ever, did not exist in most other countries prior to World War II. Leaders of Communist movements in industrialized countries saw no alternative other than to bide their time and wait for the proper moment to make a bid for power. Leaders in underdeveloped countries, however, concluded that there might be a direct path to power through a "war of liberation" or "people's war," in which guerrilla forces led by the Communist Party and backed by the masses would eventually oust the incumbent government through military victory.

The most important and the most characteristic feature of "liberation wars" is the use of the peasantry rather than the proletariat as the main source of Communist strength.[20] In China, after 1927, the Kuomintang was attemping to crush the Communists and the Communist-controlled labor unions in the major cities. Rather than continue trying to organize the urban groups and to subvert Kuomintang-controlled institutions, Mao went into the countryside, where Kuomintang administration was either weak or nonexistent, and organized the peasants into rural soviets. He succeded in organizing millions of people into such soviets and his success set a pattern for other countries where the bulk of the population was rural. Thus, in Indochina in 1930, when all nationalist activities were illegal and the Communist Party had not yet gained prominence among the nationalist underground groups, rural soviets were organized in northern Vietnam by Chinese agents from Hong Kong.[21] These initial soviets spread their influence among the peasantry and later became the bastion of Communist strength in Indochina.

Another characteristic of liberation wars is the creation or control by the Communist Party of an army which serves as the vanguard of the revolution. Such an army, usually termed a "People's Liberation Army," combines military with political activities.[22] Under the direction of the party, each soldier is indoctrinated and trained for political as well as military duties, so that he can help convince the masses that this is their struggle and persuade them to support the revolution.

A third feature is the creation by the Communists not only of "bases," which serve as supply depots, but also of large areas of "liberated territory" which serve the liberation army as sources of intelligence and supplies, sanctuaries for escape, evasion, or recuperation, and centers of political strength.[23] There is no set rule concerning how or when such liberated areas are organized. In China, the Red Army had been active for years before Mao began forming the "anti-Japanese war bases" in 1937. In forming them, he reorganized the administration and functions of rural soviets he had already set up; also, his troops occupied by force large areas hitherto controlled by the Kuomintang or the Japanese, and then organized the people.[24] In some cases, particularly during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Mao sent "armed working teams" consisting of small party cadres into an area with the ostensible purpose of helping the people, and then organized them. In Indochina, on the other hand, Ho Chi-minh usually won over villagers first, engaged in small-scale actions designed to make small isolated units of the government forces leave the area, and then created "liberated" zones in which "shadow governments" operated.[25]

Another noteworthy point is that urban undergrounds play a secondary

or supplementary role in most liberation wars. In China it was not until the Japanese were defeated and the Communists entered the "Third Revolutionary War," or final drive against the Kuomintang, that concerted efforts were made to extend Communist influence in urban areas. Efforts were centered in the cities and communications centers of Manchuria, where Communist agents were instructed to turn the people against Chiang, form underground networks, and recruit workers and intellectuals for construction work and military duties in the rural base areas.[26] In Indochina, where clandestine urban organizations had operated since 1927, they played a minor role, their main task being the extortion of money from merchants and other well-to-do people in order to help the guerrillas.[27]

The general overall strategy in liberation wars calls for a long "protracted war."[28] This permits the guerrilla army, which may be very small initially, to gain new recruits, and also gives the Communists the opportunity to establish and consolidate rural soviets and bases. From the military viewpoint, a long guerrilla war wears down the enemy both materially and psychologically, and thus facilitates its defeat. The conflict is conceived as having three main stages: an inital phase, when the guerrilla forces are weak, of terrorizing or harassing the enemy; a second phase, when the guerrillas have developed strength, of extensive guerrilla operations; and a final stage of regular warfare against the enemy's military forces,[29] which may culminate in a decisive battle. The basic plan is to gain control of the countryside first, then encircle or otherwise gain control of the major cities.

While their plan for revolution was new, the advocates of liberation wars generally followed Marxist-Leninist tenets in their overall approach and in their specific tactics. Thus the Communist parties in China, Indochina, and other Asian countries remained the tight elite groups Lenin had advocated. Each of these parties maintained firm political control over its army, with its cadres playing roles in the guerrilla forces similar to that played by party cadres in the Soviet Army. When village soviets and bases were created, party cadres played dominant parts in the governing structure.

Standard Communist techniques of forming front groups and infiltrating organizations have been used in the new milieu. Thus Mao formed a united front with the Kuomintang to fight the Japanese in 1937; in 1941 the Indochinese Communist Party organized the Vietminh as a front organization in which other nationalist groups participated but which the Communists dominated.[30] Deception regarding affiliations and goals is also practiced extensively. A war is not termed a war for "the triumph of communism" but for "agrarian reform." In Indochina, when the Communist Party was illegal, it formed "rural friendship societies" and a front group known as the "Indochina Democratic Front."[31] In other words, every effort is consciously made to present the movement and its goals in terms which attract the masses and at the same time deceive outsiders.

Specific tactics to win popular support vary according to circumstances, but some general patterns have been followed in every liberation war. A typical procedure is for the army, before entering a village, to dispatch a team

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of soldiers which includes a few party members. These men act as friends of the people, and do something useful such as helping to harvest crops. After establishing a social indebtedness for the services performed, they disseminate propaganda—usually by word of mouth, sometimes accompanied by pamphlets—describing the evils of the existing regime and the benefits which the liberation force wishes to bring to the people. They hold elections and "elect" officials favorable to the liberation force. They then form villagers into groups of interlocking organizations according to occupation or interest—for example, farmers and merchants associations, sporting clubs.[32] Particular attention is paid to organizing people, such as women, who previously have had little opportunity to play an important role in public life.

Next, a village soviet is created in which party members, or persons known to adhere to the party line, hold dominant positions. If a base is to be organized, the government structure extends above the village level to include the entire area, with at least one party member in control. The political leaders then proceed to operate a "shadow government," collecting taxes, conducting regular propaganda sessions, etc. During these preliminary operations, "liberation army" soldiers are required to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner and to respect the personal rights and property of the people as much as possible.[33]

The Communists seek more than passive acceptance of their control. Their doctrine teaches that a guerrilla force must "swim among the people like a fish in water";[34] accordingly, the people are organized to assist in what is allegedly the "people's war." Villagers are required to provide money, food, clothing, and other supplies—but preferably not in amounts that would arouse resentment. Those unwilling to cooperate are threatened with severe reprisals.

Local residents are expected also to collect intelligence concerning the enemy. All villagers are usually instructed to report items of information gathered at their places of work, social meetings, etc. Since political and military actions are considered inseparable, information is sought not only on the positions and strengths of troops, but also on political and economic developments. Usually one or more specialized intelligence groups—perhaps one for civilian and one for military information—are formed; these devote most of their time to gathering information.

The interlocking "associations" and other groups provide an excellent means of maintaining security. Members are instructed to report at group meetings any activities of other members which might be harmful to the Communists. They are also asked to confess their own misdeeds and shortcomings—a procedure proved extremely effective.

Villagers are also expected—and often forced—to contribute soldiers to the guerrilla army and to provide for the defense of the village and the base. The Communists thus usually have three levels of armed forces at their command: the regular army, regional troops composed of men from the locality, and the village-level "self-defense" units, or home guards. When the armed forces are expanded or replacements are needed, the regular forces draw from

the regional forces, the regionals from the self-defense groups, and the last-named from the villagers.[35]

In addition to the regular army, which maintained a war of movement and fought only on selected battlefields, the Vietminh maintained strong regional troops. It was their duty to protect an area and its population, as well as harass the enemy and ambush reinforcements. Many times the French could not locate the regular troops but came in contact with the regional troops. The popular troops under them consisted of two groups, the *Dan Quan* and the *Du Kich*. Although the members of both groups served only in their spare time without uniforms, the *Dan Quan* included everyone and was essential as a labor force, while the *Du Kich* was a guerrilla group. Although they occasionally committed acts of sabotage, their main duties were to collect intelligence, act as guards (during the daytime they station themselves from one half to one mile away from the village, posing as peasants in the fields), build roads, and fortify villages. They also infiltrated villages prior to a Vietminh assault. Their main purpose was not military, but political: to demonstrate that the entire population was participating in the national struggle.[36]

Since logistical problems nearly always hamper guerrillas, making it difficult for them to maintain sustained operations and forcing them to rely on surprise attacks at suitable places and times, the Vietminh took great pains to prepare the chosen battlefield, etc. The commander would be assigned a particular target and be given regular units, some regional units, and popular troops that were in that zone. The popular troops would spend a long period of time "preparing the battlefield" with stockpiles of food and munitions, gathering intelligence, sometimes preparing fortifications. The regular troops if necessary would break up into small units, infiltrate through the French lines, and assemble at the prepared battlefield prior to the attack.[37]

In urban centers the Communists concentrate less on intelligence collection and harassment than on psychological warfare aimed at creating or exacerbating antagonisms between the people and the government. If an underground does not already exist, agents are sent to penetrate unions and student groups. These agents distribute propaganda and organize meetings and demonstrations; they also foment strikes and riots to force the authorities to take countermeasures which will further alienate the populace. An existing underground or the special agents may also collect funds and information and commit acts of sabotage, or encourage citizens to do so. These urban activities, which Mao termed the "second front" in his struggle,[38] have been helpful in undermining regimes and in convincing groups of people in other nations that the rebels, not the incumbents, represent the will of the people.

COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS: EASTERN EUROPE

Before World War II, the Soviet Communist Party was able to dominate the world Communist movement for two basic reasons: first, the fact that the

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Soviet Union was the sole example of Marxism gave its party unchallengeable prestige and authority, while the obvious factor of the size and strength of the state the party had created lent weight to its decisions. Second, the formation of and control over the Comintern [39] by the Soviet Government permitted it to tailor the activities of other Communist parties to fit the current dictates of its own foreign policy.* These material and political factors were to help the Soviet Communists to bring their proteges to power in Eastern Europe after the war.

Stalin and his Kremlin colleagues had anticipated a second global conflict, and had instructed their followers in neighboring countries to prepare to bring Communist order out of the subsequent chaos.[40] Prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the position of the Communists in Eastern Europe was difficult. Although they opposed nazism ideologically, they followed the official Soviet policy of "neutrality" and did not engage in any anti-Nazi activities. Remaining underground, they avoided clash with the Nazis and, like the Soviet state, collaborated with them whenever such a collaboration might result in immediate advantages either to themselves or to the Soviet Union. Hence in Poland and Yugoslavia, the Communists preserved "neutrality" when Germany attacked their countries; in the former, they actually collaborated with the Gestapo in uncovering or denouncing the anti-Nazi underground resistance.[41] At that time the Soviet and the Nazi Governments were bound to cooperate on the basis of the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939.[42] Nevertheless, numerous Communists, particularly from Poland and Czechoslovakia, left the Nazi-controlled territories and escaped to the Soviet Union to train for an ultimate seizure of power.

The situation changed radically the day Germany attacked Russia. Without delay the Communists all over Eastern Europe turned against the Germans and began to organize undergrounds and partisan detachments. The Communists were determined to form their own underground organizations, independent of democratic, anti-Nazi resistance movements. In German-conquered areas they also refused to recognize the authority of the governments-in-exile, which as a rule exercised leadership and control over the "official" underground movements. This was particularly true in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

While preserving their own organizational independence, the Communists tried hard to conceal their identity. The term "Communist" was avoided; they generally described their organizations as "democratic," "liberal," or "people's." They also tried to form "democratic fronts" or "blocs" with non-Communist groups. Soon individual Communists established working contacts with the official non-Communist undergrounds and thus became privy to their organizational structures, activities, strength, and, what later proved extremely important, the identity of their rank-and-file members.

Throughout 1941 the Communists were generally left to shift for themselves. Beginning in 1942, however, the Soviet authorities organized material

*The Communist International, or Third International, was formed in 1919 as a brotherhood of all Communist parties in the old Marxist tradition. Although representatives from other countries usually held the presidency, the Comintern had its headquarters and most of its bureaucracy in Moscow and was actually directed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

support for them, and by the following year that support consisted not only of equipment and arms, but also of instructors and staff sent from Russia. Radio transmitters supplied by the Soviet Union as well as special Soviet radio programs broadcast to the occupied countries were particularly important in strengthening the position of the Communists among their countrymen.

Notwithstanding their propaganda allegations, the Communists did not concentrate their energies on fighting the Nazis. On the contrary, in Poland, Yugoslovia, and Czechoslovakia they concentrated on preserving their own forces until the end of the war. As a rule they avoided actions which might result in human losses, especially among their political elite, while trying to weaken the non-Communist undergrounds as much as possible. They carried on propaganda campaigns accusing the latter of "collaboration" and "fascism" in order to undermine their prestige, and often provoked Nazi reprisals against the local population, later claiming the reprisals to be the result of "official" underground cowardice or irresponsibility. Sometimes they denounced non-Communist underground workers to the Gestapo.[43] In Poland, for example, a special Communist cell was organized for that purpose.[44] Their overall strategy was to preserve their own forces, eliminate competitors for power, then seize the power for themselves.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO 1944

Soviet diplomacy, East European Communist activities, and worldwide Communist propaganda were closely coordinated. Soviet wartime diplomacy aimed at and achieved two important goals: (1) Allied secret recognition of the 1939–40 Soviet territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe and (2) Allied recognition of Soviet special "interests" in Eastern Europe.

After 2 years of secret negotiations, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed in Washington in March 1943 that recognition of the territorial acquisitions would have to be accorded. At the Tehran Conference Stalin was finally satisfied.[45] And on the second point, the British Government in August and October 1940 offered Stalin "leadership" in the Balkans in exchange for a "benevolent" Soviet attitude.[46] In October 1943, at a British-United States-Soviet conference of foreign ministers meeting in Moscow; it was agreed that each of the three Allies would act in the territories liberated by its own forces according to its own judgment.[47] In June 1944 Churchill agreed in principle to partitioning the Balkans into Soviet and British spheres of influence, and the following October an unofficial but binding Soviet-British agreement was concluded in Moscow.[48] At Tehran, as well as at Yalta, it was secretly agreed that the postwar governments of the East European countries would have to be "friendly" to the Soviet Union, and thus would include some Communists.[49] To supplement these secret negotiations, a worldwide public opinion campaign was mounted in support of the "democratic," or "liberal," Communist-led undergrounds and against the "undemocratic," "Fascist" undergrounds, led by the governments-in-exile.

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Beginning in 1942 the Soviet Government also started to supply the Communist underground groups with arms, equipment, and training personnel. Simultaneously, East European refugees and deportees in the Soviet Union formed several "national committees" challenging the legality of the governments-in-exile and preparing their own cadres for the postwar seizure of power. Whenever possible they also organized "liberation armies." In time, fairly sizable groups were organized for each of the East European countries. Through pressure, rewards, promises, or persuasion they obtained supporters from such groups as Polish and Rumanian deportees; German, Hungarian, Polish, or Rumanian prisoners of war; and Czechoslovakian or Rumanian escapees. They organized radio programs for Eastern Europe in the languages of the various ethnic or national groups.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE "LIBERATED" AREAS, 1944–48[50]

The Red Army approached the prewar western frontiers of the Soviet Union in January 1944, starting the process of "liberation" which lasted until Germany's surrender in May 1945, when all of Eastern Europe, except Greece, was occupied by the Red Army. No British or United States forces were present and the Western Allies exercised no control in the area; thus the Red Army commanders as well as the Soviet civilian authorities were free to impose any measures they wished under the cover of military exigency. Confusion, fear, unprecedented destruction, and above all, hunger, were rampant. In all of the countries except Poland, relatively large segments of the population were liable to accusations of collaboration with the Germans. Except for Czechoslovakia, no country had had a background of successful democratic government.

The Initial Steps Taken By the Soviet Authorities (Red Army)

In most of Eastern Europe the Red Army entered an administrative vacuum. Most persons who held government positions, public offices, or even significant business posts preferred to resign and either withdraw with the *Wehrmacht* or go into hiding. There was fear of the Red Army and fear of being accused of collaboration with the enemy or with the puppet governments set up by the Germans. The Red Army commanders and Soviet civilian authorities had to fill the vacuum, particularly on the lower levels, in order to maintain security and public order. They assigned administrative positions to trusted individuals—to local Communists, if possible. In addition, national councils were soon created to fill the urgent need for local lawmaking authorities and for safety and administrative measures. From the outset, these were controlled or dominated by the Communists.[51]

From the very beginning, the Soviet authorities were careful to entrust the ministries which controlled the police forces, justice, and propaganda to the most experienced Communist elite. Thus before the war ended and long

before the public realized it, the actual power in Eastern Europe was in the hands of Soviet officials or local Communists.

Liquidation of the Non-Communist Resistance Groups

As soon as the Red Army occupied an area, the local non-Communist underground fighters found that both the Soviet authorities and the local Communists were hostile. No help could be expected from any quarter. The governments-in-exile received less and less support from the Western Allies and were practically powerless. Most of their members decided to remain refugees, rather than return to their homeland and subject themselves to the new regime. In the first months, the Soviets pursued the policy of a ruthless liquidation, especially in Poland and Yugoslavia. Guerrilla fighters were shot and underground workers arrested. For some time the non-Communist resistance groups tried to remain underground, hoping that the situation would change, that the Western Allies would intervene. It soon became evident, however, that the Western Allies either would not or could not do much, and that it was impossible to maintain the underground structure any longer. By late 1945 or early 1946 the underground members revealed themselves. Those who agreed to cooperate with the Communists saved their lives and careers; the uncooperative were destroyed.

Communist Means of Mass Pressure

The Communists were in an advantageous position to exert mass pressure and restrict or paralyze the activities of opponents. Through the Red Army and Soviet civilian authorities they controlled all railroads, rolling stock, housing, paper, printing plants, radio, etc. They were free to use security measures as a political weapon. Travel permits, passes, accommodations for public meetings, transportation, and printing and radio facilities were restricted to persons or groups "friendly" to them. They exerted pressure over numerous individuals who had collaborated with the Nazis or Fascists, supported or served in the undemocratic prewar governments, participated in anti-Communist activities, etc. They were also able to dispose of the property formerly owned by Germans and Jews and other emigrees.

While using their power to stamp out actual or potential opposition, the Communists sought to enlist the support of the population through persuasion. They used propaganda slogans adroitly. A few of many successful slogans were the following:

Let us all concentrate on reconstruction. Politics now is not essential.
We need the Soviet friendship, regardless of whether we like it or not.
We have been abandoned to the Soviets and their leadership is unavoidable.
Before the war our industry and a great part of our commerce were controlled by foreign capital. This nationalization cannot harm the people and can do much good.
Our peasants are land hungry and our countryside is overpopulated. The land reform will be useful.

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Political Organizations

According to the Yalta agreement, the only political parties which were supposed to operate freely in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence were those which were "democratic," "anti-Fascist," "friendly to the Soviet Union," and willing to "collaborate" with the already existing Communist-controlled governments. The terms were vague; there was no agreement on interpretation and the Communists interpreted them to the advantage of themselves and the Soviet Union: any organization which opposed Communist leadership or Soviet policies was branded as "undemocratic," "Fascist," "unfriendly to the Soviet Union," or unwilling to "collaborate" with the government. The prewar rightwing parties, such as the National Democrats in Poland or the Agrarians in Czechoslovakia, were banned altogether. The Peasant and Socialist Parties were officially allowed to operate freely. Soon, however, numerous splinter groups formed which challenged their anti-Communist leadership. Receiving considerable help from the Communists, these groups subsequently weakened the democratic forces within the parties. Confusion was increased by the emergence of new "liberal," "democratic," "progressive" parties, most of which were actually controlled by crypto-Communists.

When political maneuvers failed, anti-Communist democratic leaders were arrested and public trials were staged. Invariably convictions followed, on charges of "collaboration with the enemy," "supplying foreign powers with intelligence" (Great Britain and the United States), "anti-Soviet activities," currency crimes, etc.

Coalition Governments

The Yalta agreement provided for the formation of coalition governments in which the Communists would participate but not have a controlling voice. The practice was much different. Usually only an insignificant minority of democratic leaders were admitted into the Communist-controlled government, where they were outvoted on each important issue and were unable to prevent the Communist-led persecution of their own followers. Then they themselves were arrested and put on trial. A few of them, like Ferenc Nagy of Hungary, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk of Poland, and Georgi Dimitrov (not related to the Communist leader of the same name) of Bulgaria succeeded in escaping. The rest perished or chose to collaborate with the Communist regimes.

Both the British and United States Governments intervened. Their diplomatic notes, however, were rejected as an "interference in the internal affairs" of "sovereign" states. They did not go beyond diplomatic intervention.

General Elections (1946–47)

According to the Yalta agreement, general elections were supposed to be "free," "democratic," "unfettered," and "secret." Freedom of speech and freedom of the press were to be respected. Again the Yalta agreement was broken by both the Soviet Government and East European Communists. Although the "national fronts" which were organized included splinter groups and pseudo-non-Communist parties, they were controlled by the Communists. The members of the front agreed between themselves on the division of parliamentary seats and presented the voters with one synthetic ballot. The elections were not secret, mass terror prevailed. Opposition parties had no chance; they were ruthlessly persecuted. When in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria the Socialist or Peasant Parties received large votes, the results were falsified by the Communists. Special secret organizations had been set up just for that purpose.

Merger of the Socialist and Peasant Parties With Communists

Following the elections and the liquidation of the democratic leaders, the Communists initiated a merger of the Socialist and Peasant Parties with the Communists or Communist-dominated groups. By that time (1948–49), opposition political parties had virtually ceased to exist. The independent Socialists joined the "sister" Communist parties, and Peasants merged with the Communist-controlled splinter groups. With this formation of the uniform national fronts unchallenged by any organized political forces, the Communist seizure of power was concluded.

In 1917 the Communists had taken advantage of the chaos bred by World War I to seize power in Russia. A generation later, they and their disciples profited by World War II to gain control of other countries. There were several factors in Eastern Europe in 1945 which facilitated the takeovers. The fact that the Germans had worked with capitalists, aristocrats, feudal landowners, and other conservative or middle-of-the-road elements made these groups easy prey to charges of collaboration, and thus decreased or destroyed their potential political strength. The presence of large peasant groups who had ample reason to desire changes in the *status quo ante bellum* provided a good potential base of support. The fact that, save in Czechoslovakia, there was no tradition of real representative government or of people's rights meant that curbs on freedom of speech, assembly, etc., would be likely to draw little immediate or effective protest.

The international situation also helped the Communists. Had the Russian forces simply attempted by brute force to install puppet regimes, this would have been understood and actively opposed by the Allies, who had promised free elections to the peoples of Eastern Europe. With the subtler techniques of takeover, however, most Western statesmen were unfamiliar. Rather than incur the wrath of an ally who had suffered grievously from the war and whose cooperation was sought to ensure the peace, the Western Allies permitted the Russians and their followers to enter a political vacuum they themselves had made no plans to fill.

While the milieu was new, the basic tactics employed by the Communists were not. The formation of united fronts, the infiltration of groups, the concealing of affiliations and intentions, the dissemination of propaganda, the use of terrorism, threats, and blackmail to discredit, divide, and otherwise immo-

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bilize the opposition, were familiar tools invented by Lenin and refined by Stalin and his contemporaries. Some of the refinements used to actually seize the centers of power, however, are noteworthy because they set the pattern for later Communist efforts in other countries.

The Communists agreed to participate in coalition regimes rather than trying to create their own governments, but insisted on controlling the ministries which exercised physical, economic, and psychological power—that is, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, and Information. In other words, they were not concerned with making an immediate show of great political strength but with controlling organs which could mold the minds and actions of people, by coercion if necessary. Also by placing their agents in positions where they could discredit non-Communist officials, they made it extremely difficult for opposition groups to campaign effectively or unite against them.

THE SOVIET SECURITY AND ESPIONAGE SYSTEMS

SOVIET SECURITY SYSTEM

The Soviet security system and some of its techniques are discussed below, in order to understand better how the Soviet Union reduces the potential for insurrection against it. The Soviet Union is a highly centralized, authoritarian state in which the Communist Party controls the instruments of power. In such a system, security—against both internal traitors and foreign spies—is of extreme importance. The two major instruments of these operations are the elaborate state police systems and the international espionage network.

The present police system has several major branches.[52] The Committee for State Security (KGB), directly responsible to the Council of Ministers, performs the functions which are handled for the United States by the FBI, CIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies. It also controls censorship, border troops, the protection of state secrets (archives), and special KGB troops provide honor guards, protect sensitive communications and installations, etc.

The KGB is also responsible for counterintelligence operations in the Armed Forces. In addition to uniformed personnel, it has networks of plainclothes police and informers, and has important functions in the field of foreign intelligence gathering. (The *Glavnoye Razzedyvetelnoye Upravlenize*—GRU, as the Chief Military Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Armed Forces, is concerned only with positive intelligence or police functions with the Armed Forces.) The Ministry of Internal Security (MVD) no longer exists on the all-union level but only on the republic level. It appears that the KGB now directs many of the activities of the republic MVD.*

*The MVD was abolished on the national level in 1960. Apparently the Government feared putting too much power into the hands of one individual as had been the case with Beria and former police leaders.

Each of the Soviet republics has a Ministry of Internal Security which controls three types of military units: the general militia, the transport militia, and departmental militia; (1) the general militia perform all normal police duties, and units are subordinate both to the local officials at republic, *oblast*, *kray*, *rayon*, or city levels, as well as to commanders of the next higher rank in the militia; (2) transport militia protect river fleets, ports, and railroads. Since railroads and airlines frequently employ their own guards to protect property, transport militia often share responsibilities with them; (3) departmental militia protect state enterprises or buildings, again sharing responsibility with guards hired to protect property. The militiamen perform another important function: supervision of the all-union passport system by which the government controls the movements and actions of Soviet citizens. The militia also enforce the licensing system for the control of firearms, explosives, poison, etc. Uniformed militiamen enjoy certain unique privileges; for example, a militiaman above the rank of sergeant is immune to arrest.

In addition to the regular militia there are such auxiliary forces as the people's guards, rural marshals, and volunteer brigades, whose main task is to curb disorderly conduct, such as drunkenness. Members serve part-time on an allegedly voluntary basis and are usually commanded by a party secretary. The Ministry of Internal Security also maintains security troops to suppress large-scale disturbances, maintain rear areas during wartime, etc.

In maintaining control over the population, the police have in recent years tended to substitute for the terrorism of the past a more subtle—and in many ways more effective—form of economic and social control. Threats to fire a person from his job and prevent him from finding another, social ostracism, and similar sanctions are now the rule instead of torture, forced labor, and other forms of terror, which were used more extensively in the past.

The government also controls closely the movements of all citizens. People are forbidden to travel without special permission in border areas or in certain restricted areas such as those containing relocation camps, military or security establishments, and strategic industries. All citizens must also have internal passports, and when traveling from one place to another, must check with authorities upon both departure and arrival. People must have work permits, and must obtain governmental permission before changing jobs. Housing permits are another effective check upon both the whereabouts and the actions of individuals, since unsatisfactory behavior can influence the type of living quarters assigned to them.

The legal system, which places the welfare of the state above the rights of the individual, permits the government to censor all mail, internal as well as external. It also gives the police great latitude in seizure and search. The citizen's knowledge of the premises of Soviet law and the special powers of the police, coupled with his fear of reprisals, constitute an effective deterrent to subversive statements or deeds.

In gathering information, the KGB and MVD units not only rely on their professional agents and *provocateurs*, but also depend heavily on informers. Chief among these are the "activists" who regularly supply intelligence to the

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police in order to achieve better jobs or positions of influence. Each secret police agent generally has his own group of informers, and maintains in a fireproof safe a personal file on each one. Each dossier contains such material as—

(1) a signed statement by the informer obligating him to work for the secret police;
(2) a photograph of the informer;
(3) the cover name of the informer;
(4) data on the personality and activities of the informer, usually including some compromising facts which could be used to prosecute him under one of the articles of the Criminal Code;
(5) a list of all the persons with whom the informer is acquainted;
(6) copies of all the informer's reports;
(7) data on rewards or punishments given to him.

Once a year the secret police operator reports to a superior concerning the work of each informer.

The number of secret informers assigned to each secret police operator varies according to the operator's need and his ability to make effective use of them. The quality of informers is usually very low; hence the police must rely more on quantity than quality. Whenever the informers report an important piece of information or a case requiring thorough investigation, professional agents from police headquarters are assigned to the job.

The secret informers are most numerous in administrative and industrial centers and in the border zones. The number of informers in each factory plant or organization depends upon the political, economic, or military importance of the establishment. A large number of informers are recruited among people who work in such public places as hotels, restaurants, barbershops, clubs, and railroad stations. In the villages, informers and "activists" also cooperate with the press by informing the newspapers of achievements or defects in work being done by the populace, etc.

The police try to recruit as informers people who, because of their past, will not be suspected by their fellow citizens. As a rule, a newly recruited secret informer is usually asked to watch persons whom he himself has named as being suspect; only after he has been tested in some way is he given real assignments for spying. Persons who have voluntarily denounced others or informed the police of subversive activities almost always receive a formal offer to become informers.

This elaborate security system, coupled with a long tradition of authoritarian rule and secret police activities, has served to check any serious indigenous threats to the security of the Soviet state. Several effective techniques have been developed for countering any subversive activity, whether internally generated or instituted by foreign agents.

One device is to undertake provocative activities designed to test the loyalty of Soviet citizens. A person may be contacted by somebody claiming to represent a subversive movement, but he would be wise to assume that the "resistance movement" is one directed and controlled by the KGB. Thus, even if he is

strongly against the regime, he will hesitate to join a subversive movement because he will doubt its authenticity. Furthermore, since all Soviet citizens are required to show "active loyalty" to the regime, he must report the attempted contact to the authorities or face severe punishment. Any clandestinely organized resistance movement is therefore very likely to be reported to the police within a very short time.

Another practice is to form a clandestine anti-Communist movement, permit it to enroll members, and conduct actual operations against the regime so as to attract the support of real enemies of the state. Once the ring has grown to a size where it may be assumed to include a large number of real anti-Communists, the police arrest the entire membership.

The communes and collective farms are another means of checking potential revolutionary operations. By centralizing food supplies, rather than leaving them in the hands of individual peasants, the government makes it extremely difficult for guerrillas to obtain food from the populace and maintain themselves. Similarly, the practice of periodically issuing new currency makes it difficult to collect the funds necessary for conducting subversive activities.[53]

In addition to these negative checks on subversive activities, there are also positive factors which prevent Soviet citizens from participating in, or seeking participation in, antigovernment operations. The educational system and the steady flow of government-controlled propaganda teach the merits of the Soviet system and inculcate a feeling of loyalty to the regime. Pride in the material and cultural accomplishments of the Soviet union, and increased benefits in the form of better housing, clothing, and recreational facilities, contribute greatly to a feeling of contentment, particularly among older people who remember the hardships of the past. Furthermore, there are many immediate benefits to be obtained by becoming a party member or active sympathizer, or otherwise supporting rather than opposing the regime.

SOVIET ESPIONAGE

Within any country Soviet espionage and intelligence work are carried out through four major groups: the Communist Party, operating openly or through front groups; the Soviet Embassies, overseas delegations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade; Tass news agency personnel, all of whom enjoy diplomatic immunity; and the illegal underground espionage network.

The two most important foreign intelligence units are located within the GRU and the KGB. The GRU group, the army intelligence branch, is in charge of military espionage in other countries and directs information gathering, subversion, and terror.[54] The KGB unit is responsible for nonmilitary espionage in foreign countries, although its activities often parallel or rival those of the GRU group.[55]

As is the case in general party organization, the Russians differentiate between legal and illegal apparatuses. The former consists of a network of

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agents operating under a member of the Soviet Embassy staff, who enjoys the benefits of diplomatic status and immunity. The illegal apparatuses, on the other hand, are networks operating under a person other than a member of the Embassy staff.[56] Soviet espionage agents generally are organized for gathering four types of intelligence: (1) political intelligence, including information on the activities of any fifth column operating in the country; (2) scientific discoveries and atomic development, armament and military intelligence; (3) economic intelligence and supply of materials; (4) special tasks and control of Soviet officials abroad.[57]

The illegal apparatus is headed by a "resident director," who, despite his title, does not usually reside in the country against which his net is operating but lives in and directs his organization from a neighboring country. His activities in the neutral country are of a normal nature and he is usually forbidden to carry out work against that country. As a rule, he is not Russian nor a native of the country in which he is residing. The major responsibilities of the resident are the control of communications and finances, and the sorting out and evaluating of information supplied by his agents. He evaluates his information, ciphers it, and transmits it to the Center in Moscow. He is usually unknown to his agents, couriers, and radio men, being in contact with them only through middlemen,* who transmit messages and information to him by means of maildrops or letterboxes. This ensures the security of both the resident director and the agents.

In every Communist Party headquarters there is one highly placed agent whose main job is to supply the resident director with information acquired from party members about potential recruits or sources of information. Generally the party man looks for recruits who have little or no association with the party, and discourages them from joining the party so as not to jeopardize their potential usefulness at some later date.[58]

In developing their network and their sources, the agents seek information which facilitates: (1) the identification of persons who have direct or indirect access to security information; (2) the preparation of personality records on such persons in order to evaluate their vulnerability to persuasion or pressure, or the likelihood of their imparting information unwittingly; (3) the discovery of persons who are willing and able to identify potentially useful persons and able to contact and use persons indicated by the preliminary investigations as having worthwhile access to channels of information.[59]

Personal data are extremely important in Soviet espionage. Agents collect all sorts of directories, reference books, and official lists in order to get information about individuals in a target country.[60] The Soviet espionage system probably has one of the largest biographical directories in the world; it includes information on any person who has ever been contacted by the Communist organization and who may be even remotely regarded as helpful

*The middleman acts as a link between agents or between agents and higher-ups. He acts as a safeguard within the ring to prevent agents or residents from coming in contact with each other and thereby conceals the identity of each agent for security reasons.

Figure 4. Soviet Espionage Apparat.

Communist Use of Undergrounds

or as a sympathizer.[61] The directory contains such items as the present position, biographical and educational data, attitudes, financial position, and positive and negative characteristics of the individual.[62]

According to two experts on Soviet affairs, the foreign intelligence section of the KGB is organized as follows:

First section, responsible for espionage and counterintelligence in the entire Western hemisphere.

Second section, responsible for the United Kingdom, its colonies, and British Commonwealth members.

Third section, responsible for Austria and Germany.

Fourth section, responsible for all other Western European countries and Yugoslavia.

Fifth section, responsible for Russian emigrees. Its functions are to infiltrate, sabotage, and destroy all active organizations outside of Russia, and to persuade these emigrees to return to the Soviet Union. It is responsible for tracing emigrees regarded as traitors to the Soviet Union, penetrating their associations and societies, and recruiting them for possible use as Soviet agents.

Sixth section, responsible for Asia.

Seventh section, responsible for the surveillance of satellite countries from North Korea to Czechoslovakia. East Germany is handled separately. Officers from this section direct trained security forces in each of the satellite countries. These security forces also collect intelligence on local Communist leaders. In the past this information was used in Communist purges.

Eighth section, the "illegal apparatus," whose agents do not have diplomatic immunity.

Ninth section, concerned with Soviet nationals who make foreign visits. It is the duty of this section to make sure that no one escapes from these delegations.[63]

Special Bureau Number I (*Spetsburo*), an independent part of KGB, is charged with terror, murder, and assassination. Using local gangsters and other foreign nationals to do its work, this group is responsible for eliminating important people as well as Russian defectors.

SUMMARY OF THE STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

As the foregoing pages have shown, the international Communist movement has participated in a wide variety of resistance and revolutionary operations. The Soviet Union during World War II demonstrated how a Communist government organized resistance activities against an enemy invader. Under the general guidance of the Red Army, citizens were organized into partisan guerrilla bands and underground networks charged with intelligence, sabotage, and psychological warfare operations. Although most citizens were

asked to participate for patriotic rather than ideological reasons, and although few of the guerrillas or underground workers were Communist Party members, party officials within the army or the government remained in control and directed their activities.

In other countries, wartime resistance movements became the vehicles by which Communist parties launched or completed revolutions. In Yugoslavia, for example, the partisan movement gradually widened its control over the country during the war and eventually assumed the reins of power. In other parts of Eastern Europe, leaders of Communist-led resistance movements seized power through coups d'etat, in most cases with the backing of the Red Army. In China, the movement already started by Mao Tse-tung gained so greatly in size and strength through its anti-Japanese activities that in 1949 it was able to consummate successfully a two-decade drive for power. In Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines, Communist-led groups capitalized on their anti-Japanese actions in order to start revolutionary wars.

Regardless of their locale or method of operations, Communist parties have followed a general pattern in their attempts to gain power through revolution. Leaders or would-be leaders were recruited or selected by Communist agents for special training in Moscow. Tito of Yugoslavia, Walter Ulbricht of Germany, Maurice Thorez of France, Evangelista in the Philippines, Lai Teck in Malaya, Ho Chi-minh in Indochina, and many others were trained in the Soviet Union. After returning home, they formed (or re-formed) small elite groups which in turn were sometimes the controlling core of large mass parties. Membership within the elite was sharply restricted: only individuals who were willing to place their dedication to the party before all other interests were admitted. Parties were organized on hierarchical structures headed by a central committee with a politburo, and discipline was strict. Preparations were also made for operating legally and illegally.

Whatever their size or strength or the degree of governmental opposition they encountered, Communist parties everywhere gave their members experience in clandestine operations, and tried to acquaint them with conspiratorial behavior. Cell meetings, for example, were often held secretly so that members attending them would learn how to travel and how to make contact with other members without arousing suspicion. Members were often assigned some sort of minor intelligence-gathering or sabotage missions which in themselves were of little or no practical use, but which both tested and trained members in the performance of clandestine activities. For the same reason, a clandestine press was often operated, even if local censorship was not severe. In addition, the members' sense of dedication was reinforced by the standard practice of self-criticism and criticizing fellow members at cell meetings. In this way, they were urged to higher goals of self-improvement and loyalty.

Even where the parties themselves remained small, Communists everywhere tried to increase their influence by organizing or infiltrating front groups. Popular causes were selected around which to build an organization. Humanitarian issues and, in the colonial countries, "imperialism" were the main reasons for organizing new groups or trying to expand and reorient existing

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groups. Particular efforts were made to form or infiltrate labor unions, which were a major instrument of power or potential power. For not only would control of union dues provide Communist leaders with a steady source of funds, but more important, it would give them a steady source of manpower to carry out other programs, and provide them with grievances and issues to exploit. In addition, Communist parties, when legal, sometimes cooperated with other leftwing parties in "united fronts" attempting to direct the activities of the fronts to further their own plans. By participating in these various social, economic, and political organizations, Communists were able to use popular discontent to foment strikes and demonstrations, and thus contribute to the general unrest necessary for revolutionary conditions.

In striving to obtain popular support for the party or for the organizations it controlled, Communists seldom stressed ideological matters. Instead, they played upon individual personal grievances or needs. Thus they clamored publicly for better working conditions generally, while helping unemployed individuals find jobs or houses. They often posed as the understanding friend of anyone who was discontented, indicating that their movement could use the services of the individual who had been unappreciated or maltreated under the existing system, and could at the same time serve the individual's needs. If possible, they sought to obligate individuals to the party for personal services rendered so that whenever the party made a bid for power, the individual could be asked or compelled to support it.

Wherever the Communists seized power through peaceful means, as in Eastern Europe, they followed a pattern of forming united fronts with other parties, obtaining posts in governments, steadily eliminating or absorbing opposition elements, and then seizing power. Where they have turned to revolutionary warfare, it has been because theoretically both "subjective" and "objective" conditions were right for it—that is, the party itself was strong and the country was filled with unrest and thus ripe for revolt. In Greece after the war, the party itself was fairly strong and found itself in a situation where economic conditions were poor and government efforts inadequate. After testing their strength, they attempted to seize control of the government by a popular revolution. However, there seem to have been circumstances which led Communists to attempt open warfare against a legal government: in the Philippines and Malaya, for example, the party was losing ground among the populace and it evidently concluded that if it was ever to have an important, let alone the most important, role in directing the country it would have to make a dramatic bid for power.

When they have decided upon revolutionary war, Communist leaders then follow a fairly standard pattern of action. The main Communist leaders themselves leave the major cities where they would probably have been arrested, and find sanctuary in various regions from which they can safely direct the war effort. At the same time, they usually destroy party records and other evidence which could directly incriminate the party. By having their front group conduct strikes and antigovernmental demonstrations, they try to augment existing unrest and thus weaken popular respect for the government.

The Communist Party then becomes part of a broader revolutionary movement. Under Communist influence or control, two organizations—a guerrilla army and a civilian underground—are created to carry on revolutionary activity. Both of these organizations assume the name of goals of popular causes such as resistance, liberation, or independence. Communist goals and objectives are seldom mentioned. In Malaya, the Communist Party organized the MRLA (military) and the *Min Yuen* (civilian); in Yugoslavia, the National Liberation Army and the National Liberation Committee; in France, *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Françaises* and the *Front National.*

Many recruits do not understand communism nor do they know that the movement is Communist-led. Often such recruits join because they want independence or freedom and do not care who helps them gain it. However, it is the party members who hold decision-making posts within these organizations, and simultaneously indoctrinate their members along Communist lines. No matter how large the guerrilla armies of the undergrounds become, the number of party members remains small.

Membership in the guerrilla army or civilian underground is generally open to anyone, provided the recruit has no commitments to other political groups. He is not required to swear allegiance to communism. The party has always sought to absorb or eliminate all opposition or potential opposition elements in order to unify resistance into one movement. In Poland and Yugoslavia they informed to the Germans on rival movements. Sometimes they have tried to form united "liberation" fronts, as in Greece, but again with the Communists themselves firmly in control. As their strength increases, they have established "liberated" areas in which they have set up governments and exercised *de facto* control, and thus further strengthen their claim to represent "the people."

Where the Communist-led movements have succeeded in ousting the former government, leading party members have usually installed themselves in the key posts. As they have been extremely wary of any possible counter-revolutionary activity, the movements have been particularly careful to gain control over the police and security forces. In virtually every case where Communists have obtained power—whether through coup d'etat or war—external cadres from the Soviet Union have entered the country to reorganize and, in many cases, to staff the police and security forces.

While the Communists have often seized power, it must be noted that in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines, for example, they failed. Either they misjudged the "subjective" or "objective" conditions, or lacked sufficient external support, or—perhaps most important—found themselves in later stages confronted by a government which was both willing and able to fight back on all fronts.

FOOTNOTES

1. Although Lenin first stated this in 1902 ("What Is To Be Done?") when the party was outlawed, he repeated it after 1905, when the party was again permitted legal existence. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1943).

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2. In 1915, for example, when striking workers were preparing to present a petition to the Winter Palace, Lenin instructed Bolshevik agitators to address the crowd without announcing themselves as Bolsheviks. In 1920 he warned Communists, in *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, against being too aggressive or too frank in announcing their revolutionary goals, and urged them to work wherever possible in united fronts. Ibid.
3. See Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 230–257, for a thorough discussion of susceptibility to communism.
4. For an extensive account of the Comintern, see Günther Nollau, *International Communism and World Revolution: History and Methods* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), particularly pp. 134–177.
5. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), p. 287. This concept of "stability of the rear" has figured heavily in the planning of other Communist military leaders. Giap, for example, stresses "the building and consolidation of the rear" and the need "to combine economic and cultural needs with those of national defense." See General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 146.
6. Joseph Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (New York: International Publishers, 1945), pp. 23–24.
7. Ibid., p. 51.
8. C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, *Communist Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 67–69.
9. Nikolai Khokhlov, *In the Name of Conscience* (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), gives an account of his training and activities as a member of an NKVD destruction squad behind German lines in World War II and later activities in postwar Europe.
10. Otto Heilbrun, *The Soviet Secret Service* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 12.
11. See Dixon and Heilbrunn, *Communist Warfare*, p. 67.
12. Heilbrunn, *Secret Service*, pp. 52ff, cites the *Soviet Handbook for Partisans*, printed in 1942, which gives elaborate instructions on how partisans were to be organized and to operate.
13. Ibid., p. 54.
14. Ibid.
15. Dixon and Heilbrunn, *Communist Warfare*, p. 70.
16. Readings in *Guerrilla Warfare* (Fort Bragg, N.C.: Psychological Warfare School, 1954), p. 46.
17. Ibid., p. 52.
18. Ibid., p. 53.
19. See F. O. Miksche, *Secret Forces* (London: Faber and Faber, 1950). Author notes that underground and resistance organizations can have important effects after a war; for by destroying the soul of a nation and systematically encouraging violence and disrespect for law and order, they can disrupt the nation's social and political structure.
20. This separation of the Chinese Communist Party from the proletariat was at first a source of deep concern to both the Comintern and the Chinese themselves. Both the Maoists and their Comintern supporters tried to excuse this apparent sharp deviation by explanations to the effect that the Red Army and the territory it controlled were, by vitrue of being Communist, speaking for the proletariat. For a good discussion of this point, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 189–199.
21. Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indochina* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 78–79, 82–83.
22. The writings of Mao Tse-tung make constant reference to the political-military nature of his revolution and to the dual role to be played by his soldiers, particularly the bona fide party members. See *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1954), particularly I, pp. 106, 107.

23. Otto Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 44–45, summarizes Mao's conception of "bases" as follows:

    (1) The base fulfills the same function for guerrillas as the rear does for a regular army. In addition to its logistical role it permits military power to be consolidated and expanded, and guerrillas and semiregulars to be recruited and trained.

    (2) The base is a political testing ground for the mass appeal of the Communist program and it is here that they mold the masses into organizations, inquire into their opinions, "co-ordinate and systematize" these opinions, and then explain and spread them until the masses accept them as their own and translate them into action—a process known as the principle of "from the masses to the masses." If the mass response is insufficient, Communist policies can temporarily "be changed."

    (3) By expanding they deny the enemy more and more territory until he is finally expelled.

    (4) The base area, in conjunction with other base areas and the semiregular forces, acts as the encirclement line of enemy-held territory. While each isolated base area is encircled by the enemy, neighboring guerrilla bases and the regular forces' front lines in turn surround the enemy. The encircling enemy thus faces encirclement itself.

    Lucien W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 30–31, discusses how "People's Liberation" parties in Asia consider the rural areas as the weakest link in the enemy's defenses, and exploit "the limited power of unstable governments and the lack of effective communications common to much of Asia."
24. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), IV, pp. 83ff. This book contains the writings of Mao during the 3d Revolutionary Civil War Period, and is not to be confused with the writings of Mao published in 1954 by Lawrence and Wishart (see footnote 22).
25. See Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 160. George K. Tanham, *Communist Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 16, 24, 25, notes that following the principles of Mao, the Vietminh after a defeat were willing to sacrifice territory, people, and economic assets in order to preserve a hard core. They never relaxed, however, in their efforts to win over the population, and their clandestine cells and guerrilla and propaganda agents proved increasingly damaging to the French. In order to create insecurity in French-held areas, they organized guerrilla groups who not only harassed the French military forces, but also indoctrinated the people and undermined their loyalty to the government.

    The Vietminh organized their bases according to their definition of "a closely integrated complex of villages prepared for defense; a politically indoctrinated population in which even children have their specific intelligence tasks; a network of food and weapons dumps; and an administrative machine parallel to that of the legal authority, to which may be added at will any regular (army) unit assigned to operations in the area."
26. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking), p. 84.
27. For a discussion of the Vietminh underground, see Lancaster, *The Emancipation*, pp. 84–85, and Tanham, *Communist Warfare*, p. 21.
28. This term was originated in 1938 by Mao, "On Prolonged War." *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Lawrence and Wishart).
29. See ibid., passim, for Mao's discussion of strategy.
30. Lancaster, *The Emancipation*, pp. 14–16.
31. Ibid.
32. This has been termed "parallel hierarchies" by French authorities. See Colonel Lacheroy, "A Lesson In Revolutionary Warfare," Ximenès et al., *Revue Militaire d'Information* (France), p. 4.

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33. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Lawrence and Wishart), particularly II, pp. 246–248.
34. Ibid., particularly IV, pp. 84–85.
35. For a detailed discussion of how to mobilize the people, see the excerpts from the *Vietminh Manual on Partisan Warfare* cited in Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 90. See also Ximenès et al., *Revue Militaire*, especially the case study on Vietnam; and Tanham, *Communist Warfare*, pp. 21–31.
36. Tanham, *Communist Warfare*, pp. 48–50.
37. Ibid., p. 25.
38. See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking), pp. 83–138.
39. See Nollau, *International Communism.*
40. Ibid.
41. Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, *Najnowsza Historja Polityczna Polski* (*The Most Recent History of Poland*) (3 vols.; London: Gryf Printers, 1960), III, pp. 343ff.
42. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 78.
43. Malinowski, *Recent History*, III, pp. 397–412; see also T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 71, 118–122, 171–172.
44. See Joseph Swiatlo, *Za Kulisami; Bezpiekii Partji* (*Behind the Corridors of the Security Police and Party*) (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, 1955), p. 15. Colonel Swiatlo was head of the key department in the Polish Security Police. He defected in 1954. The invaluable material in the above pamphlet is only a part of his knowledge of that subject.
45. For detailed information covering the Anglo-American-Soviet dealings on Eastern Europe, see: Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 531, 628–631; *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 327–339; *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), pp. 324–407; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), II, pp. 1166–1173; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 709–710. On U.S. foreign relations see: Department of State, *Diplomatic Papers, the Conference at Tehran, 1943* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961); Department of State, *Diplomatic Papers, the Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955); Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 285.
46. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 167.
47. Feis, *Churchill*, p. 208.
48. Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), pp. 73–79, 227; Feis, *Churchill*, pp. 338–343; Hull, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 1951–1958.
49. Churchill, *Triumph*, pp. 346–402; also, James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 21–45; Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949), pp. 79–292.
50. Many excellent books have been written on this subject. The authoritative information pertinent to this study was supplied by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of Poland; Ferenc Nagy, Former Prime Minister of Hungary; Stefan Korbonski, the last head of the Polish underground; Reuben H. Markham, distinguished scholar in the field of the Balkans. See Stanislaw Mikolajcyk, *The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948); Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948); Stefan Korbonski, *The Fighting Warsaw* (London: Boleslaw Swiderski, 1958); Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949); Reuben H. Markham, *Tito's Imperial Communism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947); David Martin, *Ally Betrayed* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946).
51. See "The Politics of Takeover," in *The Soviet Takeover of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954), passim. For further details on the Soviet plans for takeover, see Hugh Seton-

Watson, *From Lenin to Malenkov* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 248–260; Leland Stowe, *Conquest by Terror* (New York: Random House, 1951), p. 19, states: "By 1945–46,, M.V.D. officers and native "Muscovite" Communists had monopolized key police and government posts in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Everywhere Communists were ministers of defense and interior, controlling both the armies and police; also of national economy, information, and communications. These Moscow-trained Red leaders were also Soviet citizens: Dimitrov and others in Bulgaria; Emil Bodnaras, Ana Pauker and company in Rumania; Rakosi, Zoltan Vas, Erno Gero in Hungary; more of the same stripe in Poland."

52. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "Facts on Communism," Volume II, *From Lenin to Khrushchev*, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 310.

Since the dissolution of the OGPU in July 1934, the Soviet secret police has been repeatedly reorganized and renamed. This constant reorganization complicates any discussion of secret police agencies after 1934.

Whereas the old Cheka and OGPU were separate Soviet Government agencies assigned solely to "secret police" or "state security" work, starting in 1934 such work was periodically assigned to a subdivision of a larger governmental apparatus dealing with Soviet "internal affairs" in general.

Thus, after the OGPU was dissolved in July 1934, its tasks were assigned to GUGBEZ, a section of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). The NKVD was a ministry which included, in addition to a secret police section, many other departments dealing with routine police work (e.g., crime investigations), as well as fire protection and the recording of birth and death certificates. Although from 1934 to February 3, 1941, secret police tasks were assigned only to the GUGBEZ section of the NKVD, Westerners commonly used the term "NKVD" to apply to the Soviet secret police apparatus.

From 1941 to March 1954, the secret police functions in the Soviet Union alternated between a separate agency devoted solely to security work and a subdivision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On February 3, 1941, the GUGBEZ section of the NKVD became a separate agency under the new name: *Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*—NKGB (People's Commissariat for State Security). On July 20, 1941, it reverted to a department of the NKVD, but in April 1943 it emerged once more as a separate organization, the NKGB.

The independent NKGB was renamed *Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*—MGB (Ministry of State Security) in March 1946. At the same time, the NKVD was renamed *Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del*—MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). On March 15, 1953, the MGB reverted to a subordinate position as a department of the MVD. Westerners now, however, popularly applied the term "MVD" to the activities of one of its branches assigned to security work.

On March 13, 1954, the MGB once more became independent of the MVD, leaving the latter ministry with only routine internal affairs duties, and was at the same time renamed *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*—KGB (Committee for State Security).

53. See Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, 40 (January 1962), 264–274.
54. Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, *The Secret World* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 243.
55. Ibid., p. 60.
56. *Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage* (Commonwealth of Australia, August 22, 1955) (Available in the general collection of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). The terms "legal" and "illegal" have no reference to lawful or unlawful activities but refer instead to the status of the directors. Thus Valentin Gubechev, who enjoyed diplomatic immunity as a member of the Soviet U.N. delegation, was merely expelled from the United States when apprehended in espionage activities. The Soviet

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espionage agent, Rudolph Abel, on the other hand, having no diplomatic immunity, was imprisoned.

57. E. H. Cookridge [Edward Spiro], *Soviet Spy Net* (London: Frederick Mullen, Ltd., [1955]), p. 54.
58. Alexander Foote, *Handbook for Spies* (London: Museum Press, Ltd., 1948), p. 52.
59. *Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage* (Commonwealth of Australia, August 22, 1955).
60. Cookridge, *The Soviet Spy Net*, p. 70.
61. Ibid., p. 61.
62. Ibid.
63. Deriabin and Gibney, *Secret World*, pp. 184–187.

CHAPTER 5

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

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INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERMEASURES

At the beginning of an underground movement government countermeasures are limited by lack of information about the nature of an enemy which is coming into being. Although the ultimate aim of all government countermeasures is to destroy the leadership and organization of an underground, initially the government must find out who the enemy is. Therefore the government's first objective is to identify the underground leaders, usually by infiltrating the movement. Next the government tries to prevent growth of the underground by restricting its access to the populace and to supplies. To do this the government may seek the cooperation of the people for intelligence purposes, offering them both protection from threats by the underground and evidence that the government measures are in their best interests.

In the second stage of development of the underground the objective of government countermeasures depends upon whether the underground is a resistance or a revolutionary movement and on circumstances external to the underground itself. The aim may be either pacification or control. Pacification entails obtaining a large amount of popular support and willing cooperation. Control does not require such a high degree of popular support; if the government's security forces* control resources and production facilities, and the lines of communication and transportation in strategic areas, that may be sufficient. In both resistance and revolutionary situations pacification is preferable, because a progovernment populace requires a minimum of physical restraint and permits the government to use security forces for other duties. If an occupying government aims for pacification in a resistance situation, a great many troops will be needed originally for occupation duty. In practice it has proved expedient during a military campaign for an occupier merely to establish control without attempting to achieve pacification.

Both the Germans and the Japanese attempted pacification, but when the demand for troops increased, they limited their efforts to control of strategic points. In China the Japanese were overextended, and learned to live with the problems of resistance, being satisfied to control raw materials, industrial and commercial centers, the capitals of the various provinces, and the major seaports and transportation centers. This situation required from one-half to one-third fewer troops than would have been required for the occupation of the entire country.[1]

*Security forces are those armed groups actively engaged in maintaining civil order and suppressing subversion and insurrection. In a given country, these may include any or all of the following groups: (1) the full-time national defense establishment, including the army, navy, air force, marines, etc., (2) the police, both uniformed and nonuniformed, at the national, regional, and local levels, and (3) the militia.

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In revolutionary war, however, control alone cannot be a sufficient aim for the government. The ultimate objective must be pacification even though the government may be required to restrict personal freedom to such an extent that martial law is invoked. Such restrictions may cause resentment and aid the revolutionary movement by adding credence to its claims of government persecution. On the other hand, failure to undertake prompt and effective countermeasures may permit the illegal organization to grow rapidly. In dealing with revolution, a government typically works under several handicaps: (1) the revolution is usually well underway before control measures are applied, and therefore the security forces are on the defensive at the offset; (2) security forces are often subject to legal restraints; and (3) the government faces conflicting goals—to suppress the revolution and gain the active support of the people.

THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES DURING PHASES OF UNDERGROUND DEVELOPMENT

During the initial stages of underground development, military combat units are usually not involved, since nascent subversive activity is generally a matter for police action. The military usually does not take action until some event precipitates a crisis. Its role in suppressing underground activities may be outlined as follows:

(1) During the first phase of underground organization the role of the military is primarily one of gathering political intelligence.

(2) When the underground launches its psychological offensive—which may include demonstrations and acts of terrorism—the military role is to support the police in riot control, protect life and property, and reestablish law and order.

(3) As the underground expands and the intensity of strikes and riots increases, the military and police forces continue to restore order, and to identify and keep under surveillance suspected underground leaders.

(4) As the underground moves into its militarization phase and establishes "liberated" areas, the military usually begins a campaign of denial operations against the insurgents and a civil program designed to win the support of the populace. Usually the first step is to cut off potential outside sanctuary and supply. Next, action is taken to isolate the guerrillas from the underground to cut off internal aid and supply. Checkpoints are established to restrict the movements of underground agents and suspicious urban areas are cordoned off and searched for arms and subversive material. People in rural areas who are threatened by the guerrillas are sometimes moved into protected areas. Providing protection for the general populace helps the security forces to gain the active support of the people and establish intelligence sources. Once underground support to the guerrillas is cut off, guerrilla units are compelled to attack the security forces in order to obtain food and arms. Since the security forces are usually better trained and equipped, they have a tactical advantage in these encounters.

This chapter presents a discussion of countermeasures against revolution and resistance in four historical cases, a brief discussion of the strategy and deployment of security forces, and an analysis of the military and political elements of countermeasures.

COUNTERMEASURES IN RESISTANCE AND REVOLUTION

This section presents the countermeasures employed against two resistance movements—the anti-Nazi resistance in Europe and the Chinese resistance to Japanese occupation, and two revolutionary movements—those in Algeria and Malaya.

GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES IN EUROPE

German Occupation Policy

During World War II, the German occupation policy varied in different parts of Europe and changed from time to time. Initially, the Germans attempted to make Denmark and Norway and the unoccupied part of France into model areas by maintaining the indigenous governments and police forces and using German troops as little as possible. In territories which the Germans appended to the *Reich*, a civil administration was established and a German *Reich* commissioner appointed. In areas which were of strategic or economic importance, a military administration controlled by the *Wehrmacht* through the various military commands was established.[2] In the Balkans, for example, the German interest, as defined by Hitler, was to maintain the security of supply routes and communications to German bases, to safeguard the mineral producing areas, and to protect open shipping. The Germans did not attempt to dominate the entire area, but limited their efforts to controlling major towns, transportation nets, and strategic industries. In this way they were able to extract economic resources without committing excessive numbers of troops to pacification and occupation duty.[3] Generally, the German occupation policy could be characterized as one of control rather than pacification in the occupied countries and battle zones.

In many cases, the Germans encountered initially little organized resistance from the civilian population. As the occupation progressed, however, and as the Germans suffered defeats on the military fronts, the attitude of the populace toward the German troops changed. To obtain manpower for their military production, the Germans began trying to recruit workers in the occupied countries by offering higher wages and better living conditions in

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Germany. Although they had some success, they were still unable to get the manpower they required, so they resorted to conscription. This aroused bitterness and drove many persons into the underground.[4] The Germans also exploited the economies of the occupied countries, reducing the civilian populations to a starvation level. In many cases, relief agencies from neutral countries had to be called in.[5] This suffering, of course, also helped swell the ranks of resistance movements.

Command

German countermeasures were handicapped in some areas by a divided responsibility of command. In the Balkans, three separate agencies were responsible for the control and administration of the occupation. They had overlapping responsibilities and were often in conflict. The SS and police agencies in occupied countries reported to the German chief of police, Heinrich Himmler, and acted independently of the army. The military commanders were responsible for security, and various civilian agencies, including the German Foreign Office, were also represented.[6]

In Eastern Europe, responsibility for antipartisan measures was divided at first between the Supreme Command in the operational areas and the *SS Reichsfuehrer* in the *Reichskommissariat*. It was later centralized, however, under the *Reichsfuehrer*. Subordinate to him were the commander in chief of the antipartisan forces and the senior SS and police commanders.[7] The centralized command proved more effective in coordinating and carrying out a unified program of countermeasures.

Intelligence and Security

There was considerable confusion and wasted effort in antiresistance operations, particularly in the clandestine intelligence field. The SS and military organizations were attempting to accomplish the same missions independently, while the German Foreign Office, also working independently through its High Commissioner, was attempting to achieve political aims not always consistent with the directives given by the commanders. There was often considerable friction among these units.[8]

German security measures in the Balkans were extremely lax. Large groups of local civilians were hired to work in German areas of troop concentration and in military installations with only a minimum of security investigation. These workers were able to provide the guerrillas with information about the German troop movements and installations.[9]

The Germans used a system of informers organized into districts, cities, localities, down to units as small as apartment houses. They recruited local residents to watch the other inhabitants and report regularly to the German security forces. A block-warden system was used to check the movements and activities of the civilian populace. One individual in each dwelling was responsible for reporting to a warden on the movements of those who lived there. The Germans also used *agents provocateurs*, who would represent themselves

as Allied pilots, guerrillas, or simply as patriots who wanted to perform some subversive act. These agents would attempt to get others to join them in order to test their support of the German regime and to ferret out illegal activities. In Belgium, a "false" escape and evasion network was set up to help Allied pilots out of the country. The Germans let a few escapees get through in order to keep up appearances and deceive the underground and then captured the rest.[10]

Administration of Countermeasures

Puppet governments were installed to lighten the Germans' administrative burden, and native police and security forces were also organized to protect officials and reduce the number of occupation troops required. In many countries German agents and sympathizers provided the occupiers with political intelligence necessary to select pro-German officials to staff various governmental agencies. The Germans also organized motor guards and police to control traffic across borders, and formed state guards to support the city and rural police. In many of these units a German cadre directed operations.[11]

Persons suspected of underground activity were removed to concentration camps and detention centers. The Germans maintained a policy of collective responsibility and often exacted reprisals against the civilian population for sabotage or guerrilla attacks. To discourage resistance, they took hostages indiscriminately, warning that they would be executed if the activities continued. While this may have been effective at first, the indiscriminate execution of hostages and the destruction of villages meant that pro-German families suffered as well as anti-German families. This aroused much resentment among the inhabitants and demonstrated to the people that their actions had no effect on their fate at the hands of the Germans. This led many persons to leave their villages and join the guerrillas.[12] Other measures such as the control of printing materials and censorship of the mails were also used. Radio receivers were confiscated and loudspeakers were set up in public places for listening to radio broadcasts. Individuals were forced to register with the security forces and people's movements were controlled; ration cards and work permits were issued. Many forced-labor battalions were formed.

Measured in term of control, German antiresistance measures were generally effective: the Germans were able to maintain control over the needed resources and manpower; they maintained reliable communications and transportation without serious interruptions; and through a good intelligence and police system, they were able to keep resistance activities in most areas to a tolerable level. On the other hand, such policies as the indiscriminate taking of hostages and reprisals as well as the depleting of local economies led many persons to join the underground.

JAPANESE PACIFICATION MEASURES IN CHINA

During their occupation of China in World War II, the Japanese were constantly harassed by guerrillas operating in rural areas. Having insufficient

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security forces to deal with them, the Japanese inaugurated a program of "rural purification" which they hoped would reduce their troops requirements.[13] The first phase of this pacification program called for sending troops into a region where guerrillas had been active, wiping out or driving out the guerrillas, and conducting mop-up operations. In the second phase the region was to be made a model—autonomous or ostensibly independent of Japanese control, with courts, militias, and other instruments of local power controlled by local authorities. The Japanese organized local police forces, established training schools, provided large rewards for obedience, and imposed severe punishment for criminal violations. Japanese officials supervised the administration from behind the scenes, and strong Japanese forces were stationed outside the region but close enough to counter any serious guerrilla activity which might develop. Passive defenses were established to protect the villages from attacks, and regular patrols were made outside the villages. The third phase consisted of intensive propaganda, rebuilding of schools, and a general amnesty to guerrillas who surrendered.

The purpose of the pacification movement was to increase control over the twilight areas between guerrilla-controlled territory and Japanese-held territory. The Japanese wanted to put the guerrillas on the defensive by establishing good relations with the population and strengthening the authority of the local governments. They hoped to expand the model areas. They assumed that by instituting a campaign of intensive propaganda and reeducation and by removing the severe rationing and other restrictive control measures, they could persuade the people in the guerrilla-controlled or twilight areas to welcome Japanese rule and withdraw their support from the guerrillas. Thus, the basic aim of the pacification program was to set up an economic blockade which would prevent the guerrillas from getting food and clothing from the villages and also from obtaining recruits. Simultaneously, the Japanese carried out aggressive counterattacks using small, mobile antiguerrilla units.

Capitalizing upon the strong family ties within the oriental culture, the Japanese developed a variation of the block-warden system. In order to extend their control over the smallest unit in the Chinese community, the Japanese used a system called *Pao-Chia:* 10 families who lived close together were organized into a *pao*, and five of these *pao's* into a *ta* or a grand *pao*. The Japanese then selected the most influential or respected person, appointed him Great Pao, and placed him in charge of all of the families. The Great Pao in turn would appoint a head for each *pao*. The Great Pao was completely responsible for the actions of all the people under his jurisdiction. The Japanese expected him to carry out such government activities as collecting taxes and disseminating information, and to maintain watch over all activities of the individuals under his control. Within these family units, self-defense corps for militia or guard duty were formed to maintain law and order. If any member left the family unit or assisted the guerrillas, the Great Pao was expected to turn him over to the authorities. If the Japanese did not get the cooperation they expected, they would execute the Great Pao as an example and appoint another one. The people within the units, respectful

of the Great Pao, would not engage in subversive activities or aid the guerrillas for fear of provoking reprisals against him. In turn, the Great Pao would cooperate with the occupying authorities to prevent reprisals against his people.

Despite the careful planning and the effectiveness of the *Pao-Chia* system, the Japanese pacification was not very successful. One basic fault was in the administration of the program. The Chinese who were selected as administrators in the various villages usually lacked training for administrative duty, and many of them participated in the puppet governments purely for personal gain. For example, when food restrictions were lifted to win over the people, they often used the additional food allotments for their personal use. Consequently, the people developed contempt rather than respect for them and the Japanese, and many remained willing to aid the guerrillas.

FRENCH PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA

To quell the Algerian independence movement (1954–62), the French undertook a military campaign designed to defeat the guerrillas, and, after some delay, instituted a pacification program to bring the Algerian people closer to the administration.[14]

In 1954 General Challe introduced the "spot-of-oil" strategy in an effort to pacify the Algerians. Troops were concentrated in one section of the country at a time in sufficient strength to overcome the insurgents. Once subversive activity had ceased, they moved on to the next adjoining area. Although these areas were pacified militarily, many were not won politically, and as soon as the military departed for another area, the underground began its activities anew and guerrilla forces reinfiltrated the "pacified" zones.[15] The French, by concentrating their forces in certain areas, left many areas without military or civil control, and the insurgents simply moved in and established shadow governments without opposition.

Not until nearly 2 years after the initial uprising was the political pacification effort begun in earnest and even then it was done on a small scale. French soldiers were trained for political as well as military duties, and were to acts as "agents of pacification." Special *Sections Administratives Spécialistes* (SAS) were formed to help build schools, homes, and hospitals. The French also began to carry out large-scale reforms in education, health, and sanitation throughout the country. To show their respect for the "Algerian personality," they introduced for the first time instruction in Arabic in the French-operated schools.[16]

In order to better direct the operations, the Governor General was placed in charge of all political and military activities, thus ensuring a unified command for this area. In 1957 the Maurice line along the Tunisian border and another line along the Moroccan border were established to cut off the supply of food and arms to the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN). To deprive the guerrillas of internal support, over a million people were relocated into camps.

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Strategy, Tactics, and Countermeasures

In the meantime the FLN had organized an army and an underground, and had established through persuasion and terror a strong base of popular support. Although the French had contained the FLN militarily, they could not destroy their organization. By the time the French began their pacification program, Muslim support for independence had crystalized to such an extent that it was very difficult at best to obtain any popular active support against the FLN. The French probably could have had control over any area they chose had they concentrated their forces. However, they could not stop the small guerrilla raids nor could they locate any large FLN units to engage in battle. The military situation became a stalemate. The external command of the FLN was out of reach in Tunisia, and the meager French pacification effort did not win sufficient active support among the populace to provide the intelligence sources required to destroy the clandestine organization within their midst.

Finally, the Algerians received psychological and diplomatic support from Tunisia and Morocco as well as from groups in other countries, including France, which for one reason or another felt Algeria should be independent. In addition to international political pressure, the drain on France's economy had its effect upon the decision to grant independence to Algeria.

BRITISH COUNTERMEASURES AND PACIFICATION IN MALAYA

In Malaya (1948–60), the British, and later the independent Malayan Government, succeeded in carrying out an effective countermeasures program against the Malayan Communist Party.

Emergency Powers

After the outbreak of subversive activities, the British instituted emergency measures. These gave the police summary powers to detain suspects for as much as 2 years without trial and to search without warrant. They also had the right to control food supplies and travel and to impose curfews and to close roads. A very effective measure was the detention and banishment law, under which the British could arrest anyone suspected of subversive activity and deport him. From 1949 to 1953 the regulations provided that the inhabitants of a village could be detained for questioning concerning terrorist activities, and could be subjected to collective punishment if they refused to provide such information. The British also instituted national registration and required everyone over 12 years of age to carry an ID card with his photo and thumbprint on it.

The Briggs Plan

When terrorist activities increased and police efforts failed to check them, the British called to Malaya Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, who drew up the

Government Countermeasures

Briggs Plan in 1950. Its objectives were: (1) to control the populated areas and build up a feeling of complete security among the populace which would in turn result in an increasing flow of information from all sources, (2) to break up the Communist organization within the populated areas, (3) to isolate the insurgents from their food-supply organizations in the populated areas, and (4) to destroy the insurgents by forcing them to attack the security forces on the security forces terms.[17]

Command and Control

As the British had trouble coordinating the army and police efforts, they organized a war council, which was headed by a director of operations and comprised the chief officials of the civilian administration, the police, army, and air force. The police were to have priority in fulfilling their normal functions in towns and villages. The army was to maintain a permanent detachment of troops deployed in close conjunction with the police, cover the towns and villages which the police could not control, and act as a striking force ready to move against guerrillas anywhere within 5 hours marching distance from the towns and villages where its units were stationed. The day-to-day planning and coordinating sessions among the military, police, and civil authorities did much to bring about concerted political and military action. The British succeeded in cutting off outside sanctuary and supplies: the army and police closed off the Thai border and navy patrol boats prevented supplies from arriving by sea.[18] Although the jungle areas provided an internal sanctuary, it was difficult to grow food there and the guerrillas had to rely almost entirely upon the Communist civilian underground, the *Min Yuen*, for supplies.

Intelligence

A dossier was kept on every known terrorist in the area. If one was killed, the British would identify him and close the record. By offering rewards for information on subversive activity, they were able to secure a ready supply of informers. Through informers, defectors, and prisoners of war, they obtained most of the information needed to combat the insurgents. In order to develop a countrywide intelligence system, Briggs instituted the "Briggs map"—a massive chart of the Federation on which were shown the areas in which the terrorists were operating, the distribution of Chinese and Malays, and the areas in which squatters were living. Containing information from every conceivable source, the map also located targets which the terrorists were attacking, such as lumber camps, rubber estates, and mines, and showed where aboriginal tribes lived and traveled. Drop zones for aircraft were also indicated, and sites were located for resettlement of squatters on the basis of the information gathered.[19]

Resettlement

The major goal of the operation, in both its civil and military aspects, was to resettle people out of reach of the terrorists and to control the supply of food. Since the people living close to the jungles were susceptible to guerrilla

terror and intimidation, and some willingly supported the guerrillas, they were resettled in defensible areas in order to protect them, make it more difficult for the guerrillas to gain recruits, and to deny food to the guerrillas. To prevent food from getting outside the residential areas, the British attempted to limit the village food supplies to a week's ration for the normal population.

The new villages were built in good farming areas. They were surrounded by barbed wire, and booby traps and mines were placed around the outer perimeter of the villages. They had police posts and search lights at strategic points, and maintained a dusk-to-dawn curfew. To supplement the activities of the regular police, the people had to provide their own home guard and perform police duty.

Those who were moved to the villages were compensated for the loss of the possessions they could not bring with them, and were given an allowance and building materials to build their own homes. They were given a plot of land up to one-sixth of an acre and were instructed how to build a house and plant a garden. If they were dependent solely upon agriculture for their livelihood, they received two to three additional acres.[20] Going to these villages afforded advantages other than protection: the villages had schools, shops, electricity, medical services, and other conveniences which were not obtainable at the jungle edges. In many cases, resettlement of the landless Chinese squatters in the new villages improved their lot economically and offered them hope for permanent improvement, and ultimately led to an actual desire to cooperate with the British.

To run the settlement camps, the British usually appointed Chinese, or Chinese-speaking civil servants selected for their ability to make friends, to be persuasive, and to organize and administer.[21] Every effort was made to obtain intelligent, sympathetic officials. To develop a sense of community fellowship, the administrators arranged competitive games between teams drawn from the government, police, army, and relocated settlers.

Information Campaign

The British carried on an intensive information program to convince the inhabitants that the struggle was not between Malayan Communists and security forces but between the Malayan people and subversive Chinese Communists. They were able to win the support of the Malays by capitalizing upon their long-established antagonism toward and suspicion of the overseas Chinese. They sent teams of captured and converted Communist Party members throughout the countryside lecturing to the local populace. They used demonstrations, films, and radio broadcasts to appeal to the terrorists and offer them amnesty.

Labor Unions and Infiltration

Since the Communists had taken the lead in organizing the Malayan labor movement and had infiltrated and taken control of many union groups, it was difficult to destroy the Communists without destroying the labor movement.

Under the provisions for registration a union could perform all labor activities but no political ones. If it ventured into political activities or participated in demonstrations that had political overtones, its registration could be revoked. In addition, a union member was required to have at least 3 years of experience in the industry or trade before becoming an officer. (At this time, Communist cadres were creating unions and assuming leadership positions in many industries and trades without having ever worked in that trade.) Through these measures the British avoided antagonizing loyal citizens by eliminating the unions, but did control and minimize Communist infiltration by controlling union activities.

Retraining

The British also attempted to retrain Communists in institutions such as the Taipin School. The purpose was not to convert them to democracy, but to give them educational and vocational training that would enable them, after resettlement, to earn a living and to function as respected members of their society.[22]

In summary, the success of the British in Malaya probably resulted from a variety of effective countermeasures. They were able to close off the Thai border and deny sanctuary to terrorists. Deprived of supplies from outside and unable to convert jungle areas into base areas as prescribed in Mao's strategy, the terrorists were forced to depend exclusively upon the *Min Yuen* for supplies. The British also succeeded in isolating the rural populace from the terrorists, and thus ultimately destroyed the latter's food supply and source of recruits. Through the use of good administrators, they were able to win the support of the relocated inhabitants. They developed an efficient intelligence system, and their information program was effective in making the populace understand that the terrorists were Chinese Communist and not Malayan nationalists. The discriminating use of restrictive controls on Communist organizational activities limited Communist underground expansion in the cities. Finally, the promise and granting of independence did much to counter Communist propaganda against the British and bring an end to Communist activity.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF COUNTERMEASURES

It is extremely difficult to combat underground activities without imposing restraints upon the populace. To win or hold the support of the populace, the government may have to permit greater freedom of action to the uncommitted, which freedom the underground can utilize to its advantage. Both the underground and the government compete for the support of the uncommitted; at the very least each wants to deny that support to the other.

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