
Server-side request forgery (SSRF)


LAB 86 Basic SSRF against the local server

In check stock functionality, there is a reference to API that connects to http://stock.weliketoshop.net:8080/product/stock/check?productid=1


Contents of POST /product/stock request:



I tried to test it on the localhost and here's what I got:




I noticed that, even though I wasn't logged in, localhost (trustful source) connection is trusted by the application and provides it with Admin privileges. Admin panel is accessible by /admin, so I will modify the URL to http://localhost/admin:



Having analyzed the page source code, I could see a part with user deletion. For example, to delete 'carlos', I need to follow to /admin/delete?username=carlos:



Heading back to http://localhost/admin to check if the user was deleted:




LAB 87 Basic SSRF against another back-end system


The lab contains same "Check stock" functionality. Here is the contents of POST /product/stock request:

```
Request
                                                                                    5 \n ≡
            Raw
 1 POST /product/stock HTTP/2
 2 Host: Oaff004b0456ba728685127a00c60019.web-security-academy.net
 3 Cookie: session=GInNBEUkfCrUxuQc8WdchMOObnoe9OYD
 4 Content-Length: 96
5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A Brand"; v="8", "Chromium"; v="120"
 6 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Windows"
 7 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
 8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Geck
  Chrome/120.0.6099.199 Safari/537.36
 9 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
10 Accept: */
11 Origin: https://Oaff004b0456ba728685127a00c60019.web-security-academy.net
12 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
13 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
14 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
15 Referer: https://oaff004b0456ba728685127a00c60019.web-security-academy.net/product?product
16 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
17 Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.9
18 Priority: u=1, i
20 stockApi=
   http%3A%2F%2F192.168.0.1%3A8080%2Fproduct%2Fstock%2Fcheck%3FproductId%3D1%26storeId%3D3
```

As one can see, it uses API to check the stock, which is located at 192.168.0.1:8080 Let's try to access localhost:8080:




Let's try to access other services, available at 192.168.0.0, To do this, I've sent the request to Burp Intruder and applied number brute force attack on the last octet of the IP (0-255):




Attack shows that something is running on 192.168.0.100:8080 as I got a 404 status code of the response (Page Not Found).

I could deduce that it runs an admin interface under /admin, so let's try to reach it:




Perfect! So, just as in previous lab, to delete 'carlos' user, it's simply enough to follow on http://192.168.0.100/admin/delete?username=carlos:




LAB 88 SSRF with blacklist-based input filter

Manipulating the POST /product/stock/ request in the same manner as before shows me, that there is some security mechanism implemented for application on localhost.



Let's try to bypass the possible blacklist:




Good. Seems, that "127.1" was forgotten and they did not put this into the blacklist and I can see that Admin Panel is available under /admin:




I face another problem now: admin should be obfuscated as well. Let's try to URL encode this word:



Likely, the protection mechanism URL decodes the string before comparing it with the blacklist. Maybe, encoding URL twice would help:



Great! Now, I'm in the admin panel functionality and able to delete users. To delete 'carlos', I need to follow to /admin/delete?username=carlos. I will also double encode the request:




Now, checking if the user was deleted:




LAB 89 SSRF with whitelist-based input filter


All previous techniques do not help: the application supports only stock.weliketoshop.net hosts:




I conducted a test on embedded credentials support:



Okay, seems that the application supports embedded credentials, but I faced an error probably to referencing to not existing user. Let's change username to localhost:



Same error. Let's try to append # to username:




Now, the error is different and URL parser, probably, reads only the first part of the string (before the #). All the rest is noted as URL fragment. I can try to URL encode, better twice, the symbol:




Bingo! Seems, that I managed to bypass this protection and I can see that Admin panel is available at /admin:

'carlos' user can be simply deleted at /admin/delete?username=carlos:



Admin interface: http://192.168.0.12:8080/admin

In this task, it is not possible to issue a request to different host:




There is an option to redirect to "Next product page"



I have noticed that path parameter is placed in location header of a redirection response, leading it to an open redirection vulnerability. So, let's modify the stockApi with the following payload:

/product/nextProduct?path=http://192.168.0.12:8080/admin



Great! Admin panel is accessible now. It's easy to delete 'carlos':

