Automatic Cryptanalysis Tools

Paper Read Report: MILP II

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Paper of Interest

➤ Zhang, Y., Sun, S., Cai, J., & Hu, L. (2018). Speeding up MILP Aided Differential Characteristic Search with Matsui's Strategy.



Contents

- Motivation
- ➤ Matsui's Algorithm
- MILP Aided Characteristic Search
- ➤ Integrating Matsui's Bounding Condition into MILP Search
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Motivation

- MILP model can be solved with generic MILP
- >Inconvenience in implementing Matsui's algoritm
- Many new ciphers designed for lightweight devices or dedicated use cases

- ➤ MILP: sets up R-round model directly
- Matsui's Algo: Uses probability of optimal characteristics in lower rounds



Matsui's Algorithm

- Continuously branch down each valid trail (DFS)
- >Update the probability of reaching some round i from the previous round; $P_{Rd(i)}$
- If the probability of reaching this round (from the start) is less than some specified bound, break the algo for this trail
- Improve efficiency by (i) using a larger, valid initial probability, and (ii) updating the current best probability found



Matsui's Algorithm

Algorithm 1. Matsui's Algorithm

```
Input: R \in \mathbb{Z}^*, R \geq 2; q > 0; P_{Best}(1), P_{Best}(2), ..., P_{Best}(R-1)
     Output: differential characteristic \mathcal{T} = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{R-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n where probability
                  \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{T}) = P_{Estim}
 1 Algorithm OptimalTrail(R, q, P_{Best}(1), \dots, P_{Best}(R-1)) // Entry Point
           for each non-zero \alpha_1 do
                 \mathcal{T} = (), P_{Estim} \leftarrow q
                 Call FirstRound()
           end
            if \mathcal{T} \neq () then
                 return \mathcal{T}, P_{Estim} = \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{T})
 7
           end
 8
 9 end
10
    Function FirstRound()
                                                                                                        // Subroutine
           P_{Rd(1)} \leftarrow \max_{\alpha} \mathbb{P}(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_1)
12
           \alpha_0 \leftarrow \alpha, \ s.t \ \mathbb{P}(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_1) = P_{Rd(1)}
13
           if R > 2 then
14
                 Call Round(2)
15
           else
16
                 Call LastRound()
17
           end
18
19 end
```



Matsui's Algorithm

```
21 Function Round(r)(2 \le r \le R - 1)
                                                                                                                      // Subroutine
             for each candidate \alpha for \alpha_{r-1} do
22
                    P_{Rd(r)} \leftarrow \mathbb{P}(\alpha_{r-1} \rightarrow \alpha)
23
                    if \prod_{i=1}^{r} P_{Rd(i)} \cdot P_{Best}(R-r) \ge P_{Estim} then
\mathbf{24}
                                                                                           // Matsui's bounding condition
25
                            \alpha_r \leftarrow \alpha
26
                           if r+1 < R then
27
                                  Call Round(r+1)
28
                           else
29
                                  Call LastRound()
30
                           end
31
32
                    end
33
             end
34
35
     \mathbf{end}
36
     Function LastRound()
                                                                                                                       // Subroutine
             for each candidate \alpha for \alpha_{r-1} do
                  P_{Rd(R)} \leftarrow \max_{\alpha} \mathbb{P}(\alpha_{R-1} \to \alpha)
 \alpha_R \leftarrow \alpha, \ s.t \ \mathbb{P}(\alpha_{R-1} \to \alpha) = P_{Rd(R)}
40
             end
            if \prod_{i}^{R} P_{Rd(i)} > P_{Estim} then
                                                                  // A strictly better trail is found

\begin{array}{c|c}
 & T \leftarrow (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{R-1}) \\
 & P_{Estim} \leftarrow \prod_{i=1}^{R} P_{Rd(i)}
\end{array}

             end
45
46 end
```



MILP Aided Characteristic Search

- ➤ Objective Function
- ➤ Modelling XOR [MILP 1]
- ➤ Modelling S-Box [MILP 1]
- ➤ Modelling Modular Addition



Objective Function

- To minimize the probability weight of the underlying differential characteristic
- Recall: (Matsui's Bounding Condition)

$$\prod_{i=1}^{r} P_{Rd(i)} \cdot P_{Best}(R-r) \ge P_{Estim}$$

For simplicity, WLOG, assume the condition can be represented (linearly) by:

$$\sum_{i=1}^R \sum_{j=1}^k A_{i,j},$$

where $A_{i,j}$'s are probability weight variables for $j \in [1,k]$ in some round i in an iterative cipher

 \rightarrow Probability weight contributed by round i is

$$\sum_{j=1}^{k} A_{i,j}$$



Modular Addition in ARX construct

- >ARX= add-rotate-xor
- \triangleright Addition in (mod 2^n)
- Ex. $1 + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{2} [XOR]$
- \triangleright Ex. $F(1111) + F(1111) = E(1110) \pmod{F}$



Setting up the MILP Model

- $ightharpoonup d_{igoplus}$ is 0-1 dummy variable
- $\gt s_i$ for $i \in [1, n-2]$ is 0-1 active markers

$$\begin{cases} a_{n-1} + b_{n-1} + c_{n-1} \leq 2 \\ a_{n-1} + b_{n-1} + c_{n-1} - 2d_{\oplus} \geq 0 \\ d_{\oplus} - a_{n-1} \geq 0 \\ d_{\oplus} - b_{n-1} \geq 0 \\ d_{\oplus} - c_{n-1} \geq 0 \\ -a_i + b_i + s_i \geq 0 \\ -b_i + c_i + s_i \geq 0 \\ a_i - c_i + s_i \geq 0 \\ a_i + b_i + c_i - s_i \geq 0 \\ -a_i - b_i - c_i - s_i \geq -3 \\ c_i + a_{i-1} + b_{i-1} - c_{i-1} + s_i \geq 0 \\ -a_i - b_i - c_i + 3a_{i-1} + 3b_{i-1} + 3c_{i-1} + 2s_i \geq 0 \\ a_i + b_i + c_i - 3a_{i-1} - 3b_{i-1} - 3c_{i-1} + 2s_i \geq -6 \\ -b_i + a_{i-1} - b_{i-1} - c_{i-1} + s_i \geq 0 \\ -a_i - b_i - c_i - 3a_{i-1} + 3b_{i-1} - 3c_{i-1} + 2s_i \geq -6 \\ -a_i - a_{i-1} - b_{i-1} + c_{i-1} + s_i \geq 2 \\ a_i + b_i + c_i - 3a_{i-1} + 3b_{i-1} + 3c_{i-1} + 2s_i \geq 0 \\ (i = 1, \dots, n - 2) \end{cases}$$



Setting up the MILP Model

- $ightharpoonup d_{igoplus}$ is 0-1 dummy variable
- $\gt s_i$ for $i \in [1, n-2]$ is 0-1 active markers

$$\begin{cases}
a_{n-1} + b_{n-1} + c_{n-1} \leq 2 \\
a_{n-1} + b_{n-1} + c_{n-1} - 2d_{\oplus} \geq 0 \\
d_{\oplus} - a_{n-1} \geq 0 \\
d_{\oplus} - b_{n-1} \geq 0 \\
d_{\oplus} - c_{n-1} \geq 0
\end{cases}$$

$$\begin{vmatrix}
-a_i + b_i + s_i \geq 0 \\
-b_i + c_i + s_i \geq 0 \\
a_i - c_i + s_i \geq 0
\end{cases}$$

$$\begin{vmatrix}
a_i + b_i + c_i - s_i \geq 0 \\
-a_i - b_i - c_i - s_i \geq -3
\end{cases}$$

$$c_{i} + a_{i-1} + b_{i-1} - c_{i-1} + s_{i} \ge 0$$

$$-a_{i} - b_{i} - c_{i} + 3a_{i-1} + 3b_{i-1} + 3c_{i-1} + 2s_{i} \ge 0$$

$$a_{i} + b_{i} + c_{i} - 3a_{i-1} - 3b_{i-1} - 3c_{i-1} + 2s_{i} \ge -6$$

$$-b_{i} + a_{i-1} - b_{i-1} - c_{i-1} + s_{i} \ge -2$$

$$c_{i} + a_{i-1} - b_{i-1} + c_{i-1} + s_{i} \ge 0$$

$$-a_{i} - b_{i} - c_{i} - 3a_{i-1} + 3b_{i-1} - 3c_{i-1} + 2s_{i} \ge -6$$

$$-a_{i} - a_{i-1} - b_{i-1} + c_{i-1} + s_{i} \ge -2$$

$$a_{i} + b_{i} + c_{i} - 3a_{i-1} + 3b_{i-1} + 3c_{i-1} + 2s_{i} \ge 0$$

$$(i = 1, ..., n - 2)$$



Integrating Matsui's Bounding Condition into MILP Search

➤ Define xobj as the linear representation of P_{Estim} , and let [Minimize xobj] be the objective function of the model.

$$xobj = \sum_{i=1}^{R} \sum_{j=1}^{k} A_{i,j}$$



Integrating Matsui's Bounding Condition into MILP Search

Obtaining more constraints:

$$\sum_{t=1}^{i} \sum_{j=1}^{k} A_{t,j} + wt(P_{Best}(R-i)) \le xobj, \qquad i \in [1, R-1]$$

$$\sum_{t=i+1}^{R} \sum_{j=1}^{k} A_{t,j} + wt(P_{Best}(i)) \le xobj, \qquad i \in [1, R-1]$$

*2R - 2 more constraints




Applications to PRESENT, SIMON, and SPECK

- PRESENT: SPN network
- > SIMON: Feistel cipher with pure bitwise operations
- SPECK: ARX construction
- Using 3 models for comparison
 - original MILP without modifications
 - MILP with modified objective function, and R-1 constraints from the first inequality
 - MILP with modified objective function, and all 2R-2 constraints
- Measuring time cost for the solution to prove that the solution it identified is optimal
 - less time → tighter bound → more accurate security evaluation




Applications to PRESENT



R	p	\mathcal{M}^I	\mathcal{M}^{II}	\mathcal{M}^{III}
1	$ 2^{-2} $	0.01s	0.09s	0.13s
2	2^{-4}	0.95s	0.95s	0.06s
3	2^{-8}	3.70s	2.82s	2.43s
4	2^{-12}	15.78s	10.08s	8.82s
5	2^{-20}	629.83s	114.13s	448.61s
6	2^{-24}	1740.55s	200.03s	74.56s
7	2^{-28}	48638.29s	714.03s	655.36s
8	2^{-32}	>10h	2124.51s	1074.45s

Applications to SIMON




Parameters for SIMON32 and SIMON48

Variant $2n/mn$	Block Size $2n$	Key Size mn	Round r
32/64	32	64	32
48/72	48	72	36
48/96	48	96	36

Block size $2n$	R	p	\mathcal{M}^I	\mathcal{M}^{II}	\mathcal{M}^{III}
32	11	2^{-30}	75.05s	79.22s	67.92s
	12	2^{-34}	657.37s	559.83s	209.09s
48	13	2^{-38}	309.58s	376.33s	109.85s
	14	2^{-44}	4627.26s	3577.05s	2942.85s
	15	2^{-46}	31979.80s	3351.41s	2444.28s
	16	2^{-50}	>20h	>15h	26589.96s



Applications to SPECK



Parameters for SPECK32 and SPECK48

Variant $2n/mn$	Block Size $2n$	Key Size mn	Round r	α	β
32/64	32	64	22	7	2
48/72	48	72	22	8	3
48/96	48	96	23	8	3

Block size $2n$	R	p	\mathcal{M}^I	\mathcal{M}^{II}	\mathcal{M}^{III}
32	5	2^{-9}	9.78s	17.15s	26.08s
	6	2^{-13}	173.67s	820.82s	390.33s
	7	2^{-18}	7175.87s	>10000s	>10000s
48	5	2^{-10}	32.90s	358.11s	273.98s
	6	2^{-14}	1482.66s	2626.50s	2287.21s
	7	2^{-19}	40860.38s	>100000s	>100000s



Potential Considerations

- > PRESENT: New MILP model v. Matsui's Algorithm
- ➤ Non-lightweight ciphers
- >Integrating cutting-off inequalities (mentioned in MILP 1)



Related Readings

- ➤ Heys, H.: A Tutorial on Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis. Computer Science Department, Boston College. http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/crypto2017/heys.pdf
- Mouha, N., Wang, Q., Gu, D., Preneel, B.: Differential and linear cryptanalysis using mixed-integer linear programming. In: Wu, C.-K., Yung, M., Lin, D. (eds.) Inscrypt 2011. LNCS, vol. 7537, pp. 57–76. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34704-75
- Sun, S., et al.: Towards finding the best characteristics of some bit-oriented block ciphers and automatic enumeration of (related-key) differential and linear characteristics with predefined properties. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/747(2014). http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/747
- Sun, S., Hu, L., Wang, P., Qiao, K., Ma, X., Song, L.: Automatic security evaluation and (related-key) differential characteristic search: application to SIMON, PRESENT, LBlock, DES(L) and other bit-oriented block ciphers. In: Sarkar, P., Iwata, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8873, pp. 158–178. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8 9
- Zhang, T.: Cryptology Basics. School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University.
- ➤ Li, H.: Some Basics. School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University



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