

Kinship Structure and the Family: Evidence from the Matrilineal Belt*

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ABSTRACT: Kinship structure varies across societies and may affect incentives for cooperation within the household. A key source of variation in kinship structure is whether lineage and inheritance are traced through women, as in matrilineal kinship systems, or men, as in patrilineal kinship systems. Anthropologists hypothesize that matrilineal kinship benefits women because they have greater support from their kin and husbands have less authority over their wives. However, these same factors may reduce cooperation within the nuclear household. I test these hypotheses using a geographic regression discontinuity design along the matrilineal belt, which describes the distribution of matrilineal kinship across sub-Saharan Africa. Using over 50 DHS survey-waves with more than 400,000 respondents, I find that matrilineal women are less likely to believe domestic violence is justified, experience less domestic violence, and have greater autonomy in decision making. I collect original survey and experimental data from couples along the matrilineal belt to test how matrilineal kinship structure affects spousal cooperation. Consistent with hypotheses in anthropology, matrilineal women are less cooperative with a spouse in a public goods game when it is possible to hide income. The results highlight how broader social structures shape women's empowerment and cooperation in the household.

Keywords: Kinship structure, matrilineal, cooperation, culture, gender, domestic violence.

JEL Classification: Z13, D13, N47, J16.

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1. Introduction

Kinship systems and marriage are fundamental social institutions for many societies. They are key for organizing production, allocating resources, determining obligations to family members, and determining the scope and extent of cooperation. A growing literature in economics has begun to explore how social structures such as kinship systems affect development outcomes (e.g. [Alesina and Giuliano, 2014](#); [Ashraf, Bau, Nunn and Voena, 2020](#); [Bau, 2021](#); [Bahrami-Rad, Beauchamp, Henrich and Schulz, 2022](#)). However, the relationship between kinship structure and outcomes within the family is relatively under-explored ([Bau and Fernández, 2022](#)). In this paper I provide evidence that kinship structure affects key outcomes within the family, such as the well-being of women and cooperation within the household.

Kinship systems determine the set of people to whom an individual is considered related and their social obligations to this group ([Radcliffe-Brown, 1950](#)). Kinship systems are believed to sustain cooperation within a group (e.g. [Schulz, Bahrami-Rad, Beauchamp and Henrich, 2019](#); [Enke, 2019](#); [Schulz, 2022](#)). One of the primary sources of variation in kinship structure is whether group membership is determined through men or women. In *matrilineal* kinship systems, group membership and inheritance are traced through female members. Children are part of their mother's kin group and inheritance is restricted to the children of the female group members. In contrast, in *patrilineal* systems individuals are part of their father's kinship group, and inheritance can only be passed on to children of male group members.¹

A key distinction between matrilineal and patrilineal kinship is that in matrilineal systems, women have greater control over children and more support from their kin group. A woman's children are part of her lineage and her male children inherit from her brothers. Her kin group maintains an active role in her life and are invested in her and her children. Anthropologists have argued that matrilineal systems decrease the authority of husbands over wives because authority is dispersed between the husband and the wife's kin group ([Whyte, 1978](#); [Schlegel, 1972](#)). If a husband mistreats his wife, it is relatively easier for her to leave her spouse to return to her kin ([Richards, 1950](#)). Thus, matrilineal systems may allow women greater autonomy in decision making and may improve women's outside option in the case of spousal abuse.

¹Matrilineal and patrilineal kinship systems are examples of *unilineal descent*, in which kin are defined using only one of the two parents ([Fox, 1967](#)). Most Western societies practice *cognatic* descent, in which kinship ties are traced through both parents. An individual considers people related through their mother and through their father to be kin.

Anthropologists also note that matrilineal systems create “conflicting allegiances” within the household because men have strong ties to their sisters, and women have strong ties to their brothers (Fox, 1967). This is in contrast with patrilineal systems, where women are subsumed into the kin group of their husbands upon marriage, and thus do not retain strong ties with their own kin group. Because matrilineal kinship creates conflicting allegiances and because husbands have less authority over their wives, a large literature in anthropology suggests that matrilineal systems may also reduce cooperation within the nuclear household (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950; Gluckman, 1963; Richards, 1950; Douglas, 1969). Put differently, matrilineal kinship changes the importance of cooperating with a spouse relative to the extended kin. Note, this perspective considers “cooperation” to be partly a product of coercion; i.e., once husbands do not have as much authority over their wives, women are no longer as cooperative.


The work in anthropology suggests two hypotheses. First, matrilineal kinship may confer benefits on women in terms of well-being and autonomy. Second, the fact that women are empowered in matrilineal societies may also mean they are able to choose not to cooperate with their spouses. I test the hypotheses that matrilineal kinship benefits women but that it undermines spousal cooperation using survey data from across sub-Saharan Africa and original lab-in-the-field data from couples residing along the matrilineal belt, which describes the distribution of matrilineal kinship systems across central Africa (see Figure 1).²

To examine how matrilineal kinship affects outcomes for women, I combine data from over 50 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) across 14 sub-Saharan African countries that have geo-located cluster information and variation in kinship structure. These data represent over 400,000 female respondents. The DHS include data on attitudes toward domestic violence, exposure to domestic violence, and autonomy in decision making. I match data from the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967), which has data on traditional cultural practices, with the Murdock ethnic group boundary map (Murdock, 1959), so that for each ethnic group boundary and for each DHS cluster location, I can assign a type of kinship system.

The empirical analysis consists of two estimation strategies. The first is to estimate the cross-ethnicity relationship between matrilineal kinship and the outcomes of interest in the DHS. For this analysis, I ask how matrilineal relative to patrilineal kinship affects the outcomes of interest,

²See Appendix Figure A1 for the global distribution of matrilineal societies. Most matrilineal societies are located in sub-Saharan Africa. However, there are also many matrilineal groups in North America and in the Pacific, as well as in parts of South Asia.

Figure 1: Kinship Structure in Sub-Saharan Africa



Notes: The map presents Murdock ethnic group boundaries ([Murdock, 1959](#)) and whether each ethnic group practices patrilineal, matrilineal, or bilateral kinship in the *Ethnographic Atlas* ([Murdock, 1967](#)).

conditional on country and year fixed effects and accounting for a wide variety of geographic and cultural variables that may confound the relationship of interest. The second estimation strategy is a geographic regression discontinuity design to help mitigate identification concerns. I identify ethnic pairs – e.g. contiguous ethnic groups that differ in the practice of matrilineal or patrilineal kinship. Across all of these ethnic pair boundaries I estimate a geographic regression discontinuity specification and include an ethnicity pair fixed effect.

The benefit of the RD estimates over the OLS estimates is that the RD helps account for any omitted factors that vary smoothly over space. Specifically, it alleviates concerns about any spatially continuous variable either affecting the adoption of matrilineal kinship or affecting the outcomes of interest. I present balance for ethnic pairs for a wide variety of geographic and cultural characteristics, such as malaria suitability, Tsetse fly suitability, payment of bride price,

exposure to the slave trade, presence of the plough, and women's participation in agriculture. Nevertheless, I include the geographic controls as part of my baseline specification, and control for unbalanced cultural characteristics, including matrilineal residence, polygyny, and dependence on animal husbandry.

In the OLS and RD specifications, matrilineal women are less likely to view domestic violence as justified, are less likely to have experienced domestic violence, and are less likely to have experienced physical harm as a result of domestic violence. For example, 11 percent of women have experience some form of physical harm from domestic violence. Matrilineal kinship reduces the likelihood of having experienced physical harm by 2.6 percentage points, a 23 percent reduction.

The DHS also asks women questions on autonomy in decision making. The questions are whether a woman is able to decide by themselves, with another person, or another person decides on: visits to the family, healthcare, large household purchases, and how their earnings are used. I construct an index with these variables. In the RD specification, I find that matrilineal women have greater autonomy in decision making (a 4 percent increase relative to the mean). I then examine each question individually. In the RD specifications, matrilineal women have greater autonomy in each of these decisions, in particular in the ability to visit family and seek healthcare.

The DHS results are robust to the inclusion of geographic and cultural controls, alternative RD specifications, and to different RD bandwidths. Overall, the DHS results suggest that the structure of the kin network has important implications for the well-being of women.

I then turn to the lab-in-the-field data to test if matrilineal kinship affects cooperation within the household. Matrilineal kinship, by improving women's autonomy and empowerment, may decrease cooperation between spouses. In this perspective, cooperation may actually be a product of coercion; matrilineal women may be able to choose to be less cooperative with spouses because their husbands have less control over them. As a result, they may also retain greater control over their earnings.

Because data that allow me to test how spousal cooperation differs across kinship structures are otherwise unavailable, I collected original survey and lab-in-the-field data from 320 couples in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to test this mechanism. The DRC is an ideal place to examine the effects of matrilineal kinship because there is variation in kinship structure. The data were collected in a major city in the south of the DRC, where there are many matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups. The 640 individuals in the sample represent 28 ethnic groups and

come from villages along the border of the matrilineal belt, but they share a common institutional setting presently. Using lab experiments in a common institutional setting allow me to isolate the effects of coming from a different cultural background on cooperation in the household (see e.g. [Giuliano, 2007](#); [Fernández and Fogli, 2010](#); [Fernández, 2011](#)).

I use laboratory experiments to measure cooperation in the household. To overcome the challenge posed by a non-anonymous public goods game, I design the experiment so that there is variation in how easy it is to hide income from the other player. This is an important design choice; past work suggests that differences in behavior in non-anonymous settings are most likely to arise when there is some plausible deniability over choices (see e.g. [Ashraf, 2009](#); [Jakiela and Ozier, 2016](#); [Squires, 2021](#)). Indeed, I find that differential matrilineal cooperation is driven by these opportunities to hide income. Specifically, matrilineal women contribute less to the public good when they can easily hide income from their spouse.

As a form of a falsification exercise, participants also complete a public goods game with a stranger of the opposite sex. When partnered with a stranger of the opposite sex, matrilineal women no longer differentially respond to opportunities to hide income, suggesting that the differential cooperation of matrilineal women when they win the bonus is behavior specific to being paired with a spouse and not more general to a stranger man. In contrast, matrilineal men are in general less cooperative – both with their spouses and with a stranger woman.

The experimental results are robust to the RD specification and to the inclusion of geographic and cultural controls. I also show that the results are not driven by: altruism, time and risk preferences, education, trust in foreigners, trust in people just met, or understanding of the experiment. The results suggest that when husbands do not have as much control over their spouses and women face less threat of domestic violence, women can choose not to cooperate with their spouse.

Related Literature and Contributions

This paper provides evidence that the broader kinship structure shapes key outcomes within the household. It is the first paper to implement a geographic regression discontinuity design along the matrilineal belt – which has the highest density of matrilineal kinship – and to present causal evidence that matrilineal women have greater autonomy in decision making and experience less domestic violence. I build on recent efforts to expand representation in cultural data and to com-

bine lab-in-the-field methods with work in historical economics by collecting novel experimental data on cooperation ([Henrich, 2020](#); [Lowes, 2023](#)). I find matrilineal women are less cooperative with their spouses – consistent with the hypothesis that broader kinship structure alters incentives for cooperation within the nuclear household.

The paper is related to several literatures in economics. First, there is a growing literature on understanding the importance of social structures for economic development ([Greif, 1994, 2006](#); [Alesina and Giuliano, 2014](#); [Bahrami-Rad et al., 2022](#)). Kinship systems affect the scope and extent of cooperation and have an important evolutionary role of sustaining cooperation at the group level ([Richerson et al., 2003](#); [Henrich, 2015](#); [McNamara and Henrich, 2017](#); [Greif and Tabellini, 2017](#); [Enke, 2019](#); [Moscona et al., 2020](#)). Despite the mounting evidence that kin networks and other social structures affect cooperation and conflict, we have little evidence on how kinship structure affects outcomes within the household, an integral unit for cooperation and the unit that is generally the focus for economists. Some work has examined how kinship structure affects cooperation across generations. For example, [La Ferrara \(2006\)](#) examines how matrilineal kinship among the Akan in Ghana affects strategic transfers from children to parents. [Bau \(2021\)](#) demonstrates that matrilineal relative to patrilineal residence affects parental incentives to invest in children and responses to pension policies in Indonesia and Ghana. I contribute to this literature by showing that matrilineal kinship empowers women and reduces women's cooperation with spouses.

The paper is also related to a large literature on the cultural determinants of the status of women (see [Giuliano \(2017\)](#); [Jayachandran \(2015\)](#) for reviews) and to the historical determinants of development in sub-Saharan Africa ([Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2020](#)). For example, recent papers examine the effects of bride price, polygyny, endogamy, and pastoralism for women's well-being ([Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013](#); [Ashraf, Bau, Nunn and Voena, 2020](#); [Rossi, 2019](#); [Corno, Hildebrandt and Voena, 2020](#); [Becker, 2021](#)) and the origins of these practices ([BenYishay et al., 2017](#); [Grosjean and Khattar, 2019](#)).³ In this paper I focus on the effects of kinship structure, a fundamental social institution, and examine one of key sources of variation in kinship structure – whether lineage is traced through women or men.

Anthropologists have long studied the variation in kinship systems, but economists are just

³For example, [Alesina et al. \(2020\)](#) examine the correlation between various cultural traits – such as women's participation in agriculture, endogamy, and residence after marriage – and violence against women.

beginning to understand how kinship structure affects outcomes for women and children (Gneezy et al., 2009; Lowes, 2021). In work from India, Jayachandran and Pande (2017) find that the height differential between first sons and other children is mitigated in India's matriarchal societies. Leveraging a policy reform in Ghana that affected the matrilineal Akan, La Ferrara and Milazzo (2017) find evidence that parents substitute between land inheritance and human capital investment for male children. My paper builds on these papers by providing causal evidence from across sub-Saharan Africa that matrilineal kinship – by increasing women's support from kin and limiting a husband's authority over them – improves outcomes for women.

The paper also speaks to a growing literature on the evolution of cultural systems (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981); Boyd and Richerson (1985); Giuliano and Nunn (2021); Bisin and Verdier (2017); Nunn (2021)). Anthropologists have long puzzled over the stability of matrilineal systems. From an evolutionary perspective, the “matrilineal puzzle” is to understand how matrilineal systems continue to persist relative to alternative systems (i.e. patrilineal kinship) if they undermine cooperation in the household, an integral unit of cooperation. Given that I find that matrilineal systems confer benefits to women, this may help resolve the so-called “puzzle” of matrilineal kinship.

Finally, this paper relates to the literature on the relationship between economic development and outcomes for women (Duflo, 2012; Doepke and Tertilt, 2019). Increasing women's bargaining power may decrease spousal “cooperation,” but has positive benefits for women. This has implications for policy, as it suggests that observing cooperation in a setting with domestic violence should not necessarily be interpreted as greater empowerment for women.

2. Matrilineal Kinship

2.1. Overview of Matrilineal Kinship

In matrilineal kinship systems, individuals trace lineage and descent through women. Biologically, an individual is related to family on both the mother's side and the father's side; however, in matrilineal systems individuals are considered kin only if they share a common female ancestor. The kinship groups defined by matrilineal or patrilineal systems are often important in sub-Saharan Africa. They form a basic political unit in which members recognize each other as

kin and often have certain obligations toward each other (Fox, 1967).⁴

Figure 2a illustrates the structure of matrilineal kinship systems. In the diagram, men are represented by triangles and women are represented by circles. Membership in the same matrilineal group is denoted with red. Children are in the same matrilineal group as their mothers. Likewise, a mother is in the same matrilineal group as her male and female siblings. In matrilineal societies, the mother's brother has an important role relative to his sister's children. His inheritance and lineage will be traced through his sister's children, and he has obligations to financially support her children. Note, generally it is male children who inherit (e.g. a nephew inherits from his mother's brother). Importantly, husband and wife do not share the same lineage – for all married couples one spouse is red and the other spouse is blue.

Figure 2: Diagram of Kinship Structure




Figure 2b presents the structure of patrilineal kinship. Children are in the same group as their father, as denoted in blue. In a patrilineal society, rather than maintaining strong ties with her own lineage, a woman is effectively incorporated into the lineage of her husband upon marriage. This is because once she is married, she is not relevant for determining descent and inheritance for her lineage. This is illustrated in the patrilineal kinship diagram by the married daughter denoted in grey, while the unmarried daughter shares the same color as her father.

Matrilineal systems are not symmetric with patrilineal systems. First, in both matrilineal and patrilineal kinship systems, men often retain positions of power and authority within the kin group. This is commonly known as patriarchy. Thus, in a patrilineal society, there is

⁴For example, members of the same matrilineal group may share land and may contribute to bride price payments for lineage members. They may also provide financial support in the form of school fees or burial payments. Thus, membership in a matrilineal or patrilineal society determines your obligations and privileges relative to your kin group.

concordance between who determines group membership and who holds political authority, while in a matrilineal society there is not.⁵ Second, in matrilineal systems, husbands and wives maintain strong allegiances with their own kin group. In patrilineal systems, a wife is effectively incorporated into the lineage of her husband because she is not relevant to her kin group for determination of lineage or inheritance, reducing her ability to rely on her own kin group in the case of separation or conflict.

The asymmetries between matrilineal and patrilineal kinship systems highlight how men and women in matrilineal groups have different roles and obligations to their spouses and to their broader kin group relative to patrilineal societies. Specifically, the role of women is altered in matrilineal societies. Although matrilineal societies are not matriarchal, women have greater control over their children and have greater support from their kin network relative to patrilineal women. Additionally, the obligations men and women have to their extended kin network differ across matrilineal and patrilineal societies. This is because a husband in a matrilineal society supports his sisters, and a wife receives support from her brothers. Work in anthropology has highlighted how this creates “conflicting allegiances” within the household (Fox, 1967). A large literature on the “matrilineal puzzle” argues that it is puzzling that matrilineal systems continue to exist because they undermine cooperation within the nuclear household (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950; Gluckman, 1963; Richards, 1950; Douglas, 1969).

2.2. *Origins of Matrilineal Kinship*

There are many hypotheses on the origins of matrilineal kinship. Work in evolutionary anthropology highlights how certain features of the environment may have made matrilineal kinship more favorable, such as reliance on hoe agriculture (Aberle, 1961), lack of inheritable wealth (e.g. cattle) in places with high Tsetse fly suitability (Holden et al., 2003; Holden and Mace, 2003), or when paternal certainty is low (Fortunato, 2012). Other work suggests that matrilineal kinship was an innovation that spread from the Kongo Kingdom (Vansina, 1990), and that the slave trade may have encouraged the adoption of matrilineal kinship (MacGaffey, 2000; Lovejoy, 1989).

For more information on the historical development and spread of matrilineal kinship systems in sub-Saharan Africa and for a discussion of the work in anthropology on the effects of matrilineal kinship, see [Appendix A](#). Given the uncertain origins of matrilineal kinship, I control for

⁵Note, matrilineal kinship is not synonymous with matriarchy, in which women have political authority.

unbalanced cultural characteristics and for geographic characteristics that may affect the adoption of matrilineal kinship and employ a geographic regression discontinuity design.

2.3. Correlates of Matrilineal Kinship

To examine the effects of matrilineal kinship, I use data from the Ethnographic Atlas, a data set compiled by George Murdock that documents the cultural practices and customs of various societies across the world (Murdock, 1967). Of the 1267 societies in the Ethnographic Atlas, 12 percent are matrilineal (while 46 percent are patrilineal). Within sub-Saharan Africa, 15 percent of the 527 societies in the Ethnographic Atlas are matrilineal and 70 percent are patrilineal. The vast majority of these matrilineal societies are distributed across the center of Africa in the matrilineal belt (Richards, 1950, p.207). The matrilineal belt intersects present day Angola, Republic of Congo, DRC, Gabon, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia. Figure 1 illustrates the matrilineal belt across Africa, with matrilineal groups denoted in blue, patrilineal groups denoted in green, and bilateral groups in red.

Historically, matrilineal kinship systems are correlated with other cultural traits. Table 1 shows the traits that are correlated with matrilineal kinship within Africa in the Ethnographic Atlas. The table presents geographic traits and cultural traits that other work in economics has shown to be important for development and for women's outcomes, including: Tsetse fly suitability, malaria suitability, bride price, residence after marriage, polygyny, female participation in agriculture, reliance on animal husbandry, use of the plough, and jurisdictional hierarchy (Alesina et al., 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Alsan, 2015; Michalopoulos et al., 2019; Rossi, 2019; Ashraf et al., 2020; Bau, 2021; Becker, 2021). The first three columns present the results for all groups in the Ethnographic Atlas. The last three columns present the results for the ethnic groups represented in the geographic regression discontinuity sample – e.g for those adjacent groups that differ in whether they practice matrilineal or patrilineal kinship.

Matrilineal relative to patrilineal groups are fairly balanced on geographic characteristics in the full EA sample. One exception is Tsetse fly suitability; in the full EA sample matrilineal areas are more Tsetse fly suitable. This is consistent with work in anthropology that suggests matrilineal kinship is more likely in places without cattle (Holden and Mace, 2003). However, once the analysis restricts to the ethnicity pair sample – i.e. contiguous ethnic groups that differ

Table 1: Geographic and Cultural Characteristics By Kinship Structure

	<i>All Ethnic Groups in EA</i>			<i>Ethnicity Pair Sample</i>		
	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Geographic Variables:</i>						
Average Temperature	24.304	24.295	0.320	24.087	24.623	0.490
Average Precipitation	93.137	88.086	5.348	95.909	95.248	7.583
Soil Suitability	0.310	0.330	0.025	0.360	0.342	0.043
Malaria Suitability	14.398	15.715	0.910	14.613	15.820	1.753
Tsetse Fly Suitability	0.481	0.430	0.015 ***	0.457	0.451	0.027
<i>Cultural Variables:</i>						
Bride Price	0.846	0.913	0.032	0.864	0.933	0.055
Matrilocal	0.128	0.000	0.013 ***	0.114	0.000	0.037 ***
Polygynous	0.684	0.810	0.042 **	0.591	0.933	0.069 ***
Level of Jurisdictional Hierarchy, 1-5	1.949	2.061	0.116	1.955	1.773	0.198
Settlement Complexity, 1-8	6.115	5.543	0.208 ***	5.976	6.354	0.304
Dependence on Agriculture, 1-9	5.795	5.534	0.185	6.000	6.067	0.277
Women's Participation in Agriculture, 1-6	4.281	3.854	0.179 ***	4.286	3.738	0.332
Dependence on Animal Husbandry, 1-9	1.675	2.672	0.185 ***	1.591	2.053	0.278 *
Presence of Plough, 0/1	0.019	0.120	0.031 ***	0.000	0.000	0.000
Slave Trade (ln(1+Atlantic and Indian))	3.915	2.296	0.374 ***	4.447	3.761	0.813
Moral High God, 0/1	0.302	0.416	0.078	0.150	0.267	0.121
Groups	117	584		44	75	

Notes: This table compares mean values of geographic and cultural variables at the ethnic group level. The first three columns use the full sample of groups in the Ethnographic Atlas, while the last three use the ethnic groups included in the ethnic-pair regression discontinuity sample. Columns 3 and 6 show the standard error and significance level from t-test comparisons of the mean values. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

in their kinship structure, matrilineal areas are no longer differentially more suitable for the Tsetse fly. However, all analyses will control for geographic covariates.

Matrilineal kinship is also correlated with different cultural characteristics. For example, it is correlated with *matrilocal* residence patterns, which is when a couple lives in the same village as the bride's mother's kin group.⁶ While some matrilineal groups practice matrilocality (see Appendix Figure A2 for a map of residence patterns), most practice a form of residence in which the couple lives with the husband's family (e.g. with the household of the husband's maternal uncle or with the husband's family more generally). In the full set of EA groups, matrilineal groups are less likely to be polygynous; have more complex settlements; are more likely to have women participate in agriculture; are less likely to depend on animal husbandry; and have greater exposure to the slave trade. While matrilineal and patrilineal groups are more balanced on cultural traits in the ethnicity pair sample, there remain significant differences in matrilocality, polygyny, and dependence on animal husbandry. Given that these three cultural variables remain unbalanced in the ethnicity pair sample, I will control for them in the empirical analysis.

⁶There are many potential living arrangements after marriage. In *matrilocal* (or *uxorilocal*) groups, couples live in the same village as the bride's mother's group. About 13 % of matrilineal groups practice matrilocality. In *patrilocal* (or *virilocal*) groups, couples live in the same village as the groom's father's group. In *avunculocal* residence, the couple lives in the village of the husband's maternal uncle. In *natolocal* groups couples stay in their natal homes on marriage, and in *neolocal* groups they establish a new residence upon marriage (Fox, 1967).

3. Data

3.1. *Demographic and Health Surveys Data*

To examine outcomes for women, I use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for sub-Saharan Africa harmonized by IPUMS ([Boyle et al., 2022](#)). I combine data from all DHS survey waves for which there are geo-located cluster data and variation in kinship structure. The analysis data set represents 14 sub-Saharan African countries and over 50 survey-waves. For more information on the countries and survey waves included in the analysis, see Appendix Table [B1](#).

From the DHS surveys, I use several variables that proxy for women's well-being and autonomy. First, I examine domestic violence outcomes. These data are collected from a random sub-sample of women interviewed in the DHS. I use survey questions on whether a woman views domestic violence as acceptable in different scenarios, whether a woman has experienced domestic violence, and whether domestic violence has resulted in physical harm. Second, I also use questions on autonomy in decision making. These questions are also administered to random sub-sample of women. They ask women who has the final say in decisions like seeking health care or visiting family members. See [Appendix B](#) for variable definitions.

3.2. *Cultural Variables*

I match data from the Ethnographic Atlas ([Murdock, 1967](#)) with the Murdock ethnic group boundary map ([Murdock, 1959](#)). The Ethnographic Atlas has a wide variety of cultural data on ethnic groups, including kinship structure, residence after marriage, types of payments made at marriage, reliance on animal husbandry, and levels of jurisdictional hierarchy. Note, the EA does not correspond one-to-one to the Murdock map. I therefore construct a new and easily replicable matching strategy that takes advantage of the Murdock cultural groups outlined in the index of [Murdock \(1967\)](#). This allows me to match Murdock map groups with culturally proximate EA groups when there is not an exact match between the EA and the Murdock Map. This is described in more detail in [Appendix B](#).

3.3. *Fieldwork*

I collect original experimental and survey data from married couples who reside along the matrilineal belt to explore implications for cooperation in the household. Data for the project

were collected in 2015 in Kananga, the capital of Kasai Central province in the DRC. Kananga is an ideal setting for this study for several reasons. The DRC is intersected by the matrilineal belt. Within the country, there are many matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups. Kananga lies on the boundary between matrilineal and patrilineal groups. By collecting data in a city, rather than in smaller villages, I can ensure that couples are in a similar institutional environment today (as suggested in [Fernández \(2011\)](#) and [Fernández and Fogli \(2010\)](#) and as implemented in e.g. [Lowes et al. \(2017\)](#)). It also means I have access to many matrilineal and patrilineal groups, rather than just a single group from each. The final sample includes 320 married couples (640 individuals) from 28 different ethnic groups. The surveys and experiments are described in detail in Section 6.

4. Empirical Strategy

4.1. OLS Specification

To examine the effect of matrilineal kinship on the outcomes of interest, I first estimate the following OLS specification:

$$y_{ive} = \gamma \text{Matrilineal}_{e(v)} + \mathbf{X}_i' \beta + \mathbf{X}_v' \Lambda + \mathbf{X}_e' \Gamma + \alpha_{c(v)} + \mu_t + \varepsilon_{ive} \quad (1)$$

where y_{ive} is the outcome of interest for individual i residing in DHS cluster v within the homeland of ethnic group e ; $\text{Matrilineal}_{e(v)}$ is an indicator equal to 1 if a DHS cluster v is within the homeland of an ethnic group e that practices matrilineal descent. \mathbf{X}_i is a vector of covariates for individual i including age, age squared, and an urban indicator variable; \mathbf{X}_v is a vector of geographic covariates for DHS cluster v ; and \mathbf{X}_e is a vector of ethnicity-level cultural covariates for ethnic group e . I also include country fixed effects, $\alpha_{c(v)}$, and fixed effects for the DHS survey year, μ_t . ε_{ive} is the error term. I present two sets of standard errors, clustered at the ethnic group level and clustered at the DHS cluster level. The coefficient of interest is γ , the effect of residing in a DHS cluster in an ethnic group that practices matrilineal kinship relative to patrilineal kinship.

Geographic controls at the DHS cluster level include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil suitability, malaria suitability, and Tsetse fly suitability. Cultural variables are from the Ethnographic Atlas and vary at the ethnic group level. These include controls for those cultural characteristics that are unbalanced in the ethnicity pair sample (see Table 1) and which may affect the outcomes of interest, i.e. matrilineal residence, polygyny, and reliance on animal

husbandry. Additionally, I control for whether there is an exact match between the EA and the Murdock map and the log of years since an ethnic group was observed in the EA to account for any differences between groups that were directly observed in the EA and differences due to the timing of the observation.


One concern with specification (1) is that the matrilineal indicator variable is capturing the effect of something other than the practice of matrilineal kinship. First, omitted variable bias may be an issue. Matrilineal kinship may be correlated both historically and currently with many traits. For example, matrilineal systems may be more likely in certain ecological environments. Second, reverse causality may also be an issue if groups where women had more autonomy were more likely to adopt matrilineal kinship systems. In that case, a matrilineal indicator is capturing the effect of having this initially more favorable view toward women. To help mitigate these concerns, the OLS specification adds the geographic and cultural controls described above. I additionally include a specification with LASSO-selected controls from the full set of control variables (Belloni et al., 2014).

4.2. Geographic Regression Discontinuity Specification

To further address identification concerns, I estimate a geographic regression discontinuity specification, taking advantage of ethnic groups that border one another but differ in their practice of matrilineal or patrilineal kinship. See Figure 3 for a map of ethnic groups, kinship practices, and borders between groups that differ in their kinship practice. I identify all ethnic pairs for which a matrilineal group borders a patrilineal group and for which there are DHS data, and estimate a geographic RD using this ethnic pair sample.

The intuition behind the geographic RD specification is that the matrilineal belt borders are determined by the borders of multiple matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups. The boundaries between these multiple ethnic groups are arbitrary, and along the border these areas are quite similar: they share similar geography, history, and culture. By identifying ethnic pairs, I am able to include an ethnicity pair fixed effect in my geographic RD specification. A similar strategy is pursued in other work examining the effects of historical events or culture (see e.g. Dell, 2010; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2014; Dell et al., 2018; Moscona et al., 2020). The geographic RD specification is:

Figure 3: Kinship Structure and Ethnic Pairs in the Regression Discontinuity Sample



Notes: The map presents Murdock ethnic group boundaries (Murdock, 1959) and whether each ethnic group practices patrilineal or matrilineal kinship in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) for the ethnicity pair sample: i.e. all adjacent ethnic groups that differ in their practice of matrilineal or patrilineal kinship and for which there are DHS data. The borders between such groups are delineated in red.

$$y_{ivp} = \omega_p + \gamma \text{Matrilineal}_{e(v)} + f(\text{location}_{ivp}) + \mathbf{X}_i' \beta + \mathbf{X}_v' \Lambda + \mathbf{X}_e' \Gamma + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ivp} \quad (2)$$

where y_{ivp} is the outcome of interest for individual i from DHS cluster v in ethnic pair p . ω_p is an ethnicity pair fixed effect; ethnic pairs are adjacent ethnic groups in which one group practices matrilineal kinship and the other group practices patrilineal kinship. $\text{Matrilineal}_{e(v)}$ is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is in a DHS cluster v on the matrilineal side of the ethnic pair and equal to 0 otherwise. $f(\text{location}_{ivp})$ is the RD polynomial, which controls for a smooth function of the geographic location of DHS cluster v for ethnic pair p . \mathbf{X}_i , \mathbf{X}_v , \mathbf{X}_e , and μ_t are as defined above. ϵ_{ivp} is the error term.

In my baseline specification, I use latitude and longitude as the running variables and a local linear specification following the RD specifications in Dell (2010); Dell et al. (2018); Dell and Querubin (2018). As in the OLS analysis, I present standard errors clustered at the ethnic group

level and the DHS cluster level. For the RD analysis, I restrict the sample to observations within 100 km of the ethnic pair border for a given ethnic pair, as this restricts the range in which unobservable parameters can vary at the border. The coefficient of interest is γ : the effect of originating from a village just inside a matrilineal ethnic group on the outcome of interest. I also present robustness to alternative RD specifications and bandwidths.

The RD approach presented in equation (2) requires that all relevant factors vary smoothly at the matrilineal belt border except treatment. This assumption is needed to ensure that individuals located on one side of the matrilineal belt are a reasonable counterfactual for those located on the other side of the matrilineal belt. The benefit of the ethnic pair strategy is that it estimates the effect of matrilineal kinship among two contiguous groups. This makes balance on geographic and cultural variables more likely. Nevertheless, to address any imbalances, I control for all of the geographic variables at the DHS cluster level and control for unbalanced cultural variables at the ethnic group level. See Appendix Table C1 for balance on the geographic variables at the DHS cluster level, as well as the associated RD coefficient for the geographic variables.

5. Matrilineal Kinship and the Well-Being of Women

5.1. DHS Results

In matrilineal kinship systems, women determine descent and inheritance. As a result, women may receive more support from their extended family and husbands may have less authority over their wives. This may affect the cost of domestic violence and a woman's outside option. I examine several sets of outcomes, including: views on if domestic violence is appropriate, actual domestic violence, and autonomy in decision making.

Table 2 presents the OLS and RD specifications examining domestic violence outcomes. The first three columns present the OLS estimates; the last three columns present the RD estimates. Columns 1 and 4 present the results with the baseline controls and geographic controls. Columns 2 and 5 add the cultural controls, and columns 3 and 6 use LASSO methods to select from the full set of controls. Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level are in brackets and clustered at the DHS cluster level are in parentheses.

In Panel A, I examine the relationship between matrilineal kinship and whether the respondent views domestic violence as justified. I construct an index with all of the questions related to

whether domestic violence is justified; larger values indicate domestic violence is justified in more scenarios. The scenarios include when a woman argues with her husband, burns the food, goes out without permission, refuses sex, or neglects the children. Respondents tend to report that domestic violence is justified in about a third of the situations. Matrilineal women are significantly less likely to report that domestic violence is justified in both the OLS and RD specifications. The effect of matrilineal kinship is a 2.4 percentage point reduction in reporting domestic violence is justified (a 7 percent reduction relative to the mean of 34.6).

Panel B presents the results for experienced domestic violence, which is the mean of whether a woman has experienced less severe and more severe forms of domestic violence. Matrilineal women are also less likely to have experienced domestic violence; the effect is a 3.4 percentage point reduction (a 17 percent reduction relative to the mean). Finally, in Panel C, matrilineal women are also less likely to experience physical harm as a result of the domestic violence, such as bruising or an injury. These results paint a consistent picture: matrilineal women are less accepting of and less subjected to domestic violence.

I also examine the relationship between matrilineal kinship and women's autonomy in decision making. The DHS asks various questions on the extent to which women have the final say on visits to family or relatives, healthcare, making large household purchases, and spending a woman's earnings. I harmonize these variables so that lower values indicate less autonomy (i.e., a value of 1 means a woman's husband alone decides or another person decides), intermediate values indicate some autonomy (i.e., a value of 2 means a woman and her husband decide together) and higher values indicate full autonomy (i.e., a value of 3 means a woman alone decides).

Panel D presents the results with an autonomy in decision making index that averages the values to these four questions. For the OLS results (columns 1 to 3), the results are insignificant and close to zero. However, for the RD specification, matrilineal women report greater autonomy in the decision making index. Table C2 present the results separately for each of the questions in the index. The positive and significant index results seem to be primarily driven by matrilineal women's ability to visit their families, which are positive and significant in the OLS and RD specifications (Panel A). However, there is some indication in the RD specification that matrilineal women are also more likely to have a say in healthcare decisions, household purchases and a say in how their earnings are used (Panels B, C, and D).

Table 2: Matrilineal Kinship, Domestic Violence, and Decision Making

	OLS			RD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Domestic Violence Justified Index, [0-1]</i>						
Matrilineal	−0.043 [0.014]*** (0.005)***	−0.025 [0.017] (0.006)***	−0.024 [0.016] (0.006)***	−0.025 [0.009]*** (0.009)***	−0.027 [0.011]** (0.012)**	−0.024 [0.011]** (0.012)**
Observations	413,554	413,554	413,554	85,146	85,146	85,146
Ethnic Groups	354	354	354	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	14,626	14,626	14,626	2,653	2,653	2,653
Mean Dep. Var.	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.346	0.346	0.346
<i>Panel B: Experienced Domestic Violence Index, [0-1]</i>						
Matrilineal	−0.037 [0.011]*** (0.005)***	−0.039 [0.013]*** (0.006)***	−0.036 [0.012]*** (0.006)***	−0.022 [0.008]*** (0.008)***	−0.040 [0.010]*** (0.012)***	−0.034 [0.011]*** (0.012)***
Observations	123,755	123,755	123,755	27,447	27,447	27,447
Ethnic Groups	328	328	328	105	105	105
DHS Clusters	10,142	10,142	10,142	1,766	1,766	1,766
Mean Dep. Var.	0.165	0.165	0.165	0.190	0.190	0.190
<i>Panel C: Experienced Physical Harm, [0/1]</i>						
Matrilineal	−0.038 [0.015]** (0.005)***	−0.046 [0.013]*** (0.006)***	−0.054 [0.014]*** (0.006)***	−0.021 [0.009]** (0.009)**	−0.026 [0.009]*** (0.014)*	−0.020 [0.009]** (0.013)*
Observations	121,200	121,200	121,200	26,524	26,524	26,524
Ethnic Groups	325	325	325	105	105	105
DHS Clusters	9,874	9,874	9,874	1,701	1,701	1,701
Mean Dep. Var.	0.097	0.097	0.097	0.116	0.116	0.116
<i>Panel D: Autonomy in Decision Making Index, [1-3]</i>						
Matrilineal	0.005 [0.021] (0.007)	−0.003 [0.017] (0.009)	−0.005 [0.016] (0.009)	0.036 [0.014]** (0.014)**	0.077 [0.013]*** (0.018)***	0.071 [0.013]*** (0.018)***
Observations	328,081	328,081	328,081	68,930	68,930	68,930
Ethnic Groups	355	355	355	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	15,351	15,351	15,351	2,888	2,888	2,888
Mean Dep. Var.	1.674	1.674	1.674	1.690	1.690	1.690
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cultural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
LASSO Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y


Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level in []; standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in (). The first 3 columns present coefficients from OLS regressions; the last 3 columns present coefficients from a geographic regression discontinuity design. The OLS sample are those country-waves represented in the RD sample; the RD analysis is restricted to a 100km boundary within ethnic pairs. The OLS specification includes country fixed effects. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude and includes an ethnicity pair fixed effect. *Baseline Controls* include age, age squared, urban-rural status, a survey-year fixed effect, log of the years an ethnic group has been in the EA, and an indicator for whether the ethnic group was an exact match from the Murdock sample to the EA. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include matrilocality, polygyny, and animal husbandry. *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether a DHS cluster is located in the homeland of an ethnic group that traditionally practiced matrilineal kinship. *Domestic Violence Justified Index* is an average of yes or no questions that ask if domestic violence is justified in different scenarios. The scenarios are: a woman argues with her husband, a woman burns the food, a woman goes out without her husband's permission, a woman refuses sex, or a woman neglects the children. *Experienced Domestic Violence Index* is a mean of two indicators of whether the woman has ever experienced less severe or severe domestic violence. *Experienced Physical Harm* is an indicator for whether domestic violence resulted in physical injury. *Autonomy in Decision Making Index* varies from 1 to 3 and is increasing in the woman's control in the choice. It averages the responses to questions on whether a woman has the final say in: big household purchases, spending her earnings, deciding to visit family, and deciding on health care. *LASSO Controls* use LASSO methods from Belloni et al. (2014) to select controls from the full set of controls. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.2. Robustness of DHS Results

Figure 4 presents robustness to alternative RD bandwidths for the domestic violence and decision making outcomes. The domestic violence results are negative and significant at all bandwidths (50 kilometers to 300 kilometers). For the decision making index, the decision to visit family members and the decision to seek health care, the results are positive and significant for the full range of bandwidths (see Appendix Figure C1 for each question separately). For the ability to make big household purchases and control over earnings, the results are positive and significant for narrower bandwidths.


Figure 5 presents robustness to alternative RD specifications, including: a linear distance polynomial, quadratic latitude and longitude polynomials, and quadratic distance polynomials. Additionally, because matrilineal women tend to come from poorer households and may have fewer years of education (see Appendix Table C3), Figure 5 also presents robustness to the inclusion of household wealth quintile fixed effects and respondent's years of education fixed effects. The coefficient in red represents the baseline specification. The alternative RD specifications and controls leave the coefficient mostly unchanged. The results are robust to these alternative RD specifications and to the inclusion of these additional control variables.

Figure 4: Alternative RD Bandwidths: Outcomes for Women



Notes: The figure shows the coefficients and standard errors for the effect of Matrilineal on child outcomes in an RD specification. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude and includes an ethnicity pair fixed effect. *Baseline Controls* include age, age squared, urban-rural status, a survey-year fixed effect, log of the years an ethnic group has been in the EA, and an indicator for whether the ethnic group was an exact match from the Murdock sample to the EA. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include matrilocality, polygyny, and animal husbandry. *Domestic Violence Justified Index* is an average of yes or no questions that ask if domestic violence is justified in different scenarios. The scenarios are: a woman argues with her husband, a woman burns the food, a woman goes out without her husband's permission, a woman refuses sex, or a woman neglects the children. *Experienced Domestic Violence Index* is a mean of two indicators of whether the woman has ever experienced less severe or severe domestic violence. *Experienced Physical Harm* is an indicator for whether domestic violence resulted in physical injury. *Household Decisions* varies from 1 to 3 and is increasing in the woman's control in the choice. It averages the responses to questions on whether a woman has the final say in: big household purchases, spending her earnings, deciding to visit family, and deciding on health care.

Figure 5: Women's Outcomes with Alternative RD Specifications and Additional Controls



Notes: The figure shows the coefficients and standard errors for the effect of a Matrilineal indicator on: *Domestic Violence Justified Index*, *Experienced Domestic Violence Index*, *Experienced Physical Harm*, and *Autonomy in Decision Making Index*. Coefficients are depicted by black horizontal lines. The vertical bars, from darkest to lightest, denote the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals, respectively. The red bar indicates the baseline specification for each RD polynomial. The RD polynomials are: linear in latitude and longitude (the main specification in the paper); linear in distance; quadratic in latitude and longitude; quadratic in distance; all RD specifications include an ethnicity pair fixed effect. *Baseline Controls* include age, age squared, urban-rural status, a survey-year fixed effect, log of the years an ethnic group has been in the EA, and an indicator for whether the ethnic group was an exact match from the Murdock sample to the EA, geographic controls, and cultural controls. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include matrilocality, polygyny, and animal husbandry. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnic group level. The *Controls* panel indicates the combination of robustness checks associated with each specification. The additional controls include: wealth quintile fixed effects, years of education fixed effects, and both.

6. Examining Cooperation with Lab-in-the-Field Data

6.1. *Conceptual Framework*

In matrilineal systems, lineage and inheritance are traced through women and children are part of the woman's kin group. As a result, matrilineal kinship increases women's support from their kin and decreases a husband's control over his wife. Precisely because matrilineal kinship decreases a husband's authority over his wife and creates stronger ties with a spouse's own kin group, it may also lead to differences in spousal cooperation. Put differently, matrilineal kinship changes the relevant group with which an individual cooperates, de-emphasizing the nuclear household. Husband's have less authority over their wives, and thus are less able to enforce "cooperation". Women can choose not to cooperate with their spouses. I turn to original experimental data to test the hypothesis that matrilineal kinship undermines spousal cooperation. I expect that matrilineal women in particular will be less likely to cooperate with their husbands.

6.2. *Fieldwork Data*

To test if matrilineal kinship affects cooperation within the household, I collect survey and experimental data from individuals who reside along the matrilineal belt. Individuals were selected for participation in the study using random sampling methods within the city of Kananga. Individuals that were randomly selected to participate in the study after an initial screening survey were revisited at their homes by a team consisting of one male and one female enumerator. The enumerators asked the husband and wife if they would like to participate in the study. Ultimately, 320 individuals from the screening survey were able to participate in the study, yielding a sample of 640 individuals.⁷

The final sample consists of 28 ethnic groups, 13 of which are matrilineal. The largest patrilineal groups represented in the sample are the Luluwa, Luntu, Luba, Tetela, Songe, and Bindi. The largest matrilineal groups represented in the sample are the Kuba, Sala, Mbala, Kete, Lele, and Chokwe. Thirty nine percent of the sample reported being from an ethnic group identified as matrilineal in the anthropological literature. The remaining individuals are from patrilineal

⁷The screening survey yielded a sampling frame from which a random subsample of patrilineal individuals and all eligible matrilineal individuals were invited to participate. Individuals were unable or ineligible to participate for a variety of reasons. The primary reason for not participating is that one spouse was traveling for an extended duration. Other reasons for not participating include: illness, death, a spouse who lives outside of Kananga, divorce, or inability to locate. Very few individuals refused to participate at all, and there was no differential refusal to participate based on matrilineal status.

groups. In 47 percent of the sample, patrilineal individuals were married to other patrilineal individuals. Twenty-five percent of the sample was in a fully matrilineal marriage (where both partners are from a matrilineal society) and 28 percent were in a mixed marriage, where one partner was of matrilineal descent and the other of patrilineal descent. See Appendix Table D1 for a list of ethnic groups in the sample.⁸


Figure 6 presents a map of the locations of the villages of origin (i.e. ancestral village) for the sample and the location of the field site, Kananga. The villages of origin are in blue for those who identify as from a matrilineal ethnic group and in green for those who identify as from a patrilineal ethnic group. The map also includes the delineation of the matrilineal belt, a border that separates matrilineal groups, which are in blue, from patrilineal groups, which are in green, as well as ethnic group boundaries digitized from Vansina (1966), who provides granular ethnic group boundaries and ethnographic data for the DRC.⁹

Individuals from matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups may vary on important dimensions. Therefore, Appendix Table D2 presents basic summary statistics on the sample respondents broken down by matrilineal and patrilineal and by sex. On average, the patrilineal sample is slightly older than the matrilineal sample. Patrilineal individuals have been married slightly more times, though there is no difference in the number of current wives across matrilineal and patrilineal individuals. Virtually everyone in the sample reports having paid a bride price upon marriage. One of the primary differences between matrilineal and patrilineal individuals in the sample is years of education. Matrilineal individuals have on average 11 years of education relative to 9 years of education for patrilineal individuals. There are no significant differences in age at which they married their spouse, current employment status, or weekly income. Matrilineal women are more likely to report having access to some form of savings.

⁸Anecdotal evidence from interviews and survey evidence from Kananga suggests that matrilineal kinship is still practiced and has meaningful implications for residence after marriage and control of children. For example, individuals from groups that practiced matrilineal kinship historically are significantly more likely to report that lineage is traced through women. Additionally, children of matrilineal women are more likely to remain with the mother (or both parents) in the case of divorce and are less likely to remain with the father only. Finally, matrilineal individuals are less likely to report living with the groom's family after marriage.

⁹I construct the matrilineal belt border by tracing the boundary between matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups, but this is not an actual physical boundary.

Figure 6: The Matrilineal Belt, Ethnic Group Boundaries, and Villages of Origin for the Kananga Sample



Notes: The map presents ethnic group boundaries for DRC and whether they practice matrilineal, patrilineal, or bilateral kinship. These data are digitized from [Vansina \(1966\)](#). The villages of origin of the sample from Kananga are represented by the dots, as well as whether the individual is from a matrilineal or patrilineal ethnic group.

6.3. Validating Outcomes in Kananga Sample

To validate that there are similar patterns in the Kananga sample as in the DHS sample, I present the OLS and RD results using analogous outcomes from survey data from the Kananga sample and the same set of geographic, cultural, and LASSO selected controls as in the full DHS sample. I examine whether domestic violence is considered justified and women's autonomy in decision making. The IRB did not permit me to ask questions related to actual domestic violence. See [Appendix D](#) for additional details on the OLS and RD estimating equations for the Kananga sample. The results from the OLS and RD specifications for the Kananga sample are presented in Appendix Table [D3](#). Reassuringly, I observe similar patterns in the Kananga sample as I do in the broader sample, though the results are less precisely estimated in this smaller sample.

6.4. *Experimental Design*

Couples were visited at their homes three different times by a team of enumerators. In the first visit, participants completed a survey with demographic questions and family history. During the second visit, individuals played two versions of the dictator game (DG), three versions of a household public goods game (PGG), and completed a second shorter survey. During the third visit respondents completed a short survey which included incentivized time and risk questions.

The wife and husband completed the second visit simultaneously, with a female enumerator meeting with the wife and a male enumerator meeting with the husband. This helped ensure the privacy of the respondent and prevent coordination in game play. The order of DG and PGG play was randomized across participants, as was the order of the versions of each game. The randomization of game order was stratified on gender and on matrilineal status. All questions pertaining to views on marriage and gender were asked in the second survey after participants had completed the experiments to avoid priming game play with the survey questions. The surveys and activities were administered in either French or Tshiluba, the languages spoken in this area of DRC.

Respondents participated in two types of experiments: a dictator game (DG) and a public goods game (PGG). The DG is a proxy for altruism, and allows me to show robustness to different levels of altruism towards the spouse. The PGG is meant to be a measure of the respondent's intuition or heuristic about the "right way" to behave in a cooperative task with their spouse. Given that this is a non-anonymous setting, behavior in the lab experiment will almost certainly be part of a broader "game" that an individual has with a spouse. Thus, we should consider the decisions made in this public goods game as measuring an individual's sense of how to act with a spouse.

In the most basic variation of the PGG, couples met with an enumerator of the same sex and were separated from each other physically. The enumerator then explained the rules of the game in either French or Tshiluba and asked a series of test questions to ensure that the respondent understood the game. Respondents were given an initial endowment of 1,000 Congolese Francs (CF), which was equivalent to approximately one US dollar.¹⁰

An important modification to the standard PGG is that some individuals randomly received a larger endowment (a "bonus"). Unlike a typical public goods game, the other player is not

¹⁰Minimum wage in the formal sector is approximately \$3 a day, so the endowment size is meaningful.

anonymous. The bonus decreases the ease with which exact game play can be inferred, and it more closely mirrors an anonymous setting. Several factors motivated this design choice. First, past work suggests that plausible deniability about endowment size is important for generating variation in behavior, particularly for women (see e.g. [Jakiela and Ozier, 2016](#)). Second, the variation induced by winning the bonus aligns with what is likely to happen in daily life, where earnings are difficult to verify and are rarely fully observable to the spouse. Third, in what is generally a highly patriarchal setting where men control the finances, it was important to allow women some scope for action that was not observable to the husband. Additionally, this modification also helped address IRB concerns, given the high prevalence of domestic violence in the DRC.

The bonus was implemented as follows. Participants were given the opportunity to roll a die with three black sides and three white sides. They were told if they rolled the die and saw the black side, they would receive a "bonus" of 500 CF. Those who rolled the die and saw a black side received a total endowment of 1,500 CF to use in the game. The rest received the standard endowment of 1,000 CF. The outcome of the die roll was private knowledge, i.e. the respondent's spouse would not know whether the respondent received an initial endowment of 1,000 CF or 1,500 CF. The spouses did know that their partners were given the opportunity to roll the die however, and so they know that with 50% probability their partner received 1,500 CF. The endowment was given in increments of 100 CF bills (so either 10 bills or 15 bills depending on the outcome of the die roll).

The respondent was then told to allocate their endowment across two envelopes: an envelope for themselves and a "shared" envelope. They were told that the amount they contribute to the shared envelope would be combined with the amount their spouse contributed to the shared envelope. This amount would then be increased by 1.5 by the researchers and divided evenly between the couple. The total amount of money each respondent received would thus be the sum of what they put in the envelope for themselves plus half of the increased amount in the shared envelope. To assist with understanding the payoffs associated with various allocation decisions, respondents were given a table that showed them how much money they would make for various allocations. The respondent made their allocation to the two envelopes in the privacy of a tent using actual money. The enumerator then collected the two envelopes and brought them back to the study office. The money allocated to the envelopes was counted in the office, and the total

amount of money each respondent earned was calculated and returned to the respondent within one week.¹¹ For an example of the experimental protocols, see [Appendix E](#).

Respondents also played an additional version of the PGG with the spouse in which the amount contributed to the shared envelope was increased by 2, rather than by 1.5. This means that regardless of what the respondent's partner contributes to the shared envelope, the respondent will at least receive as much as they put in. This treatment makes it more costly to not cooperate with the other player. It also decouples the respondent's behavior from that of their spouse – their choice solely reflects willingness to cooperate rather than expectations about spousal behavior.

Additionally, the respondents also complete a version of the DG and PGG paired with an anonymous stranger of the opposite sex. By pairing individuals with a stranger of the opposite sex in addition to their spouse for the various lab experiments, I can test whether any differential cooperation or altruism are due to a general orientation toward individuals of the opposite sex or are instead specific to being paired with spouse. The logic is similar to a placebo test. I can also control for DG game play in the PGG, to ask if differential PGG behavior can be explained by altruism towards a spouse relative to a stranger.

The public goods game combines several key features of interactions between couples. First, there is some chance of getting additional income that is unobserved by the spouse. Individuals must then decide how much of their money to keep for themselves and how much to contribute to the household. Second, contributions made to the household have a positive return, but there is some chance your partner may free ride and not make contributions. To maximize household income, each partner would need to contribute their entire endowment to the shared envelope. Any deviations from this strategy results in an income loss at the household level.

Qualitative evidence collected after game play suggests that the respondents understood the key tradeoffs in the game. For example, one woman said “I put money in the common pot because it is increased,” while another woman said, “the husband has a monopoly on the common pot, and he can take decisions without asking me, therefore I also need to have money in my own pot”. Another woman said, “I put a lot in the [shared pot] because women shouldn't have their own money”. A man said, “Despite that the money in the common pot is increased, I kept a lot of money in my own pot because you never know...”. These quotes highlight that the set up

¹¹The payouts for all versions of the DG and PG were delivered to respondents in an envelope as a lump sum for all of the games. This design was required by the IRB to protect respondents from their spouses having too much of an ability to infer game play from payments.

captures a choice the individuals are familiar with, that individuals understood the key trade offs, and that they face real tensions organizing household expenses. For additional examples of quotes from respondents, see [Appendix D](#).


6.5. *Experimental Results*

The experimental data allow me to test if matrilineal individuals are less cooperative with their spouses in a public goods game. I will first present results on average – not accounting for the variation induced by the bonus. I will then turn to the experiment of interest, which is whether the behavior of matrilineal individuals varies in response to plausible deniability about endowment size when paired with a spouse relative to a stranger.

The outcome of interest is how much an individual allocates to the shared pool. Figure [7a](#) plots the coefficient on matrilineal for male and female respondents. On average, matrilineal individuals allocate less to the shared pool. When examining just men, the result is significant, but is not significant for just women (the p-value is .2). Figure [7b](#) presents the results where the respondents were paired with a stranger of the opposite sex. We find that, again, matrilineal individuals are less cooperative, and that this is particularly the case for matrilineal men (the p-value for women is .12). While the results that matrilineal individuals are less cooperative with strangers is perhaps surprising, it is consistent with work in anthropology that suggests matrilineal kinship may be particularly beneficial in circumstances of external warfare, leading to less cooperation with outsiders and a more limited scope of cooperation ([Ember and Ember, 1971](#)).

Given that matrilineal individuals are less cooperative with both their spouses and a stranger of the opposite sex, this naturally raises the question of whether the behavior we observe is about interactions with the spouse, or about a general propensity to be less cooperative. To overcome the difficulty of a non-anonymous setting when paired with a spouse, I take advantage of the variation from winning a bonus. The bonus induces some plausible deniability about initial endowment size. Past work suggests that plausible deniability over the initial endowment is likely to be important in generating variation in behavior. Thus, I am able to ask how the behavior of matrilineal individuals varies based on whether they win the bonus, and thus can more easily hide money from a spouse. I expect that if matrilineal kinship affects cooperation with a spouse, it is particularly likely to matter when the respondent wins the bonus.

Figure 7: Effect of Matrilineal Kinship on Cooperation in Public Goods Game




Notes: These figures plot the coefficient β from the following estimating equation: $y_i = \beta_1 \mathbb{1}_i^{Matrilineal} + X_i' \omega + \epsilon_i$. The estimating equation is run on men only and women only. Controls (X_i) are age and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The outcome is amount contributed to the shared envelope in the PGG.

Figure 8a presents the coefficient on $Matrilineal \times Won\ Bonus$ when paired with a spouse, controlling for a matrilineal indicator and a won bonus indicator; the coefficient is estimated for each gender separately. The results suggest that when paired with a spouse, matrilineal women in particular are less likely to contribute to the public good when they win the bonus. This is precisely when it is actually feasible for them to be less cooperative. For matrilineal men, there is no differential effect of winning the bonus when paired with a spouse.

Figure 8b presents the coefficient on $Matrilineal \times Won\ Bonus$ when the partner is a stranger of the opposite sex. By examining the effect of winning the bonus with the stranger, I can check whether the differential cooperation of matrilineal women when they win the bonus is specific to being paired with a spouse, or behavior they also exhibit when paired with a stranger man.

There is no evidence that matrilineal men or women behave differently when paired with a stranger and they win a bonus. The ability to conceal income does not matter differentially for matrilineal women when the partner is a stranger. Overall, the results provide evidence that matrilineal kinship alters cooperation within the household. Matrilineal women can choose to be less cooperative with their spouses, particularly when they have some ability to conceal their actions. This allows them to retain greater control over their earnings. In a setting where domestic violence is common, choosing not to cooperate may actually be a signal of greater empowerment.

Figure 8: Effect of Matrilineal Kinship \times Won Bonus on Cooperation in Public Goods Game



Notes: These figures plot the coefficient β from the following estimating equation: $y_i = \gamma_1 \mathbb{1}_i^{Matrilineal} + \gamma_2 \mathbb{1}_i^{Bonus} + \beta(\mathbb{1}_i^{Bonus} * \mathbb{1}_i^{Matrilineal}) + X_i' \omega + \epsilon_i$. The estimating equation is run on men only and women only. Controls (X_i) are age and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The outcome is amount contributed to the shared envelope in the PGG.

6.6. Robustness of Experimental Results

Appendix Tables D4 and D5 present the OLS and RD analyses for contributions in the public goods game for women and for men and by whether the partner is a spouse or a stranger. The specifications include baseline, geographic, cultural, and LASSO selected controls as in the DHS analyses, and present standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level, village of origin level, and respondent level. The tables present the coefficients for: matrilineal, won bonus, and the matrilineal and won bonus interaction.

The results in Appendix Tables D4 and D5 are consistent with the figures. First, matrilineal women are less cooperative with their spouses when they win the bonus (Panel A of Table D4). In contrast, patrilineal women increase how much they allocate to the shared pool when they win the bonus and are paired with their spouse. Second, winning the bonus does not affect the behavior of matrilineal women when they are paired with a stranger of the opposite sex (Panel B of Table D4). Thus, matrilineal women behave differently than patrilineal women when they have plausible deniability and are paired with a spouse.

Matrilineal men are in general less cooperative with their spouse (see Panel A of Table D5). Patrilineal men increase their allocation to the shared pool when they win the bonus and are paired with their spouse. The coefficient on Matrilineal \times Won Bonus is negative, but insignificant, for matrilineal men. In Panel B, matrilineal men are also less cooperative with a stranger woman.

Thus, while matrilineal men are less cooperative, this behavior is not specific to being paired with a spouse, as they are also less cooperative with women in general. Matrilineal men also do not respond differentially to the ability to hide income.

Additionally, Appendix Figure [D1](#) presents the results with a spouse separately for the version where the shared pot is increased by 1.5 and by 2. The benefit of this additional version of the game is that it removes confounders from expectations of spousal play: regardless of what the other player does in the times 2 version, a player will receive at least as much as they contribute. It also becomes more costly not to cooperate. In both versions, matrilineal women are less cooperative with their spouses when they win the bonus. This is suggestive of a strong heuristic to not cooperate when given some ability to hide income.

I find that the experimental results are unlikely to be driven by a wide variety of other factors, such as altruism, education, understanding of the game, and trust. The OLS and RD results are robust to the inclusion of controls for: years of education, share of test questions correct, amount sent in a dictator game to the spouse or to a stranger of the opposite sex, trust in foreigners, trust in people just met, an indicator for having a polygynous union, incentivized time and risk preference questions, and all of these controls included simultaneously (see Appendix Figure [D2](#) for robustness of the public goods game results to additional control variables; see Appendix Figure [D3](#) for the DG results when paired with a spouse and with a stranger of the opposite sex).

7. Conclusion

Kinship systems and marriage are integral social structures for society. A growing literature in economics and other fields suggest that kinship systems have important implications for the scope of cooperation, informal insurance, and economic growth. However, we have little evidence on how kinship structure interacts with outcomes within the household. This paper tests the hypothesis from anthropology that how broader kinship systems are organized affect cooperation within the nuclear family. Specifically, in matrilineal systems where women have greater support from their kin, women may be more empowered, but may have less incentive to cooperate with their spouses.

Using over 50 DHS survey-waves, I examine outcomes for matrilineal women. I find that matrilineal women are less likely to believe domestic violence is justified and to experience domestic violence. They also report greater autonomy in decision making – particularly in the

ability to visit family and seek health care. These results are robust to a variety of geographic and cultural controls.

I then examine original survey and experimental data to ask if kinship structures that relatively empower women affect spousal cooperation. Matrilineal couples complete a public goods game with a spouse and with a stranger of the opposite sex. I find that matrilineal women are less cooperative with their spouses when they win the bonus and have plausible deniability over endowment size. These results are specific to being paired with a spouse, and not more general to a male stranger. These results suggest that when women are given the opportunity to choose to be less cooperative with a spouse, they act on that opportunity. Patrilineal women, in contrast, actually allocate more to the common pool when they win the bonus and are paired with a spouse. These results highlight how altering the structure of the broader kin group has both empowered women and changed incentives for cooperation within the household. In particular, when women have more autonomy, they can choose to be less cooperative with their husbands.

Despite that I find evidence of less cooperation between matrilineal spouses, I find that there are benefits of kinship systems that result in greater autonomy for women. This speaks to the matrilineal puzzle, which suggested that the existence of matrilineal kinship systems is puzzling if they undermine cooperation within the household. A resolution to this puzzle is that matrilineal kinship confers benefits on women.

The results of my analysis have broader implications. First, they highlight that greater “cooperation” is not necessarily synonymous with greater women’s empowerment, particularly in settings with domestic violence. Additionally, they suggest a need to account for broader social structures such as kinship systems when understanding outcomes within the nuclear household.

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Online Appendix for

KINSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE FAMILY: EVIDENCE FROM THE MATRILINEAL BELT

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UC San Diego, NBER, and BREAD

5 May 2023

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
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
Appendix A. Background on Matrilineal Kinship Systems

Figure A1: Global Distribution of Matrilineal Kinship Groups



Notes: The map presents the distribution of matrilineal kinship at the Ethnologue language group level. Data are from [Giuliano and Nunn \(2018\)](#).

Figure A2: Residence After Marriage



Notes: The map includes Murdock ethnic group boundaries ([Murdock, 1959](#)) and the type of residence after marriage in the Ethnographic Atlas ([Murdock, 1967](#)) for each group. The other category includes: neolocal residence, no common house, or optionally choosing between different arrangements.

Origins of Matrilineal Kinship Systems

There are many views on the origins of the matrilineal kinship system. Early work in anthropology posited that matrilineal kinship was the most archaic of kinship systems. Lewis Morgan popularized this hypothesis with his work on the Iroquois and other Native Americans who practice matrilineal kinship (Morgan, 1907; Knight, 2008). His work on kinship was motivated by an evolutionary perspective that all societies went through certain identifiable stages of kinship structures, of which, one of the earliest was matrilineal kinship. Morgan argued that the advent of alienable property led to the demise of matrilineal kinship and to the adoption of patrilineal kinship.

Anthropologist Jan Vansina argues that matrilineal kinship is not a vestige of "antiquity", but rather that it was invented (perhaps more than once) and spread across central Africa. Proposed centers of invention include in southern Angola by the Kongo of Mayombe, in western Cameroon, and in Northern Congo (by the Doko) (Vansina, 1990, p.152). He links the invention and spread of matrilineal kinship to the adoption of agriculture and sedentary villages. In this environment, there arose a need for institutions that spanned across villages. Unilineal descent systems allowed for linkages across villages and also limited the number of claimants in succession and inheritance issues. Unlike patrilineal systems, matrilineal systems could incorporate unaffiliated men into the matrilineal group, which is more difficult in patrilineal societies where male membership is established through birth (Vansina, 1990). Douglas makes a similar observation: "If there is any advantage in a descent system which overrides exclusive, local loyalties, matrilineality has it. Furthermore, matrilineality, by its ambiguities, gives scope to the enterprising individual to override ascribed roles" (Douglas, 1969).

It is also possible that the slave trades affected the adoption of matrilineal kinship. The relationship between matrilineal kinship and the slave trade has yet to be explored quantitatively, though the correlation was noticed by Lovejoy (1989, p. 388), an historian of the slave trade, who writes, "No one has argued as much, but it may be that matrilineality and the export trade were interrelated. They certainly reinforced each other". In work on the Kongo Kingdom, MacGaffey (2000) highlights the relationship between the slave trades and matrilineal kinship. He argues that matrilineal descent was a modification of pre-existing and more ancient bilateral structures. Matrilineal kinship emerged and spread with the intensification of the slave trades, generating the matrilineal belt. He writes, "the shift [to matrilineal systems] probably took place in large part as a result of the slave trade and the demographic changes it induced; slavery had been the economic base of the Kongo capital from the beginning, but the Atlantic trade encouraged the formation of groups descended in the female line" (MacGaffey, 2000, p. 215). He notes that it isn't possible to confirm nor deny the existence of matrilineal descent prior to the 17th century, but that the demands of the slave trades induced "the expansion of matrilineal elements" (MacGaffey, 2000, p. 215). In societies that valued wealth in people (*mbongo bantu*), matrilineal descent allowed groups to retain authority over women, who were potential sources of future wealth.

Evolutionary anthropologists explain the existence of matrilineal societies as the result of an evolutionary process that created institutions suitable for the ecological and social environment. They identify several factors that contribute to the adoption of matrilineal kinship. Matrilineal societies are argued to be more beneficial with certain types of production, such as hoe agriculture. In contrast, hunting, which requires skill development and male cooperation, is argued to be more compatible with patrilineal kinship (Aberle, 1961). Additionally, matrilineal kinship may be advantageous in environments with low paternal certainty. While it is difficult to confirm paternity, maternity is easily observable. Thus, an inheritance system in which property passes from the mother's brother to her sons may be optimal since the brother knows he is related to his sister, but cannot verify that he is related to his children (Fortunato, 2012). However, this model alone would require that paternity certainty be below .268, a value that is unrealistically low even

for matrilineal societies. A more sophisticated model argues that daughter-biased investment may be adaptive when the marginal benefit of investing in sons (relative to daughters) is not sufficient to offset by the risk of non-paternity of the son's children (Holden et al., 2003). These authors argue that with the rise of moveable heritable wealth, such as cows, the marginal benefits of investing in sons increases, leading to the demise of matrilineal societies. The authors thus posit that "cows are the enemy of matriliney" (Holden and Mace, 2003). This would suggest that matrilineal kinship may be more likely in places that are more Tsetse fly suitable, as it is more difficult to have property such as cows when there is sleeping sickness. In more recent work, BenYishay et al. (2017) present evidence that reef density predicts the adoption of matrilineal inheritance in the Solomon islands.

Recent work in genetics offers mixed evidence on whether early kinship systems were matrilineal or patrilineal. A paper by Seielstad et al. (1998) is one of the initial studies that examines the relationship between social structure and genetic variation of unilinearly transmitted polymorphisms. The paper leverages the fact that Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is transmitted exclusively by females and the Y chromosome is passed only by males. They infer that differences in the relative genetic diversity of the Y chromosomes and mtDNA can be explained by differential migration rates of men and women. They find that Y chromosome variants tend to be more localized geographically than those of mtDNA and conclude that this suggests a higher female to male migration rate. This is consistent with patrilocal systems because women would relocate more than men under this system. A subsequent study by Hammer et al. (2001) also uses genetic data from sub-Saharan Africa, but finds evidence of greater mobility of males, rather than females (as would be consistent with matrilineal systems). These papers suggest that social structure is linked to the relative genetic diversity of mtDNA and Y chromosomes, but does not necessarily address whether early kinship systems were matrilineal or patrilineal.

In sum, there are many theories for the origins of matrilineal kinship, but as yet, no definitive evidence on its origins. In my analyses, I address concerns from potentially omitted variables by showing balance on factors like Tsetse fly suitability, women's participation in agriculture, plough suitability, and exposure to the slave trades. I control for those factors that are unbalanced, such as matrilineal residence and reliance on animal husbandry.

The Matrilineal Puzzle

Much of the early anthropological scholarship on matrilineal kinship focused on the so called "matrilineal puzzle". The matrilineal puzzle is the hypothesis that matrilineal kinship systems decrease spousal cooperation, and therefore it is puzzling to observe them as a kinship system. Anthropologists note that matrilineal systems (1) split an individual's allegiance between their spouse and their lineage and (2) undermine male authority.

The matrilineal puzzle captures several important features of matrilineal kinship. First, the allegiances of both husband and wife are split between the marriage and natal kin. Though a wife and husband share a bond and children, they must rely on their natal kin for their lineage and inheritance. These conflicting allegiances can lead to tensions within the marriage. Gluckman writes:

"Hence in matrilineal societies where [a wife] bears children mainly for her own blood-kin, her wifely bond is weak. Divorce is frequent; women are liable to side with their brothers against their husbands. A man trusts his sister, and not his wife: Your sister is always your sister; tomorrow your wife may be another man's wife."
(Gluckman, 1963, p.74)

According to this argument, matrilineal systems may lead to weaker bonds between husband and wife than in patrilineal systems.

Second, matrilineal kinship undermines a man's authority over his wife and children relative to patrilineality. As Gluckman writes,

"what happens in a matrilineal society is that [the rights to a woman as a wife and the rights to a woman as a child-bearer] are held by different sets of men. The woman's kin transfer to the husband, often in return for gifts, rights in her as a wife...they also retain in her rights a child-bearer" (Gluckman, 1963, p.73).

A man's children do not belong to him, but to his wife's lineage. He therefore faces competition from his wife's brothers and parents for control over the wife and the children. Relative to a patrilineal man, he has less control over his wife and children.

The notion that a system that undermines a man's authority over his wife is puzzling requires both the assumption of male dominance and the assumption that the nuclear family is the elementary unit of the household. Without the assumption of male dominance, matrilineal kinship systems are no more puzzling than patrilineal kinship systems, where women generally live with the family of their husband and are effectively incorporated into their husband's lineage. Additionally, Mary Douglas writes,

"Underlying [analyses of matrilineality] is the implicit assumption that the elementary family is the basic, universal unit of society. If matriliney divides the elementary family, and if the latter is taken to be the most viable unit of kinship in the modern world, the outlook for matriliney may indeed be dim." (Douglas, 1969, p. 125)

challenging the assumption that the integral unit of the family is a husband, a wife and their children.

Matrilineality in Congo

Richards (1950) describes in detail the structure of matrilineal groups in present day DRC. She identifies key variations in the way matrilineality is practiced across several domains including the type of marriage contract, the distribution of domestic authority, residential patterns, and primary kinship alignments.

The first group she identifies is the "Mayombe-Kongo" group, which includes the Kongo and Yansi ethnic groups. The patterns described in this group most closely resemble the practices of the ethnic groups in my sample. Within these groups, they practice matrilineal descent, inheritance and succession, but also give high marriage payments for the right of removal of the bride. Property, such as land, is administered by a group of brothers and sisters. Women who leave the village to marry may keep their possessions distinct from their husband, and remit some payments to their senior brothers. Marriage means that men acquire sex access to their wives, but never acquire full authority over his wife or children. A young man may pay some of his earnings to his father but the children of the marriage return to the mother's brother's village upon puberty and marriage (Richards, 1950, pp. 212-213). If the father is dictatorial, then "the mother reminds him that the children do not belong to him, and that they will leave him at once for their maternal uncle if they are badly treated." (Richards, 1950, p. 217). This suggests that in this type of matrilineal practice, a woman retain some bargaining power by being able to leave a husband who treats her poorly.

The second group she discusses is the "Bemba-Bisa-Lamba" group, which includes the Lunda ethnic group. This group practices matrilineal descent and succession. Unlike the Mayombe-Kongo group, bride price is only a service or token payment, with the ultimate removal of the bride from her parent's home after some time. Among this group, inheritance of personal property is not as important, as many possessions are perishable. Richards argues that fathers

in this group appear to have greater authority over their children relative to other groups. In addition, a father can maintain this authority if he is a man of high status.

In the third type, the “Yao-Cewa”, the avunculate is more strongly developed. In this case, men may not always remove their wife to the groom’s village. Women in these societies seem to have a lot of authority. They are seen as the head of the household, though are still under the authority of their brother. Additionally, the son-in-law is not as well incorporated into his wife’s family as in the previous types, and in fact, husband’s are sometimes referred to as the “current husband” (Richards, 1950, p. 222). Among, the “Yao-Cewa”, women may be relatively more empowered.

The final type is the “Ila” type, which Richards writes includes the Sala ethnic group. Among the Ila, the avunculate is strong, but the father’s lineage is recognized in the lives of the children. Bride prices are substantial, so husbands are able to remove their wives from their villages. Succession is traced through the matrilineal line, however inheritance can happen through both sides of the family. Unlike in other groups, women in this group can directly inherit land. Women can become so wealthy they can actually be chosen as chief.

Appendix B. Data Sources and Variable Definitions

DHS Survey Data and Variables

Table B1 describes the DHS survey waves that are available from IPUMS and the DHS survey waves that are included in the analysis.

Table B1: Surveys Included in DHS Analysis Sample

Country	<i>All IPUMS DHS Data</i>	<i>Analysis Sample</i>
	(1)	(2)
	Interview Year	Interview Year
Angola	2015	2015
Benin	2017-18, 2011, 2001, 1996	
Burundi	2016, 2010	
Burkina Faso	2010, 2003, 1998, 1993	2010, 2003, 1998, 1993
Cameroon	2011, 2004, 1991	2011, 2004, 1991
DRC	2013-14, 2007	2013-14, 2007
Ethiopia	2016, 2011, 2005, 2000	
Ghana	2014, 2008, 2003, 1998, 1993	2014, 2008, 2003, 1998, 1993
Guinea	2018, 2012, 2005, 1999	2018, 2012, 2005, 1999
Kenya	2014, 2008-9, 2003	
Lesotho	2014, 2009, 2004	
Liberia	2013, 2007, 1986	
Malawi	2016, 2010, 2004, 2000	2016, 2010, 2004, 2000
Mali	2018, 2012, 2006, 2011, 1995-6	2018, 2012, 2006, 2011, 1995-6
Mozambique	2011	
Namibia	2013, 2006, 2000	
Niger	2012, 1998, 1992	2012, 1998, 1992
Nigeria	2018, 2013, 2008, 2003, 1990	2018, 2013, 2008, 2003, 1990
Rwanda	2014, 2010, 2008, 2005	
Senegal	2017, 2016, 2015, 2012-13, 2010-11, 2005, 1997, 1992-93	2017, 2016, 2015, 2012-13, 2010-11, 2005, 1997, 1992-93
Tanzania	2015, 2010, 1999	2015, 2010, 1999
Uganda	2016, 2011, 2006, 2001	
Zambia	2018, 2013, 2007	2018, 2013, 2007
Zimbabwe	2015, 2010-11, 2005-6, 1999	2015, 2010-11, 2005-6, 1999

Notes: This table lists all IPUMS DHS survey samples for sub-Saharan Africa (Boyle et al., 2022) in column 1 and lists which samples are included in the OLS and RD analysis in column 2.

The survey data and detailed information on the sampling procedure and variable definitions are available at <http://dhsprogram.com/data/Data-Variables-and-Definitions.cfm>. The survey

provides GPS coordinates for each village (i.e. *clusters* in the survey); these coordinates are displaced by up to 5km for all urban clusters and 99% of rural clusters, and up to 10 km for 1% of rural clusters. Importantly, this displacement is random, and simply induces classical measurement error.

Below I explain the variable definitions for the variables used in this paper from the DHS survey.

- **Domestic Violence Justified Index, [0-1]:** For women who were randomly selected and interviewed for the domestic violence module, the index is the average of all non-missing responses to Yes or No questions regarding whether domestic violence is justified in various scenarios. The scenarios are: a woman argues with her husband, a woman burns the food, a woman goes out without her husband's permission, a woman refuses sex, or a woman neglects the children.
- **Experienced Domestic Violence Index, [0-1]:** For women who were randomly selected and interviewed for the domestic violence module, the index is the average of all non-missing responses to Yes or No questions regarding whether the woman had experienced less severe or more severe domestic violence from her husband/partner.
- **Experienced Physical Harm, [0/1]:** For women who were randomly selected and interviewed for the domestic violence module, this is an indicator variable for whether woman ever had any physical results of her husband/partner's actions.
- **Who makes decisions regarding..., [1-3]:** Women are asked who usually decides on (1) visiting family, (2) healthcare, (3) large household purchases, (4) how a woman's earning are used. I rescale the response options so that it is a 1 to 3 categorical variable where 1 is Partner/Other Person decides, 2 is Respondent and Partner together decide, and 3 is Respondent alone decides. Thus, a higher value indicates greater autonomy in decision making.
- **Autonomy in Decision Making Index, [1-3]:** Women are asked who usually decides on (1) visiting family, (2) healthcare, (3) large household purchases, (4) how a woman's earning are used. I rescale the response options so that it is a 1 to 3 categorical variable where 1 is Partner/Other Person, 2 is Respondent and Partner together, and 3 is Respondent where a higher value indicates greater autonomy in decision making. The index is the average of non-missing values for these four questions.
- **Years of Education:** For each individual in the household, the DHS survey asks the individual the total number of years of education in single years.
- **Wealth Index:** For each household, the DHS assigns a wealth quintile, based on asset ownership, housing materials, and water access and sanitation facilities.

Geographic Data and Variables

- **Precipitation:** Precipitation data are provided by the Global Climate Database created by [Hijmans et al. \(2005\)](#) and available at <http://www.worldclim.org/>. This data provides monthly average rainfall in millimeters. I calculate the average rainfall for each month in each region of interest and average this over the twelve months to obtain our yearly precipitation measure in millimeters of rainfall per year.
- **Temperature:** Temperature data are provided by the Global Climate Database created by [Hijmans et al. \(2005\)](#) and available at <http://www.worldclim.org/>. I use the average yearly temperature in degrees Celsius.

- **Soil Suitability:** Soil suitability is the soil component of the land quality index created by the Atlas of the Biosphere available at <http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/> used in [Michalopoulos \(2012\)](#) and [Ramankutty et al. \(2002\)](#). This data uses soil characteristics (namely soil carbon density and the acidity or alkalinity of soil) and combines them using the best functional form to match known actual cropland area and interpolates this measure to be available for most of the world at the 0.5 degree in latitude by longitude level. (The online appendix in [Michalopoulos \(2012\)](#) provides a detailed description of the functional forms used to create this dataset.) This measure is normalized to be between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate higher soil suitability for agriculture.
- **Malaria Suitability:** Malaria data uses the Malaria Ecology index created by [Kiszewski et al. \(2004\)](#). The index was created by [Kiszewski et al. \(2004\)](#) to approximate the prevalence of severe forms of malaria. It is created from equations relating the human-feeding tendency of the Anopheles mosquito to the malaria mortality rate using parameters from various field studies and adjusts for the mosquito type that is most prevalent in a region.
- **Tsetse Fly Suitability:** The tsetse suitability index (TSI) is from [Alsan \(2015\)](#). The TSI is constructed by [Alsan \(2015\)](#) using global climate data and parameters from laboratory experiments on the relationship between tsetse fly population birth and death rates and climate variables. The TSI is measured as the Z-score of the potential steady-state tsetse fly population.

Cultural and Historical Data and Variables

Cultural data are primarily from the Ethnographic Atlas ([Murdock, 1967](#)). I match the EA to groups in the Murdock ethnic group map ([Murdock, 1959](#)). Because the EA does not map one-to-one to the Murdock map, I construct a new and easily replicable matching strategy that takes advantage of the Murdock cultural groups outlined in the index of [Murdock \(1967\)](#). This allows me to match Murdock groups with culturally proximate EA groups when there is not an exact match between the EA and the Murdock Map.

Groups are matched between the EA and Murdock map in the following manner. First, I search for an exact name match if possible. Second, if there is no exact name match, I assign EA data from a group that shares the same cultural index code. If there is still no match, I assign EA data for an ethnic group in same cultural cluster. Finally, if there are no matches from the three previous steps, I assign the EA data from the most physically proximate group. Within the analysis sample, 62% of ethnic groups have an exact name match.

The EA variables used in the analysis are the following:

- **Matrilineal:** Matrilineal is an indicator variable equal to one if the ethnic group practiced matrilineal kinship (variable v43 equal to 3).
- **Matrilocal:** Matrilocal is an indicator variable equal to one if the ethnic group practiced matrilocal residence (variable v12 equal to 5 or 9).
- **Polygynous:** Polygynous is an indicator variable for different forms of polygyny (variable v9 equal to 3,4,5,6, or 7).
- **Level of Jurisdictional Hierarchy:** This is a variable that ranges from 1 to 5 and reflects level of centralization beyond the local group (variable v33).
- **Settlement Complexity:** This is variable that ranges from 1 to 8 and reflects settlement complexity (variable v30).

- **Dependence on Agriculture:** This variable reflects level of dependence on agriculture and ranges from 1 to 9 (variable v5).
- **Women's Participation in Agriculture:** This variable is increasing in women's relative participation in agriculture and ranges from 1 to 6 (variable v54)
- **Dependence on Animal Husbandry:** This variable varies from 1 to 9 and is increasing in reliance on animal husbandry (variable v4).
- **Presence of Plough:** This is an indicator variable for whether the plough was present indigenously or well-established use of the plough upon contact (variable v39 equals 2 or 3).
- **Moral High God:** This is an indicator variable equal to one if the group had a moral high God involved in human morality (variable v34 equal to 4).
- **Log of Years Since Observed in EA:** This variable is the log of the years since a group was observed in the EA (variable v102).
- **Exact Match:** This variable indicates whether there is an exact match between the EA and the Murdock Map.
- **Slave Trade (ln(1+Atlantic and Indian Ocean)):** These data are from [Nunn and Wantchekon \(2011\)](#). I take the natural log of the sum of individuals exported during the Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades.

I also use [Vansina \(1966\)](#) to digitize granular geographic boundaries for ethnic groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to delineate the matrilineal belt for the Kananga Sample.

Appendix C. DHS Sample: Additional Tables and Figures

Table C1: Balance on Geographic Characteristics at DHS Cluster Level

	All DHS Clusters in Sample				Ethnicity Pair Sample			
	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE	RD Coef.	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE	RD Coef.
<i>Geographic Variables:</i>								
Average Temperature	22.856 4691	25.982 12583	0.040 ***	0.539	23.619 1234	25.802 2064	0.092 ***	-0.001
Average Precipitation	90.446 4691	98.984 12583	0.836 ***	-2.627	89.548 1234	83.288 2064	1.226 ***	4.950
Soil Suitability	0.415 4686	0.376 12522	0.003 ***	-0.058 ***	0.351 1230	0.379 2045	0.007 ***	-0.032
Malaria Suitability	10.081 4662	21.304 12546	0.143 ***	1.675	13.314 1232	20.585 2063	0.326 ***	0.082
Tsetse Fly Suitability	0.445 4691	0.439 12583	0.002 ***	0.029	0.427 1234	0.452 2064	0.005 ***	-0.012

Notes: This table compares mean values of the geographic variables at the DHS cluster level. The first three columns use the full sample, while the last three restricts to DHS clusters within 100km of any ethnic pair boundary. Columns 3 and 7 show the standard error and significance level from t-test comparisons of the mean values. Columns 4 and 8 show the coefficient from regression discontinuity estimation of the matrilineal indicator on the geographic variable, clustered at the ethnicity level. The specification used is identical to the specification in the main analysis for the ethnic pair sample. For each variable, the second row shows the total number of DHS clusters in the sample. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table C2: Matrilineal Kinship and Women's Decision Making

	OLS			RD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Final Say on Visit Family, [1-3]</i>						
Matrilineal	0.046 [0.023]** (0.010)***	0.023 [0.022] (0.012)*	0.035 [0.020]* (0.012)*	0.075 [0.017]*** (0.023)***	0.112 [0.021]*** (0.029)***	0.126 [0.027]*** (0.033)***
Observations	318,188	318,188	318,188	66,068	66,068	66,068
Ethnic Groups	354	354	354	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	14,626	14,626	14,626	2,653	2,653	2,653
Mean Dep. Var.	1.665	1.665	1.665	1.711	1.711	1.711
<i>Panel B: Final Say on Healthcare, [1-3]</i>						
Matrilineal	-0.010 [0.029] (0.009)	-0.011 [0.022] (0.011)	0.003 [0.021] (0.011)	0.036 [0.021]* (0.014)**	0.102 [0.019]*** (0.019)***	0.103 [0.025]*** (0.018)***
Observations	319,027	319,027	319,027	66,169	66,169	66,169
Ethnic Groups	354	354	354	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	14,626	14,626	14,626	2,653	2,653	2,653
Mean Dep. Var.	1.529	1.529	1.529	1.541	1.541	1.541
<i>Panel C: Final Say on Large Household Purchases, [1-3]</i>						
Matrilineal	0.006 [0.017] (0.008)	0.004 [0.019] (0.010)	0.009 [0.019] (0.010)	0.021 [0.018] (0.015)	0.045 [0.017]*** (0.019)**	0.044 [0.016]*** (0.018)**
Observations	318,013	318,013	318,013	66,013	66,013	66,013
Ethnic Groups	354	354	354	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	14,626	14,626	14,626	2,653	2,653	2,653
Mean Dep. Var.	1.460	1.460	1.460	1.469	1.469	1.469
<i>Panel D: Final Say on Woman's Earnings, [1-3]</i>						
Matrilineal	-0.005 [0.036] (0.013)	-0.025 [0.026] (0.015)*	-0.041 [0.027] (0.015)*	0.013 [0.018] (0.021)	0.083 [0.015]*** (0.025)***	0.068 [0.017]*** (0.025)***
Observations	150,397	150,397	150,397	30,885	30,885	30,885
Ethnic Groups	353	353	353	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	14,656	14,656	14,656	2,749	2,749	2,749
Mean Dep. Var.	2.516	2.516	2.516	2.423	2.423	2.423
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cultural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
LASSO Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y


Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level in []; standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in (). The first 3 columns present coefficients from OLS regressions; the last 3 columns present coefficients from a geographic regression discontinuity design. The OLS sample are those country-waves represented in the RD sample; the RD analysis is restricted to a 100km boundary within ethnic pairs. The OLS specification includes country fixed effects. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude and includes an ethnicity pair fixed effect. *Baseline Controls* include age, age squared, urban-rural status, a survey-year fixed effect, log of the years an ethnic group has been in the EA, and an indicator for whether the ethnic group was an exact match from the Murdock sample to the EA. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include matrilocality, polygyny, and animal husbandry. *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether a DHS cluster is located in the homeland of an ethnic group that traditionally practiced matrilineal kinship. The decision making are whether a woman has the final say in: big household purchases, spending her earnings, deciding to visit family, and deciding on health care. *LASSO Controls* use LASSO methods from Belloni et al. (2014) to select controls from the full set of controls. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C3: Matrilineal Kinship and Other Outcomes

	OLS			RD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Wealth Index</i>						
Matrilineal	-0.147 [0.099] (0.025)***	-0.157 [0.096] (0.029)***	-0.163 [0.088]* (0.029)***	-0.145 [0.040]*** (0.035)***	-0.152 [0.058]*** (0.043)***	-0.163 [0.061]*** (0.042)***
Observations	411,785	411,785	411,785	90,706	90,706	90,706
Ethnic Groups	354	354	354	111	111	111
DHS Clusters	14,722	14,722	14,722	2,947	2,947	2,947
Mean Dep. Var.	3.045	3.045	3.045	2.931	2.931	2.931
<i>Panel B: Women's Years of Education</i>						
Matrilineal	-0.211 [0.358] (0.065)***	-0.225 [0.243] (0.074)***	-0.046 [0.252] (0.074)***	-0.176 [0.100]* (0.097)*	-0.134 [0.153] (0.125)	-0.128 [0.123] (0.126)
Observations	481,422	481,422	481,422	101,801	101,801	101,801
Ethnic Groups	357	357	357	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	17,142	17,142	17,142	3,272	3,272	3,272
Mean Dep. Var.	4.269	4.269	4.269	3.928	3.928	3.928
<i>Panel C: Women's Literacy</i>						
Matrilineal	0.012 [0.025] (0.006)*	0.017 [0.022] (0.007)**	0.005 [0.022] (0.007)**	0.016 [0.010]* (0.010)*	0.010 [0.015] (0.013)	0.013 [0.012] (0.013)
Observations	478,552	478,552	478,552	101,381	101,381	101,381
Ethnic Groups	357	357	357	112	112	112
DHS Clusters	17,142	17,142	17,142	3,272	3,272	3,272
Mean Dep. Var.	0.592	0.592	0.592	0.627	0.627	0.627
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cultural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
LASSO Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level in []; standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in (). The first 3 columns present coefficients from OLS regressions; the last 3 columns present coefficients from a geographic regression discontinuity design. The OLS sample are those country-waves represented in the RD sample; the RD analysis is restricted to a 100km boundary within ethnic pairs. The OLS specification includes country fixed effects. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude and includes an ethnicity pair fixed effect. *Baseline Controls* include age, age squared, urban-rural status, a survey-year fixed effect, log of the years an ethnic group has been in the EA, and an indicator for whether the ethnic group was an exact match from the Murdock sample to the EA. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include matrilocality, polygyny, and animal husbandry. *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether a DHS cluster is located in the homeland of an ethnic group that traditionally practiced matrilineal kinship. *Wealth Index* is a household level measure of wealth. *Years of Education* is the number of completed years of education. *Literacy* is an variable that equals 0 if the respondent cannot read, equals .5 if they can read a sentence with difficulty, and 1 if they can read easily. *LASSO Controls* use LASSO methods from Belloni et al. (2014) to select controls from the full set of controls. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure C1: Alternative RD Bandwidths: Women's Decision Making



Notes: The figure shows the coefficients and standard errors for the effect of Matrilineal on child outcomes in an RD specification. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude and includes an ethnicity pair fixed effect. *Baseline Controls* include age, age squared, urban-rural status, a survey-year fixed effect, log of the years an ethnic group has been in the EA, and an indicator for whether the ethnic group was an exact match from the Murdock sample to the EA. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include matrilocality, polygyny, and animal husbandry. Each question asks whether a woman has the final say in: big household purchases, spending her earnings, deciding to visit family, and deciding on health care.

Appendix D. Kananga Sample: Additional Tables and Figures

Kananga Data

Data Collection: Surveys and experiments were conducted in Kananga, DRC, a provincial capital on the border of the matrilineal belt. Screening surveys were conducted in 2013, 2014, and 2015 for multiple on-going projects. These screening surveys were organized by randomly sampling polygons and households within the city of Kananga to establish a sampling frame from which eligible couples were asked to participate. The screening surveys collected basic demographic information on the household head. From these screening surveys, 442 individuals and their spouses were asked to participate; 320 of them agreed and were eligible (i.e. both spouses would be present for next several months), yielding a total sample of 640 individuals. The sample represents many different matrilineal and patrilineal groups. Refer to Table D1 for information on the groups included in the sample and the number of individuals per ethnic group and Table D2 for summary statistics.

Table D1: Ethnic Groups in Kananga Sample

<i>Matrilineal Groups</i>			<i>Patrilineal Groups</i>	
	Name	Number	Name	Number
1.	Bunde	5	Bindi	37
2.	Chokwe	18	Dekese	29
3.	Kete	32	Kuchu	3
4.	Kongo	18	Kusu	1
5.	Kuba	52	Luba	44
6.	Lele	28	Luba Katanga	1
7.	Lualua	10	Luluwa	135
8.	Lunda/Rund	3	Luntu	51
9.	Mbala	35	Mfuya	4
10.	Pende	6	Nyoka	2
11.	Sala	38	Songe	37
12.	Yansi	4	Tetela	40
13.	Suku	1	Other	6
Total:		250	Total:	390

Notes: The "Other" patrilineal tribes not listed in the table are: Angola, Mongo, Nyambi, Nyoka, and Orendo.

Incentivized Time and Risk Questions: Individuals were asked five incentivized questions. In three of the questions, the individuals had to choose between gambles, where one of the two options is more risky. To ensure that the respondent understood the probability of each outcome, the gambles were contextualized using a local game that has a 50% probability of winning and losing. An additional two questions asked respondents to choose between a small amount of money now or a larger amount of money in the future. The respondents were incentivized to answer truthfully because one of these questions was randomly selected to be implemented at the end of the survey. For example, If for question 1 I said I would prefer Game 2, if question 1 were selected, the respondent would play Game 2.

1. **Question 1:** Now imagine you have a choice between playing two different games of kwatanfumu ujambonge. *Game 1:* We play kwatanfumu ujambonge. If you win, you get 1500 CF. If you lose, you get 1000 CF. *Game 2:* We play kwatanfumu ujambonge. If you win, you get 2500 CF. If you lose, you get 500 CF. Which game would you choose to play?
2. **Question 2:** Now imagine you have a choice between playing two different games of kwatanfumu ujambonge. *Game 1:* We play kwatanfumu ujambonge. If you win, you get 1000 CF. If you lose, you get 1000 CF. *Game 2:* We play kwatanfumu ujambonge. If you win, you get 2500 CF. If you lose, you get 500 CF. Which game would you choose to play?

3. **Question 3:** Now imagine you have a choice between playing two different games of kwatanfumu ujambonge. *Game 1:* We play kwatanfumu ujambonge. If you win, you get 1500 CF. If you lose, you get 1000 CF *Game 2:* We play kwatanfumu ujambonge. If you win, you get 2500 CF. If you lose, you get 0 CF. Which game would you choose to play?
4. **Question 4** Now imagine you have a choice between the following options: *Option A:* 500 CF immediately *Option B:* 1500 CF in two weeks Which option would you choose?
5. **Question 5:** Now imagine you have a choice between the following options: *Option A:* 500 CF in two weeks *Option B:* 1500 CF in four weeks. Which option would you choose?

Additional Control Variables for Public Goods Game Analysis:

- **Share of test questions correct, [0-1]:** This is the share of test questions the respondent answered correctly prior to completing the public goods game.
- **Years of education:** This is the number of years of education the respondent has completed.
- **Trust in Foreigners, [1-4]:** This is how much the respondent reports trusting foreigners, between (1) not at all and (4) completely.
- **Trust in New People, [1-4]:** This is how much the respondent reports trusting people they have just met, between (1) not at all and (4) completely.
- **Polygynous Union, (0/1):** This is an indicator variable equal to one if the husband has multiple wives.
- **Amount Given to Spouse/Stranger in the Dictator Game, [0-1000]:** This is the amount between 0 CF and 1000 CF given to the spouse or to a stranger of the opposite sex in a dictator game.
- **Risk Index, [0-1]:** This is the share of three incentivized gambles for which the respondent chose the riskier option.
- **Patient Index, [0-1]:** This is the share of two incentivized time questions for which the respondent chose the delayed option.

OLS and RD specifications for the Kananga Sample

I estimate the effect of matrilineal kinship on outcomes for women and children in the Kananga sample. I follow the RD and OLS specifications used for the analysis of the DHS data for all of Africa with a few minor modifications. The OLS specification is as follows:

$$y_{ive} = \gamma \text{Matrilineal}_e + \mathbf{X}_i' \beta + \mathbf{X}_v' \Lambda + \mathbf{X}_e' \Gamma + \varepsilon_{ive} \quad (\text{A1})$$

where y_{ive} is the outcome of interest for individual i from village of origin v and ethnic group e ; Matrilineal_e is an indicator equal to 1 if an individual is from an ethnic group that practices matrilineal kinship; \mathbf{X}_i is a vector of covariates for individual i including age and age squared; \mathbf{X}_v is a vector of geographic covariates for village of origin v ; and \mathbf{X}_e is a vector of ethnicity level cultural covariates for ethnic group e . Geographic controls at the village of origin level include precipitation, soil suitability, temperature, malaria suitability, and Tsetse fly suitability. Cultural controls are for reliance on animal husbandry and polygyny. I do not control for matrilineal residence because no group in the sample practices matrilineality. I present two sets of standard

Table D2: Kananga Sample Summary Statistics

<i>Panel A: Full Sample</i>				
	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE	(p-value)
Age	39.5	41.6	1.192	0.088
Age Married	23.2	22.9	0.566	0.606
Age Lived with Spouse	23.3	22.9	0.545	0.517
Number of Marriages	1.11	1.18	0.036	0.044
Number of Wives	1.016	1.041	0.016	0.118
Matrilocal	0.060	0.051	0.018	0.651
Left Spouse	0.289	0.337	0.038	0.216
Years Education	11.1	9.4	0.334	0.000
Employed	0.705	0.686	0.037	0.615
Weekly Income	30.7	26.3	3.083	0.151
Savings	0.414	0.341	0.039	0.061
Obs.	640			
<i>Panel B: Men Only</i>				
	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE	(p-value)
Age	42.7	45.9	1.63	0.054
Age Married	26.9	26.8	0.781	0.845
Age Lived with Spouse	26.9	26.7	0.752	0.717
Number of Marriages	1.18	1.29	0.065	0.085
Number of Wives	1.03	1.08	0.032	0.101
Matrilocal	0.039	0.047	0.023	0.739
Paid Bride Price	0.992	1.00	0.006	0.218
Left Spouse	0.352	0.356	0.055	0.935
Years Education	13.2	10.7	0.444	0.000
Employed	0.922	0.891	0.034	0.356
Weekly Income	37.2	31.9	5.32	0.327
Savings	0.375	0.351	0.055	0.660
Obs.	320			
<i>Panel C: Women Only</i>				
	Matrilineal	Patrilineal	SE	(p-value)
Age	36.2	37.4	1.63	0.474
Age Married	19.3	19.1	0.541	0.736
Age Lived with Spouse	19.4	19.2	0.506	0.711
Number of Marriages	1.03	1.07	0.026	0.146
Matrilocal	0.081	0.056	0.029	0.372
Left Spouse	0.219	0.317	0.054	0.070
Years Education	8.98	8.13	0.420	0.044
Employed	0.480	0.487	0.058	0.895
Weekly Income	24.1	20.8	2.97	0.275
Savings	0.455	0.332	0.056	0.027
Obs.	320			

Notes: Age is the individuals current age. Age Married is the individual's age at marriage. Age Lived with Spouse is age at which the individual first began living with their spouse. Number of Marriages is the number of times the individual has been married. Number of Wives is the number of wives a man has currently (if polygamous). Matrilocal is whether the individual reports having lived with the wife's family after marriage. Bride Price Paid is whether the individual reports a bride price was paid at the time of marriage. Left Spouse is whether the individual reports having ever left their spouse for an extended period of time. Years Education is the number of years of education the individual has completed. Employed is a indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is currently employed. Weekly Income is the individual's personal weekly income in dollars. Savings is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual has a savings account of some sort (formal or informal).

errors, clustered at the ethnic group level and at the DHS cluster level. The coefficient of interest is γ , the effect of residing within a DHS cluster within an ethnic group that practices matrilineal kinship.

The RD specification is as follows:

$$y_{ive} = \alpha + \gamma \text{Matrilineal}_{iv} + f(\text{location}_{iv}) + \mathbf{X}'_i \beta + \mathbf{X}'_v \Lambda + \mathbf{X}'_e \Gamma + \epsilon_{ive} \quad (\text{A2})$$

where y_{iv} is the outcome of interest for individual i from village of origin v and ethnic group e ; Matrilineal_{iv} is an indicator equal to 1 if the village of origin v on the matrilineal side of the matrilineal belt and equal to 0 otherwise. $f(\text{location}_{iv})$ is the RD polynomial, which controls for a smooth function of the geographic location of the village of origin v . \mathbf{X}_v and \mathbf{X}_e are as defined above for equation A1. The key difference is that I do not include an ethnicity pair fixed effect, since all of the villages are along a contiguous matrilineal/patrilineal border. I use a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude as the running variables. I present standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level and the village of origin level. I restrict my sample to observations within 200 kilometers of the matrilineal belt, as this restricts the range in which unobservable parameters can vary at the border. The coefficient of interest is γ : the effect of originating from a village just inside the matrilineal belt on the outcome of interest. The results from these regressions are presented in Table D3.

Table D3: Matrilineal Kinship and Outcomes in Kananga Sample

	OLS			RD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Domestic Violence Justified Index, [1-5]</i>						
Matrilineal	-0.167 [0.066]** (0.075)**	-0.168 [0.074]** (0.124)	-0.121 [0.056]** (0.116)	-0.156 [0.074]** (0.102)	-0.108 [0.115] (0.138)	-0.087 [0.086] (0.135)
Observations	317	317	317	305	305	305
Ethnic Groups	25	25	25	24	24	24
Villages	278	278	278	266	266	266
Mean Dep. Var.	2.570	2.570	2.570	2.562	2.562	2.562
<i>Panel B: Autonomy in Decision Making Index, [0-3]</i>						
Matrilineal	-0.012 [0.041] (0.039)	-0.113 [0.047]** (0.065)*	-0.073 [0.040]* (0.058)	0.101 [0.047]** (0.054)*	0.101 [0.058]* (0.063)	0.085 [0.056] (0.062)*
Observations	317	317	317	305	305	305
Ethnic Groups	25	25	25	24	24	24
Villages	278	278	278	266	266	266
Mean Dep. Var.	1.542	1.542	1.542	1.540	1.540	1.540
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cultural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
LASSO Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level in []; standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in (). The first 3 columns present coefficients from OLS regressions; the last 3 columns present coefficients from a geographic regression discontinuity design. The RD analysis is restricted to a 200km boundary from the matrilineal belt border. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude. *Baseline Controls* include age and age squared. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, Tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include polygyny and animal husbandry. In the OLS, *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether an individual's ethnic group practices matrilineal kinship; in the RD *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether an individual's village of origin is on the matrilineal side of the matrilineal belt. *Domestic Violence Justified Index* is the average of survey questions that ask if domestic violence is justified in various scenarios, where response options vary from "Never" to "Always". The scenarios are: a woman argues with her husband, a woman burns the food, a woman goes out without her husband's permission, a woman refuses sex, or a woman neglects the children. *Autonomy in Decision Making Index* varies from 1 to 3 and averages the responses to questions related to whether a woman has the final say in: big household purchases, spending her earnings, deciding to visit family, and deciding on health care. The child regressions control for child age and age squared. *Years of Education* is the number of years of education a child has completed. *Child Sick* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the child has been sick in the last month. *LASSO Controls* use LASSO methods from Belloni et al. (2014) to select controls from the full set of controls. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Experimental Results: Qualitative Evidence

One approach to examining how participants understood the experiment is through their responses to exit questions that asked participants why they made the particular allocation that they made and what this game reminded them of in their real life. The qualitative evidence suggests that the respondents understood the basic concept of the game and the trade offs between allocations to their own pool and to the shared pool.

What motivated you to make your decision in this game?

- “I put money in the common pot because it is increased” (woman)
- “I put money in the common pot to invest and to gain money soon” (man)
- “My decision depended on my husband’s choice but also on the opportunity to make some money” (woman)
- “I can share some, but I also should have money in my own pot.” (man)
- “Despite that the money in the common pot is increased, I kept a lot of money in my own pot because you never know.” (man)

Do you think you should divide the money in the same way for each version? Why?

- “I divided the money intelligently because women spend money without control therefore it is necessary to give them only a small amount and to keep the rest.” (man)
- “No, because the husband has a monopoly on the common pot, and he can take decisions without asking me, therefore I also need to have money in my own pot.” (woman)
- “I put a lot in the common pot because a wife should not have her own money.” (woman)
- “I should put a lot of money in my own account because I may work to make money in the common fund but the husband can spend it all without asking me” (woman)
- “My wife is always complaining, so I should keep money in my own account so I can help her when she needs it.” (man)
- “Despite everything, I put very little in the common pot and a lot in my own because money in a common pot always has consequences.” (man)
- “The husband should have all of the money because he is the boss of the wife.” (man)

What does this game remind you of in your life?

- “It reminds me of saving, a household with two savings accounts is a bad household and it runs the risk of divorce.” (woman)
- “It is important to always have savings in the house separate from the husband because sometimes he will make decisions without consulting the wife. Therefore, I always have my own savings.” (woman)
- “In the life of a couple, there are times when the wife knows something and the husband doesn’t, likewise the husband can have a secret that the wife doesn’t know.” (woman)

Additional Experimental Results

Table D4: Matrilineal Kinship and Contribution in Public Goods Game: Women

	OLS			RD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women						
<i>Panel A: Amount Contributed in PGG with Spouse</i>						
Matrilineal	37.402 [38.689] (34.595) (36.246)	24.763 [43.166] (63.373) (68.361)	16.679 [35.017] (60.724) (67.817)	45.583 [55.826] (45.183) (47.911)	55.983 [69.278] (56.990) (59.405)	54.568 [58.159] (54.404) (53.871)
Won Bonus	92.493 [41.042]** (33.573)*** (33.357)***	92.638 [41.187]** (33.667)*** (33.449)***	93.571 [40.304]** (33.287)*** (33.238)***	83.514 [36.602]** (33.871)** (33.901)**	82.824 [36.015]** (34.019)** (34.034)**	83.125 [35.721]** (33.607)** (33.274)**
Matrilineal × Won Bonus	-176.548 [49.561]*** (50.260)*** (50.423)***	-175.993 [49.386]*** (50.306)*** (50.527)***	-169.963 [47.567]*** (50.386)*** (50.459)***	-162.824 [40.138]*** (52.625)*** (52.831)***	-162.354 [40.336]*** (52.760)*** (52.942)***	-164.639 [39.232]*** (52.209)*** (52.620)***
Observations	636	636	636	612	612	612
Ethnic Groups	25	25	25	24	24	24
Villages	279	279	279	267	267	267
Individuals	318	318	318	306	306	306
Mean Dep. Var.	509.119	509.119	509.119	511.601	511.601	511.601
<i>Panel B: Amount Contributed in PGG with Stranger of Opposite Sex</i>						
Matrilineal	-46.365 [53.431] (48.767) (49.185)	-64.251 [78.260] (95.955) (92.121)	-49.702 [70.098] (89.203) (89.145)	-24.409 [66.253] (58.685) (60.861)	-16.279 [66.246] (73.228) (73.046)	-26.697 [61.703] (71.252) (73.106)
Won Bonus	29.134 [62.244] (43.769) (45.544)	28.159 [62.094] (43.828) (45.630)	24.236 [65.419] (44.016) (45.646)	34.112 [62.489] (44.549) (46.037)	35.299 [60.248] (44.675) (46.118)	28.443 [61.990] (44.009) (46.425)
Matrilineal × Won Bonus	-19.556 [88.638] (73.248) (73.885)	-9.061 [91.719] (72.938) (73.317)	3.908 [90.417] (70.641) (70.993)	-14.347 [86.728] (75.189) (75.989)	2.784 [87.902] (74.607) (75.293)	5.850 [90.685] (71.662) (74.384)
Observations	318	318	318	306	306	306
Ethnic Groups	25	25	25	24	24	24
Villages	279	279	279	267	267	267
Individuals	318	318	318	306	306	306
Mean Dep. Var.	461.321	461.321	461.321	460.784	460.784	460.784
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cultural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
LASSO Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y


Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level in []; standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in (); standard errors clustered at the individual level in the last set of (). The first 3 columns present coefficients from OLS regressions; the last 3 columns present coefficients from a geographic regression discontinuity design. The RD analysis is restricted to a 200km boundary from the matrilineal belt border. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude. *Baseline Controls* include age and age squared. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include polygyny and animal husbandry. In the OLS, *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether an individual's ethnic group practices matrilineal kinship; in the RD *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether an individual's village of origin is on the matrilineal side of the matrilineal belt. *Matrilineal × Won Bonus* is an indicator for a matrilineal individual who won the bonus. The regression includes indicators for matrilineal and won bonus, but only the interaction term is reported. *Amount Contributed in PGG* is the amount the individual contributed to the shared envelope. *LASSO Controls* use LASSO methods from Belloni et al. (2014) to select controls from the full set of controls. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D5: Matrilineal Kinship and Contribution in Public Goods Game: Men


	OLS			RD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Men						
<i>Panel A: Amount Contributed in PGG with Spouse</i>						
Matrilineal	-73.071 [52.282] (40.746)* (40.697)*	-177.735 [50.737]*** (66.960)*** (66.036)***	-177.650 [42.690]*** (61.137)*** (62.003)***	-78.806 [48.950] (51.401) (52.011)	-137.620 [57.241]** (67.712)** (67.971)**	-143.238 [54.893]*** (67.119)** (61.655)***
Won Bonus	77.653 [35.750]** (34.895)** (36.480)**	79.732 [35.917]** (34.950)** (36.497)**	79.066 [34.160]** (34.390)** (36.343)**	95.289 [34.760]** (35.874)*** (37.568)**	97.927 [34.026]*** (35.561)*** (37.256)***	97.628 [33.099]*** (35.195)** (37.212)**
Matrilineal × Won Bonus	-49.101 [78.329] (55.675) (56.550)	-55.640 [78.387] (55.460) (56.224)	-51.920 [74.925] (55.507) (55.818)	-76.206 [65.439] (55.725) (56.788)	-80.814 [65.520] (55.659) (56.701)	-81.102 [62.037] (54.713) (55.362)
Observations	640	640	640	616	616	616
Ethnic Groups	23	23	23	22	22	22
Villages	286	286	286	274	274	274
Individuals	320	320	320	308	308	308
Mean Dep. Var.	542.031	542.031	542.031	541.883	541.883	541.883
<i>Panel B: Amount Contributed in PGG with Stranger of Opposite Sex</i>						
Matrilineal	-111.867 [57.841]* (53.976)** (52.536)**	-232.565 [78.843]*** (73.517)*** (70.133)***	-199.208 [62.581]*** (68.883)*** (67.031)***	-154.898 [63.280]** (65.476)** (65.719)**	-223.555 [100.142]** (77.077)*** (76.758)***	-223.895 [94.194]** (72.501)*** (69.343)***
Won Bonus	9.116 [35.862] (46.164) (48.560)	9.598 [35.510] (46.304) (48.713)	12.826 [35.353] (45.415) (47.432)	-11.586 [36.550] (47.186) (49.665)	-10.863 [36.329] (47.064) (49.608)	-9.783 [34.697] (46.176) (48.799)
Matrilineal × Won Bonus	30.077 [64.356] (74.319) (76.095)	0.906 [61.788] (77.285) (79.301)	6.986 [58.043] (74.539) (76.534)	67.645 [66.054] (75.017) (77.048)	48.835 [67.769] (77.899) (79.976)	47.350 [64.597] (75.923) (77.210)
Observations	320	320	320	308	308	308
Ethnic Groups	23	23	23	22	22	22
Villages	286	286	286	274	274	274
Individuals	320	320	320	308	308	308
Mean Dep. Var.	434.688	434.688	434.688	434.416	434.416	434.416
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cultural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
LASSO Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ethnic group level in []; standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in (); standard errors clustered at the individual level in the last set of (). The first 3 columns present coefficients from OLS regressions; the last 3 columns present coefficients from a geographic regression discontinuity design. The RD analysis is restricted to a 200km boundary from the matrilineal belt border. The RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude. *Baseline Controls* include age and age squared. *Geographic Controls* include mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation, soil quality, tsetse fly suitability, and malaria suitability. *Cultural Controls* include polygyny and animal husbandry. In the OLS, *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether an individual's ethnic group practices matrilineal kinship; in the RD *Matrilineal* is an indicator for whether an individual's village of origin is on the matrilineal side of the matrilineal belt. *Matrilineal × Won Bonus* is an indicator for a matrilineal individual who won the bonus. The regression includes indicators for matrilineal and won bonus, but only the interaction term is reported. *Amount Contributed in PGG* is the amount the individual contributed to the shared envelope. *LASSO Controls* use LASSO methods from [Belloni et al. \(2014\)](#) to select controls from the full set of controls. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure D1: Public Goods Game Results By Game Version: Effect of Matrilineal Kinship \times Won Bonus




Public Goods Game with Spouse, \times 1.5 Version



Public Goods Game with Spouse, \times 2 Version


Notes: These figures show coefficient β plots of the estimating equation: $y_i = \gamma_1 \mathbb{1}_i^{Matrilineal} + \gamma_2 \mathbb{1}_i^{Bonus} + \beta(\mathbb{1}_i^{Bonus} * \mathbb{1}_i^{Matrilineal}) + X_i' \omega + \epsilon_i$. This estimating equation is run on only males, and only females. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The outcome is amount contributed to the shared envelope in the PGG.

Figure D2: Amount Contributed in Public Goods Game: Robustness of the Matrilineal \times Won Bonus Effect



Notes: The figure shows the coefficients and standard errors for the effect of Matrilineal \times Won Bonus indicator on amount contributed to the shared envelope in the public goods game for: women paired with spouses, women paired with strangers, men paired with spouses, and men paired with strangers. The top panels present the OLS coefficients; the bottom panels present the RD coefficients for a 200km bandwidth, where the RD polynomial is linear in latitude and longitude. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnic group level. Coefficients are depicted by black horizontal lines. The vertical bars, from darkest to lightest, denote the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals, respectively. The red bar indicates the baseline specification. The *Controls* panel indicates the combination of robustness checks associated with each specification. These controls include: baseline characteristics (age and age squared), ethnic group level cultural characteristics, comprehension of test questions prior to the experiments, trust in foreigners, trust in new people, an indicator for in a polygamous union, years of education, index of incentivized risk questions, index of incentivized time preference questions, and amount given in the dictator game to a spouse or stranger.

Figure D3: Dictator Game Results: Effect of Matrilineal Kinship by Gender



Notes: These figures show coefficient β plots of the estimating equation: $y_i = \beta_1 \mathbb{1}_i^{Matrilineal} + X_i' \omega + \epsilon_i$. This estimating equation is run on only males and only females. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The outcome is amount contributed in the DG to the other player.

Appendix E. PGG Experimental Protocols: Version with Spouse

Today you and your spouse will be participating in an activity. You will be working with me in this tent. Your spouse is working with my co-worker in the other tent. In this game, you will be given money to divide between two envelopes: a personal envelope and a shared envelope. Your spouse will also be given money to divide between a personal envelope and a shared envelope. The money that you and your spouse will contribute to the shared envelope will be increased by 1.5. This means that we will add half of the total amount contributed to the shared envelope by you and your spouse. For example, if you put 1000 CF in the shared envelope and your spouse puts 0 CF, it will become 1500 CF after the increase. Then the money in the shared envelope will be divided equally between you and your spouse. For example, 1500 CF will be divided in two: each player will receive 750 CF. All the money that you put in the personal envelope will be yours.

Now we will explain the game to you step by step. First we will tell you how much money you have to play this game. The amount of money that we give you at the start of the game will be the amount that you will divide between the two envelopes. You will receive at least 1000 CF, but there is a chance you will get a bonus. You will roll this black and white dice. The dice has 6 sides: three black, and three white. If you roll black, then you will receive a bonus of an additional 500 CF. If you roll white, you will not receive any additional money. Your spouse will also receive at least 1000 CF and have the opportunity to get the bonus as well. Like you, your spouse will roll a dice to determine if he/she receives the bonus. Your spouse will not know if you received the bonus or not. Your spouse will only know how much you contribute to the shared envelope.

The money that you are paid is yours, and you will decide how to allocate it between the two envelopes: the personal envelope and the shared envelope. We will collect the money that you and your spouse have allocated to the personal and the shared envelopes. Someone in our research office will increase the money that you and your spouse put in the shared envelope by 1.5, and then divide it evenly between you two. The amount of money that you put in the personal will not change. In a few days or a week, we will return with your payments from the personal envelope and the shared envelope. You can put as much or as little as you want into the shared envelope. You can contribute any amount from 0 CF to 1000 CF if you did not win the bonus, and any amount from 0 CF to 1500 CF if you did win the bonus. The decision is yours. For each amount that could be in the shared envelope, this poster tells you what will happen to your money.

PICK UP THE MULTIPLICATION SHEET AND SHOW IT TO THE PLAYER. For each amount that could be in the shared envelope, you can see here how much money you'll receive once the amount is increased by 1.5, and then divided equally between you and your spouse. DISCUSS A FEW EXAMPLES TO DEMONSTRATE HOW TO USE THE MULTIPLICATION SHEET.

Are there any questions so far? In short: there are two amounts of money you can receive to use in this game. You will be given 1000 CFs, or 1500 CF if you win the bonus. You'll decide how you want to divide that money between a personal envelope and a shared envelope. At the same time, your spouse will be making the same decision. The money that you put in the shared envelope and the money your spouse puts in the shared envelope will be increased by 1.5. It will then be divided evenly between the two of you. But remember, you will get all the money you put in the personal envelope. Now, we are going to run through some examples to show how this game can be played.

TAKE THE MONEY IN YOUR HANDS FOR THESE DEMONSTRATIONS. FOR EACH EXAMPLE, COUNT THE AMOUNTS OF MONEY THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT. BEGIN WITH 1000 CF. ADD 500 CF IF THE EXAMPLE INCLUDES WINNING A BONUS. THEN, PUT THE "PERSONAL MONEY" ON TOP OF THE PERSONAL ENVELOPE, AND THE "SHARED MONEY" ON TOP OF THE SHARED ENVELOPE.

EXAMPLES

1. Here is the first example. Imagine that you do not win the bonus, so you have 1000 CF to divide. Imagine that you decide to put 700 CF in the shared envelope, and to put 300 CF in the personal envelope. Imagine that your spouse decides to put 500 CF in the shared envelope. In total there is $700+500=1200$ CF in the shared envelope. This amount will be increased by 1.5, meaning that it will increase to 1800 CF. Both you and your spouse will receive an equal share of the money in the shared envelope: 900 CF each. At the end of the game, you will receive 900 CF from the shared envelope plus 300 CF from the personal envelope, a total of 1200 CF. Your spouse will not know whether or not you won the bonus; he/she will only know how much money you put in the shared envelope.

2. Here is another example. Imagine that you do not win the bonus, so you have 1000 CF to divide. Imagine that you decide to put 1000 CF in the shared envelope and your spouse also decides to put 1000 CF in the shared envelope. In total there is $1000+1000=2000$ CF in the shared envelope. This amount will be increased by 1.5, meaning that it will increase to 3000 CF. Both you and your spouse will receive an equal share of the money in the shared envelope: 1500 CF each. At the end of the game, you will receive 1500 CF total, since you did not put any money in the personal envelope. Your spouse will not know whether or not you won the bonus; he/she will only know how much money you put in the shared envelope.

3. Now imagine that you win the bonus of 500 CF, so you have a total of 1500 CF divide. Imagine that you decide to put 200 CF in the shared envelope and to put 1300 CF in the personal envelope. Imagine that your spouse decides to put 800 CF in the shared envelope. In total there is $200+800=1000$ CF in the shared envelope. This amount will be multiplied by 1.5, meaning that it will increase to 1500 CF. Both you and your spouse will receive an equal share of the money in the shared envelope: 750 CF each. At the end of the game, you will receive 750 CF from the shared envelope plus 1300 CF from the personal envelope, a total of 2050 CF. Your spouse will not know whether or not you won the bonus; he/she will only know how much money you put in the shared envelope.

4. Now imagine that you win the bonus of 500 CF, so you have a total of 1500 CF divide. Imagine that you decide to put 1200 CF in the shared envelope and to put 300 CF in the personal envelope. Imagine that your spouse decides to put 900 CF in the shared envelope. In total there is $1200+900=2100$ CF in the shared envelope. This amount will be multiplied by 1.5, meaning that it will increase to 3150 CF. Both you and your spouse will receive an equal share of the money in the shared envelope: 1575 CF each. At the end of the game, you will receive 1575 CF from the shared envelope plus 300 CF from the personal envelope, a total of 1875 CF. Your spouse will know that you received the bonus because you contributed

over 1000 CF to the shared envelope and that is only possible when you have received the bonus.

TEST QUESTIONS: Now please respond to the following test questions to be sure that you have understood. USE THE FOLLOWING LIST AS TEST QUESTIONS. IF IT IS NECESSARY TO ASK MORE TEST QUESTIONS, START AGAIN WITH THE FIRST EXAMPLE ABOVE AND WRITE "TEST QUESTIONS REPEATED" ON THE ANSWER FORM.

TEST QUESTIONS

1. Imagine that you do not win the bonus, and that you put 500 CF in the shared envelope. How much money did you put in your personal envelope? [500 CF]
2. Now imagine that your spouse puts 1000 CF in the shared envelope. How much money total is there in the shared envelope? [1500 CF]
3. After we multiply this amount by 1.5, how much money will there be in the shared envelope? [2250 CF]
4. When we divide this money in half, how much will you receive? [1125 CF]
5. In total, how much money will you receive? [$1125+500=1625$ CF]
6. Imagine that you do not win the bonus, and that you put 800 CF in the shared envelope. How much money did you put in your personal envelope? [200 CF]
7. Now imagine that your spouse puts 200 CF in the shared envelope. How much money total is there in the shared envelope? [1000 CF]
8. After we multiply this amount by 1.5, how much money will there be in the shared envelope? [1500 CF]
9. When we divide this money in half, how much will you receive? [750 CF]
10. In total, how much money will you receive? [$750+200=950$ CF]
11. Now imagine that you win the bonus of 500 CF. How much money do you have to divide? [1500 CF]
12. Imagine that you put 900 CF in the shared envelope. How much money did you put in your personal envelope? [600 CF]
13. Now imagine that your spouse puts 900 CF in the shared envelope. How much money total is there in the shared envelope? [1800 CF]
14. After we multiply this amount by 1.5, how much money will there be in the shared envelope? [2700 CF]
15. When we divide this money in half, how much will you receive? [1350 CF]
16. In total, how much money will you receive? [$600+1350=1950$ CF]
17. Now imagine that you win the bonus of 500 CF. How much money do you have to divide? [1500 CF]
18. Imagine that you put 1500 CF in the shared envelope. How much money did you put in your personal envelope? [0 CF]
19. Now imagine that your spouse puts 500 CF in the shared envelope. How much money total is there in the shared envelope? [2000 CF]

20. After we multiply this amount by 1.5, how much money will there be in the shared envelope? [3000 CF]
21. When we divide this money in half, how much will you receive? [1500 CF]
22. In total, how much money will you receive? [0+1500=1500 CF]
23. Who is the other player in this game? [SPOUSE.]
24. By how much is the money in the shared envelope increased? [1.5.]
25. Will the other player know if you won the bonus? [NO]

Are there any questions? Now we've finished explaining the instructions for the game, so we will ask you to make your decisions. We will collect the money that you have put in the personal and the shared envelopes, and we will take it back to our research office. One of the researchers will record your choices, augment the money that you and your spouse put to the shared envelope, and divide it in half. I will return in a few days or a week with money you get from this game.

HAND THE PLAYER 1000 CF.

Here is your 1000 CF. Now please roll the die to find out if you will win the bonus.

HAND THE PLAYER THE BLACK AND WHITE DIE. LET THEM ROLL THE DIE, AND RECORD THE RESULT OF THE THROW. IF THEY ROLL BLACK, HAND THEM 500 CF. IF THEY ROLL WHITE, DO NOT GIVE THEM ANY MORE MONEY.

DID HE/SHE WIN THE BONUS (DIE ROLL WAS BLACK)?

Now, I will leave you alone to make your decisions and divide your money. I will come back in a few minutes.

LEAVE THE TENT. AFTER A COUPLE OF MINUTES, KNOCK/CALL OUT TO CHECK IF THE PLAYER IS READY FOR YOU TO RE-ENTER. IF THEY ARE READY, GO BACK INTO THE TENT AND PICK UP BOTH ENVELOPES.

Now I will collect your envelopes and take them back to our office. One of the researchers in the office will combine the money that you contributed to the shared envelope with the money that your spouse contributed to the shared envelope. He will multiply this amount by 1.5, and then divide it equally between you two. The amount of money in your personal envelope will not change. I will come back in a few days or a week with all of your winnings from the game.

COLLECT BOTH THE PERSONAL AND SHARED ENVELOPES FROM THE PLAYER. THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THE PLAYER WILL RECEIVE WILL BE CALCULATED BY THE OFFICE. WHEN HE IS FINISHED, START THE NEXT ACTIVITY.

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