

An Authentication Protocol for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks with Embedded Certificates

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Abstract. Wireless ad hoc networks may be configured as a fixed topology of sensors or allowed to migrate as mobile nodes. The flexibility of these networks, therefore, provides opportunities for their deployment in real-time and in adverse situations as encountered in civil and military applications. These advantages are, unfortunately, curtailed by the unconstrained nature of these networks in providing a trusted level of connectivity. The establishment of secret keys and the authentication of trusted ad hoc group nodes are essential elements for a secure network. In this paper, we develop an authentication protocol for wireless ad hoc networks that is derived from a canonical splitting of time- and frequency-space (channel) over which information propagates under the constraint of a collision-avoidance protocol.

1 Introduction

The rapid deployment of wireless ad hoc networks even under the most severe conditions, has elevated their prominence in all aspects of homeland security and military communications. However, these infrastructure-less networks are prone to require explicit network cooperation, route maintenance in the event of link failure, and information losses resulting from data packet collisions. These routing protocols for dynamic networks have been discussed in [11] and [19]. Furthermore, without data encryption and trusted node authentication, these networks are vulnerable to malicious attacks that may be categorized by the following techniques: eavesdropping; man-in-the-middle; replay; impersonation; session hijacking; reflection; and interleaving attacks.

Intelligent information processing provides network security approaches that has prompted researchers to propose numerous security protocols for the establishment of secret keys; and in particular, the authentication of wireless ad hoc network nodes. A taxonomy and classification of services that rely on authentication are studied by [17, 10]. The use of local time-stamp authentication protocols [14], a hop-by-hop authentication [26], recommendation and reference protocol that is inspired by human behavior [24], location-limited channels with pre-authentication [20, 1], an end-to-end data authentication scheme that relies on mutual trust between nodes [23], a threshold secret sharing using an identity-based cryptosystem to provide end-to-end authentication

[6], under loosely time synchronized nodes with one-way chain as a cryptographic key where each such value is associated with a time interval [25].

In [3], a self-organized public-key management scheme is proposed that maintains no centralized services, yet, allows each node to generate private-public key pairs; to issue public key certificates for its neighboring nodes; and to perform authentication via a chain of public-key certificates regardless of the network partition. Several refinements to this proposed scheme are presented in [2] where each certificate is issued with a limited validity time period that contains its issuing and expiration time. After expiration of the valid time period, new certificate are issued to its neighboring nodes. In addition, nodes in alliance with their neighboring nodes form trust groups that communicate using the group's private and public key. The authenticity between nodes is performed by validating their cached public-key certificates chain. The public keys and certificates are modeled as a directed graph for which transitive properties can identify nodes belonging to a trust group.

A major difficulty with the solution specifications for certificate-based authentication, as described above, is the amorphous structure of wireless ad hoc networks in both static and dynamic systems. The unconstrained nature of malicious attacks in such networks are, therefore, difficult if not impossible to protect against. Geometrically, the use of public/private-key certificates is a one-dimensional parameterization of the problem domain. Whether in the form of a certificate-chain or a cluster-key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, the various approaches are limited by their reliance on artificial solutions that do not embrace the dynamical properties or behavior of these systems. With this in mind, we argue for a “canonical” reformulation of the authentication problem in wireless ad hoc networks and derive an alternative solution technique that is described in a two-dimensional setting.

If security is deemed critical then as in all practical engineering considerations, tradeoffs must be identified and enforced. To this end, we propose a different approach to authentication in wireless ad hoc networks that imposes a collision-avoidance policy on data transmission that has the property of untangling the authentication process such that certificates are no longer exchanged explicitly.

In the remainder of the paper, we outline the proposed approach, and provide possible means of implementations.

2 An Authentication Protocol with Embedded Certificates (APEC)

The proposed authentication protocol introduces a sequence of unique, non-overlapping communication time-slots that are assigned to each authenticated node of the network. Time-slots are used as an implicit certificate to ensure trust. In addition, we impose on top of each time-slot a pseudo-randomly correlated frequency channel F_i over which a data packet must be sent in time-slot T_i . This dependence between time-slots and frequency channels introduces a two-dimensional description of network communication and thus allows for a clear decomposition of the problem domain.

The protocol is described in terms of a cluster with a single cluster head or administrator node as follows:

1. Assume that an initial authentication phase has verified the trust of nodes that have joined the cluster.
2. The cluster head sends a public key to all nodes in the cluster.
3. The public key is used by every node to select the appropriate addend, multipliers, etc to construct a common pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) using a hash-table. Two such PRNGs are constructed $\text{RandT}()$ and RandF , that produces the sequences for T_i and F_i ; respectively.
4. From the public key, a random seed is produced and used to seed $\text{RandT}()$. Each T_i that is generated is in turn used as a seed to generate a corresponding F_i from the pseudo-random number generator $\text{RandF}()$.
5. After each complete communication time period, the order of the sequence of time-slots are permuted.

At the end of these steps, a sequence of T_m time-slots with their randomly correlated frequency channel, F_m , are created, and forms m -coordinate, 2-tuples (T_i, F_i) . In addition, the details of the PRNG construction are known to each entrusted node in the network; and therefore, allows a deterministic recreation of all present and future m -coordinate pairs. This becomes important when a node cannot send data packets to the cluster head in one hop but instead requires a multi-hop link to reach its destination.

3 A Space-Time Coordinate Basis with Collision-Avoidance

Communication can be parameterized as a space-time, 2-tuple coordinate basis. Time (time-slot), T_i , is taken as the moment (over the time-slot duration) that a message is sent or received. Space is the physical channel over which the message is sent or received. For a wireless network this channel is associated with a particular radio frequency, F_i , over which a message is sent out or received. We characterize this 2-tuple by (T_i, F_i) .

In order to avoid ambiguities, it is important that a collision-avoidance protocol be adopted for a wireless network so that no two data packets arrive at a given destination during the same time-slot. This property is reflected in the following definition:

Definition: Two valid communication coordinates (T_i, F_j) and (T_r, F_s) within a wireless ad hoc network must necessarily satisfy the condition that $T_i \neq T_r$; however, it is not sufficient since some time-slots may be forbidden. (collision-avoidance assumption).

The collision-avoidance assumption restricts a clustered network of wireless nodes to communicate only over predetermined, non-overlapping send or receive time-slots. As a consequence, certain types of external attacks can be detected if two or more distinct data packets arrive during the same time-slot.

The collision-avoidance assumption is examined by Forsmann et al., [8]. The perspective of their study is the QoS of unmanned aerial vehicles for autonomous formation flight. For the sake of this paper, we consider only the cluster formation with a single cluster head node, and assume that all communication is directed between a cluster head and each individual node within the cluster. It is, however, possible that the mobility of each vehicle (node) may require the use of intermediate nodes to form a multi-hop

message-forwarding link if the sending node drifts out of radio range with the cluster head. Multi-hop network routing links are addressed using a modified version of the AODV route-discovery protocol as described by Forsmann et al.

Under the assumptions of a collision-avoidance protocol and the two-dimensional representation of communication events within a wireless mobile ad hoc network, we introduce a cryptographic *confusion* algorithm that replaces the traditional certificate-based authentication procedures that have been attempted for these infrastructure-less networks. The following desired set of properties provide the foundation for our approach:

Property 1: A unique time-slot and frequency channel pair is assigned to only one node within the network.

Property 2: It is desirable to *conceal* the selection of the radio frequency channel F_i in each round of a node's communication time-slot sequence.

Property 3: For each communication period a new sequence order for a given node's time-slots T_i are assigned.

Property 4: The length of a time-slot duration depends upon the time-skewing experience by each node's clock. It will be assume that each node is equipped with a GPS device for time synchronization.

The process for *concealing* the selection of T_i and F_i is performed using a pair of *orthogonal* PRNGs as outline in Frederickson et al., [9]. Their work examined the issue of reproducibility of Monte Carlo random walk algorithms for parallel execution. The use of a single PRNG in a parallel processing environment has the effect of reordering the sequence of pseudo-random numbers that are generated. Although this additional randomness may seem advantageous, the final result cannot be compared for correctness with the results of the sequential execution that uses the same PRNG. Without this verification, it is not clear whether or not the parallel program has been implemented correctly.

Analogously, a wireless ad hoc network represents a collection of parallel processing nodes that can be assured a unique $\{T_i, F_i\}$ pair for each entrusted node without incurring inter-node co-channel interference. To ensure this property, each node must be given a different random number sequence in a deterministic fashion. Figure 1 illustrates the *orthogonal* structure for a pair of PRNG that result in a reproducible random number scheme.

Below, we summarize some typical PRNGs in use and techniques used in creating parallel pseudo-random number generators (PPRNG).

4 Pseudo-Random Number Generation

4.1 Types of Generators

The following list are commonly used pseudo-random number generators:




Fig. 1. *RanT* and *RanF*.

- Additive and subtractive Lagged Fibonacci (LF)
- Generalized Shift Register (GSR)
- Multiplicative Linear Congruential (MLC) and
- Combination Generators (CG)

A uniform (double precision) floating-point random number sequence x_i in the interval $[0, 1)$ or $(0, 1)$ are produced by the following recursions:

MLC ($a, m = 2^l$):

$$X_i = aX_{i-1} \bmod m; \quad x_i = X_i/m, (i = 1, 2, \dots)$$

GSR (r, s, \oplus_l):

$$X_i = X_{i-r} \oplus_l X_{i-s}; \quad x_i = X_i/2^l, (i = r, r+1, \dots) \quad (1)$$

LF ($r, s, \pm m = 2^l$):

$$X_i = X_{i-r} \pm X_{i-s} \bmod 2^l; \quad x_i = X_i/2^l, (i = r, r+1, \dots)$$

CG:

$$Z_i = X_i \odot Y_i; (i = r, r+1, \dots)$$

where \odot is either the exclusive-or-operator or addition modulo some integer m , and X and Y are sequences from two independent generators. It is best if the cycle length of the two generators is relatively prime, for this implies that the cycle length of Z will be the product of that of the basic generators. One can show that the statistical properties of Z are no worse than those of X or Y [15]. Good combined generators have been developed by L'Ecuyer [13], based on the addition of Linear Congruential sequences.

4.2 Parallel Pseudo-Random Number Generation

Historically, the introduction of PPRNG was an attempt to address various efficiency issues inherent in the parallel execution of scientific applications such as lattice

gauge and Ising model calculations. Within this context, the quality of PPRNGs have been studied by a number of researchers [4, 5, 16, 18, 21]. More recently, their use in games and graphics have drawn interest [22, 12].

As a brief overview, we list below several approaches that have been studied and applied in the design of PPRNGs. The descriptions are only meant to provide a high level, structural description of several different possible parallel techniques.

- Leapfrog – The pseudo-random sequence is partitioned in turn among nodes so that node i gets the sequence r_i, r_{i+m}, \dots , where m is the total number of nodes or time-slots.
- Sequence splitting – The sequence is partitioned by splitting it into non-overlapping contiguous sections. In particular, if it is known that the cycle length of a pseudo-random sequence is l_c then node $i + 1$ gets the sequence $r_{[il_c/m]+1}, r_{[il_c/m]+2}, \dots, r_{(i+1)l_c/m}$.
- Independent sequences – For some generators, the initial seeds can be chosen in such a way as to produce long period independent subsequences on each processor.
- Cycle parameterization – For PRNGs' that have more than one distinct cycle, it is possible to select a seed that begins in one cycle and a different seed that begins in a different cycle resulting in two sequences that do not overlap. The Lagged Fibonacci Generator is an example of a generator with this property. By associating each seed with a cycle number i , parameter i determines the cycle from which the sequence is drawn.

4.3 Reproducibility and Cycle Lengths

In order to ensure reproducibility, each node must be given a different random number sequence in a deterministic fashion. This can be accomplished by creating a random seed unique to each node (e.g., the time-slot) that in turn is used to seed a different (*orthogonal*) random number generator that produces a second “independent” pseudo-random (frequency channel) sequence. This deterministic approach is reproducible and requires no inter-node communication, whose costs are typically high. More importantly, the absence of inter-node communication is extremely desirable from a security standpoint.

A pseudo-random number generator defines at most 2^b different configurations (states) where b is the number of bits that represent the number of possible states. The sequence, after generating 2^b different configurations, must repeat.

It is desirable, therefore, to use PPRNGs with the longest cycle length to guarantee the minimal biasing of the results. This, however, does not eliminate the advantages of a small cycle length as long as the coordinates that are produced are not exactly the same. Hence even if the random number sequence repeats, if the $\{T_i, F_i\}$ pair remain unique, the bias remains low.

As a consequence, it is assumed that the correlation between pairs of pseudo-random number generators has little effect on network authentication unless the bias results in (T_i, F_j) cycles.

4.4 Security

Pseudo-random number generation is a process that either provides security or is vulnerable to attacks that can compromise the security of a system. The PRNG process is provocatively attractive to attackers because it is typically a single isolated, hardware/software component whose deterministic output is disguised as random. If an attacker can substitute pseudo-random bits generated in a way that can be predicted, security is totally compromised.

5 Time-Slot Selection

The sequence of time-slots for one complete communication period

$$\{T_0, T_1, \dots, T_n, \dots, T_{m-1}, \}$$

A communication period, τ , is defined as the sum over all m time-slots ($m \geq n$) in the closed interval $[T_0, T_{m-1}]$,

$$\tau = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} T_i.$$

The requirement ($m \geq n$) for an n node wireless network is imposed for three reasons. First, m may be viewed as a cryptographic parameter that introduces a level of *confusion*, as is shown later. Second, the choice of m introduces idle time-slots over which no data packets should be sent or received. Third, m provides a slight window (delay) between the end of one time-slot and the beginning of the next.

After each communication period, a new sequence of unique non-overlapping time-slots are assigned to each node. This assignment is defined by the following equation:

$$T_{j,i+1} = T_{j,i} + \delta t_i, \quad (2)$$

for $i, j = 0, 1, \dots, m$. In this notation index j is the node number and i is the iteration or communication period number.

There are several ways of selecting δt_i . One simple approach is to maintain the order of time-slots for each node from one iteration to the next. Figure 2 illustrates the case for $\delta t_i = \tau$.

A second and possibly more secure approach is to apply a permutation on the order of the previous time-slot sequence. The permutation of the sequence is shown in Fig. 3.

For a permutation π , we associate a permutation matrix P_π and a distance matrix D_π whose values represent the number of column swaps from their original position to their final position in the permutation. For example, if $\pi = \{0, 3, 2, 1\}$, then

$$P_\pi = \begin{vmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{vmatrix},$$




Fig. 2. Direct Mapping Constant Increment $\delta t_i = \tau$.




Fig. 3. Permutation Mapping Variable Increment δt_i .

and

$$D_\pi = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -2 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 \\ 0 & +2 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The distance matrix can then be used to define a time-slot increment vector $\delta \mathbf{t}_i$ given by

$$\delta \mathbf{t}_i = \tau \theta^T + \delta t D_\pi \cdot \theta, \quad (3)$$

where

$$\theta = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

of length m , and

$$\delta t = \tau / m.$$

The components of Eqn. 3 are then applied to Eqn. 2.

5.1 Multi-Hop Authentication

The requirement for pseudo-random reproducibility is most important in the instant that a network topology has migrated beyond a single-hop radio range to a multi-hop environment. In such a situation, a routing protocol is employed to initiate route discovery. As part of the data transfer process, the destination node may have need of the source nodes identity and the chosen route path. To obtain this information any entrusted node intercepting the packets can recompute the node's time-slot seed using the original public-key and compute the appropriate frequency channel for the current communication period. With this information, the source node and route path can be identified. The implications of this scenario is that only trusted nodes can determine the communication route, destination and source nodes in a calculable time frame.

5.2 Security Complexity

APEC is a cryptographic system protocol based on a source of random bits, whose output is used in creating unique time-slot and frequency channel pairs. APEC employs two “*orthogonal*” pseudo-random number generators that cooperate in parallel to assign node-specific send/receive, time-slots that are in turn used to seed a pseudo-random assignment of time-slot, correlated frequency channels. In this construction, the sequence of frequency channels can be systematically applied in turn to the same time-slot but on different periods of the communication cycle.

The order of time-slots assigned to each node can remain in the same order or be reordered to increase cryptographic confusion. In this paper, a reordering of the time-slot sequence is presented using a simple permutation π .

The security complexity is stated by the following theorem.

Theorem: The brute force complexity for guessing the correct sequence of coordinate basis pair for a b -bit random sequence and a permutation of the sequence order for m time-slots is $O(2^{2b} \times m!)$.

Proof: A pseudo random number generator is a finite state machine with at most 2^b different states where b is the number of bits that represent the state. The brute force complexity of guessing the time-slots is $O(2^b)$. However, since the frequency channels are coupled to the seed of a unique time-slot the complexity of the coupled random number states requires a total of $O(2^{2b})$. If we also apply a permutation to the previous time-slots sequence for every communication period the brute force complexity for m time-slots is $O(m!)$. The final complexity is the product of the time-slot, frequency channel and the permutation operations. \square

6 Conclusion

Geometrically, the use of public/private keys as certificates for authentication in wireless ad hoc networks is a one-dimensional solution in a two- or higher-dimensional problem domain. The novel abstraction taken here is to design an authentication protocol that embodies the dynamic processes and captures the essential behavior of the system in a “self-certifiable” manner. In this context, we achieve a canonical formulation of the authentication problem in wireless ad hoc networks and as such derive an alternative solution technique devoid of explicit certificate passing.

The contributions of this paper is the design of a new authentication protocol that relies on a collision-avoidance protocol to guarantee the detection of unauthorized attempts to compromise a wireless ad hoc network of trusted nodes. The protocol creates a random, yet deterministic sequence of coupled time-slots and associated frequency channels that are unique to each node in the network. For each communication period, the order of the sequence of time-slots may remain unaltered or the order can be rearranged deterministically without coordination via inter-node communication. If an analogy can be made between frequency channels to colors in the visual range, the communication in an APEC system would appear to be a coordinated light show.

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