Chinese regime might be willing to accept such risks of national destruction, but we think it highly unlikely.

14. Finally it is conceivable that the Chinese Communists might seek to introduce into the US a nuclear device with the intention of detonating it under certain circumstances—i.e., in a period of great tension between the US and the USSR in hopes that it would lead US authorities to conclude that the action had been perpetrated by the Soviets. Alternatively, the Chinese Communists might think it worthwhile to introduce into the US a nuclear device so constructed as to appear to be of Soviet origin, and intended not to be detonated but to be discovered by US authorities. In the first case, the purpose would be to touch off a war; in the second, it would be to produce a serious crisis between the US and the USSR—a crisis which could serve Chinese interests. But it is unlikely that deception would succeed; the procedures would be subject to most of the other difficulties discussed above, and we consider it highly unlikely that the Chinese would attempt either.

Source: “The Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the US (NIE 4-70)”, Federation of American Scientists: Intelligence Resource Program, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nieca1970.pdf>.

44. Project MOCKINGBIRD (Early 1970)

Classification: Secret/Eyes Only

The covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation Project MOCKINGBIRD focused the dissemination of propaganda, to include influencing foreign media. This summary report discusses the use of classified material to the media by certain individuals.

Summary Report of Project MOCKINGBIRD

PROJECT MOCKINGBIRD

Project Mockingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newsmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards: Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel (Mr. Lawrence Houston).

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

Source: "The CIA's Family Jewels," George Washington University National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf.

45. National Security Directive No. 40: Responsibility for Covert Action Operations (1970)

Classification: Top Secret

Declassified and only released in part, this document outlines the responsibility for the conduct, supervision, and coordination of covert operations. Additionally, it outlines the membership of the 40 Committee.

National Security Decision Memorandum 40

February 17, 1970

National Security Decision Memorandum 40

To: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central intelligence

Subject: Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations

I have determined that it is essential to the defense and security of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government continue to be supplemented by covert action operations.

By covert action operations I mean those activities which, although designed to further official U.S. programs and policies abroad, are so planned and executed that the hand of the U.S. Government is not apparent to unauthorized persons.

The covert actions of the U.S. Government abroad shall be subject to coordination and control by the Director of Central Intelligence. All such covert action operations, unless other specifically assigned by the President, shall be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for assuring that covert action operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies and for consulting with and obtaining appropriate coordination from any other interested agencies or

officers on a need-to-known basis. The Director of Central Intelligence shall obtain policy approval for all major and/or politically sensitive covert action programs through The 40 Committee.

The 40 Committee as presently constituted consists of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the Attorney General, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for insuring an annual review by The 40 Committee of all covert action programs previously approved.

Also, subject to The 40 Committee's policy review and specific operation mission approval are the following programs originating in the Department of Defense: the monthly Joint Reconnaissance Center Schedule, [REDACTED]

Furthermore, any proposal for covert activities or operations from agencies not represented on The 40 Committee shall be subject to that committee's approval unless otherwise directed by the President.

Covert action operations shall include any type of activity necessary to carry out approved purposes except that they will not include armed conflict by regular military forces, or cover and decision for active military operations by the armed forces of the United States.

This directive superseded and rescinds NSC 5412/2.

Richard Nixon

Source: "National Security Decision Memorandum 40," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm-40.pdf>.

46. Chile: Disregard the Ambassador, Overthrow Allende (1970)

Classification: Secret/Eyes Only

This October 16, 1970, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters memo from Thomas Karamessines, CIA deputy director of plans, to CIA station chief in Santiago Henry Hecksher states that "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup." Orders to the contrary from U.S. ambassador Edward Korry were to be disregarded.

Memo from Thomas Karamessines, CIA Deputy Director of Plans, to CIA Station Chief in Chile, Henry Hecksher

16 October 1970

CITE HEADQUARTERS

IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO (EYES ONLY)

1. Track Two policy, objectives, and actions were reviewed at high USG level afternoon 15 October. Conclusions, which are to be your operational guide, follow:
2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden. While this imposes upon us a high degree of selectivity in making military contacts and dictates that these contacts be made in the most secure manner it definitely does not preclude contacts such as reported in Santiago 544 which was a masterful piece of work.
3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus, it would be counterproductive to our Track Two [?] objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. In essence our message is to state, "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you together with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." You are requested to deliver the message to Viaux essentially as noted above. Our objectives are as follows: (A) to advise him of our opinion and discourage him from acting alone; (B) continue to encourage him to amplify his planning; (C) encourage him to join forces with other coup planners so that they may act in concert either before or after 24 October. (N.B. Six gas masks and six CS cannisters are being carried to Santiago by special [REDACTED] courier ETD Washington 1100 hours 16 October.)
4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.
5. The above is your operating guidance. No other policy guidance you may receive from State or its maximum exponent in Santiago, on his return, are to sway you from your course.
6. Please review all your present and possibly new activities to include propaganda, black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or anything else your imagination can conjure which will permit you to press forward toward our [REDACTED] objective in a secure manner.

END OF MESSAGE

Source: George Washington University National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 8, E.O. 12356, Section 3.4.

47. CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, September 15–November 3, 1970 (1970)

Classification: Top Secret

In a presidential election held in Chile on September 4, 1970, Salvador Allende, the candidate of the Popular Unity, was overwhelmingly confirmed as the winner. Eduardo Frei Montalva and his Christian Democratic Party would later unite with Allende's opponents to form a congressional majority in favor of declaring his presidency illegal in August 1973. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initiated Project FUBELT—the code name for covert operations to promote a military coup and undermine Allende's government. This report provides a good wrap-up and outline of American activity during a six-week period in the U.S. effort to destabilize Chile economically and isolate Allende's government diplomatically.

Report on CIA Task Force Activities in Chile in Late 1970

November 18, 1970

SUBJECT: Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970

1. General

a. On 15 September 1970, CIA was directed to try to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende's ascent to the Chilean presidency on 3 November. This effort was to be independent of concurrent endeavors being undertaken through, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee, Department of State, and Ambassador Korry.

b. Briefly, the situation at that time was the following:

- Allende had attained a plurality of only some 40,000 in the Chilean popular vote for president. Jorge Alessandri, a conservative and the runner-up, would face Allende in a Congressional run-off on 24 October. The run-off winner would be invested as president on 3 November.
- Allende's designation as president by Congress was very probable given all known factors in the Chilean political equation.
- Given the dismal prospects of a political formula being worked out to prevent Allende's designation as president by Congress, remaining alternatives centered around overcoming the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military.

- U.S. Government intentions were highly suspect, particularly in Allende and certain government sectors. Suspicions extended to all Americans in Chile for whatever declared purpose. In addition, the Chilean military were being monitored quite closely by the Allende forces for warning signals of any interventionist proclivities.

2. Special Organization

a. A Chilean Task Force was assembled and functioning three days after CIA was assigned the mission. It was headed by [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED] and highly-qualified CIA [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED] recalled from their [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED] posts specifically for this purpose. A special communications channel was set up simultaneously to Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, to handle sensitive cable traffic for the Task Force.

b. [ONE LINE REDACTED] It consisted of four CIA officers with the appearance, language, and experience to sustain the fiction of various foreign nationalities. They were recalled from the overseas posts to Washington, briefed, and inserted individually into Chile [ONE LINE REDACTED] nationals. In Santiago, their only U.S. contact was a CIA officer who had resided in Santiago [ONE LINE REDACTED] established contact with Chilean intermediaries or principals interested in promoting a military coup.

c. By a special (and unique) arrangement requested by CIA, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago was placed under operational direction of the CIA Chief of Station there. His assistance and Chilean military contacts were invaluable in this program.

[PAGE 4 MISSING]

selected for the presidency by Congress, he (Alessandri) would resign. The thrust of CIA's endeavors, then, was to use every plausible pressure combined with inducements to move Frei down this path. To this end, virtually overnight CIA mobilized an interlocking political action and propaganda campaign designed both to goad and entice Frei into following through on the re-election gambit.

At the same time, recognizing the fallibilities of Frei, CIA focused on provoking a military coup. This undertaking was segregated from that of the Frei re-election gambit with the intention that it be pursued independently of Frei if necessary, but with his acquiescence if possible. [FOUR LINES REDACTED]

4. Propaganda Campaign

a. The propaganda campaign was tailored to generating concern about Chile's future in terms which would condition the thinking and actions of the three key elements in the Chilean political equation: Frei himself, the Chilean political elite, and the Chilean military (the latter two of which could well bring collateral

influence to bear on Frei). Each of these elements had hastened to rationalize its acceptance of an Allende presidency. Their palliative was the built-in checks and balance of Chile's, demonstrated reverence for democracy and constitutionality, sweetened by Allende's promise to honor these traditions.

b. After the 4 September popular vote, the world press had tended to treat the prospect of witnessing the first freely-elected Marxist head of state take office as a curious aberration of democracy rather than a politically significant event. Press interest and coverage was relatively light until the Allende forces fortuitously provided an attractive issue which could be exploited. By 15 September, it became apparent that Allende was conducting a rather blatant campaign to intimidate the Chilean information media through threats of assassination and violence, take-overs by so-called worker organizations, and ultimatums to the management of newspapers and radio stations. Allende's purpose was to smother any opposition to this election by Congress and to take advantage of that peculiarly Latin, and pronounced Chilean, propensity to jump on an accelerating bandwagon—ideals and the country's welfare to the contrary. A major target of Allende was “El Mercurio”, the most prestigious newspaper in Chile and the major opposition voice to Allende up to that time. CIA mounted a propaganda campaign centered around “El Mercurio” and the issue of Allende brazenly taking his first step in “communizing” Chile by attacking freedom of the press and, worse, with the election still unsettled. Covert action resources were used to launch

- Cables of support/protest from leading newspapers throughout Latin America to “El Mercurio”.
- A protest statement from the International Press Association [THREE LINES REDACTED] [(“Freedom of the press in Chile is being strangled by Communist and Marxist forces and their allies.”)]
- World press coverage of the International Press Association protest and on the details of the Communist efforts to seize control of the Chilean press.
- A program of journalists—actual agents and otherwise—travelling to Chile for on-thescene reporting. (By 28 September, CIA had in place in, or enroute to, Chile 15 journalist agents from 10 different countries. This cadre was supplemented by 8 more journalists from 5 countries under the direction of high level agents who were, for the part, in managerial capacities in the media field.)

As a result of the ensuing furore, Allende—sensitive to world opinion and attempting to project the image of a moderate, non-dogmatic socialist—decided to become more circumspect. By 25 September, heavy-handed intimidation of the press had virtually ceased.

c. Allende's show of strength had made its point however; the Chilean press, including “El Mercurio”, never did regain its resiliency and remained thoroughly muted from thereon out. Lacking the usual forums for spontaneous generation and

replay of propaganda inside Chile, CIA had to rely increasingly on its own resources:

- an underground press dependent upon direct mail distribution;
- placement of individual news items through agents against the resistance of a cowed management;
- financing of a new, albeit small, newspaper;
- subsidy of an anti-Allende political group and its radio programs, political advertisements, and political rallies; and
- direct mailing of foreign news articles to President Frei, Mrs. Frei, selected military leaders, and the Chilean domestic press.

This effort did not, and could not, replace a Chilean press, fully operative and free of restraint. Virtually alone, it did keep the voice of public opposition alive inside Chile for coup purposes during the final weeks of this period.

d. The magnitude of the propaganda campaign mounted during this six week period in the Latin American and European media—aside from the U.S., the two “outside” areas with, by far, the greatest influence on Chile—is evident from the fact that only partial returns show 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials, and similar items as a direct result of agent activity. Just how many of these items were replayed is not known[.] [TWO LINES REDACTED] Nor, has CIA any idea of the scope of the immeasurable multiplier effect—that is, how much its “induced” news focused media interest on the Chilean issues and stimulated additional coverage—except that, even by conservative standards, this contribution must have been both substantial and significant.

e. Special intelligence and “inside” briefings were given to U.S. journalists in deference to the international influence of the U.S. media. Particularly noteworthy in this connection was the Time cover story which owed a great deal to written materials and briefings provided by CIA. The Time correspondent in Chile who was providing much of the background material for the story apparently accepted Allende’s protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face value. CIA briefings in Washington [ONE LINE REDACTED] changed the basic thrust of the story in the final stages according to another Time correspondent. It provoked Allende to complain on 13 October, “We are suffering the most brutal and horrible pressure, both domestic and international,” singling out Time in particular as having “openly called” for an invasion of Chile.

5. Political Action

a. The political action program had only one purpose: to induce President Frei to prevent Allende’s election by the Congress on 24 October and, failing that, to support—by benevolent neutrality at the least and conspiratorial benediction at the most—a military coup which would prevent Allende from taking office on 3

November. Realistically, the task was one of attempting to recast Frei, as a political personality, in a role demanding decisiveness and “machismo” to a degree that, thus far, had eluded him. Pressures from those whose opinion and/or approval he valued—in combination with adequate propaganda orchestrations—represented the only hope of converting Frei.

[FOUR LINES REDACTED]

- Allende as president would be an unparalleled disaster for Chile (Frei agreed).
- Frei had both the power and obligation to prevent this.
- [FIVE LINES REDACTED]
- [THREE LINES REDACTED]
- In the event Frei’s re-election gambit succeeded, the U.S. Government would be prepared to provide substantial support for Frei’s presidential campaign.

[SIX LINES REDACTED]

c. In Europe and Latin America, prominent and influential members of the Christian Democratic movement as well as the Catholic Church were prompted to visit Frei or send personal messages to him urging that he save Chile. Some of these endeavors were the following:

- [EIGHT LINES REDACTED]
- The West German Christian Democratic Party—which enjoyed special equities with Frei by virtue of generous support to the Christian Democrats in Chile over a range of many years—dispatched several top-level emissaries to Chile. They contacted Frei and other Christian Democratic leaders in Chile [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED]
- [FIVE LINES REDACTED]
- [THREE LINES REDACTED]
- [THREE LINES REDACTED]
- [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED] one of the international figures in Catholicism most respected by Frei, sent a personal message indicating that Frei and his party must oppose Marxism.
- [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED] of the Italian Christian Democratic Party—which had good fraternal relations with Frei and his party—refused to intervene. (He said it was a hopeless situation and he saw no point in risking his reputation in a lost cause.)

Collateral efforts were made to influence Frei or those close to Frei, such as:

- Influential lay Catholics sent messages to or visited the Vatican.

- [SEVERAL WORDS REDACTED] through a series of lay and clerical pressures from other countries, was dissuaded from ceding an Allende victory prior to his Congressional election actually taking place.
- Telegrams were sent Mrs. Frei from women's groups in other Latin American countries.
- Foreign press items were mailed directly to Frei, Mrs. Frei, and Christian Democratic Congressmen in Chile.
- Intelligence was surfaced indicating that, once in power, the Communists intended to denigrate Frei as the first step in the dissolution of his party.

d. In spite of everything, Frei never asserted himself. Indeed, he failed to attend or to influence otherwise the 3–4 October Congress of his party at which time it was decided by a substantial margin to make a deal with Allende. With that decision, the Frei re-election gambit died and constitutional alternatives had been exhausted. Subsequently, Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military officers that he would not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication he might even welcome one. Yet, when a coup opportunity and situation presented itself upon the assassination of Army Commander in Chief Schneider, Frei moved quickly away from it.

6. Military Coup

a. After early October—absent any evidence that Frei was responding, politically speaking, to artificial respiration—military coup increasingly suggested itself as the only possible solution to the Allende problem. Anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros, but were immobilized by:

- the tradition of military respect for the Constitution;
- the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution;
- fear of the reaction of non-commissioned officers who tended to harbor pro-Allende sympathies; and,
- a strong propensity to accept Allende blandishments to the effect that the military had little to fear from him.

Although individual officers among the top leadership of the military and Carabineros were pre-disposed to take action, they felt the Army was central to a successful coup, and, as long as General Schneider remained the head of the Army, the Army could not be counted upon. General Schneider's attitude could only be changed through the personal intervention and forceful advocacy of a coup by President Frei: something, it became obvious, the latter was most unlikely to bring himself to do.

Source: "Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970," George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc01.pdf>.

48. Operation ARTICHOKE: Memorandum of Record (1973)

Classification: Secret

This memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General Staff (i.e., legal office) discusses the history and impoundment of all LSD materials. Information contained in this memorandum reflects that drugs were administered without the prior knowledge or approval of the Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services. The memorandum ends with a discussion of Frank Olson, who unknowingly was given the drug LSD and soon thereafter committed suicide.

Memorandum of Record

1 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project ARTICHOKE

ARTICHOKE is the Agency cryptonym for the study and/or use of “special” interrogation methods and techniques. These special interrogation methods have been known to include the use of drugs and chemicals, hypnosis, and “total isolation,” a form of psychological harassment.

A review of available file information obtained from Office of Security resources failed to reflect a comprehensive or complete picture of the ARTICHOKE program as participated in by the Office of Security. Fragmentary information contained in a variety of files previously maintained by the Security Research Staff (SRS) reflected several basic papers which described, in general terms, the program known as ARTICHOKE. Information contained therein indicated that prior to 1952, the Office of Security had studied the use of drugs and chemicals in “unconventional interrogation.” These studies were evidently coordinated with the Agency unit which was then called OSI. OSI at that time apparently was the coordinating unit within CIA.

One paper reflected that an Office of Security team as early as 1949–50 experimented with drugs and hypnosis under a project called BLUEBIRD. This paper also reflected that by 1951 actual interrogations utilizing drugs were conducted by a combined team of Office of Security and Office of Medical Services personnel but few details were available.

File information indicated that in 1952, overall responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE passed from OSI to the Office of Security. References to operational use of drugs as an aid to interrogation since that time were found in various files, but few details concerning these experiments were reflected. A memorandum, subject title: Project ARTICHOKE dated 21 November 1952, by Mr. Sheffield Edwards reflected transfer of control of Project ARTICHOKE from OSI to the Office of Security. The memorandum indicated that I&SO (Office of Security) should call

upon the research and support facilities of the CIA Medical Staff and the Office of Technical Services as required. Responsibility for the evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of the project were to remain with OSI.

The unit within the Office of Security which apparently coordinated Project ARTICHOKE activities was SRS, with Mr. [REDACTED] for many years the focal point. Details of Office of Security involvement in individual Project ARTICHOKE operational utilizations were found in very few instances. A reference in an SRS log (1951–67) reflected, however, that SRS had been involved in the experimentation and use of hypnosis “from the start.” In the same reference, it was stated that “SRS has examined and investigated numerous unusual techniques of interrogation including psychological harassment and such matters as total isolation.” The SRS log referred to above, which covered a period from 1951 to 1967 indicated that, as of 1967, “the term ARTICHOKE is not in general use now, and drug interrogation is conducted from the recommendation of an Agency committee of which the Chief, SRS, is the Office of Security representative.” No record was found which reflected when or if overall responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE was transferred from the Office of Security to any other Agency component.

One of the few areas where detailed information was available was concerned, with hypnotic experimentations. A log of hypnotic experiments conducted by Office of Security personnel was reviewed. The log reflected that numerous (probably several hundred) experiments with hypnotism were conducted in Agency buildings, apparently utilizing the staff employee volunteers as subjects. In some instances, representatives from Agency components other than the Office of Security were present. The log reflected hypnotic experimentations during 1951, 1952, and 1953. It could not be determined from available file information when the hypnotic experiments actually began or were caused to be ceased. No record was located which reflected hypnosis utilized as an actual operational tool in the field. In connection with hypnotism, it appears that SRS utilized an Agency employee, one [REDACTED] as an informant in various societies dealing with hypnotism to keep abreast of current developments in the field.

Few references were found pertaining to the area of “total isolation” as an interrogation aid. A memorandum pertaining to this subject dated 21 March 1955, was written by Mr. [REDACTED] of SRS to the Director of Security. The paper discussed “total isolation” techniques as an operational tool of potential. Another paper (a sterilized version, probably written by an element of the Department of Defense) dated 16 March 1955 reflected the results of “total isolation” experiments on six volunteers, all members of the U.S. military. No reference was found to any additional experiments in this field, nor was any reference found which reflected actual use of this technique in an operational situation.

As far as the experimentation and/or utilization of various drugs is concerned, references to a few instances were located, but little detail is available, and it was clear from the files that much of the detailed information probably was maintained by Agency units other than the Office of Security, i.e., the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Technical Services.

Among the instances where details were located in which drugs were used in an operational environment under the auspices of Project ARTICHOKE, were the following:

- a. In 1954 three subjects interrogated by a Project ARTICHOKE team utilizing drugs of an unspecified nature. The three subjects were identified as [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in a memorandum dated 13 January 1955, with a cover sheet signed by Mr. [REDACTED]. The interrogations took place in [REDACTED] and the memorandum mentioned injections of “solution #1” and “solution #2,” but these drugs were not further identified. It was noted in the memorandum that the cases handled “under straight drug techniques—hypnosis or narco-hypnosis was not attempted.”
- b. A memorandum dated 20 January 1959 to Mr. [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] indicated that a field request had been made for a “P-1 interrogation.” The writer [REDACTED] identified a “P-1 interrogation” as one using LSD. Approval was granted on 27 January 1959 by the initials [REDACTED] presumably Mr. [REDACTED]. No further reference to the case could be found, thus no details were available.
- c. A series of cables between [REDACTED] and Headquarters in 1955 requested ARTICHOKE interrogations for nine persons. No disposition in this instance was found, however, transmittal slip affixed to the materials dated in 1960 indicated that the ARTICHOKE interrogations probably did not actually take place in [REDACTED] at that time.
- d. A memo contained in the security file of [REDACTED] reflected that an ARTICHOKE team was dispatched to [REDACTED] in June 1952 to conduct ARTICHOKE interrogations on [REDACTED]. No further reference to this operation was noted, and no disposition could be found.
- e. In the case [REDACTED] [REDACTED] operation in [REDACTED] drugs were utilized in the interrogation which took place [REDACTED]. Again, details of the operation were not available. However an interview with the Office of Security representative who participated in the interrogation revealed that a form of LSD was used in this instance. In this case, approval was granted by Headquarters for the ARTICHOKE interrogation. A memorandum dated 6 July 1960, signed by Mr. [REDACTED] Deputy Director of Security, reflected that approval for use of drugs in this case was granted at a meeting of the Drug Committee on 1 July 1960 and cabled to [REDACTED].

As stated earlier, little detail was available in file information concerning the conduct of actual cases utilizing Project ARTICHOKE techniques. It appears obvious, however, that the few cases noted above were only a small part of the actual utilization of ARTICHOKE techniques in the field. For one thing, almost no information was available for the period prior to 1952, so that Project BLUEBIRD experiments and operations were not noted specifically. In addition

annual reports of accomplishments found in SRS log materials reflected a substantial amount of activity in the Project ARTICHOKE area. The review for 1953–1954 stated in part that SRS had “dispatched an ARTICHOKE team for permanent locations in an overseas area.” The review for 1954–1955 stated in part that SRS conducted numerous ARTICHOKE experiments and “prepared and dispatched an ARTICHOKE team to an overseas area to handle a number of sensitive cases.”

Review of file materials consistently reflected that the Office of Security exercised caution in the utilization of drugs under the ARTICHOKE Program. Although it is apparent that SRS for a number of years was engaged with certain other Agency components in research and operational work with hallucinogenic drugs, the work was apparently conducted under strict controls. As previously stated, no information pertaining to when or if control of Project ARTICHOKE was transferred from the Office of Security to another Agency component was located. Apparently, SRS at one time maintained an inventory of ARTICHOKE materials which contained numerous drugs of all types including LSD-25. A memorandum dated 14 October 1957 requested authorization for SRS to transfer ARTICHOKE materials and apparatus to Dr. [REDACTED] of Medical Services. This memorandum was written by Mr. [REDACTED] on 17 October 1957.

In the review of file information contained in SRS materials, one incident which occurred in November 1953 appears worthy of note. Although it was not clear from file information whether or not the incident occurred under the auspices of Project ARTICHOKE, the incident did involve use of LSD in an experimental *exercise*. One Frank OLSON, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army, committed suicide a week or so after having been administered LSD by an Agency representative. Details concerning this incident apparently will be reported in a separate memorandum, but it appears that the drug was administered to several unwitting subjects by a Dr. GOTTLIEB, at that time a branch chief in TSS (now OTS). A short time after the LSD was administered, the subjects were told that they had been given LSD. On the day following the experiment OLSON began to behave in a peculiar and erratic manner and was later placed under the care of a psychiatrist. A few days later, OLSON crashed through a window in a New York hotel in an apparent suicide.

Source: “The Family Jewels,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/family-jewels>.

49. CIA Director: Memorandum to All Employees on Domestic Activities (1973)

Classification: CIA Internal Use Only

In a memorandum to all Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees based on the release in the media that the agency was conducting operations in the United

States, the CIA director seeks to promote calm and boost morale within the organization. Note that in the first line of this draft memo, the proper term “illegal” is replaced with the term “improper.”

Memo to All CIA Employees

May 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

1. Recent press reports implicate CIA in certain ~~illegal~~ improper activities allegedly committed in the United States. Without going into the details of these allegations, I can assure you that I intend to cooperate fully with the various law enforcement and Congressional investigations of these matters.

2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude toward matters of this sort. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within the strictest interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective: I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed by reasonable people to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency. I hereby order every person presently employed by CIA to report to me directly on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information shall call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about “questionable CIA activities”. I intend to name a highly respected person from outside the Government to review, investigate, and prepare reports for me on any apparent violations of the CIA legislative charter which are brought to his attention or may be uncovered on his own initiative. I shall give this person complete and unrestricted access to all records and persons in the Agency.

4. To insure that Agency activities are proper in the future; I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees: Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence immediately.

James R. Schlesinger

Director

Source: “The Family Jewels,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/FamilyJewels.asp>.

50. Questionable Photographic Projects (1973)

Classification: Administrative-Internal Use Only

This document describes four questionable and likely illegal projects conducted by the National Photographic Interpretation Center, a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Questionable NPIC Projects

May 8, 1973

Questionable NPIC Projects

1. Leaks of Jack Anderson

In January 1972, NPIC performed image enhancement techniques on TV tapes of a Jack Anderson show. The purpose was to try to identify serial numbers of CIA documents in Anderson's possession. The request was levied on NPIC through the Office of Security.

2. The Poppy Project

NPIC has provided the services of one PI to assist an interagency effort to detect poppy cultivation. In addition the Center has provided the contractual mechanism in support of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for a multispectral crop study by a private company.

3. Reviews of NASA Collected Imagery

NPIC has and continues to conduct reviews of satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify "sensitive" frames of photography not releasable to the public and to ascertain the intelligence potential of the imagery. This service has been provided for GEMENI and ERTS photography and preparations are underway for review of SKY LAB imagery.

4. Peaceful Use of Satellite Imagery

NPIC has been requested to provide a number of looks at domestic coverage for special purposes. Examples include:

- Santa Barbara Oil Spill
- Los Angeles Earthquake
- Sierra Snow (flood threat).

- Current Mississippi Floods
- Hurricane Cammille Damage on the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico
- Civil Disturbance in Detroit
- OEP U.S. Data Base

Source: “The CIA’s Family Jewels,” George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm>.

51. Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential (1973)

Classification: Secret/Sensitive

In early 1973, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials sought to find out which agency activities may be considered beyond the legal limits of the charter of the organization. In this letter from a senior official, it is revealed that the CIA recruited American citizens—a clear violation of the CIA’s charter and consequently an illegal activity.

Memo to Deputy Director of Operations

May 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, [REDACTED] dated 7 May 1973, same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be used as [REDACTED] support assets and access agents. These Americans are used for spotting and assessment purposes only and do not perform any recruitments.

b. Question: Do we use alias documents on Americans in course of operations?

Answer: Yes, we do use alias documents when recruiting American support assets. The great majority of these recruitments are done in alias. All recruitments of foreign targets are done in alias.

- c. What disciplinary controls do we have over alias documents?

Answer: We maintain a current list in FR Division Headquarters of the alias documents issued to each Base. More importantly, each Base Chief is responsible for supervising and maintaining control over the alias documents used by the case officers on his Base.

- d. Question: [REDACTED] Any clearances or prohibitions?

Answer: [REDACTED]

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

[REDACTED]

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

Source: "The Family Jewels," Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/FamilyJewels.asp>.

52. Potentially Embarrassing Agency Activity: Communication Intercept (1973)

Classification: Secret

On May 8, 1973, a report on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interception of radio communications between Latin America and New York for drug control purposes was issued at the request of the National Security Agency and the Central Security Service. This activity was later deemed to be outside the CIA's charter (and considered an illegal activity by the agency). Other "potentially embarrassing" activities by the CIA's Division D are included. The convention mentioned is likely the Democratic and Republican Presidential Conventions held a year earlier in Miami Beach. It was the last time both parties held their presidential conventions at the same location. Lawrence Houston was general counsel for the CIA.

Memo for Deputy Director of Operations

May 7, 1973

Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations

From: Chief, Division D

Subject: Potentially Embarrassing Activities Conducted by Division D

There is one instance of an activity by Division D, with which you are already familiar, which the Agency General Counsel has ruled to be barred to this Agency by statute: the collection [REDACTED] of international commercial radio telephone conversations between several Latin American cities and New York, aimed at the interception of drug-related communications. The background on this is briefly as follows:

[REDACTED]. . . Therefore on 29 September 1972 NSA asked if Division D would take over the coverage, and on 12 October 1972 we agreed to do so. On 14 October a team of intercept operators from the [REDACTED] began the coverage experimentally. On 13 January 1975, NSA wrote to say that the test results were good, and that it was hoped this coverage could continue.

Because a question had arisen with Division D as to the legality of this activity, a query was addressed to the General Counsel on this score. With the reception to his reply the intercept activity was immediately terminated. There has been a subsequent series of exchanges between Division D and the General Counsel as to the legality of radio intercepts made outside the U.S., but with one terminal being in the U.S., and the General counsel has ruled that such intercept is also in violation of CIA's statutory responsibilities.

We are carrying out at present one intercept activity which falls within this technical limitation—i.e., of having one terminal in the U.S. [REDACTED]. Since the [REDACTED] link being monitored carries a large number of totally unrelated conversations, the operators do intercept other traffic, frequently involving U.S. citizens—for example, BNDD staffers talking to their agents. I have described this situation to the General Counsel, and his informal judgment was that as long as the primary purpose of the coverage is a foreign target, this is acceptable. He suggests, however, that it might be desirable to inform the Attorney General of the occasional incidental intercept of the conversations of U.S. citizens, and thus legalize this activity. We will pursue this with Mr. Houston.

[REDACTED PARAGRAPH]

An incident which was entirely innocent but is certainly subject to misinterpretation has to do with an equipment test run by CIA [REDACTED] technicians in Miami in August 1971. At that time we were working jointly to develop short-range agent DF equipment for use against a Soviet agent in South Vietnam. [REDACTED] and a field test was agreed upon. The Miami area was chosen, and a team consisting of Divisions D, Como, [REDACTED] personnel went to Miami during the second week of August. Contact was made with a Detective Sergeant [REDACTED] of the Miami Beach Police Department, and tests were made from four different hotels, one a block away from the Miami Beach Auditorium and

Convention Hall. A desk clerk in this hotel volunteered the comment that the team was part of the official security checking process of all hotels prior to the convention. (The Secret Service had already been checking for 4 possible sniper sites.) As the team's report notes, "The cover for the use of the hotel is a natural."

Another subject worthy of mention is the following:

In February 1972, [REDACTED] contacts in the U.S. telecommunication companies [REDACTED] for copies of the telephone call slips pertaining to U.S.-China calls. These were then obtained regularly by Domestic Contact Service in New York, pouched to DCS Washington, and turned over to Division D for passage to FE/China Operations. The DDP was apprised of this activity by Division D in March 1972, and on 28 April 1972 Division D told DCS to forward the call slips to CI Staff, Mr. Richard Ober. Soon thereafter, the source of these slips dried up, and they have ceased to come to Mr. Ober. In an advisory opinion, the Office of General Counsel states its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Communications Act, in as much as they are a part of a normal record keeping function of the telephone company, which does not in any way involve eavesdropping.

Source: "The Family Jewels," Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/FamilyJewels.asp>.

53. MHCHAOS Program Scope and Objectives (1973)

Classification: Secret/Sensitive

In this report of May 8, 1973, CIA officials are making a record for distribution to the intelligence community of the objectives and scope of the program. The report describes in detail the program and activities, including intelligence gathering on U.S. and foreign dissidents and methods for transmitting findings to U.S. agencies. The report specifically details what countries this program is directed at and which Americans are being recruited. The last paragraph specially mentions two consumers who will receive the most important information, to include Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and White House counsel John Dean.

Report on MHCHAOS Program and Activities

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program

1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

- a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.
- b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS [permanent change of station] assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MHCHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the [REDACTED] aspect of the [REDACTED] project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.

3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets have been recruited and run exclusively for MHCHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" background are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the MHCHAOS program there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The MHCHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest. [REDACTED PARAGRAPHS "4.A" AND "4.B"]

5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.
6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.
7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.
8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the Signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean) as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

Source: "The Family Jewels," Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/FamilyJewels.asp>.

54. Establishing the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (1973)

Classification: Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only

According to this document, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was formed in December 1970 to produce fully evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism, and terrorism. The committee's membership included representatives of the Department of Justice, (chairman), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense, the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and as necessary representatives of other departments or agencies. The White House had insisted that the existence of this committee be kept secret. Consequently, knowledge of the committee's existence was limited to less than a dozen very senior government officials.

Description of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

MAY 14, 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice, (Chairman); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies (following have participated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special-Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House had insisted that the existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within this Agency has been limited to DCI, DDO (DDP), C/CI, and four officers of this office.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff)

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

Source: "The Family Jewels," Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/FamilyJewels.asp>.

55. Use of Disguise Materials and Alias Documentation within the United States (1973)

Classification: Confidential

This document describes use of disguises and false documents within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Description of CIA Use of Disguises and False Documents

June 18, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Use of Disguise Materials and Alias Documentation within the U.S.

REFERENCE: Memo dtd 30 May 73 to DTR fm [REDACTED] Subj: Issuance of Disguise Materials for Probable Use Within U.S. or It's Territories

1. The Associate Deputy Director for Operations has asked that we give you a detailed report of the actual use that the Office of Training (OTR) has made within the U.S. of all disguise materials and alias documentation we have obtained for our staff members and students.

2. Disguise Materials

OTR has obtained from OTS disguise materials—including glasses, wigs, mustaches, and special shoes to increase height—for 12 staff instructors at the Domestic Training Station. The purpose of these materials is to increase the difficulty that students in the Basic Operations Course and Advanced Operations Course will have in recognizing instructors during problems and exercises conducted [REDACTED] near DTS. Exercises include surveillance, countersurveillance, brush passes, and dead drop problems in which instructors monitor student activity. These exercises are run under carefully controlled conditions only in areas where adequate liaison exists with local authorities to avoid any flap should difficulty arise during an exercise. [REDACTED]

The sole use of disguise materials by these instructors has been or will be in support of the training exercise noted above. At no time have the materials been used for other purposes.

3. Alias Documents

U.S. alias documents consisting primarily of business and social cards, but also including drivers' licenses and social security cards, have been used for more than

a year by students [REDACTED]. Such use is limited to establishing bona fides, if required, during the human assessment problem that is a part of the comprehensive exercise, [REDACTED]. At the conclusion of the course, the alias documents are collected from the students and returned to OTS. Again, these documents are used only under carefully controlled conditions in an environment [REDACTED] where adequate liaison with local authorities exists to contain any flap; and the documents are used only for the purposes stated.

4. A thorough canvass of all elements of OTR discloses no other instance in recent years in which we have used disguise materials or alias documentation within the U.S. or obtained such materials for that purpose.

Source: “The Family Jewels,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/FamilyJewels.asp>.

56. Project AZORIAN: The Story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* (Early 1975)

Classification: Secret/NOFORN

The description of Project AZORIAN, as published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reads as follows:

Despite widespread media publicity in 1975, almost all aspects of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* project are still classified, and it is important that they remain so. The widespread publicity has contained much fact and extensive error. It remains important [REDACTED] to protect sources and methods which may have future application.

In the course of continuing litigation related to the project—principally concerning California State tax liability, Freedom of Information Act matters, and a patent infringement claim—several facts about the *Glomar Explorer* project have been acknowledged in court by the U.S. Government. These include the fact of CIA sponsorship of the project for “intelligence collection purposes;” the participation of Hughes Tool Company, the Summa Corporation, and Global Marine, Inc.; and the actions of senior CIA officials in 1975 to attempt to persuade members of the media not to broadcast or publish reports concerning the project. Beyond these few details, however, it is still firm U.S. Government policy that nothing further about the project is to be said or acknowledged. This prohibition was recently reaffirmed by the President’s Advisor for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the DCI. It applies particularly to the specific purpose of the AZORIAN mission; the degree of success; operational details; participation of other contractors, government organizations, and individuals; classified technology; and project funding matters.

The following article is being published because it now is possible to discuss most of the foregoing matters and other classified project details at the SECRET NOFORN level rather than in the TOP SECRET compartmentation which previously applied to all aspects of the AZORIAN project. Nevertheless, there has been no relaxation of the necessity to keep most of the details of the AZORIAN project classified for the foreseeable future.

History of Project AZORIAN

PROJECT AZORIAN: THE STORY OF THE *HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER* (EXCERPT)

In March 1968 a Soviet submarine of the G-II class was lost with all hands, 16500 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean.

On August 1974, [REDACTED] that submarine was brought to the surface in [REDACTED] a recovery system designed and developed specifically for that mission.

The story of the more than six years intervening is the story of Project AZORIAN, that is, the story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*. (Note: The full name of the ship is the *MV Hughes Glomar Explorer*. . . Global Marine, Inc., operates a number of ships with the word *Glomar* in their names.) AZORIAN ranks in the forefront of imaginative and bold operations undertaken in the long history of intelligence collection. It combined immense size and scope, advanced technological development, complex systems engineering and testing, unusually severe cover and security requirements, a demanding mission scenario in an unforgiving marine environment, the potential for a serious confrontation with the Soviet Union, a difficult and technically unusual exploitation phase, and high cost.

The project became widely known to the media in early 1975. At a time when the Central Intelligence Agency was under investigation by two committees of Congress and many members of the press, the CIA was credited in some newspaper editorials with pursuing its tradecraft in a most imaginative manner and doing what intelligence organizations are supposed to do—collect intelligence. Other articles were critical of the project, its cost and method of operations.

Many senior U.S. Government officials, including three Directors of Central Intelligence, two Secretaries of Defense, two Secretaries of State, and two Presidents, were personally knowledgeable of the program and recognized it as an innovative undertaking of great magnitude and complexity. Key members of four Congressional committees were also kept informed of project progress and reviewed budget requests for the project.

Because the AZORIAN Project was of such huge dimensions in cost, risk, and intelligence value, it sometimes caused difficult problems for the officials who had to make the major decisions affecting it. Some of the questions did not lend themselves to clear-cut unequivocal answers: the intelligence value of the target after six years on the ocean floor, for example, or the political or physical response of

the Russians if they should learn of the recovery effort. Because of these difficult questions, there could not be and was not unanimity of opinion among senior officials in CIA, Defense, State, the White House, and other agencies collectively responsible for AZORIAN and the decision on whether or not to proceed. Differences of opinion were expressed and debated in appropriate forums, both before the project was initiated and during its lifetime. These differences are expressed candidly in this article in several places.

In March 1975, columnist Jack Anderson disclosed the existence of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* (HGE) project on national television and radio. The original press leak had occurred in the *Los Angeles Times* in February 1975. The *Times* story was unspecific, and wrong in important facts, but it gradually developed into a widespread security problem for the program before the Anderson disclosure.

The original leak resulted from an improbable series of events following a break-in and robbery in June 1974 at Summa Corporation headquarters in Los Angeles. It was thought that among the stolen documents there might be a memorandum from a senior Hughes official to Howard Hughes describing a proposed CIA attempt to recover a sunken Soviet submarine and requesting Hughes' approval for Hughes Company participation. Thus it became necessary to brief several persons involved in the investigation in order to protect the document from disclosure if it were recovered. While the source of the leak was never identified, the circumstances became known to reporters who were covering the story and were disclosed in the *Los Angeles Times* story. Extraordinary efforts by DCI Colby and others were able to contain the spread of the story for a time, but it eventually became widely known in press circles, and Anderson decided to break it. [REDACTED]

This article describes how the *Glomar* project—code-named AZORIAN, not “JENNIFER” as stated in the press—came about, how it was managed and conducted, and to what extent it met its goal. Subsequent articles will describe how the [REDACTED] cover aspects of the AZORIAN/MATADOR program, and other related issues. . . .

From the beginning, extraordinary security was imposed and clearances severely limited to those with an absolute need-to-know. It was clear at all stages of the AZORIAN Project that it had to be leak-proof to enable the mission to be conducted without diplomatic or physical interference from the Soviets. Therefore, air-tight security and effective cover were of the utmost importance, and project continuation depended on them completely. The original CIA Task Force for Project AZORIAN, established on 1 July 1969 in the [REDACTED] became the program headquarters complement, carried in Agency records as the Special Projects Staff, DDS&T. John Parangosky, who had previously held key assignments in the Agency IDEALIST (U-2) and OXCART (A-12) aircraft reconnaissance programs, was named to head this staff. . . .

Early Political Feasibility Evaluation by 40 Committee

At this 28 July 1972 ExCom meeting, it was agreed that the 40 Committee should be asked for an early evaluation of the political feasibility of conducting

the mission in mid-1974, in the light of increasing concern that by that time the developing political climate might prohibit mission approval. On 14 August 1972 Kenneth Rush, who had succeeded David Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense and thereby as chairman of ExCom, forwarded two documents to the 40 Committee, one an intelligence reevaluation of the submarine target object by the ad hoc Committee of USIB, the other a summary of the program's technical, operational, cover, and security factors. He reported to the 40 Committee in his covering memorandum that AZORIAN was proceeding on schedule [REDACTED]. It would reach an accrued cost of [REDACTED] by 31 August 1972, and was expected to cost [REDACTED] for completion. In the light of the developing political climate and uncertain budget problems, he said, ExCom was requesting a preliminary political assessment.

On 15 August 1972, Rush forwarded to Helms and David copies of three memoranda relative to the AZORIAN assessment which he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Dr. Hall; and DIA Director Vice Admiral de Poix. All three to varying degrees judged that the value of the anticipated intelligence gain from the mission was less than that estimated by the ad hoc Committee, pointed to the escalating costs and political risks of AZORIAN, and generally felt that the program should be terminated. Zumwalt, while not recommending immediate termination, stated his strong reservations about continuing AZORIAN and recommended that the cost-benefits be studied further with relation to the total DoD intelligence program. . . .

In any event, all these papers and the assessment of the ad hoc Committee of USIB which reaffirmed the expected important intelligence gains including those in cryptographic areas were forwarded to 40 Committee by Deputy Secretary Rush on 21 August 1972 along with CIA comments which took issue with Zumwalt's and Hall's memoranda.

At this crucial juncture Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a memo to the 40 Committee on 28 August stating that he could not support the proposed AZORIAN mission, primarily because of decreased intelligence value of the target with the passage of time since the G-722 sank in March 1968, the escalating costs which he believed would continue, and the Soviets if they suspected the nature of the activity [REDACTED].

Helms countered on 14 September with a memo to Chairman, 40 Committee, which argued for a continuation of AZORIAN. While agreeing that the differing judgments around the community concerning the intelligence value of items and systems believed to be aboard the G-722 were understandable in such a difficult program, Helms urged a decision to proceed based on the documentation prepared by the joint program organization and the USIB ad hoc Committee assessment, which he considered an accurate national evaluation of intelligence potential. He further believed the technical risks were acceptable in view of the expected intelligence value, and that a political judgment as to whether to conduct the mission could be made satisfactorily only at mission time. He also believed the risk of further significant cost increase was low, and that in any case the costs recoverable if the program were terminated would be small.

Then, on 18 September 1972, Rush weighed in with his judgment. Because of current and continuing political relationships and negotiations with the Soviet Union, he believed it undesirable to execute AZORIAN as then planned. He predicted the Soviets would react strongly with physical force if they learned of the nature of the mission beforehand, and even if they discovered its nature only at a later date, U.S. Soviet relationships and negotiations would be seriously damaged. He also believed there was a high risk of technical failure, and estimated the chances of technical success at 20 to 30 percent based on the existing program schedule and budget. Rush did not take issue with Helms' evaluation of the intelligence benefits but believed that, overall, the program should be terminated in view of high political and technical risks. He shared Helms' concern about the effects of termination on contractor relationships, because the major contractors had publicly committed themselves to a large ocean mining endeavor. Helms felt that a termination now would appear capricious to contractors and jeopardize future cooperative efforts with the intelligence community when contractor support would be needed.

The AZORIAN Review Panel

Rush made the next major move by establishing a panel under Hall to review and refine AZORIAN cost data, to examine projected savings if the program were cancelled, and, alternatively, to look at technical risk areas that he believed might lead to greater costs; he invited Helms to provide a panel member. The AZORIAN Review Panel consisted of representatives of the DCI, Office of the Science Advisor to the President [REDACTED] Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and was convened by Helms and Rush.

The panel reported back to Rush on 11 December 1972. By way of background, the report stated that the program had been organized around four major developmental tasks: surface ship [REDACTED] pipe string, and data-processing systems, and that program management had been highly effective with the result that all key phases of the program were on schedule. The key phases included developments on the boundary of the state-of-the-art, such as some of the largest forgings ever made, entirely new pipe metallurgy, and a lifting apparatus that could not be fully tested prior to the actual mission operation. The new and dramatic individual developments led to some legitimate concern about the future technological risks. The panel could not in the time available examine the program's technical uncertainties, but stated that such a bold engineering undertaking must be considered a high-risk venture. The panel concluded:

1. The saving to the government, if AZORIAN were terminated, would range between [REDACTED] depending upon the effectiveness of the cover operation and availability of a competitive market.
2. Should the program be continued, the estimated cost growth could range from [REDACTED] assuming that the mission was accomplished on the planned date.

3. Current schedule and program office planning should allow the mission to be performed on the target date.
4. There was no way to test the full system in advance of the actual lift operation, and engineering unknowns at the time provided the greatest uncertainty in the program.

In a separate report on 21 November 1972 [REDACTED] and member of the AZORIAN Review Panel, concluded as a result of his overview of the project that the technical prognosis was good, project management was excellent, and schedule and cost aspects had been tracking reasonably well. He noted that the project was then entering a critical testing phase wherein difficulties had to be expected despite anticipatory efforts that had been exerted to date. He believed that further cost growth would probably develop during the testing phase, but that substantial offsets could be generated as well.

The 40 Committee Decision to Proceed

The 28 July 1972 ExCom decision to seek a 40 Committee review culminated on 11 December 1972. After the most intensive, detailed and broad-based examination to date of all facets of the program, the final decision, made by the President, was to continue the AZORIAN project, with 40 Committee exercising appropriate policy supervision. In his memo on that date to 40 Committee principals, Dr. Kissinger said the President was impressed by the project's creative and innovative approach to a complicated task and that he praised the cooperation among elements of the intelligence community to serve a national objective. [REDACTED]

So, almost four years after the initial discussions between Agency and DoD representatives about the feasibility of recovering the G-7221 [REDACTED] a very crucial milestone had been passed, the most important in a long series of high-level program reviews which, at times, had threatened the continued existence of the AZORIAN program. Now, with the Presidential green light, the program office redoubled its efforts to keep all work and planning on schedule to maximize the chances of success in 1974. . . .

[During the operation] the HGE encountered its worst effect from "Gilda" on 12 July when a series of long swells (15 to 16 seconds) came through the area about noon with a combined significant height of 9 to 10 feet. . . . That same day, a British merchant ship, *Bel Hudson*, which earlier had requested medical assistance by radio for a stricken crew member, arrived on the scene. Headquarters contingency planning for AZORIAN had anticipated such an event, and a pre-mission decision had been made based on humanitarian and cover reasons that the HGE would respond to medical emergencies if possible. Nevertheless [REDACTED] had to ponder the situation carefully, to consider whether this might be some ploy based on an awareness of the mission, and make certain there would not be an unwitting disclosure of the HGE's activities. The HGE's

surgeon, accompanied by a medical technician and security officer, and a British boatswain, made the precarious jump to the *Bel Hudson* to examine the patient. After diagnosing the patient and determining he had not had a heart attack (as the *Bel Hudson* had earlier described the ailment) the doctor brought the patient back to the HGE for X-rays and treatment. He relieved the patient's severe internal discomfort and returned him to the *Bel Hudson* in one of her lifeboats. Throughout the incident, careful security precautions were taken and mission activities not exposed. The captain of the *Bel Hudson* was very grateful to the HGE and to the doctor in particular, for his assistance and skillful diagnosis and treatment which quickly improved the seaman's condition. The incident ultimately worked to the advantage of the HGE as far as cover was concerned. As the *Bel Hudson* and the HGE were arranging the rendezvous position, the British ship asked, via the open radio circuit, what activity the HGE was engaged in. The HGE responded that it was engaged in deep-ocean mining testing using a prototype mining machine. It was hoped the Soviets were monitoring this exchange. . . .

Conclusion

Looking back on the AZORIAN operation [REDACTED] remarked that he was extremely grateful for the advice and confidence he received from William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, immediately prior to the HGE departure on the AZORIAN mission in June. Colby told [REDACTED] he was fully aware of what it meant to operate in the field and that the officer-in-charge at the scene of action is usually much more aware of a given situation than someone back at headquarters. Therefore, Colby said, he wanted to assure the Mission Director that he was to use his own good judgment in critical situations as long as he was adhering to the basic guidelines of the directives and plans which governed the operation looking back to that challenging, demanding, and very difficult experience [REDACTED] recounted that he took this advice gratefully and literally.

Thus, the long saga of AZORIAN came to a conclusion as the HGE rested at anchor in the Hawaiian Islands, more than six years since the Soviet G-II-class submarine 722 sank in the Northwest Pacific Ocean. The efforts to locate the site of the sinking and to conceive, develop, build, and deploy the HGE system [REDACTED] stretched almost as long in time, beginning in mid-1968. And the success that at was achieved depended, in the end, on the combined skills of a multitude of people in government and industry who together forged the capability that made it possible to proceed with such an incredible project. . . .

[REDACTED] The news media leak in the *Los Angeles Times* in February 1975, however, culminating in Jack Anderson's decision to expose the project on national TV and radio in March 1975 [REDACTED]. As proof that the USSR had gotten the message—and no doubt intended as a message to us—the Soviets reacted immediately to the disclosure and assigned one of their ships to sit and monitor the site of their lost submarine, which had then become known to them.

One of the most difficult exercises is to apply the cost-benefit principle to a specific intelligence operation. This is particularly true of Project AZORIAN. During its early stages of planning, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and his fellow ExCom members and other senior officials were wrestling with projected costs of the program and evaluating the technical risks involved. Lifting a submarine weighing approximately 1,750 tons from a depth of 16,500 feet had never been attempted or accomplished anywhere before. Packard contended if they were to wait until all the risks were eliminated, the project would never get under way. The resulting decision to move ahead with the plan to recover the Soviet submarine was courageous, carefully considered, and intangibly beneficial: a government or organization too timid to undertake calculable risks in pursuit of a proper objective would not be true to itself, or to the people it serves.

To attempt to evaluate Project AZORIAN in terms of cost benefits, one must consider not only the immediate intelligence gained [REDACTED] but the broader aspects and achievements as well. For example, the state-of-the-art in deep-ocean mining and heavy-lift technology was advanced in a major way. AZORIAN produced an advanced deep-ocean system with important future economic, political, and strategic potential for the United States. The need for such a capability is well-documented in the United Nations Law-of-the-Sea Negotiations. As this article is published, private consortium of companies, including Lockheed, Global Marine, Standard oil of Indiana, and Royal Dutch Shell, are readying the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* for use in deep-ocean mining operations to begin late in the fall of 1978. Also, a number of government agencies have been planning future use of the *Glomar Explorer* for other deep-ocean projects compatible with her unique characteristics.

As a final note, we can find tangible proof in such projects as AZORIAN that the intelligence profession is dynamic and alive—keeping pace with the rapid advances of science and technology, and applying the proper mixture of tradecraft to these advances to make them serve our purposes and yield the information this country needs.

Source: “Project Azorian: The Story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*,” George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb305/doc01.pdf>.

57. Conversation between President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1975)

Classification: Secret

In conversation with President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger decries William Colby's release of information to Congress about illegal intelligence activities and recommends conferring with Dean Rusk on how to manage the resulting scandal.

Transcript of Conversation between President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, January 4, 1975 9:40 a. m.—12:20 p. m.
PLACE: The Oval Office, The White House

Kissinger: What is happening is worse than in the days of McCarthy. You will end up with a CIA that does only reporting, and not operations. He has turned over to the FBI the whole of his operation. He has offered to resign and I refused. It is not my prerogative, but I said not until you are proved guilty of criminal conduct.

The President: I agree.

Kissinger: Helms said all these stories are just the tip of the ice-berg. If they come out, blood will flow. For example, Robert Kennedy personally managed the operation on the assassination of Castro. [He described some of the other stories.] I told him Buchen would warn him and he won't say anything incriminating.

The President: I know Dick Helms and think very highly of him.

Kissinger: The Chilean thing—that is not in any report. That is sort of blackmail on me.

The President: What can we do? We can get Griswold, Lemnitzer, Frienly, Reagan, Jack Connor, Shannon, Dillon.

Kissinger: You might think of Rusk. This will get very rough and you need people around who know the Presidency, and the national interest. What Colby has done is a disgrace.

The President: Should we suspend him?

Kissinger: No, but after the investigation is over you could move him and put in someone of towering integrity. When the FBI has a hunting license into the CIA, this could end up worse for the country than Watergate.

The President: Would Rusk have known any of this stuff?

Kissinger: Why don't you ask him? [Discussed the Moorer spying incident and what he did to protect the institution of the JCS.]

[Rumsfeld enters to talk about Rusk.]

Kissinger: [Discusses some of the legislative restrictions.]

The President: [Talks to Rusk.]

Source: "Kissinger Transcripts and Related Material," George Washington University National Security Archive, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/docs/.

58. Conversation on the Raising of a Soviet Submarine (1975)

Classification: Secret

In this conversation held at the White House on the raising of a Soviet submarine that went unnoticed by the media until it was leaked to the press, President Gerald Ford seeks guidance on a response from his security advisers.

Transcript of White House conversation on Raising of Soviet Submarine

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President
John O. Marsh Jr., Counselor to the President
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William E. Colby, Director, CIA

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, March 19, 1975; 11:20 a.m.

PLACE: Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Meeting

Schlesinger: This episode has been a major American accomplishment. The operation is a marvel—technically, and with maintaining secrecy.

President: I agree. Now where do we go?

Schlesinger: If we don't confirm the mission details—acknowledge the bare facts. It has been confirmed privately by Colby. There is no plausible denial story, so “no comment” will be taken as a confirmation. If we move now we can take the high ground—if not we will be pilloried.

Marsh: Who would put it out?

Schlesinger: Probably me, rather than Colby—unless the President wants to.
[REDACTED]

President: Bill, what do you think?

Colby: I go back to the U-2. I think we should not put the Soviet Union under such pressure to respond.

President: CBS reported from Moscow there was no official comment but that they were aware.

Source: “Project Azorian,” The National Security Archive, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb305/doc02.pdf>.

59. Assassination Plots against Fidel Castro (1975)

Classification: No classification

In a 150-page report based on the Senate Committee investigation chaired by Senator Frank Church (and known as the Church Committee) into Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) knowledge of Fidel Castro assassination plots, the committee found involvement by CIA officials Richard Bissell Jr. and Richard Helms. Castro assassination plots included the use of sabotage, shootings, and participation by organized crime figures. Robert A. Maheu, identified as a former U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence agent, was employed by the CIA to carry out covert operations. One assassination plot involves a poison pen. An assassination was reportedly scheduled on the day of John F. Kennedy's assassination (November 22, 1963) at the same time as Kennedy administration officials were discussing improved Cuban-U.S. relations. The Church Committee report finds evidence of at least eight CIA Castro assassination plots from 1960 to 1965.

Excerpt from Report on Assassination Plots against Castro (Excerpts taken from pages 71–88)

ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS

An Interim Report Of the SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED
STATES SENATE

November 20, 1975

THE ASSINATION PLOTS

We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot, involving the use of underworld figures, reportedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The proposed assassination devices ran the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which strain the imagination.

The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963—the very day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas—when a CIA official offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations.

The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is considered in the sections that follow.

Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image

Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts. From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches . . . with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemical was unreliable. During this period [CIA] impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The depilatory was to be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip.

Accident Plot

The first action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in 1960. A Cuban who had volunteered to assist

the CIA in gathering intelligence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be in contact with Raul Castro. . . . The cable inquired whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk “arranging an accident” involving Raul Castro and advised that the station could “at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details”. Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment “after successful completion,” but no advance payment was permitted because of the ability that the Cuban was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented “quite a departure from the conventional activities we’d been asked to handle.” The case officer contacted the Cuban and told him of the proposal. The case officer avoided the word “assassinate” but made it clear that the CIA contemplated an “accident to neutralize this leader’s [Raul’s] influence.” After being assured that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his death, the Cuban agreed to take a “calculated risk,” limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental. . . . It was, of course, too late to “drop the matter” since the Cuban had already left to contact Raul Castro. When the Cuban returned, he told the case officer that he had not had an opportunity to arrange an accident.

Poison Cigars

. . . on August 16, 1960, an official was given a box of Castro’s favorite cigars with instructions to treat them with lethal poison. The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth. The official reported that the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13, 1961. The record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the cigars to Castro.

Use of Underworld Figures—Phase I (Pre-Bay of Pigs)

In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist members of the criminal underworld with gambling syndicate contacts to aid in assassinating Castro. . . . The earliest concrete evidence of the operation is a conversation between DDP Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro. Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find someone to assassinate Castro and believed that Edwards raised the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating in Cuba. . . . Edwards assigned the mission to the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. The Support Chief recalled that Edwards had said that he and Bissell were looking for someone to “eliminate” or “assassinate” Castro. Edwards and the Support Chief decided to rely on Robert A. Maheu to recruit someone “tough enough” to handle the job. Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into a career as a private investigator in 1954. A former FBI associate of Maheu’s was employed in the CIA’s Office of Security and had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in several sensitive covert operations in which “he didn’t want to have an Agency person or a government person get

caught.” Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA of \$500, but it was terminated after his detective agency became more lucrative. . . .

Poison Is Prepared and Delivered to Cuba

The Inspector General’s Report described conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and the Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning the most effective method of poisoning Castro. There is some evidence that . . . the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro’s drink to give the “asset” a chance to escape. The Support Chief recalled Rosselli’s request for something “nice and clean, without getting into any kind of out and out ambushing”, preferably a poison that would disappear without a trace. . . . [T]he Agency had first considered a “gangland-style killing” in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed the idea because it would be difficult to recruit someone for such a dangerous operation, and suggested instead to the use of pills. Edwards rejected the first batch of pills prepared by TSD because they would not dissolve in water. A second batch, containing botulinum toxin, “did the job expected of them” when tested on monkeys. The Support Chief received the pills, from TSD, probably in February 1961, with assurances that they were lethal, and then gave them to Rosselli.

The record clearly establishes that the pills were given to a Cuban for delivery to the island some time prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April 1961. There are discrepancies in the record, however, concerning whether one or two attempts were made during that period, and the precise date on which the passage[s] occurred. . . . [T]he official returned the pills after a few weeks, perhaps because he had lost his position in the Cuban Government, and thus access to Castro, before he received the pills. . . .

Plans in Early 1963

Two plans to assassinate Castro were explored by Task Force W, the CIA section then concerned with covert Cuban operations, in early 1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief of the Task Force, asked his assistant to determine whether an exotic seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went skin diving. The idea was explored by the Technical Services Division and discarded as impractical. A second plan involved having James Donovan (who was negotiating with Castro for the release of prisoners taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) presents Castro with a contaminated diving suit.

It is likely that, the activity took place in January 1963. . . . Helms characterized the plan as “cockeyed.” The Technical Services Division bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercular bacillus. The Inspector General’s Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative. Helms testified that the diving suit never left the laboratory.

The Poison Pen Device

Another device offered to AM/LASH was a ball-point pen rigged with a hypodermic needle. The needle was designed to be so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion.

According to the Inspector General's Report, when Case Officer 2 was interviewed in 1967, he stated that AM/LASH had requested the Agency to "devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Report concluded that: "although none of the participants so stated, it may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination of a sort that AM/LASH might reasonably have been expected to have devised himself." Fitzgerald's assistant told the Committee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and "the orders were to do something to get rid of Castro *** and we thought this other method might work whereas a rifle wouldn't."

Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured "to take care of a request from him that he have some device for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case may be."

Source: "Samuel Halpern," The National Security Archives, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-10/halpern4.html>.

60. Three CIA Documents from the U.S. Embassy in Iran (ca. 1979)

Classification: Secret

On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took more than 60 Americans captive. Many U.S. intelligence documents were revealed. In the first document, Tehran embassy chargé d'affaires L. Bruce Laingen worries about cover arrangements for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers Malcolm Kalp and William J. Daugherty. SRF means "Special Reporting Facility," a euphemism for the CIA. The "R" designation is the Foreign Service Reserve status that often flagged CIA officers under State Department cover. Providing cover for its covert operations was obviously still a problem in 1979, even though five years had passed since an article was published describing how to use this "R" status—information then available from unclassified U.S. publications—to expose CIA officers in U.S. embassies. The "Show to Tom A." in Laingen's handwriting refers to Thomas L. Ahern, the CIA's station chief in Tehran.

The second document is one page from several that instructed Ahern about his cover as one "Paul Timmermans." It came with a passport containing Ahern's photograph. The third document is for an officer code-named "Jaumotte" whose real name was George O'Keefe. Laingen, Ahern, Kalp, and Daugherty were among the 52 hostages not released soon after by Iranian militants who stormed the

embassy in November 1979, but O'Keefe was out of the country by then. Over the next eight years, almost 60 volumes of embassy documents were published in Iran. Some had been pieced together from the shredder, but many were captured intact.

Three Documents from the U.S. Embassy in Iran

Document #1

SECRET TEHRAN 8933

R 091037Z AUG 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSATE WASHDC 31

SEC RET TEHRAN #8933

1. S—ENTIRE TEXT

2. I concur in assignments Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty as described Reftels.

3. With opportunity available to us in the sense that we are starting from a clean slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA activity, it is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. Hence there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles for these two officers. We must have it.

4. I believe cover arrangements in terms of assignments within embassy are appropriate to present overall staffing pattern. We should however hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future, keeping supporting staff as sparse as possible as well, until we see how things go here.

5. We are making effort to limit knowledge within emb[assy] of all SRF assignments; that effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant to new program of which he is a product and about which I have been informed.

6. I suppose I need not mind the Department that the old and apparently insoluble problem of R designation for SRF officers will inevitably complicate and to some degree weaken our cover efforts locally, no matter how much we work at it.
LAINGEN

Document #2

Cover Considerations

According to personal data in your passport, you are single, were born in Antwerp, Belgium 08Ju134, have blue eyes, have no distinguishing characteristics, and are approximately 1.88 meters tall. Your cover occupation is that of a commercial business representative.

It is not uncommon to find a Belgian whose native language is Flemish living in a nominally French-speaking section of Belgium, such as Jette. You can say that you were born in Antwerp, began work with a company with a regional office in Antwerp, then was transferred to the main offices in Brussels. Despite the fact it is only about 90 minutes driving time between Brussels and Antwerp, you decided to live in one of the suburbs of Brussels, Jette. This would explain the issuance locale of your documentation. Working from your Brussels base, you have travelled in Europe on business in the past (as reflected in your passport) and are now assigned to the Middle East section of your company. Your nonbackstopped address in Jette is 174 Avenue de Jette, Jette, Belgium.

Document #3

DISPATCH SECRET

Chief of Station, Tehran

CINE; CIEZVIVID; COS, Germany; C/WOGAME; D/WOLOCKIGAD Chief, EZNOVA

TECHS LPGAMIN—Transmittal of Alias documentation for JAUMOTTE

REF: DIRECTOR 461951

WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES & METHODS INVOLVED

1. Forwarded USC/TNP and preceding this dispatch are the following backstopped FRG documents for JAUMOTTE in alias number 203472:

- A. FRG passport number D 1797931 issued in Hannover on 21 March 1973 and revalidated on 13 July 1979. Document is valid until 21 March 1983. Prior travel per ref request has been entered.
- B. FRG internal driver's license number 9941/79 issued in Hannover on 16 July 1979 and valid indefinitely.
- C. FRG International Driving Permit issued Hannover on 24 July 1979 and valid for one year.

2. A non-backstopped Hannover address is shown on the driver's license.

3. Forwarded as attachment number two, herewith is cachet kit containing inks, cachets, date chips and instructions. Please monitor Tehran entry and exit cachets and advise EZNOV A if ink color and/or dating system changes. (Germans may remain up to 3 months without visa, so JAUMOTTE must be stamped out within 3 months of his ostensible entry.)

4. These documents should be returned to EZNOV A when no longer needed. EZNOV A should be notified if for any reason they cannot be returned. Per DOI-F

240–10, any loss, theft or compromise (actual or presumed) should be reported to EZNOVA.

Attachments:

1—One Envelope, USC/TNP & Preceding #2—One Envelope, H/W

Alan J. WAGLUND

Source: “CIA Documents from the Tehran Embassy,” NameBase, <http://www.namebase.org/foia/emb01.html>.

61. Indictment Charging David Barnett with Espionage over Operation HA/BRINK (1980)

Classification: No classification

David Barnett, formerly a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer, offered to supply the Soviet Union with information concerning a clandestine operation code-named HA/BRINK. This operation focused on the acquisition of examples of Soviet military hardware sold to the Indonesians, including an SA-2 guidance system, designs for the Whiskey-class submarine, a destroyer, a cruiser, and the Tu-16 Badger twin-engine bomber. Barnett supplied this information between 1976 and 1977 together with the identities of 30 CIA officers for a total of \$92,000. In October 1980 Barnett pleaded guilty to espionage charges. He was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment and was paroled in 1990. Below is the indictment charging him with espionage “for selling sensitive American intelligence information” to the Soviet Union.

Indictment of David Barnett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V CRIMINIAL NO K80-0390 DAVID HENRY BARNETT

RULE 11 STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case comes before the Court on a one-count indictment charging David Henry Barnett with espionage, for selling sensitive American intelligence information to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The indictment charges Barnett with a violation of 18 U.S.C Sec. 794. The charge carries a maximum penalty of life in prison imprisonment.

Section 794(a) requires that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Barnett knowingly and willfully communicated information relating to the national defense to the Soviet Union and that he did so with intent to injure the United States or give advantage to the Soviet Union.

The Government will establish this offense by knowing that in 1976 and 1977 in Vienna, Austria and Jakarta, Indonesia, David Henry Barnett, a former Central Intelligence Agency employee, communicated national defense information including information about a CIA operation known as HABRINK to agents of the Soviet Committee for State Security, the KGB.

An overview of the case to be detailed is as follows: Barnett was employed by the CIA in the late 1950's and 1960's as a contract employee and staff officer. His primary responsibility involved the conduct of clandestine intelligence operations, including operations designed to collect information on the Soviet Union. Because of his position, he was given clearances up to and including Top Secret as well as several special compartmented clearances and had access to sensitive classified information, particularly concerning the CIA's clandestine intelligence collection operations. During this period he was an undercover employee.

Barnett, however, decided in 1970 that his employment with the CIA was not sufficiently remunerative and left his employment to go into business on his own. After a few years, however, Barnett encountered significant financial difficulties in the business world and incurred substantial debts. To solve his financial difficulties, he approached the KGB in 1976 to sell them classified information that he had garnered as a CIA employee. Over the course of the next few years, Barnett received approximately \$92,600 in exchange for telling the KGB about CIA operations with which he was familiar, and the identities of numerous foreign nations who at personal risk cooperated with the CIA by providing information of value to our nation's security. In addition, he furnished the true identities of CIA covert employees, and the identities of persons in the employ of the Soviet Union who had been targeted by the CIA for possible recruitment. He also agreed to seek re-employment in the intelligence field at the behest of the Soviet Union to collect further national defense information.

Among the items relating to the national defense that Barnett sold the Russians was a description of a covert operation known as HABRINK, a CIA effort that procured substantial technical information concerning Soviet weaponry. It is that operation which is specified in this indictment. The operation took place in a foreign country without that country's knowledge.

Information, other than HABRINE, that Barnett sold would have formed the bases for additional counts had the case gone to trial, and his communication of still other information would have been the subject of testimony as other acts evidencing intent. Because the Government can adequately establish the factual basis for a plea without extensive reference to these other items, the Government will omit them here. Instead the Government will submit to Court and counsel, under a protective order, an in camera sentencing memorandum detailing these items, so that the Court will be fully informed for sentencing. The defendant claims that he did not transmit certain classified information to the Soviets. The details of that claim will also be submitted to the Court in camera by his counsel.

With respect to the value of information Barnett sold, the Government does not take the position that the KGB paid \$92,600 solely for the value of the information passed by Barnett. Undoubtedly, the KGB was motivated to spy this amount not only for information obtained but also in anticipation of Barnett's becoming re-employed in the U.S. intelligence community, or with Congressional or White House oversight committee, a re-employment that would have been of great value to the KGB.

The Government's proof of intent would rest principally on four items: First, Barnett's monetary motivation; second, the range of information Barnett sold—he passed a significant portion of his knowledge to the Soviet Union without regard to its significance to our national defense; third, his own intelligence training and background that should have made him fully aware of the significance of the KGB.

The Government's proof includes a lengthy confession given by Barnett to the FBI during the course of twelve interviews over an eighteen day period in March and April 1980. The Government would also offer independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of and corroborating the confession and expert testimony regarding the national defense character of the information passed.

With respect to proof of venue, it should be noted that 18 U.S.C. Section 3238 provides that if, as here, the offense is committed out of the jurisdiction of a particular State or District, the indictment may be brought in the district of the defendant's last known residence; in this case, Maryland.

If this case were to proceed to trial, the government would prove as follows:

The defendant was employed by the CIA as a contract employee from November 1958 through May 1960 when his contract expired. He was rehired as a contract employee in June 1961 and remained in that capacity until March 1963 when he became a staff officer of the CIA. He remained in that position until January 1970. He was again employed as a contract employee from January 1979 to March 1980.

From March 1963 until December 1965, he served as an intelligence officer in a covert capacity in a foreign country. He then returned to CIA Headquarters where he stayed until November 1967.

In November 1967 he was sent to another foreign country where he was Chief of Base, a position he held until he left the CIA in January 1970 to enter private business for family reasons and to increase his income. As Barnett later admitted, and the FBI has corroborated, after Barnett left the CIA in 1970, his business ventures proved unsuccessful and as a consequence, he became substantially indebted.

During the fall of 1972, Barnett, together with his family, established residence in Indonesia for the purpose of working in private industry and starting a number of businesses. By 1976, however, Barnett's financial situation had become quite precarious. The government would introduce the testimony of Lee Lok-khoen and Jacob Vendra Syehrail, two employees of P. T. Trifoods, an Indonesian seafood processing corporation managed by Barnett in the mid-1970s. They would testify that Barnett was authorized to and did in fact take advances at will from this Corporation, in excess of \$100,000, for his own personal use or for the C.V. Kemiri Gading, one of his then personally owned companies.

Records kept by the two employees in the ordinary course of P. T. Trifoods business reflect that during 1977, after Barnett had been paid money by the KGB, the defendant repaid approximately \$100,000 in advances that he or his personal companies had received. The government is able to link \$12,500 of the repayment to monies paid Barnett by the KGB.

Barnett admits that in mid-1976, however, while he was still in the midst of these financial difficulties, he typed an unsigned note that he intended to give the Soviets when the occasion arose, setting forth his difficult financial situation, his CIA experience and training, and his willingness to sell his services to the KGB for approximately \$70,000.

In the fall of 1976, Barnett went to the home of a Soviet Cultural attaché in Jakarta, Indonesia with whom Barnett had met frequently while he had been with the Agency. As CIA records show, there had been extensive earlier contact between this Soviet and Barnett during Barnett's tenure with the CIA—at a time when the CIA had been assessing the possibility of recruiting this Soviet. Moreover, CIA employees would testify that this Cultural Attaché is quite accessible to American diplomatic personnel and has had frequent contact with them. Barnett gave the Soviet Attaché the note and offered to provide information relating to his former CIA employment. The Soviet requested Barnett to return the following Sunday.

That Sunday at the Soviet's residence, Barnett was introduced to someone identified only as Dmitry. During this meeting, Barnett outlined his financial situation, requested \$70,000 and for the first time discussed CIA operations he had learned of while operating covertly for the CIA.

On a subsequent Sunday in late November 1976, Barnett again met with Dmitry inside the Soviet compound in Jakarta and communicated more information that he had acquired during his CIA employment. For this, Dmitry paid Barnett \$25,000 in United States currency in \$100, \$50 and \$20 bills and arranged a meeting between the defendant and the KGB in Vienna, Austria on February 27–28, 1977.

Once more before February 25, 1977, Barnett met with Dmitry and was given an additional \$3,000 for the travel expenses he would incur during his upcoming trip to Vienna.

On Friday, February 25, 1977, Barnett left Jakarta for Brussels, Belgium, where he took a commuter train to Antwerp. On the 26th he had a brief unrelated meeting in Antwerp with a business associate. After the meeting Barnett took the train first to Brussels and then to Vienna. He arrived in Vienna on the morning of the 27th. During his trip from Antwerp to Vienna, Barnett's passport was not stamped.

Shortly after he arrived in Vienna, Barnett was met at the contact point by a man who exchanged the prearranged verbal code, known as a parole, and identified himself as Pavel. Barnett was then taken to a KGB safe house on the outskirts of Vienna.

Barnett's meeting with the KGB in Vienna lasted eight to ten hours. He related his knowledge of national defense information to Pavel, and two other KGB agents identified only as Mike and Aleksey. Barnett also convinced the three that he could get a job in the United States which would give him access to classified information. The KGB told Barnett that their primary targets were the CIA, the Intelligence

and Research Bureau at the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency. At the conclusion of the meeting, the defendant was paid \$15,000.

On Tuesday, March 1, Barnett left Vienna by train for Brussels. Again, his passport was not stamped. After another meeting with his business associate in Antwerp, Barnett flew back to Jakarta from Brussels, arriving there on March 3 or 4, 1977.

In late March 1977, Barnett met again with Dmitriy in Jakarta. Dmitriy paid him an additional \$30,000 and again instructed him to obtain a job in the United States with access to national defense information. As business records show, Barnett repaid P. T. Trifoods, the company he managed, \$5,000 on March 29 and \$7,500 on March 31. Barnett admits this money came from the KGB. Barnett also admits that before flying to the United States on June 16, 1977, he met with Dmitriy and was paid \$3,000 for expenses for this upcoming trip to the United States to search for a job.

Barnett was in the United States from June 16 to July 3. While in Washington, Barnett called David Kenny, a State Department employee, about obtaining a job on the White House Intelligence Oversight Board. Barnett subsequently reported his effort to Dmitriy.

Approximately July 10, 1977, after his return to Indonesia Barnett met with Dmitriy and Pavel. Barnett falsely told Pavel that during his last trip to Washington, he had met with a senior CIA official. However, Barnett mentioned that he was afraid to become reemployed with the CIA because he felt that he could not pass the polygraph examination required for staff and employees with the Agency. Nonetheless, the KGB instructed him to obtain a position in the CIA, State Department, or DIA. Barnett was given \$3,000 for travel expenses to return to Washington for another attempt to find a job.

On August 11, 1977, Barnett traveled to Washington, D.C. While in Washington, he met with Joseph Dennin, General Counsel of the White House Intelligence Oversight Board, and with William Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and applied for jobs on those committees. The government would call Mr. Dennin and Mr. Miller to confirm that Barnett unsuccessfully sought employment in those sensitive organizations.

Barnett returned to Jakarta on September 5, 1977. On Wednesday following his arrival, he met with Dmitriy. During this meeting, Barnett claims he falsely told Dmitriy that he had obtained a job on the "White House Oversight Committee." He also met with Dmitriy sometime between late September and early November and received approximately \$3,600 for packing and moving expenses back to the United States. Barnett's travels to meet with members of the KGB during 1977 were corroborated in large part by an examination of the defendant's passports. Robert G. Lockard, Chief of the Forensic Document Laboratory in the Immigration and Naturalization Service, would testify that Barnett's passport show either entry and an exit on February 25, 1977 from Indonesia and another entry into that country on March 4, 1977, the dates coinciding accurately with the dates on which he admits he traveled from that country to Vienna and returned.

The absence of European entries reflected on his passport also corroborates Barnett's statements that no European passport entries had been made during this

trip to Vienna. The passport also reflects two departures from entries into Indonesia during the summer of 1977, the time when Barnett states that he traveled to the United States to obtain a job with access to intelligence information.

In November 1977 in Jakarta, Barnett was introduced by Dmitriy to a Soviet who identified himself only as Igor. Igor claimed to be stationed in America and explained that he would be working with Barnett in Washington. Igor also mentioned that he lived in a Virginia apartment complex owned by Shannon and Luchs. During that meeting, Igor gave Barnett the location of two public telephones near an Exxon Station at 7336 Little River Turnpike, Annandale, Virginia, which were to be used for contact purposes at 3:00 p.m. on the last Saturday of every month. Igor also arranged a dead drop site near Lock 11 along the C&O Canal. Barnett was instructed to place a piece of red tape on the side of a nearby telephone booth to signal the KGB that the drop site had been serviced. Neither the two phone booths in Annandale nor the dead drop site, however, was ever used by Barnett.

During one of the FBI interviews, Barnett was shown a photograph of Vladimir V. Popov, a former Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., and identified Igor as Popov. The government would offer further evidence establishing that the “Igor” Barnett met in November was in fact, Vladimir V. Popov, former Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. As noted, Igor mentioned that he lived in a Shannon and Luchs apartment in northern Virginia in 1977. A copy of the lease for apartment 830, 1200 South Courthouse Road, Arlington, Virginia, an apartment managed by Shannon & Luchs, shows the lease to be Vladimir Popov. To corroborate the fact that Popov met with the defendant in Jakarta in November 1977, the government would also introduce two I-94 forms from the Immigration and Naturalization Service showing that Popov departed Dulles Airport on November 22, 1977 for Moscow and returned on December 6, 1977. Testimony from the CIA would establish that Barnett would not have had any reason to know Popov or his whereabouts from Barnett’s employment with the CIA.

On April 21, 1978, Barnett returned to the United States and established residence in Bethesda, Maryland, where he resides today. Between April 1978 and January 1979, Barnett sought jobs both in the intelligence field and in the private sector. Barnett, for example, admits meeting with Richard Anderson, an employee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), in Washington to discuss employment possibilities.

Mr. Richard D. Anderson, Jr., Professional Staff Member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), would testify that Barnett called him in September 1976 regarding the possibility of obtaining a position on the HPSCI. The two met on September 27, 1978, and Barnett told Anderson that he “was well fixed for funds” and that his interest in the committee was a matter of personal interest rather than salary. Mr. Anderson, however, informed Barnett that there were no vacancies on the committee. Anderson could also testify that had Barnett obtained a position on that committee, he probably could have had access to information relating to CIA covert operations. Despite this job-seeking effort Barnett did not contact the KGB during this time.

In January 1979, Barnett was rehired by the CIA as a contract employee to train CIA employees in operational tradecraft, on a part-time basis at a wage of \$200 a day. This position, which did not provide him with access to CIA records and files, did provide him with access to some classified information. Because Barnett was still in dire financial straits, he traveled on March 31 from Maryland back to Indonesia. On his arrival, he went to the residence of the Soviet Attaché in Jakarta to re-establish contacts with the KGB. He told the Soviet that if the KGB wanted to contact him, they should meet him at 9:00 p.m. at the same place where Barnett first met Dmitriy. When no one appeared, Barnett returned to the Attaché's residence where he met for an hour with another Soviet identified to Barnett only as Bob. According to Barnett, he told Bob of his experiences since his return to the United States and provided a general description of his new position with the CIA.

Two days later, Barnett says that he met with Bob again. During this session, Bob reiterated Igor's instructions given during the November 1977 meeting, by urging the defendant to use the emergency contact plan on the last Saturday of each month if a need arose. Barnett, however, told Bob that he did not feel that Igor's contact plan was secure and provided the number to a public telephone located at the Bethesda Medical Building on Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland. He later discovered, however, that he had transposed the first two numbers to this telephone number. As a result, Barnett was never able to use the emergency contact procedure. Arrangements were also made with Bob for another meeting with the KGB at the new location for June 30, 1979. At the conclusion of the meeting, Bob paid Barnett \$4,000 for expenses. Barnett returned to the United State on April 14, 1979.

On June 30, 1979, as instructed by the KGB, Barnett traveled back to Jakarta, and met with another Soviet, identified only as George, in the Soviet compound. During this meeting, which lasted approximately two days, Barnett described his new position with the CIA, offered to photograph the training manual and to use the dead drop site to transfer the information, and give the correct number to the public telephone booth at the Bethesda Medical Building. The government is not taking the position that these manuals had substantial significance.

George, the Soviet contact, told Barnett that if no contact were established on the last Saturday of each month, Barnett should go to the Annandale Bowling Alley on the following Sunday to meet Igor. George stressed that Barnett should attempt to obtain a permanent position with the CIA which would give him access to more sensitive information. Barnett, however, was reluctant, feeling that he could not pass the polygraph that the CIA gives to staff employees. Barnett arranged to meet again with the KGB in late November. George paid Barnett \$3,000 for expenses.

As Barnett details in his confession, on the last Saturdays in September and October at 3:00 p.m., Barnett received calls at the Bethesda Medical Building from an individual whose voice he later positively identified to the FBI as belonging to Igor, the Soviet that he had met in November 1977. The exchanges between Barnett and Igor were brief, no classified information was exchanged, and the defendant told Igor that he was still looking for another job. During the October telephone contact, Barnett specified other days in December 1979 on which he could meet with the KGB should he not be able to meet at the scheduled date in November.

In his interviews with the FBI, Barnett admits traveling again to meet with the KGB in late November 1979 in Jakarta. On the day of his arrival, Barnett was picked up and taken to the Soviet compound where he met with George. During the meeting, which lasted into the night and the following day, George told Barnett his present position with the CIA was of no interest to the KGB and urged Barnett to pursue actively a full time position with the CIA. The defendant also provided George with a number of a second public telephone which was to be used for future contacts and which was located at the corner of Wilson Lane and Cordell Avenue in Bethesda, Maryland.

George gave Barnett \$3,000 for travel and expenses, for Barnett to meet him in Vienna on April 25, 1980. The two were to meet at 64 Taberstrasse in front of KOCH Radio Shop in the second district. To corroborate this fact, Leonard B. Ralston, FBI Legal Attaché, from Berne would testify that he traveled to 64 Taberstrasse in the second district. At that address is a KOCE Radio Shop.

The government would further corroborate Barnett's dealings with KGB in 1979, as they have been described here. His passport accurately reflects his 1979 journeys to Indonesia. Also, an American Express card slip shows his purchase of an airline ticket on November 31, 1978 from Dupont International Travel, Inc., a Washington, D.C. travel agency for one of the trips. Moreover, records of Barnett's bank account at Riggs National Bank show a \$2,600 cash deposit on December 5, 1979, only a few days after the KGB had paid him \$3,000 in late November.

When Barnett returned to the United States, he was called by Igor on the first Saturday in January at the public telephone in the Bethesda Medical Building. Barnett told Igor that he was still trying to obtain a full-time job with the CIA. Barnett also suggested that he be called at the second telephone number.

The defendant also stated that he was again contacted by Igor at 3:00 p.m. on the first and third Saturdays in February. The first telephone call was received at the public telephone at the corner of Cordell Avenue and Wilson Land; the second at the Bethesda Medical Building. According to Barnett, he told Igor in the first call that he would be traveling abroad in connection with his CIA employment and gave his itinerary during the second call. During the second conversation, the defendant gave Igor the number of a telephone at the Bradley Shopping Center on Arlington Road in Bethesda which was to be used for the contact on the following Saturday, March 1, 1980.

On March 1, Barnett received a telephone call at the Bradley Shopping Center from Igor. During the conversation, Igor told the defendant that the KGB would not meet with Barnett during Barnett's upcoming overseas trip for the CIA, but would meet with him in Europe as previously scheduled.

In his confession, Barnett also told the FBI that on April 5, 1980 Igor was to call him at the Bradley Shopping Center at 3:00 p.m. If the call was not completed at 3:00, Igor was to call again at 4:00 p.m. By April 5, 1980, of course, Barnett had been confronted by the FBI. However, Special Agent Michael Waguespack would testify that he went to the phone booth described on the fifth of April and heard it ring three different times between 2:55 p.m. and 3:03 p.m.

In fairness to Barnett, it should be noted that after his initial sale of information in 1976 and 1977, he did not do everything the KGB wished. He claims that he failed to communicate with the KGB as directed between April 1978 and January 1979 in the United States. Barnett told the FBI he was fearful of detection if he operated in this country. He also failed to regain staff officer status with CIA and thus had not attained access to the type of intelligence information that the KGB primarily sought or would consider major importance. It could well be that these failures could have caused some skepticism in the KGB about his bona fides and, retrospectively, the value of the information that he had previously sold. In March of 1980 Barnett was interviewed by the FBI about his suspected espionage activities involving the KGB, and confessed his involvement as has been described here.

Barnett was first interviewed by the FBI on the morning of March 18, 1980 at his place of work. Special Agent Waguespack and Rankin would testify that they told Barnett that they wished to speak with him regarding his involvement with the KGB and that they knew he had been in contact with the KGB. At no time did the agents indicate that the defendant was under arrest or that his freedom of movement had been deprived in any way. In fact, Barnett was told that the FBI's function was only to investigate the facts and that the Attorney General would decide whether a prosecution was warranted. After a short discussion with the agents, Barnett began his confession. He was read his rights and signed the standard waiver form prior to his drafting and signing a written statement outlining briefly his activities with representatives of the Soviet Union. He left his office for home after the interview. Prior to each of the subsequent eleven interviews which all occurred in motel rooms, Barnett was read his Miranda rights and signed a standard waiver form.

Barnett admitted that during his meetings with Dmitriy in the Fall of 1976 and early 1977 and his meeting with the KGB in Vienna, he communicated information relating to (1) the details of the CIA's collection of personality data on seven Soviet consular officials in the late 1960's, where Barnett had been Chief of Base; (2) the identities of thirty covert CIA employees as well as personality data on some of them; and (3) numerous CIA operations with which the defendant was familiar from his employment with the CIA, including HABRINK, the operation that forms the basis for the indictment. Again, the details and significance of the remaining information will be discussed in an in camera sentencing memorandum.

Barnett's access to the classified information which he confessed to having communicated to the Soviets can be proved through both CIA documents and the testimony of Barnett's former colleagues within the CIA. Personnel records maintained at the CIA indicated that Barnett had security clearances while he was employed by the CIA and had access to the information which he confessed to having communicated to the KGB. In particular, the CIA has documents, authored by Barnett during his employment, detailing his involvement in studies of the recruitment potential of the seven Soviets and his participation in some of those operations, the details of which he confessed to having transmitted. However, testimony from one of the defendant's former colleagues within the CIA would establish that Barnett worked closely on the HABRINK operation, which is the subject matter of the indictment.

HABRINK was a clandestine intelligence collection operation designed to obtain information on Soviet weaponry. The information was collected by utilizing a net of agents with access to information concerning sophisticated weaponry which the Soviets were, during that period, supplying to a foreign nation, whose relationships, however, at the time were very close to the Soviet Union. Recently, however, that country has enjoyed good relations with the United States.

In the early 1960's that country had begun to receive current conventional Soviet army, navy and air force weapons systems. The purpose of the HABRINK operation was to secure, without the knowledge of the government of that country or the Soviet Union, the weaponry itself or parts thereof and classified Soviet documents providing the operational characteristics and technical description of these weapons systems. The operation was very successful and provided a large volume of Soviet documentary data and a limited amount of Soviet hardware on a large variety of weapons systems deployed in that country.

The operation collected detailed information concerning the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system, the Russian Styx naval cruise missile, and the Soviet W-class submarine. The information regarding that weaponry has never been available from any other source. Information pertaining to the KOMAR-class guided missile patrol boats, the RIGA-class destroyer, the SVERDLOV-class cruiser, the TU-16 (BADGER) bomber aircraft and associate KENNEL air-to-surface missile systems as well as other weaponry information of lesser significance was also obtained.

One example of the importance of this operation to the national defenses of this country during the late 1960's and early 1970's was the security by HABRINK of the guidance system from an SA-2, familiarly known as a SAM missile. That missile had been used very effectively by the North Vietnamese to shoot down many U.S. aircraft. As a result of HABRINK's obtaining the guidance system, it became possible to determine the radio frequencies used to direct the missile and to jam those frequencies, resulting in the saving of the lives of many bomber crews engaged in action in Vietnamese.

This example is cited to demonstrate the utility of the HABRINK operation and its relationship to the national defense. The government, however, is not attempting to argue that Barnett's disclosure of HABRINK in 1976 had a deleterious impact on the United States with respect to that particular item of Soviet weaponry and American countermeasures.

As indicated above, this operation was run without the knowledge and consent of this foreign nation, has not been publicly disclosed and—so far as can be determined—was not known by the Soviet Union until Barnett revealed it to the KGB.

This operation was run by the CIA through an individual assigned the cryptonym HABRINK/1 who had wide access to the information sought and utilized an extensive network of sub-agents who supplied him with the information desired by the United States. This agent is alive, though no longer active as a source.

Barnett told the KGB HABRINK/1's true name. The CIA has confirmed that the name Barnett admits giving to the KGB is, in fact, the agent's true name. As a

result of Barnett's actions, HABRINK/1 is exposed to retribution if the Soviets found it to their advantage.

Clearly, Barnett knew, when he told the Soviets about HABRINK, that the operation related to the national defense and that there was a continued need to keep the operation secret. When Barnett was asked by the FBI in March 1980, if there was one event or operation that was big and that stood out in his mind, he promptly identified HABRINK. Barnett's acknowledgment of HABRINK's importance is further evidence of his intent.

Barnett also admits telling the Soviets that HABRINK obtained Soviet training manuals and hardware from all over the country and from air force, army and navy bases and received \$300,000 for the material, being paid approximately \$175 per manual. He claims not to have any recollection of which manuals were secured. However, experts from the CIA would testify that Barnett's disclosures sufficed to alert the KGB that the compromise to the United States of the weapons supplied to that country was total. Barnett also admits that the KGB was interested in knowing where the manuals came from, when the operation started, when it ended, which agents and subagents were still in the country and the circumstances behind the termination of the operation. Finally, he accurately revealed to the KGB that HABRINK had secured the antenna guidance system and gyroscope from the Soviet Styx missile, but the KGB for its own reasons, falsely denied that the missiles supplied had that equipment. In short, Barnett fully and accurately described his knowledge of the HABRINK operation.

Barnett claims, however, that when he disclosed information about HABRINK at the Vienna meeting, Dmitry did not question him extensively concerning the operation. Barnett told the KGB that he had been afraid to tell them about this operation for fear they would be angered by his involvement. Dmitry, according to Barnett, shrugged the operation off, claiming that the KGB assumed that when hardware gets out of their hands, it is compromised. According to Barnett, Dmitry said that "the Americans got the information so they are happy, the agents got the money, so they are happy, and the Soviets got the benefits from supplying the hardware in the first place, so everybody's happy."

To the contrary, expert testimony from the government would establish that the decision to supply sophisticated weaponry to this nation involved was the subject of an intense internal debate within the Soviet Union. The Soviet faction opposing the supplying of these weapons argued this supplying would lead to the compromise of detailed Soviet defense information. The decision to supply the weapons was eventually made on purely political grounds. In short, the government's position would be that while debriefing Barnett, the KGB gave short shrift to HABRINK because it did want to acquaint him with the value of the HABRINK operation or the value to them of learning that such an operation had taken place.

At the height of its productivity in the late 1960's, HABRINK was considered by the CIA as one of its highest priority operations. It should be noted that Barnett's compromise of HABRINK in 1976 and 1977 was far less damaging than if it had been compromised while it was ongoing in the late 1960's or soon after its termination in 1969. Nonetheless, Barnett's disclosure of HABRINK to the KGB in 1976 and 1977 has military, operational and diplomatic implications for the United States.

To address the military significance of Barnett having revealed the HABRINK operation, the government would call among its expert witnesses. Collectively, they would testify that among the items received by HABRINK operation were the components of a Styx cruise missile, including the seeker and autopilot, and its wiring manuals and associated diagrams. The Styx missile is a patrol boat missile that has the demonstrated capacity of sinking a destroyer at a range of at least 15 miles. Although developed in the late 1950's and in the early 1960's the Soviet Union still supplies the Styx to a number of third-world countries. The Soviet Union makes extensive use of updated and modified versions of the Styx in their own fleet. Unlike most military programs of the United States that develop new weapons systems to replace old ones, the Soviet Union frequently updates its arsenal by the piecemeal modification of existing weapons. For this reason, information about the Styx missile has continuing use to the United States, even after the Soviet Union replaced it with successor weapons.

The United States benefited from HABRINK's obtaining the Styx and related information. As a result of this information, the military refined and developed offensive and defensive countermeasures, including electronic, design, tactical and other countermeasures to a high degree of effectiveness. According to these experts, some of these countermeasures can be expected to be useful in combating the successors of the Styx. Moreover, the HABRINK information enables the United States to identify as ineffective other costly countermeasures previously underway and to cease those efforts.

Barnett's disclosure to the KGB that the United States got the guidance system for the Styx missile signals the Soviets that the United States has likely developed effective electronic counter measures just as it did with the SA-2 missile. As a result of Barnett's actions, the Soviet Union may make design changes on its successor missiles intended to nullify the electronic and other countermeasures that the United States has developed. This could make the United States more vulnerable to these weapons systems.

Limitations on resources require the Soviet Union, like the United States, to select priorities in weapons development. As government experts would say, confirmation of HABRINK's success in obtaining the Styx would make the Soviet Union's choices more informed, since it would not definitely know that the United States possessed this information and would have developed countermeasures.

In other words, should the United States become engaged in an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union or its allies who have Styx missiles, or their successors, Barnett's transmission of the information concerning HABRINK's success may allow the Soviet Union to use these missiles more effectively against our ships where, before Barnett's revelation, those ships might well have been able to take appropriate countermeasures.

HABRINK obtained the battery discharge curves for the Soviet W-class submarines. The W-class submarines are diesel submarines, still in use because they have certain advantages over nuclear powered submarines in certain tactical situations. The Soviet Union uses these submarines in its own arsenal; indeed, it has continued manufacturing diesel submarines that use either the same or similar batteries. The battery discharge curves could not then have been predicted without this information.

The United States learned from the discharge curves how long Soviet submarines may stay submerged. That period of time was longer than the United States had previously thought and that information was disseminated, under classification, within the American fleet.

In an engagement, a Soviet submarine commander might well make some tactical decisions if they believed the United States did not know how long he could stay submerged. The United States, in fact, having that knowledge would not be misled by those decisions and therefore could have a distinct tactical advantage in such an engagement.

However, as a result of Barnett's revelations, Soviet submarine commanders have undoubtedly been notified that the United States is aware of the discharge curves and will thus forego engaging in strategies that would erroneously attempt to take advantage of our supposed ignorance. In short, Barnett's compromise of the information garnered by HABRINK eliminates the tactical advantage the information originally provided.

An expert witness from the Soviet East Europe Division of the Directorate of Operations of the CIA would testify concerning the operational damage done by Barnett's transmission of this information. According to this expert, Barnett's compromise is the first definite indication to the Soviets that the CIA has been able to obtain successfully technical information in such quantity and detail regarding Soviet military equipment supplied by the Soviets to foreign countries by means of clandestine intelligence operations conducted without the knowledge or cooperation of the government of the country involved. As I mentioned above, the Soviets made the decision to supply this foreign nation with the sophisticated weapons for political reasons and over the objections of those factions within the Soviet Union who felt that such action could compromise sensitive weaponry information. This expert would testify that, in his judgment, the Soviets, having learned through Barnett's revelations that CIA has such capability, may now further restrict the dissemination of technical information when it exports equipment to nonaligned nations, if this were to happen, continued access to such information by clandestine means would become exceedingly difficult.

Barnett's revelation of this information to the Soviet Union has serious implication for our diplomatic relationship with this country. The country where this operation was carried out has definite geopolitical significance to the United States and which is one with whom this country currently enjoys a good relationship. It is also a country with natural resources important to the United States. The Soviets could use this information to the disadvantage of the United States' relationships with the country involved. If the Soviets were to reveal to the government of the country involved that CIA had conducted clandestine intelligence collection operations, without that country's government's knowledge, the country involved may well take steps to monitor and restrict essential activities there.

The Soviet Union has the option of attempting to use its knowledge of this operation to damage our relationship with that country, by conveying to that country's government the fact of, the nature of, and the extent of the HABRINK operation. The Soviets can withhold disclosure until conditions prevail that maximize the impact of disclosure.

If the Soviet Union chooses to reveal this information, diplomatic relations may be soured for some period of time and the CIA's capability in that country could be substantially curtailed, the government, had the case gone to trial, would have called as experts persons from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency to describe the use that the Soviet Union could make to damage our diplomatic relations with that country.

Mr. Barnett's awareness that the Soviet Union could make use of the HABRINK operation to the damage of the United States' diplomatic interests is demonstrated by Barnett's admission to the FBI that during the HABRINK operation the CIA was concerned about political implications, should the operation be exposed. Thus, Barnett must have been aware that he was giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to do exactly what had been a concern of the United States all along, and that was to avoid diplomatic damage that would flow from its exposure.

Your honor, if the case were to go to trial, the government would present ample proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—that David Henry Barnett communicated information to the Soviet Union relating to the national defense of the United States with intent and reason to believe that the information would aid the Soviet Union and injure the United States.

Source: "United States of America vs David Henry Barnett: Rule 11 Statement of Facts," The National Security Archive (subscription service), http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsc&rft_dat=xri:dnsc:article:CEP00986.

62. Limits on Intelligence Activity: Executive Order 12333 (1981)

Classification: Unclassified

In an attempt to provide limits on U.S. intelligence activities, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333. Of the more controversial items in the executive order is section 2.11, which states that "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."

Executive Order 12333

Executive Order 12333—United States Intelligence Activities December 4, 1981

Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available.

For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Part 1

Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities with Respect to the National Intelligence Effort

1.1 *Goals.* The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.

(a) Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.

(b) All means, consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to develop intelligence information for the President and the National Security Council. A balanced approach between technical collection efforts and other means should be maintained and encouraged.

(c) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, or United States corporations, establishments, or persons.

(d) To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort.

1.2 The National Security Council.

(a) *Purpose.* The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities, and attendant policies and programs.

(b) *Committees.* The NSC shall establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its functions and responsibilities under this Order. The NSC, or a committee established by it, shall consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity and shall review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.

1.3 *National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups.*

(a) *Establishment and Duties.* The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish such boards, councils, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community concerning:

1. Production, review and coordination of national foreign intelligence;
2. Priorities for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget;
3. Interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information;
4. Arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters;
5. Protection of intelligence sources and methods;
6. Activities of common concern; and
7. Such other matters as may be referred by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(b) *Membership.* Advisory groups established pursuant to this section shall be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence or his designated representative and shall consist of senior representatives from organizations within the Intelligence Community and from departments or agencies containing such organizations, as designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. Groups for consideration of substantive intelligence matters will include representatives of organizations involved in the collection, processing and analysis of intelligence. A senior representative of the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall be invited to participate in any group which deals with other than substantive intelligence matters.

1.4 *The Intelligence Community.* The agencies within the Intelligence Community shall, in accordance with applicable United States law and with the other provisions of this Order, conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States, including:

- a. Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
- b. Production and dissemination of intelligence;
- c. Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States,

international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents;

- d. Special activities;
- e. Administrative and support activities within the United States and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and
- f. Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.

1.5 Director of Central Intelligence. In order to discharge the duties and responsibilities prescribed by law, the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible directly to the President and the NSC and shall:

- a. Act as the primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and provide the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with national foreign intelligence;
- b. Develop such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community as will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national foreign intelligence;
- c. Promote the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community;
- d. Ensure implementation of special activities;
- e. Formulate policies concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments, coordinate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments, and establish procedures governing the conduct of liaison by any department or agency with such services on narcotics activities;
- f. Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;
- g. Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products;
- h. Ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures;
- i. Establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence;

- j. Establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the Director's responsibilities;
- k. Have full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence, and authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations, in consultation with those organizations, ensuring that appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis are developed so that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgment within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national policymakers;
- l. Ensure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by national foreign intelligence collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities and military commands;
- m. Establish mechanisms which translate national foreign intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the NSC into specific guidance for the Intelligence Community, resolve conflicts in tasking priority, provide to departments and agencies having information collection capabilities that are not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program advisory tasking concerning collection of national foreign intelligence, and provide for the development of plans and arrangements for transfer of required collection tasking authority to the Secretary of Defense when directed by the President;
- n. Develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President and the Congress;
- o. Review and approve all requests for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds, in accordance with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget;
- p. Monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation, and, as necessary, conduct program and performance audits and evaluations;
- q. Together with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs consistent with the requirement to develop competitive analysis, and provide to and obtain from the Secretary of Defense all information necessary for this purpose;
- r. In accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, give the heads of the departments and agencies access to all intelligence, developed by the CIA or the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence, relevant to the national intelligence needs of the departments and agencies; and
- s. Facilitate the use of national foreign intelligence products by Congress in a secure manner.

1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies.

(a) The heads of all Executive Branch departments and agencies shall, in accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, give the Director of Central Intelligence access to all information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States, and shall give due consideration to requests from the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate support for Intelligence Community activities.

(b) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall ensure timely development and submission to the Director of Central Intelligence by the program managers and heads of component activities of proposed national programs and budgets in the format designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall also ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence is provided, in a timely and responsive manner, all information necessary to perform the Director's program and budget responsibilities.

(c) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program may appeal to the President decisions by the Director of Central Intelligence on budget or reprogramming matters of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community or the heads of such organizations, as appropriate, shall:

- a. Report to the Attorney General possible violations of federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as specified in those procedures;
- b. In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security, recommend to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation;
- c. Furnish the Director of Central Intelligence and the NSC, in accordance with applicable law and procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, the information required for the performance of their respective duties;
- d. Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and keep the Director of General Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning any intelligence activities of their organizations that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive;
- e. Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure consistent with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
- f. Disseminate intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under arrangements established or agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence;

- g. Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination of intelligence resulting from criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad if their departments, agencies, or organizations have intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic narcotics production and trafficking;
- h. Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Intelligence Oversight Board; and
- i. Ensure that the Inspectors General and General Counsels for their organizations have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by this Order.

1.8 *The Central Intelligence Agency.* All duties and responsibilities of the CIA shall be related to the intelligence functions set out below. As Authorized by this Order; the National Security Act of 1949, as amended; appropriate directives or other applicable law, the CIA shall:

- a. Collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
- b. Collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking;
- c. Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
- d. Coordinate counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other departments and agencies;
- e. Conduct special activities approved by the President. No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87 Stat. 855)) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective;
- f. Conduct services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as directed by the NSC;
- g. Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
- h. Protect the Security of its installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of

applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary; and

- i. Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (h) above, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements.

1.9 The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:

- a. Overtly collect information relevant to United States foreign policy concerns;
- b. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;
- c. Disseminate as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic and consular posts;
- d. Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of United States Missions abroad; and
- e. Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their statutory responsibilities for direction and coordination of mission activities.

1.10. The Department of Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:

- a. Overtly collect foreign financial and monetary information;
- b. Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information;
- c. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States economic policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibilities; and
- d. Conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment being used against the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President, and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, other Secret Service protectees and United States officials. No information shall be acquired intentionally through such activities except to protect against such surveillance, and those activities shall be conducted pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.

1.11 The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall:

- a. Collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- b. Collect, produce and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as required for execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;

- c. Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental and tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
- d. Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
- e. Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals intelligence and communications security activities, except as otherwise directed by the NSC;
- f. Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
- g. Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions;
- h. Protect the security of Department of Defense installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Department of Defense as are necessary;
- i. Establish and maintain military intelligence relationships and military intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and international organizations, and ensure that such relationships and programs are in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- j. Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal management for the National Security Agency and for defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance entities; and
- k. Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.

1.12 *Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense.* In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the following:

- a. Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:
 - 1. Collection, production, or, through tasking and coordination, provision of military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies;
 - 2. Collection and provision of military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence products;
 - 3. Coordination of all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements;
 - 4. Management of the Defense Attaché system; and

5. Provision of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. National Security Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:
 1. Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense;
 2. Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders;
 3. Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
 4. Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
 5. Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorize elements of the Government, including the military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
 6. Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information for counterintelligence purposes;
 7. Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
 8. Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the communications security of the United States Government;
 9. Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence and communications security;
 10. Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the NSA as are necessary;
 11. Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of

- the NSA, and exercising the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations;
 - 12. Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence; and
 - 13. Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.
- c. Offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, whose responsibilities shall include:
- 1. Carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs for specialized intelligence;
 - 2. Responding to tasking in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence; and,
 - 3. Delegating authority to the various departments and agencies for research, development, procurement, and operation of designated means of collection.
- d. The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, whose responsibilities shall include:
- 1. Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
 - 2. Conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI; and
 - 3. Monitoring of the development, procurement and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conducting related research development, and test and evaluation activities.
- e. Other offices within the Department of Defense appropriate for conduct of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense. If such other offices are used for intelligence purposes, the provisions of Part 2 of this Order shall apply to those offices when used for those purposes.

1.13 *The Department of Energy.* The Secretary of Energy shall:

- a. Participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information with respect to foreign energy matters;
- b. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the Secretary's responsibilities;
- c. Participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the Department can contribute; and
- d. Provide expert technical, analytical and research capability to other agencies within the Intelligence Community.

1.14 *The Federal Bureau of Investigation.*

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:

- a. Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the FBI involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;
- b. Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
- c. Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;
- d. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and
- e. Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Part 2

Conduct of Intelligence Activities

2.1 *Need.* Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to informed decision-making in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Collection of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded.

2.2 Purpose. This Order is intended to enhance human and technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of international terrorist activities and espionage conducted by foreign powers. Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.

2.3 Collection of Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order. Those procedures shall permit collection, retention and dissemination of the following types of information.

- a. Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned;
- b. Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons;
- c. Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation;
- d. Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist's organizations;
- e. Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United States shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other agencies of the Intelligence Community may also collect such information concerning present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting;
- f. Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purposes of determining their suitability or credibility;
- g. Information arising out of lawful personnel, physical or communications security investigation;

- h. Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons;
- i. Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws; and
- j. Information necessary for administrative purposes.

In addition, agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each appropriate agency within the Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it.

2.4 Collection Techniques. Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize:

- a. The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance;
- b. Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for:
 - 1. Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and
 - 2. Searches by CIA of personal property of non–United States persons lawfully in its possession.
- c. Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for:
 - 1. Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting; and

2. Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a non-intelligence element of a military service.
- d. Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means.

2.5 Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.

2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:

- a. Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community;
- b. Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
- c. Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the General Counsel of the providing agency; and
- d. Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable law.

2.7 Contracting. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to enter into contracts or arrangements for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions in the United States and need not reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of appropriate officials of the institution.

2.8 Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.

2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States. No one acting on behalf of agencies within the Intelligence Community may join or

otherwise participate in any organization in the United States on behalf of any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing his intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the agency head or designee. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the organization or its members except in cases where:

- a. The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation; or
- b. The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

2.10 *Human Experimentation.* No agency within the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.

2.11 *Prohibition on Assassination.* No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.

2.12 *Indirect Participation.* No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order.

Part 3

General Provisions

3.1 *Congressional Oversight.* The duties and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments, agencies, and entities engaged in intelligence activities to cooperate with the Congress in the conduct of its responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall be as provided in title 50, United States Code, section 413. The requirements of section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2422), and section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413), shall apply to all special activities as defined in this Order.

3.2 *Implementation.* The NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are necessary to implement this Order. Heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue appropriate supplementary directives and procedures consistent with this Order. The Attorney General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving any procedures established by the head of an agency

in the Intelligence Community other than the FBI. The National Security Council may establish procedures in instances where the agency head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds.

3.3 Procedures. Until the procedures required by this Order have been established, the activities herein authorized which require procedures shall be conducted in accordance with existing procedures or requirements established under Executive Order No. 12036. Procedures required by this Order shall be established as expeditiously as possible. All procedures promulgated pursuant to this Order shall be made available to the congressional intelligence committees.

3.4 Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have these meanings:

- a. Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.
- b. Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
- c. Employee means a person employed by, assigned to or acting for an agency within the Intelligence Community.
- d. Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.
- e. Intelligence activities means all activities that agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order.
- f. Intelligence Community and agencies within the Intelligence Community refer to the following agencies or organizations: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); (2) The National Security Agency (NSA); (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); (4) The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; (5) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; (6) The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and (7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.

- g. The National Foreign Intelligence Program includes the programs listed below, but its composition shall be subject to review by the National Security Council and modification by the President:
 - 1. The programs of the CIA;
 - 2. The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance, except such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded;
 - 3. Other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
 - 4. Activities of the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence;
 - 5. Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations by the United States military forces are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
- h. Special activities means activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.
- i. United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.

3.6 Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as amended, entitled “United States Intelligence Activities,” is revoked.

Source: “Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities, December 4, 1981,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html>.

63. National Security Decision Directive No. 159: Covert Policy Approval and Procedures (1985)

Classification: Top Secret/Veil/Sensitive

National Security Decision Directive 159 of January 18, 1985, states that the U.S. president shall approve all covert operations with a written presidential finding and outlines management policy for all covert operations and that all information concerning covert operations are to be covered by a special sensitive compartmented information system designated under the codeword VEIL. Typically, this included senior members of the U.S. National Security Council and a minimum number of covert operations personnel with a need to know.

National Security Decision Directive #159

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 18, 1985

National Security Decision Directive 159

COVERT ACTION POLICY APPROVAL AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES

The US faces a variety of threats to its national security interests as well as opportunities to advance those interests. Among these threats are the overt and covert efforts of hostile powers to influence and control international organizations, governments, and certain non-governmental groups throughout the world. In particular the Soviet Bloc and terrorist organizations continue to intervene in the internal affairs of both democratic and non-democratic countries and to use any means considered effective to achieve their ends. These include covert political action and propaganda and paramilitary and intelligence support programs to assist their allies and damage their opponents, including actions to subvert democratic elections, organize and support coups d'etats, terrorism, insurgencies, and spread disinformation designed to discredit the US and its allies.

While the US will not make use of most of the techniques employed by our adversaries, we must be prepared to counter such efforts and to assist our allies and friends in resisting these threats. The US requires a range of national security tools to protect and advance its interests. When the President determines that it is appropriate, he must have at his disposal appropriate means to assist allies and friends and to influence the actions of foreign countries, including the means to affect behavior both when the US wishes to acknowledge its role, and to do this covertly when the revelation of US sponsorship, support, or assistance would adversely affect US interests. These tools include overt and covert diplomatic information channels, political action, and covert action including paramilitary and intelligence support programs.

To ensure that all means are considered and utilized effectively to serve policy purposes, there is a need to review fully and integrate covert with overt activities. Covert action must be consistent with and supportive of national policy and must be placed appropriately within a national security policy framework. Covert action must never be used as a substitute for policy. The National Security Council must coordinate all of the instruments of US national security, and the President must decide which purposes can best be accomplished by covert action.

Moreover, while the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947 sanction the use of covert action, subsequent authorizations impose special reporting requirements. Covert activities, therefore, require special review and control mechanisms. At the same time, exceptional care must also be taken to ensure that while there may be overt manifestations of covert action, the decision and review process, as well as the specific intelligence means and techniques that are used covertly always remain secure.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of this NSDD is to establish procedures for the planning, approval, and coordination of covert action (intelligence “special activities” under Executive Order 12333) and for the review and evaluation of these activities in order to ensure that they continuously derive from and support US national security objectives and are integrated fully into overall US policy. Knowledge of covert action policies, decisions, and programs shall be strictly limited to the absolute minimum number of senior officials and their immediate staff focal points. To the extent possible, knowledge of policies, deliberations, and programs; knowledge of operations; and knowledge of supporting information or activities will be strictly compartmented from each other.

In support of these objectives and this process, the following procedures and responsibilities are established:

Approval Procedures for Intelligence

1. *Presidential Findings.* The President shall approve all covert action Findings in writing. Under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, all covert actions undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency must be authorized by a Presidential Finding that each such operation is important to US national security. E.O. 12333 and this Directive establish that covert actions (intelligence “special activities”) undertaken by components other than CIA also require a Presidential Finding. Each covert action is also considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity under Section 501 of the National Security Act and is subject to certain Congressional reporting procedures. The Congressional reporting procedures for significant intelligence activities apply to all agencies of the intelligence community. Findings shall remain valid until formally cancelled.

2. In accordance with Executive Order 12333, the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct covert actions unless the President specifically designates another agency of the government. When the provision of substantial support by one government component to another is essential to the conduct of a covert action,

indication of the extent and nature of that support shall be included as part of the Finding or Memorandum of Notification. However, the provision of routine support in the form of personnel, funds, equipment, supplies, transportation, training, logistics, and facilities by Government components other than CIA to support a covert action shall not in itself be considered a separate covert action by the supplying agency.

3. *Memorandum of Notification (MON)*. The MON is the means by which CIA or other designated components seek approval for a substantial change or modification in the means of implementation, resource level, other change in assets or level of activity, or when there has been a significant change in the operational conditions or risks associated with a covert action program. The President shall approve all such modifications to existing covert action Findings. All such changes must be within the scope of authorities granted by an existing Presidential Finding. MONs shall not be used to exceed the limits authorized in the Finding or to modify objectives, targets, or add foreign states, organizations, or individuals of countries other than those authorized in the Finding. The MON shall also be used to request cancellation or suspension of a Finding for which action has been completed, which has been bypassed by events, or which, for other reasons, should be cancelled.

National Security Planning Group (NSPG)

The National Security Planning Group, as a committee of the National Security Council, shall provide a recommendation to the President on each proposed covert action or proposed modification to an ongoing covert action.

1. For consideration of covert action, the NSPG shall consist of the following members:

The President

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

Counselor to the President

The Director of Central Intelligence

Chief of Staff to the President

Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Attorney General and the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and others as appropriate, shall attend NSPG meetings for covert action consideration.

2. The NSPG is the component of the National Security Council authorized to establish, review, evaluate, provide guidance for and direction to the conduct of

covert action and ensure coordination of covert action with other instruments of US national security policy. Proposed Findings and Memoranda of Notification shall be sent in writing to the President via the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs together with the recommendation of the NSPG including dissents of any member on the recommendations.

3. The NSPG shall periodically review policy for the conduct of covert actions, evaluate covert action programs and operations for adequacy and efficacy and recommend the assignment of resources. The NSPG shall review the funding for covert actions to be included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program and the programs of other US Government components and report to the President on the adequacy of US covert action programs and capabilities.

4. The NSPG annually shall review all current covert action programs and seek the President's concurrence in the continuation of each program.

5. The Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, National Security Council Staff, shall act as recorder of written minutes at NSPG meetings, prepare papers for and maintain records of NSPG meetings and administer the special access security compartment protecting covert action policies.

Planning and Coordination Group (PCG)

A senior level Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) is established to review covert action proposals and implementation for the purpose of ensuring their effectiveness and their integration with other aspects of US national security policy. The PCG replaces all ad hoc interagency groups for this purpose. The PCG shall consist of a representative of the Office of the Vice President, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Director of CIA for Operations, the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and be chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Representatives of other departments and agencies may be invited to attend on a case-by-case basis. In carrying out its responsibilities, the PCG shall:

1. Ensure that covert action programs are coordinated with related US Government national security actions so that they are mutually supportive.
2. Review each proposed covert action Finding or proposed modification to an ongoing covert action to ensure that such activities support US policies and make recommendations on each proposed covert action to the NSPG, including the dissent, if any, of PCG members.
3. Provide continuing review and evaluation of ongoing covert actions to ensure they meet policy objectives and ensure preparation of an annual review for submission to the NSPG.
4. Review the nature of the threat or opportunity to be addressed by each proposed covert action, including US interests, objectives and plans (political, economic, military, etc.), resources available, legal considerations, Congressional and legislative requirements, public and media issues, and security requirements.

5. Identify situations and areas in which covert action should be used to support policies to meet threats to US national security or which present opportunities to advance US interests.
6. Develop and coordinate Congressional briefing, legislative and, if appropriate, public affairs strategies for covert action programs.
7. Recommend and coordinate operational security and cover strategies which will enhance the likelihood of successful execution of covert actions.

Coordination Procedures

1. Unless otherwise authorized, all proposed Findings and Memoranda of Notification shall be prepared by the component selected by the President to perform the covert action for staffing and deliberation by the PCG and the NSPG. Other components of the US Government shall participate in the drafting of proposed Findings and Memoranda of Notification when they provide substantial support essential to the conduct of covert action by another component.

2. Draft Findings and MONs shall be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for further circulation to PCG and NSPG principals via the designated staff focal points.

3. At the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Senior Director of Intelligence Programs, National Security Council Staff, shall distribute, via the designated staff focal points, draft copies of proposed Findings and MONs.

4. The PCG shall meet to review each proposed Finding and MON and shall provide its comments and recommendations and the comments and recommendations of individual members, including dissents when appropriate, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the DCI for preparation of Findings and MONs to be forwarded to the NSPG for final consideration. When substantive changes to a proposed Finding or MON are recommended by the PCG, the revised draft Finding or MON shall be circulated to the PCG members prior to NSPG consideration.

5. The NSPG shall review all Findings and MONs and shall transmit them together with any additional comments, recommendations or dissents, via the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the President for approval. Concurrence on MONs may be via a signed memorandum in lieu of a formal NSPG meeting unless any NSPG member requests a formal meeting.

6. Normally a minimum of four working days shall be available to PCG and NSPG members for processing Findings and MONs at each level prior to meetings or votes.

7. The Senior Director of Intelligence Programs, National Security Council, shall make available a copy of the final proposed Finding to the Attorney General, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget for legal and budgetary review at least three full days before NSPG deliberation.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be prepared to brief the final proposed Finding to the Attorney General; the Director, Office of Management and

Budget; or other NSPG members at least three full days prior to the NSPG meeting.

9. NSPG members shall be notified in writing by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of the President's decision on all Findings and MONs.

10. The original approved Finding and MON shall be retained for record purposes by the Senior Director of Intelligence Programs, NSC Staff. A record copy shall be provided to the Director of Central Intelligence or to other components undertaking a covert action. No other copies of approved Findings or MONs are authorized.

Congressional Notification Procedures

1. Section 501 of the National Security Act requires the DCI and the heads of all other components of the US Government involved in intelligence activities to keep the Intelligence Committees of the Congress fully and currently informed of all significant anticipated intelligence activities including covert action. The Director of Central Intelligence has primary responsibility for reporting covert actions to the Congress. Representatives of other components shall report jointly with the Director of Central Intelligence to the Congressional Intelligence Committees in those instances when that component is conducting a covert action or when the NSPG deems it appropriate.

2. *Advisory.* In accordance with procedures agreed to with the Congress, the DCI shall provide the Congress with a briefing on each Finding and MON after they have been approved by the President. This briefing shall consist of an "advisory" which shall be provided to the PCG and NSPG with each proposed Finding and MON. This advisory, undated and unsigned, shall describe the Finding or MON, the scope of each, and those additional elements required by the agreed Congressional reporting procedures. Since the Congressional reporting procedures permit oral notification, no paper other than the advisory shall be provided to the Congress. It is intended that this advisory replace the scope paper and MON as the instrument of Congressional notification.

Security Procedures

1. Security is indispensable to the successful conduct of covert action. Therefore, security requirements and administration are major elements in the development of covert action policy. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall establish a separate, specially compartmented control and access system at the Top Secret classification level for all policy matters concerning covert action. Each NSPG member shall ensure that access to information on US covert action policies shall be restricted to the absolute minimum number of persons possible.

2. Each NSPG member shall designate one senior member of his component as the sole focal point for all matters related to covert action for both the PCG and the NSPG. Each focal point shall strictly adhere to the special access security compartment procedures regarding covert action policies to be promulgated under separate cover. In accordance with these procedures, each focal point shall develop implementing procedures for ensuring strict limitation of knowledge and for separating

knowledge of covert action policy from operational or support information and knowledge within other elements of his component.

3. NSPG members shall ensure that the absolute minimum number of documents and files necessary for handling each covert action are created or maintained.

Ronald Reagan

PROCEDURES FOR SAFEGUARDING COVERT ACTION POLICY INFORMATION

All information concerning covert action policies and review and approval procedures (i.e., Presidential Findings and Memoranda of Notifications and related correspondence) shall be protected under a separate, specially compartmented control and access system identified by the unclassified codeword “VEIL.”

VEIL information is restricted to members of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) and Planning and Coordination Group (PCG); designated focal points; and an absolute minimum number of supporting personnel whose major responsibilities involve the review, evaluation, development, and/or implementation of covert action policies and operations.

Access to VEIL information shall be on a “MUST NEED-TO-KNOW” basis and does not automatically entitle an individual, who has knowledge of a specific covert action or a particular aspect of a covert action, to have access to the entire body of VEIL information.

Designated focal points are responsible for ensuring strict limitation of knowledge and, to the extent possible, for separating knowledge of covert action policies from operational or support information and knowledge within his component. Additionally, he shall be responsible, within his component, for receiving and accounting for all VEIL material; conducting indoctrination briefings and maintaining a record of all personnel with authorized access; secure handling; storage; and transmission of VEIL information from his component.

All VEIL information will be copy numbered. Reproduction of Presidential Findings and Memoranda of Notification is not authorized.

Declassify on: Presidential Approval Only

Source: “Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination Procedures,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-159.pdf>.

64. Domestic Gambles and Instability in the Soviet Union (1989)

Classification: Secret

This controversial assessment from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Soviet Analysis goes against the general view that would soon be expressed in an autumn 1989 national intelligence estimate (NIE). That NIE would predict that

Mikhail Gorbachev would survive the coming economic crisis of 1990–1991 without resorting to widespread repression—a relatively optimistic and wrong conclusion. The assessment below takes a much bleaker view, and essentially concludes that Gorbachev’s reforms will fail, precipitating a coup, a crackdown, and perhaps even the piecemeal breakup of the empire.

CIA Assessment of Instability in the Soviet Union

CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Gorbachev’s Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR”

September 21, 1989

Key Judgments:

Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders are concerned about serious future breakdowns of public order in the USSR. This concern is well justified. The unrest that has punctuated Gorbachev’s rule is not a transient phenomenon. Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability on an even larger scale—in the form of mass demonstrations, strikes, violence, and perhaps even in the localized emergence of parallel centers of power. This instability is most likely to occur on a regional basis, not nation-wide—although overlapping crises and a linking together of centers of unrest could occur.

Instability in the USSR is not exclusively a product of glasnost, and some of it is indeed a sign—as Gorbachev asserts—that reforms are taking hold. But Gorbachev’s claim that instability otherwise merely reflects the surfacing of problems that were latent or repressed under Brezhnev is only partly true. The current budget deficit and consumption crisis is largely due to policies Gorbachev himself has pursued since 1985. And the prospects for further crises and expanded turmoil in the future are enhanced by key policy gambles he is taking now:

- In the nationality arena, Gorbachev is gambling on defusing ethnic grievances and achieving a more consensual federative nation through unrestrained dialogue, some concessions to local demands aimed at eliminating past “mistakes,” a constitutionalization of union/republic and ethnic group rights, and management of ethnic conflict to a substantial degree through the newly democratized soviets.
- In the economic arena, Gorbachev is gambling that, by putting marketization on hold through the postponement of price reform, and by pursuing a short-term “stabilization” program, he can avoid confrontation with the public and reengage in serious economic reform without steep costs at a later date.
- In the political arena, Gorbachev is gambling that, by transforming the Communist Party from an instrument of universal political, social, and economic management into a brain trust and authoritative steering organ, while empowering popularly elected soviets, he can create a more effective mechanism for integrating Soviet society and handling social tensions.

[REDACTED]

Gorbachev's gambles and the centrifugal trends they have set in motion are already viewed with extreme alarm and anger by many members of the Soviet political elite. But Gorbachev's major gains in the Politburo at the September 1989 plenum of the Central Committee demonstrated once again how difficult it is to translate conservative sentiment in the ranks into effective opposition to Gorbachev's rule at the top. For the time being, his power looks secure. If, somehow, a successful challenge were mounted against him over the next year or so, the most likely outcome would be a traditionalist restoration that would attempt to "draw the line" in various areas—especially with respect to democratization of the party and soviets, glasnost in the media, the conduct of informal groups, and expression of "nationalist" views—but would accept the need for significant change, including reduction in military spending and decentralization of management. Unless such a regime chose to move ahead vigorously with marketization (not impossible, but highly unlikely) it would obtain possible stability in the near term but suffer high medium- to long-term instability, leading toward Ottomanization or upheaval from below. If Gorbachev were not overthrown in the near term, an attempt to turn the clock back would become more difficult—given the reaction of increasingly well-entrenched pluralistic forces—and could thus also be nastier, possibly involving the armed forces and taking on a xenophobic Russian nationalist coloration.

Whether or not Gorbachev retains office, the United States for the foreseeable future will confront a Soviet leadership that faces endemic popular unrest and that, on a regional basis at least, will have to employ emergency measures and increased use of force to retain domestic control. This instability is likely to preoccupy Moscow for some time to come and—regardless of other factors—prevent a return to the arsenal state economy that generated the fundamental military threat to the West in the period since World War II. Moscow's focus on internal order in the USSR is likely to accelerate the decay of Communist systems and growth of regional instability in Eastern Europe, pointing to the need for post-Yalta arrangements of some kind and confronting the United States with severe foreign policy and strategic challenges. Instability in the USSR will increase uncertainty in the West about proper policies to pursue toward Moscow, reflecting nervousness about Soviet developments but nonchalance about defense, and will strain domestic and Alliance decision-making.

Domestic policy successes or failures will be the paramount factor ultimately determining Gorbachev's retention of office, but foreign policy achievements that allow him to justify further cuts in military spending on the basis of a reduction in the external "threat" would give him more room for maneuver. Western actions that could be presented by his opponents as attempts to "take advantage" of Soviet internal instability could hurt Gorbachev.

[REDACTED]

The chances that Gorbachev will successfully overcome the dilemmas (many of his own making) that confront him are—over the long term—doubtful at best. But

the process of pluralistic forces taking root in Soviet society strengthens the rule of law, builds constraints on the exercise of power, and fosters resistance to any turnaround in military spending and to reinvigoration of an expansionist foreign policy—which, as argued above, will be strongly inhibited in any event by the insistent demands of consumption and the civilian sector. This process, and the deterrence of a military reactionary restoration that might attempt to bring about a basic shift in the Soviet Union's foreign posture, benefits greatly from each year's prolongation of Gorbachev's rule. [REDACTED]

Source: “Document No. 1: CIA Intelligence Assessment, ‘Gorbachev’s Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR,’ September 1989,” George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB293/doc01.pdf>.

1990–2014

65. Project SLAMMER (1990)

Classification: Top Secret

Project SLAMMER was based on extensive prison interviews with about 30 former military and intelligence personnel who had been convicted of spying for Russia, China, and other hostile powers during the Cold War. The project sought to answer why they had violated the trust that their agencies had bestowed in them. The authors of this highly classified Project SLAMMER report, delivered to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) management, emphasized that behavioral changes were often associated with acts of espionage.

Report on Project SLAMMER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505

ICS 0858-90

April 12, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Forum

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Project SLAMMER Interim Report

As members will recall, Project SLAMMER is an innovative Community research program using state-of-the-art behavioral science techniques. The intent is to better understand and deter espionage through the direct assessment of convicted American spies. The interim report attached reflects much of the more recent work of the group engaged in the project. This program is conducted under the sponsorship of the Personnel Security Committee (PSC) of the Advisory Group/Security Countermeasures (AG/SCM), with personnel from the various Community organizations participating. The report is provided to Forum members for information, with the permission of the Chairman, PSC. Any comments you wish

to offer are welcomed and may be submitted to [REDACTED] directly or through CCISCMO.

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE

Attachment:

Project Slammer Interim Progress Report

Submitted to [REDACTED]

Chairman, Personnel Security Committee

15 December 1989

SLAMMER-GRAM

This is an interim presentation of observations developing in the progress of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage. This research examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage. This "Slammer-gram" briefly shares subjects' self-perceptions and some of the implications that might be considered in view of these insights. To date, cases studied have involved only male subjects, the majority of whom were volunteers in initiating espionage. The following observations are offered with the caveat that this is work in progress, each issue is worthy of continuing study and will be reported in greater depth in the next formal report scheduled for release in June, 1990.

HOW THE ESPIONAGE SUBJECT SEES HIMSELF (at the time he initiates espionage)

He believes:

- He is special, even unique.
- He is deserving.
- His situation is not satisfactory.
- He has no other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).
- He is only doing what others frequently do.
- He is not a bad person.
- His performance in his government job (if presently employed) is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount his contribution in the workplace.
- Security procedures do not (really) apply to him.
- Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for him, unless they connect with something with which he can personally identify.

He feels isolated from the consequences of his actions:

- He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continually narrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially “Okay” to initiate the crime.
- He sees espionage as a “Victimless” crime.
- Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.
- He finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards (he is able to solve that problem). He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do (the information would really be better protected). This “Ease of accomplishment” further reinforces his resolve.

He attempts to cope with espionage activity:

- He is anxious on initial HOIS contact (some also feel thrill and excitement).
- After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues (even flourishes).
- In the course of long term activity subjects may reconsider their involvement.
 - Some consider breaking their role to become an operative for the government. This occurs when access to classified information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves, or both.
 - Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides. They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact.
 - Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have done. Those wanting to reverse their role aren’t confessing, they’re negotiating. Those who are “Stressed out” want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT IMPLICATIONS

- The security measure that was consistently most effective was the polygraph.
- Aside from polygraph, security procedures are not viewed as obstacles to espionage. Security procedures are seen by subjects only as inconveniences.
- Changes in affluence or travel abroad are easily (although falsely) explained. Explanations are rarely challenged; if so the reasons given are accepted by those who inquire.
- Espionage subjects don’t see themselves as traitors. Their acts are usually sustained with some measure of comfort and self-justification.
- The security briefings that seem to have any impact on this group have something in the message with which the subject can personally identify. Among

the areas subjects have suggested are, the acknowledgment of espionage as appearing reasonable to those who do it, that (in time) the honeymoon is over and glamour turns to threat, and that some subjects may want to come in from the cold, but they don't know how to do that (without taking a deep plunge into punishment).

- It is not until after they have been apprehended that they feel remorse, which is perceived in personal terms, such as their own stress and pain caused to loved ones. National security issues are of little or no relevance.
- Subjects sometimes do think about turning themselves in, but they are not sure how to do that. Trying to find out (how) has risks so high that they can be scared away. The community may wish to consider procedures so that subjects can (from their perspective) more readily approach authorities.
- Subjects often tell people close to them what they are doing, and sometimes even engage associates in the process. Former intimates (spouses, lovers, close friends—people with whom they spent a good deal of time) are a potentially important source of information in all investigations.
- Subjects almost invariably conceive of committing espionage after they are in a position of trust. While initial screening continues to be important, focusing on update and monitoring procedures seems increasingly worthwhile.

Source: “Project SLAMMER Interim Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000218679.pdf.

66. Greater Openness for the CIA (1991)

Classification: Secret

This report from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) task force focuses on questions concerning how to inform the general public and key constituencies about the need for strong intelligence efforts, the classification and release of records, and the improvement of intelligence capabilities.

CIA Task Force Report on Greater Openness

December 20, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Task Force on Greater CIA Openness
SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

1. In response to your referenced request, the Task Force addressed the following:

- How can we do a better job of informing the general public and key constituencies about the need for a strong intelligence effort and about the missions and accomplishments of the Intelligence Community in a changing world, and
 - To what extent do the dramatic changes in the world situation and the needs of oversight and accountability to the American people and their representatives dictate a reexamination of policies on classification and release of records, and finally
 - How can we use openness to learn from others outside the Agency in order to improve our capabilities and our people.
2. Senior officials in the media, in the Executive and Legislative Branches, in the business/private sector and in academia all shared their views on CIA openness with the Task Force. We also consulted Agency retirees and employees throughout the organization.
3. Many of those interviewed said the CIA was sufficiently open; all thought the CIA could do more to declassify and make available portions of its historical archives, especially regarding CIA successes and scientific/technical accomplishments; some said the CIA will have to work harder at explaining the need for intelligence in a post-cold war world. All agreed that an effective public affairs program for the CIA was necessary and that whatever changes were made to increase openness, all would expect the CIA to keep the secrets it is charged to protect.

4. In whatever program we pursue, we should:

- get our employees on board first
- be consistent
- be excellent
- be credible—admit when we are wrong
- personalize the Agency
- preserve the mystique

We should also ensure a coordinated PAO-OCA effort for this program. It will be important to get the Hill on board with the Agency's public position on various issues and to articulate the overall Agency strategy to Congress to honor your commitment re openness.

5. Before we can pursue greater openness, it is important to understand the Agency's current program in this area to put down a marker for possible change in the future. To provide some context you should be aware that while PAO grew during Judge Webster's tenure to meet the needs of increased requirements and an expanded program, PAO is now being told to downsize by about 33%. We recognize that a program of increased openness will require commitment of additional

resources, not only for PAO but for other parts of the Agency. The Directorates will need to assess the resource implications of these recommendations.

6. In most of our discussions with outsiders as well as within the task force *there was substantial agreement that we generally need to make the institution and the process more visible and understandable rather than strive for openness on specific substantive issues*. To do this, we need to develop a strategic vision of what we want to be open about, why we want to be more open and to whom we want to be more open. Our suggestion for such a vision statement is:

CIA, the most open intelligence agency in the world, wants to be recognized as an organization of high caliber and culturally diverse people who achieve technical and analytic excellence and operational effectiveness in fulfilling their mission with integrity and the trust of the American people. We believe that it is important for the American public to see CIA as a law-abiding organization whose role supporting national security policymakers continues to be important in an even more complex and dangerous world.

Formal acceptance of this statement by the Agency, or one similar to it, will provide a necessary and well-understood framework for taking the steps to achieve greater CIA openness.

7. We have an important story to tell, a story that bears repeating. We are the most open intelligence agency in the world which is proper in our form of democracy. (In fact, several foreign intelligence organizations have sought advice from PAO on how to establish a mechanism for dealing with the public.) That said, many Americans do not understand the intelligence process and the role of intelligence in national security policymaking. Many still operate with a romanticized or erroneous view of intelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspapers. These views often damage our reputation and make it harder for us to fulfill our mission. There are steps we can take which will benefit us and the American people.

8. To increase CIA openness and signal a change in how we do business, we need to take initiatives to share our history through the declassification of old records, explain our mission and functions in a changing world through an expanded briefing program within and outside of government, and develop a strategy for expanding our work with the media as a means of reaching an even broader audience. Our major recommendations address these issues:

A. Declassifying and releasing records that describe CIA's history and activities would go a long way to educating the public on the work of intelligence. Our voluntary Historical Review Program has proceeded very slowly, and recent legislation (H.R. 1415) has mandated greater access to our records by State Department historians. Presently, policy and resource constraints severely limit the amount of historical records released by the CIA. Therefore, we recommend that you:

1) Establish a senior-led, Agency-wide group to review the Agency's policy and practices related to declassification and release of records under the Historical

Review and FOIA programs, as they relate to the changing international environment and counterintelligence threat, and with a view to accelerating the process. [Note: The Editorial Board of Studies has identified several hundred unclassified or declassified articles and taken steps to interest scholars and publishers in them. About half a dozen university presses have expressed interest, but to date none have actively begun the editorial process.]

___ Approve___ Disapprove

2) Initiate in the near-term the declassification of historical materials on specific events, particularly those which are repeatedly the subject of false allegations, such as the 1948 Italian Elections, 1953 Iranian Coup, 1954 Guatemalan Coup, 1958 Indonesian Coup and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Notify the public of the availability of the resulting materials.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

3) Have OTE publish an unclassified version of Studies in Intelligence and make it available to the public for sale through the National Technical Information Service and have it listed in the Social Science Index

___ Approve___ Disapprove

4) Publish compendiums of papers delivered at conferences sponsored or cosponsored by CIA.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

B. Many people inside and outside of government do not understand what we do or how we do it. It is important that we increase our efforts to tell people both what we do and what we don't do. To this end, we recommend that you:

1) Commission PAO, working in concert with OCA and the directorates, to develop additional unclassified material on CIA, its mission, functions, and changing role into the next century.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

2) Expand the Agency's briefing program for:

- new members of Congress
- key Congressional staffers, as appropriate
- Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) staff members
- new political appointees in relevant agencies, (especially important to prepare for in an election year)

- Agency contractors
- Academic consultants
- Academic, business and other private sector groups

___ Approve___ Disapprove

C. To reach our objective of greater openness, we must come up with a better balance in dealing with the media in a world where television is the primary conveyor of information to most Americans. In the past we have been reluctant to do television (Judge Webster appeared only three times before he announced his retirement), and some would still caution against it because of the special risks involved. Yet the opportunity for impact is so great that we believe the time has come to change our position. One of the things that is leading us in this direction is the strong view from many quarters that we need a visible Agency spokesperson, such as the D/PAO, to refute allegations and set the record straight. When such false allegations come from television we need to be able to speak to them in the same forum. [Note: For example, an Agency spokesperson reading our statement in response to the allegations made by *Nightline* in summer 1991 would have been more effective than Ted Koppel's reading of it with raised eyebrows and a look of "What do you expect given the source?" increases the visibility of the DCI and the intelligence process, expands the role of the Agency spokesperson and takes a more proactive approach toward the media in general.] To this end, we recommend that you:

1) Commission the D/PAO to develop in consultation with the Deputy Directors a media strategy for the '90's that increases the visibility of the DCI and the intelligence process, expands the role of the Agency spokesperson and takes a more proactive approach toward the media in general.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

9. In most of our discussions we defined the audiences for greater CIA openness as the following: the media, academia, business, the private sector, government and our own employees. We have used these categories to describe our current program related to openness which provides a context for offering our other recommendations.

A. MEDIA

1) *Current Program:*

a) PAO now has relationships with reporters from *every* major wire service, newspapers, news weekly, and television network in the nation. This has helped us turn some "intelligence failure" stories into intelligence success stories, and it has contributed to the accuracy of countless others. In many instances, we have persuaded reporters to postpone, change, hold, or even scrap stories that could have adversely affected national security interests or jeopardized sources and methods.

b) PAO spokespersons build and maintain these professional relationships with reporters by responding to daily inquiries from them over the telephone (3369 in 1991), by providing unclassified background briefings to them at Headquarters (174 in 1991), and by arranging for them to interview the DCI, DDCI and other senior Agency officials (164 in 1991).

c) PAO responds to numerous requests from authors, researchers, filmmakers, and others seeking information, guidance, or cooperation from the Agency in their endeavors. Some responses can be handled in a one-shot telephone call. Others, such as Life Magazine's proposed photo essay, BBC's six-part series, Ron Kessler's requests for information for his Agency book, and the need for an Agency focal point in the Rochester Institute of Technology controversy drew heavily on PAO resources.

d) PAO has also reviewed some film scripts about the Agency, documentary and fictional, at the request of filmmakers seeking guidance on accuracy and authenticity, in a few instances, facilitated the filming of a few scenes on Agency premises. Responding positively to these requests in a limited way has provided PAO with the opportunity to help others depict the Agency and its activities accurately and without negative distortions. Except for responding to such requests we do not seek to play a role in filmmaking ventures about the Agency which come to our attention. For example, although we knew that Oliver Stone's movie on JFK was in the works for some time, we did not contact him to volunteer an Agency viewpoint.

e) PAO coordinates the preparation of detailed background materials, usually in Q&A format, on major news issues for the DCI and DDCI for their appearances before media groups, world affairs councils, universities, and business and professional groups. PAO also prepares verbatim transcripts of their interviews with reporters and their appearances before media groups.

2) Recommendation

a. Provide more background briefings, when practical, to a greater number of print and electronic media journalists. Respond more quickly to telephone queries from the media, especially on fast-breaking events. PAO should continue to work with area analysts and specialists so that PAO can respond telephonically to these questions, rather than insisting on an eventual in-person background briefings at Langley. Keep PAO as the conduit for these efforts and ensure that media across the U.S., not only those in the Washington, D.C. area, are aware of our program.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

b. Find more opportunities for the deputy directors to have on-the-record interviews with the media to talk about process and, on occasion, substantive issues.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

c. When there is a major international event that requires the attention of CIA (i.e., the Persian Gulf war), PAO should consider inviting a number of reporters to CIA Headquarters for an unclassified background briefing.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

d. Look for ways to emphasize the changing nature of the intelligence work force and the growing number of women and minorities in each directorate and increasingly in more senior positions. Consider support for some individual profiles which help personalize the world of intelligence in broad circulation newspapers or magazines. [Note: The recent Denison University Alumni Magazine feature on Martha Kessler is a good example.]

___ Approve___ Disapprove

B. *ACADEMIA*

1) *Current Program*

a. The Agency has a wide range of contacts with academics through recruiting professional societies contractual arrangements and OTE. PAO has recently been designated the focal point for all information about CIA's relations with the academic community. As such, PAO is building a data base of information about Agency contacts with academia—conferences and seminars, recruiting, officers and scholars-in-residence, contracts, teaching—and serves as the clearing house of such information for Agency employees.

b. PAO officers also speak to approximately 250 academic audiences a year. Subject areas vary, but most focus on the structure and functions of the CIA, its role in the intelligence community, the intelligence process, and congressional oversight. PAO has developed a speakers' package for Agency officers and retirees who speak in public, including an annually update Q&A package to aid the speaker in answering a broad array of questions.

c. PAO maintains a mailing list of 700 academicians who receive unclassified Agency publications four times a year. Recipients write to praise the quality of the products and to claim that these mailings are one of the most effective ways of reaching out.

d. PAO sponsors the DCI Program for Deans twice a year. This program seeks to expose administrators of academic institutions to Senior Agency officials—the DCI, the DDCI, all the DDs, and heads of independent offices—and to give them a sense of what the Agency does, how it operates, and how it fits in and relates to American society.

2) Recommendations:

a. The Officer-in-Residence (OIR) program is seen by many as an excellent means of providing a window into CIA for the academic community. The program (currently 13 participants) could be enhanced with dedicated slots and resources, under central management. At present, individual offices provide the positions and about \$100,000 per officer. Such enhancement would ensure that selection of schools and officers meets our needs.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

b. PAO should work with OTE and OP to develop a program for CIA employees involved in recruiting to ensure that they are conversant on all issues affecting the CIA with emphasis on the intelligence process and multicultural sensitivities. Provide for periodic update for recruiters on long-term assignment.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

c. PAO's Coordinator for Academic Affairs should take steps to see that CIA becomes an institutional member of relevant scientific and professional societies. Agency employees should participate openly in such meetings as CIA officers. Procedures for individuals to present papers in such for a need to be updated.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

d. Sponsor either unilaterally or in cooperation with academic institutions or other government agencies conferences on the history and craft of intelligence, as well as on other areas of common interest. PAO will work with OTE's Center for the Study of Intelligence on these programs. [Note: For example, PAO is currently talking with the Truman Library about a conference in late 1992 or 1993 on the origins of the Intelligence Community. A similar conference with the Wilson Center is being considered to mark the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis next fall.]

___ Approve___ Disapprove

e. Conduct more academic conferences here at Langley. Take the successful DI model of substantive conferences with the academic community and explore how it could be valuable to S&T and DA.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

f. PAO, CPAS and FBIS should examine ways to continue or enhance the program to disseminate unclassified publications (highly valued by all we talked to) to ensure that the Agency is receiving maximum benefit for its efforts.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

g. Encourage the establishment of intelligence studies programs at academic institutions.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

C. GOVERNMENT

1. *Current Program:*

a. The Agency has a broad range of contacts throughout government and provides product, briefings, and exchanges to both Executive and Legislative Branches. PAO is an active participant in briefing the military and other government agencies on the CIA, its mission and functions. This year, PAO provided more than 70 briefings to groups from the National Security Agency, Foreign Service, Pentagon, Defense Intelligence College, and the United States information Agency.

2. Recommendations:

a. OCA should seek additional opportunities for the DCI to appear before congressional committees in open session when such a session helps to educate the public about the role of intelligence and the relevance and accountability of the CIA.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

b. Explore with the SSCI and HPSCI leadership the possibility of having the oversight committees issue an unclassified annual report on the performance of the Intelligence Community.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

c. The DDI and DDS&T in coordination with OCA should reassess the Agency's relationship with CRS and OTA.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

d. PAO should work with PCS to look for ways to reach broader military audiences with information about our programs.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

D. BUSINESS

1. *Current Program:*

a. The Agency currently has three types of basic relationships with the US business sector. First, business is an important source of intelligence information via NR

collection activities. Second, the US corporate sector is involved in the vast bulk of the Agency's contracting efforts. Finally, business receives selected briefings by the Agency—talks on the counterintelligence challenge, counterterrorism and other presentations at business-oriented conferences organized by groups such as SASA. Given the emphasis on economic security for the United States in the '90s, the business sector is looking to the potential contributions the Intelligence Community can make in this area.

b. This past year, PAO provided remarks and support for the DCI and DDCI for some 40 appearances before outside audiences—including a wide range of groups from the business, legal and civic communities. Most of these appearances were covered by the media giving even more visibility to our leaders' comments.

2. Recommendations

a. Establish a program with appropriate guidelines for providing unclassified, off-the-record (or on background) country specific briefings (similar to those given to journalists) to corporate leaders. NR should act as the focal point for this effort to consider the potential gain for the Agency in providing such information.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

b. Host groups of CEOs at the Agency for day-long programs similar to the DCI's Program for Deans.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

c. Task the DDS&T to take the lead in a program to consider declassifying the relationship between CIA and many of its contractors that have historically been classified. Many benefits could be derived by the Agency and by the contractors if these relationships and perhaps the general nature of the work involved were revealed.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

E. PRIVATE SECTOR

1. *Current Program:*

a. PAO officers this year made presentations about the CIA to members of more than 60 civic and service clubs. Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs in particular have been the recipients of this service. PAO took steps to establish a speakers' bureau last spring to increase the number of presentations that the Agency could provide.

b. PAO responds to nearly 4000 pieces of correspondence a year from the public. Queries range from the ridiculous to the scholarly request for information. PAO also answers some 6,000 telephone queries from the public annually.

2. Recommendation:

a. Assign PAO the resources to fund and manage its speaker's bureau to develop a group of effective Agency speakers who can talk about the intelligence process and the role of CIA in a changing world.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

F. *INTERNAL AUDIENCE*

1. *Current Program:*

a. Every business day PAO produces, Media Highlights a 50–75 page collation of newspapers articles, editorials, and commentaries on the Agency and intelligence-related subjects. The staff produces 172 copies of the Highlights for distribution through the Agency. Modified versions of Highlights have also been prepared and forwarded to the DCI during his trips abroad.

b. In addition, PAO posts “Agency Views” on the Public Affairs bulletin boards throughout the Agency. These are compilations of statements by the DCI, DDCI, and PAO spokesmen on the Agency or intelligence-related issues of the day.

c. PAO also publishes a newsletter quarterly called the Public Eye to inform employees about the activities of PAO and the Agency issues which are being discussed in the media. PAO ensures that transcripts of selected DCI speeches are made available to employees through employee bulletins, on-line and in the library.

2. Recommendations:

a. PAO should work with OTE to develop a training course for employees to better understand our relationship with the media with particular emphasis on the rules for background briefings.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

b. PAO should work with OTE to invite more members of the media to speak to CIA groups, either in a class (i.e., mid-career) or at an offsite/seminar. More people in the Agency will need to be exposed to media representatives to better understand appreciate the work of the media and its appropriate interaction with the Intelligence Community.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

c. The Task Force on Internal Communications is addressing the subject of communications without own employees, which is the responsibility of Agency managers at all levels. Current and former Agency officers emphasized, however, the need for a program of increased CIA openness to be part of our corporate strategy.

That is senior managers must be on board and the employees informed that we are increasing the openness of the Agency and how we plan to do it. To this end we recommend that you:

- Distribute an employee bulletin describing the program for increased CIA openness
- Task senior managers to talk about the program
- Address employees in the bubble on this program and take questions

___ Approve___ Disapprove

EVALUATION OF INCREASED OPENNESS

10. In recommending ways to increase CIA openness, we wanted to come up with some means to measure the results of these efforts and to make changes in course, as appropriate. Since these are not programs or initiatives that lend themselves readily to quantifiable impact, we need to rely on an evaluation of how the perception of the Agency has changed. This can manifest itself in many ways including: a friendlier, more cooperative working environment for our officers, more interest in employment, more accurate reporting on our activities, etc. To this end, we recommend that you:

- a. Task all NR Station Chiefs to provide an annual evaluation of our openness program as it is seen from their perspective and to make recommendations for changes.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

- b. Establish an advisory group of senior business, academics, and government leaders to provide advice on and evaluation of CIA efforts to explain the role of intelligence in the '90s.

___ Approve___ Disapprove

Source: "Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness, 20 December 1991," George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ciacase/EXB.pdf>.

67. Use of Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993)

Classification: Secret

This classic Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment shows the options available to policy makers as developed by intelligence analysts, in this case from the

Office of European Analysis. In the end, the United States supported United Nations (UN) efforts to stop the war through the use of force.

Memo on the Use of Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Intelligence Memorandum: Office of European Analysis

The Use of Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Options, Utility, and Possible Outcomes.

Summary

A Western use of force to impose or maintain peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be unlikely to succeed, except under the most favorable conditions. Each party would attempt to exploit it for its own ends.

- The Bosnian government would see Western involvement as a ground for hoping that its control over Bosnia and Herzegovina could be restored without negotiation.
- Croatia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo may see Western intervention as providing the chance to gain control of territories under Serb control.
- A Western attempt to compel the Serbs to accept a peace plan probably would have a high cost. Although Western forces could destroy organized resistance, guerrilla warfare would continue and eventually erode political support in the West.
- Even if all parties agreed to the Vance-Owen plan, low level violence would continue and a substantial peacekeeping force would have to remain for years to prevent a resumption of large-scale hostilities.
- Limited actions outside the framework of Vance-Owen, such as enforcing the no-fly zone, would have almost no political or military impact on the Serbs, but would encourage Muslim hopes of greater Western involvement.
- A decision to relieve Sarajevo by force—itself an ambitious military undertaking—also would stiffen the Muslim negotiating position and probably would not end fighting in the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs probably would block relief efforts in other areas.
- If force were used against the Bosnian Serbs, Belgrade probably would increase military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. Major efforts to stop this would carry a risk of all-out war with Serbia.

Poor Prospects for the Bosnian State

Our judgment regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina remains that anything short of massive, long-term Western occupation is unlikely to succeed in forestalling the

eventual dissolution of Bosnia as a state. Ethnic Serbs and Croats—nearly half the population—appear to prefer affiliation with the more powerful and expansionist states of Serbia and Croatia, sentiments Serb and Croatian nationalists have fanned and exploited.

The Muslims, Serbs, and Croats almost certainly do not believe that the international community would be willing to sustain the long-term occupation that would be required to hold Bosnia together. This shared assumption explains why the Muslims who have no homeland beyond Bosnia—are the most fearful of a negotiated settlement.

Intervention to Support Vance-Owen

We have considered the potential outcomes and utilities of four possible scenarios involving Western employment of force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first two are centered on enforcing the Vance-Owen plan, with or without the consent of all the parties involved. The third and fourth scenarios, which lie outside the Vance-Owen framework, involve the use of force either to halt violation of the no-fly zone or to relieve Sarajevo.

Scenario One: Enforcing the Vance-Owen Plan With the Agreement of All Parties

Participation in a multinational peacekeeping effort to enforce the Vance-Owen plan with the approval of all parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be relatively low-risk initially, but could easily become costly if any of the protagonists try to modify it in their favor. The peacekeeping force's mission would be to ensure compliance with the agreements; rules of engagement for the force would have to be worked out carefully in advance. In the event of complete and voluntary compliance by the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, work on building the political and administrative apparatus of the new Bosnian state, the delivery of relief supplies, and economic recovery could be undertaken.

- We view it as more likely, however, that any cease-fire arrangements would be fragile; all sides would probably be trying to rearm and maneuver for political advantage, while violence would still be endemic in the countryside as scores are settled. Even if the formal cease-fire holds, incidents and casualties among the peacekeepers would be common.
- In a worst case, the cease-fire would simply fall apart and the war resume. The peacekeepers could use force to restore the agreements, but would quickly become targets for all the warring groups. If the Peacekeepers stand aside, they would still risk being caught in the crossfire.

Because the peacekeepers' mandate would be tied to voluntary acceptance of Vance-Owen, a resumption of fighting would require the West to choose between leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina and becoming more deeply involved.

Scenario Two: Forcing the Serbs to Consent to Vance-Owen

If the Bosnian government accepted the Vance-Owen plan or a derivative, and the Serbs refused, there would be increased calls for the West to use military force in conjunction with tightened sanctions to compel the Serbs to accept the peace agreement. The Western mission would be to use ground and air forces to compel Bosnian Serb political leaders to consent to a cease-fire while destroying or disabling any Bosnian Serb units violating the cease-fire. Western forces would also have to destroy or forcibly remove any heavy weapons the Bosnian Serbs refuse to withdraw and forcibly evict any Bosnian Serb units refusing to abandon positions on confrontation lines. This could require up to several hundred thousand Western troops. The main Western advantages in this situation would be the poor training and uneven morale among Bosnian Serb units as well as their own professionalism and firepower. The Bosnian Serbs would be hard pressed to cope with fluid Western tactics and coordinated air and artillery strikes; Serbs with little commitment to their cause would probably quit.

The Western force, however, would face a significant threat. The 40,000-man Bosnian Serb army and numerous Serb irregulars would have significant tactical advantages, including knowledge of the mountainous and forested terrain which favors small infantry actions and ambushes to counter the Western technological edge. The Serbs could and would attack Muslim civilians.

Such an intervention would likely cause a prolonged conflict:

- The Bosnian Muslims would try to take advantage of Western military pressure on the Serbs. Western forces would face the prospect of separating two warring factions or siding with Muslim efforts to defeat Serb units.
- Even if Bosnian Serb organized resistance were defeated, well-armed Serbs would sustain a violent resistance movement for years, with Western forces and Muslim civilians as their primary targets.
- Western casualties could gradually erode support for the enforcement operation and undermine the willingness of some Allies to maintain units in Bosnia. The potential for incidents in which Western forces unwittingly killed civilians also would be high.

Intervention Outside Vance-Owen

Political Implications

Western intervention outside the framework of the Vance-Owen plan, unless aimed at pacifying the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would have little effect, in our judgment. Limited actions—such as enforcing the no-fly zone or relieving Sarajevo—would allow the parties to continue the conflict on the ground or elsewhere in Bosnia rather than compel them to settle their differences. Moreover, a

limited action would present the West with a dilemma. Without the credible threat of an expanded use of force, the parties would be free to continue fighting. A willingness to use increased force, however, would almost certainly be tested quickly and lead to increasing Western military involvement

Scenario Three: Enforcing No-Fly

One option for the use of Western force in Bosnia and Herzegovina outside the Vance-Owen process would involve enforcement of a no-fly zone, either the current unmandated zone over Bosnia or an extended one including Serbia. The mission, involving Western AWACS and fighter airplanes, would be to ensure that no aircraft take off. We believe this goal could be achieved fairly easily. Ground-based air defenses—the Bosnian Serbs have large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)—and Belgrade’s WG-21 and -29 fighters would pose only a moderate threat. The MiG-21s are technologically obsolete, only a handful of MiG-29s are still operational, and Serb pilots are poorly trained in comparison to their Western counterparts.

Enforcing no-fly would have little military or political utility, in our judgment. The military impact on the Serbs would be minimal—the conflict in Bosnia is a ground war and there is no firm evidence that the Bosnian Serbs have flown fixed-wing combat sorties since early December 1992. Many helicopter and some light fixed-wing aircraft sorties have been reported, but they have been militarily insignificant. Without an effect on the military situation, the political impact on the Serbs of enforcing no-fly is likely to be negligible, and could actually increase Serb intransigence and hostility, leading to adverse military and humanitarian consequences. At the same time, it would encourage Muslim hopes of greater Western support.

This scenario would involve only minimal risks for the West.

- In the most favorable, and likely, outcome, nothing would happen. The Serbs, realizing they are outmatched in the air, would obey the no-fly mandate and not challenge the Western force.
- In the unfavorable case, Serb aircraft or air defenses would take on the enforcing aircraft. Western retaliation would almost certainly quickly destroy the Serbs’ assets, although a small number of Western aircraft could be lost. The Bosnian Serbs would almost certainly end humanitarian aid mission to their zones of control.

Scenario Four: Relieving Sarajevo

Relieving Sarajevo would have high humanitarian, but mixed political and military utility. The city has symbolic importance but little military value to the Bosnian Serbs, and Western intervention would be unlikely to compel the Serbs to accept a negotiated settlement. The Muslims, however, would interpret intervention as Western involvement on their side and their negotiating position would stiffen.

Lifting the siege would free Muslim and Serb combatants to fight elsewhere, probably increasing the level of fighting in central and eastern Bosnia. Relieving Sarajevo, moreover, would come at the likely price of a cut-off of aid missions to isolated Muslim enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The outcome would depend on the Bosnian Serbs.

They may choose to avoid provoking further intervention and allow outside forces to establish a land corridor into Sarajevo.

- In a worst-case scenario, Bosnian Serb forces would resist. Land convoys could face hit-and-run ambushes and landmines. Western air assets' or artillery with counterbattery radar could be used to destroy Serb artillery positions, but it would [be] hard to locate and destroy the numerous smaller mortars and hand-held weapons which have caused almost as much destruction. Even with a very broad mandate, outside forces would have difficulty identifying and eliminating hostile forces in an urban setting.

The Slippery Slope

Belgrade, in our view, would not react passively to a more activist Western role, would use a variety of indirect means to raise the costs of Western intervention. Belgrade could, for example, provide the Bosnian Serbs with weapons, ammunition, safe havens, "volunteers", or even artillery support along the border. If these measures led to greater Western involvement on the ground, Western forces would then face the threat of Belgrade's 100,000-man army. The army's standards of training and equipment have steadily improved since 1991, but still lag most Western military forces.

In our view, threats alone would not compel Belgrade to stop aiding the Bosnian Serbs and force would have to be used against Serbia itself. At a minimum, military forces would have to be placed at major border crossings.

- Military action on the border would probably lead to further Serb attacks on Western forces. A combination of air and ground attacks on delivery routes from Serbia to Bosnia might be used to try to stop the flow of aid, for example. Seeing itself threatened, Belgrade would probably see continued aid to the Bosnian Serbs as the best way to strike back at the West while calculating that the West would not launch an all out attack on Serbia.
- A broader Western intervention into Serbia proper would also carry an uncertain and costly outcome. Even if Serb air defenses and air forces could be destroyed and much of the country overrun, much of the army would be able to retreat to the rugged terrain of southern Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo and fight on. Pacification of the country could take years, with substantial casualties.

Other actors in the former Yugoslavia are likely to see Western intervention as creating an opportunity to pursue their own ends. The conflict could easily spread to Croatia and Kosovo.

- Croatia is determined to regain the one-third of its territory under nominal UN supervision but actually controlled by Serbs. A major Western intervention against the Bosnian Serbs could lead Zagreb to conclude that the time was opportune to take the offensive, putting UN forces there under severe threat and possibly triggering direct intervention in Croatia by the Yugoslav Army.
- Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo also could conclude that Western intervention in Bosnia provided an opportune time to strike against Serbian control of Kosovo—particularly if substantial Croat-Serb fighting had resumed in Croatia.

Source: CIA Directorate of Intelligence: Fifty Years of Informing Policy; Expanded Edition Containing Declassified Documents (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 306–315.

68. Aldrich Ames: Statement of Facts (1994)

Classification: Unclassified

This document provides a statement of facts concerning the espionage-related activities of Aldrich Ames.

Statement of Facts Regarding Espionage of Aldrich Ames

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V ALDRICH HAZEN AMES a/k/a/ “Kolokol”
Criminal No. 94-64-A

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the event that this matter was to proceed to trial, the government would prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

I. INTRODUCTION

ALDRICH HAZEN AMES is 52 years old, born on May 26, 1941. In June 1962, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, and he has been a full-time CIA employee for more than 31 years. At the time of his arrest, AMES was a GS-14 Operations Officer in the Counternarcotics Center at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

During his employment with the CIA, AMES held a variety of positions including the following: from 1983 through 1995, AMES was the Chief, Soviet Operational Review Branch in the Operational Review and Production Group of the Soviet/East European (SE) Division of the Directorate of Operations (DO) of the CIA; from 1986 through 1989, AMES was assigned to the United States Embassy in Rome, Italy; from September 1989 through December 1989, AMES was Chief, Europe Branch, External Operations Group, SE Division; from December 1989 through August 1990, AMES was Chief, Czechoslovak Operations Branch, East European Operations Group, SE Division; from September 1990 through August 1991, AMES was assigned to the USSR Branch, Analytical Group, Counterintelligence Center; from September 1991 through November 1991, AMES was Chief, KGB. Working Group, Central Eurasia (CE) Division; from December 1991 through August 1993, AMES was a referant for CE Branch, regional Programs Branch, International Counternarcotics Group, Counternarcotics Center (IOG/CNC) and from August 1993 to February 1994, AMES was Chief, Europe and CE Branch, ICG/CNC. Throughout AMES' employment with the CIA, he held a TOP SECRET security clearance and had regular access to information and documents classified SECRET and TOP SECRET pursuant to Executive Order 12356.

On August 10, 1985, AMES married Maria Del Rosario Casas Dupuy in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Prior to their arrests on February 21, 1994, ALDRICH and ROSARIQ AMES resided at 2512. North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, with their minor son.

II. ESPIONAGE RELATED ACTIVITIES

In 1984, as part of his duties as a CIA Operations Officer, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES began meeting with officials of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("U.S.S.R." or "Soviet Union") in Washington, D.C. These meetings were authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and were designed to allow AMES to assess Soviet officials as possible sources for intelligence information and recruitment. AMES was required to report each of his meetings with these Soviet officials to CIA officials. In approximately April 1985, AMES agreed with Soviet officials to sell classified information from the Central Intelligence Agency and other branches of the United States government to the KGB, in return for large sums of money. In May and July 1985, AMES engaged in authorized meetings with Soviet officials, meetings he used as a cover to provide classified information to the KGB in exchange for money. Although Ames stopped regularly reporting these meetings to the CIA in July 1985, over the next year AMES continued to meet with the KGB in Washington, D.C. During many of these meetings, AMES provided classified information relating to the national defense of the United States to the KGB in return for cash payments. In July 1986, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES was assigned to the United States Embassy in Rome, Italy, where he served until July 1989. During this time, AMES met with his KGB handler, code-named "SAM." AMES reported a few of these

meetings to the CIA, claiming that he was obtaining information from “SAM,” a Soviet Embassy official. During these meetings, AMES continued to disclose classified information relating to the national defense of the United States which AMES obtained through his work for the CIA in Rome.

In the spring of 1989, as AMES was preparing to return to CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, the KGB provided him with two written documents. The first document was a financial accounting which indicated that as of May 1, 1989, AMES had already received approximately \$1.8 million and that some \$900,000 more had been appropriated for him. The second document was a nine-page letter which listed the types of classified information the KGB wanted AMES to obtain for them upon his return to CIA Headquarters, discussed arrangements for cash payments to AMES upon his return to the United States, warned AMES to avoid traps set by the CIA, and detailed a communication plan governing further communications between AMES and the KGB. Pursuant to this communication plan, AMES would pass documents to and receive money from the KGB in the Washington, D.C. area at set times throughout the year using signal sites and dead drops. AMES would also meet personally with the KGB at least once yearly in meetings outside the United States. The fixed site for these meetings would be in Bogota, Colombia, on the first Tuesday every December, although additional meetings could be held in other cities, including Vienna, Austria, on an as needed basis.

In 1990, the KGB provided AMES with a communications plan for 1991 through a dead drop in the Washington, D.C. area. The 1991 communication plan provided for impersonal contacts through signal sites and dead drops, and for personal meetings between AMES and the KGB in Vienna, Austria, in April, and in Bogota, Colombia, in December. On December 17, 1990, AMES obtained valuable intelligence information regarding a KGB officer cooperating with the CIA. AMES prepared a letter for the KGB on his home computer advising the KGB of this information and the cryptonym of the KGB officer.

Pursuant to AMES’ communication schedule with the KGB, on April 25, 1991, AMES travelled to Vienna, Austria, to meet with his KGB handlers. Although AMES was present in Vienna and prepared to exchange classified information for money, the KGB failed to meet with AMES at that time. Later that year, in December 1991, AMES met personally with the KGB in Bogota, Colombia, where he exchanged classified information for a large amount of cash. At that meeting, the KGB provided AMES a communications plan for 1992, pursuant to which they would communicate through signal sites and dead drops in March and August, and meet personally in Caracas, Venezuela, in October of 1992.

In March 1992, defendant ALDRICH HAZEN AMES communicated with the KGB by placing a signal at signal site SMILE and leaving a message with a package of documents at dead drop BRIDGE. In this message to the KGB, AMES requested that they promptly transmit more money to him through a dead drop. Again in June, 1992, AMES prepared a message on his computer to the KGB in which he complained of their failure to provide him money in response to his previous message, indicated that he was forced to sell stock and a certificate of deposit

in Zurich to meet pressing needs, and asked them to deliver to him up to \$100,000 in cash through dead drop PIPE. This message was transmitted to the KGB by placing a signal at signal site SMILE and leaving the message at dead drop BRIDGE.

On August 18, 1992, AMES typed a letter to the KGB on his home computer, at his home in the Eastern District of Virginia, discussing dead drops and his access to classified information, stating: "My lack of access frustrates me, since I would need to work harder to get what I can to you. It was easier to simply hand over cables! Documents are enclosed in this package which should be of interest."

In discussing his possible transfer to a different position within the CIA, AMES stated that, "If this job offer becomes serious during the next week or so, I will surely take it. It would be more interesting and productive for us." In this letter, AMES agreed to a personal meeting with the KGB in Caracas, Venezuela and AMES also provided them with information on the level of CIA operations in MOSCOW, U.S. conclusions about Russian technical penetrations of our embassy in MOSCOW, and CIA recruitment plans for Russian officials. The letter also stated that, "My wife has accomodated (sic) herself to understanding what I am doing in a very supportive way."

AMES attempted to transmit this letter and accompanying classified documents to the KGB on August 19, 1992, by placing a pencil mark at signal site HILL in the morning and thereafter leaving the documents and letter at dead drop GROUND at 4 p.m. that day. Early the next day, however, AMES returned to the signal site and determined that his signal to the KGB had not been erased, signifying that they had not picked up his package from the dead drop. AMES thereafter retrieved his package, and on September 1, 1992, typed a second letter to the KGB on his home computer. This letter advised them that he had been forced to retrieve his earlier drop and would signal them again. This message, along with the earlier package, was retransmitted to the KGB in early September through dead drop GROUND.

On October 2, 1992, pursuant to his communications plan, AMES travelled to Bogota, Colombia, and then on to Caracas, Venezuela, to meet with officers of the KGB. During this meeting, AMES provided the KGB with classified information and received in return approximately \$150,000 in cash. The KGB also provided AMES with a communications plan for 1993, pursuant to which AMES would transmit information and messages to them by dead drops in January, April, July, and October receive money and messages from the KGB in March, June, and September, and would meet with them personally in Bogota, Colombia, in November or December 1993. Upon his return to the United States, AMES deposited more than \$85,000 of the KGB money received in Caracas into accounts he controlled with his wife in banks in Northern Virginia, all deposits in amounts of less than \$10,000.

On March 9, 1993, AMES typed a message to the KGB on his home computer discussing a variety of topics including the morale of the CIA division concerned with the former U.S.S.R. and Russia, personnel changes and budgetary matters in the CIA, and the fact that he was transmitting to them a "variety" of documents.

AMES opened this message telling the KGB, “All is well with me—I have no indications that anything is wrong or suspected.” This message, along with a package of classified documents and information, was transmitted to the KGB through a dead drop in March 1993.

On May 26, 1993, AMES transmitted an “urgent” message to the KGB, asking for money to be delivered to him immediately through a dead drop in the Washington, D.C. area. Four days later, the R.G.B. transmitted a package containing a substantial amount of cash to AMES through dead drop BRIDGE. In July 1993, the KGB transmitted to AMES additional money through a dead drop, as well as a message discussing an upcoming personal meeting, and their plan to test a dead drop to determine whether it was secure. In this message, the KGB advised AMES that they would provide additional money shortly, unless the money was postponed due to the “diplomatic pouch schedule.”

In preparation for his trip to Bogota on September 8, 1993, AMES drafted a message to the KGB stating that he would be available to meet with them on October 1, 1993. On September 9, 1993, AMES left this message for the KGB, and that evening drove with his wife into the District of Columbia to determine whether the KGB had received the message. Later that month, the KGB signaled AMES through signal site NORTH, advising him they would be unavailable to meet with him on October 1, 1993, and transmitted a message to him through dead drop PIPE stating they would meet with him between November 1 and November B, 1993. On October 13, 1993, AMES signaled his willingness to attend this meeting in Bogota by placing a chalk mark at signal site SMILE.

Thereafter, on October 30, 1993, AMES travelled to Bogota, Colombia, where he met with officers of the KGB. In Bogota, AMES provided the KGB with classified information in exchange for a substantial amount of cash. In Bogota, AMES also received a communications plan for 1994 which established new signal sites throughout the Washington metropolitan area and provided for dead drops in February, March, May, August and September, face-to-face meetings in Caracas, Venezuela, or Quito, Ecuador, in November 1994, and a face-to-face meeting in 1995 in Vienna, Austria, or Paris, France. During this meeting, the KGB also advised AMES that they were holding \$1.9 million for him.

III. COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

When ALDRICH HAZEN AMES began spying for the KGB in the spring of 1985, his position within the CIA guaranteed him access to most information relating to penetrations of the Soviet military and intelligence services and intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. AMES disclosed substantial amounts of this information, including the identities of Russian military and intelligence officers who were cooperating with the CIA and friendly foreign intelligence services, including but not limited to, sources codenamed GTACCORD, GTCOWL, GTFITNESS, GTBLIZZARD, GTGENTILE, GTMILLION, GTPROLOGUE, GTWEIGH, GTTICKLE, and others. [FOOTNOTE: The individuals listed above whose activities on behalf of the CIA were compromised by AMES included a number of high

level officials of the Soviet military and intelligence services. GTACCQRD, for example, was an official of the GRU (the Soviet military intelligence service) who provided valuable classified information to the CIA. He was arrested by the KGB and thereafter executed. GTCOWL was a KGB officer stationed in Moscow who provided valuable intelligence including the revelation that the KGB used an invisible substance referred to as “spydust” to surveil U.S. officials in Moscow. Eventually President Reagan confronted the Russians on this matter using information provided, in part, by GTCOWL. Following AMES’ disclosure of his identity, GTCOWL was arrested and executed. GTTICKLE was the Chief KGB officer in the United Kingdom whose cooperation with the British AMES revealed to the KGB GTFITNESS was a KGB officer and GTMILLION, a Lt. Colonel in the GRU, both of whom cooperated with the CIA. AMES disclosed both to the KGB; both were subsequently arrested and executed. AMES maintains that he was never personally advised by the KGB or anyone else as to the disposition and fate of the sources he compromised.] AMES’ disclosures included a substantial amount of TOP SECRET information including signals intelligence. AMES compromise of these penetrations of the Soviet military and intelligence services deprived the United States of extremely valuable intelligence material for years to come.

During his assignment to the U.S. Embassy in Rome from 1986 to 1989, AMES provided the KGB with valuable intelligence information concerning CIA activities against the Soviet Union, including a large number of double agent operations launched against the Soviet Union. AMES compromised a substantial number of double agent operations organized by U.S. intelligence agencies, and also advised the KGB of our knowledge of Soviet double agent operations targeted against the U.S. AMES informed the KGB of important CIA strategies involving double agent operations and answered detailed inquiries regarding past penetrations of the Soviet intelligence services. During this period AMES also disclosed to the KGB the identities of an Eastern European security officer who had begun cooperating with the CIA, code named GTMOTORBOAT, and a Soviet official cooperating with the CIA, codenamed GTPYRRHIC.

Following his return in 1989 to CIA Headquarters, AMES continued to provide the KGB with valuable classified information related and unrelated to his specific CIA job assignments. AMES also provided the KGB with a substantial amount of information regarding CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, including information on budgets, staffing, personnel, morale, strategy, and other issues affecting the Soviet Union and Russia.

IV. THE FINANCES AND FALSE TAX RETURNS

During this conspiracy, defendant ALDRICH AMES received approximately \$2.5 million from the KGB for his espionage activities. AMES received this money primarily in face-to-face meetings overseas, but also through dead drops in the Washington, D.C. area. While AMES was stationed in Rome, he deposited the bulk of this cash into two accounts at credit Suisse Bank in Zurich, Switzerland. [FOOTNOTE: One account was in ALDRICH HAZEN AMES’ name with a power

of attorney in favor of his wife; another account was in his mother-in-law's name, with ALDRICH HAZEN AMES listed as trustee.] For example, on June 29, 1989, prior to departing Rome for the United States, AMES deposited a total of \$450,000 in cash into two accounts he controlled at Credit Suisse.

AMES and his wife, Rosario Casas Ames, used the money received from the KGB to purchase a residence in Arlington, Virginia for \$540,000, property in Colombia, expensive automobiles, extensive wardrobes, and to pay approximately one half million dollars in credit card bills. A portion of the money was used to support Rosario Casas Ames' family in South America as well. Most of the money deposited in cash into United States banks was deposited in sums less than \$10,000, to avoid having the financial institutions file a Currency Transaction Report.

Of the approximately \$2.5 million paid to AMES by the KGB, none of the money was declared on AMES' United States income tax returns. ALDRICH HAZEN AMES subscribed and filed false Joint Income Tax Returns for tax years 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.

In committing the foregoing acts, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES acted knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully, not by accident or mistake.

Respectfully submitted,

HELEN F. FAHEY
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

(NOTE: On 28 April 1994 Rick Ames was sentenced to life imprisonment.)

Source: "Statement of Facts, *United States of America v. Aldrich Hazen Ames*, Criminal Case No. 94-64-A, April 28, 1994," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci3/ch4.pdf>.

69. Statement of Aldrich Ames to the Court (1994)

Classification: Unclassified

This document provides Aldrich Ames's statement to the court regarding his espionage activities.

Statement of Aldrich Ames

April 28, 1994

STATEMENT OF ALDRICH HAZEN AMES

This is my opportunity to say a number of things of very great importance to me. I think they may also be of interest to this Court and to the public.

I bitterly regret the catastrophe which my betrayal of trust has brought upon my wife and son and upon any who have loved or cared for me. No punishment by this Court can balance or ease the profound shame and guilt which I bear.

For those persons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere who may have suffered from my actions, I have the deepest sympathy—even empathy. We made similar choices and suffer similar consequences.

I would like the Court and the public to understand, in the context of this plea agreement, how it is that my beloved wife has agreed to spend many years in jail. She has been the object of a purposeful, vindictive campaign of vilification by the government, designed to demoralize her, pressure me and to destroy her reputation here and in her native country. The government has used the threat of a life sentence for her to obtain our agreement to this plea. These are the facts:

I successfully concealed my relationship with the KGB and the SVRR from her for seven and a half of the nine years of my criminal activity. When she learned of it through my careless mistake that knowledge was devastating to her and to our marriage. Frightened nearly to death by the possible consequences to me, to her and to our son, she pleaded with me to break off the relationship with the Russians. I was able to manipulate her, even to blackmail her, into delaying that action. I argued falsely that we dared not anger the Russians. I argued that her retired mother, whose support we had become, would be injured, as well as our plans for an orderly retirement. I also implied that extravagance on her part had been and continued to be a contributing fact to my espionage, an implication which I believe came to undermine her own sense of self and integrity, making her even more vulnerable to my blackmail. Unable to convince me to take action, she shrank from turning me in, hoping against hope that we would survive detection until my retirement.

Rosario had no knowledge of what information I furnished the KGB and SVRR. She had little or no understanding of what any consequences of my actions could be. While she knew that I had received a great deal of money, she had no way to associate such sums with the gravity of the information I was passing. Rosario understood me to be cooperating with Russia, a country which she had heard extolled by Presidents Bush and Clinton as a friend and potential security partner. She had heard me speak since 1991 of the growing confidence of the CIA and the Russian security services in their evolving liaison relationship. Not indoctrinated by education or experience into the American view of the Cold War, she never saw Russia as a mortal threat to the United States.

Rosario recognized and feared my sloppiness, verging on recklessness. She ultimately found herself cautioning and counseling me to be careful and precise in my contacts with the Russians. These statements have been used with brutal effect by the government to imply falsely that she supported my espionage activity. Unfortunately, I expect the government to continue its policy of leaking or of tolerating the leaking of selective information to justify its actions. We, of course, are bound to silence, under threat of a much, much heavier sentence for her.

On the day of our arrest, she waived her rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present and cooperated with the FBI and the prosecutor. She made a

number of statements incriminating her. Then the government broke off the interview without explanation, dispatched her to jail and when she telephoned the FBI from jail to pursue her cooperation, the FBI refused to talk with her. It is clear that the government, having learned how little she knew of my activities, having elicited incriminating statements from her, and realizing the great value of the evidence being found at that moment in our home, simply decided what she was no longer important to the prosecution's case against me, and ignored her bona fide efforts to assist the government's investigation.

Until last week Rosario had refused to make any public statement in the belief that straightforward talks with the government, uncomplicated by interviews or public statements, would give the best results for both sides. But the government continued, in official and leaked statements, to depict Rosario as an active and scheming participant in my espionage. This vindictive campaign produced several tragic ironies.

During our negotiations over this plea agreement, it was apparent that the government was uncomfortable with displaying leniency with Rosario in large part because of the public impression create[d] by the government's own statements.

A government press release on the day of our arrest exposed Rosario's past assistance to the U.S. government, lending her apartment for meetings, when she was in Mexico and before our marriage. The CIA had originally contracted to keep that relationship secret and broke that promise to blacken her reputation in her country of birth, an act of gratuitous vindictiveness. The irony arose during our pre-detention hearing when the prosecutor unblushingly asserted that Rosario's assistance to the CIA, provided in good faith and at great risk, actually impeached her character and reliability.

My wife is being punished by the government far beyond her real culpability and even precedent. The government's intention to try us together on extremely serious and significant espionage charges left her with no choice but to accept this excessive and unfair sentence.

The main explanation for the government's treatment of my wife is the ferocity of the government's desire to punish me, both in revenge and to set an example. To punish her beyond her deserts punishes me. To punish my son indirectly also punishes me.

Having spoken of my regrets and anger, I want this Court also to understand how I view the criminal charges to which I have pled guilty. In breaking the law, I have betrayed a serious trust, much as does a corrupt government official receiving a bribe or stock speculator acting on inside information. I do regret and feel shame for this betrayal of trust, done for the basest of motives.

But I am compelled by my desire to be honest with this Court and with the public to assure you that, as an intelligence officer with more than thirty years' experience, I do not believe that our nation's interests have been noticeably damaged by my acts, or, for that matter, those of the Soviet Union or Russia noticeably aided.

In April 1985, seeking money to pay debts, I conceived a kind of confidence game to play on the KGB. In exchange for \$50,000 I provided the KGB with the identities of several Soviet citizens who appeared to be cooperating with the CIA

inside the Soviet Union. I suspected that their cooperation was not genuine, that their true loyalty was to the KGB, and, therefore I could cause them no harm. Then, a few months later, I did something which is still not entirely explicable even to me: without preconditions or any demand for payment, I volunteered to the KGB information identifying virtually all Soviet agents of the CIA and other American and foreign services known to me. To my enduring surprise, the KGB replied that it had set aside for me two million dollars in gratitude for the information. I think that two factors operated in complex ways to help shape my sudden decision.

First, I had come to dissent from the decades-long shift to the extreme right in our political spectrum and from our national security and foreign policies.

Second, I had come to believe that the espionage business, as carried out by the CIA and a few other American agencies, was and is a self-serving sham, carried out by careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several generations of American policymakers and the public about both the necessity and the value of their work.

There is and has been no rational need for thousands of case officers and tens of thousands of agents working around the world, primarily in and against friendly countries.

The information our vast espionage network acquires at considerable human and ethical costs is generally insignificant or irrelevant to our policymakers' needs.

Our espionage establishment differs hardly at all from many other federal bureaucracies, having transformed itself into a self-serving interest group, immeasurably aided by secrecy.

Now that the Cold War is over and the Communist tyrannies largely done for, our country still awaits a real national debate on the means and ends—and costs—of our national security policies. Just as we need to ask why we need even twelve carrier battle groups, new generations of fighters and bombers and thousands of ICBMs and SCBMs, we need to question, as only a few have done, our real needs for intelligence collection, including the highly suspect tool of espionage. To the extent that public discussions of my case can move from government-inspired hypocrisy and hysteria, to help even indirectly to fuel such a debate, I welcome and support it.

Our teachers in the arts of espionage were Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Both used their traditions of secrecy and ruthless statecraft to sponsor huge and ultimately useless espionage campaigns directed against both friends and foes. The CIA learned well from its teachers and, despite its difficulty in maintaining the requisite secrecy, brought our own American tendency toward bureaucratic gigantism and missionary zeal to the task. But the longer we delay in recognizing the truth—that espionage is a desperate and limited expedient, not a routine bureaucratic practice—the more dangerous we will be to ourselves and our friends. Our enemies, as in the past, need not worry.

In interesting contrast to an almost universal silence over the deficiencies at our espionage programs, the putative ups and downs of the “spy wars” or counterintelligence activities, are eagerly discussed by government officials, the press and the

public. This is especially indicative because our counterintelligence efforts have had dramatic success since the mid-1950's. Despite decades of scare-mongering by bureaucrats who know better, American counterintelligence, the CIA, the FBI and the military services, have effectively penetrated and manipulated the Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence services on a massive scale. Though it had been considered important to conceal the scale of our successes from the other side, our counterintelligence chieftains have routinely gone overboard, violating the truth in preferring to whip up hysteria on this topic. Frankly, these spy wars are a sideshow which has had no real impact on our significant security interests over the years. The government's case against me as represented in the Statement of Facts reflects this basic distinction between intelligence and counterintelligence. The government concentrates upon the counterintelligence compromises, and ignores the huge quantity of information on United States foreign, defense and security policies which I provided the USSR and Russia.

I earnestly hope that an enlightened view of our nation's true and enduring security interests can emerge from a real debate on the issues. Congress and the public have sufficient information to begin this discussion. Many current and past government officials have a realistic view of them. Intelligence collection, including espionage, is too important and costly an undertaking to be left to its traditional, self-serving managers.

Finally, I wish to thank the Court for providing me with attorneys who have helped me and my wife through this ordeal. They have spared no efforts on our behalf.

Source: "United States v. Aldrich Hazen Ames," National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/ames.pdf>.

70. Abstract Case Report on Aldrich Ames's Ability to Conduct Espionage (1994)

Classification: Secret

This Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) inspector general report describes how Aldrich Ames, a CIA employee for 31 years, was able to steal classified intelligence and sell it to the Russians for almost a decade. Until his arrest in February 1994, Ames compromised more than 100 intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and passed several thousand classified documents to the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB) and its successor organization, the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR). Ames's betrayal led to the execution of 10 Soviet officials working for CIA.

Report on Aldrich Ames' Espionage

ABSTRACT OF REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

THE ALDRICH H. AMES CASE: AN ASSESSMENT OF CIA'S ROLE IN IDENTIFYING AMES AS AN INTELLIGENCE PENETRATION OF THE AGENCY

October 21, 1994

PREFACE TO THE REPORT FROM THE IG

Procedurally, this has been an unusual report for the CIA IG to write. In the first instance, our inquiry was directly requested by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate in late February 1994—shortly after Aldrich H. Ames was arrested. Normally, our congressional oversight committees ask the Director of Central Intelligence to request an IG investigation. On this occasion their request was directed to the IG.

Second, the DCI chose to ask us to look into the Ames matter in phases after Ames's arrest for fear of disrupting the Ames prosecution. We were requested to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the CI investigation of the Ames betrayal—what procedures were in place respecting CIA counterespionage investigations at the time Ames volunteered to the Soviets in 1985; how well did they work; and what was the nature of CIA's cooperation with the FBI in this case. On March 10, 1994, the DCI asked us to seek to determine if individuals in Ames's supervisory chain discharged their responsibilities in the manner expected of them and directed the Executive Director of CIA to prepare a list of Ames's supervisors during the relevant periods. The DCI also directed that awards and promotions for the individuals on the Executive Director's list be held in escrow pending the outcome of the IG investigation. I wish to state at this point that neither I nor any member of the team investigating the Ames case have viewed the DCI's escrow list. We wanted to be as completely unaffected by the names on the list as we could be in order to discharge our responsibility to advise the DCI objectively of possible disciplinary recommendations. As a precautionary measure, I did ask my Deputy for Inspections, who is otherwise uninvolved in the Ames investigation, to view the escrow list to advise of any individuals on it whom we might have failed to interview through inadvertence. That has been our only involvement with the escrow list.

Third, there was an unusual limitation placed on our inquiry at the outset caused by a desire on the part of the DCI, the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia to do nothing that would complicate the Ames trial. We willingly complied with these constraints, confining ourselves to background file reviews and interviews of nonwitnesses until the Ames case pled guilty on April 28, 1994. The consequence has been that we have had to cover a great deal of ground in a short period of time to conduct this investigation in order to have a report ready for the DCI and the congressional oversight committees by September 1994. I am extremely proud of our 12-person investigative team.

Apart from the unusual procedures affecting this investigation, the Ames case presented several major substantive problems as well. This case raised so many issues of concern to the DCI, the oversight committees and the American people, that we have not chosen to tell the story in our normal chronological way. Instead,

we have focused on themes: Ames's life, his career, his vulnerabilities. We have tried to discuss how counterespionage investigations have been conducted in CIA since the Edward Lee Howard betrayal and the Year of the Spy, 1985—in the context of this particular case. Necessarily, we have made analytical judgments about what we have learned—some of them quite harsh. We believe this is our job—not just to present the facts, but to tell the DCI, the oversight committees and other readers how it strikes us. We have the confidence to do this because we have lived with the guts of Ames's betrayal and his unearthing for countless hours and we owe our readers our reactions. In this sense our 12 investigators are like a jury—they find the facts and make recommendations to the DCI for his final determination. This investigative team, like a jury, represents the attitude of the intelligence professionals from whose ranks they are drawn and from whom they drew testimony—sometimes shocked and dismayed at what we've learned, often appreciative of the individual acts of competence and courage, and always intrigued by the complexity of the Ames story.

In the end, the Ames case is about accountability, both individual and managerial. The DCI and the congressional oversight committees have made this the issue, but if they had not, we would have. As a postscript to my opening sentences, let me note that the CIA IG had begun to look into the Ames case on its own, even before the SSCI or the DCI had requested it, because we believe that the statute setting up our office requires it. The issue of managerial accountability has been one of this office's principal points of focus since its inception in 1990—and we have enjoyed mixed success in our reviews and recommendations to promote it.

Seeking to determine managerial accountability in the Ames case has not been an easy task. On the individual level, we have uncovered a vast quantity of information about Ames's professional sloppiness, his failure to file accountings, contact reports and requests for foreign travel on time or at all. We have found that Ames was oblivious to issues of personal security both professionally—he left classified files on a subway train—and in his espionage—he carried incriminating documents and large amounts of cash in his airline luggage; he carried classified documents out of CIA facilities in shopping bags; and he openly walked into the Soviet Embassy in the United States and a Soviet compound in Rome. We have noted that Ames's abuse of alcohol, while not constant throughout his career, was chronic and interfered with his judgment and the performance of his duties.

By and large his professional weaknesses were observed by Ames's colleagues and supervisors and were tolerated by many who did not consider them highly unusual for Directorate of Operations officers on the “not going anywhere” promotion track. That an officer with these observed vulnerabilities should have been given counterintelligence responsibilities in Soviet operations where he was in a prime position to learn of the intimate details of the Agency's most sensitive operations, contact Soviet officials openly and then massively betray his trust is difficult to justify. The IG investigative team has been dismayed at this tolerant view of Ames's professional deficiencies and the random indifference given to his assignments, and our recommendations reflect that fact.

Finally, on the grander scale of how the reaction to the major loss of Soviet cases in 1985–86 was managed, our team has been equally strict, demanding and greatly disturbed by what we saw. If Soviet operations—the effort to achieve human penetrations of the USSR for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information—was the highest priority mission of the clandestine service of CIA in 1985–86, then the loss of most of our assets in this crucial area of operations should have had a devastating effect on the thinking of the leaders of the DO and CIA. The effort to probe the reasons for these losses should have been of the most vital significance to U.S. intelligence, but particularly to the CIA, and should have been pursued with the utmost vigor and all necessary resources until an explanation—a technical or human penetration—was found.

It is true that the spy was found, but the course to that conclusion could have been much more rapid and direct. While those few who were engaged in the search may have done the best they could with what they had, in this investigation we have concluded that the intelligence losses of 1985–86 were not pursued to the fullest extent of the capabilities of the CIA, which prides itself on being the best intelligence service in the world. The analytical judgments and recommendations in this Report reflect that conclusion. We wish it could have been otherwise.

Frederick P. Hitz
CIA Inspector General

SUMMARY

1. In the spring and summer of 1985, Aldrich H. Ames began his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. In 1985 and 1986, it became increasingly clear to officials within CIA that the Agency was faced with a major CI problem. A significant number of CIA Soviet sources began to be compromised, recalled to the Soviet Union and, in many cases, executed. A number of these cases were believed to have been exposed by Edward Lee Howard, who fled the United States in September 1985 to avoid prosecution for disclosures he made earlier that year. However, it was evident by fall of 1985 that not all of the compromised sources could be attributed to him.

2. Later in 1985, the first Agency efforts were initiated to ascertain whether the unexplained compromises could be the result of a) faulty practices by the sources or the CIA officers who were assigned to handle them (i.e., whether the cases each contained seeds of their own destruction), b) a physical or electronic intrusion into the Agency's Moscow Station or Agency communications, or c) a human penetration within the Agency (a mole). Although they were never discounted altogether, the first two theories diminished in favor over the years as possible explanations for the losses. A "molehunt"—an effort to determine whether there was a human penetration, a spy, within CIA's ranks—was pursued more or less continuously and with varying degrees of intensity until Ames was convicted of espionage in 1994, nine years after the compromises began to occur.

3. The 1985–1986 compromises were first discussed in late 1985 with DCI William Casey, who directed that the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) make every effort to determine the reason for them. In January 1986, SE Division instituted new and extraordinary compartmentation measures to prevent further compromises. In the fall of 1986, a small Special Task Force (STF) of four officers operating under the direction of the Counterintelligence Staff (CI Staff) was directed to begin an effort to determine the cause of the compromises. This effort, which was primarily analytic in nature, paralleled a separate FBI task force to determine whether the FBI had been penetrated. The FBI task force ended, and the CIA STF effort diminished significantly in 1988 as its participants became caught up in the creation of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC). Between 1988 and 1990, the CIA molehunt came to a low ebb as the officers involved concentrated on other CI matters that were believed to have higher priority.

—Soviet East European Division, later renamed Central Eurasia Division, directed operations related to the Soviet Union and its successor states.

4. In late 1989, after his return from Rome, Ames's lifestyle and spending habits had changed as a result of the large amounts of money he had received from the KGB in return for the information he provided. Ames made no special efforts to conceal his newly acquired wealth and, for example, paid cash for a \$540,000 home. This unexplained affluence was brought to the attention of the molehunt team by a CIA employee in late 1989, and a CIC officer began a financial inquiry. The preliminary results of the financial inquiry indicated several large cash transactions but were not considered particularly significant at the time.

5. Nevertheless, information regarding Ames's finances was provided to the Office of Security (OS) by CIC in 1990. A background investigation (BI) was conducted and a polygraph examination was scheduled. The BI was very thorough and produced information that indicated further questions about Ames and his spending habits. However, this information was not made available to the polygraph examiners who tested him, and CIC did not take steps to ensure that the examiners would have full knowledge of all it knew about Ames at the time. In April 1991, OS determined that Ames had successfully completed the reinvestigation polygraph with no indications of deception, just as he had five years previously.

6. In 1991, CIA's molehunt was revitalized and rejuvenated. Two counterintelligence officers were assigned full-time to find the cause of the 1985–86 compromises. The FBI provided two officers to work as part of the molehunt team.

7. During this phase, attention was redirected at Ames and a number of other possible suspects. In March 1992, a decision was made to complete the financial inquiry of Ames that had been initiated in 1989. In August 1992, a correlation was made between bank deposits by Ames that were identified by the financial inquiry and meetings between Ames and a Soviet official that the Agency and FBI had

authorized in 1985. The joint CIA/FBI analytic effort fort resulted in a report written in March 1993, which concluded that, among other things, there was a penetration of the CIA. It was expected by CIA and FBI officials that the report, which included lists of CIA employees who had access to the compromised cases, would be reviewed by the FBI in consideration of further investigative steps.

8. The totality of the information available to CIC and the FBI prompted the FBI to launch an intensive CI investigation of Ames. During this phase, the FBI attempted to gather sufficient information to determine whether Ames was in fact engaged in espionage, and the Agency molehunt team was relegated to a supporting role. Every effort was made to avoid alerting Ames to the FBI CI investigation. According to FBI and Agency officials, it was not until a search of Ames's residential trash in September 1993, which produced a copy of an operational note from Ames to the Russians, that they were certain Ames was a spy. After the FBI had gathered additional information, Ames was arrested on February 21, 1994 and pled guilty to espionage on April 28, 1994.

9. The two CIA officers and the two FBI officers who began working in earnest on the possibility of an Agency penetration in 1991 under the auspices of the Agency's CIC, deserve credit for the ultimate identification of Ames as a hostile intelligence penetration of CIA. Without their efforts, it is possible that Ames might never have been successfully identified and prosecuted. Although proof of his espionage activities was not obtained until after the FBI began its CI investigation of Ames in 1993, the CIA molehunt team played a critical role in providing a context for the opening of an intensive investigation by the FBI. Moreover, although the CIA and the FBI have had disagreements and difficulties with coordination in other cases in the past, there is ample evidence to support the statements by both FBI and CIA senior management that the Ames case was a model of CI cooperation between the two agencies.

10. From its beginnings in 1986, however, the management of CIA's molehunt effort was deficient in several respects. These management deficiencies contributed to the delay in identifying Ames as a possible penetration, even though he was a careless spy who was sloppy and inattentive to measures that would conceal his activities. Despite the persistence of the individuals who played a part in the molehunt, it suffered from insufficient senior management attention, a lack of proper resources, and an array of immediate and extended distractions. The existence and toleration of these deficiencies is difficult to understand in light of the seriousness of the 1985–86 compromises and especially when considered in the context of the series of other CI failures that the Agency suffered in the 1980s and the decade-long history of external attention to the weaknesses in the Agency's CI and security programs. The deficiencies reflect a CIA CI function that has not recovered its legitimacy since the excesses of James Angleton, which resulted in his involuntary retirement from CIA in 1974. Furthermore, to some extent, the "Angleton Syndrome" has become a canard that is used to downplay the role of CI in the Agency.

11. Even in this context, it is difficult to understand the repeated failure to focus more attention on Ames earlier when his name continued to come up throughout the investigation. He had access to all the compromised cases; his financial resources improved substantially for unestablished reasons; and his laziness and poor performance were rather widely known. All of these are CI indicators that should have drawn attention to Ames. Combined, they should have made him stand out. Arguably, these indicators played a role in the fact that Ames was often named as a prime suspect by those involved in the molehunt.

12. One result of management inattention was the failure of CIA to bring a full range of potential resources to bear on this counterespionage investigation. There was an over-emphasis on operational analysis and the qualifications thought necessary to engage in such analysis, and a failure to employ fully such investigative techniques as financial analysis, the polygraph, behavioral analysis interviews, and the review of public and governmental records. These problems were exacerbated by the ambiguous division of the counterespionage function between CIC and OS and the continuing subordination by the Directorate of Operations (DO) of CI concerns to foreign intelligence collection interests. Excessive compartmentation has broadened the gap in communications between CIC and OS, and this problem has not been overcome despite efforts to improve coordination. CIC did not share information fully with OS or properly coordinate the OS investigation process.

13. These defects in the Agency's capability to conduct counterespionage investigations have been accompanied by a degradation of the security function within the Agency due to management policies and resource decisions during the past decade. These management policies emphasize generalization over expertise, quantity over quality, and accommodation rather than professionalism in the security field. This degradation of the security function has manifested itself in the reinvestigation and polygraph programs and appears to have contributed to Ames's ability to complete polygraphs successfully in 1986 and 1991 after he began his espionage activities.

14. Beyond defects in counterespionage investigations and related security programs, the Ames case reflects significant deficiencies in the Agency's personnel management policies. No evidence has been found that any Agency manager knowingly and willfully aided Ames in his espionage activities. However, Ames continued to be selected for positions in SE Division, CIC and the Counternarcotics Center that gave him significant access to highly sensitive information despite strong evidence of performance and suitability problems and, in the last few years of his career, substantial suspicion regarding his trustworthiness. A psychological profile of Ames that was prepared as part of this investigation indicates a troubled employee with a significant potential to engage in harmful activities.

15. Although information regarding Ames's professional and personal failings may not have been available in the aggregate to all of his managers or in any complete

and official record, little effort was made by those managers who were aware of Ames's poor performance and behavioral problems to identify the problems officially and deal with them. If Agency management had acted more responsibly and responsively as these problems arose, it is possible that the Ames case could have been avoided in that he might not have been placed in a position where he could give away such sensitive source information.

16. The principal deficiency in the Ames case was the failure to ensure that the Agency employed its best efforts and adequate resources in determining on a timely basis the cause, including the possibility of a human penetration, of the compromises in 1985–86 of essentially its entire cadre of Soviet sources. The individual officers who deserve recognition for their roles in the eventual identification of Ames were forced to overcome what appears to have been significant inattentiveness on the part of senior Agency management. As time wore on and other priorities intervened, the 1985–86 compromises received less and less senior management attention. The compromises were not addressed resolutely until the spring of 1991 when it was decided that a concerted effort was required to resolve them. Even then, it took nearly three years to identify and arrest Ames, not because he was careful and crafty, but because the Agency effort was inadequate.

17. Senior Agency management, including several DDOs, DO Division Chiefs, CIC and DO officials, should be held accountable for permitting an officer with obvious problems such as Ames to continue to be placed in sensitive positions where he was able to engage in activities that have caused great harm to the United States. Senior Agency management, including at least several DCIs, Deputy Directors, DO Division Chiefs, and senior CI and security officials, should also be held accountable for not ensuring that the Agency made a maximum effort to resolve the compromises quickly through the conduct of a focused investigation conducted by adequate numbers of qualified personnel.

WHAT WAS AMES'S CAREER HISTORY WITH CIA?

18. In June 1962, Ames completed full processing for staff employment with the Agency and entered on duty as a GS-4 document analyst in the Records Integration Division (RID) of the DO. Within RID, Ames read, coded, filed, and retrieved documents related to clandestine operations against an East European target. He remained in this position for five years while attending George Washington University, on a part-time or full-time basis. In September 1967, Ames received his Bachelor of Arts degree in history with an average grade of B–.

19. Ames originally viewed his work with RID as a stopgap measure to finance his way through college. However, he grew increasingly fascinated by intelligence operations against Communist countries, and, influenced by other RID colleagues who were entering the Career Trainee (CT) program, he applied and was accepted as a CT in December 1967. When Ames completed this training nearly a year later,

he was assigned to an SE Division branch. He remained there for several months before beginning Turkish language studies.

20. Ames's first overseas posting took place between 1969 and 1972. It was not a successful tour, and the last Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) of his tour stated, in effect, that Ames was unsuited for field work and should spend the remainder of his career at Headquarters. The PAR noted that Ames preferred "assignments that do not involve face-to-face situations with relatively unknown personalities who must be manipulated." Such a comment was devastating for an operations officer, and Ames was discouraged enough to consider leaving the Agency.

21. Ames spent the next four years, 1972–76, at Headquarters in SE Division. Managing the paperwork and planning associated with field operations at a distance was more comfortable for Ames than trying to recruit in the field himself, and he won generally enthusiastic reviews from his supervisors. One payoff from this improved performance was the decision in September 1974 to name Ames as both the Headquarters and field case officer to manage a highly valued Agency asset.

22. Ames's opportunity to expand his field experience came with his assignment to the New York Base of the DO's Foreign Resources Division from 1976 to 1981. The PARs that Ames received during the last four of his five years in New York were the strongest of his career. These PARs led Ames to be ranked in the top 10% of GS-13 DO operations officers ranked for promotion in early 1982. He was promoted to GS-14 in May 1982.

23. The career momentum Ames established in New York was not maintained during his 1981–83 tour in Mexico City. This assignment, like his earlier tour and his later tour in Rome, failed to play to Ames's strengths as a handler of established sources and emphasized instead an area where he was weak—the development and recruitment of new assets. In Mexico City, Ames spent little time working outside the Embassy, developed few assets, and was chronically late with his financial accountings. Further, Ames developed problems with alcohol abuse that worsened to the point that he often was able to accomplish little work after long, liquid lunches. His PARs focused heavily, and negatively, on his failure to maintain proper accountings and were generally unenthusiastic. In Mexico City, Ames also became involved in an intimate relationship with the Colombian cultural attaché, Maria del Rosario Casas Dupuy.

24. Despite his lackluster performance in Mexico City, Ames returned to Headquarters in 1983 to a position that he valued highly. His appointment as Chief of a branch in an SE Division Group was recommended by the officer who had supervised Ames in New York and approved by Chief, SE Division and the DDO. This position gave him access to the Agency's worldwide Soviet operations. Ames completed this tour with SE Division by being selected by the SE Division Chief

as one of the primary debriefers for the defector Vitaly Yurchenko from August to September 1985. For his work in the SE Division Group, Ames was ranked very near the lower quarter of DO operations officers at his grade at this time.

25. By early 1984, Ames was thinking ahead to his next field assignment and asked to go to Rome as Chief of a branch where he had access to information regarding many operations run or supported from that post. He left for Rome in 1986. He once again began to drink heavily, particularly at lunch, did little work, sometimes slept at his desk in the afternoons, rarely initiated developmental activity, and often fell behind in accountings, reporting and other administrative matters. Ames was successful in managing liaison relations with U.S. military intelligence units in Italy, but he registered few other achievements.

26. Ames's mediocre performance for the Agency in Rome did not prevent his assignment upon his return to Headquarters in mid 1989 to head a branch of an SE Division Group. Here again he had access to many sensitive cases. When that position was eliminated in a December 1989 reorganization of SE Division, Ames became Chief of another SE Division branch, where he remained until late 1990. At this time, Ames was ranked in the bottom 10% of DO GS-14 operations officers. He appears to have been a weak manager who focused only on what interested him.

27. Ames moved to a position in the Counterintelligence Center in October 1990. In the CIC, where he remained until August 1991, he prepared analytical papers on issues relating to the KGB but also had access to sensitive data bases. Discussions between Ames and the Deputy Chief, SE Division, resulted in Ames's temporary return to SE Division as head of a small KGB Working Group between August and November 1991.

28. In 1991, Chief SE Division requested that a counternarcotics program be established through liaison with the states of the former Soviet Union. Thereafter, Ames began a rotation to the Counternarcotics Center (CNC) in December 1991. At CNC, where Ames remained until his arrest, he worked primarily on developing a program for intelligence sharing between the United States and cooperating countries.

29. Ames was arrested on February 21, 1994. On that date, DCI Woolsey terminated his employment with the Agency.

WHAT WERE AMES'S STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES?

Performance Problems

30. Ames appears to have been most successful and productive in assignments that drew on his:

- Analytical skills, particularly collating myriad bits of information into coherent patterns;
- Writing skills, both in drafting operational cables and crafting more intuitive thought pieces;
- Intellectual curiosity and willingness to educate himself on issues that were beyond the scope of his immediate assignment; and
- Creativity in conceiving and implementing sometimes complex operational schemes and liaison programs.

31. Ames was far less successful—and indeed was generally judged a failure—in overseas assignments where the development and recruitment of assets was the key measure of his performance. For most of his career, moreover, a number of work habits also had a dampening impact on his performance. These included:

- Inattention to personal hygiene and a sometimes overbearing manner that aggravated the perception that he was a poor performer;
- A lack of enthusiasm for handling routine administrative matters. By the late 1970s, when Ames was assigned to New York, this pattern of behavior was evident in his tardy filing of financial accountings and failure to document all of his meetings in contact reports. Ames's disdain for detail also manifested itself in his pack-rat amassing of paper and his failure, especially in Rome, to handle action cables appropriately and expeditiously; and
- Selective enthusiasm. With the passage of time, Ames increasingly demonstrated zeal only for those few tasks that captured his imagination while ignoring elements of his job that were of little personal interest to him.

Sleeping on the Job

32. A significant number of individuals who have worked with Ames in both domestic and foreign assignments state that it was not uncommon for Ames to be seen asleep at his desk during working hours. This behavior often coincided, especially in Rome and at Headquarters in the 1990s, with Ames having returned from lunch where he consumed alcohol.

Failure to File Required Reports

33. The Agency has an established system of reports of various kinds that serve administrative, operational, security, and counterintelligence purposes. Ames paid very little attention to a variety of these reporting requirements. His inattention to these matters was by and large ignored, to the extent it was known by Agency management.

Foreign Travel

34. Over the course of several years, Ames failed to report foreign travel to OS as required by Headquarters Regulation. It is difficult to determine whether and to what extent management was aware of his unreported travel. The official record includes no mention, but fellow employees appear to have had some knowledge of his travels, especially in Rome.

Contact Reports

35. Ames also failed to file timely contact reports regarding many of his meetings with foreign officials. While this failure originally may have been related to his laziness and disdain for regulations, it became more calculated and had serious CI implications once he had volunteered to the Soviets in 1985. Ames states that he deliberately avoided filing complete and timely reports of his contacts with Soviet officials in Washington. If he had done so, he believes, Agency and FBI officials might have identified contradictions. Moreover, he believes they would have seen no operational advantage to the meetings, ceased the operation, and removed the ready pretext for his espionage activities. This also was true of his meetings with Soviets in Rome.

Financial Accountings

36. Throughout the course of Ames's career, managers reported that they frequently counseled and reprimanded him, or cited in his PAR Ames's refusal to provide timely accountings and properly maintain his revolving operational funds. This is more than a question of financial responsibility for DO officers. It also provides DO managers with another means of monitoring and verifying the activities of the operations officers they supervise.

Foreign National Contacts and Marriage

37. Ames also did not fully comply with Agency requirements in documenting his relationship with Rosario. He never reported his intimate relationship with her as a "close and continuing" one while he was in Mexico City. Management was aware generally of a relationship but not its intimate nature and did not pursue the reporting. He did follow proper procedures in obtaining approval for their marriage. However, Agency management did not accept or implement properly the CI Staff Chief's recommendation at the time that Ames be placed in less sensitive positions until Rosario became a U.S. citizen.

Security Problems

38. Ames also seemed predisposed to ignore and violate Agency security rules and regulations. In New York in 1976, he committed a potentially very serious security violation when he left a briefcase full of classified information on a New York subway train. In 1984, Ames brought Rosario to an Agency-provided apartment; a

clear violation that compromised the cover of other operations officers. Ames also committed a breach of security by leaving a sensitive secure communications system unsecured at the FR/New York office. On July 2, 1985, Ames received the only official security violation that was issued to him when he left his office safe open and unlocked upon departure for the evening. Ames admits to using his home computer occasionally when in Rome between 1986 and 1989 to draft classified memoranda and cables that he would print out and take into the office the next day. In the most extreme example of his disregard for physical security regulations, of course, Ames wrapped up five to seven pounds of cable traffic in plastic bags in June 1985 and carried it out of Headquarters to deliver to the KGB.

Alcohol Abuse

39. Much has been made since his arrest of Ames's drinking habits. While it is clear that he drank too much too often and there is some basis to believe this may have clouded his judgment over time, he does not appear to have been an acute alcoholic who was constantly inebriated. Ames acknowledges the presence of a variety of symptoms of alcohol addiction. The term "alcoholic" often conjures up images of broken individuals who spend their days helplessly craving a drink, becoming intoxicated beyond any self-control, and only breaking out of their intoxication with severe withdrawal symptoms. As explained in the psychological profile prepared by the psychologist detailed to the IG, alcohol addiction is, in reality, a more subtle, insidious process. This accounts for the fact that many of Ames's colleagues and a few supervisors were able to work with Ames without noticing his substance abuse problem.

40. In regard to why they did not deal with problems associated with Ames's alcohol abuse, several Agency managers say that alcohol abuse was not uncommon in the DO during the mid- to late-1980s and that Ames's drinking did not stand out since there were employees with much more serious alcohol cases. Other managers cite a lack of support from Headquarters in dealing with problem employees abroad.

41. Medical experts believe that alcohol, because it diminishes judgment, inhibitions, and long-term thinking ability, may play some role in the decision to commit espionage. At the same time, because the number of spies is so small relative to the fraction of the U. S. population that has an alcohol abuse problem, statistical correlations cannot be made. As a result, alcohol abuse cannot be said to have a predictive connection to espionage and, in and of itself, cannot be used as an indicator of any real CI significance.

Financial Problems

42. In 1983–85, Ames became exceedingly vulnerable to potential espionage as a result of his perception that he was facing severe financial problems. According to

Ames, once Rosario moved in with him in December 1983 he had begun to feel a financial pinch. Ames describes being faced with a credit squeeze that included a new car loan, a signature loan that had been “tapped to the max,” mounting credit card payments, and, finally, a divorce settlement that he believed threatened to bankrupt him.

43. Ames claims to have first contemplated espionage between December 1984 and February 1985 as a way out of his mounting financial dilemma. Confronting a divorce that he knew by that time was going to be financially draining, and facing added expenses connected with his imminent marriage to someone with already established extravagant spending habits, Ames claims that his financial predicament caused him to commit espionage for financial relief.

WHY DID AMES COMMIT ESPIONAGE?

44. Ames states that the primary motivating factor for his decision to commit espionage was his desperation regarding financial indebtedness he incurred at the time of his separation from his first wife, their divorce settlement and his cohabitation with Rosario. He also says that several otherwise inhibiting “barriers” had been lowered by a) the opportunity to meet Soviet officials under Agency sanction, b) the lack of concern that he would soon be subject to a reinvestigation polygraph, c) his fading respect for the value of his Agency work as a result of lengthy discussions with Soviet officials, and d) his belief that the rules that governed others did not apply to him. Ames claims he conceived of a one-time “scam” directed against the Soviets to obtain the \$50,000 he believed he needed to satisfy his outstanding debt in return for information about Agency operations he believed were actually controlled by the Soviets. He recognized subsequently that there was no turning back and acted to protect himself from the Soviet intelligence services by compromising Agency sources first in the June 1985 big dump.

HOW WERE INDICATIONS OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN AMES'S FINANCIAL SITUATION HANDLED?

45. The financial inquiry regarding Ames began in November 1989 with the receipt of information from at least one Agency employee that Ames's financial situation had changed and he was living rather extravagantly. Upon his return from Rome, Ames purchased a home in Arlington for more than a half million dollars in cash and made plans to remodel the kitchen and landscape the yard, sparing no expense. Ames was also known to have purchased a Jaguar automobile and to have Filipino servants whom he had flown to and from the Philippines. Ames's lifestyle change was apparent to others as well and several employees state that they noticed at that time a marked improvement in Ames's physical appearance, including capped teeth and expensive Italian suits and shoes.

46. The financial inquiry faltered over resource limitations and priority conflicts, was reinvestigated in March 1992 and was not completed until mid-1993. The

information obtained as a result of the Ames financial review, especially the correlation between deposits made by the Ameses and the operational meetings, was an essential element in shifting the focus of the molehunt toward Ames and paving the way, both psychologically and factually, for the further investigation that resulted in his arrest. Yet the financial review was permitted to stall for almost a year while other matters consumed the time and effort of the single CIC officer who possessed the interest and ability necessary to conduct it. Technical management expertise to oversee the investigator's activities and help guide him was lacking. Given the responsibility that was placed on the investigator and his relative inexperience in conducting and analyzing financial information, he did a remarkable job. But there was clearly a lack of adequate resources and expertise available in CIC for this purpose.

47. If the financial inquiry had been pursued more rapidly and without interruption, significant information about Ames's finances would have been acquired earlier.

WAS THE COUNTERESPIONAGE INVESTIGATION COORDINATED PROPERLY WITH THE FBI?

48. Under Executive Order 12333, CIA is authorized to conduct counterintelligence activities abroad and to coordinate the counterintelligence activities of other agencies abroad. The Order also authorizes CIA to conduct counterintelligence activities in the United States, provided these activities are coordinated with the FBI. Under a 1988 CIA-FBI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) the FBI must be notified immediately when there is a reasonable belief that an individual may engage in activities harmful to the national security of the United States.

49. CIA-FBI cooperation in the Ames case after the spring of 1991 generally exceeded the coordination requirements under the 1988 MOU. The FBI could have taken over the Ames case completely in 1991 but apparently concluded that it did not have sufficient cause to open an intensive CI investigation directed specifically at Ames. The FBI officers who were part of the team were provided unprecedented access to CIA information related to Ames and to other CIA cases. These FBI officers indicate that they had full access to all of the CIA information they needed and requested. Once the FBI did take over the case in 1993, CIA cooperation with the Bureau was excellent, according to FBI and CIA accounts.

WERE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE AMES INVESTIGATION?

50. In considering whether the resources that were applied to the molehunt were sufficient, it is necessary to evaluate the need for secrecy and compartmentation. If alerting a potential mole to the investigation was to be avoided at all costs, then concerns about the size and discretion of any group undertaking the investigation

would be paramount. Nevertheless there must be some balance between secrecy and progress. Despite the arguments for the small size of the molehunt team, many officers concede that more resources could have been brought to bear earlier on the Ames investigation.

51. Even accepting the argument that the team had to be small to maintain compartmentation and to manage a complex CI investigative process, the resource issue remains because the molehunt team members who were made available were not focused exclusively on the task, but were frequently diverted to other requirements. The limited size and diffused focus of the molehunt team does not support DO management's assertions that the 1985–86 compromised Soviet cases were "the biggest failure a spy Agency could have." Rather, the resources applied to the task force indicate lack of management attention to this most serious of intelligence failures.

52. The resources that the Agency devoted to the molehunt were inadequate from the outset, especially when considered in light of the fact that the 1985–86 compromises were the worst intelligence losses in CIA history.

HAS AGENCY USE OF POLYGRAPHS AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS BEEN SUFFICIENT TO DETECT POSSIBLE AGENCY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AT THE EARLIEST TIME?

53. The fact that Ames conceived, executed and sustained an espionage enterprise for almost nine years makes it difficult to argue that Agency screening techniques functioned adequately to detect a CI problem at the earliest possible time. The question then becomes whether the screening techniques, particularly the periodic polygraph examination, were adequate and why they did not detect Ames. The available evidence indicates that there were weaknesses in the polygraph methods that were used. However, it is difficult to conclude that the techniques themselves are inadequate since the major failing in the Ames case appears to be traceable to non-coordination and non-sharing of derogatory information concerning Ames.

54. Although this IG investigation necessarily focused on the Ames polygraph and background investigations, many employees of the Office of Security also raised more generic problems in these programs. At a minimum, these expressions of concern about the Agency's polygraph program reflect a significant morale problem.

55. In light of the dominant role that the polygraph plays in the reinvestigation process, OS management came to be interested in production. For most of the time since 1986—when the five-year periodic reinvestigation program was begun—until the present, the reinvestigation program has been behind schedule. As a result, OS managers have stressed the successful completion of polygraph examinations. Many examiners believe that this requirement implicitly stressed quantity over

quality. In addition to the pressures of production, the lack of experience in the polygraph corps has detrimentally affected the Agency's polygraph program. The 1988 IG reinspection of the polygraph program noted this loss of experience. Many current and former OS polygraphers say that the OS policy of promoting generalists has caused the loss of experience. Many individuals also cite the lack of complete information on testing subjects as a defect in the Agency's polygraph program.

56. The 1986 polygraph of Ames was deficient and the 1991 polygraph sessions were not properly coordinated by CIC after they were requested. The Office of Security (OS) conducted a background investigation (BI) prior to Ames's polygraph examination in 1991. This 1991 BI is deemed by OS personnel to be a very professional and in-depth investigation of Ames's personal and professional activities. The investigator who conducted this BI deserves great credit for the competency and thoroughness of her efforts. Unfortunately, the results of this 1991 BI were not available to the polygraph examiners at the time they tested Ames nor was financial information that had been developed by CIC. Ultimately, the miscommunication between the CIC and OS components that were involved led the individual examiners to conduct standard reinvestigation polygraph tests that Ames passed. Both examiners say that having such detailed information available could have significantly altered their approach to testing Ames.

TO WHAT EXTENT DID AMES USE COMPUTER ACCESS AND CAPABILITIES TO ENGAGE IN ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES?

57. Ames reports that he bought his first computer in the late winter or early spring of 1986 just prior to leaving for Rome. Ames's interest, however, was limited to computer applications rather than the technical aspects of computer science or programming. Ames admits to using his home computer occasionally when in Rome to draft classified memoranda and cables that he would print out and take into the office the next day. Ames admits to writing all his notes to the Soviets on his home computer using WordPerfect word processing software while in Rome. These notes, however, were passed only in paper form. Ames began preparing at home and passing computer disks to the Soviets after returning to Washington. These disks had been password-protected by the Russians. The information contained on the disks, according to Ames, consisted only of one or two-page messages from him to his handler. All other information he passed was in the form of paper copies of documents. The intent was for Ames to leave a disk at a drop site and have the same disk returned later at his pick-up site.

58. Ames says that passing disks and using passwords was entirely his idea. Although Ames admits to discussing Agency computer systems with the Soviets, he says it was obvious that his handlers had little or no expertise in basic computer skills. Ames describes his handlers as being "rather proud of their having been able to turn a machine on, crank up WordPerfect and get my message on it."

59. Ames states consistently that he did not use or abuse computer access as a means for enhancing his espionage capabilities. He explains that the computer systems to which he had access in CIC, SE/CE Division and Rome Station were “really no more than bona fide electric typewriters.” He does say, however, that this changed after he was given access to the CNC Local Area Network (LAN). That LAN featured the DO’s message delivery system (MDS). However, the CNC terminals differed from DO LANs in that the capability to download information to floppy disks had not been disabled in the CNC LAN. The combination of having the MDS system available on terminals that had floppy disk capabilities represented a serious system vulnerability.

60. Ames clearly viewed his access to the CNC LAN as a very significant event in his ability to conduct espionage. The broadened access, combined with the compactness of disks, greatly enhanced the volume of data he could carry out of Agency facilities with significantly reduced risk. Fortunately, he was arrested before he could take full advantage of this system vulnerability.

61. No specific precautions were taken by Agency officials to minimize Ames’s computer access to information within the scope of his official duties. In fact, there is one instance where Ames was granted expanded computer access despite expressions of concern by CIC and SE Division management at the time about his trustworthiness. Ames states he was surprised when he signed on and found that he had access to information about double agent cases. This allowed him to compromise a significant amount of sensitive data from the CIC to which he did not have an established need-to-know.

IS THERE ANY MERIT TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE “POISON FAX?”

62. In April 1994, an anonymous memorandum was faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence criticizing CIA counterintelligence policies and practices. That memorandum, which came to be known as the “poison fax,” also alleged that an SE Division manager had warned Ames he was suspected of being a KGB mole and that a message from the field confirmed this. These allegations were featured in the press and raised questions in the Congress. No evidence has been found to substantiate these allegations.

HAS CIA BEEN EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZED TO DETECT PENETRATIONS SUCH AS AMES?

63. During the period of the Agency molehunt that led to Ames, the CI function and its counterespionage element was divided between the DO and OS. This division created problems that adversely affected the Agency’s ability to focus on Ames. Although attempts were made to overcome these problems by written understandings and the assignment of OS officers to CIC, these attempts were not altogether successful.

64. Senior security officials have pointed out that there always has been a “fault line” in communications between the CIC, and its predecessors, and the OS. This division has created a number of problems, given the disparate cultures of the two organizations. Attempts are being made to employ CIC-OS teams to overcome these problems, but the problems are inherent to the division of CI responsibilities. The division of responsibility for CI between CIC and OS interfered with a comprehensive approach to the molehunt. When financial leads were obtained in 1989 and 1990, CIC essentially turned the matter over to OS for Ames’s reinvestigation but failed to communicate all the relevant facts effectively with the OS personnel who were involved in the reinvestigation.

65. Many senior managers and other officers have strong opinions regarding whether the Agency’s CI element, at least the portion that handles possible penetrations of the Agency, should report through the DDO. A number of officers believe that taking the CI function out of the DO would permit the addition of personnel who are not subject to the limitations of the DO culture and mindset. Other officers view the prospect of taking counterespionage outside the DO as impossible and potentially disastrous. Doing so, they argue, would never work because access to DO information would become more difficult. Some officers also argue that reporting directly to the DCI would be copying the KGB approach, which proved over the years to be unworkable. As a counter argument, however, former DCI Webster believes, in retrospect, that the CIC he created in 1988 should have reported to him directly with an informational reporting role to the DDO.

WERE CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WHO CONDUCTED THE MOLEHUNT PROPERLY QUALIFIED BY TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE?

66. Of the four officers who were assigned to the STF in 1986, one remained when the molehunt team was established by CIC in 1991 to continue to pursue the cause of the 1985–86 compromises. That officer was chosen to head the effort primarily because she was an experienced SE Division officer, was familiar with the KGB and wanted to pursue the compromises. According to her supervisor, there were not many other employees who had the years of experience, the operational knowledge, the interest, the temperament, and the personality to persist in this effort. She was joined by another officer who had headed the Moscow Task Force inquiry charged with doing the DO damage assessment concerning the Lonetree/Bracy allegations. A third officer, who had been on rotation to CIC from the Office of Security was chosen to assist the team because of his background and CI experience, although he was not actually made a team member until June 1993. While this investigator was certainly not the only person in CIA who was capable of performing a financial analysis, he was the only one who was known to, and trusted by, the team leader. He was ideal in her view because of his previous work with her on other CI cases. In addition, two FBI officers were assigned to the effort.

67. Put most simply, the consensus view of those in CIC who were directly involved in the molehunt seems to be that good CI officers have both innate and learned characteristics that make them effective. In addition to innate CI ability, a good CI analyst needs a great deal of general and particular knowledge to make the mental connections necessary to conduct a CI investigation. General knowledge in the molehunt context refers to knowledge of the KGB, while particular knowledge refers to knowledge of the 1985–86 compromised cases. In addition, many CIC employees say that operational experience is essential to CI work. Although this general and particular knowledge can be acquired through study, for the most part it is obtained over years of experience actually working on foreign intelligence operations and CI cases in a particular subject area.

68. In the judgment of the IG, these criteria for qualification as a CI analyst and for the process of conducting a CI investigation reflect a very narrow view of the scope and nature of CI investigations. In the Ames case, it was unduly cramped and justified an unfortunate resistance to adding more personnel to the molehunt unless they were deemed by the team leader to be qualified. Further, this view of counter-espionage presents significant risks both to the Agency and successful prosecutions in the future. In the Ames investigation, the equities of any future prosecution were protected by the fact of FBI participation. Law enforcement officers bring an understanding of investigation procedure critical to building a successful prosecution. Without FBI participation, the risk of the narrow CIC view is that prosecutions may be jeopardized in future CI investigations. In addition to protecting Agency and prosecutive equities, training in law enforcement and other investigative techniques would expand the scope of information and techniques available to the Agency's CI investigators.

69. Despite these general shortcomings in CI training and methodology, the molehunters performed admirably. Their work included useful analysis that helped advance the resolution of the 1985–86 compromises significantly. On occasion, their work also went beyond the scope of what had been considered an adequate CI investigation to that point. Thus, they advanced the art form of CI investigations within CIA. In the final analysis, they contributed substantially to catching a spy.

WAS THE MOLEHUNT THAT LED TO AMES MANAGED PROPERLY, AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?

70. Supervisory responsibility for the molehunt that eventually led to Ames shifted over time as managers, organizations and circumstances changed.

71. The primary responsibility for the molehunt within the Agency rested with officials in the CI Staff, later the CIC, as well as senior DO management. Management of the molehunt during the initial, analytic phase was inconsistent and sporadic. Although keen interest was expressed from time to time in determining what went wrong, the resources devoted to the molehunt were quite modest,

especially considering the significance to the DO and the Agency of the rapid compromise of essentially all major Soviet sources. Those directly engaged in the molehunt also had to contend with competing assignments and were distracted from the molehunt by other possible explanations for the compromises, such as technical penetrations and the Lonetree/Bracy case, that eventually proved not to be fruitful. Senior CI managers at the time admit that they could, and probably should, have devoted more resources to the effort.

72. In the CI Staff, the early years of the molehunt were primarily analytical and episodic, rather than investigative and comprehensive. Although information gathering and file review are important, little else appears to have been done during this time. A number of CI cases concerning Agency employees were opened based on suspicious activity, but none were brought to resolution. No comprehensive list of Agency officers with the requisite access was created and analyzed during this stage in an attempt to narrow the focus of the molehunt.

73. SE Division management must also assume some responsibility, given the fact that the 1985–86 compromises involved major SE Division assets. SE Division management should have insisted upon an extensive effort and added its own resources if necessary to determine the cause of the compromises. It is not sufficient to say, as these and many other officials now do, that they did not more closely monitor or encourage the molehunt effort because they knew they were suspects themselves and did not wish to appear to be attempting to influence the matter in an undue fashion. The distinction between encouraging a responsible effort and improperly interfering in the progress of that effort is considerable. In any event, another senior SE official who was not on the list could have been given the necessary authority and responsibility.

74. Given the importance of the compromises and the need to determine their cause, the DDOs during this phase also must bear responsibility for not paying more attention to and better managing the molehunt.

75. Beyond those in the DO and CIC who had direct responsibility for the molehunt during this phase, OS should have done a better job of developing leads that would have assisted the molehunt team in focusing its attention on Ames as early as 1986. In the mid-1980s, OS had fallen behind in its reinvestigation polygraphs, and many officers had not been repolygraphed for periods much longer than the required five-year intervals. Ames had not been polygraphed for almost ten years when he was scheduled for a reinvestigation polygraph in 1986. That polygraph raised several questions but failed to reveal any problems despite the fact he had begun spying for the Soviets a year earlier and he reports he was very apprehensive at the time about being exposed.

76. The reorganization of OS in 1986 was followed in 1988 by the creation of the CIC which included a large OS contingent operating as an integral part of CIC.

While one of the purposes of CIC was to consolidate all of the Agency's CI resources in a single component, the result was an overlap of missions, jurisdictional struggles at the highest levels of OS and CIC, and a failure to share information. According to a May 1991 Office of Inspector General Report of Inspection concerning OS, these problems were caused by the failure of Agency management to define the relative responsibilities of the two components, to provide a mechanism for a smooth flow of information between them, and to establish policy for managing cases of common interest.

77. CIC and the FBI can be credited for initiating a collaborative effort to revitalize the molehunt in April 1991. However, CIC management must also bear responsibility for not allocating sufficient dedicated resources to ensure that the effort was carried out thoroughly, professionally and expeditiously. The delay in the financial inquiry can be attributed largely to the lack of investigative resources allocated to the effort. The CIC investigator deserves a great deal of credit for his initiative and interest in financial analysis and it appears clear that an inquiry into Ames's finances would not have occurred to anyone else in CIC had he not been available to suggest it and carry it out. However, the failure to either dedicate the investigator fully to this inquiry before 1992, or to bring in other officers who would have been able to conduct a similar or more thorough financial analysis of Ames, represents one of the most glaring shortcomings of the molehunt. This failure alone appears to have delayed the identification of Ames by at least two years.

78. In 1993, when the FBI opened an intensive CI investigation of Ames, the Agency was fully cooperative and provided excellent support to the FBI's investigation. CIA deferred to the FBI's decisions regarding the investigation and allowed Ames continued access to classified information in order to avoid alerting him and to assist in developing evidence of his espionage. The common goal was to apprehend Ames, while safeguarding evidence for a successful prosecution. As has been stated earlier, the CIA/FBI working relationship during the FBI phase appears to have been a model of cooperation.

Source: "The Aldrich H. Ames Case: An Assessment of CIA's Role in Identifying Ames as an Intelligence Penetration of the Agency, October 21, 1994," Loyola University, <http://www.loyola.edu/departments/academics/political-science/strategic-intelligence/intel/hitzrept.html>.

71. A Review of CIA Guatemala Assassination Proposals during 1952–1954 (1995)

Classification: Secret

In the early 1950s just a few years after World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began planning covert operations to remove senior foreign officials

who seemed to be a threat to U.S. security. An assassination list was developed, and the first person targeted for removal was Jacobo Guzmán Arbenz in Guatemala. This report is an excellent case study of the procedures that the CIA developed to carry out an assassination. Included in this study in a chronological manner is the planning and proposals for a covert operation given the code name PBFORTUNE. Later renamed PBSUCCESS, this operation was carried out in 1954. This report illustrates the depth of planning by U.S. government officials in the Directorate of Operations at the CIA. In the end the plans were abandoned, and no Arbenz officials or Guatemalan communists were killed. Although the operation was not successful, it met its objective: President Arbenz would resign later that year.

Report on CIA Assassination Proposals in Guatemala

CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals 1952–1954

CIA History Staff Analysis

Gerald K. Haines

June 1995

Introduction

In the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency directed covert operations aimed at removing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala. Included in these efforts were various suggestions for the disposal of key Arbenz government officials and Guatemalan Communists. The Agency drew up lists of individuals for assassination, discussed training Guatemalan exiles for assassination teams, and conducted intimidation programs against prominent Guatemalan officials.

This brief study traces, in a chronological manner, the injection of assassination planning and proposals into the PBFORTUNE covert operation against the Arbenz government in 1952 and into the PBSUCCESS operation in 1954. It attempts to illustrate the depth of such planning and the level of involvement of Agency officials. It also attempts to detail where the proposals originated, who approved them, and how advanced the preparations for such actions were. Finally, the study examines the implementation of such planning and the results—i.e., in the end, the plans were abandoned and no Arbenz officials or Guatemalan Communists were killed. The study is based almost exclusively on Directorate of Operations records relating to PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS.

Background

As early as 1952 US policymakers viewed the government of President Arbenz with some alarm. Although he had been popularly elected in 1950, growing Communist influence within his government gave rise to concern in the United States that Arbenz had established an effective working alliance with the Communists. Moreover, Arbenz policies had damaged US business interests in

Guatemala; a sweeping agrarian reform called for the expropriation and redistribution of much of the United Fruit Company's land. Although most high-level US officials recognized that a hostile government in Guatemala by itself did not constitute a direct security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing global Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared that Guatemala could become a client state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.

CIA and Intelligence Community reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of the Communists. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith and other Agency officials believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was, that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and ineffective. The anti-Communist elements—the Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers union, university students, and the Army were prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power, but they had little outside support.

Other US officials, especially in the Department of State, urged a more cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for example, did not want to present the “spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse.” It wanted a policy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Although the Department of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment of the situation had support within the Truman administration as well. This led to the development of a covert action program designed to topple the Arbenz government—PBFORTUNE.

PBFORTUNE

Following a visit to Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman asked DCI Smith, to investigate the possibility. Smith sent an agent, codenamed SEEKFORD, to contact Guatemalan dissidents about armed action against the Arbenz regime. After seeing his report, [REDACTED] Chief of the [REDACTED] Division of the Directorate of Plans (DP), proposed to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that the Agency supply Castillo Armas with arms and \$225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras furnish the Guatemalans with air support. Gaining Department of State support, Smith, on 9 September 1952, officially approved [REDACTED]'s request to initiate operation PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz. Planning for PBFORTUNE lasted barely a month, however, when Smith terminated it after he learned in October that it had been blown.

Throughout planning for PBFORTUNE there were proposals for assassination. Even months before the official approval of PBFORTUNE, Directorate of Plans (DP) officers compiled a “hit list.” Working from an old 1949 Guatemalan

Army list of Communists and information supplied by the Directorate of Intelligence, in January 1952 DP officers compiled a list of “top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in event of successful anti-Communist coup.” Headquarters asked [REDACTED] to verify the list and recommend any additions or deletions. Headquarters also requested [REDACTED] to verify a list of an additional 16 Communists and/or sympathizers whom the new government would desire to incarcerate immediately if the coup succeeded [REDACTED] in Guatemala City added three names to the list in his reply. Nine months later, SEEKFORD, the CIA agent in touch with Castillo Armas, forwarded to Headquarters a disposal list compiled by Castillo Armas. That list called for the execution through executive action of 58 Guatemalans (Category I) and the imprisonment or exile of 74 additional Guatemalans (Category II). SEEKFORD also reported at the same time, 18 September 1952, that General Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had agreed to aid Castillo Armas in return for the “killing of four Santo Dominicans at present residing in Guatemala a few days prior to D-Day.” According to SEEKFORD, Castillo Armas readily agreed, but cautioned that it could not be done prior to D-day because of security reasons. Castillo Armas further added that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were already being trained. There is no record that Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas’ list.

After the PBFORTUNE operation was officially terminated, the Agency continued to pick up reports of assassination planning on the part of the Guatemalan opposition. In late November 1952, for example, an opposition Guatemalan leader, in a conversation with SEEKFORD, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special “K” groups whose mission was to kill all leading political and military leaders, and that the hit list had included the location of the homes and offices of all targets which had already been drawn up. On 12 December SEEKFORD reported further that Castillo Armas planned to make maximum use of the “K” groups. Another source subsequently reported that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Salvadoran soldiers in civilian clothes would infiltrate Guatemala and assassinate unnamed Communist leaders.

In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the [REDACTED] government [REDACTED] in 1953 proposed not only to focus on sabotage, defection, penetration, and propaganda efforts with regard to Guatemala, but to eliminate [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] draft memorandum, after creating a story that [REDACTED] was preparing to oust the Communists, he could be eliminated. His assassination would be “laid to the Commies” and used to bring about a mass defection of the Guatemalan army. A Western Hemisphere Division memo of 28 August 1953 also suggested possibly assassinating key Guatemalan military officers if they refused to be converted to the rebel cause. In September 1953 [REDACTED] also sent [REDACTED] an updated plan of action which included a reference to “neutralizing” key Guatemalan military leaders.

In the psychological warfare area, Guatemala City Station sent [REDACTED] all leading Communists in Guatemala, “death notice” cards for 30 straight days beginning 15 April 1953. The Station repeated the operation beginning 15 June 1953 but reported no reaction from the targeted leaders.

PBSUCCESS

By the fall of 1953, US policymakers, including CIA officials, were searching for a new overall program for dealing with Arbenz. The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer to the Communists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salama. In response, the National Security Council authorized a covert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility.

The CIA plan, as drawn up [REDACTED]’s Western Hemisphere Division, combined psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS, and coordinated with the Department of State, the plan’s stated objective was “to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala.” In the outline of the operation the sixth stage called for the “roll-up” of Communist and collaborators after a successful coup.

Training

Although assassination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, the Chief of [REDACTED] requested a special paper on liquidation of personnel on 5 January 1954. This paper, according to the [REDACTED] chief, was to be utilized to brief the training chief for PBSUCCESS before he left to begin training Castillo Armas’ forces in Honduras on 10 January 1954. A cable from [REDACTED] the following day requested 20 silencers (converters) for 22 caliber rifles. Headquarters sent the rifles. The [REDACTED] chief also discussed the training plan with the agent SEEKFORD on 13 January 1954, indicating that he wanted Castillo Armas and the PBSUCCESS [REDACTED] officer to train two assassins. In addition, he discussed these “assassination specialists” with Castillo Armas on 3 February 1954.

The idea of forming assassination teams (“K” groups) apparently originated with Castillo Armas in 1952. Adapting Castillo Armas’ concept, the [REDACTED] chief routinely included two assassination specialists in his training plans.

CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a “K” group trained to perform assassinations. The main mission of the sabotage teams or harassment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property and to avoid attacks on the army. A chart depicting the [REDACTED] chiefs plan for the CALLIGERIS (Castillo Armas) organization showed the “K” Group. It was distributed in various paramilitary planning packets as late as the spring of 1954. In a briefing for [REDACTED] in June 1954, [REDACTED] also mentioned that sabotage teams would assassinate known Communists in their areas once the invasion.

Psychological Warfare

As in PBFORTUNE, an intensive psychological warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Utilizing the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders. These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communist throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as for the dissident leader. The “Nerve War Against Individuals,” as it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman’s nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals. Such slogans as “Here Lives a Spy” and “You have Only 5 Days” were painted on their houses.

Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident leader suggested that the “violent disposal” of one of the top Guatemalan Communists would have a positive effect on the resistance movement and undermine Communist morale. The dissident leader’s recommendations called for the formation of a covert action group to perform violent, illegal acts against the government. LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader, however, that such techniques were designed only to destroy a person’s usefulness. By destroy “we do not mean to kill the man,” LINCOLN cabled the dissident leader. Responding to the proposal that a top Communist leader be killed, [REDACTED] Guatemala City told [REDACTED] he could not recommend assassinating any “death letter” recipients at this time because it might touch off “wholesale reprisals.” Reiterating that the plan was to “scare not kill,” he nevertheless suggested that [REDACTED] might wish to “study the suggestion for utility now or in the future.”

While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning both included suggestions which implied assassination proposals, these proposals appear never to have been implemented. The [REDACTED] chief had sought to use Castillo Armas’ “K” group scheme but there was no State Department or White House support. Such was also the case when the subject of assassination emerged in high-level Agency and inter-agency planning discussions.

Target Lists

A weekly PBSUCCESS meeting at Headquarters on 9 March 1954 considered the elimination of 15–20 of Guatemala’s top leaders with “Trujillo’s trained pistoleros.” Those attending the meeting were [REDACTED] DP Operations, along with State Department representative [REDACTED]. Addressing the group, [REDACTED] while stating clearly that “such elimination was part of the plan and could be done,” objected to the proposal at that time. [REDACTED] however, expressed the view that “knocking off the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over.”

Following this meeting, [REDACTED] appears to be the Agency official who revived discussion of assassination as an option. On 25 March he broached the

subject with [REDACTED] who had just returned from the Organization of American States meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, that voted 17 to 1 to condemn communism in Guatemala. . . . The records do not indicate why [REDACTED] flew to [REDACTED], but on that date the [REDACTED] officers were asked to draw up an up-dated target list. Criteria for inclusion on the disposal list required that individuals be (1) high government and organizational leaders “irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy,” (2) “out and out proven Communist leaders,” or (3) those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance “whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action.”

The [REDACTED] chief took the new list with him when he consulted Castillo Armas on 7 April 1954. [REDACTED] also borrowed a copy of the list on the same day. The [REDACTED] chief and Castillo Armas apparently discussed the list and at least tentatively agreed that any assassination would take place during the actual invasion of Guatemala by Castillo Armas’ forces. There was still no time date for the actual beginning of hostilities, however.

Agency contacts with conservative Guatemalan exile leader [REDACTED] at the same time also produced an assassination list. [REDACTED] provided a CIA cutout with a list of Communist leaders he would like to see executed. [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] as a loose cannon, however. They did not want him to become involved in PBSUCCESS.

CIA received further Department of State encouragement for assassination plotting in April 1954. Fueling the fire for action, [REDACTED] in a meeting with [REDACTED] and another CIA officer, concluded that “more drastic and definitive steps to overthrow the government [in Guatemala] must be taken.”

Meanwhile, [REDACTED] traveled to Washington and submitted a proposal on 1 June 1954 that suggested that as an alternative approach to the paramilitary action program “specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected.” [REDACTED] took up [REDACTED] suggestion in discussions with [REDACTED] on 1 and 2 June. According to [REDACTED] considered the proposal and then ruled it out, “at least for the immediate future,” on the ground that it would prove counterproductive. [REDACTED] wanted more specific plans concerning the individual targets, timing, and statement of purpose. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed that the advantages gained by this type of activity needed to be clearly spelled out. This appears to be the end of serious planning in Washington for the inclusion of selective assassination proposals in PBSUCCESS. Returning from Washington [REDACTED] on 2 June 1954, [REDACTED] however, reported to his staff that the consensus in Washington was that “Arbenz must go; how does not matter.”

The Paramilitary Operation

On 16 June 1954 Castillo Armas’ CIA-supported force of armed exiles entered Guatemala. While these forces advanced tentatively in the hinterland, [REDACTED] Guatemala City on 16 and 17 June met with a leading Guatemalan military

commander, in the hopes of convincing him to lead a coup against Arbenz. In these discussions, the military commander hinted he would like to see [REDACTED] killed. The [REDACTED] frustrated by the continued inaction of the Guatemalan military commander, told him that if he wanted them killed he should do it himself. Despite the Guatemalan military commander's vacillation, a [REDACTED] cable indicated that he remained convinced that [REDACTED] had to be eliminated.

With the Guatemala Army's position uncertain and the outcome still in doubt, a few days later, the [REDACTED] chief, in [REDACTED], requested permission to bomb the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] LINCOLN responded on 22 June that it did not want to waste air strikes on [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] while a battle was raging at Zacapa. The [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also supported the [REDACTED] chiefs request to bomb [REDACTED] with a dramatic cable which ended "Bomb Repeat Bomb." LINCOLN and Headquarters held fast and [REDACTED] was never bombed. "We do not take action with grave foreign policy implications except as agent for the policymakers," Dulles cabled LINCOLN.

President Arbenz, on 27 June 1954, in a bitterly anti-American speech, resigned his office and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy in Guatemala City. After Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however, Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, which granted him political asylum. In addition, 120 other Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the Castillo Armas government. There is no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed.

CONCLUSION

CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing covert action against the Arbenz government engaged in extensive discussions over a two-and a half year period about the possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials [REDACTED]. Consideration of using assassination to [REDACTED] purge Guatemala of Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Cold War years. The Agency did not act unilaterally, but consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward Latin America. In the end, no assassinations of Guatemalan officials were carried out, according to all available evidence. Proposals for assassination pervaded both PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS. Rather than being confined to an early stage of these programs, even before official approval of PBFORTUNE, CIA officers compiled elimination lists and discussed the concept of assassination with Guatemalan opposition leaders. Until the day that Arbenz resigned in June 1954 the option of assassination was still being considered.

Discussions of assassination reached a high level within the Agency. Among those involved were [REDACTED] known to have been present at one meeting where the subject of assassination came up. It is likely that [REDACTED] was also aware in general terms that assassination was under discussion. Beyond planning, some actual preparations were made. Some assassins were selected, training began, and tentative "hit lists" were drawn up.

Yet no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was ever approved or implemented. The official objective of PBSUCCESS was to remove the Guatemalan government covertly “without bloodshed if possible.” Elimination lists were never finalized, assassination proposals remained controversial within the Agency, and it appears that no Guatemalans associated with Arbenz were assassinated. Both CIA and State Department officers were divided (and undecided) about using assassination.

Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalan Communists and leaders sympathetic to Communist programs took place in a historical era quite different from the present. Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow’s interests internationally. Considering Moscow’s machinations in Eastern Europe, role in the Korean War, sponsorship of subversion through Communist surrogates in the Third World, and espousal of an ideology that seemed to have global hegemony as the ultimate objective, American officials and the American public alike regarded foreign Communist Parties as Soviet pawns and as threatening to vital US security interests.

Cold War realities and perceptions conditioned American attitudes toward what political weapons were legitimate to use in the struggle against Communism. It would be over two decades after the events in Guatemala before DCI William Colby prohibited any CIA involvement in assassination and a subsequent Executive Order banned any US government involvement in assassination.

Source: “CIA Guatemal Assassination Proposals, 1952–1954,” The National Security Archive, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc01.pdf>.

72. Statement on the Damage Caused by Aldrich Ames (1995)

Classification: Unclassified

In this statement, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director John Deutch acknowledges the damage to U.S. intelligence efforts caused by spy Aldrich Ames. According to Deutch, Ames’s spying for the Soviet Union was far more extensive and serious than previously disclosed. In what he called the “most troubling” finding of the damage assessment, Deutch said that flawed intelligence was allowed to remain in reports given to top policy makers, including Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. According to Deutch, a CIA inspector general’s report recommended disciplinary action for 12 CIA officers for failing to report the intelligence breakdowns.

Statement of Damage Caused by Aldrich Ames

[EXCERPT]

STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE
CLANDESTINE SERVICES AND THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALDRICH
AMES

December 7, 1995

I. Introduction and Overview

From the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has recognized the compelling need to collect Intelligence by clandestine means. For much of our history, this collection could only be done by human agents. Recent technological developments have, of course, vastly increased our ability to collect intelligence. The capacity of these technical systems is awesome and our achievements are astonishing. However, these technical means can never eliminate the need for human agents.

Throughout our history, the contribution of the clandestine service of the United States has frequently been the difference between victory and defeat, success and failure. It has saved countless American lives. . . .

. . . Aldrich Ames' espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and Russia from April 1985 through February 1994 caused severe, wide-ranging and continuing damage to US national security interests. In addition to the points that I made in my public statement on 31 October, Ames did the following:

- In June 1985, he disclosed the identity of numerous U.S. clandestine agents in the Soviet Union, at least nine of whom were executed. These agents were at the heart of our effort to collect intelligence and counterintelligence against the Soviet Union. As a result we lost opportunities to better understand what was going on in the Soviet Union at a crucial time in history.
- He disclosed, over the next decade, the identity of many US agents run against the Soviets, and later the Russians.
- He disclosed the techniques and methods of double agent operations, details of our clandestine trade craft, communication techniques and agent validation methods. He went to extraordinary length to learn about U.S. double agent operations and pass information on them to the Soviets.
- He disclosed details about US counterintelligence activities that not only devastated our efforts at the time, but also made us more vulnerable to KGB operations against us.
- He identified CIA and other intelligence community personnel. Ames contends that he disclosed personal information on, or the identities of, only a few American intelligence officials. We do not believe that assertion.
- He provided details of US Intelligence technical collection activities and analytic techniques.
- He provided finished intelligence reports, current intelligence reporting, arms control papers, and selected Department of State and Department of Defense cables. For example, during one assignment, he gave the KGB a stack of documents estimated to be 15 to 20 feet high.

Taken as a whole, Ames' activities also facilitated the Soviet, and later the Russian, effort to engage in perception management operations by feeding carefully selected information to the United States through agents whom they were controlling without our knowledge. Although the extent and success of this effort cannot now be determined with certainty, we know that some of this information did reach senior decision makers of the United States. As the Committee knows, one of the most disturbing findings of the DAT was that consumers of intelligence were not informed that some of the most sensitive human intelligence reporting they received came from agents known or suspected at the time to be under the control of the KGB, and later the SVR. This finding was substantiated by a detailed audit done by the CIA's Inspector General. Because this aspect of the assessment is so important and has generated so much public interest, I would like to discuss it in some detail.

In response to requests from the DAT, same consumers of sensitive human reporting identified just over 900 reports dating from 1985 to 1994 that they considered particularly significant. These consumers included CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Military Services and other agencies. The DAT then reviewed the case files of the agents who were the source of just over half of these reports and concluded that a disturbingly high percentage of these agents were controlled by the KGB, and later the SVR, or that evidence exists suggesting that they were controlled. [FOOTNOTE: The DAT intended to review the source for each of these reports but, for a variety of reasons, was not able to do so. For example, the filing system of the DO was incomplete and the sources for some reports could not be identified. To expedite the review the DAT did not review the files or sources who produced only one or two reports. In the end, the Team examined and thoroughly reviewed the sources who produced roughly 55% of the reports cited by consumers as significant.]

Although some of the reports from these sources were accompanied by warnings that the source might be suspect, many other reports did not include adequate warning. The IG was asked to review reporting from the sources that the DAT concluded were known or suspected to be controlled. They concluded that CIA did not provide adequate warning to consumers of 35 reports from agents whom we had good reason to believe *at the time* were controlled and 60 reports from agents about whom we had suspicions *at the time*. Of these 95 reports, at least three formed the basis of memoranda that went to the President; one of those reports was from a source who we had good reason to believe was controlled and two were from sources about whom we had suspicions. While these and other reports could well have been reflected in other such analytic products, we have not identified them.

The fact that we can identify only a relatively few significant reports that were disseminated with inadequate warning does not mitigate the impact of Ames' treachery or excuse CIA's failure to adequately warn consumers. We believe that, whatever the numbers of such reports, the provision of information from controlled sources without adequate warning was a major intelligence failure that calls into

doubt the professionalism of the clandestine service and the credibility of its most sensitive reporting.

This situation requires us to take two steps. First, and most importantly, we must ensure that such information does not reach senior policymakers in the future without adequate warning that the information comes from sources we know or suspect to be controlled. Second, we must examine certain important decisions taken by the United States to ensure that they were not influenced by these reports. If any decisions were influenced by faulty reports, we must determine what, if any, corrective measures should be taken.

With respect to the first step, I have established a new Customer Review Process under the National Intelligence Council. This process, which will include appropriately cleared representatives of our customer agencies, will work with the Directorate of Operations to ensure that recipients of extremely sensitive human intelligence reports are adequately advised about our knowledge of the source of the reports. This does not mean that these representatives of other agencies will be told the identity of the source of the information. Rather, our goal is that recipients of especially sensitive information can adequately understand and evaluate the intelligence.

With respect to the second step—reviewing decisions that might have been made using controlled information—it is important to understand that our knowledge of the details of a Soviet perception management effort is limited, as is what can be said publicly about the subject. Also, it is not the job of the DCI to review decisions made by other agencies. However, it is very likely that the KGB, and later the SVR, sought to influence U.S. decision makers by providing controlled information designed to affect R&D and procurement decisions of the Department of Defense. The DAT believes one of the primary purposes of the perception management program was to convince us that the Soviets remained a superpower and that their military R&D program was robust.

In an effort to understand the impact of this Soviet/Russian program, the DAT reviewed intelligence reporting relevant to a limited number of acquisition decisions taken by the Department of Defense to determine whether any reports from controlled or suspect agents had an impact on the decisions. The reporting covered eight categories of weapons systems, including aircraft and related systems, ground force weapons, naval force weapons, air defense missiles and cruise missiles. The DAT concluded, in coordination with DIA and the intelligence components of the military departments that the impact varied from program to program. In some cases the impact was negligible. In other cases, the impact was measurable, but only on the margin.

The dissemination of reports on Soviet/Russian military R&D and procurement programs from questionable sources had the potential to influence U.S. military R&D and procurement programs costing billions of dollars. The DAT surveyed a number of intelligence consumers in the Department of Defense. They found that consumers were often reluctant to state that this reporting had any significant impact. Determining damage always involves much speculation, but the team concluded that “clear cut damage” to intelligence analysis may have been limited to a “few cases.” They cited three in particular:

- A report in the late 80s that would have influenced debates on U.S. general purpose forces.
- Analyses of Soviet plans caused us to revise logistics support and basing plans in one overseas theater (see also above), and
- Studies of certain Soviet/Russian cruise missile and fighter aircraft R&D programs may have overestimated the pace of those programs.

In addition, the team reviewed intelligence reporting that supported decisions in a number of defense policy areas, including U.S. military strategy. The team found that reporting from controlled or suspect agents had a substantial role in framing the debate. The overall effect was to sustain our view of the USSR as a credible military and technological opponent. The DAT found that the impact of such information on actual decisions, however, was not significant. In some cases, our military posture was altered slightly. In one example, changes already underway to enhance the survivability and readiness of the basing structure in an overseas theater was justified by information received from a controlled source. However, before the changes could be fully carried out, the Soviet Union collapsed, obviating the need for the change.

The DAT also reviewed a handful of national security issues that were the most likely to have been impacted by Ames' actions. For example, Ames passed U.S. all-source analysis of Soviet motives and positions in arms control negotiations. His espionage assisted their efforts to feed us information that supported the Soviet positions. The DAT interviewed a limited number of officials with respect to arms control issues and related programs. The DAT found no major instance where Soviets maneuvered U.S. or NATO arms control negotiators into giving up a current or future military capability or agreeing to monitoring or verification provisions that otherwise would not have been adopted. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Soviet's bargaining position grew increasingly weak as its economy deteriorated and Gorbachev struggled to maintain control.

After reviewing the DAT report, I believe it is incorrect to maintain that this reporting was completely irrelevant or completely determinate in U.S. weapon system decisions. The process by which U.S. weapons system development and acquisition decisions are made is complex and involves many considerations. These include technical feasibility, force modernization, life cycle cost, and industrial base considerations, as well as estimates of the near and long term threat. No single strand of intelligence information ever serves as the full justification for undertaking a large program.

The kind of impact that intelligence *does* have is:

- Influencing the pace and timing of a development program to meet an anticipated threat. This is an influence at the margin of system acquisition.
- Shaping the thinking of the technical and contractor community on the threat envelope facing a system under development.
- Creating an impression, in combination with other information, of the status and vitality of an adversary's military R&D and procurement activities.

All of this affects the context in which U.S. acquisition decisions are made. I believe the net effect of the Soviet/Russian “directed information” effort was that we overestimated their capability. [FOOTNOTE: A DoD team, working at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, recently completed the Department’s review of the impact of directed reporting on military policy, acquisition, and operations. That report has been briefed to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Congress.] Why the Soviet/Russian leadership thought this was desirable is speculative.

The combination of the loss of key human sources compromised by Ames, plus the directed information the KGB and SVR provided to the U.S. through controlled sources, had a serious impact on our ability to collect and analyze intelligence information. The DAT concluded that Ames’ actions diminished our ability to understand:

- Internal Soviet development, particularly the views and actions of the hard liners with the respect to Gorbachev in the late 1980s.
- Soviet, and later Russian, foreign policy particularly Yeltsin’s policies on nonproliferation and Russian involvement in the former CIS states.
- The extent of the decline of Soviet and Russian military technology and procurement programs.

The Ames case—and the other espionage cases of the ’80s remind us that other issues must be addressed. These include the serious lack of adequate counterintelligence during much of the 80’s and early 90’s. My predecessors, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI have made great progress in repairing this extremely important function. We have continued to make progress, but much work remains to be done. I detailed in my statement of 31 October a number of steps that are underway to correct these serious problems.

I look forward to working with the Committees to ensure the adequate implementation of these measures. I assure you that my colleagues in the Intelligence Community are fully committed to achieving these important reforms.

III. Conclusions

I regret that I cannot discuss in public more detail about the actual damage done by Aldridge Ames. To do so would compound that damage by confirming to the Russians the extent of the damage and permit them to evaluate the success and failures of their activities. That I cannot do.

However, it is extremely important that we not underestimate the terrible damage done by Ames’ treachery. It is impossible to describe the anger and sense of betrayal felt by the Intelligence Community. It reverberates to this day and has given all of us renewed motivation to do our jobs. Across the board, in all areas of intelligence activities—from collection, to counterintelligence, to security, to analysis and production, to the administrative activities that support the Community effort—we must renew our efforts to ensure that our activities are

conducted with integrity, honesty, and the highest standards of professionalism. To do less is to fail.

I believe that the most important value the Intelligence Community must embrace is integrity—both personal and professional. We operate in a world of deception. It is our job to keep this nation's secrets safe and to obtain the secrets of other nations. We engage in deception to do our job and we confront deception undertaken by other nations.

But we must never let deception become a way of life. We must never deceive ourselves. Perhaps more than any other government agency, we in the CIA must have the highest standards of personal and professional integrity. We must be capable of engaging in deceptive activities directed toward other nations and groups while maintaining scrupulous honesty among ourselves and with our customers. We must not let the need for secrecy obscure the honest and accurate presentation of the intelligence we have collected or the analyses we have produced.

I believe we have approached the damage caused by Ames with honesty and integrity. We have made the hard calls. We may have to make more. We have taken the steps necessary to discipline those responsible, to reduce the likelihood of such damage recurring and to begin to restore the confidence of our customers and the American people.

As I said at the beginning of this report, clandestine human operations remain vital to this country's security. They are often the most dangerous and difficult intelligence operations to conduct. But I want to assure the Congress and the American people that the American clandestine service will continue to conduct these operations and do so in the highest tradition of integrity, courage, independence and ingenuity that have made our service the best in the world.

Source: "DCI Statement on the Ames Damage Assessment," CIA NEWS, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1995/ps103195.html>.

73. Excerpt from Report on Osama bin Laden's Attempts to Develop Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability (1997)

Classification: Top Secret

This heavily redacted four-page report, classified as top secret, is one of the first documents available to the public indicating that Osama bin Laden was seeking weapons of mass destruction, possibly involving chemical and biological agents. The report ends with speculation that it is possible that the target may be U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.

Report on Usama Bin Laden Seeking WMD Capability

DCI COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER COMMENTARY

Central Intelligence Agency

January 6, 1997

Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?

Summary

[REDACTED] agents of Usama Bin Ladin purchased a container of uranium [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] bogus nuclear material [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] efforts of Bin Ladin suggest he is taking steps to develop the capability to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—possibly involving chemical agents and biological toxins as well as nuclear material—for terrorist operations, or may plan to give these substances to supports.

To What End?

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin’s stated intention to undertake hostile acts against the US presence in the Persian Gulf region—based as it is on an implacable antipathy toward the United States—could be abetted strongly by access to WMD material.

In public statements made in late November, Bin Ladin warned that “qualitative operations” would be necessary to pursue “a real battle between the Islamic Nation and US forces.” We do not know exactly what Bin Ladin might be threatening or how serious he is about following threats with action. [REDACTED] targeting US interest in the Persian Gulf.

Source: “Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability? Document C05373665, 6 January 1997,” Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

74. Department of Justice: *The CIA–Contra–Crack Cocaine Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department’s Investigations and Prosecutions* (1997)

Classification: Unclassified

In August 1996, the San Jose Mercury News published a series of articles titled “Dark Alliance: The Story behind the Crack Explosion” alleging that certain individuals associated with the Nicaraguan Contras had flooded South Central Los Angeles with cocaine in the 1980s. The articles further alleged that these

individuals had used the proceeds from their drug trafficking to finance the Contras' war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The articles made the startling claim that this drug pipeline helped trigger the crack epidemic in Los Angeles and throughout the United States. The Mercury News articles sparked renewed interest in such allegations, but the articles' chief significance was their suggestion that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other agencies of the U.S. government may have been responsible for the crack epidemic that ravaged the African American community in South Central Los Angeles and in other cities throughout the country. The articles raised numerous questions concerning whether Department of Justice employees, including employees from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and various U.S. attorney's Offices, properly investigated and prosecuted these individuals or whether they were protected because of ties to the Contras or pressure from the CIA. In short, according to this summary, the "review did not substantiate the main allegations stated and implied in the Mercury News articles."

Executive Summary on the CIA-Contra Cocaine Controversy

USDOJ/OIG Special Report

THE CIA-CONTRA-CRACK COCAINE CONTROVERSY: A REVIEW OF
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

(December, 1997)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

I. Introduction

In August 1996, the *San Jose Mercury News* published a series of articles, entitled "Dark Alliance: The Story Behind the Crack Explosion," which alleged that certain individuals associated with the Nicaraguan Contras had flooded South Central Los Angeles with cocaine in the 1980s. The articles further alleged that these individuals had used the proceeds from their drug trafficking to finance the Contras' war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The articles made the startling claim that this drug pipeline helped spark the crack epidemic in Los Angeles and throughout the United States. More explosively, the stories implied that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was aware of these activities and either attempted to protect the drug dealing of these Contra supporters or turned a blind eye to their activities. The articles also questioned how certain individuals connected to the Contras were treated by law enforcement authorities, including elements of the Department of Justice (DOJ)—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS), and various United States Attorney's Offices—implying that they were treated differently because of ties to the Contras or the CIA.

The articles focused on the drug operation of Ricky Ross, an African-American resident of Los Angeles who was a major cocaine dealer. The series claimed that his meteoric rise as a drug trafficker was made possible by Oscar Danilo Blandon and Norwin Meneses, two Nicaraguan nationals with ties to the Contras who allegedly used the profits they earned from selling Ross massive amounts of cocaine to help fund the Contra war effort.

Allegations of drug dealing by Contra supporters in the 1980s are not new, and they have been previously investigated by various government entities and the press. The *Mercury News* articles sparked renewed interest in such allegations, but the articles' chief significance was their suggestion that the CIA and other agencies of the United States government may have been responsible for the crack epidemic that ravaged the African-American community in South Central Los Angeles and other communities throughout the country. Although the *Mercury News* later claimed that it had not made the allegation directly, the suggestion of government or CIA involvement in the crack epidemic spawned calls for investigations about the claims suggested by the *Mercury News* articles.

The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a review of the actions of the Department of Justice that were implicated by the allegations in the *Mercury News* articles. We did not reinvestigate the more general allegations of Contra involvement in drug trafficking, which had already been extensively reviewed in previous inquiries by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism and International Operations; the State Department; the DEA; and the CIA. Rather, we focused our attention on the new allegations about the individuals described in the *Mercury News* articles, including Blandon, Meneses, Ross, and Ronald Lister, an associate of Blandon. The articles raised numerous questions concerning whether Department of Justice employees, including employees from the DEA, the FBI, the INS, and various U.S. Attorney's Offices, properly investigated and prosecuted these individuals or whether they were protected because of ties to the Contras or pressure from the CIA.

We also reviewed related allegations raised by the articles about the actions of Department of Justice employees in other cases, including the claim that \$36,000 was returned to convicted drug dealer Julio Zavala by the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Francisco in 1984 because of Zavala's ties to the Contras or intervention from the CIA; the claim that Zavala and his associate Carlos Cabezas trafficked in drugs to benefit the Contras; claims by former DEA agent Celerino Castillo that his investigation of drug trafficking by Contras at Ilopango Airport in El Salvador was stymied; and allegations that John Hull, an American citizen who owned a ranch in Costa Rica and was suspected of drug trafficking activities, received lenient treatment from the Department of Justice because of his alleged connections to the Contras or the CIA.

In our investigation, we directed all Department of Justice components to produce documents from their files relating to the specific individuals mentioned in the *Mercury News* and allegations of drug trafficking by the Contras. We obtained

and reviewed over 40,000 pages of documents from these Department of Justice components and other sources, and we conducted over 200 interviews of present and former Department of Justice employees and many of the individuals that were the subject of the articles, including Blandon, Meneses, Lister, Ross, Zavala, Cabezas, and others. These interviews took place throughout the United States and in Nicaragua. Only a few individuals who were no longer government employees refused to talk to us, and the OIG does not have testimonial subpoena power to compel them to cooperate.

Our review was coordinated with the inquiry conducted by the CIA's Office of Inspector General (CIA OIG), which undertook its own investigation focusing on the actions of CIA employees regarding allegations of drug trafficking on behalf of the Contras. Our two investigations were independent, however, and addressed different issues. We leave to the CIA OIG to report its findings about the CIA's conduct in these matters; our report focuses on the Department of Justice's role in these cases.

Our report is divided into chapters examining the cases of the individuals who were the focus of the *Mercury News* articles, including Blandon, Meneses, Lister, Ross, Zavala, and Cabezas; we also have a separate chapter on miscellaneous cases, such as that of Hull. Although our inquiry concentrated on the Department of Justice's role in pursuing the investigations and prosecutions of these individuals, we did, in the course of our interviews and document review, find information touching on whether these individuals in fact dealt drugs on behalf of the Contras or were connected to the CIA. We present this information in our report. We also discuss the rise of crack cocaine in the United States and the accuracy of the suggestion in the *Mercury News* articles about the cause of that epidemic. Finally, we discuss the sharing of intelligence information between the DEA and CIA about Contra drug trafficking in certain cases.

This Executive Summary briefly describes the most important facts we found and conclusions we reached regarding the individuals that were the focus of the claims in the *Mercury News* articles; it does not include all or even most of the important details and events that the full report addresses. We believe our entire report should be read for a fuller and fairer understanding of the results of our inquiry.

In short, our review did not substantiate the main allegations stated and implied in the *Mercury News* articles. It is clear that certain of the individuals discussed in the articles, particularly Blandon and Meneses, were significant drug traffickers who also supported, to some extent, the Contras. There were conflicting claims about how much money they provided to the Contras, although that support appears to be modest. We did not find that Blandon, Meneses, or the other Contra supporters referred to in these articles received special consideration or leniency with regard to their investigation or prosecution by the Department of Justice because of their Contra connections. While the Department of Justice's investigative efforts suffered from lack of coordination and insufficient resources, these efforts were not affected by anyone's suspected ties to the Contras.

Moreover, the implication that the drug trafficking by the individuals discussed in the *Mercury News* articles was connected to the CIA was also not supported by

the facts. We did not find that the CIA or any other national security entity interceded in the cases referred to in the *Mercury News*. An exception to this general conclusion was the CIA's intervention in the Zavala case concerning the return of the seized money to him.

Finally, we found that neither Bandon's supply of cocaine to Ross nor Ross' own drug dealing was the cause of the crack explosion in Los Angeles or across the United States, as the articles implied. While Bandon was a major cocaine supplier and Ross was a major distributor, the rise of the crack market, both in Los Angeles and across the country, was not the result of any single source or seller.

II. Oscar Danilo Bandon

Oscar Danilo Bandon, a member of a prominent family in Nicaragua, fled to the United States soon after the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in 1979. In the early 1980s, while living in Los Angeles, Bandon began distributing cocaine, originally at the behest of Norwin Meneses to support the Contra movement. Shortly after he began dealing drugs, Bandon began selling large quantities of cocaine on his own for his personal profit. By his own admission, he became a significant drug dealer, receiving cocaine from Colombian, Mexican, and Nicaraguan sources, and selling it to Ricky Ross and others in Los Angeles and elsewhere.

In 1986, Bandon's drug trafficking activities became the focus of criminal investigations in Los Angeles by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), the DEA, and the FBI. In October 1986, with the help of the FBI and DEA, the LASD obtained search warrants for more than a dozen locations connected to Bandon's drug organization. When the search warrants were executed, however, the LASD found only a negligible quantity of drugs at Bandon's residence.

The *Mercury News* articles raised various allegations about why the LASD raids failed, including the suggestion that the federal authorities may have impeded the LASD investigation or that the Bandon organization may have been tipped off about the search warrants by the CIA or federal law enforcement authorities. This speculation was largely fueled by statements made by Ronald Lister, who told the LASD deputies who searched his home during the raid about his alleged CIA connections and suggested that his activities were protected by that agency. In addition, the newspaper articles claimed that the federal authorities seized the evidence collected by the LASD during its raids and requested that drug possession charges against Bandon be dropped.

Our review did not substantiate these claims. The FBI and DEA investigators did ask the LASD to delay the execution of the search warrants while they pursued their investigation of Bandon, a position that was justified in retrospect. However, once the LASD indicated its intent to go forward with the searches, the FBI and DEA fully cooperated with the LASD, even providing information that became part of the basis for the LASD affidavit in support of the search warrants. We found no evidence that the failure of the LASD investigation was the result of its being

compromised by the CIA or any other federal authorities. Blandon changed his operations before the raids occurred because he correctly believed he was under surveillance. We found no evidence to suggest that any government officials told him about the surveillance or the search warrants in advance. We also concluded that Lister and others made statements at the time of the raids about alleged connections to the CIA because they apparently thought such claims would be helpful rather than because they were true. In any event, we found no evidence that the investigators changed any of their actions because of these unsubstantiated claims. Charges against Blandon were dropped because of the small amount of cocaine found at his home and because of the federal agents' plans to pursue a larger case against the Blandon organization.

In fact, three months later, in January 1987, the FBI, DEA, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in coordination with the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney's Office, opened a federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) case targeting Blandon and his associates. This investigation was unsuccessful and was closed in the summer of 1987 for several reasons, none of which related to the CIA or the Contras. We concluded there were insufficient law enforcement resources assigned to the OCDETF investigation for them to investigate Blandon's organization effectively. Second, Blandon apparently stopped his drug trafficking activities after the unsuccessful LASD raid on his home and moved to Florida. Finally, there were problems of coordination among the various law enforcement entities involved in the case, particularly between the DEA and FBI regarding whether Meneses should be used as an informant against Blandon or should be a target of the investigation. We found no evidence that Blandon and Meneses were protected by any intelligence agency or received any benefits because of their connection to the Contras or any alleged connection to the CIA.

Blandon eventually returned to Southern California in 1990 and continued drug dealing there. In 1990, another federal OCDETF investigation was opened against Blandon in San Diego, eventually resulting in a 1992 indictment against him for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it. After Blandon's arrest, he agreed to cooperate with the government in return for a reduced sentence. Blandon was eventually sentenced to 48 months in prison, based on his substantial cooperation against drug traffickers. The government later filed a motion seeking a further reduction in Blandon's sentence, based on his cooperation, and the court reduced Blandon's sentence to 28 months.

The *Mercury News* articles suggested that Blandon was given an inappropriately lenient sentence after his 1992 conviction, despite his "admi[ssion] to crimes that have sent others away for life." We found that Blandon clearly received a considerable degree of leniency, at the behest of the government, based on his substantial cooperation. Whether the government should have given more consideration to Blandon's prior criminal history before providing him the substantial sentence reduction, or whether his sentence was appropriate given the extent of his cooperation, is part of a broader debate about the leniency with which the government treats certain valuable cooperating witnesses and informants that extends far beyond the context of this case. In our review, we found no indication that the

government's actions were based on anything other than its assessment of Blandon's cooperation. We also found no evidence that Blandon received any special consideration because of any alleged affiliation with the Contras or the CIA.

The OIG concluded that Blandon improperly received a "green card"—legal permanent residence (LPR) status in the United States. After Blandon's release from prison in 1994, the INS agent assigned to the OCDETF investigation was given responsibility for obtaining the necessary travel documents so that Blandon could travel to work undercover for the DEA. Rather than pursue various avenues that would have allowed Blandon to stay in the country while he worked for the DEA, the INS agent arranged for Blandon to obtain a green card from an INS immigration examiner. Blandon was not eligible for a green card because of his 1992 felony drug trafficking conviction. Although recollections differ on what the INS agent told his supervisors or the immigration examiner who approved the green card concerning Blandon's prior criminal conviction, we concluded that the INS agent knew or should have known that Blandon was not eligible for the green card, and that the agent withheld the fact of Blandon's conviction from the immigration examiner. We concluded that the INS agent took the actions he did because he did not want to expend the additional effort necessary to obtain the travel documents the appropriate way, rather than because of any alleged connection between Blandon and the Contras or the CIA.

III. Norwin Meneses

The OIG also examined Department of Justice actions with respect to Norwin Meneses, another Contra supporter who engaged in significant drug trafficking in California, primarily in the San Francisco area. The evidence is overwhelming that beginning in the 1970s, Meneses ran large drug trafficking operations both in Central America and the United States. In the early 1980s, he also supported the Contra cause in California with some contributions. The evidence we found suggested that his drug dealing was not motivated by any desire to aid the Contra cause, but instead was for his personal profit. Indeed, it appears that he established contacts and dealt drugs with both sides in the Contra war, including the Sandinista government.

The *Mercury News* articles suggested that, despite being a known drug trafficker, Meneses was able to enter and live in the United States with impunity, and that he was protected because of his connections to the Contras, the CIA, or other agencies of the United States government. According to the articles, DEA investigations of Meneses were halted for reasons that were not clear, and when Meneses was finally indicted in San Francisco on federal drug charges in 1989, the indictment was "quickly locked away in the vaults of the San Francisco courthouse," and inexplicably kept secret for many years. The articles claimed that the arrest warrant for Meneses in 1989 was never entered into a national law enforcement database. We did not substantiate any of these claims.

Meneses was investigated several times over the course of many years. These investigations failed for various reasons, including the same problems of

coordination between and within law enforcement agencies that arose in the Blandon case. Between 1980 and 1986, the DEA in San Francisco conducted various investigations of Meneses or his associates. Some of his associates were successfully prosecuted, although the DEA never obtained sufficient evidence to prosecute Meneses.

Contrary to the *Mercury News* claims, we did not find that these investigations were halted because of any alleged connection between Meneses and the Contras or the CIA. The DEA agent who initially handled the investigations told us that she believed that a task force was necessary to investigate Meneses and his associates because it was a large and complex organization. Her suggestion was rejected because she was working on other cases and, she claimed, because her supervisors did not take her request seriously because she was a female agent. In any event, there was no evidence that there was any external pressure brought to bear on her or anyone else in DEA regarding the investigation of Meneses.

After two of his associates were arrested, Meneses fled the United States for Costa Rica. In 1986, he approached the DEA's Costa Rica office and offered to cooperate with the DEA. After checking DEA's database and finding no outstanding arrest warrants for Meneses, the DEA in Costa Rica proposed using him to introduce an experienced DEA informant to targeted drug traffickers, including Danilo Blandon. Meneses traveled to the United States in early 1987 with the DEA informant to meet with Blandon and other targeted drug dealers, and then returned to Costa Rica.

At the same time, the San Francisco FBI and the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office were investigating Meneses for drug trafficking. They were surprised to learn that Meneses was being used as a source of information. The San Francisco authorities agreed that Meneses could be used as a source of information, but insisted that he would also have to plead guilty to a federal drug charge in San Francisco. In the spring and summer of 1987, attempts to get Meneses back to the United States to cooperate in the Los Angeles OCDETF investigation against Blandon, discussed above, were unsuccessful because the DEA would not agree to Meneses' demands regarding the conditions of his cooperation. The Los Angeles OCDETF case was eventually closed without any prosecutions.

Despite Meneses' reluctance to cooperate in the Los Angeles investigation, the DEA in Costa Rica formally established him as a confidential informant in July 1987. The DEA reported that several cases were initiated as a result of his cooperation, and he travelled to the United States several times to work undercover for the DEA. In December 1989, the DEA deactivated Meneses as an informant, reactivated him for a short period in the summer of 1990, and then deactivated him again in 1990.

In February 1989, just before the statute of limitations was set to run out, the San Francisco FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office obtained an indictment charging Meneses with drug trafficking offenses. The indictment was sealed because Meneses was considered a fugitive, a typical procedure in such cases to prevent the defendant from learning about the charges. Also, contrary to the claims made in the *Mercury News* articles, the arrest warrant was entered into the FBI's law enforcement database.

Meneses was never arrested on these charges, even while he was working with the DEA in Costa Rica and traveling to the United States on behalf of the DEA. During this time, there clearly was inadequate coordination between the DEA, which was using Meneses as an informant, and the FBI, which was seeking Meneses' arrest. But we did not find that this had anything to do with any ties to the Contras or the CIA. Although there were some rumors that he was involved with the CIA, largely fueled by his own bragging to others, we found no evidence that this was true or that the rumors affected law enforcement actions.

On November 3, 1991, the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, Enrique Miranda, and three others for drug trafficking in Nicaragua. After Meneses received a 25-year prison sentence in Nicaragua, the FBI suspended any effort to arrest him. Meneses' Nicaraguan sentence was later reduced, and he was released from prison on November 14, 1997. The San Francisco indictment against Meneses is still pending.

An important question in this matter, as the *Mercury News* articles noted, is how Meneses was able to enter the United States repeatedly, despite the various investigations of him for drug trafficking. We requested all immigration files on Meneses, but they provide only sketchy details about his entries into the United States. When he began cooperating with the DEA in Costa Rica, he obtained several visas with DEA assistance to travel to the United States to work on undercover cases. According to Meneses' friends and associates, he often entered the United States with false passports, and we found evidence that he had access to such fraudulent documents.

In sum, we found significant evidence that Meneses was a large-scale drug trafficker who was pursued by federal authorities for many years. None of these cases resulted in his successful prosecution in the United States, although he is still under indictment here. The failure to prosecute Meneses successfully was caused in part by insufficient resources devoted to a targeted effort against him, problems of communication and coordination between and within law enforcement offices, and a vacillation as to whether Meneses should be considered a target or an informant. We did not find that any of these actions were taken for improper purposes, as a result of political considerations, or because of the influence of the CIA or other national security entities.

IV. OIG Analysis of Allegations Regarding Blandon's and Meneses' Relationship with the Contras and the CIA

In investigating the allegations in the *Mercury News* articles and how the Department of Justice handled the investigations of Blandon and Meneses, we came across considerable information touching on their alleged connections to the Contras and the CIA.

According to the *Mercury News* articles, information in a 1990 trial against deputy sheriffs from the LASD for corruption "indicates that the drug ring of former Nicaraguan government official Danilo Blandon was connected to the CIA and

efforts to launder drug money to finance anti-communist Nicaraguan rebels.” During this trial, the prosecutors filed a motion attempting to preclude the defense from raising the claim that the CIA was involved in laundering drug money, not because the prosecutors believed there was any basis for such a claim, but because the claim was irrelevant to the issues at trial. The court granted the government’s request, stating that it “could not conceive of any theory under which that evidence would be admissible” and calling defense counsel’s behavior “very unprofessional.” We reviewed the documents related to this defense claim, including documents seized from Blandon’s and Lister’s residences during the 1986 LASD searches, and found that they did not prove the claim made by the defense counsel.

The *Mercury News* asserted that Blandon, in testifying before a federal grand jury in San Francisco in 1994, “implied that his cocaine sales were, for a time, CIA-approved.” Although Blandon’s statement in the grand jury was subject to misunderstanding because of the way he expressed himself, the transcript of the proceeding does not support the conclusion that Blandon’s drug dealing was connected to the CIA.

In reviewing FBI and DEA files on Blandon and Meneses, we found some reports containing rumors that Blandon, Meneses, or their associates may have been connected to the CIA. These records also indicate that when the DEA or FBI contacted the CIA about such claims, it responded that there was no such relationship and that it had no objection to the prosecution of these individuals. Our investigation found no evidence reflecting that either Blandon or Meneses was in fact connected to the CIA.

In addition to interviewing Blandon and Meneses, we interviewed many people connected to Meneses or Blandon concerning their alleged drug dealing on behalf of the Contras. These accounts were conflicting but generally indicated that Blandon and Meneses engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in the 1980s and also provided some modest monetary support for the Contras. How much they contributed to the Contras is unclear. We believe, based on the evidence we gathered, that their role in the Contras was marginal. Both gave some proceeds from their drug trafficking to the Contras in the early 1980s, but the monetary amounts appear to be relatively insignificant compared to the money they made in drug trafficking.

Source: “The CIA–Contra–Crack Cocaine Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department’s Investigations and Prosecutions (December, 1997),” Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/exsumpl.htm#Executive_Summary.

75. Rendition Planning for Osama bin Laden (1998)

Classification: Secret

In a letter to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst Mike Scheuer, chief of the unit responsible for tracking Osama bin Laden, the use of rendition is discussed. This is the first mention of this controversial covert operation conducted by the CIA.

Letter Making First Mention of Rendition to Track Usama Bin Laden

To: Michael F. Scheuer

Date: 05/05/98

Mike,

[REDACTED] planning for the ubi [Usama Bin Ladin] rendition is going very well. [REDACTED] have come up with a very good plan—it fits the military model [REDACTED] and is detailed, thoughtful, realistic, and keeps the risks up front and clearly addressed. The team really is enthusiastic about the effort and quality of work presented.

. . . Still the odds of success are iffy—as in any special ops [operations] raid of this type—hundreds of variables which can be anticipated but not really planned for—and the thing could blow up at any point along the way. Still a much better plan than I anticipated. . . . Odds the op [operation] will get the green light—50-5-; odds it will succeed 40-60 (if we define success as ubi [Usama Bin Ladin] either in custody or dead).

Source: “Email, To Michael Scheuer, OBL Rendition, 1998-05-05: Document C05411935,” Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

76. Future Options Available against Osama bin Laden (1998)

Classification: Top Secret

In this document, written at Alec Station, three options are reviewed on the future capture of Osama bin Laden.

Discussion of Options for Capture of Usama Bin Laden

November 18, 1998

Subject: Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin

1. [REDACTED] effort against Usama Bin Ladin has been ongoing [REDACTED]. During this period, there have been several times when it appeared possible that a capture attempt would take place, yet in each case, the effort was not made for one reason or another. It is perhaps a good time to review the ongoing initiative and consider other options which might be launched concurrent with [REDACTED] initiative.

2. A second option would be to revitalize [REDACTED] effort by providing more direct tasking which would allow them to directly assault his quarters. This option would be much less complicated than a capture attempt of a road convoy and would perhaps be more in line with the type of raids [REDACTED] conducted during the war. It might require modification of the existing MON covering this operation. Given the threat posed by UBL to the United States, this is an option worth considering.

3. A third option would be to enlist the support to Afghan warlord Ahmed Shah Masood. Masood is currently in Northern Afghanistan fighting Taliban forces who are attacking him. It is thought that he will be able to successfully withstand the Taliban attacks and will be a force to consider in Afghanistan for many years to come. Masood is a soldier and accomplished guerrilla fighter. He has demonstrated an ability to plan and execute difficult operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Many of these options are not in and of themselves a clear best choice. [REDACTED] The more options we pursue, the greater the likelihood that one will succeed.

Source: "Memo re: OBL Rendition, 1998-11-18: Document C05411966," Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

77. Options for Addressing the Problem of Osama bin Laden (1998)

Classification: Top Secret

This document reviews the strengths and weaknesses of different strategies involving how to capture Osama bin Laden.

Options for Addressing the "Usama bin Ladin Problem"

November 24, 1998

Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem

[REDACTED] Following are the range of options that are available for US policy-makers to choose from to address the Usama Bin Ladin problem:

CONTINUE CURRENT PLAN: We are keeping our tribal assets deployed [REDACTED] wait for an opportunity to ambush and capture him as he moves around [REDACTED] continue to try and bring Bin Ladin to justice.

—Upside: Little or no collateral damage to noncombatants [REDACTED]

—Downside: We are in a responding-to-events mode; we cannot take the initiative; limited likelihood of success.

TRIBAL RAID ON ONE RESIDENCE: [REDACTED] the tribals have completed plans for an armed, nighttime raid of one of the residences [REDACTED]

- Upside: Restores the initiative to us; plays to the paramilitary talents of the tribals; increases the chances of success [REDACTED] the tribals prefer this option to an ambush because they believe it is less dangerous to their forces both during the operation and after. The assets, for example, believe they can better control the operational setting when attacking a single house than when attacking a multi-vehicle convoy. They also believe that a raid has a better chance than an ambush of being executed quietly, thereby decreasing the chance that nearby Taliban security forces will be alerted.
- Downside: Increases risk of collateral damage to noncombatants; increases the risk of casualties among our operatives; scenario lends itself to a quick response by Taliban forces [REDACTED] one shot deal: if Bin Ladin is in the house he will either captured or killed-if the tribal assets achieve surprise capture is likely; if surprise is not achieved, Bin Ladin and his guards will resist and likely die in the engagement

[REDACTED]

US MILITARY I: We are providing the military with locations of the residences Bin Ladin is shuffling among. [REDACTED] A simultaneous cruise missile attack on each would increase the likelihood of catching Bin Ladin at one of them.

- Upside: Restores the initiative to us; no risk of US casualties; high chance of success if Bin Ladin is in one of the residences; little risk of casualties to our assets; clear signal of U.S. resolve
- Downside: High risk to noncombatants; clear exposure of the US hand [REDACTED] might miss some/all of the targets. Acute embarrassment if information is inaccurate.

Source: "Options for OBL (Rendition), 1998-11-24: Document C05411967," Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

78. Osama bin Laden Preparing to Hijack U.S. Aircraft and Carry Out Other Attacks (1998)

Classification: Secret

Written almost three years before the terrorist attacks on 9/11, this report discusses possible activity by Osama Bin Laden that could cause a threat to the United States, including hijacking an aircraft and obtaining missiles.

Report on Possible Terrorist Attacks by Usama bin Ladin

December 4, 1998

SUBJECT: Usama Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack and Other Attacks

Reporting [REDACTED] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh “Umar” ‘Abel al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq ‘Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama’ at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin, but that the operation hold. A senior Bin Ladin operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options—perhaps including an aircraft hijacking.

IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the “next couple of weeks” to free ‘Abd al-Rabman and the other prisoners, according to what may a different source.

The same source late last month said that Bin Ladin might implement plans to hijack US before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport. [REDACTED]

Some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training, according to various sources, but no group directly tied to Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization has ever carried out an aircraft hijacking. Bin Ladin could be weighing other types of operations against US aircraft. According to [REDACTED] the IG in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to move from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, if unsuccessful, a US military or civilian aircraft.

A [REDACTED] in October told us that unspecified “extremist elements” in Yemen had acquired SA-7s [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicate the Bin Ladin or its allies are moving closer to implementing anti-US attacks at unspecified locations, but we do not know whether they are related to attacks on aircraft. A Bin Ladin associate in Sudan late last month told a colleague in Kandahar that he had shipped a group of containers to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin associates also talked about the movement of containers to Afghanistan before the East Africa bombings.

In other [REDACTED] Bin Ladin associates last month discussed picking up a package in Malaysia. One told his colleague in Malaysia that “they” were in the “ninth month [of pregnancy].”

An alleged Bin Ladin supporter in Yemen late last month remarked to his mother that he planned to work in “commerce” from abroad and said his impending “marriage,” which would take place soon, would be a “surprise.” “Commerce” and “marriage” often are codewords for terrorist attacks. [REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The author can be reached [REDACTED]

Source: “PDB: Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/pdb120498.html>.

79. Almost Three Years before 9/11: “We Are at War” with Osama bin Laden (1998)

Classification: Top Secret

Almost three years before the 9/11 attacks, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet sent this memo to his staff, stating that “We must now redouble our efforts against Bin Ladin himself, his infrastructure, followers, finances, etc. with a sense of enormous urgency. . . . We are at war.”

Memo of CIA Director George Tenet

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

December 4, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Usama Bin Ladin

1. [REDACTED] We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Ladin. Our work to date has been remarkable and in some instances heroic, yet each day we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced.
2. [REDACTED] We must now redouble our efforts against Bin Ladin himself, his infrastructure, followers, finances, etc. with a sense of enormous urgency.
3. [REDACTED] We must acknowledge that our efforts [REDACTED] can no longer be solely relied upon to bring Bin Ladin to justice. As a result, we must now pursue multiple paths simultaneously. This should include:

- a. Discussions with all liaison services who may have a capability to capture and render Bin Ladin to justice.
- b. Active and immediate efforts to ensure that we are able to provide the military with timely and accurate information for targeting purposes against Bin Ladin [REDACTED]
- c. Immediate operational exploitation, planning and threat warning [REDACTED] both unilaterally and in concert with liaison partners

[REDACTED] liaison relations which have the potential for greatest gain and recontact at senior levels.

- d. We need to immediately push the rest of the collection community to make Bin Ladin and his infrastructure our top priority. I want . . . to ensure that we are doing everything we can to meet CTC's requirements
- e. I want to know that we are pursuing all available conventional and special collection methods to get after Bin Ladin, his infrastructure, people and money.
- f. We need an immediate engagement with Special Operations Command and all DoD collection assets/programs, SAPs etc. which may be of assistance to our efforts.

4. We need an integrated plan which captures these elements and others which may be appropriate. This plan must be fully coordinated with the FBI.

5. We are at war. The DDCI will chair the group to coordinate the actions proposed above and any other actions which may be possible. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.

George J. Tenet

Source: "Memorandum, Usama Bin Laden, From Director CIA, 1998-12-04: Document C05453693," Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

80. Frustrations at Missing an Opportunity to Attack Osama bin Laden (1998)

Classification: No classification

In this e-mail, Michael Scheuer, director of the unit responsible for tracking and killing Osama bin Laden, writes an unknown recipient about his deep frustration with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials. Not until 13 years later did U.S. troops eventually kill bin Laden.

Memo Lamenting Missed Opportunity to Attack Usama Bin Ladin

From: Michael F. Scheuer

Date 12/21/98

. . . i couldn't sleep so i thought il'd come in and catch up a little. i'm sure we'll regret not acting last night. this is the third time you and your officers have put ubi in this gov't's sights and they have balked each time at doing the job. how many times can we/they expect to get a shot? there is at times such a sense of unreality in these out-of-langley deliberations that it is hard to assimilate exactly how things work. they spent a good deal of time yesterday, for example, worrying that some stray shrapnel might hit the habash mosque and "offend" Muslims—seeming to forget the four days the just spend bombarding what bin ladin calls the "muslim iraqi people." the policymakers also seem obsessed with having others—[REDACTED]. . .—do what we won't do.

Source: "Memo from Michael Scheuer, 12/21/98: Document C05411965," Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

81. Osama bin Laden's Public Profile May Lead to an Attack (2001)

Classification: Top Secret

Less than four months before the 9/11 attacks, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment indicated that Osama Bin Laden's ability to raise his public profile may lead to an attack.

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief on Usama Bin Ladin's Public Profile

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

May 3, 2001

Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack

[REDACTED] 10-minute videotape of Bin Ladin the widest public airing [REDACTED] In a press conference in May 1998, just months before the East Africa bombings Bin Ladin used the media to predict news to gladden his supporters' hearts.

[REDACTED]

Bin Ladin's heightened public profile may be an attempt to profit from the attention being paid to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and to reassert his importance as a backer of Islamic causes. Bin Ladin in January and February appeared in two videos about the wedding of his son; both featured rhetoric supporting the Al-Aqsa *intifadah*, and the second showed Bin Ladin reading a poem extolling the attack on the USS Cole [REDACTED]

Source: "Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack, 2001-05-03: Document C05453665," Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder2.pdf>.

82. Osama bin Laden Attacks May Be Imminent (2001)

Classification: Top Secret

A little more than two months before the 9/11 attacks, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefing stated that there were "multiple reports indicating that" Osama bin Laden could launch an attack against the United States or Israel in the very new future.

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief on Imminence of Bin Ladin Attacks

SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
June 23, 2001

International: Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent

Multiple reports indicate that extremists [REDACTED] expect Bin Ladin to launch attacks over the coming days, possibly against US or Israeli interests. . . . The time frame may be flexible. US facilities have been warned of the threat and are heightening security, which could delay an attack because operatives would need to revise their plans.

Source: "Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent, 2001-06-23: Document C05453670," Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder2.pdf>.

83. Osama bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks (2001)

Classification: Top Secret

One week after a previous briefing report (see Document #82), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued this report indicating that "near-term attacks"

were planned and would “have dramatic consequences” with “major casualties.” The United States is not mentioned in this report.

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief on Bin Ladin’s Planning for High-Profile Attacks

SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

June 30, 2001

Terrorism: Bin Ladin Planning High-Profile Attacks

Operations linked to Usama Bin Ladin’s organization expect the near-term attacks they are planning to have dramatic consequences, such as [REDACTED] major casualties [REDACTED] uproar in two weeks

. . . Arabian Peninsula as a likely venue for an anti-US attack. [REDACTED] . . . Yemen [REDACTED] Kuwait and Bahrain. Attacks on targets in Israel, Jordan, and Europe also could occur. . . Events such as [REDACTED] the G-8 summit in Genoa next month would be inviting targets.

Source: “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Planning High Profile Attacks, 2001-06-30: Document C05453660,” Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder2.pdf>.

84. Osama bin Laden Threats Are Real (2001)

Classification: Top Secret

This Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefing report states that Osama bin Laden’s “threats are real” and were not part of a “disinformation campaign” aimed at the United States by bin Laden. The report also indicates that targets in the United States and Israel targets were expected to be hit by terrorists “during the next two weeks.” The 9/11 attacks occurred nine weeks later.

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief Describing Reality of Bin Ladin Threats

SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

June 30, 2001

Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threats Are Real

The US is not the target of a disinformation campaign by Usama Bin Ladin. [REDACTED] warning of near-term attacks against US and Israeli interests is consistent with [REDACTED] public statements issues by his organization, and his current motivations.

- Bin Ladin’s aides last week told a journalist to expect attacks against US and Israeli targets during the next two weeks, a bold move that risks Bin Ladin’s credibility if he fails to follow through.
- The Taliban had insisted that Bin Ladin avoid linking himself directly to attacks, but his public anti-US speeches in recent months, including multiple statements implying involvement in the USS Cole bombing, indicate he no longer feels bound by such constraints.
- The war in Chechnya and violence between Israelis and Palestinians have increased competition for funding and recruits among Sunni extremists during the past year, ratcheting up pressure on Bin Ladin to mount an attack soon.

The passage of a week since the warning that an attack would occur within one or two days does not signal a diminished danger. Other threats [REDACTED] point to a longer time frame [REDACTED] more attacks are planned for a later date.
- Bin Ladin’s operative closely monitor security measures at their intended targets. They may have delayed an attack until conditions are more favorable or alternative targets are identified.

Bin Ladin’s increasingly inflammatory rhetoric may be intended to ensure he gets credit for impending attacks and to reinforce his image in the event of US retaliation as a heroic figure standing up to US aggression. Bin Ladin must make an especially strong case to receive credit for an anti-Israeli attack, which might otherwise be attributed to other terrorists, such as Lebanese Hizballah or Palestinian groups.

Source: “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Threats Are Real, 2001-06-30: Document C05453671,” Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder1.pdf>.

85. Osama bin Laden Determined to Strike in the United States (2001)

Classification: Top Secret/For the President Only

Four weeks before the 9/11 attacks, this Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report “For the President Only” stated that although the CIA had not been able to corroborate that Osama bin Laden planned to hijack an American airliner to gain the release of Umar Abd al-Rahman (known as the Blind Sheikh) and other extremists held in the United States, there was information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicating “patterns of suspicious activity” in the United States.

Report of Bin Ladin’s Intentions to Strike the U.S.

August 6, 2001

Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicated Bin Ladin since 1997 *has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US*. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America.”

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to [REDACTED] service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [REDACTED] service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin’s first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but also that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled the Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa’ida members—including some US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Sheikh” Umar ’Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

Source: “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US, 2001-08-07: Document C05453670,” Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder2.pdf>.

86. Terrorist Threat Review PowerPoint Presentation Slide: Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly (2001)

Classification: Top Secret

Two weeks before the 9/11 attacks, a PowerPoint slide—presented in the document below—was part of a presentation given to White House officials. Although the presentation remains classified, this slide points out that an identified Islamic fundamentalist was learning to fly 747 aircraft. This presentation refers to Zacarias Moussaoui, who failed to board an aircraft on September 11, 2001.

DCI Update: Terrorist Threat Review

August 23, 2001

Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly

- Islamic fundamental travels to US to learn to fly a 747 in Minnesota
- Pays for training in cash
- Interested to learn that 747 doors don't open in flight
- Wanted training on London-JFK flights
- FBI arrested him based on the fact that he overstayed his 90 day visa

Source: “DCI Update, Terrorist Threat Review, Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly, 2001-08-23: Document CO5464171,” Intelwire, <http://intelwire.egoplex.com/CIA-911-Binder2.pdf>.

87. Director George Tenet's Statement to a CIA Workforce about 9/11 Terrorist Attacks (2001)

Classification: Unclassified

The day after the 9/11 attacks, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet made these remarks to the CIA workforce.

Director Tenet's Statement on 9/11 Attacks

Good afternoon.

Yesterday, the entire American people—joined by men and women around the globe—recoiled in horror at the barbaric acts against our country.

In my hometown of New York, at the Pentagon, and in the skies over Pennsylvania, the bloody hand of evil struck again and again, stealing thousands of innocent lives.

As the devastating toll of terror comes into focus, we are sure to find among those who were lost friends, colleagues, and others we hold dear.

Our thoughts and prayers are with all the victims, with those searching and caring for them, and with those who mourn them. I urge all of you to take the time to think of brothers and sisters that we, as Americans, have lost and to pray for those who survive them. The images of fire and destruction are forever etched in our minds. And in our hearts, amid the numbing shock, there has been profound grief and renewed resolve.

As President Bush said last night, the search for the sponsors of these unspeakable acts has already begun. Our Agency is among the leaders of that search. The fight against those who use the weapon of terror to menace and murder is necessarily hard. The shield of fanaticism—wielded by those ready to forfeit their lives to achieve their twisted dreams—is not easily pierced.

But it has been pierced before, and it will be pierced again.

Though we did not stop the latest, terrible assaults, you—the men and women of CIA and our Intelligence Community—have done much to combat terrorism in the past.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of American lives have been saved by the brave men and women of our Counter-Terrorism Center, our Directorate of Operations, our analysts, our scientists, our support officers—all who work relentlessly every day against this difficult target.

I know that together, we will do even more in the future.

The response yesterday—from our Counter-Terrorism Center, the Ops Center, Global Support, our entire Security Staff, and many, many others—was absolutely magnificent. Today, I am—as I always have been—very, very proud of all the men and women in this organization.

The important thing for us now is to do our job. To run to ground a vicious foe—one without heart or pity. A foe who has killed Americans, but who hopes in vain to kill the ideals and values that define all of us as Americans. The terrorists behind these atrocities—and those who give them shelter and support—must never know rest, ease, or comfort. The last word must not be theirs.

For the future must belong to the champions of freedom, not its enemies. That is our aim—today, tomorrow, always. This is a time for us to come together. To bring all our talents to bear in a steely determination to do what we are called to do—protect our fellow citizens. It is our turn again to step up to a challenge, and to meet it as we meet all challenges: With commitment and courage.

Put some spirit in your step, square your shoulders, focus your eyes . . . we have a job to do.

Many years ago, Winston Churchill—a giant of democracy—recalled his reaction on hearing the news of another surprise attack on America, this one at Pearl Harbor:

There were, he wrote, “many, not only in enemy countries [who] might discount the force of the United States. Some said they were soft, others that they would never be united. They would fool around at a distance. They would never come to grips. They would never stand blood-letting.”

But, Churchill concluded, “I had studied the American Civil War, fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark which Edward Grey had made to me more than thirty years before—that the United States is like ‘a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate.’” Indeed there is not.

I thank you all very, very much for your hard work. May God bless you all.

Source: “Director Tenet’s Statement to CIA Workforce about Terrorist Attacks,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/dci_speech_09122001.html.

88. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in the War against Terrorism (2001)

Classification: Unclassified

On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush signed an executive order authorizing the creation of military tribunals for the detention, treatment, and trial of certain noncitizens in the war against terrorism. The order is one of the tactics taken by the U.S. government to combat terrorism as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

Military Order of November 13, 2001

Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism

By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Findings.

(a) International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.

(b) In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense in the national capital region, on the World Trade Center in New York, and on civilian aircraft such as in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a national

emergency on September 14, 2001 (Proc. 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks).

(c) Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States Government.

(d) The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon using the United States Armed Forces to identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks.

(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.

(f) Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.

(g) Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.

Sec. 2. Definition and Policy.

(a) The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing that:

1. there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
 - (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
 - (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused,

threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or

(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and

2. it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this order.

(b) It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any individual subject to this order is detained in accordance with section 3, and, if the individual is to be tried, that such individual is tried only in accordance with section 4.

(c) It is further the policy of the United States that any individual subject to this order who is not already under the control of the Secretary of Defense but who is under the control of any other officer or agent of the United States or any State shall, upon delivery of a copy of such written determination to such officer or agent, forthwith be placed under the control of the Secretary of Defense.

Sec. 3. Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Any individual subject to this order shall be—

- a. detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States;
- b. treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria;
- c. afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, and medical treatment;
- d. allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of such detention; and
- e. detained in accordance with such other conditions as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

Sec. 4. Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals Subject to this Order.

(a) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or death.

(b) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, including subsection (f) thereof, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and regulations,

including orders for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Orders and regulations issued under subsection (b) of this section shall include, but not be limited to, rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and qualifications of attorneys, which shall at a minimum provide for—

1. military commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent with such guidance regarding time and place as the Secretary of Defense may provide;
2. a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law;
3. admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military commission (or instead, if any other member of the commission so requests at the time the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the commission rendered at that time by a majority of the commission), have probative value to a reasonable person;
4. in a manner consistent with the protection of information classified or classifiable under Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, or any successor Executive Order, protected by statute or rule from unauthorized disclosure, or otherwise protected by law, (A) the handling of, admission into evidence of, and access to materials and information, and (B) the conduct, closure of, and access to proceedings;
5. conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys designated by the Secretary of Defense and conduct of the defense by attorneys for the individual subject to this order;
6. conviction only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present;
7. sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present; and
8. submission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by me or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for that purpose.

Sec. 5. Obligation of Other Agencies to Assist the Secretary of Defense.

Departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United States shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, provide to the Secretary of Defense such assistance as he may request to implement this order.

Sec. 6. Additional Authorities of the Secretary of Defense.

(a) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any of the provisions of this order.

(b) The Secretary of Defense may perform any of his functions or duties, and may exercise any of the powers provided to him under this order (other than under section 4(c)(8) hereof) in accordance with section 113(d) of title 10, United States Code.

Sec. 7. Relationship to Other Law and Forums.

(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to—

1. authorize the disclosure of state secrets to any person not otherwise authorized to have access to them;
2. limit the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or the power of the President to grant reprieves and pardons; or
3. limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of Defense, any military commander, or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any State to detain or try any person who is not an individual subject to this order.

(b) With respect to any individual subject to this order—

1. military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual; and
2. the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.

(c) This order is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

(d) For purposes of this order, the term “State” includes any State, district, territory, or possession of the United States.

(e) I reserve the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense, at any time hereafter, to transfer to a governmental authority control of any individual subject to this order. Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the authority of any such governmental authority to prosecute any individual for whom control is transferred.

Sec. 8. Publication.

This order shall be published in the Federal Register.

GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 13, 2001.

Source: "Presidential Documents," *Federal Register* 66 (222) (November 16, 2001): 57831–57836.

89. Excerpt from a Document Discussing the Status of Iraq's Facilities to Produce Weapons of Mass Destruction: Postwar Assessment (2002)

Classification: Top Secret

This assessment is one of the main documents that led to the U.S. entry into war with Iraq. The report states that Iraq had continued its weapons of mass destruction programs, was in possession of chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles, and was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program and would probably have a nuclear weapon before the end of the decade. The report also estimates that Iraq would probably attempt clandestine attacks, probably with biological agents, in the United States if the Iraqi regime feared that an attack against it was imminent or unavoidable. In addition, in the event that Saddam Hussein concluded that Al Qaeda was the only organization that could conduct the type of terrorist strike against the United States that he wished to see take place, he might take "the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists." However, not everyone in the intelligence community agreed with this assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research argued that while Hussein wanted to acquire a nuclear weapon, it did not believe that Iraq's recent activities made a compelling case that a comprehensive attempt to acquire nuclear weapons was being made. The Bureau of Intelligence Research, along with the Department of Energy, questioned whether the high-strength aluminum tubes that Iraq had been attempting to acquire were well suited for use in gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.

Assessment of Iraq's Ability to Produce WMDs

Key Judgments:

Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction

We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and

biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

- Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
- Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles, which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
- Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSOC inspectors departed—December 1998.

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

- If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapons within several months to a year.
- Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise. . . .
- In a much likely scenario, Baghdad could make enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale uranium enrichment facilities. . . .

We judge that all key aspects—R&D [research and development], production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW [biological weapons] program are active and that most elements are larger and more advance than they were before the Gulf war.

- We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponization a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

- Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program
- Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents

- Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability.

- Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within three to six months these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent. . . .

- Baghdad's UAV could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the United States, the US Homeland.
 - An Iraqi UAV procurement network attempted to procure commercially available route planning software and an associate topographic database that would be able to support targeting of the United States, according to analysts of special intelligence.
 - The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capacity.
- Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities, including a test stand for engines more powerful than those in its current missile force.

We have low confidence in our ability to access when Saddam would use WMD.

- Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against US forces, friends, and allies in the region in a attempt to disrupt US war preparations and undermine the political will of Coalition.
- Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.
- He probably would use CBW when he perceived he irretrievably had lost control of the military and security situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that point.
- We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.
- Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the use of WMD; however, he probably has provided contingency instructions to his commanders to use CBW to specific circumstances.

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war.

Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the US Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks—more likely with biological than chemical agents—probably would be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.

- The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes action against Iraq. The IIS probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory.

Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al Qaeda—with worldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life or death struggle against the United States—could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

- In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting that Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.

In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichments and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.

Source: "Key Judgments (from October 2002 NIE): Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction," George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd15.pdf>.

90. National Intelligence Estimate: Key Judgments on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002)

Classification: Secret

The national intelligence estimate (NIE) is the highest-level document generated by U.S. intelligence agencies. This NIE issued in October 2002 was titled "Iraq's Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction" and was produced in just a few weeks because Congress was nearing a vote on going to war with Iraq. The NIE's key findings were later proven wrong, but not before they had seeped into President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union address and, a month later, into Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation at the United Nations (UN) in which he argued the case for war. This deeply flawed assessment, which was the basis for the United States invading Iraq, has come to be seen as one of the worst intelligence products produced by the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community.

Estimate of Iraq's WMDs

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
October 2002

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Key Judgments:

Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

- Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.
- Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
- Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
- Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.
- If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
- Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.

—Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program.

Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

—Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.

Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

- Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.
- The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads,

including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds. All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.

- Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.
- Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war. Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
- Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
- Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.
- Baghdad’s UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.
- Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.

Source: “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf.

91. Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support of Detainee Interrogations (2003)

Classification: Top Secret

This draft memorandum written by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Medical Services provides guidelines on 22 methods of interrogation for detainees. The methods of interrogation range in intensity from shaving to waterboarding.

Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations

September 4, 2003

The following guidelines offer general references for medical officers supporting the detention of terrorists captured and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency for interrogation and debriefing. There are three different contexts in which these guidelines may be applied: (1) during the period of initial interrogation, (2) during the more sustained period of debriefing at an interrogation site, and (3) [REDACTED]

INTERROGATION SUPPORT

Captured terrorists turned over to the CIA for interrogation may be subjected to a wide range of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which are also used on U.S. military personnel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically “dislocate” the detainee, maximize his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or eliminate his will to resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence.

Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by the Director, CTC in the case of each individual case. They include, in approximately ascending degree of intensity:

Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure)

Shaving

Stripping

Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours)

Hooding

Isolation

White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing)

Continuous light or darkness

Uncomfortably cool environment

Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain general health)

Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position

Water Dousing

Sleep deprivation (up to 72 hours)

Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above)

Attention grasp

Facial hold

Insult (facial) slap

Abdominal slap

Prolonged diapering

Sleep deprivation (over 72 hours)

Stress positions

- on knees, body slanted forward or backward
- leaning with forehead on wall

Walling

Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)

Waterboard

In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact and not some physical effect, with a specific goal of “dislocat[ing] his expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive. . . .” The more physical techniques are delivered in a manner carefully limited to avoid serious physical harm. The slaps for example are designed “to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation” and “not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting.” To this end they must be delivered in a specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is only against a springboard designed to be loud and bouncy (and cushion the blow). All walling and most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject’s head solidly supported with a towel to avoid extension-flexion injury.

OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency detainees subject to “enhanced” interrogation techniques, and for determining that the authorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or permanent harm.[1] “DCI Guidelines” have been issued formalizing these responsibilities, and these should be read directly.

Whenever feasible, advance approval is required to use any measures beyond standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all “enhanced” measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel[2] confirming from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to produce “severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” As a practical matter, the detainee’s physical condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will result.

[1] The standard used by the Justice Department for “mental” harm is “prolonged mental harm,” i.e., “mental harm of some-lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years.” “In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been inflicted.” Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p. 15.

[2] [REDACTED] Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use after waterboard requires the presence of a physician.

The medical implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below.

General intake evaluation

New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with a complete documented history and physical addressing in depth any chronic or previous medical problems. [REDACTED] Vital signs and weight should be recorded and blood work drawn. [REDACTED]

Documented subsequent medical rechecks should be performed on a regular basis, [REDACTED] Although brief, the data should reflect what was checked and include negative findings. [REDACTED]

Medical treatment

It is important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees, even those undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chronic medications should receive them, acute medical problems should be treated, and adequate fluids and nutrition provided. [REDACTED]

The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable, but should include adequate fluids and nutritional. Actual consumption should be monitored and recorded. Liquid Ensure (or equivalent) is a good way to assure that there is adequate nutrition. [REDACTED] Individuals resurging adequate liquids during this stage should have fluids administered at the earliest signs of dehydration. [REDACTED] if there is any question about adequacy of fluid intake, urinary output also should be monitored and recorded.

Uncomfortably cool environments

Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortably cool environments for varying lengths of time, ranging from hours to days. [REDACTED]

Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of 10°C/50°F. At this temperature increased metabolic rate cannot compensate for heat loss. The WHO recommended minimum indoor temperature is 18°C/64°F. The “thermoneutral zone” where minimal compensatory activity is required to maintain core temperature is 20°C/86°F to 30°C/85°F. Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°C/78°F is considered optimally comfortable for lightly clothed individuals and 30°C/86°F for naked individuals. [REDACTED]

If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented. [REDACTED]

At ambient temperatures below 18°C/64°F, detainees should be monitored for the development of hypothermia. [REDACTED]

White noise or loud music

As a practical guide there is no permanent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hours-a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18 hours a day; 90 dB for up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hours, and 100dB for 2 hours. If necessary, instruments can be provided to measure those ambient sounds. [REDACTED]

Shackling

Shackling in non-stressful position requires only monitoring for the development of pressure sores with appropriate treatment and adjustment of the shackles as required. [REDACTED] Assuming no medical contraindications are found, extended periods (up to 72 hours) in a standing position can be approved if the hands are no higher than head level and weight is borne fully by the lower extremities [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sleep Deprivation

[REDACTED] The standard approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard to shackling position) is 72 hours. Extension of sleep deprivations beyond 72 continuous hours is considered an enhanced measure, which requires D/CTC prior approval. [REDACTED]

Note: Examinations performed during periods of sleep deprivation should include the current number of hours without sleep; and, if only a brief rest preceded this period, the specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded.

Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)

Detainees can be placed in awkward boxes specifically constructed for this purpose. [REDACTED] confinement in the small box is allowable up to 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8 consecutive hours, [REDACTED]

Waterboard

This is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The historical context here was limited knowledge of the use of the waterboard in SERE training (several hundred trainees experience it every year or two). In the SERE model the subject is mobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered with a cloth. A stream of water is directed at the upper lip. Resistant subjects then have the cloth lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water continues to be applied, fully saturating the cloth and precluding the passage of air. Relatively little water enters the mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removal of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect.

This process can continue for several minutes, and involve up to 15 canteen cups of water. Ostensibly the primary desired effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily occluding the nose and mouth, and psychological impact of the continued application of water after the cloth is removed. SERE trainees usually have only a single exposure to this technique, and never more than two; SERE trainers consider it their most effective technique, and deem it virtually irresistible in the training setting.

[REDACTED]

The SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (single exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications without significant or lasting medical complications. The procedure nonetheless carries some risks, particularly when repeated a large number of times or when applied to individuals less fit than a typical SERE trainee. Several medical dimensions need to be monitored to ensure the safety of the subject.

[REDACTED]

In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation, the subject may simply give up allowing excessive filling of the airways and loss of consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to resume normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. Any subject who has reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the waterboard, and the physician on the scene cannot approve further use of the waterboard without specific C/OMS consultation and approval.

A rigid guide to medically approved use of the waterboard in essentially healthy individuals is not possible, as safety will depend on how the water is applied and the specific response each time it is used. The following general guidelines are based on very limited knowledge, drawn from very few subjects whose experience and response was quite varied. These represent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are operative and may be more restrictive.

A series (within a “session”) of several relatively rapid waterboard applications is medically acceptable in all healthy subjects, so long as there is no indication of some emerging vulnerability. [REDACTED] Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed without apparent medical complication. The exact number of sessions cannot be prescribed, and will depend on the response to each. If more than 3 sessions cannot be prescribed, and will depend on the response to each. If more than 3 sessions of 5 or more applications are envisioned within a 24 hours period a careful medical reassessment must be made before each later session.

By days 3–5 of an aggressive program, cumulative effects become a potential concern. Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages of this technique, we believe that beyond this point continued intensive waterboard applications may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive use of the waterboard beyond this point should be reviewed by the HVT team in consultation with Headquarters prior to any further aggressive use.

[REDACTED]

Note: In order to best inform future medical judgments and recommendations, it is important that every application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented; how long each application (and the entire procedure) lasted, how much water was used in the process (realizing that much splashes off), how exactly the water was applied, if a seal was achieved, if the naso- or oropharynx was filled, what sort of volume was expelled, how long was the break down between applications, and how the subject looked between each treatment.

[REDACTED]

Source: “Draft OMH Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, September 4, 2003,” George Washington University National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf.

92. Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities: Inspector General’s Report (2004)

Classification: Top Secret

This special review by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of the Inspector General examines the CIA’s counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities, including the apparently unauthorized use of mock executions, a handgun, a power drill, threats, smoke to induce vomiting, stress positions, a stiff brush and shackles, pressure points, the “hard takedown,” and excessive waterboarding. The report also describes the death of a detainee following four days of detention and brutal interrogation.

IG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities

Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003)

May 7, 2004

Introduction

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] In November 2002, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that the Agency had established a program in the Counterterrorist Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC Program"). He also informed OIG that he had just learned of and had dispatched a team to investigate [REDACTED]. In January 2003, the DDO informed OIG that he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee, Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights. In January 2003, OIG initiated a review of Agency counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities [REDACTED] and the incident with Al-Nashiri. This review covers the period September 2001 to mid-October 2003.

Summary

3. [REDACTED] The DCI assigned responsibility for implementing capture and detention authority to the DDO and to the Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC). When U.S. military forces began detaining individuals in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] the Agency began to detain and interrogate directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah, in March 2002, presented the Agency with a significant dilemma.[FOOTNOTE] The Agency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu Zubaydah was withholding information that could not be obtained through then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior Al-Qa'ida high value detainees.

[FOOTNOTE: The use of "high value" or "medium value" to describe terrorist targets and detainees in this Review is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC. CTC distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United States. Senior Al-Qa'ida planners and operators, such as Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fall into the category of "high

value” and are given the highest: priority for capture, detention, and interrogation. CTC categorizes those individuals who are believed to have lesser direct knowledge of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as “medium value” targets/detainees.]

5. The conduct of detention and interrogation activities presented new challenges for CIA. These included determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing qualified personnel to manage and carry out detention and interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa’ida personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques, another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that Agency personnel could lawfully use to overcome the resistance. In this context, CTC, with the assistance of the Office of Technical Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place against the backdrop of pre–September 11, 2001 CIA avoidance of interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners and detainees in the international community.

6. The Office of General Counsel (OGC) took the lead in determining and documenting the legal parameters and constraints for interrogations OGC conducted independent research and consulted extensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) and National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working with DoJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), OGC determined that in most instances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and interrogation, activities [REDACTED] the criminal probation against torture 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. In August 2002, DoJ provide to the Agency a legal opinion in which it determined that 10 specific “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” (EITs) would not violate the torture prohibition. This work provided the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide the CTC Program.

7. By November 2002, the Agency had Abu Zubaydah and another high value detainee, ‘Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, in custody [REDACTED] and the Office of Medical Services (OMS) provided medical care to the detainees.

[REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED] From the beginning, OGC briefed DO officers assigned to these [REDACTED] facilities on their legal authorities, and Agency personnel staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the condition of detainees in cables.

[REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED] there were few instances of deviations from approved procedures [REDACTED] with one notable exception described in this Review. With respect to two detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the

waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for purposes of DoJ's legal opinions.

[REDACTED]

15. Agency efforts to provide systematic, clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems have been identified and addressed. CTC implemented training programs for interrogators and debriefers. Moreover, building upon operational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DCI on 28 January 2003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant [REDACTED]". The DCI Guidelines require individuals engaged in or supporting interrogations [REDACTED] be made aware of the guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines make formal the existing CTC practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquarters approvals prior to the application of all EITs. Although the DCI Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for interpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and interrogation activities.

16. The Agency's detention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world. The CTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military commanders.

17. The current CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal review and Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency policy and rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers. Officers are concerned that public revelation of the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself.

18. [REDACTED] recognized that detainees may be held in U.S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate law enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has been ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC, Defense Department, and Justice Department officials, no decisions on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the U.S. Government rather than a CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely.

19. The Agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately do with terrorists detained by the Agency.

20. This review makes a number of recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities. Although the DCI Guidelines were an important step forward, they were only designed to address the CTC Program, rather than all Agency debriefing or interrogation activities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Editors Note: The entire chapter on “Recommendations” is redacted.

Source: “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003),” George Washington University National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf.

93. Special Operations Forces and CIA Paramilitary Operations (2006)

Classification: Unclassified

This report examines the roles and missions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Special Operations Command, reviews the history of paramilitary operations, assesses the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations to shift responsibility for paramilitary operations to the Special Operations Command, and presents congressional considerations, including oversight, and legal concerns.

Report on Special Forces and CIA Paramilitary Operations

December 6, 2006

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress

What Are Special Operations and Paramilitary Operations?

DOD defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”

DOD defines paramilitary forces as “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission.” In this report, the term “paramilitary operations” will be used for operations conducted by the CIA whose officers and employees are not part of the armed forces of the United States. (In practice, military personnel may be temporarily assigned to the CIA and CIA personnel may temporarily serve directly under a military commander.)

In general, special operations are distinguishable from regular military operations by degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and mode of employment among other factors. DOD special operations are frequently clandestine—designed in such a way as to ensure concealment; they are not necessarily covert, that is, concealing the identity of the sponsor is not a priority. The CIA, however, conducts covert and clandestine operations to avoid directly implicating the U.S. Government.

Roles and Mission of CIA and SOF

USSOCOM was established by Congress in 1987. USSOCOM’s stated mission is to plan, direct and execute special operations in the conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States.

The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to collect intelligence through human sources and to analyze and disseminate intelligence from all sources. It was also to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct.” This opaque phrase was, within a few months, interpreted to include a range of covert activities such as those that had been carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Although some observers long maintained that covert actions had no statutory basis, in 1991 the National Security Act was amended to establish specific procedures for approving covert actions and for notifying key Members of Congress.

The statutory definition of covert action (“activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. . .”) is broad and can include a wide range of clandestine efforts—from subsidizing foreign journals and political parties to participation in what are essentially military operations. In the case of paramilitary operations, there is a clear potential for overlap with activities that can be carried out by DOD. In general, the CIA would be designated to conduct operations that are to be wholly covert or disavowable. In practice, responsibilities for paramilitary operations have been assigned by the National Security Council on a case-by-case basis.

Brief History of CIA and SOF Paramilitary Operations

CIA. In addition to acquiring intelligence to support US military operations from the Korean War era to Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DOD personnel in military operations. On occasion it has also conducted clandestine military operations apart from the military. One example was the failed Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Especially important was a substantial CIA-managed effort in Laos in the 1960s and 1970s to interdict North Vietnamese resupply efforts. The CIA was directed to undertake this effort in large measure to avoid the onus of official U.S. military intervention in neutral Laos. The CIA's paramilitary operations in Afghanistan in 2001 have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan before the end of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the Taliban regime by the end of the year. According to media reports, the CIA has also been extensively involved in operations in Iraq in support of military operations.

SOF. SOF have reportedly been involved in clandestine and covert paramilitary operations on numerous occasions since the Vietnam War. Operations such as the response to the TWA 847 and Achille Lauro hijackings in 1985, Panama in 1989, Mogadishu in 1993, and the Balkans in the late 1990s have become public knowledge over time but other operations reportedly remain classified to this day. Some speculate that covert paramilitary operations would probably become the responsibility of a number of unacknowledged special operations units believed to exist within USSOCOM.

9/11 Report Recommendations

Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: "Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command." The 9/11 commission's basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11 and instead relied on improperly trained proxies (foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome. The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build "two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations," and suggests that we should "concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity."

Some observers question whether procedures are in place to insure overall coordination of effort. Press reports concerning an alleged lack of coordination during Afghan operations undoubtedly contributed to the 9/11 commission's recommendation regarding paramilitary operations. Although such accounts have been discounted by some observers, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act included a provision that requires DOD and CIA to develop joint procedures "to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve elements" of the CIA and DOD. When separate missions are underway in the same geographical area, the CIA and DOD are required to establish procedure's to reach "mutual

agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.”

Potential Impacts

Diminished CIA Intelligence Capabilities. Some observers suggest that a capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly related to the Agency’s responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources. Some individuals and groups that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or supporting a paramilitary operation. If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however, certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear.

Additional Strain on SOF. Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility would place additional strains on SOF who are extensively committed worldwide. Others argue that SOF lacks the experience and requisite training to conduct covert operations. They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their more traditional missions.

A Reduction in Flexibility. The 9/11 Report notes the CIA’s “reputation for agility in operations,” as well as the military’s reputation for being “methodical and cumbersome.” Some experts question if DOD and SOF are capable of operating in a more agile and flexible manner. They contend that the CIA was able to beat SOF into Afghanistan because they had less bureaucracy to deal with than did SOF, which permitted them to “do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military.” Some are concerned that if SOF takes over responsibility for clandestine and covert operations that they will become less agile and perhaps more vulnerable to bureaucratic interference from defense officials.

SOF Funding Authority. Section 1208 of PL 108-375 permits SOF to directly pay and equip foreign forces or groups supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism. Although not a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission’s report, many feel that this authority will not only help SOF in the conduct of unconventional warfare, but could also be a crucial tool should they become involved in covert or clandestine operations. In Afghanistan, SOF did not have the authority to pay and equip local forces and instead relied on the CIA to “write checks” for needed arms, ammunition, and supplies.

Issues for Congress

Oversight Issues. Congress may choose to review past or current paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA and might also choose to assess the extent of coordination between the CIA and DOD. P.L. 108-458 required that a report be submitted to defense and intelligence committees by June 2005 describing procedures established in regard to coordination and deconfliction of CIA and DOD operations. That report provided an opportunity to indicate how initiatives by the executive branch have addressed relevant issues.

CIA has not maintained a sizable paramilitary force “on the shelf.” When directed, it has built paramilitary capabilities by using its individuals, either U.S. or foreign, with paramilitary experience under the management of its permanent operations personnel in an entity known as the Special Activities Division. The permanent staff would be responsible for planning and for maintaining ties to former CIA officials and military personnel and individuals (including those with special language qualifications) who could be employed should the need arise. Few observers doubt that there is a continuing need for coordination between the CIA and DOD regarding paramilitary capabilities and plans for future operations. Furthermore, many observers believe that the CIA should concentrate on “filling the gaps,” focusing on those types of operations that DOD is likely to avoid. Nevertheless, they view this comparatively limited set of potential operations to be a vitally important one that should not be neglected or assigned to DOD. There may be occasions when having to acknowledge an official U.S. role would preclude operations that were otherwise considered vital to the national security; the CIA can provide the deniability that would be difficult, if not impossible, for military personnel.

Potential Legal Considerations. Some experts believe that there may be legal difficulties if SOF are required to conduct covert operations. One issue is the legality of ordering SOF personnel to conduct covert activities that would require them to forfeit their Geneva Convention status to retain deniability. To operate with deniability, SOF could be required to operate without the protection of a military uniform and identification card which affords them combatant status under the Geneva Convention if captured. Also, covert operations can often be contrary to international laws or the laws of war and U.S. military personnel are generally expected to follow these laws.

Traditionally, the public text of intelligence legislation has included few provisions regarding paramilitary operations; levels of funding and other details are included in classified annexes which are understood to have the force of law. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees do have considerable influence in supporting or discouraging particular covert actions. In a few cases Congress has formally voted to deny funding to ongoing covert operations. Special Forces, however, fall under the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and it is unclear how Congress would handle oversight if covert operations are shifted to SOF as well as how disputes between the intelligence and armed services committees would be dealt with.

Congressional Activity

109th Congress. The 109th Congress did not address this issue legislatively. On November 23, 2004, President Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit their advice to him by February 23, 2005. In unclassified testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, the Director of the CIA testified that the CIA and DOD disagreed with the

9-11 Committee's recommendation. In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that "neither the CIA nor DOD endorses the commission's recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or operations." The Administration reportedly rejected the 9-11 commission's recommendation to shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations to DoD.

110th Congress. It is possible that the 110th Congress might legislatively shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations from the CIA to DOD. Reports suggest that the Democratic-led House might act early to adopt all of the 9-11 Commission's recommendations, including Recommendation 32.

Source: Richard A. Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert, "Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf>.

94. U.S. Strategy for Intelligence in the Post-9/11 Era (2009)

Classification: Unclassified

This 2009 national intelligence strategy represents a refined understanding of the counterterrorism challenge and elevates the importance of the challenges that the United States faces in cyber and counterintelligence threats. The document also affirms priorities to focus intelligence community plans and actions while providing direction to guide the development of future intelligence community capabilities.

U.S. Post-9/11 Intelligence Strategy

The National Intelligence Strategy

August 2009

Twenty years after the Berlin Wall came down and eight years after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the United States has emerged from the post-Cold War world and post-9/11 world. We know the type of world we face, the nature of the threats, challenges, and opportunities before us, and the role intelligence can play in supporting policies that advance our national interests.

The United States faces a complex and rapidly shifting international security landscape. Events at home and abroad move quickly, often in an interconnected fashion, driven by the pace of technological change and international communications. National security priorities adapt as rapidly as these events unfold. The Intelligence Community (IC) must keep a steady focus on enduring challenges in

and among nation-states and persistent transnational issues, and also be agile in adapting to emerging threats and harnessing opportunities. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) sets out the following guiding principles: responsive and incisive understanding of global threats and opportunities, coupled with an agility that brings to bear the Community's capabilities.

The 2009 NIS represents several advances in the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) leadership of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the IC. It reflects a refined understanding of the counterterrorism challenge and elevates the importance of the challenges we face in the cyber domain and from counterintelligence threats. This NIS also affirms priorities to focus IC plans and actions for the next four years, while providing direction to guide development of future IC capabilities. The NIS highlights areas that demand our attention, resources, and commitment. It also establishes the basis for accountability, in conjunction with an implementation plan, to ensure that the Community meets the goals of our strategy.

This document affirms the vital role that intelligence plays in our Nation's security. We will only succeed because of the extraordinary talent, courage, and patriotism of our professionals.

Dennis C. Blair
Director of National Intelligence

VISION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The United States Intelligence Community must constantly strive for and exhibit three characteristics essential to our effectiveness. The IC must be integrated: a team making the whole greater than the sum of its parts. We must also be agile: an enterprise with an adaptive, diverse, continually learning, and mission-driven intelligence workforce that embraces innovation and takes initiative. Moreover, the IC must exemplify America's values: operating under the rule of law, consistent with Americans' expectations for protection of privacy and civil liberties, respectful of human rights, and in a manner that retains the trust of the American people.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The United States faces a complex and rapidly changing national security environment in which nation-states, highly capable non-state actors, and other transnational forces will continue to compete with and challenge U.S. national interests. Adversaries are likely to use asymmetric means and technology (either new or applied in a novel way) to counter U.S. interests at home and abroad. There may be opportunities for cooperative multilateral action to meet these challenges.

A number of nation-states have the ability to challenge U.S. interests in traditional (e.g., military force and espionage) and emerging (e.g., cyber operations) ways.

- Iran poses an array of challenges to U.S. security objectives in the Middle East and beyond because of its nuclear and missile programs, support of terrorism, and provision of lethal aid to U.S. and Coalition adversaries.
- North Korea continues to threaten peace and security in East Asia because of its sustained pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, its transfer of these capabilities to third parties, its erratic behavior, and its large conventional military capability.
- China shares many interests with the United States, but its increasing natural resource-focused diplomacy and military modernization are among the factors making it a complex global challenge.
- Russia is a U.S. partner in important initiatives such as securing fissile material and combating nuclear terrorism, but it may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence in ways that complicate U.S. interests.

There also may be opportunities for cooperation with many nation-states, including those cited above, in support of common interests that include promoting rule of law, representative government, free and fair trade, energy, and redress of troublesome transnational issues.

Non-state and sub-state actors increasingly impact our national security.

- Violent extremist groups are planning to use terrorism—including the possible use of nuclear weapons or devices if they can acquire them—to attack the United States. Working in a number of regions, these groups aim to derail the rule of law, erode societal order, attack U.S. strategic partners, and otherwise challenge U.S. interests worldwide.
- Insurgents are attempting to destabilize vulnerable states in regions of strategic interest to the United States.
- Transnational criminal organizations, including those that traffic drugs, pose a threat to U.S. interests by potentially penetrating and corrupting strategically vital markets; destabilizing certain nation-states; and providing weapons, hard currency, and other support to insurgents and violent criminal factions.

A number of transnational forces and trends—from shifting global demographics to resource struggles—present strategic challenges to U.S. interests, but also provide new opportunities for U.S. global leadership.

- The global economic crisis could accelerate and weaken U.S. security by fueling political turbulence. In some developing economies, a sustained slowdown could induce social and political instability, while in others it could erode support for market-oriented liberal democracy and create openings for authoritarianism.
- Failed states and ungoverned spaces offer terrorist and criminal organizations safe haven and possible access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and may cause or exacerbate starvation, genocide, and environmental degradation.

- Climate change and energy competition may produce second-order effects for national security as states anticipate the effects of global warming (e.g., by contesting water resources in regions with limited potable sources) and seek to secure new energy sources, transport routes, and territorial claims.
- Rapid technological change and dissemination of information continue to alter social, economic, and political forces, providing new means for our adversaries and competitors to challenge us, while also providing the United States with new opportunities to preserve or gain competitive advantages.
- As the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak vividly illustrates, the risk of pandemic disease presents a persistent challenge to global health, commerce, and economic well-being.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Intelligence Community has four strategic goals. In order to meet them, we must operate effectively regardless of where the intelligence resides, with a clear legal framework to guide us. The first two goals, supported by six Mission Objectives (MOs), speak to the missions we must accomplish. The third and fourth goals, supported by seven Enterprise Objectives (EOs), describe what we will achieve as an intelligence enterprise to support our Mission Objectives.

- Enable wise national security policies by continuously monitoring and assessing the international security environment to warn policymakers of threats and inform them of opportunities. We will provide policymakers with strategic intelligence that helps them understand countries, regions, issues, and the potential outcomes of their decisions. We will also provide feedback to policymakers on the impact of their decisions.
- Support effective national security action. The IC will deliver actionable intelligence to support diplomats, military units, interagency organizations in the field, and domestic law enforcement organizations at all levels. At times, we will be directed by the President to carry out covert activities that we will faithfully execute within the bounds of U.S. law.
- Deliver balanced and improving capabilities that leverage the diversity of the Community's unique competencies and evolve to support new missions and operating concepts. We must integrate Community capabilities to reap synergies and efficiencies, continuously reassessing and adjusting our portfolio so that we can prepare for tomorrow's challenges while performing today's missions.
- Operate as a single integrated team, employing collaborative teams that leverage the full range of IC capabilities to meet the requirements of our users, from the President to deployed military units.

Mission Objectives

- MO1: Combat Violent Extremism
- MO2: Counter WMD Proliferation
- MO3: Provide Strategic Intelligence and Warning
- MO4: Integrate Counterintelligence
- MO5: Enhance Cybersecurity
- MO6: Support Current Operations

Enterprise Objectives

- EO1: Enhance Community Mission Management
- EO2: Strengthen Partnerships
- EO3: Streamline Business Processes
- EO4: Improve Information Integration & Sharing
- EO5: Advance S&T/R&D
- EO6: Develop the Workforce
- EO7: Improve Acquisition

MO 1: Combat Violent Extremism

Understand, monitor, and disrupt violent extremist groups that actively plot to inflict grave damage or harm to the United States, its people, interests, and allies.

Violent extremist groups—primarily al-Qa’ida and its regional affiliates, supporters, and the local terrorist cells it inspires—will continue to pose a grave threat to U.S. persons and interests at home and abroad. The Intelligence Community supports the whole-of-U.S. Government efforts to protect the homeland, defeat terrorists and their capabilities, counter the spread of violent extremism, and prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. The IC’s mission is to identify and assess violent extremist groups; warn of impending attacks; and develop precise intelligence to cut off these groups’ financial support and to disrupt, dismantle, or defeat their operations.

We will build on the IC’s significant progress since September 11, 2001. We must continue improving our capabilities to enhance the quality of our support and the responsiveness to customers’ needs. . . .

MO 2: Counter WMD Proliferation

Counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by state and non-state actors. The Intelligence Community must support five enduring policy objectives for countering the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery: dissuade, prevent, roll back, deter, and manage consequences. The IC will work with partners inside and outside the U.S. Government to improve capabilities needed to support action across all five WMD objectives.

The IC must continue enhancing its capabilities in the following areas:

- **Enhance dissuasion.** Identify opportunities and levers that the United States and its allies can use to discourage interest in WMD.
- **Support prevention.** Increase support to policymakers in preventing WMD proliferation by enhancing capabilities that contribute to U.S. Government efforts to prevent the flow of WMD-related materials, technologies, funds, and expertise.
- **Enable rollback.** Identify opportunities and levers that the United States and its allies can use to end or roll back WMD or capabilities that raise serious concerns.
- **Enhance deterrence.** Improve capabilities to understand adversaries' WMD plans, intentions, and doctrines and to deny the impact of their capabilities.
- **Manage consequences.** Reinforce U.S. Government efforts to mitigate or manage the consequences of WMD use by supporting the characterization of adversaries' WMD capabilities and the development of countermeasures against WMD use, and by improving the ability to support timely attribution of WMD used against the United States, its allies, or friends.

MO 3: Provide Strategic Intelligence and Warning

Warn of strategic trends and events so that policymakers, military officials, and civil authorities can effectively deter, prevent, or respond to threats and take advantage of opportunities.

The issues and trends that will shape the future security environment—economic instability, state failure, the ebb and flow of democratization, emergence of regional powers, changing demographics and social forces, climate change, access to space, pandemic disease, and the spread of disruptive technologies, to name just a few—will test the Intelligence Community's ability to provide strategic warning and avoid surprise. Most of the IC's analytic cadre focus on assessing ongoing and near-term events of significance. The IC must improve its ability to anticipate and identify emerging challenges and opportunities. To accomplish this objective, the Community must better integrate long-range and trend analysis, strategic warning, and opportunity identification. This will enable multiple objectives, including long-range policy planning, strategy development, and policy formulation. We must identify the gaps in our knowledge, analytic resources, capabilities, tradecraft, and performance to ensure proper coverage of strategic analytic priorities. Expanded use of techniques such as red-teaming can help ensure quality and integrity in analytic products, and potentially produce fresh insights into our toughest challenges.

In particular, the IC must:

- **Broaden expertise.** Provide greater scope, depth, and quality of intelligence analysis—especially in economics, energy and natural resources, and non-military technologies.
- **Deepen understanding.** Build and access deep understanding of the cultural, political, religious, economic, ethnic, and tribal factors in operational theaters.

- **Enhance outreach.** Conduct strategic outreach to key external centers of knowledge and expertise.
- **Improve collaboration.** Develop and field new techniques and capabilities to enhance collaboration and promote a Community-wide culture of sound strategic analysis.
- **Increase language skills.** Increase the quantity and fluency of our foreign language capability.

MO 4: Integrate Counterintelligence

Provide a counterintelligence capability that is integrated with all aspects of the intelligence process to inform policy and operations.

Foreign entities, including state and non-state actors, violent extremist groups, cyber intruders, and criminal organizations, are increasingly undermining U.S. interests in myriad and growing ways. Globalization of the marketplace and the openness of modern information networks have enabled our adversaries' goals. At the strategic level, these actors are attempting to manipulate U.S. policy and diplomatic efforts, disrupt or mitigate the effectiveness of our military plans and weapon systems, and erode our economic and technological advantage. At the tactical level, they are intent on penetrating our critical infrastructure, information systems, and leading industries.

Our counterintelligence (CI) community must lead a consistent, comprehensive, and collaborative effort across the U.S. Government, employing both offensive and defensive CI measures to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, and protect against these threats. The CI community must serve both the policymaker and operator. Tasks include: penetrating and exploiting adversaries, mitigating the insider threat, providing input to strategic warning, validating sources of intelligence, contributing to cyber defense, and evaluating acquisition risk.

Our CI community must build on its current efforts and focus in four areas:

- **Detect insider threats.** Detect insiders who seek to exploit their authorized access in order to harm U.S. interests.
- **Penetrate foreign services.** Penetrate hostile foreign intelligence services to determine their intentions, capabilities, and activities.
- **Integrate CI with cyber.** Employ CI across the cyber domain to protect critical infrastructure.
- **Assure the supply chain.** Assure the national security community's supply chain from foreign intelligence exploitation.

MO 5: Enhance Cybersecurity

Understand, detect, and counter adversary cyber threats to enable protection of the Nation's information infrastructure.

The architecture of the Nation's digital infrastructure, based largely upon the Internet, is neither secure nor resilient. Nation-states and non-governmental

entities are compromising, stealing, changing, or destroying information, and have the potential to undermine national confidence in the information systems upon which our economy and national security rests. The Intelligence Community plays an integral role in enhancing cybersecurity both by increasing our ability to detect and attribute adversary cyber activity and by expanding our knowledge of the capabilities, intentions, and cyber vulnerabilities of our adversaries.

The IC has made progress in implementing the initiatives and developing the enabling capabilities needed to meet national cybersecurity guidance. We must quickly add to these efforts through the following:

- **Leverage partnerships.** Integrate cyber expertise throughout the IC, as well as with allied intelligence services, industry, and the academic community.
- **Protect U.S. infrastructure.** Identify, prioritize, and close the gaps in our collection capability and analytic knowledge base on threats to our cybersecurity.
- **Combat cyber threats to non-traditional targets.** Focus more resources on identifying and neutralizing cyber threats to non-traditional intelligence customers.
- **Manage the cyber mission.** Strengthen Community-wide processes for mission management, specifically processes for enabling collaborative planning and execution and for providing a scalable, foundational capability to conduct cyber operations.

MO 6: Support Current Operations

Support ongoing diplomatic, military, and law enforcement operations, especially counterinsurgency; security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction; international counternarcotics; and border security.

Intelligence will continue to be a critical factor in a range of ongoing missions: defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, stabilizing Iraq, curbing drug cartels, ensuring the free and lawful flow of people and goods into and out of the homeland, and dealing with new contingencies as they arise. These ongoing operations have greatly expanded the Intelligence Community's missions and placed heavy demands on its resources and analytic efforts.

The IC has made notable progress in bringing actionable intelligence to bear in multiple complex and dangerous environments. However, we need to continue to develop new approaches; eliminate or reduce barriers to efficiency and effectiveness; and sustain technical, analytic, linguistic, and operational excellence to support a wide range of military, law enforcement, and civilian operations. We must also continue to improve our ability to collaborate between intelligence and law enforcement to detect and respond to threats to the homeland. Three areas deserve focus:

- **Monitor time-sensitive targets.** Sustain multidiscipline, high-fidelity collection on, and analysis of, time-sensitive targets.

- **Forward deploy collection and analytic presence.** Embed Community analysts in operational settings as part and parcel of an integrated enterprise approach.
- **Share information.** Enhance the ability to share intelligence with foreign governments; federal civil agencies; and state, local, tribal, and private-sector partners.

Enterprise Objectives

EO 1: Enhance Community Mission Management

Adopt a mission approach as the expected construct for organizing and delivering intelligence support on high-priority challenges.

The IC is at its best when it integrates its efforts across the enterprise to meet specific mission needs. Mission management provides a mechanism for focusing Community efforts against missions of high priority; it does not direct agencies how to perform their functions. Mission management leadership brings greater integration of analysis and collection so that priority intelligence gaps are identified, integrated solutions are developed and executed, and additional insights are provided to analysts, policymakers, and operators.

We must capture the best practices of mission management from recent years, find ways to nurture their development, integrate them across the Community, and encourage Community leadership at all levels to take the initiative and apply these practices. Mission management must be the norm, not the exception, for approaching our most important challenges.

The principles of Community mission management are:

- **Create unity of effort.** Work together, under common direction, as integrated, cross-cleared, multi-intelligence discipline teams to ensure the full range of IC capabilities are marshaled against the challenge. Community mission management leads to unified strategies that identify required actions, resources, and policies needed to accomplish the mission. IC elements are collaborative partners that share information, capabilities, and resources to achieve mission success.
- **Ensure accountability.** Designate an individual, team, center, or executive agency to act on the DNI's behalf to manage a national-level mission for the Community.
- **Tailor support.** Allow mission management to take many forms. We require a flexible approach that allows tailored support where no single solution fits all. Some forms of mission management require establishing a major center with a large staff, similar to the National Counterterrorism Center; others can be less formal, smaller arrangements similar to the Strategic Interdiction Group.
- **Foster agility.** Inculcate a mission approach in all we do and encourage initiative at all levels in response to mission needs. Our construct must allow the IC to respond to complex challenges of highest national importance,

including ones that arise suddenly and that require extraordinary effort from across the Community. The mission centers must move quickly to identify and meet intelligence needs, stay in touch with a wide range of policy and operational organizations, and provide timely and relevant intelligence support.

- **Deepen relationships.** Foster intense interactive links with users, whether they are policymakers or operators in the field. Mission centers must have direct relationships with users, while keeping IC components and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) informed of developments and requirements.
- **Foster mission management.** Establishing mission teams for complex challenges often requires significant changes in assignments, tasking, analytic production, and information-sharing arrangements. The IC must work cooperatively to encourage leaders at all levels to adopt a mission management approach, ensure that mission teams have the institutional support and resources needed, and continually review the impact of establishing such teams or centers and the gains achieved through doing so.

EO 2: Strengthen Partnerships

Strengthen existing and establish new partnerships with foreign and domestic, public and private entities to improve access to sources of information and intelligence, and ensure appropriate dissemination of Intelligence Community products and services.

The IC must leverage partnerships to obtain the access, expertise, and perspective required to succeed at our missions. Partnerships are particularly important for transnational issues that cross traditional organizational lines. In some cases, this means deepening existing traditional liaison relationships; in others, forging non-traditional relationships.

Our approach must align with broader national policy and be harmonized across the IC through policy that delineates roles, responsibilities, and authorities. Partnerships vary in scope, depth, and duration to reflect the type of requirement, the expected benefits, and the anticipated risks. Partnership characteristics may also vary across mission area, time, and intensity.

To address these multiple and sometimes conflicting demands, we will identify and prioritize which partnerships to form, when and under what conditions; coordinate IC interaction to advance common goals and use resources optimally; and assess the effectiveness of partnerships individually and collectively and adjust them accordingly.

To enhance our partnerships, we must focus in the following areas:

- **Build familiarity.** Deepen partners' knowledge of the IC and its capabilities and capacity, as well as IC understanding of the benefits partners provide.
- **Establish new partnerships.** Build mutual trust and a shared understanding of needs, capabilities, and missions with partners, particularly those with whom the IC has traditionally not had a relationship.

EO 3: Streamline Business Processes

Streamline IC business operations and employ common business services to deliver improved mission support capabilities and use taxpayer dollars more efficiently and effectively.

The Intelligence Community faces several critical challenges related to its business and security systems environments: redundant and non-interoperable systems and infrastructure; the inability to achieve clean financial audits as a result of poor data quality and integrity; and disparate, inefficient, ill-defined business and security clearance processes with unclear outcomes. We need more timely access to critical information, as well as easier aggregation of specific information at the enterprise level.

To address these challenges, eliminate wasteful redundancies, and transform enterprise business and security operations, the Intelligence Community must:

- **Modernize business operations.** Transform business operations and processes using innovative approaches, collaborative fora, and recognized best practices that inform senior IC leaders of the status of critical assets and issues.
- **Adopt standards and processes.** Develop and employ enterprise business standards and processes, modernize operations and services, and improve them through established performance goals and targets.
- **Implement a shared business/mission environment.** Implement a shared environment with improved business operations and services that enhances mission capabilities and simplifies IC leader access to business information and optimizes use of taxpayer money.
- **Integrate security practices.** Ensure security practices are streamlined and then integrated into transformed business processes to protect national intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.
- **Demonstrate sound financial management.** Achieve financial management transparency, accountability, and auditability, compliant with applicable laws and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines.
- **Promote robust consultation and oversight.** Support effective consultation with, and oversight by, inspectors general, general counsels, and agency officials responsible for privacy and civil liberties protection, with respect to processes, operations, and services.

EO 4: Improve Information Integration & Sharing

Radically improve the application of information technology—to include information management, integration and sharing practices, systems and architectures (both across the IC and with an expanded set of users and partners)—meeting the responsibility to provide information and intelligence, while at the same time protecting against the risk of compromise.

The Intelligence Community faces an explosive growth in type and volume of data, along with an exponential increase in the speed and power of processing capabilities. Threats to our networks and the integrity of our information have proliferated. Our partners and users increasingly expect us to discover, access, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information in compressed time frames. We have the responsibility to share information, while protecting sources and methods and respecting the privacy and rights of U.S. citizens.

Information policies, processes, and systems must cope with these circumstances, while providing a trusted and reliable environment to support operations, even when under attack. Initiatives and programs tied to information sharing and systems must accelerate and synchronize delivery of information enterprise capabilities. In addition, we must keep pace with changes in technology and mission needs. The Community must focus on the following areas:

- **Assure the environment.** Develop a world-class, Community-wide, assured information environment based on a common, effective, reliable, and secure infrastructure capable of providing information wherever IC elements or their customers are positioned.
- **Rationalize solutions.** Enable the rapid implementation of simple, logical, effective, crosscutting solutions (materiel and non-materiel), recognizing the need to terminate and eliminate legacy systems.
- **Enable information flow.** Integrate assured and authorized discovery and access of information to the IC workforce, while ensuring timely and tailored dissemination of information at appropriate classification levels.
- **Improve information aggregation and analysis.** The IC must narrow the gap between our capacity to “sense data” and our capabilities to “make sense of data” in handling an exponentially increasing volume and variety of data and information.
- **Maintain cyber security awareness.** Improve cyber security awareness and training throughout the IC enterprise, including IC partners and customers.

EO 5: Advance S&T/R&D

Discover, develop, and deploy Science & Technology/Research & Development advances in sufficient scale, scope, and pace for the IC to maintain, and in some cases gain, advantages over current and emerging adversaries.

The explosive pace in the development of technology offers opportunities to improve the IC’s productivity, effectiveness, and agility even if its increasing availability may also benefit our adversaries. History proves that riding the leading edge of technology is critical to the IC’s ability to deliver better intelligence. The focus of the IC’s Science & Technology (S&T) enterprise rests on several factors. Our adaptation, adoption, and development of technology will be guided by a combination of “technology push,” “capabilities pull,” and “mission pull.” The range of missions we face demands innovative approaches in many areas,

from major long-term collection systems to advanced analytical techniques, and clandestine sensors to secure, reliable networks and communications systems. Our Research & Development (R&D) program must balance the larger, longer-term, and often higher-risk initiatives that promise dramatically improved or completely unexpected capabilities with smaller, incremental improvements in capability that can be brought into use rapidly, then adapted and improved as they are used.

We must coherently manage the S&T/R&D effort across the IC to accelerate technology development, enhance collaboration, develop new and unexpected solutions, and protect “high risk/big payoff” projects such as those in the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity. Other specific areas of focus include:

- **Transition new technologies.** Improve the transition of S&T solutions to the operational user and into major system acquisition, as appropriate.
- **Expand partnerships.** Engage the academic community, industry, U.S. and partner-nation governments, mission customers, and nongovernmental centers of technical excellence and innovation.
- **Scan for trends.** Assess global technology trends to find emerging and potential breakthroughs and new technology for integration into IC capabilities.

EO 6: Develop the Workforce

Attract, develop, and retain a diverse, results-focused, and high-performing workforce capable of providing the technical expertise and exceptional leadership necessary to address our Nation’s security challenges.

People are at the core of building an agile and flexible intelligence enterprise and promoting a culture of collaboration. We must continue to build a diverse workforce with technical, linguistic, and cultural understanding and expertise that can work across organizational boundaries and meet the wide-ranging requirements of our mission objectives.

To meet this objective, the Community must:

- **Build a diverse and balanced workforce.** Employ, develop, and retain a workforce that reflects diversity in its broadest context—culture, ethnicity, ancestry, race, gender, language, and experiences—properly balanced among its military, civilian, and contractor components.
- **Enhance professional development.** Develop, reward, and retain technical expertise and professional leadership, including in S&T.
- **Cultivate relevant expertise.** Educate and train the workforce to align with national security and intelligence priorities.
- **Support an entrepreneurial ethos.** Encourage initiative, innovation, collaboration, resourcefulness, and resilience.

- **Deploy integrated, agile teams.** Integrate and deploy cross-functional and cross-organizational teams of personnel to meet mission objectives.
- **Build a culture of leadership excellence.** Create and sustain a culture of personal, professional, technical, and managerial leadership at all organizational levels.

EO 7: Improve Acquisition

Improve cost, schedule, performance, planning, execution, and transparency in major system acquisitions, while promoting innovation and agility.

Acquisition excellence requires a combination of agile decisionmaking and disciplined execution to leverage technology while meeting cost, schedule, and performance expectations. Major system acquisitions provide important new capabilities to meet future missions. Being able to deliver capability cost-effectively when it is needed improves mission effectiveness, provides leadership with flexibility in making investments, and precludes gaps in necessary capabilities.

Acquisition delivery timelines must be shortened to allow for innovation and maximum exploitation of new technologies. Agile decisionmaking and disciplined execution require that we:

- **Develop qualified acquisition professionals.** Provide expertise in leading the planning and execution of major IC acquisition programs. The IC acquisition workforce must be experienced, educated, and trained in the best practices of acquisition by parent organizations, with support from the ODNI.
- **Employ effective acquisition processes.** Apply the best practices of systems engineering, contracting, technology maturation, cost estimating, and financial management in acquisition execution. IC elements must demonstrate discipline in documenting and executing these processes. The ODNI will ensure that the best practices are applied across the Community.
- **Align with complementary processes.** Synchronize the planning, programming, and execution of major acquisition programs with other IC and Department of Defense processes. The requirements process must generate clearly defined user expectations; cost estimates must better align with the development of the annual budget; and human resources processes must provide personnel needed for successful execution.
- **Empower decisionmaking at lower levels.** Empower acquisition executives and program managers to manage programs and be held accountable for the results. In order to streamline decisionmaking, the DNI will delegate statutory milestone decision authority to the maximum extent possible when IC elements demonstrate a track record of successful performance, maintain transparency, and freely provide information to oversight entities.

ROLE OF THE DNI IN IMPLEMENTING THE NIS

By law and executive order, the DNI has sole authority to lead the Intelligence Community and manage the NIP. A principal vehicle through which the DNI executes responsibility on behalf of the President and the National Security Council is the National Intelligence Strategy. The DNI's role in leading the Community to implement the NIS includes:

- **Establish priorities with clear and measurable goals and objectives.** The DNI sets the intelligence agenda. The DNI will translate user requirements into intelligence priorities by which IC resources can be managed and progress measured and assessed.
- **Provide leadership on cross-cutting issues.** The DNI will exercise leadership to align incentives and enforce compliance on the coordination of issues that cross IC organizational boundaries.
- **Get direction through policy and budgets.** The DNI will issue policy directives to clarify roles and responsibilities so IC elements can effectively carry out NIS goals and objectives. Of particular importance is policy that enables or induces collaboration to meet DNI direction. The DNI will also determine the NIP budget request to the President and oversee execution of budgetary resources to properly fund national-level priorities.
- **Promote integration of agency capabilities.** The DNI will promote a “joint” perspective for how capabilities can be combined or integrated to achieve synergies and efficiencies so that the sum of the IC is greater than its parts. While some natural alignment occurs, the DNI has particular interest in reducing unwanted or unnecessary redundancy and increasing our shared effectiveness.
- **Monitor agency and leadership performance.** The DNI will establish and enforce performance expectations by reviewing IC elements' strategic plans for alignment with the NIS, assessing element and IC-wide progress against NIS objectives, and ratifying personal performance agreements that specify how the IC elements' leaders are accountable for implementing the NIS. IC components have a similar responsibility to develop plans, capabilities, programs, and policies that explicitly support the objectives laid out in this strategy.

CONCLUSION

The National Intelligence Strategy presents a way ahead for the Intelligence Community to focus on the missions the Nation requires, enhance the enterprise's agility, and improve understanding and support to our users. We must now translate this strategy into initiatives, plans, and capabilities. Decisions about program, budgeting, policy, and acquisition, as well as the operation of the IC, will reflect this document. The objectives in this NIS shall be incorporated into the Intelligence

Planning Guidance and cascaded into direction given for development of integrated program and budget options and recommendations. The development of measures and targets for the NIS's objectives will ensure we can assess our progress and adapt our approach during implementation as appropriate. Only as we become a unified enterprise can we meet the unprecedented number of challenges we face and seize opportunities to enhance the security of the United States along with that of its allies, friends, and like-minded nations.

Source: "The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, August 2009," Federation of American Scientist, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nis2009.pdf>.

95. CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks (2007)

Classification: Top Secret

This document describing the unreadiness of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the attacks of 9/11 was prepared in June 2005 by the CIA's Office of the Inspector General. In August 2007, the executive report portion of the document was released. The report includes new details of the agency's missteps before the 9/11 attacks, outlining what the report says were failures to grasp the role being played by the terror mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and to assess fully the threats streaming into the CIA in the summer of 2001. The report says that 50–60 CIA officers knew of intelligence reports in 2000 that two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, may have been in the United States. However, none of those officers thought to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about the potential domestic threat, evidence of what the report calls a systemic failure.

The inspector general recommended that several top agency officials, including former director George J. Tenet, be held accountable for their failure to put in place a strategy to dismantle Al Qaeda in the years before the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately, the agency declined to seek disciplinary action against Tenet and others named in the report. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA's Office of Inspector General review the findings of their Joint Inquiry Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any CIA employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the 9/11 attacks or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. In other words, the legislative bodies had found problems in the functioning of the CIA and requested that the CIA take appropriate corrective measures. The refusal to seek disciplinary action against CIA officers by the head of the CIA is therefore significant.

Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate in this review of

the events of the pre-9/11 period were forwarded separately to senior CIA managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the Office of Inspector General continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the CIA, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.

The team notes that it used a “reasonable person” approach to determine if actions taken were responsible or negligent based on what a reasonable person would do. The results of this approach are sometimes peculiar. For example, the team decided, in contradiction to Congress, that the use of foreign liaison and walk-in (volunteer) “assets” by the CIA was not excessive. But then the team decides that the CIA officials were not to blame for failures because the failures were due to a lack of cooperation or to limited operations provided by such assets and liaisons.

An important recommendation of the report is the establishment of an Accountability Board made up of non-CIA employees for the purpose of reviewing the performance and determining the potential accountability of CIA employees.

Executive Summary of CIA Accountability for 9/11

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.

(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency’s many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels (including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.

(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.

(U) After conducting its review, the Inspector General Team reports that, while its findings differ from those of the JI on a number of matters, it reaches the same overall conclusions on most of the important issues. Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to review the performance of some individuals and assess their potential accountability.

(U) In its deliberations, the Team used a “reasonable person” approach and relied on Agency regulations—which are subjective—concerning standards of accountability. A discussion of those regulations is included in the Foreword. While the Team found that many officers performed their responsibilities in an exemplary fashion, it did not recommend individuals for additional recognition because these officers already have been rewarded.

(U) The Team found no instance in which an employee violated the law, and none of the errors discussed herein involves misconduct. Rather, the review focuses on areas where individuals did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner; that is, they did not—with regard to the specific issue or issues discussed—act “in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as required by Agency regulation. On occasion, the Team has found that a specific officer was responsible for a particular action or lack of action, but has not recommended that an Accountability Board review the officer’s performance. Such a conclusion reflects the Team’s view that extenuating circumstances mitigate the case.

(U) The findings of greatest concern are those that identify systemic problems where the Agency’s programs or processes did not work as they should have, and concerning which a number of persons were involved or aware, or should have been. Where the Team found systemic failures, it has recommended that an Accountability Board assess the performance and accountability of those managers who, by virtue of their position and authorities, might reasonably have been expected to oversee and correct the process. In general, the fact that failures were systemic should not absolve responsible officials from accountability.

(U) The Review Team found that Agency officers from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa’ida and Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found neither a “single point of failure” nor a “silver bullet” that would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find, however, failures to implement and manage important processes, to follow through with operations, and to properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had been able to view and analyze the full range of information available before 11 September 2001, they could have developed a more informed context in which to assess the threat reporting of the spring and summer that year.

(U) This review focuses only on those findings of the Joint Inquiry that relate to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Team cooperated with the Department of Justice Inspector General and the Kean Commission as they pursued their separate inquiries. For this report, the Team interviewed officers from other agencies who had been detailed to the CIA in the period before 9/11, but did not undertake to interview systematically other officers outside CIA and the IC Management Staff. This report reaches no conclusions about the performance of other agencies or their personnel.

(U) Senior Leadership and Management of the Counterterrorism Effort

(U) The JI concluded that, before 9/11, neither the US Government nor the IC had a comprehensive strategy for combating al-Qa'ida. It charged that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of IC resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United States. The OIG Team also found that the IC did not have a documented, comprehensive approach to al-Qa'ida and that the DO did not use all of his authorities in leading the IC's strategic effort against UBL.

The Team found that the DCI was actively and forcefully engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA. Beginning in 1999, he received regular updates, often daily, on efforts to track and disrupt UBL. He was personally engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many different audiences in the policy community, military, Congress, and public, and he worked directly and personally with foreign counterparts to encourage their cooperation.

In December 1998, the DCI signed a memorandum in which he declared: "We are at war." In addition to directives related to collection programs and other matters, this memorandum stated that the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) would chair an interagency group to formulate an integrated, interagency plan to counter the terrorist challenge posed by Usama Bin Ladin; The OCI wrote that he wanted ". . . no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community."

The Team found that neither the DCI nor the DDCI followed up these warnings and admonitions by creating a documented, comprehensive plan to guide the counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence Community level. The DDCI chaired at least one meeting in response to the DCI directive, but the forum soon devolved into one of tactical and operational, rather than strategic, discussions. These subsequent meetings were chaired by the Executive Director of the CIA and included few if any officers from other IC agencies. While CIA and other agencies had individual plans and important initiatives underway, senior officers in the Agency and Community told the Team that no comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was created in response to the DCI's memorandum, or at any time prior to 9/11.

The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was not used effectively as a strategic coordinator of the IC's counterterrorism efforts. CTC's stated mission includes the

production of all-source intelligence and the coordination of the IC's counterterrorism efforts. Before 9/11, however, the Center's focus was primarily operational and tactical. While focusing on operations is critically important and does not necessarily mean that other elements of mission will be ignored, the Team found that this nearly exclusive focus—which resulted in many operational successes—had a negative impact on CTC's effectiveness as a coordinator of IC counterterrorism strategy. The Team found that the most effective interagency effort against UBL was that of the Assistant DCI for Collection, who, from the early months of 1998 to 9/11, worked with representatives of several intelligence agencies to stimulate collection.

In the years leading up to 9/11, the DCI worked hard and with some success, at the most senior levels of government, to secure additional budgetary resources to rebuild the CIA and the IC. At the same time, the Team found that he did not use his senior position and unique authorities to work with the National Security Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities, or to alter the deployment of human and financial resources across agencies in a coordinated approach to the terrorism target. While the nature of the IC makes the mission of managing it problematic and difficult, the DCI at the time had some authority to move manpower and funds among agencies. The Team found that, in the five years prior to 9/11, the DCI on six occasions used these authorities to move almost [REDACTED] funds from other agencies to the CIA for a number of important purposes [REDACTED]. One of these transfers helped fund a Middle East program that was terrorism-related, but none supported programs designed to counter UBL or al-Qa'ida. Nor were DCI authorities used to transfer any personnel into these programs in the five years prior to 9/11.

The Team notes that the former DCI recognized the need for an integrated, interagency plan, and believes that such a plan was needed to mobilize all of the operational, analytic, and resource capabilities of the IC to enable the several agencies of the Community to work cooperatively and with maximum effectiveness against al-Qa'ida. At the same time, the Team concludes that the former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be done.

The JI report discussed a persistent strain in relations between CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) that impeded collaboration between the two agencies in dealing with the terrorist challenge from al-Qa'ida. The Team, likewise, found that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA over their respective authorities. The Team did not document in detail or take a position on the merits of this disagreement, but notes that the differences remained unresolved well into 2001 in spite of the fact that considerable management attention was devoted to the issue, including at the level of the Agency's Deputy Executive Director. Senior officers of the CIA and the IC Management Staff stated that these interagency differences had a negative impact on the IC's ability to perform its mission and that only the DCI's vigorous personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution of the matter.

(C) The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the former DCI for failing to act personally to resolve the differences between CIA and NSA in an effective and timely manner. . . .

(U) Management of CIA's Resources for Counterterrorism

Funding for the Agency's counterterrorism programs increased significantly from Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 to FY 2001 as a result of supplemental appropriations. These funds were appropriated, in part, because of the efforts of the CIA's Director and senior leaders to convince the Administration and Congress that the Agency was short of resources for counterterrorism and other key programs. The Team preparing this report did not attempt to reach a conclusion regarding the proper level of funding for counterterrorism programs.

The Team did find, however, that during the same period they were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not effectively managing the Agency's counterterrorism funds. In particular, Agency managers moved funds from the base budgets of the Counterterrorist Center and other counterterrorism programs to meet other corporate and Directorate of Operations (DO) needs. The Team found that from FY 1997 to FY 2001 (as of 9/11), [REDACTED] was redistributed from counterterrorism programs to other Agency priorities. Some of these funds were used to strengthen the infrastructure of the DO and, thus, indirectly supported counterterrorism efforts; other funds were used to cover nonspecific corporate "taxes" and for a variety of purposes that, based on the Agency's budgetary definitions, were unrelated to terrorism. Conversely, no resources were reprogrammed from other Agency programs to counterterrorism, even after the DCI's statement in December 1998 that he wanted no resources spared in the effort. The Team found that the Agency made little use of the Reserve for Contingencies to support its counterterrorism effort. Finally, CTC managers did not spend all of the funds in their base budget, even after it had been reduced by diversions of funds to other programs.

The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Executive Director, the Deputy Director for Operations, and the Chief of CTC during the years prior to 9/11 regarding their management of the Agency's counterterrorism financial resources, including specifically their redirection of funds from counterterrorism programs to other priorities.

Concerning human resources, the Team found that the unit within CTC responsible for Usama Bin Ladin, UBL Station, by the accounts of all who worked there, had an excessive workload. Most of its officers did not have the operational experience, expertise, and training necessary to accomplish their mission in an effective manner. Taken together, these weaknesses contributed to performance lapses related to the handling of materials concerning individuals who were to become the 9/11 hijackers. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the

performance of the Chiefs of CTC during the period 1997–2001 regarding the manner in which they staffed the UBL component.

The Team found that certain units within CTC did not work effectively together to understand the structure and operations of al-Qa'ida. This situation had a particularly negative impact on performance with respect to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The Team, like the Joint Inquiry, found that CTC's assigning principal responsibility for KSM to the Renditions Branch had the consequence that the resources of the Sunni Extremist Group, UBL Station, and all analysts were not effectively brought to bear on the problem. CTC considered KSM to be a high-priority target for apprehension and rendition, but did not recognize the significance of reporting from credible sources in 2000 and 2001 that portrayed him as a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant and thus missed important indicators of terrorist planning. This intelligence reporting was not voluminous and its significance is obviously easier to determine in hindsight, but it was noteworthy even in the pre-9/11 period because it included the allegation that KSM was sending terrorists to the United States to engage in activities on behalf of Bin Ladin.

The evidence indicates that the management approach employed in CTC had the effect of actively reinforcing the separation of responsibilities among the key CTC units working on KSM. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for failure to provide proper oversight and guidance to their officers; to coordinate effectively with other units; and to allocate the workload to ensure that KSM was being covered appropriately. The Team also recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chief of CTC for failure to ensure that CTC units worked in a coordinated, effective manner against KSM. Finally, the Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the [REDACTED] failure to produce [REDACTED] coverage of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad from 1997 to 2001. [FOOTNOTE: As a result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to the KSM issue and to the strategic analysis issues discussed below. The two successive Deputy Inspectors General did participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis and all other issues.]

(U) Information Sharing

The Team's findings related to the issue of information sharing are in general accord with the JI's overall assessment of CIA's performance. Like the JI, the Team found problems in the functioning of two separate but related processes in the specific case of the Malaysia operation of early 2000: entering the names of suspected al-Qa'ida terrorists on the "watchlist" of the Department of State and providing information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in proper channels. The Team also found that CTC did not forward relevant information to [REDACTED]. In regard to broader issues of information sharing, the Team found basic problems

with processes designed to facilitate such sharing. In particular, CTC managers did not clarify the roles and responsibilities of officers detained to CTC by other agencies.

The Malaysia Operation. Agency officers did not, on a timely basis, recommend to the Department of State the watchlisting of two suspected al-Qa'ida terrorists, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. These individuals, who later were among the hijackers of 9/11, were known by the Agency in early January 2000 to have traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to participate in a meeting of suspected terrorists. From Kuala Lumpur, they traveled to Bangkok. In January 2000, CTC officers received information that one of these suspected terrorists had a US visa; in March 2000, these officers had information that the other had flown from Bangkok to Los Angeles.

In the period January through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency cables containing travel information related to these terrorists. These cables originated in four field locations and Headquarters. They were read by overseas officers and headquarters personnel, operations officers and analysts, managers and junior employees, and CIA staff personnel as well as officers on rotation from NSA and FBI. Over an 18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to review the information on multiple occasions, when they might have recognized its significance and shared it appropriately with other components and agencies. Ultimately, the two terrorists were watchlisted in late August 2001 as a result of questions raised in May 2001 by a CIA officer on assignment at the FBI.

In 1998, CTC assumed responsibility for communicating watchlisting guidance in the Agency. As recently as December 1999, less than a month before the events of early January 2000, CTC had sent to all field offices of the CIA a cable reminding them of their obligation to watchlist suspected terrorists and the procedures for doing so. Field components and Headquarters units had obligations related to watchlisting, but they varied widely in their performance. That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown—a breakdown caused by excessive workload, ambiguities about responsibilities, and mismanagement of the program. Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watchlisting program.

The Review Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC in the years between 1998 and 2001 concerning their leadership and management oversight of the watchlisting program.

Agency officers also failed to pass the travel information about the two terrorists to the FBI in the prescribed channels. The Team found that an FBI officer assigned to CTC on 5 January 2000 drafted a message about the terrorists' travel that was to be sent from CIA to the FBI in the proper channels. Apparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing, the message was never sent. On the same date, another CTC officer sent a cable to several Agency addressees reporting that the

information and al-Mihdhar's travel documents had been passed to the FBI. The officer who drafted this cable does not recall how this information was passed. The Team has not been able to confirm that the information was passed, or that it was not passed. Whatever the case, the Team found no indication that anyone in CTC checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few UBL Station officers said, should have been routine practice.

Separately, in March 2000, two CIA field locations sent to a number of addressees cables reporting that al-Hazmi and another al-Qa'ida associate had traveled to the United States. They were clearly identified in the cables as "UBL associates." The Team has found no evidence, and heard no claim from any party, that this information was shared in any manner with the FBI or that anyone in UBL Station took other appropriate operational action at that time.

In the months following the Malaysia operation, the CIA missed several additional opportunities to nominate al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting; to inform the FBI about their intended or actual travel to the United States; and to take appropriate operational action. These included a few occasions identified by the Joint Inquiry as well as several others.

The consequences of the failures to share information and perform proper operational followthrough on these terrorists were potentially significant. Earlier watchlisting of al-Mihdhar could have prevented his re-entry into the United States in July 2001. Informing the FBI and good operational followthrough by CIA and FBI might have resulted in surveillance, of both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the potential to yield information on flight training, financing, and links to others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.

The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of [REDACTED] for failing to ensure that someone in the Station informed the FBI and took appropriate operational action regarding al-Hazmi in March 2000. In addition, the Team recommends that the Accountability Board assess the performance of the latter three managers for failing to ensure prompt action relevant to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later opportunities between March 2000 and August 2001.

(U) Broader Information Sharing Issues. The Joint Inquiry charged that CIA's information-sharing problems derived from differences among agencies with respect to missions, legal authorities, and cultures. It argued that CIA efforts to protect sources and methods fostered a reluctance to share information and limited disclosures to criminal investigators. The report also alleged that most Agency officers did not focus sufficiently on the domestic terrorism front, viewing this as an FBI mission. The 9/11 Review Team's findings are similar in many respects, but the Team believes the systemic failures in this case do not lie in reluctance to share. Rather, the basic problems were poor implementation, guidance, and oversight of

processes established to foster the exchange of information, including the detailee program.

CTC and UBL Station had on their rosters detailees from many different agencies, including the FBI, NSA, Federal Aviation Administration, and State Department. The manner in which these detailees were managed left many of them unclear about the nature of their responsibilities. Many CIA managers and officers believed the detailees were responsible for conveying information to their home agencies, while most of the detailees maintained that they were working as CTC officers and had neither the time nor the responsibility to serve as links to their home agencies. The Team found, at a minimum, that there were fundamental ambiguities about the responsibilities of the detailees as they related to information sharing, and that these responsibilities were never delineated explicitly or in writing. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC during the years before 9/11 concerning their oversight of the Center's practices in management of the detailee program. . . .

(U) Strategic Analysis

The Team, like the JI, found that the IC's understanding of al-Qa'ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis. The Team asked three individuals who had served as senior intelligence analysts and managers to conduct an independent review of the Agency's analytic products dealing with UBL and al-Qa'ida for the period from 1998 to 2001 and assess their quality. They found that, while CTC's tradecraft was generally good, important elements were missing. Discussion of implications was generally weak, for example. Most important, a number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all. The Team found:

- No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa'ida by CTC or any other component.
- No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
- No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional hijackings.
- Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target.
- No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.

That said, CTC's analytic component, the Assessments and Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other analytic products.

The personnel resources of AIG were heavily dedicated to policy-support and operational-support activities. Analysts focused primarily on current and tactical

issues rather than on strategic analysis. In the two years prior to 9/11, the Directorate of Intelligence's [REDACTED] and others had raised with CTC managers the need to dedicate some proportion of the analytic work force to strategic analysis, as was the practice in many DI offices. In early 2001, the DCI specifically directed CTC to establish a strategic analysis unit within AIG. The Chief of AIG had for some time been aware of the need to strengthen the analytic work force and was working to do so. The strategic analysis unit was formed in July 2001; as of late July, it was manned by [REDACTED] analysts.

The Team found that the National Intelligence Council (NIC) addressed the al-Qa'ida threat to only a limited extent. The NIC produced a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the United States in 1995 and an update in 1997. It did not produce a similar, comprehensive assessment from that point until after 9/11, although preparation of such a product was underway, with a CTC drafter, in the early months of 2001 and was being edited as of 9/11. . . .

(U) Operations (Unilateral and Liaison)

(S/NF) The Joint Inquiry charges that CIA did not effectively develop and use human resources to penetrate al-Qa'ida's inner circle, thus significantly limiting the IC's ability to acquire actionable intelligence before 9/11. The report argues that this lack of sources resulted from an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services and walk-ins (sources who volunteer); a focus on disruption and capture rather than collection; and adherence to the dirty asset rules (guidelines that restricted the recruitment of sources who had committed certain proscribed acts).

The Review Team did not find that CIA's reliance on liaison for collection was excessive but did find that [REDACTED] CIA reliance was not balanced with a strong focus on developing unilateral assets. The Team did not find that CIA reliance on walk-ins was misguided [REDACTED]. Although the CIA focused its al-Qa'ida operations on Afghanistan, possibly limiting its ability to focus elsewhere, the Team believes that this approach was reasonable and that its purpose was collection on al-Qa'ida as well as disruption of al-Qa'ida's activities. While agreeing that the dirty asset rules may have created a climate that had the effect of inhibiting certain recruitment operations, the Team is unable to confirm or determine the extent of the impact. Finally, the Team found that several operational platforms [REDACTED] were not effectively engaged in the battle against al-Qa'ida. In the case of [REDACTED] this reflected the weakness of the program itself. In the case [REDACTED] it reflected CTC's focus on Afghanistan and the priority of its attempts to penetrate al-Qa'ida's inner circle.

The Team found that the CIA's relations with foreign liaison services were critical to its ability to disrupt al-Qa'ida and thwart some terrorist attacks on the United States. While the capabilities and cooperation of liaison services were uneven, the program itself did not detract from CIA's efforts to mount its own unilateral

operations. The Team did raise serious questions about whether CTC prior to 9/11 had made the most effective use of [REDACTED] liaison services in its operations against al-Qa'ida. Nevertheless, the Team observes that the complicated dynamics of liaison relationships, including lack of common goals and counterintelligence problems, suggest that CTC managers made reasonable judgments [REDACTED]

The Joint Inquiry particularly criticized CIA for the conduct of its operational relationship [REDACTED]. It noted that CIA had unsuccessfully pressed [REDACTED] authorities for additional information on individuals later identified as associates of some of the hijackers. It placed some of the blame for this on CIA's decisions [REDACTED]. The Team also found that CIA was unable to acquire the information cited by JI but found that it made repeated efforts to do so and that its lack of success was the result of a difficult operating environment and limited cooperation on the part of [REDACTED]. The Team concluded that the decisions made with respect to [REDACTED] were reasonable.

The Joint Inquiry also argued that both the FBI and CIA had failed to identify the extent of support from Saudi nationals or groups for terrorist activities globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, to the extent it existed, was knowing or inadvertent. While most of the JI discussion on the Saudi issue dealt with issues involving the FBI and its domestic operations, the report also [REDACTED]. The Team found that a significant gap existed in the CIA's understanding of Saudi extremists' involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The primary reasons for this gap were the difficulty of the task, the hostile operational environment, and [REDACTED].

The Team also found, however, that UBL Station and [REDACTED] were hostile to each other and working at cross purposes over a period of years before 9/11. The Team cannot measure the specific impact of this counterproductive behavior. At a minimum, however, the Team found that organizational tensions clearly complicated and delayed the preparation of the Agency approaches [REDACTED] thus negatively affecting the timely and effective functioning of the exchange with [REDACTED] on terrorism issues. . . .

(U) Covert Action

The Joint Inquiry charged that US policymakers had wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998 and believed CIA personnel understood that. However, the government had not removed the ban on assassination and did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa'ida [REDACTED]. The JI said that the CIA was reluctant to seek authority to assassinate Bin Ladin and averse to taking advantage of ambiguities in the authorities it did receive that might have allowed it more flexibility. The JI argued that these factors shaped the type of covert action the CIA undertook against Bin Ladin and that, before September 11, covert action had little impact on al-Qa'ida or Bin Ladin.

[REDACTED] The findings and conclusions of the Review Team correspond with most but not all of the JI conclusions. The Team believes that the restrictions in the authorities given the CIA with respect to Bin Ladin, while arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed for a period of time in late 1998 and early 1999, limited the range of permissible operations. Given the law, executive order, and past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist. The Team believes this position was reasonable and correct. Ultimately, the Team concludes the failure of the Agency's covert action against Bin Ladin lay not in the language and interpretation of its authorities, but in the limitations of its covert action capabilities: CIA's heavy reliance on a single group of assets, who were of questionable reliability and had limited capabilities, proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against Bin Ladin. Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior to 9/11.

[REDACTED] The Joint Inquiry states that US military officials were reluctant to use military assets to conduct operations in Afghanistan or to support or participate in CIA operations against al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11. At least in part, this was a result of the IC's inability to provide the necessary intelligence to support military operations. The findings of the Team match those of the JI as they relate to the CIA. The Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of the US military for the precise, actionable intelligence that the military leadership required in order to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or launch cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the August 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. Differences between CIA and the Department of Defense over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan. The Team concludes, however, that other impediments, including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the importance of these CIA-military differences. The Team believes CIA handled its relationship with the US military responsibly and within the bounds of what was reasonable and possible.

[REDACTED] The Joint Inquiry charges that the CIA failed to attack UBL's finances and failed to work cooperatively with the Department of the Treasury to develop leads and establish links to other terrorist funding sources. The Team, likewise, found that CIA failed to attack Bin Ladin's money successfully but finds that this was not for lack of effort. [REDACTED] The Team also agrees that bureaucratic obstacle and legal restrictions inhibited CIA's partnership with the Department of the Treasury.

(U) Technology

[REDACTED] The Joint Inquiry charged that technology had not been fully and effectively applied in support of US counterterrorism efforts. The Team found that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA over several critical issues. One of these involved a dispute over which agency had authority [REDACTED]. This dispute had not yet been resolved in September 2001. The second issue

involved NSA's unwillingness to share raw SIGINT transcripts with CIA; this made it more difficult for CTC to perform its mission against al-Qa'ida. In the late 1990s, however, NSA managers offered to allow a CTC officer to be detailed to NSA to cull the transcripts for useful information. CTC sent one officer to NSA for a brief period of time in 2000, but failed to send others, citing resource constraints. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chiefs of CTC for their failure to detail officers to NSA on a consistent, full-time basis to exploit this material in the years before 9/11. . . .

Source: "OIG Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks," Federation of American Scientist, <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/oig-911.pdf>.

96. Example of Letters Found at Osama bin Laden's Hideaway (2011)

Classification: Unclassified

This document is among the 17 declassified documents captured in the Abbottabad raid in Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden. The 17 documents, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation, are dated between September 2006 and April 2011. These internal Al Qaeda communications were authored by several leaders as well as several unknown individuals who were either affiliated with the group or wrote to offer it advice. Some of the letters are incomplete and/or are missing their dates, and not all of the letters explicitly attribute their author(s) and/or indicate to whom they are addressed. Given that they are all electronic documents saved on thumb drives, memory cards, or the hard drive of bin Laden's computer except for the letters addressed to him, it cannot be ascertained whether any of these letters actually reached their intended destinations.

This document is a long letter authored by bin Laden after the death of Sheikh Sa'id (Mustafa Abu'l-Yazid) in late May 2010 and addressed to Shaykh Mahmud ('Atiyya), whom bin Laden designates as Sa'id's successor. Bin Laden's letter is concerned with the mistakes committed by regional jihadi groups that have resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslim civilians. He indicates that he would like to start a new phase so that the jihadis can regain the trust of Muslims. He directs 'Atiyya to prepare a memorandum to centralize, in the hands of Al Qaeda Central, the media campaign and operations of regional jihadi groups. Considerable space is devoted to a discussion about Yemen, external operations, and bin Laden's plans for his son Hamza. This document includes an additional letter authored by Shaykh Yunis that bin Laden forwarded to 'Atiyya. The letter discusses a new operational plan that Al Qaeda should consider adopting and provides insight into how bin Laden sought to develop strategy on the strategic and operational levels. Toward the end of the letter, there is a discussion about U.S. officials—including David Petraeus, Robert Gates, Michael Mullen, Richard

Holbrooke, Joe Biden, and Barack Obama—and who should and should not be targeted for assassination.

Letter of Usama Bin Ladin Taken in Raid

Dear Brother Shaykh Mahmud, God protect him, Peace be with you, and God's mercy and blessings.

I hope this letter finds you, your family and all the brothers well and in good health, and closest and most obedient to God Almighty. I begin this message with condolences for myself and you on the death of our dear brother Shaykh Sa'id, God rest his soul. May the Almighty honor him with what he desires, accept him as one of the martyrs, and count his forbearance and steadfastness among his good deeds.

God bless him, he spent nearly three decades in the theater of Jihad aiding the religion of God. (Rest of paragraph is a eulogy of the life and deeds of the above Shaykh Sa'id.) I also offer condolences on the deaths of our dear brothers Abu'Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu-Hamzah al-Muhajir and those who waged Jihad with them until they died. We ask God Almighty to compensate us for our hardship and bring some good from it for us, and that he accept them among the martyrs and let them dwell in Heaven, for He is most capable of that. (TN: Paragraph seeking God's protection and guidance for all the Mujahidin, then:)

In keeping with the words of the Prophet on forbearance, and to fulfill our duties regardless of the hardship faced, I begin my words with you on Jihad activities in general.

First, I wish to inform you that you have been appointed successor to the departed Shaykh Sa'id for a period of two years from the date on which you receive this letter. I ask Almighty God to help you carry out this responsibility well, and augment your success, forbearance, piety and good character which if the leader possesses, his followers will benefit all the more so. As you well know, the best people are the ones most agreed on by the people, and the key attributes that bring people together and preserve their staying behind their leader are his kindness, forgiveness, sense of fairness, patience, and good rapport with him, as well as showing care for them and not tax them beyond their ability. What must always be in the forefront of our minds is: managing people at such times calls for even greater wisdom, kindness, forgiveness, patience and deliberation, and is a complex task by most any measure. But, to begin again talking about Jihad activities:

We are now in a new phase of assessing Jihad activities and developing them beyond what they were in the past in two areas, military activity and media releases. Our work in these two areas is broad and sweeping, encompassing the headquarters and regional areas.

I put before you some ideas in my mind that time has enabled me to, so we can brainstorm and improve on them, in addition to a document that was attached to your message under the name "attachment for Shaykh Mahmud," which contained some of what I had sent to Shaykh Sa'id, God rest his soul, about this new stage.

Regarding military activities:

The conditions that grew more serious after the attacks on New York and Washington and the Crusader campaign against Afghanistan filled Muslims with sympathy toward their fellow Mujahidin, as it became patently clear that the Mujahidin are the vanguard and standard-bearers of the Islamic community in fighting the Crusader-Zionist alliance that has caused the people to endure various forms of pain and degradation. One indication of that is the wide-scale spread of Jihadist ideology, especially on the Internet, and the tremendous number of young people who frequent the Jihadist websites—a major achievement for Jihad, through the grace of God, despite our enemies and their efforts.

On the other hand, after the war expanded and the Mujahidin spread out into many regions, some of the brothers became totally absorbed in fighting our local enemies, and more mistakes have been made due to miscalculations by the brothers planning the operations or something that arises before it is carried out, in addition to some who have expanded the “barricade argument” (on whether it is acceptable to kill Muslims being used as human shields by the enemy) which has resulted in the killing of Muslims (we ask God to have mercy on them and forgive them, and compensate their families). I reckon that the barricade argument was . . . debated centuries ago amid circumstances different from those of today, and it needs to be revisited based on the modern-day context and clear boundaries established for all the brothers, so that no Muslims fall victim except when it is absolutely essential.

Amongst the mistakes made were the killing of some, the Muslims did not understand the justification behind allowing their killing. As you may know, one of the principles of Shari’ah is to bring in the interests and repulse evil. This is what the Messenger of Allah, Peace and Prayers be upon him had done with the head of hypocrisy ‘Abdallah Bin Abi; not to underestimate the fact that these issues, amongst others, led to the loss of the Muslims sympathetic approach towards the Mujahidin. What also led to the loss of the Mujahidin was exploitation of the foes to several of their mistakes and tainting their picture before the crowds of the nation; the purpose was to split them from their popular bases, and needless to say that this issue involving the loss of the nation’s audience paralyzed the Jihadist movements.

Here is an important issue that we should pay attention to; carrying out several attacks without exercising caution, which impacted the sympathy of the nation’s crowds towards the Mujahidin. It would lead us to winning several battles while losing the war at the end. It requires an accurate criteria for the ramifications of any attack prior to carrying it out; also weighing the advantages and disadvantages, to then determine what would be the most likely to carry out.

There is the need to collect anything within the capacity to collect—such as information, especially the Afghanistan commando operations carried out by the Mujahidin or others, the Palestinian Liberation Organization; also to study the advantages and disadvantages as the study would include two aspects:

The aspect of the operational steps required to ensure the success of the operation, or the hindrances leading to its failure, as well as the impact on the foe.

The other aspect involves the impact on the nation’s impression towards the Mujahidin and being sympathetic towards them. The operations that bear extreme

negative impact on the partisans of the Jihad include targeting the apostates in mosques or nearby—such as the assassination attempt of Dustum during the holiday worship location, and the assassination of General Muhammad Yusuf in one of the Pakistani mosques. It is extremely sad for an individual to fall into the same mistake more than once.

I would also like to seek your advice on an opinion as follows: whatever exceeds our capability or what we are unable to disburse on attacks inside America, as well as on the Jihad in open fronts, would be disbursed targeting American interests in non-Islamic countries first, such as South Korea. We shall avoid carrying out attacks in Islamic countries except for the countries that fell under invasion and direct occupation.

There are two major reasons to avoid carrying out attacks in Islamic countries as follows: the first involves attacks amongst the Muslims which would increase the possibility of victims amongst them; even though the brothers were previously warned not to expand the shield issue (TN: possibly killing Muslims who are being used as human shields by the enemy), that was not made clear to them. The operational fact continues to expand in terms of the shield.

Firstly, it holds us responsible before Allah, praise and glory be to him, while in reality it holds us responsible for the losses and damages in the call to Jihad.

The second reason is the extremely great damage that impacts the brothers in the region where the work begins, following the alert of the state against the youths who are engaged in the Jihad work or even the preaching work. Tens of thousands are being arrested, similar to what happened in Egypt, and the arrest of thousands such as in the country of the two holy sanctuaries (Saudi Arabia), while the issue is one involving time. The fact requires that we maintain the attrition of the head of disbelief (TN: Kufar) and the life artery of these apostate organizations on open fronts without bearing additional losses on the Jihad; by that, eliminating the ruler's despotism with these large numbers of devoted youths and Muslim prisoners.

When the global disbelief reaches the level of attrition, it would lead to its collapse; we would then engage in a conflict with the rulers, after they have been weakened following its weakness. We would then find the brothers there with their entire strength and energy. Some of the disadvantages in carrying out attacks against the Americans in Islamic countries, where the components for success had not been prepared and the removal of the ruler is in an effort for the Americans not to accuse it of failing, the regime shall have a huge reaction towards the Mujahidin; this would lead to defending themselves and avenging the regime. The brothers and the regime would then engage in a war which we did not begin against it, because the power of the brothers is not ready for it, as such it would be one result.

The disadvantages in engaging as previously mentioned would change the general line—meaning to avoid wasting our energy with these regimes at this stage; that, in addition to losing the sympathy of the Muslims towards us. This is when we lose the perception of the Muslims towards us, which is that we are the ones defending the Muslims and fighting their biggest enemy, the Crusader Zionist alliance—without killing those that the general public consider Muslims.

So, if we fight the rulers while being in this situation, and we do not respond other than with direct defense during their offense against us, and this issue is

being repeated several times, it would appear that we are wronged and the rulers are the tyrants; it would increase the hatred of the people towards them and make them feel that the rulers did not defend our brothers in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. They were not content with that, but they fought the Mujahidin that defend our people there.

However, if we engage in a fight against the rulers outside the direct defense, we would have eliminated the damage the rulers would have carried out in their fight against us; the reason is that it would reveal the truth, and the media shall demonstrate to the people that we are the ones fighting the government and killing the Muslims. Between the roar of the killing and the fight, the people shall forget who began the fight against the other—as such we shall lose the people and strengthen the stance of the government without cutting its hostility against us.

What aids the success of our fight against the Americans in non-Islamic countries and reducing its cost, is for limited groups, distanced from the Muslim and devout circles, to launch from countries with the Mujahidin presence without announcing their launching location; this is to avoid the reaction against the Mujahidin in that country. Given the potential for the foes to reveal that issue, it would be better for the training to be carried out and launched from the open fronts where naturally the foes would be exerting their utmost efforts.

Amongst the opportunities to be exploited in targeting the Americans is the state of security laxity found in countries where we had not carried out any attacks. Given that the difference of the impact of attacks against the foes inside or outside of America is substantial, we need to confirm to the brothers that every effort that could be spent on attacks in America would not be spent outside of it.

The overflow of the work (TN: meaning attacks) outside of America and the work in non-Islamic countries could be spent in targeting the U.S. interests in the Islamic countries where we have no bases or partisans or Jihadist Islamic groups that could be threatened by danger. The Islamic groups there would express their stance against us and renounce us—a fact that would prevent the regime from retaliating against them following our attacks. The condition is to be extremely cautious and take necessary measures to avoid misleading the Muslims in these operations.

With respect to the media publications, I would say: It is important for you to focus a portion of your interest on the Mujahidin publications; provide them with advice and guidance to avoid the mistakes that would impact either the reputation of the Mujahidin and the sympathy of the nation's masses or that would impact the mind and the character of the youths—who rely mainly in their culture on the publications issued by the Mujahidin and their partisans. Needless to say, the substantial damages that this fact would have and the loss of great opportunities from a proper care and valuable guidance to millions of youths who listen to what the Mujahidin have to say in their lectures, movies and writings.

Based upon the aforementioned: I request that you prepare a memorandum that would include general guidelines on how the Mujahidin publications should be; focus on the basics and the Shari'ah literature (rules) such as violation of the Muslim blood and their honor, as well as the importance in committing to the

Hadith of the messenger of Allah, peace and prayers be upon him (not he who believes in stabbing, in blasphemy, the obscene, and the disgusting) as narrated by al-Bukhari.

Once the memorandum is prepared, we shall discuss it and send it to all the regions, along with sending the general policy in the military work. We shall then inform you of the committee that we are in the process of forming (I sent its formation to Shaykh Sa'id—May God have mercy on him); that committee will have the privilege of reviewing and postponing any publications assessed to be outside the general policy that we sought to keep in conformity with the Shari'ah teachings and which, God willing, would achieve the interest of Islam and the Muslims.

We ask every emir in the regions to be extremely keen and focused on controlling the military work and not to expand the barricade, due to the several attacks carried out by the Mujahidin whereby several Muslims had fallen; we could have reached the target without injuring the Muslims with some effort and deliberation. Also the need to cancel other attacks due to the possible and unnecessary civilian casualties—for example, the attacks targeting several infidel Imams during their visits to public locations where most of the Muslims are located, as they should be targeted away from the Muslims. Making these mistakes is a great issue; needless to say, the greatness of the Muslim blood violation in addition to the damage impacting the Jihad. As a result, the alienation of most of the nation from the Mujahidin.

For the brothers in all the regions to apologize and be held responsible for what happened. They would be questioned about the mistake causing the flaw that occurred and about the measures to be taken to avoid repeating the same mistakes. With respect to the human error outside the human will, as it is repeated in wars, the need to apologize for these errors and be held responsible, as the aspects of the flaw would be explained.

Perhaps some of those killed and who were killed mistakenly were amongst the immoral; there is no need to reveal their immorality while the people are wounded and the foes are keen in demonstrating our indifference about them.

Should some of the brothers in the regions fail to carry out their duties in this respect, we should then assume the responsibility and apologize for what had happened. The need to confirm to all the Mujahidin brothers the importance of clarity, honesty, loyalty and promises and be cautious of the betrayal.

The emirs in the regions would also be requested to task one of the qualified brothers with them, to follow up on the media section from all aspects as mentioned in the memorandum: from a Shari'ah standpoint—care for the general taste of the nation's crowds, so long as it does not conflict with the Shari'ah. The same brother would be requested to always seek the development of his aptitude and his knowledge in all arenas associated with his mission, such as: reading books on dealing with the people because he would be largely dealing with the brothers, reading books concerning the production. The purpose is for the Mujahidin publications to be a good potential for the competition and to gain the crowds. The main goal is to spread awareness amongst the people of the nation, to rescue them from the aberration of the rulers. He, in turn, would seek to improve the aptitude of the

brothers contributing in the media section; he would also provide advice in general for those issuing the statements, lectures, books, articles and those who comment on the Jihad films. He would be appointed as the Jihadist media individual in this region, characterized by objectivity and accepted by the people of the nation.

This brother would be in charge of the media as is the case in the regions—otherwise the position of the General Manager of the Media divisions would be updated in every region; no publications would be made unless he reviews them, to include the leadership speeches. He would have the right to stop any publication that includes a term considered outside the general policy, whether in the context or timing. The subject would be reviewed with the individual who issued it, and he would be informed of its conflict with the general policy; as well as the dispersion of the nation's views from the larger Mujahidin goals, such as the case of Palestine, while appointing the foe to defame the reputation of the Mujahidin—therefore the fear of the Mujahidin during this phase is substantial with respect to their conduct and expressions.

Some of the examples to this was when the general populace were in the peak of dealing with the Freedom Fleet heading towards Gaza to break the blockade and deliver the civil relief to our people there, and at the time when the Jews stopped it with an armed force and killed several of those in it, activating Turkey in this respect.

The Freedom Fleet attack dominated the media in a very large way, as the western politicians were forced to discuss it; they criticized the Israelis for publishing on one of the websites a speech for the deputy of Abu Basir in Yemen, our brother Sa'id al-Shahri. What was shown in the media was his speech concerning the arrest of one of our sisters in the country of the two holy sanctuaries and the Mujahidin demanding to carry out kidnappings against the westerners, the princes of Al Sa'ud (TN: the Sa'ud family) and the senior security employees in exchange for her release.

Following the issuance of this speech, al-Arabiyah Television channel exploited it widely and focused on it. It made it the number one piece in its news reports and hosted men and youth from the general populace on the streets as they had claimed. That to include (TN: the hosting of) several ill-informed scholars and state men—no doubt they accept each other, especially those who ignore their status amongst the people; the purpose was to discuss the tape, showing honesty and each mentioning individually that the Mujahidin are not interested in the Palestinian cause, and the blockade of our brothers in Gaza—rather that their concern is to fight, corrupt and argue with the security men and not with the usurper Jews.

No doubt, issuing this lecture was driven by jealousy of the blood and honor of the Muslims; however it was not in conformance with the events. The reason was because there were one and half million Muslims at that time under siege, and most of them were women and children. They have more than ten thousand prisoners with the Jews, many of whom are sisters and children in tragic circumstances. The issuance of this speech, especially at this time, conflicted with our policy of focusing on the bigger foe, and concealed our interest in the main issues that were the main reasons in initiating the Jihad. It announced to the people that we are in a fight

and argument with the rulers to avenge our brothers, those that were killed and detained far from the cases and interests of the general nation, due to which it held our brothers responsible for the killing and imprisonment. It also gave the Muslims an impression of us that we were overcome by the region-like command or parties or both; they heard our brother talk about the sister from the Arab Peninsula and from al-Qa'ida organization, but they did not hear him talk about our sister in Palestine—this is contrary to our reality and our general policy, as it weakens our stance when we say that we are an international organization fighting for the liberation of Palestine and all of the Muslim countries to erect an Islamic caliphate that would rule according to the Shari'ah of Allah.

This mistake was repeated, in a statement in which the brothers in Yemen adopted the big operation, the operation of 'Umar al-Faruq—May God release him when they said, it was a reaction to the U.S. bombing of al-Mahfad; linking this large operation with other than the Palestinian cause covers some of the stances that show the victory of the brothers in Yemen for the Palestinian cause. That, in addition to their absorption on a daily basis in the fight against the Yemeni government and the strong focus on the key figures of the Peninsula rulers in their lectures; it drew the people's attention, that the first and biggest foe of the Mujahidin in the Arab Peninsula are the rulers of Yemen and the country of the two holy sanctuaries.

This was repeated in the comments of the brothers concerning the attack of our brother Humam al-Balawi, may God have mercy on him, when they mentioned it was a revenge for the murder of Mahsud, may God have mercy on him. It was necessary to discuss Palestine first. In an effort to avoid such stances the international perception and the general policy should be present and clear in our minds; as such we would avoid being distracted or absorbed in its expansion at the expense of what is more of a priority and importance.

The priorities in the preaching work are to clarify the meaning of the term al-Tawhid (TN: monotheism) and its requirements and to warn the people from falling in its contradictions; that, to include the instigation of the Jihad against the Crusader Zionist alliance.

The priority in the military work is to focus and provide the lion's share for the head of international disbelief or to focus on the apostate and excessively talk about them which the people of the nation do not understand; consequently they would not react to it, as many of them would repel from it. This would make us the splinter in an environment that does not harbor the Jihadist movement, and does not provide us with support to pursue the Jihad and its continuity.

I believe there is a need to look into publishing pictures of the apostates' killing those of the apostate organizations who deal with the Americans against the Muslims.

Once the brothers in the regions are committed to the memorandum, it would be advisable for you and for Shaykh Abu Yahya to write some articles and provide advice to those working in the Jihad media in general to include the author partisans to the Mujahidin on the internet. Shaykh Yunis wrote to me about the importance of preparing a memorandum indicating our stance on the Takfir issue without

the Shari'ah criteria. I wrote to him and told him I would send him what you had sent. I had attached it in the last letter, and asked him to follow up on sending his comments to you so you could write it in your style, in light of the fact that the foes know his true personality through the prisoners who also recognize his style when they peruse his articles on the internet.

Before concluding the discussion concerning the media publications, I would say:

We are in need of an advisory reading, with constructive criticism to our entire policy and publications at the center and in the regions internally; as such have two available brothers ready for this mission.

From abroad, seek safe routes to achieve a contact with one of the knowledge seekers so long as he is credible and trusted; inform him that we are in a new phase of amendment and development and require an advisory reading and development of our entire policy and publication at the center and in the regions. The purpose is to amend our mistakes and develop our Jihadist work according to their suggestions and opinions, especially in corresponding with the masses of the nation in context and shape.

Taking into consideration the importance not to publish it and the importance of the secrecy in all of that, as we ask God to grant us success. Important comment: After you provide me with your opinions and suggestions, and after we consult amongst each other, we need to send what we agree upon to the brothers, the leaders of the regions and ask them for their responses to what we would be sending them.

I intend to issue a statement, in which I would discuss starting a new phase to amend what we have issued—as such we would regain the trust of a large portion of those who had lost their trust in the Mujahidin; we would increase the lines of communication between the Mujahidin and their nation.

This would require, prior to telling and reassuring the people that the intent from all aspects would have become clear to the brothers in the center and in the regions—that it would be established and implemented on the ground; the purpose is not to contradict our statements with some of our conduct. First, for all the brothers contributing in the media of al-Qa'ida in the center, the need to commit to avoiding everything that would have a negative impact on the perception of the nation towards the Mujahidin; also ensure everything possible that would bring the Mujahidin and their nation closer.

The basis for that is to take into consideration the general opinion or the general taste within the Islamic Shari'ah criteria; it is a very important issue that the Messenger of Allah, peace and prayers be upon him had done—as was said in the Hadith (if your people were not newly ignorant, the Ka'bah would not have been destroyed and would only have two gates) narrated by al-Tarmazi.

The issues taking over the public opinion are the alienation from harshness and leaning towards friendliness and objectivity; also repulsion from repetition in lectures unless it is absolutely necessary. It is therefore necessary to focus on expansion, and increase the knowledge in factual jurisprudence and developments of the events; the purpose is for our lecture to touch the crowds of the nation and their aspirations, while treating the important doctrinal issues.

In summary: committing to the general lines, designed according to the Shari'ah policy in our Jihadist operations and our media publications is an extremely important issue; it will achieve, God willing, great gains for the Jihadist movement—most importantly gain the crowds of the nation, correct the wrong impressions in the minds of the Mujahidin. Additionally, an increase in the attrition of the head of disbelief, because the plan was to focus more on it. I add here two issues that appear important to me in the stability of the Jihadist work and its progress. I would like for you to research it amongst you—first: the need to circulate a new administration arrangement, sent to all the regions after we discuss it amongst us, and which would include the following points:

A. If any contingency situation results in the absence of the Emir from his leadership of the Mujahidin, the Deputy Emir will automatically and temporarily take on the responsibility of managing the affairs of the Mujahidin for several days, with his title being “Acting Emir”. The Mujahidin in his territory will be informed of this, and he is not to be called “The Emir”. Furthermore, he will not be announced in the meeting except after consulting with the brothers and gaining their agreement to that or some other action. Consultation among brothers in any region will take place internally, though they will also consult with “Central al-Qaida.” This term was coined in the media to distinguish between al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qa’ida in the other territories. In my opinion, there is no problem with using this term in principle in order to clarify the intended meaning.

B. The term of an Emir chosen by the influential people in each territory, in consultation with the central group, shall be two years, with the potential to be renewed. If there is delay in consulting with the central group due to a difficulty in communications, the term shall be one year, also with the potential to be renewed. It shall be taken into consideration that this term is most similar to the leadership of a Wali (TN: governor) in Muslim territories during the time of the caliphate, and is not like the grand imamate.

C. The Shura council in each territory will provide the Emir with recommendations and will write an annual report to be sent to the central group detailing the local situation, to include the progress of the local Emir in his activity and his dealings with the Mujahidin.

I also think that if the brothers in any territory deem to elevate the position of any of the brothers to a position of importance, such as First Deputy or Second Deputy, then that should be done in consultation with the central group. If there is a problem with communications, then the matter will be temporary until consultation can be completed.

This is with the stipulation that the CV of the brothers nominated to the position is sent.

Second: Attention should be paid to creating command structures and devising plans to develop and refine the energies called upon for Jihad. The Muslim Nation, in general, suffers from a lack of qualified leadership, and it comes as no surprise to you that the fields of Jihad are where leaders are made.

Finally: I want you to inform me of your recommendations that will help with elevating the level of activity on all fronts and in all territories. You no doubt

understand the great importance of the progress of our work in the territories through general policies that are controlled by Islamic law in order to achieve our interests and reject corruption. I reviewed your opinions regarding the issue of establishing an Islamic state before the elements of success have been completed and the issue of escalation in Yemen. I wanted to share with you my opinion in these two matters in order to establish a fruitful and constructive discussion, God willing.

However, talking about them brings sorrow, and I am compelled to talk at length about them and their importance and the risks in them. If I am unable to give these matters their due time within these pages, then perhaps I can finish the discussion in the next message. I'll begin with the matter of escalation in Yemen. To begin I would say that Yemen is the Arab country most suited to the establishment of an Islamic state, but this does not mean that the necessary fundamental elements for success for such a project have yet been realized. Henceforth, we must increase our efforts to preserve Yemen and not drag it into a war before the necessary preparations are made on a number of important fronts. I anticipate that we will not escalate in Yemen for the following reasons:

A. Escalation in Yemen would siphon off a large portion of the energy of the Mujahidin without doing the same to the head of the infidels (America) directly. Thus, the majority of harm would be inflicted on the Mujahidin in general, and would impact the greater war between the infidels and Islam. Yemen represents an important center of gravity in supporting fronts with men, and if war broke out there, then the supply lines to other fronts would be disrupted or weakened. Furthermore, Yemen represents a focal point in terms of supplies, as a reserve force for the Mujahidin, and it has become a proven fact in military science that in a war between two sides, neither side should commit all its forces to the fight; rather, it is important for a force to remain as a fork with several prongs in reserve. It seems to me at this point that Yemen remains a force of supplies and reserves for the Mujahidin at the open fronts, and a powerful tool to restore the caliphate when circumstances are conducive to doing so. Thus far, circumstances are not yet suited to opening up a front in Yemen that would bring about the desired results. The Islamic nation, as an army, has several battalions. So when the enemy's tanks advance, we need to advance anti-tank battalions, and when the enemy's aircraft conduct raids, our anti-aircraft battalions must show themselves, all the while camouflaging and concealing our other battalions in order to protect them from being bombed, so as to not lose them. So this is the state of things in our battle with the infidels of the world. We want to cause him to only bleed in this mission, while preserving the other armies as a reserve force that enters the battlefield at the appropriate time.

B. The emergence of a force in control of the Mujahidin in Yemen is a matter that provokes our enemies internationally and locally and puts them on a great state of alert, which is quite different from the emergence of the strength of the Mujahidin in any nation not in the heart of the Islamic world, despite the enemy's increased alert posture at the appearance of the Mujahidin in any location.

Thus, their situation in Yemen would be like that of anyone fighting for his life, for Yemen is the launching point toward all other oil nations. Control of these

nations means control of the world, so they are willing to die and make every effort to break the backs of the Mujahidin there. At the same time, the capabilities of our brothers there are not yet such that they can enter this sort of struggle, neither in terms of their administration or their financial resources. The finances do not permit them to provide the basic life support services to whomever would take on the burden, whether they want to or not, particularly since Yemen is suffering from a food and health services crisis even before entering into a war, and all that this implies. The issue of providing for basic needs is a matter that must be taken into consideration before taking control of nations or cities. If a controlling force, that enjoys the support of the majority where it has taken control, fails to provide for the basic needs of the people, it will lose their support and will find itself in a difficult position that will grow increasingly difficult with each passing day. People will not bear seeing their children die as a consequence of a lack of food or medicine. This is in addition to providing necessities to fighters and what we call logistical support.

I would add that the initiative is in our hands, and we have the room to look for the appropriate time to begin Jihad in Yemen. In the words of Almighty God, "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom God doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of God, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly."

We still have a large force we are able to gather and prepare, and if we suppose that the suitable conditions for establishing an Islamic state in Yemen that can be preserved are realized in three years, for example, then beginning Jihad before that time is unwise because the forces would be squandered and it would take longer to prepare, all while not achieving their primary goal, which is to establish the religion.

It is our desire, and the desire of the brothers in Yemen, to establish the religion and restore the caliphate, to include all the countries of the Islamic world. God willing, that will be followed by other conquests that we are able to achieve by continuing to wage Jihad at the fronts that are prepared for combat, while holding off at the fronts that are not yet prepared, such as Yemen, until they become prepared and until combat at those fronts will produce results that aid in establishing a guided caliphate, God willing. What demonstrates the dangers in beginning a fight before the necessary elements have been put in place is the failure of the coup attempted by the socialists in Yemen, which was due to their haste in beginning before putting in place the elements necessary to success. These included securing the loyalty of the surrounding tribes and other such items, despite the fact that what pushed them to do this was the increase in assassinations among their cadre, be it assassination by way of murder at the hands of the Mujahidin or the assassination by granting money from the president, which drew them to him. As you know, the duty of Jihad does not mean establishing it in every territory, including the territories in which the elements of success have not been achieved. Jihad is a means to establish the religion, and it might be brought down by an inability to do so without being brought down by the preparation for it. This would be the case if most of

those with experience in Jihad decided that the elements necessary for success had not been achieved such that the desired results could be realized.

By God's grace, Jihad is underway at several fronts, and these are sufficient, by His will and His glory, as well as by the steadfastness of the Mujahidin there, to perform the function of bleeding the head of the infidels, America, such that it is defeated, God willing. Then, the Islamic Nation will be able to expel that which has stricken it with weakness, servility, and degradation.

The interest of the Mujahidin in knowing that which effects the enlightenment of the people of the Islamic Nation and is met with acceptance by the people is sufficient, God willing, to rescue the nation from the oppression of the ignorant and the misled. Thus, the plague that exists in the nations of Muslims has two causes: The first is the presence of American hegemony and the second is the presence of rulers that have abandoned Islamic law and who identify with the hegemony, serving its interests in exchange for securing their own interests. The only way for us to establish the religion and alleviate the plague which was befallen Muslims is to remove this hegemony which has beset upon the nations and worshippers and which transforms them, such that no regime that rules on the basis of Islamic law remains. The way to remove this hegemony is to continue our direct attrition against the American enemy until it is broken and is too weak to interfere in the matters of the Islamic world.

After this phase comes the phase in which the second cause—rulers who have abandoned Islamic law are toppled, and this will be followed by the phase in which God's religion is established and Islamic law rules.

The focus must be on actions that contribute to the intent of bleeding the American enemy. As for actions that do not contribute to the intent of bleeding the great enemy, many of them dilute our efforts and take from our energy. The effect of this on the greater war in general is clear, as is the resulting delay in the phases leading to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, God willing.

Based on this, there is no overriding pressure or great need to exhaust and deplete the front in Yemen before the elements of success there have been achieved. Putting reserve forces and supply lines for the Mujahidin into the quagmire is a difficult thing, for the reasons I've already mentioned, including that the scope of the struggle will be greater than the capabilities in a number of ways.

So it seems to me that halting the escalation in Yemen is in the general interest of the Mujahidin and is similar in many ways to what took place in the Battle of Mu'tah, as the Prophet described it, and the actions of Khalid Bin al-Walid. He achieved victory when he withdrew the army; the victory in the circumstances of that battle came in his rescuing the companions (of the Prophet Muhammad) from the destruction of their army in the battle. Their army was completely outnumbered by the Roman army, and there were no elements in place for success, and they weren't on the verge of a complete disaster. They had the ability to go and regroup, much like we do now. They even had the ultimate Prophet, who eventually praised them, telling them they were fighters, not fleers.

As for the matter of establishing the state before putting in place the elements necessary for success:

A. It seems to me that being deliberate in this matter is a good thing, and to explain further, establishing the state before the elements necessary for success are put in place most often will lead to aborting the effort wherever it takes place, because establishing a state and then toppling the state represents a burden that exceeds the energy of the people. Weighing people down with something that exceeds their energies is fraught with negative results and leads to the shock of Jihad for the people of a territory in which the movement is suppressed, and it may exceed them. This is true whether the movement was suppressed after establishing the state or while it seeks to do so, as was the case in Syria when the Muslim Brotherhood tried to begin their Jihad and establish an Islamic state before they were prepared to do so and before the elements necessary for success were in place. This led to a shock for the Muslims in Syria at the emergence of Jihad, and many people decided it was less harmful to remain with the current regime than what would happen to them if they took part in the Jihad.

Following this shock, Jihad lost a generation of men who had been passionate about the victory of the religion, including men who had given their lives for this cause. The winds of Jihad were still for nearly twenty years in Syria until a new generation came along that had not experienced that shock. The overwhelming majority of those who answered the call to Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq were those who had not witnessed the Hamah experience and the murder committed by the regime there.

B. Jihad as a means to bring down countries and to gain control of them does not require beginning such a plan based on the hope that people will fight to establish a nascent state. Instead, it requires close study and inspection and confirmation that the elements necessary to success are in place. And it requires searching for the appropriate time. So we cannot waste a golden opportunity, and we must not begin before the appropriate opportunity is at hand. A man might measure the results of establishing an Islamic state before toppling its enemies against the results of the fall of the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan, which we pray to God does not happen again. Such a comparison shows a big difference, due to a number of factors. The first factor is that the people of the Islamic world are divided into two groups, the Arabs and the non-Arabs. Given that the enemies have knowledge of and experience with the Arabs and their history, they have learned that Arabs have dangerous qualities that make them suitable to quickly carry out the call to Jihad, and that the Qur'an and the Hadith are sufficient to justify that. On top of that is the speed with which they comprehend the texts of these without the need for translation. Based on this knowledge, the enemies have focused the bulk of their campaign against the Islamic world on the Arabs, particularly in the destructive media bombardment against Arab culture and their characteristics. This all serves the interests of the west; sufficient proof of this lies in the fact that the first language in which BBC broadcasts are transmitted after English is Arabic. This, when Arabs represent 2.5% of the world's population, while other people, including China by itself, represent a fifth of the world's population. The same is true for the Indian sub-continent, which represents another fifth of the population, while the number of Muslims in India is greater than the number of all the Arab Muslims. It was possible for the

voice of the British Empire to reach 40% of the world's population through just its broadcast, but their primary concern was with destroying the Arabs via the media.

The second factor is the continued American occupation manifested in military forces on the ground. This is a very important factor in awakening people and inciting them to continue fighting, as opposed to the situation in countries in which the external enemy brings down the Islamic state established there without putting its military forces on the ground. Instead, they are satisfied to support the local or regional enemy, particularly if the country hasn't been destabilized by significant internal dispute, as is the case in Iraq.

The third factor is that the Afghan people are religiously devout by nature and live spartan lives. They are extremely sensitive to the presence of foreigners in their country, where there are many primitive villages in the mountains and rural areas cut off from the cities. The residents in such areas are aware of their freedoms and their strength, and know they are far from the control of the security forces that are weak even in the major cities.

These factors are important in completing the elements necessary for successfully establishing a Muslim state, but they do not apply to all countries in the region. The people in many of these countries are still not prepared to enter the fight against governments and to bring them down. Many people have no idea how they would respond, and those who do understand that or who want to do away with these governments for some other reason, such as poverty or administrative corruption, do not believe that the solution is to fight them and to bring them down, because America is the dominant force in the region and will bring down any state that is established after its representatives are toppled.

In this phase, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are exceptions to the countries in the region. Here we have an important issue, which is that one of the most important factors that will aid in the success of Jihad and its continuation is calling on Muslims to fight the enemy whose hostility they know and whom they know it is permissible to fight against, as is the case with the American enemy. As for the local enemy, such as if the Yemenis were to begin a long battle against the security services, this is a matter that will weigh on the people. As time goes by, they will begin to feel that some of them have been killed and they will start to want to stop the fighting. This would promote the ideology of secular governments that raise the motto of pleasing all sides.

Our goal is not to expend our energy in Yemen, to use the greater part of our strength in supplies and reserves, and to wear down and ultimately topple an apostate regime, only to establish another apostate regime. This is on the assumption that the people would revolt with us to topple that regime. However, while it is the nature of tribes to be daring in fighting among themselves, they are cautious and hesitant to enter a struggle against a sizeable opponent. (They will do so only) after they make sure that the force and timing sufficiently predicts that the revolution has a good margin of success. This is when one of the most important factors for establishing a stable Muslim country in Yemen is dependent on substantial tribal support and adoption and gaining their trust so that they enter the struggle and contribute to establishing the government and protecting it. It is worth mentioning here that

the entity that the tribes are going to confront in their fight will be just the Yemeni government, it will be international and regional apostasy.

It is also worth mentioning that the situation on the ground imposes the importance of differentiating between the North and the South, as the situation in the South cannot wait any longer. This is due to the people's intense anger toward the government and the huge amount of injustice inflicted on the people by the government, in addition to the mobilization conducted by al-Hirak. These two factors made large sectors of the people in the South dare to revolt, prepare for armed confrontation, and fight against the government. As for North Yemen, I see that it is in the same condition as the rest of the countries in the region, as far as the people not being ready to fight against the government. So I see that we do not seek a truce in the South, as it goes against the fabric of the people in their movement to lift off the injustice put upon them. It will lead to us losing most of the government opponents; we should not follow their lead, but we benefit from the tense atmosphere in spreading our call to Allah among the Muslim ranks in the South.

This is because the current anger is led by al-Hirak, and it is allied to the United States and the Gulf states. Accordingly, not declaring a truce does not mean that we escalate against the government in the South and enter into a fight against the military, as it would not bring the desired outcome. This is because the sons of the northern tribes will be targeted in the fight. The commoners in these tribes do not realize that the military are apostates. So the tribes will think that we increased the bloodshed, and people will talk among the tribes saying that al-Qa'ida kills a lot. This would distance many people from us and might lead to a tribal uprising to fight against us in revenge for their sons. This also means that we do not jump to establish an Islamic state in the South at the first chance of the government losing control in the South. The reason for this is what we mentioned earlier, that we are not yet ready to cover the people with the umbrella of Islamic rule. The reasons are that the people have needs and requirements, and the lack of these requirements is the main reason for their revolt against the ruler. We cannot provide for these needs in light of the battle and siege of the whole world against us. It is human nature that they will go with whoever better provides them with these needs and requirements. The animosity of the world and its siege against the Mujahidin is well known to the people, so no matter how much they love the Mujahidin, they will not stand beside them under these circumstances.

It is apparent from this that most people in Yemen, if given a choice between a government formed by al-Qa'ida or a government formed directly or indirectly by any of the Gulf states—such as if they give support to 'Ali Salim al-Bayd or any other who has administrative ability—they will choose the government that is formed by the Gulf states, either in the North or the South. The simple reason for this is that they think that these are Muslim governments and that they have the ability to provide them the necessities of their livelihoods. These are the demands of the people.

To stay away from wishful thinking and hope, we have to look at the people's revolution in the South like it is a boulder rolling down the side of a mountain. It is a benefit to whoever takes it; however, stopping it to our benefit is difficult, as it

naturally will end up with the person who has the ability to control it, and who is at the current time, the Yemeni opposition, which is supported by the Gulf states. However, looking at the indications, it seems that at the time the US is weakening—and accordingly, its agents are weakening—the Mujahidin are preparing to cover the people with the umbrella of the Caliphate. We will be the prime choice nearest to them, as they are Muslims in Muslim countries, and it is natural for that environment to receive the Mujahidin to reestablish the Caliphate and rule with Allah's Shari'ah. This is what scares the adversaries more than the Mujahidin; they are scared of the rejectionists (TN: the Shi'a).

Based on the above, we should not begin to attempt to establish a government in Yemen, even if the people revolted against government and toppled it, either in South Yemen or in all of Yemen. This is regardless of how bad the nominees to control that government are, because the outcome will be worse on Islam and Muslims if we start something that does not have all factors of success put together. This would put us in trouble with the people and put the Mujahidin forces in the sights of the enemy fire. This is because in the view of the rulers of the Land of the Holy (Mosques) (TN: Saudi Arabia), we are their worst enemies and our presence in Yemen threatens their royalty's existence, in addition to their abiding by the American wishes for them to fight us, so they will pump huge funds into recruiting the Yemeni tribes to kill us.

They will win over the swords of the majority, which will put the Mujahidin force in Yemen under enemy fire and in a very serious situation.

Miscellaneous Points:

1—Please give me the news about the condition of the sons of our brother Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul. (Tell me) how he was martyred and how the enemy discovered his location. I had been planning to mourn him and talk to the nation about him; however, I did not get a confirmation of the news from your side. Please relay my regards and condolences to Shaykh Abu Muhammad, and give me the news about his condition. For several months, I have been sending messages to him, and Shaykh Sa'id told me that he had not yet received a courier from him. It then became noticeable that he has not been heard in the media in recent times. I hope that the problem is something good, and I advise that he get a companion (TN: bodyguard) from the Arab brothers.

2—I had mentioned in several previous messages to Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul, the importance of the exit from Waziristan of the brother leaders, especially the ones that have media exposure. I stress this matter to you and that you choose distant locations to which to move them, away from aircraft photography and bombardment, while taking all security precautions. Also work on bringing out the brothers who have distinguished talents after they have been battle hardened, either by exposure to a big battle or by staying at the front for approximately one month.

3—It would be nice if you would send me the names of some who are qualified to be your deputy.

4—It would be nice if you would nominate a brother to be responsible for the general duty of the external work in all the regions. If it is not possible to nominate

someone for this, then you take over that responsibility. Knowing that Shaykh Yunis (Var: Younis) is the official responsible for external work in Africa and west Asia, please inform him of that. I sent a message in the past to Shaykh Sa'id and to you about the importance of external work, I hope it has reached you. In any case, I have attached it to your messages.

5—It would be nice if you would nominate one of the qualified brothers to be responsible for a large operation in the US.

6—It would be nice if you would pick a number of the brothers, not to exceed ten, and send them to their countries individually, without any of them knowing the others, to study aviation. It would be better if they are from the Gulf states, as study there is at the government's expense. They have to be picked with the utmost care and with very accurate specifications, one of which is that they are willing to conduct suicide actions and are prepared to do daring, important, and precise missions that we may ask of them in the future. So please pay top attention to this matter due to its utmost importance. Establish a mechanism to monitor and follow up on the brothers going to study aviation so that we reduce the chances of them slackening from conducting Jihad.

7—It would be nice if you would ask the brothers in all regions if they have a brother distinguished by his good manners, integrity, courage, and secretiveness, who can operate in the US. (He should be able to) live there, or it should be easy for him to travel there. They should tell us this without taking any action and also tell us whether or not he is willing to conduct a suicide operation.

8—It would be nice if you would send the message to the brothers in all regions, without exception, that whoever has an operation outside the region where he is located must coordinate with you. This is so there will no conflicts between operations or failures where the brothers could be exposed or captured.

9—It would be nice if you would send two messages—one to Brother Abu Mus'ab 'Abd-al-Wadud, and the other to Brother Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi—and ask them to put forward their best in cooperating with Shaykh Yunis in whatever he asks of them.

Hint to the brothers in the Islamic Maghreb that they provide him with the financial support that he might need in the next six months, to the tune of approximately 200,000 euros. These two messages are to be coordinated with Shaykh Yunis, and arrange a name for him that does not divulge his nationality. Arrange for a secure method of communications and coordination between them and Shaykh Yunis. Stress the utmost secrecy in work and restrict the knowledge of Shaykh Yunis affair to the leadership in the regions in which he has to work with the brothers.

Also indicate to the brothers in Yemen when talking about coordination before conducting any work outside the peninsula, that working in the sea, even within the territorial waters of the peninsula, is to be considered external work that requires coordination with you. Pay attention to explaining the importance of coordination, as well as the dangers of neglecting it, to all the brothers in all the regions. In general, it would be good to clarify the wisdom or the reason behind this in most of what we ask the brothers for, unless it exposes operational secrets.

10—Please write a report about Brother Shaykh Yunis at the first opportunity. Include (information on) his birth, education, social status, his best qualifications

and experiences, as well as his manner and dealings with the Mujahidin and his relationship with them, the date of his becoming religiously adherent, and his joining Jihad. If it is not easy on you that the report be complete and comprehensive, it is alright to ask the brothers in the Islamic Maghreb for help after you send me whatever you already have.

11—In a previous message, we asked the security official, Brother Abu al-Wafa' and also his deputy for a report about the conditions on your side; however, we have not yet received them, it would be good if you would follow up on this matter.

12—Please report to me in detail about the financial situation on your side and about your vision and plans to improve it. Your earmarking of the budget should set aside enough salaries for the brothers and the families for a year, regardless of the financial forecast for the coming days.

13—It would be good of you to provide us with detailed information about our brother Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was appointed as a replacement for our brother Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi, Allah have mercy on his soul, and his first lieutenant and deputy al-Nasir Lidin Allah, AKA Abu Sulayman. It would be better for you to ask several sources among our brothers there, whom you trust, about them so that the matter becomes clear to us. I also would like that you ask our brothers in Ansar al-Islam Organization where they stand on the new Emirs, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his brothers. I do remind you to put forward your maximum effort to achieve unity and resolve any conflicts between all of the Jihadi entities in Iraq.

In these efforts to achieve unity, there should be a special message directed to our brothers there that stresses the importance of unity and collectiveness and that they maintain a basic foundation of the religion, so it must get precedence over names, titles, or entities if they obstruct the achievement of that great duty.

14—I want to remind them of the importance of the people's first impression of who is addressing them, especially when he bears great responsibility. Since we carry the responsibility of a call that we want to deliver to the people, this takes care to find out what suits the people and the path from which you can reach them, deliver the faith to them, and convince them with it. Part of this is to eliminate any strange appearance that will make them wonder and to adopt what they are used to, such as appearing in the media in true name, even if just a first name, and also appearing in Arab dress, as it is closer to the people than the dress of the people in these areas. (I also want to remind you that) people like short audio and video speeches and to disseminate what you can on the Internet. These are just opinions and I am open to your opinion.

15—You should send (a message) to the brothers in all the regions saying that a minimum of two brothers should be sent for suicide operations; they should not send a single suicide brother. We have experienced this in many operations where the percentage of success was very low, due to the psychological effects that overcome the brother in such cases. The most recent of which was the operation in which our brothers targeted the British Ambassador in Yemen, and one of our brothers, Allah have mercy on his soul, conducted it. Regardless of the heroism of the brother and his steadfastness, the psychological factors that affect the person in

such cases necessitate the presence of a companion that will support and bolster him. Some people will say that some of the Prophet's companions conducted operations alone. This is a very different example: They were not suicide operations, and that is where the big difference lies.

16—I asked Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul, to task brother Ilyas to prepare two groups—one in Pakistan and the other in the Bagram area of Afghanistan—with the mission of anticipating and spotting the visits of Obama or Petraeus to Afghanistan or Pakistan to target the aircraft of either one of them. They are not to target visits by US Vice President Biden, Secretary of Defense Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman) Mullen, or the Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Holbrook. The groups will remain on the lookout for Obama or Petraeus. The reason for concentrating on them is that Obama is the head of infidelity and killing him automatically will make Biden take over the presidency for the remainder of the term, as it is the norm over there. Biden is totally unprepared for that post, which will lead the US into a crisis. As for Petraeus, he is the man of the hour in this last year of the war, and killing him would alter the war's path. So please ask brother Ilyas to send to me the steps he has taken into that work.

17—It would be good if you coordinate with our brothers of the Pakistan and Afghanistan Taliban in regards to the external work, so that there is complete cooperation between us, and tell them that we started planning work inside America many years ago, and gained experience in that field, and we and they are brothers so we should not fall into the error that hurts the Muslims and benefits the enemy, due to lack of coordination between us. So, for example, the operation of brother Faysal Shahrzad, Allah release his imprisonment, was possible to avoid his capture and the errors that happened easily by one who had experience in that area, so if a brother purchased the vehicle and then travelled from America to Waziristan before the operation, it would have made it difficult to capture the brother that fast, and based on that, draw their attention to the importance of cooperation among us and the possibility of the two sides adopting the operation reduces the possibility of these errors, after which the Americans commented that the Mujahidin have become unable to conduct a large operation that is well planned.

18—You have to keep in mind the possibility, though remote, that the journalists may be involuntarily monitored, in a way that we or they do not know about, either on ground or by satellite, especially Ahmad Zaydan, and it is possible that a tracking chip could be put into some of their personal effects before coming to the meeting place to conduct any business with them, or to conduct an interview with one of the brothers, and as you know Ahmad Zaydan has interviewed a number of the Taliban leaders and also with Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul, and the Americans did not kill any of them or know his location from surveying Ahmad Zaydan except that it may be a matter that might attract their attention, as they identified the house where the brothers Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir Allah, have mercy on their souls, were staying in, across satellites, by monitoring some brothers who were released from prison and who went to them after that. And based on that, it would be prudent and a defeat to the enemy to avoid any meetings with journalists. And paying attention to aircraft and satellite surveillance cannot be

avoided with training on counter surveillance or changing vehicles or conducting meetings with journalists in a place away from the location of the Mujahidin, or bringing the journalists by night so that they do not find the way and the other procedures like that. But you should use the secure means in contacting the media and journalists which are using the mail. So please inform our brothers of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan about that for fear on their safety.

19—It is obvious that remaining on the same M.O. in communications between us makes it weak from a security point of view, as it makes it easy on the enemy to find out the method that we use in communicating, so initially we have to employ the following steps:

A—That the two brothers' couriers from my side and yours should not meet to exchange messages except in a closed market or mall.

B—That the brother who is bringing the messages out of Waziristan report to you after every trip to inform you if the security situation is normal or elevated and changed, like increased scrutiny, questioning, or photography, whether aimed at specific persons or at all the passersby or that the search elements have been replaced with elements that are more alert and attentive.

20—Regarding our brother Abu Talhah al-Almani, Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul and accept him among the martyrs, told me that the brother was on his way to a suicide operation, so if he has executed the operation, we ask Allah to take him among the martyrs and put him in paradise, and if his operation has been delayed and you see that he has a special talent that is lacking in the external work section, then it would be good to tell him that, and that if he postpones his desire to conduct a suicide operation that he write to me his vision of external work.

21—It would be nice to ask our brothers of Pakistan Taliban to deny their connection to the recent operation in Lahore against (phonetic: al-Briluwiyah). [TN: possibly referring to: (The News Online, 2 Jul) Lahore: Two back-to-back suicide bombings and a cracker blast killed at least 42 people and injured over 175 inside the crowded shrine of Data Gunj Bukhsh in Lahore on Thursday night.] And also ask them about the truth in the news that talks about beginnings of negotiations and truce talks between them and the Pakistani government, and what is theirs and your opinion on that, knowing that much of what I have said about Yemen can be applied to the situation on your side.

22—It would be nice to inform us of the truth about what was mentioned of arresting our brother 'Azzam al-Amriki.

23—It would be nice if you can send us the book of Shaykh Abu Yahya (Enemy Usage of Bystanders in Present Jihad), and his book (Studies in Decisive Unanimity) and it would be better that you provide us with each theological work published by you.

24—Enclosed is a message for Shaykh Yunis, please deliver it to him if he is on your side or if he has travelled, but there is a secure mode of delivering it; and if there is no secure method to deliver it, then please destroy it.

25—It would be nice to inform me of whom you have of the brothers who have no objection to accompanying me, and they are natives of this country and their

situation is suitable for that matter. I asked Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul, to tell me who he has and he mentioned some of the brothers, except that their situation, security wise, was not suitable to our conditions, and it seems that he had limited choices, so please continue the search and provide me with names and resumes of the brothers that you think are qualified. You know the features that they must have, like being tested until there is no doubt and that he is not wanted by the authorities for lawsuits or crimes, and that he owns an official ID card that is valid or can renew it if it has expired, and that he is able to rent houses and purchase requirements. And that he be secretive even from his family and friends, and to be well-mannered, quiet, patient, aware, and knowledgeable of the enemy tricks, and able to stay away from his family if that becomes risky.

And that he is not from an area known to have many Mujahidin and that he does not inform you of his real name or the location where his family lives. And please pay attention to that subject and inform me within two months, as the notice that my companion has given me is limited.

26—Brother 'Abdallah al-Halabi ('Abd-al-Latif) informed me that my family in Iran is on the way to come to the brothers in Pakistan or Waziristan, so as a precaution and to safeguard everyone, we have to assume that their arrival will be different than what we are used to when our brothers arrived who were coming from Iran in the past, for several reasons of which is that my son Ladin has been allowed by the Iranians to exit Iran and go to Syria as a show of good will to the rest of the detainees, and that they will be released, and he will be keen on informing the family that his brothers will be exiting soon from Iran. No doubt that such news will [be] exchanged over the phone, while the phones are monitored, thus the information will be available to the adversaries. Accordingly, if the intelligence commander in the area is aware, he will think that they are headed to me and will survey them to find the place that they will settle in. And regardless of the possibilities in monitoring them, we have to be on the cautious side and take the following steps to break the surveillance:

They will go to the tunnel between Kuhat and Peshawar, and arrange a meeting between them and another brother. The meeting must be precise in timing and it will be inside the tunnel, and they will change cars inside the tunnel, so they will ride in the car with the brother that they will meet instead of the car they were riding in, and the brothers who are going to drive the car must be instructed on the strict adherence to the timings.

After changing cars, the brother who is driving the car that is subject to surveillance will drive to an area that is unsuspected, and the people coming from Iran will go to Peshawar, go to one of the closed markets, and change cars again, then head to a safe place in Peshawar until we arrange for them to come, with Allah's will.

The main thing about succeeding in avoiding surveillance is to go to the tunnel and to move after getting out of it in overcast weather, even if that would lead to them waiting for some time, knowing that the Peshawar area and its surroundings is often overcast. They also should be warned on the importance of getting rid of everything they received from Iran, like baggage or anything, even as small as a needle, as there are eavesdropping chips that are developed to be so small that they

can even be put inside a medical syringe; and since the Iranians are not to be trusted, then it is possible to plant chips in some of the coming people's belongings. This process will be done only with Um Hamzah. As for my sons 'Uthman and Muhammad, it would be nice to arrange a safe place for them in Pakistan.

And it is preferred that we communicate with the Iranians if they release my family and do not release my daughter Fatimah, as they promised that after the release of their prisoner with us that they will release my family, which includes my daughter Fatimah, and she is connected to her husband, and it is not fair to separate women from their husbands, so she should be released with her husband and his wife Um Hafs (TN: his other wife). As for what concerns my son Hamzah, you had an opinion that the arrival of the brothers to us be stopped due to the current difficult situation, so after thinking it over, I sent to Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul, an opinion that he agreed on with me, which is that we receive all the brothers arriving, so that they remain as a lifeline and replenishment for what we lose of talents and cadres, and to limit the time that they remain in Pakistan to two or three weeks, whereby they are given a quick training course that is heavy on ideology in addition to weapons usage basics, and through that we get to identify the talents and abilities of the coming brothers, so that whom we find is distinguished and capable on call and recruitment. We will send him to his country to conduct specific missions like inciting for Jihad over the internet, collecting donations, or recruiting some distinguished brothers, and we will keep a limited number of them to develop their energy with you in Waziristan. As far as the rest of the youth, you send the ones that show toughness and discipline, and adherence to Islamic manners to the front with the Taliban, and you tell him that he will live like they live and those that you notice who do not have it, then you apologize to them and tell them that when the conditions improves, we will send a call out for him and his like to respond and join.

And based on that, there is an issue that I wanted to consult with you on, which is that my son Hamzah be sent to Qatar, where he studies religious sciences, and perform the duty of informing the nation and delivering some of what we ask him to deliver to the nation, spread the Jihad doctrine, and refute the wrong and the suspicions raised around Jihad within the freedoms allowed there.

There is no doubt that the nation needs to be approached and closely interacted with, and the knowledge of its realities and the approaches that need to be used in delivering the information, while the Mujahidin do not get that opportunity because of their distance and the apostates chasing them worldwide, which denies them the chance to find out the needs of the nation and to respond to these needs.

Except that Hamzah is one of the Mujahidin and he bears their thoughts and worries and at the same time he can interact with the nation, as it is difficult to indict him and to ask Qatar to extradite him because he was imprisoned when he was a child, so there are no crimes outstanding against him.

27—In the past, I watched some of programs about me, the most recent of which was al-Islamiyun program (TN: the Islamists). In one of its episodes was a repeated matter that relied on incorrect information, and in some case inaccurate information, and as you know, if the person does not disclose his history then the media

people and the historians will make up some history for him with whatever information is available to them, whether right or wrong. So in order not have a mix-up on that subject, I thought that you could arrange with Ahmad Zaydan to prepare a program documented by us with real information, which I might send to you in a future message. And part of the agreement is that the work would be joint between al-Jazeera and al-Sahab, so that they have the copyrights preserved to them.

In closing: We wait to hear your news and messages, and we pray to Allah to guide us all on what he likes and on what pleases him, and to get us together with his help and will, and cover us with his mercy, and praise Allah.

Your brother Zamrai.

—The attached is what Shaykh Yunis wrote:

Our status and the two pitfalls endangering us which we need to eradicate. Presently we are experiencing the most favorable atmosphere in the history of the Islamic nation. There is a base of youths adopting our teachings and following our path without any efforts on our parts to teach them the faith. They are ready for anything posted for them on the spider web (Internet), after validating the source.

It is the main principle of the empowerment strategy, as the saying goes; swords conquer and knowledge enlightens; and capturing the hearts comes before controlling nations. It makes the establishment of the religion easier; and the best example is the model of Fayruz al-Daylami, who accomplished his task without seeing the Prophet Muhammad. Also, because Fayruz knew in his heart what was needed to be done, and did it. Therefore, spreading our cause and simplifying its principles so it is easy to understand and clarify its applicability in answering all the mundane and religious questions. The model will speed up the conquering, the victory, and uncover any hidden surprises from the unexpected in our midst, which is a point realized by the enemy of God among the Christians. They have found a class of followers in our countries who are educated in their culture to work for them. It behooves us to facilitate the Jihad road before our ores in unimaginable, easy, and clean-to-achieve ways; and to protect against two dangerous pitfalls: one is security related and the other is inflexibility and narrow-mindedness, on which I will elaborate later.

Having the youth base represent the right soil for our cause, without having to publicize our activities. The leadership cadre here in Khurasan has been praised and trusted by everyone, and it is doing that on our behalf, allowing us freedom of movements and innovation in the methods, the ways of smuggling, and counterfeiting; and mastering these skills, will allow us to teach the art of mingling among the people executing our strikes and hiding without a trace.

Now the pitfalls:

1—Security pitfall: I will issue a small guideline, signed by the organization, for awareness and directions for anyone thinking about Jihad to prevent the brother from burning himself before burning the enemy. I will also add a suggestion to

indicate they are preparing the stage for the coming nation, to disguise our intentions from our enemy, leading him to thinking it is a dream attributable to the demise of our cadres and the adversity we are under. We will utilize the right individual at the right stage, either before or after the creation of the nation. The format of the guideline will be video, audio, written and translated to all languages available to us. It will save time in training and make any newcomer an arrow ready to fly.

2—We have to make our position unequivocally clear on the issue of inflexibility and narrow-mindedness; and must have concise, written instructions published for all of the awakening youths to know our stand. The benefits are undeniable on having a guideline to abide by, for ourselves as well as our friends, and to rid ourselves of the accusation of inflexibility and narrow-mindedness, and it will also broaden the horizons of our brethren. We are approaching a stage where narrow-mindedness is a killer, and ignorance of Shari'ah is damning. Lately, the term the Salafist approach to Jihad is spreading on the Internet, accusing individuals of not following the approach. It is a very dangerous situation, especially because it is attributed to us and the rise of new groups advocating for a stringent form of the faith.

The certainty in issues related to Jihad is mere guessing used to typify and classify people in a way that is not free from the hands and intervention of state security apparatus. It is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. This typifying (TN: religious stereotyping), boasting with titles, isolates and segregates us from the nation. You have experienced it in Peshawar and have seen its outcome in Algeria. If this concept gains footing, it will put the individuals in a situation where they refrain from speaking the truth for the fear of typifying (TN: religious stereotyping). Therefore, it is a must to eliminate it while in its infancy, and expand peoples' horizons, guiding them gently to the truth. We are not monopolizing the Salafi way or any other doctrine, but we are members of the entire nation, reciting the words of its scholars on righteousness, and we do not hold any grudges or are unreachable by the followers of any dogma. We are all from one nation and we are all held by our words, and none but the ones descried in the Cow verse are left. The matter of the practical Jihad operations is vast, and the issues we are facing now are agreed upon by the prominent scholars of our nation.

We must avoid the stigma of being a one-dimensional sect, opposed to all others. We are Muslims following the teachings of Islam and we are not the owners of the Salafist way, and must avoid typifying (TN: religious stereotyping) each other. It is important to have a memorandum issued from Shaykh Abu-Yahya and Shaykh Mahmud clarifying the issues of penitence, atonement, and the virtue of patience; refraining from accusing and judging without being qualified to judge; in addition to expanding the awareness of the followers in the arenas of politics and Shari'ah, which I believe publishing a letter in the form of questions and answers well help greatly.

Source: "Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?," Combating Terrorism Center, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined>.

97. Excerpt of Remarks by the CIA Director at In-Q-Tel Summit (2012)

Classification: Unclassified

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director David Petraeus discusses the challenges and future of In-Q-Tel, to include the “transformational changes in the nature of intelligence” in the digital world.

Remarks by Director David H. Petraeus at In-Q-Tel CEO Summit

Excerpts from Remarks Delivered by Director David H. Petraeus at the In-Q-Tel CEO Summit (March 1, 2012)

Thank you for that kind introduction and warm welcome. It truly is a pleasure to be here with such an impressive mix of entrepreneurs, investors, and technologists—in fact, some of you, I’m sure, have all three titles to your credit. I’m also pleased that we have such strong representation from across the US Intelligence Community. I had a great discussion at dinner last night with a number of venture capitalists, and I’m looking forward to continuing those exchanges today with In-Q-Tel partner companies. Indeed, I’m very impressed with the innovative technologies In-Q-Tel is fostering development of in partnership with its portfolio companies. I can tell you that they are providing enormous support to us as we execute various critical intelligence missions. And, on behalf of the Agency, I thank you all for helping us perform at the very high level that the American people expect of us.

Well, up front, I know it takes a wide variety of expertise to come up with the truly amazing applications that are associated with In-Q-Tel and its portfolio. And when I thought of that, I recalled the story of the four engineers driving home from one of our partner startups in Silicon Valley—a mechanical engineer, a chemical engineer, an electrical engineer, and a computer engineer. And, sure enough, while heading up the West Valley Freeway, their car broke down. This is a joke, by the way, which I don’t quite get—but my team assures me it is funny, so work with me please!

They of course immediately sought to determine the cause, and the mechanical engineer naturally said, “Sounds to me as if the pistons have seized. We’ll just have to strip down the engine.”

“I’m not sure about that,” offered the chemical engineer. “Seems to me the fuel might be contaminated. We should flush out the fuel system.” “No,” the electrical engineer replied, “I think it’s a grounding problem, or maybe a faulty plug lead. We need to check the wiring.”

They all then turned to the computer engineer, who had said nothing, and asked for his opinion. “Well,” he said, “this is a tough one. How about if we all get out of the car and get back in again?” Well, thanks for laughing. You know the deal . . . at this stage in life, I’m only as good as the material they give me!

I'm often asked what I find most gratifying about my job—which, by the way, is the best job in the world and, in my case, a pretty awesome entry-level position. But the reason being CIA Director is so much fun is the extraordinary people with whom I'm privileged to serve. The CIA truly is a national treasure, with a workforce unparalleled in my experience. Within our Directorate of Science and Technology, the operative trait is diabolical creativity. The ingenuity our people bring to our S&T work—helped by folks like you, those with whom you work, and those you lead—is world-class, and the value they add to our operations worldwide is immeasurable. And it's great to have the Director of Science & Technology, Glenn Gaffney, here with me. Our Chief Information Officer is also here, along with other DS&T deputies and the S&T equivalent from NSA.

Indeed, I've found that our technical capabilities often far exceed what you see in Tom Cruise films. But there are a few feats he can accomplish in the movies that we can't: we haven't figured out, for example, how to change an individual's fingerprints or eyeballs just yet—but give us time.

In any event, our partnership with In-Q-Tel is essential to helping identify and deliver groundbreaking technologies with mission-critical applications to the CIA and to our partner agencies. We don't necessarily ask you to be diabolical—you can leave that to us—but your creativity is vital. So, again, I truly appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today for this exchange of ideas, and I appreciate you all being here for the annual In-Q-Tel gathering.

This morning, I'd like to discuss some of the top challenges that the CIA faces—challenges that your work is helping us to meet. To set the context at the strategic level, the Agency is engaged in a “tug of war,” if you will, between the need to lead our country's war against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, and the need for global intelligence coverage—all of this, of course, against the backdrop of tighter budgets.

As you know, our Agency has a global charter to collect intelligence. It's our job to ensure that challenges that arise in any corner of the world are not surprises to the President or to other policymakers. Certainly, we will continue relentlessly to pursue terrorists and support the troops in several different theaters. That is imperative, and the last year has seen considerable achievement in the fight against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. But, to use the kids' soccer analogy, we cannot turn the counterterrorist fight into a game of magnetball, in which the leadership is always focused on the counterterror mission. Everyone can't flock to the ball and lose sight of the rest of the field—the whole rest of the world.

And it's an enormous field to cover: again, the whole world, with proliferation of weapons and technology, cyber threats, counterintelligence threats, the next developments in the evolution of the Arab Spring, Iran, North Korea, China, illegal narcotics, emerging powers, non-state organizations, and even lone wolves. Our duty is nothing less than to be on top of every potential foreign challenge and opportunity facing the United States—and we now have to do it without the steady budget growth we saw in the years after 9/11. And this is why my job is so intellectually stimulating.

Against this backdrop, transformational changes in the nature of intelligence work have driven us to adopt the kind of innovative technologies developed by the firms represented in this room. And I'd like to briefly discuss three major

challenges of this new era: the utter transparency of the digital world, the enormous task of processing so-called Big Data, and the ever-greater need for speed.

First, given the digital transparency I just mentioned, we have to rethink our notions of identity and secrecy. In the digital world, data is everywhere, as you all know well. Data is created constantly, often unknowingly and without permission. Every byte left behind reveals information about location, habits, and, by extrapolation, intent and probable behavior. The number of data points that can be collected is virtually limitless—presenting, of course, both enormous intelligence opportunities and equally large counterintelligence challenges. We must, for example, figure out how to protect the identity of our officers who increasingly have a digital footprint from birth, given that proud parents document the arrival and growth of their future CIA officer in all forms of social media that the world can access for decades to come. Moreover, we have to figure out how to create the digital footprint for new identities for some officers.

As you all know, exploiting the intelligence opportunities—which is an easier subject to discuss in an unclassified setting than the counterintelligence challenges—will require a new class of in-place and remote sensors that operate across the electromagnetic spectrum. Moreover, these sensors will be increasingly interconnected. The current “Internet of PCs” will move, of course, toward an “Internet of Things”—of devices of all types—50 to 100 billion of which will be connected to the Internet by 2020. As you know, whereas machines in the 19th century learned to do, and those in the 20th century learned to think at a rudimentary level, in the 21st century, they are learning to perceive—to actually sense and respond. Key applications developed by our In-Q-Tel investment companies are focused on technologies that are driving the Internet of Things. These include:

Item identification, or devices engaged in tagging;

Sensors and wireless sensor networks—devices that indeed sense and respond;

Embedded systems—those that think and evaluate;

And, finally, nanotechnology, allowing these devices to be small enough to function virtually anywhere.

Items of interest will be located, identified, monitored, and remotely controlled through technologies such as radio-frequency identification, sensor networks, tiny embedded servers, and energy harvesters—all connected to the next-generation Internet using abundant, low cost, and high-power computing—the latter now going to cloud computing, in many areas greater and greater supercomputing, and, ultimately, heading to quantum computing.

In practice, these technologies could lead to rapid integration of data from closed societies and provide near-continuous, persistent monitoring of virtually anywhere we choose. “Transformational” is an overused word, but I do believe it properly applies to these technologies, particularly to their effect on clandestine tradecraft. Taken together, these developments change our notions of secrecy and create innumerable challenges—as well as opportunities.

Secondly, the CIA and our Intelligence Community partners must be able to swim in the ocean of “Big Data.” Indeed, we must be world class swimmers—the best, in fact. We are inundated by constantly evolving open sources of foreign information, such as social media, that can provide invaluable, real-time insights. The Arab Spring has been a case study in how these rich streams of data can speak volumes on how a breaking crisis is liable to develop. And our Open Source Center and social media folks are on it. Of course, making sense of today’s massive quantities of unstructured data presents enormous challenges as well. For any given high-interest event, the “digital dust” to which we have access is being delivered by the equivalent of dump trucks!

The volume of Twitter and YouTube traffic in the continuing unrest in the Middle East offers an idea of what we’re up against: at the start of the Arab Spring, there were 2,200 Tweets generated every second—that equals some 190 million Tweets generated each day. And, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, those numbers have risen dramatically.

This ocean of Big Data has implications for both intelligence collection and intelligence analysis. For collection, having access to free and open information on so many topics that used to be denied to us allows our Agency to better focus our human intelligence effort—which often involves high costs and risks—on learning the key secrets that justify those costs and risks.

The implications of big data loom largest, of course, for our analytic effort. I’m convinced that the CIA has the greatest, most talented concentration of all-source intelligence analysts in the entire world; individuals unequaled in their ability to pull together the product of myriad sources of intelligence—human, signals, imagery, liaison, and so on, in addition to open sources—and to provide analysis with true insight. We place a high premium on knowledge, including regional and cultural expertise, and skills such as foreign language fluency, and fluency with applications that enable them. Indeed, we owe our analysts tools and systems that increasingly help them to give structure and meaning to the mountain of raw intelligence and to place it in proper context for the President and our policymakers.

Moreover, our analysts must discern the non-obvious relationships embedded deeply within different types of data: finding connections between a purchase here, a phone call there, a grainy video, customs and immigration information, various embedded meta-data, and so on—and then making sense of it. Ultimately, if you combine the open-source feeds such as those I mentioned with the increasingly massive volumes of classified data we receive, it’s clear that the CIA and our Community partners require new ways to organize and unify this universe of data—to make it usable, to accelerate automation, and to enable data traceability, relevance, and security. In short, these solutions must lead to automated discovery, rather than depending on the right analyst asking the right question.

Cloud computing provides important new capabilities for performing analysis across all data, allowing our analysts and decisionmakers to ask ad-hoc analytic questions of Big Data in a quick, precise fashion. New cloud computing technologies developed by In-Q-Tel partner companies are driving analytic transformation in the way organizations store, access, and process massive amounts of disparate data via massively parallel and distributed IT systems.

I am very encouraged by what I've seen so far. In fact, we're excited about it. For example, among the analytic projects underway with In-Q-Tel startups is one that enables collection and analysis of worldwide social media feeds, along with projects that use either cloud computing or other methods to explore and analyze Big Data. These are very welcome additions to the initiatives we have underway to enable us to be the strongest swimmers in the ocean of Big Data.

Finally, and my third point, is that we need products that help us respond to threats at the speed our mission demands. Despite our success in preventing another major attack on our shores since 9/11, we still face a resilient enemy in al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, an enemy every bit as determined to attack our country and our allies as it has ever been, and an enemy becoming increasingly sophisticated. The stakes are very high, and, quite simply, we must derive ever greater speed for our work from the systems you provide. Over the past decade, we have achieved considerable progress along the continuum from responsive and reactive to predictive and preventive, and we must sustain that momentum.

"Connecting the dots" may be one of biggest catch phrases of the last ten years, but it truly remains at the heart of our CT mission and many others. At the end of the day, that's how we got Bin Ladin. And In-Q-Tel companies are providing capabilities that allow our analysts to develop unique insights into seemingly intractable search-and-discovery challenges—and to do it quickly, interactively, and securely.

We require speed not only in performing our mission, but in developing and fielding tools that are as state-of-the art when they arrive in the field as when they were designed. It used to be acceptable to take years to build a new capability. Now we're lucky if we have months between identifying a need and deploying a solution. Sometimes the deadline we're facing is only weeks—or even days.

Industry's ability to rapidly prototype new products and get them to market—especially our market—is a skill that government simply cannot match. And so, in many cases, we rely on the private sector for the developmental speed that intelligence work requires. In-Q-Tel and its partner companies, through the Interface Center, help accelerate our application of technology—and, consequently, our ability to meet our global mission.

Chris Darby and the In-Q-Tel team live inside the fence, as we say, a good bit of the time. And they have become expert at translating our requirements into language that partner companies understand. And, of course, what we need often anticipates a need in the commercial arena—and that is why In-Q-Tel attracted more than \$9 in venture capital for every \$1 we put in.

I have boundless confidence in what the partnership between the CIA, our Intelligence Community colleagues, In-Q-Tel, and our partner companies can accomplish in helping us meet our global intelligence missions. There is, after all, no limit to what American ingenuity can achieve, whether in commerce, on the battlefield, or in the intelligence realm. Thanks in large part to your invaluable work, our officers enjoy an operational edge that our adversaries cannot hope to match—though they are trying! And we have to stay Number One!

Working together, we can best meet the high expectations that the American people have of us, especially in wartime. And we can put our nation's greatest

strengths to work against America's most dangerous enemies. You have my personal commitment that we will continue to make our market more available and accessible to you. I strongly support the In-Q-Tel model, and I am one of its biggest boosters. That's why I'm here today, and that's why I have asked Glenn Gaffney, our Director for Science and Technology, to expand our outreach to the startup community.

So, thanks for being here today, thanks for what you and your firms do in helping the Agency to be diabolically clever, and thanks for helping to keep America's Intelligence Community at the forefront of global innovation.

Source: "Remarks by Director David H. Petraeus at In-Q-Tel CEO Summit, March 1, 2012," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/in-q-tel-summit-remarks.html>.

98. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (2014)

This controversial 6,000-page report was released on December 9, 2014, by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee. It exposed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks and the Global War on Terror. Although large portions of the report were heavily redacted for national security purposes and some of the report's details merely repeated already disclosed information, it proved highly controversial because of its details on the CIA's use of coercive interrogation with terror suspects and the CIA's alleged activities to cover up such conduct. The following excerpt is a summary of the committee's findings and conclusions that appears at the beginning of the report.

The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions:

#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.

The Committee finds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information or gaining detainee cooperation.

For example, according to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody. CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques.

While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the CIA identified as its highest priorities.

At numerous times throughout the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence.

#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.

The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that "saved lives."

The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies.

In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique information from the use of the techniques.

Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have “disrupted” as a result of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized.

#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.

Beginning with the CIA’s first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and “wallings” (slamming detainees against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an “an open, nonthreatening approach,” or that interrogations began with the “least coercive technique possible” and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.

The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah, for example, became “completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as evolving into a “series of near drownings.”

Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.

Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take “precedence” over his medical care, resulting in the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep deprivation.

At least five CIA detainees were subjected to “rectal rehydration” or rectal feeding without documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water “baths.” The CIA led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box. One interrogator told another detainee that he would never go to court, because “we can never let the world know what I have done to you.” CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to their families—to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to “cut [a detainee’s] mother’s throat.”

#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policymakers and others.

Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. CIA detainees at the COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. The chief of interrogations described COBALT as a “dungeon.” Another senior CIA officer stated that COBALT was itself an enhanced interrogation technique.

At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their hands above their heads for extended periods of time. Other times, the detainees at COBALT were subjected to what was described as a “rough take-down,” in which approximately five CIA officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long corridor while being slapped and punched.

Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by CIA personnel.

Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems.

#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. Those representations were inaccurate in material respects.

The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA rarely informed the department.

Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002, senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of using coercive interrogation techniques. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives."

Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.

On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques." The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques would later be applied.

In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. OLC memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable intelligence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives.

#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.

The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the Committee in January 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested documents to the full Committee.

The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee beyond the chairman and vice chairman until September 6, 2006,

the day the president publicly acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119 known detainees had already entered CIA custody. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions from other Committee members that related to CIA interrogation activities.

Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the Committee. Briefings to the full Committee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained numerous inaccuracies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the views of members of Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that every Committee member was “fully briefed,” and that “[t]his is not CIA’s program. This is not the President’s program. This is America’s program.” The CIA also provided inaccurate information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of Justice.

A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. That legislation was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in February 2008, and was vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008.

#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.

The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the operation and effectiveness of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program to the White House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding oversight and decision-making.

According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques. The CIA did not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than Country [redacted].

At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense—both principals on the National Security Council—were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. An internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that “. . . the

WH [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on." Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of the National Security Council coordination process.

The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive."

#8: The CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.

The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.

The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S. government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and operate detention facilities. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees was restricted within the Intelligence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA officers that limitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism analysis.

The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. ambassadors not

to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention facilities in the countries in which they served.

In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the countries to host the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new CIA detention facilities were taking place, the CIA told local government officials not to inform the U.S. ambassadors.

The ODNI was provided with inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the director of national intelligence from effectively carrying out the director's statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. The inaccurate information provided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNI releasing inaccurate information to the public in September 2006.

#9: The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General.

The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office Inspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. Once notified, the OIG reviewed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and issued several reports, including an important May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies.

During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released publicly, and remains uncorrected.

In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were completed. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict the CIA's detention and interrogation authorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when the program was a classified covert action program, and before the CIA had briefed the full Committee membership on the program.

The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget . . . we either put out our story or we get eaten. [T]here is no middle ground." The same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York Times] quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us . . . authorized and directed by OPA [CIA's Office of Public Affairs]."

Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques was inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the White House.

#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.

On September 17, 2001, the President signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) granting the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to covertly capture and detain individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities." The MON made no reference to interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques.

The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON authorities. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S. military base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a facility in Country [redacted]—a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a CIA detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/

preparations,” but stated that this plan would be presented to the president. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA’s proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country [redacted].

The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. After taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he “should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life,” which “may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country.”

The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement to Congress that “inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers.” The CIA also did not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise.

In July 2002, on the basis of consultations with contract psychologists, and with very limited internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of coercive interrogation techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training of U.S. military personnel at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which was designed to prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment to which they might be subjected if taken prisoner by countries that do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions.

As it began detention and interrogation operations, the CIA deployed personnel who lacked relevant training and experience. The CIA began interrogation training more than seven months after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, and more than three months after the CIA began using its “enhanced interrogation techniques.” CIA Director George Tenet issued formal guidelines for interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time 40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA.

#12: The CIA’s management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the program’s duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.

The CIA’s COBALT detention facility in Country [redacted] began operations in September 2002 and ultimately housed more than half of the 119 CIA detainees identified in this Study. The CIA kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not—and never became—part of the CIA’s formal “enhanced” interrogation program. The CIA placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of COBALT. On November [redacted], 2002, a detainee who had been held partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility. At the time, no single unit at CIA

Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and interrogation operations. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General, CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used there.

Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation activities, serious management problems persisted. For example, in December 2003, CIA personnel reported that they had made the “unsettling discovery” that the CIA had been “holding a number of detainees about whom” the CIA knew “very little” at multiple detention sites in Country [redacted].

Divergent lines of authority for interrogation activities persisted through at least 2003. Tensions among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's interrogation practices.

The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and interrogation roles, and provided inadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective questioning of CIA detainees, resulting in diminished intelligence. The lack of CIA personnel available to question detainees, which the CIA inspector general referred to as “an ongoing problem,” persisted throughout the program.

In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA assessed as “high-value” were held, complained that CIA Headquarters “managers seem to be selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time,” resulting in “the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence. . . .”

Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including histories of violence and records of abusive treatment of others—that should have called into question their suitability to participate in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly all cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to detention and interrogation positions.

#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced operations related to the program.

The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation operations. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air

Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. Neither psychologist had any experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise.

On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on "learned helplessness," and developed the list of enhanced interrogation techniques that was approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists personally conducted interrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these techniques. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The psychologists carried out inherently governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the interrogation of detainees in *[sic]* held in foreign government custody.

In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced virtually all aspects of the program. In 2006, the value of the CIA's base contract with the company formed by the psychologists with all options exercised was in excess of \$180 million; the contractors received \$81 million prior to the contract's termination in 2009. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the program. The CIA has since paid out more than \$1 million pursuant to the agreement.

In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and interrogation operations at the CIA, had a total of [redacted] positions, which were filled with [redacted] CIA staff officers and contractors, meaning that [redacted] contractors made up 85% of the workforce for detention and interrogation operations.

#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.

Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation. The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that period. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice.

At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without authorization from CIA Headquarters. Additionally, multiple detainees

were subjected to techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to use them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved.

#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate.

The CIA never conducted a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the individuals it had detained or subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA statements to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and that less than a third of those 100 detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, were inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an "intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Detainees often remained in custody for months after the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees.

CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host country had no independent reason to hold the detainees.

A full accounting of CIA detentions and interrogations may be impossible, as records in some cases are non-existent, and, in many other cases, are sparse and insufficient. There were almost no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country [redacted]. At CIA detention facilities outside of Country [redacted], the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed

records of its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.

The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. An "informal operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers, whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program, concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety of the rendition, detention and interrogation program." According to one individual, the review was "heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA Counterterrorism Center] staff to provide us with the factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, was a "great success." The second reviewer concluded that "there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques.

There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Nor did the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique and "otherwise unavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtained from other sources.

#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management failures.

CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility.

Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not result in appropriate, effective, or in many cases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account.

On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability recommendations were overruled by senior CIA leadership. In one instance, involving the death of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been “motivated to extract any and all operational information” from the detainee. In another instance related to a wrongful detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, “[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty,” and “the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them.” In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA management personnel.

#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations.

Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. These concerns were regularly overridden by CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the program. At

times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or observations in written communications.

In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the CIA's official position.

The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," while the CIA general counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture" of the program. A February 2007 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which the CIA acting general counsel initially stated "actually does not sound that far removed from the reality," was also criticized. CIA officers prepared documents indicating that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual claims." CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report undermine its overall credibility."

#19: The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns.

The CIA required secrecy and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine detention facilities, and both had eroded significantly before President Bush publicly disclosed the program on September 6, 2006. From the beginning of the program, the CIA faced significant challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These challenges became increasingly difficult over time. With the exception of Country [redacted] the CIA was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program. Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the program could collapse of its own weight."

Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention facilities caused recurring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA's detention facility in that country. The U.S.

Department of Defense also declined to provide medical care to detainees upon CIA request.

In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture and a public statement by the White House that prisoners in U.S. custody are treated “humanely” caused the CIA to question whether there was continued policy support for the program and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general recommended that the CIA seek an updated legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel. In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of *Rasul v. Bush* prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* caused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.

By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA’s ability to operate clandestine detention facilities.

After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.

#20: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States’ standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.

The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, leading to formal *demarches* to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral intelligence relationships.

In one example, in June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in Country [redacted] to deliver a *demarche* to Country [redacted], “in essence demanding [Country [redacted] Government] provide full access to all [Country [redacted]] detainees” to the International Committee of the Red Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country [redacted] was holding included detainees being held in secret at the CIA’s behest.

More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States’ public standing, as well as to the United States’ longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the prevention of torture in particular.

CIA records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over \$300 million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly \$[redacted] million that were never used, in part due to host country political concerns.

To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government officials. CIA Headquarters encouraged CIA Stations to construct "wish lists" of proposed financial assistance to [redacted] [entities of foreign governments], and to "think big" in terms of that assistance.

Source: United States Senate, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/findings-and-conclusions.pdf>.

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