EECS4312 eHealth Project

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Keep track of your revisions in the table below.

Revisions

| Date | Revision | Description |
|-------------|----------|-------------------------------|
| date please | 1.0 | Initial requirements document |

Requirements Document:

for Patient care eHealth System

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1. System Overview

The System Under Development (SUD) is a computer system to create and manage health prescription records for Ontario.

This requirements document is specifically for prescription management. The purpose of the eHealth Patient care System is to maintain physicians, medications, patients, and patient prescriptions. The system will also control the undesirable interactions between medications, that is when two medications conflict in some way with one another. Only specialist physicians should be allowed to prescribe undesirable interactions while general physicians should be allowed to prescribe medications, as long as they do not create undesirable interactions.

2. Context Diagram

The System Under Description (SUD) is a computer *controller* to keep track of the physicians, patients, patient prescriptions, medications, and medication interactions. The monitored variables and controlled variables for this computer system can be found in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.

The system must keep track of abstract state which isn't available to the user. For a list of the abstract states within the controller see Figure 3.




Figure 1: Context Diagram

3. Goals

The high-level goals (G) of the system are:

- G1— The user should be able to add doctors (generalists, and specialists)
- G2— The user should be able to add patients
- G3— The user should be able to add medications
- \bullet G4— The user should be able to add perscriptions
- G5— The user should be able to add interactions between medications
- G6— The user should only be able to add a prescription with a dangerous interaction if the doctor is a specialist

4. Monitored Events

The monitored events are those which come through the user interface. The following monitored events will be available to the user.

| Name | Interpretation | |
|---|--|--|
| add_physician(id: ID_MD; name: NAME; kind: PHYSICIAN_TYPE) | Add a Physician to the system | |
| add_patient(id: ID_PT; name: NAME) | Add Patient to the system | |
| add_medication(id: ID_MN; medicine: MEDICATION) | Add a medication to the system, | |
| add_interaction(id1:ID_MN;id2:ID_MN) | Add an interaction between | |
| add_interaction(id1.iD_ivitv,id2.iD_ivitv) | two medications | |
| new_prescription(id: ID_RX; | Add a new prescription to | |
| doctor: ID_MD; patient: ID_PT) | the system | |
| add_medicine(id: ID_RX; medicine:ID_MN; dose: VALUE) | Add a medicine to a prescription | |
| remove_medicine(id: ID_RX; | Remove a medication from | |
| medicine:ID_MN) | a prescription | |
| prescriptions_q(medication_id: ID_MN) | Get all the prescriptions with that medication | |
| $dpr_{-}q$ | Get all the dangerous interactions prescribed | |

Table 1: Monitored Events

5. Controlled Variables

The controlled variables represent what will be shown to the user.

| Name | Interpretation | Abstract State |
|---------------|--|----------------|
| Physicians | A list of all the Physicians currently within the system | See table 3 |
| Patients | A list of all the Patients currently in the system | See table 3 |
| Medications | A list of all the Medications currently within the system | See table 3 |
| Interactions | A list of all the Interactions currently within the system | See table 3 |
| Prescriptions | A list of all the Prescriptions within the system | See table 3 |
| Error | A message displaying the highest priority error, or ok | See table 3 |

Table 2: Controlled Variables

6. Mode Diagram

REQ1 states The controller shall operate in one of four modes: off, init, normal and fail, shown in Fig. 2. As shown in the figure, the Isolette will begin in the off mode, and will enter init mode when the nurse flips $m_s s w$ into the on position. The Isolette will only be able to move from the init mode of the normal mode if it is properly configured such that the desired range is valid and not overlapping with the alarm levels, and both the sensors and operator controls are working (see REQ??). Once inside the normal mode, the controller will move to the fail mode if either the controls or sensor fails, as specified in REQ??, and will only return to the normal mode once they are both working correctly (REQ7). In any of these states, if the nurse switches $m_s s w$ to off the controller will switch to the off mode (REQ8).




Figure 2: Statechart for the modes variable $c_{-}md$

7. E/R-descriptions

7.1. Requirements Descriptions

| REQ1 | The system will keep track of Physicians, Patients, Medications, Interactions, and Prescriptions | . <mark></mark> |
|------|---|---|
| | | |
| REQ2 | The system will output a different response depending on which monitored event occurs. | |
| | | |
| REQ3 | In normal mode, the controller shall activate an alarm whenever • the current temperature falls outside the alarm temperature range (either through temperature fluctuation or a change in the alarm range by an operator), or • a failure is signalled in any of the input devices (temperature sensor and operator settings). | The alarm temperature range is $m_{-}al$ $m_{-}ah$. Monitored variable $m_{-}st$ shows "invalid" when any of the input signals fail. |

Rationale: During normal operation, if any conditions occur that could affect the wellbeing of the infant, the nurse should be notified by an alarm. This could include sensor or interface failure, or current temperature exceeding alarm values - even if this is caused by the nurse adjusting the values.

7.2. Environmental Descriptions

| ENV4 | All input to the system will be assumed as correct, i.e. without syntax errors. | see table for a list of monitored events. |
|------|---|--|
| ENV5 | The desired and alarm temperatures received from the operator are all in increments of 1°F. | $m_{-}ah$, $m_{-}al$, $m_{-}dh$, and $m_{-}dl$ in Table 1: Monitored Variables. |

Rationale: The operator interface for the nurse is designed in such a way that the increments of the input temperatures from the control interface must change by whole numbers.

| ENV6 Failure of the sensors or operator settings will cause the status to become invalid. | If the sensor or operator settings fail, m_st becomes invalid. |
|---|--|
|---|--|

Rationale: The environment has ways of detecting failures of the operator interface or the temperature sensor and indicating their status to the controller. The Isolette must constantly be monitoring the status of the sensors and controls to ensure that safe assumptions can be made on their values so as to not endanger the infant.

8. Abstract variables needed for the Function Table

| Name | Interpredation | Purpose |
|------|---|--|
| mnid | The set of all medication ids | Keep track of all the medication ids in the system |
| ptid | The set of all patient ids | Keep track of all the patient ids in the system |
| mdid | The set of all doctor ids | Keep track of all the doctor ids in the system |
| rxid | The set of all prescription ids | Keep track of all the prescription ids in the system |
| mdpt | Relationship between Doctor and Patient | Keep track of the doctor and the patient |
| rx | Relation between doctor patient and medication | Keep track of all the medical prescriptions between doctor and patient in the system |
| prs | List of all prescriptions including dosage | Keep track of all the prescriptions in the system |
| di | Set of dangerous interactions between medications | Keep track of all the dangerous interactions in the system |
| gs | The kind of doctor | Keep track of all the type of doctor |
| dpi | The dangerous | Notify dangerous interactions, |
| ирі | prescription report | if they exist |

Figure 3: Abstract Variables used in Function Tables

9. Function Tables

9.1. Table of Error codes and Warnings

| Name | Meaning |
|-------|--|
| err1 | physician id must be a positive integer |
| err2 | physician id already in use |
| err3 | name must start with a letter |
| err4 | patient id must be a positive integer |
| err5 | patient id already in use |
| err6 | name must start with a letter |
| err7 | medication id must be a positive integer |
| err8 | medication id already in use |
| err9 | medication name must start with a letter |
| err10 | medication name already in use |
| err11 | require 0 <low-dose <="hi-dose</td"></low-dose> |
| err12 | medication ids must be positive integers |
| err13 | medication ids must be different |
| err14 | medications with these ids must be registered |
| err15 | interaction already exists |
| err16 | first remove conflicting medicine prescribed by generalist |
| err17 | prescription id must be a positive integer |
| err18 | prescription id already in use |
| err19 | physician with this id not registered |
| err20 | patient with this id not registered |
| err21 | prescription already exists for this physician and patient |
| err22 | prescription with this id does not exist |
| err23 | medication id must be registered |
| err24 | medication is already prescribed |
| err25 | specialist is required to add a dangerous interaction |
| err26 | dose is outside allowed range |
| err27 | medication is not in the prescription |
| warn1 | There are dangerous prescriptions |
| warn2 | There are no dangerous prescriptions |

Figure 4: Table of errors and warnings

9.2. Function Table for eHealth

| Monitored Inputs | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| i = 0 | | See Table 6 |
| | new_prescription(id, doctor, patient) | See Table 7 |
| i >0 | add_medicine(id, medicine, dose) | See Table 8 |
| | remove_medicine(id, medicine) | See Table 9 |
| | add_interaction(id1, id2) | See Table 10 |

Figure 5: Function Table for eHealth

9.3. Function Table for init

error: false

| Abstract State | ¬ error | error |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|-------|
| mind(i) | Ø | NC |
| ptid(i) | Ø | NC |
| mdid(i) | Ø | NC |
| rxid(i) | Ø | NC |
| mn(i) | Ø | NC |
| mns(i) | ε | NC |
| mdpt(i) | Ø | NC |
| rx(i) | ε | NC |
| prs(i) | ε | NC |
| di(i) | Ø | NC |
| gs(i) | $\varnothing \mapsto \varepsilon$ | NC |
| dpr(i) | $\varnothing\mapsto\varepsilon$ | NC |
| r(i) | ok | error |

Figure 6: Function Table for init

9.4. Function Table for new_prescription(id, md, pt)

error: $\neg(id > 0 \land \neg rxid_1(id) \land md > 0 \land mdid_1(md) \land pt > 0 \land ptid_1(pt) \land mdpt_1(md, pt))$

| Abstract State | ¬ error | error |
|----------------|--|-------|
| mind(i) | NC | NC |
| ptid(i) | NC | NC |
| mdid(i) | NC | NC |
| rxid(i) | $rxid_{-1} \cup \{id\}$ | NC |
| mn(i) | NC | NC |
| mns(i) | NC | NC |
| mdpt(i) | NC | NC |
| rx(i) | $rx_{-1} \upharpoonright (id \mapsto (md, pt))$ | NC |
| prs(i) | $prs_{-1} \upharpoonright (id \mapsto empty_prs(mnid_1))$ | NC |
| di(i) | NC | NC |
| gs(i) | NC | NC |
| dpr(i) | $dpr_{-1} \mid (id \mapsto \varnothing)$ | NC |
| r(i) | ok | error |

Figure 7: Function Table for new_prescription(id, doctor, patient)

9.5. Function Table for add_medicine(id, m, d)

error: $\neg(id > 0 \land \neg rxid_1(id) \land m > 0 \land mnid_1(m) \land pt > 0 has(m, prs_1(id)) \land sumthin \land isValidDose(m, d))$

| Abstract State | ¬ error | error |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|-------|
| mind(i) | NC | NC |
| ptid(i) | NC | NC |
| mdid(i) | NC | NC |
| rxid(i) | NC | NC |
| mn(i) | NC | NC |
| mns(i) | NC | NC |
| mdpt(i) | NC | NC |
| rx(i) | NC | NC |
| prs(i) | $prs_{-1}(id) \uparrow (m \mapsto d)$ | NC |
| di(i) | NC | NC |
| gs(i) | NC | NC |
| dpr(i) | NC | NC |
| r(i) | ok | error |

Figure 8: Function Table for add_medicine(id, medicine, dose)

9.6. Function Table for remove_medicine(id, med)

error: $\neg (id > 0 \land \neg rxid_1(id) \land med > 0 \land mnid_1(med) \land prs_1(id)(med)`1 > 0)$

| Abstract State | ¬ error | error |
|----------------|---|-------|
| mind(i) | NC | NC |
| ptid(i) | NC | NC |
| mdid(i) | NC | NC |
| rxid(i) | NC | NC |
| mn(i) | NC | NC |
| mns(i) | NC | NC |
| mdpt(i) | NC | NC |
| rx(i) | NC | NC |
| prs(i) | $prs_{-1} \upharpoonright (id \mapsto \varepsilon)$ | NC |
| di(i) | NC | NC |
| gs(i) | NC | NC |
| dpr(i) | NC | NC |
| r(i) | ok | error |

Figure 9: Function Table for remove_medicine(id, medicine)

9.7. Function Table for add_interaction(id1, id2)

error: $\neg (id1 > 0 \land id2 > 0 \land \neg id1 = id2 \land mnid_1(id1) \land mnid_1(id2) \land (\exists a : (prs_1(a)(id1)`1 > 0 \land sumin) \lor (prs_1(id)(med)`1 > 0 \land sumin)))$

| Abstract State | ¬ error | error |
|----------------|---|-------|
| mind(i) | NC | NC |
| ptid(i) | NC | NC |
| mdid(i) | NC | NC |
| rxid(i) | NC | NC |
| mn(i) | NC | NC |
| mns(i) | NC | NC |
| mdpt(i) | NC | NC |
| rx(i) | NC | NC |
| prs(i) | NC | NC |
| di(i) | $di_{-1} \cup (id1, id2) \wedge di_1 \cup (id2, id1)$ | NC |
| gs(i) | NC | NC |
| dpr(i) | NC | NC |
| r(i) | ok | error |

Figure 10: Function Table for add_interaction(id1, id2)

10. Validation

```
todo
*** top (23:34:28 11/15/2015)
*** Generated by proveit - ProofLite-6.0.9 (3/14/14)
   Trusted Oracles
    MetiTarski: MetiTarski Theorem Prover via PVS proof rule metit
Proof summary for theory top
   Theory totals: 0 formulas, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded (0.00 s)
Proof summary for theory Time
   r2d TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.23 s)
   d2r TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.03 s)
   held_for_TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.08 s)
   Theory totals: 3 formulas, 3 attempted, 3 succeeded (0.33 s)
Proof summary for theory isolette
   c md ft TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.03 s)
                                                [shostak](0.03 s)
   c_md_ft_TCC2.....proved - complete
   c_md_ft_TCC3.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.05 s)
   c md ft TCC4.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.10 s)
   c_md_ft_TCC5.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.06 s)
   c md ft TCC6.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.03 s)
   c_md_ft_TCC7.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.02 s)
   c_md_ft_TCC8.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.02 s)
   c_md_ft_TCC9.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.02 s)
   c td ft TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.01 s)
   c_hc_ft_TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.07 s)
   c_hc_ft_TCC2.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.11 s)
   c_hc_ft_TCC3.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.07 s)
   c_hc_ft_TCC4.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.05 s)
   c_hc_ft_TCC5.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.03 s)
   c_al_ft_TCC1.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.03 s)
   c_al_ft_TCC2.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.04 s)
   c_al_ft_TCC3.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](0.00 s)
   c_al_ft_TCC4.....proved - complete
                                                 [shostak](0.07 s)
                                                 shostak](0.04 s)
   c_al_ft_TCC5.....proved - complete
   c_al_ft_TCC6.....proved - complete
                                                 shostak](0.03 s)
                                                 shostak](0.34 s)
   inv_hc_holds.....proved - complete
   inv_al_holds.....proved - complete
                                                [shostak](2.71 s)
   Theory totals: 23 formulas, 23 attempted, 23 succeeded (3.98 s)
```

Figure 11: Validated Isolette

Grand Totals: 26 proofs, 26 attempted, 26 succeeded (4.32 s)

You must also provide and prove in PVS one important safety invariant for the heat control c_-hc and one important safety invariant for the alarm control c_-al .

Include the PVS sources in the appendix to this document but summarize the proofs here (top.summary).

11. Use Cases

See Section A2 of [?] for some use cases. The use cases need to be adapted to the revised descriptions of the previous sections of this document.

12. Acceptance Tests

In this section, the use cases have to be converted into precise acceptance tests (using the function table to describe pre/post conditions) to be run when the design and implementation are complete.

13. Traceability

Matrix to show which acceptance tests passed, and which R-descriptions they checked.

14. Glossary

The definition of important terms is placed in this section. You are not required to complete this.

A. Additional Requirements

| REQ7 | In fail mode, the controller shall only return to normal mode if The sensor is working and The operator controls are working | In fail mode the controller shall return to normal mode when m_st returns "valid" |
|------|--|--|
| | | |
| REQ8 | In any mode, the controller will transition to the <i>off</i> mode if the nurse turns the switch off. | The controller will transition to off mode from any mode if m_sw becomes off |

B. Isolette PVS

```
isolette[delta:posreal]: THEORY
BEGIN
  %% Import timing resolution
  importing Time[delta]
  i: VAR DTIME
  %% TYPE declarations
  SWITCH: TYPE = {on, off}
 MSTATE: TYPE = {valid, invalid}
  CONTROL: TYPE = {on, off}
  STATE: TYPE = {off, init, normal, failed}
  ERROR: TYPE = {ok, invalid, config, low, high}
  DISPLAY: TYPE = {i: nat | i = 0 OR (68 <= i AND i <= 105)}
        CONTAINING 0
  ALARM: TYPE = \{on, off\}
  TM: TYPE+ = {r: real | r \ge 68.0 AND r \le 105.0} CONTAINING 68.0
 DL: TYPE+ = {i: nat | i >= 97 AND i <= 99} CONTAINING 97
 DH: TYPE+ = {i: nat | i >= 98 AND i <= 100} CONTAINING 98
  AL: TYPE+ = {i: nat | i >= 93 AND i <= 98} CONTAINING 93
 AH: TYPE+ = {i: nat | i > = 99 AND i <= 103} CONTAINING 99
  %% Monitored Variables
 m_tm: [DTIME -> TM]
 m_dl: [DTIME -> DL]
 m_dh: [DTIME -> DH]
 m_al: [DTIME -> AL]
 m ah: [DTIME -> AH]
 m_st: [DTIME -> MSTATE]
 m_sw: [DTIME -> SWITCH]
  %% Controlled Variables
  c_hc: [DTIME -> CONTROL]
  c_td: [DTIME -> DISPLAY]
  c_al: [DTIME -> ALARM]
  c_md: [DTIME -> STATE]
  c_ms: [DTIME -> ERROR]
```

```
al on(i): bool = c al(i) = on %% Alarm is on
% General Function table conditions
c1(i): bool = m_st(i) = valid
c2(i): bool = m_dl(i) <= m_tm(i) <= m_dh(i)
c3(i): bool = m_al(i) < m_dl(i) < m_dh(i) < m_ah(i)
c4(i): bool = c1(i) AND c2(i) AND c3(i)
c5(i): bool = m_tm(i) <= m_al(i) + 0.5
c6(i): bool = m_tm(i) \le m_al(i) - 0.5
c7(i): bool = c1(i) AND c3(i) AND m_al(i) < m_tm(i) < m_ah(i)
c8(i): bool = NOT c1(i) OR NOT c3(i) OR c5(i) OR c6(i)
held_for(i): bool = held_for(al_on, 10)(i)
% Mode Function Table
c_md_ft(i): bool =
COND
      i = 0 \rightarrow c_md(i) = off,
      i > 0 ->
      COND
               m_sw(i) = off -> c_md(i) = off,
               m_sw(i) = on ->
               COND
                       c_md(i-1) = off -> c_md(i) = init,
                        c_md(i-1) = normal OR c_md(i-1) = failed ->
                       COND
                                NOT c1(i) \rightarrow c_md(i) = failed,
                                c1(i) \rightarrow c_md(i) = normal
                       ENDCOND,
                       c_md(i-1) = init ->
                       COND
                                NOT c4(i) \rightarrow c_md(i) = normal,
                                c4(i) \rightarrow c_md(i) = init
                        ENDCOND
               ENDCOND
      ENDCOND
ENDCOND
```

```
% Temperature Display Function Table
c_td_ft(i): bool =
COND
      c_md(i) = normal \rightarrow c_td(i) = m_tm(i),
      NOT c_md(i) = normal -> c_td(i) = 0
ENDCOND
% Heat Control Function Table
c_hc_ft(i): bool =
           COND
               i = 0 \rightarrow c_hc(i) = off
               i > 0 ->
                 COND
                    c_md(i) = off OR (NOT cl(i))
                      OR (NOT c3(i)) -> c_hc(i) = off,
                  (NOT c_md(i) = off) AND c1(i) AND c3(i) \rightarrow
                        COND
                              c2(i) \rightarrow c_hc(i) = c_hc(i-1),
                                     m_tm(i) < m_dl(i)
                                       -> c_hc(i) = on,
                                     m_tm(i) > m_dh(i)
                                       -> c_hc(i) = off
                        ENDCOND
                   ENDCOND
           ENDCOND
```

```
% Alarm Function Table
c_al_ft(i): bool =
COND
      i = 0 -> c_al(i) = off,
      i > 0 ->
      COND
               c_al(i-1) = off ->
               COND
                       c7(i) \rightarrow c_al(i) = c_al(i-1),
                       NOT c7(i) \rightarrow c_al(i) = on
               ENDCOND,
               c_al(i-1) = on ->
               COND
                       c8(i) \rightarrow c_al(i) = c_al(i-1),
                       NOT c8(i) ->
                       COND
                                held_for(i) \rightarrow c_al(i) = off,
                                NOT held_for(i) -> c_al(i) = on
                       ENDCOND
                ENDCOND
      ENDCOND
ENDCOND
% Message Display Function Table
c_ms_ft(i): bool =
          IF m_st(i) = invalid THEN c_ms(i) = invalid
          ELSIF NOT c3(i) THEN c_ms(i) = config
          ELSIF m_tm(i) < m_al(i) THEN c_ms(i) = low
          ELSIF m_tm(i) > m_ah(i) THEN c_ms(i) = high
          ELSE c_ms(i) = ok
          ENDIF
% Isolette Specification
isolette(i): bool = c_hc_ft(i) AND c_td_ft(i) AND c_al_ft(i)
      AND c_md_ft(i) AND c_ms_ft(i)
```