



VIT-AP
UNIVERSITY

INCIDENT RESPONSE AND FORENSICS

SUBMITTED TO: SMART INTERNZ

SUBMITTED BY:

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Introduction:

- Incident response and computer forensics are closely related disciplines in the field of cybersecurity. While incident response focuses on the immediate response and management of security incidents, computer forensics deals with the collection, analysis, and preservation of digital evidence related to those incidents. Here's a brief overview of each:
- Incident Response:
 - Incident response involves the structured and coordinated approach to managing and mitigating the impact of security incidents. The main objectives of incident response are to minimize damage, identify the source and nature of the incident, and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. Key activities in incident response include:
 - Preparation: Establishing incident response plans, defining roles and responsibilities, and implementing necessary technical controls.
 - Detection and Analysis: Monitoring systems and networks for signs of security incidents, analyzing indicators of compromise, and determining the scope and severity of the incident.
 - Containment and Eradication: Taking immediate actions to contain the incident, prevent further damage, and remove the cause from affected systems.
 - Recovery and Remediation: Restoring affected systems to their normal operational state, implementing additional security controls, and patching vulnerabilities to prevent similar incidents in the future.
 - Post-Incident Analysis: Conducting a thorough analysis of the incident, identifying lessons learned, and implementing improvements to enhance incident response capabilities.
- Computer Forensics:
 - Computer forensics is the application of scientific methods and techniques to collect, analyze, and preserve digital evidence for legal or investigative purposes. It involves the systematic and meticulous examination of digital artifacts to reconstruct events, establish facts, and support legal proceedings. Key aspects of computer forensics include:
 - Evidence Collection: Identifying and preserving digital evidence in a forensically sound manner to ensure its integrity and admissibility in legal proceedings.
 - Analysis and Examination: Conducting in-depth analysis of digital artifacts, such as hard drives, memory dumps, network logs, and application data, to extract relevant information and uncover the sequence of events.
 - Data Recovery: Employing specialized tools and techniques to recover deleted or hidden data that may be crucial to the investigation.
 - Reporting and Presentation: Documenting findings in a clear and concise manner, presenting evidence in a format suitable for legal purposes, and providing expert testimony if required.

LITERATURE SURVEY AND THEORITICAL ANALYSIS

Volatility and voldiff are powerful tools that can be used to gather valuable information during incident response and forensics investigations. By using these tools, investigators can quickly identify the signs of a compromise and gather evidence that can be used to track down the attackers.

Here are some examples of how Volatility and voldiff can be used in incident response and forensics:

- Identifying malicious processes: Volatility can be used to list all of the processes that were running at the time of the memory dump. This information can be used to identify malicious processes, such as those that are known to be associated with malware.
- Tracking network activity: Volatility can be used to list all of the active and closed network connections at the time of the memory dump. This information can be used to track network activity that may have been associated with the compromise, such as connections to known malware command-and-control servers.
- Identifying malicious DLLs: Volatility can be used to list all of the DLLs that were loaded into memory at the time of the memory dump. This information can be used to identify malicious DLLs, such as those that are known to be used by malware.
- Comparing memory dumps: Voldiff can be used to compare two memory dumps to identify changes. This can be useful for identifying changes that were made to the system after the first memory dump was taken, such as changes to the list of processes, network connections, or DLLs.

Volatility and voldiff are powerful tools that can be used to gather valuable information during incident response and forensics investigations. By using these tools, investigators can quickly identify the signs of a compromise and gather evidence that can be used to track down the attackers.

What is Memory Forensics

- Memory forensics is the process of analyzing the volatile data in a computer's memory. This data can be used to identify malware, track down attackers, and reconstruct events that have taken place on a system.
- Memory forensics is important because it can provide investigators with evidence that may not be available from other sources, such as disk images. For example, memory forensics can be used to identify malware that has been installed on a system, to track down the source of a network attack, or to identify who was using a system at a particular time.
- The contents of memory can change over time, so it is important to analyze memory as soon as possible after an incident. There are a number of tools that can be used for memory forensics, including Volatility, X-Ways Forensics, and The Sleuth Kit. These tools allow analysts to extract information from memory dumps, such as process information, network connections, and file system access.
- Memory forensics is a complex and challenging field, but it can be a valuable tool for investigators. By understanding volatility and using the right tools, analysts can gather valuable evidence that can be used to solve crimes and protect systems from attack.
- **Here are some of the benefits of using memory forensics:**
 - It can be used to gather evidence that may not be available from other sources, such as disk images.
 - It can be used to identify malware that has been installed on a system.
 - It can be used to track down the source of a network attack.
 - It can be used to identify who was using a system at a particular time.

What is volatility

- In memory forensics, volatility refers to the fact that the contents of memory can change over time. This is because memory is constantly being used by the operating system and applications. As a result, it is important to analyze memory as soon as possible after an incident in order to preserve the evidence.
- There are a number of factors that can cause memory to become volatile, including:
- Power cycling the system: When a system is powered off, all of the data in memory is lost.
- Writing to disk: When data is written to disk, it is also copied to memory. This means that if data is written to disk, it may also be overwritten in memory.
- Running applications: When applications are run, they can change the contents of memory. This means that if an application is run after an incident, it may overwrite evidence.
- It is important to note that not all data in memory is volatile. Some data, such as the contents of the kernel memory, is not overwritten until the system is powered off. However, most of the data in memory is volatile and can be overwritten quickly.
- As a result of volatility, it is important to analyze memory as soon as possible after an incident. This will help to ensure that the evidence is not lost or overwritten. There are a number of tools that can be used to analyze memory, including Volatility, X-Ways Forensics, and The Sleuth Kit. These tools allow analysts to extract information from memory dumps, such as process information, network connections, and file system access.
- Memory forensics is a complex and challenging field, but it can be a valuable tool for investigators. By understanding volatility and using the right tools, analysts can gather valuable evidence that can be used to solve crimes and protect systems from attack.

- Introduction to volatility 3
- Install volatility 3 on windows
- Find the path of target memory image
- Get RAM image information with windows.info
- Listing installed plugins
- Get process list from RAM with windows.pslist
- Filter Volatility output with powershell Select-String
- Find process handles with windows.handles
- Dump a specific file from RAM with windows .dumpfile
- Dump all files related to PID
- Find active network connections with netstat
- Find local user password hash with windows.hashdump
- Analyze user actions with windows.registry.userassist

EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS:

Installation

- Download new version of Python now as we dealing with volatility 3 itsupports python3.
- We need Git for Windows to download lot of forensic tools using git
- We need visual studio cpp build tools this is to build python modules thatway we can run volatility.
- Go to github release page and copy https url.
- Links: * Python: <https://python.org> (get version 3) * Git for Windows: <https://gitforwindows.org/> * Microsoft C++ Build Tools: <https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/vi...> * Python Snappy: <https://www.lfd.uci.edu/~gothke/pytho...> * Volatility 3: <https://github.com/volatilityfoundation...> * Practice memory image: <https://archive.org/details/Africa-DF...>

1. Visit this <https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3> and copy url.

The screenshot displays the GitHub interface for the repository `volatilityfoundation/volatility3`. The browser's address bar shows the URL `https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3`. The repository page includes a navigation bar with links for Code, Issues (94), Pull requests (32), Actions, Projects, Wiki, Security, and Insights. A dropdown menu is open over the repository name, showing options to Clone (via HTTPS or GitHub CLI), Open with GitHub Desktop, and Download ZIP. The file list on the left includes directories like `.github`, `development`, `doc`, and `test`, as well as files like `.gitignore`, `.readthedocs.yml`, `.style.yapf`, `API_CHANGES.md`, `LICENSE.txt`, `MANIFEST.in`, `README.md`, `mypy.ini`, `requirements-dev.txt`, `requirements-minimal.txt`, `requirements.txt`, and `setup.py`. The 'About' section on the right provides information about the repository, including its description 'Volatility 3.0 development', the website `volatilityfoundation.org/`, and various tags like `python`, `ram`, `memory`, `incident-response`, `malware`, `forensics`, `volatility`, `volatility-framework`, and `digital-investigation`. It also shows statistics such as 1.5k stars, 55 watchers, and 279 forks.

volatilityfoundation / volatility3 Public

Notifications Fork 279 Star 1.5k

<> Code Issues 94 Pull requests 32 Actions Projects Wiki Security Insights

develop 29 branches 8 tags

ikelos Volshell: Mark the script as executable in the repo

.github Actions: Bump black checkout t

development Core: Fix up more scanning not

doc Update simple-plugin.rst

test Testing: Fix undlosed file open

volatility3 Merge pull request #898 from

.gitignore Add: EOF in requirements-test.

.readthedocs.yml use doc/requirements.txt when

.style.yapf Fix: typo for yapf style file 8 months ago

API_CHANGES.md Merge branch 'develop' into issue_713_fix_vad_end_off_by_one_pr 7 months ago

LICENSE.txt Remove: duplicate paragraph 7 months ago

MANIFEST.in Documentation: Ensure the doc reqs are included in s_dist builds last year

README.md Core: Bump the copyright year of the README 2 weeks ago

mypy.ini Update to ignore missing imports for now. 6 years ago

requirements-dev.txt Layers: Use ctypes for snappy support 2 months ago

requirements-minimal.txt refs #566 refactor dependencies 2 years ago

requirements.txt Layers: Use ctypes for snappy support 2 months ago

setup.py Merge branch 'develop' into feature/python-37 4 months ago

Local Codespaces

Clone ?

HTTPS GitHub CLI

https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/vo

Use Git or checkout with SVN using the web URL.

Open with GitHub Desktop

Download ZIP

About

Volatility 3.0 development

volatilityfoundation.org/

python ram memory

incident-response malware forensics

volatility volatility-framework

digital-investigation

Readme

View license

1.5k stars

55 watching

279 forks

Report repository

Releases 7

Volatility 3 2.4.1 Latest 2 weeks ago

+ 6 releases

Packages

No packages published

Go to file

Code ▾

Local

Codespaces



Clone



HTTPS

GitHub CLI

`https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/vo`



Use Git or checkout with SVN using the web URL.



Open with GitHub Desktop



Download ZIP

About

Volat



vc

pyth

incid

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digit



R



V



1.



5



2

8 months ago

1. Clone volatility code into my downloads

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP> cd Downloads
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads> git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3.git
Cloning into 'volatility3'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 30378, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1222/1222), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (543/543), done.
remote: Total 30378 (delta 795), reused 1036 (delta 672), pack-reused 29156
Receiving objects: 100% (30378/30378), 6.15 MiB | 2.47 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (22976/22976), done.
```

Downloads

FileHomeShareView

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This PC > Downloads

↕↺

Search Downloads

Quick access

DesktopDownloadsDocumentsPicturesPic'sSourceSystem32vs2019

OneDrive

This PC

3D ObjectsDesktopDocumentsDownloadsMusicPicturesVideosWindows (C:)Data (E:)DVD Drive (F:) SecuUSB Drive (G:)USB Drive (G:)NetworkLinux

Today (5)

vs_BuildTools(1)
python_snappy-0.6.1-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl
Git-2.40.0-64-bit
python-3.11.3-amd64
volatility3

Yesterday (1)

volatility_2.6_win64_standalone

Earlier this month (17)

19045.2006.220908-0225.22h2_release_svc_refresh_CLIENTENTERPRISEEVAL_OEMRET_x64FRE_...
windowsserver2019
19045.2006.220908-0225.22h2_release_svc_refresh_CLIENTENTERPRISEEVAL_OEMRET_x64FRE_...
MediaCreationTool22H2 (1)
mediacreationtool (1)
cloudflared-windows-amd64 (1)
node-v18.15.0-x64
FireGiant.HeatWave.Dev17
em_P1m1JZ0Q_installer_Win7-Win11_x86_x64
GitHubDesktopSetup-x64
17763.737.190906-2324.rs5_release_svc_refresh_SERVERESSENTIALS_OEM_x64FRE_en-us_1
Cloudflare_WARP_Release-x64
cloudflared-windows-amd64
On_demand_report_2023-04-01T10 30 10.526Z_2e07a7e0-d078-11ed-8d0c-195d4de1901b
Capture-modified
alert category feb 24-modified
Screenshot 2023-04-01 at 12-49-53 Wazuh

Last month (15)

4d
4c
4b
4a
4
na2
na1
na
3
2
1
Qubes Operating System
TeamViewer_Setup_x64
Qubes-R4.1.1-x86_64

Name

Date modified

Type

Size

25-04-2023 15:56Application3,625 KB

25-04-2023 15:56WHL File30 KB

25-04-2023 15:56Application52,533 KB

25-04-2023 15:56Application24,753 KB

25-04-2023 17:42File folder

24-04-2023 20:07File folder

09-04-2023 11:07Disc Image File54,20,408 KB

08-04-2023 22:12Disc Image File48,74,352 KB

08-04-2023 20:53Disc Image File54,20,408 KB

08-04-2023 17:10Application19,008 KB

08-04-2023 16:21Application9,845 KB

06-04-2023 15:14Windows Installer ...18,155 KB

06-04-2023 15:05Windows Installer ...30,864 KB

06-04-2023 14:59Microsoft Visual S...32,084 KB

06-04-2023 14:35Windows Installer ...96,348 KB

06-04-2023 11:48Application1,35,977 KB

04-04-2023 15:16Disc Image File48,74,352 KB

03-04-2023 14:55Windows Installer ...1,02,676 KB

03-04-2023 14:19Windows Installer ...18,155 KB

01-04-2023 16:00Microsoft Edge P...268 KB

01-04-2023 13:05PNG File44 KB

01-04-2023 13:02PNG File66 KB

01-04-2023 12:50PNG File48 KB

21-03-2023 14:31PNG File48 KB

21-03-2023 14:31PNG File103 KB

21-03-2023 14:30PNG File77 KB

21-03-2023 14:30PNG File60 KB

21-03-2023 14:30PNG File44 KB

21-03-2023 14:29PNG File52 KB

21-03-2023 14:28PNG File73 KB

21-03-2023 14:28PNG File61 KB

21-03-2023 14:26PNG File32 KB

21-03-2023 14:23PNG File61 KB

21-03-2023 14:20PNG File37 KB

17-03-2023 10:56Microsoft PowerP...58 KB

16-03-2023 17:02Application49,147 KB

09-03-2023 18:14Disc Image File56,55,552 KB

133 items

2. Install python snappy extension

Python-snappy: wraps the snappy compression library.

[python snappy-0.6.1-pp38-pypy38_pp73-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp311-cp311-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp310-cp310-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp310-cp310-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp39-cp39-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp39-cp39-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp38-cp38-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp38-cp38-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp37-cp37m-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.6.1-cp37-cp37m-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.4-cp36-cp36m-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.4-cp36-cp36m-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.4-cp35-cp35m-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.4-cp35-cp35m-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.4-cp27-cp27m-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.4-cp27-cp27m-win32.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.3-cp34-cp34m-win_amd64.whl](#)

[python snappy-0.5.3-cp34-cp34m-win32.whl](#)

[31 KB] [May 10, 2022]

<https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/vi...> * Python Snappy:

3. Check python version and Installing packages of python snappy in powershell

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads> python -V
Python 3.11.3
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads> pip install C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\python_snappy-0.6.1-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl
Processing c:\users\vit-ap\downloads\python_snappy-0.6.1-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl
Installing collected packages: python-snappy
Successfully installed python-snappy-0.6.1
```

4. cd volatility 3 and see list of all files in volatility 3 by ls command

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads> cd .\volatility3\
```

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3> ls
```

Directory: C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3

| Mode | LastWriteTime | Length | Name |
|---------|------------------|--------|--------------------------|
| d----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | | .github |
| d----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | | development |
| d----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | | doc |
| d----- | 25-04-2023 17:42 | | dump |
| d----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | | test |
| d----- | 25-04-2023 16:17 | | volatility3 |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 558 | .gitignore |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 520 | .readthedocs.yml |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 8200 | .style.yapf |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 1416 | API_CHANGES.md |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 3956 | LICENSE.txt |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 207 | MANIFEST.in |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 83 | mypy.ini |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 6094 | README.md |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 781 | requirements-dev.txt |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 76 | requirements-minimal.txt |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 639 | requirements.txt |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 1946 | setup.py |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 300 | vol.py |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 5560 | vol.spec |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 307 | volshell.py |
| -a----- | 25-04-2023 16:02 | 3029 | volshell.spec |

5. We need to install all the requirements to run volatility

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3> pip install -r .\requirements.txt
Collecting pefile>=2017.8.1
  Downloading pefile-2023.2.7-py3-none-any.whl (71 kB)
----- 71.8/71.8 kB 131.2 kB/s eta 0:00:00
Collecting yara-python>=3.8.0
  Downloading yara_python-4.3.1-cp311-cp311-win_amd64.whl (1.1 MB)
----- 1.1/1.1 MB 1.1 MB/s eta 0:00:00
Collecting capstone>=3.0.5
  Downloading capstone-4.0.2-py2.py3-none-win_amd64.whl (896 kB)
----- 896.4/896.4 kB 5.7 MB/s eta 0:00:00
Collecting pycryptodome
  Downloading pycryptodome-3.17-cp35-abi3-win_amd64.whl (1.7 MB)
----- 1.7/1.7 MB 4.2 MB/s eta 0:00:00
Collecting leechcorepyc>=2.4.0
  Downloading leechcorepyc-2.14.3-cp36-abi3-win_amd64.whl (358 kB)
----- 358.4/358.4 kB 332.5 kB/s eta 0:00:00
Installing collected packages: yara-python, pycryptodome, pefile, leechcorepyc, capstone
Successfully installed capstone-4.0.2 leechcorepyc-2.14.3 pefile-2023.2.7 pycryptodome-3.17 yara-python-4.3.1
```



```
pip install -r .\requirements.txt
```

6. Checking version of volatility

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -v
Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.2
INFO    volatility3.cli: Volatility plugins path: ['C:\\Users\\VIT-AP\\Downloads\\volatility3\\volatility3\\plugins', 'C:\\Users\\VIT-AP\\Downloads\\volatility3\\volatility3\\framework\\plugins']
INFO    volatility3.cli: Volatility symbols path: ['C:\\Users\\VIT-AP\\Downloads\\volatility3\\volatility3\\symbols', 'C:\\Users\\VIT-AP\\Downloads\\volatility3\\volatility3\\framework\\symbols']
usage: volatility [-h] [-c CONFIG] [--parallelism [{processes,threads,off}]] [-e EXTEND] [-p PLUGIN_DIRS] [-s SYMBOL_DIRS] [-v]
                  [-l LOG] [-o OUTPUT_DIR] [-q] [-r RENDERER] [-f FILE] [--write-config] [--save-config SAVE_CONFIG] [--clear-cache]
                  [--cache-path CACHE_PATH] [--offline] [--single-location SINGLE_LOCATION] [--stackers [STACKERS ...]]
                  [--single-swap-locations [SINGLE_SWAP_LOCATIONS ...]]
                  plugin ...
volatility: error: Please select a plugin to run
```

python vol.py -v

Plugins

- Plugins in Volatility are like add-on modules that you can use to get more information from a computer's memory (RAM) when investigating a cybersecurity incident or performing forensic analysis. They are like extra tools that extend the functionality of Volatility, which is a framework used for analyzing memory dumps.
- For example, you might have a plugin that helps you extract information about web browsing history, another plugin that helps you detect and analyze malware, or a plugin that generates visualizations to help you better understand the memory data. ed for analyzing memory dumps.

Next thing is to get a memory image that we want to analyse and get location of memory image

```
python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-  
AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-  
memdump.mem
```

RESULTS:

First thing to do in analysing memory is to see information of memory dump file:

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.info | more
Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.2

Variable      Value
-----
Kernel Base   0xf8043cc00000
DTB           0x1aa000
Symbols       file:///C:/Users/VIT-AP/Downloads/volatility3/volatility3/symbols/windows/ntkrnlmp.pdb/769C521E4833ECF72E21F02BF33691A5-1.json.xz
Is64Bit       True
IsPAE         False
layer_name    0 WindowsIntel32e
memory_layer  1 FileLayer
KdVersionBlock 0xf8043d80f368
Major/Minor   15.19041
MachineType   34404
KeNumberProcessors 4
SystemTime    2021-04-30 17:52:19
NtSystemRoot  C:\Windows
NtProductType NtProductWinNt
NtMajorVersion 10
NtMinorVersion 0
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 10
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 0
PE Machine    34404
PE TimeDateStamp Tue Oct 11 07:04:26 1977
```

- The command `python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.info` is using Volatility to gather information about the Windows system captured in the memory dump file.
- Here are some of the information and variables provided by the command:
- The output of the command you ran shows information about the Windows system that the memory dump file came from. The following is a breakdown of the information that is being displayed:
- Kernel Base: The address of the kernel in memory.
- DTB: The address of the DTB (Device Tree Base) in memory.
- Symbols: The path to the symbols file for the kernel.
- Is64Bit: A flag indicating whether the system is 64-bit.
- IsPAE: A flag indicating whether the system is PAE-enabled.
- layer_name: The name of the layer that the memory dump file came from.
- memory_layer: The name of the layer that the memory dump file was created on.
- KdVersionBlock: The address of the KdVersionBlock structure in memory.
- Major/Minor: The major and minor versions of the Windows kernel.
- MachineType: The machine type of the system.
- KeNumberProcessors: The number of processors in the system.
- SystemTime: The system time at the time of the crash.
- NtSystemRoot: The path to the Windows system root directory.
- NtProductType: The type of Windows product.
- NtMajorVersion: The major version of Windows.
- NtMinorVersion: The minor version of Windows.

- PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion: The major version of the operating system that the PE image was built for. PE
MinorOperatingSystemVersion: The minor version of the operating system that the PE image was built for.
- PE Machine: The machine type of the PE image.
- PE TimeDateStamp: The time stamp of the PE image.
- This information can be used to help you investigate the memory dump file and determine what caused the crash.

Process list :

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.pslist | more
Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.2
```

| PID | PPID | ImageFileName | Offset(V) | Threads | Handles | SessionId | Wow64 | CreateTime | ExitTime | File output |
|------|------|----------------|---------------------|---------|---------|-----------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| 4 | 0 | System | 0xbff0f64a63080 132 | - | N/A | False | 2021-04-30 | 12:39:40.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 108 | 4 | Registry | 0xbff0f64bc6040 | 4 | - | N/A | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:38.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 396 | 4 | smss.exe | 0xbff0f66967040 | 2 | - | N/A | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:40.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 492 | 484 | csrss.exe | 0xbff0f6adb6080 | 13 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 568 | 484 | wininit.exe | 0xbff0f6b67a080 | 1 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 584 | 560 | csrss.exe | 0xbff0f6b681080 | 16 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 668 | 560 | winlogon.exe | 0xbff0f6b6db080 | 5 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 712 | 568 | services.exe | 0xbff0f6b6da080 | 11 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 736 | 568 | lsass.exe | 0xbff0f6b6fb0c0 | 10 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 856 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6b7042c0 | 20 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 884 | 568 | fontdrvhost.ex | 0xbff0f6b70b1c0 | 5 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 892 | 668 | fontdrvhost.ex | 0xbff0f6b7091c0 | 5 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 976 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6b785340 | 12 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 320 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6b78a2c0 | 6 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 564 | 668 | LogonUI.exe | 0xbff0f6b7b7100 | 0 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | 2021-04-30 17:39:58.000000 | Disabled |
| 560 | 668 | dwm.exe | 0xbff0f6b7ba080 21 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled | |
| 1080 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6be74340 | 2 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1088 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6be77080 | 3 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1164 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6becd300 | 5 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1172 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6becc080 | 3 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1204 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bed1080 | 1 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1296 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bf192c0 | 7 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1336 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bf20080 | 8 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1376 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6be1c080 | 6 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1440 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bf9a0c0 | 4 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1452 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bfa52c0 | 8 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1556 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f64a81080 | 8 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1660 | 712 | VBoxService.ex | 0xbff0f6bff4080 | 11 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1684 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bff5080 | 5 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 12:39:44.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1784 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6c03d340 | 4 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 17:39:46.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1804 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6c03b080 | 5 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 17:39:46.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1824 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6bf6ee080 | 3 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 17:39:46.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1880 | 712 | svchost.exe | 0xbff0f6c0b1340 | 2 | - | 0 | False | 2021-04-30 17:39:46.000000 | N/A | Disabled |

- **The output of the command you ran shows a list of all the processes that were running on the system at the time of the crash. The following is a breakdown of the information that is being displayed:**
- PID: The process ID of the process.
- PPID: The parent process ID of the process.
- ImageFileName: The name of the process image.
- Offset(V): The virtual address of the process image in memory.
- Threads: The number of threads that are associated with the process.
- Handles: The number of handles that are open by the process.
- SessionId: The session ID of the process.
- Wow64: A flag indicating whether the process is running in 32-bit mode.
- CreateTime: The time at which the process was created.
- ExitTime: The time at which the process exited.
- File output: The path to the file where the process information was written.
- This information can be used to help you investigate the crash and determine what caused it. For example, you can look at the list of processes that were running at the time of the crash to see if any of them are known to be malicious.
- You can also look at the handles that are open by the process to see if any of them are to files that are known to be malicious.
- In addition to the information that is displayed by the windows.pslist plugin, you can also use the volatility framework to extract additional information about the processes that were running at the time of the crash.
- For example, you can use the windows.handles plugin to extract a list of all the handles that are open by a process. You can also use the windows.modules plugin to extract a list of all the modules that are loaded into a process.
- This additional information can be used to help you investigate the crash and determine what caused it.

The command `python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.pslist | Select-String chrome` is using Volatility to list the running processes in the Windows system captured in the memory dump file and filtering the output to only show processes that have "chrome" in their name

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.pslist | Select-String chrome | more
```

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------------|----------------|----|---|---|-------|----------------------------|-----|----------|
| 1328 | 4352 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d53e080 | 26 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:52.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 6764 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d748080 | 7 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:52.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 4508 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6be38340 | 10 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:53.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 1840 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6cbc5080 | 12 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:53.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 5492 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6a897080 | 7 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:53.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 2432 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6a9e7080 | 19 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:53.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 5888 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d2ea340 | 13 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:44:57.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 460 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d591300 | 12 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:48:07.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 4108 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f667f1300 | 12 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:48:07.000000 | N/A | Disabled |
| 3380 | 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d182080 | 6 | - | 1 | False | 2021-04-30 17:48:07.000000 | N/A | Disabled |

These are the processes with "chrome" in their name, likely referring to instances of the Google Chrome browser running in the captured system. The output provides information such as the PID (Process ID), PPID (Parent Process ID), ImageFileName (Name of the executable file), Offset(V) (Virtual address offset), Threads, Handles, SessionId, Wow64 (if the process is running in 32-bit compatibility mode on a 64-bit system), CreateTime, ExitTime (if applicable), and File output status.

The command `python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.handles` is using Volatility to retrieve information about the handles (open resources) in the Windows system captured in the memory dump file.

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.handles | more
Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.2
```

| PID | Process | Offset | HandleValue | Type | GrantedAccess | Name |
|-----|---------|----------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|---|
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a63080 | 0x4 | Process | 0x1fffff | System Pid 4 |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64b4a140 | 0x8 | Thread | 0x1fffff | Tid 28 Pid 4 |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64aad0a0 | 0x10 | Mutant | 0x1f0001 | BcdSyncMutant |
| 4 | System | 0xa8032f041cd0 | 0x14 | Directory | 0xf000f | GLOBAL?? |
| 4 | System | 0xa8032f032520 | 0x18 | Directory | 0xf000f | |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a8ba40 | 0x1c | Partition | 0x1f0003 | MemoryPartition0 |
| 4 | System | 0xa8032f0326f0 | 0x20 | Directory | 0xf000f | KernelObjects |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74920 | 0x24 | Event | 0x1f0003 | LowPagedPoolCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74ca0 | 0x28 | Event | 0x1f0003 | HighPagedPoolCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74720 | 0x2c | Event | 0x1f0003 | LowNonPagedPoolCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74d20 | 0x30 | Event | 0x1f0003 | HighNonPagedPoolCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a747a0 | 0x34 | Event | 0x1f0003 | LowMemoryCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74320 | 0x38 | Event | 0x1f0003 | HighMemoryCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74a20 | 0x3c | Event | 0x1f0003 | LowCommitCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74da0 | 0x40 | Event | 0x1f0003 | HighCommitCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a74ea0 | 0x44 | Event | 0x1f0003 | MaximumCommitCondition |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a748a0 | 0x48 | Event | 0x1f0003 | MemoryErrors |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64a746a0 | 0x4c | Event | 0x1f0003 | PhysicalMemoryChange |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64bc1080 | 0x50 | Thread | 0x1fffff | Tid 92 Pid 4 |
| 4 | System | 0xbf0f64bc6040 | 0x54 | Process | 0x1fffff | Registry Pid 108 |
| 4 | System | 0xa8032f0f9e80 | 0x58 | Key | 0x2001f | MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\HIVELIST |

- **The output of the command you ran shows a list of all the handles that are open by the system process. The following is a breakdown of the information that is being displayed:**
- PID: The process ID of the process that has the handle open.
- Process Offset: The virtual address of the process image in memory.
- HandleValue: The value of the handle.
- Type: The type of handle.
- GrantedAccess: The access that is granted to the handle.
- Name: The name of the object that the handle is open to.
- This information can be used to help you investigate the crash and determine what caused it.
- For example, you can look at the list of handles that are open by the process to see if any of them are to files that are known to be malicious. You can also look at the access that is granted to the handles to see if any of them are excessive.


```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.handles | Select-String File | more
```

```
4 System 0xbf0f6660b1e0 0x64 File 0x12019f \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Extend\$\RmMetadata\$\TxLog\$\TxLogContainer00000000000000000002
4 System 0xbf0f6a357a20 0xd0 File 0x150003 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\DumpStack.log.tmp
4 System 0xa8032f0b5db0 0xd4 Key 0xf003f MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\HARDWARE PROFILES
4 System 0xbf0f66995ef0 0xe4 File 0x13008b \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\LogFiles\WMI\RtBackup\EtwRTEventlog-Security.etl
4 System 0xbf0f668de470 0x144 File 0x12019f \Device\Tcp
4 System 0xa803326964f0 0x170 Key 0x9 MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS
4 System 0xbf0f6a357ed0 0x174 File 0x140003 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\swapfile.sys
4 System 0xa8032f4fa3e0 0x190 Key 0x8 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\POWER\PROFILE\EVENTS\{54533251-82BE-4824-96C1-47B60B740D00}\{0DA965DC-8FCF-4C0B-8EFE-8DD5E7BC959A}\{7E01ADEF-81E6-4E1B
-8075-56F373584694}
4 System 0xa8032f4fb40 0x194 Key 0x8 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\POWER\PROFILE\EVENTS\{54533251-82BE-4824-96C1-47B60B740D00}\{0AABB002-A307-447E-9B81-1D819DF6C6D0}\{CE74AA52-A71A-4036
-BEEF-B6C411010E28}
4 System 0xa8032f4f53d0 0x198 Key 0x8 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\POWER\PROFILE\EVENTS\{54533251-82BE-4824-96C1-47B60B740D00}\{8BC6262C-C026-411D-AE3B-7E2F70811A13}\{C072EE8B-1955-4FA9
-B4BA-421E96E1D674}
4 System 0xa8032f4fa600 0x19c Key 0x8 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\POWER\PROFILE\EVENTS\{54533251-82BE-4824-96C1-47B60B740D00}\{D4140C81-EBBA-4E60-8561-6918290359CD}\{35037BB4-9528-481D
-8CB2-8FCC63A9DD81}
4 System 0xa8032f4fb920 0x1a0 Key 0x8 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\POWER\PROFILE\EVENTS\{54533251-82BE-4824-96C1-47B60B740D00}\{EE1E4F72-E368-46B1-B3C6-5048B11C2DBD}\{9C1F0DBA-33E9-43AF
-9EDA-A607AA5139DA}
4 System 0xa8032f4fab50 0x1ac Key 0x10 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\FILESYSTEM
4 System 0xa8032f0e8360 0x1d8 Key 0x10 MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\FILESYSTEM
4 System 0xbf0f668bfa90 0x214 File 0x12019f \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Extend\$\RmMetadata\$\TxLog\$\TxLog.blf
4 System 0xbf0f6660a0a0 0x218 File 0x12019f \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Extend\$\RmMetadata\$\TxLog\$\TxLog.blf
4 System 0xbf0f6660a380 0x220 File 0x12019f \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Extend\$\RmMetadata\$\TxLog\$\TxLogContainer00000000000000000005
4 System 0xbf0f6660a210 0x228 File 0x1 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Extend\$\RmMetadata\$\Txf:$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATION
4 System 0xbf0f6660c380 0x244 File 0x120089 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\drivers\en-US\ntfs.sys.mui
```

- **The output of the command you ran shows a list of all the handles that are open to files by the system process.**
- **The following is a breakdown of the information that is being displayed:**
- PID: The process ID of the process that has the handle open.
- Process Offset: The virtual address of the process image in memory.
- HandleValue: The value of the handle. Type: The type of handle.
- GrantedAccess: The access that is granted to the handle.
- Name: The name of the object that the handle is open to.
- This information can be used to help you investigate the crash and determine what caused it.
- For example, you can look at the list of files that are open by the process to see if any of them are known to be malicious. You can also look at the access that is granted to the files to see if any of it is excessive.

- **Here are the some file-related handles obtained from the output:**

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\$Extend\$RmMetadata\$TxfLog\$TxfLogContainer0000000000000000000002

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\DumpStack.log.tmp

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\LogFiles\WMI\RtBackup\EtwRTEventlog-Security.etl

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\swapfile.sys \Device\HarddiskVolume1\$Extend\$RmMetadata\$TxfLog\$TxfLog.blf

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\$Extend\$RmMetadata\$TxfLog\$TxfLog.blf

File handles related of any execution:

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.handles --pid 1328 | more
Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.2
```

| PID | Process | Offset | HandleValue | Type | GrantedAccess | Name |
|------|------------|----------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------|
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6cb02260 | 0x4 | Event | 0x1f0003 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6cb03360 | 0x8 | Event | 0x1f0003 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d0547c0 | 0xc | WaitCompletionPacket | 0x1 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab07900 | 0x10 | IoCompletion | 0x1f0003 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d0057b0 | 0x14 | TpWorkerFactory | 0xf00ff | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ce2cb50 | 0x18 | IRTimer | 0x100002 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d0539f0 | 0x1c | WaitCompletionPacket | 0x1 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ce2b830 | 0x20 | IRTimer | 0x100002 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6d055320 | 0x24 | WaitCompletionPacket | 0x1 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab07d50 | 0x28 | EtwRegistration | 0x804 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab07b90 | 0x2c | EtwRegistration | 0x804 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab08290 | 0x30 | EtwRegistration | 0x804 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xa8032f8100c0 | 0x34 | Directory | 0x3 | KnownDlls |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6cb03960 | 0x38 | Event | 0x1f0003 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6cb03b60 | 0x3c | Event | 0x1f0003 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab232d0 | 0x40 | EtwRegistration | 0x804 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab07e30 | 0x44 | EtwRegistration | 0x804 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ab08530 | 0x48 | EtwRegistration | 0x804 | |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6c567070 | 0x4c | ALPC Port | 0x1f0001 | |

- **Here are the some handles associated with the process ID (PID) 1328:**
- HandleValue: 0x4, Type: Event, GrantedAccess: 0x1f0003
- HandleValue: 0x8, Type: Event, GrantedAccess: 0x1f0003
- HandleValue: 0xc, Type: WaitCompletionPacket, GrantedAccess: 0x1
- HandleValue: 0x10, Type: IoCompletion, GrantedAccess: 0x1f0003
- HandleValue: 0x14, Type: TpWorkerFactory, GrantedAccess: 0xf00ff
- HandleValue: 0x18, Type: IRTimer, GrantedAccess: 0x100002
- HandleValue: 0x1c, Type: WaitCompletionPacket, GrantedAccess: 0x1
- HandleValue: 0x20, Type: IRTimer, GrantedAccess: 0x100002
- HandleValue: 0x24, Type: WaitCompletionPacket, GrantedAccess: 0x1
- This additional information can be used to help you investigate the crash and determine what caused it.
- The handles that are listed in the output of the command you ran are all associated with the chrome.exe process.
- The chrome.exe process is a web browser that is used to display web pages. The handles that are open to files are all related to the chrome.exe process and its operation.
- The fact that these handles are open to files that are related to the chrome.exe process suggests that the chrome.exe process is functioning normally. However, it is always a good idea to investigate any crash that occurs, even if it appears to be caused by a normal process.

File handles of chrome execution:

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.handles --pid 1328 | Select-String File | more
```

| | | | | | | |
|------|------------|----------------|-------|------|----------|---|
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ac8c9f0 | 0x70 | File | 0x100020 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93 |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ac8a470 | 0x8c | File | 0x100001 | \Device\KsecDD |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ac8bd70 | 0x9c | File | 0x100001 | \Device\CNG |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xa80337116510 | 0xac | Key | 0x9 | MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe2080 | 0x294 | File | 0x120089 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\icudtl.dat |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe2850 | 0x29c | File | 0x120089 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\v8_context_snapshot.bin |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe3660 | 0x33c | File | 0x12019f | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\John Doe\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\BrowserMetrics\BrowserMetrics-608C4214-530.pma |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe3b10 | 0x344 | File | 0x120089 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\chrome_100_percent.pak |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe3e30 | 0x34c | File | 0x120089 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\chrome_200_percent.pak |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe4150 | 0x354 | File | 0x120089 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\Locales\en-US.pak |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abc6970 | 0x35c | File | 0x120089 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\resources.pak |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe4600 | 0x444 | File | 0x100020 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.19041.844_none_ca00b6081b84eb1d |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6c5bb2a0 | 0x474 | File | 0x100080 | \Device\Nsi |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6db9c240 | 0x490 | File | 0x100020 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.19041.844_none_ca00b6081b84eb1d |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6ac8b280 | 0x5a4 | File | 0x100020 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93 |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6db9d1e0 | 0x5e4 | File | 0x12019f | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\John Doe\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_32.db |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6db935a0 | 0x628 | File | 0x100001 | \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\drivers\etc |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xa803377efc10 | 0x638 | Key | 0x20019 | USER\S-1-5-21-3061953532-2461696977-1363062292-1001\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\EXPLORER\FILEEXTS |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe2d00 | 0x698 | File | 0x120089 | \Device\DeviceApi\CMApi |
| 1328 | chrome.exe | 0xbf0f6abe8160 | 0x6b4 | File | 0x120089 | \Device\DeviceApi\CMNotify |

- The files that are open by the chrome.exe process are all related to the operation of the web browser.
- The files that are open to files that are related to the chrome.exe process suggests that the chrome.exe process is functioning normally.
- However, it is always a good idea to investigate any crash that occurs, even if it appears to be caused by a normal process.
- The files that are open by the chrome.exe process include: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93: This is the directory where the chrome.exe process is located.
- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\John Doe\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\BrowserMetrics\BrowserMetrics-608C4214-530.
- pma: This is a file that contains performance metrics for the chrome.exe process.
\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\90.0.4430.93\icudtl.
- dat: This is a file that contains data for the International Components for Unicode (ICU) library.

List of all the open network connections on the system

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.netstat | more
Volatility 3 Framework 2.4.2
```

| Offset | Proto | LocalAddr | LocalPort | ForeignAddr | ForeignPort | State | PID | Owner | Created |
|----------------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|------|---------------|----------------------------|
| 0xbf0f6a535aa0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49846 | 96.90.32.107 | 7680 | SYN_SENT | 2116 | svchost.exe | 2021-04-30 17:52:01.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d8a1010 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49771 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:57.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6cbb9530 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49772 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d0c64a0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49843 | 204.79.197.222 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 5104 | SearchApp.exe | 2021-04-30 17:51:26.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6ad1fad0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49847 | 52.230.222.68 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 2812 | svchost.exe | 2021-04-30 17:52:17.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6ca71a20 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49769 | 142.250.190.14 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:55.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6cfd17f0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49777 | 35.186.220.63 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6ad16050 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49829 | 142.250.191.208 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 5624 | svchost.exe | 2021-04-30 17:49:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6c85bb20 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49775 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d51c4a0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49838 | 13.107.3.254 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 5104 | SearchApp.exe | 2021-04-30 17:51:23.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d5c8a70 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49797 | 172.217.4.74 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:48:27.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d51c010 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49763 | 172.217.4.35 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:53.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6c6352b0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49842 | 52.113.196.254 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 5104 | SearchApp.exe | 2021-04-30 17:51:25.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d525a20 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49845 | 23.101.202.202 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 1156 | MsMpEng.exe | 2021-04-30 17:51:36.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6a896ae0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49773 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d5d1ac0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49770 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:57.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6cd4fa20 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49837 | 204.79.197.200 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 5104 | SearchApp.exe | 2021-04-30 17:51:18.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6c7104d0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49778 | 185.70.41.130 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:00.000000 |

- **The output of the command you ran shows a list of all the open network connections on the system.**

The following is a breakdown of the information that is being displayed:

- Offset: The offset of the network connection in the memory dump.
- Proto: The protocol that is being used for the network connection. LocalAddr: The local address of the network connection.
- LocalPort: The local port of the network connection.
- ForeignAddr: The foreign address of the network connection.
- ForeignPort: The foreign port of the network connection.
- State: The state of the network connection.
- PID: The process ID of the process that owns the network connection.
- Owner: The name of the process that owns the network connection.
- Created: The time that the network connection was created.
- The network connections that are listed in the output of the command you ran are all essential for the operation of the system.
- The fact that these connections are open suggests that the system is functioning normally.
- However, it is always a good idea to investigate any crash that occurs, even if it appears to be caused by a normal process.

Network connections associated with the "chrome.exe" process

```
PS C:\Users\VIT-AP\downloads\volatility3> python vol.py -f C:\Users\VIT-AP\Downloads\volatility3\volatility3\Win10Home-20H2-64bit-memdump.mem windows.netstat | Select-String chrome | more
```

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------------|-----|-------------|------|------------|----------------------------|
| 0xbf0f6d8a1010 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49771 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:57.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6cbb9530 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49772 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6ca71a20 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49769 | 142.250.190.14 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:55.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6cfd17f0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49777 | 35.186.220.63 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6c85bb20 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49775 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d5c8a70 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49797 | 172.217.4.74 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:48:27.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d51c010 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49763 | 172.217.4.35 | 443 | CLOSE_WAIT | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:53.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6a896ae0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49773 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:58.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6d5d1ac0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49770 | 185.70.41.35 | 443 | FIN_WAIT2 | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:44:57.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6c7104d0 | TCPv4 | 10.0.2.15 | 49778 | 185.70.41.130 | 443 | ESTABLISHED | 1840 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:00.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6aa4b320 | UDPv4 | 0.0.0.0 | 5353 | * | 0 | | 1328 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:04.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6aa4a6a0 | UDPv4 | 0.0.0.0 | 5353 | * | 0 | | 1328 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:04.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6aa4a6a0 | UDPv6 | :: | 5353 | * | 0 | | 1328 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:04.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6aa4f010 | UDPv4 | 0.0.0.0 | 5353 | * | 0 | | 1328 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:04.000000 |
| 0xbf0f6aa4f010 | UDPv6 | :: | 5353 | * | 0 | | 1328 | chrome.exe | 2021-04-30 17:45:04.000000 |

- There are several TCPv4 connections with the local IP address 10.0.2.15 and different local ports. The connections are in various states such as CLOSE_WAIT and FIN_WAIT2.
- They are established with remote IP addresses on port 443.
- There is an established TCPv4 connection between 10.0.2.15 (local IP) on port 49778 and the remote IP address 185.70.41.130 on port 443.
- This connection is associated with the "chrome.exe" process and was created at 2021-04-30 17:45:00.000000.
- There are also some UDPv4 and UDPv6 connections associated with "chrome.exe" on port 5353.

VOLDIFF

VolDiff is a Python script that uses the Volatility memory analysis framework to analyze two memory dumps and output the differences between them.


When applied to memory analysis, this script will focus your attention on memory artifacts generated after, and possibly as a result of, code execution. This can expedite your analysis of large memory dumps to detect activity such as code injection and provide visibility into packed or obfuscated code.

However, keep in mind that memory is in a state of flux, so changes included in the diff results are not necessarily caused by executing the suspect file.

I used a file named funfile.exe, you can download the sample (password: infected).

Some initial behavioral analysis indicated that this sample generated network traffic to an IP address. Since our goal is to assess memory artifacts, I chose to launch several “fake” services in REMnux to encourage activity. Specifically, I ran the following from a REMnux terminal:

accept-all-ips start: This bash shell script written by Lenny Zeltser redirects all network traffic destined for an IP address to the REMnux VM.



```
remnux@remnux: /usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/volatility/plugins/community/aim4r × remnux@remnux
remnux@remnux:/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/volatility/plugins/community/aim4r$ accept-all-ips start
OK, iptables will accept and redirect connections to all IPs on ens33.
Remember to set the client system's default gateway to IP of this REMnux host.
remnux@remnux:/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/volatility/plugins/community/aim4r$
```

To compare memory dumps using VolDiff, we need to capture a memory image before and after infecting a sacrificial host. With VMware, one approach to obtaining a memory image is to use the snapshot feature. Whenever a snapshot is created, VMware saves a “.vmem” file that includes the contents of memory at the time the snapshot was created. This file can then be analyzed using a memory analysis tool like Volatility. To create the memory dumps VolDiff requires, I followed these steps:

- I copied funfile.exe to the Windows VM desktop.
- I created a VM snapshot and noted the new “.vmem” file name on my host.
- In the Windows VM, I right-clicked funfile.exe and selected “Run as administrator” to execute the sample with admin rights.
- After giving the sample a couple minutes to run, I created another VM snapshot and noted this second “.vmem” file name.

New pslist entries.

| Offset(V) | Name | PID | PPID | Thds | Hnds | Sess | Wow64 | Start | Exit |
|------------|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------------------------------|------|
| 0x874fecc0 | svchost.exe | 2976 | 2968 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2015-06-14 16:12:10 UTC+0000 | |
| 0x874d8cc0 | svchost.exe | 3000 | 548 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2015-06-14 16:12:10 UTC+0000 | |

New psscan entries.

| Offset(P) | Name | PID | PPID | PDB | Time created | Time exited |
|--------------------|-------------|------|------|------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| 0x000000007cad8cc0 | svchost.exe | 3000 | 548 | 0x7e23a2c0 | 2015-06-14 16:12:10 UTC+0000 | |
| 0x000000007cafecc0 | svchost.exe | 2976 | 2968 | 0x7e23a2a0 | 2015-06-14 16:12:10 UTC+0000 | |

New psxview entries.

| Offset(P) | Name | PID | pslist | psscan | thrdproc | pspcid | csrss | session | deskthrd | ExitTime |
|------------|-------------|------|--------|--------|----------|--------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| 0x7dae7cc0 | svchost.exe | 904 | True | True | True | False | True | True | False | |
| 0x7db67cc0 | svchost.exe | 1204 | True | False | True | False | True | True | False | |
| 0x7cad8cc0 | svchost.exe | 3000 | True | True | True | False | True | True | False | |
| 0x7cafecc0 | svchost.exe | 2976 | True | True | True | False | True | True | False | |

New netscan entries.

| Offset(P) | Proto | Local Address | Foreign Address | State | Pid | Owner | Created |
|------------|-------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------|------|-------------|------------------------------|
| 0x7c668470 | UDPv4 | 0.0.0.0:0 | *:* | | 0 | ?A???? | 2015-06-14 16:07:20 UTC+0000 |
| 0x7cadb858 | TCPv4 | 172.16.240.128:49159 | -:443 | ESTABLISHED | 2976 | svchost.exe | |

```
New malfind entries.
=====
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 2976 Address: 0xed0000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6
```

```
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6
```

```
0x00ed0000  4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  MZ.....
0x00ed0010  b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....@.....
0x00ed0020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0x00ed0030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 00 00 00  .....
```

```

0xed000 4d      DEC EBP
0xed001 5a      POP EDX
0xed002 90      NOP
0xed003 0003    ADD [EBX], AL
0xed005 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed007 000400  ADD [EAX+EAX], AL
0xed00a 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed00c ff      DB 0xff
0xed00d ff00    INC DWORD [EAX]
0xed00f 00b800000000 ADD [EAX+0x0], BH
0xed015 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed017 004000  ADD [EAX+0x0], AL
0xed01a 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed01c 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed01e 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed020 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed022 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed024 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed026 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed028 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed02a 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed02c 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed02e 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed030 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed032 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed034 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed036 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed038 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed03a 0000    ADD [EAX], AL
0xed03c c8000000 ENTER 0x0, 0x0

```

```
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 2976 Address: 0x12d0000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6
```

```
0x012d0000 0f 01 0d 30 fa e9 00 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...0.....
0x012d0010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x012d0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x012d0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
```

New sessions entries.

=====
Process: 3000 svchost.exe 2015-06-14 16:12:10 UTC+0000
Session(V): 8dccc000 ID: 1 Processes: 7
Process: 2976 svchost.exe 2015-06-14 16:12:10 UTC+0000

New messagehooks entries.

=====

| Offset(V) | Sess | Desktop | Thread | Filter | Flags | Function | Module |
|------------|-------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|---------|------------|-----------|
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 0x90998b38 | 0 | Service-0...\Default | 3008 (svchost.exe 3000) | WH_KEYBOARD | 5570628 | 0x0042004b | 0x2e0053L |
| 0x90998b38 | 0 | Service-0...\Default | 2144 (svchost.exe 856) | WH_KEYBOARD | 5570628 | 0x0042004b | 0x2e0053L |
| 0x90998b38 | 0 | Service-0...\Default | 1364 (svchost.exe 856) | WH_KEYBOARD | 5570628 | 0x0042004b | 0x2e0053L |
| 0x90998b38 | 0 | Service-0...\Default | 2680 (vmtoolsd.exe 1828) | WH_KEYBOARD | 5570628 | 0x0042004b | 0x2e0053L |
| 0x909c7c18 | 1 | WinSta0\Default | 2980 (svchost.exe 2976) | WH_SYSMSGFILTER | 5439565 | 0x00000000 | 0x540043L |
| 0x909c7c18 | 1 | WinSta0\Default | 2612 (vmtoolsd.exe 2600) | WH_SYSMSGFILTER | 5439565 | 0x00000000 | 0x540043L |
| 0x909c7c18 | 1 | WinSta0\Default | 2616 (vmtoolsd.exe 2600) | WH_SYSMSGFILTER | 5439565 | 0x00000000 | 0x540043L |

New cmdline entries.

=====

svchost.exe pid: 2976
Command line : svchost.exe

svchost.exe pid: 3000
Command line : C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup

New driverscan entries.

=====

| Offset(P) | #Ptr | #Hnd | Start | Size | Service | Key | Name | Driver | Name |
|--------------------|-------|-------|------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|----------|--------------------|
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 0x000000007c40e5a8 | 3 | 0 | 0x805d3000 | 0x1a000 | | | ??? | ?? | |
| 0x000000007c413790 | 7 | 0 | 0x805ed000 | 0x7000 | | | ??? | | |
| 0x000000007c41b670 | 3 | 0 | 0xa1003000 | 0xa1000 | | | ?h??? | (08X | |
| 0x000000007c41f818 | 4 | 0 | 0xa10a4000 | 0xa000 | | | | ?? | |
| 0x000000007c578520 | 3 | 0 | 0x80400000 | 0x25000 | | | | ???????? | |
| 0x000000007e619840 | 13 | 0 | 0x821ba000 | 0x46000 | FltMgr | | FltMgr | | \FileSystem\FltMgr |
| 0x000000007e877d18 | 3 | 0 | 0xa19e4000 | 0xd000 | condrv | | condrv | | \Driver\condrv |

New driverscan entries.

| Offset(P) | #Ptr | #Hnd | Start | Size | Service | Key | Name | Driver Name |
|--------------------|------|------|------------|---------|---------|-----|--------|--------------------|
| 0x000000007c40e5a8 | 3 | 0 | 0x805d3000 | 0x1a000 | | | ??? | ?? |
| 0x000000007c413790 | 7 | 0 | 0x805ed000 | 0x7000 | | | ??? | |
| 0x000000007c41b670 | 3 | 0 | 0xa1003000 | 0xa1000 | | | ?h??? | (08X |
| 0x000000007c41f818 | 4 | 0 | 0xa10a4000 | 0xa000 | | | | ?? |
| 0x000000007c578520 | 3 | 0 | 0x80400000 | 0x25000 | | | | ????????? |
| 0x000000007e619840 | 13 | 0 | 0x821ba000 | 0x46000 | FltMgr | | FltMgr | \FileSystem\FltMgr |
| 0x000000007e877d18 | 3 | 0 | 0xa19e4000 | 0xd000 | condrv | | condrv | \Driver\condrv |

New driverirp entries.

DriverName: condrv
DriverStart: 0xa19e4000
DriverSize: 0xd000
DriverStartIo: 0x0

| | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| 0 | IRP_MJ_CREATE | 0xa19e8420 | condrv.sys |
| 1 | IRP_MJ_CREATE_NAMED_PIPE | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 2 | IRP_MJ_CLOSE | 0xa19e82f0 | condrv.sys |
| 3 | IRP_MJ_READ | 0xa19ec778 | condrv.sys |
| 4 | IRP_MJ_WRITE | 0xa19e86b0 | condrv.sys |
| 5 | IRP_MJ_QUERY_INFORMATION | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 6 | IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 7 | IRP_MJ_QUERY_EA | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 8 | IRP_MJ_SET_EA | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 9 | IRP_MJ_FLUSH_BUFFERS | 0xa19ec72a | condrv.sys |
| 10 | IRP_MJ_QUERY_VOLUME_INFORMATION | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 11 | IRP_MJ_SET_VOLUME_INFORMATION | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 12 | IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 13 | IRP_MJ_FILE_SYSTEM_CONTROL | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 14 | IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL | 0xa19e9610 | condrv.sys |
| 15 | IRP_MJ_INTERNAL_DEVICE_CONTROL | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 16 | IRP_MJ_SHUTDOWN | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 17 | IRP_MJ_LOCK_CONTROL | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 18 | IRP_MJ_CLEANUP | 0xa19e8670 | condrv.sys |
| 19 | IRP_MJ_CREATE_MAILSLLOT | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 20 | IRP_MJ_QUERY_SECURITY | 0xa19e8010 | condrv.sys |
| 21 | IRP_MJ_SET_SECURITY | 0xa19ec7c6 | condrv.sys |
| 22 | IRP_MJ_POWER | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 23 | IRP_MJ_SYSTEM_CONTROL | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 24 | IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CHANGE | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 25 | IRP_MJ_QUERY_QUOTA | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 26 | IRP_MJ_SET_QUOTA | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |
| 27 | IRP_MJ_PNP | 0x8192148e | ntoskrnl.exe |

```
New modules entries.
=====
Offset(V)  Name                Base                Size File
-----
0x874ed4f0 condrv.sys      0xa19e4000          0xd000 \SystemRoot\System32\drivers\condrv.sys

New modscan entries.
=====
Offset(P)  Name                Base                Size File
-----
0x000000007c41b148 ??                0xa10ae000          0x33000
0x000000007c577008                0x80400000          0x25000
0x000000007caed4f0 condrv.sys      0xa19e4000          0xd000 \SystemRoot\System32\drivers\condrv.sys

New devicetree entries.
=====
DRV 0x7c40e5a8 ??
DRV 0x7c413790
DRV 0x7c41b670 (08X
DRV 0x7c41f818 ??
DRV 0x7c578520 ????????
---| DEV 0x80000070 UNKNOWN
-----| ATT 0x85c48ee0 - \FileSystem\FltMgr FILE_DEVICE_MAILSLOT
-----| ATT 0x86711a48 - \FileSystem\FltMgr FILE_DEVICE_NAMED_PIPE
---| DEV 0x87503680 FILE_DEVICE_DISK_FILE_SYSTEM
---| DEV 0x85c48ee0 FILE_DEVICE_MAILSLOT
---| DEV 0x86711a48 FILE_DEVICE_NAMED_PIPE
DRV 0x7e877d18 \Driver\condrv
---| DEV 0x85677bf8 ConDrv UNKNOWN
---| DEV 0x874a78e8 FILE_DEVICE_DISK_FILE_SYSTEM
-----| ATT 0x87503680 - \FileSystem\FltMgr FILE_DEVICE_DISK_FILE_SYSTEM

New mutantscan entries.
=====
.NET CLR Data_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
.NET CLR Networking 4.0.0.0_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
.NET CLR Networking_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
.NET Data Provider for Oracle_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
.NET Data Provider for SqlServer_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
.NET Memory Cache 4.0_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
.NETFramework_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
273...4:0
748:752
BITS_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
DBWinMutex
ESENT_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
LOADPERF_MUTEX
Lsa_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
MSDTC Bridge 3.0.0.0_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
MSDTC Bridge 4.0.0.0_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
MSDTC_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
MSSCNTRS_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_724
```

No notable changes to highlight from the following plugins.

=====

- iehistory
- privs
- eventhooks
- envvars
- shimcache
- shellbags
- consoles
- hashdump
- drivermodule
- unloadedmodules
- callbacks
- threads
- symlinkscan
- ssdt

Plugins that were executed but are not included in the report above.

=====

- filescan
- handles
- getsids
- deskscan
- dlllist
- ldrmodules
- atoms
- svcs
- atomscan
- idt
- gdt
- timers
- gdtimers

End of report.

This report provides an analysis of volatility, generated by VolDiff v2.1. The report includes information about the memory images, profile, and date and time of the analysis. It also presents various sections with new entries found during the analysis.

Here is a summary of the new entries found in each section:

New pslist entries:

svchost.exe with PID 2976, PPID 2968, 5 threads, and 0 handles.

svchost.exe with PID 3000, PPID 548, 3 threads, and 0 handles.

New psscan entries:

svchost.exe with PID 3000, PPID 548.

svchost.exe with PID 2976, PPID 2968.

New psxview entries:

svchost.exe with PID 904 and various attributes.

svchost.exe with PID 1204 and various attributes.

svchost.exe with PID 3000 and various attributes.

svchost.exe with PID 2976 and various attributes.

New netscan entries:

UDPv4 connection on 0.0.0.0:0.

TCPv4 connection on 172.16.240.128:49159 with an established state, owned by svchost.exe (PID 2976).

New malfind entries:

Process svchost.exe with PID 2976 at address 0xed0000, containing specific hexadecimal data.

Process svchost.exe with PID 2976 at address 0x12d0000, containing specific hexadecimal data.

New sessions entries:

Process svchost.exe with PID 3000, associated with session ID 1 and 7 processes.

Process svchost.exe with PID 2976, associated with session ID 1.

New messagehooks entries:

Entries with various offsets, sessions, desktops, threads, filters, flags, functions, and modules.

New cmdline entries:

svchost.exe with PID 2976 and command line "svchost.exe".

svchost.exe with PID 3000 and command line "C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup".

New driverscan entries:

Various driver entries with offsets, pointers, handles, start addresses, sizes, service keys, and names.

New driverirp entries:

Information about the driver "condrv" with its start address, size, and associated IRP (I/O Request Packet) functions.

CONCLUSION :

By leveraging Volatility and VolDiff within an incident response process, organizations can gain several advantages. Here are a few key conclusions:

1. **Memory Forensics Capabilities:** Volatility's extensive set of plugins and its ability to analyze memory artifacts allow analysts to uncover hidden or malicious activity that might not be evident through traditional disk-based forensics. This provides a deeper understanding of the incident, including the execution of malware, presence of rootkits, or evidence of memory-based attacks.
2. **Timeline Analysis:** VolDiff complements Volatility by comparing memory images taken at different time points, highlighting differences and changes. This helps in tracking the evolution of an incident and understanding the persistence mechanisms employed by attackers. It can also assist in identifying stealthy or fileless malware that may not leave traditional artifacts on disk.
3. **Malware Detection and Analysis:** Volatility's memory analysis capabilities can aid in the identification and analysis of malware present in memory. This includes examining malicious processes, identifying injected code or hooks, and extracting malware samples for further analysis. VolDiff can assist in tracking changes made by malware across different memory images.
4. **Enhanced Incident Response Capabilities:** By incorporating Volatility and VolDiff into the incident response workflow, organizations can improve their ability to detect and respond to security incidents promptly. The ability to analyze live memory or memory images allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the incident, leading to faster containment, eradication, and recovery.

In conclusion, the integration of Volatility and VolDiff into the incident response process empowers organizations with advanced memory forensics capabilities. These tools provide deeper visibility into volatile data, facilitate the detection and analysis of malware, and contribute to a more effective and efficient incident response. By leveraging these tools, organizations can enhance their incident response capabilities and better protect their systems and data.