developed an interest in intelligence while visiting German industrial concerns. He provided information to the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and to Winston Churchill to support the latter's drive for British rearmament.

In May 1940 Churchill, newly appointed Prime Minister named Stephenson his personal representative to President Roosevelt and assigned him to establish BSC in the United States. Stephenson also represented the Security Service (MI5) and SOE (Special Operations Executive) in the United States, and acted as the British liaison to the FBI and OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS). His nominal COVER when the office was established was that of British passport control officer.

He met some opposition in the United States in 1940–1941 because of American isolationism, although his efforts were supported by Roosevelt and J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI, and WILLIAM DONOVAN of the OSS. Later, the relationship between Hoover and Stephenson cooled, causing some difficulties. (See DUSKO POPOV.)

Stephenson was knighted after the war.

At the start of the Cold War he was involved in the case of IGOR GOUZENKO, a Soviet CIPHER officer who defected to the West.

Stephenson's exploits were chronicled in *A Man Called Intrepid* (1976) and *Intrepid's Last Case* (1983), both by William Stevenson, and *The Quiet Canadian* (1962) by H. MONTGOMERY HYDE (retitled *Room 3603* in the United States).

Stephenson's code name was Intrepid.

●● STERILIZE

To remove from material to be used in clandestine operations any marks or components that could identify it as originating with the sponsoring organization or nation.

●● STEVE BRODY

U.S. Navy plan to use F2H-2P Banshee photo-RECONNAISSANCE aircraft to overfly prospective nuclear targets in the Soviet Union. In 1951–1952 the lack of aerial photography of the Caucasus, Crimea, and Ukraine areas led Navy INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS in the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to plan an aerial mission over those areas.

The Sixth Fleet's aircraft carriers were assigned the mission of striking targets in those areas with nuclear weapons. According to Capt. William C. Chapman, then the fleet's air intelligence officer, "The only photography we or anyone on our side had was World War II German stuff. . . . Most of it was made in winter, and all I ever saw of it was mostly white, crisscrossed maybe here and there by railroad tracks."

Addressing the fleet's nuclear strike mission, Chapman continued, "The probability of an AJ Savage hitting a Soviet target was almost nil; lack of photographic intelligence was the first hurdle. . . ."

At least four F2H-2P photo planes were to be launched from a carrier operating south of Salonika in the Aegean Sea. The mission would have required the F2H-2P aircraft to fly about four hours over the Soviet Union to obtain the needed coverage. The proposal for the highly sensitive photo mission was hand-carried to Washington, D.C., in May 1952. It would require President Truman's personal approval. But Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett refused to take the proposal to the White House and the operation was aborted.

(Steve Brody was a New York saloon keeper who, in 1886, jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge to win a wager. "To pull a Brody" instantly became a term for doing a dangerous stunt.)

●● STEVENS, MAJ. H. R.

British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer who, with Capt. S. PAYNE BEST, was lured into a meeting with German intelligence AGENTS and captured at Venlo on the Dutch frontier on Nov. 9, 1939. The two were interned by the Germans for the duration of the war.

At the time of the incident Stevens had the COVER of British passport control officer at The Hague in the Netherlands. However, the Germans knew his true identity. He and Best believed that they were meeting with representatives of an anti-Hitler movement in the German armed forces. (Details of the incident are given under the BEST entry and under VENLO INCIDENT.)

The postwar investigation into German knowledge of MI6 showed that, while Stevens gave up more information than Best, a third MI6 officer, CHARLES (DICKIE) ELLIS, who remained in the secret service until the 1950s, had also been a prewar source of information.

●● STIEBER, WILHELM   (b. 1818 d. 1882)

Prussian who revolutionized intelligence activities in Europe in the 19th Century.

After studying for the Lutheran ministry, Stieber changed his mind and became a lawyer. Between 1845 and 1850 he built up a successful law practice, while also working as an informer and spy. He specialized in criminal cases and knew in advance what evidence would be produced against his clients in court because he was also editor of the police periodical. In spite of the scandal that ensued when this was revealed, King Frederick William remained a supporter of Stieber and appointed him commissioner of police. He was called "the spymaster" and "the king of sleuth-hounds."

When William I became ruler of Prussia, Stieber was dismissed. He changed allegiance, between 1858 and 1863 working for the czar of Russia and helping to organize the czar's secret police service. Stieber traced Russian political activists after they had left Russia. He continued to spy for Prussia while working for Russia, and on behalf of Count von Bismarck of Prussia he also traveled to Austria to spy.

Largely because of the information he collected, Prussia easily defeated Austria in 1866. Afterwards he

spent 18 months in France establishing an espionage NET-WORK. On behalf of the Prussian government he also organized a Central Information Bureau and set up his own news organzation and recruited spies in railroads and hotels. He also bought newspapers in neighboring countries and published pro-German propaganda.

∞∞ STIGGA, OSKAR ANSOVICH

(b. 1894 d. 1938)

Chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, from 1920 to 1922.

Born in Latvia, he served as a soldier in World War I. After the Bolshevik revolution he became a communist and an officer in the Red Latvian Riflemen, who suppressed counterrevolutionaries and served as V. I. Lenin's bodyguard. (The Latvians strongly supported the Bolsheviks during this period because of the German occupation of Latvia; they were thus mercenaries of the Bolsheviks.)

When the GRU was formed in Oct. 1918, Stigga became a deputy chief and served as an ILLEGAL in Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The following year he was chief of intelligence on the Western Front and in Aug. 1920 became chief of the GRU. After two years in that post, he was reduced to deputy chief. He continued to travel extensively to establish intelligence NETWORKS. Like other overseas GRU officials, he was recalled to Moscow in 1938 and executed.

∞∞ STOCKADE

British Security Service (MI5) operation from 1960 to 1963 to break into French high-grade CIPHERS.

The operation, supervised by PETER WRIGHT, was carried out by placing a radio frequency BUG or tap on specific telephone cables that carried communications to and from the French Embassy. The taps ran to an MI5 operations room set up in the nearby Hyde Park Hotel.

According to Peter Wright in his book *Spycatcher* (1987)

> For nearly three years, between 1960 and 1963, MI5 and GCHQ [GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS] read the French high-grade cipher coming in and out of the French Embassy in London. Every move made by the French during our abortive attempt to enter the Common Market was monitored. The intelligence was avidly devoured by the Foreign Office, and verbatim copies of [President Charles] De Gaulle's cables were regularly passed to the Foreign Secretary in the red box.

∞∞ STRAIGHT, MICHAEL W.   (b. 1916)

American writer-editor who was recruited into the CAMBRIDGE SPY RING by ANTHONY BLUNT.

Straight belonged to a wealthy, Anglophile American family. His brother, who flew for the Royal Air Force in World War II, became a British subject. His mother, the widow of an American investment banker, lived in England, as Michael had since the age of ten.

In 1934, after a year at the London School of Economics, he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, and was made a member of a secret society called the Apostles. Blunt was also a member. Straight also became a member of the communist cell at Cambridge, joining other future members of the Cambridge spy ring. Straight was recruited as an AGENT for international communism (the Comintern) by Blunt in Feb. 1937, while he was mourning the death of poet John Cornford, a communist friend who had gone off to fight on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War.

Blunt, suggesting that Straight could best remember his friend by working for the Comintern, at first urged him to return to the United States after Cambridge and become a banker "to provide appraisals of Wall Street's plans to dominate the world economy." That idea was later withdrawn, and Straight was told to await contact in the United States. Straight believed that Blunt was acting for GUY BURGESS, another Apostle who would become a spy for the Soviet Union.

Straight duly went to the United States and used family connections with President Roosevelt to become a volunteer worker in the State Department and later in the Department of the Interior, where he wrote speeches for Roosevelt and cabinet members. Around this time he met a Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who identified himself as "Michael Green" and said he had been contacted by Straight's friends at Cambridge.

Straight later maintained that he gave the Soviets "nothing save for reports of my own opinions." At the time, penetration of the U.S. government was a prime objective of Soviet intelligence (see WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, ALGER HISS, VENONA).

Straight became an influential liberal voice in the United States as editor and publisher of the *New Republic,* a magazine founded by his parents. He also wrote three novels and other books. From 1969 to 1977 he was the deputy chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts.

As Straight wrote in his memoirs, *After Long Silence* (1983), he and his wife were living in Washington, D.C., in 1940 when Burgess visited them. Straight later told his wife that Burgess and Blunt were Soviet agents. She then informed her analyst, Dr. Jennie Welderhall, who in 1948 confessed to Mrs. Straight that she had passed the information on to her husband, a British Embassy official. "I was greatly relieved, unwilling as I was then to act as an informer," Straight wrote.

Then, in March 1951, Straight was "surprised and shocked" to see Burgess in the British Embassy and swore he would turn him in unless he left the Foreign Office. Straight was afraid that Burgess could be costing American lives in the Korean War. Burgess was soon on his way to warn DONALD MACLEAN, another Cambridge spy, that British and U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE was closing in on them. Straight's encounter with Burgess seems to have had nothing to do with the decision; the warning had come from HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY, another Cambridge spy.

In June 1963 Straight was in line to become chairman of the Advisory Council on the Arts, a new federal agency being created by President Kennedy. Concerned that a SECURITY CHECK by the FBI might expose his communist past, he went to Arthur Schlesinger, a distinguished historian and adviser to the President, who arranged an FBI interview for Straight. He finally told the FBI about Blunt; Burgess had long since been identified as a spy.

The FBI passed the information on to Arthur Martin, head of D1, the British Security Service (MI5) unit that dealt with Soviet espionage in Britain. Martin had been trying to extract a confession from Blunt, who was art advisor to Queen Elizabeth. Straight's information gave Martin what he wanted. Straight later wrote that Blunt had told him he was relieved that Straight had turned him in.

●● STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence employed in the formulation of policy and military plans at the national and international levels.

Historians Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, in *The Israeli Army* (1975), describe strategic intelligence as "warning of the enemy *intention* to attack, and 'tactical' warning, i.e., the detection of actual physical preparations for an attack."

●● STRINGER

A low-level AGENT who lives or works near an intelligence TARGET and who passes along significant information when it comes to his attention. A stringer's reporting may be regular, periodic, or infrequent, depending upon the nature of the target and his or her access to it.

Such agents generally receive little specialized training. They may be paid a small stipend on a regular basis, with a bonus for special reporting.

●● STRIP CIPHER

The use of long strips of letters that can be arranged in different orders for letter substitution to create a CIPHER. The strip cipher used by the U.S. Army and Navy in World War II (designated M-138 and CSP-642, respectively) was used for very low-grade ciphers. It consisted of up to 30 interchangeable strips.

The Japanese broke into the U.S. Consulate in Kobe in late 1937 and photographed the M-138 strip cipher. They subsequently captured the strip cipher, apparently on several occasions, beginning with the fall of Wake Island in Dec. 1941; but they could never solve the cipher on a regular basis.

●● STRONG, MAJ. GEN. KENNETH W. D.

(b. 1900 d. 1982)

Head of intelligence for Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II. Born in Scotland, General Strong graduated from the military academy at Sandhurst. Before the war, Strong served as assistant British military ATTACHÉ in BERLIN, and for the first year and a half of the war headed the German section in the War Office. In 1942–1943 he was head of intelligence for the British Home Forces.

After the U.S. military debacle at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in Feb. 1943, Lt. Gen. Eisenhower asked the British government to replace his then head of intelligence, Brig. Eric Mockler-Ferryman, with another British officer "who has a broader insight into German mentality and method." Ike added, "In his successor, I now look for a little more inquisitiveness and greater attention to checking and cross-checking reports from various sources." The British proposed Strong, then a brigadier.

He and "Ike" got on well. In *Intelligence at the Top* (1968), Strong wrote that Eisenhower

> had an immense talent for listening to oral explanations and distilling their essence. I was also to discover that the best way to deal with him was to be completely frank, no matter what national considerations or other controversial factors were involved in any issue. . . . Most people in high places have too much to read. . . . Only on a few occasions, when it was essential that something should appear on the record, did I produce a written Intelligence appreciation for Eisenhower.

Eisenhower sent Strong with his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. WALTER BEDELL SMITH, to Lisbon in Aug. 1943 to secretly arrange with Italian representatives for the surrender of Italy.

At the height of the Allied campaign in Europe, Strong had more than a thousand men and women on his staff. He finished the war as a major general. Strong objected to activities of the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES in the European area because he disliked the idea of a secretly funded, largely civilian organization involved in military operations in wartime.

Strong became the first Director-General of Intelligence in Britain's Ministry of Defence in 1964; under his direction the military intelligence staffs of the three British armed services were combined into a defense intelligence staff. (His deputy was Vice Adm. NORMAN DENNING.) Strong retired in 1966.

●● STUDEMAN, ADM. WILLIAM O.

(b. 1940)

The Deputy DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) from April 1992 to Aug. 1995, and the acting DCI in early 1993, Studeman was only the second U.S. Navy INTELLIGENCE OFFICER to attain four-star rank (see Adm. BOBBY RAY INMAN).

A 1962 graduate of the University of the South in Tennessee, Studeman was commissioned in the Navy the following year and attended flight officer school. Studeman subsequently served in a number of intelligence assignments during his career, both ashore and afloat. He also attended the Naval War College and earned a master's degree from George Washington University.

In 1980 he became executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and in 1984 he was promoted to commodore as the director of the Navy's Long-Range Planning Group. In Sept. 1958, he became DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, after which, in Aug. 1988, as a vice admiral, he became Director of the NSA. He held the NSA position until being named Deputy DCI in 1992. In early 1993 he served as acting DCI pending the appointment of R. JAMES WOOLSEY to the post.

He retired from the Navy when he left the Deputy DCI position on Oct. 1, 1995.

◌◌ STUDIES AND OBSERVATION GROUP

(SOG)

U.S. Army HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) collection organization in the Vietnam War. Part of the Military Assistance Command (MAC), Vietnam, SOG (also known as MACSOG) had its headquarters on Pasteur Avenue in Saigon. The innocuously named Studies and Observation Group inserted intelligence teams deep into enemy territory by land, parachute, helicopters, and PT boats.

Founded in Jan. 1964, SOG was given this mission: "to execute an intensified program of harassment, diversion, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of intelligence, generation of propaganda, and diversion of resources against North Vietnam."

SOG was an elite, joint-service organization directly controlled by the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command. It worked closely with a South Vietnamese counterpart organization. Ethnic Chinese from South Vietnam were often members of SOG patrols into Vietcong territory.

The CIA was also involved in SOG. One of SOG's best-known operatives was WILLIAM BUCKLEY, a CIA officer who was kidnapped in Beirut in 1984 and later murdered. In posthumous accounts of Buckley's career, SOG is linked to Operation PHOENIX, the highly secret program for assassinating Vietcong leaders.

See also VIETNAM.

★ ◌◌ SUBMARINES

Submarines have an inherent intelligence collection capability because of the covert nature of their operations. Beginning early in this century, submarines entered hostile areas and collected intelligence by landing personnel on a beach or by periscope observation.

During World War II several nations made extensive use of submarines for RECONNAISSANCE and espionage activities, with the Japanese also launching floatplanes from their submarines for reconnaissance. Japanese submarine-launched aircraft flew such missions 34 times from Nov. 1941 to Nov. 1942. They overflew such areas as Pearl Harbor; Melbourne and Sydney, Australia; Auckland and Wellington, New Zealand; Amchitka and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands; Diégo Suarez, Madagascar; and the coast of the state of Oregon.

In 1942 German U-boats landed sabotage teams—of four men each—on the U.S. Atlantic coast, at Long Island, New York, and Florida. A two-man team also landed by U-boat at Frenchman Bay in Maine in 1944. All of the teams were quickly captured by U.S. officials, principally because some of the saboteurs decided to contact the U.S. government after they arrived. (See FBI.)

Submarines were particularly useful for general surveillance, especially in straits and other areas where enemy ships passed on a regular basis. Periscope photography was a valuable source of intelligence regarding hostile coasts. Such photography was particularly important for planning amphibious landings, as the periscope's low-lying perspective was similar to that of the coxswain of a landing craft approaching the beach. The U.S. submarine Nautilus pioneered submarine photography, being fitted with brackets to mount a camera on a periscope; a darkroom was provided to process film on board to allow any unsatisfactory photographs to be retaken, and an enlisted photographer was embarked.

Thus fitted, in Sept. 1943 the Nautilus carried out periscope reconnaissance of Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands in preparation for the Nov. 1943 U.S. landings on those atolls. On Nov. 19, one day before the assault, the Nautilus again entered the Tarawa lagoon. The atoll had been under air attack for five days and a surface bombardment was in progress. The Nautilus found that heavy log walls built on the beaches were so far undamaged, as were the coastal guns, some of which were firing at the Nautilus. This information was radioed to the task force commander along with estimates of the height of the surf at the beaches.

More submarine reconnaissance missions followed during the war in the Pacific. A preinvasion submarine reconnaissance mission involved taking up to 2,000 photographs of the target area. In addition to photo-reconnaissance, the submarine Burrfish put a landing party on the beaches of Palau and Yap islands in July 1944 to obtain beach intelligence. Also see SERAPH.

Since World War II submarines have additionally been employed for ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) and ACOUSTIC INTELLIGENCE (ACINT) collection. British and U.S. submarines undertook operations of this kind in Soviet coastal waters beginning in the 1950s. These submarines operated on a regular basis off major Soviet naval ports in Arctic and Pacific areas. The submarine Totem undertook the first British operation off the Kola Peninsula in 1954; the start date of similar U.S. operations remains classified, but the Gudgeon (SS 567) apparently operated close in to Vladivostok in July 1957 and was heavily harassed by Soviet destroyers that forced her to the surface. The U.S. missions were given the CODE NAME HOLY STONE.

During the 1970s, in a program known as IVY BELLS, the U.S. submarines Halibut and, subsequently, Parche were employed to install recording devices for tapping into an underwater communications cable at a depth of some 400 feet in the Sea of Okhotsk, between Soviet bases on the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Soviet Far Eastern coast. This operation was revealed to the Soviets in Jan. 1980 by the U.S. traitor RONALD PELTON. The Soviets quickly shut down the American operation. (One of the seized seafloor recording devices is now on display in the KGB Museum in Moscow.)

U.S. submarines also carried out intelligence collection missions against China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Libya, and Cuba during the Cold War era. And, in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict the British submarine *Otus* twice put special troops ashore on Iraqi territory at the northern end of the gulf.

Soviet submarines have similarly been employed in espionage activities. One older diesel-electric submarine of the Whiskey class ran aground in Swedish waters near a sensitive military installation in Nov. 1981, while on an apparent espionage-training operation.

The Holy Stone operations led to several collisions between U.S. and Soviet submarines. Neither Navy lost an undersea craft in these incidents, but several submarines were damaged. These undersea encounters occurred in Soviet coastal waters as well as on the high seas.

Some Soviet reports claim that such underwater collisions occur because they are trailing U.S. submarines in an attempt to garner ACINT and other information. This was the reason given by the Soviets for the loss of a diesel-electric Golf class (Project 629) submarine in the Hawaiian Islands in 1968 (see Project JENNIFER) and of a nuclear-propelled Yankee (Project 667) submarine off Bermuda in 1986. Available evidence indicates that both submarines were lost because of operational problems. Both submarines carried nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

●● SUCKING DRY

Russian term for debriefing an AGENT after he or she returns from a mission.

●● SUDOPLATOV, PAVEL ANATOLIEVICH

(b. 1907)
Soviet assassin and spymaster.

Born to a Ukrainian father and Russian mother, Sudoplatov ran away from home in 1920 to join the Red Army and fight in the Russian Civil War. He joined a CHEKA battalion and, because he could read and write, became a telephone operator and CIPHER clerk.

During the 1920s and 1930s he held a succession of posts in the state intelligence ORGAN, mostly operating against Ukrainian nationalists. He married in 1928, and his wife, Emma, was also in Soviet intelligence.

In 1935 he was sent to Finland and then to Germany to work under COVER, infiltrating the Ukrainian nationalist movement headquartered in BERLIN and working with the Nazi Party.

He was accepted by the exiles and visited Ukrainian supporters in VIENNA and Paris, where his wife, working as a COURIER for the NKVD, met him. Sudoplatov continually reported on overseas enemies of the Soviet state. "My successful journey to Western Europe changed my status in the intelligence community. My mission was reported to Stalin. . . . Later, I was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and received it from President M. I. Kalinin," Sudoplatov wrote in his autobiographic *Special Tasks* (1994). (See SPECIAL TASKS.)

In 1937–1938 he traveled to the West as a courier on a cargo ship under cover as a radio operator. During that period he met with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Sudoplatov wrote in *Special Tasks*:

> I was thirty years old and still could not control my emotions. I was overwhelmed and could not believe that the leader of the country would meet with a rank-and-file case officer. When Stalin shook my hand I could not collect myself to report to him succinctly. Stalin smiled and said: "Young man, don't be so excited. Report the essential facts. We have only twenty minutes."

He soon met again with Stalin as the assassinations of Ukrainian nationalists—at home and abroad—were plotted. Sudoplatov personally assassinated Yevhen Konovalets in Rotterdam in May 1938, presenting the Ukrainian nationalist leader with a box of chocolates—which soon exploded, killing him. Fleeing Rotterdam, Sudoplatov ended up in Spain, where for several weeks he acted as a Polish volunteer in a guerrilla group run by the NKVD, attached to the Republican forces. Back in Moscow, Sudoplatov was charged with planning the assassination of Leon Trotsky, a political opponent of Stalin. Trotsky was subsequently murdered in Mexico by Ramón Mercader, an NKVD officer. (The attempt was made on Aug. 20, 1940; Trotsky died of his wounds the following day.)

During this period Sudoplatov survived Stalin's purges of the NKVD, all the more remarkable because of his extensive visits to Western Europe.

On July 5, 1941, shortly after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Sudoplatov was appointed director of the Administration for Special Tasks—responsible for espionage operations against Germany and its allies. His organization grew rapidly to some 20,000 men and women, including 2,000 non-Soviets. In Oct. 1941, his organization was redesignated as Independent Department Two of the NKVD, and Sudoplatov began reporting directly to NKVD commissar LAVRENTY BERIA. He was also promoted to commissar of state security 3rd grade, the equivalent of lieutenant general in the Red Army.

Describing the operations he commanded, Sudoplatov wrote in *Special Tasks*:

> During the course of the war, we placed 212 guerrilla detachments and units comprising 7,316 men to the rear of the enemy. We trained a thousand officers and technicians in sabotage for the Red Army. We also sent 3,500 civilian saboteurs and agents. The [NKVD] parachutists' unit dropped an additional 3,000 guerrillas behind enemy lines.

Informed by DONALD MACLEAN and other sources of the U.S.-British atomic bomb project, in 1942 Stalin established a special committee on atomic energy, headed by Beria, to coordinate the efforts of Soviet scientists and research activities dealing with atomic issues. Sudoplatov was attached to the committee as its director of intelligence. In July 1943 the foreign intelligence and security services of the NKVD were reorganized as a separate commissariat, the NKGB. Sudoplatov was assigned to

the NKGB to head Department "S," which would supervise all atomic espionage operations of the GRU (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE) as well as the NKGB.

Thus, Sudoplatov coordinated all intelligence from the ATOMIC SPY RING as well as other Soviet espionage efforts in the United States, Canada, and Britain. His memoirs detail these activities, naming not only the better-known atomic spies but also J. Robert Oppenheimer, the technical head of the U.S. atomic bomb (Manhattan) project, Enrico Fermi, Niels Bohr, and other distinguished scientists.

Such accusations are clearly false. Quite possibly Soviet spies KLAUS FUCHS, BRUNO PONTECORVO, and others openly obtained information from Oppenheimer (given the Soviet CODE NAME Star) and Fermi in the course of their work on the atomic bomb; by identifying these scientists as their sources, the true spies may have led Sudoplatov to consider the others de facto Soviet AGENTS.

After the war Sudoplatov continued as a senior intelligence officer, working directly with Stalin as well as Beria. Stalin died in March 1953 and Beria became one of three men who took control of the Soviet state. On June 26, Beria and several of his deputies were arrested. Sudoplatov's name was often heard in the interrogations of Beria, who was executed on Dec. 23, 1953.

After being questioned, Sudoplatov himself was arrested on Aug. 21. Although steadfastly claiming that he was not a conspirator with Beria, and that all of his actions during more than three decades in state security ORGANS had been "legal" within the Soviet state, in 1958—five years after his arrest—he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Released in 1968, Sudoplatov immediately began a campaign to have the charges against him overturned and his pension reinstated. In 1992 he was "rehabilitated."

His autobiographic *Special Tasks* was written in collaboration with his son, Anatoli, and veteran writers on Soviet affairs Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter.

●● SUGITA, COL. ICHIJI   (b. 1904 d. 1993)

Senior Japanese Army INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who participated in major campaigns and surrenders in World War II.

A 1925 graduate of the Japanese Military Academy, he was commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant in infantry. After standard assignments, in Jan. 1937 he became an assistant military ATTACHÉ in the United States and in Sept. 1938 was sent to Britain. In early 1939 he was assigned to the General Staff in Tokyo. He was the only member of the Army General Staff with specialized intelligence training.

In Nov. 1941, a month before the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK and U.S. entry into World War II, Sugita, as a lieutenant colonel, was assigned as intelligence officer to the 25th Army for the Japanese campaign against Malaya and Singapore. During that campaign Sugita was badly injured in a motorcycle accident. Despite severe pain, he continued to perform his duties, and in Feb. 1942 he helped to negotiate and translate the surrender of Lt. Gen. A. E. Percival, commander of the British Commonwealth forces defending Singapore.

Sugita subsequently served on Guadalcanal, where he endured the ordeal and privation of that jungle campaign. He planned the evacuation of 13,000 troops from the island in Japan's first land defeat of the war. Returning to staff duties in Tokyo, he also flew to Southeast Asia to observe the ill-fated Japanese assault on Imphal, India.

When Japan surrendered to the Allies on board the U.S. battleship *Missouri* on Sept. 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, Sugita was a member of the Japanese delegation. Across the surrender table he saw Gen. Percival, recently released from a Japanese prison camp, whom he had escorted to another surrender table three years earlier. (At the time of the surrender on the *Missouri* Sugita was assigned as secretary to the Prime Minister.)

Imprisoned after the war, he was released in May 1947. Sugita subsequently joined the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (Army). He became Chief of Staff in March 1960, holding that position until March 1962.

●● SUNSET

British CODE NAME for highly classified material based on ENIGMA decrypts prepared by the NAVAL INTELLIGENCE Department of the Admiralty and sent to the Admiralty delegation in Washington, D.C., during World War II. When Prime Minister Winston Churchill was at the Casablanca Conference with President Roosevelt in Jan. 1943, there was no SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT available to pass him ULTRA material; accordingly, Sunset "telegrams" were provided to him.

●● SUNTAN

CODE NAME for the proposed Lockheed CL-400 spyplane, intended as a successor to the U-2 aircraft. It was never built.

●● SUN-TZU   (b. circa 510 B.C.)

Early Fourth Century B.C. Chinese general with a keen sense of the value of intelligence. Sun-tzu wrote the classic *Ping-fa* (The Art of War). The earliest known textbook on war and espionage, it is still required reading in both Eastern and Western military services.

A native of the Ch'i state at the mouth of the Yellow River, Sun-tzu spent most of his life as a general for the adjacent state of Wu and at times was the commander of Wu's armies.

Sun-tzu wrote, "A hundred ounces of silver spent for information may save ten thousand spent on war," and "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer a defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the enemy, you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle."

Sun-tzu wrote that there were five classes of spies:

(1) local inhabitants; (2) government officials of the enemy who could be persuaded to keep their positions but to change their loyalty; (3) enemy spies who could be persuaded to change sides, providing information about

the enemy and also possibly sending back false information; (4) spies who perform acts of espionage against the enemy for the purpose of deception; these are sacrificed to give the enemy false information (i.e., they will be executed by the enemy); and (5) spies sent behind enemy lives who survive the operation and return with information.

In *Ping-fa* he wrote:

As living spies we must recruit men who are intelligent but appear to be stupid; who seem to be dull but are strong in heart; men who are agile, vigorous, hardy, and brave; well-versed in lowly matters and able to endure hunger, cold, filth, and humiliation.

●● SUPERENCIPHER

Process of "super" encoding to increase security of communications. For example, if the word "battleship" is encoded in a four-letter code as VTMG, under the process of superenciphering each letter would have a substitute letter for actual transmission. For example, V might become B, T becomes E, M becomes R, and G becomes P, with the word battleship being transmitted as BERP.

●● SÛRETÉ GÉNÉRALE

French police agency whose duties include DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE.

The Sûreté traces back to Napoleonic times. In 1804 Napoleon's prefect of police, Joseph Fouché, established the Sûreté, or secret police, within the Ministry of General Police. The powerful agency ran a spy network that ranged beyond France, informing Napoleon about his political enemies, both internal and external. Much of the Sûreté's intelligence came from the old French tradition of surreptitious mail opening (see BLACK CHAMBER and FRANCE).

After the fall of Napoleon and the establishment of the French Republic, the Sûreté continued to focus on serving the government by gathering political intelligence. Besides keeping opposition politicians and political movements under SURVEILLANCE, Sûreté operatives kept watch over German AGENTS who had infiltrated French businesses and journals.

By the end of the 19th Century the Sûreté had expanded into a COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agency, under the Interior Ministry, with a few agents in major European cities, such as BERLIN, Geneva, and St. Petersburg. Sûreté officials sometimes countenanced cooperation with the OKHRANA, the secret police of Czar Alexander III, especially after France and Russia formed an alliance in 1894. But when the Okhrana openly operated in France, intimidating and achieving the deportation of Russian dissidents, French radicals agitated against the Sûreté. To French liberals, the Sûreté became a lasting symbol of political repression.

With the rise of communism, the Sûreté fanned the Red Scare sweeping Europe, finding Bolsheviks in all strata of French society and often fighting the SR in uncoordinated battles against communist subversion. In the 1920s the French Communist Party incited workers to espionage to aid the Red Army and world communism. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS in the Soviet Embassy distributed questionnaires that specified what intelligence Communist Party members were expected to get. The Soviets were particularly interested in getting spies into French arms and aircraft factories.

The questionnaires turned public opinion in favor of the Sûreté, which arrested a member of the French Communist Party's central committee and his girlfriend. They subsequently fled to the Soviet Union.

The Sûreté has remained essentially a police agency, with military-based intelligence agencies, such as the SDECE, doing the spying for France. The Sûreté has sometimes found itself caught up in intelligence controversies; its agents, for example, participated in the 1965 kidnapping of Mehdi Ben Barka, a left-wing Moroccan political leader. But mostly, the Sûreté has been analogous to Britain's SPECIAL BRANCH of Scotland Yard—the police who do the trailing and arresting of spies.

●● SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY

see BLACK BAG JOB

●● SURVEILLANCE

The systematic observation of a specific area—including space, air, surface, and underwater—or of a specific person, by various means of intelligence collection.

Although surveillance techniques vary little from one nation's intelligence agencies to the next, the British and the Soviets for a while in the 1940s were both reading from the same set of instructions. ANTHONY BLUNT, while working for the British Security Service (MI5), was for a time the officer in charge of the WATCHERS, the women and men who carried out SURVEILLANCE of foreign agents and spy suspects. Blunt gave each one his weekly task and knew the details of each case. He reportedly analyzed surveillance techniques, recommending changes. Blunt was a Soviet MOLE in MI5, so he then passed everything about British surveillance on to the Soviets. As a result, Soviet AGENTS could elude British watchers. How long this went on is not known.

●● SUVOROV, VIKTOR [P]

Former GRU Col. Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, who defected to the British in VIENNA in 1979.

Rezun was commissioned as an officer after attending the Kharkov Guards Tank Command School and subsequently served in armored units of the Soviet ground forces. His unit participated in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, at which time he came to the attention of the head of intelligence of the assaulting army and was assigned to MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. He underwent SPETSNAZ training in 1969 and, after attending the presti-

gious Frunze Military Academy in Leningrad, was assigned to GRU headquarters in Moscow.

He served as an assistant military ATTACHÉ in VIENNA from 1975 to 1979 while carrying out intelligence activities. He was reportedly being sought by GRU officers when he defected. Settling in Britain, Rezun wrote several books under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov while in the West: *The Liberators: My Life in the Soviet Army* (1981), *Inside the Soviet Army* (1982), *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* (1984), *Inside the Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy* (1986), and *Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces* (1987).

(Aleksandr Suvorov was Russia's greatest general of the 18th Century.)

●● SVR

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The SVR was established in Dec. 1991 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin as one of the successor agencies to the KGB. The SVR was subordinate to the short-lived Ministry of Security (MB).

The SVR took over the foreign intelligence functions of the KGB, with the COUNTERINTELLIGENCE activities being transferred to the newly created FSK. (Similarly, the presidential security functions and related activities previously carried out by the KGB were transferred to the new SBP.)

The first director of the SVR was YEVGENY PRIMAKOV, appointed to head the KGB in Oct. 1991 following the abortive coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. He remained in charge of the KGB and the successor SVR until Jan. 9, 1996, when Yeltsin named him Russia's Foreign Minister.

●● SWALLOW

Russian term for a female AGENT, especially one used in HONEY TRAP situations where SEX is used to obtain information, or to create a situation where a TARGET can be blackmailed at a later time.

●● SWEEPER

Term for electronic technician who examines or "sweeps" an office or facility to determine if electronic BUGS have been planted.

●● 12 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMPANY

Part of the Intelligence Corps formed by the British Army in Northern Ireland in 1942. The Intelligence Corps (also see 14 INTELLIGENCE COMPANY) was a key element in British COVERT ACTION against the terrorism of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army.

●● 30TH ASSAULT UNIT

British multiservice combat unit in World War II that collected TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE on German forces during amphibious landings. The unit, organized in part by IAN FLEMING, creator of JAMES BOND [f], first saw action in the Anglo-American North Africa landings in Nov. 1942.

Also known as No. 30 Commando, the unit came ashore with the first wave of Allied landing forces to seize enemy documents and equipment before they could be destroyed or lost. The unit subsequently participated in operations in Sicily, Italy, and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, capturing valuable documents as well as CIPHER, radio, and radar equipment and weapons. In Sicily the unit captured a complete set of Italian Air Force ciphers for homing beacons, enabling Allied planes to fly to targets in northern Italy guided by Italian navigation beacons.

The British had learned that in 1941 the Germans had a similar intelligence commando unit that had entered Athens with the first German troops and seized important documents from the abandoned British head-quarters there. Other, similar German units were known to exist.

The 30th Assault Unit returned to Britain in late 1943 to prepare for the Normandy landings in 1944. However, the British 15th Army Group requested the return of the Army component of the unit to Italy for operations there. Thus, only the naval component participated in the D-DAY landings. At Normandy the 30th Assault Unit landed with the 47th Royal Marine Commando to help capture and collect technical intelligence at a German coastal radar station.

●● T-10

CODE NAME assigned by the FBI to actor Ronald Reagan in the 1950s when he was an informer during the communist scare period.

The earliest FBI record on Reagan was dated Nov. 18, 1943, when Reagan told of "nearly coming to blows" at a party when an unidentified German sympathizer made antisemitic remarks. Reagan was then in the U.S. Army, assigned to the Army Air Forces' motion picture unit at Camp Roach in Culver City, Calif. His name appears again in 1946 during an FBI investigation of the Hollywood Independent Citizens' Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions, which the FBI considered a "communist front." Reagan quit the committee, he told the FBI, after its members voted down a resolution condemning communism as well as fascism.

Reagan, as president of the Screen Actors Guild, testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee in Oct. 1947, when the committee was looking for

communists in the entertainment business. Reagan and his then wife, actress Jane Wyman, told of cliques in the guild that "follow the party line."

Reagan subsequently became governor of California and, in 1981, the 40th President of the United States.

∞∞ TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence for planning and conducting tactical operations at the force or unit level. It focuses on an enemy's capabilities, immediate intentions, and the environment. The U.S. Navy used the term OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE through the 1980s to refer to tactical intelligence provided to naval operating forces.

Military history is full of examples of tactical intelligence being ignored by commanders who did not accept it because it interfered with plans or clashed with assumptions about the enemy's intentions.

Days before the German offensive in the Ardennes in Dec. 1944—the Battle of the Bulge—U.S. outposts facing the Germans reported hearing vehicles moving along the front. Other U.S. soldiers reported seeing German troops in clean uniforms, indicating that they had recently moved to the front. These small bits of information, added to others coming in at a higher level, could have led Allied commanders to the realization that the Germans were about to launch a major offensive. But the importance of this tactical information was only seen afterwards, in the postmortems following the stunning German surprise.

Sometimes, tactical intelligence is heeded. In March 1945, when Germans were destroying or defending all bridges across the Rhine, advance units of the U.S. 9th Armored Division at the edge of the town of Remagen, Germany, discovered that the Ludendorff Railway Bridge was still intact. They reported the discovery, and as the intelligence went up the hierarchy of command, the Americans took the bridge. (The Germans attempted to blow it up, but the bridge did not fall.) When the news reached Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, he changed his battle plans and ordered all available troops to head for Remagen, speeding the advance of American troops into Germany.

See also STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

∞∞ TAGBOARD   see D-21

∞∞ TAI LI, LT. GEN.   (b. ? d. 1946)

Chief of intelligence for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese government during World War II. Tai Li was the organizer and chief of the BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND STATISTICS, the intelligence arm of the National Military Council of Nationalist China from 1932 to 1946.

He was a member of Chiang's military police in the 1920s, rising to captain by 1927. His career is lost in the murk of COVER stories and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, for he probably did some highly secret infiltration of China's communist organizations. He was said to have so buried

his past that he burned the records of his early life and killed people who knew him as a teenager.

People called him "the butcher," whispering tales of the torture and executions he seems to have gleefully supervised. Richard Deacon in *The Chinese Secret Service* (1974) quotes a description of one of Tai Li's techniques: "He lined up some locomotives on a siding, got the fireboxes red hot, opened their doors, tied down the whistles to shut out the screams, and one after another threw his living victims into the fiery furnaces." He was said to have burned alive thousands of labor leaders, intellectuals, and students—all viewed by him as Chiang's enemies.

Tai Li believed that alcohol and women were "weapons" that he could wield to control men he targeted. He forbade his officers and servants to marry, saying that inevitably marriage meant that two people, rather than one, knew a secret.

When Western nations went to war against Japan in 1941, Tai Li cooperated with China's new allies, organizing guerrilla units and intelligence nets. From 1942 to 1945 he was also director of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), which had up to 3,000 U.S. military personnel in China for weather reporting, combat operations, and intelligence activities. Through SACO, Tai Li learned the names of AGENTS working for the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

"It was the boast of the organization," an American wrote, "that there was not a single village in China in which there was not a Tai Li spy to report on subversive activities. By terrorizing a man's family it was easy to keep the man in line." Tai Li and his men also assassinated an unknown number of people who had nothing to do with fighting Japan. Many of the assassins, it was said, used silencer-equipped pistols supplied by Americans.

Tai Li held the rank of lieutenant general at the time of his death in an airplane crash on March 17, 1946, near Pangchow. Officially, the plane hit a mountain during bad weather. Rumors persisted that he was killed by his enemies.

∞∞ TALENT KEYHOLE

U.S. classification for OVERHEAD/SATELLITE photography. Talent KEYHOLE and SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE classifications concern data that are the product of SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE collection and/or overhead RECONNAISSANCE.

∞∞ TALENT SPOTTER

Person who alerts an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER to someone who is a potential AGENT. The intelligence officer will then gather background information on the proposed agent and will make an approach. The spotter need not be a full-fledged agent and is more likely to be a bartender or bank teller who is being paid, often through a CUTOUT, for the names of likely prospects. The talent

spotter may also be told, in a FALSE FLAG ploy, that the talent seeker is a friendly nation or firm.

○○ TALLMADGE, MAJ. BENJAMIN

(b. 1754 d. 1835)

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER for Gen. GEORGE WASHINGTON during the American Revolution. Tallmadge's greatest accomplishment was the establishment of the CULPER RING, which provided Washington with vital intelligence.

Washington's appointement of Tallmadge as a spymaster in 1778 resulted from the general's disappointment over the failure of the NATHAN HALE spy mission in 1776; Hale had been discovered and was executed.

Tallmadge was instrumental in unmasking Maj. Gen. BENEDICT ARNOLD as a traitor. Arnold had ordered Tallmadge to aid "John Anderson," to whom Arnold had given a pass to go through American lines. When troops detained Anderson and found he carried documents about the garrison at West Point, Tallmadge shrewdly connected the man (who was British spy Maj. JOHN ANDRÉ) with Arnold. Tallmadge wanted to have Arnold held for interrogation by Washington, but he did not have the authority to do so. André was held and later executed; Arnold escaped.

In ciphers that Tallmadge devised for his AGENTS, he was 721 and Washington was 711.

○○ TARGET

Person, agency, facility, area, or country against which intelligence operations are directed.

○○ TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY

Person, agency, facility, or area that becomes available as a target for intelligence operations without prior planning.

○○ TASK FORCE

COVER designation for U.S. Navy intelligence operations. "Task force" is normally used for a seagoing operation involving ships and other naval forces. In the case of Task Force 96, the U.S. Navy command organization to coordinate activities of INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIPS in the Far East in the late 1960s, actual ships were involved. Task Force 96, operating under the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan, was assigned to the spy ships *Banner* and PUEBLO.

But "task force," in its intelligence usage, came to mean an intelligence-gathering organization when the OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI) ordered its intelligence-gathering unit, the Naval Field Operations Support Group (NFOSG), to establish "a worldwide intelligence collection organization while preserving nonintelligence attributability of collection operations."

Because the existence of NFOSG was publicly known, naval intelligence officials wanted a way to provide individual cover for NFOSG activities so that if a single operation was BLOWN, NFOSG would not be. The cover selected was "task force," a standard Navy name for an operational unit.

"Should the unit's initial task force designation—157—be compromised in any way it would be simply replaced by another one of the numbers. While the Task Force 157 designation was not intended to replace the NFOSG designation as the organization's real name . . . the NFOSG designation fell into disuse over time," wrote intelligence historian JEFFREY T. RICHELSON.

TASK FORCE 157

During the 1970s Task Force 157 (TF 157) was involved in a variety of intelligence missions, ranging from monitoring ports to providing a TOP SECRET communications channel used to arrange the 1971 clandestine trip to China of Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser. (See WEATHER.)

The task force had about 75 contract AGENTS, including EDWIN P. WILSON, a former CIA officer who was later convicted of selling arms to Libya.

The task force's official cover was the Naval Administrative Services Command, ostensibly a Navy unit for supporting naval personnel in remote areas; TF 157's unofficial cover was an international maritime consulting firm, Pierce Morgan Associates. The firm was located in the same Alexandria, Va., building as the Administrative Services Command. TF 157 had about 25 field offices throughout the world and ran at least ten PROPRIETARY COMPANIES in the United States and other countries.

The unit was so secret that its existence was itself secret, as was the fact that the Navy had a program for gathering HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT). In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1973, however, Adm. W. D. Gaddis, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics, revealed the existence of HUMINT by saying that the "Navy's human intelligence collection program is expanding operations in sensitive areas." He was referring to TF 157.

Sometimes through newspaper advertisements, the unit recruited civilians who worked as CASE OFFICERS, running agents and operations at the field offices. In Germany, for instance, they got leads to retired veterans of the German Navy, who might work as agents by intercepting mail between East and West Germany.

One operation involved the creation of a SPY SHIP, ostensibly for the Iranian Navy. Wilson, using a proprietary cover, bought a trawler and sold it to Iran for $500,000. The ship was to sail near Soviet ships and monitor their electronic systems. But there were few such TARGETS in the Persian Gulf, and the ship was not seaworthy.

One of the unit's missions was to monitor of nuclear weapons being shipped by the Soviets. Ships were checked at such narrow passages—"choke points"—as the Straits of Gibraltar and the Bosporus by "civilian" yachts carrying Navy technicians and nuclear detection equipment. (See CLUSTER SERIES.)

The unit also provided data on Soviet weapons for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks negotiations. TF 157

ferried agents from Taiwan to mainland China, where they installed electronic monitoring equipment; those operations ceased after Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972. In Vietnam, TF 157 provided information about Haiphong Harbor, aiding in the 1972 mining of the harbor by U.S. naval aircraft. In Oct. 1973, the task force reported detecting nuclear weapons being shipped to Egypt during the Yom Kippur War against Israel, although the detections were not conclusive.

Investigation into purchasing practices of the task force led to discoveries of dealings between contract agents like Wilson and firms selling equipment and supplies to TF 157. About the time of these discoveries, then-Capt. BOBBY RAY INMAN became DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE in Oct. 1974; he was under Pentagon orders to cut back intelligence spending, and TF 157 was one of the possible budget-slashing sites. After a futile attempt to have it taken over by the CIA or the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, in July 1976 Inman abolished TF 157, effective Sept. 30, 1977.

"Case officers were told to destroy all records of employment by the Navy . . . ," according to historian Richelson. "They were to deny that the task force ever existed."

But the existence of TF 157 became known in May 1977 when BOB WOODWARD of *The Washington Post*, who had been working on a story about Wilson, heard of the task force.

TASK FORCE 168

As TF 157 was being abolished, its assets and projects were distributed in the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. The Navy retained some of the TF 157 activities by assigning them to Task Force 168, which provided TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE and TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE to fleet commanders.

TF 168 had itself been created by the NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND (NIC) in 1969 to evade NIC staff cuts. In 1977 it inherited from TF 157 the Navy Scientific and Technical Element, Far East, and two intelligence units stationed in Munich, Germany, primarily to interrogate refugees and defectors for information valuable to ONI.

Also see GOLDFINGER.

●● TAVRIN   see ZEPPELIN

●● TAYLOR, BRIG. GEN. TELFORD

(b. 1908)
U.S. Army officer who worked at BLETCHLEY PARK, the British ULTRA codebreaking establishment, during World War II and later became the U.S. chief prosecutor on the international military tribunal at Nuremberg that tried Nazis for war crimes.

As a colonel at Bletchley Park, Taylor was responsible for distributing Ultra material to the principal U.S. Army and Army Air Forces headquarters in Europe. (See SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT.)

As the war was ending in Europe, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, who had been appointed chief prosecutor at the war crimes trial, asked that Taylor be assigned to the prosecution staff. Taylor succeeded Jackson as chief prosecutor, presiding over 12 trials of Nazis and military leaders tried by civilian triburnals in 1946–1949.

Taylor wrote *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* (1992), several books about World War II, and *The Grand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations* (1955).

●● TEAM B   see B TEAM

●● TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

(TECHINT)
Intelligence derived from foreign sources related to technical equipment and capabilities. During World War II the British and German armies established specialized units that accompanied or followed the lead assault units to seize technical material. (See 30TH ASSAULT UNIT.) The U.S. Army organized the ALSOS MISSION to seize enemy material related to atomic bomb development.

During the Cold War technical intelligence included the gathering of intelligence through computers (see COMPUTER ESPIONAGE), electronic sensors, SATELLITES, and overhead photography. Technical intelligence is often so dependent upon technology that its users assume they need little or no HUMAN INTELLIGENCE. In intelligence agencies throughout the world there are frequent debates over the relative value of the two collection methods.

Also see SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE.

●● TELEKRYPTON

Secure transatlantic radio communications system used by the U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES during World War II.

●● TELEMETRY INTELLIGENCE   (TELINT)

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE derived from the interception, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.

●● TELEVISION

Real-life espionage reached American television screens in the early 1950s when congressional investigations of communism went before the cameras. The setting became familiar: senators or House members on a podium, witnesses with right hand raised to swear they were telling the truth, and glaring klieg lights. The spies were few, but viewers did get insights into TRADECRAFT from undercover AGENTS for the FBI. In 1954, Sen. Joseph McCarthy, searching for communist spies in the U.S. Army, drew one of the largest audiences in television's short history. When McCarthy faded away, the televising of Congress did not. The search for spies in congressional

hearing rooms continued into the 1960s; but not until the days of the PLUMBERS and WATERGATE were large audience again lured to the screen for intelligence revelations.

One of the FBI undercover agents who appeared before Congress, Herbert A. Philbrick, led audiences from the real SECRET WORLD of espionage to the television world where fact gives way to fiction. Philbrick, who rose high in the U.S. Communist Party, wrote a popular book, *I Led Three Lives* (1952), which was made into a television series of the same name. In a fairly close approximation of how the FBI infiltrated the U.S. Communist Party, actor Richard Carlson played Philbrick, whose three lives were undercover agent, MOLE inside the Communist Party, and ordinary American who did not let people know about his two secret lives.

Like the makers of MOVIES, television producers have been drawn to espionage as a source of drama since the medium's earliest days. But given the narrow boundaries of television, spy dramas almost always became even more improbable and absurd than spy movies. Some producers took the easy—and humorous—way out by simply making the exploits of spies laughable. The ridiculous doings of MAXWELL SMART [f] in *Get Smart* is a fine example of a television series making the secret world funny.

In television series, realism about espionage has been as rare as social realism in situation comedies. One early show of the 1950s, made by Hollywood film producers, was *A Man Called X*. Promotion material implied that the latter was based on real cases involving the CIA, then a shadowy government entity about which little was known.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) founded the Voice of America as a collection of government-controlled radio stations that spread pro-American information around the world. When Third World countries began television broadcasting in the 1950s, the USIA went into that medium, supplying free film to countries with newly acquired television. USIA-prepared films also went into foreign editions of some U.S. newsreels through a program with the CODE NAME Kingfish. The CIA provided subsidies to Fox Movietone and Hearst-MGM in return for their inserting the USIA films.

American television added this real-world information to its own staples: standard adventure series about cowboys and Indians or cops and robbers. Writing about this period in *Tube of Plenty* (1990), radio and television historian Erik Barnouw said, "A deluge of spy fiction, latching onto a timely topic, provided the rationale [for actual U.S. covert action], and got Americans used to the idea. On television it was *The Man from U.N.C.L.E., The Girl from U.N.C.L.E., Get Smart, I Spy, The Man Who Never Was, Mission Impossible,* and others—some amiable, some witty, some melodramatic."

Mission: Impossible became one of the most successful of all U.S. television series about spies. The message—that nothing is impossible for practitioners of U.S. COVERT ACTION—was a reflection of what was perceived as the truth in the Third World countries that imported the show. To prevent complaints from those real coun-

tries, the producers accommodated American diplomats by sending the missions to fictional countries. The places were vaguely Third World or Soviet-like, with signs that were foreign-looking but readable: Alarüm, Dänjer, Elevaten, Entrat Verbaten. The villains with their sinister accents got what they deserved: trickery, betrayal, sometimes death (at the hands of their fellow countrymen, *not* Americans).

Built into the show's opening was what, in real life, would come to be known as the government's PLAUSIBLE DENIAL: "As always," the anonymous voice on the tape told the leader of the Impossible Missions Force (IMF), "should you or any of your IMF be caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of your actions. This tape will self-destruct in five seconds. . . . Good luck. . . ."

Jim Phelps (Peter Graves) was the leader of the IMF after the first season. The other members of the IMF were Barney Collier (Greg Morris), a skilled black technician who invented gadgets that functioned at the edge of plausibility; Cinnamon Carter (Barbara Bain), a woman irresistible to duped villains; Rollin Hand (Martin Landau), a master of disguise; and muscular Willy Armitage (Peter Lupus), who usually simply carried things or impersonated the villains' uniformed guards. Other actors who were in the IMF at various times included Leonard Nimoy and Ann Warren. In the United States the series ran from Sept. 1966 until April 1973 on CBS and was brought back, on ABC, in 1988 and 1989. In 1996 *Mission Impossible* reappeared as a MOVIE.

Get Smart, a leading prime-time television series in the 1960s, was a spoof on modern intelligence, American style. The lead bumbler was Maxwell Smart, played by Don Adams. Agent 99 (Barbara Feldon) helped to keep him out of worse trouble. The signature prop was Maxwell Smart's telephone-in-a-shoe and his favorite phrase as he botched an operation was, "Oops, sorry about that!" Maxwell Smart worked for an agency known only as "Control," whose director (Edward Platt) was known only as "the Chief." The global enemy was K.A.O.S., whose only purpose seemed to be to provide weekly capers for Control.

Sharing prime time in that era were two other "spy-fi" hits. *I Spy* featured Robert Culp and television's first black hero, Bill Cosby, as agents with a sports COVER: Culp was touring tennis player Kelly Robinson, and Cosby played his trainer Alexander Scott. (In the real world, the KGB often used traveling athletic groups as cover.)

The show featured many episodes in which Culp and Cosby helped Asians and Africans resist communist inroads into their societies. The CIA reputedly arranged for the export of *I Spy* to developing countries to impress people with the CIA's power and "goodness."

In *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.,* debonair Robert Vaughn played Napoleon Solo, a cool, sophisticated agent working for the United Network Command for Law and Enforcement, an international organization that, like the real UNITED NATIONS, was a spy nest. Aiding Solo was Russian Illya Kuryakin (David McCallum). Alexander Waverly (Leo G. Carroll) headed the agency.

The short-lived spinoff *The Girl from U.N.C.L.E.* (1966–1967) starred the attractive Stefanie Powers as agent April Dancer. In *Scarecrow and Mrs. King*, a later romantic comedy-espionage thriller, Kate Jackson played Mrs. Amanda King, a divorced suburban mother who accidentally became involved with Scarecrow, the CODE NAME for Lee Stetson (Bruce Boxleitner), who worked for a U.S. intelligence agency.

The FBI, starring Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., as Inspector Erskine, began a long run on ABC in 1965. The FBI seal appeared on the screen to stamp every show with the approval of J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI. All scripts had to be approved by the FBI, and only actors cleared by the FBI could play agents. Although Hoover often boasted of FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE prowess, the television agents chased more robbers than they did spies. In the 1990s came *The X-Files,* supposedly named for bizarre, unsolved cases in FBI files. A show very much *not* approved by the FBI, it deals with extraterrestrial agents, leaving the terrestrial ones to the real FBI.

BRITISH SPY-FI

The British added to the spy-fi genre with characters inspired by JAMES BOND, including *Secret Agent Man, The Saint,* and *The Avengers,* a spoof of MI5. *The Saint,* based on books by Leslie Charteris dating back to the 1920s, was adapted for British television in 1962; Roger Moore, a future James Bond [f], portrayed Simon Templar, alias the Saint. Although a detective who solved crimes, the Saint occasionally ventured into espionage. *Secret Agent Man* starred Patrick McGoohan as a hard-working, low-key British secret service operative. The highly successful theme song, "Secret Agent Man," was sung by Johnny Rivers. McGoohan went from spoof to surrealism in the somewhat bizarre television series *The Prisoner,* in which he played an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who tries to resign, only to be kidnapped to a strange place where veterans of espionage must live out their lives lest they reveal secrets. He continually came tantalizingly close to escaping.

Each episode of *The Avengers,* which began in 1962, opened with the statement, "Extraordinary crimes against the state have to be avenged by agents extraordinary"—a variation on Bond's "licence to kill." The main characters were John Steed (played by Patrick MacNee) and a female assistant. The most successful of several who played the latter part was the very attractive and talented actress Diana Rigg. She replaced Cathy Gale, played by Honor Blackman, and was named Emma Peel, supposedly from a note suggesting that Gale's successor have "man appeal." Realism was scarce in this amusing, long-running series. (Diana Rigg went on to become a leading star of the British stage and the hostess for the very popular *Mystery!* series on American public television.)

Unlike television series, individual British espionage dramas showed a respect for the secret world, especially as limned by the master of espionage fiction, JOHN LE CARRÉ. *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1979) and *Smiley's People* (1982), both presented in several episodes and taken from his books of the same title, were outstanding.

Sir Alec Guinness played such a convincing GEORGE SMILEY [f] in both television adaptations that le Carré later said Guinness "took the character away from me" and "I defected from him."

Another great British espionage saga adapted for television was *Reilly: Ace of Spies,* based on the incredible adventures of SIDNEY REILLY, who has been called the greatest spy of modern times. The 12-episode series, shown in America on public broadcasting stations in 1985, starred Australian actor Sam Neill as Reilly. The story captured the mood of the times and the character of Reilly, a man who knew he was a legend in his time.

The Sandbaggers, first shown in 20 episodes from 1978 to 1980, focused on an elite covert action branch of British intelligence. Much of the action involved the head of the Sandbaggers, Neil Burnside (Roy Marsden), battling his superiors. They constantly left him short of resources, and seemed more interested in pleasing the Prime Minister than in winning the Cold War, which Burnside and his Sandbaggers had to fight on their own. As an import on American public television, it gathered enough of a cult following to produce a fan club and a site on the INTERNET.

The end of the Cold War essentially ended the spy-fi genre both in Britain and the United States. An epilogue came in 1992 with the three-part drama *Sleeper,* which focused on two Soviet SLEEPERS who had been sent to Britain in the 1960s. As the Cold War ended, they were contacted. But they had made new lives for themselves— one was married with children and the other had become a successful financial account executive. Neither wanted to return to Russia.

●● TELINT   TELEMETRY INTELLIGENCE

●● TEMPEST

CODE NAME for investigations and studies of acoustic or electric communications. Tempest guards "compromising emanations"—unintentional intelligence-bearing signals that, if intercepted and analyzed, would disclose classified information. Although Tempest refers to both acoustic and electric communications, most Tempest security measures deal with electrical signals, such as those transmitted by computer keyboards and electric typewriters.

Also see COMPUTER ESPIONAGE

●● TER BRAAK, JAN WILHELM

The only known German spy to enter Britain during World War II and escape being captured or TURNED by the DOUBLE CROSS SYSTEM. However, he accomplished nothing for his spymasters during the five months that he was free in Britain.

He was about 27 years old, and his real identity and nationality have never been established. He came down by parachute at Haversham in Berkshire, near Cambridge, probably on Nov. 3, 1940, with papers in the name of Ter Braak, a Dutchman. He took lodgings in

Cambridge, claiming to have been evacuated at Dunkirk in the summer of 1940. He said he was working for a Dutch newspaper in London. His identity papers were poor forgeries, and there was some suspicion about him; but there were no follow-up investigations.

He made many day trips, some to observe important airfields, but there is no evidence that he actually reported anything back to Germany. When his radio set was found, it had not been used.

Finally, his money ran out. On April 1, 1941, his body was found in an air raid shelter in Cambridge. He had shot himself in the temple.

(Two other men claimed to have parachuted into Britain during the war, evaded capture, and returned to Germany, but there is no corroborating evidence for their claims.)

●● TERMINATED WITH EXTREME PREJUDICE

Expression denoting the execution of an AGENT or an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER by his or her agency. *Terminated* thus has the dual meaning of cessation of employment and life. The phrase does not apply to the execution or assassination of nonemployees.

●● TERPIL, FRANK E.   see EDWIN P. WILSON

●● THIRD MAN

Label used by the British press to refer to the person who was involved in setting up the escape to the Soviet Union of British spies DONALD MACLEAN and GUY BURGESS. Eventually, the label was accurately pinned on HAROLD (KIM) PHILBY. (See CAMBRIDGE SPY RING.) Later came the labels FOURTH MAN and FIFTH MAN.

After the exposure of Philby, author GRAHAM GREENE, himself a former INTELLIGENCE OFFICER under Philby, pointed out that the first use of "third man" was by Greene in *The Third Man*, a great 1950 suspense MOVIE whose plot centered on the man in the title role in postwar VIENNA. The film's plot revolved around black market racketeering, not espionage.

●● THOMPSON, HARRY T.

Former U.S. Navy yeoman who, while unemployed at San Pedro, Calif., spied for the Japanese against the United States in 1934–1935. Thompson's HANDLER was Toshio Miyazaki, a Japanese Navy officer who was in the United States ostensibly to study English.

Thompson sold engineering, gunnery, and tactical information about the Pacific Fleet. He was arrested by the FBI, tried and convicted of espionage, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

●● THOMPSON, AIRMAN 2ND CLASS ROBERT G.

U.S. Air Force clerk convicted in 1965 of passing secrets to the Soviet Union and sentenced to 30 years for es-

pionage. He confessed to giving hundreds of photographs of classified documents to his Soviet HANDLERS while he was stationed in BERLIN. He was a participant in one of the most intricate three-way spy swaps in history:

In May 1978 Thompson was taken from his U.S. prison cell to Berlin, where he was exchanged for Alan van Norman, an American student who had been sentenced to a two and a half year prison term for attempting to smuggle an East German family into West Germany. Norman had been held for three months when the swap took place.

According to Air Force records, Thompson was born in Detroit, Mich. When he was exchanged, at age 43, he said that he had been born in Leipzig of a Russian father and a German mother. He also said that he would spy again for the Soviets if given the chance. He then crossed into East Germany (where Leipzig was then located) and disappeared.

Also involved in the exchange was Miron Marcus, an Israeli who had been held in Mozambique since Sept. 1976, when bad weather forced his private plane to land while it was en route to South Africa. Mozambican troops fired on the plane when it landed, wounding Marcus and killing his brother-in-law.

Marcus insisted that he was on business when his plane was forced to land. But Western intelligence sources said that he might have been attempting to gather information about Soviet and Cuban activities in Mozambique for Israeli and perhaps U.S. intelligence agencies.

The intricate three-way deal had been arranged by WOLFGANG VOGEL, who had negotiated the 1962 spy swap of FRANCIS GARY POWERS, a U-2 pilot shot down over the Soviet Union, and RUDOLF IVANOVICH ABEL, an NKVD agent who had spied in the United States.

●● THOMSON, SIR BASIL

(b. 1861 d. 1939)
Assistant commissioner of the SPECIAL BRANCH (Criminal Investigation Department) of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) from 1913 to 1921.

Educated at Eton and Oxford, Thomson, the son of a bishop, became a prison warden, shifting to law enforcement in 1913 when he was appointed head of the Special Branch. When World War I began in 1914, Thomson's Special Branch had a staff of 70; by the end of the war it numbered 700. He was responsible for the arrest of several German spies. He also interrogated MATA HARI, who was suspected of spying for the Germans when she was in England, on her way to Holland.

Under Thomson the Special Branch established its lasting relationship with MI5, the British COUNTERINTELLIGENCE agency, which did not (and does not) have the power of arrest. The Special Branch also handled SURVEILLANCE and assignment for MI5.

After the war, during the "Red scare" that swept Britain, Thomson sought out communists and radicals. He resigned in 1921 amid growing criticism of the failure of intelligence agencies to halt the terrorism of the Irish Republican Army. Hope for his return was dashed in 1925 when he was arrested in Hyde Park for "fondling" a prostitute. He tried to explain that he was doing secret

work and claimed that the communists had set up his arrest.

●● THÜMMEL, PAUL

British DOUBLE AGENT in the German ABWEHR. An agent of the Abwehr since 1934, he served in Dresden and Prague before the outbreak of World War II, and then in the Balkans and Turkey. Thümmel, a confidant of Abwehr chief WILHELM CANARIS, was a conduit for anti-Hitler forces in Germany, passing secret documents to the British officials through local anti-Nazi groups.

Thümmel originally worked for Maj. FRANTISEK MORAVEC, head of the Czech Military Intelligence Service, who gave him the CODE NAME A54. With his access to both the Abwehr and SD, the Nazi security service, Thümmel produced remarkably fine and timely intelligence. He predicted the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, enabling the British to get Moravec and his family out of the country. He provided the Allies with a nearly perfect ORDER OF BATTLE on the Luftwaffe early in the war.

Following the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Thümmel could pass on his intelligence only through the Czech resistance movement. Arrested by the GESTAPO in Feb. 1942 and court-martialed, he managed to win his release by claiming that he had been trying to infiltrate the Czech movement.

He had supplied British intelligence so well that Sir STEWART G. MENZIES, head of MI6, said, "When A24 reports, armies march." After his arrest and release, the British decided to EXFILTRATE him with a rescue attempt code-named Anthropoid. The effort failed, and again he was arrested by the Germans. This time he was imprisoned for treason and was executed in April 1945.

His Czech code name was Franta. His aliases included Dr. Holm and René.

●● THURLOE, JOHN   (b. 1616 d. 1668)

Secretary of State and intelligence chief for Oliver Cromwell. Thurloe operated an effective intelligence organization in England and Europe. His espionage and intelligence service operated against the Restoration efforts of Charles Stuart.

Previously a lawyer in Sussex, Thurloe was financially supported by Cromwell, who ruled England from 1649 to 1658, for most of the Commonwealth period. Thurloe built the most efficient intelligence organization in Europe. He directed intelligence activities through his official position of Postmaster General. He subsequently (and at times simultaneously) held the posts of Secretary of State, Home Secretary, Chief of Police, Foreign Secretary, War Secretary, and Counsellor of State. His intelligence organization included a network of AGENTS in European capitals and in England as well, a massive mail intercept operation (see JOHN WALLIS).

Thurloe survived Cromwell, and served as Secretary of State in the succeeding administration of the Lord Protector's son Richard (1658–1659). Thurloe was arrested for high treason on May 15, 1660. Subsequently released, he spent the last eight years of his life writing papers on foreign policy. He compiled seven volumes of correspondence, which constitute an invaluable primary source of information for the Cromwell period.

●● TIEDGE, HANS JOACHIM   (b. 1937)

West German COUNTERINTELLIGENCE officer who defected to East Germany in Aug. 1985.

Tiedge, a senior officer of West Germany's BFV counterintelligence agency, was a specialist in East German espionage. He had served in West German intelligence since 1966.

Colleagues described him as despondent, alcoholic, deeply in debt, and unable to deal with life. His wife, Ute, had died in July 1982 in a fall at the family home in Cologne. His daughters were involved with drugs. (His wife's death had been ruled an accident at the time. After Tiedge's defection, the Cologne prosecutor's office initiated an inconclusive investigation into her death.)

Despondent as he may have been, Tiedge was professional enough to give the East Germans information that would guarantee him a welcome. He betrayed at least two AGENTS working for BfV in East Germany and warned at least three East German agents to flee West Germany. But he apparently could not save MARGARETE HOEKE, a secretary in the office of West German president Richard von Weizsacker. Almost at the same time that Tiedge defected she was arrested on espionage charges.

●● TIMOKHIN, COL. GEN. YEVGENY LEONIDOVICH

Chief of the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, in 1991–1992. Prior to his appointment to the GRU, Timokhin was deputy chief of the main staff of the Soviet Air Defense Forces. He was one of the few officers from outside the security ORGANS or Soviet Ground Forces to head the GRU.

●● TINA   see RADIO FINGERPRINTING

●● TISLER, FRANTISEK

CIPHER clerk in the Czech Embassy in Washington, D.C., who was a DEFECTOR IN PLACE for the FBI in the 1950s.

Tisler, on home leave in the summer of 1957, got drunk with an old friend, also on leave. The friend, a military ATTACHÉ at the Czech Embassy in London, told Tisler that he was running an AGENT who was working on a guided missile project for the Royal Air Force. Tisler passed this information to his FBI HANDLER, and J. EDGAR HOOVER, director of the FBI, had it passed to the British Security Service (MI5). The British tracked the tip down to Brian F. Linney, an electronics engineer for a company doing defense work. Linney pleaded guilty to violating the OFFICIALS SECRETS ACT and was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

The FBI gave Tisler bits of information that he passed on to Prague, where intelligence officials were so impressed that they gave him a promotion—and a post in Prague. The FBI, upset about losing such a good ASSET, exposed Tisler's successor as a spy, forcing his recall. Tisler was then reassigned to Washington for a year before being posted back to Prague again. At that point, he and the FBI decided to end his espionage career. One night he passed the files from his office out the window to FBI agents and at dawn left the embassy for a life in the United States under a new identity.

●● TK   TALENT KEYHOLE

●● Tkachenko, Aleksey G.

Soviet diplomat in Washington, D.C., who was the point of contact for JOHN WALKER at the time of Walker's arrest for espionage on May 19, 1985.

Tkachenko, ostensibly the third secretary at the Soviet Embassy, was supposed to have serviced the Walker DEAD DROP that night in Poolesville, Md. FBI agents, who had staked out the drop site, saw Tkachenko drive by in a car registered to the embassy; his wife and a child were in the car as COVER. Walker had dropped a 7-Up can at a prearranged spot to signal that he had placed the material at the drop, near a specified tree. On seeing the signal, Tkachenko was to proceed to the drop, pick up the bag, and leave Walker a packet of cash.

But an FBI agent picked up the can as evidence and Tkachenko, not seeing it, had driven away. (Walker, not knowing the drop had been aborted, left a garbage bag full of classified documents. FBI agents recovered the bag and arrested Walker when he returned to his motel.

Tkachenko, his wife, and two daughters left the United States on May 23. Their departure was so sudden that, reportedly, they left half-cooked hamburgers on the stove in their apartment.

Also see TRADECRAFT.

●● Tobias, Radioman 3rd Class Michael T.

U.S. Navy sailor who offered to sell classified documents. In Aug. 1984 Tobias, who served on the tank landing ship *Peoria*, told a U.S. Secret Service agent in San Diego, Calif., that he would sell classified documents for $1,000. Previously, he said, an unidentified "foreign power" had offered him $100,000 for the documents—KEY CARDS for U.S. cryptographic machines. Tobias had taken the key cards from the ship instead of shredding them, as called for in security regulations. Tobias had been seen near the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco the night before.

Tobias had conspired with his brother and two others to extort the money by telling the Secret Service that they had the cards and would give them back for cash. In the course of their scheme two of the 12 key cards disap-

peared and were not recovered. Tobias was arrested as he prepared to leave the country.

In Nov. 1985 Tobias was found guilty of attempting to extort money with threats, compromising classified information, and stealing government property. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

●● Tokumu Han

"Special section"—for cryptology—of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Naval General Staff.

The section, established in the early 1920s, had some early success against Chinese CODES and the U.S. State Department gray code. In 1937, a Tokumu Han officer, aided by a locksmith and accompanied by a photographer, broke into the U.S. Consulate in Kobe and photographed the U.S. brown code (used by the State Department and the Navy). The Japanese also photographed the M-138 CIPHER device. However, the break-in did not produce any breakthroughs for Tokumu Han.

By World War II the section had grown from a few officers to a large enterprise that included radio intercept stations and several thousand naval personnel and civilians. Among the workers were NISEI women who had learned English in the United States and returned to Japan. They were used to translate open conversations on radio telephones.

Tokumo Han "failed almost completely in extracting usable information from American messages," David Kahn wrote in *The Codebreakers* (1967). "They did not even attempt to solve medium- and high-echelon messages, couched in cryptosystems far beyond their ability. They concentrated instead on three simpler cryptosystems of the lowest level of command. Even with these, they achieved only limited success."

Much of the Japanese SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE effort was devoted to TRAFFIC ANALYSIS. But the analyses did not produce significant results.

●● Tokyo Rose

U.S. servicemen's name for female Japanese propaganda broadcasters in World War II. Provided with DISINFORMATION by their Japanese superiors, several English-speaking women gave the impression of having secret information, giving their American and British listeners the impression that Japanese intelligence was better than it really was.

Japanese radio propaganda during World War II operated under the direction of the War Information Bureau. All English-speaking workers were screened by the KEMPEI TAI and the Special Security Police. One of them was Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino, a Japanese-American born in Los Angeles and a graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles. When Japan staged the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK on Dec. 7, 1941, she was visiting a relative in Japan. She, along with others, made the broadcasts under duress, it was later claimed.

The first went on the air as "Ann," short for "*an*nouncer." She later became "Orphan Annie—your fa-

vorite enemy." The propaganda broadcasters usually relied on information picked up from U.S. commercial radio stations. American newscasts were searched for information, particularly disasters, that could be passed on by the broadcasters. Between records of dance bands and light classical music, the women—all eventually called Tokyo Rose—offered servicemen bogus casualty figures, some mentioning specific U.S. military units; tales of infidelity by wives and sweethearts back home; and prophetic reports of upcoming operations.

After the war the U.S. government identified Tokyo Rose as d'Aquino, even though others had done what she had done. Returned to the United States, she was tried in 1949 for treason and undermining U.S. troops' morale. At her trial she insisted that she had been forced to make the broadcasts. She said she was one of at least 20 "Tokyo Roses." Acquitted of treason but convicted of the lesser charge, she served ten years in prison. President Ford formally pardoned her in 1977.

●● TOLKACHEV, ADOLF G.

Soviet aviation specialist who provided classified material to the U.S. government.

Tolkachev, who worked at a Soviet aerospace research institute in Moscow, was arrested in June 1985 after being exposed by former CIA officer EDWARD L. HOWARD. The Soviet Union announced on Oct. 22, 1986, that Tolkachev had been executed.

Tolkachev had been spying for the United States since the late 1970s. He provided plans, specifications, and test results on existing and planned Soviet aircraft and missiles. American journalist BOB WOODWARD wrote in *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987* (1987) that Tolkachev ". . . also opened a window into the future—the research, development, and new generations of weapons, particularly on new radar-defeating 'stealth' technology. Estimates were that his intelligence was worth billions of dollars."

Howard had been briefed about Tolkachev and was supposed to take over as his CASE OFFICER upon his arrival in Moscow. Tolkachev's case officer, Paul M. Stombaugh, Jr., was detained by the KGB on June 13, 1985, as he was about to meet with Tolkachev. On that same day, in Washington, D.C., ALDRICH W. AMES, a CIA officer turned Soviet MOLE, handed over to his Soviet HANDLER several pounds of CIA documents that included Tolkachev's name. Ames's information thus confirmed Howard's.

According to KGB documents obtained by the Cold War International History Project, Gen. VIKTOR M. CHEBRIKOV, head of the KGB, told Soviet leader Mikail S. Gorbachev on Sept. 25, 1986, "Yesterday Tolkachev's sentence was implemented."

"American intelligence was very generous with him," Gorbachev remarked. "They found 2 million rubles [about $500,000] on him."

"This agent gave very important military-technical secrets to the enemy," Chebrikov said.

Tolkachev's CIA CODE NAME was GTSPHERE.

●● TOMPKINS, MAJ. PETER

U.S. Army officer who entered Rome in Jan. 1944 as an AGENT of the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS), while the city was still occupied by German troops.

Tompkins formed a partisan band in Rome and received a stream of information about the city until it was liberated by the U.S. Fifth Army in June 1944. The intelligence he provided was never acted upon by U.S. forces because of command problems.

As the liberators were arriving and the Germans withdrawing, Tompkins, acting on his own, issued orders on OSS letterheads he had printed, ordering the Italian Army to guard all public utilities.

Tompkins' OSS CODE NAME in Rome was Pietro.

●● TOP SECRET   (TS)

U.S. security CLASSIFICATION for national security information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be expected to result in *exceptionally grave damage* to national security, such as war or a break in diplomatic relations. This is the highest U.S. security classification.

The other U.S. security classifications are CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET.

●● TOP HAT   see DIMITRI POLYAKOV

●● TOPAZ   see SAPPHIRE

●● TORTELLA, LOUIS W.   (b. 1911 d. 1996)

Deputy director of the NSA from 1958 to 1974.

Tortella began his codebreaking career in 1942, when, as a U.S. Navy lieutenant junior grade, he was assigned to OP-20-G (see NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE) to work on the German ENIGMA machine. He was on a team of mathematicians who planned, designed, and put into use the BOMBE, a machine used to decipher the Enigma keys. He was later sent to the OP-20-G collection stations at Bainbridge Island, Wash., and Skaggs Island, Calif.

After the war, as a civilian, he joined the ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY and devised policy for the creation of NSA in 1952, becoming its deputy director in 1958. Running daily NSA operations, he served under six military directors.

A pioneer in the use of machines to break codes, he brought more and more powerful computers into the NSA. After his retirement he continued to advise the agency until a few months before his death.

●● TOUBIANSKI, MEIR   (d. 1949)

Israeli accused of spying for the British.

A major in the British Army's Corps of Engineers during World War II, Toubianski became a captain in the

Israeli Army after Israel became a nation in 1948. On June 30, 1948, the day that ISSER BE'ERI took charge of AMAN, Israel's MILITARY INTELLIGENCE agency, Be'eri accused Toubianski of treason and had him arrested. Convicted of spying for the British in what Be'eri called a "field court martial," Toubianski was immediately executed by an Army firing squad.

The evidence against Toubianski was entirely circumstantial. In 1949 he was posthumously judged innocent, his rank was restored, and his remains were reinterred with full military honors.

A military court in Dec. 1948 found Be'eri guilty of manslaughter in another case and he was dismissed from military service. Arrested again in 1949 for the execution of Toubianski, Be'eri was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to a token one-day prison term "in consideration of . . . loyal service . . ."

◯◯ TOURISTS

U.S. intelligence term during World War II for a team of AGENTS placed behind German lines.

◯◯ TOWNSEND, ROBERT

New York City businessman who was a member of the highly successful CULPER RING that spied for GEORGE WASHINGTON during the American Revolution.

Because Townsend, a Quaker, had not spoken out about the Revolution, he easily assumed the role of a British sympathizer in New York in 1778 when Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, commander of British forces in America, occupied the city. Townsend even joined a Tory militia to preserve his COVER as an American AGENT. His name was never used in messages, which used his CODE NAME, Culper Junior.

Washington, needing intelligence on Clinton's forces and intentions, ordered Maj. BENJAMIN TALLMADGE to set up an espionage net. Townsend was one of Tallmadge's recruits.

Townsend wrote his reports in coded SECRET WRITING, on the specific instructions of Washington, who told him that "he should occasionally write his information on the blank leaves of a pamphlet, on the first, second, and other pages of a common pocket book, or on the blank leaves at each end of registers, almanacks, or any new publication or book of small value." He also suggested interlining the secret writing in letters to friends.

Townsend wrote a gossip column for a Tory newspaper whose other contributors included Maj. JOHN ANDRÉ, who wrote poetry. André was also a spy, in contact with Maj. Gen. BENEDICT ARNOLD. Townsend ran a coffee shop—another source of POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE—with the owner of the newspaper, who almost certainly was also an American spy. (For details on how the ring operated, see CULPER RING.)

◯◯ TR-1

◯◯ TRADECRAFT

Espionage techniques and tricks that substantiate the view of practitioners that their work is a skilled occupation or craft. The operational skills include tricks of SURVEILLANCE and running AGENTS. Tradecraft, mentioned frequently in the novels of JOHN LE CARRÉ [p], appears frequently in real cases. Practices are taught in training and are then handed down from one generation of AGENTS to another.

David W. Szady, a veteran FBI agent who specialized in COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, philosophized about why the classical ways are the best and the most reliable. "Dead drops here, face-to-face meets overseas. They are classical because they work," he said. "Radio is often a problem because of the chances of detection and the need to maintain the equipment, which is often miniaturized and delicate. In my experience, the classic ways work. . . . There are only three basic needs of an espionage operation: a way for the agent to get a hold of someone in an emergency, a way for the intelligence officer to get information from the agent, and a way to pay him."

The DEAD DROP, the BRUSH CONTACT—the ways to meet, to exchange, without seeing each other—these are the essential elements of tradecraft. Following are some examples of standard tradecraft:

- Switch off a car's interior lights so they do not come on when door is opened. This is useful for picking up or dropping off someone when the driver suspects the car is being followed.
- Thoroughly wash car, including interior, after a pickup or dropoff to remove telltale dirt, mud, or foliage that could identify the area where the car was driven.
- Before use, wash out cans, bottles, or jars to be used as caches or signals during a drop or pickup at a DEAD DROP to keep wild animals from carrying off the drop.
- When boarding or leaving a subway, train, or bus, act nonchalantly, then jump in or out at the last moment to elude possible followers.

Here are some tradecraft examples from cases mentioned in entries in this book:

JAMES HARPER wrote a limerick on the back of a laundry list. His HANDLER tore it in half, gave one half back to Harper, and retained the other. When Harper appeared at an appointed time and place to meet a CUTOUT, the cutout identified himself by showing the other half of the laundry slip.

HARRY GOLD used one half of a Jell-o box top when he met DAVID GREENGLASS, as proof that Gold was connected to JULIUS ROSENBERG in the ATOMIC SPY RING. When meeting KLAUS FUCHS, Gold carried a pair of gloves in one hand, along with a green-covered book. Fuchs was to carry a ball. Fuchs later was to meet his Soviet handler while carrying in one hand a book by Bennett Cerf with a yellow-and-green dust jacket and in the other hand five books tied with string.

JONATHAN JAY POLLARD was instructed to make a list of pay phones near his apartment. His Israeli HANDLER assigned a Hebrew letter to each one. The handler would call Pollard at home and mention a letter. Pollard would then go to the phone indicated by that letter and wait for the call.

JOHN WALKER got specific instructions for his dead drop, which was near a specific tree. He put his documents in a trash bag, along with cans and bottles which he cleaned (see above). His drop site had to be within a 25-mile radius of the center of Washington, D.C., the area in which Soviet diplomats were allowed to travel without special permission. The safest place for a drop in the metropolis is a wooded area. It is hard to follow people in the woods, and the ordinary objects lying around there—discarded beer cans, other trash, rocks—can be drops.

NELSON C. DRUMMOND, on the first Saturday of the month, walked south on Seventh Avenue in New York City starting at 125th Street, carrying a black bag and wearing a cuff link, with a horse head design in his lapel. A man would approach and ask, "Can you show me the way to the Savoy Ballroom." He was to say, "Yes, I will show you the way."

During his CIA training EDWARD HOWARD was taught to use a JACK IN THE BOX or JIB, a snap-up dummy that someone under surveillance carries in a briefcase after getting into the passenger seat of a car. As soon as the car is temporarily out of sight of the surveillance car, the person in the passenger seat activates the JIB, opens the door, and leaps out. Those in the following car continues to see two figures in the car. Howard successfully escaped from FBI surveillance by making a JIB out of a coat hanger, sawn-off broom handle, his wife's wig holder, and a disguise wig he later claimed to have stolen during his CIA training. He put the baseball cap he had been wearing on the dummy and then jumped from the car while it was making a turn and momentarily out of sight of the tailing FBI car.

Some of the most elaborate tradecraft ever to be made public came from the Moscow dead drop instructions that OLEG PENKOVSKY, a mole in the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, gave to his CIA handlers:

> In the entrance (foyer)—to the left upon entering therein a dial telephone, No. 28, is located. Opposite the hall is a steam heat radiator, painted in oil paint in a dark green color. The radiator is supported by a single metal hook, fastened into the wall. If one stands facing the radiator, then the metal hook will be to the right, at the level of one's hand hanging from the arm.
>
>   Between the wall, to which the hook is attached, and the radiator there is a space of two—three centimeters. For the dead drop, it is proposed to use the hook and the space, open space, between the wall and the radiator.

While serving that dead drop, a CIA officer under diplomatic COVER in Moscow was captured by the KGB.

The CIA communicated with another GRU officer by slipping him a copy of the *National Geographic Magazine*. On a black line in an advertisement on an inside page, CIA technicians using a laser had embedded a microscopic message, similar to a MICRODOT, giving instructions about a dead drop.

The magazine is in the KGB MUSEUM in Moscow. The GRU officer was caught—betrayed by Howard and ALDRICH H. AMES.

●● TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

A form of SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE in which radio intercepts are studied to determine patterns. Even if interceptors are not able to read an enemy's code, they can draw inferences from such elements as the source of a signal, its length, and its regularity in terms of time and wavelength. Relays of the same message indicate connections between, say, army units that are all being given the same orders.

During World War II the Japanese, with virtually no prowess in codebreaking, often relied on traffic analysis to make intelligence estimates. A surge of U.S. traffic sometimes could be tracked, so that a sudden increase of transmissions from Hawaii directed toward the southwest Pacific could mean a move in that direction. Sudden radio silence usually indicated an impending action.

Aware that surges of traffic provided the enemy with an indicator of action, U.S. communications specialists added new disciplines to military traffic. PADDING was added to messages, so that the length—or brevity—of a message would not be an indicator. A more sophisticated method was the opposite of radio silence: a continual stream of number groups; most of them were meaningless, but buried in the stream were real messages.

●● TRAVIS, COMDR. SIR EDWARD

Director of BLETCHLEY PARK, the British codebreaking center, at the beginning of World War II.

The founding director of Bletchley Park (BP) was Comdr. ALASTAIR DENNISTON; Travis was the day-to-day manager.

A Royal Navy officer, Travis tried to run Bletchley Park like a ship. The staff of eccentric dons and undisciplined mathematicians, however, saw Travis as a tyrant. Some complained directly to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Oct. 1941, saying, "we have done everything we possibly can through the normal channels." Well aware of the value of BP, Churchill tried to pacify the complainers by ordering an increase in its staff and resources.

Early in 1942 Denniston was replaced by Travis as director of BP, who also became director-general of BP's parent organization, the GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS (GCHQ). He was so dictatorial that people at BP called him "der Führer." But BP continued to be a phenomenally successful intelligence enterprise.

He retired as head of GCHQ in 1952.

●● TREBITSCH, IGNATZ TIMOTHEUS

(b. 1897 d. ?)

AGENT for German intelligence in Britain before and during World War I and then for a number of countries during a bizarre espionage career that took him from Hungary to China.

Born in Hungary the son of Orthodox Jews, Trebitsch initially studied to become a rabbi at the Jewish Seminary in Hamburg. He left the seminary and went to England, where he abandoned the Jewish faith to become an Anglican. Trebitsch later returned to Hamburg to train for the Lutheran ministry. Then he moved again, this time to Canada.

In Canada he married a German woman and reverted to the Anglican Church. Returning to England in 1902, he became a curate, but resigned in late 1903 to travel extensively in Europe on behalf of British industrialists and politicians, from whom he took money for petroleum speculation. In 1910 he became a member of Parliament (changing his name to Trebitsch Lincoln). By then he was in the employ of German intelligence; he may have been working for Germany since 1902.

On the eve of World War I Trebitsch went bankrupt and did not have the funds to stand for reelection. He offered his services to British NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, was rejected, and fell under suspicion. In early 1915 he fled to the United States, where, backed by funds from the German Consulate in New York City, he wrote anti-British articles.

The United States extradited him to Britain in 1916 on charges of fraud (not espionage). He was tried and given a three-year prison sentence. On his release he went first to Hungary and then to Germany, where he became involved in a right-wing conspiracy. Abandoning Germany, he turned to China, working there for a warlord who was being secretly supported by Britain.

By the early 1920s Trebitsch-Lincoln, as he was then known, was a Buddhist monk working for Chinese intelligence while possibly also working for the British, Germans, Dutch, and Japanese. Now known as Abbot Chao Kung, he played a role in getting former Chinese Emperor Pu Yi into the hands of Japanese military officials, who made Pu Yi the puppet emperor of Manchuria.

"Lincoln was always a modest asset to us even in his old age when we knew he was backing the Japanese. He had a complicated mind, but we probably understood it better than your Westerners," a former officer in the Chinese secret service told espionage writer RICHARD DEACON for his book *Kempei Tai* (1982).

At the beginning of World War II Abbot Chao Kung was said to be making German propaganda broadcasts from *Tibet*. He was reported dead in Oct. 1943, but another report, in May 1947, claimed that he was alive—in India.

●● TREF

Russian slang for secret meeting. The word may have been derived from the Yiddish word for "unclean," that is, nonkosher, food.

●● TRICYCLE   see DUSKO POPOV

●● TRIGON

CODE NAME for a Soviet citizen who was an AGENT for the CIA. The code name appeared in the U.S. press several times in the fall of 1980, when Republican members of Congress claimed that Trigon had been compromised by a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) official who had inadvertently leaked the existence of the agent to an Eastern European diplomat at a Washington party. The issue flared briefly as part of the presidential election campaign between Republican Ronald Reagan and the incumbent Democratic President Jimmy Carter.

As recounted by more leaks from Republican sources, the NSC official's remark was reported by the diplomat in a cable that was intercepted and decoded by the NSA. Carter administration sources said, however, that Trigon had been discovered at least two years before, tried in a Moscow court, and convicted. They said he had been exposed by his own expensive living on his espionage earnings.

●● TRINE   see UMBRA

●● TRIPLE AGENT

An AGENT who serves three intelligence services in an agent capacity but who, like a DOUBLE AGENT, wittingly or unwittingly withholds significant information from two services at the instigation of the third service.

Also see REDOUBLED AGENT.

●● TRITHEMIUS, JOHANNES

(b. 1462 d. 1516)

Fifteenth-Century Benedictine monk in Germany who was one of the most revered figures in occult sciences. His scholarship earned him the accolade "Father of Bibliography."

A year and a half after his death his *Polygraphiae libri sex* (Six Books of Polygraphy) was published in Latin, soon afterwards being reprinted in French and German. Most of the massive volume consisted of columns of words printed in large Gothic type that Trithemius used in his systems of CRYPTOGRAPHY. The work also contained a square table, or tableau, that enabled enciphering through substitution. However, the abbot's most dramatic contribution to the development of codes was that each letter of the PLAIN TEXT was replaced by a word or phrase, so that the enciphered word read like an ordinary sentence.

The first four letters of Trithemius's alphabet could be translated as follows:

A	B	C	D
I hail thee	beautiful	lovely	we hasten
Mary	Pallas	Isis	Astarte

filled	magnified	devoted	enthroned
of grace	of enticement	of knowledge	of charm
the Lord	a god	desire	felicity
with thee	at thy breast	in thy arms	in thy heart
thou art blest	thou art admired	thou art the shield	loved
of women	of the miserable	of all wise men	of lovers
fruit	work	delicacy	treasure
is blest	is eternal	is admirable	is adorable

Thus, through word substitution for letters, the plain text word BAD could be written as "beautiful Mary in thy heart," or "work of women [is] treasure." Trithemius produced 14 such alphabets, and the sender could choose any one of them, stating at the outset to the recipient which one he was employing for the specific message. Because the alphabet is similar for Latin, English, and French, a message (alphabet) in one language could be encoded in another language.

The major problem with the scheme was the large number of words needed to compose a message, which made the operation time-consuming.

Trithemius's book *Steganographio* (Covered Writing), written in 1499, was published in 1606.

●● TROUNG, DAVID

see RONALD L. HUMPHREY

●● TRUST, THE

DECEPTION organization established by the Bolshevik regime in Russia during the revolution of 1917, ostensibly as an association to help overthrow the new Bolshevik government. The organization, formally the Monarchist Association of Central Russia, was established and run by the Bolshevik government, under FELIKS EDMUNDOVICH DZERZHINSKY, in an effort to identify and control anti-Bolshevik efforts.

The Trust acted as a magnet for anti-Bolsheviks, who returned to Russia not knowing that they were being lured into a trap. Outside Russia, the Trust identified the sympathies of émigré groups, confused Western intelligence agencies, and distributed DISINFORMATION about the Bolsheviks.

France and other countries donated funds to the Trust in the belief that they were aiding the anti-Bolshevik Russians. There *was* an anti-Bolshevik movement, the Russian Combined Services Union (ROVS), formed first to foster anti-Bolshevik and then anti-Soviet activities. The Bolsheviks infiltrated the ROVS and kidnapped both its original leader, who died in their hands, and his successor, who was executed in the Soviet Union.

U.S. intelligence analyst John J. Dziak, in his book *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (1988), wrote that the Trust "utilized not only provocation to achieve its counterintelligence goals, but trafficked heavily in forged and other spurious documents and intelligence reports against the émigrés and Western intelligence services."

The Trust was abolished about 1924, in part because of its exposure by SIDNEY REILLY, who went into Russia on a guarantee by the Trust. At its peak the organization had about 5,000 operatives in and out of Russia.

●● TS   TOP SECRET

●● TSUJI, COL. MASANOBU

Japanese Army officer during World War II who subsequently embarked on a mysterious political-espionage career.

Commissioned in 1923, Tsuji was chief of operations and planning on the staff of the 25th Japanese Army in Malaya in Dec. 1941 and the architect of a campaign that was highly successful although notorious for Japanese atrocities.

Tsuji, sought by Allied officials for war crimes after the war, said he was ordered "by the Japanese High Command to disappear and preserve himself for the reconstruction of Japan." He escaped to Thailand, spent some time in China and Indochina, returned to Japan when the Allies restored Japan's sovereignty in 1952, and was elected to the upper house of parliament. He later went to Vietnam as a correspondent for a Japanese newspaper and again disappeared.

Japanese sources said that Tsuji wrote to his family in April 1964 from Saigon saying he would be home by the end of the month. But he disappeared, and four months later Radio Beijing claimed that Tsuji had been killed by AGENTS of the CIA in Laos, a claim U.S. officials denied.

He wrote *Singapore: The Japanese Version* (1960; originally published in Japanese in 1951).

●● TUBERVILLE, SIR THOMAS

English knight who served as a spy in the service of King Philip IV of France. In the Anglo-French War of 1293–1298 he attempted to incite Scots and Welsh against Edward I.

●● TUBMAN, HARRIET   (b. 1821 d. 1913)

Ex-slave who became a spy for the Union during the American Civil War. Born to slave parents in Maryland, Tubman escaped to freedom in Pennsylvania around 1849 by following Polaris, the north star. During the 1850s she became a leading abolitionist and one of the conductors on the Underground Railroad, which brought other slaves, including her own parents, to freedom.

When the Civil War began, she volunteered, first as a Union Army cook, then as a nurse, and finally as a spy. She led Union raiding parties into Confederate territory in Maryland and Virginia.

In 1863 she organized a scouting service consisting of former slaves who could slip through Confederate lines and locate supply dumps. Black river pilots work-

ing for Tubman located Confederate "torpedoes," as river mines were called. After she did the RECONNAISSANCE for a raid up the Combahee River in South Carolina, a Confederate officer reported, "The enemy seems to have been well posted as to the character and capacity of our troops and their small chance of encountering opposition, and to have been well guided by persons thoroughly acquainted with the river and country."

After the war, she tried unsuccessfully to collect $1,800 in back pay. She finally got a pension in 1899—but only as the widow of a veteran. She settled in Auburn, N.Y., opened schools for freedmen in the South, and sponsored a home for poor blacks in Auburn. In acknowledgment of her work during the Civil War, she was buried with full military honors.

●● TUOMI, KAARLO RUDOLPH

Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER who became a DOUBLE AGENT, working for the United States.

Born in the United States, Tuomi was instilled with a love of communism at an early age by his Finnish stepfather. In 1933 his family moved from Michigan to the Soviet Union. Four years later the NKVD arrested his stepfather, who was never seen again.

After working as a lumberjack to support his mother, in 1939 Tuomi was drafted into the Red Army. Although trained for intelligence duty, he was assigned to the infantry when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. During the war he was decorated for bravery.

Leaving the Army in 1946, he enrolled in the Teacher's Institute at Kirov. While there he married one of the daughters of the family with which he was a boarder. Late in 1949 the secret police (MGB) blackmailed Tuomi into working as an informer. After graduating from the institute, he remained—at the MGB's bidding—an English instructor. His career as a teacher-informer continued at other educational activities until 1957, when he was recruited by the KGB to serve as an ILLEGAL in the West.

He was to undergo specialized SPY SCHOOL training for three years. However, the deteriorating relations between the United States and Soviet Union at the time led to Tuomi being seconded to the GRU, Soviet MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, and sent to Western Europe in mid-1958 with the COVER of an American tourist to familiarize himself with Western society. He arrived in Canada in Dec. 1958 carrying the papers of a Finnish-American; once in Canada, he assumed to cover of an American businessman Robert B. White of Chicago. On New Year's Eve he crossed into the United States by train.

After establishing his LEGEND in the United States, he made contact with his GRU HANDLER. Picked up by the FBI, who had him under observation since he had crossed the Canadian border, Tuomi was forced to admit his real identity to U.S. COUNTERESPIONAGE officers. He was turned into a double agent, working as a clerk at Tiffany's and later for a steamship firm while he re-

mained in contact with the GRU and awaited specific assignments. Meanwhile, the FBI had access to all of his communications with the Soviet Union and learned much of the contemporary GRU TRADECRAFT.

In June 1963, scheduled to return to the Soviet Union for a brief visit and then return to the United States, he elected to remain in his native country, leaving his wife and children in the Soviet Union. He disappeared into the population, and not until 1971 did the FBI, in a *Reader's Digest* article, reveal his service as a double agent.

●● TURING, ALAN   (b. 1912 d. 1954)

British mathematician and cryptologist at BLETCHLEY PARK during World War II who led the group that found a way to crack Germany's ENIGMA CIPHER machine.

Turing's maternal grandfather was known as the genius who saved India for Britain by inventing a fan that whisked and cooled the subcontinent's hot, humid air. Following in his grandfather's footsteps, in 1936, two years after graduating from Cambridge, Turing wrote a paper, "On Computable Numbers," forecasting the computer. His theoretical version, called the "universal Turing machine," could, he said, imitate any other machine.

Carrying this theory into reality, Turing and his colleagues at Bletchley Park were presented with an Enigma machine and told to build another machine that could fathom its machinations. The team created the BRONZE GODDESS, a "a large copper-coloured cupboard"; it was a primitive computer that cracked its first codes in April 1940. This was the beginning of ULTRA, the epochal effort that gave the Allies the ability to read German codes.

Later, when the Germans upgraded Enigma, Bletchley Park cryptologists, using Turing's theories, built the COLOSSUS, the first programmable digital computer.

Turing, a long-haired young man in "rumpled and dirty clothes," was a HOMOSEXUAL. When schoolboys were reported molested in a town near Bletchley Park early in 1944, Turing was transferred to a secret MI6 radio laboratory at Hanslope Park in Buckinghamshire. There he worked on a voice scrambler, while at Bletchley Park his colleagues produced the Colossus.

After the war, Turing's homosexuality made him a SECURITY RISK in the opinion of intelligence officials. He died of cyanide poisoning after being convicted in Manchester of being a practicing homosexual.

●● TURN

To transform an AGENT into a DOUBLE AGENT. This is usally done through coercion, as happened in Britain during World War II when the TWENTY COMMITTEE gave German agents the choice of being turned or being executed. Blackmail, often involving SEX, can also help accomplish a turning. Sometimes, however, an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

can persuade a hostile agent to turn for patriotic, altruistic, or monetary reasons.

○○ TURNER, ADM. STANSFIELD   (b. 1923)

Career U.S. naval officer who was DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE from March 1977 to Jan. 1981.

A 1946 graduate of the Naval Academy, Turner served one year at sea and then attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he earned a master's degree in 1950. He subsequently served in various sea assignments, including command of several surface warships (a minesweeper, destroyer, and guided missile destroyer). Turner also served in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), and was executive assistant and naval aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

After attending Harvard Business School he was promoted to rear admiral in 1970. He subsequently commanded a carrier task group and then became head of the Navy's Systems Analysis Division. He became president of the Naval War College in 1972, serving for two years. He next became Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet in the Atlantic. In Sept. 1975 he became the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION's Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, with the rank of admiral.

When President Carter entered office in Jan. 1977, his lack of knowledge of intelligence matters and prospective DCIs led him to select his Naval Academy classmate—whom he barely knew—to serve as DCI. Turner was appointed DCI while on active duty. (He retired from active duty in Dec. 1978.)

As DCI, Turner began shifting the assets of the CIA, emphasizing intelligence gathered from SATELLITES and electronically over reliance on HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, and drastically cutting back on the agency's clandestine operations. He dismissed a number of veterans of the Directorate for Operations and forced nearly 150 more into early retirement. They were told of his decision in a letter that said, "It has been decided that your services are no longer needed."

Turner ran the CIA as an admiral would, giving orders and expecting them to be carried out. He did not like people drinking at lunch. In the Navy, an admiral's displeasure in this regard would have turned subordinates into lunchtime teetotalers; in the CIA, it made him look like a moralistic martinet. His actions created lasting resentment, as did his tendency to second-guess analysts by adding his own views.

Under Turner the CIA drew back its veil of secrecy a bit. He appointed an office of public affairs under a former Navy officer. To counteract anti-CIA attitudes on college campuses, Turner invited university presidents to the CIA for seminars.

After leaving the DCI post, Turner became a lecturer and writer, authoring *Secrecy and Democracy* (1985), an account of his four years as DCI. When he submitted the manuscript for review, CIA officals asked for more than 100 deletions. In a prefatory note, Turner implied that the censorship was aimed more at protecting the CIA than guarding secrets. In 1994, at a conference on intelligence, he sharply criticized the CIA for its failure to predict the toppling of the shah of Iran or the collapse of the Soviet Union.

○○ TWENTY COMMITTEE

The group of British intelligence officials, including wartime amateurs, who held the key to the DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM, which transformed German spies into DOUBLE AGENTS. To German INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, the doubled agents appeared to be operating successfully because they were transmitting back to Germany information that seemed to be valid.

The committee's name came from the pun produced by the Roman numeral XX and its double-cross purpose. It was also called the Double-Cross Committee and the XX Committee. The group provided tantalizing information—an ingenious mixture of real and fake secrets—that the TURNED agents transmitted to a completely deceived ABWEHR, the German intelligence agency that believed it was handling the agents.

The Twenty Committee focused much of the system on BODYGUARD, the overall DECEPTION plan for the Allied invasion of Europe. The plan was developed to help hide the real date, location, and details of D-DAY, the June 1944 Normandy landings. A nonexistent military force, the FIRST U.S. ARMY GROUP, was part of the deception.

The origin of the committee was the W-Board, which consisted of the commander in chief of Home Forces and the directors of military, naval, and air intelligence. The W-Board established a working committee, W-Section, and that became the Twenty Committee, which began meeting in Jan. 1941. Charged with handling COUNTERESPIONAGE against German agents in Great Britain, the committee soon assumed the task of developing deceptive information for the doubled agents.

The British Security Service, MI5, established a special section, B1(a), under. Lt. Col. T. A. Robertson to find and handle German agents. Beginning in Oct. 1941, the Twenty Committee provided B1(a) with the deceptive information supplied to the agents. John Marriott of BI(a) was secretary of the committee.

The chairman of the committee was Sir JOHN MASTERMAN, an Oxford don. The 14 members included Robertson; EWEN MONTAGU of NAVAL INTELLIGENCE; Col. John H. Bevan of the LONDON CONTROLLING STATION (for ULTRA); and representatives of the chief of staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and various other British intelligence agencies. Norman Holmes Pearson, head of X-2, the counterintelligence branch of the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, was part of the committee but technically was not a member. Montagu conceived of another elaborate deception plan, MINCEMEAT, to throw off the Germans prior to the Allied invasion of Sicily.

Masterman attributed the near-perfect attendance record of the committee to the fact that he always provided tea and excellent buns.

Also see DUSKO POPOV.

○○ TYPEX

The principal British CIPHER machine used for higher-classification encryptions during World War II.

Development of the Typex began with a 1926 inter-departmental committee established to examine the value of cipher machines to replace the BOOK CIPHERS then in use by all three British military services, as well as the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the India Office. During this period the British purchased two ENIGMA machines for evaluation.

In Jan. 1935 the committee recommended that the Air Ministry procure three cipher machines of an improved Enigma type, referred to as Type X. The development and procurement of the machine—soon known as Typex—was successful, and by Sept. 1939, when war began in Europe, the War Office (Army) and Air Ministry (Royal Air Force) had adopted the machine for use with high-grade ciphers. The Royal Navy, however, decided against the Typex, remaining dependent upon cipher and code books. (Not until late 1943 did the Navy began adopting a cipher machine—the Combined Cypher Machine—used by the U.S., British, and Canadian Navies; it was based on the U.S. SIGABA machine.)

The Typex was a multirotor machine similar in principal to the Enigma. The Typex was considered fast, efficient, and secure. Although the British lost several Typex machines to the Germans at Dunkirk and in North Africa early in the war, the Germans undertook no serious effort to break into the Typex ciphers. (Similarly, there was no major German effort to solve ciphers produced by the Combined Cypher Machine.)

Operational units, the Army down to division headquarters, and all major ground commands of the Royal Air Force used the Typex, which was also used by all British SPECIAL LIAISON UNITS except for those in the China-Burma-India Theater, which employed the U.S. Sigaba. A few U.S. units used Typex.

●● U-2

The world's best-known spyplane. The U-2 is a U.S. photo and electronic RECONNAISSANCE aircraft developed specifically for intelligence collection over the Soviet Union. The aircraft was flown over the Soviet Union from July 1956 until May 1960. It was subsequently flown over other TARGET areas, including Cuba, Indochina, and China (the China flights also being made by Taiwanese pilots). More than 800 U-2 flights were made over the Persian Gulf region in 1990–1991. The U-2 has continued in front-line service through the 1990s, outlasting its planned successor, the SR-71 BLACKBIRD aircraft, in first-line service.

Work on the U-2 began about 1953 as a BLACK program sponsored by the CIA, with RICHARD M. BISSELL as the program manager. CLARENCE (KELLY) JOHNSON, head of the Lockheed SKUNK WORKS, was the chief designer. President Eisenhower, who personally approved the production of 30 U-2 aircraft, supported the U-2 because of concern that Soviet strategic nuclear weapon developments could threaten the United States with a surprise attack in a nuclear version of the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

In 1954 Eisenhower had asked JAMES R. KILLIAN, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to chair a panel to look into the potential of long-range, strategic missile developments. Some 50 distinguished scientists and engineers from academia, laboratories, and the government were assembled to look into various aspects of strategic offensive weapons, strategic defense, and strategic intelligence technologies. EDWIN H. LAND of Polaroid fame chaired a subpanel on intelligence; the

panel's highly classified report of Feb. 1955 began: "We *must* find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross under-estimation of the threat." The panel urged U-2 operations.

The U-2 was to fly over Soviet territory at altitudes above 60,000 feet. Essentially a powered glider, it had "such a unique configuration that there was little chance of its being mistaken for a bomber," according to Eisenhower's memoirs, *Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (1963). In addition to cameras, the early U-2s had a miniaturized ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) system, more advanced than any previously built, to collect Soviet radar signals. The reconnaissance systems were regularly updated; the U-2B of the early 1960s had a camera fitted with a 944.7-millimeter lens that could take 4,000 paired photos of a strip of earth 125 miles by 2,174 miles.

The U-2 flew for the first time on Aug. 1, 1955. The first U-2 OVERFLIGHT of the Soviet Union took place on July 4, 1956, with Moscow the primary target. The following year a U-2 was reported to have looked down on the first Soviet intercontinental missile on its launcher at Tyuratam, east of the Aral Sea.

The flights over the Soviet Union were piloted by civilian pilots under contract to the CIA, actually on loan from the Air Force; the planes were initially assigned to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons (Provisional). U-2s were assigned to the U.S. Air Force beginning in June 1957 and subsequently all strategic reconnaissance U-2s were assigned to the Air Force.

U.S. Air Force U-2 intelligence collection aircraft. (LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS)

The 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale Air Force, Calif., took over U-2 operations. From 1982 to 1991 the 17th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing was established at Alconbury Royal Air Force Base, England, for U-2 and TR-1 operations.

British pilots also trained to fly the U-2, and in 1958 President Eisenhower persuaded Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to have his pilots overfly the Soviet Union. The first of several British-piloted U-2 overflights was made on Aug. 24, 1958.

When the U-2 was built it was estimated that it would be able to fly safely over the Soviet Union for only two years before the Soviets would be able to detect it and shoot it down. But all 24 overflights of the Soviet Union between 1956 and 1960 were tracked by Soviet radar. On May 1, 1960, a U-2B flown by CIA pilot FRANCIS GARY POWERS was shot down by a Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile near the industrial center of Sverdlovsk in central Russia. Powers had taken off from Peshawar, Pakistan, and had intended to cross the Soviet Union and land in Bödo, Norway, in a nine-and-a-half-hour flight covering 3,788 miles—of which 2,919 miles would be over the Soviet Union. Apparently several SA-2 missiles were fired by the air defense unit commanded by Maj. M. R. Voronov. The U-2 seems to have suffered an engine problem and as it lost altitude it was severely damaged by an SA-2 missile.

Powers's aircraft was fitted with a plastic explosive linked to a delayed timing switch that he was to initiate prior to ejecting from the aircraft. He was unable to initiate the destruct mechanism, however, and upon parachuting to the ground was immediately captured. The wreckage of his crashed aircraft was later placed on display in Gor'kiy Park in Moscow.

The Powers U-2 flight occurred 15 days before a scheduled summit conference of major world leaders in Paris. As a result of the U-2 incident, Premier Nikita Khrushchev demanded an apology at the conference from President Eisenhower, causing the collapse of the meeting and a worsening of American-Soviet relations. Following this incident U-2s were no longer flown over the Soviet Union, but they continued to be flown over other areas of interest to the United States.

U-2s were flown extensively over Cuba; the first flight, personally authorized by Eisenhower, was made on Oct. 27, 1960, by a CIA aircraft. On the night of Oct. 13–14, 1962, Air Force pilots began making the Cuba flights. The U-2s revealed the buildup of Soviet weapons on the Caribbean island, precipitating the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. On Oct. 27, 1962, a U-2 piloted by Air Force Maj. RUDOLF ANDERSON, JR.,was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile; Anderson was killed.

U-2 flights over China flown by Nationalist pilots from Taiwan began early in 1960. The first Taiwanese U-2 loss occurred in Sept. 1962, and China eventually claimed to have shot down a total of nine Taiwanese U-2s during the 1960s. (The last flight over China was made in June 1974.) U.S.-Taiwan U-2 losses totaled more than 40 aircraft shot down and lost in accidents.

About 60 aircraft of the U-2A/B/C series were built from 1955 to 1969. These aircraft were periodically modified and updated before the last was retired in 1989. At least 12 larger, more capable U-2R models were manufactured in the late 1960s; they were fitted with advanced reconnaissance radar and a variety of electronic sensors as well as cameras. Then the TR-1 *Tactical Reconnaissance* version, similar to the U-2R, was developed to provide surveillance over European battlefields. From 1979 to 1989 the Air Force took delivery of 27 TR-1s, while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) received two similar *Earth Resources* ER-1 models. (The TR-1s were redesignated U-2R in 1991.) NASA also flew several earlier U-2s.

While U-2 production numbers are still secret, probably up to 100 have been built.

At least two U-2R COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) aircraft were fitted with a large, airfoil-shaped radome on a short dorsal pylon to relay COMINT data by SATELLITE; several U-2s and two TR-1s had a second position for pilot training. The Navy flew two U-2s with special radar to evaluate an ocean surveillance role, but that program was canceled. U-2s fitted with arresting hooks have flown from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, the U-2 having been designed from the outset for such operations.

The early U-2s had a single turbojet engine with a maximum speed of 430 mph; a more powerful engine increased this to 528 mph in the later U-2C, and the current U-2R has a top speed of 510 mph. The ceiling for the U-2 was originally some 60,000 feet (85,000 feet for the U-2C and 90,000 feet for the U-2R). The early U-2s had a range of 2,200 miles, extended to 3,000 miles in the U-2C, and 3,500 miles in the U-2R. A few U-2C aircraft were fitted for in-flight refueling to extend their range.

Also see RAINBOW.

∞∞ UKUSA AGREEMENT

". . . quite likely the most secret agreement ever entered into by the English-speaking world," is the way JAMES BAMFORD described the UKUSA Agreement in his seminal study *The Puzzle Palace* (1982).

UKUSA—the United Kingdom–United States of America Security Agreement—is the successor to the BRUSA AGREEMENT (British-U.S. Agreement) of 1943, which provided for the full exchange of SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) and cooperation in the SIGINT effort between the two Allies. The 1947 UKUSA agreement essentially combined the SIGINT efforts of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as well as those of the United States and Great Britain. Each of the five nations had spheres of cryptologic coverage, some of which were shared; for example, Britain made use of its listening post in Hong Kong and the United States its listening posts in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to provide SIGINT coverage of mainland China.

The UKUSA nations agreed to use standardized CODE WORDS, terminology, intercept-handling techniques, and security procedures. All rules and procedures were spelled out in a comprehensive document known as the International Regulations on SIGINT (IRSIG), although "international" in this context meant a highly classified procedure shared by only five nations.

The UKUSA agreement has survived political events that have divided the United States and Great Britain, albeit temporarily, such as differences over the Suez campaign of 1956. Still, periodic accusations have been made on both the British and U.S. sides that the other has cheated on the agreement. PETER WRIGHT, scientist at Britain's Security Service (MI5), in his *Spycatcher* (1987), wrote of learning that one WILLIAM K. HARVEY was establishing a Staff D section in the CIA: "If the Americans wanted to mount a cipher attack and did not wish to share the product with us, or if they wanted to operate against the UK, or a Commonwealth country, *as we were sure they were doing,* Staff D was the obvious place from which to do it." [Emphasis added]

∞∞ ULTAN, DONALD

Brooklyn-born employee of the U.S. Embassy in VIENNA who was a TARGET for Soviet intelligence because he was a CODE clerk—the highest priority for KGB and GRU efforts. In this complex and somewhat bizarre plan, which unfolded in the 1960s, a Soviet AGENT who was a naturalized citizen of a Western country invited a close friend of Ultan for a drink, thus enabling a "chance" meeting in a cafe with a semiretired Belgian businessman who was, of course, a KGB officer.

This encounter in turn led to a meeting with Ultan. The KGB officer never appeared to be particularly interested in Ultan but instead scheduled more encounters with Ultan's friend. There followed many hours of friendly meetings in cafes and coffee houses, chess playing, and an occasional outing. Ultan, who was Jewish and, like most Belgians, fluent in French, began a pleasant association with the Belgian, who claimed also to be Jewish (and to have relatives in Israel).

Only after five months did the KGB agent ask Ultan to provide code information for money. After a brief delay, Ultan went to the embassy security officer and revealed the KGB contact. The Soviet effort against Ultan was sophisticated and, in the words of a U.S. intelligence report on the incident, "well-planned."

∞∞ ULTRA

The generic term for COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) obtained by Britain and the United States during World War II. Ultra consisted of the CRYPTANALYSIS of all German radio communications employing the ENIGMA machine *and* Japanese military communications employing enciphering machines. However, deciphered Japanese diplomatic communications were known as MAGIC.

Early in World War II the British used a variety of CODE WORDS at various times for high-grade COMINT, among them Sidar, Swell, and Zymotic; they soon settled on Ultra, Pearl, and Thumb as the three code words for COMINT, in descending order of importance. With the BRUSA AGREEMENT of 1943 the U.S. coebreaking agencies adopted the British terminology, with Pearl and Thumb later replaced by the single CODE WORD Pinup.

Prior to 1941 the British circulated the decryptions of German radio traffic under the code name BONIFACE, the implication being that the information was supplied by a SECRET AGENT. Subsequently, the classification Ultra SECRET was employed. Initially the precise use of the term was only as a security grading for outgoing signals and documents; the actual information itself was referred to as SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE or "Z" (see Z PRIORITIES).

Ultra had a key role in many Allied victories, the most important being the Battle of the Atlantic (Sep. 1939–May 1945). The longest "battle" and in several respects most vital and complex theater of World War II,

the Atlantic was a vital route for Britain to bring in supplies to survive and for the United States to build up troops, aircraft, and other war matériel to take to the European theater of operations.

The Battle of the Atlantic was a close battle: "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril . . . ," wrote Prime Minister Churchill, "I was even more anxious about this battle that I had been about the glorious air fight called the Battle of Britain." Both the German U-boat command and the Allies were heavily dependent upon CRYPTANALYSIS for their respective successes.

The German B-DIENST service was able to give the U-boat command precise information of the routing of Allied convoys during the early part of the war. The Allied codebreaking effort gave invaluable information on U-boat movements, in the end having more effect on the outcome of the battle. The distinguished German naval historian Jürgen Rohwer, who served in U-boats at the end of the war, concluded:

> If we have to place the many factors which decided the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic in the order of precedence, we should place Ultra at the top, followed by the closing of the air-gap in the North Atlantic, the high-frequency direction-finding equipped escort and [antisubmarine] support groups, the introduction of decimeter radar, etc.

Dr. Rohwer believes that without the Ultra successes the Battle of the Atlantic would still have been won by the Allies, but that the turn in favor of the Allies would have occurred much later than the spring of 1943.

●● UMBRA

Overall U.S. CODE WORD for the highest-grade SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) derived from KEYHOLE-series SATELLITES and possibly other sources. The code names Trine and Dinar were apparently used earlier for Cold War SIGINT.

These code words were also used by the British on their SIGINT material under the terms of the UKUSA AGREEMENT.

●● UMBRELLA GUN   see GEORGI MARKOV

●● U.N.C.L.E.   see TELEVISION

●● UNDERCOVER AGENT   see SECRET AGENT

●● UNITED KINGDOM

see England–Great Britain–United Kingdom

●● UNITED NATIONS

Since its founding near the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) has been a magnet for spies. While delegates from Allied countries were meeting in San Francisco in 1945 to create the UN, the United States was eavesdropping. Using what had become standard radio intercept and codebreaking techniques, American intelligence-monitoring organizations were picking up diplomatic messages between San Francisco and embassies in Washington and then relaying them to high-level officials in Washington as MAGIC diplomatic intercepts.

Many of these diplomatic intercepts were kept secret until 1993, and even then the released documents were censored. The NSA, although finally admitting in 1993 that the United States had eavesdropped on some Allies, was still sensitive about certain intercepts of presumably friendly diplomats.

The Soviet Union was also quick to see the UN as a potential hub of espionage. DONALD MACLEAN, a longtime Soviet MOLE in the British Foreign Office, was frequently involved in UN matters. In the spring of 1945 he argued strongly for the Soviet position on two key UN issues: the Soviet right of veto in the Security Council and UN membership for the Ukraine and Belorussian Republics, which in effect gave the Soviet Union three votes in the UN General Assembly.

In 1946 the Soviets, in a proposal aimed at the United States and Britain, introduced a resolution requiring each UN member to declare the number and location of its armed forces on the territories of other countries. To produce a response, Maclean worked with the director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs, whose responsibilities included the UN. The director was ALGER HISS, who would later be accused but never convicted of spying for the Soviets. The two men exchanged information on their respective nations' overseas troops. So Maclean was able to report to the Soviets that the United States had troops in 108 locations—including 52,590 in South Korea. That information was of particular interest in 1950 when the Korean War began.

From its inception to the end of the Cold War the UN and its subordinate agencies (especially those in Geneva and VIENNA) were among the favorite operating sites for Soviet intelligence gathering—and for the spy-hunting agents of the FBI. The first known case involving an American and a UN spy came in March 1949 when JUDITH COPLON, a Justice Department employee, was arrested carrying documents she was about to hand over to Valentin Gubitchev, a Soviet assigned to the UN group planning what the future UN building on the East River. (At that time the UN headquarters was at Lake Success, Long Island.) Gubitchev was sentenced to 15 years for espionage but was allowed to leave the country.

Until the mid-1950s the Soviets maintained tight restrictions on staffing UN positions, fearing that exposure to the West would inspire defections. Then, as former colonies in Africa and elsewhere became independent and sought UN membership, Soviet intelligence officials saw

the possibility of using the UN as a rendezvous for Soviet INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS and Third World leaders. KGB officers also promoted "the connection between UN and Soviet front organizations, such as the World Peace Council," according to a 1985 report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

By obtaining positions in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Soviet intelligence officers gained access to Western nuclear information. One of the Soviets' earliest introductions to data-bank technology came in 1974, when a Soviet official attending a UN meeting in New York was shown *The New York Times* data-bank system. The following week the wife of the KGB RESIDENT in New York began using the UN's data bank to tap into the *Times* data bank, making the acquisition of OPEN SOURCE intelligence much easier.

ARKADY SHEVCHENKO, an Under Secretary General of the UN, became the highest-ranking Soviet official to defect to the United States. Several other Soviet defectors from the UN helped the FBI to expose spies in the United States. One of the defectors was a Pole who led the FBI to WILLIAM H. BELL, a Hughes Aircraft Corp. employee who was later convicted of espionage.

In the halls of the UN, Shevchenko later wrote, it was easy to distinguish regular diplomats from KGB operatives:

> The first giveaway was money. The KGB . . . spent it much more generously than real diplomats. A Foreign Ministry employee would need to hoard the dollar portion of his salary for as much as a year or more before he could afford to buy a used American car. KGB agents had the cash to get one as soon as they arrived in New York. They also had money to entertain lavishly. A mid-level Mission or Secretariat staffer who is regularly seen treating non-Soviets to round after round of drinks is almost certainly using KGB funds . . .
>
> (UN employees wryly referred to their Soviet colleagues' espionage as their other work.)

A 1985 report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said, "Approximately one-fourth of the Soviets in the UN Secretariat are intelligence officers and many more are co-opted by the KGB or GRU. All Soviets in the Secretariat must respond to KGB requests for assistance." Another 200 UN employees came from Eastern Bloc nations that routinely contributed intelligence information to the Soviets.

In Feb. 1972, as U.S. and Soviet negotiators were working on the antiballistic missile treaty and SALT I strategic arms limitations agreement, FBI agents arrested Valery Markelov, a Soviet intelligence officer who worked under the cover of a translator at the UN. He was charged with getting classified documents about the F-14A Tomcat fighter from a Grumman engineer, who turned out to be a DOUBLE AGENT working for the FBI. (Three months later, as President Nixon was about to have a summit meeting with Brezhnev, the U.S. government quietly quashed the espionage indictment and Markelov, who had been out on bail, was allowed to return to the Soviet Union.)

In 1973, Anatoliy Andreyev, an intelligence officer working as a UN librarian, met a civilian employee of the U.S. Department of Defense at a librarians' conference. For a year the two exchanged unclassified documents of "mutual" interest. Then Andreyev offered to help the American financially in exchange for specific classified documents. After a protest to the United Nations, the Soviet quietly left the United States.

An attempt by Soviet UN spies to recruit Lt. Comdr. ARTHUR LINDBERGH touched off a diplomatic incident in 1977. Similar approaches to members of the U.S. armed forces were tried by UN employees or officials from Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries. In one case the Soviet intelligence officer, a UN translator, was arrested but not tried. Even though he did not have diplomatic immunity, he was allowed to return to the Soviet Union in what many observers believed was a secret deal involving the release of a U.S. agent.

UN assignments permitted Soviets to travel to areas of the United States (and other countries) where Soviet citizens would normally not be allowed to go. But perhaps most dangerous from the West's viewpoint, senior Soviet officials in the United Nations had access to the personal files of all UN employees, permitting them to identify potential collaborators and blackmail victims.

When the Cold War ended, spying waned at the UN. The republics of the former Soviet Union were more interested in gaining membership and seeking aid than in continuing espionage.

●● UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)

see REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLE

★ ●● UNITED STATES

Spying is as American as GEORGE WASHINGTON and GEORGE BUSH, spymasters at two significant junctures in American history. Washington fostered MILITARY INTELLIGENCE that helped to win the American Revolution, 1775–1783. Bush, as DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) and then as President, oversaw the CIA, a singularly American institution, for it works secretly in an open society.

Washington and Bush were not the only presidents to have direct involvement with intelligence and COVERT ACTION. Gen. Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of New Orleans in Jan. 1815, secretly got aid from Jean Lafitte, the notorious pirate (foreshadowing CIA-Mafia plotting in the 1960s). Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, on March 12, 1898, gave instructions to Lt. G. L. Dyer, the naval ATTACHÉ at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, in CIPHER. "Abrolhando geoselenic abtruppen," began one message, ordering Dyer to inform the Navy about Spanish Navy ships that were sailing to Havana. The U.S. battleship *Maine* had been sunk in Havana Harbor on Feb. 15, and war with Spain was a month away.

For Washington, intelligence was vital to victory in the Revolution. He sometimes acted like a CASE OFFICER, directly running AGENTS, giving specifics on the use of SECRET WRITING, telling an INTELLIGENCE OFFICER that he wanted "Intelligence of the Enemy's situation & numbers—what kind of Troops they are, and Guards they have—their strength and where posted." He also knew the absolute cardinal rule of espionage: "There can be scarcely any need of recommending the greatest Caution and secrecy in a Business so critical and dangerous."

COVERT ACTION, psychological warfare, and special operations were all phrases of the future. Washington, however, saw the need for irregular action against an enemy and in 1776 ordered Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton, a hero of the Battle of Bunker Hill, to form a RECONNAISSANCE unit of volunteers able to gather intelligence "either by water or by land, by night or by day." The unit became known as the Knowlton Rangers, the first official U.S. Army military intelligence organization.

In that same grim year of the Revolution a young officer, NATHAN HALE, volunteered to go behind British lines and spy. The mission failed and Hale died on a British gallows. With the Knowlton Rangers and the legendary heroism of Nathan Hale, the U.S. Army took its first steps toward establishing an intelligence service.

On Nov. 29, 1775, the Continental Congress created the first U.S. agency for collecting foreign intelligence, the COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. The Congress declared that "the sole purpose" of the committee of was for "Corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world." But the real, unstated purpose was the gathering of intelligence; the chairman, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, shared with Washington a firm belief in the importance of this activity.

By 1777 Washington had set up an intelligence service, initiating direct correspondence with the patriotic Committees of Safety in each of the colonies, and bringing more structure to his use of spies. (See CULPER RING, Maj. BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.)

As President, Washington guided the new nation through the shoals of democracy and confronted the first attempt at congressional oversight. In 1791 Congress established a committee to investigate a defeat suffered by an Army expedition against the Indians. Washington's cabinet recommended that the executive branch "ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit & ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public." Washington decided to cooperate with Congress and presented the information, setting a precedent that would be cited in the 1970s when Congress began questioning CIA covert actions.

As the young United States of America grew westward beyond the Cumberland Mountains, the Army sent off expeditions—Lewis and Clark to the Northwest, Pike to Colorado—that were partly intelligence missions. Capt. Benjamin L. E. Bonneville, heading out on an expedition beyond the Rockies in 1832, was ordered to gather intelligence on the "warriors that may be in each tribe or nation that you meet with. . . ."

Military intelligence and NAVAL INTELLIGENCE played insignificant roles in the War of 1812. There was no Gen. Washington demanding intelligence. Spying was on the level of scouts, brave men sent out on reconnaissance missions.

During the American Civil War spies served on both sides, an easy enough undertaking because the people on both sides were Americans and the borders between North and South were difficult to discern and always changing. The Confederacy used many women as agents. Among them were BELLE BOYD, who outwitted ALLAN PINKERTON, the Union's COUNTERINTELLIGENCE expert, and Rose Greenhow, a wealthy Washington party giver who picked up POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE from her guests and passed it on through one of the many NETWORKS the Confederates ran in Washington. (JOHN WILKES BOOTH, who assassinated President Lincoln, was an agent in one of these.)

Neither the Union nor the Confederacy had a formal, top-level military intelligence service. Pinkerton, private detective turned spymaster, and his successor, LAFAYETTE C. BAKER, are often described as "intelligence chiefs" for the Union during the war. In fact, there was no such chief and there was no civilian-run intelligence organization working for the Union. But a military BUREAU OF INFORMATION was set up by Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. SHARPE.

After the war, the Army and Navy founded permanent intelligence offices. (See ARMY INTELLIGENCE, U.S., and NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S.) In 1882 Secretary of State John Watson Foster (grandfather of ALLEN W. DULLES, future DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE), posted military attachés to London, BERLIN, Paris, VIENNA, and St. Petersburg, ostensibly to gather books and publications "to give early notice of any new or important publications or inventions or improvements in arms."

From the Spanish-American War (1898) came the saga of the "message to Garcia," carried by a U.S. Army intelligence officer, Lt. Andrew S. Rowan, to Gen. Calixto García y Iñigues, the commander of the Cuban rebel army.

The ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM, a complex foreign intelligence operation, helped to draw the United States into World War I. On Jan. 16, 1917, German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann sent a telegram to the German ambassador to Mexico revealing plans for imminent unrestricted submarine warfare—and instructing the German ambassador to offer Mexico an alliance with Germany and promise that "Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona." The telegram was intercepted and decrypted by British naval intelligence (see ROOM 40) and was revealed to the United States to stoke U.S. rage against Germany. On April 2, 1917, when President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war, he cited the telegram as proof that Germany "means to act against our peace and security."

The British prowess in handling the Zimmermann telegram showed how superior and sophisticated were the intelligence capabilities of Britain compared with the limited resources of the United States. When the United States entered the war, the U.S. Army General Staff had a Military Information Division but no significant intelligence service. Largely through the efforts of a pioneering officer, Maj. RALPH H. VAN DEMAN, the American Expeditionary Force had a Military Intelligence Division. He

also created the Army's Corps of Intelligence Police, an odd band of criminals, vagabonds, and ordinary soldiers who had nothing in common except that they could all speak French. Patrolling forward areas, they hunted spies and saboteurs.

Maj. Van Deman also launched the Army's first extensive DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE campaign, soldiers joining with civilians to track down spies and draft dodgers on the home front. The campaign was a prelude to the postwar searches for "Reds" and subversives.

REDS AND SPIES

World War I brought an end to U.S. innocence about intelligence and subversion. Modern U.S. spy and counterspy organizations are outgrowths of ideas and organizations developed mainly during the war. In the hunt for Germany's spies and saboteurs, intelligence organizations sprang up in the State Department, the Army, the Navy, and the Justice Department. The legal basis for their work was the Espionage Act of 1917, which made giving aid to a U.S. enemy unlawful. In 1918 the act was amended to prohibit speech or writing "intended to incite resistance to the United States or promote the cause of its enemies." This act, much amended, has remained the nation's basic espionage law. Its view of espionage as an ideological menace has also persisted.

The Sedition Act was passed in 1918, and in 1919 Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., set forth guidelines for when a real or imagined need for national security can abridge the constitutional right of freedom of speech. In an opinion on an espionage case, Holmes said, "When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight." Going beyond wartime, Holmes said that Congress has a right to put the nation above an individual when absolute freedom of speech would create "a clear and present danger." That phrase would ring down the years, echoing especially in the Cold War to explain away executive branch abuses of power.

Soon after the war, reacting to public panic toward "Red" threats of revolution reaching America from Russia, the Justice Department became the focal point for actions against suspected subversives and spies. The department's Bureau of Investigation (BOI) was the principal U.S. weapon against spies, though the bureau drew upon help from the OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI). The BOI went after Reds and aliens with a particular vengeance under its aggressive young director, J. EDGAR HOOVER, who continued his long reign as the BOI evolved into the FBI.

Besides the real and imaginary home-grown Reds there was the Soviet variety. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917, the United States withheld recognition of the regime. In the 1920s the Soviet Union was represented by the American Trading Organization (AMTORG), one of whose founders was FELIKS DZERZHINSKY, director of the CHEKA, the Bolshevik secret police. Although Amtorg did engage in trade, it also engaged in espionage. Many Amtorg officials were Soviet intelligence officers seeking industrial and military secrets and recruiting Americans, especially members of the American Communist Party, as spies.

After U.S. recognition of the Soviet regime in 1933, Soviet military attachés joined their civilian comrades in trying to acquire U.S. secrets. Adm. William H. Standley, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, complained, "Russian attachés, military, naval, and commercial, picked up everything—copies of all technical and trade magazines and military and naval professional magazines, blueprints, and everything from nuts and bolts to washing machines, tractors, and combine harvesters." (Standley later served as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from Feb. 1942 to Oct. 1943.)

Japan was also gathering intelligence, especially about the U.S. Fleet and its bases, as early as 1912, when the new battleship *Arkansas* arrived in Panama carrying President Taft for an inspection of the Canal Zone. An observant U.S. Navy officer looked warily at Japanese waiters, barbers, and fishermen who were seeking information. "We suspected that some of them were spies," he later reported, "but the general attitude was: 'So what!' "

Not of that attitude was John A. Gade, a New York banker and former U.S. naval attaché, who in 1929 approached the Navy's district intelligence officer in New York and discussed ideas about "some sort of a central Intelligence Agency" that would report directly to President Hoover. In his proposal he said that, compared with other countries, Americans "were amateurs where they were past masters." Gates suggested placing a "National Intelligence Service" in the State Department, with a "Chief Central Officer" at the "Central hub of the Wheel of Information."

The idea died aborning, primarily because of opposition by military intelligence chiefs. Besides, neither Hoover nor his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, had any interest in intelligence. The State Department had a Division of Foreign Intelligence; all it actually did was distribute, primarily to government officials and members of Congress, "items of any news value" culled from public foreign sources. The War Department had the BLACK CHAMBER, a codebreaking group organized in 1913 by HERBERT O. YARDLEY. It operated during World War I and was still busy when Stimson discovered it. He ceased funding it, reputedly remarking, "Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail." (The Army did continue the codebreaking organization; see below.)

The Navy's ONI did little more than collect information on foreign navies and commercial fleets. The ONI did not evaluate the information it gathered, primarily from naval attachés, one of whom remembered being told that "reputation and career did not profit" from any ventures into "questionable activities." G-2, as U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE was generally known, mustered about 90 people in 1922; by 1929, there were only 74; and in 1936, the number dropped to a low of 66.

In May 1940, with the European War eight months old, the British Security Service (MI5) discovered that TYLER KENT, a CODE clerk in the U.S. Embassy in London, was smuggling copies of transatlantic conversations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston

Churchill to a pro-German organization. When U.S. State Department officials heard of Kent's arrest, they first asked the Army's G-2 for help. When G-2 said it could not "guarantee service," the State Department turned to the FBI, until then thought of as the agency of G-men who tracked down gangsters, not spies. Before the FBI could get involved, the British had tried, convicted, and jailed Kent.

OSS TO CIA

Japan's PEARL HARBOR ATTACK on Dec. 7, 1941, revealed to U.S. political and military leaders the incredible shambles of U.S. intelligence—a collection of bickering, uncoordinated, understaffed agencies. Almost lost in the outrage over this intelligence failure was the fact that U.S. CRYPTOLOGY had already given the United States the ability to read some Japanese codes and would soon deliver the aptly named MAGIC—decrypted radio intercepts that would help to win the war. (See EDWIN T. LAYTON, THEODORE S. WILKINSON, and WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN.)

"It's a good thing that you got me started on this," President Roosevelt said to WILLIAM J. DONOVAN at 2 A.M. on Dec. 8 1941. Roosevelt had founded the Office of CO-ORDINATOR OF INFORMATION (OCI), the executive branch's first intelligence organization independent of the armed services, in July 1941 and had appointed Donovan, a World War I hero, to head it. In June 1942 the OCI became the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS) under Donovan.

The creation of the OSS gave the United States an agency that would engage in espionage and covert action throughout the world during World War II. The OSS gathered and evaluated intelligence while also running guerrilla and subversive operations against the enemy. This double mission of intelligence and covert action would form the pattern for the postwar spawn of the OSS, the CIA.

While the OSS often operated as a freewheeling outfit answerable only to Donovan, military leaders worked on ways to coordinate the intelligence agencies of the U.S. armed services. The result was the Joint Intelligence Committee, whose members included intelligence representatives from the Army, Navy, the State Department, the OSS, and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Rooted in the origin of the OSS was the idea that bright young graduates of Ivy League colleges could give an intellectual underpinning to a profession that traditionally had relied on the gleanings of humdrum military attachés. As Yale professor Robin W. Winks wrote in *Cloak & Gown* (1987):

> More than once a non-Yale, indeed non-Ivy League member of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II would find, at some remote outpost in south or southeast Asia, or in Africa, that both American and British intelligence officers, whether desk bound or spooks back from the field, would conclude a festive occasion by linking arms and singing the "Whiffenpoof Song."

The FBI's Hoover and senior military intelligence officers fought the OSS. While Donovan's people were able to carry out espionage and sabotage behind enemy lines in North Africa, Europe, and the China-Burma-India Theater, they were unsuited for the war in the Pacific. And in the Southwest Pacific theater (which came to include the Philippines), Gen. Douglas MacArthur already had his own espionage organization (see ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU). Hoover also resented what he perceived as intrusions of British intelligence (see BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION, DUSKO POPOV, WILLIAM STEPHENSON). Hoover staked out Latin America and the United States as FBI spy-hunting grounds, and the bureau rapidly demonstrated its new skills. (See WILLIAM COLEPAUGH, DUQUESNE SPY RING, ERICH GIMPEL, WILLIAM G. SEBOLD.)

The FBI's Soviet espionage squad in New York City also kept a quiet watch on Soviet spies working from the spy nest that was the Soviet Consulate. Arrests of Soviet spies were rare because U.S. officials did not want to disturb a touchy wartime ally. One of the few Soviets arrested in the 1940s was GAIK OVAKIMIAN, who had been running spies in North America since the 1930s.

The extent of Soviet espionage was not realized until, just after the war ended, IGOR S. GOUZENKO, a CODE clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, defected and provided material that revealed the existence of an ATOMIC SPY RING involving British scientists KLAUS FUCHS and ALAN NUNN MAY, along with JULIUS ROSENBERG and his wife, Ethel, and other Americans.

In 1939 the U.S. Army SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS) had begun collecting intercepted encrypted Soviet cables between the United States and Moscow. In a project code-named VENONA, the SIS in 1943 began trying to decrypt the messages. Not until the summer of 1946 was a codebreaker able to read portions of messages that had been sent between Soviet intelligence officers in New York and their superiors in Moscow. In Dec. 1946, he broke into another message sent to Moscow two years earlier. It contained a list of the leading scientists working on the U.S. atomic bomb.

THE COLD WAR BEGINS

On Aug. 29, 1945, near Hamhung, Korea, Soviet fighters fired on and forced down an American B-29 SUPERFORTRESS that was dropping supplies to Allied prisoners of war. World War II had been over for 15 days. Unknown to the crew of the B-29, the Cold War had begun.

An "Iron Curtain," in Winston Churchill's memorable phrase, slammed down on Eastern Europe. To pierce that curtain, or at least peer behind it, the United States began to develop a massive intelligence apparatus. Donovan had seen the need and had urged President Truman to create, around the core of the OSS, a peacetime intelligence agency separate from the military services. Truman resisted the idea. When he abolished the OSS on Oct. 1, 1945, he gave the OSS Research and Analysis Branch to the State Department; OSS clandestine and counterintelligence resources became the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) in the War Department.