

Bureaucratic infighting over intelligence management continued among the military services, the State Department, and the FBI. In Jan. 1946 Truman created the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP and made SIDNEY W. SOUERS, a fellow Missourian and Navy rear admiral, Director of Central Intelligence. There was not much to direct, but Souers' small staff produced a daily intelligence summary that Truman liked.

A crisis in Turkey, a coup in Czechoslovakia, a civil war in Greece—all triggered by the Soviet Union—challenged the “Truman Doctrine,” which pledged that the United States would support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation.” To fight the Cold War, on July 26, 1947, Truman signed the National Security Act, which established the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC), the U.S. Air Force (which formerly had been part of the Army), and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Within a year covert action emerged as an instrument of U.S. policy. The NSC circulated among Truman's principal advisers a TOP SECRET directive authorizing “propaganda, economic warfare . . . sabotage . . . subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements. . . .” The covert action would be run by the OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION (OPC), administratively within the CIA but under State Department and Pentagon supervision. FRANK G. WISNER, an OSS veteran, began running covert operations from Albania to Korea, which had become the battlefield of a real war.

The CIA failure to predict North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June 1950 led to a reorganization that included the production of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIEs), which henceforth provided Truman and every succeeding President with factual analyses. The NIEs came from the Directorate of Intelligence; the covert action came from the Directorate for Plans (later Operations) which absorbed the OPC.

Covert action threatened the traditional checks-and-balances mechanism between the executive and legislative branches of government. (Eventually, the third branch, the judicial, was also affected; see FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.) The CIA offered the executive branch—primarily, the White House and the NSC—opportunities to act in such secrecy that Congress would not be able to fulfill its role of watchdog over the executive. Illegal wiretaps had been flourishing. The FBI, searching for spies and subversives, had tapped several thousand phones and installed more than 2,000 BUGS.

In the crusade against domestic communists—fueled by the Reds-in-government charges of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R., Wis.)—civil liberties were often abused. The rationale of a “clear and present danger” reappeared. In 1948, the Department of Justice moved against the U.S. Communist Party under the Smith Act, which prohibited advocating the violent overthrow of the government. “There are today many communists in America,” said Attorney General J. Howard McGrath in April 1949. “They are everywhere—in factories, offices, butcher stores, on street corners, in private businesses. And each carries in himself the germ of death for society.”

The FBI arrested 145 Communist Party leaders. Many of the 109 convictions came from trials at which FBI informants, planted in the party, appeared as star government witnesses. The most successful FBI penetration of the party involved informers who met consistently with Soviet leaders in Moscow. (See SOLO.)

A Congressman introduced a bill to require the Librarian of Congress to list all the books in the library that might be regarded as subversive. Congressional hearings under the glare of television lights sought communists in universities, churches, and labor unions.

Actor Ronald Reagan—his FBI CODE NAME was T-10—testified about communism in Hollywood. Entertainers who refused to answer questions, citing their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, were condemned as “Fifth Amendment communists” and blacklisted from television and radio. Congressman Richard M. Nixon gained publicity for his pursuit of ALGER HISS, a former State Department official accused of espionage by WHITTAKER CHAMBERS.

Overseas, there seemed to be no bounds to what the lavishly funded CIA could do. (The agency's budgeted funds are hidden in the general accounts of other agencies and departments. Congress has also exempted the CIA from laws requiring disclosure of “functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel.”) CIA covert operators managed coups in Egypt (1952), Iran (1953), and Guatemala (1954). Through dummy foundations, the CIA secretly provided funds to a host of organizations, including the intellectual magazine *Encounter*, edited by the British poet Stephen Spender; the National Student Association, and the American Newspaper Guild, among others. To display the creativity and intellectual freedom of American artists, the CIA generously and secretly subsidized exhibitions of avant-garde artists Jackson Pollock, Robert Motherwell, Willem de Kooning, and Mark Rothko. The American public contributed to fund-raising campaigns for RADIO FREE EUROPE, which purported to be privately operated but was actually run by the CIA.

NSA, operating in deep secrecy, eavesdropped around the world. A DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE program code-named SHAMROCK monitored the overseas calls and cables of American citizens, U.S. organizations, and foreign nationals. CIA scientists, in a secret program code-named MKULTRA, experimented with brainwashing and tested LSD and other hallucinogenic drugs on unwitting subjects.

Seeking intelligence about Soviet technology and military developments, first Truman and then Eisenhower authorized limited OVERFLIGHTS of the Soviet Union by American planes (some flown by British crews). The CIA, in a secret Lockheed facility called the SKUNK WORKS, developed the U-2 high-altitude spyplane. Almost immediately, work began on the U-2's successor, the SR-71 BLACKBIRD, which flew at three times the speed of sound (Mach 3), faster than any plane flying within the atmosphere. And realizing that counters to manned spyplanes were inevitable, during the Eisenhower administration spy SATELLITES were also developed. Eisenhower

felt that only with detailed OVERHEAD intelligence of the Soviet union would the United States be safe from a “nuclear Pearl Harbor.”

Eisenhower accepted another clandestine plan: a CIA proposal to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro by staging a commandolike raid with CIA-trained guerrillas drawn from the Florida émigré community. By the time Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, took office, the CIA force had grown to some 1,400 men. The Bay of Pigs invasion, on April 17, 1961, was a disaster. (See CUBA.) Obsessed by Castro, Kennedy ordered MONGOOSE, a mammoth CIA operation aimed at bringing down the Cuban leader by sabotage—or, with Mafia help, by assassination.

The second year of the Kennedy administration brought the United States and Soviet Union close to a nuclear confrontation in the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. U.S. intelligence—high-flying U-2s and low-flying F8U CRUSADER and F-101 VOODOO photo planes—achieved great success in spying out the Soviet attempt to secretly emplace in Cuba missiles that could strike the United States. But U.S. intelligence failed to detect that nuclear warheads for the missiles were already in Cuba, or the extent of the Soviet buildup.

## CONGRESS STEPS IN

From their founding, the CIA and NSA were exempt from the kind of public scrutiny given the Defense and State Departments. The entire INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY—encompassing the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, the NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE, the FBI, and other agencies—was immune from all but wink-and-a-nod oversight by Congress. One exception was the EASTLAND DOCUMENT, an assessment of damage to U.S. nuclear activities caused by Soviet spy DONALD MACLEAN, demanded by Sen. James Eastland, chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

However, disillusionment with the conduct of the Vietnam War (see PENTAGON PAPERS, VIETNAM) and the revelations of the WATERGATE scandal eventually turned the congressional spotlight on covert action. In 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Act, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, called upon the President to report any covert actions to relevant congressional committees in a timely fashion. In 1976 President Ford endorsed the idea of a congressional oversight committee; he also, rather casually, issued a directive that outlawed assassination as an instrument of American policy.

More scrutiny came from the CHURCH COMMITTEE and the PIKE COMMITTEE, which aired the abuses of the CIA, the dark secrets known as the FAMILY JEWELS. Out of these hearings came the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981 set up a special procedure for reporting covert actions: the CIA must notify the chairman and vice chairman of cognizant committees, along with the majority leaders of the Senate and House. The method of notification was called a “finding,” later designated as a “presidential finding,” which was to describe the action within a rea-

sonable period of time after it had begun. Questions about what was “reasonable” often provoked controversy.

This procedure was violated by WILLIAM J. CASEY, DCI under President Reagan, who failed to notify the committees properly when covert operators mined harbors in Nicaragua in an attempt to support the Contras, insurgents trying to bring down the elected left-wing government of Nicaragua. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., N Mex.) wrote to Casey: “I've been trying to figure out how I can most easily tell you my feelings about the discovery of the President having approved mining some of the harbors of Central America. It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off!”

Congressional displeasure, so eloquently stated by Goldwater, led to further restrictions on the Reagan administration's use of CIA covert operations in Nicaragua. And these led to the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.

The stock of U.S. intelligence had never been lower than it was in the 1980s. Besides the antics of Iran-Contra, there was the YEAR OF THE SPY, 1985, during which three major spy cases were uncovered, raising issues about the whole state of U.S. counterintelligence. By the end of the year ten Americans were under arrest for espionage and an eleventh was in Moscow, having eluded FBI surveillance. “Some of you may be wondering if the large number of spy arrests in recent weeks mean that we're looking harder or whether there are more spies to find,” President Reagan said in Dec. 1985. “Well, I think the answer to both questions is yes.”

Indeed, the large number of Soviet spies uncovered throughout the 1980s—in addition to JONATHAN POLLARD who sold secret documents to Israel—makes the title DECADE OF THE SPY an apt description.

## HUNTING FOR MISSIONS

The development of spy satellites, begun in the Eisenhower administration, made overhead verification of disarmament agreements possible. As each new disarmament talk seemed to lead to another, the Cold War began fading. First President Reagan and then former spymaster President Bush discovered they could do business with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. His withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan eased tensions (and ended a CIA arms-smuggling operation to the mujahedin rebels fighting the Soviets). By Oct. 1990, when the last sections of the Berlin Wall fell and the collapse of the Soviet Union loomed, the Cold War was over.

There would still be spies. The arrest in Feb. 1994 of CIA counterintelligence officer ALDRICH H. AMES showed that the spy war still went on. Ames, whose treachery cost the lives of at least ten U.S. agents, was a transitional traitor, who started spying for the Soviet Union and was spying for Russia when the FBI ended his career. The CIA discovered belatedly that he needed to earn much more than his government salary to buy a \$40,000, red XJ6 Jaguar and a \$540,000 house. (In 1996 Congress passed legislation providing U.S. citizenship to the widows and children of Russian agents executed after Ames betrayed them.)

The Cold War had given U.S. (and Soviet) intelligence agencies a clear-cut purpose. Since the end of the Cold War years meant the end of this purpose, the search for a new mission began. Terrorism, drug trafficking, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—they all routinely appeared on the agenda. The CIA also ran a few traditional intelligence operations in support of U.S. and United Nations peacekeepers in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence felt, however, that something more fundamental than a shift to new missions was necessary. The agency's handling of the Ames case "suggests the need for a fundamental change in the culture of the CIA," the committee said, and JOHN DEUTCH was appointed DCI to do the changing. He won a fiscal vote of confidence from Congress, which in 1996 increased intelligence spending by 6.3 percent, putting the intelligence budget in the neighborhood of \$30 billion.

He talked of reorganization and tightening control over the entire intelligence community. But hanging over his plans was a question asked publicly by THOMAS POLAR, a retired CIA officer who had been station chief in Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War. "What," he asked, "is the clandestine service supposed to be doing these days?" No one seemed to have a simple answer to that simple question.

## OO UNITED STATES COUNTRY TEAM

The concept that in a country represented by a U.S. ambassador, he or she is in charge. The CIA station chief, while reporting to the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, is also supposedly under the ambassador. The only exceptions to the ambassador's authority are members of the military who are in the country and under the command of a U.S. area military commander.

President Kennedy issued a letter outlining the authority of the ambassadors in his administration, and this practice has continued. In these letters, however, there is inevitably an exemption for the CIA. The letter that President Clinton wrote, for example, stated, "You have the right to see all communications to or from mission elements, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or executive decision." That final phrase is seen as a loophole for the CIA.

## OO UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

(USIB)

Successor to the BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES (BNE) as the overseer of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES within the CIA.

In 1973 WILLIAM E. COLBY, the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, abolished the OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES and the BNE, replacing that system with National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) who were responsible for specific regions or topics. The United States Intelligence Board was replaced three years later by the NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD.

The NIOs reported to the DCI through a deputy for national intelligence who was also the director of the National Foreign Assessment Center. Beginning in 1979 the NIOs were known collectively as the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

## OO UNSHLIKHT, IOSIF STANISLAVOVICH

(b. 1879, d. 1938)

Acting chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, in 1935–1936 while YA.K. BERZIN was in the Far East carrying out a purge of NKVD officials and then in Spain supporting the Republican government in the Spanish Civil War and recruiting GRU AGENTS.

Born a Polish nobleman, Unshlikht was active in left-wing Polish politics and a leader of the October 1917 revolution in Russia. Immediately after the revolution he helped form the secret police, which soon became the CHEKA, founded by fellow Pole FELIKS DZERZHINSKY.

From 1920 Unshlikht was a member of the short-lived Polish revolutionary government. From 1921 to 1923 he was a deputy chairman of the GPU, after which he became a deputy chief of the GRU. He traveled abroad regularly to organize AGENT activities in Germany, Lithuania, and Poland. In 1935–1936, while Berzin was out of Moscow, he acted as chief of the GRU. Subsequently, he was assigned as director of the main administration of the Red Air Force and was a candidate member of the Central Committee of the USSR.

He was arrested in the Stalinist purges and on July 29, 1939, he was shot, with Berzin.

## OO UNWITTING AGENT

An AGENT who furnishes information without knowing that the ultimate recipient is an intelligence service or without being aware of the true identity of the government involved. When arrested for espionage, JERRY WHITWORTH claimed to be unwitting; he said he believed that JOHN WALKER was recruiting him to provide information for the reference book *Jane's Fighting Ships*.


## OO URITSKI, CORPS COMDR. SOLOMON PETROVICH

(b. 1895 d. 1937)

Acting chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, in 1936–1937 while YA. K. BERZIN was in Spain supporting the Republican government in the Spanish Civil War and recruiting GRU AGENTS.

Uritski was active in the October revolution and ensuing civil war and was a leader in the attacks against sailors in the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921. Little is known of his subsequent career until he became acting head of the GRU while Berzin was out of Moscow.

He was arrested and shot in 1937 during the Stalinist purges.



## ●● VANAMAN, BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR W.

(b. 1892 d. 1987)

U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) officer with ACCESS to ULTRA intelligence who flew on a bomber mission over Europe and was shot down over Germany. So far as is known, he was the only U.S. officer with knowledge of Ultra who was captured by the Germans.

Vanaman enlisted as an Army pilot in 1917 and was commissioned in 1920. He held mostly air engineering assignments and, from July 1937 to June 1941, was assistant U.S. air ATTACHE in BERLIN. Vanaman then held senior positions in AAF matériel agencies, being promoted to brigadier general in March 1942. In May 1944 he was ordered to join the Eighth Air Force in England as assistant chief of staff for intelligence. On a mission over Germany on June 27, 1944, his plane was shot down, and he became a prisoner of war. However, the Germans did not grill him, and he was able to maintain the secrecy of Ultra.

On April 23, 1945, Vanaman was released by WALTER SCHELLENBERG in an effort to advise American officials that the Allied prisoners of war needed supplies and that some German leaders wished a negotiated peace with the Western allies.

After the war he reverted to his permanent rank of colonel, but he was promoted to major general in 1948.

(A British officer with access to Ultra, Air Commo. Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, was shot down over German-occupied France in May 1944; he bailed out of the crippled Lancaster bomber before it crashed and was initially rescued by the French Resistance but later captured by

the GESTAPO. He, too, was able to keep Ultra a secret from his captors. A large number of Polish codebreakers with knowledge of the Allies' early success in breaking into ENIGMA codes were captured by the Germans in late 1939, but none is known to have revealed any secrets.)

## ●● VAN DEMAN, MAJ. GEN. RALPH H.

(b. 1865 d. 1952)

U.S. Army INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who is considered the father of modern American MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

An 1889 graduate of Harvard University, he read law for one year and then began medical school. He was commissioned in 1891 and was able to finish medical school in 1893. However, he remained an infantry officer and attended the Infantry and Cavalry School at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

In 1898, Van Deman was assigned to the Army's Military Information Division, and served in Cuba for a year. He then transferred to the Military Information Section of the Philippines Department in 1901–1903, collecting intelligence against both the natives and the Japanese. While in the Philippines he discovered and stopped a plot to assassinate Gen. Arthur MacArthur.

Van Deman returned to Washington, D.C., to attend the Army War College. He was then sent to China in 1906 to conduct a secret RECONNAISSANCE in conjunction with Japanese interests there. Back in Washington in 1915, now a major, Van Deman was assigned to the War College Division, but not to intelligence duties. No one was assigned to intelligence work at the time, so he read and filed military information reports from the U.S. Mex-

ican campaign and from the European war. He began a system of summarizing the incoming information for distribution to interested staff sections.

After American entry into World War I in April 1917, Van Deman was unable to persuade the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Hugh Scott, that the Army should have an intelligence organization. Scott believed that the U.S. Army could just say to French and British intelligence, "Here we are now ready for service—we would be pleased if you hand over to us all the necessary information concerning the enemy which your intelligence services have obtained."

Although Scott forbade Van Deman to see the Secretary of War, Van Deman ignored the order. Within 48 hours of seeing the secretary, Van Deman was made head of the new Military Intelligence (MI) Branch of the War College Division. It was called intelligence instead of information because the British were already using that term and the U.S. Army would be working with them.

Van Deman asked for and was given the authority to grant direct commissions to his subordinate officers. He asked major city police departments for some of their best people to work for him. By the end of the war, MI consisted of 282 officers and 1,100 civilians and controlled COUNTERINTELLIGENCE offices throughout the country. In 1917 Van Deman commissioned HERBERT O. YARDLEY, a State Department CODE clerk and amateur cryptologist. Yardley was given the job of organizing MI-8, the Cipher Bureau. The Cipher Bureau had great success.

Van Deman retired from the Army in 1929.

During World War II he organized volunteers in the United States to help provide intelligence to the military services and FBI. After the war he spoke frequently about the menace of communism to the United States.

## OO VANDENBERG, GEN. HOYT S.

(b. 1899 d. 1954)

The second DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI), from June 1946 to April 1947, and subsequently the second Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.

A 1923 graduate of the Military Academy and a fighter pilot, Vandenberg was Assistant Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Air Forces when World War II began. He remained in staff work throughout the war, serving in North Africa in 1942–1943, and was deputy chief of the Air Staff from 1943 to 1946. In the latter position he also went to Moscow as the senior air member of the U.S. Military Mission to Moscow. In 1946 he became the ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE) or the G-2 on the Army's General Staff.

Vandenberg was hoping to command the independent U.S. Air Force that was expected to be created by President Truman, when the President appointed him DCI. The appointment was a shrewd choice for Truman, who needed political support for the creation of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, and the CIA. Vandenberg was a nephew of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, a powerful Republican and president pro tem of the Senate.

As DCI, Vandenberg directed the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (CIG), a precursor of the CIA, which would be established in July 1947. Under Vandenberg the CIG gained some independence and was given authority to collect and analyze intelligence. Previously the CIG could only collect intelligence and was producing a daily and weekly summary of intelligence and operational cables for Truman. Vandenberg told the White House that the nation needed an independent central intelligence agency.

Vandenberg created the Office of Research and Evaluation, which was soon renamed the Office of Reports and Estimates at the insistence of the State Department, which did not want the office confused with its own BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. Vandenberg also acquired the remnants of the abolished OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES that had been given to the War Department. This gave the CIG the right to collect clandestine foreign intelligence. To fulfill this new charter, Vandenberg asked for and got the right for the CIG to work in Latin America, which during World War II had been the exclusive domain of the FBI with respect to intelligence activities.

After the creation of the U.S. Air Force in Oct. 1947, Vandenberg was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the new service with the rank of full general. He subsequently served as the second Chief of Staff of the Air Force, from May 1948 through June 1953.

## OO VANUNU, MORDECHAI

(b. 1954)

Nuclear technician who revealed Israeli nuclear bomb secrets and was enticed—by sex or the promise of sex—into returning to Israel, where he was arrested for espionage and treason.

Vanunu was the son of an Orthodox Jewish family that immigrated to Israel from Morocco. Although an outspoken leftist student at Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, he was hired as a technician at the highly classified nuclear research-production facility at Dimona in the Negev Desert. He worked at Dimona for nine years but was laid off in 1985. A short time later he left Israel, going first to Australia and then to London. He took with him a suitcase filled with TOP SECRET data, his attorney later claiming that Vanunu's goal was not to harm Israel but to warn Israelis of the nuclear threat. In London, Vanunu told the *Sunday Times* that Israel had stockpiled almost 200 nuclear weapons since the 1960s, far more than most experts had estimated.

In Sept. 1986, a few days before the *Times* story was to appear, Vanunu disappeared. He had been lured to Rome by a blonde woman he believed to be an American called Cindy. She was an AGENT of the MOSSAD. In Rome, reportedly, Vanunu was drugged, taken aboard a yacht, and returned to Israel in chains.

His seven-month trial on two counts of espionage and one count of treason was held in secret; the only words made public came from the court's 60-page verdict on March 25, 1988: "We decided the defendant is guilty on all three counts." The three-judge panel sentenced him

to 18 years in prison—calculated from Oct. 7, 1986, the day he was brought back to Israel. (The prosecution had asked for a life sentence; the court could have imposed the death penalty, but no Israeli has been sentenced to death.)

## ●● VASCIO, STAFF SGT. GIUSEPPE

U.S. Air Force photographic laboratory technician who was arrested in 1952 after trying to sell flight-test data on the F-86E Sabre aircraft to North Korea. Vascio was then stationed in South Korea. A World War II hero, Vascio had twice earned the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was convicted of conspiracy to pass secrets to the enemy and sentenced to 20 years at hard labor and a dishonorable discharge.

## ●● VASSALL, WILLIAM JOHN (b. 1924)

British Admiralty clerk who spied for the Soviet Union. He was arrested on Sept. 12, 1962, confessed, was tried, and on Oct. 22, 1962—the same day that President Kennedy announced the Cuban missile crisis—was sentenced to 18 years in prison. Vassall served ten years of his sentence.

Investigation into Vassall's espionage began when ANATOLI GOLITSIN, a Soviet DEFECTOR told his interrogators that a HOMOSEXUAL working in the Admiralty was a Soviet spy. MI5 operatives tracked down Vassall.

A clergyman's son, Vassall had a varied government career. He had been an assistant private secretary to the civilian Lord of the Admiralty and had served in the British Embassy in Moscow as a clerk to the naval ATTACHÉ. In Dec. 1956 he had been cleared "for access to classified atomic energy information and for regular and constant access to Top Secret defence information."

During the war he had been a photographer in the Royal Air Force, and he put his photographic skills to work copying documents. A search of his rooms produced an Exakta camera and hidden rolls of film.

Vassall reportedly had been blackmailed into spying when his homosexual proclivities were noted by Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS when he was stationed in Moscow. His nickname was Vera.

The slack security investigation of Vassall led to the creation of the Vassall Tribunal, which found that Vassall's free-spending habits should have aroused suspicions about him. The tribunal also said that Vassall's open homosexuality, which made him a prey to blackmail, also should have subjected him to closer scrutiny by security officers.

## ●● VAUPSHASOV, COL. S.A.

(b. 1899 d. 1976)

Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who in 1920–1924 was engaged in underground work in Belorussia, which was occupied by anti-Soviet Poles. After several intelligence assignments, in 1937–1939 he went to Spain, where he carried out intelligence operations behind the lines of the Nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War.

During World War II he headed a major guerrilla unit that operated behind German lines in the Minsk region. After the war he continued in intelligence operations.

Vaupshasov was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union and was honored by a Soviet POSTAGE STAMP issued in 1990.

## ●● VECTOR

see VEIL

## ●● VEIL

Supposed CODE NAME for a DISINFORMATION program that the CIA is said to have planned against Muammar Qaddafi, dictator of Libya. *Washington Post* reporter BOB WOODWARD said that he had seen memos about Veil and another similar plan, code-named Vector, and wrote a *Post* article about a "secret U.S. deception plan" in Oct. 1986.

President Reagan and his DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WILLIAM J. CASEY denied the existence of the program. Woodward used *Veil* as the title of his book on Casey and the CIA.

## ●● VELA

U.S. SATELLITE developed to detect nuclear explosions.

Three types of Vela satellites were deployed: Vela Hotel satellites, orbited in pairs to detect explosions on earth; Vela Sierra, to spot atmospheric and space detonations; and Vela Uniform, to pick up vibrations from underground and underwater explosions. The Vela Hotel satellites were "parked" some 60,000 miles above the earth—roughly one-fourth the distance to the moon.

The first U.S. detections of nuclear weapons from space was made by the *Explorer 4* satellite, which detected five U.S. high-altitude nuclear tests in 1958. The *Explorer 4*, launched on July 26, 1958, was a radiation research satellite. Additional tests of monitoring equipment were carried out with Discoverer series satellites.

On Oct. 17, 1963, the first pair of Vela Hotel satellites was placed in orbit. Each satellite—launched on the same Atlas-Agena D booster rocket—weighed 485 pounds. The gamma rays and neutron detectors in the satellites could detect a nuclear detonation as small as ten kilotons as far as 100 million miles from earth. The sensors could also measure solar flares, lightning, and radiation from sources other than nuclear explosion.

Vela launches continued, with improvements being made to their sensors. The last pair—*Vela 11* and *Vela 12*—was orbited on April 8, 1970. Subsequently, satellites of the DSP program (see MIDAS) were fitted with nuclear detectors.

The Vela satellites detected nuclear detonations by the Soviet Union and China as well as other countries. They also made highly useful observations of natural phenomena.

*Vela* is Spanish for “watchman.”

(Prior to the Vela satellites, the principal means of detecting nuclear detonations outside the United States was by aircraft fitted to collect fallout from explosions. A modified B-29 SUPERFORTRESS collected radioactive material from the first Soviet nuclear detonation on Sept. 3, 1949, over the Sea of Japan. The bomb had been detonated in the Kazakh Desert on Aug. 25. Later, U-2 spy planes were used in this role.)

## OO VENLO INCIDENT

Kidnapping of two British INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS of MI6 by Nazi SD officer SS Sturmbannführer (major) WALTER SCHELLENBERG.

On Nov. 8, 1939, Schellenberg, posing as a German Army officer in an anti-Hitler plot, lured Capt. S. PAYNE BEST and Maj. H. R. STEVENS to Venlo, a Dutch town near the German border, where Best and Stevens were to meet key members of the alleged conspiracy. As the two British officers waited for Schellenberg and other ostensible conspirators, a car crashed through the border checkpoint, Nazi gunmen firing at the Dutch border guards. The Nazis, disregarding Dutch neutrality, kidnapped the Britons and took them to Germany, where they were relentlessly interrogated by the GESTAPO.

The incident had widespread consequences. Adm. Sir HUGH SINCLAIR, director of MI6 lay dying as the events leading up to the kidnapping took place. His deputy, STEWART G. MENZIES was running MI6 and was directly in charge of the British attempt to topple Hitler through high-ranking dissidents in the German Army. But the Nazis, aware of the plot, were operating their own hoax against the British, run by Schellenberg.

Britain had been at war against Germany only since Sept. 3. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had staked great hopes on ending the war rapidly by dealing with the dissidents, and the work of Best and Stevens was vital to his plan. When Sinclair died on Nov. 4, Menzies became acting head of MI6.

Meanwhile, Best and Stevens were giving up information (Stevens more than Best, apparently), wiping out much of the MI6 spy network in Europe. They had also identified Belgian and Dutch intelligence operatives. HEINRICH HIMMLER, head of the SS, used this information in a statement he made attempting to justify the German invasion of Belgium and Holland in May 1940. Germany also claimed that the British Secret Service had plotted to kill Hitler. (An attempt had in fact been made on Hitler's life on Nov. 8, 1939, in Munich, when a bomb exploded in a beer hall shortly after he left the hall.)

Schellenberg was given the Iron Cross first class by Hitler himself for the Venlo operation. The rising SD officer's success at Venlo led to his being selected to lead a plot to kidnap the Duke of Windsor, formerly King Edward VIII, and put him back on the throne of a Britain conquered by Germany (see WILLI).

Certain Foreign Office files on the incident are not to be opened until the year 2015, primarily because of references to individuals.

## OO VENONA

CODE NAME for the U.S. codebreaking project that deciphered portions of the texts of Soviet intelligence messages between Moscow and the United States in the 1940s. Many names in the newspaper headlines of the 1940s—ELIZABETH BENTLEY, WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, KLAUS FUCHS, ALGER HISS, DONALD MACLEAN, and the atomic spies HARRY GOLD, DAVID GREENGLASS, JULIUS ROSENBERG and his wife, Ethel—appear in the messages. The decrypts reveal what U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officials knew about those cases at the time. But the messages could not be used publicly because officials could not reveal that U.S. codebreakers had penetrated major Soviet cryptographic systems.

The messages were never exploited in real time, nor were all messages deciphered. Codebreakers in 1946, for example, were working on messages of 1944. Each time a decrypted message yielded a potential lead to tracking down a spy, the codebreaking agency turned the information over to the FBI and often to a liaison officer from British intelligence. The French intelligence agency DST was also given Venona material showing that Pierre Cot, Minister for Air in the 1930s, and André Labarthe, a scientist at the French Air Ministry, had been serving Soviet intelligence.

The Venona messages were full of CRYPTONYMS, some of which Western analysts could link to specific people. One of the most frustrating cryptonyms was Mlad. Only when the NSA made the messages public, beginning in 1995, did U.S. officials tie Mlad to THEODORE A. HALL, a physicist who had worked on the atomic bomb project. Another cryptonym, Ales, referred to a Soviet AGENT who had accompanied President Roosevelt to Yalta in Feb. 1945, when he conferred with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Ales, said a cable, had been working for Soviet intelligence since 1935. From clues in this and other messages, officials identified Ales as Alger Hiss.

When the Venona messages became available to U.S. counterintelligence officials, they substantiated the statements of ex-communist WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, who had given the FBI details about Soviet espionage in the United States in the 1930s. Venona also produced background for the information given by IGOR GOUZENKO, a CODE clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, who defected in 1945 and revealed the extent of Soviet spying, including information about the ATOMIC SPY RING. Bentley, a veteran COURIER for the NKVD and sometime HANDLER of AGENTS, had gone to the FBI in 1945 and confessed her espionage, naming names. With Venona-supplied information, the FBI could confirm many of her statements.

The U.S. Army's SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS) had been accumulating the intercepted Soviet messages since 1939 but had not tried to crack them. Gene Grabeel, a young SIS employee who had been teaching school only weeks before, began sorting the messages by diplomatic mission and by cryptographic system or subscriber. She found five systems. One seemed to involve trade and Lend-Lease, the sending of U.S. war matériel to

D045

# BRIDE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY:  
NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.



USSR

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## JOURNALISTS' VIEWS IN CANDIDATES FOR APPOINTMENTS TO BE MADE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No. 1 1507

23 Oct. 1944

To VICTOR.

From a chat with SWING[1]

{69 groups unrecoverable}

[SW]ING[1] assert[s] that HENDERSON[1ii] will not be appointed to this post. Thomas KEYNOLDS, a correspondent of the CHICAGO SUN who is on very friendly terms with CAPTAIN's [KAPITAN][iv] close adviser - ROSENBLUM[v], said that HENDERSON[1ii] will be given the post of economic [D. adviser] with the Military administration of Occupied Germany. BUNDE-SEE [BUNKE][vi] and SWING[1] consider the most serious candidacy in 1944 is that for the head of the IRSEBLI[vii]. They and correspondent HIGHOWER [HIGHTOWER], who has connections with the DANKI[viii], assert that so far the question has not been decided. Several correspondents have raised General WEDEMAYER [WIDEMAYER] as commander of the occupation forces of the COUNTRY [JERUSA][ix], however there is no possibility of checking the information. Apparently one [3 groups unrecovered] General CLARK, but at the instance of MURPHY [MURPH][x] his candidacy has been turned down because he is a Jew.

No. 844.

MAY [MAY][xi]

23rd October

(T.N. and documents overleaf)

Distribution

the Soviet Union. Diplomats used a second system. The other three systems were used by Soviet intelligence services—the NKVD and GRU, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. The Venona project (then code-named BRIDE) began in Feb. 1943, when the SIS (a forerunner of the NSA) started working on encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications at ARLINGTON HALL in suburban Washington, D.C.

In Oct. 1943 Lt. Richard Hallock, an Army Signal Corps reserve officer who had been an archaeologist at the University of Chicago, made a small break into the trade-traffic cryptographic system, providing a tool for further progress on the other systems. In 1944 another cryptanalyst, Cecil Phillips, made a discovery that allowed a limited break into what later turned out to be the CIPHER system used by the NKVD. It would be nearly two more years before parts of any of these NKVD messages could be read, or even recognized as spy messages as opposed to routine diplomatic or trade communications.

The key breakthrough came in the summer of 1946, when Meredith Gardner, an SIS analyst, noted similarities in the pattern of several messages. The cryptographic system used by the NKVD involved a code book in which words and phrases were represented by numbers. These numbers were then further enciphered by a technique called additive—the addition of random number groups taken from a ONE-TIME PAD, consisting of pages of random numbers, copies of which were used by the sender and receiver of a message to add and remove an extra layer of encipherment. For example, if the first word in the message was “atomic” and the code book number group for the word was 3856, then 3856 was added to, say, 1349, the first group on the one-time pad. The addition used the Fibonacci, or “Chinese arithmetic” method, in which numbers greater than 9 were not carried forward. So in that message, “atomic” would become 4195.

## HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE?

One-time pads used only once are unbreakable. But the Soviet cryptographic material manufacturing center had reprinted some pages from one-time pads. Gardner saw the repetition in the midst of thousands of number groups. It was this repetition that gave U.S. codebreakers the breakthrough. The Soviet duplication of one-time pads was rare in 1942, increasing in 1943, and even more so in 1944. Thus, the code-breakers’ success rate improved for those years.

To break into the system successfully, analysts first had to identify and strip off the layer of additive to attack the underlying code. Working with nothing more than their own brains, the U.S. cryptographers essentially broke into code books that they had never seen. Some 1942–1943 messages were not attacked successfully until 1953–1954, when a second major cryptanalytic breakthrough was made through pure analysis by Dr. Samuel P. Chew at the NSA. After this breakthrough, a partially burned Soviet code book began to have a role.

During the last days of World War II in Europe, a MILITARY INTELLIGENCE team headed by Lt. Col. Paul Neff, acting under Arlington Hall’s direction, obtained a

photocopy of the code book from a German Foreign Office signal intelligence archive in a castle in Saxony. The Nazis had acquired this code book—and others—from Finns who had taken them from the Soviet Consulate in Petsamo, Finland, on June 22, 1941. Officers in the consulate had managed to burn the code book only partially before the Finns seized the building. Neff’s team got the code book back to U.S. lines only a day before Soviet occupation forces moved into the area. At about the same time, Lt. Oliver Kirby, also connected to Arlington Hall, recovered related cryptographic material in Schleswig, Germany. (Both Neff and Kirby later became senior civilian officials at the NSA.)

Meanwhile, Gardner had first extracted a phrase from an NKVD message sent from New York to Moscow on Aug. 10, 1944. Later analysis showed that this message referred to clandestine activity in Latin America. On Dec. 13 Gardner managed to read a message about the U.S. presidential election campaign of 1944. Then, on Dec. 20, 1946, he broke into another 1944 message and hit pay dirt: a list of the leading scientists working on the U.S. atomic bomb project. In late April or early May 1947, Gardner read two messages, sent in Dec. 1944, showing that someone on the U.S. Army’s General Staff was providing highly classified information to the Soviets. (The NSA, in releasing the Venona material in 1995, would only say, “These two messages are currently undergoing declassification review.”)

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the assistant U.S. Army G-2 and a key figure in the wartime MAGIC project, was stunned by what was emerging from the decrypts. He notified the FBI, which in Oct. 1948 assigned special agent Robert Lamphere to Venona. Later the British sent analysts to work on Venona.

HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, a Soviet MOLE in British intelligence assigned to Washington from 1949 to 1951, occasionally visited Arlington Hall, saw Venona decrypts, and regularly received summaries of U.S. progress in Venona. He undoubtedly reported the breakthrough to his Soviets handlers. In late 1945 Bentley told the FBI that the Soviets had acquired some limited information about the U.S. effort during 1944. The Soviets could do nothing about the past, but they could, and did, tighten up cryptologic systems.

PETER WRIGHT, an officer in the British Security Service (MI5), was shown Venona messages in the late 1950s. He realized that any one of the cryptonyms could be an existing spy in MI5. One of the British spies identified by Venona was Cedric Belfrage, who worked from 1941 to 1943 for BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION, the wartime intelligence organization headquartered in New York City. Belfrage, who wrote and lived in the United States after the war, was deported as a “dangerous alien” in 1955. He was seen then as a victim of the U.S. witch-hunt for alleged communists.

In *Spycatcher* (1987), Wright wrote, “I remember wondering, as I read the tantalizing decrypts, how on earth anyone at the top of MI5 had slept at night in the dozen years since they were first decrypted.” (Wright, obviously, exposed the existence of Venona before it was

officially revealed.) He wrote that the FLUENCY COMMITTEE used Venona material in its search for a mole in British intelligence, as did investigators probing the espionage of Sir ANTHONY BLUNT and the bona fides of ANATOLI GOLITSIN, a Soviet DEFECTOR.

The Soviet message traffic contained hundreds of COVER names, including Antenna and Liberal, both later identified as names for Julius Rosenberg. One message mentioned that Liberal's wife was named Ethel.

More than 200 named or cover-named persons appear in the Venona translations, including persons claimed by the NKVD and GRU as ASSETS or contacts. Messages describe the clandestine activities of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold, David and Ruth Greenglass, and Klaus Fuchs. Other cover names of people in the atomic spy ring remain unidentified.

Venona messages show that Leonid Kvasnikov (cover name Anton), headed atomic bomb espionage in the United States. He, like the Rosenbergs (who came under his control) had many other high-tech espionage targets, such as developments of U.S. jet aircraft, radar, and rockets. Also revealed were extensive contacts of Soviet intelligence with the U.S. Communist Party and the way the Soviet spy NETWORK operated under cover of consulates, the AMTORG trade mission, the Soviet news agency Tass, and Soviet inspectors in U.S. factories producing war matériel being sent to the Soviet armed forces.

Most Venona messages pertained to the operation of agents and TRADECRAFT, including countermeasures against the FBI, meeting scenarios, and document photography. So much material was collected by Soviet spies that beyond information sent by enciphered messages, photocopies of classified documents had to go to Moscow by diplomatic courier. In one message, New York informed Moscow CENTER that it had 56 rolls of film from "Robert" (still not identified). Other messages describe the NKVD assessment and recruitment of American communists as spies.

Messages mention "Stanley" as an agent in British intelligence with a responsibility for Mexico; that agent was later found to be Philby. From a reference to "Hicks" as a man who sent more opinion than facts, mole hunters identified GUY BURGESS. Travels of "Johnson" coincided with those of Blunt. Venona also contained information about Soviet penetration of Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement, the core of what would be the postwar French government.

"Albert" was Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov, a Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who did two U.S. tours of duty as an ILLEGAL and sometimes used the cover of a clothier. He had many aliases: William Greinke, Michael Green, Michael Adamec, and more. (American MICHAEL STRAIGHT told of being contacted by a Soviet intelligence officer using the name Michael Green.) Elizabeth Bentley knew him only as "Bill." She knew his wife, also an illegal, as "Catherine." Catherine (with the cover name El'za) was Helen Lowry, a niece of U.S. Communist Party leader Earl Browder, whose cover name was Rulevoj.

The Venona achievement remained highly secret until 1995, except for Peter Wright's revelations and

some other "leaks" that indicated the United States had special sources of intelligence. (Of course, the Soviet government knew about Venona from Philby and possibly other spies.) In 1995 the NSA began to release more than 1,200 Venona messages. They exposed the extent of Soviet espionage against the United States during the 1940s and also revealed the important role that SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE and CRYPTOGRAPHY had played in U.S. counterintelligence.

## CODENAMES AND TRADECRAFT

Other code names or tradecraft words found in Venona decrypts included:

*Anton*: Leonid Kvasnikov, chief of A-bomb espionage in Soviet intelligence's New York City office.

*Arsenal*: U.S. War Department.

*Babylon*: San Francisco.

*The bank*: Department of State.

*Charl'z*: Klaus Fuchs

*Enormoz*: Manhattan Project or A-bomb.

*Fellowcountryman*: member of the U.S. Communist Party.

*Good Girl (or Myrna)*: Elizabeth Bentley.

*Homer*: DONALD MACLEAN, like Philby a member of the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING.

*HOUSE or Big House*: Moscow Center.

*Kapitan*: President Roosevelt.

*Konspiratoria*: tradecraft and OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

*Leslie*: Lona Cohen, atomic spy ring courier (see MORRIS COHEN).

*Line*: specific long-term task or operation, such as the Line for the atomic bomb or the Fellowcountryman Line for liaison with the U.S. Communist Party.

*Neighbors*: how the NKVD referred to GRU and vice versa.

*Maj*: Stepan Apresyan, a young, inexperienced officer who became the New York City RESIDENT in 1944.

*Maxin*: VASSILI M. ZUBILIN (Zarubin), Soviet resident in New York City, under cover of vice consul, posted to Washington, D.C. as resident in 1943.

*Petrov*: either LAVRENTY BERIA, head of Soviet state security, or VSEVOLOD MERKULOV, his principal deputy

*Probationers*: Soviet agents.

*Robert (or Pel)*: Soviet intelligence officer Greg Silvermaster.

*Put on ice or in cold storage*: deactivate an agent.

*Vardo*: Zarubin's wife, Elizabetha, also an intelligence officer.

*Zvuk*: Soviet intelligence officer Jacob Golos.

## ● ● VERTRAUENSMANN

Literally "a man of our confidence" or "confidential agent," a word that appears frequently in German diplomatic telegrams in World War II. To Anglo-American translators, the word often was given the meaning "SECRET AGENT."

## ●● VETTERLEIN, KURT

German engineer who during World War II operated an intercept station that unscrambled and transcribed the scrambled trans-Atlantic telephone conversations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

In the 1930s Vetterlein was assigned by the Research Institute of the German Post Office (which ran Germany's telephone system) to work on ways to unscramble telephone calls. He knew the general technique used by the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. to scramble voices. The Germans had one of the AT&T machines, called the A-3.

Operating from a building on the Dutch coast, the interception unit—called simply the Research Post—picked up only the conversations of many high-ranking leaders. "The spectacular feat of tapping into the top-level Allied radio-telephone conversations produced no great results," DAVID KAHN wrote in *Hitler's Spies* (1978). "They did not give the Germans any extraordinary insight into Allied plans."

## ●● VIAT

South Vietnamese private air transport corporation used in the 1960s to conduct clandestine operations over North Vietnam. The airline was a PROPRIETARY COMPANY run by the CIA. VIAT often used pilots from AIR AMERICA, another CIA proprietary company.

Also see AIR PROPRIETARIES.

## ●● VIENNA

A center of international intrigue from the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the Cold War.

A pleasant city for tourists, Vienna has also attracted spies and counterspies because of its location, straddling the realms of East and West in Europe. From here Russia and Germany spied on each other in imperial days. Neutral Austria does not look for spies; there is no COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agency to bother known INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, as in Paris, London, Washington, and Tel Aviv.

The Soviets so preferred to stage meetings with their Western AGENTS in Vienna that the U.S. FBI called the routine the "Vienna procedure." ANATOLI GOLITSIN, a KGB officer who defected to the West in 1961, was stationed in Vienna from 1953 to 1955, keeping watch on Soviet émigrés. PETER DERIABIN, another KGB DEFECTOR, also had a tour in Vienna as a counterintelligence officer who arranged for ILLEGALS to remain in the city after the pull-out of Soviet occupation troops in 1954.

After World War II Austria, like Germany, was divided into American, Soviet, British, and French occupation zones. Unlike BERLIN, which had been divided into four separate zones, Vienna was administered jointly. This was visibly demonstrated by the military police jeeps that patrolled the city carrying soldiers from each of the occupying powers. Invisibly, the Western allies often teamed up to spy on the Soviets.

The MOVIE *The Third Man* (1950) captured perfectly the shadowy atmosphere of postwar Vienna. GRAHAM GREENE's screenplay focused on the black market rather than on espionage. But as a former INTELLIGENCE OFFICER himself, he knew that the city was a natural place for intrigue.

U.S. and British intelligence agencies, working against Soviet intelligence in Vienna, discovered that a telephone cable to Soviet headquarters ran underground near the boundary between the British and Soviet zones. In a project code-named Silver, they dug a tunnel and tapped a telephone junction box. The COVER for a tap, a shop that sold Harris tweed, had a basement listening post. As David Martin reported in *Wilderness of Mirrors* (1980), the shop became so popular that the intelligence services had to divert an unexpected amount of energy and talent to keep it in business.

In the 1950s Vienna began to fade in importance next to BERLIN, a flashpoint of East-West crisis and a center of large spy stations. (It was also the site of another tunnel, code-named Gold.) But because the city is the site of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it attracted Cold War spies. Soviets got positions there and at the UNITED NATIONS Industrial Development Organization to acquire technology and circumvent U.S. and Western restrictions on its transfer to the Soviet Union.

Diplomats under cover at the Soviet and U.S. embassies trolled diplomatic cocktail parties for recruits. The large CIA station included COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officers watching for American spies. There were many.

Navy radioman JOHN A. WALKER, JR., who spied for the Soviets, met with his HANDLER in Vienna 11 times during his espionage career. As he described the Vienna procedure, he went to a specified car rental firm, rented a car, and drove it around the city, tracing streets on a map. He parked exactly where he was told to park, got out of the car, and began walking along a corkscrew route that spiraled him through some 20 turns. He had to time his pace so that when he reached the rendezvous point his contact would be approaching from the opposite direction.

"As soon as we made visual contact, I would pass the material," Walker recalled. His material mostly pertained to U.S. Navy cryptography. "He would disappear with that for 15 minutes or so and then come back for the verbal discussion," which would include some talk about communist ideology. The handler would order the next round of material or tell him to discontinue some line of secrets in which the Soviets had lost interest. At the end of the meeting, the Soviet would pay Walker and give him, in writing, the procedures for the next face-to-face meeting. On one trip Walker took his mother to Europe and, on the way back, to ease getting his cash payment through U.S. customs, put the bills in a money belt and strapped it to his mother. The smiling customs man waved the plump old lady through.

RONALD W. PELTON, who betrayed NSA secrets, went to Vienna twice to talk in a SAFE HOUSE. On his third trip, he later said, he walked around his meeting site—the gardens of the imperial summer palace, Schönbrunn—for about three days, but was not contacted. His handlers

suspected that he might have been turned, so they left him out in the cold. JAMES HARPER, who had been supplying the Soviets with information about ballistic missiles, was also sent to Vienna.

Marine Sgt. CLAYTON J. LONETREE, recruited at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, met a new handler when he was transferred to the U.S. Embassy in Vienna. Former CIA officer EDWARD LEE HOWARD made at least one round trip between the United States and Vienna, probably for training, prior to his flight to Moscow as a fugitive. FELIX S. BLOCH was deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna when he was accused of spying. But the face-to-face was in Paris, where a French SURVEILLANCE team photographed him meeting with a Soviet intelligence officer.

It was also in Vienna that Soviet defector NICHOLAS SHADRIN disappeared while working as a DOUBLE AGENT for the FBI against the KGB. In fact, the CIA had failed to provide protective coverage for him and he was abducted by the KGB and accidentally killed.

## ● VIETNAM

There are many names for war in Vietnam, a vast battlefield for intelligence operations through much of its modern history. The French called theirs “the war without fronts.” Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh used “the people’s war.” To Americans it would be an “unconventional war” for the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese. And within the American war there was a secret war conducted by the CIA and U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE.

The roots of the secret war went back to World War II, when, in the spring of 1945, men of the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) joined forces with Ho Chi Minh and his coalition communist nationalists, the Vietminh. They were fighting the Japanese, who had occupied portions of French Indochina—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—since the fall of France in June 1940.

By taking Indochina, Japan cut off supplies reaching China via a railroad from the Indochinese port city of Haiphong. The Japanese had long allowed French garrisons to remain in Indochina; fearing an Allied invasion of the area, however, on March 9, 1945, they had attacked the garrisons. Surviving French troops and civilians, weak and ill equipped, began fighting their way through Japanese lines to China. Thousands were taken prisoner, 2,200 were killed, and about 3,000 reached China.

The OSS saw themselves fighting against the Japanese. To the OSS, Ho Chi Minh was an ally against the Japanese. Thus OSS units, with support from French guerrillas, trained Vietminh units in commando warfare, parachuted arms and supplies to the Vietminh, and sent AGENTS behind Japanese lines to gather intelligence about Japanese forces.

The Vietminh aided downed U.S. fliers and took part, along with French guerrillas and OSS operatives, in a commando raid on a Japanese division headquarters in June 1945. The raiders captured documents that gave Allied planners valuable intelligence on Japanese opera-

tions in Southeast Asia. When Japan surrendered in Aug. 1945, the OSS, still seeing the Vietminh as allies, joined them as they proclaimed the independence of Vietnam and marched into Hanoi.

In France, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, determined to regain Indochina and bitter about OSS aid to the Vietminh, sent troops into Saigon in Oct. 1945. The French DEUXIÈME BUREAU began reestablishing an intelligence NETWORK. But French intelligence provided only a last-minute warning of an attack on Hanoi and other garrison sites by the Vietminh under Vo Nguyen Giap on Dec. 19, 1946. Vietnam was again at war.

At first the French hunted down communists, with the help of Nationalist Chinese officers who had worked for China’s CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND STATISTICS. Then the French intelligence service SDECE developed the concept of “Vietnamese maquis,” resistance groups modeled on the World War II maquis that fought the Germans with sabotage and espionage in occupied France. But resistance movements that worked in the urbanized society of France did not transfer well into the jungles and paddies of Indochina.

The French-sponsored native resistance groups were no match for the Vietminh, whose own intelligence teams, the Trinh Sat, consistently discovered French military plans. Another idea was the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), airborne commando groups that tried to harass the Vietminh and gather intelligence. The GCMA units also fell victim to the Trinh Sat’s knowledge of where and how to gather intelligence in their own land.

The war’s end in July 1954 was foreshadowed by France’s humiliation at Dien Bien Phu. The symbol of French defeat in Indochina, Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7, 1954, after a bloody, 56-day siege. Ten thousand French, North African, Foreign Legion, and loyal Vietnamese troops died at Dien Bien Phu; another 10,000 were taken prisoner by the Vietminh. In the peace talks that followed, the French agreed to a partitioning of Vietnam along the 17th parallel, with a communist North Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and a Republic of South Vietnam under Ngo Dinh Diem in the south, with Saigon as its capital. This was to be a temporary measure pending nationwide elections in 1956.

Some 80,000 French troops remained in the Republic of Vietnam, to the displeasure of Diem, who was anti-French. “To the French secret services,” wrote Douglas Porch in *The French Secret Services* (1995), “fell the task of enforcing French interests, a charge which they assumed with the self-interested conviction of a service some of whose members had developed a cozy business relationship with the Binh Xuyen,” a Vietnamese criminal organization with ties to the French underworld.

American EDWARD G. LANSDALE—an OSS veteran and CIA officer—intrigued against both the French and the communists. He once organized a South Vietnamese Army raid on the Binh Xuyen, which was provided with intelligence by the Deuxième Bureau. Lansdale launched what he called a counterterrorist campaign against the French, targeting INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. Before a serious breach occurred between the two countries’ intelligence

services, in May 1955 France withdrew all forces from Indochina, leaving it to the United States and Ho Chi Minh.

## THE LONGEST WAR

By Jan. 1961, when President Kennedy took office, Ho Chi Minh controlled some 15,000 Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam. To turn back the communists, Kennedy put his faith in counterinsurgency units in the belief that they could do more to stabilize Indochina than conventional military forces. In May 1961, Kennedy sent 400 of the U.S. Army's Green Berets to Vietnam to "expand present operations in the field of intelligence, unconventional warfare, and political-psychological activities." Linked to the Green Berets was the growing CIA presence in Vietnam. In 1962 Kennedy gave the CIA responsibility for all paramilitary activities in Vietnam and, secretly, in Laos.

With each succeeding military escalation of the war there was an intelligence escalation. Intelligence in this war, however, was not like that of any war the United States had ever fought. Besides the usual MILITARY INTELLIGENCE units there was a civilian intelligence apparatus, at best paralleling the military and often competing with it.

In Aug. 1964, while U.S. Navy destroyers sailed in the Gulf of Tonkin off North Vietnam gathering ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE under an operation code-named DESOTO, Operations Plan 34A was being run by the CIA. One aspect of Plan 34A called for hit-and-run attacks against North Vietnamese shore installations by high-speed craft manned by South Vietnamese or mercenaries hired by the CIA. When North Vietnam reacted to the raids by sending torpedo boats after the destroyers, the U.S. Congress, at President Johnson's request, responded with the Tonkin resolution. It authorized the use of U.S. forces to support Vietnam and became the legal basis for the Vietnam War.

Direct U.S. involvement in the war increased as a result. There was a buildup of U.S. troops in the south (peaking at 525,000); intensive air strikes were carried out against communist positions (real and suspected) in South Vietnam, as were periodic bombings of North Vietnam; and intensive naval and clandestine activities were undertaken. At the height of the war the CIA occupied three floors of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and had about 700 employees in Vietnam under the broad COVER of Office of the Special Assistant to the ambassador (OSA). The head of the OSA was WILLIAM E. COLBY, a future DCI. Other CIA covers were the Combined Studies Detachment and the STUDIES AND OBSERVATION GROUP (SOG), a HUMAN INTELLIGENCE collection organization.

The SOG inserted intelligence teams into enemy territory by land, parachute, helicopters, and PT boats. Another CIA operation, also part of the 1961 Operations Plan 37-A, dropped teams of Vietnamese "covert agents" into North Vietnam. All of them were either killed, captured, or turned into DOUBLE AGENTS who sent false radio messages that lured in more teams. North Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security had nearly perfect intelligence on exactly where the agents had landed.

When the CIA finally realized what was happening, the agency tried to stop the program. The Army took it

over and by 1968 about 500 would-be agents had been lost. Declassified postwar documents, obtained by former intelligence officer Sedwick Tourison for his book *Secret Army Secret War* (1995), show that nearly 400 were imprisoned for up to 27 years.

In Laos, the CIA secretly mounted its largest paramilitary operation: the building of L'Armée Clandestine, about 30,000 Meo tribesmen, other Laotians, and about 17,000 Thai mercenaries. The secret army of the secret war was supplied by the CIA's AIR AMERICA, a CIA PROPRIETARY COMPANY. (Also see CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP.)

The CIA ran the Laos war from Thailand under cover of the 4802nd Joint Liaison Detachment. To preserve the appearance that it was not an American war, no U.S. ground troops were committed, except in the case of some Green Beret operations using cross-border teams in uniforms without U.S. insignia, carrying Chinese or Soviet rifles. They also operated in Cambodia.

News of the CIA army remained a secret until 1965, when U.S. newspapers published some details. The broad scope of the war in Laos, however, was not revealed officially until 1969, and even then many details were withheld. Even official Washington sometimes ignored the CIA war. "We often forget there is a significant—secondary—war going on in Laos," national security adviser Walt Rostow wrote to President Johnson in Aug. 1966.

An air of distrust hung heavy over U.S.-South Vietnam relations. U.S. intelligence officers were especially suspicious of their counterparts—and even more so of South Vietnamese politicians.

The handling of local agents could be complex. In one operation, a CIA officer worked with highland peasants along the Laos-Vietnam border. They were hunters, charcoal makers, and rattan gathers who would not look suspicious around the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in the border area. "They were our eyes and ears on the ground," he later wrote in a CIA publication. "Most of the agents were organized in small nets of a half-dozen under a principal agent who, in turn, was controlled by Vietnamese agent handler with an American case officer counterpart. The American case officer typically worked with two or three agent handlers."

Meanwhile, the communists were infiltrating the South Vietnamese government. The highest-ranking MOLE was Vu Ngoc Nha, an adviser first to President Diem, a devout Catholic killed in a 1963 coup, and then to President Nguyen Van Thieu. Nha posed as a Catholic recommended by church leaders. He was said to have advised Thieu to furlough soldiers for a few days during the Tet (lunar) new year in late Jan. 1968. It was then that the North Vietnamese struck with a widespread and morale-shattering attack that eventually led to the U.S. decision to quit the war. Hanoi officials revealed in 1988 that Nha had been a deep-penetration agent.

The CIA's PHOENIX program was to have been the centerpiece of the CIA-orchestrated campaign to win the war by winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. Phoenix ran under cover of the Civil Operations/Revolutionary Development Systems (CORDS) pacification program. In Phoenix offices throughout Vietnam hung a sign that summed up what realists thought of the pro-

gram: "When you got 'em by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow."

Phoenix, ostensibly a campaign to destroy the Vietcong by capturing and prosecuting local leaders, became a murderous instrument in the hands of the South Vietnamese. The program was run first by Robert W. Komer, who later became President Johnson's special assistant for Vietnam, and then by Colby.

Komer later wrote that the United States was involved in two wars—one fought by the troops and the other by the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the CIA. In his book *Bureaucracy at War* (1986), Komer wrote, "Though national intelligence estimates at the Washington level were generally realistic, what might be called tactical intelligence in the field was for long critically weak. . . . The kinds of intelligence most needed in Vietnam were simply alien to the standard institutional repertoires of most U.S. and GVN [Government of South Vietnam] intelligence services involved."

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, said in 1970, when he was U.S. Army chief of staff, "We were not exactly a giant without eyes, although that allusion has some validity." The search for ways to see the invisible enemy characterized some of the technology of the war.

## AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Aerial RECONNAISSANCE was extensive (see A-12 OXCART, BUFFALO HUNTER, SR-71 BLACKBIRD, and U-2), but so were triple-canopy tropical forests that made photography difficult. Ingenious attempts were made to penetrate the forests with sensor technology. Project Igloo White targeted the 3,000-mile Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main supply line for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam. Aircraft dropped thousands of tiny, dart-shaped transmitters that buried themselves in the ground. Protruding from them were antennas that looked like jungle plants. Seismic sensors were to pick up the tramp of people or the vibrations of a passing truck. The transmitters, which would self-destruct if uprooted, were dropped at crossroads along the trail. Signals from the transmitters were picked up in Thailand, where a computer transformed the signals into patterns for intelligence analysts to interpret.

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft also ranged far and wide over potential intelligence TARGETS in North Vietnam. One set of targets of particular interest was the prison camps in North Vietnam in which American fliers who had been shot down were being held. When intelligence discerned a POW camp at Son Tay, deep in the heart of Vietnam—23 miles from the center of Hanoi—a daring raid was planned. The CIA built a model of the Son Tay compound (code-named Barbara) and carefully planned a helicopter raid. It was carried out in Nov. 1961 with great skill and despite a fierce firefight, the raiders escaped without a single serious casualty. But they also left without a single POW. There were no POWs. Intelligence had failed. (The CIA blamed the failure on the fact that

the agency had not been involved in the Army's planning for the raid.)

Interpretations of intelligence were not always granted a hearing in Washington. Sometimes the blind giant was also deaf. In Vietnam, as in many wars over many centuries, the generals and the politicians did not always listen to intelligence reports.

In July 1965, a joint study by the CIA and the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) said that bombing North Vietnam had only a marginal effect on the North's ability to wage war. The CIA particularly said that the attacks would not lead to changes in communist policy. Another study, issued three weeks later by the CIA alone, reinforced its earlier evaluation. The military services and the DIA dissented. In 1966, after another study questioned the effects of bombing, the CIA issued still another estimate, which argued that the bombing had failed because of restrictive rules of engagement.

The CIA position shifted dramatically again in Aug. 1967, when DCI RICHARD MCG. HELMS gave President Johnson a personal evaluation of the bombing. Helms noted that since March 1967 there had been more than 10,000 bombing sorties a month against North Vietnam. But, he continued, "despite the increasing hardships, economic losses and mounting problems in management and logistics caused by the air war, Hanoi continues to meet its own needs and to support its aggression in South Vietnam. Essential military and economic traffic continues to move."

Three weeks later Helms followed up with a "sensitive" analysis from the CIA's OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES prepared for Johnson alone. The paper looked at the "Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam" and concluded that the risks of a loss in Vietnam "are probably more limited and controllable than most previous arguments have indicated."

Even in the final scenes of the visible war on April 30, 1975—people rushing up a ladder to board a helicopter on the roof of a CIA outpost in Saigon (*not* the U.S. Embassy)—there was a feeling that the truth about the secret war would remain untold. FRANK SNEPP, a CIA analyst who was there at the end, wrote in his book *Decent Interval* (1977):

The full impact of CIA losses and failures in Vietnam will probably never be known. There are too many unanswered questions. But based on what can be ascertained, it is not too much to say that in terms of squandered lives, blown secrets and the betrayal of agents, friends and collaborators, our handling of the evacuation was an institutional disgrace. Not since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 had the agency put so much on the line, and lost it through stupidity and mismanagement.

## VOGEL, WOLFGANG

East German lawyer who specialized in setting up SPY SWAPS during the Cold War.

His first swap, in Feb. 1962 at the midpoint of BERLIN's Glienicke Bridge over the Havel River, involved Col. RUDOLF ABEL, a Soviet ILLEGAL who had been arrested in New York City, and FRANCIS GARY POWERS, convicted of espionage and jailed by the Soviet Union after his U-2 spyplane was shot down. He also arranged for the release of GÜNTER GUILLAUME, who spied for the Stasi while a member of Chancellor Willy Brandt's staff. West German officials at first refused to set Guillaume free from his 14-year sentence. But Vogel won out, as he usually did, trading Guillaume for eight captured West German, British, and American AGENTS.

His lesser-known dealings included brokering during the Cold War the secret release of 250,000 East Germans—dissidents, clergymen, union leaders, and other victims of the East German MFS (Stasi). West Germany secretly paid more than three *billion* marks in ransom to free these people. By some estimates, a physician cost as much as \$100,000, with lesser fees for people of other trades and professions. Sometimes the secret payments were in kind: potash, coffee, rubber, bananas, elevators.

In another complex swap, ROBERT G. THOMPSON, a U.S. Air Force clerk convicted of espionage, was freed from his U.S. prison and taken to East Germany in exchange for an American student held by East Germany and an Israeli held in Mozambique. Vogel also arranged for the release of Soviet dissident Anatoly Scharansky, who had been arrested in Moscow in 1977 on charges of spying for the West. Scharansky and three imprisoned Western agents crossed the Glienicke Bridge to West Berlin while MORRIS COHEN and his wife Lona, agents held by the West, crossed into East Berlin, along with three East German agents held by West Germany.

Vogel, who took a small fee for his transactions, described himself as "the middleman between the all-powerful and the powerless." While Germany was divided he was also the middleman between political leaders in East and West who could not be seen talking to each other directly. East Germany, in an extraordinary exception to Marxist rules, let Vogel maintain a private practice and become prosperous.

### OO VOIT, CAPT. LUDWIG

Founder of German COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE during World War I. In 1914 Voit set up a radio station with a CRYPTOGRAPHY section in General Headquarters and established intercept stations that could pick up Allied radio communications. The cryptographic section was the basis for the Per Z codebreaking effort of the 1930s and World War II. Per Z, attached to the Foreign Office, solved some of the codes of 34 countries.

### OO VOLKOV, KONSTANTIN

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER of the NKVD who became a DEFECTOR. Volkov used as his COVER the position of vice consul at the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul.

In Aug. 1945 he contacted his opposite number at the British Consulate and offered information on Soviet

MOLES in the British government, saying that two were in the Foreign Office and one was head of a COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agency in London. He also warned that neither his information nor his offer to defect should be cabled to London, because the Soviets had broken the British diplomatic codes.

His claims about moles were sent to London by diplomatic pouch and thus arrived a week later at MI6, reaching the desk of HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY—who realized that he was one of the moles Volkov was about to name. "I stared at the papers rather longer than necessary to compose my thoughts," Philby later wrote in his self-serving memoir, *My Silent War* (1968). By a combination of luck and conniving, Philby managed to take the place of another intelligence officer who was to have gone to Istanbul. By the time Philby got to Istanbul, Volkov had vanished and was never heard of again.

Years later, after Philby's espionage was revealed, British intelligence officials backtracked on the Volkov case and concluded that Philby had tipped off the Soviets, in effect signing Volkov's death warrant. They assumed he had been ordered back to Moscow and executed. In his memoir, Philby told of writing a report suggesting that the Soviets might have bugged Volkov's quarters or that he had confessed. As for the possibility that he had been betrayed by a British spy, that theory "was not worth including in my report."

### OO VON BREDOV, LT. COL. FERDINAND

Chief of the ABWEHR, Germany's MILITARY INTELLIGENCE organization, from 1930 to 1932.

Von Bredow, who had served in the Abwehr since its founding in 1921, reorganized the agency and recruited German arms dealers as AGENTS. When his friend Kurt von Schleicher became Defense Minister, he made von Bredow one of his key aides and appointed a naval officer, Rear Adm. Conrad Patzig, to replace him. Von Schleicher later became the last Chancellor of the Weimar Republic before Hitler came to power.

### OO VON RINTELEN, CAPT. FRANZ

(b. 1877 d. 1949)

German INTELLIGENCE OFFICER sent to the United States during World War I to commit acts of sabotage.

The son of an international banker, von Rintelen learned English at an early age. He entered the German Navy in 1903 and was serving in the naval High Command when war broke out in 1914.

Traveling under a Swiss passport made out to Emile V. Gache, von Rintelen entered the United States in March 1915 to direct German sabotage in the United States, which, although officially neutral, was supplying Britain, France, and Russia with arms.

Von Rintelen supervised the mass production of "cigar bombs." A cigar-size metal tube was divided into two compartments filled with acids and separated by a copper disk, which acted as a timing device. The tube was

plugged with wax at either end. When the acids ate through the disk and mixed, they produced an intense stream of flame that shot out of the tube.

The bombs were produced on board a German ship berthed in New York City. Von Rintelen hired Irish longshoremen with anti-British sympathies to slip the bombs into munitions loaded onto ships bound for Britain. The bombs were timed to burst into flame while the ships were in mid-Atlantic.

The boastful von Rintelen claimed that some ships blew up, while on others the fires were detected but the dousing of them damaged the munitions. Three of the firebombed ships, he later wrote, carried supplies that he had, through a CUTOUT, sold to the Russians. So he had actually made money besides destroying the ships and their cargoes. There is no record of exactly how many ships his sabotage sank or damaged.

Von Rintelen also worked on schemes to get workers in munitions plants to go on strike. He was despised by Frank von Papen, the military ATTACHÉ at the German Embassy in Washington, D.C.. Von Papen was in charge of German espionage and sabotage in the United States. Worried that von Rintelen's schemes would hurt other, more valuable operations, von Papen succeeded in having him recalled. British codebreakers intercepted messages concerning the recall, and in Aug. 1915, when von Rintelen, using his Swiss identity, arrived at Southampton on a Dutch ship, he was arrested and extradited to the United States. He was tried and convicted of fomenting strikes and sent to a federal penitentiary until the end of the war.

He wildly exaggerated his exploits in his memoirs, *The Dark Invader* (1933), taking credit for fatally infecting horses and mules sent to the Allies from America. He also claimed to have had a hand in the Black Tom explosion in New York Harbor in July 1916, even though he was in prison at the time of the explosion.

## ●● VQ SQUADRONS

U.S. Navy fleet air RECONNAISSANCE squadrons that operate the Navy's ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) spyplanes. From the mid-1950s squadrons VQ-1 in the Far East and VQ-2 in the European-Mediterranean area carried out ELINT missions in support of TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE collection requirements as well as providing TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE to fleet and area commanders.

Naval aircraft began flying electronic missions during World War II, employing a variety of land-based aircraft as well as flying boats. As the Cold War began, the Navy initiated flights around the Soviet periphery with modified PBM Mariner two-engine flying boats and land-based PB4Y-2 PRIVATEER four-engine bombers. These planes were assigned to regular Navy patrol squadrons (designated VP). The first U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN in a Cold War spy flight was a PB4Y-2 from VP-26 based at Port Lyautey (now Kénitra), Morocco. (That aircraft, shot down off Latvia on April 8, 1950, had staged for the Baltic Sea mission through Wiesbaden, West Germany, and was to land in Copenhagen, Denmark, after the ELINT mission.)

The Navy recognized the need for dedicated ELINT squadrons, and VQ-1 was established as an ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM) squadron at the naval air station at Iwakuni, Japan, on June 1, 1955. The unit initially flew the P4M-1Q MERCATOR aircraft; VQ-2 was established as an ECM squadron on Sept. 1, 1955, at Port Lyautey, first flying the P4M-1Q and A3D-1Q SKYWARRIOR aircraft. The latter aircraft could fly from land bases as well as aircraft carriers. The term ECM was intended as a COVER for the squadrons' true purpose.

The designation VQ was changed to fleet air reconnaissance squadron on Jan. 1, 1960. The squadrons continue in operation: VQ-1 is now based at Whidbey Island, Wash., and VQ-2 at Naples, Italy. Each currently flies ELINT-configured EP-3E variants of the P-3 ORION patrol aircraft.

In 1991 the Navy established two additional VQ squadrons to operate the ES-3A Viking ELINT aircraft, which are based aboard aircraft carriers. These are VQ-5 at Agana, Guam, on April 15, 1991, and VQ-6 at Cecil Field, Fla., on Aug. 8, 1991. (VQ-5 is now at North Island in San Diego, Calif.)

## ●● VORTEX

see CHALET

## ●● VOSJOLI, PHILIPPE

see TOPAZ



## ● ● WALK-IN

Someone who voluntarily offers to spy. An unheralded DEFECTOR or a "dangle," a walk-in is a potential AGENT or MOLE who literally walks into an enemy embassy or intelligence agency without prior contact or RECRUITMENT.

During the DECADE OF THE SPY the term was especially applied to Americans who walked into Soviet embassies or other offices and proffered secret information. They included civilians and uniformed men from the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, major defense contractors, CIA, NSA, and FBI.

From the 1960s through the 1980s Soviet intelligence achieved major successes not by the recruitment of spies but by walk-ins. Walk-ins who "volunteer information for sale," said a 1986 report by the U.S. Senate Select Committee ON INTELLIGENCE, are "the most dangerous agents of all," accounting for "the greatest losses of the most highly classified information."

## ● ● WALKER, LT. COMDR. ARTHUR J.

(b. 1934)

Retired U.S. Navy officer recruited as a spy by his brother, retired Chief Warrant Officer JOHN A. WALKER, JR.

Arthur Walker enlisted in the Navy in 1953 and became a sonarman first class on submarines. He was commissioned an ensign and remained in the submarine force. In 1968 he began teaching antisubmarine warfare

at the Atlantic Fleet Tactical School in Norfolk, Va., remaining there until his retirement in 1973 as a lieutenant commander.

He set up a business installing or upgrading car radios. After the business failed, Arthur went to work for the VSE Co., a military contracting concern that provided engineering services to the Navy. John recruited Arthur as a spy, and in Sept. 1980, Arthur began giving John classified material that he handled at VSE.

After arresting John Walker on May 20, 1985, the FBI linked his brother to spying. While Arthur was being interviewed by the FBI, he waived his right to remain silent and gave two FBI agents a confession.

According to the charges, Arthur had given his younger brother "documents, files, photographs, booklets, and defense plans relating to U.S. naval forces," knowing that John was passing them on to the Soviet Union. Other documents included a report on equipment failures aboard Navy amphibious ships and a damage-control manual from the command ship *Blue Ridge*.

During his trial in Norfolk his wife, Rita, testified that after John was arrested, Arthur, in a confessional mood, had told her that in the late 1960s and early 1970s he had had an affair with John's wife, Barbara. At the trial the government prosecutor said that Arthur might have been spying for Walker while he was on active duty, but this accusation was not developed.

Arthur's defense rested without calling any witnesses. He was convicted and sentenced to three life terms and fined \$250,000.



*John A. Walker, Jr., at the time of his arrest—wearing his toupee.*  
(FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)

## OO WALKER, CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER JOHN A., JR.

(b. 1937)

Retired naval officer arrested in 1985 on espionage charges that he operated a spy ring that included his son, MICHAEL WALKER, and brother, Lt. Comdr. ARTHUR J. WALKER as well as Senior Chief Radioman JERRY A. WHITWORTH, all of whom had served in the U.S. Navy. The Walker case was probably the largest and most damaging spy episode in the history of the U.S. Navy.

Walker, who held a "top secret-cryptographic" clearance, was a WALK-IN at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., probably in 1967 while he was assigned to the Submarine Training Center in Charleston, S.C., where he bought a bar and restaurant. (This is the contention of his wife, Barbara, who later reported his espionage to the FBI. Walker told the FBI that he began spying while he was watch officer and message center officer on the staff of Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Va.)

Walker enlisted in the Navy in 1955 and became a communications specialist. His assignments included duty in two nuclear-propelled strategic missile submarines from 1962 to 1966. After his assignments in Charleston and Norfolk, he became assistant director of the radioman's school at the Naval Training Center in San Diego. It was there that he met Whitworth, a senior

chief radioman who held the same cryptographic clearance as Walker.

Walker retired from the Navy, but not from spying, in 1976. Whitworth and later his son, Michael, and brother, Arthur, supplied him with classified documents. After leaving the Navy he operated two commercial firms in Norfolk, Va.—a general detective agency called Confidential Reports, Inc. and a firm for removing BUGS, Electronic Counter-Spy, Inc.

Walker met with Soviet agents in VIENNA, Hong Kong, and the Philippines as well as in the United States. He is believed to have been awarded a high rank in the Soviet armed forces.

John Walker's daughter, Laura Walker Snyder, was in the Army when he attempted to involve her in the spy ring too, but without success. Laura recalled that her father urged her to abort her pregnancy so that she could stay in the Army and become a spy. "He told me I was stupid for quitting [the Army], that I had no hope for the future, that I would never amount to anything. I was an idiot."

Walker took a peculiar pride in his espionage work. "No member of the organization or prospective members has any of the classic problems that plague so many in this business," he once wrote to the Soviets in his best executive manner. "We have no drug problems, alcoholic problems, homosexuality. All are psychologically well-adjusted and mature. And the organization could launder funds."

The FBI was informed of John Walker's spying activities in Nov. 1984 by Walker's former wife, Barbara, urged on by Laura. Barbara had been aware of his spying for some time and had accompanied him when he serviced DEAD DROPS to leave classified material and pick up his payments. After years of estrangement and drunken arguments, they had divorced in 1976. She had twice informed the FBI of his spying, but the first time her drunken ramblings had been ignored.

John Walker was watched by the FBI from late 1984 and arrested on May 20, 1985, after leaving 129 classified documents (stolen by his son on the aircraft carrier *Nimitz*) at a dead drop in Poolesville, Md. Soviet Vice Consul ALEKSEY TKACHENKO, who was sighted near the drop site, left the United States on May 23.

On the eve of his trial, in Oct. 1985, John Walker and his son, Michael, agreed to plead guilty to espionage and to assist the government in the case against Jerry Whitworth. Walker was sentenced to life imprisonment and his son to 25 years in prison. John Walker's nickname, derived from his initials, was "Jaws."

John Walker repeatedly failed POLYGRAPH tests administered by government interrogators during debriefing sessions. The questioners were particularly dissatisfied with his answers about the origin and dimensions of his spy ring.


By the time Walker was arrested for espionage in 1985, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that the Soviet Union had received and decoded more than 1 million messages through the CRYPTOMATERIAL that Walker had supplied. "The Soviets gained access to weapons and sensor data and naval tactics, terrorist threats and surface,

submarine and airborne training, readiness, and tactics," said Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger in assessing the Walker-Whitworth damage. "We now have clear signals of dramatic Soviet gains in all areas of naval warfare, which must now be interpreted in the light of the Walker conspiracy."


**OO WALKER, YEOMAN 3RD CLASS  
MICHAEL**

(b. 1962)

U.S. Navy sailor recruited by his father, JOHN A. WALKER, to spy for the Soviet Union.



Directions prepared by the KGB on a map for John A. Walker. (FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)



Directions prepared by the KGB on a photo for John A. Walker. (FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)

Michael remembered his first acquaintance with family espionage in an incident with his drunken mother. “[She] came up to my room—it was about midnight—dragged me downstairs into the living room, started screaming and yelling at me”; in the midst of that diatribe, she shouted, “Your father is a spy!” Michael, then about 13 years old, told her he did not believe her.

Sometime later, when he was in high school, he and his father would often go to a neighborhood bar together. Michael could see that his father was wealthy. He owned a couple of boats, an airplane, and was a lavish spender, especially around young women. After a few drinks, John Walker would say that some day he would tell Mike about how he made his money. Michael had suspicions, but, he claimed later, he did not then know that his father was a spy.

At the urging of his father, who wanted Michael to become a spy, Michael joined the Navy in Dec. 1982. His first assignment after boot camp was as a yeoman striker—a plain seaman striking for advancement in a specialty—aboard the aircraft carrier *America*. When he came back from his maiden cruise in July 1983, he took leave and went ashore to visit his father, with whom he had been living when he enlisted. They went to his father’s den one night, and Michael began talking about his job on the *America*.

“At first I made reference that I was handling classified information. I was giving my Dad a rundown of the job I had, and he was interested,” Michael later recalled. “Then, a few weeks later, he approached me and said, ‘Well, I can pay you if you deliver classified information to me from your work space. . . . You want to make the money, there’s a lot of it out there to be made.’” He told Michael that he could make “anywhere from a thousand dollars a week to five thousand dollars a month.”

In Oct. 1983 Michael, by then engaged to be married, was living on the base of the naval air station in Virginia Beach, Va. One night as he went on liberty, he stuck a classified document under his uniform shirt and took his first stolen secret to his father. “Well, he was pleased,” Michael recalled. “He was happy that I actually had the guts to do it. He didn’t say a whole lot. He thumbed through the document, and he said this was good, and that’s about it.” Later, they went up to John Walker’s second-floor workroom, where Walker showed his son how to use a Minox camera. They also talked about the fact that Michael’s mother knew his father was a spy. Walker told his son: “She is a problem and can put us away.”

In Dec. 1983 he married Rachel Allen, a cashier at a bar his father frequented. The following month he was transferred to the carrier *Nimitz*. He reported first to the ship’s special services department, which supervised recreational activities aboard ship and arranged for liberty trips ashore. In Sept. 1984, Michael was assigned to the operations office of the *Nimitz*.

When FBI agents arrested John Walker in Maryland on May 20, 1985, he had just left at a DEAD DROP a plastic garbage bag full of classified documents passed to him by Michael.

Michael’s spying was uncovered during the FBI investigation of John Walker prior to his arrest. The FBI advised Navy authorities in extreme secrecy, fearing that Michael might have shipmates who were also spying.

On May 20 Michael Walker was placed under guard on board the *Nimitz* and questioned by NAVY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE agents while the carrier was at anchor in Haifa, Israel. The agents found 15 pounds of classified material hidden on the ship by Michael. He confessed to spying. Taken off the ship, he was flown to Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, where FBI agents arrested him.

Under a plea bargain that John Walker arranged, in exchange for John Walker’s cooperation with federal authorities, Michael was given a 25-year sentence and would be eligible for parole in about eight years.

### OO WALKING BACK THE CAT

U.S. intelligence term for going back to the beginning of an operation or the performance of an AGENT and continuing forward to the present time. This procedure is used when an agent or operation is BLOWN, to determine whether something happened back in time that led to the disaster.

### OO WALLENBERG, RAOUL

(b. 1910 d. 1947?)

Swedish diplomat credited with saving some 20,000 Hungarian Jews by his bold and courageous work in Nazi-held areas. He was also a spy for the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS).

A member of a prominent Swedish family, his education included a degree in architecture from the University of Michigan. In July 1944, Wallenberg went to Budapest under the auspices of the International Red Cross on a mission to save the Jews being sent to the death camp at Auschwitz. Appointed an official of the Swedish legation in Budapest, he rescued Jews on their way to the extermination camp, gave them protective papers, rented buildings, and housed thousands of Jews.

When Germans once tried to seize Jews from Wallenberg’s protected area, he rushed outside and shouted, “This is Swedish territory. . . . If you want to take them, you will have to shoot me first.” He plucked Jews out of death marches and removed them from ghettos, saving about 20,000 in his Swedish “territory” and aiding in the protection of 70,000 confined Jews who survived until liberation.

Wallenberg was supported by advice and funds from the U.S. War Refugees Board. But he was also working for U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE—the OSS. Reportedly, President Roosevelt personally approved Wallenberg’s humanitarian mission and his spying mission. The latter was periodically suspected after his disappearance, but documents recently released by the CIA are more positive. CIA historian Kevin Ruffner has stated that on the basis of these documents “it is a reasonable conclusion

that Raoul Wallenberg was of benefit to American intelligence."

At Washington's behest, Wallenberg was assigned to the Swedish legation in Budapest. It was, according to *U.S. News & World Report*, an effort to counter U.S. pressure for Sweden—neutral in the war—to stop shipping iron ore to Germany.

On Jan. 16, 1945, during fierce fighting for Budapest, Soviet troops liberated Wallenberg's facilities and the area around it. But Soviet officials, apparently believing Wallenberg was an American spy—although how they would have such information is a matter of some conjecture—would not aid him in getting the Jews to freedom. On Jan. 17, he went with a Soviet officer and his driver to Soviet military headquarters at Debrecen, about 120 miles east of Budapest. He was not seen again and was assumed to have been arrested.

Postwar efforts to trace him led to reports of his being seen in various Soviet prisons. In 1957 the Soviet government, in response to international interest in Wallenberg, said that he had died in Moscow's LUBYANKA prison on July 17, 1947 of "a heart attack." But he was reportedly seen after that date within the Soviet prison system, notably at the Vladimir prison some 120 miles northeast of Moscow. Among those who saw him were German prisoners of war, subsequently repatriated.

The Soviets said his arrest and imprisonment were a "tragic mistake." In Oct. 1989, Soviet authorities gave Wallenberg's family some of his personal belongings—passport, money, calendar book, and a permit to carry a pistol—but no personal papers.

In 1996 the U.S. Postal Service revealed that a POSTAL STAMP would be issued to honor Wallenberg with the single word "humanitarian." After NATHAN HALE, Wallenberg is only the second known spy to be honored by a U.S. stamp.

## OO WALLIS, DR. JOHN

(b. 1616 d. 1703)

English clergyman, mathematician, and Oxford University professor who served as a cryptographer for JOHN THURLOE during the regime of Oliver Cromwell (1649–1658). Wallis directed the highly efficient deciphering organization of the English SECRET SERVICE under Thurloe. The system was used to seek out secret messages in vast amounts of correspondence from Royalists and their sympathizers intercepted by the government (Thurloe was postmaster general).

When Charles II came to the throne in 1660, he sought out Wallis to continue his cryptologic efforts. Wallis eventually became chaplain to the king. When William III (William of Orange) came to the throne in 1689, he asked Wallis to train a young man as a successor, so impressed was the monarch with Wallis's skills. Upon his death, his grandson, 20-year-old William Blencowe, carried on Wallis's efforts. Blencowe was the first English cryptographer to be given the title "Decypherer" and to receive a regular stipend for his services. (He committed suicide in 1712.)

Wallis was the author of *Essay on the Art of Decyphering* in addition to several works on mathematics.

## OO WALSINGHAM, SIR FRANCIS

(b. c. 1532 d. 1590)

The architect of an extensive intelligence organization in England for activities aimed mainly against Catholics. He was Secretary of State and adviser to Queen Elizabeth I from 1573 until his death.

Walsingham, a fervent Protestant, was educated at King's College, Cambridge. He initially became involved in intelligence while secretary to the English ambassador to France. When Elizabeth became queen he returned to England. After coming to the attention of Queen Elizabeth he was appointed ambassador to France in 1570; he returned to England in 1573 to become Principal Secretary and a member of the Privy Council and established the secret service in London in 1573.

Walsingham, whose motto was "Knowledge is never too dear," began developing an extensive, highly competent foreign intelligence organization. His efforts marked the first national and comprehensive English intelligence organization. He also established an elaborate CIPHER operation, as a result of his own personal fascination with codes.

His AGENTS operated in France, Germany, Italy, the Low Countries, Spain, and Turkey, with some being ensconced in foreign courts. This spy network was financed mostly from Walsingham's private fortune. Many of his people were recruited from Cambridge and Oxford universities.

Walsingham's numerous intelligence successes included deriving intimate knowledge of the Spanish plans for the Armada being sent against England. His interception of letters from Mary Stuart (Queen of Scots) to conspirators led to her trial and execution in 1587, which Walsingham enthusiastically endorsed.

His ardent Protestantism led to frequent disagreements with the queen over her failure to promote the Protestant cause. Although Queen Elizabeth affectionately referred to Walsingham as "my Moor" because of his dark complexion and good looks, she rewarded him poorly despite his loyal service and successes. He died in poverty and debt.

Walsingham's daughter, Lady Sidney, was involved in his espionage operations. Also see CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE.

## OO WALTON [P]

U.S. Army and Air Force enlisted man who provided information to the GRU while stationed in West Germany. "Walton," as he is known in U.S. Air Force intelligence records, served in the U.S. Army from 1961 to 1964 and enlisted in the U.S. Air Force several months later.

He was separated from the Air Force in 1972 at his own request, charging that he had been discriminated against because he was black. He was driving a taxi in Houston, Tex., when he was interviewed by the Air Force OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS in the 1970s. He was granted immunity from prosecution (and the protection of a pseudonym in the records) in return for giving a full account of his espionage activities.

**●● WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE  
SOURCES OR METHODS**

(WNINTL)

Former U.S. security category warning that a document contained information on intelligence sources or methods. The Cold War-era category was eliminated in late 1995 as the marking added little to security.

**●● WASHINGTON, GEN. GEORGE**

(b. 1732 d. 1799)

The commander of continental troops in the American Revolution. Washington had a considerable interest in and aptitude for intelligence activities. "Washington was in fact the most important intelligence officer of the American Revolution, the chief American spy master. He recruited spies, instructed them in their treacherous craft, sent them out, welcomed them back, and paid them off," wrote former CIA officer G. J. A. O'Toole in his comprehensive history *Honorable Treachery* (1991).

Washington had limited formal military or academic education. He gained much of his knowledge of RECONNAISSANCE and military operations as a surveyor and as an officer in the British Army during the French and Indian Wars of the 18th Century. His first military venture came in 1754 when, moving supplies up into Pennsylvania to fight the French, he was forced to fight a battle, with troops inferior in numbers, against a French force at a rudimentary fortification, sometimes called Fort Necessity, on July 3. He was defeated in a one-day battle, fought in a heavy rain. This defeat did not deter Washington, and he continued to serve the British and, between military duties, manage his estate at Mt. Vernon, near Alexandria, Va.

When the colonies decided to fight for independence, Washington was offered command of all continental troops, which he accepted on July 3, 1775. He held that command—through successes and defeats—until the final British withdrawal from the colonies in early 1783.

His first known venture as a spymaster came on July 15, 1775, when he recorded the payment of \$333 ½ to an unidentified person "to go into the town of Boston; to establish a secret correspondence for the purpose of conveying intelligence of the Enemys movements and designs." Washington employed more spies during the course of the conflict, and he encouraged an awareness of the importance of intelligence in his subordinates: "As everything, in a manner, depends upon obtaining intelligence of the enemy's motions, I do most certainly entreat you and General [Henry] Clinton to exert yourselves to accomplish this most desirable end," he wrote to Gen. William Heath on Sept. 5, 1776.

By 1777 Washington had established an intelligence service, initiating direct correspondence with the patriotic Committees of Safety in each of the colonies and bringing more structure to his use of spies. This led to a series of spy networks in those areas occupied by British troops. And when the British entered a new area, "stay-behind" spies would wait to report their every movement to Washington.

In the summer of 1778 he ordered Maj. BENJAMIN TALLMADGE to establish a spy network in New York. Known as the CULPER RING, this network was one of the most successful of Washington's intelligence operations. While Tallmadge was the CASE OFFICER for the spy ring, Washington was directly involved in the operation.

Later, when his forces were about to enter New York City, Washington directed Tallmadge to go into the city before the Continental Army to protect his agents from possible retaliation by the withdrawing British.

Washington also displayed astuteness in COUNTER-ESPIONAGE activities. When one of his officers sought to arrest a suspected British spy, Washington told the officer to befriend the man and invite him to dinner. Then, Washington proposed, he should give the British agent an opportunity to steal a document that would provide inflated figures of the strength of his army. Periodically Washington would use deception—keeping up camp fires and having sentries patrol an area long after his troops had departed—to further mislead British commanders.

Success in intelligence activities certainly contributed to the colonial victory over the British. With victory, Washington bade farewell to his troops in 1783, and—with less fanfare—paid off his spies.

Washington served as first President of the United States from 1789 to 1796, turning down offers of a third term. When war with France threatened, on July 3, 1798, Washington accepted a commission as lieutenant general and Commander in Chief of the Army, a commission that he retained until his death.

Records survive to testify to Washington's astuteness in intelligence activities. And novelist JAMES FENIMORE COOPER wrote a most successful historical novel, *The Spy: A Tale of the Neutral Ground* (1821), based on the activities of one of Washington's spies.

**●● WATCHERS**

British Security Service (MI5) term for observers who follow Soviet-Russian diplomats and other embassy staff members around London and in other parts of Britain.

**●● WATCH LIST**

Compilation of names of persons considered of interest to an intelligence service; with high-speed computers, words like "terrorist" and "atomic bomb" could be included in watch lists.

Operation SHAMROCK by U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE agencies involved a massive watch list of Americans as well as foreign individuals and organizations.

**●● WATERGATE**

Apartments-hotel complex in northwest Washington, D.C., and location of Democratic National Committee

headquarters, which were broken into by the Nixon administration's PLUMBERS (Special Investigation Unit) on the night of June 17, 1972, to plant bugging devices and photograph documents. The Watergate break-in led to the eventual exposure of President Nixon's illegal activities and his resignation.

The five Watergate burglars, all arrested and convicted, were James W. McCord Jr. (security coordinator for the Committee to Re-elect the President, former FBI agent, and former employee of the Office of Security of the CIA); Bernard L. Barker (realtor and former CIA employee, who had been involved in the 1962 Bay of Pigs invasion); Frank A. Sturgis (a soldier of fortune with CIA connections); Eugenio R. Martinez (part-time CIA informant); and Virgilio R. Gonzalez (locksmith).

The burglary was discovered by a security guard, who called the Washington police. The police investigation led to two other men being implicated in the break-in, E. HOWARD HUNT and G. Gordon Liddy, who were also in the Plumbers. Hunt, a former CIA officer, had worked with Barker in CIA operations.

Although the CIA had no official knowledge of the break-in, the connections with the principals raised suspicions that this was a "rouge" operation set up with PLAUSIBLE DENIAL. None of the burglars was then working for the CIA, but McCord had retired from the agency in 1970 and Martinez, a CIA contract employee, was on the CIA payroll. Hunt had received technical help from the CIA when he broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist after publication of the PENTAGON PAPERS, which Ellsberg had stolen.

The men made no statements that linked them to the White House, but some of them demanded money. And when they felt they had been abandoned, McCord wrote a letter to the judge claiming that a White House cover-up was cloaking the real authority for the burglary. This launched the scandal that became known as Watergate.

Also see L. PATRICK GRAY, RICHARD M. HELMS.

## OO WEATHER

CODE NAME for the TOP SECRET communications system of U.S. Navy TASK FORCE 157 (TF 157). It was used by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, for arranging his secret trip to China in 1971. Kissinger, fearing leaks, wanted to bypass the White House and State Department communications systems.

Weather used an outdated NSA machine encryption system to encrypt messages before they were handed off to the existing U.S. Navy communications system, where the encrypted messages were reencrypted. Thus, only TF 157 personnel at the transmitting and receiving end could read the doubly encrypted messages.

A TF 157 COURIER picked up Kissinger's message at the White House. Then a TF 157 officer encrypted it and had it transmitted to a TF 157 office at the U.S. Navy facility at Yokosuka, Japan, near Tokyo. The unit commander decrypted it and personally took it to the Chinese Trade Mission in Tokyo.

Kissinger also used the TF 157 system to communicate with U.S. delegates at a four-power conference on BERLIN.

## OO WEBSTER, WILLIAM H.

(b. 1924)

The only man to serve as both the Director of the FBI (from 1978 to 1987) and DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) (from 1987 to 1991). He resigned over the criticisms from members of the administration of President GEORGE BUSH and members of Congress at the intelligence failures during the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 and the CIA's failure to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Webster received his bachelor's degree from Amherst College and his law degree from Washington University Law School (St. Louis) in 1949. After practicing law in St. Louis, in 1960 he was named U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri. President Nixon appointed him to a federal judgeship in 1971.

Webster was not seeking the position when President Carter appointed him to head the FBI, a ten-year appointment. He saw his role as rebuilding the image of the FBI after the WATERGATE scandal and the autocratic policies of J. EDGAR HOOVER, who had died in office in 1972.

As director of the FBI, Webster suggested that the United States could help curb the espionage war with the Soviet Union by reducing the number of documents being classified; at the same time he proposed reducing the number of U.S. personnel with TOP SECRET clearances to help prevent espionage incidents. "People driving around with secret material stashed in their trunk, that leave them around their house or leave them on their desks at night, have an ambivalence . . . that preconditions them to be receptive to a money offer [from foreign INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS] when they need it," he said.

Webster also directed a more aggressive policy against spying. As he told a public gathering in Washington, D.C., "We had three convictions [for espionage] in 1984, which is a lot more than the previous year. And we've had over nine convictions this year [1985] so far. At the same time there were eight arrests in fiscal 1984, and there have been 14 so far this year on espionage charges."

Following the death of WILLIAM J. CASEY, Webster became DCI in May 1987 and vowed to restore the reputation of the CIA, which had been discredited by the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. Before the end of the year he dismissed two CIA employees involved in Iran-Contra, demoted one, and issued letters of reprimand to four others.

Soon after he took over the CIA, Webster told a congressional committee that he had reorganized the agency to improve COUNTERINTELLIGENCE and to strengthen security at U.S. embassies around the world. (The CIA, however, would fail for six more years to detect ALDRICH AMES, who was spying for the Soviet Union, and would become a member of the CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE staff.)

He resigned as DCI on May 8, 1991, but at President Bush's request remained in office until Aug. 31, 1991.

### ●● WELCH, RICHARD S. (b. 1929 d. 1975)

CIA official in Athens, murdered on Dec. 23, 1975, after PHILIP AGEE, a former CIA AGENT called for CIA officials to be "neutralized." A career CIA operative, Welch became station chief in the Greek capital under the COVER of a State Department special assistant to the ambassador. However, his real position was fairly well known in Athens.

In 1975 Agee wrote in the anti-CIA magazine *Counter-Spy* that CIA agents should be identified and "neutralized." Another article in the same issue identified Welch as CIA station chief in Athens. Based on the *Counter-Spy* article, the *Athens News* in Nov. 1975 also identified Welch and gave his home address.

On Dec. 23 he was shot to death outside his home by three gunmen claiming to be part of a left-wing group called the Revolutionary Organization of November 17th. Welch's body was returned to the United States for burial in Arlington National Cemetery, in formal ceremonies attended by President Ford and a host of senior officials, including the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WILLIAM E. COLBY.

A spokesman for *Counter-Spy* magazine quickly declared that "If anyone is to blame for Mr. Welch's death, it is the CIA. We don't want to see anyone shot."

### ●● WENNERSTROM, COL. STIG (b. 1906)

Swedish Air Force officer who was a Soviet spy.

Wennerstrom entered the Swedish Navy in 1929 and applied for flight training the following year. After attending flying school, he learned Russian and was trained in intelligence. Promoted to captain in 1939, he was sent to Moscow that same year as the air ATTACHÉ in the Swedish Embassy. In 1940 he became a defense staff air intelligence officer in 1941.

He was promoted to major in 1945 but was dissatisfied with his rate of promotion and what he perceived as a lack of appreciation of his work. After he had returned to Moscow in 1948 as a colonel, Wennerstrom's lamentations caught the attention of Soviet spy recruiters, who began a campaign to get him to work as an AGENT. Flattered and entertained at parties, Wennerstrom was told that he could win clandestine promotion in the GRU, the Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE agency. He began spying in 1948, continuing as he moved through assignments in Sweden and for the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

In 1959, the U.S. ambassador in Bern, Switzerland, received a letter addressed to the director of the FBI. The letter was opened by the CIA head of station. The letter, signed "Sniper," said that someone in Poland was offering to spy for the United States. Sniper, offering some information, said that a Swedish Air Force officer who had served as an air attaché was a spy. The trail quickly led to Wennerstrom. (Sniper was Lt. Col. MICHAL GOLIENIEWSKI, a Polish MILITARY INTELLIGENCE officer

who later defected to the West. His information also helped the British track down GEORGE BLAKE.)

When Wennerstrom's espionage was revealed, he was a senior official at the Swedish Ministry of Defense. Placed under SURVEILLANCE, he was seen contacting Soviets in Stockholm. He was then transferred to an innocuous post while the Swedish Security Police tapped his phone and built a case against him. The investigation led to his arrest on June 20, 1963 and the expulsion of two Soviet CASE OFFICERS. After confessing to 14 years of spying, he attempted suicide. He was tried and sentenced to hard labor for life.

His Soviet CODE NAME was Eagle.

### ●● WESSON [P]

U.S. Air Force enlisted man who spied for the Soviets. "Wesson," born in England, served in the Air Force from 1957 to 1963, first as an aircraft radio operator and then as a weapons systems operator. An investigation into espionage activities in the Air Force led to his being interrogated. Investigators were convinced that he was a spy. Records about him use the pseudonym "Wesson." The disposition of his case is not publicly known.

### ●● WEST, NIGEL [P] (b. 1952)

Pseudonym of Rupert Allason, the leading writer of the Cold War era on the subject of British intelligence. His books are scrupulously researched and incorporate what he has called "guidance" by INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

The son of a former Conservative member of Parliament, he successfully ran for Parliament as a Conservative in 1987. He had been a member of the Metropolitan Police in London and became interested in intelligence when he researched a book on the subject. With Donald McCormick, he researched and co-authored a BBC documentary series, *Spy*, in 1980.

His books include *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909–1945* (1981); *A Matter of Trust. MI5 1945–1972* (1982); *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945* (1983); *The Branch—a History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch 1883–1983* (1983); *Unreliable Witness. Espionage Myths of the Second World War* (1984) (Published in the U.S. as *A Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of World War II*); *GCHO: The Secret Wireless War 1900–86* (1986) (Published in the U.S. as *The SIGINT Secrets*, 1988); *Mole Hunt: Searching for Soviet Spies in MI5* (1987); and *The Blue List* (1989), his first work of fiction, in which he weaves a tale that HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY was actually a double DOUBLE AGENT working for Britain against the Soviet intelligence services. His novel *Cuban Bluff* (1991) fictionalized the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

The manuscript for *A Matter of Trust* was stolen by a senior Security Service (MI5) officer in an attempt to stop its publication. At the time, another copy of the manuscript was carried to New York City for publication of the American edition of the book, entitled *The Circus. MI5 Operations 1945–1972* (1982). On Oct. 12, 1982, the British government asked for a court injunction to

prevent publication because "the conduct of [intelligence] investigations and operations may be prejudiced and put at risk." The court did grant the injunction—and issued an order to the publisher. This was the first that the publisher or West knew of the injunction.

In the American edition of the book West said that after some discussions with intelligence officials "certain names would be deleted" because these were officers "who had all undertaken dangerous missions abroad and whose identification might compromise them." After these deletions were made, the book was published.

## OO WESTPHAL, JÜRGEN

High-ranking civilian employee of the West German Defense Ministry who was arrested on Dec. 11, 1986, on suspicion of spying for East Germany or possibly other communist countries. Westphal worked on a project to improve the efficiency of computer systems used by West Germany's military forces. He was apparently caught before he passed on information to his contacts, who had recruited him in Aug. 1986 in VIENNA.

## OO WET AFFAIRS

Russian slang for intelligence operations involving a killing, "wet" being a reference to blood. Sometimes called "wet job."

U.S. intelligence analyst Dr. John J. Dziak, in *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (1988), provides a list of Soviet state security organizations that carried out direct action or wet affairs:

<i>Pre-1936</i>	Foreign Department (INO) (CHEKA-GPU-OGPU)
<i>1936-1941</i>	Administration for Special Tasks (NKVD)
<i>1941-1946</i>	Fourth Directorate (Partisans)(NKGB)
<i>1946-1953</i>	Spets Byuro No. 1 (NKGB-MGB)
<i>1953-1954</i>	Ninth Section, First Chief Directorate (MVD)
<i>1954-late 1960s</i>	Department 13, First Chief Directorate (KGB)
<i>late 1960s-early 1970s</i>	Department V, First Chief Directorate (KGB)
<i>early 1970s-1991</i>	Department 8, Directorate S (Illegals), First Chief Directorate (KGB)

## OO WET SQUAD

Slang for a Soviet-Russian group for carrying out murder or assassination operations.

## OO WET WORK

Western slang for intelligence operations involving murder or assassination.

## OO WHALEN, LT. COL. WILLIAM H.

U.S. Army intelligence specialist arrested in 1966 for having spied for the Soviets for at least two years while he was in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whalen was charged with revealing "information pertaining to atomic weapons, missiles, military plans for the defense of Europe, information concerning the retaliation plans of the United States Strategic Air Command, and information pertaining to troop movements, documents, and writings relating to the national defense of the United States." Tried and convicted, he received a 15-year prison sentence.

Whalen is believed to have been unmasked by Maj. Gen. DIMITRI POLYAKOV, a Soviet GRU officer who spied for the United States for nearly 20 years.

## OO WHITE

(1) Slang for an unclassified or open (acknowledged) classified program; (2) Someone who has not been identified as an intelligence operative.

## OO WHITE, SIR DICK (GOLDSMITH)

(b. 1906 d. 1993)

During a 32-year career in intelligence, White was the only person to serve as head of both the British Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). He enjoyed a reputation as a thorough professional.

Educated at Bishop's Stortford College—where he held the record for running the mile—and Christ Church College, Oxford, he then attended the Universities of Michigan and California for two years, after which he briefly taught school. In 1936 he began his career in intelligence with MI5. His assignments included nine months in Germany before World War II. During the war he served in MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, rising to the rank of colonel. His assignments included being on the staff of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in western Europe.

After the war he served in MI5, being made head of B Division (COUNTERESPIONAGE) in 1946. He held that important position until he became Director-General in 1953. He was knighted in 1955.

Following the botched effort by MI6 to learn technical details about the Soviet cruiser *Ordzhonikidze*, at anchor in Portsmouth Harbor, using the aged diver LIONEL CRABB, White became Director-General of MI6. The move was made hastily, to chastise the intelligence service for having embarrassed the government by spying on the ship that brought Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to Britain.

White was the first noncareer military or naval officer to head MI6. Upon assuming his appointment he learned that the service had ignored his recommendations that HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY never be employed in intelligence work again. White, who had interrogated Philby in 1951, was certain he was a Soviet AGENT. Further, then-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had several months earlier stated publicly that there was no evidence against Philby.

As more evidence became available, White sent Nicholas Elliott to Beirut to force a confession from Philby, who was working there as a journalist—thanks to MI6 recommendations. The operation was bungled, and Philby fled to the Soviet Union. Although stung by Philby's escape, White did believe that he had taken the proper approach in trying to bring Philby back to Britain.

Philby later proffered his opinion of White, as head of MI5's B Division, in *My Silent War* (1969):

He was a nice and modest character, who would have been the first to admit that he lacked outstanding qualities. His most obvious fault was a tendency to agree with the last person he spoke to. With his usual good sense, he was content to delegate a lot of work to his subordinates, and to exercise his gifts for chairmanship with a view to keeping harmony in the division. . . . His capacity for avoiding departmental fights paid off in the outcome.

Still plagued by Soviet spies in the intelligence services, White was forced to support the FLUENCY COMMITTEE, set up to determine if ROGER HOLLIS, his successor as head of MI5, was a Soviet MOLE.

MI5 officer PETER WRIGHT described White in his *Spycatcher* (1987): "He was tall with lean, healthy features and a sharp eye. There was something of David Niven about him, the same perfect English manners, easy charm, and immaculate dress sense. Indeed, compared with his Board [of directors at MI5], he was positively raffish." Wright also offered a view of White's move from MI5 to MI6:

The decision to appoint Dick White as Chief of MI6 was, I believe, one of the most important mistakes made in postwar British Intelligence history. There were few signs of it in the mid-1950s, but MI5, under his control, was taking the first faltering steps along the path of modernization. He knew the necessity for change, and yet had the reverence for tradition which would have enabled him to accomplish his objectives without disruption. He was, above all, a counterintelligence officer, almost certainly the greatest of the twentieth century, perfectly trained for the Director-General's chair. He knew the people, he knew the problems, and he had a vision of the sort of the effective counterespionage organization he wanted to create.

White retired from MI6 in 1968, becoming the intelligence and security officer for the Cabinet Office. He officially retired from that post in 1972, although he remained "on call" to the government.

## OO WHITE CLOUD

U.S. Navy SATELLITE for ocean RECONNAISSANCE. The Navy-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE project called for groups of three of the FERRET satellites to be used to triangulate on hostile warships at sea employing ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) sensors.

The White Cloud system was not deployed. The Soviet union did deploy an ELINT satellite system (see RADAR OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE).

## OO WHITWORTH, SENIOR CHIEF RADIOMAN JERRY A.

(b. 1939)

U.S. Navy communications specialist who provided classified information, including CRYPTOMATERIAL, to JOHN A. WALKER for transfer to the Soviet Union. During Whitworth's trial in March-April 1986 an FBI official stated that Whitworth's espionage damaged U.S. security even more than the atomic spying of Ethel and JULIUS ROSENBERG.

A graduate of Coalings Junior College, Whitworth served in the Navy from Sept. 1956 to Oct. 1983. He was a radio specialist, and during the later stages of his 26-year career Whitworth served in several highly sensitive positions; he worked with SATELLITE communications and various cryptographic systems on board several ships, including the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, as well as at shore stations.

Although the FBI did not know it at the time, the first break in the Whitworth case came in May 1984 when a letter arrived at the FBI field office in San Francisco from someone who said he had been "involved in espionage for several years" and had "passed along top secret cryptographic keylists for military communications, tech manuals for same, intelligence messages, etc." The letter went on to say that he was part of a ring and that the FBI could contact him through an advertisement in *The Los Angeles Times* addressed to "RUS."

The RUS letters, as the FBI called them, continued, in reaction to the FBI advertisement. But finally RUS wrote in August to say, "I've done a lot of serious thinking and have pretty much come to the conclusion that it would be best to give up the idea of aiding in the termination of the espionage ring previously discussed."

When the FBI captured John Walker on May 20, agents found at the DEAD DROP a plastic garbage bag containing classified documents and three letters. One letter referred to "D," who apparently was a Walker spy who wanted to quit. Piecing together clues from that letter and others found in a search of Walker's home, the FBI decided that "D" resembled a former Navy radioman whose name, Jerry A. Whitworth, had turned up in the background investigation of Walker. A "Brenda" mentioned in one of Walker's letters had to be Brenda L. Reis, Whitworth's wife since 1976.

Two agents called on Whitworth in Davis, California. During the interview he left the room and could be seen pulling two sheets of paper from the printer next to his computer. When he allowed the agents to search his mobile home, one of them found what he had so ineptly hidden: the printout of a letter to Walker, written that day.

The FBI did not immediately arrest Whitworth, although agents kept him under highly visible surveillance. He was allowed to surrender on his own on June 3. By

then, the FBI was convinced that both "D" and RUS were Whitworth.

A grand jury indicted Whitworth for conspiring to commit espionage. He was also charged with the crime of espionage itself and with copying and taking a document in violation of another section of the Espionage Law of 1914. Five other counts concerned income tax law violations that essentially constituted failure to report his espionage earnings, which the government estimated to be at least \$332,000. The counts were legally entwined, so that Whitworth had to be tried simultaneously for both spying and tax cheating.

John Walker, as part of his plea bargain to win clemency for his son, MICHAEL WALKER, was the key witness against Whitworth. Michael also testified against Whitworth, as did John Walker's ex-wife, Barbara Joy Crowley Walker, who turned Walker in; their daughter, Laura Walker Snyder, who said John Walker had tried to recruit her; and Lt. Comdr. ARTHUR WALKER, John Walker's brother.

Whitworth was sentenced to 365 years in prison and fined \$410,000. Under a formula incorporated in the sentence, it would be 60 years before Whitworth could be paroled. Jerry Whitworth, said the judge who sentenced him, was "a man who represented the banality of evil . . . a zero at the bone. He believes in nothing. His life is devoted to determining the wind direction and how he can make a profit from the coming storm."

## OO WICHER

(Gale)

Polish code-name for the Poles' pioneer work in decrypting the German ENIGMA machine.

## OO WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS

Expression to signify the confusion of the world of intelligence and espionage. JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, long-time head of COUNTERESPIONAGE for the CIA, is generally credited with coining the term, having written that the Wilderness of Mirrors "is that . . . myriad of stratagems, deceptions, artifices and all the other devices of disinformation which the Soviet bloc and its coordinated intelligence services use to confuse and split the West," thus producing "an ever-fluid landscape where fact and illusion merge. . . ."

The term was used by David C. Martin as the title for his book about Angleton, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (1980).

## OO WILKINS, BISHOP JOHN

(b. 1614 d. 1672)

Bishop of Chester, England, who served as a cryptographer for JOHN THURLOE. He invented CIPHER systems and wrote a manual on the subject for Thurloe. His CODES were in wide use through the American Civil War.

Wilkins was a parliamentarian under Oliver Cromwell during the Commonwealth period following the execution of King Charles I in 1649, and he survived to serve King Charles II after the monarchy was restored in 1660.

Wilkins also produced many learned treatises on technical subjects. In his book *Mathematicall Magick*, he described the advantages of operating a "submerged vessel" on voyages through polar regions because of the safety of such a craft from the dangers of ice, cold, and severe weather conditions encountered by surface ships—undoubtedly the first person to write about submarine navigation in the Arctic.

## OO WILKINSON, MAJ. GEN. JAMES

(b. 1757 d. 1825)

American Army officer who was an AGENT for Spain.

Wilkinson, who served with Maj. Gen. BENEDICT ARNOLD during the American Revolution, was promoted to brigadier general in the Continental Army in 1777. The following year he became secretary to the Board of War, but lost that post because he had been in a plot to remove Gen. GEORGE WASHINGTON as commander in chief of the Army. For the rest of his Army career Wilkinson continued to plot against his superiors.

After the Revolution, Wilkinson went to Kentucky, then part of Virginia, and became an agent for Spain, scheming to keep the region out of the United States. Kentucky became a state in 1792, but Wilkinson, still in the Army, continued his subversive work, serving Spain's efforts to annex western territory.

In 1796, Wilkinson became the commanding general of the U.S. Army. He continued to work for Spain and even took an oath of allegiance to the King of Spain. In 1805, as governor of the Louisiana Territory, he conspired with former Vice President Aaron Burr to create an empire in the West. He later betrayed Burr and became the principal witness against him when Burr was tried for treason (and acquitted).

Wilkinson survived a court-martial growing out of the Burr affair—and two more courts-martial following his disastrous leadership in the War of 1812. Promoted to major general in 1813, he was honorably discharged in 1815. He was seeking a Texas land grant when he died in Mexico City. It was said of him that he lost every battle and won every court-martial. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner called Wilkinson "the most consummate artist in treason that the nation ever possessed."

## OO WILKINSON, VICE ADM. THEODORE S.

(b. 1888 d. 1946)

The U.S. DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (DNI) at the time of the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

First in his class of 1909 at the Naval Academy, his subsequent assignments ashore and afloat included successive command of four destroyers (1920–1926) and, later, command of the battleship *Mississippi*. Historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that at the start of World War II Wilkinson "had one of the best brains in the armed forces."

As a rear admiral he became DNI in Oct. 1941. Under his direction, the MAGIC decrypts of Japanese

diplomatic communications were distributed to senior officials in Washington, D.C. But Wilkinson and his staff were not allowed to evaluate, much less disseminate, the vast amount of Magic and other intelligence coming into his office. Rather, evaluating the material, predicting future Japanese fleet movements, and deciding who should see this information was the responsibility of the war plans officer, Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner. Wilkinson, who had several trained Japanese-language officers on his staff—and language nuances were important in dealing with the Japanese—was “ordered not to develop enemy intentions.”

Turner would hold all such information closely, dribbling out bits and pieces to those he felt should see them. Thus, there was no overall picture within the U.S. Navy, let alone in Washington, of what the Japanese Fleet was doing. But, wrote Morison in *The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931-April 1942* (1948), “. . . as Admiral Wilkinson made the same underestimate of the enemy’s capabilities and overestimate of his common sense as did everyone else, the result might have been the same if he had been made responsible.”

With Turner controlling all information, however, there was *no* opportunity for an overall analysis of the Japanese capabilities and potential actions.

Another point of debate has been that Wilkinson and Turner withheld the Magic diplomatic decrypts from the Navy and Army commanders at Pearl Harbor, although it is unlikely that they would have helped those commanders to be on the alert for a Japanese attack. (The U.S. Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines had access to the Japanese diplomatic CODE with their own PURPLE machine.) The lack of a central U.S. analysis staff, coupled with the failure to permit Wilkinson to bring his keen mind and his highly qualified staff to address the issues, made it inevitable that the United States would be taken by surprise when the Japanese initiated hostilities in the Pacific.

Wilkinson left the DNI post in July 1942, going to the Pacific to command a battleship division before becoming involved in amphibious operations. For the remainder of World War II he commanded U.S. amphibious forces in several major assaults against Japanese-held islands.

He died in an automobile accident.

## ●● WILLES, BISHOP EDWARD

(b. 1694 d. 1773)

Eighteenth-Century English cryptographer who succeeded JOHN WALLIS and his grandson William Blencowe as the leading codebreakers of their time, becoming England’s “Decypherer.”

Willes, like Wallis, was a clergyman. But Willes used his codebreaking services for the Crown to accelerate his advancement in the church, reaching the post of Bishop of Bath and Wells. He was able to use his skills to decipher correspondence of Francis Atterbury, the Bishop of Rochester, to reveal his involvement in a conspiracy to restore the Stuarts to the throne. This effort threatened to force Willes to reveal some of his deciphering methods before the House of Lords. However, the Lords voted “that it is not consistent with the public safety to ask the

Decyphers and questions, which may tend to discover the art or mystery of decyphering.” (Atterbury was convicted and banished from England.)

Willes’s eldest son succeeded him as Decypherer in 1742.

## ●● WILLI

German CODE NAME for the ss operation to kidnap Britain’s Duke of Windsor in July 1940 and take him from Portugal to Germany. The Nazis hoped to restore him to the British throne after the German conquest of Britain.

Edward, the son of George V, assumed the throne as Edward VIII in Jan. 1936 when his father died. But the new king was in love with an American divorcée, Wallis Warfield Simpson. Unable to marry her (the Church of England, of which the monarch was constitutional head, at that time forbade the remarriage of divorced persons), he stunned the world on Dec. 10, 1936 by abdicating.

The ex-king and Simpson married in France and, as the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, in Oct. 1937 toured Nazi Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, fanning speculation that they were pro-Nazi. The trip was paid for by the Nazi government, which believed that the duke was a potential ally.

When Britain went to war in Sept. 1939, the duke became liaison officer with the British Military Mission at French General Headquarters. He actually served as an AGENT for British MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, which wanted information on French defenses, particularly the Maginot Line. The duke, wrote Michael Bloch in *Operation Willi* (1981), “turned out to have a flair for his undercover job; and his five secret reports give a devastating picture of French unpreparedness. . . . Had these warnings been heeded in London, the course of the war might have been different; but they were ignored.”

As German armies overran France, the Windsors made their way into neutral Spain, then to Portugal, where German diplomatic and intelligence officials plotted ways to keep the duke in Europe and perhaps get him into Germany. (The intelligence officials included representatives of Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the private intelligence service run by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.) In Lisbon the duke received a telegram from Prime Minister Winston Churchill, ordering him back to Britain. Churchill pointed out that the duke was under military authority and would “create a serious situation”—an implication of court-martial—if he refused the order. (The duke had the temporary rank of major general.) Then came another telegram appointing the duke governor of the Bahamas, a small British possession in the Caribbean.

Working against time, the Germans sent WALTER SCHELLENBERG, a highly effective SS intelligence officer, to Portugal to handle the operation. The plan was to entice the Windsors over the border to Spain and keep them there to “protect” them from plots on their lives. When the duke declined to go to Spain and decided to sail to the Bahamas, Schellenberg later said, Hitler himself ordered that the ex-king be abducted. But Schellenberg, possibly deliberately, failed to carry out the abduction, and the duke sailed on Aug. 1, 1940.

**●● WILLOUGHBY, MAJ. GEN.  
CHARLES A.**

(b. 1892 d. 1972)

The chief INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (G-2) for Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur from 1941 to 1951. Willoughby was considered paranoid and vulnerable to emotional extremes by his peers; as a general officer he was often angry, screaming at subordinates—his abuses punctuated by the term ULTRA, much to the chagrin of other intelligence and communications officers.

Born Karl Weidenbach in Germany, Willoughby studied in Europe, majoring in philosophy and modern languages. After several visits, he moved to the United States in 1910 and became a U.S. citizen. He enlisted in the Army that same year and was able to complete college in 1914. He later earned a master's degree at the University of Kansas and attended the Army Command and General Staff School and Army War College.

He received an Army commission in 1916. Seven months later, in June 1917, he was shipped to France with the 1st Division of the American Expeditionary Force. He soon transferred to the Air Corps, where he was involved with aviation training. Returning to the United States in 1918, he was placed in charge of the first air mail service.

During the 1920s and 1930s he served in various Army posts in the United States and at U.S. embassies in South America. In 1940, as a colonel, he was ordered to the Philippines; and in July 1941, when Gen. MacArthur was called back into the U.S. Army to command U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, Willoughby became his Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

When the Japanese advances in the Philippines forced MacArthur to flee from Corregidor, the fortress island in Manila Bay, by PT boat and aircraft, Willoughby was one of the staff officers who accompanied him on the breakout. Upon reaching Australia, Willoughby continued to serve as MacArthur's G-2. Willoughby was not allowed access to MAGIC decrypts of Japanese communications (as were MacArthur and his chief of staff) until well after U.S. entry into the war. As G-2 for the Southwest Pacific Area, Willoughby exercised broad authority over a variety of intelligence activities, including the ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, the Royal Australian Navy's COASTWATCHERS, the highly effective Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, and other units. However, BELL, the U.S. Navy's CRYPTANALYSIS station in Australia was under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations, not Willoughby.

Willoughby served MacArthur throughout the war and afterwards, when MacArthur became the Allied commander in Japan and then the commander of UNITED NATIONS forces in the Korean War. In May 1951 Willoughby departed Japan, returning to the United States for medical treatment. (MacArthur was fired as commander of Allied forces in the Far East in 1951.)

He subsequently wrote *Shanghai Conspiracy* (1952), the story of the RICHARD SORGE spy ring in Japan, based on his report of "how Communists under the guise of idealism work with no scruples . . . how they operate and

how they manipulate innocent liberals to give aid and comfort to the enemy." He also wrote a biography, *MacArthur: 1941–1951* (1954).

A most critical appraisal of Willoughby came from his opposite number in the Pacific. In "*And I Was There*" (1982), Rear Adm. EDWIN T. LAYTON, intelligence officer for the Pacific Fleet, and his collaborators wrote:

Willoughby was flawed, as an intelligence officer, by the conviction that his avid reading of military history had made him an authority on strategy. Worse than that, he was jealous in his own domain and resented excessively the intrusion of others. MacArthur, aware of this quirk, nevertheless protected him—of all "the gang" he was the only one to serve his master without a break from 1941 to 1951—and was prone to accept his appreciations as gospel, particularly as Willoughby produced the intelligence estimates which were most likely to be palatable.

(The term "gang" referred to MacArthur's senior officers who were with him in the Philippines, particularly on Bataan, where U.S. forces were defeated by the Japanese in the first four months of 1942.)

**●● WILLSHER, KATHLEEN**

Member of Soviet spy network in Canada revealed by IGOR GOUZENKO.

A graduate of the London School of Economics, she worked for the British High Commission. Frustrated by an arid personal life and a lack of rapid promotion, she was ripe for RECRUITMENT by Soviet intelligence. A member of the Canadian Communist Party, she passed to other communists information she obtained from the commission's registry, of which she was assistant registrar.

She was arrested on Feb. 15, 1946, tried on May 3, and sentenced to three years in prison. Her Soviet CODE NAME was Ellie.

**●● WILMOTH, JAMES R.**

see RUSSELL P. BROWN

**●● WILSON, EDWIN P.**

Renegade CIA employee who supplied arms and explosives to Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Wilson was arrested in 1982 on the arms charge and was later convicted of plotting to murder government prosecutors who had brought him to trial. He was sentenced to a total of 57 years in prison. After serving in the U.S. Marine Corps, Wilson joined the CIA Office of Security in 1951 and became a contract employee in 1955. He infiltrated the Seafarer's International Union and, while still a CIA contract employee, lobbied for the union. Sometime in the 1960s he founded a CIA PROPRIETARY company, Consultants International. About this time the line between his private and CIA dealings be-

came hazy. Later investigation showed that he was authorizing procurement contracts and getting kickbacks from the contractors.

He drifted out of the CIA and into TASK FORCE 157 (TF 157), a highly secret U.S. Navy intelligence operation. Wilson apparently set up another proprietary company, but details about it are known only from unofficial sources. According to one report, he proposed a worldwide commodities firm that would simultaneously give TF 157 global access to ports and a profit that would finance TF 157 operations—after deductions for Wilson's salary and expenses.

Wilson's contacts included U.S. Air Force Col. Richard V. Secord, chief of the Air Force Military Advisory Group in Iran. Secord, a future major general, later played a role in the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.

In Oct. 1975, as DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, BOBBY RAY INMAN was contemplating the abolition of TF 157, the commander of the unit notified Wilson that his contract would end on April 30, 1976. Wilson, using a congressional contact, met with Inman and offered to set up another task force. The meeting accelerated Inman's decision to abolish TF 157.

## ●● WINDOW SYSTEM CODE

see PERFORATED SHEET

## ●● WINTERBOTHAM, GROUP CAPT. F. W.

Royal Air Force (RAF) officer in charge of the distribution of ULTRA intelligence to Allied commanders during World War II. His book *The Ultra Secret* (1974) was one of the earliest revelations of the great codebreaking success of the Allies. Although two earlier books had revealed the Ultra secret, Winterbotham's garnered worldwide headlines (see ENIGMA).

At the start of World War I he was a junior officer in the Royal Gloucester Hussars Yeomanry, a cavalry unit. In 1916 he was able to enter the air service and entered combat in France in April 1917. He was shot down in an aerial dogfight on July 13, 1917, and spent the next 18 months as a prisoner of war.

After the war he studied law at Christ Church College, Oxford, but went into farming and traveled. Winterbotham returned to Britain to become the RAF representative to the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in Dec. 1929 and visited Germany regularly from 1934 to 1938 to observe the buildup of the German Air Force. In 1934 he was able to meet personally with Adolf Hitler and other Nazi officials as well as with senior officers of the rapidly growing Luftwaffe. (In 1938 the Germans learned that he worked for MI6 and he was warned not to return to Germany.)

In early 1939, Winterbotham established a SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE unit in his air section of MI6 to begin monitoring advanced German weapons and electronics developments. This—and the fact that his offices were located in the same building as the GOVERNMENT CODE AND CYPHER SCHOOL—led to his involvement in British code-breaking.

Following the relocation of British codebreakers to BLETCHLEY PARK in Aug. 1939, parts of MI6 moved there the next month, including Winterbotham's staff.

In the spring of 1940, when British codebreakers at Bletchley Park began to decipher German radio messages, Winterbotham was given the responsibility for distributing those highly classified decrypts. He realized the need for a secure means of transmitting Ultra to the military staffs and to commanders in the field. Accordingly, he developed a scheme for SPECIAL LIAISON UNITS to handle Ultra intelligence and operate with the headquarters of major field commanders. They would use special radio circuits and virtually unbreakable ONE-TIME PADS to handle Ultra messages. Winterbotham established rules that protected the Ultra secret from the Germans and, indeed, from the world for more than 20 years after the war.

He retired after the war, having been awarded a "modest" decoration for his services. In addition to *The Ultra Secret*, he wrote *The Nazi Connection* (1978), detailing his activities in Germany in the 1930s.

## ●● WISEMAN, SIR WILLIAM

(b. ? d. 1962)

British SECRET SERVICE BUREAU representative in the United States during World War I—an AGENT OF INFLUENCE.

A graduate of Cambridge University, where he was a champion boxer, Wiseman was descended from an old and distinguished naval family and held a baronetcy. He tried his hand as a journalist (rarely being published) and then wrote plays (which were never performed), after which he went to America and made his fortune in a variety of businesses in Canada and Mexico.

When World War I began in 1914 he returned to Britain to volunteer for the Army and was commissioned a captain in the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. After being gassed in Flanders in 1915 he was returned to London where, after recuperating, he joined what was then MI1(c), the foreign section of the SECRET SERVICE BUREAU, the predecessor of MI6. Sent to the United States in early 1916, Wiseman reported on German attempts to sabotage U.S. munitions production for Britain, ran the British Purchasing Commission, and tried in every way possible to bring the United States unto the war on Britain's side.

Wiseman also obtained financial backing—the then considerable sum of \$75,000—from the Wilson administration to send with a British AGENT he had selected to go to Russia in an attempt to help keep the Russians in the war against Germany. The agent was SOMERSET MAUGHAM. After the U.S. entered the war in April 1917, Wiseman made an effort to provide all intelligence possible to the United States.

Col. Edward M. House, President Wilson's principal adviser, told King George V that Wiseman was "one of the most efficient men of his age [he] had ever met." He met regularly with House, U.S. officials, and, on several occasions, President Wilson. Wiseman was also accepted as a member of the ROOM.

Wiseman's tenure in the United States was highly successful. Recalling that success, in May 1940 Prime

Minister Winston Churchill appointed Sir WILLIAM STEPHENSON to head a similar organization, BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION, with headquarters in New York City.

Just a month before, the British consul general in San Francisco had informed the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., that he had been approached by an acquaintance who was also known to the German consul. The acquaintance wished to establish relations on a confidential basis with someone in the British government. Stephenson advised the FBI of the contact, which was monitoring the German consul's telephone calls. Stephenson, after discussions with FBI director J. EDGAR HOOVER, invited the retired Wiseman to make the contact.

Working with an intermediary, Wiseman and the German consul—who had been Adolf Hitler's commanding officer in World War I—met in San Francisco. The issue of negotiating with Hitler was quickly dismissed, and the discussion shifted to the possibility of reestablishing the monarchy in Germany with the help of the German Army! (The German Kaiser had abdicated in 1918.) Wiseman and the German consul talked on several occasions, with Wiseman gleaning considerable POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE as well as some strategic information from the meetings.

News of these discussions reached the U.S. State Department, but the contact was broken off because such political negotiations could violate the neutral status of the United States.

## ● WISNER, FRANK G.

(b. ? d. 1965)

The quintessential U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who served in the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) during World War II and the CIA during the Cold War.

A 1934 graduate of the University of Virginia Law School, Wisner joined a Wall Street law firm. When the United States entered World War II he was commissioned in the Navy. Assigned to the OSS, he worked in the SI (Secret Intelligence) branch. After the war Lt. Comdr. Wisner was one of the OSS officers who dealt with the GEHLEN ORGANIZATION and watched the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe.

Wisner then returned to Wall Street, but his interest in foreign affairs led him to join the Department of State in 1947 as the assistant secretary for occupied countries.

In June 1948 the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL established the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) within the CIA to carry out a program of political, psychological, and economic warfare against the Soviet Union. Significantly, although the OPC would be funded by the CIA's unvouchered funds, it would not be under the control of the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI). Rather, the head of OPC would receive directions from a joint panel of the Departments of Defense and State. Secretary of State George C. Marshall chose Wisner to head the OPC.

"It was a haphazard system and the marvel is that it worked as well as it did . . .," wrote veteran U.S. intelligence executive RAY CLINE in *Secret Spies and Scholars* (1976).

The OPC grew rapidly. In his comprehensive history of U.S. intelligence, *Honorable Treachery* (1991), G. J. A. O'Toole wrote,

Although brilliant and energetic, Frank Wisner was not a talented manager, and he found that the difficulties of administering a burgeoning government department were compounded by the very nature of covert-action operations. There was little experience with such things in American government. All of the lessons had been learned in the wartime OSS, and chief among them was the precept that covert operations could not be managed through bureaucratic routine and strict lines of authority.

The OPC also suffered from being in competition with other parts of the CIA, especially the Office of Special Operations. When WALTER BEDELL SMITH became DCI he decided to move OPC into the CIA. A new Plans Directorate—a COVER name—was set up to direct both the OPC and Office of Special Operations in carrying out covert operations, the change becoming effective in Oct. 1951. ALLEN W. DULLES was named head of the Plans Directorate; Wisner remained head of the OPC.

When the Korean War began in June 1950, Wisner's OPC established outposts in Japan to carry out operations in Korea, which was mostly overrun by communist forces. Even after the U.S. landing at Inchon, which led the massive Allied offensive, the OPC continued clandestine operations behind enemy lines.

In Aug. 1952 the OPC and Office of Special Operations were merged and Wisner was placed in charge (Dulles having been promoted to Deputy DCI). Wisner's deputy was RICHARD HELMS, a future DCI.

Wisner's operations now increased in scope and range as he sought to foment anti-Soviet movements in Eastern Europe. In 1956, when a revolt erupted in Hungary, Wisner wanted to have his AGENTS help the Hungarians and initiate uprisings elsewhere in Eastern Europe—a proposal that was designated Operation Red Sox-Red Cap. President Eisenhower said no to Wisner, and the Hungarian revolt was soon suppressed by the Red Army.

Wisner, who had been in VIENNA and then on the Hungarian border during the revolt and Soviet suppression of it, returned to the United States dejected. He soon turned his attention eastward, trying to foster an Army coup against Sukarno, Indonesia's pro-Soviet leader. This effort also failed, further depressing Wisner, who was hospitalized for six months with nervous exhaustion and a case of severe hepatitis.

When he returned to duty, Dulles, the new DCI, sent him to London as CIA station chief. But his problems continued, and he resigned from the CIA in 1961. Four years later he committed suicide with a shotgun.

## ● WITZKE, LT. LOTHAR

(b. 1896 d. ?)

The only German spy condemned to death in the United States during World War I. He was not executed.

Witzke was a naval cadet on the cruiser *Dresden* off South America when the ship was sunk; he was interned

in Valparaiso, Chile. He managed to escape from internment and reach San Francisco, Calif., where the German consul—and spymaster—Franz von Bopp recruited him as a spy and saboteur.

Witzke worked for a while with KURT JAHNKE, a German spy and saboteur. As a sabotage team they were implicated in a rash of munitions explosions prior to U.S. entry into the war.

Using the alias Pablo Waberski, Witze slipped into Mexico when Jahnke was there, late in 1917, running German AGENTS along the border. Paul Altendorf, a former Mexican Army officer who had been recruited by U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE, accompanied Witze to the United States. Drunk one night, Witze told Altendorf about acts of sabotage he and Jahnke had committed.

Altendorf managed to get word about Witze to an American consulate official. Witzke, who had entered the United States on a Russian passport as Paul Waberski, was placed under SURVEILLANCE by U.S. Army Intelligence. He was arrested in Arizona, and a search of his baggage produced a CODE book and CIPHER table, which were sent to Army cryptographers in Washington, D.C. When one of his papers was decrypted, it was shown to be a "strictly secret" introduction to German diplomats in Mexico describing him as a German SECRET AGENT whose "code telegrams" should be sent as official dispatches.

Under questioning, Witze said, "I am very young to die, 22 years. But I have done my duty." He would not admit to having been a spy. Put on trial before a military commission at Fort Sam Houston in Aug. 1918, he was convicted and sentenced to death. He was awaiting execution when the war ended on Nov. 11, 1918.

His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, but he was released and deported to Germany in 1923. During his confinement he had been repeatedly questioned about the spectacular destruction of the huge munitions depot on Black Tom Island on the New Jersey side of New York Harbor on July 30, 1916. He had told Altendorf that he and Jahnke had almost drowned when the waves caused by the explosion nearly swamped their boat in the harbor.

In 1925, when U.S. officials were trying to fix blame for sabotage during the war, the German government responded with denials, including one from Witzke, who charged that he had confessed only when "[police] beat me on the head with rubber sticks until I broke down."

Woikin was arrested in 1946, tried, and convicted. She received a sentence of two and a half years.

## ●● WOLF, MARKUS

(b. 1923)

East German spymaster.

Born in Germany, Wolf was the son of a Jewish physician, playwright, and communist. The family moved to Switzerland when Adolf Hitler came to power in the early 1930s. The young Wolf then went to live in France and traveled to Moscow in 1934 to attend the Comintern's school for émigrés.

After World War II he returned to Germany to assist the Soviet government in establishing an East German regime in 1949. There Wolf worked first as a radio commentator and then in the East German diplomatic service, becoming the country's first chancellor when a mission was established in Moscow.

In 1958, Wolf became head of the Chief Administration, Intelligence (HVA), the foreign intelligence arm of the MFS or Stasi. His principal efforts—and achievements—were placing spies in the West German government of Chancellor Willy Brandt; he succeeded, and when GÜNTER GUILLAUME was uncovered as an East German MOLE in 1974 Brandt was forced to resign.

Wolf retired in 1987 from the Stasi at his own request because of poor health.

When the two Germanys merged in 1990, Wolf was among several former East German intelligence officials who were tried for their previous activities and indiscretions. He was found guilty in 1993 and sentenced to six years in prison. However, the unified Germany's Constitutional Court ruled on May 23, 1995, that former Stasi officials could not be prosecuted for conducting Cold War espionage against the West. The 5-to-3 ruling effectively gave amnesty to Wolf and other East German former foreign intelligence officials who had stolen secrets from the West. A new trial was ordered for Wolf, to determine whether he had personally crossed over to the West to steal secrets or had limited himself to having his spies in the West do the purloining of secrets.

## ●● WOLKOFF, ANNA

(b. 1903 d. 1969)

Russian fascist who, early in World War II, was an accomplice of TYLER KENT, a CODE clerk at the U.S. Embassy in London. She was charged by the British with violating the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT by getting from Kent "documents which might be useful to an enemy" and copying them "with intent to assist an enemy." She was also charged with trying to send a coded letter to WILLIAM JOYCE, the traitorous "Lord Haw-Haw," who broadcast anti-Allied propaganda for the Nazis from BERLIN.

Wolkoff belonged to the profascist, anti-Semitic Right Club. When Great Britain went to war against Germany in Sept. 1939, the Right Club supposedly disbanded, but it merely went underground and planned ways to aid Germany. Wolkoff, using a CUTOUT at the Italian Embassy, sent information to Berlin, including suggestions for Joyce's propaganda broadcasts.

## ●● WNINTEL

WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS

## ●● WOIKIN, EMMA

Member of the Soviet spy network in Canada revealed by IGOR GOUZENKO. She worked in the Canadian Department of External Affairs and passed on information to Col. NIKOLAI ZABOTIN, military ATTACHÉ at the Soviet Embassy in Canada. Zabotin was director of Soviet espionage activities in Canada.

The daughter of the last naval ATTACHÉ in the Imperial Russian Embassy and a maid of honor to the czarina, she was under SURVEILLANCE as a suspected German spy when she met Kent. Her family operated the Russian Tea Room near the Natural History Museum in London, a rendezvous for White Russians.

She was arrested on the same day as Kent—May 20, 1940. A young boy watched wide-eyed as she was put into a police car. He would never forget that first brush with espionage. He was the future spy novelist LEN DEIGHTON.

Tried in camera in the Old Bailey, Wolkoff was sentenced to ten years for attempting to assist the enemy. She was released in 1947.

### OO WOOD, SGT. JAMES D.

U.S. Air Force enlisted man who worked for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. He was arrested in 1973 after FBI agents saw him meeting with a Soviet diplomat. The agents found hundreds of classified documents in a car Wood had rented.

Wood was caught as a result of FBI SURVEILLANCE of the diplomat Viktor A. Chernyshev, a first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Wood, who cooperated with the FBI, was given a dishonorable discharge and a two-year prison term.

### OO WOODWARD, BOB (b. 1943)

American journalist who, following the WATERGATE break-in, coauthored the articles in *The Washington Post* that led to the resignation of President Nixon. Subsequently, his book *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987*, chronicled the tenure of WILLIAM J. CASEY, President Reagan's DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI).

Woodward attended Yale University, participating in the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) program while there. Commissioned in the Navy in 1965, he served in a command ship and a cruiser, spending the last half of his five years on active duty in Navy communications at the Pentagon.

In 1971 he went to work for *The Washington Post*. With fellow reporter Carl Bernstein, he broke the story that the Watergate break-in had been carried out by the White House. He and Bernstein chronicled the fall of Nixon in their books *All the President's Men* (1974) and *The Final Days* (1976). The former was made into the 1976 film *All the President's Men* starring Dustin Hoffman as Bernstein and Robert Redford as Woodward.

Woodward's book *Veil* (1987) describes how Casey was given a free hand by Reagan and was probably the most powerful DCI in the 40-plus years of the CIA's history. After the publication of *Veil*, President Reagan denounced the book as "an awful lot of fiction about a man who was unable to communicate at all." Much of the controversy over the book centered on Woodward's description of a deathbed interview with Casey, which Casey's widow would later claim never took place. That

interview, said Woodward, later four minutes and Casey managed just 19 words.

But Reagan did admit to some of the revelations in the book. For example, he confirmed that he had signed a secret order authorizing counterterrorist actions in Lebanon.

Woodward wrote the book while he was assistant managing editor of the *Post* for the investigative staff.

### OO WOOLSEY, R. JAMES

(b. 1941)

U.S. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) from Feb. 1992 to Jan. 1995. A longtime Washington insider, Woolsey was unable to bring the CIA into the post-Cold War era.

A graduate of Stanford University and a Rhodes scholar with a master's degree from Oxford University in England, Woolsey later earned a law degree from Yale University. He served in the Army from 1968 to 1970, working on strategic arms limitation issues, and served on the staff of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

In 1970 Woolsey was appointed general counsel to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, where he served until 1973, when he entered private law practice. From 1978 to 1979 he served as Under Secretary of the Navy, after which he returned to private practice. During the 1980s he also participated with Soviet and NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION officials in talks on weapon limitations. In 1989 he was appointed U.S. negotiator to the talks on the conventional forces in Europe, with the rank of ambassador. After the successful conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union, in July 1991 he once again returned to law practice.

President Clinton appointed Woolsey DCI as the Cold War was ending and the U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, as well as the CIA, required redirection and restructuring. At the time the agency was also under fire for discrimination against women in promotion and assignment policies, illegal actions in Guatemala, and the exposure in 1994 of ALDRICH H. AMES having been a Soviet MOLE in the agency.

Woolsey resigned as DCI following severe criticism for his failure to punish officials at the CIA who had had responsibility for supervising Ames.

### OO WORLD-WIDE WEB

see INTERNET

### OO WRIGHT, COL. JOHN R., JR.

U.S. Air Force officer assigned to the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY who, using photographs taken by a U-2 spyplane over Cuba in Sept. 1962, was the first person to determine that Soviet ballistic missiles were being emplaced on the Caribbean island.

Wright saw a connection between the patterns in the arrangement of Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles being installed in Cuba and the fact that similar patterns in the Soviet Union were always used to protect long-range ballistic missiles. This discovery precipitated further U.S. ef-