### CODEBOOK AND SOURCES FOR THE DATASET PRESENTED IN THE ARTICLE

# DIRECT PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES: BETWEEN PROXY MEASURES AND HARD DATA

## **ACRONYMS**

PFR – Political Financing Regime

PFL – Party Financing Law

DPF – Direct Public Funding

LPP – Law on Political Parties

DPFRV – Direct Public Funding per Registered Voter

DPFV – Direct Public Funding per Vote

SBL – State Budget Law

PE – Parliamentary Elections

CEC – Central Election Commission

DEC - District Electoral Commission

SAO – State Audit Office

EC – Electoral Code

SMD – Single Member District

MMD – Multi-Member District

MP – Member of Parliament

MMW – Minimal Monthly Wage

AMW – Average Monthly Wage

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisations

IO – International Organisations

 $OSCE/ODIHR-Organisation\ for\ Security\ and\ Cooperation\ in\ Europe\ /\ Office\ for\ Democratic\ Institutions\ and\ Human\ Rights$ 

GRECO – Group of States against Corruption

IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IRI – International Republican Institute

NDI – National Democratic Institute

#### **GENERAL OVERVIEW**

The dataset on the actual level of direct public funding (DPF) provided by the state to political parties for their statutory/routine and electoral activities has a panel data structure. It covers 27 post-communist regimes from Central-Eastern Europe, Balkans, and former Soviet Union republics for the period 1990 – 2020. Given the substantial cross-national and within-country variation as well as between party statutory vs. election financing in the level of DPF, the data structure accounts for these peculiarities. Therefore, for the party statutory funding, the unit of analysis is country-year, while for the election financing the unit is country-election. This approach is justified due to the various methods employed by different countries to determine the level of direct state funding. Since my goal is to provide an accurate and reliable measure on the actual level of DPF provided to political parties, I rely on official sources. As shown in the article text, to make data comparable cross-nationally and overtime, I construct two alternative indicators: direct public funding per registered voter (DPFRV) and direct public funding per vote (DPFV) that represent the final result of the operationalization process, regardless of the method used by a given country to determine the level of state support.

Hence, for the transparency of the data generating process, reliability, and reproducibility of these indicators, the dataset contains additional intermediate variables that allowed me to arrive at DPFRV and DPFV. This implies that anyone can also use raw data on DPF to construct other relevant indicators depending on the research question of interest. Besides various laws and regulations that stipulate (or not) how state funding to parties is determined and calculated, I collect data from a wide array of other primary and secondary sources, such as state budget laws, decisions of the electoral management bodies, oversight institutions, electoral monitoring, and technical assistance reports of various international organizations (OSCE/ODIHR, GRECO, IFES, IRI, NDI, etc.). Furthermore, when there are data inconsistencies (sometimes even between official sources), I cross-check it with alternative information sources. In this codebook, I also provide the links to the original data sources used to construct these measures for each country separately. For instance, if I use the state budget laws as sources on DPF, I provide the links to each country's SBL for various years. Likewise, if I use the reports of electoral or supervisory bodies from which I retrieved DPF data, I provide links to those reports, so everyone can access the original source if needed.

Nevertheless, in some cases for which I could not find data from official primary or secondary sources (it does not mean that it does not exist), especially for the early transition years, I estimate it based on regulatory provisions and other economic indicators as foreseen by law, although there are only a few cases for which I performed these calculations. To understand how I carried out this task, I provide a few examples.

Example 1: Reimbursement of campaign expenses for the 1992 parliamentary elections in Croatia. The 1992 governmental decision (Narodne Novine №. 42, 1992) envisaged the reimbursement of campaign expenses in the amount of HRD 150,000 for each electoral competitor that passed the electoral threshold of 6% at the constituency level. Accordingly, using electoral data at the district level (Državno Izborno Povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske, Parlamentarni izbori: 1992, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2003), I counted all candidates that fulfilled this requirement in each SMD as well as for the national constituency and multiplied it by HRD 150,000, thus obtaining the total amount of DPF provided by the state to all qualified parties and candidates. I performed similar estimations regarding other parliamentary elections in Croatia until the 2007 contest accounting for the amendments of the electoral system and changing levels of campaign reimbursement per each competitor fulfilling the eligibility criteria in each parliamentary election (see the country note for additional information).

**References:** Narodne Novine №. 42. Odluka o Utvrđivanju Visine Naknade Troškova Izborne Promičbe (1992). Retrieved from https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1992\_07\_42\_1064.html

Državno Izborno Povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske. Arhiva izbora Republike Hrvatske. Parlamentarni izbori. Retrieved from https://www.izbori.hr/arhiva-izbora/index.html#/app/home

Example 2: Reimbursement of campaign expenses for 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000 Serbian parliamentary elections. The 1992 Serbian law on the election of representatives (including later amendments) foresaw the equivalent of 1000 AMW as state support allotted to electoral competitors. Therefore, for each campaign, I used the official data on AMW from the Serbian Statistical Office (Илић et al., 2006) and multiplied it by 1000, thus obtaining the total state subsidy earmarked as campaign assistance. I used a similar approach to estimate the reimbursement of campaign spending in Montenegro for the 1992 and 1996 elections (see the country note for additional information).

**References:** Илић, Б., Тодоровић, М., Манов, С., & Републички завод за статистику. (2006). Зараде у републици Србији, 1965-2005. Београд: Република Србија, Републички завод за статистику. Retrieved from https://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/G2006/Pdf/G20066004.pdf

**Example 3**: Reimbursement of campaign expenses for the 2019 Polish parliamentary contest. Unlike 2007, 2011, and 2015 elections, the data on campaign reimbursement is missing from the website of CEC. Thus, I calculate it based on the party campaign financing reports (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, 2020) and the provisions of the Electoral Code. Electoral Code foresees the reimbursement of campaign expenses proportional to the number of seats each electoral committee obtained but not more than the actual expenses incurred by a given committee. Hence, I firstly added campaign expenses of all electoral committees eligible for campaign reimbursement (5% electoral threshold) and divided it by 560 seats, thus obtaining the reimbursement coefficient for a single parliamentary seat. Then, I multiply it by the number of seats each party/committee won. If the subsidy of a given party was higher than the actual incurred expenses, I use the expenses data as a baseline for reimbursement. Finally, I add the party level data into a common pool, thus obtaining the total subsidy. The reimbursement of campaign expenses for the 2019 elections turned out to be almost identical to the reimbursement provided after the 2015 elections.

**References:** Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (2020). Komunikat Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 30 stycznia 2020 r. w sprawie sprawozdań finansowych komitetów wyborczych uczestniczących w wyborach do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przeprowadzonych w dniu 13 października 2019 r. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/30XB81U

Besides these specific examples and the variable coding (next section), I also provide a brief overview of the nature and development of the DPF mechanism in each country separately for party statutory and election financing. Furthermore, I explain for each country separately how the raw data were transformed to obtain DPFRV and DPFV. While some shortcomings and mismatches might still be present, I believe that they are minor and do not distort presented data in a way that would affect its accuracy and reliability, particularly considering the existing proxies used in comparative research on political financing.

# **APPENDIX A: Variables and coding**

# The method by which the level of DPF is determined for party statutory financing: method\_amount\_st

This is a three-level categorical variable: Ad-hoc decision, Law-dynamic, Law-fixed. The *ad-hoc decision* implies the lack of any regulatory provisions embedded into party law or electoral legislation describing the procedure by which state subsidy is determined. It represents those PFR that determine the level of DPF through the budgetary process on an annual basis. *Law-dynamic* represents the situation when the amount of DPF is determined based on a floating economic indicator such as the average or minimal wage, a given share of budgetary revenues, expenses, or GDP. *Law-fixed* defines a situation in which the level of DPF is determined by a fixed coefficient/indicator (e.g., a given amount per registered voter, ballot cast, parliamentary seat) explicitly stipulated in the party or electoral law.

# The method by which the level of DPF is determined for election financing: method\_amount\_el

This variable is identical to *method\_amount\_st* but applies to state funding of elections.

# Total DPF for party statutory financing expressed in national currency: dpf\_statutory\_nc

This variable represents the total amount of DPF provided by the state to political parties each year, expressed in national currency. Nevertheless, in those cases in which the level of DPF is determined using a voter- or a vote-based reference criterion, that is, per registered voter or per valid cast ballot, I use the amount of DPF per voter or valid vote.

# Total DPF for party statutory financing expressed in national currency 2: dpf\_statutory\_nc\_2

This variable is identical to <code>dpf\_statutory\_nc</code>, but unlike the <code>dpf\_statutory\_nc</code>, which in some cases expresses the amount of DPF for a single registered voter or valid ballot cast, the <code>dpf\_statutory\_nc\_2</code> expresses the level of funding for the total number of registered voters or valid ballots cast. For instance, in the case of Armenia and Russia, the level of DPF for party statutory funding, as expressed by <code>dpf\_statutory\_nc</code>, reflects the amount for a single registered voter while <code>dpf\_statutory\_nc\_2</code> reflects the amount of DPF for the total number of registered voters, that is, DPF per voter multiplied by the number of registered voters. This variable is better suited to construct new indicators; however, one should bear in mind that for those post-communist countries that joined the eurozone, the total subsidy is expressed in two currencies: national currency and euro.

# Total DPF for election financing expressed in national currency: dpf\_elections\_nc

This variable represents the total amount of DPF provided by the state to political parties/electoral competitors for campaign financing. Two types of state funding are incorporated into this variable: DPF provided before and after elections. In the first case, DPF can be used for campaigning by parties and candidates, while in the second case, it takes the form of campaign reimbursement to compensate fully or partially for the incurred expenses.

# Total DPF for election financing expressed in national currency 2: dpf\_elections\_nc\_2

This variable is constructed based on the same logic as *dpf\_statutory\_nc\_2*. Hence *dpf\_elections\_nc\_2* is identical to *dpf\_elections\_nc* with the difference that it expresses DPF concerning the total number of registered voters or valid votes. Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic represent such examples.

### Total DPF for party statutory financing expressed in current USD: dpf\_statutory\_usd

This variable represents the amount of DPF expressed in USD. It is obtained by converting the DPF expressed in national currency into USD using each country's annual exchange rate against US \$.

# Total DPF for election financing expressed in current USD: dpf\_elections\_usd

This variable represents the amount of DPF expressed in USD. It is obtained by converting the DPF expressed in national currency into USD using each country's exchange rate against US \$. However, unlike party statutory financing, I do not always use the average (yearly) exchange rate. Since many post-communist polities passed through severe inflation periods or even hyperinflation during the '90, the annual exchange rate is not appropriate. Hence, in electoral years when a country experienced severe inflation, as a rule, I take the average exchange rate of the two months before elections.

# **DPF** per registered voter on party statutory funding expressed in current USD: dpfrv\_stat\_usd

This variable represents the level of DPF per registered voter provided for party statutory financing. It is obtained by dividing the total DPF in USD for party statutory financing (*dpf\_statutory\_usd*) by the number of registered voters (*registered\_voters*).

# DPF per vote on party statutory funding expressed in current USD: dpfv\_stat\_usd

This variable represents the level of DPF per vote for party statutory financing. It is obtained by dividing the total DPF in USD provided for party statutory financing (*dpf\_statutory\_usd*) by the number of voters who participated in parliamentary elections (*total\_votes*).

# **DPF** per registered voter on election financing expressed in current USD: dpfrv\_elect\_usd

This variable represents the level of DPF per registered voter allocated for election financing. It is obtained by dividing the total DPF in USD for campaign funding (*dpf\_elections\_usd*) by the number of registered voters (*registered\_voters*).

# DPF per vote on election financing funding expressed in current USD: dpfv\_elect\_usd

This variable represents the level of DPF per vote provided for election financing. It is obtained by dividing the total DPF in USD provided for campaign funding (*dpf\_elections\_usd*) by the number of voters who participated in parliamentary elections (*total\_votes*).

# Total DPF per registered voter expressed in current USD: dpfrv\_total

This variable represents the total amount of DPF per registered voter and is calculated as the sum of statutory and campaign funding (*dpfrv\_stat\_usd* + *dpfrv\_elect\_usd*).

## **Total DPF per vote expressed in current USD:** dpfv total

This variable represents the total amount of DPF per vote and is calculated as the sum of statutory and campaign funding  $(dpfv\_stat\_usd + dpfv\_elect\_usd)$ .

# Eligibility requirements (pay-out threshold) to get access to DPF for statutory party activity: access\_statutory

This variable reflects the minimum requirement a given party must fulfil to be eligible to state subsidy for statutory funding. It is commonly expressed in votes or parliamentary seats (when the pay-out threshold is the same as the electoral threshold). The minimum threshold is zero, while the maximum is the parliamentary representation (which in some cases might imply 50+1). A zero threshold means that all political parties have access to DPF regardless of electoral performance; thus, no minimum requirement exists to benefit from DPF.

# Eligibility requirements to get access to DPF for election activity access elections

This variable is almost identical to *access\_statutory* with the difference that it applies to elections. Another difference is that in the electoral context, the absence of minimum requirements might also refer to the candidate status, that is, once a party/candidate is officially registered as an electoral competitor, it is automatically entitled to DPF.

# State funds distribution formula for statutory party activity: distrib\_statutory

The distribution formula epitomizes the proportionality-equality spectrum in the allocation of DPF among the recipients. It ranges between zero and one, where zero implies a pure egalitarian distribution of DPF, that is, regardless of electoral performance, while one – a fully-proportional distribution, exclusively based on electoral results expressed in votes seats or their combination. For instance, if 30% of DPF is distributed in equal shares between the recipients while 70% – based on electoral performance, I assign a score of 0.7.

# State funds distribution formula for election activity: distrib\_elections

This variable is operationalized in the same way as *distrib statutory* but applied to election financing.

# Disaggregation of allocation formula for party statutory funding: distr\_formula\_st

This variable disaggregates the variable *distrib\_statutory* into smaller components and represents the share of DPF distributed to parties based on alternative criteria: members (m), votes (v), seats (s).

For instance, if *distrib\_statutory* gets a score of 0.8 while *distr\_formula\_st* is expressed as 20-s; 70-s; 10-v it means that 20% of the total state subsidy is allotted equally between parties, 70% - proportionally to the seat share, while 10% - proportionally to the vote share.

Likewise, if the *distrib\_statutory* scores 0.6 while *distr\_formula\_st* is expressed as 10-m; 30-s; 60-v it implies that 10% of the total state subsidy is allotted equally between parties that fulfil a minimum requirement of membership base, 30% - equally between parliamentary parties (regardless of their seat share), 60% - proportionally to the vote share.

# Disaggregation of allocation formula for election funding: distr\_formula\_el

This variable disaggregates the variable *distrib\_elections* and has the same interpretation as *distr\_formula\_st*. However, in addition to members, votes, and seats, it accounts for another criterion – the number of registered candidates (rc).

For instance, if *distrib\_elections* gets a score of 0.5 while *distr\_formula\_el* is expressed as 10-rc; 40-s; 50-v it implies that 10% of the total state subsidy is allotted equally between parties that registered as electoral competitors, 40% - equally between parliamentary parties (regardless of their seat share), while 50% - proportionally to the party vote share.

Likewise, if the *distrib\_elections* scores 0.67 while *distr\_formula\_el* is expressed as 33-rc; 67-rc, it implies that 33% of the total state subsidy is allotted equally between registered parties as election contenders, 67% - proportionally to the number of candidates included on the party list.

### Number of registered voters: registered voters

This variable represents the number of voters included in the country's voter registry.

Source: Voter Turnout Database (IDEA International, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout)

# **Number of voters who participated in elections:** total\_votes

This variable represents the number of voters who cast their ballots in elections, including both invalid and valid votes. Essentially, this variable reflects the election turnout.

Source: Voter Turnout Database (IDEA International, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout)

# Exchange rate for statutory financing: exchange\_rate\_annual

This variable represents the annual average exchange rate of each country's national currency relative to US \$.

Sources: Official exchange rates set by the national Central Banks; World Bank database on annual exchange rates relative to the US \$ (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF); Historical exchange rates (https://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange-rates.php?MA=0&TR=1).

# Exchange rate for election financing: exchange\_rate\_elections

This variable represents the exchange rate of each country's national currency relative to US\$. In most cases, it is the same as for statutory financing. However, for electoral years when a given country experienced very high inflation, I use the average exchange rate for the two months before PE.

Sources: Official exchange rates set by the national Central Banks; World Bank database on annual exchange rates relative to the US\$ (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF); Historical exchange rates (https://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange-rates.php?MA=0&TR=1).

# Significance of public funding for elections: v2elpubfin

This variable represents the aggregate expert score as feedback to the question: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office? I retrieve data from the "Varieties of Democracies" dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020, 2021) and use it to explore the relationship between the DPFV and expert opinions regarding the importance of electoral subsidies. The left-hand panel of Figure 6 in the article shows this relationship.

Coppedge M, Gerring J, Knutsen CH, et al. (2020) *V-Dem Codebook V10*. ID 3557877, SSRN Scholarly Paper, 20 March. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3557877.

Coppedge M, Gerring J, Knutsen CH, et al. (2021) V-Dem Dataset 2021. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. DOI: 10.23696/VDEMDS21.

# Equitable access to public funding during elections: subsidies\_eip

This variable represents the aggregate expert score to the question: Parties/candidates had equitable access to public political subsidies? I retrieve data from the "Electoral Integrity Project" dataset (Norris and Grömping, 2019a, 2019b) and use it to investigate the relationship between expert perceptions on the fairness mechanism to access state subsidies and the pay-out threshold that represents the legal equivalent of fairness. The right-hand panel of Figure 6 in the article depicts this relationship.

Norris P and Grömping M (2019a) *Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) dataset: Codebook.* 7.0, April. University of Sidney, Harvard Kennedy School. Available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/citation?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PDYRWL (accessed 10 December 2020).

Norris P and Grömping M (2019b) Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-7.0). Harvard Dataverse. DOI: 10.7910/DVN/PDYRWL.

# **APPENDIX B: Country notes, operationalization and sources**

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#### **ALBANIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Albania foresaw the provision of state support to political parties already in the 1991 LPP. The law did not specify the level of state support but stipulated that it should be set in the budget law adopted by the parliament. Subsequent amendments of LPP did not change this provision and only affected the access and distribution criteria.

# Data and operationalisation

Albania is the only country for which I could not find DPF data for the 1992, 1994-1998, 2000-2001 years. Therefore, for these years, I have imputed missing data using a linear interpolation method using "imputeTS" R package (Moritz and Bartz-Beielstein, 2017). For the 1993, 1999, 2002 – 2020 periods, I retrieve data on DPF from the SBL. To obtain DPFRV and DPFV, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is divided by the official number of registered voters and the official turnout figures, respectively. Then it is adjusted for the annual exchange rate against USD.

#### **Sources**

Law on Political Parties (№. 7502, 1991). In K. Barjaba (ed.), *Albania's democratic elections*, 1991-1997: analyses, documents and data (2004). Edition Sigma.

ALB: No. 8580. Law on Political Parties (as amended, 2017) (2000). Retrieved from https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7820/file/Albania\_law\_political\_parties\_2000\_am2017\_en.pdf

Moritz S and Bartz-Beielstein T (2017) imputeTS: Time Series Missing Value Imputation in R. *The R Journal* 9(1): 207. DOI: 10.32614/RJ-2017-009.

# Selection of SBL

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 1993 (№. 7684, 1993). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/303110001/Article-Per-buxhetin-e-shtetit-te-vitit-1993-.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 1999 (№. 8516, 1999). Retrieved from http://80.78.70.231/pls/kuv/f?p=201:Ligj:8516:22.07.1999

Për disa ndryshime në ligjin nr. 8847, datë 19.12.2001 "Për buxhetin e shtetit të vitit 2002". (№. 8903, 2002). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/205230004/Article-Per-disa-ndryshime-ne-ligjin-nr-8847-date-19-12-2001-Per-buxhetin-e-shtetit-te-vitit-2002-.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit te vitit 2004. (№.9165, 2003). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/312230004/Article-Per-Buxhetin-e-Shtetit-te-vitit-2004-.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 2005. (№. 9339, 2004). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/412210002/Article-Per-Buxhetin-e-Shtetit-te-vitit-2005-.aspx

Për buxhetin e shtetit të vitit 2006 (№. 9464, 2005). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/512280008/Article-Per-buxhetin-e-shtetit-te-vitit-2006.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 2007 (№. 9645, 2006). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/611270001/Article\_Per-Buxhetin-e-Shtetit-te-vitit-2007.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 2008 (№. 9836, 2007). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE\_CATEGORY/711260004/Article\_Per-Buxhetin-e-Shtetit-te-vitit-2008.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 2011 (№. 10355, 2010). Retrieved from http://www.ikub.al/LIGJE/1012240066/Article-PeR-BUXHETIN-E-VITIT-2011.aspx?cookiesEnabled=false

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 2015 (№. 160, 2014). Retrieved from https://www.vendime.al/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LIGJI-PER-BUXHETIN-2015.pdf

Për Buxhetin e Shtetit të vitit 2016 (№. 147, 2015). Retrieved from http://dap.gov.al/images/buxheti/Ligj%20nr.147-2015%20Per%20buxhetin%202016.pdf

Për Buxhetin e Vitit 2019 (№. 99, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.parlament.al/Files/ProjektLigje/20191104114208Ligji%20per%20buxhetin%20e%20vitit%202019.pdf

Krasniqi, A. & Hackaj, A. (2014). *Albanians and the European Social Model: Internal Democracy in Albanian Political Parties*. Tirana: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.festirana.org/media/publications/pdf-files/2015/t-150311-partite-politike-cdi-eng.pdf

### **ELECTION FINANCING**

# Note

As in the case of party statutory funding, the 1991 electoral law explicitly stipulated the provision of state support to electoral competitors who do not have material means for campaigning, without specifying, however neither the level of state support nor its distribution. The subsequent amendments of the electoral legislation did not clarify the procedure determining the level of DPF. It only amended the provisions concerning the access and distribution criteria.

### **Data and operationalisation**

For campaign financing, I rely mostly on various monitoring and assistance reports of IO and data from the Albanian Open Data project. To obtain DPFRV and DPFV, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is divided by the number of officially registered voters and by the turnout figures and adjusted for the exchange rate against USD.

#### **Sources**

ALB: №. 10019. Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania (as amended №. 74, 19 July 2012) (2008). Retrieved from

https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5840/file/Albania\_ELECTORAL%20CODE\_2012\_en.pdf

ALB: №. 10019. Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania (as amended №. 31, 2 April 2015) (2008). Retrieved from

https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/6059/file/Albania\_electoral\_code\_%20as%20of%202015.pdf

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IFES. (1992). *Republic of Albania: A Technical Assessment of the Election of the 1992* (No. R01505). Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Retrieved from https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/r01505.pdf

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OSCE/ODIHR. (2005). *Republic of Albania: Parliamentary Elections 3 July 2005*. Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

Project Open Data Albania: http://open.data.al/uploadserise/skedaret/pssh-fonde\_she\_shenzime\_elektorale\_2009\_Anglisht.xls

OSCE/ODIHR. (2013). *Republic of Albania: Parliamentary Elections 23 June 2013*. Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

OSCE/ODIHR. (2017). *Republic of Albania: Parliamentary Elections 25 June 2017*. Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

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#### **ARMENIA**

#### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

## Note

Armenia foresaw the provision of DPF to political in the 2002 LPP. The law set the level of DPF to 0.03 of the MMW per registered voter (AMD  $30 - \approx \$0.05$  in 2003). However, this coefficient is not estimated based on the actual MMW that increased over time but a different one (despite its name) since it remained unchanged despite the actual increase of MMW. In 2016 the new LPP increased this coefficient to 0.04 (AMD  $40 - \approx \$0.08$  in 2017).

# Data and operationalisation

Since the amount of DPF is based on registered voter as a reference criterion for the calculation of the total subsidy, I simply use this coefficient although I cross-check it with the SBL data by dividing the total subsidy by the number of registered voters and obtain the same result.

#### Sources

Закон Республики Армения о Партиях (№. 3P-410-H, 2002). Retrieved from https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=63561

Конституционный Закон Республики Армения о Партиях (3P-224-H, 2016). Retrieved from https://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?docid=126275

Закон Республики Армения О минимальной месячной заработной плате (№. 3P-66-H, 2003). Retrieved from https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=63980

### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Armenia does not provide direct state subsidies to political parties for campaign financing.

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#### **AZERBAIJAN**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Between 1992 – 2011 Azerbaijan did not provide DPF to political parties. For the 2012-2020 period, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is set in the SBL on annual basis, while between 2013-2017 the annual DPF was the same each year.

# **Data and operationalisation**

To obtain DPFRV and DPFV, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is divided by the official number of registered voters and/or by the official turnout figures and adjusted for the annual exchange rate against USD.

#### **Sources**

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#### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

Since independence Azerbaijan provided DPF for election financing only in the 2000 and 2005 elections. I could not find data for the total amount of DPF provided to political parties in the 2000 parliamentary contest.

# **Operationalisation**

To obtain DPFRV and DPFV, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is divided by the official number of registered voters and/or by the official turnout figures and adjusted for the exchange rate against USD.

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#### **BELARUS**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Belarus does not provide DPF to political parties for their daily/regular activity.

#### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Belarus provided DPF for electoral candidates for 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 parliamentary contests. The regulations are not explicit on DPF for the 1995 elections. For the 2016 and 2019 parliamentary contests, the state cancelled out the provision of DPF for election campaigning.

# Data and operationalisation

According to the Byelorussian EC, DPF is provided to individual candidates running in SMD that amounts to 50 MMW for each registered candidate. Therefore, I multiplied the number of officially registered candidates by the MMW value at the time of each election campaign, thus obtaining the total amount of DPF. Next, I divided this figure by the number of registered voters and/or valid votes and adjusted for the official exchange rate against USD.

For the 2000 and 2008 elections, my estimations coincide with the campaign financing data from the OSCE/ODIHR monitoring reports. For the 2012 PE, the OSCE/ODIHR report contradicts the CEC data. Here I opted for the DPF calculation based on the CEC decision.

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### **BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA**

#### **DPF FOR STATUTORY AND ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Neither Party Financing Law nor Election Law stipulates the provision of DPF to political parties and/or electoral competitors at the federal level. However, political parties receive both types of financing at the entity level as a share of the budgetary funds. In the Srpska Republic, the amount of DPF for party statutory funding is set at 0.2% while for electioneering purposes it represents 0.05% of the budget. In the Federation, these figures are set at 0.1% and 0.03% respectively (GRECO, 2011). Given the complexity of these formulas, I use the CEC aggregate data on DPF provided to political parties from all administrative levels. Although I am not able to split data into DPF for statutory and election funding, it is still available as total funding.

# Data and operationalisation

To obtain DPFRV and DPFV, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is divided by the official number of registered voters and/or by the official turnout figures and adjusted for the exchange rate against USD.

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#### **BULGARIA**

## PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Bulgaria introduced DPF for political parties regularly in 2001. Initially, the amount of state funding was not specified in the LPP but had to be set in the SBL. The provisions affecting DPF amount have been subsequently amended several times in 2005, 2006, 2009 by tying the size of DPF to the MMW and setting it at 1%, 2%, 5% respectively. In 2011 the LPP was again amended by detaching the amount of DPF from the MMW, thus reversing it to the initial provisions when the amount of DPF was set in the SBL.

# Data and operationalisation

Since the amount of DFP is determined by applying a vote-based method, I simply use this value and adjust it for the average exchange rate against USD. Therefore, the total amount provided by the state to political parties represents the amount per valid vote multiplied by the total number of valid votes. However, I use the amount per single valid vote. My estimations are cross-checked with SBLs and journalistic accounts (see sources).

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Bulgaria provided DPF for election financing for the 1990, 1991, 1994, and 1997 parliamentary contests. Upon the introduction of DPF for party statutory activities, direct election financing from the state budget was discontinued.

# **Data and operationalisation**

To obtain DPFRV and DPFV, the total amount of DPF allocated to political parties is divided by the official number of registered voters and/or by the official turnout figures and adjusted for the exchange rate against USD.

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#### **CROATIA**

# PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Croatia stipulated the provision of DPF in the 1993 LPP applying a rather convoluted formula. In 1998 the law was amended by setting the amount of DPF at 0.056% of the budgetary expenses for the previous year. The 2006 law on party and campaign funding provided additional funding to parties from the regional/local budgets. In 2011 the share of DPF was slightly lowered to 0.05% of the budgetary expenses for the previous year.

### **Data and operationalisation**

Due to the complexity of determining the total amount of DPF and to avoid potential errors, I retrieved the DPF data from the annual SBL for the period 1995-2006. Likewise, given the additional provision of DPF from the regional/local budgets, introduced by the 2006 law (not foreseen in the SBL), I have relied on annual reports of the Croatian SAO, which contain information on both types of DPF (DPF from central budget + DPF from local budgets). Therefore, for the post-2006 period, the total amount of DPF provided by the state to political parties also incorporates the resources from local budgets. Next, I divide the total amount by the number of registered voters and valid votes to obtain the DPFRV and DPFV.

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# **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Croatia provided DPF for election financing starting with the 1992 PE. Since then, for each parliamentary contest, the state provided DPF as election campaign reimbursement setting the amount based on an ad-hoc decision.

# **Data and operationalisation**

For 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003 and 2007 PE, I have estimated the total amount of DPF based on the electoral results for each SMD/MMD, the government's decision establishing the conditions for the eligibility criteria and the amount for campaign reimbursement for each electoral competitor at MMD level (see example 1). For 2011, 2015, and 2016 contests, I retrieved the data from the SAO reports (see above) for the respective years, while for the 2020 PE I used the CEC decision on the level of DPF each electoral competitor received.

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#### CZECH REPUBLIC

# PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

While Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia at the time) introduced DPF to political parties already in the 1990 PE as campaign reimbursement, political parties were provided with state subsidies explicitly earmarked for their routine activities in 1993 following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The system of DPF was subsequently amended several times by increasing the level of state support for party daily operations. After the 2000 amendment of the LPP, the amount of state support remained stable (as expressed in national currency) until 2016 when it was slightly increased as a result of a thorough revision of the entire PFR.

# Data and operationalisation

The Czech system of DPF established in 1994 envisaged a rather complicated allocation mechanism made up of three elements: a) a lump sum of CZK 3 million ( $\approx$ \$105,000) for political parties clearing the eligibility threshold of 3 per cent; b) a subsidy of CZK 100,000 ( $\approx$ \$3475) for each 0.1% of votes up to 5 per cent; c) a subsidy of CZK 500,000 ( $\approx$ \$17,370) for each parliamentary seat.

The same mechanism was preserved but the subsidy increased following the 2000 amendment. Accordingly, the lump sum and the vote-based subsidy were doubled reaching CZK 6 million ( $\approx$ \$160,000) and CZK 200,000 ( $\approx$ \$5,350), while seat-based contribution was set at CZK 900,000 ( $\approx$ \$24,000). In 2010, the seat-based subsidy was decreased to CZK 855,000 ( $\approx$ \$44700), while in 2016 it was replaced with the previous sum of CZK 900,000 ( $\approx$ \$36800).

Given the complexity of this mechanism to estimate the total amount of DPF and to avoid potential errors, I rely on hard/actual data. For the early period (1991-1997), I use data from Šimral (2015), while for the 1998-2019 period, I rely on data from the Czech Ministry of Finance (Ministerstvo Financí České Republiky, 2019). I also cross-check my data with other secondary literature on Czech party finances, although in most cases data on DPF is reflected on the party, not the system level.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Unlike statutory funding, the formula for the provision of DPF for election financing is much simpler. The exact amount of DPF that ranged between CZK 10 ( $\approx$ \$0.47 in 1990) and CZK 100 ( $\approx$ \$3 in 2000,  $\approx$ \$4.3 in 2017) per valid vote is stipulated in electoral legislation.

# **Data and operationalisation**

Here, I calculate the level of state support by dividing the amount of DPF per vote based on the election law by the exchange rate for every election year.

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#### **ESTONIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Estonia introduced the provision of DPF in the 1994 LPP. However, state funding was effectively disbursed starting with 1996. LPP did not set the level of DPF and it was determined through the standard budgetary process. In 2004 the level of funding was set in the LPP only for the non-parliamentary parties while for the parliamentary parties the method remained the same.

# **Data and operationalisation**

Data on DPF for the 1996-2019 period were retrieved from the annual SBLs. Accordingly, I take the total amount of DPF and divide it by the number of registered voters and valid votes to obtain the DPFRV and DPFV.

#### Sources

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#### **ELECTION FINANCING**

# Note

Estonia does not provide DPF for election financing.

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# **GEORGIA**

#### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Georgia foresaw the provision of DPF in the 1997 LPP but the transitional provisions of the law postponed the effective disbursement of subsidies until 1<sup>st</sup> January 2000. The initial amount of DPF was set at GEL 150 per MP ( $\approx$  \$70 in 2000) and was increased to GEL 200 in 2005 ( $\approx$  \$110 in 2005) although the later

provision turned out to be short-lived. In December 2005, the Georgian parliament amended the 1997 LPP by substantially increasing the level of state support. It introduced a vote-based formula by employing a regressive coefficient to the number of votes gained by each party (see table).

Currency	Votes <= 200,000	Votes > 200,000 - <= 500,000	Votes > 500,000
	(per vote)	(per vote)	(per vote)
GEL	2	1.5	1
USD	1.13	0.84	0.56

In 2007 the LPP was again amended by making the allocation mechanism more complex based on a threeelement formula: an equal lump sum (basic funding), seat-based and vote-based regressive coefficients (see table below).

	Basic funding	Basic funding	Seats	Seats	Votes	Votes
	<= 8% parl. elections	> 8% parl. elections	<= 30	>30	<= 200,000	> 200,000
	<= 6% local elections	> 6% local elections	(per seat)	(per seat)	(per vote)	(per vote)
GEL	150,000	300,000	7200	1200	1.5	1
USD	84,440	168,881	4,053	676	0.84	0.56

While this mechanism remained the same, the level of DPF increased overtime either through altering the amount on a single dimension, as happened in 2013 when the basic funding was doubled or by instituting additional channels whereby parties would access additional state support. Accordingly, as of 2009, a new source of DPF became available with the aim of "creation of a healthy and competitive political system", that is for educational purposes. The size of the new subsidy represented half of the parties' main income but had to be shared equally with NGOs, which still accounted for an increase of 25% of their statutory funding.

# **Data and operationalisation**

For the early years 2000 – 2005, I calculate the total DPF using data from Gobronidze (2008) on the subsidy level per MP and multiply it by the number of MPs. Given the complexity of the DPF introduced after the 2005 amendment, I rely on the official data on state subsidies from the CEC and SAO for the 2008 – 2019 period. These reports provide party level data from each I construct yearly aggregates for the total subsidy. Likewise, I cross-check my calculations with reports of NGOs and IOs (Transparency International Georgia, GRECO). Accordingly, I take the total amount of DPF and divide it by the number of registered voters and valid votes to obtain the DPFRV and DPFV.

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# **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

The provision of campaign funds for electioneering purposes was foreseen in the 1992 Law on the Parliamentary elections and remained in force for the 1992,1995 and 1999 PE. However, it is not clear whether the DPF provisions were actually enforced. At least in the 1995 contest, electoral competitors did not receive state funding despite regulatory provisions. DPF for election financing was reintroduced in 2012 PE as campaign reimbursement subsidies. Besides a lump sum of GEL 1 million ( $\approx$  \$606 thousand in 2012) reimbursed to parties that cleared the 5% threshold, the law also foresaw the reimbursement of TV advertisement up to GEL 300 thousand ( $\approx$  \$182 thousand in 2012). These provisions were amended several times in 2014, 2017 and 2018 by extending the state support to political parties.

# **Data and operationalisation**

As for data on party statutory activity, I rely on the official reports of CEC, which provide disaggregated data on state funds received by each party/electoral competitor. Hence, I aggregate party-level data to obtain the total amount of DPF for the respective campaign.

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#### HUNGARY

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Hungary introduced the provision of DPF in the 1989 LPP but it did not specify the level of state subsidies, which was set in the SBL on annual basis. Therefore, the total amount of DPF was determined through the standard budgetary process by political parties.

# Data and operationalisation

I retrieved data on DPF from the annual editions of Hungarian SBL (1992-2020), which provide disaggregated data on party level for both parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties. Hence, I simply added up party level data to obtain the total amount of DPF at the system level. From 2005, I also include the state funding provided to party foundations. Next, I performed the standard procedure by dividing the aggregate amount by the number of registered voters and valid votes to obtain the DPFRV and DPFV.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Unlike DPF for party statutory funding, the level of DPF for campaign financing was much lower between 1994-2010 PE. For this period, the state provided about HUF 100 million to be distributed among electoral competitors proportionally to the number of registered candidates. In 2013 the state support for election funding was substantially increased. The state provided HUF 1 million to a candidate registered in SMD districts and additional funding for party lists, contingent on the number of registered candidates across the country. The maximum amount of DPF for election financing for a single party could reach HUF 703 million ( $\approx$ \$3 million) in 2014.

# **Data and operationalisation**

For the 1994-2010 election, the level of state support remained the same (HUF 100 million), while for the 2014 and 2018 elections it varied depending on the number of party lists registered for the country wide electoral district and the number of candidates filed in SMD.

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#### KAZAKHSTAN

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

# Note

Kazakhstan is one of the latecomers within the group of post-communist regimes providing DPF to political parties. DPF was introduced in 2009 and the level of state support was set in SBL based on the CEC decision that linked the amount of DPF to MMW. Accordingly, the level of state subsidy was set initially at 1% MMW, increased to 6.5% in 2011 but decreased to 3% in 2012. As the MMW increased over time, the same happened with the pool of state subsidies provided to political parties.

# **Data and operationalisation**

As in other cases, I retrieved data on DPF from the annual SBLs for the entire period 2009-2020. While it is still possible to estimate the amount of DPF using only the MMW, the regulatory provisions changed several times during the first years after its introduction and the timing of the CEC decisions would make the estimation difficult. Therefore, I opted for SBL data, which also was amended several times. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV from the aggregate funding.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Kazakhstan does not provide DPF for election financing.

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#### **KYRGYZSTAN**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Kyrgyzstan does not provide DPF for party statutory funding.

### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Kyrgyzstan does not provide DPF for election financing.

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# **LATVIA**

## PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Latvia introduced effectively the DPF for party statutory activity in 2012, although the party financing law was amended in 2010 to foresee state subsidies. In 2012 level of subsidies was set at LVL 0.50 for each valid vote while in 2013 it was set at €0.71 given the country joining the euro zone in 2014. At the end of 2019, DPF was substantially increased being set at €4.50 per valid vote.

# **Data and operationalisation**

I simply use the amount of DPF for a valid vote and adjust for the exchange rate to USD.

### **Sources**

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# **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Latvia does not provide DPF for election financing.

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#### **LITHUANIA**

#### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Lithuania introduced DPF for party routine activity in 1999. Initially, the level of DPF should not exceed 0.1% of the budgetary expenditures, a limit that was removed in 2004. As a result, the level of DPF had to be determined through the standard budgetary process. CEC was authorised to determine the amount and the allocation of DPF to political parties.

# **Data and operationalisation**

Given the key role of the CEC in determining the amount and distribution of DPF among beneficiaries, I use the publicly available data from the CEC webpage. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

#### Sources

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#### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Lithuania provided DPF for campaign financing only for 2004 and 2008 PE. The level of campaign reimbursement represented 25% of the total budgetary subventions provided to political parties in the election year.

### **Data and operationalisation**

As for data on party statutory activity, DPF data on campaign financing was retrieved from the CEC webpage.

### **Sources**

The same as for party statutory activity (see above)

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#### **MACEDONIA**

#### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Macedonia envisaged the introduction of DPF in the 1994 LPP. As in other cases, the law itself did not determine the level of state support that had to be established through the budgetary process. Yet, unlike other cases, the transparency of state funding of parties was insufficient and between 1995-2004, the transfer of subsidies to parties, as a separate budget line, can be found only in 1996, 1999, and 2004 SBLs. For other years during this period, state funding was included in the overall funding of NGOs and/or citizens' associations. While the 2004 PFL set the level of DPF to 0.06% of the budgetary revenue, the transparency of allocation remained an issue and between 2005-2011 the total subsidy for parties was alike part of the funding provided for NGOs. Only from 2011-2012, the provision of DPF to parties can be identified in SBL as a separate budget line but still, it was concealed under the label "transfers to NGOs" (Трансфери до невладини организации). In 2018 PFL was amended and the level of DPF was increased to 0.15% of the budgetary revenue, that is an increase of 2.5 times.

# **Data and operationalisation**

Despite insufficient transparency, I rely on SBL for the 1995-2004 period. Even though there was not a separate budget line for all these years on DPF, based on data from 1996 and 1999 for which the level of DPF is available, one may conclude that it was fairly stable. Likewise, I resort to SBLs for the 2011-2020 period, for which DPF for parties appears as a separate budget item but under a different label as explained above. From 2005 to 2010, I calculate it based on legal provisions from the PFL and budgetary revenue. However, given the fact that for 2011-2019, the level of subsidies was slightly lower than the maximum 0.06% allowed by the PFL (on average 93% from the 0.06%), I apply the same rate for the 2005-2010 period. Accordingly, I calculate firstly the maximum of 0.06% from the budgetary revenue and then adjust for the 93% share from form the total. Next, I use the standard procedure to obtain the DPFRV/DPFV.

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#### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Unlike party statutory funding, the provision of DPF for election financing was more transparent while the procedure to determine the subsidy level more straightforward. During seven parliamentary contests hold between 1998-2016, the reimbursement of campaign expenses was set at MKD 15 per vote ( $\approx$  \$0.3 in 1998). The 2018 amendment of EC cancelled the provision of DPF for campaign funding, but it was compensated with a substantial increase of DPF for party statutory activity.

# **Data and operationalisation**

For the 1990 and 1994 PE, the law on elections of deputies stipulated that 1/3 of financial resources allocated for the election organisation should be distributed to electoral competitors (I could not find data for these 2 PE). The 1998 EC directly sets the level of subsidy to 15 dinars per vote, a provision that remained in force until the 2018 amendments.

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#### **MOLDOVA**

# PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Moldova foresaw the provision of DPF in the new LPP adopted at the end of 2007. Yet the implementation of this provision was postponed several times. As a result, the effective disbursement of DPF to political parties was performed only in 2016. Initially, the level of DPF was set at 0.2% of the budgetary revenue for the respective year. An amendment to LPP removed this limit in 2018. Another LPP amendment reintroduced the cap in 2019 but set the DPF at 0.1% of the budgetary revenue. CEC was authorised to calculate this amount and to allocate it to political parties based on their electoral performance.

# Data and operationalisation

I retrieve data from the CEC decisions regarding the amount and the distribution of DPF to political parties, which is based on the DPF amount determined by the SBL. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Moldova does not provide DPF for campaign financing, but parties are permitted to use their subsidies allocated for statutory activities on campaign spending.

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#### **MONTENEGRO**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

While Montenegro was part of a common state with Serbia until 2006, it had separate regulation on party and campaign financing. Montenegro introduced the provision of DPF for party statutory activity in the 1993 PFL setting the level of subsidies at 0.2% of the budgetary revenue. State support to political parties was increased in 1997 following the passage of a new PFL that fixed the level of DPF at 0.3% of the budgetary revenue. A 2004 amendment of PFL altered this threshold by setting a minimum (0.3%) and a

maximum (0.5%) of DPF from the budgetary revenue. While in 2008 the minimum and maximum ceilings have been lowered to 0.2% and 0.4% respectively, a new source of DPF was made available for political parties – local budgets. For the financing of party daily operations in local assemblies, the minimum and maximum threshold were set at 0.5% and 1% of the budgetary revenue. In 2010, another amendment of PFL cancelled out the provision on the minimum and maximum caps for both central and local budgets but increased the level of subsidies to 0.5% of the central budget and 1% of the local budget. In 2014 the share of DPF allotted to parties from the central budget was raised to 0.6% while the subsidy shares from local budgets ranged between 1.1% - 3%. The last amendment regarding DPF, passed in 2017, set the level of DPF from the central budget back to 0.5% while leaving untouched the subsidy level from the local budgets.

# **Data and operationalisation**

Given the highly unstable nature of DPF provisions and difficulty to estimate the level of state subsidy, I rely on SBL, execution of SBL and NGO's monitoring reports on party and campaign financing. For the 1993-1997 period, SBL contains disaggregate data on DPF for each party entitled to DPF. Hence, I pooled party level data to obtain a county-year total. For the 1998-2020 data come in aggregate form as budgetary transfers to political parties. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

# Note

Already in the 1990 PE Montenegro envisaged state support as reimbursement of election expenses for the elected MPs. The 1992 electoral law stipulated more clearly the nature of this support by securing 1000 net AMW for campaign funding to be distributed among all electoral contenders. In 1996 PE, the level of subsidies increased considerably. Each registered electoral list received 4 AMW for every constituency (14 in total), and 400 net AMW if it nominated candidates in at least 10 constituencies. The subsequent amendments of election law in force during 1998, 2001 and 2002 PE cancelled out the numeric criteria on how much state funding should be provided to political parties. This decision was placed in the hands of the legislative. The revision of the PFR, via the adoption of the 2004 PFL, increased again the level of DPF for election financing. The law set the subsidy level at 0.3% from the state budget, however, it was subject to several amendments in 2005 (0.4%), 2008 (0.15%), and 2010 (0.25%).

# Data and operationalisation

To obtain data on total DPF for election financing, I use several sources or estimate it based on regulatory provisions in force for the respective election campaign. For the 1992 and 1996 elections, I calculate the amount of state funding relying on the Election Law and AMW. For the subsequent campaigns, I was able

to find aggregate figures from various sources, including electoral assistance or election monitoring reports of IO (OSCE/ODIHR, IFES, GRECO), local NGOs and official documents. These sources provide the exact figures on DPF disbursed to political parties for campaign financing. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV/DPFV.

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# **POLAND**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

# Note

Poland introduced a permanent state subsidy for political parties for their statutory activities in 2002 following the amendment of LPP in 2001. Nevertheless, political parties received DPF for their statutory activities after the 1997 PE, although it was not a permanent one. Since 2002 the amount of DPF was calculated applying a regressive coefficient to the number of votes won by each party. In 2010 the LPP was amended by reducing this amount by almost a half (in force from 2011).

2002		2011		
Percentage votes	Amount PLN per vote	Percentage	Amount PLN per vote	
<=5	10	<=5	5.77	
> 5 - <= 10	8	> 5 - <= 10	4.61	
>10 - <=20	7	>10 - <=20	4.4	

>20 - <= 30	4	>20 - <= 30	2.31
> 30	1.5	> 30	0.87

# **Data and operationalisation**

For the 1997 year, I calculate the amount of DPF based on Walecki (2007), the LPP regulations and SBL allocations to CEC for the 1997 electoral year. For the 2001 – 2020 period, I rely on the official data on the total amount and distribution of DPF to political parties from the Polish CEC that used the above formula to calculate the level of state subsidy for each party. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Poland introduced DPF as campaign reimbursement for election financing already for the 1993 PE, which became a permanent feature of the PFR. Initially, the level of subsidy was set at 20% of the entire budget allocated for election organisation. In 2001 the formula was amended by tying the campaign reimbursement to actual expenses incurred by political parties and election committees. Accordingly, the pool of total expenses incurred by electoral competitors that won parliamentary seats is divided by 560 (total number of seats in lower and upper chambers). Then, the obtained coefficient is multiplied by the number of parliamentary seats obtained by each party, although a party/election committee cannot receive more than it spent in elections.

# **Data and operationalisation**

For the 1993 and 1997 PE, data on campaign reimbursement is based on Walecki (2007). For the 2001-2015 period, I rely on the official data published by the CEC on its webpage, while for the 2019 elections I calculated it (see example 3 in the general overview section). Similar to party statutory funding, CEC provides data on the amount of DPF for each party/election committee entitled to state support. Next, I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

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### **ROMANIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

### Note

Romania introduced DPF to parties for their routine activities in 1996. The LPP set the maximum level of DPF to 0.04% of the budgetary revenue, a ceiling that remained unaltered during the subsequent adoption of new PFLs in 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, even though the maximum of 0.04% of the budgetary revenue represented a rather modest allocation, Romanian parties rarely reached this maximum between 1996 – 2015. In 2018, however, through an amendment to the 2006 PFL, the amount of DPF was set as a floating coefficient linked to the GDP instead of the budgetary revenue. Accordingly, article 18 of PFL set the minimum and maximum levels of DPF to 0.01% and 0.04% of the GDP respectively. As a result, the 2018 subsidy was almost 6 times higher compared to the 2017 subsidy.

# Data and operationalisation

For the 1996 – 2007 period, I rely on SBL that determine the total amount of DPF allotted to parties on annual basis. For the 2008-2020 period, I retrieve data from the Permanent Electoral Authority which published either annual or monthly summaries on the actual subsidies received by political parties, which sometimes are different from the foreseen budget allocations. In those cases, I use the data on DPF that were effectively paid to political parties. I cross-check these data with other sources such as annual reports of the Department for the Control of the Financing of Political Parties and Election Campaigns and with a recent online database of Romanian party finance (Expert Forum, 2021)

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## **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

Romania did not provide DPF for campaign funding/election reimbursement for the PE held between 1992 – 2012. While the 1992 Law on Election of Deputies stipulated that political parties may receive a state subsidy through a special law, such a law has never been adopted. Very limited state support was provided for the first democratic elections held in 1990. State funding of elections was reintroduced in 2015 and was implemented in the 2016 elections as reimbursement of election expenses. Electoral competitors were reimbursed in full for the election expenses they could justify with proofs. Accordingly, reimbursement of

aggregate election expenses in the 2016 PE represented about 93% from the reimbursement claims and 83% from the total election expenses.

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### **RUSSIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

### Note

Russia foresaw the provision of DPF for party statutory activities in the 2001 LPP. However, the effective disbursement of budgetary funds occurred only in 2004 based on the results of State Duma elections held in December 2003. Initially, the LPP set the amount of DPF for a vote at 0.005% (in 2004 this represented RUB 0.5 - \$0.02) of the MMW in force on 1 March the year previous to the electoral one. Hence, the total amount of DPF was calculated by multiplying this coefficient by the number of registered voters. The level of state subsidy per vote was increased several times in 2006 (RUB 5 - \$0.18), 2009 (RUB 20 - \$0.63), 2013 (RUB 50 - \$1.6), 2015 (RUB 110 - \$1.8), and 2017 (RUB 152 - \$2.6).

# **Data and operationalisation**

Since the formula for calculating the level of DPF is vote-based, I simply use the amount specified by the LPP and divide it by the annual exchange rate against the USD. Note that due to the vote-based formula, the DPFRV is equivalent to the DPFV.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

Russia provided state support for campaign financing only for the first three State Duma elections in 1993, 1995, and 1999. The size of state support was decided on an ad-hoc basis by the CEC before each parliamentary contest. In the 1993 Duma elections, CEC disbursed RUB 100 million (\$83.6 thousand) to each registered party-list filing candidates in the proportional tier of the electoral system and advised DECs to provide RUB 200 thousand (\$167) to each registered candidate in SMD. In 1995, every registered party-list nominating candidates in the proportional tier received RUB 115 million (\$25.4 thousand), while each SMD candidate benefited from RUB 400 thousand (\$88). Finally, in 1999 the CEC recommended DECs to distribute between RUB 800 – RUB 1200 (\$30-\$45) to every SMD candidate, whereas party lists received RUB 220 thousand (\$8.7 thousand).

# **Data and operationalisation**

Considering that the total amount of DPF was dependent on the number of registered party list and SMD candidates, I retrieve the data on the total amount from the CEC reports on the election financing for each Duma elections. Then I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

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The above decisions and reports can be found in the collection of documents on election financing (see below)

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### **SERBIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

## Note

Serbia introduced DPF to parties for their statutory activity in the 1991 PFL, which set the level of DPF to 3000 AMW (12 AMW for each of 250 MPs). The 1992 PFL increased the subsidy to 6000 net AMW, while the 1997 PFL maintained the subsidy at the same level. Yet, the hyperinflation Serbia passed through the early '90 substantially affected the real value of state subsidy. The breakdown of the Milosevic regime brought about another change in the PFR, including the mechanism of the DPF allocation. The new law set the subsidy level at 0.2% of the budgetary revenue, a provision that survived only until 2003 when another amendment of PFL set the limit to 0.15% of the budget (minus transfers to other administrative levels, social security and medical insurance contributions). Yet the same law foresaw additional income sources – 0.1% of the budgetary revenue from the local budgets and 0.1% from the budget of the territorial autonomy unit. These provisions remained in force until the 2011 amendment of the PFL that set the same level of DPF for all administrative levels – 0.15% of the budgetary expenses minus transfers. The last amendment was passed in 2014 by lowering the level of DPF to 0.105% of the budgetary revenue for all levels of government.

# Data and operationalisation

Given the uncertainties stemming from the political, economic and military turbulences Serbia was exposed to during the '90, the calculation of DPF based on regulatory provisions is problematic Therefore, for this period (1991 – 1996, 1999), I rely on data provided in Goati (2007), while for the 1997 and 1998, I estimate the amount of DPF based on PFL provisions using the annual AMW and exchange rates of Serbian Dinar to USD. For the 2000 – 2020 years, I retrieve DPF data from the annual SBL and/or the law on the execution of SBL. Then I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

As of 1992 PE, Serbian regulations foresaw the provision of DPF as state support for elections. The 1992 election law set the level of DPF at 1000 AMW in the month preceding the month when the elections are called. These financial resources were to be distributed proportionally among the party lists that nominated at least 75% of candidates. The 1000 AMW remained in force for the 1993,1997 and 2000 parliamentary contests, although the distribution formula was amended by removing the 75% threshold. The 2003 PFL (in force from 2004) applied a different formula for the state support for campaign funding, which was similar to statutory funding but with lower thresholds. Accordingly, the level of subsidy was set at 0.1% from the central budget (minus transfers to other administrative levels, social security and medical insurance contributions), 0.5% from the local budget and 0.5% from the budget of the territorial autonomy unit. These regulations survived until 2011 when the new PFL established the same proportion of funds to be secured for campaign funding from the budgets of all administrative levels – 0.1%. The last amendment of PFL regarding DPF decreased this coefficient to 0.07%.

# Data and operationalisation

Given the difficulty to find systematic data on DPF for the 1992 – 2003 election period, I use the provisions of the Election law and annual AMW to calculate the amounts of budgetary resources foreseen for the election financing of parties and candidates. For the 2007-2020 electoral period, I rely on data from SBL, reports of the Serbian Anti-Corruption Agency (responsible for the oversight of PFR as of 2011) and reports of international organisations (GRECO, IFES, OSCE/ODIHR, Transparency Serbia). The aggregate amount of DPF is converted to USD and divided by the number of registered voters/valid votes.

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### **SLOVAKIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

### Note

During the early transition years, Slovakia, as a part of Czechoslovakia, shared the same PFR. After the 1993 country peaceful split, Slovakia amended the LPP and Election Law by establishing a new system of DPF. The level of state subsidy for party statutory activity was set at SKK 15 (≈ \$0.47 in 1994) and represented ¼ of the subsidy provided as campaign reimbursement, a regulatory feature that remained stable over time (when campaign reimbursement increased, so did the DPF for statutory funding). The 2000 amendment to LPP extended the previous system by adding a seat-based income source for parliamentary parties. Accordingly, each party received a subsidy amounting to SKK 500 thousand (≈ \$10.3 thousand in 2001) for each parliamentary seat. This formula was replaced by a new one following the enactment of a new LPP in 2005. The new seat-based formula relied on a regressive coefficient linked to the AMW. Hence, for the first 20 seats, a political party would receive 30 AMW per seat, whereas for every seat above 20 it would receive 20 AMW. This feature of the DPF mechanism remains currently in force but since the AMW increased over time, so did the pool of state funds disbursed for each parliamentary seat.

### **Data and operationalisation**

Given the complexity of the DPF mechanism and its change over time, I use several methods to obtain the amount of DPF. For the 1990-1993 years, I employ the same data and method as for the Czech Republic. For the 1994 – 2000 period, I directly use the DPFV per vote (SKK 15) which is explicitly stipulated in the LPP on DPF allocation, that is the level of DPF for statutory activity represents ¼ of campaign reimbursement expenses (SKK 60). While, for the 2001-2005 period, I rely on Belko (2005), Sičáková-Beblavá & Zemanovičová (2002), I also estimate the level of DPF based on regulatory provisions. Since the 2000 amendment of the LPP, while keeping the vote-based formula, additionally introduced a seat-based method (SKK 500 thousand per parliamentary seat), I multiply this coefficient by the number of parliamentary seats (150), thus obtaining the total subsidy for the seat-based component of the DPF

mechanism. Next, I add this sum to the vote-based subsidy (SKK 15 per vote multiplied by the number of votes obtained by eligible parties) and I divide it by the number of votes, thus obtaining DPFV.

Since the 2005 amendment of the LPP introduces a significantly more complex formula to determine the level of DPF, for the 2006-2020 period, I rely on official data of DPF from various sources. However, considering that official information I found does not split DPF data separately for party statutory and election activities for the electoral years, I use election data (votes gained by all parties that qualify for reimbursement (> 3% threshold)), the vote-based coefficient (0.75% or 1% AMW) and the AMW from the statistical office (in the year previous to the one when elections are held) to estimate the total amount of campaign reimbursement received by the recipient parties. Then I subtract this number from the total amount of DPF, thus retaining only the subsidy for party statutory activity. This operation was conducted for 2006, 2010, 2012, 2016 and 2020 election years.

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#### **ELECTION FINANCING**

#### Note

Slovak political parties benefited from state funding from the first founding democratic elections when the country was part of Czechoslovakia. After Czechoslovakia's split, Slovakia increased substantially the level of DPF for campaign financing PE. In 1994 political parties clearing the 3% threshold were entitled to SKK  $60 \approx 1.85$ ) per vote as campaign reimbursement expenses. The level of DPF was increased in 2004 when the Election Law set it to 1% of the AMW per vote for the year preceding the year when PE were held (although for the 2010 and 2012 elections the coefficient was capped at 0.75% of the AMW). The table below illustrates the level of DPF for campaign funding per vote.

Election year	1990	1992	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2016	2020
Amount DPFV	10	15	60	60	60	172.6	5.58	5.90	8.83	10.92
Currency	CZK	CZK	SKK	SKK	SKK	SKK	€	€	€	€

### **Data and operationalisation**

Since the amount of DPF relies on a vote-based allocation method (DPFV), I use the regulatory provisions as well as the wage growth to calculate it as of 2006 elections. Then I simply adjust for the exchange rate against the USD.

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### **SLOVENIA**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Slovenia envisaged DPF for party statutory activity already in the 1989 LPP. The law did not specify how much state support political parties should receive but it had to be determined by the SBL. In 2000, the amendment of LPP set the maximum level of DPF to 0.017% of the GDP for the year preceding the one for which SBL is adopted, a provision currently in force.

## **Data and operationalisation**

For the entire period between 1992 - 2020, I rely on official data from annual SBL and parliamentary decisions on the allocation of state subsidies to political parties, which are complementary. SBL provide yearly aggregate data on DPF, while parliamentary decisions break down DPF for each political party separately.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

Slovenia introduced reimbursement of campaign expenses in 1994 following the adoption of the elections campaign act. Electoral competitors passing the 2% countrywide threshold, or 6% constituency threshold were entitled to SIT 30 per vote ( $\approx$  \$0.22 in the 1996 PE). The nominal value of campaign reimbursement was increased in 1997 to SIT 60 per vote ( $\approx$  \$0.27 in the 2000 PE), while the 2007 elections and referendum campaign act set the reimbursement cap at  $\in$ 0.33 ( $\approx$  \$0.49 in the 2008 PE). Yet the 2007 law, introduced a discriminatory provision. Only the parliamentary parties were entitled to  $\in$ 0.33, while those clearing the 2% national and/or the 6% constituency threshold were entitled to a half subsidy  $-\in$ 0.17.

# **Data and operationalisation**

For the campaign financing, I simply rely on regulatory provisions and use the DPFV as foreseen by law as an indicator of DPF for campaign financing.

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### **TAJIKISTAN**

## PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

### Note

Tajikistan does not provide DPF for party statutory activities.

### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

State funding of parliamentary elections in Tajikistan represented the only source of legal income for the 1995 and 2000 PE. However, the support provided to parties and candidates was very limited. The election law does not set the subsidy level which is determined by the CEC for each election separately. The table below provides a summary of the amount of DPF received by each registered party competing in the country-wide constituency and by each candidate running in SMD.

Competitor type ↓ / Election year →	2000	2010	2015	2020
Political party / Nation-wide constituency (\$)	129	1373	5550	5158
Candidate / SMD (\$)	26	229	555	516

## **Data and operationalisation**

I construct aggregate data for each election campaign by multiplying the amount of DPF provided for each party/candidate retrieved from OSCE/ODIHR monitoring reports and media (there is no information on the CEC webpage either on parliamentary elections or election financing) to the number of registered parties/candidates. Then I apply the standard procedure to obtain DPFRV and DPFV. Missing data: 1995, 2005 parliamentary contests.

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#### **UKRAINE**

### PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

### Note

Ukraine introduced DPF to political parties for their statutory activity in 2016 (a 2003 amendment of the LPP prescribing the provision of DPF as of 2007 was not enforced and was annulled in 2008), that is after 25 years since the country declared its independence in 1991. The 2015 amendment of the 2001 LPP, which foresaw the provision of state subsidies, was considered a tool to fight political corruption. The new regulations set the total subsidy level at 0.02% of the MMW as established on January 1<sup>st</sup> of the year preceding the year when the budgetary funds are allocated, multiplied by the number of voters who cast their ballots in the nationwide constituency. In 2019 another amendment to LPP halved the subsidy by setting it at 0.01% of the MMW. The new amendment also raised the eligibility threshold from 2% to 5%, thus cutting off extra-parliamentary parties from the state funding.

## **Data and operationalisation**

While the regulatory provisions on DPF make it possible to calculate the DPFV easily, the timing of elections affected the implementation of the law and the actual disbursement of public resources to parties. Hence, to avoid potential errors, I rely on the actual DPF data from the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, responsible for the distribution of state subventions to parties.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

Ukraine effectively provided DPF for campaign financing only for the parliamentary contests held in 2006 (in 2007 CEC also adopted a decision on campaign reimbursement but it was not implemented) and 2019. In both PE political the regulations specified a full reimbursement of campaign expenses within the spending limit.

### **Data and operationalisation**

Data on DPF for both parliamentary contests are retrieved from the CEC decisions on campaign reimbursement.

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### **UZBEKISTAN**

## PARTY STATUTORY FUNDING

#### Note

Uzbekistan introduced DPF to political parties for their routine activities in 2005 following the adoption of a brand new PFL in 2004. According to the law, the total amount of DPF was capped at 2% of the MMW multiplied by the number of registered voters, a provision currently in force.

# Data and operationalisation

Considering the lack of budgetary data on DPF from primary sources for the entire period since the introduction of state funding (2005 - 2020), I use the official MMW data to estimate the DPFRV, which is the reference unit for the calculation of the aggregate state funds allotted to political parties. I cross-check my estimations with the available information on the total state subsidies for a few years from the media, by dividing the subsidy value by the number of registered voters and obtain a similar result.

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### **ELECTION FINANCING**

### Note

Uzbek electoral legislation prohibits the use of private resources for election campaigning and all election-related expenses are covered by the state. Electoral law, however, does not specify the level of state funds provided to electoral candidates. This decision is adopted by the CEC for each parliamentary campaign separately.

# Data and operationalisation

Considering the majoritarian electoral system, the state funding of elections is candidate oriented, that is the total subsidy depends on the number of registered candidates. For a few elections data is available as total DPF, while for the others it is available at the candidate level as the amount of state funding provided to each candidate. Accordingly, for those PE for which data is available at the candidate level, I multiply this coefficient by the number of registered candidates, thus obtaining the aggregate amount of DPF provided to all registered candidates. Then I apply the standard procedure to calculate DPFRV and DPFV. Missing data: 1994, 1999 parliamentary contests.

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