

CS458/CS558 Introduction to Computer Security

Double-DES?

- Could use 2 DES encryptions on each block


$$C = E(K_2, E(K_1, P))$$
- Issue of reduction to single stage
 - Would it be possible to find a key K_3 such that

$$E(K_2, E(K_1, P)) = E(K_3, P)$$
 - Answer: NO - proved in 1992

Double-DES?

Meet-in-the-middle attack


- Works whenever use a cipher twice
- Based on the observation:
 If $C = E(K_2, E(K_1, P))$,
 then $X = E(K_1, P) = D(K_2, C)$



Double-DES?

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
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- Encrypt P for all 2^{56} keys. Store the result in a table and then sort the table.
- Decrypt C with 2^{56} keys and check the result against the table for a match.
- If a match occurs, then test the two resulting keys against some more known plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

Triple-DES with Two-Keys

- An obvious counter to the meet-in-the-middle attack is to use **three** stages of encryption with 3 different keys
 → requiring key length 168-bits
- Can use 2 keys with E-D-E sequence
 - $C = E(K_1, D(K_2, E(K_1, P)))$
 - The only advantage of the use of decryption for the second stage is: if $K_1 = K_2$ then can work with single DES




Triple-DES with Three-Keys

- No current known practical attacks
 - Brute-force: 2^{112}
 - Differential cryptanalysis: $> 10^{52}$ plaintext-ciphertext pairs
- Can use Triple-DES with 3 Keys to avoid these
 - $C = E(K_3, D(K_2, E(K_1, P)))$
- Has been adopted by some Internet applications, eg PGP, S/MIME

Section 6 Block Cipher Modes of Operation

Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)

- The message is divided into blocks.
- Plaintext is handled **one block** at a time and each block is encrypted using the **same** key.




Advantages and Limitations of ECB

- Each block is encrypted **independently** of the other blocks
- Ideal for a **short** amount of data, e.g. transmit a DES key securely.
- For **lengthy** mesg, the ECB mode may not be secure.
 - The same **n-bit** block of plaintext, if it appears more than once in the mesg., always produces the same ciphertext - does not hide data patterns well.

Example: Disadvantage of ECB

- A pixel-map version of the image on the left was encrypted with ECB mode and with other modes.




Encrypted using
ECB mode

Example: Disadvantage of ECB

- A pixel-map version of the image on the left was encrypted with ECB mode and with other modes.



Original



Encrypted using
ECB mode



Encrypted using
other modes

Advantages and Limitations of ECB

- Weakness is due to the encrypted message blocks being **independent**
 - Would like a technique in which the same plaintext block, if repeated, produces different ciphertext block.

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- The input to the encryption algorithm is the **XOR** (\oplus) of the current plaintext block and the preceding ciphertext block. ($A \oplus A = 0, 0 \oplus A = A$)
- Each ciphertext block is **dependent** on all plaintext blocks processed up to that point.
 $C_j = E(K, [C_{j-1} \oplus P_j]), C_0 = IV$

(a) Encryption

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- For decryption, each cipher block is passed through the decryption alg.. The result is **XORed** with the preceding ciphertext block to produce the plaintext.
 $P_j = C_{j-1} \oplus D(K, C_j), C_0 = IV$

(b) Decryption

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- How to prove that the decryption process is correct?

Encryption: $C_j = E(K, [C_{j-1} \oplus P_j]), C_0 = IV$
 Decryption: $P_j = C_{j-1} \oplus D(K, C_j), C_0 = IV$

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Proof:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &A \oplus A = 0 \\
 &0 \oplus A = A \\
 &P_j = C_{j-1} \oplus D(K, C_j) \\
 &= C_{j-1} \oplus D(K, E(K, [C_{j-1} \oplus P_j])) \\
 &= C_{j-1} \oplus C_{j-1} \oplus P_j \\
 &= 0 \oplus P_j \\
 &= P_j
 \end{aligned}$$

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- At end of message must handle a possible last block, which is not as large as block size of cipher
 - ❖ Pad either with known **non-data value** (eg nulls)
 - ❖ Or pad last block along with **count** of pad size
 - > eg. [b1 b2 b3 0 0 0 5] - 3 data bytes, 5 bytes pad+count

