HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF TODAY'S UNDERGROUNDS

Today's revolutionary movements in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America and World War II resistance movements against German and Japanese occupying forces are but the latest examples of major world events in which undergrounds have played a critical role. Throughout history undergrounds have been at the base of resistance and revolutionary movements, frequently directing political activities, performing many different kinds of organizational and operational functions, and in most cases supporting overt guerrilla warfare.

During the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century B.C., underground agents in Athens and Sparta tried to subvert the governments of each other's city states. Spartan agents working within democratic institutions of Athens were particularly effective in their propaganda and agitational activities which were designed to create internal dissension and develop popular distrust of the government.

In China it early became common strategy for underground movements to form guerrilla bands and organize support groups among citizens in order to overthrow a local warlord or mandarin. During the T'ang dynasty, in the ninth century A.D., a popular leader named Huang Ch'ao set himself up as a sort of Robin Hood, taking goods from the wealthy and from government officials, distributing them to starving peasants, and organizing the peasants behind him. The underground and guerrilla tactics of this era provided lessons which were absorbed by subsequent revolutionary groups and were ultimately reflected in the actions and writings of Mao Tse-tung.[1]

In Europe during the Middle Ages there were underground movements among underprivileged or persecuted groups. Among these were the *Jacquerie*, a loosely knit organization of beggars and thieves in 13th-century France; the peasant groups in southern Germany; and the clandestine heretical religious sects, such as the Albigensians in southern France.

Underground movements also played a role in numerous dynastic conflicts, such as the "War of the Sicilian Vespers." Around 1280, Charles of Anjou, the French King of the Two Sicilies,* was preparing to invade the Byzantine Empire. The elderly Byzantine Emperor, Michael VIII (Paleologus), anxiously sought by all possible means to prevent Charles from carrying out his plans. Michael was aware of considerable unrest in Sicily which had resulted from Charles' harsh rule and was also aware of the frustrations of Spain's King of Aragon, Pedro III, who asserted claims to Sicily. After a promise of aid from Pedro, Michael's agents aggravated the unrest

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*The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies included southern Italy as well as the island of Sicily.

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among the Sicilian people, and as a result of their underground activities a popular uprising in Sicily resulted in the massacre of eight thousand French troops in 1282. Soon after this, Pedro, pretending to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, changed course to land on the shores of Sicily and help the insurgents against Charles. The War of the Sicilian Vespers* lasted for 20 years and eventually culminated in the Aragonese conquest of Sicily from the Angevins.

The Sicilian spirit of independence, which first manifested itself during the War of the Sicilian Vespers, was to lead to further revolts against a variety of rulers in subsequent years. Though not a political independence movement, the Mafia developed from a group of outlaws who, for pay, protected landed estates, to an extralegal organization which strongly influenced the political activity of the island through economic means. To the present day the Mafia claims to be the spearhead for the true interests of the Sicilian people.

The 14th century also provides some interesting cases of people resisting an outside invader and regaining national independence via movements involving undergrounds. For instance, after the second conquest of Scotland by Edward I of England, a Scottish resistance movement was begun in 1306 by Robert Bruce, a former vassal and ally of Edward. Bruce combined ambush and surprise attacks against English garrisons in Scotland with raids extending into the border regions of northern England. Using these tactics, Bruce had driven the English from most of Scotland by 1314 and was crowned Robert I, King of Scotland. In the same year he defeated the invading army of Edward II, son of Edward I, at the Battle of Bannockburn and thus restored the independence of Scotland.

The Renaissance and Reformation were marked by the development of many groups with the primary goal of plotting political change. Perhaps the most notable of these were the numerous small clandestine groups planning coups throughout the major cities of central and northern Italy during the 15th and 16th centuries. Intrigue and assassination were common weapons in these struggles for wealth and power, aptly described by Machiavelli. The Counter Reformation saw the growth of international movements organized in the name of the Catholic and Protestant faiths, but dedicated to achieving political as well as religious goals. Elaborate intelligence and counterintelligence systems, propaganda campaigns and other forms of political warfare aimed at influencing the rulers of Europe characterized these movements.

New concepts in the 17th century stressing the importance of the individual led to the formation of reform movements which brought about major changes in many countries. The overthrow of Charles I of England, for example, was effected primarily by religious groups which had been forced to meet clandestinely and which turned to political and military action in order to achieve a wide range of political as well as religious reforms. Later, clandestine groups favoring a restoration of the monarchy obtained funds from persons friendly

*The name "Sicilian Vespers" is given to the war because the massacre began at the hour of prayer.

Crown Prince Charles and infiltrated offices of the English Government. In 1660, after years of civil war and interregnum, they brought Charles to the throne.

In the 18th century are two outstanding examples of underground movements which were well-organized and active on a wide variety of fronts. In America the Secret Committee for Correspondence and affiliated groups evolved into an intercolonial movement engaging in large-scale propaganda and other psychological warfare campaigns against the British colonial authorities. They trained militia groups, established friendly contacts abroad, and eventually played a leading role in gaining independence for the 13 colonies.

In France the Revolution of 1789 had its genesis in underground groups. Once in control, the Jacobins organized networks of sympathizers in other countries dedicated to subversion and revolution. The subsequent overthrow of the radical Jacobins was followed by the establishment of the 5-man Directory, which was soon in difficulties both at home and abroad. Disorder was rampant, the financial situation was desperate, discontent was everywhere, and the Republican armies suffered reverses. The government, not knowing which way to turn, swayed one day to the Jacobins, the next to the moderates. Under these circumstances, Gen. Napoleon Bonaparte, with the aid of several political leaders, was able to come to power through a coup d'etat.

Napoleon's conquest gave rise to a series of resistance movements throughout Europe and Latin America. In such notable cases as Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela, armed guerrilla uprisings occurred in the name of restoring or gaining national independence.

The "Spanish Ulcer," as Napoleon termed the war in Spain, was one of the principle factors leading to the defeat of the French Emperor. France invaded Spain, defeated the regular army, and captured the main cities and towns. However, it was not able to control the people living in the rugged Spanish countryside. They organized into small irregular bands and made surprise attacks upon units of the French Army. They were estimated to have taken a total of 100 soldiers a day. This guerrilla war* diverted French military resources badly needed for operations elsewhere. With the aid of English forces in Portugal and Spain, the Spanish guerrillas were able to drive the French from Spain and assist Wellington's forces in defeating Napoleon.

After the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and with the subsequent spread of nationalist aspirations, underground resistance and revolutionary movements became particularly important in effecting political change. Especially noteworthy are the Carbonari and Young Italy movements on the Italian peninsula, which were led by such men as Mazzini and Garibaldi. These men sought not only independence for the Italian states under foreign rule but also the ultimate unification of Italy into one nation.

The Carbonari began during the Napoleonic era as an open resistance movement with cells throughout most of Italy. In 1813, after an abortive insurrection, they were driven underground. Though operating clandestinely, the

*Guerrilla is a Spanish word meaning "little war," or "body of partisans," and it was here that the term guerrilla was first used.

movement managed to enroll nobles, army officers, small landlords, government officials, peasants, and priests. It was not until 1861 that the goals of the movement were achieved.

The Irish nationalist movement, though unsuccessful for many years, attracted considerable attention throughout the 19th century by its constant use of political warfare and terrorist techniques. The Irish movement for independence was certainly one of the most prolonged of its kind, spanning nearly four centuries.

Underground movements throughout the Russian Empire during the late 19th century, many of which employed extensive terrorism, were almost as influential as Marxism itself in shaping Lenin's concepts of party organization and tactics. This was particularly true with regard to the use of terror for obtaining popular compliance with party demands. The Bolshevik revolution was brought about by well-organized underground activity.

World War I was precipitated by the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Bosnian student working with the Black Hand society. This clandestine group, organized in Serbia, financed by the Russian-led Pan-Slav movement, and including among its members several high Serbian officials, was dedicated to liberating Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and organizing them into a Greater Serbia.

From this brief historical overview, it is clear that clandestine organizations are not the product of a particular: political or religious ideology; cultural, ethnic, national, or geographical grouping of persons; structure or form of government; segment of society or social class; or stage of a society's economic or technological development. Also it is clear that undergrounds are not new nor unique to the contemporary world scene, although such an impression is easily created by the pressure of current problems. Underground movements directed toward changes in governing authority have appeared in societal life throughout recorded history.

WHAT IS AN UNDERGROUND?

DEFINITION

Before turning to a closer examination of undergrounds in resistance and revolutions, the term *underground* needs to be defined as it has been used in the past in a wide variety of ways, and as it will be used in this study.

(1) *Underground* has been used synonomously and interchangeably with *resistance*. The various European resistance movements of World War II have been called undergrounds, with no distinction being made between organizations performing guerrilla fighting and those performing clandestine support activities.

(2) *Underground* is frequently used to describe a revolutionary movement in its early stages, as in "Castro's Cuban Underground."

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(3) *Underground* has been used to refer to civilian organizations which support military or guerrilla forces of a resistance or revolutionary movement. In the Malayan insurgency, the revolutionary movement was made up of a military organization (the Malayan Races Liberation Army—MRLA) and a civilian organization (the *Min Yuen*) of which the latter was considered the underground.

(4) *Underground* is used to mean espionage or spy rings. Agents, foreign or indigenous, working for a foreign government in order to provide "intelligence" information about an existing government are called members of an underground.

The word *underground* is also used in the phrase "to go underground," which means to disappear from view, to escape and evade security forces, to work undercover or subversively, or to hide for months or years in order to conceal one's subversive ties so that one may be useful at some later date. *Underground* is also used to describe a secret, concealed, or illegal object such as an "underground press."

Ideally a definition of the term *underground* would include not only what an underground is, but what functions it performs and how it goes about doing its functions. In a real sense, then, this entire study is aimed at completing a full definition of an underground, because the emphasis in the study is on describing the functions and techniques of undergrounds. As a starting point, however, undergrounds are defined for this study as: *Clandestine organizational elements of politico-military movements attempting to illegally weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority.*

DISCUSSION OF DEFINITION

Although undergrounds assume different forms, all are characterized by the following: (1) their goals are illegal under the system within which they exist; (2) their activities may be either legal or illegal, but they use primarily illegal means to achieve their goals; (3) they attempt to conceal the identity of their members and organization from the governing authority.[2]

A political party which exists legally and openly, and whose goals and activities are legal, falls outside of the definition even though it may be working to modify or replace an existing governing authority. Likewise, a secret society which conceals its goals and activities from nonmembers does not constitute an underground so long as both goals and activities are legal. On the other hand, a crime syndicate, although both its goal and activities are illegal and it conceals its identity, is not considered an underground since it typically does not aim at changing existing governing authority. A formerly legal political party which is declared illegal by the governing authority is not an underground even though it continues to exist, unless it then attempts to overthrow the government through clandestine, illegal means.

Clandestine may mean that the existence of the underground is unknown. More often, however, it means that responsibility for actions such as sabotage

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cannot be determined precisely. In this instance, it is known that an underground exists, but its members are unknown to the government. Most underground members conceal their identity by playing normal, legal roles within the society while simultaneously working for a resistance or revolutionary movement. They live at known addresses, work, or appear to work, at legal occupations, and may participate in some legal, nonoccupational activities. This is in contrast to a guerrilla member, who ordinarily leaves his normal social pursuits to take up arms in quasi-military guerrilla units and to live outside the community.

Members of undergrounds are of several different types. Leadership cadres constitute the hard core of the organization; they devote most, if not all, of their effort to the movement and plan their lives around the movement and its needs. They frequently do not play a role in the society, but rather work full time for the movement with the cooperation of other underground members. Active workers are those underground members who, while maintaining their role in society, knowingly and voluntarily perform assigned tasks on a regular basis and attend meetings regularly. Auxiliary, or part-time workers, are those members of the movement who will perform a particular task when called upon, but who are not "regular" for one reason or another. Finally, unorganized sympathizers, who do not join the movement for one reason or another, may help the movement by participating in activities such as passive resistance, or mass demonstrations, or by withholding information from the governing authority.

Politico-military movements are those resistance or revolutionary organizations whose primary strategy of change is centered on disrupting the political and physical (primarily military) mechanisms of the existing government's influence on or control of the people, and on establishing new mechanisms of influence and control by their movement. Excluded by this definition are those organizations who work for societal change, sudden or gradual, in political or physical mechanisms through nonviolent, legal means, such as by changing legislation, long-term education, or even nonviolent persuasion of so-called "pressure groups."

The true goals of politico-military movements may or may not be known or suspected by the government. The goals of the non-Communist anti-Nazi resistance movements were well known. The aims of Communist-led partisans and many Communist front groups, on the other hand, have usually been hidden. The true goals of a movement may even be concealed from some of its members, as was the case with such groups as the Vietminh and Malayan Races Peoples Union, who thought they were struggling for "national liberation." Undergrounds may also employ the services of individuals who know little or nothing of either announced or real goals, but who participate for adventure, mercenary motives, or out of fear or expediency.

The primary means for implementing a movement's strategy is through a combination of political and military actions. The functions and techniques used by undergrounds are developed in the remaining sections of this Chapter and in Chapters 2 and 3. Generally, however, the actions of an underground

may be violent or nonviolent. Some undergrounds restrict themselves to basically nonviolent activities such as the formation of front groups. Most undergrounds plan to work eventually with armed groups and to conduct violent activities themselves. Undergrounds will use whatever political or military means necessary to accomplish their strategic goals of obtaining human and physical resources for the movement and withholding human and physical resources from the government.

A useful distinction can be made between urban and rural undergrounds. The former ordinarily carry the brunt of a politico-military movement's activities in the cities. The latter are concerned more often with support of guerrilla units. Urban undergrounds can be used to relieve governmental pressure on guerrillas (and vice versa). Through mass demonstrations, raids, and sabotage, urban undergrounds can draw security forces to cities. On the other hand, increased guerrilla activities can draw security forces back to rural areas.

Finally, it should be noted that "governing authority" is broadly conceived to include: the representatives of government who control the symbols of government and the instruments of force, the established bureaucracy, and the legally sanctioned institutions and procedures (however they came to be established). It is recognized that attempts to change these may only be efforts to change fundamental ideologies, values, beliefs, and other basic concepts of a "way of life." However, in this study emphasis is on changes in governing authority as defined, whether these changes are sought as ends in themselves or only as means to other ends. The emphasis here is on the mechanisms of influence and control—the symbols and instruments of political control, and the symbols and instruments of military power, whether the government be de facto or de jure.

UNDERGROUNDS IN RESISTANCE

The distinction between resistance and revolution is somewhat artificial; some resistance movements, in fact, evolved into revolutionary movements, as was the case in Yugoslavia, Indochina, Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines after World War II. Nevertheless, this classification does provide a convenient structure within which to describe organizational and operational functions of undergrounds, because these functions do vary as a result of basic differences in aims, in the nature of the enemy faced, and resulting different patterns of development. For example, resistance movements being usually dependent upon some outside power or coalition for aid, or being an auxiliary fighting force to the outside power, need not themselves plan self-contained major actions that will be decisive to the outcome of the total struggle. Revolutionary movements, however, must plan to conduct their own conclusive actions.

RESISTANCE

Resistance has been defined by one authority as "operations directed against an enemy, behind his lines, by discontented elements among the enemy or enemy-occupied population."[3] Such operations are of increasing importance, he states, because the ideological aspects of modern conflicts transcend national boundaries, because modern means of communication and transport make it possible to contact and supply people behind enemy lines, and because total war makes every part of the community a legitimate target for attack. A resistance movement, therefore, is characterized by the fact that in addition to drawing support from the local population, it is likely to receive assistance from some outside source in order to defeat a common enemy. Also, a resistance movement is organized only after a foreign power has taken over the government through a sponsored revolution or invasion.

The goals of resistance movements are directly related to the military power requirements of an occupier. The occupier of an area may generally be said to want the territory for its strategic value, its natural resources, or for the prestige of territorial expansion. More specifically: the acquisition of territory may be required for reasons of position, communication, or transportation; the territory may be on the occupier's frontiers and may be useful in absorbing the shock of a surprise attack, or it may protect the flank of a strategic position; the conquest of territory, or territorial expansion, may add to the prestige and morale of peoples at home and abroad. In all of these, the occupier is necessarily concerned with the resources of the occupied country—human, industrial, and natural. Therefore, his combat power cannot be measured only by the number of troops and amount of firepower in the field; the communication and transport network and the supplies en route and at the source of supply must also be considered. It is these latter components of combat power—the communication, transportation, and supply networks—which are the main targets of the resistance movement. Actions against these targets cause the enemy to suffer in three ways: he has increased difficulties in coordination; he receives less combat materiel for his troops; and he has to use troops needed for combat to protect his resources and lines of supply. In short, the resistance attempts to extract a higher price for occupation than the enemy is willing to pay.

Resistance, of course, can take a variety of forms. It may be characterized primarily by partisan warfare, as in Russia. Or, due to difficulties imposed by terrain, supply, or concentration of enemy troops, the underground may constitute the entire movement, as in Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In still other instances, both guerrillas and the underground may form the basis of resistance, as in Yugoslavia. In all forms, undergrounds can and usually do play a critical role.

UNDERGROUNDS IN RESISTANCE DURING WORLD WAR II

After the German occupation of a large part of Europe and the Japanese occupation of China and Southeast Asia, resistance movements became a way of life for many people in those areas. In the mountains, forests, and swamps of European countries such as Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, and western Russia, partisan bands fought guerrilla wars.[4] In the jungles of Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, small groups of guerrillas harassed the Japanese supply lines and communication centers. In both areas people organized into clandestine groups to provide food and clothing for the guerrillas and to gain information about enemy movements.

(U.S. Army Photograph)

Disbandment ceremony for one group of the Malay Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (December 1945).

In Norway, where the climate was cold and bitter and the mountains lacked cover and the snow provided German security forces with clues for tracking, the resistance took the form of urban underground organizations which carried on sabotage, intelligence work, and passive resistance against the occupier. The flat terrain of Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium made it relatively easy for the Germans to concentrate their forces rapidly and destroy guerrilla bands; therefore, guerrilla warfare was difficult. There were a few scattered groups in the wooded and mountainous areas of Belgium and Czechoslovakia which harassed the Germans.

Although some of the terrain of Poland is suitable for guerrilla warfare, the Poles did not engage in large-scale guerrilla warfare, mainly because of the difficulty of obtaining supplies. Instead, they performed sabotage and diversionary actions and maintained an intelligence network. They also organized a secret "state" with officials who, among other things, ran secret schools and courts. Throughout the war they organized and maintained a secret army

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whose main function was to rise at the defeat of the German Army or collapse of the Nazi regime.[5] In Germany, where security measures were severe and there was popular support for the government, guerrilla warfare was extremely difficult.[6]

In all of these countries, throughout the population centers and the rural areas "resistance" predominantly meant underground resistance. These underground groups in Europe provided the Allies with intelligence, aided special agents dropped into these countries for special assignments, disrupted supply and communication lines, and helped downed Allied fliers to escape. They provided information to the Allies about the disposition of German forces, their movements, capabilities, attitudes, and morale; and also located, described, and mapped targets for Allied and guerrilla attacks. Intelligence was transmitted by radio from occupied Europe to Allied forces in London and Cairo. Undergrounds also performed acts of sabotage, carried on strikes and slowdowns to hinder war production, and engaged in passive resistance to lower the morale of the German soldiers. In order to maintain national morale and identity, they published clandestine newspapers and distributed them throughout the country.

Undergrounds throughout Europe recruited secret armies which emerged during the Allied invasion, took up arms against the Germans and prevented the retreating Germans from demolishing bridges, harbors, and other strategic points. Working behind the German lines, they coordinated their activities with the advancing Allied forces, and also organized provisional governments to maintain law and order until Allied troops arrived.

These resistance groups were composed of all types of people from all walks of life—from political parties, church groups, unions, students, or Boy Scouts. Some groups sprang up spontaneously in various localities after the occupation and eventually organized into large national undergrounds whose leaders attempted to coordinate their activities. Other groups were organized before the war and ... local Communist parties which had been well organized before the war and in some cases were already carrying out subversion. In several countries, such as France and Yugoslavia, Communist-led groups carried a large share of the resistance effort after the Allied invasion. In order to unify disjointed groups into larger, more effective organizations, the Allies dropped liaison officers into these countries to coordinate underground efforts with those of the Allied military forces. In return, the Allies provided the underground with supplies and other forms of aid.

SUMMARY OF UNDERGROUND FUNCTIONS IN RESISTANCE

It is clear that in many cases the underground is the total resistance movement and the functions of the two are identical. In these cases, the underground *clandestinely* performs the following functions, usually with the aid of external supporting powers:

(1) Organizes and controls all resistance activities, coordinating them with external supporting powers;
(2) Performs internal administrative "housekeeping" functions for the resistance movement;
(3) Maintains intelligence and escape and evasion networks for external supporting powers, as well as for the movement itself;
(4) Conducts sabotage, strikes, passive resistance against the transportation, communication, and supply sources and mechanisms of the occupying power;
(5) Conducts psychological operations and other activities among the occupied peoples to win or maintain influence and control over them (e.g., "shadow governments," "governments-in-exile," recruiting a secret army which will "rise up" at a given time).

In resistance cases in which organized guerrilla units can operate, the underground performs the following additional functions:

(6) Coordinates activities with guerrilla units;
(7) Provides intelligence information for guerrilla units;
(8) Provides recruits, shelter, food, clothing, and other supplies for guerrilla units.

UNDERGROUNDS IN REVOLUTION

REVOLUTION

Revolution is frequently used interchangeably with other terms such as rebellion, coup d'etat, insurgency, or insurrection. *Webster's Dictionary*, the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, and various writers on the subject do not agree on a common meaning of the word. Revolution is used usually to refer to any sudden change with far-reaching consequences. Occasionally revolution is used to indicate gradual change that is suddenly recognized as having had far-reaching consequences. Without qualifying adjectives—such as cultural, scientific, economic, industrial, or technological—revolution most frequently means political revolution and it will be so used in this study. More precisely, revolution as used in this study means *the illegal modification, or attempted illegal modification, of an existing governing authority at least partially through the use, or threat of use, of force, by a group of the indigenous people of a nation*.[7]

A revolution may be undertaken for a variety of reasons. A small group of people whose only objective is to be in political power may feel they cannot obtain it through legal means and may therefore seek to gain control of the government through illegal means. A nationalist group within a colony or protectorate may seek to obtain independence, or autonomy as a step toward independence. A foreign power may encourage individuals with whom it is sympathetic to form a group, then assist them in taking over a government.

Role of Undergrounds

The steps usually involved in carrying out a revolution from the top are—

(1) *Organization*. A small clandestine group attempts to recruit people who can secretly influence or actually gain control of top commands in the military.

(2) *Infiltration*. The next task is to infiltrate trusted agents into the army, police, and centers of power such as mass-communications media and power stations.

(3) *Seizure*. A decisive blow is struck to seize the instruments and the symbols of power and finally the bureaucratic apparatus.

(4) *Consolidation*. Consolidation of power and elimination of the opposition are the final steps.

Neutralization of government leaders is critical, for the control of the state does not rest in any impersonal system: "It [control] is the function of men. When men are disposed of, their control also vanishes. There are two ways of neutralizing personalities of the existing regime—they must either be killed or captured."[10] Once the seizure is effected, the group directs propaganda at those segments of the population whose support is needed for them to stay in power. Plans are made to destroy or neutralize opposition elements and to explain the coup to the outside world.

The Egyptian coup d'etat of 1952 followed this pattern very closely.[11] A clandestine group was established within the army and a junta was formed. Strategic posts within the army and the government were infiltrated, and at the proper moment came the following decisive moves:

(1) *Capture of the government leaders*. Cairo was divided into four sectors, and teams of four officers and two enlisted men, each with a jeep and a van, arrested all officials in their sector.

(2) *Separation of government leaders from the instruments of violence*. Small bands surrounded the barracks in Cairo in order to prevent loyal officers from reaching the troops.

(3) *Capture of the means of mobilization*. The Egyptian state broadcasting system, the central telephone exchange, rail stations, airfields, and the army general headquarters were taken; tanks were deployed at strategic points in the city.

(4) *Capture of the symbols of power*. Key government buildings were taken.

(5) *Prevention of foreign intervention*. Officers were sent to the British and United States Embassies to explain that this was an internal affair and that foreign intervention would not be tolerated.

In order to carry out a successful coup d'etat, the instruments of power must be in the hands of small elite groups. Since the number of men who control and operate the government is usually small, their power rests in the will-ingness of the people to be ruled by them and in their ability to rapidly mobilize sufficient instruments of violence to destroy any organized resistance.

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Whatever the motivation, the revolutionary objective is illegal transfer of internal political power.

A number of terms are used to designate different forms of revolutionary activity. A revolution in which a small group of men within the government or its armed forces seizes control of government is generally viewed as a *coup d'etat*. The use of open, organized, and armed resistance in which the inhabitants of an area seek to obtain autonomy or independence but make no attempt to alter or overthrow the central government is a *rebellion*. *Revolutionary warfare* refers to all aspects of revolutionary efforts to displace an existing government by force, and also to the efforts of a *de facto* government to defend itself against such displacement. An *insurrection* is the initial stage of a revolution which is still localized and limited to seeking modifications of government policy and not yet a serious threat to the state or the government in power.

In analyzing political power and the process of revolution, one observer describes two types of illegal transfer of power—revolution from the top and revolution from the bottom.[8] The discussion which follows is based largely on that author's analyses.

In a revolution from the top, or coup d'etat, a small group tries to obtain control of, or to neutralize, the armed forces and other instruments of power, usually with little or no violence. It usually does not seek public support until after the coup has been initiated or has succeeded. Here men in top echelons of government seize the instruments of power, such as mass-communication media, military materiel, transportation facilities, power stations, and finally the symbols of power such as administrative and legislative buildings in the government capital city. On the other hand, revolution from the bottom, which usually involves more violent seizure of power, is largely the result of social disorganization and unrest. A spontaneous mass movement encouraged or directed by an underground group develops slowly in a long revolutionary process that explodes suddenly through a precipitant event. There may be a mixture of these two forms of revolution, as there was in Russia, where a movement from below was combined with a Communist coup from the top.

REVOLUTION FROM THE TOP

In effecting a coup, insurgents typically must cope with three major conditions: (1) the sympathies of the nation's armed forces, (2) the state of public opinion, and (3) the international situation.[9] If any one of these factors is unfavorable and not properly assessed, the coup can fail. If the revolutionaries do not alienate the support of the armed forces from the government, civil war may develop; without public dissatisfaction with the existing government, it is difficult to implement control (and without the support of public opinion, it is difficult for the revolutionaries to maintain control once it is gained); and if international conditions are unfavorable, other nations may step in to protect their own interests.

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REVOLUTION FROM THE BOTTOM

In a revolution from the bottom, the ultimate objectives are the same, but the strategy is quite different. As the rebels do not have access to key governmental or military posts, they must aim to (1) eliminate or neutralize the government's instruments of violence and (2) gain control and the support of the people. In laying their plans, the revolutionaries typically consider several basic factors which can influence the outcome of the struggle.

Environmental Conditions

The size of the country, its terrain and climate, and its geographical position with respect to its neighbors are important. A revolution from the bottom is usually a long, drawn-out war. A large country with extensive isolated areas, such as China, provides an ideal situation for a revolutionary war. (In fighting the Communists, Chiang-Kai-shek's government was forced to spread its troops over huge areas, thereby reducing concentrations in any one place.) The long communication lines necessitated by wide dispersal of troops are vulnerable to attack and this in turn limits the government's ability to mobilize a counterforce rapidly. Rugged terrain, with mountains, forests, or swamps, usually handicaps the government forces, which are generally organized in large units with heavy equipment for larger, external wars; the same terrain is advantageous to the smaller forces of the revolutionaries, usually lightly armed and specially trained for small surprise raids. On the other hand, readily accessible sources of food are crucial for a small force which lives off the land. The better the climate and the more food there is available, the easier it is for a guerrilla force to operate.

Sanctuary

A sanctuary, or safe-area, in the territory of an external power or located in some remote rural area is needed where supplies can be gathered and stored and men trained. The safe-area also provides a place for escape and recuperation beyond the reach of government forces. In countries with large territorial expanses, sanctuary is found in remote, isolated areas. If the country is small, a neutral country, preferably with a common frontier, may provide such refuge.

The sanctuary is used primarily for organizational rather than strategic purposes, and fulfills the same function as the rear for a regular army. It also serves as a political training ground for testing mass appeals and molding mass organizations.[12] Postwar Greece provides an illustration of the importance of the sanctuary: the Communist insurgency collapsed shortly after Yugoslavia closed its borders to the rebels. In Indochina, where the Communists were successful, most of the initial organizing and staging took place in neighboring China, and this is considered to have contributed significantly to the ultimate outcome of the campaign.

Foreign Assistance

A revolutionary movement usually must have outside support in the form of arms, money, and supplies. In seeking this support, the revolutionaries must consider the international situation. Rebels in countries whose locations are of strategic importance to larger, more powerful nations often receive assistance from them.

Having launched a revolution, the leaders typically pay a good deal of attention to foreign reactions, as the incumbent regime usually has allies who may have a vested interest in its maintenance of power. Usually they must decide, for example, whether to announce their aims and affiliations or whether to conceal them in order to neutralize possible opposition from other countries or groups in other countries who have different values.

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

In revolutions from the bottom, most revolutionary movements seem to evolve through five distinct phases. The phases can be identified by the predominant activity being carried on by the movement. It should be recognized that a phase is not completely separate from the others: there is some overlap of its predominant activity into other phases. Neither do the phases have minimum or maximum time-lengths; they will vary from revolution to revolution depending on the successes or failures experienced within phases. Finally, evolution can be uneven within a very large revolutionary movement: in some areas of the nation, the movement may be in one phase, while in other areas it is in a later or earlier phase.

Clandestine Organization Phase

In this phase, clandestine cells typically are established in heavily populated areas, organizations and industries are infiltrated, and cadres are recruited, trained, and tested. Clandestine escape and evasion nets usually are established to provide means of escape in the event that the group's subversive activities are discovered. External support may be secretly solicited in the form of money and often weapons. A base is usually established in a safe-area or sanctuary in order to develop the necessary training schools, create a supply and logistics system, and try out various political and organizational appeals upon the local inhabitants. Once the hard-coreworkers have been recruited and trained, and the skeletal framework of an organization established, the insurgents are ready for more overt actions.

Psychological Offensive Phase

The object of this phase is to bring about the loss of effectiveness of the social and governmental institutions of the country and to create unrest and disorder. Both real and conjured sources of tension and discontent usually are

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exploited such as scarcity of the basic economic necessities of life; social, political, and economic discrimination; lack of adequate housing or education; economic or political dependence on a foreign power; etc. Agitators may lead demonstrations, start riots, and organize strikes. Typically propaganda campaigns are organized and newspapers and slogans are circulated to emphasize, and frequently to create the theme of discontent. Agitators may spread rumors which cast doubt on the government's good faith and administration of justice. They usually spread stories of graft or corruption within the government and armed forces, and of oppression of citizens. They frequently make exorbitant demands for reform which they do not expect will be met. They capitalize on the fact that much of the support for a government is based on the people's confidence in the trustworthiness of its administrators. In most cases, the mere fact that honesty of the officials is questioned is enough to make many people lose confidence in the government. Selective terrorism—threats, intimidation, and assassination—is directed against officials at all levels of government.

Expansion Phase

During the unrest and uncertainty created by its disruptive activities, the movement typically attempts to crystallize public support for a strong organization which can reestablish order. The objective of the expansion phase is to recruit people through mass organizations and to win popular support. United front groups usually are organized. Clandestine cells within various groupings in the country, such as laborers or students, attempt to enlist the support of these groups. Revolutionary movements actively seek malcontents, victims of ill fortune or of social or economic discrimination; adventurers, men without property or family ties, the unemployed, and people with political aspirations. The movement also attempts in this phase to eliminate all opposition; thereby it destroys other alternatives and leaves only one solution to the chaos—popular support of the revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary group must demonstrate continually that it exists and that it is determined to gain control of the government in the name of the people or a large majority of the people. Terrorism is one way of drawing attention to the movement; it usually exaggerates the movement's strength. When the existing government imposes restrictions and controls, the insurgents can use the hardships created by these measures as further ammunition against the government. To prove their determination to rule the country, the insurgents often seek as soon as possible to establish a provisional government. Formal committees" are set up in other countries to lobby on behalf of the revolutionary movement. At that point in time, when the existing government begins to lose popular support and the revolutionary ranks begin to fill, the movement enters the militarization phase.

Militarization Phase

In order to overcome the government's military forces, a guerrilla army is usually formed.[13] Guerrilla fighting is characterized by absence of fixed fronts,

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infiltration, quick concentration of guerrilla forces for action, and their immediate disengagement and dispersal after fighting.

Much guerrilla strategy generally follows the three-stage campaign outlined by Mao Tse-tung.[14] The first stage is termed strategic defense. Since the government forces are usually superior, the guerrillas concentrate on harassment, surprise raids, ambushes, and assassinations; they try to force the government troops to extend their supply lines. Since their primary aim is control of people rather than of territory, they readily trade territory to preserve the guerrilla force.

The second stage is said to begin when the government forces stop their advance and concentrate on holding territory in order to stop guerrilla action. As men, arms, and supplies are acquired, the guerrillas attack larger government forces and installations. Government forces are usually organized in large units, armed with heavy weapons, and prepared to fight conventional wars. The guerrillas are dispersed in small units through widely separated areas. They seek rough terrain, where the mobility of larger government units is minimized, and capitalize on the speed and mobility of their own smaller units. Thus, harassment is used to wear down the government troops while the guerrillas are organizing and building their army. As Mao says, "Our strategy is one against ten and our tactics are ten against one."[15]

The third stage referred to by Mao is the counteroffensive, which begins when the guerrilla army becomes sufficiently well-trained and well-equipped to meet the government forces. The guerrillas seek to create liberated areas and within these areas of control they build up additional military forces. Local militia units are organized and armed. Members work at civilian jobs and fight only when the government forces approach their village. Roving territorial units are created and carry on sabotage, ambush, and intelligence work. These units act as a screen and security force for the regular guerrilla army. They attack government troops, disperse, and reassemble at some preplanned point. Guerrilla members infiltrate government lines and concentrate to attack large government installations. Civilians in villages are organized into groups which form food networks and intelligence nets, manufacture or procure weapons and ammunition, and prepare the battle area with caches of supplies for the guerrilla force.

Consolidation Phase

Throughout the militarization phase the revolutionary movement does not cease its political and economic actions. If the guerrilla force cannot decisively defeat the government's military forces, the drain on the economy and the effect of political pressure by the insurgents are often enough to ensure success. Indochina and Algeria are two cases in which heavy economic costs and political conditions were significant factors in the outcome of the revolutions. Once in control, revolutionaries frequently use instruments of force to eliminate opposition, create new mass organizations, and establish surveillance systems to prevent a counterrevolution.

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SUMMARY OF UNDERGROUND FUNCTIONS IN REVOLUTION

In terms of the revolutionary dynamics of a revolutionary movement just described, all revolutionary functions up to the militarization phase usually are clandestinely performed *within* or by the underground, which—

(1) organizes the revolutionary movement;
(2) controls and coordinates all revolutionary activities;
(3) provides internal administrative functions for the revolutionary movement, such as recruitment, training, indoctrination, finances, logistics, communications, security;
(4) conducts subversion of the existing government's personnel and institutions;
(5) conducts psychological operations, both propaganda and actions (e.g., popular fronts) among the uncommitted people of the nation, and among important foreign nations;
(6) establishes "shadow" governments which are to assume power when the revolutionaries win;
(7) provides intelligence information for the revolutionary movement;
(8) conducts sabotage of sources of government control over the people of the nation, including assassination of political leaders; disruption of economic institutions and processes, communication, transportation, armed forces, police, and militia, and "all those things which make the lot of the people a happier one."
(9) provides escape and evasion networks for members of the movement.

During the militarization phase and thereafter, the underground functions in all of the above ways in "nonliberated" areas—areas in which the existing government has a continuing "presence" in one form or another (e.g., military forces political officials, militia, police) and the underground element continually needs to conceal the identity of its members. In this situation, *roving guerrilla units may conduct their own internal command, organization, and training function, but the underground usually performs all other essential functions for those guerrilla elements.* Only in areas where the government "presence" may be sporadic at best—either because it was driven out or because it never had enough troops to effectively control the area—can the revolutionary movement operate overtly, forming provisional governments and controlling the people. The concept of an underground is inappropriate in such a situation, because the people can openly provide food, clothing, shelter, and supplies.

In the consolidation phase, when the underground emerges into overt identification with the new revolutionary government, the government may continue to maintain underground elements to perform counterrevolutionary functions.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERGROUNDS

It is apparent from the preceding two sections that undergrounds are as important, if not more so, as guerrilla elements to the success or failure of

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resistance or revolutionary movements—if on no other basis than the sheer number of functions performed. But such an assessment of the significance of undergrounds is supported by historical accounts as well. Resistance and revolutionary movements have sometimes succeeded with little decisive assistance from guerrilla troops (e.g., Cuba) and have sometimes failed not so much from defeat of the guerrillas as from successful operations against the underground itself (e.g., Malaya, Philippines). On the basis of the functional analysis and the historical accounts, a number of observations can be made which may account for the strength and significance of undergrounds, whether in a resistance or revolutionary situation.

(1) Because the underground is part of the community and sustains itself from normal sources, there are no geographic restrictions on its operations comparable to those which limit guerrilla operations. Both resistance and revolutionary underground operations can be successfully conducted under a wide variety of rural and urban conditions.

(2) The variety of personnel in an underground movement is the source of a second significance. Because it chooses members from all parts of the population, an underground has direct access to more varied support than the government which it opposes. This direct access to the people is less important in resistance than in revolutionary situations, because the resistance underground is operating against an occupying power whose claim to govern is based on military conquest and whose governing is accomplished chiefly by the use, actual or threatened, of military coercion. A revolutionary underground, on the other hand, is operating against an indigenous government which claims to govern on its legitimacy, which is based ultimately on the cooperation and loyalty of a significant part of the people governed. With this legitimacy as a primary target, the revolutionary underground has, obviously, a critical advantage in its broadly based membership. And given "real" and widespread sources of discontent in a population or an indigenous government whose governing relies more on physical coercion than on legitimacy, broadly based membership facilitates efficient, effective organization and operations.

(3) The clandestine nature of an underground, whether resistance or revolutionary, contributes to its significance. For the individual, membership in an underground does not always require an open, irreversible commitment, while it does give the individual the satisfaction of participating in something of general importance. For the underground, then, the clandestine character of its organization enlarges and to some extent facilitates recruitment.

(4) In considering underground functions vis-à-vis guerrilla operations one should not be misled by the more dramatic nature of guerrilla action. Characteristically guerrilla elements emerge only after undergrounds have prepared the way and, when formed, guerrilla troops are almost wholly dependent for their support on an active underground. The number of guerrillas is typically much smaller than the number of underground members. When a government has destroyed a few guerrilla bands, it has by no means destroyed the underground movement whose clandestine cells in every community can carry on the struggle.

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It is also critical, when assessing the significance of undergrounds, to examine resistance and revolutionary movements in terms of the international context in which they occur.

A resistance underground operates in a time when there is an overt international military conflict and in the situation in which one country has already occupied another militarily. The major decisive struggles, on which the success or failure of the resistance movement ultimately depends, is being waged primarily by military means of parties other than the members of the resistance movement.

The usefulness of resistance movements as an aid to conventional forces in World War II was attested to by Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery who referred to the large number of enemy divisions "tied down" by European resistance movements.[16] And support or nonsupport of a particular resistance movement can significantly affect the length of a military campaign and the future of a postwar political situation. Thus, while resistance movements may be important strategically in "hot" international conflict, they may not be decisive, and the contending parties can treat resistance movements (and their undergrounds) as of secondary or ancillary importance.*

A revolutionary underground, on the other hand, usually operates in a situation when there is no "hot" international conflict and in situations in which contending parties are indigenous—in short, in an internal war. There is no other more decisive military struggle on which the outcome of the internal war depends. Rather, the revolution itself is the major and ultimate arena of conflict for the people directly involved. When other nations become interested, such as in a "cold war" international conflict, by identifying their own interests with the success or failure of various revolutionary movements and heavily supporting "their" side with political, social, economic, military resources, the outcome of each revolutionary situation is primary and decisive for the international conflicts. Provided such internal conflicts do not escalate to overt international military conflict, the cumulative successes or failures of revolutionary movements represent the ultimate yardstick of victory in a cold war international conflict, and the contending parties *cannot* treat the revolutionary movements (particularly their undergrounds) as of secondary or ancillary importance.

The implications of this assessment of the strategic importance of undergrounds are manifold in terms of the problems faced by internal security forces tempting to counter undergrounds in a revolutionary situation.

Indiscriminate use of internal security measures can alienate the uncommitted, or even those who support the government; for every underground worker eliminated, two more may be created. On the other hand governmental moves increasing the freedom of the people also increase the opportunity for underground members to perform their functions. Major military weapons

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*This conclusion applies to conventional forms of war, perhaps even wars in which tactical atomic weapons might be used if such wars could occur without escalating to all-out nuclear warfare. In all-out nuclear war the conclusion might not be applicable. In such a situation, it has been argued, resistance movements might be the key to survival, if not victory.[17]

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systems—missiles, artillery, bombers, fighter planes—are relatively ineffective against an unidentified enemy subverting persons within one's own camp or influencing people within the town one is committed to help to survive.

Internal security forces are forced to develop and use countermeasures which strike some required balance between physical coercion and political persuasion. The countermeasures must at once (1) protect the people and the instruments of political control against the coercive and destructive actions of the undergrounds and (2) perform a substantial role in positively influencing the people to support the existing government's claim to legitimacy as a governing authority.

FOOTNOTES

1. See S. Y. Teng, *The Nien Army and Their Guerrilla Warfare 1851–1868* (Paris, La Haye: Mouton and Co., 1961), p. 193. The tactics of the Chinese Communists in guerrilla warfare are compared with the tactics of Nien, and the author concludes that Mao Tse-tung's strategy is based on previous Chinese guerrilla movements, not on Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

2. For a discussion of the legal status of unconventional forces see Phillip M. Thienel, *The Legal Status of Participants in Unconventional Warfare* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, December 1961). The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the "Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War" extends prisoner-of-war status to guerrillas in an organized resistance and in a civil war if they are declared belligerents and if they (1) are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (3) carry arms openly, (4) conduct operations within the laws and customs of war. Underground members would not meet these requirements. Hence the occupier could impose the death penalty on a civilian if the person is guilty of espionage, or performs serious acts of sabotage against the occupier, or intentionally causes the death of one or more persons.

3. Julian Amery, "Of Resistance," *In the Nineteenth Century and After*, LXLV (1949), 138–149.

4. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961). The author discusses World War II resistance movements in Eastern Europe. See also Ronald Seth, *The Undaunted: The Story of the Resistance in Western Europe* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), for a discussion of resistance movements in Western Europe. See also Arnold and Veronica Toynbee (eds.), *Hitler's Europe* (*Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946*), (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), for a discussion of the German occupation policy and European resistance efforts.

5. T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1943), Passim.

6. See Jon B. Jansen and Stefan Weyl, *The Silent War* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1943), for a discussion of the anti-Nazi underground.

7. Paul A. Jureidini, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1962). This study discusses several definitions of revolutions and insurgency and offers some new definitions. The report presents a systematic summary of 23 revolutions from World War I to the present and describes the historical background, environmental conditions, leaders, organizations, techniques, and outcomes of the various revolutions.

8. See Feliks Gross, *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958).

9. Donald J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), p. 209.

10. Ibid, p. 225.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERGROUND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

11. See Gross, *The Seizure*, for an analysis of the coup, and K. Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), for a more detailed account.

12. Otto Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 44.

13. There are many sources for discussion on the principles of guerrilla warfare. See Hope Miller and William Lybrand, *A Selected Bibliography on Unconventional Warfare* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1961). Standard Communist sources are *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1954), a discussion of the Chinese Communist strategy and tactics; Vo Nguyen Giap, *The War of Liberation and the Popular Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), a discussion of guerrilla activities in Indochina; and Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington: Command Publications, 1961). A useful source is Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare*, for a discussion of guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.), *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), presents a collection of papers on guerrilla warfare and counterguerrilla procedures and policies.

14. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Protracted War," *Selected Works*, Volume II.

15. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, Volume I.

16. David Lampe, *Danish Resistance* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957), pp. 28–31; also F. O. Miksche, *Secret Forces* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1950), p. 141.

17. F. A. Gleason, "Unconventional Forces—The Commanders' Untapped Resources," *Military Review*, 39 (1959), 25–33. The author describes how resistance forces can be used and the kinds of activities which they can perform which are of value to a military command. See also G. T. Metcalf, "Offensive Partisan Warfare," *Military Review*, 32 (1952), 53–61, for a discussion of the use of partisans in future wars.

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INTRODUCTION

The underground must develop an effective organization in order to carry out its operational missions. An effective organization in turn requires the underground to perform certain essential "housekeeping" administrative functions. Over the years many and varied techniques have been devised for performing both administrative and operational functions. In discussing these functions in this chapter and the next, an attempt has been made to establish the major problems likely to be faced by most undergrounds and to describe alternate ways in which the problems have been handled.

It should be recognized that usually there is no one best way to accomplish a given function. The choice and effectiveness of a given technique depends largely upon the countermeasures used by the security force. As undergrounds adopt certain practices, the security forces invariably develop countermeasures that destroy the effectiveness of these practices. Consequently, both governments and undergrounds are constantly changing techniques and developing new ones.

The use of techniques is also governed by the resources available to the underground. Although sophisticated communications techniques such as "spurt" radio transmission (messages are electronically condensed and transmitted in a very short time interval) and microphotography are sometimes used by espionage rings, undergrounds generally use simpler techniques. In Angola, for example, the nationalist underground has relied upon tribal drums for communications. Diplomatic and intelligence services use complicated, mechanical ciphers to conceal the meaning of messages; undergrounds, on the other hand, rely upon a courier's memory or the use of special jargon to hide message content. Whether a simple or complicated device is used, the ultimate criterion is whether or not it works. Since undergrounds usually have limited means, in this chapter—and the next—the simpler, easy-to-use techniques are presented for each function and, where possible, alternate ways of accomplishing the function are described.

ORGANIZATION

There is no single organizational structure which is the best for an underground under all conditions. There are a number of major factors which must be considered by those responsible for organizing the underground, and on the basis of this consideration, an organizational pattern is used which will best provide for successful accomplishment of underground functions. The four major factors which must be considered are discussed next, after which, patterns of organization that reflect critical organizational principles are de-

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scribed. (The case histories in Part II illustrate various specific organizational structures.)

FACTORS DETERMINING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Predominant Strategy

As indicated in the previous chapter, resistance and revolutionary movements operate on both political and military fronts. The choice of which front an underground will emphasize depends on the likelihood of success in one area rather than another and on unexpected events which compel the underground to revise its predominant strategy. It may be that underground infiltration of key positions in both the government and the military is blocked, as is usually the case in resistance situations and often the case in revolutionary ones. With seizure of the instruments of control impossible, the underground chooses the predominantly political strategy of trying to weaken the government's effectiveness by sabotage and by subverting the people's support of the government.

An underground may shift from a predominantly political strategy to one predominantly military because it is losing popular political support. The leaders may feel that unless they act immediately and aggressively they may lose their last opportunity to seize power. In the Philippines, the Communists were restrained from continuing their activities on the political front when they were denied access to seats in the legislature. To offset the drop in popular support created by this curtailment of their activities, they consequently turned to military action. Also, popular sentiment against the existing government may be so strong that the leadership may feel that they can use this popular discontent so quickly seize power, as the Communists in Greece believed after World War II.

Once having decided to shift primary emphasis from either the political or military front to the other, the entire underground may require major reorganization. General Vo Nguyen Giap reports that in Indochina the transition from political to armed struggle caused a great change in the principles of organization and work.[1] In Malaya, the strategy shifted from political efforts, through the organization of united fronts and infiltration of unions, to the militarization phase of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. After this failed, they turned back to political activity. With each shift in strategy, various organizational units had to be either organized, disbanded, or reorganized, all at no small cost to the movement. These included: escape and evasion nets for both guerrillas and underground; intelligence nets in urban areas, as well as throughout the countryside; secret supply depots and supply routes; and recruiting teams for both underground and military units.

The expected duration of the underground also has a very important effect upon its organization and its activities. Movements which are organized for a very short period of time usually do not have a complex organization, elab-

orate security procedures, or selective membership (excluding the coup d'etat type revolution). Underground movements which expect to exist for several years usually develop more complicated organizations and undertake a wider range of activities.

The important point is that different predominant strategies will give different emphases to different underground functions, and performance of these different functions, in turn, requires different organizational structures.

Origins and Leadership

In periods of political unrest, or after a country has been invaded, it is extremely risky to attempt to form a completely new clandestine organization. Consequently, undergrounds usually develop within existing social, political, or military organizations. The underground organizer usually must rely upon past friendship so that he will not be betrayed and upon the informal communication channels of organizations with which he is familiar. As a result, many undergrounds have emerged from outlawed political parties or disbanded military organizations. In these cases, they are usually constructed along previous organizational lines.

Historically, the organizational character of the underground movement has differed according to whether the movement has its beginning in political or military organizations and whether it was led by a political or military leader.[2] Organizations controlled by politicians are frequently found in revolutionary warfare. Also, many of the European underground organizations of World War II developed from prewar political parties and were directed by political leaders. Consequently, the organization reflected the influence of the political leader.

On the other hand, although many resistance groups may organize spontaneously, national groups are usually sponsored and supported by external conventional military forces. Since it is usually through this military assistance that the movement gains its stature, the choice of underground leaders is influenced by their knowledge of strategy, tactics, and military affairs, and their activities are oriented toward providing aid to conventional forces. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Allied Forces withdrew support from Mihailovic and recognized and supported Tito because they felt he was carrying on aggressive action against the Germans and would thereby be of greater assistance to the military mission. This support, both political and military, greatly affected the growth and expansion of the partisan organization.

Some movements have both political and military leaders who function independently of each other. In this form of organization, the underground operates politically in the populated areas, while the guerrilla forces are led by a military man in the rural areas. This occurred in the anti-Fascist resistance in Italy during World War II and in Morocco during the fight for independence (1953-55).

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Types of Organization

Organizational structure varies with the organizational theories of the resistance or the revolutionary leaders.

Mass Organization

The assumption is made that a large number of people are necessary to overcome the power of the governing authority and its instruments of force. This type of organization was advocated by the Mensheviks in the Russian revolution. Membership is open to anyone who wishes to join and the objective is to recruit as many people as possible. One disadvantage of this organizational structure is the loose security measures associated with it. The members are usually not practiced in security precautions and the identity of underground members is easily obtained through loose talk and careless, overt actions. However, organizations of this type have managed to minimize the threat of informers primarily through the public sympathy for the movement and through the use of terrorism.[3] In the early days of the OAS in Algeria, Gen. Raoul Salan moved about openly, even while the French Government was seeking him and had posted a reward for him; the populace was terrorized into remaining silent. Another disadvantage of this type of organizational structure is in its command and control structure. It is difficult to obtain concerted action against the governing authority, usually due to the lack of training and discipline of members.

Elite Organization

The theory here is that a small elite organization can make up in skill and discipline what it lacks in size and that at the proper moment, a small militant group can accomplish more in one blow than a large mass organization can accomplish over a prolonged period of time. The membership in a movement such as this is small and each individual is carefully screened and tested before he is permitted to join. Once a member, he is subjected to intensive training and discipline to develop the skills necessary for clandestine work. This type of organization usually works toward a coup d'etat, or a revolution from the top. In a police state, where the mechanisms of internal security are extensive, this is the most common form of underground. An elite organization generally must have some condition of internal confusion, such as the assassination of the head of state or rivalry between several major political factions, before it can strike with any hope of winning. The disadvantage of this type of organization is that it must remain relatively inactive while waiting for the proper moment, and inactivity usually works against a movement because its members may lose their enthusiasm.

Elite-Front Organization

The Communists usually work from this type of organizational theory. Recruitment is very selective and the party itself does not expand rapidly. Instead, a "front" organization is created or an existing organization is in-

filtrated which claims to seek some popular objective such as liberation or independence. Within the front movement, military and civilian organizations are established. Since the Communists organize these groups, they are usually in leadership positions. If the movement fails, the Communist underground is not damaged either organizationally or by reputation since it is the front group and not the Communists who lose the insurgency. On the other hand, if they are successful, the Communists are in firm control of the revoluntionary organization.

Conflicting Needs of Security and Expansion

An underground operates in a hostile environment in which government forces attempt to seek it out and destroy it. In order to survive, and at the same time achieve its ultimate objectives, an underground must adapt to two major factors, government countermeasures and its own successes and failures.

Changes in the organization and its size are dependent upon the effectiveness and size of the government security forces. As the government becomes more effective, the underground must emphasize security—and this usually means smaller and fewer organizational units.

An underground may, after a few spectacular successes, find itself deluged with new recruits. If it fails to expand its organization quickly by relaxing security measures, it may pass up an opportunity to seize power and attain its objectives. On the other hand, if it recruits unreliable persons, a serious security leak may enable the security forces to destroy the entire organization. Also, rapid expansion may provide government security forces with the opportunity to infiltrate the underground.

Thus, underground's face a dilemma of conflicting goals. In order to achieve their objectives, they must be expansive and aggressive. In order to survive, they must take precautions and prize security. Organizational patterns and size must be juggled so as to achieve an optimum balance between the need to expand and the need to maintain security.

Summary

In summary, the following major factors affect an underground's organizational structure:

(1) Predominant strategy of the resistance or revolutionary movement, which in turn is determined by—
  (a) Access to positions in the government and the military;
  (b) Popular support;
  (c) Expected duration of movement;
(2) Organizational antecedents and types of leaders;
(3) Size and membership of movement according to prevailing revolutionary theory or doctrine;
(4) The conflicting needs of security and expansion.

Strategy, Tactics, and Countermeasures

PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION

Command and Control

To be effective an underground needs concerted action. Unless it can establish a centralized command, an underground's activities occur in a haphazard manner and may lose much of their cumulative effect (e.g., units may attack the same targets and draw government attention to each other). However, for security reasons, decentralization of activities is most desirable. Therefore, a compromise must be achieved.[4]

Since a command echelon cannot direct each subordinate unit, it must rely on mission orders; that is, the central command issues orders describing the tactical objective and recommends activities that it believes can best accomplish the objective. Each of the subordinate units, which must place a premium on survival, can devise its own plan for carrying out the orders. Consequently, the subordinate units usually have the authority to make independent decisions on local issues, and to operate autonomously with only general direction and guidance from the centralized command. When special assignments are given, the central command may send a special representative to the subordinate underground unit to supervise the task directly. In this case, the special representative, being responsible to the central command, is usually placed in charge of the unit.

The central command may not know precisely how many members belong to the subordinate units of the organization. It may test the strength of the organization by calling demonstrations, strikes, or other trial actions. This provides the central command with some estimate of underground strength and ability to react without jeopardizing the identity of its members. It can also determine the length of time necessary to mobilize its units through the clandestine communications net, the approximate number who can be reached, and finally the ultimate number who participate.

The underground usually specifies in great detail the transfer of authority as well as the procedure for reestablishing the chain of command in case a leader is captured. This is to ensure that the capture of an important leader will not necessarily lead to the collapse of the organization or an interruption of its activities.

Centralization of Administrative Functions

Undergrounds which function for a prolonged period of time generally centralize many activities in the central command so that subordinate units may receive services which they could not ordinarily provide for themselves. Such activities as the production of false documents, the collection of funds, the purchase of supplies, analysis of intelligence information, and security checks on new recruits may be better performed by a central agency. These centralized activities can best be performed outside of the country, in areas in which government security measures are lax, or in a place of sanctuary. Here

members can meet openly and discuss plans and procedures without fear of being captured or of having records fall into the hands of the security forces. In Algeria, the internal command was buttressed by an external political-military command which was usually in Tunisia. In the Philippines, the Communists had not only an internal underground command, the "politburo-in" (in Manila), but a "politburo-out," safely located in guerrilla-held territory where much of the collating of intelligence and planning took place. During World War II, much of this centralized activity was conducted for European governments by the governments-in-exile which were located in England.

Decentralization of Units

The basic underground unit is the cell. The cell usually has from three to seven members, one of whom is appointed cell leader and is responsible for making assignments and checking to see that they are carried out. As the underground recruits more and more people, the cells are not expanded—rather, new cells are created.[5]

The cell may be composed of persons who live in a particular vicinity or who work in the same occupation. Often, however, the individual members do not know the place of residence or the real names of their fellow members, and they meet only at prearranged times.[6] If the cell operates as an intelligence unit, its members may never come in contact with each other. The agent usually gathers information and transmits it to the cell leader through a courier or maildrop.* The cell leader may have several agents, but the agents never contact each other and only contact the cell leader through intermediaries.[7] Lateral communications and coordination with other cells or with guerrilla forces are also carried out in this manner. In this way, if one unit is compromised, its members cannot inform on their superiors or other lateral units.

To reduce the possibility of discovery of its members, the underground disperses its cells over widely separated geographic areas and groups. This extends the government security forces so that they cannot concentrate on any single area or group. For example, the underground attempts to gain as wide a representation as possible among various ethnic and interest groups. The Malayan Communist Party was easy prey for security forces partly because it was almost entirely composed of indigenous Chinese. The OAS in Algeria was composed of Europeans who numbered only one out of every 10 inhabitants. Even more crucial for the OAS, it was centered in three cities, thus allowing the French to concentrate their forces. The FLN, on the other hand, was made up of Muslims, who constituted 90 percent of the population and were distributed throughout the country.

An underground is usually organized into territorial units. The size of the units depends on the density of the population and the number in the underground. Each territorial unit is subdivided into districts and finally into cells. Within each of these geographical districts, and on each level of organi-

*A maildrop is a place where a message may be left by one person to be picked up later by another.

COMMUNICATIONS

Critical messages, such as emergency warnings to other units, must get through with speed and certainty. Therefore, undergrounds use parallel communication nets—that is, an important message is sent by two routes in order to ensure delivery. For less vital messages, the underground uses a back-up system: the message is sent, and without immediate confirmation that the message arrived, another message is sent through another channel. In all clandestine operations, acknowledgment of the receipt of a message is crucial. If positive confirmation is not received, or if there is considerable delay, the underground must assume for security reasons that the message has been intercepted and that the network may be compromised. Here again the fail-safe principle is applied. If a message is believed to have been intercepted, members who are most susceptible to compromise either prepare cover activities or proceed to some safe-house and await events to determine whether the ring has been compromised and whether it is necessary for them to use an escape and evasion net.

Parallel communications are important because it takes considerable time to set up a communication net in a hostile environment. Every effort is made to have alternative means of communication available in case there should be a breakdown in any one channel. In Malaya, the Communist Party was forced to rely entirely on runners to deliver messages and this constituted one of its major handicaps. A message may go to one address, be picked up by a courier and delivered to another place, and thence be delivered by another courier to the recipient. In this way the message moves through a chain-like system of maildrops. Obviously, for routine messages, it is advisable to use maildrops or couriers since they ensure the security of the various units. Emergencies may require that the message be sent directly by courier or by radio.

RECRUITMENT

Techniques of recruitment vary with the stage of underground development. In the clandestine organization stage, recruiting is on a highly selective basis with an emphasis on security. After leaders and cadres are trained, however, recruitment takes on the character of mass enrollment. In the early stages, a great deal of emphasis is placed upon the abilities and reliability of the recruit, since these men will eventually be the leaders of the movement and will possess important organizational information. During the mass recruitment stages, the underground enlists the support of the entire populace in order to obtain sufficient numbers to overcome the security forces. Mass recruitment techniques place more emphasis on active support than on security.

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Figure 2. Intelligence Network.

tion, different functions and groups responsible for those functions are represented. In addition, undergrounds have found it convenient to organize units within existing occupational activities such as railroad workers unions. Thus the underground is organized by territorial units, such as state, county, city, and cell, as well as by professional and occupational groups which transcend traditional boundaries.

The underground organization and many of its activities are based upon a "fail-safe" principle, that is, it is organized so that if one element fails, the consequences on the total organization will be minimal. Almost all clandestine organizations which are susceptible to compromise by security forces have parallel organizational units and networks of units. In every case the underground attempts to have a back-up unit which can perform the same duties as the primary unit if the latter is compromised. It usually takes a long time to establish a unit or net, and the underground must plan for contingencies such as the compromise of the primary unit or increased government security measures. Thus, the organizational expansion of undergrounds is usually in a lateral direction by duplicating units and functions. The decentralization extends to all functions. The underground usually does not jeopardize intelligence units by demanding that they perform sabotage as well, for sabotage operations may draw attention to individuals and compromise their usefulness as intelligence agents.

Administrative Functions

competencies.[10] · To obtain food for refugees or guerrillas, an underground may establish contact with some food distributor. Recruits from the police force aid in the escape of imprisoned underground personnel, and provide needed passes and documents. Also, trucks and drivers are sometimes needed to carry underground personnel on raids and to transport food and arms to friendly military forces.

MECHANICS OF THE APPROACH

Selecting Reliable Recruits

The Use of Friends

Naturally, only persons whose apparent attitudes indicate they will be loyal to the movement are contacted for recruitment. This leads to the frequent use of members' friends as a source of recruits, since much is already known about their views. Such individuals are not likely to inform on friends in the organization who try to recruit them. Friends are particularly useful when quick recruitment is needed and there is not enough time to appraise and check other prospects. British citizens who had spent time in France were often sent to that country by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to establish resistance cells among former acquaintances.[11]

Many friends, however, would not be willing to join, perhaps because of family commitments. A member may attempt to determine whether his friends are available before revealing his subversive interests, thus concealing his underground connections from as many outsiders as possible. The tactic used by an underground organizer in Nazi Germany illustrates this point. Werner Michaelis had been expelled in 1933 from his job as leader of a mining union local, for being politically unreliable. In 1934 he began systematically to look up all his old friends in the district. He would casually drop in on them, and if he noticed that a former acquaintance seemed nervous, he would explain that he was looking for a job, drink a cup of coffee, and go. But if he got the feeling that his host had remained loyal to the movement, he would stay and ask the person to join a political discussion group. In this way, Michaelis established a network of likely underground workers without prematurely revealing his illegal motives.[12]

Not all friends willing to join are suitable for recruitment. Those who are politicians, labor leaders, newspaper editors and reporters, professors, student leaders, or religious leaders in known opposition to the government are sometimes avoided, since they may be under police surveillance. In Germany, immediately after the Nazi takeover, an underground organizer who was a member of the Communist Party avoided contacts with party leaders. He knew that the Gestapo was making frequent arrests of central committee members, and the only party people that he approached were functionaries and members of the party with lesser-known backgrounds.[13]

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Strategy, Tactics, and Countermeasures

SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT

For many tasks, no qualifications beyond a certain degree of intelligence, emotional stability, and reliability are required of recruits. Some activities, however, call for special qualifications.

Leadership Tasks

In recruiting for leadership positions, an underground seeks persons who possess what one former underground leader termed "ability and talent in handling people."5 Of course, this is especially important in an underground since units are usually operationally autonomous and depend heavily upon their leaders to give tactical direction, enforce discipline, and sustain morale. Sometimes these persons are recruited from the ranks of national or local leaders in various occupations, since they already have proved leadership abilities as well as influence. An example of this type of recruitment was seen in Algeria, where the Arab *Organisation Secrète* directed part of its first recruitment effort at Arab tribal chieftains. Similarly, the underground might recruit politicians, labor organizers, priests, etc., as leaders.

Intelligence Tasks

Some intelligence tasks call for the recruitment of persons with access to important information. Gathering intelligence is a major activity of an underground, and to do it effectively an underground contacts and develops sources in all areas of interest. The range of persons so utilized may be wide, varying from a peasant woman living near an enemy convoy route to a person in a sensitive governmental bureau.

Immediate access to valuable information is not the only criterion for selection, however. Sometimes the underground recruits individuals to provide information which is valueless in order to keep them on a string, in the hope that they may advance in their profession and be in a position to supply useful information someday. If time permits, it may be better to wait for someone to work his way up into a position of trust rather than to seek to recruit someone in a high position with the attendant risk of failure or compromise.9

Special Tasks

A variety of technical skills is frequently required. Doctors may be recruited on a standby basis to treat wounded personnel. Skilled carpenters are enlisted to construct false partitions in rooms to hide equipment or refugees. Metalworkers are used to construct small arms and bombs. Also, bookbinders, who can bind messages into the covers of books, may be brought into membership. Printers are often contacted to assist in publishing propaganda tracts. In addition, locksmiths might be recruited to make special keys, and chemists to mix explosives. One underground leader had a close assistant whose sole, permanent assignment was to secure the services of persons with such technical

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Strategy, Tactics, and Countermeasures

Development of Recruits

To expand its membership an underground may have to develop recruits. An example of this is the recruitment activities in front groups in postwar Malaya. Many unions were Communist led, and it was not uncommon for the leaders to give party-line lectures to union members several times a week. Party members had a standing assignment to notice the workers' reactions. Those who seemed interested and receptive to this educational prodding and who possessed leadership ability were marked as prospects. It should be noted that the Communists did not always stress doctrinal themes, but rather based their appeals on noncontroversial generalities such as Chinese solidarity, general social welfare, trade unionism, and anticolonialism, and transferred the widespread loyalty evoked by these themes to the Communist Party.[14]

Surveillance of prospective recruits by the Communists in Malaya was a long process. Interviews with one group of 60 ex-party members revealed that those who had been party leaders were scrutinized for an average period of 18 months in unions and other front groups before being admitted to probationary membership, while those who had been rank-and-file members were under observation for an average of 2 years. Party members engaged in surveillance were often forbidden to make recruitment propositions to the prospects. Instead, they were instructed to pass on the names to outside recruiters for further action. In this way, the members doing surveillance concealed their underground connections and escaped the danger of being denounced by prospects whose attitude they had misjudged.[15]

Recruitment

After being cleared in security investigations, prospects are recommended for recruitment by the members with whom they have had the closest contacts. To prompt members to make thoughtful appraisals before sponsoring a prospect, undergrounds sometimes hold members personally responsible if the recruits they recommend should provide unreliable. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) Constitution even provided for the expulsion of members who recommended such individuals.[16] In practice, however, this step was seldom taken, because recommendations had become mere formalities and it was considered unfair to expel members under these circumstances.[17]

In the first direct proposition to a prospect, care is taken to give him only the bare minimum of information. This precaution is taken not only because he may refuse to join—and thereafter would be considered a potential informer—but because recruitment at this stage may be only tentative, with checks and double checks still to be made.[18]

Probationary Periods

Sometimes it is not possible to run full security checks immediately. In such cases the prospects may be recruited but not permitted to meet other underground members until full checks have been conducted. These recruits

deal with only one person from the cell, and at some location other than the cell's regular rendezvous. One anti-Nazi cell in Germany made it a practice to have one of its cell members meet unchecked recruits in a crowded coffeeshop or in woods. Only after the background of the recruits had been checked were they permitted to come into contact with the other cell members.[19]

Recruits often undergo a period of trial membership before being accepted into regular membership. They are assigned menial tasks until they learn proper security procedures and demonstrate their abilities. In the MCP, the periods were supposedly set by the party Constitution: workers, peasants, and soldiers were to undergo a 2-month probation; skilled workers, tradesmen, members of the intelligentsia, students, and government workers were to be tested for 3 months; members of the "petty bourgeoisie" were to be subjected to 4-month periods; and former party members were to be put on trial for 1 year before being granted full status.[20] To fill depleted ranks, though, these periods often were greatly reduced.[21]

MASS RECRUITMENT AND POPULAR SUPPORT

The underground must rely on mass support and not merely on conspiracy if a revolutionary movement is to succeed.[22] Furthermore, public sympathy is vital since it provides a shield for the underground activists against the security forces. Once the underground leaders and cadres have been recruited and trained, the next objective is to obtain support from a large segment of the populace and to expand the base of the underground.

Urban Areas

Underground workers organize front groups with humanitarian or other legitimate goals and infiltrate large organizations to obtain positions of leadership. When they have thus developed mass followers, the underground workers introduce the objectives of the underground and divert the membership to support their own cause. In Indochina, Vo Nguyen Giap reports that in order to prepare for insurrection, they had first to develop and consolidate organizations, then expand other organizations in cities, mines, plantations, and provinces, for only on the basis of strong political organization could semiarmed organizations be set up.[23]

Cells are organized in cities throughout the country in a unified effort to win the sympathy and ultimately the support of the populace. Underground workers are instructed to look for and to help families who have lost everything, those who have not received needed assistance from the government, the unemployed, and the sick. In this manner, social indebtedness is created, enabling the worker to gain entree to a family or neighborhood. Once the underground has gained the attention and loyalty of a large number of people, pressure is applied to make them repay the indebtedness by joining the movement. A favorable word from a mother, father, or relative, or close