

COUNTERMEASURES

Upon his election in 1949, President Quirino initiated an extensive program of economic, political, social, and military reform. Most of the reform measures were conceived and administered by Ramon Magsaysay when he became Defense Minister in 1950, and completed by him when he became President in 1953. Magsaysay made frequent, unscheduled trips into the hinterland to observe the progress of the reform measures. Ultimately, through a combination of personal integrity, determination to end the revolt, and demonstrated interest in public welfare, he restored popular confidence in the government and its leaders.

POLITICAL REFORM

The presidential election of 1949 was effectively exploited by the Philippine Communists, who convinced the population of Luzon that it was natural to assume that the existing government would always be corrupt. In contrast, during the elections of 1951, government authorities stationed teachers as poll clerks, used ROTC cadets to guard polling places, and directed soldiers to prevent intimidation of voters and guard ballot boxes. Magsaysay had announced these measures previously, as he wished to assure the voters that their voting rights would be guaranteed. He announced that government officials who had abused their responsibilities would be tried, and urged all citizens to report directly to him and his personal staff any complaints they might have concerning the behavior of government troops and officials. Reforms initiated during these tense years of Magsaysay's leadership led to the turning of the tide of public opinion toward the government.

MILITARY REFORM

The Philippine Constabulary had not been able to stem the growth of the Huk movement. Its company-size units were inadequately equipped for the task and not able to conduct sustained antiguerrilla operations. It also frequently failed to obtain the cooperation of the populace. It was resented by many because some of its officers and men had served in the Bureau of Constabulary under the Japanese. As it stood, the regular army was hardly better prepared to combat the insurgents. Promotions were not awarded on the basis of merit but on the strength of political influence, thereby creating a morale problem among the officers and men. Corruption was prevalent throughout the army. Then too, the army was not organized for extensive counter guerrilla operations. It consisted mainly of administrative, service, and training units, and had only two infantry battalions ready for combat.

Magsaysay's solution was to bring a reorganized Armed Forces into the counterinsurgency campaign, replacing the Constabulary as the prime counter-

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Until Magsaysay became Defense Minister in 1950, intelligence efforts were directed at gaining the cooperation of government officials who had access to pertinent government information. Until Magsaysay was able to install and enforce some measure of security within the government bureaucracy, obtaining valuable information usually required merely a bribe.

In the "liberated areas," municipal officials, especially the town mayor and police chief, were usually in the service of the insurgents. They were often able to inform on government agents and military officials assigned to the area. It was not until the government was able to deny the Huk the aid of local officials that any counterinsurgency measures showed signs of success.



(UPI Photo)

Datu Kamton (seated in foreground), notorious brigand, surrenders to Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay (seated center) in ceremonies at Lahing Beach. The boy on Magsaysay's lap is the bandit's 6-year-old son, who was sent to a government patrol ship as hostage when the surrender talks began. Terms of the surrender included a \$20,000 payment to Kamton by the government for damages caused in his territory by army operations, and the release of a number of his men serving time for sedition.

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As a psychological device, booby-trapped weapons were deposited at points where it was known that rebels would find them. When they exploded, it made many rebels hesitant about using stolen firearms or captured weapons.

Although the Army Intelligence Corps was responsible for the overall collection of information, each troop unit gathered and utilized such intelligence data as was necessary for its own operations. Government troops dressed as Huk guerrillas visited towns in "liberated" areas, and noted underground participants and officials friendly to the guerrillas. In this way they acquired information about activities of the insurgents and identified collaborators. Also, once other villages were aware of such operations, they hesitated to assist the Huks. A graduated system of rewards was instituted for information leading to the capture, dead or alive, of ranking leaders. To stimulate the flow of information for the populace, immediate cash payment or partial payment was made to informers; the responsibility for immediate payment was extended to lower echelon field commanders.

A fee was paid for any unregistered firearm turned in to the Defense Ministry; 60,000 arms were turned in at 75 pesos each. Rewards were also offered to civilians for killing or capturing Huk guerrillas. To lessen the danger of Huk reprisals against those cooperating with the government, civilians were urged to bring complaints of any kind directly to Defense officials or to Magsaysay himself.

An agent who infiltrated the Communist National Finance Committee was able to collect records which led to the arrest of 1,175 party members. Rewards were offered to individuals who furnished information leading to the arrest of active Communists. The high-ranking Communist official, José Lava, for example, was worth \$50,000 to anyone who turned him in. The climax to these efforts came when, acting on information supplied by a Huk informer, the government captured the Communist Politburo and the underground party headquarters in Manila. Magsaysay was contacted by the informer and asked to meet him alone. From the informer, Magsaysay learned the identity of an underground courier in Manila. The members of the central secretariat had taken the precaution never to hold meetings in the same place twice; they met at the homes of the various Politburo members. However, government agents followed the woman courier, who posed as a peddler delivering vegetables to these homes. In the raid, the government captured 12 members of the Politburo along with other high-ranking officials and many party records. They found 42,000 pesos, electric mimeograph machines, typewriters, subversive publications, submachineguns, pistols, and grenades. The records captured included a complete roster of all members of the party in the Philippines, party sympathizers, and active Huk supporters, who included many Chinese and Filipino businessmen. Additional documents described the management of the organization. The information gained from the raid was significant in the subsequent breaking of the insurgent movement.²⁹

After 1950 the security officials also concentrated on improving counter-intelligence activities, since many government agents who had infiltrated the ranks of the Huks had been discovered.³⁰

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force. The first step was to remove the Constabulary from the Department of the Interior and place it under the command of the Department of Defense. Constabulary forces were greatly reduced and many were transferred into regular army units. The army was reorganized for counterinsurgency operations. Twenty-six battalion combat teams of about 1,047 officers and men each were formed. Each BCT contained—besides infantry—intelligence, psychological warfare, and medical units that could be assigned to particular sectors. Squad-sized ranger teams that could stay on patrol for as much as 7 days were formed in order to achieve the mobility and jungle penetration capacity necessary to better pursue the guerrillas.³¹

Officers who were not performing their duties were removed, promotions were made on the basis of merit, and soldiers who were caught stealing were punished in the presence of the villagers. The determined effort to rid the Philippine Armed Forces of inefficient and unreliable officers led to the dismissal of personnel of all ranks, from the Army Chief of Staff, who was an influential personal friend of the President, to local battalion commanders who were slow in carrying out counteroperations against guerrilla bands. Magsaysay's obvious determination to rid the Armed Forces of undesirable elements, and his success in doing so, increased public confidence in national government.

Patrols had been in the habit of falsifying their reports to cover the fact that they did not seriously attempt to search out the enemy. To end this, Magsaysay required the patrols to take photos of the enemy dead. Enlisted men were given a promotion for every guerrilla killed and received a personal letter from Magsaysay.

He had the military perform civic and social welfare missions in addition to military operations against the Huks. Each military unit was assigned a civil affairs officer who maintained liaison with local barrio police officials and civilian home guard units. In this manner integration and cohesion of all government and quasi-government agencies was achieved. To free soldiers for patrol and other combat duty, local defense units of civilian commandos were formed with regular army men as leaders. Civil advisory committees were also formed to resolve disputes between regular forces and the civil defense units.

Authorities developed a program to gain the necessary intelligence. Intensive interrogation of the family and friends of known Huks was undertaken. The interrogators urged these people to encourage the guerrillas to abandon the Communist cause, and sought to persuade them to act as undercover agents and infiltrate Huk units and their civilian front organizations. Intelligence was transmitted to the proper authorities in a variety of ways. One method was to fly a reconnaissance plane over a farm where the farmer had arranged farm equipment or other commonplace possessions in such a way as to transmit information about guerrilla strength and direction of movement. This enabled the government to maintain a network of agents, widely distributed over a large rural area, who could quickly provide information about guerrilla actions without compromising their roles as informers.³²

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JUDICIAL REFORM

Before 1952 the Communists exploited the fact that small landowners rarely had a chance to gain justice when they were abused by large landowners. Magsaysay, however, made provisions for the peasant to have the right of legal counsel at government expense if he so desired. Also, Magsaysay held open trials for captured Hukbalahap leaders and government officials accused of dishonesty.³¹

ECONOMIC REFORM

The army also launched an economic betterment program as part of its counterinsurgency campaign. As the Huks received most of their support from tenant farmers, the first civil actions of Magsaysay and the army were agrarian reforms. Initially, rural civil betterment activities were conducted under the heading of Psychological Warfare, but later they were administered as Civil Affairs. At the battalion level, battalion commanders and their civil affairs officers would meet with barrio heads and other civilian leaders to plan for the defense of farmers during their work in the fields and the implementation of barrio self-defense procedure. This initial contact between military and the civilians led to further discussions of numerous barrio needs and to the initiation of more measures by the army. Department of Agriculture agents were escorted by army personnel into rural areas so that they could acquaint farmers with newer agricultural techniques. Eventually, troops were used to construct barrio grammar schools, to drill pure water wells, and to carry out other public work projects. Also, civilians wounded in the crossfire between government troops and the guerrillas were treated in army hospitals.

Probably the major civic effort of the Armed Forces was the work of its Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), whose aim was to rehabilitate and resettle Huk prisoners and their families and, by this example, to induce defections from the guerrilla ranks. The program was initiated near the end of 1950. Four years later, EDCOR could point to the successful completion of several major projects: four farm communities for former Huks were established, a vocational training center was begun, and one complete barrio was moved to a more favorable site.

The first two farm communities were constructed in 1951 in Mindanao. Along with the selected Huk prisoners, volunteer retired military personnel and civilian applicants were settled in these communities. The first step in the construction of each of these settlements began with the arrival on site of small army units, usually numbering 12 officers and 91 enlisted men. These units scraped dirt roads, set up security procedures, and constructed initial housing to receive the settlers. The troops then worked with the settlers upon their arrival to clear the land for farming, to build family houses, village centers, school buildings, chapels, and dispensaries, to set up sawmills, to drill wells, to build markets, and to construct sanitary facilities. The army also helped the settlers earn title to the land by handling the legal matters involved.

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Similar procedures were later followed in 1953 and 1954 in establishing two more communities. As of December 1958, there were 5,175 settlers in these communities. By 1959 EDCOR reported that all four communities were approaching independence; the settlers were able to begin payment for their land; political stability was established in the areas of the communities; and there was no indication of organized resistance among the former dissidents.

Another project of EDCOR was the establishment of a Huk Rehabilitation Center. This organization was founded to train surrendered Huks in the skills necessary in order to obtain regular employment. The center was begun in part of an army warehouse, where the men were trained in woodworking. The center eventually produced furniture for army barracks and officers' quarters, and the profits from these sales were retained by the workers.

The EDCOR villages in Mindanao were quite distant from the major area of insurrection in central Luzon, and it was felt that the success of a similar project in Luzon would be much more damaging to the guerrilla cause. The army, therefore, selected an economically poor Luzon town, located in the middle of Huk territory, as the target for a civil betterment program. The chosen town was San Luis, Pampanaga, the birthplace of Luis Taruc and the place of residence for many families of Huks. The plan called for the relocation of some townspeople into a settlement to be established nearby. The army drained some swampland across the river to prepare for the settlement; it built a bridge to link the town with the new settlement; and it moved townspeople's houses across if possible, and, if not, it built new housing to replace the houses which could not be transported. Army personnel also drilled fresh water wells, built schools for children, and helped the farmers by providing seed and agricultural advice. Word of this project was widely disseminated by word-of-mouth, and was followed by the surrender of many Huks who stated their reluctance to fight against troops who were aiding the families of Huks. Magsaysay felt that this project was more effective in combatting the Huks than the application of several fighting battalions.³²

Although the program was not by any means large, the psychological effects of the EDCOR operations upon the Huk movement and the populace were great. It provided the people with new respect for the government and it offered the rebels an alternative other than resistance. Already assured of amnesty and protection from fellow insurgents, EDCOR now provided the rebels with a hope of future economic security. Huk defections eventually provided the government forces with the intelligence necessary to break the movement and by 1954, the Huk insurgents had lost most of their effectiveness as a revolutionary force.

FOOTNOTES

1. Maj. Kenneth M. Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 179.
2. Alvin Scaff, *The Philippine Answer to Communism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 27-28.

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CHAPTER 12

PALESTINE (1945-48)

3. Maj. Boyd L. Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War," *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 196-197.
4. Charles T. R. Bohannon, "Anti-Guerrilla Operations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (May 1962), 27.
5. See Jesus Vargas, *Communism in Decline—The Huk Campaign* (Bangkok: SEATO, 1957); see also Col. Ismael Lapus, "The Communist Huk Enemy" in Seminar, *Counter Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946-1953* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 15 June 1961), p. 11; and J. H. Brimmell, *Communism in South East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 101.
6. Lapus, "The Communist Huk," p. 12.
7. A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia, A Challenge to American Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 491.
8. U.S. Department of Labor, *Summary of the Labor Situation in the Philippines* (Washington: August 1956), pp. 5-6.
9. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer*, pp. 12-13.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.
11. It is noted that by 1943 the Huks were not fighting the Japanese, but the guerrilla forces sponsored by the U.S.A. Malcolm Kennedy, *A History of Communism in Southeast Asia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 318.
12. Russell Fifield, "The Hukbalahap Today," *Far Eastern Survey* (January 24, 1951), 14.
13. and Lapus, "The Communist Huk," p. 14. Fifield states that although Tarnuc was a Communist since 1939, most of the Huk leaders were Socialists or peasant leaders, and that the movement could not be characterized as "Communist" at this time.
14. Fifield, "The Hukbalahap," p. 15; Lapus, "The Communist Huk," p. 16.
15. Luis Tarnuc, *Born of the People* (New York: International Publishers, 1953), p. 299.
16. Tarnuc, however, claims that the Huks officially disbanded in early 1945 and maintained contact through veterans organizations. *Ibid.*, p. 217. For an objective account of events of the period, see Scaff, *The Philippine Answer*, pp. 25-30 ff; Fifield, "The Huk balahap," pp. 14-15.
17. According to captured Communist documents, the period 1946-51 was to be the "period of preparation," to be followed by a military offensive aimed at "the seizure of national power." See Uldarico S. Baclagon, *Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines* (Manila: M. Calcal & Co., Inc., 1960), p. 12.
18. Lapus, "The Communist Huk," p. 22.
19. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer*, p. 34.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
21. Fifield, "The Hukbalahap," pp. 13-14.
22. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer*, Chapter 10.
23. A separate Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines worked closely with the Huks during the insurrection period. Communism was never, however, very strong among the Chinese community. See Sheldon Appleton, "Communism of the Chinese in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs* (December 1959), 387-391.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 379.
25. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer*, pp. 116-120.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
27. Lapus, "The Communist Huk," p. 17.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 61; see also Bashore, "Dual Strategy," p. 197.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
30. C. Rómulo, *The Magsaysay Story* (New York: John Day, 1956), pp. 114-117.
31. Lapus, "The Communist Huk," pp. 44-45.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
33. Col. E. G. Lansdale, USAF, "Civic Activities of the Military, Southeast Asia," (Anderson: Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee), 13 March 1959; see also Operations Research Office Staff Paper ORO-SP-151, "Civil Affairs in the Cold War." (Bethesda, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), pp. 185-189.

BACKGROUND

When the Zionist campaign for the return of the Jews to their Biblical homeland began in 1897, there were only 47,000 Jews living in Palestine. In 1917 the British issued the Balfour Declaration requesting that "a national home for the Jewish people" be established in Palestine. Five years later the declaration was incorporated into the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. Under this mandate, the United Kingdom had full responsibility for the civil administration of Palestine; a Jewish agency was to be established to advise the administration on economic, social, and other matters affecting the establishment of a Jewish national home.¹ The Palestinian Jews and Zionists in other countries interpreted the Balfour Declaration as promising them a homeland and rejected British explanations that it really did not mean quite that. At the same time, the Arabs of Palestine were pressing more and more insistently for a constitution and eventual independence.


In August 1929 the World Zionist Congress, meeting in Zurich, created the Jewish Agency with the participation of non-Zionist Jews. This agency was to become the organ through which world Jewry would deal officially with the *Yishuv** community governments and national council, the mandatory authorities, and the League of Nations. Many non-Zionists, while opposed to the creation of a Jewish state, "were nevertheless anxious to assist in the further growth of a national home as a Jewish cultural and religious center."² In the early years of World War II, however, non-Zionist participation in the agency virtually ceased to exist.

The British tried repeatedly, but without success, to find a formula that would satisfy everybody. Three attempts (in 1923, 1929, and 1935)³ to set up a legislative council foundered, and several commissions were sent to investigate the reasons for the failures. In response to the recommendations of one of them, the British issued, in 1930, a white paper providing for stricter control of immigration and containing measures to protect Arab peasants and tenants. It evoked Zionist protests, and was, in effect, rescinded. As Nazi persecution swelled the influx of immigrants, the situation worsened. In 1937 a commission reported that partition was the only solution. Another white paper in 1939 dealt what appeared to be a death blow to Zionist dreams of a Jewish state. It provided for an independent Palestine after 10 years, with a permanent Arab majority, but with protection for Jewish rights. To preserve that Arab majority, it decreed that no more than 1,250 immigrants per month or 15,000 per year could enter the mandate area.

The immediate Zionist reaction to the white paper of 1939 was to make preparations to increase clandestine immigration, and to expand the illegal

*The *Yishuv* was the Jewish community in Palestine.

Figure 21. Map of Palestine.



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Jewish-community defense force, the Haganah.* The official attitude of the Jewish quasi-government in mandatory Palestine after September 1939 was essentially that expressed early in the war by the then chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, David Ben-Gurion, who said that the Palestine Jews would fight the war as if there were no white paper, and would fight the white paper as if there were no war. The Haganah did in fact cooperate closely with the Palestine Government and Britain in the Allied war effort. At the same time it continued its clandestine operations connected with enlarging its organization and increasing its supplies of military materiel. That relations were far from harmonious during the war could be seen in the second half of 1943 in the anger of the Palestine Jews over a series of arms trials and searches implicating the Haganah.⁴

At the end of the war, Palestine had a population of two million, of which some 1,200,000 were Arabs, 600,000 Jews. Because of the plight of the European refugees, Zionist organizations around the world urged the creation of an official Jewish state, with or without the cooperation of mandate authorities. The Haganah, with a membership close to 10,000, began to step up its underground activities against some 90,000 mandate troops, and to expand the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine.

In addition to the Haganah, there was another underground group, the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organization). The *Irgun* had been organized in 1937 after a disagreement within the Haganah over the question of armed reprisals against the Arabs. This group conducted an extensive campaign of sabotage and terror, a policy not favored by the sponsors of the Haganah, the Jewish Agency, or the World Zionist Organization. At the beginning of World War II, the *Irgun* began to cooperate with the government, which led to another internal disagreement. A group of about 50 broke off from the *Irgun* and regrouped themselves into what was to be called the "Stern Gang," which carried on a campaign of terror. In 1944 the *Irgun* again undertook a campaign of violence and sabotage against the government.

By 1947 the increased tension and clashes between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, and increasing diplomatic pressure from both Zionists and independent Arab states, made it obvious that some sort of settlement was necessary. Great Britain referred the whole Palestine matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which appointed a special committee of inquiry, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. In August of that year this commission recommended termination of the British mandate at the earliest workable date, and a tripartite partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state with Jerusalem as an international zone.

On May 14, 1948, Great Britain officially terminated her responsibilities for the security of Palestine and announced the withdrawal of her military forces. The same day, the State of Israel was proclaimed by the Jewish Provisional Council of Government as the state called for by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II).

*The Haganah had been organized in 1920 to protect the Jewish community in Palestine from Arab raids.

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ORGANIZATION


Friction between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine had been endemic for years. When the area was under Turkish rule, *shomrim* (guards) were appointed to protect Jewish settlements vulnerable to attack by Bedouin (nomadic Arab) tribesmen. In 1907 these guard units were expanded into a larger organization called the *Hashomer*, or watchmen. Many of these militiamen fought in British units in World War I. After the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the duties of the *Hashomer* were assumed by the Jewish Settlement Police. However, after the anti-Jewish riots of 1920, an illegal underground defense corps, the Haganah, was organized within the settlement police to protect the settlements from Arab attacks. The British never recognized the Haganah as the legal protection force, but nevertheless the organization secretly expanded. Arms were acquired illicitly, and training was conducted clandestinely until the outbreak, in April 1936, of the Arab revolt against Zionism and the British mandate, which lasted until September 1939. A British captain Orde Wingate, then began to train Haganah units openly in offensive military tactics, starting in 1937 with 75 volunteers organized into "special night squads."⁵

During World War II many members of the Haganah served in British units. In 1945 the Haganah had more than 300 British-trained officers, many of whom had learned military skills in the Jewish Brigade, a regular British Army unit fighting in Europe. Some of the 20,000 postwar immigrants who had served in other Allied armies joined the Haganah.

The Haganah was sponsored by the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish National Council, and the Jewish Agency.⁶ Political control was vested in the chairman of the Jewish Agency, and in a high command composed of representatives of the political parties of the Jewish settlement (*Yishuv*). Professional military control was under a general staff.⁷ All general staff members had one or more code names, so that captured documents would not identify them. These were full-time salaried soldiers, many of them trained by Captain Wingate, others by British Special Forces during World War II.⁸

The Haganah had three specialized groups, concerned respectively with illegal immigration, intelligence, and paramilitary operations. The *Mosad*, with headquarters in Paris, supervised the movement of Jews from Central Europe to Mediterranean ports after the war, and arranged for passage to Palestine. The principal "secret roads" were operated by the *Bricha* (the "escape" unit of the *Mosad*). The *Shai*, operating in Palestine, was concerned principally with counterintelligence against the British. It was considered by the British to be one of the most efficient intelligence networks ever formed: its 2,000 well-trained and trusted agents infiltrated every branch of the British Mandate Administration. The *Palmach* (*Plugot Mahatz*), the Haganah's commando branch, trained 2,500 men and women by 1948.¹⁰ During the mandate they acted as defense units to forestall British interception of incoming refugee ships.

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(UPI Photo)

Brig. Gen. Orde Wingate (1944).

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for operational purposes, supplemented by carrier pigeons for longer range communication. An elaborate hand-courier system was developed, including a special corps of children trained for message carrying. Women were also used for traveling longer distances, using taxis or public buses.¹²

Clandestine communications of the Haganah were concerned, for the most part, with coordination of *Shai* and *Mosad* operations. For a successful voyage of an illegal immigrant ship from a Mediterranean port to the shores of Palestine precise information was required as to: (1) the location and condition of available vessels, (2) number of passengers and sailing date (this was often fixed by British security measures in European ports), (3) estimated time of arrival of the Haganah ship, and (4) precautions to be taken in order to ensure a safe landing and successful transport of passengers to a safe area. Ship-to-shore contact was maintained between the ship and agents in Palestine once the vessel was at sea. Many of the radio operators had been trained by the British during the war, and had defected with their equipment once the emigration of Jews from Europe had begun.¹³

One participant states that a coordinating center for immigration operations was set up at Istanbul.¹⁴ It is also that members of the Jewish Brigade established a competent wireless service throughout Europe to communicate with the Haganah High Command in Tel Aviv.¹⁵ The same source states that a French officer in Cairo acted as a courier for the *Mosad* between that city and Tel Aviv.¹⁶ It is likely, however, that *Mosad* and *Shai* agents traveled or sent their messages by normal channels of communication.

Recruitment

After World War II the Haganah needed large numbers of specialists and technicians. It attempted to recruit Jews from other countries, acting on the assumption that the great majority of Jews throughout the world would support any undertakings of the Jewish Agency. Threats or violence were never employed, although some of the promises made to prospective recruits may have been misleading. The Jewish Agency based its appeals on two general premises:

(1) The Haganah was the official organ of the quasi-government in Palestine, which was sponsoring a movement entitled to worldwide moral, political, and financial support.¹⁷

(2) This was to be a nonviolent movement; condemnation of the terrorist activities of the rival *Irgun* and Stern Gang was implicit.

In order to recruit qualified persons to carry out specific duties concerned with illegal immigration, the Jewish Agency acted, in effect, as an open employment agency. Many radio operators, seamen, and military personnel had been trained by British Forces during the war. These men offered their services when full-scale resistance began.

Those Jews who would not associate themselves with Zionism were urged to support programs aiding the health and welfare of world Jewry.

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


Figure 22. Haganah.

Auxiliary military units were the *Hish* (specially trained field units totaling 9,500 men) and the *Him* (a local defense organization of 32,500 men and women). The Haganah also supervised the training of the *Gadna* youth group. At the height of its strength, it is estimated that the Haganah could call on about 45,000 persons.¹¹

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Communications

A system of communication between the settlements employed Aldis lamps, heliographs, flags, and light signals. A wireless telegraphy system was used

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Cases of Undergrounds

Finance

After 1930 the Haganah received funds through the Jewish Agency, which had offices or representatives throughout the Western world. In 1942 a large scale effort was undertaken to enlist the support of the 5,000,000 Jews living in the United States. Such Zionist leaders as David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency, traveled throughout the country seeking financial aid. Appeals for money were made in newspaper advertisements, at charity balls and other social events.

Logistics

Arming the *Palmach* and other groups, in defiance of British regulations which limited the arms of each village defense group to a few shotguns, was a large-scale operation. By 1946, however, almost every combatant had a personal weapon (rifle, submachinegun, or revolver). Other weapons frequently used included: (1) rifle grenades and other types of grenades; (2) large numbers of medium machine guns; (3) two- and three-inch mortars; (4) antitank mines and Molotov cocktails; (5) homemade flamethrowers; and (6) heavier weapons such as bazookas, light antitank guns, and light field pieces. Ammunition for these heavier weapons was in short supply, but stocks of light ammunition were usually adequate. Certain weapons and ammunition, such as mortars and mortar-bombs, grenades and submachineguns, were manufactured in secret factories, and well-concealed caches existed in almost every settlement and in the large towns. Armored cars were improvised by nailing armor plating to commercial vehicles.¹⁸ Although the British made systematic searches, they were unsuccessful in the control of illegal arms.

Arms came from four sources:

- (1) *Jewish immigrants*. Those coming illegally brought in whatever they could. Those entering under the quota would hide firearms in suitcases, baskets, and jars. Often they bribed Arab customs officials, to whom they posed as smugglers of trade goods. Members of the *Mosad* in Europe purchased arms in large quantities and shipped them to Palestine with immigrants.
- (2) *Illegal purchases from Arab tribesmen*. These were weapons abandoned or sold as surplus after the North African campaign or left behind by the British, who had used the region as a training area until the end of 1943.
- (3) *Planned raids on British arms depots*. These were often arranged by members of the *Shai* or the Jewish Settlement Police, who could ascertain the quantity and types of supplies at specific depots.
- (4) *Clandestine production*. During the Arab rebellion (1936-39) the Haganah began to establish workshops for the clandestine production of arms. These were usually located in rural areas in locations where small workshops would not attract attention. Materials were purchased most frequently through regular trade channels, and established firms were used as "covers." After World War II larger shops were established. The workshops produced legitimate as well as illegal items. An intelligence network was organized, and

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lookouts were provided for each plant; such a warning system allowed sufficient time to switch from illegal to legal production in case of a raid. This was possible in parts-producing plants, where arms components did not constitute the entire output. Arms assembly plants, on the other hand, had to be carefully concealed, for in these the identity of the product was unmistakable.

Workers for the arms plants were carefully chosen after extensive security checks on their background, behavior, etc. Since their occupations had to be kept secret, they were encouraged to limit contact with outsiders, thus lessening the chances of security leaks. To minimize the possibility of compromise, the top management of arms production was limited to a few men who knew the locations and operational features of the various plants, and controlled the movement of work among plants; and of these men, only a very few of the most trusted knew more than one link in the system. The head office of the clandestine arms production unit was located within the office of a large enterprise and had a cover title within the legal organization. Records of arms production and financial transactions were carefully maintained in code, with each military item having a cover name in the company's files. Officers of the arms system were also employees of legitimate firms or institutions and were paid as such.

The Haganah maintained a transportation system as well as an assembly plant for weapons, parts of which were produced all over the country. One assembly plant was located less than 100 meters from the headquarters of British Forces in Tel Aviv, near a power station and central bus station, in the vicinity of garages and auto workshops where day and night truck traffic was normal and did not arouse suspicion.¹⁹

Individual arms were stored in parts of household furniture, while large caches of arms were usually put in reinforced concrete underground storage chambers. This involved problems of temperature and humidity control and camouflaged means of ventilation.

Because the British were taking measures to halt the flow of homeless Jews from inland Europe to the ports of the Mediterranean, supplies for the voyage to Palestine, as well as the vessel itself, were acquired clandestinely by *Mosad* agents. Most of the ships were obtained from shipowners in Greece and Italy, who often charged exorbitant fees.²⁰ Soon after the war a Jewish transport unit of the British Army in Italy was infiltrated by Haganah agents. These men gave their time and money in order to obtain supplies for *Mosad* operations.²¹

Illegal Immigration

After the war the United Nations requested European countries to cooperate in providing free transportation for displaced persons. Only Poland refused to make facilities available to the Jews. This created one of the most difficult problems of the *Mosad*, the agency charged with supervising illegal emigration. Emigration of Jews from Poland usually involved long marches to the Czech border, where the border guards had to be bribed or eluded. However, the Czech Government recognized the *Mosad* as a legal organization, and did not interfere with its agents.

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the Jewish population that the Zionist goals could best be achieved by non-violent methods. The Stern Gang's terroristic attacks on British officials and the sabotage instigated by the *Irgun* were condemned as unnecessary provocations which would only postpone the establishment of a free Jewish state. The Haganah insisted that it condoned military operations only for the purpose of self-defense.

Intelligence

The intelligence unit of the Haganah was the *Shai*. Many members of the *Shai* had gained practical experience during 4 years of underground and intelligence work in the various European resistance movements. The main task of this intelligence unit was to infiltrate every possible channel of British security, and to gather information on—

- (1) Location of British supplies and munitions,
- (2) Name, location, and rank of British Criminal Investigation Department (CID) agents,
- (3) Proposed British countermeasures,
- (4) British communication and codes,
- (5) Collection of British circulars and handbooks.²⁶

Much of this information was contributed by Jewish policemen and government employees who were secret members of the Haganah. The majority of these were recruited by underground agents after they had secured positions with the Palestine colonial administration. Some who were not members of Haganah also supplied information at their convenience. Such information had to be checked by a *Shai* agent to ensure that it had not been planted by the British to impede resistance operations. The Haganah tried to convince all Jews that it was their patriotic duty to supply the underground with information, without payment. Experience with contracting shipowners had shown that those who participated in clandestine activities for financial gain were likely to play a double game.

When a person showed interest in joining the *Shai*, attempts were made to determine his sincerity. One method was to have a *Shai* agent pose as a British agent and arrest the prospective recruit. His reaction to intensive questioning was taken as an indication of his loyalty, or lack of it.

The *Shai* was also responsible for maintaining the security of Haganah activities, including:

- (1) Guarding the operations of *Ta'as*, the secret arms factory. Only those immediately concerned with production knew its location. *Shai* agents were expected to see to it that no routine patrols approached the site. The *Shai* was also responsible for the importation of machinery and raw materials and for safe delivery of the weapons.
- (2) Guarding the *Mahads*, or training schools for new members, while classes were in session.
- (3) Warning Jewish communities of forthcoming British searches.

This information was usually gathered by agents working in the CID, or by

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The British tried unsuccessfully to persuade other countries to help stem the illegal immigration. French civil authorities made no secret of their refusal to heed official British requests that they discourage Jews from traveling to Mediterranean ports, where they could seek passage to Palestine. Every British attempt to arrest or slow the flood of emigrants brought charges, inspired by Jewish Agency propaganda, that they were "behaving like Nazis."

The facilities of the International Red Cross, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, and Roman Catholic charities²² were put at the disposal of *Mosad* agents. U.S. occupation officers often provided transportation for Jewish emigrants. The SHAFF Command offered the service of U.S. naval vessels. It is even alleged that the British Ambassador in Turkey issued visas for Palestine without permission,²³ and some individuals within the British Army saw that *Mosad* agents were provided with supplies ranging from trucks to telephone wire.

In accordance with international maritime laws, the British never interfered with Palestine-bound ships outside of territorial waters. Haganah headquarters maintained constant radio contact with refugee ships, and instructed vessels where to land when they were one day out. The site chosen would depend on the tides, the disposition of British military units and naval craft, and the proximity to a Jewish settlement. Steps would then be taken to defend the beachhead. Haganah men would go to the site by individual routes to avoid detection. Once at their destination, they would assemble their weapons, which had been carried in parts for better concealment. All roads approaching the landing area would then be sealed off by improvised roadblocks. Should word be received that the ship had been intercepted or the landing abandoned for some reason, the Haganah men would disperse and avoid contact with any British patrols. If the enemy arrived during an actual disembarkation, however, they would be engaged by the Haganah.²⁴ British communications were also jammed to cripple efforts to intercept shiploads of illegal immigrants.

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

Psychological Operations

The *Shai* operated several radio transmitters known as "The Voice of Israel," or "*Kol Israel*." *Kol Israel* began broadcasting in March 1940. After several months of operation, it went off the air in compliance with a wartime truce with the British. It began transmitting again in the spring of 1945, broadcasting daily for about a half hour in English, Hebrew, and Arabic.²⁵ Members of *Gadna*, a Haganah youth group, would circulate handbills announcing the time of coming broadcasts. The transmitter was moved often, and the British never caught up with it.

The Haganah published at least one clandestine newspaper, *Ashnab*. In Palestine, the Haganah had to compete with the *Irgun* and the Stern Gang for the sympathy and support of the population. It sought to convince

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monitoring and decoding internal British communications. *Shai* agents monitored 74 radio stations operated by the CID.²⁷

The British authorities admitted that often members of the Haganah high command knew of decisions made by the highest level of colonial administrators long before orders implementing these decisions had reached their destination.

Sabotage

Unlike its rivals, the *Irgun* and the Stern Gang, both of which sabotaged railroads, bombed hotels, kidnapped mandate officials, and assassinated "obstructionists," the Haganah maintained a general policy of abstaining from indiscriminate sabotage and terror. The Haganah did, however, engage the British forces interfering with illegal immigration. Sabotage was carried out against coastal radar stations and refugee detention camps. In 1945 members of the Haganah's *Palmach* cooperated with the *Irgun* in sabotaging a railway line.

COUNTERMEASURES

During 1945-47 the British Armed Forces were increasingly active in carrying out government policy in Palestine and curbing underground activities. By 1949 their forces totaled 90,000 troops, including almost three infantry divisions, several RAF squadrons, approximately 7,400 soldiers of the Arab Legion, and 3,000 members of the Transjordanian Frontier Force. Also available were the services of 4,000 British members of the Palestine Police Force, plus the Mediterranean Fleet.²⁸

The British in Palestine were organized under a dual civil and military administration. The civil authority was headed by a High Commissioner, who in turn supervised the activities of the military commanders in Palestine and Transjordan. The Commissioner enacted regulations which gave military officials powers equivalent to martial law. These powers were in turn delegated to the military commanders in the various sectors. Although the military commanders had the power to deal with problems without recourse to higher authority, political expedience sometimes restricted the actions taken.²⁹

Counteroperations against the Haganah had two main purposes: to find and confiscate arms caches, and to halt illegal immigration. To accomplish the first objective curfews were imposed, road traffic was restricted, and the power of search and arrest was exercised freely. Patrols operated day and night to keep the illegal forces on the run. There were frequent spot checks of hotels, cafes, and vehicles.

Frequent searches were made of large sections of cities and entire villages. Generally, a cordon and search resulted after an attack by underground members. The commander would cordon and search an area in which the suspects

were believed to be hiding. Planned searches were also made when the police or military intelligence received information on the possible location of wanted suspects. General searches were made for illegal arms and ammunition.

Initially searches were conducted by the police. However, strong resistance rendered these ineffective. The police were refused entrance to homes and hand-to-hand fighting with bricks and sticks broke out in the streets. When troops arrived on the scene, a signal was sounded by alarm gongs or sirens, and the villagers from a nearby settlement came in a body to break into the area being searched. During these encounters the Jewish community even organized first aid stations to care for Jewish casualties. In most cases they stopped short of armed resistance. However, through this technique, they succeeded in preventing the capture of wanted individuals and supplies which could be moved during the confusion.³⁰

Planned searches by military units were also difficult, since Jewish intelligence and the Jewish community would provide neighboring villages with a minute-by-minute account of British movements. To counter these activities, the British employed cordon and search procedures tailored to fit this unique situation. Since information invariably leaked out to the underground through civilian employees working on the military base, it was necessary to seal the base before an operation. Civilians were kept on the base under guard until the operation was completed. Since much of the preparation went on in view of the civilian populace, elaborate cover plans were devised to conceal the purpose of the military activity. Reconnaissance was usually not possible without giving away the mission; therefore planning was accomplished through the use of maps and photos. Written orders were kept to an absolute minimum, and were usually handed out just before the mission. Neither radio nor telephones were trusted for communication, since they might be monitored by *Shai* agents. The troops participating in the operation were not alerted until they were awakened at midnight or later. Troops were assembled under cover of darkness, and plans were made for the troops to arrive at the search area before dawn.³¹

The village was surrounded while it was still dark and the search began at dawn. Success depended on the search being well coordinated and carried out with the utmost speed.

Roadblocks were set up. An inner cordon of troops surrounded the area to be searched in order to seal it off and prevent escape. An outer cordon was placed at strategic points some distance from the village to prevent interference from neighboring villages, and to act as reserves. Cages or enclosed areas were erected to which the inhabitants were brought for interrogation. Search parties collected the inhabitants of the village and moved them to the cages for detention. Other search parties looked for hidden arms. Screening teams checked identification cards against photos and lists of wanted men and suspects. After these search operations, suspects were taken to permanent detention camps.³²

British warships and airplanes patrolled the coastline constantly, ready to intercept immigrant ships as soon as they entered territorial waters. Between February 1947 and January 1948, 22 ships carrying 40,000 immigrants were stopped,³³ and their passengers were sent to detention camps in Cyprus.

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FOOTNOTES

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