


EHRA Program Modules



Matlab GUI Application Configuration

1. External Hazard Information

Intensity	AFE (/yr)
0.0500	0.0055
0.0600	0.0037
0.0700	0.0027
0.0800	0.0020
0.0900	0.0015
0.1000	0.0012
0.1100	0.0010
0.1200	0.0008
0.1300	0.0007
0.1400	0.0005
0.1500	0.0005

Hazard Input (XLS)

2. Hazard Fragility Information

Component
C1: S1 Offsite power
C2: S2 CST
C3: S3 Reactor internals
C4: S4 Reactor enclosure structure
C5: S6 Reactor pressure vessel
C6: S10 SLC tank
C7: S11 440-V bus/SG breakers
C8: S12 440-V bus transformer breaker
C9: S13 125/250-V DC bus
C10: S14 4-kV bus/SG
C11: S15 Diesel generator circuit

Fragility Input (XLS)

Output

Hazard Curves

Component Fragility Curves

System Fragility Results

System Risk Result Bar

System Risk Result Table

<System Risk Result Bar>

System Equations	Risk (/yr)
TEUX	2.7475e-06
TRpv	3.8622e-08
TRb	3.5691e-07
TECC	3.3378e-07
TRC	5.3569e-08
TEW	1.7291e-07
CM	3.9122e-06

3. Systems Analysis Model

Name	System Equations(Logic)
TEUX	$C(:,1) \& (C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9))$
TRpv	$C(:,5)$
TRb	$C(:,4)$
TECC	$C(:,1) \& (C(:,3) RF(:,3)) \& ((C(:,3) C(:,4) \& (RF(:,3) C(:,3)))$
TRC	$C(:,4) \& (RF(:,3) C(:,3))$
TEW	$C(:,1) \& \sim(C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9))$
CM	$C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,1) \& ((C(:,7) $

System Equation (XLS)

4. Risk Quantification

Intensity Initial

0.050

Intensity Last

2.000

Intensity Subdivision

0.010

of Samples for Each Intensity

10000

Solver

Boolean Algebra (UMB)

Original DQFM

Improved DQFM(Scaling)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)




Fig. 12. Seismic hazard curves for all seismogenic zones at LGS site (SARA-LGS).

Ellingwood, B. (1990). Validation studies of seismic PRAs. *Nuclear Engineering and Design*, 123(2-3), 189-196.
Kim, J. H., Choi, I. K., & Park, J. H. (2011). Uncertainty analysis of system fragility for seismic safety evaluation of NPP. *Nuclear Engineering and Design*, 241(7), 2570-2579.
Kwag, S., Choi, E., Eem, S., Ha, J. G., & Hahm, D. (2021). Toward improvement of sampling-based seismic probabilistic safety assessment method for nuclear facilities using composite distribution and adaptive discretization. *Reliability Engineering & System Safety*, 215, 107809.

Table 1
Seismic fragility and random failure probability information of components of LGS NPP (A_m is a seismic intensity when the probability of failure is 50%) [30].

Components		$R_m (A_m)$	S_m	β_R	β_S	β_C	Mean failure rate (per yr)
S_1	Offsite power	0.20g	0.20g	0.226	0.226	0.320	-
S_2	Condensate storage tank	0.24g	0.24g	0.273	0.273	0.386	-
S_3	Reactor internals	0.67g	0.67g	0.300	0.300	0.425	-
S_4	Reactor enclosure structure	1.05g	1.05g	0.282	0.282	0.398	-
S_6	Reactor pressure vessel	1.25g	1.25g	0.252	0.252	0.356	-
S_{10}	SLC tank	1.33g	1.33g	0.233	0.233	0.330	-
S_{11}	440-V bus/SG breakers	1.46g	1.46g	0.411	0.411	0.582	-
S_{12}	440-V bus transformer breaker	1.49g	1.49g	0.397	0.397	0.561	-
S_{13}	125/250-V DC bus	1.49g	1.49g	0.397	0.397	0.561	-
S_{14}	4-kV bus/SG	1.49g	1.49g	0.397	0.397	0.561	-
S_{15}	Diesel generator circuit	1.56g	1.56g	0.368	0.368	0.520	-
S_{16}	Diesel generator heat and vent	1.55g	1.55g	0.363	0.363	0.513	-
S_{17}	RHR heat exchangers	1.09g	1.09g	0.330	0.330	0.466	-
DG_R	DGR – diesel generator common mode		-	-	-		0.00125
W_R	WR – containment heat removal		-	-	-		0.00026
C_R	CR – scram system mechanical failure		-	-	-		1.00E-05
SLC_R	SLCR – standby liquid control		-	-	-		0.01

Ellingwood, B. (1990). Validation studies of seismic PRAs. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 123(2-3), 189-196.
Kim, J. H., Choi, I. K., & Park, J. H. (2011). Uncertainty analysis of system fragility for seismic safety evaluation of NPP. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 241(7), 2570-2579.
Kwag, S., Choi, E., Eem, S., Ha, J. G., & Hahm, D. (2021). Toward improvement of sampling-based seismic probabilistic safety assessment method for nuclear facilities using composite distribution and adaptive discretization. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 215, 107809.




Fig. 5. Fault tree expression of scenario *CM*.

$$A = S_{11} \cup S_{12} \cup S_{13} \cup S_{14} \cup S_{15} \cup S_{16} \cup DG_R \tag{15}$$

$$T_sE_sUX = S_1 \cap A \tag{16}$$

$$T_sR_b = S_4 \tag{17}$$


$$T_sR_{pv} = S_6 \tag{18}$$

$$T_sE_sC_mC_2 = S_1 \cap (S_3 \cup C_R) \cap (A \cup S_{10} \cup SLC_R) \tag{19}$$

$$T_sR_bC_m = S_4 \cap (C_R \cup S_3) \tag{20}$$

$$T_sE_sW = S_1 \cap \bar{A} \cap (\bar{S}_{17} \cap W_R \cup \bar{S}_2 \cap S_{17}) \tag{21}$$

$$CM = S_4 \cup S_6 \cup S_1 \cap [A \cup (S_3 \cup C_R) \cap (S_{10} \cup SLC_R) \cup (S_{17} \cup W_R)] \tag{22}$$



1. External Hazard Information

Intensity	AFE (/yr)
0.0500	0.0055
0.0600	0.0037
0.0700	0.0027
0.0800	0.0020
0.0900	0.0015
0.1000	0.0012
0.1100	0.0010
0.1200	0.0008
0.1300	0.0007
0.1400	0.0005
0.1500	0.0005

Hazard Input (XLS)

2. Hazard Fragility Information

Component

C1: S1 Offsite power

C2: S2 CST

C3: S3 Reactor internals

C4: S4 Reactor enclosure structure

C5: S6 Reactor pressure vessel

C6: S10 SLC tank

C7: S11 440-V bus/SG breakers

C8: S12 440-V bus transformer breaker

C9: S13 125/250-V DC bus

C10: S14 4-kV bus/SG

C11: S15 Diesel generator circuit

Fragility Input (XLS)

Output

Hazard Curves

Component Fragility Curves

System Fragility Results

System Risk Result Bar

System Risk Result Table

<Component External Fragility Curves for SSCs>

Component Seismic Fragility Curves for LGS NPP SSCs

3. Systems Analysis Model

Name	System Equations(Logic)
TEUX	$C(:,1) \& (C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9))$
TRpv	$C(:,5)$
TRb	$C(:,4)$
TECC	$C(:,1) \& (C(:,3) RF(:,3)) \& ((C(:,1) C(:,2) C(:,3) C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,6) C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) C(:,13))$
TRC	$C(:,4) \& (RF(:,3) C(:,3))$
TEW	$C(:,1) \& \sim(C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) C(:,13))$
CM	$C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,1) \& ((C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) C(:,13))$

System Equation (XLS)

4. Risk Quantification

Intensity Initial0.050

Intensity Last2.000

Intensity Subdivision0.010

of Samples for Each Intensity10000

Solver

Boolean Algebra (UMB)

Original DQFM

Improved DQFM(Scaling)

Systems Analysis Model Input & System Fragility Results

[Input File](#) [Settings](#) [Results](#) [Help](#)

Output

Hazard Curves

Hazard Curves	Component Fragility Curves	System Fragility Results	System Risk Result Bar	System Risk Result Table
---------------	----------------------------	--------------------------	------------------------	--------------------------

Two Types of Systems Analysis Models: (1) Logic Equation, and (2) UMB-type Equation



Name	System Equations(Logic)
TEUX	C(:,1) & (C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9)
TRpv	C(:,5)
TRb	C(:,4)
TECC	C(:,1) & (C(:,3)) RF(:,3)) & ((C(:
TRC	C(:,4) & (RF(:,3) C(:,3))
TEW	C(:,1) & ~(C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9
CM	C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,1) & ((C(:,7)

System Equation (XLS)

Intensity Initial 0.050

Intensity Last 2.000

Intensity Subdivision 0.010


of Samples for Each Intensity 10000

Solver

Boolean Algebra (UMB)

Original DQFM

Improved DQFM(Scaling)



1. External Hazard Information

Intensity	AFE (/yr)
0.0500	0.0055
0.0600	0.0037
0.0700	0.0027
0.0800	0.0020
0.0900	0.0015
0.1000	0.0012
0.1100	0.0010
0.1200	0.0008
0.1300	0.0007
0.1400	0.0005
0.1500	0.0005

Hazard Input (XLS)

2. Hazard Fragility Information

Component
C1: S1 Offsite power
C2: S2 CST
C3: S3 Reactor internals
C4: S4 Reactor enclosure structure
C5: S6 Reactor pressure vessel
C6: S10 SLC tank
C7: S11 440-V bus/SG breakers
C8: S12 440-V bus transformer breaker
C9: S13 125/250-V DC bus
C10: S14 4-kV bus/SG
C11: S15 Diesel generator circuit

Fragility Input (XLS)

Output

Hazard Curves

Component Fragility Curves

System Fragility Results

System Risk Result Bar

System Risk Result Table

<System Risk Result Table>

Name	Risk(/yr)	CDF contribution(/yr)
TEUX	2.7475e-06	2.7475e-06
TRpv	3.8622e-08	3.8622e-08
TRb	3.5691e-07	3.5691e-07
TECC	3.3378e-07	3.3378e-07
TRC	5.3569e-08	5.3569e-08
TEW	1.7291e-07	1.7291e-07
CM	3.9122e-06	3.9122e-06

Basic Input-2

3. Systems Analysis Model

Name	System Equations(Logic)
TEUX	C(:,1) & (C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9)
TRpv	C(:,5)
TRb	C(:,4)
TECC	C(:,1) & (C(:,3) RF(:,3)) & ((C(:,
TRC	C(:,4) & (RF(:,3) C(:,3))
TEW	C(:,1) & ~(C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9
CM	C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,1) & ((C(:,7)

System Equation (XLS)

4. Risk Quantification

Intensity Inital

0.050

Intensity Last

2.000

Intensity Subdivision

0.010

of Samples for Each Intensity

10000

Solver

Boolean Algebra (UMB)

Original DQFM

Improved DQFM(Scaling)

Risk Quantification Bar Result using Three Different Solvers

Appendix. File Type and Import for Example Case

MATLAB App

Input File Settings Results Help

Basic Input - 1

1. External Hazard Information

Intensity	AFE (/yr)
1.9000	0
1.9100	0
1.9200	0
1.9300	0
1.9400	0
1.9500	0
1.9600	0
1.9700	0
1.9800	0
1.9900	0
2.0000	0

Hazard Input (XLS)

2. Hazard Fragility Information

Component
C1: S1 Offsite power
C2: S2 CST
C3: S3 Reactor internals
C4: S4 Reactor enclosure structure
C5: S6 Reactor pressure vessel
C6: S10 SLC tank
C7: S11 440-V bus/SG breakers
C8: S12 440-V bus transformer breaker
C9: S13 125/250-V DC bus
C10: S14 4-kV bus/SG
C11: S15 Diesel generator circuit

Fragility Input (XLS)

Button Click and Import Sheet2 of the EXCEL file.



Input_Data_LGS1.xlsx

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Am	br	bu	random_failure
2	C1: S1 Offsite power	0.2	0.2	0.25	0
3	C2: S2 CST	0.24	0.23	0.31	0
4	C3: S3 Reactor internals	0.67	0.28	0.32	0
5	C4: S4 Reactor enclosure structure	1.05	0.31	0.25	0
6	C5: S6 Reactor pressure vessel	1.25	0.28	0.22	0
7	C6: S10 SLC tank	1.33	0.27	0.19	0
8	C7: S11 440-V bus/SG breakers	1.46	0.38	0.44	0
9	C8: S12 440-V bus transformer breaker	1.49	0.36	0.43	0
10	C9: S13 125/250-V DC bus	1.49	0.36	0.43	0
11	C10: S14 4-kV bus/SG	1.49	0.36	0.43	0
12	C11: S15 Diesel generator circuit	1.56	0.32	0.41	0
13	C12: S16 Diesel generator heat and vent	1.55	0.28	0.43	0
14	C13: S17 RHR heat exchangers	1.09	0.32	0.34	0
15	RF1: DGR Diesel generator common mode	0	0	0	0.00125
16	RF2: WR Containment heat removal	0	0	0	0.00026
17	RF3: CR Scram system mechanical failure	0	0	0	1.00E-05
18	RF4: SLCR Standby liquid control	0	0	0	0.01
19					
20					
21					

Sheet1 Sheet2 Sheet3



Input_Data_LGS1.xlsx

Basic Input-2

3. Systems Analysis Model

Name	System Equations(Logic)
TEUX	C(:,1) & (C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9)
TRpv	C(:,5)
TRb	C(:,4)
TECC	C(:,1) & (C(:,3) RF(:,3)) & ((C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) RF(:,1)) C(:,6) RF(:,4))
TRC	C(:,4) & (RF(:,3) C(:,3))
TEW	C(:,1) & ~(C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9)
CM	C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,1) & ((C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) RF(:,1)) (C(:,3) RF(:,3))&(C(:,6) RF(:,4)) (C(:,13) RF(:,2)))

System Equation (XLS)

4. Risk Quantification

Intensity Initial0.050

Intensity Last2.000

Intensity Subdivision0.010

of Samples for Each Intensity10000

Solver

Boolean Algebra (UMB)

Original DQFM

Improved DQFM(Scaling)

Button Click and Import Sheet3 of the EXCEL file.

	A	B
1	Name	System Equations (Logic Tree)
2	TEUX	C(:,1) & (C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) RF(:,1))
3	TRpv	C(:,5)
4	TRb	C(:,4)
5	TECC	C(:,1) & (C(:,3) RF(:,3)) & ((C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) RF(:,1)) C(:,6) RF(:,4))
6	TRC	C(:,4) & (RF(:,3) C(:,3))
7	TEW	C(:,1) & ~(C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) RF(:,1)) & ((~C(:,13) & RF(:,2)) (~C(:,2) & C(:,13)))
8	CM	C(:,4) C(:,5) C(:,1) & ((C(:,7) C(:,8) C(:,9) C(:,10) C(:,11) C(:,12) RF(:,1)) (C(:,3) RF(:,3))&(C(:,6) RF(:,4)) (C(:,13) RF(:,2)))
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		

“Event Tree and Fault Tree-type” Model -> “Logical Expression”

	C	D	E
1	System Equations (UMB)		Secondary ET
2	C(:,1)*(1 - (1 - C(:,7))*(1 - C(:,8))*(1 - C(:,9))*(1 - C(:,10))*(1 - C(:,11))*(1 - C(:,12))*(1 - RF(:,1)))		1
3	C(:,5)		1
4	C(:,4)		1
5	C(:,1)*(1 - (1 - C(:,3))*(1 - RF(:,3))*(1 - (1 - (1 - C(:,7))*(1 - C(:,8))*(1 - C(:,9))*(1 - C(:,10))*(1 - C(:,11))*(1 - C(:,12))*(1 - RF(:,1)))*(1 - C(:,6))*(1 - RF(:,4)))		1
6	C(:,4)*(1 - (1 - RF(:,3))*(1 - C(:,3)))		1
7	C(:,1)*(1 - (1 - (1 - C(:,7))*(1 - C(:,8))*(1 - C(:,9))*(1 - C(:,10))*(1 - C(:,11))*(1 - C(:,12))*(1 - RF(:,1)))*(1 - (1 - (1 - C(:,13))*RF(:,2))*(1 - (1 - C(:,2))*C(:,13)))		1
8	1 - (1 - C(:,4))*(1 - C(:,5))*(1 - C(:,1)*(1 - (1 - (1 - (1 - C(:,7))*(1 - C(:,8))*(1 - C(:,9))*(1 - C(:,10))*(1 - C(:,11))*(1 - C(:,12))*(1 - RF(:,1)))*(1 - (1 - (1 - C(:,3))*(1 - RF(:,3))*(1 - C(:,6))*(1 - RF(:,4)))*(1 - (1 - (1 - C(:,13))*(1 - RF(:,2)))))		1
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			

“Event Tree and Fault Tree-type” Model -> “Uni-Modal Bound(UMB) Approach-type Mathematical Expression”