


UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENT,  
REVOLUTIONARY, AND  
RESISTANCE WARFARE



SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE  
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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**UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENT,  
REVOLUTIONARY, AND  
RESISTANCE WARFARE**

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## FOREWORD

The phenomena of social change are of widespread interest among social scientists, as well they should be in these dynamic and dangerous times. The bulk of research in this field deals with forces that are relatively open to observation, or at least are accepted as "normal" and within the law.

One important set of forces in the pull and tug of social change is not open to ready and systematic study, but is outside the law and clandestine. Underground movements aim not only to evade and thwart established processes of the existing government but work for an early and usually violent change of the form or function or personnel of the government itself.

This report thus invites attention to this much neglected aspect of insurgency and revolutionary warfare—the underground organization which typically is the first manifestation of a revolution and which, in the revolution's later stages, is usually its heart and soul, if not its body. In a real sense, the report attempts to redress an imbalance. Much has been written about guerrillas, but relatively little literature has focused on undergrounds. Yet, for every guerrilla member of a revolutionary movement, the authors of this report point out there are two to twenty-seven underground members, with an average of nine underground members to one guerrilla. The list of functions which the underground performs for the revolution is no less impressive—for example, providing food, weapons, ammunition and other support for guerrilla units, collecting and disseminating intelligence, maintaining safe houses, acquiring financing for the movement, and leading the political offensive.

The information about undergrounds synthesized in this report should prove helpful in providing some of that knowledge which is a prerequisite to the effective suppression and elimination of insurgency and revolutionary movements—or effective support of them if such support is ever deemed desirable. It will be used at the Special Operations Research Office as one foundation for additional research in revolutionary dynamics. For this reason, comments of readers are most welcome.

*T. Vallance*

Theodore R. Vallance  
Director

## TASK UNDERGROUNDS

Research Completed June 1963

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## PREFACE

The task of one who attempts to write about the topic of undergrounds is formidable. The reasons are immediately apparent. By definition, undergrounds are organized and function in such a way as to minimize knowledge about them—clandestinely and with extreme “security” precautions. Few members know one another, first hand observation and data recording are usually impossible, and few written records are kept (those that are kept frequently are destroyed or become highly classified if the insurgents are successful).

At the time of the preparation of this report, there was no single unclassified document which was focused on underground organizations. There were bits and pieces of information about undergrounds scattered around in many open sources, but a compendium which would synthesize available information into a format useful for a variety of purposes was clearly needed.

For the military user, this report is designed to complement the information presented about undergrounds in existing field manuals. As such, it should be most useful in those military schools offering courses related to the counterinsurgency mission. The report also contains much helpful background information for the formulation of counterinsurgency policy and doctrine.

To avoid misunderstanding, a few words concerning format and style are in order. The report tries to be comprehensively descriptive; in so doing, the information presented ranges from material that can be considered simple, obvious statements of fact to intricate abstractions. Some elements of the report, then, demand the indulgence of the neophyte, while other elements may try the patience of the knowledgeable person. Organization of the report into two parts, and into relatively autonomous chapters within each part, should facilitate selective use of the material presented—and such was its intent. For ease of reading, numbered footnotes appear at end of each chapter. Inevitably there is some redundancy of content for the reader who goes through the report from cover to cover.

With the exception of the last chapter in Part I on government countermeasures, the report reflects an insurgent's viewpoint of undergrounds rather than a counterinsurgent's. By this is meant only that much of the material is presented in terms of the effectiveness of underground operations—and not how to effectively counter them. Design of effective countermeasures depends on first understanding undergrounds.

Finally, treating the information from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of undergrounds has resulted in a prescriptive writing style in some sections of

Part I of the report. Statements phrased in terms such as "must," "should," and "are," imply a greater degree of certitude or a more firm doctrinaire position than the evidence may warrant. On the one hand, the virtue of clarifying propositions and principles. On the other hand, the reader is cautioned not to accept all such statements uncritically, but to view them primarily as hypotheses based on limited evidence.

SORO wishes to express its thanks to a number of consultants whose expertise and advice were invaluable. Mr. Slavko Bjelajac, of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Special Operations), Director of Special Warfare's Office, provided invaluable guidance throughout the project and special assistance on the case study of Yugoslavia underground movements. Three men reviewed the entire report, and offered specific suggestions in their areas of special competence: Dr. Paul Linebarger, of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, who provided useful insights and ideas for carrying out such a project; Dr. George K. Tanham, of the Rand Corporation, who was particularly helpful in clarifying the portions dealing with revolutionary warfare; and Dr. Jan Karski, of Georgetown University, whose personal experiences as an underground worker and knowledge of Soviet methods contributed immeasurably to the sections on Communism.

The descriptions in Part II of the report of the undergrounds in seven countries benefited greatly from the painstaking critique of several area specialists: Dr. Marcell Vigneras, of the Research and Analysis Corporation, who reviewed the study of the French resistance; Mr. David Martin, Administrative Assistant to Senator Thomas Dodd, who reviewed the Yugoslavia study; Dr. Frank Trager, Professor of Politics at the National War College, whose intimate knowledge of Southeast Asia contributed greatly to the Malayan and Philippine studies; Dr. Hans Kohn, Professor Emeritus of the City College of New York, who reviewed the Algerian summary; Dr. William McNeill, of the University of Chicago, whose help was invaluable on the Greek underground; and, Dr. J. C. Hurewitz of Columbia University, who reviewed the Palestine study.

Although the above named persons contributed much of value to this report, final responsibility for its content rests solely with the Special Operations Research Office.

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**SUMMARY**

**PURPOSE OF STUDY**

**BACKGROUND**

**SYNOPSIS**

**METHODOLOGICAL NOTES**

## PURPOSE OF STUDY

The objective of this study is to develop a comprehensive introduction to the subject of undergrounds. It is designed to bring together existing information about undergrounds through—

- (1) A generalized description of
  - the strategic roles of undergrounds in insurgency, revolutionary,\* and resistance warfare
  - the administrative and operational missions performed by undergrounds for revolutionary and resistance movements
  - typical techniques utilized by undergrounds in accomplishing their missions
  - Communist use of undergrounds
  - countermeasures utilized by incumbent governments to suppress or eliminate undergrounds
- (2) Historical illustrations of the activities of undergrounds in both revolutionary and resistance movements.

## BACKGROUND

The overwhelming destructive potential of nuclear weapons has focused attention on internal (revolutionary) wars in the developing nations and on the relationship of such wars to U.S. interests and security. Undergrounds are the clandestine elements of indigenous politico-military revolutionary organizations which attempt to illegally weaken, modify, or replace the governing authority, typically through the use or threat of force. Such movements may or may not be supported by external powers attempting to subvert the established government. Neither are undergrounds uniquely a revolutionary phenomenon. When the politico-military movement is directed against an external occupying power, usually in times of "hot" international conflict such as World War II, undergrounds are the clandestine elements of such resistance efforts. Finally, of course, neither revolutionary nor resistance movements are necessarily limited to the developing nations, although it is the revolutionary ferment in these nations that commands attention on the international scene at the present time.

Whatever the strategic politico-military context, it is vital to U.S. defense efforts, particularly those of the U.S. Army, to have as complete an understand-

\*For purposes of this study, the terms insurgency and revolution are considered synonymous and are hereafter used interchangeably.

## Summary

ing as possible about the nature of undergrounds—their organization, missions, strategies, methods of action, and relationships to other elements of the total revolutionary movement, such as guerrilla units. For many situations, such knowledge is needed to assist established governments in suppressing or eliminating revolutionary movements. Other situations are conceivable in which it may be in the U.S. interest to assist revolutionary undergrounds, as it assisted a number of resistance movements during World War II.

## SYNOPSIS

The first chapter of Part I is summarized as an inventory of 14 selected statements of fact, principles, or propositions about the strategic role and importance of undergrounds in resistance and revolutionary warfare. This style was chosen because this chapter has broader relevance to U.S. defense policy and planning than the other chapters. The remaining chapters in Part I are in the form of brief narratives, made up of key statements, designed to highlight aspects of the subject rather than to summarize it.

Part II, the seven historical illustrations, is treated in yet another way. After an initial résumé of important characteristics of each, a series of qualitative and quantitative comparisons based on the seven undergrounds are made. The last part of the summary presents a chart on the numbers of underground members, guerrilla members, total population, and security forces involved in the seven undergrounds reviewed, with interpretative comments.

### PART I

#### Chapter 1: The Role of Undergrounds

1. Undergrounds have been the base of resistance and revolutionary movements throughout recorded history.
2. Clandestine organizations, such as undergrounds, are not the particular product of—
  - a. political or religious ideology;
  - b. cultural, ethnic, national, or geographical grouping of persons;
  - c. structure or form of government;
  - d. segment of society or social class;
  - e. stage of a society's economic or technological development.
3. Although undergrounds assume different forms, all are characterized by the following:
  - a. their *goals* are illegal in terms of the *de facto* governmental system against which they act;
  - b. their *activities* are generally both legal and illegal;
  - c. their *members* usually play legal roles within the society, with their underground membership concealed.

## Summary

4. Most revolutionary movements (excluding coup d'état, a revolution "from the top") go through five distinct phases of evolutionary development:
  - a. clandestine organization phase;
  - b. psychological offensive phase;
  - c. expansion phase;
  - d. militarization phase;
  - e. consolidation phase.
5. Undergrounds typically perform the following functions for a revolutionary movement up to the militarization phase:
  - a. organize the revolutionary movement;
  - b. control and coordinate all revolutionary activities;
  - c. provide internal administrative functions for the revolutionary organization, such as recruitment, training, indoctrination, finances, logistics, communications, security;
  - d. undertake subversion of the existing government's personnel and institutions;
  - e. conduct psychological operations, both propaganda and actions, among the people and in important foreign nations;
  - f. establish "shadow" governments which are to assume power if the revolutionaries win;
  - g. collect and disseminate intelligence information for the revolutionary movement;
  - h. carry out sabotage;
    - i. set up escape and evasion networks for members of the movement.
6. After the militarization phase, undergrounds perform the same functions, proceeding in "nonliberated" areas with the additional critical role of supporting overt guerrilla units of the revolutionary movement by all means—intelligence, recruits, food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, medicines, and other supplies.
7. Undergrounds are as important as guerrilla units, if not more so, to the success or failure of a revolutionary movement.
8. The strength of undergrounds lies in—
  - a. the lack of geographical restrictions on their operations;
  - b. the varied nature of their membership;
  - c. their clandestine nature.
9. Characteristically, guerrilla units emerge only after undergrounds have prepared the way and are almost wholly dependent for their support on an active underground.
10. The differences between undergrounds in resistance and revolutionary movements are their strategic politico-military goals, and not the functions.
11. Resistance movements, and their associated undergrounds, may be important strategically in "hot" international conflict (e.g., affecting length of campaign or nature of a postwar political situation), but

they have not been decisive; undergrounds can properly be considered to be of secondary or ancillary importance in such conflicts.

12. In revolutionary warfare, there is no other, more decisive, military struggle (as in "hot war") on which the outcome of the internal war depends; undergrounds are of primary and vital importance to "cold war" conflict outcomes when such revolutions are tacitly accepted as a major battleground of that conflict.

13. The loyalty of the people is the primary target in revolutionary wars; this political objective is sought by undergrounds through a combination of political and military activities.

14. As a part of a government's counterinsurgency effort, internal security forces must—

- a. protect the people and the government's instruments of political control and influence from the coercive and destructive actions of the undergrounds;
- b. perform a substantial role in influencing the people to support the existing government's claim to legitimacy as a governing authority;
- c. be prepared to perform noncoercive, quasi-military activities, as well as military activities, all with the same ultimate political objective—the loyalty of the people to the governing authority.

#### Chapter 2: Underground Administrative Techniques

Like other human organizations, undergrounds require essential "house-keeping" administrative functions. Operating in hostile environments, they must balance the need for expansion and aggressive action with the need to limit membership to trustworthy individuals. For this and other reasons, an underground's *organizational structure* will vary through time. Undergrounds generally seek to have agents in every geographic area and among all social and ethnic groups within the country. Although command and responsibility are centralized within the organization, each unit usually operates autonomously under mission-type orders from higher commands.

Undergrounds utilize a number of standard techniques to ensure their survival and growth. For example, they organize on the "fail-safe" principle wherein if one element is compromised the entire system will not be incapacitated. *Parallel units* for every type of activity are maintained. At the base of the organization, workers are organized into *cells* and their contacts limited to members of their own cell. This prevents a captured member from implicating other than fellow cell members. For the same reason, a leader in the chain of command has contact only with his immediate superior and immediate subordinates.

*Communications* within the underground are subject to the strictest security precautions. Parallel nets are used for important messages, verification of message receipt is usually required, and back-up messages are frequently used. Couriers generally carry compromising documents. Maildrops (places where

messages may be left by one courier and picked up by another) are used by the couriers to eliminate the need for them to know each other's address.

*Recruitment* varies with the stage of underground development. In the early stage, it is highly selective; only individuals of known reliability are accepted. Later, however, more emphasis is placed upon obtaining the support of the general populace. The insurgents move into communities and rural areas and assist the people in any way possible. Once a feeling of indebtedness is created, the insurgents ask help in return and ultimately recruit or "draft" young men for the movement.

Undergrounds may tap external sources such as foreign governments or fraternal societies for *financing*. To raise money within their own country, secret loans from wealthy individuals or concerns sympathetic to the movement may be secured. Various items may be sold by door-to-door canvasses or through "front" stores. Robbery is another means of obtaining funds; victims are usually restricted to wealthy individuals and "impersonal" business firms, since undergrounds avoid arousing the hostility of the general populace. Persons with more modest incomes may be coerced to make "contributions" under threat of reprisal. In areas controlled by the underground, taxes may be levied.

The underground usually is the internal *supply* arm of the guerrillas. It buys supplies on the black market or on the legal market through front organizations. It may steal goods from warehouses, or conduct open raids to get supplies. Sometimes undergrounds manufacture weapons and ammunition. Rural workshops may be small and mobile so that they can be moved to avoid enemy forays; those in cities are ordinarily disguised since they are stationary. Urban manufacturing usually is done in established or front shops. Goods and materials may also be systematically collected from the population, though this requires a high degree of underground influence and freedom of action. In making such collections, undergrounds generally try to avoid the label of "bandits" by making at least nominal payments, or giving IOU's for the goods. Sources outside the country also may be tapped. Firms engaged in foreign trade may import equipment under noncontraband labels. Foreign governments may supply undergrounds through such means as parachute drops.

To protect the personal anonymity of their members, many jobs may be filled with persons who can perform their duties while engaging in their legal occupations; such members appear "normal" and escape the suspicion of neighbors or security personnel. Those who must live under false identities are given the necessary documents. These may be forged in underground printing shops; or authentic papers of dead or missing persons may be slightly altered and used. In choosing meeting places, neighborhoods of persons known for antiregime activities and likely to be under surveillance are avoided.

*Security* of communications may be protected by using old men and women, or children as couriers, for their movements are least likely to arouse suspicion. The missions of couriers may be made part of routine trips, to escape the suspicion of observant persons and provide a good excuse for travel. Couriers are usually expected to arrive exactly on time for a rendezvous, as an individual

ical effect upon the government and the people. When persuasion alone does not get the desired response from an audience, an underground sometimes resorts to coercion, threats, and terror.

In preparing for the assumption of power, a *provisional government* is frequently set up to lend an air of legitimacy to the underground movement, and to get financial help from those foreign governments who recognize it. In areas which it controls, an underground may create *shadow governments* which operate courts and schools and supply police, public health services, etc. Underground *intelligence* operations assist guerrilla units by providing them with scene-of-battle information. They usually gather tactical rather than strategic intelligence and rely upon quantity rather than quality. Transportation and communication facilities are reconnoitered by undergrounds in preparing for sabotage attacks, which may be supervised by specialists from military units. Secret scientific and military information as well as political intelligence is also obtained by undergrounds.

Techniques of underground *sabotage* can be viewed in two general categories: selective sabotage and general sabotage. In the first, the underground tries to incapacitate installations which cannot easily be replaced or repaired in time to meet the government's crucial needs. Tactical targets, such as a bridge essential for transporting troops and supplies to a battle area, are concentrated on since strategic targets, such as factories, must be incapacitated for a much longer period. An underground may undertake sabotage, not only to hamper the government's military effort, but to encourage the populace to engage in general acts of destruction. Such acts serve as a form of propaganda and commit people more firmly to the cause.

Undergrounds generally use simple *explosives*, since their members usually are not trained demolition experts. Plastic explosives are ideal, since they are easily stored and simple to use. Members receive training through manuals, directives, clandestine newspapers, leaflets, radio broadcasts, or personal instruction from military units. To foster general sabotage the underground often instructs the population in the use of such simple devices as Molotov cocktails, tin-can grenades, and miscellaneous devices for causing fire or damage to small equipment.

In conducting *escape and evasion* operations, an underground may remove persons from an area, in which case egress routes are usually directed away from lines of battle, or it can hide fugitives in secret lodgings within the area. If they are to be hidden for only a short time, it is only necessary to provide some food, a place of rest, and directions for travel. If, however, a fugitive must live in hiding for an extended period of time, extra ration cards may have to be obtained and cover stories formulated to explain his presence in case of discovery. A third alternative is to put fugitives in remote camps in wooded or mountainous areas, or with roving guerrilla units. To guard against infiltration of the escape and evasion network by government security personnel, strangers seeking the assistance of the underground may be subjected to tests. They may be questioned repeatedly to uncover any discrepancies in their accounts of places of residence, jobs, friends, and reasons for asking help.

who must wait for his contact risks being arrested for loitering. Members meeting for the first time often establish their identity by recognition signals which appear innocent to an observer.

Other security measures are designed to prevent betrayal from within. Loyalty checks are conducted on prospective recruits and on members suspected of collaboration with the enemy. Loyalty oaths may be given to new members to impress them with the seriousness of the cause and the need for secrecy. The general practice is to hold records to a minimum, on the principle that only information which cannot be memorized or which is needed for future reference should be put in writing. When it is necessary to record the names and addresses of underground workers, only cover names are generally used.

### Chapter 3: Underground Operational Techniques

In *subverting organizations*, an underground member seeking a leadership post represents himself as dedicated and loyal. He takes the initiative in planning activities and volunteers for any job, no matter how time-consuming or unpleasant, while avoiding any contacts or activity which might jeopardize his position in the organization. At the same time, his candidacy is supported by underground members who belong to the rank and file. Although they may be few in number, they can thus influence the decisions of the whole organization. Its membership may be controlled through a system of rewards and sanctions, once the underground is master.

*Front groups* are frequently used. If it is unable to infiltrate existing organizations, an underground often creates organizations to do its work behind an innocent façade. These usually espouse some worthy cause which will enlist the support of respectable members of the community, while the leadership is kept firmly in the hands of the underground members. When a subversive group is small, it often seeks to draw legitimate groups into a *united front*, and gain the prestige of speaking for a larger number of people. After the united front has been formed, the subversive group will try to discredit its leaders and take over.

*Paper groups* are also used. Organizations with one or two members obtain charters from some national or international body and then send delegates to its confederation or congress. The paper group often gets equal representation with larger, legitimate groups, and if delegations vote as a bloc, it can give the impression of wide popular support of a particular individual or policy. Such groups created by an underground can disproportionately influence larger organizations.

Standard techniques are used in the conduct of *psychological operations*. The means of communicating the propaganda message approximate those used by governments or legal organizations: radio broadcasts, where the populace possesses radios; newspapers and pamphlets; word-of-mouth; slogans or other symbols displayed upon walls. Overt mass responses are sometimes evoked for their psychological effect; mobs are formed and demonstrations created to show dissatisfaction with the government. Passive resistance is encouraged, not only for the material effect it may have upon production, but also for its psychological

## Chapter 4: Communist Use of Undergrounds

The international Communist movement has participated in a wide variety of resistance and revolutionary movements. In some instances, Communist wartime resistance movements became the vehicles by which Communist parties launched or completed revolutions. The case of Yugoslavia is well-known but it is sometimes overlooked that anti-Japanese activities helped the postwar Communist movements in China, Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines.

Regardless of their locale or particular method of operations, Communist parties have followed a general pattern in their attempts to gain power through revolution. Leaders trained in Moscow return home to form small elite groups and prepare to operate both legally and illegally. Two apparatuses are usually formed, one more or less overt, the other tightly secret and open only to the core elite. The open party rarely attempts to gain support on ideological grounds, but appeals to local, regional, and national interests. It joins in united front activities to improve its image and credibility. In the meantime, the secret elite are *infiltrating* legal organizations and gaining key positions, without revealing their Communist affiliation. Once in power, they may persuade such organizations to join united fronts with the open Communist Party. When the revolutionary situation is considered ripe, two organizations are formed by the open party—a guerrilla unit and a civilian support unit. Both assume the names of popular causes (e.g., liberation, independence) and recruit membership in that name. Recruits need not give allegiance to communism, and frequently do not understand communism, or know that the movement is Communist-led.

Key leadership positions are maintained by Communists in the revolutionary movement, and any opposition—people or parties—is eliminated, making the Communist Party the only alternative for the people. Throughout, membership in the core elite is kept very selective and small; should the “open” party be defeated, the cadre is likely to remain intact for another attempt at a later date.

## Chapter 5: Government Countermeasures

It is difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate most undergrounds in their initial stages of development, as to do so would require a very large and comprehensive intelligence system. A better course of action is to contain their influence by measures that will command the respect and loyalty of the people. Once an underground movement has become militant, however, the government can take steps to cut off foreign sanctuary and support, and to separate the guerrillas from the underground and the local populace from which it must obtain supplies. By offering rewards for information, by regrouping people away from the guerrillas, and by civic action designed to win the confidence and active cooperation of the people, the government may force the underground into a defensive position.

Since underground activities are directed toward gaining the control and loyalty of the people, government forces can meet this threat through population control measures and pacification. In administering a pacification pro-

gram it is important to understand the nature of human behavior under stress. Civic action, information campaigns, relocation, and retraining are some of the techniques which have been used in reducing stress and winning active support.

To penetrate the underground, intelligence sources can be established, potential targets can be identified, the *modus operandi* of underground agents determined, and informers acquired. Once members have been identified it is important to keep them under surveillance and identify their contacts within the underground. The most successful way of destroying underground initiative and obtaining information seems to be infiltration.

In combating undergrounds, it is preferable to centralize military and civilian commands under one authority so that concerted political-military action can be taken against the underground while security and assistance can be provided to the populace. Although military units should follow the overall direction and policy of a central authority, they also should be allowed to function locally in such a manner as to take advantage of “five” intelligence and changes in the tactical situation.

## PART II

In France during World War II, the underground carried out sabotage and small raids while building a secret army for the purpose of assisting in the Allied invasion. Some of the complexities of coordination of underground activities with external forces, in this case the Allies, are illustrated.

In Yugoslavia, Mihailovic operated on a similar strategy. So as not to put the populace in jeopardy of Nazi retaliation, he carried out small guerrilla attacks which would not implicate civilians and organized a secret army anticipating an Allied invasion. Tito's partisans were less concerned about the character of the attacks and engaged the occupiers whenever it was to their advantage. Foreseeing the day when the resistance would end, the Communists sought to gain control of the country by forming both open and clandestine governments to provide the needed civil administration. Yugoslavia was the scene not only of resistance against the occupier but also competition and fighting between the Communist and non-Communist factions for control of the resistance movement and of the country.

Algeria is an example of a successful non-Communist revolution fought to win independence from the French. The Algerians struggled against a major world power for 7½ years and won primarily through political rather than military means. Noteworthy in this case is the importance of extraterritorial support obtained by the Algerians via Tunisia and Morocco.

In Malaya the Communist Party (MCP) organized a military force (MRLA) and a civilian underground (the Min Yuen) from remnants of the anti-Japanese resistance movement. The MCP was comprised almost entirely of one ethnic group in Malaya, the Chinese. This factor, and the collapse of their underground supply organization through British relocation of the rural population, contributed heavily to their defeat.

In Greece, another Communist movement was defeated after the loss of a sanctuary and base of supply in Yugoslavia. Failing to develop an effective

underground supply organization, the guerrillas were forced to retreat to the Albanian borderland and fight the Greek army in a conventional type battle which they ultimately lost.

In the Philippines, an underground Communist movement developed from the anti-Japanese resistance and carried on a revolutionary campaign to overthrow the government. Through social, political, and military reform measures and the able leadership of Ramon Magsaysay, the cooperation of the people was obtained and the Communist insurrection suppressed.

The unusual factors of large-scale, illegal immigration and the special political status of the mandate in Palestine created a unique situation for an underground to operate in. Drawing on former members of World War II undergrounds, the Haganah developed an effective intelligence network. It also transcended national boundaries and utilized the sympathy of other nations for the refugees to aid the movement.

#### Some Qualitative Comparisons

A characteristic of the underground organizations reviewed was the development of cadres. The non-Communist underground groups grew up from war labor, political, military, and religious organizations. The leaders of these groups were instrumental in organizing the underground groups and in setting up civilian administrations throughout occupied territories. On the other hand, the Communist cadres were composed of professional organizers who had been involved in clandestine work for many years before the war. All of the undergrounds reviewed were organized on a cellular basis.

The undergrounds primarily relied on couriers and radios for communications, although they often improvised when conventional means were lacking. They were frequently dependent upon external support for finances and supplies. In most cases, undergrounds supplied guerrillas with food and supplies, and manufactured crude weapons and ammunition. In order to maintain the security of the organization, counterintelligence units were established to infiltrate government military posts and civil organizations with civilian workers. Terror squads were characteristic of all the movements studied; they provided necessary security for clandestine operations by enacting threats and punishing traitors and collaborators.

Psychological operations were carried out through clandestine newspapers primarily through word-of-mouth communications. Radio broadcasts from outside the country were used for propaganda purposes in Yugoslavia, Palestine, Algeria, Malaya, and Greece. Ethnic and religious differences as well as group prejudices played an important role in the propaganda campaigns in these five countries. In the revolutionary movements reviewed, psychological operations were perhaps the most important single activity.

The undergrounds generally were responsible for tactical rather than strategic intelligence and tended to rely on quantity rather than quality of information. In World War II the Allies, although working with the underground, sent agents from the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and

British Special Operations Executive (SOE) on special assignments to gather strategic information. Sabotage was used not only to destroy the enemy's lines of communication and supply depots, but also to take the pressure off guerrillas. One of the most useful and successful functions of an underground was the development of escape and evasion networks.

Countermeasures against undergrounds usually involved a two-pronged attack. The first was aimed at obtaining the cooperation of the population and the second at attempting to destroy the movement. In order to protect and separate the people from the guerrillas and underground, relocation to safe areas was used in Malaya, Greece, the Philippines, and Algeria. The German device of deportation was another variation of relocation. Relocation provided a means by which the populace could be protected from threats of the insurgents, and acted as a method to separate the underground and their local supporters. By the use of cordon and search, and population control measures, many members of undergrounds were captured. Amnesty and rewards were made to induce defection from the underground. These measures, coupled with rehabilitation programs, often placed the underground on the defensive, making it more concerned with defections, informers, and infiltration than with expansion and aggressive activities.

#### Some Quantitative Comparisons

In comparing selected quantitative information on the seven undergrounds studied (see fig. 1), some interesting observations can be made.

In each of the movements, the underground was larger than the guerrilla force. The size of the ratio of underground members to guerrillas varies from two-to-one to twenty-seven to one, with an average of nine underground members to every guerrilla. In addition, the guerrillas were organized into (1) roving guerrilla units, (2) regional troops, and (3) militia. The latter two usually remained close to the village or community from which they came and operated in a quasi-clandestine manner. The fact that, even in the peak of the militarization phase, there are more underground members than guerrillas emphasizes the political nature of resistance movements and internal wars.

The highest ratios of underground to guerrilla strength occurred in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. These three countries have several factors in common which may suggest the reason for this. The terrain and cutoff of external supply required that food, ammunition, and arms be furnished through an internal underground organization. All three movements were Communist directed, and the Communists characteristically use large underground organizations.

And yet these are precisely the three countries in which a successful counterinsurgency effort occurred and in two of them (Greece and the Philippines) the insurgents greatly outnumbered the security forces. Clearly, the number of combatants is less critical than the measures taken by either side. Although accomplished by different means, the end-result of all three counterinsurgency campaigns was the cessation of underground support of the guerrillas which directly or indirectly broke the back of the revolutionary movement.

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Country	Population (millions)	Insurgents				Security forces			Ratios and percentages		
		Underground	Guerrillas	Total	Military, militia, police	Underground	Guerrillas	Population	Guerrillas	Guerrillas	Security forces
France-----	41.0 (1946)	300,000	100,000	400,000 (1944)	500,000 (1940-44)	1	3	1	46	1	1.25
Yugoslavia-----	16.0 (1940)	Partisans	50,000	200,000 (1944)	200,000 (1940-44)	1	3	1	34	1	1.3
Algeria-----	10.3 (1956)	FLN	21,000	29,000 (1956)	800,000 (1958)	1	3	1	12	1	13
Malaya-----	4.9 (1950)	OAS	5,000	25,000 (1962)	300,000 (1951-54)	1	18	1	12	1	3

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Country	Population (millions)	Insurgents				Security forces			Ratios and percentages		
		Underground	Guerrillas	Total	Military, militia, police	Underground	Guerrillas	Population	Guerrillas	Guerrillas	Security forces
Greece-----	7.9 (1946)	675,000	25,000	700,000 (1948)	182,000 (1948)	1	27	1	9	1	4
Philippines-----	19.2 (1946)	100,000	12,000	112,000 (1952)	37,000 (1950)	1	8	1	129	1	3
Palestine-----	2.0 (1948)	30,000	15,000	45,000 (1948)	95,000 (1948)	1	2	1	14	1	2

Figure 1. Insurgents, Security Forces, and the Population.

The sources for the figures are referenced in each of the case descriptions. The figures are estimates of the insurgent and government strengths at the peak of the movement.

Underground/Guerrilla  
 X Median 3/1  
 X Mean 9/1  
 Range 2/1 to 27/1

Combatants/Population  
 X Median 1/14  
 X Mean 1/36  
 Range 1/129 to 1/9

Insurgents/Security Forces  
 X Median 1/1.25  
 X Mean 1/4/1  
 Range 1/13 to 4/1



Another interesting aspect is the percentage of combatants (insurgent and government security forces) engaged in the conflict, full time or occasional, at the peak of the movement. These range from 0.7 to 11 percent with an average of 6 percent of the population being involved. This leaves a large proportion of the populace who, for personal or other reasons, were not directly involved, and raises some interesting questions about the meaningfulness of referring to the "people" in an undifferentiated manner. It may be to the government's advantage to make finer distinctions than those between "the guerrillas" and "the people" and plan countermeasures that do not alienate the uncommitted, or passive supporters, and focus them on the underground, as well as the guerrillas.

## METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

The development of a single source book of information on undergrounds, which would reflect the current state of knowledge about undergrounds, was undertaken as an initial study. Sources used in the study were all open (unclassified). In this literature, very few sources treat undergrounds systematically and nonpersonally as the major subject. Rather, undergrounds are discussed as an ancillary topic in historical accounts of larger campaigns as in *Rearming the French* by Marcel Vigner, analytic studies of particular situations such as *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* by Lucien W. Pye, and foreign sources, as *Guerrilla Warfare* by Ernesto Guevara. Information from these sources was supplemented by cautious and selective use of more detailed and focused accounts of underground actions found in autobiographical memoirs and other personal documents.

A direct methodology was used in research. First, a cross-section of the available literature was reviewed; an outline for categorizing and describing the collected information was developed for the first part of the study. From this framework, the chapters of Part I evolved inductively, by generalizing from specific actions, and deductively, through a functional analysis of performance requirements as derived from general goals and objectives of varying strategic politico-military situations. Thereafter, an iterative process, consisting essentially of collecting additional information, evaluating it, and categorizing it, was used. The framework was modified and refined to accord with the additional information. The whole process was then repeated. When the framework was finally established near the end of the data collection and analysis effort, subsequent information rarely modified it. Instead, the information primarily clarified the general propositions of the outline, (e.g., basic security techniques) or illustrated variations in application of a technique (e.g., secret message delivery).

For the second objective of the study, preparation of historical illustrations, seven relatively recent (during or after World War II) instances of underground movements were selected. They were chosen on the basis of the extent

to which the experience emphasized an important characteristic of the nature of undergrounds (see introduction to Part II), and on availability of information about the underground. Sources describing the resistance movement involved were reviewed, information pertinent to the study abstracted, and the underground's "story" reconstructed. However, the cases in Part II are not histories of the undergrounds; they represent only selected aspects of the underground's role and functions.

As a final methodological note, the draft manuscript of this report, after intensive internal review and revision, was submitted to the expert consultants identified in the Preface. Revisions and additional literature review were made at their suggestion. It will be noted by the reader that treatment of topics within the study is uneven; this reflects the necessary time and effort limitations under which the study was conducted; there may be available unclassified information which could fill some gaps in our knowledge as presented in this study. Some of these gaps might be considered as candidates for additional research, not only of a descriptive nature, but for analytic and predictive studies utilizing recent advances in military social science research. The study will be used as one foundation for future SORO research programming aimed at increasing our knowledge of all aspects of unconventional warfare and its relationship to the revolutionary process.

**PART I**

**UNDERGROUNDS: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND  
COUNTERMEASURES**

**CHAPTER 1. THE ROLE OF UNDERGROUNDS IN RESISTANCE AND  
REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE**

**CHAPTER 2. UNDERGROUND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS**

**CHAPTER 3. UNDERGROUND OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS  
AND TECHNIQUES**

**CHAPTER 4. COMMUNIST USE OF UNDERGROUNDS IN  
RESISTANCE AND REVOLUTION**

**CHAPTER 5. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES**

CHAPTER 1

THE ROLE OF UNDERGROUNDS IN RESISTANCE  
AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE