Access control vulnerabilities and privilege escalation

LAB 61 Unprotected admin functionality

Quick fuzzing of the website reveals presence of /robots.txt file. Here are the contents of the file:

```
User-agent: *
Disallow: /administrator-panel
```

I directed to /administrator-panel and got access to admin table:



Now, I can delete user 'carlos':

Congratulations, you solved the lab!

User deleted successfully!

Users

wiener - Delete

LAB 62 Unprotected admin functionality with unpredictable URL


Page source code:

It reveals an URL obfuscated admin page /admin-3161wg:

Users

wiener - Delete carlos - Delete

Deleting 'carlos' user:



LAB 63 User role controlled by request parameter

In this lab, I noticed Admin cookie to be set during log in:

```
Request to https://baef00e003f19e768445be9004c098.web-security-academy.net443 [34.246.129.62]

Forward Drop Intercept on Action Open browser

Pritty Raw Hex

1 POST /login NTTP/2

1 Rose: logic 2000003f19e768445bde9004c098.web-security-academy.net
3 Cookie: Admin = false; session = OwEnyAoUyUDEFdCoaxFEFkymffsmcCV
4 Content-Length : 88
5 Cache-Control: max-age=0
5 Sec-C-No : "Moci A Brand'yu"D", "Chromium',ve"120"
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 10
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 11
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 11
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 12
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 12
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 13
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 13
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 13
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 13
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 14
5 Sec-Petch-Deer: 15
5 Sec-Petch-
```

I intercepted the request using Burp Interceptor and changed cookie to be true:

```
Pretty Raw Hex

1 GBT /admin HTTP/2
2 Host: OsefOse031fl9e76844Sbde9004c0098.web-security-academy.net

3 Cookie: Admin=true; session=ltrSgreuNpq3ufrVSZHZgDWCVcLQIxkp
4 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="120"
5 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Mindows"
7 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
8 User-Agent: Nozilla/5.0 (Mindows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.6099.199 Safari/537.36
9 Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/xml;q=0.9, image/avif, image/webp, image/apng,*/*;q=0.8, application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7

10 Sec-Petch-Sate: same-origin
11 Sec-Petch-User: 71
12 Sec-Petch-User: 71
13 Sec-Petch-User: 71
14 Referer: https://doefOole003fl9e76844Sbde9004c0098.web-security-academy.net/my-account?id=wiener
15 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
16 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
7 Priority: u=0, i
18
```

I did it on every request, since any action on website checks the admin cookie, directing o /admin requires cookie change as well. Finally, Admin panel is available:




After 'carlos' deletion:

Congratulations, you solved the lab!

LAB 64 User role can be modified in user profile

Changing account email request contains JSON piece of code:

In lab description, it was mentioned that admin panel is available to users with roleid:2, therefore, I will add "roleid":2 into json:



Having changed the email with my injection, I have admin panel access now. Now, final step of the task – deletion of user carlos:



LAB 65 URL-based access control can be circumvented

This website has an admin panel, available to unauthenticated users. Trying to move to /admin will bring to the page with "Access denied" message.

In task description it was mentioned, that back-end supports non-standard HTTP headers such as X-Original-URL. It can be tested by adding this header to /doesnotexist page and if the application returns Error 404 page not found, it means that it indeed supports these headers.

Thus, let's send a request GET / with X-Original-URL: /admin header, which should redirect me to admin panel, bypassing filter using Burp Intercept:

```
Users
wiener - Delete
carlos - Delete
```

Gladly, I have access to admin panel now and I was asked to delete user 'carlos':

Congratulations, you solved the lab!

User deleted successfully!

Users

wiener - Delete


LAB 66 Method-based access control can be circumvented

Admin credentials: administrator: admin

Having admin credentials given, I could test the admin functionality and was able to promote certain users to admin level with following POST/admin-roles request:

As the task is asking us to promote user from our wiener account, which does not have any access to admin panel, I used its session cookie and pasted it in the request above:

session= OTMizTrt61du7lJPl9Ggd0vrxaZHm9zA



"Unauthorized" message appears, meaning that one cannot do in such a way. However, access control could be implemented just for POST methods, and I could simply try to change the method to GET and put the parameters inside url:



Now, wiener has admin panel access:



LAB 66 User ID controlled by request parameter

Valid credentials: wiener~peter

wiener API: tOhSDtCmDhZg5DjRwf7gF7rnx1zXHK1q This is a format of URL, when I am logged in as 'wiener':

https://0a2e003c045574d98434322500f800c9.web-security-academy.net/my-account?id=wiener

If I change id parameter to 'carlos', I can get to 'carlos' user home page and see his API key:

My Account Your username is: carlos Your API Key is: O9jMxKBspbdyjdpTfVmDzaFGUy0hvvwD Email Update email

Carlos API: O9jMxKBspbdyjdpTfVmDzaFGUy0hvvwD

LAB 67 User ID controlled by request parameter, with unpredictable user IDs

credentials: wiener:peter

carlos' post can be found on website:

Faking It! - InstaCam
carlos | 09 February 2024

His GUID is revealed in the URL of the post:

https://...../blogs?userId=989f50c5-6011-4ed1-82af-a46f29120ba3 userId=989f50c5-6011-4ed1-82af-a46f29120ba3

Now, I will log in as 'wiener', user's homepage has the following format: https://.../my-account?id=3a969832-eb8c-4355-9ef3-ea6a150fda5f

wiener API: WA17hDIRii88DJEN9KC1Hs9fEFlwTdPO

Now, I can simply replace wiener's GUID with carlos' one:

My Account

Your username is: carlos

Your API Key is: IBoWFYmteUGNQuhnXDPMzDg7a5HW8vrz

carlos API: IBoWFYmteUGNQuhnXDPMzDg7a5HW8vrz

credentials: wiener:peter

wiener' API: mC43HUWLGXZLL65DRKYlkkXAZk8rdnv8

changing parameter to ?user=carlos brings me to the login page, however it contains body with all the information revealed:

carlos API: XXvdZHp5zeraYPCpaZIFruCPDKrq1KH9

LAB 69 User ID controlled by request parameter with password disclosure

credentials: wiener:peter


Firstly, logged in as 'wiener' and changed the parameter in URL to ?user=administrator, and it revealed me the admin user home page:

Inspecting the code, I found his password in plain text, even though in website interface it was masked with dots.

Admin password: serx6wcskiovb0n9aig4

Also, admin panel is available:

State after deleting 'carlos' user:



LAB 70 Insecure direct object references

This website contains a live chat:

Live chat

```
CONNECTED: - Now chatting with Hal Pline --
You: test

Hal Pline: Perhaps YOU could help ME settle an argument. Milk or water in first when making tea?

Hal Pline: Sorry, I didn't hear that, I was listening to someone more interesting than you.
You: stfu

Hal Pline: I'd rather not answer that; you are so rude.
You: Of course. You said I am not interesting

Hal Pline: Sorry I don't know that, I'm not psychic.
You: Get good

Hal Pline: Ask Alexa.
You: She is more interesting than you

Hal Pline: I don't know. I can tell you a secret instead.

Your message:
```

There is a possibility to View transcript of the chat and it will download a .txt file:


It assigned name 2.txt, and all consequent ones were named with incrementing number. So, I can request to download any txt file, by changing the parameter in Burp Repeater:



1.txt contained a password mentioned during conversation, so I will not it out:

ux5nmmmjn6nhrpc8luy8

Now, I will try logging in, using this password:



LAB 71 Multi-step process with no access control on one step

Admin functionality can be explored with given administrator:admin credentials. One can promote users' status to admin and action confirmation window appears. Here is the content of POST /admin-roles request:

To complete the lab, I will replace admin cookie session with wiener's cookie session:

session=D0DEZ1j5yUb2H7vc9IZcgoR2rjptWMkt

and username parameter value will be changed to "wiener"

```
nequest
                                                                                             In ≡
  Pretty
            Raw
 POST /admin-roles HTTP/2
Host: Oa7900df04717453803f49c200ea00e5.web-security-academy.net
  Cookie : session =DODEZ1j5yUb2H7vc9IZcgoR2rjptWMkt
  4 Content-Length : 45
5 Cache-Control : max-age=0
  Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not_A Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="120"
Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
   Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform : "Windows"
 9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests
13 Accept :
   text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/ap
   ng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
14 Sec-Fetch-Site : same-origin
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode : navigate
16 Sec-Fetch-User : ?1
17 Sec-Fetch-Dest : document
18 Referer :
https://0a7900df04717453803f49c200ea00e5.web-security-academy.net/admin-roles
Accept-Encoding : gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language : en-US,en;q=0.9
21 Priority: u=0, i
23 action = upgrade & confirmed = true & username = wiener
```

Congratulations, you solved the lab!

I have escalated privileges of user 'wiener'.

LAB 72 Referer-based access control

Analogically, promoting 'carlos' user to admin and observe the structure of the request:

The request contains REFERER header that points on the page at which the request was sent.

As one can notice, it is GET HTTP request with parameters enlisted inside URL. Trying to direct to this URL leads to the message (no REFERER header present):



Now, in the same manner, I will replace admin cookie with wiener's and return referrer header value: wiener session cookie= 3LUkCY6MI23iyqY7T130KSqV3D5G6W4n



User's role was escalated:

Congratulations, you solved the lab!