

ELECTRONizing macOS privacy

A NEW WEAPON IN YOUR RED TEAMING ARMORY

Whoami?

Wojciech Reguła

Head of Mobile Security at securing

- Focused on iOS/macOS #appsec
- Blogger – <https://wojciechregula.blog>
- iOS Security Suite Creator
- macOS environments security



Agenda

1. TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS
2. The problem with Electron applications
3. Granted TCC permissions inheritance
4. Electroniz3r presentation (**demo time**)
5. Detections
6. Conclusion



TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS




TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS

System Integrity Protection (SIP)

- Based on Sandbox kernel extension
- Restricts access to many directories on macOS
- Denies debugger attachments to processes signed directly by Apple
- Also known as rootless, because even root cannot do the above-mentioned operations when the SIP is turned on
- When turned on (default configuration) – Transparency, Consent and Control (TCC) comes into play

TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS



TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS

What resources are privacy-sensitive according to Apple?

Apple Security Bounty



* Qualifying charities can be found at Benevity.

** Sensitive data includes contents of Contacts, Mail, Messages, Notes, Photos, or real-time or historical precise location data.

TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS



TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS



TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS – private entitlements

```
$ codesign -d --entitlements - /System/Applications/Utilities/Disk Utility.app
Executable=/System/Applications/Utilities/Disk Utility.app/Contents/MacOS/Disk Utility
[Dict]
  [Key] com.apple.private.asr
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] allow-obliterate-device
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] com.apple.authkit.client.private
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] com.apple.authorization.extract-password
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] com.apple.private.CoreAuthentication.SPI
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] com.apple.private.storagekitd.destructive
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] com.apple.private.icloud.findmydevice.account.modify
  [Value]
    [Bool] true
  [Key] com.apple.private.tcc.allow
  [Value]
    [Array]
      [String] kTCCServiceSystemPolicyRemovableVolumes
```

TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS – private entitlements

```
[sh-3.2$ ./hello_world  
Hello world]
```

```
sh-3.2$ cat entitlements.xml  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">  
<plist version="1.0">  
<dict>  
    <key>com.apple.private.tcc.manager</key>  
    <true/>  
</dict>  
</plist>
```

```
sh-3.2$ codesign -d --entitlements :- hello_world  
hello_world: code object is not signed at all  
sh-3.2$ codesign -s - --entitlements entitlements.xml hello_world
```

```
sh-3.2$ ./hello_world  
Killed: 9
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TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS – private entitlements

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TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS – private entitlements


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


TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS – private entitlements



TCC / privacy fundamentals on macOS

- SQLite 3 database
- User: ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC
- Global: /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC

service	client	auth_value	csreq
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.weather	2	??
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.iBooksX	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.mail	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.ScriptEditor2	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.Preview	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.QuickTimePlayerX	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.TextEdit	2	NULL
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder	net.tunnelblick.tunnelblick	2	??
kTCCServiceAppleEvents	com.vmware.fusionApplicationsMenu	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder	com.googlecode.iterm2	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	org.idrix.VeraCrypt	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	org.gpgtools.gpgkeychain	2	??
kTCCServiceMicrophone	org.mozilla.firefox	2	??
kTCCServiceCamera	org.mozilla.firefox	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder	com.microsoft.VSCode	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	com.microsoft.VSCode	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	org.mozilla.firefox	2	??




The problem with Electron applications

The problem with Electron applications

- Simplifying you run a website with embedded web browser.
- The packed JavaScript files may have bridge to your native OS API.
- In the past there were a lot of Cross-Site Scripting to Remote Code Execution kill chains...

The problem with Electron applications

- Simplifying you run a website with embedded web browser.
- The packed JavaScript files may have bridge to your native OS API.
- In the past there were a lot of Cross-Site Scripting to Remote Code Execution kill chains...
- On macOS popular Electron apps require granting TCC permissions



The problem with Electron applications



A screenshot of a web browser window displaying a blog post. The title of the post is "Abusing Electron apps to bypass macOS' security controls". Below the title, it says "After reading Adam Chester's neat article about bypassing macOS privacy controls, I decided to share my recently discovered trick." At the bottom, it says "To bypass the Transparency, Consent, and Control service (TCC), we need an Electron application that already has some privacy permissions. As it turns out, you probably have at least one such app installed - look, for example, on your desktop messengers." The browser interface includes a back/forward button, a search/address bar with the URL <https://wojciechregula.blog/post/abusing-electron-apps-to-bypass-macos-security-controls/>, and various browser controls.

Abusing Electron apps to bypass macOS' security controls


@WOJCIECH REGUŁA · DEC 18, 2019 · 3 MIN READ

After reading Adam Chester's neat [article](#) about bypassing macOS privacy controls, I decided to share my recently discovered trick.

To bypass the *Transparency, Consent, and Control service* (TCC), we need an Electron application that already has some privacy permissions. As it turns out, you probably have at least one such app installed - look, for example, on your desktop messengers.


The problem with Electron applications

In the past, there was a code injection possible by definition





```
$ echo "INJECTED\!" >> [redacted]/VulnerableElectronApp.app/Contents/Resources/app/index.html  
$ /usr/bin/codesign -d --verify VulnerableElectronApp.app  
VulnerableElectronApp.app: a sealed resource is missing or invalid
```





```
// Executing your JavaScript code in the app browser's context:  
require('electron').app.on('browser-window-focus', function (event, bWindow) {  
    bWindow.webContents.executeJavaScript("alert('Hello World!')")  
})  
  
// Loading your dynamic library  
const os = require('os');  
process.dlopen(module, "path/lib.dylib", os.constants.dlopen.RTLD_NOW);  
  
// Spawning the calc  
const exec = require('child_process').exec;  
exec("/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator");
```

...but macOS Ventura ruined fixed 😊 that technique



```
wregula$ cd /Applications/
```


```
wregula$ ls -l ./GitHub\ Desktop.app/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x  9 wregula  staff  288 Jun 13 10:49 Contents
```

```
wregula$ echo 1 > ./GitHub\ Desktop.app/Contents/Resources/test
sh: ./GitHub Desktop.app/Contents/Resources/test: Operation not permitted
```



Privacy & Security

"Terminal.app" was prevented from modifying apps on your Mac.




Granted TCC permissions inheritance

Granted TCC permissions inheritance

- TCC inheritance system is complicated and caused many vulnerabilities in the past (e.g., CVE-2020-10008, CVE-2021-1824)
- From time to time, Apple changes details in the TCC permissions inheritance system
- Generally speaking (may not always be true):
 - When an app has private TCC entitlements – its permissions are not inherited by other apps they spawn
 - When an app has TCC permission granted by the user (User clicked “OK” in the prompt) - its permissions are inherited

Granted TCC permissions inheritance


- Electron apps always have permissions granted by the users, so their TCC permissions will be inherited by children processes
- If only there was a code injection technique that doesn't break the macOS Ventura App Protection mechanism...



INTRODUCING ELECTRONIZ3R

electroniz3r

- Electron apps are like websites with embedded web browsers: you can open Dev Tools and execute JavaScript within their context
- By default, Electron apps allow users to spawn them with Web Inspector API turned on, using `--inspect` flag



electroniz3r


unauthorized access to user's desktop
via Visual Studio Code



Terminal — 90×20

sh-3.2\$

I



electroniz3r

unauthorized access to user's camera
via MS Teams

A screenshot of a Mac OS X desktop environment. At the top, there's a menu bar with standard Apple menu items like 'File', 'Edit', etc. Below the menu bar is a toolbar with icons for file operations like 'New', 'Open', 'Save', etc. The main window is a Finder window titled '/private/tmp'. It lists several items in a table format:

Name	Date Modified	Size	Kind
> com.apple.launchd.LuGeSqCecF	19 May 2023 at 17:49	--	Folder
> devio_semaphore_logi_hp...4A6-9F5D-7BC0A9B8B80F	Today at 09:09	--	Folder
> perfcount	22 Jun 2023 at 15:06	--	Folder
> test	23 Jun 2023 at 14:09	--	Folder
WindowServer.sinfo.out	Today at 14:59	9 KB	Document
WindowServer.winfo.plist	Today at 15:02	50 KB	Property List

Terminal — 95x17

```
sh-3.2$
```

OK, but what if the Electron app
disabled --inspect flag?

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Get Started > options to the Node.js runtime and isn't typically used by apps in production. Most apps can safely disable this fuse.

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Processes in Electron >

Best Practices >

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Development >

- Accessibility
- ASAR Archives
- ASAR Integrity
- Boilerplates and CLIs

Electron Fuses

- Native Node Modules
- Windows on ARM

Distribution >

Testing And Debugging >

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Contributing >

nodeCliInspect

Default: Enabled @electron/fuses:
FuseV10Options.EnableNodeCliInspectArguments

The nodeCliInspect fuse toggles whether the `--inspect`, `--inspect-brk`, etc. flags are respected or not. When disabled it also ensures that `SIGUSR1` signal does not initialize the main process inspector. Most apps can safely disable this fuse.

embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation #

Default: Disabled @electron/fuses:
FuseV10Options.EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation

The embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation fuse toggles an experimental feature on macOS that validates the content of the `app.asar` file when it is loaded. This feature is designed to have a minimal performance impact but may marginally slow down file reads from inside the `app.asar` archive.

What are fuses?
Current Fuses
`runAsNode`
`cookieEncryption`
`nodeOptions`
nodeCliInspect
`embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation`
`onlyLoadAppFromAsar`
`loadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot`
How do I flip the fuses?
The easy way
The hard way
Quick Glossary

Let's take Slack.app for example





Terminal — 66x11

```
[sh-3.2$ npx @electron/fuses read --app /Applications/Slack.app ]
```

```
Analyzing app: Slack.app
```

```
Fuse Version: v1
```

```
RunAsNode is Disabled
```

```
EnableCookieEncryption is Enabled
```

```
EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable is Disabled
```

```
EnableNodeCliInspectArguments is Disabled
```

```
EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation is Enabled
```

```
OnlyLoadAppFromAsar is Enabled
```

```
LoadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot is Disabled
```

```
sh-3.2$
```

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Manually flipping fuses requires editing the Electron binary and modifying the fuse wire to be the sequence of bytes that represent the state of the fuses you want.

Somewhere in the Electron binary there will be a sequence of bytes that look like this:

```
| ...binary | sentinel_bytes | fuse_version | fuse_wire_length
```

- `sentinel_bytes` is always this exact string
`dL7pKGdnNz796PbbjQWNKmHXBZaB9tsX`
- `fuse_version` is a single byte whose unsigned integer value represents the version of the fuse schema
- `fuse_wire_length` is a single byte whose unsigned integer value represents the number of fuses in the following fuse wire
- `fuse_wire` is a sequence of N bytes, each byte represents a single fuse and its state.

What are fuses?

Current Fuses

runAsNode

cookieEncryption

nodeOptions

nodeCliInspect

embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation

onlyLoadAppFromAsar

loadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot

How do I flip the fuses?



```
$ cd /Applications/Slack.app
```

```
$ grep -Hri "dL7pKGdnNz796PbbjQWNKmHXBZaB9tsX" .
```

```
Binary file ./Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework/Versions/A/Electron Framework matches
```




So, theoretically if the Electron app disables library validation...

service	client	auth_value	csreq
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.weather	2	??
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.iBooksX	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.mail	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.ScriptEditor2	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.Preview	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.QuickTimePlayerX	2	NULL
kTCCServiceUbiquity	com.apple.TextEdit	2	NULL
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder	net.tunnelblick.tunnelblick	2	??
kTCCServiceAppleEvents	com.vmware.fusionApplicationsMenu	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder	com.googlecode.iterm2	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	org.idrix.VeraCrypt	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	org.gpgtools.gpgkeychain	2	??
kTCCServiceMicrophone	org.mozilla.firefox	2	??
kTCCServiceCamera	org.mozilla.firefox	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder	com.microsoft.VSCode	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	com.microsoft.VSCode	2	??
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyNetworkVolumes	org.mozilla.firefox	2	??

```
1 #import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
2
3 int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
4
5     NSString *codeRequirementBase64Encoded =
6         @"+t4MAAAAkGAAAAABAAAAwAAAAAYAAAAPAAAAdgAAAAAAAACKoZIhvdjZAYBCQAAAAAAAAAYAAAAGAAAABgAAAA8AAAAAOAAAAQAAAoqhkiG92
7             NkBGIgAAAAAAADgAAAAAAAACKoZIhvdjZAYBDQAAAAAAAAAsAAAAAAAACnN1Ymp1Y3QuT1UAAAAAAEAAAQNDBUTkzNkg5NgAA";
8     NSData *codeRequirementData = [[NSData alloc] initWithBase64EncodedString:codeRequirementBase64Encoded options:0];
9
10    SecRequirementRef secRequirement = NULL;
11    SecRequirementCreateWithData((__bridge CFDataRef)codeRequirementData, kSecCSDefaultFlags, &secRequirement);
12
13    CFStringRef requirementText = NULL;
14    SecRequirementCopyString(secRequirement, kSecCSDefaultFlags, &requirementText);
15    NSLog(@"%@", (__bridge NSString *)requirementText);
16 }
```

```
anchor apple generic and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.9] /* exists */ or anchor apple generic and certificate
1[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.2.6] /* exists */ and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.13] /* exists */ and
certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "43AQ936H96"
```



electroniz3r

injecting to an older Slack version




desktop



research



Slack



The screenshot shows a macOS desktop environment with a browser window open. The browser's address bar displays the URL `wojciechregula.blog`. The main content of the browser window is a blog post titled "macOS Red Teaming: Bypass TCC with old apps". Below the title, it says "@WOJCIECH REGUŁA · MAR 10, 2022 · 3 MIN READ". The post is part of a series titled "macOS Red Teaming Tricks series". It discusses the idea of sharing simple & ready-to-use tricks for macOS red teaming engagements. The post then describes a specific trick for bypassing the TCC framework using old app versions, mentioning iTerm2 as an example. The sidebar on the left contains a user profile picture of a man with sunglasses, the name "Wojciech Reguła", and the text "IT Security blog". It also lists navigation links for "Posts", "About Me", and "TCC Exploitation", along with social media icons for GitHub, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Medium.

macOS Red Teaming: Bypass TCC with old apps

@WOJCIECH REGUŁA · MAR 10, 2022 · 3 MIN READ

macOS Red Teaming Tricks series

The idea of #macOSRedTeamingTricks series is to share simple & ready-to-use tricks that may help you during macOS red teaming engagements.

The trick

This post shows how to bypass the macOS privacy framework (TCC) using old app versions. During red teaming engagements sometimes you need access to the Camera/Microphone or files stored on the user's Desktop. It turns out that on macOS you cannot do this without special permissions that are handled by the TCC framework. If you are interested more in TCC you should take a look at [my and my friend Csaba's Black Hat talk](#).

To use this trick we have to determine if any user-installed applications, currently installed on the device, have TCC permissions already granted. From my experience, developers usually have iTerm2 installed with Full Disk Access TCC permission. Let's focus on iTerm2 then, but keep in mind that **you may target any other application**.



DETECTIONS

Detections

```
ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC {  
    [...]  
    "context" : "app_path --inspect=13337"  
    [...]  
}
```

Summing up

Thank you!



Wojciech Reguła
Head of Mobile Security at SecuRing
securing



@_r3ggi



wojciech-regula