

软件安全与漏洞分析

3.2 返回导向编程的发展（1）

Previously in Software Security

- 返回导向编程初步介绍
 - 渊源
 - 基本原理
 - 典型构造方式
- CISC指令构架对返回导向编程的意义

返回导向编程的发展

- 本节主题 - 失去CISC所带来的优势时，返回导向编程如何生存？
 - RISC以及针对RISC的返回导向编程
 - Smashing the stack vs. Smashing the gadgets
 - 不使用ret指令（0xC3）的返回导向编程

回顾：经典的CISC返回导向编程

- 将劫持后的控制流引导至正常指令的内部 (**middle of an instruction**)
- 利用CISC的特点，形成意外的指令片段 (**unintended instruction sequence**)
- Gadget资源的重要来源：因误解析而形成的“指令”（特别是0xC3字节）
- 那么，无法使CPU做出错误的解读，又如何？

精简指令集 (RISC)

□ 背景：CISC存在许多缺点

- 各种指令的使用率相差悬殊，且微码串行执行让频繁使用的简单指令也效率低下
- 复杂指令 → 复杂的硬件结构，**CISC**越来越难以集成在单一芯片上
- 许多复杂指令需要极复杂的操作，多数已可视为某种高级语言的翻版，通用性差

□ RISC的特点：

- 统一指令编码，如所有指令长度相等、**op-code**位置相同等，可快速解译
- 泛用的缓存器，单纯的寻址模式(用计算指令序列取代复杂寻址模式)
- 硬件中支持少数数据类型别（如区分整数/浮点数等）

精简指令集 (RISC)

□ 举例：“可”

00


rd

op2

imm22

SPARC)

Instruction	op3	Operation	Assembly Language Syntax		Class
ADD	00 0000	Add	add	reg _{rs1} , reg_or_imm, reg _{rd}	A1
ADDcc	01 0000	Add and modify cc's	addcc	reg _{rs1} , reg_or_imm, reg _{rd}	A1
ADDC	00 1000	Add with 32-bit Carry	addc	reg _{rs1} , reg_or_imm, reg _{rd}	A1
ADDCcc	01 1000	Add with 32-bit Carry and modify cc's	addccc	reg _{rs1} , reg_or_imm, reg _{rd}	A1



精简指令集 (RISC)


□ SPARC的寄存器“窗口”机制

- 32个通用寄存器，其中8个全局寄存器和一个“窗口”（包含24个寄存器）
- 支持2~32个“窗口”（取决于硬件实现），通常为7~8个——由此得名“可扩展的”
- 在任何时候，只有一个寄存器窗口是可见的

Register Group	Mnemonic	Register Address
global	%g0-%g7	r[0]-r[7]
out	%o0-%o7	r[8]-r[15]
local	%l0-%l7	r[16]-r[23]
in	%i0-%i7	r[24]-r[31]

精简指令集 (RISC)

SPARC函数调用的栈结构



Address	Storage
<i>Low Memory</i>	
%sp	Top of the stack
%sp - %sp+31	Saved registers %l [0-7]
%sp+32 - %sp+63	Saved registers %i [0-7]
%sp+64 - %sp+67	Return struct for next call
%sp+68 - %sp+91	Outgoing arg. 1-5 space for caller
%sp+92 - up	Outgoing arg. 6+ for caller (<i>variable</i>)
%sp+__ %fp-__	Current local variables (<i>variable</i>)
%fp	Top of the frame (previous %sp)
%fp - %fp+31	Prev. saved registers %l [0-7]
%fp+32 - %fp+63	Prev. saved registers %i [0-7]
%fp+64 - %fp+67	Return struct for current call
%fp+68 - %fp+91	Incoming arg. 1-5 space for callee
%fp+92 - up	Incoming arg. 6+ for callee (<i>variable</i>)
<i>High Memory</i>	

针对RISC的返回导向编程

□ 对SPARC构造返回导向编程所面临的问题

- 无法利用意外的指令序列（该种情况不可能发生）
- x86下返回导向编程gadget的所有构造特点在RISC中均不存在

□ 新的返回导向编程设计思路

- 将函数的**后缀**作为gadget使用（利用其结尾处的ret-restore指令序列）
- 利用结构化数据流使得gadget与SPARC的函数调用惯例相吻合
- 构造内存-内存gadget（寄存器仅在gadget内部使用）

针对RISC的返回导向编程

SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 读/写指针

Pointer Read ($v1 = *v2$)

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$\%i0 = m[v2]$	$\%i4 = \&v2$	ld [%i4], %i0 ld [%i0], %i0 ret restore
$v1 = m[v2]$	$\%i3 = \&v1$	st %o0, [%i3] ret restore

Pointer Write ($*v1 = v2$)

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$\%i0 = v2$	$\%l1 = \&v2$	ld [%l1], %i0 ret restore
$m[v1] = v2$	$\%i0 = \&v1-8$	ld [%i0 + 0x8], %i1 st %o0, [%i1] ret restore

针对RISC的返回导向编程

□ SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 常/变量赋值

Constant Assignment ($v1 = 0x*****$)

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$v1 = 0x*****$	$\%i0 = Value$ $\%i3 = \&v1$	st $\%i0$, [$\%i3$] ret restore

Constant Assignment ($v1 = 0x00*****$)

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$v1 = 0xff*****$	$\%i0 = Value \mid$ 0xff000000 $\%i3 = \&v1$	st $\%i0$, [$\%i3$] ret restore
$v1 = 0x00*****$	$\%i0 = \&v1$	clrb [$\%i0$] ret restore ...

Variable Assignment ($v1 = v2$)

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$v1 = v2$	$\%l7 = \&v1$ $\%i0 = \&v2$	ld [$\%i0$], $\%l6$ st $\%l6$, [$\%l7$] ret restore

针对RISC的返回导向编程

□ SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 算术运算（以加法为例）

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
v1++	%i1 = &v1	ld [%i1], %i0 add %i0, 0x1, %o7 st %o7, [%i1] ret restore

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
m[&%i0] = v2	%l7 = &%i0 (+2 Frames) %i0 = &v2	ld [%i0], %l6 st %l6, [%l7] ret restore
m[&%i3] = v3	%l7 = &%i3 (+1 Frame) %i0 = &v3	ld [%i0], %l6 st %l6, [%l7] ret restore
v1 = v2 + v3	%i0 = v2 (stored) %i3 = v3 (stored) %i4 = &v1	add %i0, %i3, %i5 st %i5, [%i4] ret restore

针对RISC的返回导向编程

□ SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 逻辑运算（以逻辑与为例）

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$m[\&\%13] = v2$	$\%17 = \&\%13$ <i>(+2 Frames)</i> $\%i0 = \&v2$	<code>ld [%i0], %16</code> <code>st %16, [%17]</code> <code>ret</code> <code>restore</code>
$m[\&\%14] = v3$	$\%17 = \&\%14$ <i>(+1 Frame)</i> $\%i0 = \&v3$	<code>ld [%i0], %16</code> <code>st %16, [%17]</code> <code>ret</code> <code>restore</code>
$v1 = v2 \ \& \ v3$	$\%13 = v2$ (<i>stored</i>) $\%14 = v3$ (<i>stored</i>) $\%11 = \&v1 + 1$ $\%i0 = -1$	<code>and %13,%14,%12</code> <code>st %12, [%11+%i0]</code> <code>ret</code> <code>restore ...</code>

针对RISC的返回导向编程

SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 移位运算

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
$m[\&\%i2] = v2$	$\%17 = \&\%i2$ (+2 Frames) $\%i0 = \&v2$	ld [%i0], %16 st %16, [%17] ret restore
$m[\&\%i5] = v3$	$\%17 = \&\%i5$ (+1 Frame) $\%i0 = \&v3$	ld [%i0], %16 st %16, [%17] ret restore
$\%i0 = v2 \ll v3$	$\%i2 = v2$ (stored) $\%i5 = v3$ (stored) $\%16 = -1$	sll %i2,%i5,%17 and %16,%17,%i0 ret restore
$v1 = v2 \ll v3$	$\%i3 = v1$	st %o0, [%i3] ret restore

针对RISC的返回导向编程


SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 控制转移

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
jump T1	%i6 = T1	ret restore

Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
m[&%i0] = v1	%i7 = &%i0 (+2 Frames) %i0 = &v1	ld [%i0], %i6 st %i6, [%i7] ret restore
m[&%i2] = v2	%i7 = &%i2 (+1 Frame) %i0 = &v2	ld [%i0], %i6 st %i6, [%i7] ret restore
(v1 == v2)	%i0 = v1 (stored) %i2 = v2 (stored)	cmp %i0, %i2 ret restore
if (v1 == v2): %i0 = T1 else: %i0 = T2	%i0 = T2 (NOT_EQ) %i0 = T1 (EQ) - 1 %i2 = -1	be,a 1 ahead sub %i0,%i2,%i0 ret restore
m[&%i6] = %o0	%i3 = &%i6 (+1 Frame)	st %o0, [%i3] ret restore
jump T1 or T2	%i6 = T1 or T2 (stored)	ret restore

针对RISC的返回导向编程

SPARC返回导向编程的图灵完整性 --- 函数/系统调用



Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
m[&%i6] = LastF	%i0 = LastF %i3 = &%i6 (safe)	st %i0, [%i3] ret restore
m[&%i7] = LastI	%i0 = LastI %i3 = &%i7 (safe)	st %i0, [%i3] ret restore
Optional: Up to 6 function arg seq's (v[1-6]).		
m[&%i_] = v_	%i17 = &%i[0-5] (safe) %i0 = &v[1-6]	ld [%i0], %i16 st %i16, [%i17] ret restore
Previous frame %i7 set to &FUNC - 4.		
call FUNC		ret restore
Opt. 1- Last Seq.: No return value. Just nop.		
nop		ret restore
Opt. 2 - Last Seq.: Return value %o0 stored to r1		
r1 = RETURN VAL	%i3 = &r1	st %o0, [%i3] ret restore


Inst. Seq.	Preset	Assembly
Write system call number to %i0 of trap frame.		
m[&%i0] = num	%i17 = &%i0 (trap frame) %i0 = &num	ld [%i0], %i16 st %i16, [%i17] ret restore
Optional: Up to 6 system call arg seq's (v[1-6]).		
m[&%i_] = v_	%i17 = &%i[0-5] (arg frame) %i0 = &v[1-6]	ld [%i0], %i16 st %i16, [%i17] ret restore
Arg Frame: Trap arguments stored in %i[0-5]		
nop		ret restore
Trap Frame: Invoke system call with number stored in %i0 with %o[0-5] as arguments.		
trap num	%i0 = num (stored) %o0 = v1 %o1 = v2 %o2 = v3 %o3 = v4 %o4 = v5 %o5 = v6	mov %i0, %g1 ta %icc, %g0+8 bcc,a,pt %icc, 4 Ahead sra %o0,0,%i0 restore %o0,0,%o0 ba __cerror nop ret restore

针对RISC的返回导向编程

- 参考文献：Buchanan E, Roemer R, Shacham H, et al. When good instructions go bad: Generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC[C]//Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, 2008: 27-38.
- 这里，针对**RISC**的返回导向编程设计反映出一个重要现象：
 - 指令集简单了，但是**ROP**实现反而更复杂了？
 - 原因：缺少x86上**ROP**所依赖的关键特性——这能否用于对**ROP**的防御？

Smashing the gadgets

□ 核心思路：阻止x86代码中出现意外的gadget



□ 难点：x86编译器所生成的代码高度优化，难以随意改变指令长度

- 因此，Smashing the gadgets必须是 (in-place) 的
- 像上面这样抹掉0xC3字节仅仅是可用的手段之一

Smashing the gadgets

手段2：指令重新排序

... 53 8B 59 0C 3B C3 89 41 08 ...

program code

4A83D176	mov	eax,[ecx+0x10]
4A83D179	push	ebx
4A83D17A	mov	ebx,[ecx+0xc]
4A83D17D	cmp	eax,ebx
4A83D17F	mov	[ecx+0x8],eax
4A83D182	jle	0x5c

gadget

4A83D17B	pop	ecx
4A83D17C	or	al,0x3b
4A83D17E	ret	

... 0C 8B 41 10 89 41 08 3B C3 ...

program code

4A83D176	push	ebx
4A83D177	mov	ebx,[ecx+0xc]
4A83D17A	mov	eax,[ecx+0x10]
4A83D17D	mov	[ecx+0x8],eax
4A83D180	cmp	eax,ebx
4A83D182	jle	0x5c

gadget

4A83D17B	inc	ecx
4A83D17C	adc	[ecx-0x3cc4f7bf],c1

Smashing the gadgets

□ 手段3: 寄存器压栈顺序随机化

```
4A834B3B  0  push ebx
4A834B3C -4  push esi
4A834B3D -8  mov  ebx,ecx
4A834B3F -8  push edi
4A834B40 -C  mov  esi,edx
...
4A834B7C -C  pop  edi
4A834B7D -8  pop  esi
4A834B7E -4  pop  ebx
4A834B7F  0  ret
```



```
4A834B3B  push edi
4A834B3C  push ebx
4A834B3D  push esi
4A834B3E  mov  ebx,ecx
4A834B40  mov  esi,edx
...
4A834B7C  pop  esi
4A834B7D  pop  ebx
4A834B7E  pop  edi
4A834B7F  ret
```


Smashing the gadgets

手段4: 寄存器重分配

```
1 4A8063BF push esi
2 4A8063C0 push edi
3 4A8063C1 mov edi,[ebp+0x8]
4 4A8063C4 mov eax,[edi+0x14]
5 4A8063C7 test eax,eax
6 4A8063C9 jz 0x4a80640b
```


```
7 4A8063CB mov ebx,[ebp+0x10]
8 4A8063CE push ebx
9 4A8063CF lea ecx,[ebp-0x4]
10 4A8063D2 push ecx
11 4A8063D3 push edi
12 4A8063D4 call eax
```

```
13 4A806414 mov eax,[ebp+0xc]
14 4A806417 test eax,eax
15 4A806419 pop edi
16 4A80641A pop esi
17 4A80641B pop ebx
18 4A80641C jz 0x4a806423
```



Smashing the gadgets

□ Smashing the gadgetsの防御効果




Smashing the gadgets

- 参考文献：Pappas V, Polychronakis M, Keromytis A D. Smashing the gadgets: Hindering return-oriented programming using in-place code randomization[C]//Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2012: 601-615.
- 类似的其他研究：Li J, Wang Z, Jiang X, et al. Defeating return-oriented rootkits with return-less kernels[C]//Proceedings of the 5th European conference on Computer systems. ACM, 2010: 195-208.
- 但是，这一切仍然并没有什么效（luan）果（yong）

不“返回”的返回导向编程

- 核心思想：既然你们针对ret（0xC3），那么我想出不用ret也可以的办法
 - 利用update-load-branch指令序列“pop x; jmp *x”
 - 但是，update-load-branch序列并不像ret那样常见，因此要采用“蹦床”机制




不“返回”的返回导向编程

□ ROP without return之图灵完整性：可用资源及trampoline

```
pop %eax;  sub %dh, %bl;  jmp *(%edx)
pop %ecx;  cmp %dh, %dh;  jmp *(%edx)
pop %ebp;  or $0xF3, %al;  jmp *(%edx)
pop %esi;  or $0xF3, %al;  jmp *(%edx)
pop %edi;  cmp %bl, %dl;   jmp *(%edx)
pop %esp;  or %edi, %esi;  jmp *(%eax)
popad;     cld;            ljmp *(%edx)
```

不“返回”的返回导向编程


□ ROP without return之图灵完整性：条件分支



不“返回”的返回导向编程

ROP without return之图灵完整性：函数调用


- 在esi中载入call-jmp序列的地址
- 在ebp中载入leave-jmp序列的地址
- 在eax中载入n+偏移量
- 将call-jmp序列的地址存储至地址n
- 改写esi，使其存储“返回地址”
- esi值写入result位置后，再读出至edi
- 交换使返回值存入ebp，leave指令换入edi



不“返回”的返回导向编程

ROP without return之图灵完整性：函数调用

- 在esi中载入pop-jmp序列的地址
- 在ecx中载入函数入口地址
- 在eax中载入地址n
- 交换esp和eax，栈指针指向n（函数地址）
- edi处的leave指令将使函数“返回”至



What's next?

- 控制流完整性保护技术
 - 理念和思路
 - 不同类型的设计方案