the most urgent to be defused. In addition the insights and the practical steps that characters can take to change the frame are essentially limitless in variety.

4.4 Dilemma Analysis

Intensive pre-play communication characterises the Build-up phase of interaction. To demonstrate the dynamics of this process which precedes commitment to action by the characters, the example of the Middle East conflict will be used here: this case has been presented in more detail elsewhere (Bryant 2014).

The present narrative begins in April 2002 when the Israelis mounted an offensive against a refugee camp at Jenin on the West Bank, claiming that it served as a launch site for terrorist attacks. The site was booby-trapped and the majority of residents had left before the heavily armed Israeli forces entered but it still took over a week of bitter fighting before the battle ended. Afterwards claims were made that a massacre had taken place and war crimes committed but a UN fact-finding mission was hampered in its efforts to establish what had occurred. Even today what took place in Jenin is subject to dispute: the strategic conversation over the events has not quietened. The 'Battle of Jenin' typifies the sort of conflict that has erupted time and again in the Middle East.

To appreciate the contextual factors which prompt the chronic violence that has characterised the Middle East over the past century, it is necessary to examine the stance of the principal protagonists. Israel's official position is that a negotiated peace would involve relinquishing some control over the occupied territories in exchange for a cessation of violence. Some Palestinians question the state of Israel's right to exist; at the very least a right for refugees to return to a Palestinian state remains an essential requirement of their demands. Formally a two-state solution remains the basis for negotiations between the two sides though some believe that a one-state solution would be more realistic.

An 'Options Board' summarising this high-level interaction at the time of the conflict at Jenin is shown in Table 4.1a. The format is the same as that used earlier in Table 3.3 except that, in contrast to soft game analysis, characters' preferences between the possible future states are omitted. This is because the firm stance taken in drama theory is that the model must represent CCK: preferences are not directly observable and so are not part of CCK. Indeed the way in which preferences were deduced in previous analysis was from the doubts or misgivings that characters expressed about other parties' resolve in sticking to threats or promises. For instance, because

character A, say, doubted that character B would carry out its threat (i.e., because A thought that B was bluffing) then the inference drawn was that B would prefer to renege on the threat to implementing it. Doubts are the observables which form part of CCK at a moment of truth and it is they, as will shortly be explained, that give rise to the dilemmas which characters may face. Doubts are shown by question marks in the table (for the present analysis the possibility of 'self-doubts'—doubting one's own intentions—is ignored): the identity of the 'doubter' is obvious from the context.

Table 4.1a. Middle East Conflict: Options Board.

	Futures			**Dilemmas**		
	I	**P**	**S.I.**	**Persuasion**	**Rejection**	**Trust**
ISRAELIS						
permit refugees' return	**×**	**✓ ?**	**×**	**P has Per(p) with I**		
reduce territorial control	**~**	**✓ ?**	**×**	**P has Per(t) with I**		
PALESTINIANS						
stop violence	**✓ ?**	**✓ ?**	**×**	**I has Per(t) with P**	**P has Rej(p) with I**	
recognise Israel	**✓ ?**	**~**	**~**	**I has Per(t) with P**		

Table 4.1a can be 'read' as follows:

- The Israeli Position (second column) is that Palestinian violence—the Israelis would probably refer to it as 'terrorism'—should cease and that the Palestinians should accept the fundamental right of the state of Israel to exist: however the Israelis doubt that the Palestinians would subscribe to either of these demands. At this point in time (April 2002) Israel is not willing to permit Palestinian refugees to return nor to make any commitment to reduce control of the extended territories that it holds.
- The Palestinian Position is that they would be prepared to give up the armed struggle as long as the Israelis both allow refugees to return and reduce the level of control exercised over the Palestinian territories: However they doubt that the Israelis would accede to either of these requirements.
- The Stated Intentions (i.e., what the two characters say they will do given the Positions of both sides and the other character's Stated Intentions) are:
  - The Israelis will refuse to allow refugee returns and to reduce territorial control.
  - The Palestinians will not call a halt to the violence.

  Neither character doubts the resolve of the other over these threats.

This example illustrates an important general rule for the correct formulation of drama theoretic models. Note that there is a tilde (~) against 'reduce territorial control' in the Israeli Position but a cross against their Stated Intention on this option. This signals the existence of conditionality in the Stated Intention here: the Israelis are saying that they are prepared for this choice to be determined on the basis of the Palestinian's communications: depending on whether or not they give assurances (i.e., remove or leave doubt) on stopping violence and recognising the state of Israel. Generally, as here, options used as threats or promises are left open in the 'owning' characters' Position: in other words, a tilde is used in a character's Position on an option if its Position depends upon others' Stated Intentions. Where there is a tick or a cross in a cell of a Position column then these correspond to unconditional declarations (of the 'owner') or demands (upon other characters).

To clarify this convention, it is helpful to 'mechanise' the verbal expression of the content of an options table. Normally, for example, each column can be expressed by using the conjunction 'AND' or 'BUT' to link the successive elements: the Palestinian Position column in Table 4.1a would read, 'The Israelis SHOULD permit refugees' return AND SHOULD reduce territorial control AND we (the Palestinians) WILL stop violence BUT will not make any commitment to recognise Israel'. Note here the use of SHOULD and WILL describing unconditional demands and declarations respectively. To take a further example, the cross in the Israeli Position against 'permit refugees' return' is read as 'We (the Israelis) WILL not permit refugees' return' (an unconditional declaration) while the tick against the Palestinian option to stop violence is read as 'The Palestinians SHOULD stop violence' (an unconditional demand). The conjunction 'AND' can also be used to describe the Stated Intentions, but reverting to the issue of conditionality explained above, the connector 'IF' can also be used here (but never in a verbal description of a Position). So the Israeli Intention is 'We will not permit refugees' return; we will not reduce territorial control IF the Palestinians will not stop violence' while the Palestinian Intention is 'We will not stop violence'.

Given the Positions and Intentions specified in Table 4.1a, the dilemmas facing each character can be readily established. In DT2 three distinct types of dilemmas are defined, two of which appear in one of two so-called modes. The dilemmas can be expressed as follows in the context of a 2-character interaction between A and B:

- A has a 'Persuasion Dilemma' with B if B's Intention flouts A's Position and A does not doubt B's Intention. This dilemma is in 'threat mode' if it's a threat from which B needs to be dissuaded, and in 'position mode' if B needs to be dissuaded from its position.

- A has a 'Rejection Dilemma' with B if A's Intention flouts B's Position but B doubts A's Intention. This dilemma is in 'threat mode' if it's a threat that A needs to make credible, and in 'position mode' if it is A's rejection of B's Position that A needs to make credible.
- A has a 'Trust Dilemma' with B if B's Intention is compatible with A's Position but A doubts B's Intention.

The identification of these dilemmas within an options board can be reliably undertaken by using the diagnostic chart of Figure 4.1.

Here the dilemmas arising over a specific option, o, are established for any character c. It is assumed that there is some function OWN which indicates the character OWN(o) that 'owns' (i.e., is responsible for) each



Figure 4.1. Dilemma Identification Chart.

option. At the moment of truth, every character, c, has a Position, P(c,o) as to whether the option should be 'adopted by OWN(o)', 'rejected by OWN(o)' or 'left open'. In the light of these Positions OWN(o) will also have made clear its Stated Intention, SI(o), on the option: whether to 'adopt' or 'reject' the option or to 'leave it open'.

To use the chart commence at the top-left box. If character c leaves open its Position on the option then, regardless of what OWN(o) proposes to do, it can face no dilemmas since it does not care what decision is made on the option, so has no need to convince anyone about its specific wishes or intentions. If c's Position coincides with what c says it intends to do, then as long as c has no doubts about OWN(o)'s intention, again c faces no dilemma: it is secure in the knowledge that OWN(o) will act in a way with which both parties are content. On the other hand, if there is some doubt about OWN(o)'s intentions—c and OWN(o) might have agreed that the latter should take a course of action but c suspects OWN(o) will renege on the promise (and this is CCK)—then c has a Trust Dilemma with OWN(o) over option o. In the case when c's Position and OWN(o)'s Stated Intention clash then dilemmas will certainly arise for one party or the other. When c has no doubt that OWN(o) is in earnest about its Stated Intention, then this poses a Persuasion Dilemma for c. This is also the case when OWN(o) simply won't say what it will do. However if c has doubts about OWN(o)'s resolve to carry out its contrary intention (which may be a contrary Position or an explicit threat), then the dilemma faces OWN(o): this is a Rejection Dilemma for OWN(o) who has somehow to give this contrary intention credibility.

Returning to the example of the Middle East Conflict, the dilemmas faced by the two characters are recorded in the right side of the table of Table 4.1a against each option. In the first row, for example, the Persuasion Dilemma experienced by the Palestinians is noted. This arises because:

- The Palestinians have take a definite position on this option (that refugees should be permitted to return)
- The Palestinians Position conflicts with the Position (and the explicit intention) of the Israelis
- The Palestinians have no doubt the Israelis' would not permit refugees to return.

This sequence of 'answers' to the questions implied by the flowchart of Figure 4.1 tracks down the left side of the diagram to the conclusion that a Persuasion Dilemma is created for the Palestinians. It should also be noted that this dilemma is recorded as being in 'position mode'. The mode is not diagnosed by the flowchart but can readily be seen from the option board since the Israelis must be dissuaded from their Position if the dilemma is to be resolved. In this case their Stated Intention (i.e., threat) is the same as

their Position, so actually the dilemma is in threat mode as well, but the convention is that if both modes are relevant then it is the position mode that is recorded. If, as in the second row of the option table, the Position of the option owner is left open then the resulting dilemma is clearly in threat mode. It is implausible that an option owner holds a clear view in its Position but either takes the contrary view or leaves open its Stated Intention. The remaining dilemmas in Table 4.1a are found in the same way by applying the logic of Figure 4.1. Since the options board here corresponds to a conflict between the characters, only Persuasion and Rejection Dilemmas appear. It will be see in later examples how Trust Dilemmas can occur when there is apparent agreement between the characters. Trust Dilemmas are often foreshadowed by the doubts recorded agains characters' Positions but as long as a confrontation remains the doubts don't give rise to these dilemmas because the corresponding actions aren't yet promised as (doubted) Stated Intentions.

It is worth itemising the dilemmas facing the two characters in the Middle East conflict as formulated in Table 4.1a. These dilemmas each place pressure upon the corresponding party and are as follows:

Upon the Israelis:

- A Persuasion Dilemma (threat mode) because the Palestinian threat not to stop violence is entirely credible
- A Persuasion Dilemma (threat mode) because the Palestinians are unwilling or unable to make any commitment to recognise the state of Israel.

Upon the Palestinians:

- A Persuasion Dilemma (position mode) because the Israelis seem implacably determined not to permit refugees' return
- A Persuasion Dilemma (threat mode) because the Israelis have stated an unwavering intention not to reduce territorial control
- A Rejection Dilemma (position mode) because the Israelis cannot believe the declared Palestinian Position (that they are proposing to stop violence).

Before considering how the characters might deal with these dilemmas it is instructive to compare the present analysis with the results that would have been obtained using soft game analysis as in the previous Chapter. The equivalent option table appears in Table 4.2 where the characters' assumed preferences for each future have been inserted in each column in the row corresponding to each character (it is taken that both the Israelis and the Palestinians most prefer their own Positions and least like the others' Position).

Table 4.2. Middle East Conflict: Soft Game Model.

	Futures			Dilemmas
	I	**P**	**S.I.**	
ISRAELIS	**1**	**3**	**2**	**I has Per with P I has Trust with P**
permit refugees' return	**×**	**✓?**	**×**	
reduce territorial control	**~**	**✓?**	**×**	
PALESTINIANS	**3**	**1**	**2**	**P has Per with I P has Co-opn with I P has Trust with I**
stop violence	**✓?**	**✓?**	**×**	
recognise Israel	**✓?**	**~**	**~**	

Then the dilemmas faced are as follows:
For the Israelis:

- a Persuasion Dilemma because the Palestinians reject their Position and prefer the Threatened Future
- a Trust Dilemma because they doubt that even if the Palestinians said they agreed to the Israeli Position, they would, in the event, stop violence and recognise Israel.

For the Palestinians:

- a Persuasion Dilemma because the Israelis prefer the Threatened Future under which no refugee returns would be permitted to the Palestinian Position
- a Co-operation Dilemma because the Israelis doubt that the Palestinians would implement any agreement that violence should stop
- a Trust Dilemma because the Palestinians doubt that even if they were to agree to the Palestinian Position the Israelis would actually implement these proposals to permit refugees' return and reduce territorial control.

The identification of the same number of dilemmas in both analyses is pure chance! Indeed most often the drama theory analysis generates fewer dilemmas because it excludes dilemmas that have no leverage (e.g., where one character has preferences that no-one thinks it can or will do anything about). Furthermore, as noted above issues of trust (Trust and Cooperation dilemmas in soft game analysis) do not feature in drama theoretic analysis until there is potential agreement between the characters. At the same time, the drama theoretic analysis is clearly more precise, since it indicates the specific options over which each dilemma occurs.