

(Courtesy of the Norwegian Information Service)

A Norwegian underground worker prepares a news bulletin about Allied frontlines activities. She obtains the information over the radio.

carried on a fight against collaborators and traitors by publishing information about them and printed pictures of Gestapo and other agents. They also printed articles describing how individuals could engage in sabotage.[11]

Written materials do present certain problems. Large quantities of paper, ink, and other supplies are required for continuing publication, and usually the regime controls printing materials and presses. Also, the distribution of printed matter requires a complex and coordinated effort if the material and the distributors are not to be intercepted. Finally, the possession of subversive literature is hazardous to readers as well as distributors.

The most difficult problems in running an underground newspaper are staffing it with reporters, printers, and distributors, and finding a safe place to print it. In some cases, such as Algeria, newspapers were printed outside the country. News is often obtained from foreign broadcasts via shortwave.

Where presses and printing materials are licensed or under close surveillance, chain letters have been used effectively to communicate information to a large segment of the population. In Italy, *Alleanza Nazionale*, an anti-Fascist underground, employed a chain-letter technique, having each recipient make six copies and forward them to six other people, including two Fascists.[12]

Word-of-Mouth Communication

In countries where a large portion of the population is illiterate and few radio receivers are available, word-of-mouth messages are the principal means of communication. Agitators circulating in crowds, spreading rumors, and appealing for aid to the underground have often been very effective.[13] In South Vietnam the Viet Cong have set propaganda messages to music and traveling minstrels have gone from village to village singing revolutionary songs. Agitators who spread rumors usually seek out locations such as marketplaces or talk to travelers who are likely to pass the rumor along to the next village. Word-of-mouth communications have the advantage that the message is usually spread by people who know each other, and therefore it gains credibility. Another advantage is the fact that the messages, though subversive in content, may not sound subversive when presented by the agent, and there are no materials to incriminate the agent. A big disadvantage, however, is that the message may be distorted or may never reach the target group. Once the agitator transmits the initial message, he has lost control over where it will go and the form it will take. North Korean Communists in South Korea, by placing agitators in various territories, cities, and precincts, attempted by sheer numbers and distribution of agitators to get their message across.

Military units are often effective in spreading communications. In South Korea, an investigation by the ROK intelligence revealed that 50 percent of all rumors spread among the local population were disseminated consciously or unconsciously by military elements who came in contact with the civilians and whose opinions on military situations were considered "hot" news.[14] On the other hand, word-of-mouth communication is a two-way street: government messages and those of the underground may be equally credible and acceptable. For either side, word-of-mouth communication usually has the advantage of being viewed as "hot" news or information not normally available through other mass media.

Symbolic Devices

Another way to transmit information and harass the enemy is by symbolic devices such as slogans or symbols written on walls or in public places which are convenient to the target groups. Antigovernment slogans and messages can be displayed on walls in such a way that they cannot easily be eradicated. Jokes and cartoons carry great impact and are an effective way of conveying disrespect and resistance in a socially acceptable manner.

Agitators

North Korean agitators trained by the Russians for intelligence, sabotage, agitation, and propaganda were sent into South Korea. Communist directives ordered them to organize cells of four members and to set up chan-

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(UPI Photo)

Secret Army Organization propaganda in Algiers (March 1962).

nels through which propaganda materials and other equipment could be smuggled to partisans in South Korea. The agitators were to keep a close check on the attitudes of the populace within their precinct and to record all South Korean cooperation with U.N. forces. They were to prepare and distribute posters and leaflets and other propaganda, and compose slogans and appeals and post them at night in public places. They were warned not to speak openly in favor of North Korea, but to point out that the North Koreans did not destroy citizens' homes, bomb their children, or kill their cattle. The agitators were told to look for South Koreans who had lost all they owned or who had not received help from the government, and those rejected from U.N. jobs. They were instructed to help sick neighbors; South Koreans whose sons were serving with the ROK Armed Forces were to be offered a hiding place for their sons if and when the latter deserted. To utilize the war situation, the agitators were to invent and spread rumors to upset and frighten the people, and instill hatred against the Syngman Rhee government and the United Nations. They were also to exploit existing rumors, and to concentrate on themes which struck close to the hearts of the majority of the South Koreans regardless of their political creed. They were told to emphasize the sentimental over the rational and to utilize the elements of uncertainty, fear, and doubt which existed among the people.[15]

One analysis of speeches given by various agitators indicates that an agitator will concentrate on emotional appeals and attempt to exploit the frustrations of his public.[16] His function is described as bringing to flame the smoldering resentments of his listeners and then lending social sanctions to actions that might otherwise seem to be simply dangerous temptations. His themes are—

(1) *Distrust.* The agitator plays on his audience's suspicion of things they do not understand. He points out that the individual is being manipulated and duped by the government.

(2) *Dependence.* The agitator talks to the crowd as if they suffered from a sense of helplessness and offers them protection through membership in a strong organization led by a strong leader.

(3) *Exclusion.* The agitator suggests that there is an abundance of material goods for everyone, but that the crowd does not get the share to which it is entitled.

(4) *Anxiety.* He points to a general premonition of disasters to come, and plays upon the fears of the individuals and the general uncertainty of life in the community.

(5) *Disillusionment.* The agitator points to politics and alleges that the government and its leaders are guilty of fraud, deception, falsehoods, and hypocrisy.

The agitator does not invent issues, nor does he base his appeals on abstract, intellectual theories. He exploits the vagueness of his terms, playing not on facts but upon basic emotions of fear and insecurity. The agitator is not hindered by facts, and he needs none, since the themes he uses are emotional and common to all men.

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(Wide World Photos)

A group of Venezuelan demonstrators await the motorcade of Vice President Richard Nixon and his party.

OVERT MASS RESPONSES

Mob Violence

Mobs and demonstrations have been used with great effect, particularly by Communists in recent years. For example, in 1958, when Vice President Richard Nixon visited Venezuela, top Communists—with the support of the local party organization—hired hoodlums, armed them with long wooden clubs and placards, and put on a demonstration against the Vice President. Gustavo Machado, the Venezuelan Communist Party leader, admitted that the party had organized the demonstration of 8,000 in order to ruin Nixon's trip. Sometime later in Japan, agitators organized a similar demonstration against Press Secretary James Hagerty. Before Hagerty's arrival, the agitators visited the unemployment offices to hire all applicants present. The hiring was so complete that the police were able to tell newsmen that the absence of lines at the employment office made it certain that demonstrations would occur later in the day. The Japanese security officials also estimated that the 5 weeks of violence against the Japanese-United States Treaty cost the Communists as much as 1.4 million dollars.[17] One observer has outlined the organization of a Communist demonstration and mob violence as follows:

(1) *External command.* The leaders who comprised the external command remained some distance from the scene of immediate action, observing and issuing orders from a place of relative safety.

(2) *Internal command.* Within the mob was the Communist cadre who implemented orders from the external command. Because the cadre was in the thick of the action, great care was taken to protect the leaders of this unit.

(3) *Bravadoes.* Bodyguards, or bravadoes, surrounded and shielded the internal command from the police and facilitated their escape if necessary. These men also flanked processions and guarded the banner carriers.



(Wide World Photos)

Demonstration at Tokyo's Haneda Airport, June 1960, where White House Press Secretary James Hagerty and companions had to be rescued by helicopter from their car besieged by some 5,000 demonstrators.

(4) *Banner carriers.* These men carried the banners and switched them upon instruction. At first, signs with slogans that expressed popular grievances were used, but as the mob became frenzied, the banners were exchanged for others bearing Communist propaganda. Key agitators were stationed near conspicuous banners so that they could easily be found by messengers bearing instructions from the leaders.

(5) *Cheering sections.* Demonstrators were carefully rehearsed on slogans to be chanted and the sequence in which they were to be used.

(6) *Messengers.* They ran messages between the external and internal commands. Generally, they rode their bicycles along sidewalks, keeping abreast of the moving demonstration.

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(Wide World Photos)

Japanese demonstrate at Haneda Airport in Tokyo as Press Secretary James Hagerty arrives to arrange Eisenhower's visit to Japan (June 1960)

(7) *Shock guards.* These men carried clubs and accompanied the Communist cadre. They marched along the sidewalks, screened by the spectators, and rushed into the mob only as reinforcements if the Communists were engaged by the police. Their sudden and violent action was designed to provide enough diversion to enable the Communist demonstrators to escape from the area, leaving to the police the bystanders, unknowing excitement seekers, and sympathizers.[18]

Agitators frequently work on the assumption that bloodshed can be very effective in giving the proper impetus to the cause they are promoting, and that such bloodshed can turn an ordinary grievance into a holy commission. They may recruit and use women and children for acts of violence to inhibit the police in their use of countermeasures or at least to embarrass them. It is also common for women and children to be used by resistance groups to mock government occupation troops. The hope is that the enemy soldier will be so infuriated as to attack one of these people and hence to arouse the wrath of the populace.

Passive Resistance

Passive resistance is an important supplement to major underground activities, particularly since it allows sympathizers to aid the movement with relatively little risk. One advantage of passive resistance is that the offenses committed are so trivial that the governing authority will not take extreme countermeasures. Particularly if many engage in such activity, the government is unlikely to undertake any severe punitive action. A second advantage is that this type of activity camouflages an organized underground and hence enhances its effectiveness. The government arrests passive resisters and in turn finds no organized threat against the government; it exhausts itself searching the wrong quarter for organizations, plans, or activities. This acts as a distraction and provides a cover for the more dangerous underground activities.

Some of the activities of passive resistance are—

(1) *Boycotts.* By boycotting certain products, markets, or activities, the resisters show contempt for the governing authority and can thereby affect the morale of the government forces or supporters. The boycott of French cigarettes in Morocco in 1953–55, for example, deprived the French Government of revenue and also demonstrated the strength of the Istiqlal Party.[19]

(2) *Social ostracism.* Collaborators or people sympathetic to the governing authority or occupier are frequent targets for ostracism. To maximize its effect, ostracism is best employed against a particular group of people who are easily identifiable and small in number. Exploitation of existing prejudices toward minorities or special interest groups also helps to magnify the effect of ostracism.

(3) *Fear and suggestion.* Telephoned threats, bomb scares, and threats to contaminate drinking water are matters which the police must investigate and against which they must take precautionary action; the attention of the police is thereby diverted and their effectiveness is reduced.

(4) *Overloading the systems.* By following governmental instructions to report suspicious incidents and persons, large numbers of people can turn in false alarms or make unfounded denunciations of people who are "suspected of aiding the enemy" and in this way so overload the governmental authority that valid reports cannot be handled. This device has been especially effective against a block-warden surveillance technique used to counter underground activities.[20]

(5) *Symbolic acts.* In the Netherlands, when the Jews were told to wear armbands to identify them, many Dutch also wore armbands in defiance of the German authorities. This showed contempt for German regulations and had the effect of encouraging more resistance.

(6) *Absenteeism and slowdowns.* Production is hampered when workers fail to report for reasons of "illness," or when they go to work but create natural errors or work slowly.

COERCION, THREATS, AND TERRORISM

Coercion

While an underground will attempt to win support wherever possible through persuasion alone, it will often use intimidation and coercion to obtain

the support of undecided or uncommitted people. In Malaya, for example, the Communists would ask fellow Chinese labor union members to pay as little as 25 cents a month dues to the party. Rather than risk trouble over such a small amount, the workers would contribute. Then the Communists would ask for more money and threaten to expose the workers to the government as dues-paying Communists unless they cooperated further with the party. When such methods of simple coercion failed to produce the food, arms, and money needed to expand the movement, the Communists formed an armed terrorist group called the "Blood and Steel Corps" to carry out threats and punish antiparty people.[21]

Threats

In order to be effective, the demand part of a threat must be stated so clearly that it cannot be misunderstood by the individual or group to which it is directed, otherwise the threatened party might not comply simply because he did not know what was demanded of him. If a particular threat to an individual or small group is to have an effect on a great many people, it must be specifically related to a clearly discernible act so that the others will have no doubt as to why the individual or group was threatened. For the threatener is not always attempting only to get particular individuals to perform an act, he frequently wants large numbers of people to learn the lesson demonstrated by any enforcement of his threat. Indiscriminate and nonspecific punishment or mass terror does not lead people to act in the desired manner. Rather than threatening an individual or group because of some intangible such as being sympathetic to the enemy, punishment should be contingent on some observable act such as giving material aid to the enemy.

Secondly, to be effective the threatener must have means of administering punishment which are obvious to the threatened person. In counterinsurgency situations such means can be a group such as the Malayan Communist "Blood and Steel Corps," the Greek *Aftoamyna*, the Yugoslav Partisan O.Z.Na., and the enforcing squadrons of the Huks in the Philippines.

Thirdly, the threatener must discern whether or not the threatened persons did comply with his demand before he inflicts punishment, lest the situation of a specific threat be changed to a situation of general terror. For example, the Nazi threat to shoot all Yugoslavs who cooperated with the Partisans became ineffective because the Nazis shot randomly-chosen groups of Yugoslavs which included both persons who had and persons who had not complied with the demand. The Yugoslavs soon understood that they were liable to punishment whether or not they cooperated with the Partisans.

In making a threat, it is to the advantage of the threatener to choose for the demands in his threat actions which the people are predisposed to do. In Algeria the OAS, in order to demonstrate its displeasure against the French Government, demanded that all Algerians stay off the streets during the evening hours and turn out their lights, and threatened to punish anyone found on the streets during the evening hours. These demands on the populace were consonant with what an individual might do on his own during any kind of disorder, so it was extremely likely that the populace would comply with the demands.

There are ways to improve the effectiveness of a threat.[22] To keep the people from acting in an undesirable way, the threatener may try to prevent their taking the first step toward the ultimate action; if he cannot do this, he tries to prevent their taking the second step; etc. If drastic threats contingent on completion of the action are prefaced by a series of smaller, successively harsher threats relating to each step, and if the threatener shows that he is willing to carry out the intermediate threats, he may not have to carry out the ultimate one. Similar to decomposing the threat into a series is decomposing the punishment into a series of increasingly severe punitive acts. In this way the threatener, by inflicting lesser punishments, gives credence to the possibility that he might carry out the most drastic punishment. In France, for example, the OAS would send someone a note saying that an OAS tax representative would call to collect money for the organization. If the victim refused to pay, his car might be blown up with a plastic bomb. He was approached again and asked to contribute; if he failed again to pay the tax, his house might be damaged by bombs. If an additional refusal was received, he might be assassinated.

Terrorism

Terror is used to disrupt government control over the populace. It is probably most effective in a rising revolution where it can be used to express the discontent of many, and it is least effective where there is popular support for the government.[23] Terror is used to draw attention to the movement and to demonstrate in a dramatic way the strength and seriousness of the underground. The small strong-arm-unit, which most undergrounds maintain to protect its members, may also be used against informers and people who cooperate with the government.[24] In this way the underground demonstrates that cooperation with the security forces is a risky thing.

Because terror is a state of mind, the underground must carefully assess the probable reactions that may follow it. Such acts as murder, assassination, and bombing will usually produce fear, but that fear does not necessarily lead the people into the ranks of the terrorists; it may instead lead them to mass indignation and counteractions.

The Malayan Communists, unable to carry out and win a guerrilla war, attempted through mass terror to neutralize the elements of the population who were assisting the government. But soon the party received complaints from its underground, the *Min Yuen*, that the indiscriminate use of terror had made even routine *Min Yuen* work difficult and was making the populace more willing than before to cooperate with the government. The party then called for discriminate use of violence and greater political infiltration. However, as one source points out, the Malayan Communist Party had become a "prisoner of terrorism."[25] It could not use violence effectively; on the other hand, to

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give up violence would have indicated that it was losing its effectiveness and its ability to enforce demands.[26] The discriminate use of terror is probably more effective than mass terror. The assassination of a key government official may lead some people to refrain from seeking political office.

A common strategy is to perform acts of terrorism which will drive the government to retaliate in kind and in this way drive people who were sympathetic to the government or neutral over to the underground. Yugoslav Partisans attacked villages knowing full well that the Germans would execute hostages. But they also knew that the remaining villagers would flee the villages and would come to the partisan movement voluntarily.[27]

In Algeria, the OAS committed acts of terrorism against Muslims in the hope that the Muslims would retaliate, thereby making it necessary for the French Army to fight Muslims and indirectly win the sympathy of the European population of the country. The FLN, having used similar tactics, was prepared for this maneuver and provided FLN agents to prevent any counterdemonstrations by the Muslims or counteractions against the French Algerians.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

Since an underground is attempting to win people to a cause, it must consider how best to present itself to the populace. Its leaders must decide what activities would be useful to the populace and make for better relationships between the people and the underground. In South Korea the Communists helped people who were homeless and who needed assistance. In Belgium the underground supported families of former underground workers who had been caught and nonunderground people who were evading the German conscript laws. This type of public relations is one of the most significant tasks the underground performs to enhance its cause.

Members of the underground are usually instructed to respect the customs and the moral standards of the major groups within the country. Failure to do so might provide the security forces with an effective propaganda tool. In Malaya, the British were successful in characterizing the Communist Party as "Communist terrorists" and as a "Chinese" organization, and thereby prejudiced the Malayan people against the movement. In Algeria, the OAS was successfully labeled as "Fascist." Such unpopular labels can destroy the underground's appeal and ability to recruit and expand.

SHADOW GOVERNMENTS

Shadow governments are reflections of the important objective of the underground to win control of the people, an objective more important than control of territory or military victories.

EXTERNAL SHADOW GOVERNMENTS

Many World War II resistance movements established governments-in-exile. Such a government acted as a rallying point for the resistance and conferred legitimacy on the acts of resistance against the occupier. It was felt that the existence of an exile government restrained people from collaboration. Also, funds were obtained in the name of the exile government within or outside the country.

In a revolutionary movement, the establishment of a provisional government and its recognition by foreign powers adds prestige to its cause. The provisional government can also act as a spokesman for the underground and make concessions to the other countries in return for aid.

INTERNAL SHADOW GOVERNMENTS

In spite of war and unrest certain public needs must be met in order to maintain social stability. Courts, schools, and police and public health services must be provided. In unoccupied territory, the underground resistance usually steps in and fills this vacuum by forming local and regional governments. In occupied territory, shadow governments are set up by the resistance. The underground in Poland was able to build a secret state complete with ministries, a parliament, and an army. It carried on underground schools and courts. The effectiveness of this state along with the threat of assassination for collaborators permitted the Poles to boast of having never produced a Quisling—a unique record in occupied Europe. In Yugoslavia, Tito organized National Liberation Committees for all levels of government and when the resistance ended, he was in political control of most of the country. Much of the postwar strength and success of the Communist revolutionary groups in Greece, Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines was built upon the political control which they were able to build through local and regional governments during the wartime resistance.

The local governments play a military as well as a civil role. They collect taxes and supply food and intelligence as well as safe-houses for the guerrillas. Civil defense or militia units are formed to protect the villages and also to serve as sources for guerrilla recruitment.

Shadow governments are usually established under the protection of a guerrilla force, with "elections" of individuals sympathetic to the movement. The government usually maintains itself by providing needed public services. If the territory should be retaken by the government forces, underground agents, through terrorism and assassination, coerce people into refraining from collaboration and keep a record of whatever collaboration occurs.

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obtained by the Danish resistance. During the summer of 1943, fishermen near the island of Bornholm began to report the crashes of unidentified objects into the sea; these were recorded by the resistance leader on the island. In August the island's police commissioner notified the underground leader of the crash of a flying craft in a nearby field. The two men rushed to the scene before the Germans and found the wreckage of what was clearly a new kind of aircraft. The only identification mark was a number: "V¹–83." The men took photographs immediately before the arrival of the German investigators. From the skid marks the underground leader was able to determine that the device had come from the southwest. From the pictures, the underground chief drew a complete sketch of the weapon. This sketch, the photographs, and the notations as to the direction from which the missile had come were sent by courier to England, providing the British with perhaps their first technical data on the new German rocket.[33]

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Underground agents also collect political intelligence. They note the statements and activities of persons to determine who favors the regime, so that these persons may be closely watched, or eliminated if their actions seriously threaten the underground. In Belgium during World War II, the *Mouvement National Belge* kept files on collaborators and campaigned by threatening phone calls and letters to dissuade these individuals from working with the enemy. If this failed, the collaborators were often executed. The list of collaborators was never made public in order to keep concealed the extent of cooperation with the enemy.[34]

In wartime the underground also notes the morale of the enemy soldiers. The Polish Home Army systematically collected data on German troops by reading their mail. There were too few Germans to handle all of the postal work; thus many Poles were employed. These workers would open letters and photograph the contents before sending them on. From these letters a fairly good estimate could be made of the enemy's morale.[35]

SABOTAGE

SELECTIVE SABOTAGE

The General Plan

A principal advantage of underground sabotage in wartime is that it can succeed in destroying a target not easily reached by conventional means. The former head of SOE activities in France said that this consideration often governed British action against targets in France. To launch an RAF attack on important targets in France required aircraft and trained flying-crews whose

main task was to hit targets in Germany or Italy. The chance of success on a small target was very low, even with the refinements of precision bombing. One saboteur could—with more personal risk, but also with far less expenditure of total lives and money—obtain more certain results in a shorter time.[36]

The importance of this capability was demonstrated in France soon after D-Day. Fifteen days after the landings, the SOE's French section received a "Most Urgent" message from General Eisenhower. The problem outlined was the following: the Allied hold in Normandy was tenuous; all Allied forces were fully committed; any German reinforcement might swing the balance and prove fatal to the invasion; such a reinforcement, a Panzer Corps, was moving towards Normandy and was expected to cross the Eure River near Evreux at the only bridge the RAF had failed to destroy; it had to be destroyed before the Panzers crossed it. Could SOE saboteurs in France undertake this mission?

The operation was commenced—its importance increased when yet a second air attack that day failed to demolish the bridge—and the bridge was completely blown up that night approximately 3 hours before the tanks were to arrive. RAF reconnaissance the next day noted the success of the mission—the Panzer Corps drawn up at the river. It never crossed the Eure. The following day the SOE French section received a message of congratulation from the Supreme Commander.[37]

This type of sabotage is selective: it aims at incapacitating installations which cannot easily be replaced or repaired in time to meet the enemy's crucial needs. The length of delay required varies with the target. A tactical target such as a bridge, which might be crucial in the transport of troops and supplies to a battle area, need be removed from use for only a few hours or days. A strategic target such as a factory, however, must be incapacitated for a much longer period, perhaps months, if there is to be a telling effect. Since massive bombardment is often required to knock this type of target out of production for a long period, underground sabotage is most often directed at tactical targets—the enemy's lines of transportation and communication. By destroying transportation routes, the underground obstructs the flow of troops and supplies to battle areas, and by disrupting communications, it can interrupt or confuse the transmission of battle orders.

Timing, of course, is of the essence. To blow up a bridge without considering the immediate needs of the enemy might only put an unnecessary hardship on the populace, but to destroy it at a time when it is vital to the enemy's troop and supply movements would be of real tactical value.[38]

A series of sabotage acts that met this requirement of timing were those conducted by the Danish resistance against the Jutland rail system after the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944. At this time the Germans began to transfer divisions stationed in Scandinavia to the Western Front. From Denmark alone about two and a half German divisions were sent immediately to oppose the landings. Intelligence reports indicated that these troops were to be followed in November by more than 12 divisions from Norway, and the

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

(Courtesy of the Norwegian Information Service)

Troop train derailed by Norwegian saboteurs during World War II.

British asked the underground to disrupt this transfer of troops by systematic sabotage of the railroads.

Throughout the winter of 1944–45 about 300 resistance members engaged in these operations. They supposedly accounted for most of the following items: 92 wagons, 58 locomotives, 11 cranes, 14 water towers, 25 signal boxes, 8 bridges, 8 locomotive sheds, 9 turntables, and 31 level-crossings were destroyed; 119 trains were derailed; and 7,512 attacks were made along the tracks.[39] Other resistance movements during the war surpassed these figures, but failed to match this sabotage operation in terms of effectiveness. The Danes succeeded in carrying out a concentrated attack on the railroads which incapacitated items *immediately needed*. According to General Viscount Montgomery, these operations changed the entire tide of the Battle of the Ardennes. During the most crucial 2 weeks of the campaign, when it appeared that Allied troops would be pushed back if the Germans could get reinforcements, the Danish saboteurs worked so well that, for 2 weeks, every trainload of German soldiers was stopped.[40]

Less effective were the numerous acts of sabotage committed by the French resistance *prior* to D-Day against railways transporting supplies to Germany. According to one source, only about 500 of the 9,500 locomotives in the French railroad service were put out of commission by saboteurs, and those 500 locomotives constituted the margin by which French civilian transportation was provided for.[41] The time delays caused by derailments seldom exceeded 13 hours.[42] Highway sabotage was also easily repaired by the Germans with their powerful equipment.[43] These acts of sabotage were of little operational value

because these installations were restored to usability in a matter of hours, and the brief delay did not impede the delivery of food and other goods to Germany. In time of battle similar delays in transportation would have been effective on the tactical level, and indeed were of some value at the time of the Normandy landings.

Sometimes undergrounds can successfully sabotage factories. One such case occurred in June 1944 in Denmark, where a resistance organization, the BOPA, destroyed the Globus radio factory. This factory, located just outside Copenhagen, was making components for the new V–2 rockets. A review of this operation reveals the extent of the planning and preparation that is needed in a sabotage operation of this scope.

(Courtesy of the Norwegian Information Service)

Remains of Shell building in Oslo after being struck by saboteurs in January 1945. The building had served as an oil depot for the Germans. About 200 tons of oil were destroyed in the fire which lasted for several days.

Three months before the raid, BOPA began planning; it received drawings of the Globus buildings and the deployment plan of the German guards from sympathizers in the police department. Several days before the attack, BOPA men, dressed as laborers and operating in full view of passers-by, planted a minefield in the road between the factory and Copenhagen. If necessary, the electronically-controlled mines could be triggered to blow the road and halt any pursuing German guards after the attack. On the day of the attack, over 100 underground members assembled on the outskirts of Copenhagen with knapsacks and bicycles. They could have passed as a cycling club, but in their packs were guns, ammunition, grenades, and mines. The men

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moved to the gardens of homes around the factory, from which they launched their attack. After using grenades and submachineguns to blast through the barbed wire and guards, the saboteurs placed their mines and withdraw to the factory yard where two buses were waiting to carry them quickly from the scene. The subsequent blasts so effectively incapacitated the vital machinery that the BOPA earned a radioed message of congratulations from General Eisenhower's SHAEF headquarters.[44]

Of course, selective sabotage is exercised with caution. Installations in regions which military units associated with the underground expect to occupy within a short time are usually spared, because they may be needed in an advance against the enemy or in production for the antiregime forces.[45]

Tactical Aspects

Explosives

A number of explosives can be used in sabotage, but only a few can be handled easily by underground members. These persons generally are not demolition experts and therefore require explosives that are relatively safe and easy to use. Nitroglycerine is potent but unstable; almost any jarring can cause it to explode. When mixed with sawdust or other absorbent material, making dynamite, it is safer but still very sensitive in warm temperatures. More suitable for use by undergrounds is trinitrotoluene, or TNT, which is so stable that even a piercing bullet might not cause an explosion. To set it off it is necessary to explode an embedded blasting cap of gunpowder. An improved explosive is made by mixing TNT with hexogene; the product is a malleable but equally powerful explosive. Although it is sometimes called cyclonite, or RDX, its popular label is "plastic."

This mixture is ideal for underground use because not only is it stable—it can be stamped upon, cut, frozen, or fried, and it will not explode—but it can also be molded for any use and readily stuck to surfaces, as putty. Like TNT, it must be detonated by a blasting cap, and also like TNT, a one-half pound charge of "plastic" can kill or severely wound a person standing a few feet away.

To have available such a handy explosive is not enough, however; a certain amount of expertise is still needed to use an explosive with maximum effectiveness. Would-be assassins failed in their attempt to kill President De Gaulle in his car on September 8, 1961, because the 66 pounds of "plastic" used were not skillfully tamped into the ground beside the road. As a result, most of the charge did not explode.[46] Detailed instructions in the use of explosives, therefore, are usually needed.

Training of Saboteurs

The problem of training underground saboteurs has been treated in various ways. They have been trained, when possible, by liaison personnel from military units. Manuals, directives, newspapers, leaflets, and even radio broadcasts have been used to disseminate technical instructions to units which do not have the benefit of personal instruction.

One Soviet partisan newspaper, *Red Star*, in World War II instructed readers on the following points: (1) the placement of charges for optimum effect in sabotaging steel or wooden bridges; (2) the best points for sabotaging railway tracks, e.g., at bends or on high embankments; and (3) the alternative ways of sabotaging tracks, e.g., by using explosives or removing rivets from joints.[47] Similar instructions were broadcast in a twice-daily, 10-minute program called "Course for Partisans."[48] and the *Soviet Handbook for Partisans* with detailed instructions was distributed extensively.

The following incident from the French resistance illustrates the practical effect of sabotage instruction. A directive on railway sabotage issued by the French Forces of the Interior departmental chief in Meurthe-et-Moselle instructed sabotage units to avoid breaking tracks before the passing of a train, as such ruptures "were always revealed before an accident was caused." The saboteurs were told "to cause accidents by provoking the break in the rail under the train in motion . . . [and] to place the charges in the curves or against the main switching points: these elements being more difficult to replace than straight rails."[49] According to the department chief, "the result [was] felt immediately. . . . The duration of traffic interruptions [rose] immediately to more than thirteen hours on the average instead of 6 hours and 50 minutes."[50]

Tactical Planning

Effective sabotage missions are generally preceded by a tactical reconnaissance of the target and surrounding area. The specific information sought by this reconnaissance will vary with the choice of targets. In general, however, it will include the exact location of the target and pertinent details such as the structure of a bridge, the number and positioning of guards, the routine of the guards, the paths of access to the targets, the routes of escape, and areas for regrouping in case of dispersal. Before a sabotage mission proceeds to the target, the commander briefs the unit members on the plan of operations. A large raiding party may be divided into three units—one in charge of eliminating the guards and securing the area around the target, one to execute the act of sabotage, and one to stand in reserve.

GENERAL SABOTAGE

The General Plan

An underground may undertake sabotage operations not only to hamper the enemy's war effort but also to encourage the populace to engage in general acts of destruction. Although the latter probably would not have much material effect, they could serve as "a form of propaganda among the population, a stimulant in the fight against the enemy."[51] By inducing people to perform minor acts of sabotage, the underground can weld them more firmly to its cause.

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Tactical Operations

To foster this type of sabotage, undergrounds often instruct the population in the use of certain sabotage techniques. These instructions are usually limited to the use of simple devices which do not require technical skills or elaborate equipment. For arson, the public may be instructed in the use of homemade incendiary grenades, or "Molotov cocktails." According to one member of the Castro movement, "every man, woman, child, or aged person" can make an incendiary grenade by following a few simple steps: fill a glass bottle with gasoline; insert a rag into the bottle so that one end rests on the bottom and the other sticks out of the top to act as a fuse; plug the remaining space in the neck with a cork or some other stopper to prevent the liquid from spilling out. To use the grenade, one lights the fuse, after which he throws the bottle against a target. When the bottle breaks, the spilt gasoline will be ignited by the burning rag, producing the destructive effect.[52]

Fragmentary hand grenades can also be made with little trouble. The source referred to above suggests that an empty evaporated-milk can be used for the casing. After making sure that the can is dry, one begins by placing a dynamite cap on the bottom, and over that, a layer of nails or small iron pieces. The metal bits are tamped and the process is repeated until several layers of dynamite caps and metal bits are built up to the top of the can. A detonator and fuse are then laid on the charge. A wooden or metal lid with a hole for the fuse is then prepared. When this is put in place, with the fuse protruding, the device is ready for use. When the fuse is lighted, it sets off the detonator and the charge.[53]

There are many other easy-to-use devices. Fires may also be started by substituting incendiary solutions for nonvolatile fuels and by deliberately overloading machines. Mechanical interference may be produced by placing emery dust or sand in delicate bearings, or tossing bolts and pieces of scrap into moving mechanisms. Miscellaneous techniques for disrupting transportation include putting sugar into gasoline tanks, strewing nails in roads, blocking roads with stalled trucks and felled trees, and changing signs to misdirect traffic.[54]

In "passive" sabotage, the enemy is hampered when workers fail to lubricate machines, misplace spare parts, slow down production, practice absenteeism, etc. Supposedly, in the spring of 1949 a quarter of a million Italian workers used such methods in the metallurgical industries to cause a 16 percent reduction in output.[55]

ESCAPE AND EVASION

TYPES OF PERSONS GENERALLY AFFECTED

Escape and evasion operations assist the following types of persons to elude the authorities: underground workers whose identity has become known

to the enemy and are being sought; members who are in imminent danger of being exposed, perhaps by captured coworkers; stranded military personnel (e.g., downed airmen, troops stranded behind enemy lines, and escaped POWs); refugees; and couriers.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Escape From the Country

One way to save persons from capture is to send them to a friendly or neutral country. This may be the only effective course if a large number of persons are in danger (as, for example, where the Jews in Nazi-occupied areas), if there are not enough guerrilla units or secret camps to absorb them, or if is impossible to house and feed them in the houses of underground workers. In Norway during World War II inclement weather and barren terrain made guerrilla activities infeasible and precluded the secret establishment of large camps. The only alternative was to take the refugees out of the country, mainly to Sweden.[56]

The direction of out-of-the-country escape and evasion routes is governed by political-military factors. Such routes usually cross borders into friendly (to the underground) or neutral countries where sanctuary is given, and avoid military fronts where enemy patrols and security measures are the heaviest. Since there are no fronts on the borders of neutral countries, egress routes often lead to these countries in time of war. The principal routes in Europe during World War II fit this pattern of operation.

From Denmark and Norway

Most escapees from Denmark were taken to Sweden, departing from the eastern islands, particularly Sjaelland, and traveling in private speedboats, in fishing boats, and as stowaways aboard commercial ferries. Before the fall of 1943, when the Nazi authorities stopped Danish travel to Sweden and initiated the pogrom against the Jews, the relatively few escapees, unassisted by an organization, made the crossing in small boats, even canoes and kayaks. After these Nazi measures were introduced, organizations were immediately formed to help the escapees, most of whom were Jews. Fishermen were co-opted, and the transport of Jews to Sweden began from the small fishing harbors on the east coast nearest to Sweden. Some 6,500 of the 7,000 Jews in Denmark were thus taken to Sweden. Speedboats made direct trips; the slower fishing and cargo vessels sometimes transferred their cargoes in the middle of the sound to boats which came from the Swedish side. Larger vessels in regular service were often diverted at gunpoint to a Swedish port to discharge the escapees, who had been hiding below deck. One cargo vessel had secret compartments which could hide 16 refugees.[57]

Escapees from Norway also found refuge in Sweden, crossing the border on foot at numerous points between the Norwegian cities of Halden and Elverum. During the first years of the Nazi occupation, they had to make

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their own way, but the increase in Nazi terror against the Jews fostered the growth of organized escape operations. Through the effort of an escape network known as the "Spider," 700 of Norway's 1,420 Jews were helped over the border into Sweden.[58]

From France and the Benelux Countries

From these countries, escapees were generally taken south by trains, cars, and on foot to the towns in the foothills of the French Pyrenees—Perpignan, Foix, Toulouse, Saint-Gaudens, Tarbes, and Pau. Thence, for a fee of 50 to 100 francs per person, they were conducted over the mountains into Spain by local French or Basque guides called *passeurs*. Once in Spain, they made their way with forged documents to Portugal or to the southernmost coast of Spain, whence speedboats, fishing boats, or submarines took them to Gibraltar or Algiers.[59] During the first months of the Nazi occupation, before the German coastal watch was tightened, many escaped across the Channel to England in fishing boats or other small craft.[60]

From Eastern Europe

Most Eastern European escapees came from Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece. The major escape route from Poland first led south to the Carpathian Mountains on the Polish-Slovakian border. Then escapees followed mountain paths across German-occupied Slovakia and into Hungarian Slovakia. Until the fall of France in June 1940 and Italy's entry into the war, Poles who escaped to Hungary—which remained neutral until August 1940—were able to board trains and travel openly through Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy into France.[61] The most extensive use of this route was made by Polish soldiers following the collapse of Poland in September 1939, although this particular operation was not carried out by an underground. Approximately 140,000 Polish soldiers reached Hungary this way, and by June 1940 over 100,000 of them had traveled on to France to join the reconstituted Polish Army.[62] Even after this route was curtailed by the extension of the war, some Polish Jews still sought refuge in Hungary, where persecution was less severe than in most other countries under Axis control. It is estimated that nearly 70,000 foreign Jews—from Galicia, Slovakia, Rumania, etc.—sought refuge in Hungary until March 1944,[63] when the Nazis assumed full control of Hungarian affairs.

From Yugoslavia, most escapees were taken out by Mediterranean-based Allied airplanes, which used crude landing strips built by the Yugoslav guerrillas. Probably the most notable episode was the rescue of several Allied airmen who had been sheltered by underground and guerrilla units under the direction of General Mihailovic. Between August 9 and December 27, 1944, the U.S. Air Crew Rescue Unit evacuated from Mihailovic's territory 432 U.S. airmen who had been shot down during the war in various parts of Yugoslavia. They had been found and brought to several concentration points where U.S. aircraft could land. In addition to the 432 U.S. personnel, the Rescue Unit evacuated 4 British airmen, 2 Canadians, 2 Belgians, 30 Russians, and 76 Italians.[64]

The same technique accounted for many escapes from Greece. The August 11, 1943, flight of an RAF C-47 to and from a guerrilla "safe-area" near Neraidha is thought to have been the first Allied flight during the war to use a landing strip built by guerrillas in German-occupied territory. This particular flight picked up 12 passengers for the return trip to Cairo; and by late summer 1943 other landing strips were in operation in Greece.[65]

After the extension of the war in 1940–41, there were relatively few escapees from the Axis-occupied countries of Eastern Europe. Several factors not present in Western Europe to the same degree made out-of-the-country escape operations less feasible: the shortage of trains and cars made travel difficult; the terrain (e.g., the forests of Poland and the mountains of the other occupied countries) made in-country sanctuaries possible; and, except for Turkey, there were no contiguous neutral countries during most of the war.

Secret Lodgings

Couriers and persons facing capture may be hidden in safe-houses—quarters provided by underground sympathizers. Such a place is not necessarily a family's residence, but may be any building controlled by persons friendly to the underground. For example, Algerian doctors working for the FLN sometimes placed evaders in the Algiers Municipal Hospital as patients. Polish Home Army personnel sometimes asked prostitutes to provide secret lodging.

Regular underground workers sometimes allow their homes to be used as secret lodgings, but this compounds the risks already confronting these workers and poses an additional threat to the security of the organization. To avoid this, undergrounds have often preferred to house persons in hiding with sympathizers who know little about the underground's workings, but have consented to do their part for the movement by providing lodging on call.[66]

For a Short Period

Some situations call for only temporary housing. To facilitate the travel of persons along escape routes, undergrounds provide houses where escapees may stop for food, rest, and directions to the next place. The French resistance provided Allied forces with addresses of such places for use by Allied airmen shot down over French territory. Usually directions are given only to the next stop, to prevent the exposure of several safe-houses should an escapee be captured and interrogated.

Temporary lodging may be required also by underground workers who have reason to fear for their safety; there is always a possibility of exposure when an associate is captured and interrogated. In such circumstances, the endangered person goes into hiding until it can be determined whether he has been implicated. The experience of an anti-Nazi underground leader in Germany illustrates this need for safe-houses during periods of danger. On two occasions this leader felt it would be safer for him to stay away from his apartment for several nights: the first time, there was a risk of accidental

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detection because the Gestapo was watching his apartment building for another man; the second time, a good friend of the leader was arrested and there was risk of the leader himself being implicated. Both times the difficulty was where to go. In his words:

> You know that you can't walk in the door of a respectable hotel in Germany without having to fill out the regular police registration. A hotel with a doubtful reputation would be the surest way to be caught in a police raid . . . finding quarters for underground purposes is one of our most perplexing tasks.[67]

For an Extended Period

Persons sought by the authorities may require more or less permanent refuge. This situation arises when other alternatives are closed; that is, when such persons cannot leave the country or take refuge in hidden camps or with guerrilla units. This situation confronted most of the fugitives in the Netherlands during World War II. Escape by sea was effectively sealed by the Germans so that only 150 to 200 Dutchmen were able to leave by this route. There were some railroad lines to Spain via France, but they were not able to cope with the vast numbers. The number of fugitives ran into the hundreds of thousands, and most of them became "*onderduikers*" ("divers") and went into hiding. Because of the country's size, topography, and density of population, it was impracticable to organize large guerrilla bands or collective hiding places. The great majority of "divers," therefore, had to be hidden by relatives, friends, or others willing to run the risks of providing safe-houses.

The risks in providing safe-houses are often considerable. Neighbors may notice and report the evaders. There is also the problem of obtaining forged ration cards, forged identity papers, and even money with which to buy food and other necessities for the "guests."[68] Cover stories must also be devised to explain the presence of lodgers in case of inquiry by neighbors or the authorities.

The risks in providing refuge are greatly increased when a number of people rather than a single person has to be housed. A well-known instance of this was the effort to hide the Frank family altogether as a group in an Amsterdam attic.

In Remote Camps

Given wooded or mountainous terrain, camps may be established to accommodate evaders. Such camps were established by the Dutch in the spring of 1943 in the forests of Limburg and Gelderland; but the problems of feeding the fugitives and maintaining the secrecy of the camps soon led to their abandonment.[69]

With Guerrilla Units

Fugitives may evade capture by joining guerrilla units. Able-bodied persons become fighters or supply carriers. Those who are not able to fight—aged persons, children, and the handicapped—may perform support tasks such as working in small manufacturing shops in the safe-areas.

In Indochina, a shortage of arms and ammunition did not cause the Vietminh to reject able-bodied evaders—they used them in the auxiliary service to transport supplies. The less physically fit could always be taken care of in safe-areas. On the other hand, the French Maquis was forced to turn away many persons because there was often a lack of arms and ammunition and there was no significant support activity in which they could be engaged.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Supplies

An underground attempts to provide all escapees, evaders, and couriers with such necessary documents as birth certificates, identity papers, travel permits, ration cards, and work stamps, so that they may safely pass through police checks. Of course, this cannot always be done when there is a sudden demand for a large number of papers. Groups of Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied areas often failed to receive covering papers because of their quick exit and the lack of adequate collections of forged documents. To prepare for such emergencies, an underground may accumulate large quantities of documents: in 1943 one underground in Germany was in possession of over 5,000 passports.[70]

Besides documents, an underground may give money to travelers for the purchase of tickets and food and clothes for disguises. Habib Bourguiba, then head of the illegal Neo-Destour Party, escaped from Tunisia in 1945 in the clothes of a Berber tribesman. He crossed into Libya and made his way on camelback across the desert to Egypt.[71] An underground also may provide those traveling on foot with compasses, maps, or food.

Counterinfiltration Measures

To guard against the infiltration of the escape and evasion network by enemy security personnel, strangers seeking the assistance of the underground may be subjected to tests. They may be questioned on their background to determine whether there are any discrepancies in their accounts of their places of residence, jobs, friends, and reasons for soliciting aid.

Persons identifying themselves as foreign military personnel can be checked by asking them questions whose answers only genuine nationals of the given country would be likely to know; for example, questions about geographical details, sporting figures, units of measurement. A former member of the French resistance reports that German *agents provocateurs* posing as Allied airmen were sometimes exposed by being asked their weight. An Englishman would reply quickly, but a German would hesitate, trying to convert his weight into stone. The British assisted by providing a detailed list of useful questions.[72]

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Other Security Aspects

Despite precautions, a traveler may find himself in need of help. In such a case, he should appeal to someone who is alone rather than to a group whose members might hesitate to extend aid for fear there might be an enemy collaborator among them. Foreigners traversing an escape route have to cover their accents or inability to speak the country's language in case they are questioned by the police. British airmen downed in France were sometimes given papers certifying them as deaf and dumb or attributing to them some other disability that would account for their silence if questioned.[73] A Polish Home Army courier traveling through Europe as a Frenchman concealed his imperfect French by pretending to have a toothache and mumbling his words.

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CHAPTER 4

COMMUNIST USE OF UNDERGROUNDS IN RESISTANCE AND REVOLUTION

Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03581R000200100001-5

INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes the basic elements of the Communist theory and practice of subversion, and describes the role of Communist undergrounds in (1) German-occupied Soviet territory, (2) the "wars of liberation" in the underdeveloped countries, and (3) the Soviet takeover of Eastern European countries. The chapter concludes with a brief description of the Soviet security and espionage systems and a summary statement of the activities of national Communist parties.

ELEMENTS OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Although many 19th century advocates of revolution had propounded theories concerning the organization of subversive movements, Karl Marx was the first to analyze the historical processes and the political environment in which the Communists would operate, and to evolve his strategy and tactics accordingly. In his theory, modern capitalist society was divided into two major classes: the small bourgeois group, which owned the means of production and exploited the workers, or proletariat, and the latter, who were destined to revolt against the bourgeoisie and set up a society wherein the workers controlled the means of production and enjoyed the full products of their labor. The Communist Party, acting as the "vanguard of the proletariat," would clarify the issues for the masses and guide them toward revolution. Thus, while assuming a certain "class consciousness" and "activism" on the part of the proletariat, Marx carefully stressed the need for skilled cadres. Such cadres would be thoroughly versed in dialectics and trained in revolutionary techniques by which they would develop and channel properly the predominantly dormant revolutionary sentiment of the masses which he assumed to exist in all societies.

From this concept, Nicolai Lenin evolved the theory that the party alone would be capable of making a revolution; that the proletariat was incapable of any meaningful action. Whereas many of his comrades were interested in enrolling large numbers of people in the revolutionary movement, Lenin insisted on confining it to a small, hard core of dedicated militants who could be depended upon to maintain firm discipline and carry out orders precisely. Making a revolution, in other words, was to be the work not of idealistic amateurs but of a realistic elite professionally trained in the skills of subverting a government.[1]

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The Leninist strategy for revolution encompassed three basic phases: organizing party nuclei capable of expanding; employing these nuclei, once they became strong enough, in such centers of power as unions, other political parties, and the *Duma* (the Russian parliament); and the final seizure of power. When his party was in the initial stage, Lenin expounded many precepts designed to increase its efficiency and protect it against governmental interference. The most important of these was the injunction to form both an open party organization and an underground apparatus, which could continue functioning even if the party was declared illegal. When illegal, he stated, the party must seek to obtain control of legal nonparty organizations. This duality of apparatuses was to become a cardinal rule of Communist organization throughout the world. The Communist International obliged all parties, whatever their status, to construct underground organizations.*

The second stage entailed not only infiltrating, "capturing," and manipulating smaller groups, but also finding temporary "allies" with whom to work in larger arenas of power, while trying to gain influence over the masses. Here Lenin cautioned his followers to conceal their party affiliation or, if this was known, to disguise the party's intentions.[2] He also advocated extensive use of propaganda designed to allay the fears of other organizations (including allies) regarding the party's true aims: to divert hostile attention away from the party and toward a common enemy, to create and spread disunity among the other groups and organizations, and to undermine the authority of the government.

Lenin believed that the Soviet Union must do everything possible to further world revolution, and to this end he supervised the founding of the Comintern in 1919. Through this organization, the Soviet Government was able to direct the activities of Communist Parties throughout the world and tailor their policies to suit its own interests. Lenin continued to concentrate on plans for making revolution in the more industrialized countries of Europe, but also became impressed with the political significance of the backward areas. In his *Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism* (1915) he transferred the intranational class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat to the international arena, describing the colonized or underdeveloped nations as the victims of exploiting "imperialist" powers. After the war he stated:

> It is necessary to pursue a policy that will achieve the closest alliance of all the national and colonial Liberation movements with Soviet Russia, the form of this alliance to be determined by the degree of development of a Communist movement among the proletariat of each country, and of the bourgeois Democratic Liberation movement of the workers and peasants in backward countries or among backward nationalities.

These general ideas were subsequently developed by Josef Stalin, who added the concept of Communists being "scavengers of revolutions"—that is,

*In 1936 the Communist Party of Indochina was permitted legal existence by the French Government. Nevertheless, on orders of the Comintern, it still maintained clandestine networks.

capturing control of revolutionary movements started by other groups and by other leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap. Under Stalin, the world Communist movement grew in size and strength. It tended to attract different types of members in different areas, depending on the given society. In the United States, for example, its members were drawn mainly from minority groups and from otherwise insecure people of various economic strata. In Europe communism tended to be identified with workers and trade union interests and leftwing intellectuals. In Asia it attracted nationalists who wished to fight colonialism.[3]

Organizational methods and tactics became highly developed. The concept of the professional revolutionary was maintained, and recruits were subjected to various trials and tests to determine their willingness to devote themselves completely to the movement and their ability to carry out useful tasks. Once accepted, members were given extensive and continuous indoctrination in the theories of Marx, and the theories and strategy developed by Lenin and Stalin. They were also given technical training for specific tasks, such as gathering intelligence, sabotage, and clandestine publication of subversive literature. The dual apparatuses were maintained. The legal parties concentrated on political agitation and propaganda and on the infiltration of such important groups as unions, professional associations, communications media, and even churches. They also organized front groups under names which would have appeal in the given environment; for example, the Thomas Jefferson Club in New York and the "agrarian friendship societies" in Indochina. Although organized to support popular reform, these groups used organizational pressure to exploit issues, government actions, and public opinion which coincided with the interests of international communism.

The clandestine parties followed a system of organization adapted from the overt party structure: they were organized in a hierarchical structure with numerous cells on the bottom and a central committee at the top. While concealing their party affiliation, members held, or tried to attain, positions of some importance in the country. It was mainly these people who collected intelligence on governmental activities, conducted sabotage operations, acted as couriers, and maintained contact with individuals who were cooperating unwittingly with the Communist Party. In countries with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations, an underground party member might serve as a member of the embassy staff protected by diplomatic immunity.

The Kremlin-controlled Comintern not only set the "party line" for the various Communist parties, but also ran training schools for Communists from all nations.[4] Such men as Tito, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi-minh, and Walter Ulbricht received instruction in Moscow not only in organizational methods and tactics but also in means of infiltrating governments and effecting coups d'etat. These trained leaders profited from World War II by attracting patriotic people to a resistance movement, training them for military operations, conducting a logistical and liaison operation, and winning foreign support. After the war these factors were critical in their winning control of the government.

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In selecting the proper moment to launch a revolutionary offensive, Communist leaders were also taught to assess both "objective" and "subjective" factors in making their decision. The former consisted of the overall conditions prevailing in the country—for example, the amount of unemployment, degree of social discontent, degree of political instability and corruption. The subjective conditions included the factors pertinent to the strength of the party itself—the size and quality of its membership, its skill and experience in techniques of subversion and organization for guerrilla warfare, its ability to obtain personal and material support, etc. Given satisfactory conditions in both categories, the leadership could then launch a revolution.

ROLE OF UNDERGROUNDS IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORY

PREWAR FACTORS INFLUENCING RESISTANCE

In creating its anti-German resistance campaign, the Soviet Government was aided appreciably by the existence of several reliable organizations which could constitute a framework for an underground resistance movement. The most important of these was the Communist Party apparat; consisting of a hierarchy of echelons throughout the Soviet Union centrally controlled from Moscow. Supplementing this network were the Komsomol youth organization and the NKVD police force, both of which had chains of command generally paralleling those of the party.

The Soviet leaders were also able to profit from both prerevoluntionary and postrevolutionary party experiences. Clandestine antigovernmental operations during Czarist days and the overthrow of the moderate Kerensky regime had demonstrated that, under certain conditions, a well-directed underground movement comprising disciplined individuals could overthrow a regime by hammering away at its weak points and infiltrating its centers of power. The civil war and the subsequent Allied intervention provided lessons on how to mobilize the populace against a foreign enemy and how to weaken or destroy an occupying force. These experiences influenced the development of Soviet military doctrine, which always emphasized the importance of resistance activities.

Soviet military theorists, before and since World War II, have placed great stress on the "stability of the rear," a concept which they rank alongside such better-known tactical principles as surprise, mobility, and concentration of force. According to Marshal Klementi Voroshilov stability of the rear includes—

> all that constitutes the life and activity of the whole state—social system, politics, economy, the apparatus of production, the degree of organization of the working class, the ideology, science, art, the morale of the people and other things.[5]

The concept of "security of the rear" connotes both the strengthening and securing of the Soviet rear and the simultaneous weakening and undermining of the enemy rear. Stalin noted that as the Germans advanced into Russia they were getting away from their normal rear base, and that by operating in hostile surroundings, they were becoming an increasingly vulnerable target.[6] He welcomed the Western European resistance movements because they further weakened the German rear and helped undermine the entire German military effort.[7]

In operating against the German rear, the Soviets relied mainly upon partisan warfare. This combined large-scale fighting by guerrilla bands in rural areas with political activities was designed to obtain or maintain the allegiance of people in the German-occupied areas. The underground movement, then, was essentially an adjunct to the guerrilla forces in this effort to disrupt the "stability of the German rear."

Although partisan warfare was not a new concept in the Soviet Union, the population and even the party cadres in the German-occupied areas were not sufficiently prepared initially for underground resistance against an occupying power. Years of operating as a ruling elite had caused many older party members to lose the feeling for conspiratorial work, while younger members had never participated directly in clandestine operations. Also, probably because prewar Soviet military doctrine envisaged a future war as an offensive campaign, there was a lack of detailed contingency planning at the regional and local levels.

Early Soviet plans for resistance existed only at the All-Union and Republic levels, and envisioned organizations paralleling the territorial structure of the party and the NKVD. In each *oblast* (region) an "underground secretary," secretly appointed by the party, was to remain and direct the entire partisan effort. A major component of this effort was to be a network of "diversionist" groups, whose most important activities would take place in the urban areas under the direction of remaining NKVD cadres.

On its lowest levels, the resistance network was to consist of groups of three to seven persons trained for sabotage and miscellaneous missions. Members were to continue working at their normal occupations in order to cloak their clandestine activities, and, to ensure security, each member would know only his group leader and the others in his immediate band. In addition to the diversionist groups, a considerable *ad hoc* party network under the direct control of the underground secretary was to carry out sabotage, armed attacks, and propaganda activities.[8]

The diversionist groups were to be supplemented by territorially based *otryad*, or "destruction" groups, which were full-time, overt partisan bands.[9] Theoretically there was to be no organizational connection between the diversionist network and the partisan bands, in order to reduce the risk of discovery. In practice, however, many underground diversionist groups later found it necessary to rely on the partisan bands for assistance and refuge. The partisans were to engage in hit-and-run tactics against small isolated German posts and acts of terrorism against collaborators. They were to avoid any lengthy

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or major engagements with the enemy, and to make no attempts to control any areas through physical presence. The emphasis was to be on stealth and surprise, with the underground members resuming their normal activities after the completion of an operation.

The initial plans for underground and partisan activities, however, were generally swept aside by the swift advance of the German Army during the summer and early fall of 1941. During the winter of 1941–42 the surviving party underground organization led a precarious existence, and concerned itself primarily with self-preservation rather than with actions against the Germans. Nevertheless, its ability to survive at all must not be minimized.

DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERGROUNDS DURING THE WAR

During early 1942, significant changes were made in the Soviet partisan structure which reflected a fundamental reorganization of the entire resistance effort. Instead of remaining a relatively small elite movement based on loyal party members and NKVD agents, the resistance became a mass movement utilizing all available sources of manpower, including peasants, escaped prisoners of war, and soldiers who had been cut off from their units by the German advance. Tasks were assigned to individuals or to groups, not on the basis of their party affiliations or proved political loyalties, but on the basis of their ability to operate effectively behind German lines.[10]

The partisan bands were constantly reorganized into larger units, and were assigned to occupy large rural areas. Since a manpower shortage restricted the physical presence of the German occupation forces to the major towns and road junctions even in regions where the guerrillas were active, the countryside fell under the control of the partisan bands. While the partisans were able to gain control of large regions and to operate with some effectiveness in many "twilight zones," these areas contained only a minority of the population of the occupied territories. Nevertheless, the guerrillas were able to give support and refuge to the underground networks concentrated in the cities, and thus to contribute to their effectiveness.

Both the partisans and the underground networks pursued the dual aims of disrupting the German-oriented local administrations and spreading the idea of Soviet invincibility. The former, by constantly harassing the enemy, were able to demonstrate to the populace that Soviet power was not extinct, and to discourage the development of anti-Soviet movements. The latter, through extensive propaganda and psychological warfare, spread the news of partisan successes and discouraged collaboration. Both partisans and underground workers, in other words, fought political and psychological battles in order to maintain or recapture the political allegiance of the people in the occupied zones.[11]

The urban underground was assigned two main tasks: psychological warfare and intelligence operations. As was previously mentioned, the Communist Party planned originally to leave in the occupied areas an underground

apparatus which could not only harass the enemy, but also conduct such propaganda activities as publishing clandestine newspapers. This party organization was to be aided by the Komsomol, which had an extensive network in the occupied territories. As it turned out, more Komsomol cadres than party members actually remained behind. Therefore, the government made them the nucleus of the urban underground. Literate, physically fit, and highly motivated, the Komsomol members were ideally suited for psychological actions directed at both the Germans and the indigenous population.

Both the partisans and the urban underground employed sabotage, terror, and intimidation. Since the latter group operated in closer contact with occupation forces, collaborators, and large numbers of people, assassination and terrorism became its special domain. (Partisan bands specifically formed for these tasks operated occasionally, and were particularly active during the summer and fall of 1943.) [12] The urban underground also concentrated on infiltrating and subverting German and collaborator organizations. Agents would infiltrate spontaneously when the opportunity arose, or when ordered to do so by a superior, or when recruited by someone already working as an infiltrator. Not only clerks and interpreters but also such officials as police and municipal authorities and chairmen of *kolkhoz* units were recruited.

The crucial task of penetrating and subverting indigenous puppet administrations was given to special agents usually recruited from the party or Komsomol. They were to plan activities designed to cause the breakdown of the local administration, sabotage German reconstruction and rehabilitation work, and discredit collaborators. It was not unusual for agents to infiltrate and capture from within a police or civil organization and thus reduce considerably the efficiency of the German administration.[13]

Agents assigned to intelligence activities sought information on three basic subjects: German operations which might affect the security of local partisan bands; German operations which might affect the Red Army; and political, economic, social and cultural matters. Although some of these agents worked only for the urban underground, the majority were affiliated with local partisan bands. These informants worked as railroad men and hospital staff; others volunteered for jobs as German interpreters, helpers or servants. As agents who came in daily contact with the Germans, they provided the partisan groups with a constant source of information.[14]

In recruiting intelligence agents, a premium was placed on innocent appearance and freedom of movement. Thus women, children, and older people were used extensively.[15] According to one observer, 70 percent of all Soviet intelligence agents working behind German lines were women. Employed as clerks, laundresses, attendants, and translators, they could not only obtain useful information, but also help recruit other agents and guerrilla fighters and perform occasional sabotage missions.[16]

The organization of underground intelligence networks varied considerably in different areas. Each network was under the direction of the local partisan intelligence officer who controlled four types of agents: (1) informants among the population, such as former activists, party members and candidates,

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

Figure 3. Organization of Partisan and Soviet Army Units.

and wives of soldiers, (2) resident agents, (3) agents recruited from groups working for the Germans, (4) information agents recruited from those persons who had special passes and were thus able to move freely between localities.

In view of the risks assumed by full-time informants, only the most active and patriotic citizens volunteered for these activities. There were others who occasionally participated to provide insurance for the future, expecting that the Soviets would eventually reestablish control of the occupied areas. From the

majority of the population, however, the partisan intelligence network could expect only passive neutrality or, at most, timely warning of German operations.[17]

IMPORTANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET UNDERGROUNDS

The undergrounds affiliated with the partisan movement became so important during the war that by 1943 the Kremlin relied almost exclusively on their intelligence networks for information on German activities and the attitudes of the population. The effectiveness of these networks, according to one source, was probably due less to the quality of the agents than to the quantity of intelligence activities and the large amount of *ad hoc*, informal reporting on German activities.[18] As the partisan forces grew in number and the successes of the Red Army presaged a Soviet victory, more and more civilians cooperated in underground activities, including the gathering of intelligence.

Besides its intelligence activities, the underground also performed effectively in psychological warfare. In evaluating their importance in this field, one must remember that the underground networks were employed by the Soviet Government not only to create difficulties for the German occupiers, but also to represent and maintain its own authority over the people in occupied areas. Their help in propaganda operations, purges, psychopolitical operations, and the establishment of governing bodies behind German lines was a valuable asset [19] in maintaining or regaining for the Kremlin the allegiance of the populace. It must be noted that as the Soviet counteroffensive moved westward in 1944, and anti-German activities decreased, the underground networks posed a problem for the Soviet authorities. For although they had on the whole maintained close connections with the party elite and had been staffed by people of known political loyalty—in contrast with the partisans, who had armed large numbers of politically untested men—the undergrounds presented a potential danger to the security of the regime because of the revival of conspiracy and the "legitimization of illegality." The Soviet Government succeeded in destroying this threat by imposing tight party controls over the underground and by disseminating propaganda which stressed that the anti-Fascist resistance activities were a bona fide aspect of Soviet Communist policies.

THE ROLE OF UNDERGROUNDS IN "WARS OF LIBERATION"

In World War I the Russian Communists seized power by organizing strong urban networks and effecting a rapid coup d'etat. The conditions which had permitted the Bolsheviks to enter and control key centers of power, how-

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