

CS558: Introduction to Computer Security

Key Distribution

Key Distribution

- For symmetric encryption to work, the two parties must share a **secrete key**.
- **Frequent** key changes are usually desirable to limit the amount of data compromised if an attacker learns the key.
- **Key distribution**: refers to the means of delivering a key to two parties who wish to exchange data, without allowing others to see the key
- Often secure systems failure due to a break in the key distribution scheme

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 - If an attacker succeeds in getting one key, then all subsequent keys will be revealed

Key Distribution

- For two parties A and B, **key distribution** can be achieved in a number of ways:
- If A & B have secure communications with a **third party C**, C can deliver a key on the encrypted links to A and B
 - A key distribution center is responsible for distributing keys to pairs of users.
 - Each user must share a **unique key** with the key distribution center for purpose of key distribution.

Key Hierarchy

- The use of a key distribution center is based on the use of a **hierarchy** of keys.
- Master key**
 - Used to encrypt session keys
 - Shared by user & key distribution center
- Session key**
 - Temporary key
 - Used for encryption of data between users

The diagram illustrates a key hierarchy. At the top, 'Data' is shown in a grid, protected by 'Cryptographic Protection'. Below it, 'Session Keys' are shown in a grid, also protected by 'Cryptographic Protection'. At the bottom, 'Master Keys' are shown in a grid, protected by 'Non-Cryptographic Protection'. Arrows indicate the flow of keys: Master Keys are used to protect Session Keys, and Session Keys are used to protect Data.

Key Distribution Scenario

- A wishes to establish a logical connection with B and requires a **one-time session key** to protect the data transmitted over the connection
- A shares the **master key K_a** with the KDC
- B shares the **master key K_b** with the KDC

The diagram shows the key distribution scenario. Initiator A sends a request (1) $ID_A || ID_B || N_1$ to the KDC. The KDC responds with a message (2) $E(K_a, [K_s || ID_A || ID_B || N_1] || E(K_b, K_s, ID_A))$. Initiator A then sends a message (3) $E(K_b, K_s || ID_A)$ to Responder B. Responder B sends a message (4) $E(K_a, N_2)$ back to Initiator A. Finally, Initiator A sends a message (5) $E(K_a, R(N_2))$ to Responder B.

Key Distribution Scenario

- Msg1:** A issues a **request** to the KDC for a session key to protect a connection to B. The message includes the **identity of A and B**, and a unique identifier, N_1 (**nonce**).
- Nonce:** a random number that is used to demonstrate the freshness of a session - prevent replay attack

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Key Distribution Scenario

- Msg2:** The KDC responds with a message encrypted using K_a
- The **one-time session key K_s**
- The **original request message** and the **nonce**
- Two items for B, encrypted using K_b : the **one-time session key K_s** and an identity of A, ID_A .

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
Key Distribution Scenario

- Msg3:** A stores the session key for use in the upcoming session and forward to B the information that originated at the KDC for B, $E(K_b, [K_s, ID_A])$.

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
Key Distribution Scenario

- Now, a session key has been securely delivered to **A** and **B**.
- Msg4**: B sends a nonce N_2 to A using the newly minted session key.
- Msg5**: Also using K_s , A responds with $f(N_2)$, where f is a function that perform some transformation on N_2



Hierarchical Key Control

- It is not necessary to limit the key distribution function to a single KDC - for large networks, a **hierarchy of KDCs** can be established
- E.g. **local KDCs**, each responsible for a small domain
- If two entities are in different domains, then **local KDCs** can communicate through a **global KDC**.



Chapter 9

Public-Key Cryptography

Private-Key Cryptography

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- If this key is disclosed, communications are compromised
- Can we use symmetric key encryption to protect sender from receiver forging a message and claiming it was sent by sender?

Private-Key Cryptography

- Symmetric** key cryptography uses one key, shared by both sender and receiver
- If this key is disclosed, communications are compromised
- Can we use symmetric key encryption to protect sender from receiver forging a message and claiming it was sent by sender?
 - John can **deny** sending the message. Because it is possible for Mary to forge a message, there is no way to prove that John did in fact send the message.
 - Mary may **forge** a different message and claim that it came from John

Public-Key Cryptography

- Public invention due to **Whitfield Diffie & Martin Hellman** at Stanford University in 1976.
- Public-key/two-key/asymmetric** cryptography involves the use of two keys:
 - A **public-key**, which may be known by anybody, and can be used to encrypt messages, and verify signatures
 - A **private-key**, known only to the recipient, used to decrypt messages, and sign (create) signatures
- Is **asymmetric** because
 - Those who encrypt messages or verify signatures may not decrypt messages or create signatures

Public-key cryptography: Misconceptions

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- ◆ **Misconception 2:** Public-key encryption is a general-purpose technique that has made symmetric encryption obsolete.
 - ❖ Computation overhead of public-key encryption

Why Public-Key Cryptography?

- ◆ Developed to address two key issues:
 - ❖ **Key distribution** - how to have secure communications in general without having to trust a KDC
 - ❖ **Digital signatures** - how to verify a message comes intact from the claimed sender
- ◆ Public invention due to **Whitfield Diffie & Martin Hellman** at Stanford University in 1976.

Requirements for Public-Key Cryptography

- ◆ It is computationally easy for a party B to generate a pair: public key PU_b , private key PR_b
- ◆ The two keys can be applied in either order.

$$M = D(PU_b, E(PR_b, M)) = D(PR_b, E(PU_b, M))$$
- ◆ It is computationally easy for sender A, knowing the public key and the message to be encrypted, M , to generate the corresponding ciphertext.

$$C = E(PU_b, M)$$
- ◆ It is computationally easy for the receiver B to decrypt the resulting ciphertext using the private key to recover the original message.

$$M = D(PR_b, C) = D(PR_b, E(PU_b, M))$$

Requirements for Public-Key Cryptography (Cont.)


- It is computationally infeasible for an adversary, knowing the public key PU_b , to determine the private key PR_b .
- It is computationally infeasible for an adversary, knowing the public key PU_b and the ciphertext C encrypted using PU_b , to recover the original message M .
- These are formidable requirements - only a few algorithms (e.g. RSA) have received widespread acceptance.

Public-Key Cryptosystems: Secrecy

- A produces plaintext $X = [X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$
- The message is intended for destination B.
- A has two keys: a public key PU_a , and a private key PR_a .
- B has two keys: a public key PU_b , and a private key PR_b .

Public-Key Cryptosystems: Secrecy


- A forms the ciphertext $Y = [Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_n]$:
 $Y = E(PU_b, X)$
- The receiver is able to invert the transformation
 $X = D(PR_b, Y)$



Public-Key Cryptosystems: Digital Signature


Public-Key Cryptosystems: Digital Signature

- A prepares a message to B and encrypts it using A's **private key** before transmitting it.
 $Y = E(PR_a, X)$
- B decrypts the message using A's **public key**
 $X = D(PU_a, Y)$




Public-Key Cryptosystems: Digital Signature

- Does not provide **confidentiality**.
 - The message being sent is safe from **alteration** but not from **eavesdropping**.
 - Any observer can decrypt the message using the sender's public key



Public-Key Cryptosystems: Digital Signature

- Because the message was encrypted using A's private key, only A could have prepared the message
- Serves as **digital signature**.
- It is impossible to alter the message without knowing A's private key → **data integrity**




Public-Key Cryptosystems: Digital Signature and Secrecy

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- Double use of the public-key scheme:

$$Z = E(PU_b, E(PR_a, X))$$

$$X = D(PU_a, D(PR_b, Z))$$



Conventional vs. Public-Key Encryption

Conventional Encryption	Public-Key Encryption
<p><i>Needed to Work:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The same algorithm with the same key is used for encryption and decryption. 2. The sender and receiver must share the algorithm and the key. <p><i>Needed for Security:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The key must be kept secret. 2. It must be impossible or at least impractical to decipher a message if no other information is available. 3. Knowledge of the algorithm plus samples of ciphertext must be insufficient to determine the key. 	<p><i>Needed to Work:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One algorithm is used for encryption and decryption with a pair of keys, one for encryption and one for decryption. 2. The sender and receiver must each have one of the matched pair of keys (not the same one). <p><i>Needed for Security:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One of the two keys must be kept secret. 2. It must be impossible or at least impractical to decipher a message if no other information is available. 3. Knowledge of the algorithm plus one of the keys plus samples of ciphertext must be insufficient to determine the other key.

Chapter 8 Introduction to Number Theory

Prime Numbers

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- An integer $p > 1$ is a **prime number** if and only if its only divisors are ± 1 and $\pm p$
 - ❖ Eg. 2,3,5,7 are prime, 4,6,8,9,10 are not
- Any integer $a > 1$ can be factored in a unique way as $a = p_1^{a_1} p_2^{a_2} \dots p_t^{a_t}$
 - ❖ $p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_t$ are **prime numbers** and a_i are **positive integers**.
 - ❖ eg. $91 = 7 * 13$; $3600 = 2^4 * 3^2 * 5^2$

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 - ❖ eg. $300 = 2^3 * 3^1 * 5^2$, $18 = 2^1 * 3^2$ hence $\text{gcd}(18,300) = 2^1 * 3^1 = 6$

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Greatest Common Divisor (gcd)

- ◆ $\text{gcd}(x,y) = x$ if $y == 0$
 $= \text{gcd}(y, (x \bmod y))$ if $x \geq y$ and $y > 0$

e.g.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{gcd}(300, 18) &= \text{gcd}(18, (300 \bmod 18)) \\ &= \text{gcd}(18, 12) \\ &= \text{gcd}(12, (18 \bmod 12)) \\ &= \text{gcd}(12, 6) \\ &= \text{gcd}(6, 0) = 6\end{aligned}$$

Fermat's Theorem

- ◆ **Fermat's Theorem**: If p is a prime number and $a < p$ is a positive integer not divisible by p , then
 - $a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$.
 - ❖ E.g. $p=3$, $a=2 \rightarrow a^{p-1} \bmod p = 4 \bmod 3 = 1$.
- ◆ Also $a^p \bmod p = a$
- ◆ Useful in public key and primality testing

Euler Totient Function $\phi(n)$

- ◆ **Euler Totient Function $\phi(n)$** : the number of positive integers less than n and relatively prime to n .
 - ❖ m is a **relatively prime** to n if $\text{gcd}(m,n)=1$
 - ❖ $\phi(37)$

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 - ❖ For a prime number p , $\phi(p) = p-1$
 - ❖ $\phi(35) = 24$:
 - 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34.

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- Two prime numbers p and q with $p \neq q$, then
 - $\phi(pq) = \phi(p) * \phi(q) = (p-1) * (q-1)$
 - ❖ The set of integers less than pq is $\{1, 2, \dots, pq-1\}$

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 - ❖ The integers in this set that are **not relatively prime to $p*q$** : $\{p, 2p, \dots, (q-1)p\}$ and $\{q, 2q, \dots, (p-1)q\}$
$$\begin{aligned} \phi(pq) &= (pq - 1) - [(q-1) + (p-1)] \\ &= pq - p - q + 1 \\ &= (p-1) * (q-1) \\ &= \phi(p) * \phi(q) \end{aligned}$$
- ❖ E.g. $\phi(21) = (3-1) * (7-1) = 2 * 6 = 12$

Euler's Theorem

- **Euler's Theorem**: for every a and n that are relatively prime, $a^{\phi(n)} \bmod n = 1$
 - ❖ $a=3; n=10$;
 $\phi(10)=4$; $3^4 \bmod 10 = 81 \bmod 10 = 1$
 - ❖ $a=2; n=11$;
 $\phi(11)=10$; $2^{10} \bmod 11 = 1024 \bmod 11 = 1$

Primality Testing

- For many cryptographic algorithms, it is necessary to select one or more **very large prime numbers** at random

Primality Testing

- For many cryptographic algorithms, it is necessary to select one or more **very large prime numbers** at random
- Naïve algorithm:** divide by all numbers in turn less than the square root of the number
 - Only works for small numbers

Miller Rabin Algorithm

- Background**
 - $n-1 = 2^k q$ with $n > 3$, n odd, $k > 0$, q odd
 - Divide $(n-1)$ by 2 until the result is an odd number.
- Property**
 - Let $n > 2$ be a prime number, a be an integer $1 < a < n-1$, and $n-1 = 2^k q$. Then one of the following two conditions is true: 1) $a^q \bmod n = 1$ or 2) there exists $1 \leq j \leq k$ such that $a^{2^{j-1}q} \bmod n = n-1$.

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However, if the above condition is met, n may not be a prime.

E.g. $n=2047=23*89$, then $n-1 = 2*1023$.

$2^{1023} \bmod 2047 = 1$, but 2047 is not a prime

Miller Rabin Algorithm

- Algorithm:** check if n is a prime
 - Find integers $k > 0$, q odd, so that $(n-1)=2^k q$
 - Select a random integer $1 < a < n-1$
 - if $a^q \bmod n = 1$ then return ("maybe prime");
 - for $j = 1$ to k do
 - if $a^{2^{j-1}q} \bmod n = n-1$ then return("maybe prime")
 - // n is definitely not prime
 - return ("not prime")

Probabilistic Considerations

- It was shown that given an odd number n that is not prime and a randomly chosen integer $1 < a < n-1$, the probability that the algorithm fails to detect that n is not a prime is $< 1/4$

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- It was shown that given an odd number n that is not prime and a randomly chosen integer $1 < a < n-1$, the probability that the algorithm fails to detect that n is not a prime is $< 1/4$
- Hence if repeat test with different a , then chance n is prime after t tests is:
 - $\Pr(n \text{ maybe a prime after } t \text{ tests}) = (1/4)^t$
 - eg. for $t=10$ this probability is $< 10^{-6}$

Section 9.2 The RSA Algorithm

RSA

- By Rivest, Shamir & Adleman of MIT in 1977
- Best known & widely used public-key scheme
- The RSA scheme is a block cipher
 - A typical size is 1024 bits.

Algorithm

- Each block has a value less than some number n
- Encryption and decryption are of the following form for some plaintext block M and ciphertext block C .
 $C = M^e \bmod n$
 $M = C^d \bmod n$
- Property of modular arithmetic

$$[(a_1 \bmod n) * \dots * (a_m \bmod n)] \bmod n = (a_1 * \dots * a_m) \bmod n$$
- Thus: $M = C^d \bmod n = (M^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = (M^e)^d \bmod n = M^{ed} \bmod n$

Determining e and d

- Find values of e, d, n s.t. $M^{ed} \bmod n = M$ for all $M < n$.

Theorem:

If $e*d=1+k*\phi(n)$ (or $e*d \bmod \phi(n) = 1$) where $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$, then $M^{ed} \bmod n = M$.

The proof is given at the end of the slides

RSA Algorithm

Theorem:

If $e*d=1+k*\phi(n)$ (or $e*d \bmod \phi(n) = 1$) where $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$, then $M^{ed} \bmod n = M$.

- Find values of e, d, n such that $M^{ed} \bmod n = M$ for all $M < n$
 - Selecting two large primes p and q
 - Computing $n=p*q$
 - $\phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$
 - Selecting at random the encryption key e where $1 < e < \phi(n)$, $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
 - Solve following equation to find decryption key d
 $e*d \bmod \phi(n) = 1$ and $0 \leq d \leq n$

RSA Use

- To encrypt a message M the sender:
 - Obtains public key of recipient $PU=\{e, n\}$
 - Computes: $C = M^e \bmod n$, where $0 \leq M < n$
- To decrypt the ciphertext C the owner:
 - Uses their private key $PR=\{d, n\}$
 - Computes: $M = C^d \bmod n$
- Can also use the private key to encrypt the message and use the public key to decrypt the message

RSA Example - Key Setup

1. Select primes: $p=17$ & $q=11$
1. Compute $n = p \cdot q = 17 \times 11 = 187$
1. Compute $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 16 \times 10 = 160$
1. Select e : $\gcd(e, 160) = 1$; choose $e=7$
1. Determine d : $d \cdot e \bmod 160 = 1$ and $d < 160$. Value is $d=23$ since $23 \cdot 7 = 161 = 160 + 1$
1. Publish public key $PU = \{7, 187\}$
1. Keep private key $PR = \{23, 187\}$

RSA Example - En/Decryption

- Sample RSA encryption/decryption is:


- Given message $M = 88$ (nb. $88 < 187$)

- **Encryption:**

$$C = 88^7 \bmod 187 = 11$$

- **Decryption:**

$$M = 11^{23} \bmod 187 = 88$$



RSA Requirements

- Encryption and decryption are of the following form for some plaintext block M and ciphertext block C .

$$C = M^e \bmod n$$

$$M = C^d \bmod n = M^{ed} \bmod n$$

- The following requirements must be met:

❖ **Requirement 1:** It is possible to find values of e, d, n such that $M^{ed} \bmod n = M$ for all $M < n$

❖ **Requirement 2:** It is relatively easy to calculate $M^e \bmod n$ and $C^d \bmod n$ for all values of $M < n$

❖ **Requirement 3:** It is infeasible to determine d given e and n

RSA Security

- Possible approaches to attacking RSA are:

❖ **Brute force attacks**

❖ **Mathematical attacks:**

- > Factoring n into its two prime factors
- > Determine $\phi(n)$ directly without determining p and q .
- > Determine d directly.