Training of new members involved giving the recruits "relatively simple tasks, such as carrying messages, driving automobiles or providing hideouts. Gradually, they become increasingly committed, and receive revolutionary tasks of violence." [27]

Finance

The OAS Finance Department had a good deal of success in Algeria proper, and also made determined efforts to collect money in France itself. The network of collectors in Algeria had little trouble, at least at first, in gaining the cooperation of Europeans, who were either in sympathy with the OAS or afraid of it, since the OAS made it clear that it would deal sharply with those *colons* who tried to resist. Bank holdups were common. In metropolitan France the OAS approached businessmen by sending them a note stating that a *percepteur* would soon come calling to collect funds. These people were taxed a specific amount, determined by their income and wealth. Receipts were given everywhere for "taxes" paid.

The money accumulated was used to purchase supplies, pay hired assassins, and give financial relief to the families of the OAS insurgents participating in the movement. Higher officials of the OAS also received specified salaries.

Logistics

Since the activities of the Secret Army were concentrated in metropolitan areas where there were minimal restrictions as far as acquiring the necessities of daily life was concerned, the main effort of logistics was gathering arms for the Secret Army "killer groups." These included plastic bombs, .45 caliber pistols and other small arms, bazookas, and submachineguns. Many of these weapons were brought from French Army depots by the many deserters who joined the movement. Police stations in the metropolitan areas were raided, often with the passive cooperation of the *pied-noirs* ("black feet," or Algerian-born Europeans).

The trademark of the OAS became the *plastique*. These bombs, made of TNT and a putty-like mass which is easily pliable, are safe to carry under varying conditions. The ingredients can be stored easily and special machinery is not needed for manufacture. Bombs and their ingredients were stored in homes, cellars, and cafes secured for the OAS by the Organization of the Masses. Most bombings occurred in Paris; in a city of three million, it was not difficult to find "safe homes" for the terrorists and their equipment. The *plastique* was used mainly for psychological effect because of the noise and damage it produced. It is not a discriminate weapon for assassination, but was quite successful in producing fear among the public.

Security

OAS security measures were less efficient. Double agents working for the French Government were able to infiltrate the OAS on several occasions.

One, acting as OAS courier between Paris and Algiers, provided French police with the information leading to the capture of General Salan.[28]

Originally, the high command of the OAS resided in downtown areas, moving about from one apartment and home to another, protected only by a shield of personal bodyguards. The OAS leaders even went so far as to be interviewed openly by newsmen. The capture of several leaders, however, indicated that the security system was lax. As Salan himself remarked:

> I saw too many people for silly reasons. People that I didn't know . . . that is probably how I was captured. But it was probable now, or later . . . what difference does it make? Everything was collapsing around us.[29]

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

Psychological Operations

The Secret Army at first presented itself not as a group of insurgents but as loyal Frenchmen betrayed by De Gaulle. Subsequently it emphasized the theme that it was merely trying to obtain guarantees for the future for Europeans of Algeria. The Political and Psychological Branch of the OAS was directed by the former director of the French "5ème Bureau" (Psychological Warfare Branch), and prepared political propaganda.[30]

Posters and painted signs urging the citizens to arm, and suggesting that the OAS "can strike who it wants, when it wants, where it wants," were seen on buildings and streets throughout the downtown areas of Algerian cities.

The OAS succeeded in interfering with broadcasts over the French national radio network, which appealed for support of the central government.

The OAS often used violence to frustrate countermeasures. This was usually done by exploding bombs or machinegunning people. Because the terrorists followed no set pattern, the population was never sure whether the next target would be a government official or a group of school children. This led to mass demonstrations for peace in Algeria, the control of which diverted the government from efforts against the Secret Army. Furthermore, terrorism was violently condemned by many factions of the French political scene, including the Communists; the OAS sought to exploit the many shades of reaction to produce a rift among the political leaders and divide French public opinion. Fully aware that terrorism would provoke the Communists into calling for public demonstrations which could easily turn into riots, the OAS wished to convince other political factions that the Communists were the prime menace. An emotional fear of communism in general might then force President De Gaulle to bring his policies more into line with those of the OAS, thus precluding any agreement between France and the FLN.

Immediately after the cease-fire was agreed on, the OAS began to attack Muslims in hospitals and schools, hoping that the Arab population would retaliate. This would require the French Army to step in and deal with the

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

(UPI Photo)

On a wall in Algiers a cartoon depicts French President Charles DeGaulle being struck on the head with a club marked "OAS." The inscription reads: "OAS strikes where it wants to."

Algerians, thus possibly reviving the war. This maneuver had little success, however; both the FLN underground leadership and the French Army saw through it and assigned men to the Muslim sections to ensure that no reprisals were carried out. Attempts were made on the lives of high French Government officials (including De Gaulle) to intimidate the authorities in Paris.

Intelligence

The Organization of Information and Operations section was concerned with assassination as well as intelligence. The combination of these two functions suggests that the main effort of the intelligence service was directed

against individuals who were working against the movement. A particular effort was made to track down and murder government counteragents. When discovered, FLN agents were also executed.

The immediate attacks on French undercover agents arriving in Algeria offer some clue to the effectiveness of the OAS intelligence net. The leaders of the Secret Army assumed that the European population would not cooperate with the French authorities trying to stamp out the movement. Most of the *pied-noirs* and local police ignored the presence of OAS members. Therefore, movement was relatively secure in the European sectors of the cities. Native police officers sympathetic to the insurgents turned over records giving important information concerning government and FLN agents. It was reported that the movement had the full cooperation of police, firemen, prison wardens. It was also claimed that Soviet intelligence agents were used to supply information.[31]

Sabotage

Sabotage was used more for psychological reasons than as a weapon for physical destruction. When a plastic bomb was thrown at a cafe or a small store, it was done mainly to disrupt the commercial activity of the area. In addition, many automobiles of government officials were destroyed and police stations attacked in order to destroy security records and other government facilities. The most dramatic sabotage mission in France took place when a truck carrying documents belonging to the Interior Ministry was blown up. Bombs were also placed in the homes of Communists and French officials loyal to De Gaulle.

COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION

The reaction by the army to previous political developments had stimulated the French Government to prepare for violent insurgency on the part of Europeans once the cease-fire was agreed upon.

In Algeria, the French Foreign Legion, composed of foreign professionals except for French commanding officers, was disbanded in 1961. This denied the Secret Army access to many types of military supplies, although many ex-legionnaires wilingly offered their services to the OAS. Regular military units composed of men whose loyalty was questionable were also removed from Algeria and stationed on the continent.

The OAS was declared subversive. This permitted French police authorities to detain and arrest persons suspected of aiding, or sympathizing with, the goals of the clandestine group. Following appeals for mass support of government policies, a popular referendum was held which indicated that President De Gaulle had popular support in the measures he would take to carry out the terms of the cease-fire.

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French forces cordoned off European sectors of the large urban areas, making building-to-building searches in order to gather arms and make arrests. The city was sectioned off with barbed wire and barricades. Under the terms of the cease-fire, a joint Algerian-French security force was established which had official responsibility for preventing the Algerian population from retaliating against the violence of the OAS.

A counterintelligence force, popularly known as the *Organisation Clandestine du Contingent*, was also established. The government never openly admitted that this organization existed, but members of the OAS (who referred to it as the *Organisation Communiste du Contingent*) and other observers stated that it included many conscripts who did not share the opinions of their professional officers.[32]

The flow of supplies from France to Algeria was restricted to what the French Army itself would use in one month. This measure was taken to prevent the OAS from building up a large inventory of arms, ammunition, and other necessities for a revolt.

FOOTNOTES

1. Michael K. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 299.
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3. For further details, see Joseph Kraft, *The Struggle For Algeria* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 65–68.
4. Lorna Hahn, *North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960), pp. 156–158; see also p. 69, and Joan Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 94–96. For a thorough account in French of the outbreak of the revolt, see Serge Bromberger, *Les Rebelles Algériens* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958), pp. 1–30.
5. Hahn, *North Africa*, p. 158.
6. Kraft, *The Struggle*, pp. 69–71.
7. Ibid., p. 77.
8. Peter Braestrup, "Partisan Tactics—Algerian Style," *Army* (August 1960), 37.
9. Gillespie, *Algeria*, pp. 97–102; Kraft, *The Struggle*, pp. 81–85; see also Brace, *Ordeal*, pp. 106–109.
10. See Bromberger, *Les Rebelles*, pp. 139–209, for a great many pertinent details; see also Charles-Henri Farod, *La Révolution Algérienne* (Paris: Libriarie Plon, 1959), pp. 111–118, for biographical data on leading FLN persons.
11. Ibid., pp. 139–209.
12. See Braestrup, "Partisan Tactics," p. 33.
13. Brace, *Ordeal*, p. 113; Hahn, *North Africa*, pp. 158–159.
14. Hahn, *North Africa*, pp. 158–159.
15. Ibid.
16. Braestrup, "Partisan Tactics."
17. Ibid.
18. For a discussion of psychological operations in Algiers, particularly terrorism, see Bromberger, *Les Rebelles*, pp. 161–209.
19. Ibid., p. 152.
20. See Hahn, *North Africa*, pp. 159–165, for a discussion of initial French reaction to the revolt.

21. Raoul Salan, *Directives à la Pacification* (Algiers: Government of Algeria, 1956).
22. See "Synthèse Relative à la Participation de l'Armée aux Tâches Extra-Militaires de Pacification," 1er Semestre 1959, 2/694/EMJ/5/ACT, Algérie, le 18 août, 1959.
23. Kraft, *The Struggle*, pp. 104–105.
24. Ben Welles, *The New York Times*, March 20, 1962, pp. 1, 15.
25. *Time* (January 26, 1962), 22.
26. Ibid.
27. Welles, *The New York Times*.
28. *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1962, p. 18.
29. Ibid.
30. Welles, *The New York Times*.
31. Ibid.
32. Ray Alan, "Brigitte, France and the Secret Army," *The New Leader* (December 25, 1961), 3–5.

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CHAPTER 10

GREECE (1945–49)

BACKGROUND

On October 28, 1940, Greece was invaded by Italian troops stationed in Albania. The Greek Army was successful in repelling the invaders and in several months Mussolini's forces were routed. The following spring Hitler sent in German troops to secure his southern flank in preparation for the planned invasion of the Soviet Union; they were successful.

Early in 1942 the British dropped Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents into Greece to destroy the important Gorgopotamos Bridge. After successfully completing this mission, the agents were instructed to remain as liaison officers with indigenous resistance groups. Despite British efforts to bring about some measure of cooperation between the various underground groups, the main efforts of these resistance organizations were directed against one another. Although agreeing not to interfere in each other's resistance activities, the largest resistance groups, the National Republican Greek League (EDES) and the Communist-controlled National Liberation Front (EAM) together with its military arm, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), fought one another sporadically.

In December 1944 the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front (EAM) made clear its revolutionary intentions[1] by forcibly attempting to take control of the government in Athens. Meeting stiff resistance from British forces stationed in the city, the EAM/ELAS insurgents were ultimately defeated in battle. The insurgents agreed to truce terms in February 1945. By the terms of the Varkiza Agreement, the Communists agreed to disband their armed forces.

After failing to gain control of the government by legal, political, and nonviolent means, the Communists resumed underground and guerrilla warfare. Fighting again broke out in June 1946. Already in *de facto* control of many mountain areas of Greece, the Communists revived their wartime underground organizations and used the newly created Communist states of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as sanctuaries and training bases for many of their 25,000 troops.

The war, which lasted until the fall of 1949, was characterized by Communist use of underground apparatuses in major urban centers for gathering intelligence, instigating strikes, and recruiting popular support in rural areas. Logistical support was received from neighboring Communist countries.

The Communists were aided by the postwar economic chaos which existed throughout Greece. Despite fiscal reforms and extensive United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency aid received in 1946, the county had not rebuilt the harbors or railroads, or replaced the vast quantities of livestock, vineyards, and other resources which had been destroyed. Unemployment was high, and

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to further complicate matters, radical currency inflation raised prices. Fear of Communist control of labor unions led to repeated attempts by the Greek Government to control or curb labor activities, which only strengthened the appeal of the Communist Party in Greece (KKE).[2] Furthermore, Great Britain, preoccupied with her own problems of recovery, let it be known in February 1947 that she was unable to assist Greece further.

The turning point in Greece's fortunes came when the United States announced the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, and subsequently provided the Greek Government with both financial and military aid with which to fight the Communist Greek Democratic Army (DAS) and the unstable economic situation. This initial grant of 300 million dollars enabled the government to expand its military and security forces to almost 200,000 men.

In 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. By the summer of the following year, Tito had stopped supplying the rebels in addition to denying them the use of Yugoslav soil for sanctuary and training. Since Bulgarian-Greek animosity had precluded any large-scale participation by the Bulgars in the Greek revolution, Albania now became the only source of outside support. Strategically this forced the guerrillas to maintain themselves in a small mountainous area adjoining the Albanian frontier. Being placed in a position of fighting along conventional military lines, the insurgents were not able to resist the counteroperations of the Greek National Army. The government forces were successful in encircling and cutting off the insurgent escape routes into Albania and finally defeating them when the DAS abandoned their guerrilla tactics and tried to defend their base area in the Grammos-Vitsi Mountain region. This military defeat led to the ultimate collapse of the movement.

In order to isolate the guerrillas from their internal support and food supply, the Greek Government, assisted by U.S. aid funds, cared for the many refugees and displaced inhabitants from areas of insurgent activity. The relocation of about one-seventh of the population into camps prevented the insurgents from maintaining the effective underground support organization which EAM/ELAS had developed during the war. Two other factors were possibly responsible for this collapse. First, the "troika" command system, which had been so successful during World War II, collapsed. This system called for a local "popular leader" to maintain a sympathetic relationship with the rural population, in order to ensure a constant source of supplies. During the postwar period, the *kapitanos* was usually not a local inhabitant, but an outside party member who also served as a political officer. His relationship with the local populace was not one which would stimulate support for the movement, and thus supplies which were more willingly given during the war now had to be confiscated. Second, because of widespread economic chaos and social disorganization, the population lacked the physical, moral, and emotional resources to aid the insurgency even if they had wished to do so. The hardships of 7 years of war and famine had left most Greek peasants apathetic toward armed conflict of any kind. In many cases the peasants refused to cooperate with either the Greek National Army and security forces, or the rebel Greek Democratic Army.



Figure 16. Map of Greece.

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For the first 2 years of the insurgency, rebel morale was high. They felt that they were acting as patriots seeking legitimate reform in Greece. It was not until the split within the international Communist movement became clear that the image of this "patriotic" movement changed. The Yugoslav-Bulgarian rift over Macedonia[3] was accompanied by internal dissension in the Greek Communist Party.[4] The KKE's final decision to support an autonomous Macedonia was followed by a collapse of rebel enthusiasm. There was no longer a patriotic will to fight.[5]

ORGANIZATION

Although outside interest in the Greek Communist movement had existed before that time, it was not until 1931 that the Comintern intervened in party activities in Greece. Hoping thereby to improve party discipline, it engineered the appointment of the Moscow-trained Nicholas Zakhariadhis as Secretary General of the KKE. The Greek Communists had their first experience in clandestine activity after the party was outlawed by the dictator Ioannis Metaxas in 1936. Using the legal Socialist Party as a front for open activity, the party secretly began to organize cells throughout Greece.

After World War II began, the British Government, seeking to build a resistance movement in Greece, offered to supply arms to any group—including the Communists—which would participate in guerrilla activities. The creation in September 1941 of the National Liberation Front (EAM), which was Communist dominated, gave the Communists a chance to gain control of the activities of various political parties. Also, the KKE was the only party with experience in clandestine operations, a circumstance that proved an enormous advantage. Since EAM's Central Committee was dominated by the Communists it provided the device by which the KKE established control over a number of organizations operating in rural and urban areas. Among the significant organizations controlled by them in this way were the Workers National Liberation Front (EEAM), the National Cooperative (EA), the United Pan-Hellenic Youth Organization (EPON), the Units for Protection of the People's Struggle (OPLA), and a guerrilla commissariat (ETA).[6] All these groups worked to support the largest and strongest guerrilla army in Greece, the ELAS, which at the height of its strength had 50,000 men.[7] The nature of the EAM/ELAS organization varied in different areas. In some villages EAM was represented by only one man, perhaps even a priest or a school teacher. Often it consisted of an expanded unit which included non-Communists. However, the organizer and local EAM secretary was usually a party member, when one was available.

When EAM/ELAS prepared to set up its shadow government in the northwest mountains in 1943, it felt enough confidence in the influence of its subsidiary organizations to try to organize elections secretly behind the enemy lines. This provisional government, the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), was acclaimed by the Soviet press in March 1944, although the first Russian military liaison group (which came to insist that the PEEA cooperate with the Royal Government-in-exile), did not arrive in Greece until July 1944.[8]

The defeat of the EAM/ELAS forces of Athens by British troops in December 1944 convinced the Communists that revolutionary victory could not be obtained immediately by open force. Failure to obtain Soviet and United States diplomatic support for their claim to rule the country convinced the EAM leaders that they must come to terms with the Greek Government. They therefore signed the Varkiza Agreement of February 1945,[9] which provided for demobilization of the guerrilla forces. The KKE also suffered a major electoral defeat in early 1946. Nevertheless, the elected Greek Government commanded no deep loyalty among the population, and did not solve the difficult economic problems. The weakness of the government and the now tacit support of Russia, together with direct encouragement from other Balkan Communist leaders, persuaded the Greek Communists to resume insurgent action.

The KKE openly assumed responsibility for the rebellion that began in June 1946. Its ruling group was a politburo, composed of seven members, each a leader in his home area. Urban organizations which supported the rebellion were under direct control of the central committee. Branches, or "rays," were organized in each trade and each geographic area. In Athens, for example, one group of agents recruited industrial workers, civil servants, bank clerks, and military reservist groups, while others organized cells in the various quarters of the city.[10]

Originally, military operations at all levels were directed by a tripartite command system. The military commander took charge of combat operations, and the *kapitanos* was responsible for maintaining good relations with the civilian population.[11] Real power, however, lay in the hands of the political representative, who received his orders from the high command of the Communist Party. When this three-man command unit collapsed, the political representative assumed the role of the *kapitanos*.

Some front groups controlled by the party were the Seamen's Partisan Committee (KEN), the Communist Organization of Greek Macedonia (KOEN), secret cells (KOSSA) inside the Greek National Army, a Slav-Macedonian organization (OENA), and the Democratic Women's Organization of Greece (PDEG). In rural areas, the KKE operated quite openly through the facilities and under the cover of the Greek Agrarian Party (AKE), which was responsible for supervising the activities of various "self-defense" groups. This included the Communist youth organization (EPON) and the supply organization of the DAS (ETA). In the "liberated" villages civil administration was usually carried out by officials of these front groups.[12]

In order to acquire an appearance of dignity and officiality, the insurgents had hopes of establishing a "government" in an area near the Albanian border. The town of Konitsa was to be the capital of this "Free Greece." This plan, however, was never realized.

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

DAS - Greek Democratic Army
EPON - Youth Organization
PDEG - "Democratic Women's Organization of Greece"
KOEN - Macedonian Communist Organization
NOF - Slav-Macedonian Independence Organization
AKE - Greek Agrarian Party

Figure 17. Organization of KKE–DAS.

(UPI Photo)

Markos Vafiades, or "General Markos," commander in chief of the Greek Communist-led guerrillas.

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Within the revolutionary organization were security units whose identity was unknown to most party members and sympathizers. The most important of these was the *Aftoamyna*, the successor of the OPLA, the security force which had existed during the German occupation. Originally formed to train party members for revolutionary action in towns, the *Aftoamyna* organized its first cadres in 1946. Participants were chosen from among the most fanatical members of the party with preference given to persons with criminal records and those who had distinguished themselves by their daring in conspiratorial work. Members of the *Aftoamyna* were planted in all party organizations from the cell upward to act as observers and informers.[13]

Although the *Aftoamyna* probably penetrated the leadership of the General Confederation of Labor (ERGAS), the KKE's attempt to capture the labor movement failed. ERGAS was reorganized, with the assistance of the British Trade Union Confederation, and became a member of the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The *Aftoamyna* scored elsewhere, however. For a time it had access to the files of the Greek General Staff and was able to provide information on the movement of government troops. It also supervised the clandestine traffic in arms, supplies, and recruits. Its mission, as defined in an order signed by General Markos (Commander in Chief of DAS Forces) in December 1948, was to "watch the movement of the enemy of his agents . . . help us call up the andartes [partisans], and send us reliable and suitable men." [14]

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Communications

Although the Communists developed a fairly extensive communications network, it was insufficient to maintain continued and rapid contact between forces scattered in the rugged mountain terrains.

Communication between the underground and the guerrillas, and between guerrilla units in the field, was mainly by courier. Usually couriers were young boys recruited and trained by the village youth organizations.

Direct instructions in code were given through the facilities of the Communist Radio Free Greece, and possibly via the radios of the three neighboring Communist countries. A letter from General Markos to Zakhariadhis (Secretary General of the KKE),[15] while the latter was in Moscow in January 1948, indicates that there was also a system of communication between Communist officials in Moscow and KKE leaders in Greece. It can be assumed that these communications were relayed through Belgrade and Sofia. The guerrillas also made use of a few field radios supplied to ELAS by the Allies during the war and cached after the Varkiza Agreement. One observer noted that, "Throughout Greece, the *Aftoamyna* communicated with one another by Morse,

and the whole organization was in direct or indirect communication with the headquarters of DAS." [16]

Recruitment

Beginning with a nucleus estimated as no larger than 3,000 men,[17] the KKE and its affiliates employed four main methods to recruit additional forces and replace losses:

(1) The Communist Party itself supplied "volunteers" from among its ranks. A women's organization, the PDEG, was responsible for recruiting a significant portion of the revolutionary force both by working for the movement and by persuading men to join. The undergrounds (*yiafkas*) of Athens, Salonika, and other cities, channeled new recruits to the fighting units in the hills.[18]

(2) By giving the impression that it supported autonomy for the state of Macedonia, the KKE won the sympathy of some Slavic Macedonians who eventually supplied fighting units from the ranks of the KOEN.

(3) In the mountain villages of northern Greece, the DAS, assisted by local Communists, persuaded or forced able-bodied men to join its ranks. With no government security forces at hand to protect him or his family, a male often dared not refuse.

(4) World War II ELAS veterans were given additional training in Yugoslavia. They returned to Greece with instructions to organize guerrilla bands in the mountain villages of Greece.

The recruiting methods proved to be fairly successful. The rebels were able to maintain an armed force of about 23,000 even after the national government's countermeasures began to be effective. The number of insurgent participants can only be conjectured. One source estimates that at the peak of its strength the Communists mustered no more than 700,000 to 750,000 active members and sympathizers.[19]

A report issued by the United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans investigating charges that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were aiding the rebellion, presented evidence that these nations were giving extensive aid to the guerrilla forces. The training camp at Bulkes, Yugoslavia, was an army camp built for the training of DAS recruits.[20]

Logistics

A major factor in the Communists' defeat in Greece was their inability either to produce sufficient supplies themselves or to obtain continuous logistical support from outside the country.

Although the rebels were required to surrender all arms under the Varkiza Agreement of 1945, much of the material seized from the Italians in 1943 or given them by the Allies during World War II was secreted and used during the period 1946–49. However, the DAS forces evidently had no facilities for producing additional military equipment. Furthermore, they often found it

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

(UPI Photo)

The Greek town of Kalavrita after a guerilla force of 1,000 had attacked it. Forty civilians were killed and the entire police garrison of 20 wiped out.

difficult to obtain such basic supplies as food and clothing. Thus, while guerrilla forces operating near the frontier could often obtain supplies from across the border, those in the Pindos Range in western Greece had a more serious problem. They could not live off the country, barren and sparsely populated as it was, and had to be supplied by mule trains. It obviously took a great number of such pack animals to fill even their minimum needs.

The DAS appears to have received the bulk of its support between 1945 and 1949 from other Communist nations who shipped supplies through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The U.N. Commission found evidences of arms depots in these countries near the Greek frontier, and witnesses interviewed by the commission stated that they had received Russian small arms while training in Albania. The Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group noted that this logistical support included not only clothing, rations, arms, and ammunition, but training camps, transit areas, replacement areas, field hospitals, and supply depots—all easily accessible in safe areas across the northern borders.[21]

On August 2, 1947, a convention of Communist military officials* held at Bled, Yugoslavia, drew up the terms by which Communist states would aid the rebellion. In summary, these were:

(1) The Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian General Staffs undertook to assist the Greek Democratic Army with stores and other supplies, and with technical equipment and instructors.

(2) The same general staffs undertook to organize a rear defense of the DAS and to provide infantry, artillery, and aircraft for the purpose. They also stated their willingness to take part in military action.

(3) The Hungarian and Rumanian Governments also were to be asked to take part in assisting the KKE.

(4) The Albanian Government was to place a naval base at the disposal of the rebels.

(5) Representatives of the Communist governments were to establish contact with the headquarters of the "Greek Democratic Government" as soon as it was formed.[22]

Following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, a series of disputes with the Greek Communists led Tito to alter his policy toward the rebels. Halting supplies in late 1948, he had the borders officially closed between the two countries on July 10, 1949. One reason for this was Yugoslav resentment of KKE statements indicating support of an autonomous, rather than a Yugoslav, Macedonia.[23] With the cessation of Yugoslav assistance and the sealing off of its border, the total amount of outside assistance was sharply reduced, and the internal forces and the underground were unable to fill their logistic requirements. The continuous and insoluble supply problem greatly impeded the Communist war effort.

*This convention was attended by members of the KKE, as well as military representatives from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

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Security

The *Aftoamyna* (Self-Defense) was charged with internal security. Not only was the identity of its agents within each cell secret, but members were also unknown to each other. When a security measure was to be taken (e.g., eliminating an unreliable individual) a group called a *synergeia* was formed to carry out the deed. The *synergeia* consisted of at least three persons, who were introduced to one another under assumed names by an agent of the central committee. When the mission was accomplished, the members of the group dispersed, changed their addresses, habits, and clothes, and concocted alibis.

It is probable that members of one group, such as the EPON, were urged to spy on suspects within other groups and report any suspects to a higher echelon of the party.

A clandestine judicial system existed to try to judge those accused of a criminal act against the movement. The system was structured around a series of "courts" which judged those accused of noncooperation, treason, and collaboration. These tribunals were primarily interested in restricting the activities of those aiding the Greek counterinsurgent forces and their U.S. advisers.[24]

In many areas of northern Greece, the insurgents lived openly, as there were no government officials or military personnel who could challenge their authority. When they were threatened by government counterinsurgency forces, soldiers fled to the neighboring countries of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Civilian supporters of the insurgency merely "blended in" with the native population.

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

Psychological Operations

Communist propaganda was addressed to the people of Greece, to Communist Party members and sympathizers, and to governments and peoples of other countries. The overall propaganda line was that the monarchy was alien (the King was a Dane) and Fascist, and that its officials were puppets of the British Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department. Propaganda addressed to KKE members and sympathizers and to prospective recruits emphasized the true "patriotism" of the insurgent movement.

For the first 2 years of the postwar insurgency (1946–48), the call to patriotism kept the morale high among the *andartes*. The Communists lost the initiative when they openly supported a Bulgarian plan for the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia. Few Greeks, with the exception of the Slavic Macedonians, could support such a plan.

Although word of mouth was the major instrument of Communist agitational and propaganda activity, the KKE and its subsidiary organizations also used radio and published materials. After the party was outlawed in December 1947, its operations were conducted clandestinely and, to an increasing degree, from foreign soil.

Until they were suppressed in December 1947, two daily newspapers published in Athens, *Rizospastis* and *Eleftheria*, were in effect organs of the KKE. Afterward they continued to appear in various forms at various places in "the free hills of Greece."[25] Actually, much of the literature appears to have been printed in Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, and Moscow. One publication printed in Yugoslavia was called *The Voice of Bulkes* and was directed primarily to members of the DAS and rural inhabitants of northern Greece. The Yugoslav League of Anti-Fascist Women undertook drives to furnish printing supplies to the illegal newspapers.

Little information is available concerning the distribution of these clandestine publications. Probably the party's youth and women's organizations took charge of circulation in Greece, and the soldiers themselves brought in pamphlets printed in Yugoslavia and Albania. The couriers who maintained communications between guerrilla units may have distributed printed material while on their rounds.

The KKE operated a radio station, *Eleftheria Ellada* (Free Greece)—also called Radio Markos after the DAS commander—which purported to be on Greek soil but probably was located in Albania and later in Rumania. Radio Belgrade, Radio Tirana, and Radio Sofia also reported the activities of the "Free Greek Government."

Besides disseminating propaganda, the Communist youth movement, EPON, served as a school for Communist indoctrination and prepared its members to become agitators, saboteurs, and *andartes*.[26] It gave the young people responsible tasks, such as distributing leaflets and watching persons suspected of being traitors to the Communist cause.

The public reaction to all this propaganda failed to meet Communist expectations; there were constant complaints that the masses "were not responding."

Intelligence

The Communists maintained an elaborate network for intelligence in the mountains of Northern Greece. In rural areas, "self-defense" personnel operated clandestinely through local *yiafkas* (cells which kept the guerrillas informed of all government troop movements and locations). When government forces arrived in the vicinity, the armed partisans would flee and the local resistance leaders would blend in with the population. Usually fear of reprisal prevented local inhabitants from exposing the Communists to the loyal troops.

The KOSSA was responsible for gathering and transmitting counter-intelligence information. The members of this organization were expected to relay to the DAS high command military information which might affect the plans of the revolutionaries.

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COUNTERMEASURES

The Communists' first attempt to seize control of Greece, in December 1944, was defeated by British forces, who, after the German withdrawal, had moved in elements of two divisions.

Thus they were able to meet open force when it materialized. They followed up their military victory with an extensive reconstruction and rehabilitation program.

On the heels of their defeat in the general elections in early 1946, the Communists suffered a further blow by the reorganization, under British auspices, of the Communist-dominated labor confederation in Athens. This move was arranged by delegates of the British Trade Union Confederation, who came to Athens and urged the Greek Government to oust the Communist labor leaders. The net effect of this reorganization, plus the apathy with which it was regarded by the urban workers, was a serious setback for Communist hopes of an early victory.

> The KKE complained constantly that the masses were not responding. It felt that without political strikes in the towns, without active unrest among the urban workers, no revolution was possible. If the DAS had received half as much support from labor as the French and Italian Communist parties, the revolution might have succeeded.[27]

Notwithstanding the success of the British thrusts against the insurgents, the Greek Government itself was unable to institute effective countermeasures during 1946–47. A basic problem was the low morale of the army. Many Greek soldiers were not convinced the government would win, many disliked shooting at fellow Greeks, or preferred simply to take no action at all. Army units frequently allowed guerrillas to escape.

Another factor was that individual Greek politicians demanded military security for their home districts without concern for the total problem. This prevented any coordinated effort of government forces against the rebels. Political interference of this nature destroyed much of the initiative the Greek National Army might have had. At the same time, British military advisers had great difficulty in establishing the necessary cooperation between the army and the police forces. They were even less successful in convincing Greek military strategists that small, mobile units were required to suppress the insurgents.[28]

By 1947 the British were unable to sustain the financial burden any longer, and the United States, under the provisions of the Truman Doctrine, assumed the responsibility of maintaining the Greek economy and financing and equipping the Greek Armed Forces. The initiation of an expansive U.S. aid program, which was to total $500 million by 1952, coupled with the establishment of a U.S. military advisory group, headed by General James Van Fleet, gave the Greek Government the facilities it needed to begin an effective program against the DAS. Between 1947 and 1948 the Greek Army and gendarmery reached a total of 182,000 men.[29]

700,000 refugees and others who had evacuated territories of guerrilla activity. In this way the insurgents were denied a prime source of supplies and recruits.[30]

At the suggestion of Van Fleet, a reindoctrination center was established on the island of Makronesos to rehabilitate captured insurgent soldiers. Its success was attested to by the violent reaction it provoked from the Communists.[31]

In 1949, in order to isolate the DAS forces, the government carried out a series of mass arrests designed to destroy the Communist intelligence network. "As a result the armed guerrillas, operating without their eyes and ears, could no longer avoid surprise attacks by government (GNA) forces. Guerrilla leaders and their forces were killed or captured in a number of quickly executed operations beginning in the Peloponnesus and working toward the satellite borders." [32] These counterinsurgency operations were successful largely because of the quasi-military units set up under military command.[33]

Certain happenings within the European Communist bloc also worked to the advantage of the Greek Government. Friction developed between the leaders of the Greek Communists and Stalin because the latter did not provide large-scale material support. Furthermore, the border nations of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia failed to support the DAS adequately under the provisions of the joint agreements made by their general staffs. When Yugoslavia ceased its direct support in 1948, the guerrillas were denied their major supply routes and sanctuary. And without a reliable system of supply, the DAS was unable to maintain large-scale operations.

Defeat in conventional military battle in the Grammos-Vitsi Mountain area led the insurgents to announce in the fall of 1949 that they were halting military operations. The rebellion is considered to have been terminated at that time.

FOOTNOTES

1. Armed conflict between British forces and those of ELAS was an unplanned development. When armed ELASites approached government buildings, they found British soldiers accompanying Greek police guarding these establishments. Exchange of fire between the British and some of the insurgents took place at this time. See William McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1947), chapter VII, esp. p. 175; see also C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1948), pp. 217–218.
2. Hugh Seton Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 333.
3. This problem of postwar Macedonia began long before Tito's conflict with the Kremlin. Traditionally, it has been an area of dispute between Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. As early as 1943, Tito announced Macedonia to be one of the six "federal republics" of the new Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1945, partisan troops were sent to parts of Macedonia to insure Yugoslav control. See "The Conference of Berlin, 1945," Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, Vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 666–668. In August of 1947 President Tito and Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria drew up a plan for the division of Macedonia which did not include

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Greece. In November 1948 a Bulgarian Communist organization announced their support for an "independent Macedonia." This plan was supported by the Greek Communist Party in March 1949. On July 10 of that year Tito sealed the borders between Yugoslavia and Greece. (See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. XIV, p. 563.) See also McNeill, *Greek Dilemma*, pp. 261–269. For a detailed discussion of the Macedonian question, see Elizabeth Barker, *Macedonia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950); Christopher Christides, *The Macedonian Camouflage* (Athens: The Hellenic Publishing Company, 1949); and H. F. Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955).

4. Dimitrov Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953), p. 178.
5. See William McNeill, *American Aid in Action* (New York: Twentieth Century, 1957), p. 43.
6. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 63.
7. E. R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946–1949: A Case Study," *Military Review* (June 1957), 22.
8. See Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 112.
9. For further discussion on this matter see D. M. Condit, *Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1961), pp. 98–100; C. M. Woodhouse, "The Greek Resistance 1942–1944," in *European Resistance Movements 1939–1945* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1960), p. 389; D. G. Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom*, p. 120.
10. F. N. Voight, *The Greek Sedition* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), p. 213.
11. See Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp. 67 and 144; see also Condit, *Case Study in Guerrilla War*, pp. 149–150.
12. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War," p. 19.
13. Voight, *The Greek Sedition*, p. 215.
14. Ibid., p. 219.
15. Ibid., p. 254–258; see also *Documents of International Affairs*, ed. Margaret Carlyle (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 318–320.
16. Voight, *The Greek Sedition*, p. 219.
17. Capt. Labignette Ximenès, Capt. A. Souyris, and H. Carrère d'Encausse, "The Communist Insurrection in Greece (1946–1949)," Intelligence Translation No. H–2060 (tr. from *Revue Militaire d'Information* No. 281) (Washington: DA, OACSI, November 3, 1958), p. 40.
18. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War," p. 22.
19. Wainhouse, in "Guerrilla War," suggests 750,000 (p. 22).
20. Harry Howard, *U.N. and Problems of Greece* (Department of State publication 2909, Washington, 1947), p. 16.
21. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War," p. 19.
22. Voight, *The Greek Sedition*, pp. 207–209.
23. See footnote 3.
24. Voight, *The Greek Sedition*, pp. 180–186.
25. Floyd Spencer, *War and Postwar Greece* (Washington: Library of Congress, European Affairs Division, 1952), p. 110.
26. Voight, *The Greek Sedition*, p. 144.
27. Ibid., p. 205.
28. Spencer, *War*, pp. 101–102.
29. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War," p. 22.
30. See McNeill, *American Aid*, p. 40.
31. Ibid., p. 111.
32. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War," p. 24.
33. See Alexander Papagos, "Guerrilla Warfare" in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 238.

CHAPTER 11

THE PHILIPPINES (1946–54)

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BACKGROUND

After the Japanese invaded the Philippines, in 1942, resistance was carried on by many Filipino guerrilla bands. One of these was the Communist-directed *Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon* (Hukbalahap), or People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Army. During the height of their World War II activities, in the year 1943, the "Huks" numbered about 5,000 full-time officers and men.[1] Immediately after the war, Communists were refused seats in the newly-formed Parliament to which they had been elected, and the Huks resorted to rebellion. Against the rebels, the government marshalled 24,000 poorly-equipped paramilitary police of the Department of the Interior's Constabulary. It was this force that had to carry the brunt of the campaign against the Huks during the years 1946–50. They opposed insurgents who, at their apex, consisted of about 12,000 armed guerrillas and 100,000 active members.[2] The regular Philippine Army was ill-equipped, unorganized for sustained combat, and staffed by many inept and corrupt officers, and it played only a minor role until 1950.

Hampering government operations were certain social and economic conditions which alienated the large rural peasantry. In the rural areas, government posts were monopolized and political leadership was dominated by small groups of wealthy landowners. The tax system favored the wealthy. Personal influence frequently superseded statute law; hence nonpayment of taxes by landowners and failure to enforce the minimum wage law was usually the rule. Government officials were generally related and nepotism was common. Some officials served without pay and were susceptible to bribery. In many cases, promotions within the military were obtained through influence rather than merit.

Supplies for military units were inadequate. On arriving in a barrio* the officer in charge would often confiscate food and material from the local populace. Troop morale was consequently very low, and civilian-military relations were poor. Furthermore, the elections of 1949 were characterized by intimidation of voters, assassination of candidates, and general corruption.

The Huks were in almost virtual control of central Luzon (called "Huklandia") in late 1950, when Ramón Magsaysay was appointed Minister of Defense by President Quirino and took charge of the counterinsurgency program. To aid the new Defense Minister, the United States sent to the Philippines a Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) and substantial loans. One of the first acts by Magsaysay was a reorganization of the entire armed forces of the country. The Constabulary was placed under Department

*A barrio is a village or subdivision of a town and usually includes large areas of adjoining arable land.



Figure 18. Map of the Philippines.

of Defense command; many policemen were transferred into the regular army; and out of the army, 26 battalion combat teams (BCT's), totalling about 26,000 men, were formed to serve as the core of the new counterforce. Total government fighting strength (regular army and Constabulary) now figured at about 30,000 men.[3] Incompetent and corrupt army officers were dismissed. Provisions were made to ensure honest elections. Resettlement areas for surrendered and captured Huks were established by the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR). Habeas corpus was suspended in order to detain government officials suspected of corruption as well as suspected Communists and Communist sympathizers.[4] Magsaysay's counterinsurgency program was expanded after his election to the Presidency in 1953. In 1954 Luis Taruc, commander of the Huk forces, surrendered, and by the following year the rebellion was no longer a serious threat to the constitutional government of the Philippine Republic.

ORGANIZATION

The first Communist organizers in the Philippines were William Jane-quette (alias Harrison George), a representative of the U.S. Communist Party,* and Tan Malaka (alias Elias Fuentes), an Indonesian who had been expelled from his homeland by the Dutch and subsequently became the Comintern's agent for Southeast Asia and Australia.[5] In 1928 two future Philippine Communist leaders, Crisanto Evangelista and Cirila Bognor, went to Moscow for a brief period of training. After returning home, Evangelista in 1930 founded the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the stated aim of which was "to overthrow American imperialism in the Philippines."[6] In 1932 it was admitted to the Comintern.[7]

Until the war, party membership was confined to small groups of individuals, many of whom were schooled in Moscow. The party was supported by a few intellectuals, and at times had a fairly substantial following among workers and peasants. Having maintained contact since the 1920's with the Pan Pacific Secretariat of Labor Unions, a branch of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern), many Communist Party officials spent much of their time before the war engaging in labor activity,[8] both in Manila and in the interior of Luzon Island. The Printers Union of the Philippines, influenced by Mariano Balgos, and the League of the Sons of Labor, headed by Evangelista, achieved some significance in Manila before the war. The League of Poor Laborers (AMT), predecessor of the Confederation of Peasants (PKM), was to be one of the principal mass-support bases of the insurgent movement from 1946 to 1954. It organized rural elements of the Philippine population for use in "front" activities.

*The Comintern charged the Communist Party in the United States with responsibility for the activities in the Philippines.

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(UPI Photo)

Luis Taruc, after pleading guilty to a charge of rebellion, delivers a speech on Marxist doctrine and the history of the dissident movement in the Philippines.

The first attempts to gain mass support led to several violent strikes in 1931, after which party leaders were arrested. The following year the party was outlawed, but its activities continued underground, and through various legal peasant and labor organizations.[9]

In 1938 the imprisoned leaders were released and immediately began to infiltrate the legal Socialist Party, which had been growing steadily. One observer notes, however, that "Regardless of the official legal interrelations, the Communist Party and its various labor organizations by 1939 operated openly, and by 1941 had achieved legal standing and enjoyed the rights of a minority party under the law." [10]

At the beginning of the war, the CPP pledged its loyalty to the Philippines and the United States. Its cooperation as a unit was refused by the U.S. military authorities,[11] however, and thus its plans for possible united front activities were curbed. When Japanese invasion came, the Communists made no effort to support the Fi-American group,* but laid plans for forming their own resistance group. The result was the official formation on March 29, 1942, of the People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Army, or "Hukbalahap" (the abbreviation of the name in Tagalog language), under the command of Luis Taruc.[12] Although the Huk army, which numbered approximately 5,000 by 1943, eventually swelled to about 10,000, the number of party members within it remained small, and most members, including Taruc, concealed their party affiliation.[13]

The Communists organized the Barrio Units Defense Corps (BUDC) and although these units had some responsibility for maintaining public order (similar to that of other "home guard" units), their prime purpose was to be the civilian counterpart of the Huks and to supply an intelligence organization for the Huk guerrillas. Since the BUDC units were first organized in villages where the AMT peasant unions had operated before the war, many of the BUDC leaders were probably former union officials. Both the Huk and Barrio groups facilitated the development of various united-front activities, such as popular agitation for land reform. During the war, the Hukbalahap claimed to have killed 25,000 men, only 5,000 of whom were Japanese. The other victims were evidently Filipino "obstructionists." [14]

During the brief and confused period immediately following the liberation of the Philippines, the central government attempted to obtain the cooperation of the Communists. The latter ostensibly cooperated by participating in such open activities as campaigning for elections. They did not, however, scrap their plans for ultimately trying to overthrow the government. Thus, although the government tried to disarm the Huks, most of the Huk veterans kept their arms, and maintained their control in most areas of Huklandia.[15] Other Huks, as well as other Communists and sympathizers, became active in the Communist-dominated labor organizations, particularly the PKM and the Federation of Philippine Workers, and in youth groups. Most of the members of the Communist Politburo in Manila, in fact, were officers in the

*The joint Filipino-American Guerrilla Command under General MacArthur.

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unions affiliated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). Thus when the Communist leaders decided to open "phase one" of their plan for takeover, which included commencing open warfare, in 1946,[16] it was not very difficult for them to reconstitute the Huks as a fighting organization and build an underground support network on the order of the BUDC. Plans for warfare were intensified after the international Communist meetings at Calcutta in 1948, which directed South Asian Communists to resort to open warfare for "national liberation."

The Huks, whose name was changed to People's Liberation Army (HMB) in 1950, eventually had three types of forces: mobile striking units under Luis Taruc, operating as a regular military force; seven regional commands, each under the leadership of a top Communist official, and local self-defense corps.[17] Their overall structure was a combined political and military command with a general headquarters located in the Sierra Madre Mountains in central Luzon. This was considered to be the "Politburo-out," and the national headquarters of the HMB. The regional commands, under the control of the Communist Party Regional Committees (RECOs) were autonomous, but were obligated to report to the general headquarters in the Sierra Madre or to the underground sub-headquarters (Politburo-in) in Manila. Local militia functions, as well as support activities for the military effort, were performed by local groups organized according to the system used by the BUDC during the war. District

THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES



Source: Document captured by Task Force "GG" at Lagrimas, Twin Falls, Mount Dorst, August 12, 1951, based on "Political Resolution 12," March 1951 Central Committee Conference.

Figure 19. National Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines.



Source: Documents captured by the Philippine Armed Forces, 1951.

Figure 20. The Organization Department.

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committees, under direct orders from the RECOs, generally organized these support units so that they included at least one party member.[18] In a Huk-controlled barrio, the police and municipal administrators and sometimes members of the Philippine Constabulary were in the service of the rebels.

In central Luzon, which they controlled almost completely as a "liberated area," the Huks put to use the administrative experience they had gained during the war. They appointed civil officials, collected taxes, established courts and administered justice, set up schools, and organized the people into groups whereby they could receive indoctrination and also help the revolutionary movement. There were also many fringe areas which were controlled by government troops during the day, but where the Huks took control at night.[19]

When the Huks first entered a new town, a meeting would be called at a place such as a schoolhouse, where a Huk leader would explain the movement, and steps would be taken to establish Huk administrative control. Usually a Huk military commander announced himself as governor of such a region. Often the Huks did not replace existing officials; they simply bribed them to carry out Huk-directed policies.

A special "expansion force" was formed to initiate Huk movements on islands other than Luzon. The only area where it made any headway was Panay, and even there it never developed into a substantial threat. The main reason for Huk failure in this venture was probably the lack of support the movement received among local officials, who had been of prime importance to the Huks in gaining their grip on Luzon.

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Communications

The Huks employed the usual type of shortwave radio connections between Huk headquarters and guerrilla units, between these units and barrio-supported groups, and between party headquarters in Manila and Huk headquarters in Mount Arayat. Within each RECO, communications were the responsibility of a "director of communications," who remained in contact with Huk headquarters.

Additional communication was by standard courier system under the overall direction of a courier division established within the organizational bureau of the party in Manila. Couriers operating under orders from the national headquarters or the RECO director carried out their missions alone or through a system of relays.

They used flags and flashlights for messages. Sometimes, in rural areas, they signaled by imitating animal calls and banging two bamboo sticks together.

Recruitment

According to Philippine Army estimates, the Communists were eventually able to enroll approximately 100,000 followers, including 12,000 armed, active soldiers. The nucleus of the revived Huk organization were veterans of the World War II Huk fighting forces and Barrio Unit Defense Corps, many of whom resumed fighting because they felt the government had neither given them due recognition for their services during the war nor fulfilled their hopes of postwar reforms, including land reforms. Individuals recruited by the Huks included—

(1) those who were embittered at the fact that the 70/30 crop sharing law which was supposed to give the peasant 70 percent of the crop he grew,[20] was never put into effect;

(2) those who were dissatisfied with the inequities of the land-reform program, and with a judicial system which favored the landholders in disputes;

(3) veterans who had not received backpay;

(4) those who were forced to bribe government officials in order to receive this pay;

(5) those who joined accidentally (e.g., a man would join a barrio youth organization and later find out that his job was to supply the Huk band in the rear with food);

(6) those who joined because of verbal persuasion;

(7) a "natural leader" in a barrio (who) would have pressures put upon him by the local population to became commander of a local Huk unit;

(8) those who were recruited through coercion, many having to join at gunpoint, or because of threats to the family;

(9) those who were blackmailed into serving the Huks (an individual would be asked to perform what he thought was an innocent task for "a friend," only to discover that he would have to continue his services or be exposed to the authorities for aiding the rebels);

(10) those who were recruited after a Huk unit entered a barrio and demanded that a certain number of people accompany them back to the jungle for training and indoctrination.[21]

Finance

The channeling of funds for the Huk movement was the responsibility of the National Finance Committee of the Politburo-in located in Manila. Taxes were levied by the Huk high command in rebel-controlled areas of central Luzon, while in other areas Communists would illegally present themselves as government tax collectors. There were cases of outright confiscation, which included raids, holdups, and train robberies. Although there is no direct evidence that union funds were used to finance the movement, it is highly probable that the members of CLO-controlled unions were tapped for "donations." The PKM (Confederation of Peasants) placed its financial resources at the disposal of the Huks.

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Many gifts were received from the 20,000 Chinese in Manila. One wealthy Chinese, Co Pat, is alleged to have supported by himself the entire Wah Chih Chinese guerrilla unit.[22] The Huks apparently received direct financial support from the 3,000-member Chinese Communist Party of the Philippines, which is said to have received some $200,000 in funds from China.[23]

Logistics

In Huklandia, where Huk control was complete, food was supplied by the local population, and it was common practice to take a certain percentage of the annual crop. In areas where the Huks were not in complete control, the members of the BUDC were responsible for supplying the guerrilla units. As the countermeasures introduced by Magsaysay began to be effective, the Huks began to raid barrios simply to obtain supplies, especially food.

Most of the weapons used by the Huks were obtained during the war. Additional arms and ammunition were supplied by or captured from the Municipal Security Forces, who were either apathetic toward the central government, or susceptible to bribery.

Security

Each guerrilla band maintained a special "terror force," which took violent security measures against the local population. An "enforcing squadron" punished offenders, usually by performing an act which would be visible to observers. Among the guerrillas themselves, "treason" or desertion could lead to execution.

In Manila the labor unions and youth organizations were infiltrated wherever possible, and the offices of union officials were used as meeting places and storage areas for Huk documents. The guerrillas were instructed not to operate in zones where underground headquarters were located and nonmilitary functions were being carried out. The fact that they kept written documents, however, was disastrous to the party apparatus in Manila. The operations of the Hukbalahap virtually ceased in Manila when the leaders and many of their documents were captured in June 1950.

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

Psychological Operations

One authority has pointed out that the usual "agitprop" organization in the Philippines took the form of PEIRA (the Political, Economic, Intelligence, and Research Association), which was the body primarily responsible for the dissemination of Huk propaganda. In addition to a continuing flow of posters, pamphlets, and leaflets designed for the general public, four major publications by PEIRA were *Ang Kommunista*, *Titus*, *Mapappalaya*, and *Klayarn*. Almost everything was mimeographed, and the pamphlets were usually illustrated with crudely drawn cartoons. The contents were a mixture of political analysis, comments on the news, stories of peasant exploitation "at the hands of the landlords," and appeals to support the "national liberation movement." This literature was widely circulated throughout central Luzon by young courier agents of PEIRA.

The propaganda line varied according to current objectives and targets of attack. Certain themes, however, reappeared constantly. These were: corruption, bribery, and injustice of the federal government; land reform; charges that U.S. interests always represented imperialism and colonialism. Local and temporary issues were also seized upon, such of the irregularities and intimidation of voters and candidates in the federal elections of 1949, and the brutality of EDCOR "concentration camps." It should be noted, however, that no charges were leveled against municipal employees, as this was a group potentially useful to the Huks. Except for the anti-United States themes, the Huk propaganda lines were fairly effective. An investigator who interviewed ex-Huks to determine the most important aspects of Huk appeal found a variety of contributing factors. Some were forced to join at gunpoint; others joined in order to avoid government prosecution on other criminal charges; others indicated primary concern for agrarian reform; others were influenced by verbal persuasion.[24] Personal friendship with an insurgent, Communist promises of land reform, the hopes for a more democratic government, and mere curiosity drove many to the ranks of the insurgents.

A great deal of emphasis was placed on the indoctrination of new Huk recruits, which was the responsibility of the RECO Educational Department. These recruits, as well as populations of Huk-controlled areas were put through a well-developed Communist indoctrination program.[25]

In addition to these mass schools, special military schools were operated. One of these was "Stalin University," located in the vicinity of Mount Arayat, which was designed to train military unit leaders in guerrilla tactics.

In the immediate postwar period the use of terror to further the revolutionary movement was sporadic; it evidently occasioned great debate within the ranks of the Central Committee.[26] A series of terrorist raids on villages took place immediately after the resumption of hostilities in the spring of 1946. The major purpose of these attacks seems to have been to show the local inhabitants that the insurgent forces could not be defeated by government army and security forces, and thus to forestall popular cooperation with government officials. The terrorist attacks against individual vehicles and individuals traveling in areas occupied by insurgent forces were intended to impress upon the public the strength of the clandestine organization. This practice was largely abandoned after the attack on the widow of ex-President Quezon, an incident which aroused great public indignation. In 1949, after the election of Quirino and the escape of several Communist leaders to the hills, the Huks decided to intensify their efforts, and stepped up their terrorist attacks on villages. These attacks were accompanied by others on farmland and forest areas, to extend the area of Huk control and to demonstrate concretely their aversion to landlords.

Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03581R000200100001-5