CHAPTER 1

The historical background

Another decree is that [the Mongols] are to bring the whole world into subjection to them, nor are they to make peace with any nation unless they first submit to them ...
John of Plano Carpini (ca. 1247)[1]

The Mongols and their conquest of southwest Asia

The Mongol Empire was founded in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries by Temüchin, later known as Chinggis Khan (died AD 1227), who united the Mongolian and Turkish-speaking tribes of the eastern Eurasian steppe and forged an empire which within the span of two generations was to stretch across Asia. Having put the Inner Asian steppe under his sway and obtained the submission of the Tanguts of the Hsi-Hsia state in northwest China, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan (1209), Chinggis Khan commenced his campaign against the north Chinese state of the Chin in 1211. While this conquest was not yet completed by the end of the decade, it was well enough along for Chinggis Khan to turn his attention to the west. One of his generals had already defeated the ruler of the Qara-Khitai in western Turkestan, obliterated this state and integrated its territory into the Mongol Empire.[2]

In 1219, Chinggis Khan launched a massive offensive against the Khwārazm-shāh, who controlled most of the eastern Islamic world. The campaign had been sparked off by the Khwārazm-shāh's truculent attitude towards the Mongols and by his governor's murder of several hundred Muslim merchants under Mongol protection. This, however, was only a pretext, and it would seem – as Barthold has suggested – that once the Mongols had definitely established themselves on the steppes bordering the Khwārazm-shāh's kingdom, "they could not but become aware of its internal weakness and under such circumstances a nomad invasion of the much richer lands of the civilized

[1] "History of the Mongols," in C. Dawson (ed.), *The Mission to Asia* (London, 1980), 25; original text in A. Van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Fransciscana*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 64.

[2] For Chinggis Khan and his early conquests, see P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, tr. and ed. T.N. Haining (Oxford, 1991); Morgan, *Mongols*, 55–73; J.J. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (rpt., London, 1977), 44–70.

peoples was inevitable."[3] By 1223, the Khwārazm-shāh was dead, the lands and cities of this empire were in ruins and Chinggis Khan was on his way back to Mongolia, having left behind a small part of his army in the conquered territory.

Mongol administration of the newly conquered area was of a limited nature, its primary goals being the prevention of rebellion and the extraction of maximum taxes and tribute. In spite of its relatively small size, this Mongol force – first under Chormaghun and then Baiju (with a brief interruption in which Eljigidei was in command) – slowly but steadily expanded the realm of Mongol control, reaching as far as Seljuq Rūm (Anatolia), which was subjugated in the aftermath of the battle of Köse Dagh in 641/1243.

Areas independent of Mongol control, however, continued to exist, such as the Ismāʿīlī strongholds in Iran and the local dynasties in southern Iran. In addition, the Jazīra (the region divided today among northern Iraq, northeastern Syria and southeastern Turkey) and the Caliph's state in Iraq had yet to be conquered, although the Mongols had raided the former area several times. Even before Hülegü's arrival in the mid-1250s in Iran, potentates large and small in the as yet unconquered parts of southwest Asia had begun to realize that some type of accommodation had to be made with this strange but very real menace from the East, and many rulers had already dispatched missions to ascertain its nature and to request its mercy.[4]

A recurring theme in early Mongol history is the idea of Mongol imperial destiny. According to this belief, which may be called the Mongol imperial ideology, Chinggis Khan had been given a divinely inspired mission to conquer the world and place it under Mongol domination. Thus the Mongols were not only pursuing a campaign of self-aggrandizement, but were also carrying out a heaven-ordained task to bring order to the world by placing it under the aegis of Chinggis Khan and his family. Those who totally submitted were *el* (written *īl* in Persian and Arabic texts), which literally meant "to be at peace or in harmony," but really connoted the state of unconditional loyalty to the Mongols. On the other hand, all those who resisted the Mongols and refused to submit were *bulgha* (literally "to be in a confused or disordered state") or *yaghi* ("enemy"); both terms expressed the state of being "unsubmitted" or "rebellious" and thus being at war with the Mongols. There was no intermediate state and those who resisted were to be annihilated accordingly.[5]

[3] W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (4th ed., London, 1977), 400.

[4] For Chinggis Khan's campaign against the Khwārazm-shāh and the subsequent period up to Hülegü's dispatch by Möngke, see Barthold, *Turkestan*, 381–483; Spuler, *Iran*, 16–44; Morgan, *Mongols*, 145–7; Boyle, "Il-Khāns," 303–40; R.S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols* (Albany, 1977), 220–1, 227, 310, 334–41.

[5] J.F. Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspective," *HJAS* 46 (1986):19, 30–5; I. de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 7 (1973):21–36; K. Sagaster, "Herrschaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen," *CAJ* 17 (1973):223–6; E. Voegelin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255," *Byzantion* 15 (1940–41):378–413; Spuler, *Iran*, 20; T.T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), 42; P. Jackson and D.

This concept of divinely inspired mission played an important role in the Mongol conquests. The seemingly endless Mongol victories and resulting wealth evidently proved the validity of the ideology. This in turn strengthened the resolve of the soldiers and officers to fight and led to more victories, thereby consolidating further the belief in the ideology. It is difficult to judge how far this belief permeated the Mongol ranks, that is, did every soldier of Turco-Mongol origin know or really believe it? This ideal must certainly have been held by members of the Mongol ruling strata, thus welding them to Chinggisids and helping to propel the Mongols towards conquest.[6] In addition, there is some evidence in a Chinese source from the 1230s that this ideology was known and internalized by the rank and file of the Mongol army.[7]

This is not to say that the belief in the ideal of Mongol "manifest destiny" was the only or even primary reason for the ongoing Mongol expansion under Chinggis Khan and his successors.[8] Other factors favoring Chinggis Khan's rise to power were the particular relations within the steppe at his time, especially China's relative inability to interfere with steppe politics, as well as plain luck.[9] On a more fundamental level, territorial expansion into neighboring areas was a *sine qua non* of nomadic states in the Eurasian steppes, motivated as they were by the desire to control the manufactured and agricultural goods which could only be found there.[10] Expansion was also the justification for the existence of the nomadic ruler, and one who did not succeed in this endeavor was soon abandoned by his followers.[11] The flexible nature of Turco-Mongolian tribal society made possible both the rapid construction of larger tribal entities and the absorption of foreign nomadic groups,[12] thus giving the tribal leader the power to launch his campaigns of

Morgan (tr. and ed.), *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck* (London, 1990), 25–6. For a discussion of the terms *el/īl*, *bulgha* and *yaghı*, see M. Erdal, "Die Türkisch-mongolischen Titel *elxan* und *elči*," *Proceedings of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference (Berlin, 1991)*, forthcoming; *TMEN*, 2:197, 317–19; 4:99–102.

6 Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 79, and B. Spuler, *The Muslim World*, vol. 2: *The Mongol Period* (Leiden, 1960), 4–5, emphasize the impact of this belief on the Mongol elite.

7 Peng Da-ya and Xu Ting, *Hei-da shi-lue*, in Wang Guo-wei (ed.), *Meng-gu shi-liao si-zhong* (Taipei, 1975), 488, as cited in T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," in G. Seaman and D. Mark (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe* (Los Angeles, 1991), 223.

8 This point is made by Fletcher, "Mongols," 32.

9 O. Lattimore, "The Geography of Chinggis Khan," *The Geographical Journal* 129/1 (1963):1–7; *idem*, Review of F. Grenard, *Genghis-Khan* (Paris, 1935), in *Pacific Affairs* 10/4 (Dec. 1937):466–8.

10 See A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, tr. J. Crookenden (Cambridge, 1984), 228–30; cf. D. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," *Oriens Extremus* 19 (1972):180.

11 Khazanov, *Nomads*, 161, 229; J.M. Smith, Jr., "Turanian Nomadism and Iranian Politics," *Iranian Studies* 11 (1978):63–4; Morgan, *Mongols*, 38–9; Fletcher, "Mongols," 19–20.

12 A.M. Khazanov, "Characteristic Features of Nomadic Communities in the Eurasian Steppes," in W. Weissleder (ed.), *The Nomadic Alternative* (The Hague, 1978), 123; R.P. Lindner, "What Was a Nomadic Tribe?," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (1982):693–711; Morgan, *Mongols*, 37. On the similarities and differences between Turks and Mongols, see Fletcher, "Mongols," 39; L. Krader, "The Cultural and Historical Position of the Mongols," *Asia Major*, NS 3 (1952–3):175–6.

expansion. The warrior culture and ethos of the tribesmen must also have contributed to Turco-Mongol irredentism.[13] Finally, the archery and riding skills of the tribesmen, along with their toughness and endurance, made for excellent soldiers who constituted the conquering armies.[14] It was Chinggis Khan's genius to weld the various Mongol, and later Turkish, tribes into a united military machine, and provide the leadership and vision to engage in a series of victorious campaigns. As he became increasingly successful, more and more tribesmen either flocked to his banner of their own free will or were compelled to join his army.

It is clear that without these factors the Mongol imperial ideology would have had little if any impact, and it is even doubtful that it ever would have been conceived. But this ideology cannot be discounted merely as a rationalization for unbridled nomadic egoism. At the least, it helped in the formation of a more united and motivated Mongol soldiery, let alone leadership, which in turn contributed to Mongol successes.

Dr. Morgan has expressed some doubts as to whether the Mongol imperial ideology was conceived in Chinggis Khan's reign, and has raised the point that there is only concrete evidence for its existence in the years subsequent to the great leader's death.[15] The resolution of this question is not germane to the subject of the present book, although it might be mentioned that Temüchin's adoption of the title Chinggis Khan, which has been translated as "Oceanic" or "Universal Khan,"[16] may be an indication that some form of this ideology was current in his lifetime. Be this as it may, it is important to note that the "imperial idea" was later to find repeated expression in the context of the Mamluk–Īlkhānid war. As will be seen, this belief is found to varying degrees in the many missives sent to the Mamluk rulers from 1260 onward. I would suggest that it was one of the reasons behind the ongoing war with the Mamluks; this point will be discussed in chapter 10.

The phase of slow but steady Mongol expansion in the Islamic world came to an end in the middle of the 1250s, when Hülegü Khan came into the region at the head of a large army. Hülegü had been ordered to campaign in southwestern Asia in 1251 by his brother Möngke, the newly elected Qa'an (the supreme Mongol ruler). Hülegü, after making the necessary arrangements, left Mongolia in 1253. Travelling slowly through the steppe, Hülegü only began his campaign in earnest in the spring of 1256.[17] According to Rashīd al-Dīn,

[13] Fletcher, "Mongols," 33. [14] See Morgan, *Mongols*, 84–5.

[15] Morgan, *Mongols*, 14; *idem*, "The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean," *MHR* 4 (1987):200; see also the comments in Jackson and Morgan's introduction to William of Rubruck, tr. Jackson, 25–6. It might be added that one could take this line of reasoning to an extreme, and suggest that we can know nearly nothing of Chinggis Khan's life and work, since almost all the sources for his biography are posthumous.

[16] On the meaning of this title, see Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, 89–90. But see now I. de Rachewiltz, "The Title Činggis Qan," in W. Heissig and K. Sagaster (eds.), *Gedanke und Wirkung* (Weisbaden, 1989), 221–8, who suggests that the title should be translated as "fierce khan." [17] Boyle, "Il-Khāns," 340–2; Morgan, *Mongols*, 147–9.

Hülegü's mission was first to eliminate the Ismāʿīlī sect, concentrated in eastern Iran and south of the Caspian Sea, and having completed that he was to continue on to Iraq and put down the rebellious Kurds and Lurs. As for the Caliph, if he submitted, he was to be well treated; if not, he was to be attacked. Möngke also took the opportunity to commission his brother to "conquer the lands of the enemies ... until you have many summer and winter camps." In addition, Hülegü was to enact the laws of Chinggis Khan in the lands from the River Oxus (Jayḥūn) up to the edge of the land of Egypt.[18]

Rashīd al-Dīn's evidence should be approached with some care, as he was writing more than half a century after the events he describes, and like Juwaynī, he might be retelling history in a tendentious fashion for the sake of his employers, the Toluids.[19] There is, however, nothing in the above brief which rings false. Quite the contrary: the large size of Hülegü's army (see below) indicates that his mission was more than just the subjugation of the Ismāʿīlīs, and that a goal of his campaign was to enlarge the Mongol Empire. This is confirmed by information in the *Yüan Shih* (compiled in 1369), where Hülegü (Hsuh-lieh) is sent to subject the "Western countries and the various lands of the Sultan."[20]

Möngke's dispatch of Hülegü was part of a larger effort to expand the Mongol Empire. A third brother, Qubilai, was also sent at this time to expand Mongol territory in China.[21] There is a parallelism between Hülegü's and Qubilai's missions: Rashīd al-Dīn writes that Möngke simultaneously ordered the two to set out on campaign, and Juwaynī reports that the Qa'an allocated armies of equal size to each prince.[22] Mustawfī (ca. 730/1329–30) equates the two campaigns, stating that the two brothers were dispatched in order to expand Mongol-ruled territory,[23] while the *Yüan shih* also describes together the dispatch of the two expeditions, indicating that they were conceived as parallel campaigns.[24] Möngke's plans to enlarge the empire were certainly influenced by the traditional Mongol desire for expansion, of which the imperial ideology discussed above was surely a component. In addition, there

[18] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, ed. ʿA. ʿAlīzādah, vol. 3 (Baku, 1957):23. For the reasons behind the decision to destroy the Ismāʿīlīs, see Morgan, *Mongols*, 147–8; see also ʿUmarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*, ed. and tr. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), 2, 17 (of Arabic text). For Hülegü's brief *vis-à-vis* the Caliph, see below, p. 16.

[19] On Juwaynī's tendentiousness, see Ayalon, "Yāsa," pt. B, 152–66. See also Jackson, "Dissolution," 188–9. Tolui was the fourth son of Chinggis Khan, and the father of Möngke, Hülegü, Qubilai and Arigh Böke.

[20] W. Abramowski, "Die chinesischen Annalen des Möngke. Übersetzung des 3. Kapitel des Yüan-chih," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979):21. It is not specified to whom "Sultan" here refers.

[21] On his expedition, see M. Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley, 1988), 22–8.

[22] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:21. Cf. Juwaynī (*Taʾrīkh-i jahān-gushā*, ed. M.M. Qazwīnī [London and Leiden, 1912–37], 3:90; trans. in J.A. Boyle, *The History of the World Conqueror* [Manchester, 1958], 2:607), where Möngke first orders Qubilai to go, and only subsequently, in AH 650/1252–3, gives his command to Hülegü.

[23] Mustawfī, *Taʾrīkh-i guzīda*, ed. A. Nawāʾī (Teheran, 1958–61), 587–8.

[24] Abramowski, "Annalen," 21; see also Pai-nan Rashid Wu, "The Fall of Baghdad and the Mongol Rule in al-Iraq, 1258–1335," Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Utah (1974), 69–70.

was a political aspect to the expansionist policy: this was a way of dealing with the crisis which struck the Mongol elite after the death of Güyük and the election of Möngke in 1251, by keeping "the Mongol ruling class ... continuously involved in the preparation and execution of military operations."[25]

In conclusion, Möngke gave Hülegü the mission to expand the Mongol empire to the southwest, the first stage of which was to eliminate the Ismāʿīlīs. Thereupon, Hülegü was to continue as he thought fit, although he was given general instructions. Already at the planning stage in Mongolia, it is hinted that Egypt was within the sights of the Mongol ruler.[26]

One matter which remains unclear is the nature of Möngke's ultimate plans for Hülegü and whether he intended him to set up his own dynasty in the Islamic world. Professor Allsen has suggested that this was the case, and Qubilai was to do the same in China. Möngke's plan was to establish sub-qa'anates in order to strengthen his position and that of his immediate family *vis-à-vis* the other branches of the Mongol royal family. Möngke bestowed the title *īlkhān* ("subservient *khan*"; see below) on Hülegü, to indicate the latter's clearly defined subordinate status to the Qa'an.[27] On the other hand, Dr. Jackson has shown that the evidence on Möngke's mandate to his brother is far from unequivocal. In fact, there are indications that Hülegü may have been exceeding his brother's instructions, both by setting up a dynasty and "usurping" the rights of the Jochid Mongols, rulers of the Golden Horde, who had some type of authority over the pasture areas of northern Iran.[28]

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to resolve this question. I will limit myself therefore to three comments. First, on the basis of the evidence at our disposal, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether Hülegü was sent merely as the commanding general of the expeditionary force or had a mandate to establish a dynasty. Yet, whatever his original status, it does appear that sometime after the conquest of Baghdad and probably after hearing of the death of Möngke (who died August 1259), Hülegü probably took advantage of the prevailing confusion in the Mongol empire to increase his authority.[29] Qubilai, needing Hülegü's support in his war with Arigh-böke, could do little to contest this; according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Qubilai sent a *yarligh* (royal decree) to Hülegü ca. 661/1263, giving him the kingship over the land from the Oxus "up to the extremities of Syria and Egypt."[30]

[25] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 77–79 (77 for quote); Fletcher, "Mongols," 39.

[26] On the general nature of instructions given to Mongol generals or princes before they set out on a campaign of conquest, see D. Sinor, "On Mongol Strategy," in *idem*, *Inner Asia and its Contacts with Medieval Europe* (London, 1977), art. XVI, 241.

[27] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 48–9. In his subsequent article "Legitimation in Mongol Iran," Allsen has adopted a position closer to Jackson and Morgan, as cited in the next note.

[28] Jackson, "Dissolution," 220–22; cf. Morgan, *Mongols*, 148–9 for a more moderate version of this thesis. Jochi was Chinggis Khan's first son, whose descendants ruled over the Qipchaq steppe of southern Russia; their kingdom came to be known as the Golden Horde. Jochid claims on Iran will be discussed in ch. 4.

[29] Jackson, "Dissolution," 232–5; Morgan, *Mongols*, 149.

[30] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:90. See also Jackson, "Dissolution," 234.

Secondly, there is no evidence that Möngke actually bestowed the title *īlkhān* on Hülegü, and it is possible that he adopted the title of his own volition. It is true that this title is used in the Arabic version of the *Chronography* of Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) to describe Hülegü *sub anno* 651/1253, but this may well be anachronistic.[31] The earliest references whose dating leaves little doubt are from 657/1259.[32] The first example of the title on a coin would appear to be on a specimen struck in 658/1259–60.[33] At this point, the circumstances of the adoption by Hülegü of the title *īlkhān* are still unknown.[34]

Thirdly, there is some question regarding the exact meaning of title *īlkhān* (thus in Persian and Arabic transcription < *elkhan/elqan* in Mongolian). Until recently, most scholars were in agreement that the term should be translated as "subservient or submissive *khan* (ruler)" and it referred to the subservient status of Hülegü and his descendants towards the Qa'an in the east.[35] Other possible translations, such as "*khan* of the tribe" or "peaceful *khan*," have been suggested but were not widely accepted.[36] Recently, Dr. Krawulsky has suggested that the term should be glossed as "the *khan* who brings peace (*īl*)." Little evidence, however, is adduced to prove this proposal.[37] On the other hand, Prof. Erdal has cogently argued that the term is derived from the old Turkic title *elkhan*, which in turn is a contraction of *eligkhan*. The original meaning of both these titles is merely "ruler," and thus it may have been understood by the Mongols. It is also possible, Erdal adds, that the Mongols may have associated the title with the term *el/īl* and thus modified the original meaning of the title.[38]

In spite of the obscurity of the title *īlkhān*'s etymology, translation and the circumstances in which it was adopted, there is clear evidence that it was in use during Hülegü's reign, at least as early as 657/1259. Hülegü's successors continued using the *īlkhān*, showing that, whatever its origins, they attributed great importance to it, surely serving to provide legitimization to the dynasty.[39] The title has also supplied modern historians with a convenient name for the dynasty.

[31] Ibn al-ʿIbrī, *Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, ed. A. Ṣāliḥānī (Beirut, 1980), 460. For other uses of *īlkhān* before 658/1260, see R. Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence for the Early Use of the Title *īlkhān* among the Mongols," *JRAS*, 3rd ser. 1 (1991):353 n. 4.

[32] See Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence," 353–61.

[33] N. Amitai-Preiss and R. Amitai-Preiss, "Two Notes on the Protocol on Hülegü's Coinage," *Israel Numismatic Journal* 10 (1988–9 [1991]):126. Certain colleagues have questioned our reading of the date on this coin and even have suggested that "Hülegü Īlkhān" is only found on posthumous strikes. This question will have to be resolved by further study.

[34] Some speculation is offered in *ibid.*, 120–1; Allsen, "Legitimation," 234.

[35] The literature is reviewed in Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence," 353, n. 2. This translation is also adopted in Amitai-Preiss, "Protocol," 117, 120–1; Allsen, "Legitimation," 234; Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, 274.

[36] *TMEN*, 2:207–9, reviews these and other suggestions.

[37] D. Krawulsky, "Die Dynastie der Ilkhâne. Eine Untersuchung zu Regierungsbeginn, Dynastie- und Reichsname," in *idem*, *Mongolen Ilkhâne und Ideologie Geschichte* [*sic*] (Beirut, 1989), 93–8. In light of the literary and numismatic evidence mentioned above, the author's assertion that *īlkhān* was adopted by Hülegü only in 1264 cannot be accepted.

[38] Erdal, "Titel," forthcoming.

[39] Allsen, "Legitimation," 227–34; Amitai-Preiss, "Protocol," 120–1.

The large size of Hülegü's army has been alluded to above, and calls for additional comment. Some idea of the enormous nature of Hülegü's forces is found in Juwaynī's statement that his army was composed of two out of every ten soldiers in the Mongol army, that is, the adult male population of Inner Asia.[40] This evidence, however, should perhaps not be taken too literally, because the expression "two out of every ten" may have merely been a way of saying very many troops or contingents from all the princes. This expression is already found in AD 1246, when Güyük sent Eljigidei to the Islamic world.[41] It is difficult to imagine that then also 20 percent of the Mongol army was dispatched to that corner of the Mongol empire.

Some scholars have attempted to calculate a more exact figure for Hülegü's army: 15–17 *tümens* (units of theoretically 10,000 men), ca. 150–170,000 Mongol and Turkish troops to which a slightly smaller number of local auxiliaries was eventually added, for a grand total of some 300,000 troops under Hülegü's command.[42] Even if these figures are questioned,[43] they still give an idea of the general scale of the forces at Hülegü's disposal. It is noteworthy that two ninth/fifteenth-century sources give figures for these forces: Naṭanzī writes that 70,000 troops actually accompanied Hülegü from Mongolia;[44] and, the fifteenth-century anonymous *Shajarat al-atrāk* reports that Möngke gave Hülegü "one fifth of all able-bodied" Mongols (see above), and this equalled 120,000 men.[45]

By the end of 1256, Hülegü had successfully completed the first stage of his campaign. The Ismāʿīlī "state" had been destroyed, the vast majority of its castles taken and its grand master captured and later executed.[46] Hülegü thereupon turned his attention to the next stage: expanding and consolidating the areas under Mongol control.[47] Most of the remaining rulers of Iran had

[40] Juwaynī, 3:90 (= tr. Boyle, 2:607); whence Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 22.

[41] Juwaynī, 1:211–12 (= tr. Boyle, 1:256).

[42] J.M. Smith Jr., "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population," *JESHO* 18 (1975):270–99, esp. 274–8; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 2, 203–7.

[43] The calculations are based on the assumption that each Mongol commander named in the sources was a *tümen* commander and each *tümen* numbered exactly 10,000 soldiers. Even if we accept the first assertion, other research has shown that *tümens* were rarely up to their theoretical strength; Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA, 1978), 170–1 n. 27, cited in Morgan, *Mongols*, 89; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 193–4.

[44] Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i muʿīnī*, ed. J. Aubin (Teheran, 1957), 133. U. Schamiloglu ("Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde," Ph.D. diss., Columbia Univ. (New York, 1986), pp. 165–8) criticizes Naṭanzī's veracity, at least as far as the Golden Horde is concerned.

[45] *Shajarat al-atrāk*, tr. Miles (London, 1838), 213; I was unable to check this evidence in the original Persian text (MSS. British Library Or.8106 and Add. 26190).

[46] See Morgan, *Mongols*, 149–59; Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," 342–5; M.G.S. Hodgson, "The Ismāʿīlī State," *CHIr*, 5:479–482.

[47] The Georgian historian edited and translated by M. Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1849), 544, writes: "S'étant ainsi rendu maître d'Alamout et de tout de Khorasan, Houlagou résolut de marcher contre tous les peuples non soumis . . ."

made their submission to the Mongols previous to Hülegü's campaign and upon his arrival presented themselves or sent representatives to reaffirm their loyalty.[48] One figure who had yet to submit was al-Musta'ṣim, the Caliph in Baghdad. While his political authority scarcely went beyond Baghdad and the surrounding countryside, the Caliph still commanded a great deal of religious and moral prestige in the Islamic world and some political influence. His claim to universal sovereignty, albeit far from the political reality of the day, must have annoyed the Mongols. Hülegü's anger must have been aroused by the Caliph's refusal to send troops to fight the Ismā'īlīs as ordered, and his subsequent unwillingness to show any obeisance to the Mongols,[49] even though as early as 1246 envoys had come from the Caliph to the Qa'an, who – it appears – performed some expression of submission.[50] Hülegü and his armies proceeded westward, approaching Baghdad from the north. Before drawing close to the city, a number of letters were sent back and forth between the two rulers, but the Caliph refused to submit. The Mongol forces then converged on Baghdad at the start of 1258 and in early February the city wall was breached. The Caliph was taken prisoner and subsequently put to death. The city itself was given over to slaughter. Hülegü, after sending an army south to complete the conquest of southern Iraq, moved north, first to Hamadhān, and then into Azerbaijan, where he remained for more than a year, until the commencement of his campaign in Syria.[51]

Hülegü (and Möngke) probably had the vague idea of pushing on to Syria and Egypt in mind all along. This goal would have become more defined as Hülegü drew closer to the Mediterranean. Certainly by the time he reached Baghdad this aim was set in his mind. Even before the capture of that city, there is evidence that Hülegü had his eyes set on the Syrian coast when he told the general Baiju, hitherto the commander of the Mongol forces in Anatolia and Iran: "You must set out, in order to deliver those countries up to the coast of the western sea, from the hands of the sons of France and England(?)."[52] He was also thinking of Egypt at this time. During the siege of Baghdad itself, Hülegü sent back to the city two officers who had submitted to him, so that they would bring out their followers; these were to join him in the fight against Egypt.[53] After taking the city, Hülegü sent part of the booty captured to

[48] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alīzādah, 3:25.

[49] Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in J.A. Boyle, "The Death of the Last 'Abbāsid Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account," *JSS* 6 (1961):151–2; Ibn al-'Ibrī, 471; trans. in G.M. Wickens, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī on the Fall of Baghdad: A Further Study," *JSS* 7 (1962):32.

[50] Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abû 'l-Faraj*, tr. E.A.W. Budge (London, 1932), 1:411 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 448); John of Plano Carpini, tr. Dawson, 62 (= ed. Van den Wyngaert, 118). On early relations between the Caliphs and the Mongols, see: Wu, "Fall of Baghdad," 73–6, 131.

[51] Boyle, "Îl-Khāns," 345–50; Morgan, *Mongols*, 151–4.

[52] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alīzādah, 3:39; cf. the earlier edition of E. Quatremère, *Histoire de Mongols de la Perse* (Paris, 1836), 224, who read *az kuffār* instead of *l-n-k-t-'-r*, which has been read here as a corrupted form of *ingiltera*. See P. Jackson, "Crisis," 481–513, 495, cf. *idem*, "Bāyjū," *EIr*, 4:1, where it is suggested that this conversation is apocryphal.

[53] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alīzādah, 3:58. This was, however, only a ruse to get the two officers to bring out their troops and dependents. They were subsequently all killed.

Möngke, along with a message telling him of his victories and how he intended to ride on to Egypt and Syria.[54] Around 657/1258–9, Hülegü ordered the two Seljuq sultans of Rūm to Tabrīz, in order to take part in the invasion of Syria and Egypt.[55] Before he set out westward, Hülegü wrote to Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', ruler of Mosul, that he should send his son al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl to accompany him to Syria and Egypt.[56] His letters to the premier Syrian prince, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf (see below), and his subsequent letter to Sultan Qutuz of Egypt give additional proof that his sights were set on these countries.

Hülegü's appetite for Syria was probably whetted by reports that he must have received of the fractured state of politics in that area, and in particular of the conflict between the Ayyūbid princes and the new Mamluk state in Egypt.[57] Why he waited a year and a half before setting off again on the offensive is unknown, but by the end of the summer of 657/1259 Hülegü rode out from Azerbaijan. Before moving onto Syria, he tarried in the Jazīra, putting most of it under his direct control by the end of the year, with the exception of Mayyāfāriqīn, which was to hold out until the spring of 658/1260. By the end of 657/1259, Hülegü and his army were on the verge of invading Syria.[58]

Egypt and Syria on the eve of the Mongol invasion

In 1250, the Baḥrī Mamluks deposed the Ayyūbid prince of Egypt and Damascus, al-Muʿaẓẓam Tūrānshāh b. al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb. With this, the Ayyūbid dynasty in Egypt was brought to an end, although it was another decade until the Baḥrīs were firmly to establish their rule in this country. In Syria, on the other hand, Ayyūbid rule continued for an additional ten years until it was obliterated by the Mongols. R. Irwin has aptly called this interim period "the turbulent decade,"[59] for it was a period of civil disorder, conspiracies, *coups d'état*, battles and political confusion. It was only in the face of the Mongol menace that some semblance of unity was achieved, and this only in Egypt.

The mamluks were slave-soldiers, mostly of Turkish origin, who had been brought when young from the wild, pagan areas to the north of the Islamic world. Upon coming to their new homes, they were converted to Islam and then underwent a rigorous religious and military training, until they were manumitted and then enrolled as mounted archers in the army of their patron. Separated as they were from their families and land of origin, on the one hand,

[54] *Ibid.*, 3:65.1

[55] Ibn Bībī, *Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineur*, ed. T. Houtsma (Leiden, 1902), 294; trans. in H.W. Duda, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bībī* (Copenhagen, 1959), 281.

[56] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:68.

[57] See below, in the next section. Boyle's suggestion ("Īl-Khāns," 350) that Hülegü may have been motivated into invading Syria by Christian influence or his own pro-Christian feelings is not convincing; see Jackson, "Crisis," *passim*.

[58] Humphreys, *Saladin*, 344–5; Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," 349–50.

[59] The title of chapter 2 of his *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*.

and the local population, on the other, they maintained a strong loyalty to both their patron and their comrades in slavery. Mamluk society was a continually replicating one-generation military aristocracy, that is, the sons of mamluks could not become mamluks. The mamluk ranks were replenished by the influx of new, young slave recruits.[60]

From the beginning of the Ayyūbid period, even during Saladin's reign, Mamluk units and *amīrs* (officers) played an important and often decisive role in both the military campaigns and political events.[61] It was the last important Ayyūbid sultan in Egypt, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (637–47/1240–9), who unwittingly laid the foundations of the Mamluk Sultanate. Distrustful of his non-mamluk troops and taking advantage of the flooded slave-markets, an indirect result of the Mongol invasions of southern Russia, he founded the Baḥriyya mamluk regiment. This unit, numbering some 800–1000 men, was to save the day against the Franks at the battle of al-Manṣūra in 647/1250. They were the driving force behind the ending of the Ayyūbid regime and the establishment of the Mamluk Sultanate.[62]

It is worth dwelling on the impact of the Mongol campaigns in the steppe of southern Russia on the formation of the Baḥriyya. The Mamluk writers were certainly aware of this connection. The earliest writer whom I have found to make this link is al-Nuwayrī (d. 732/1332), who writes after describing the difficulties that the early Ayyūbids had in procuring mamluks from the Qipchaq Turkish tribes of the southern Russian steppes, that:

> The [Mongols] fell upon [the Qipchaqs] and brought upon most of them death, slavery and captivity. At this time, merchants bought [these captives] and brought them to the [various] countries and cities. The first who demanded many of them and made them lofty and advanced them in the army was al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb . . .[63]

In other words, the Mongols unintentionally and indirectly helped create the force which was to stop them at ʿAyn Jālūt in 1260 and was to frustrate their plans to conquer Syria in the succeeding years.

The end of Ayyūbid rule in Egypt came about soon after the victory at al-

[60] This sketch is based on the articles of Prof. D. Ayalon, most of which have been collected in two books: *Studies on the Mamlūks of Egypt* (London, 1977); *The Mamlūk Military Society* (London, 1979). See also R. Amitai, "The Rise and Fall of the Mamlūk Military Institution: A Summary of David Ayalon's Works," in M. Sharon (ed.), *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of Professor David Ayalon* (Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986), 19–30, esp. 20.

[61] D. Ayalon, "Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon: Ayyūbids, Kurds and Turks," *Der Islam* 54 (1977):1–32.

[62] Ayalon, "Aspects," 23–5. A discussion of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb's mamluk policy is found in A. Levanoni, "The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt," *SI* 72 (1990):122–6; Thorau, *Baybars*, 14–23.

[63] Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, MS. Leiden Univ., MS. Or. 2m, fol. 114a. See also Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿibar* (Bulāq, 1284/1867–8), 5:371–2; Ibn al-Duqmaq [Duqmāq], *Kitāb al-jawhar al-thamīn* (Mecca, n.d.), 255; Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā* (Cairo, 1913–19), 4:458; Ayalon, "Yāsa," pt. C1, 117–24; *idem*, "The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom," *Islamic Culture* 25 (1951):88; R.S. Humphreys, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," *SI* 45 (1977):95–6.

Manṣūra. Al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb had died just prior to this battle and was replaced by his son al-Muʿaẓẓam Tūrānshāh, who quickly succeeded in alienating the military elite in general, and the mamluks of his father, the Baḥriyya, in particular.[64] The latter group spearheaded the conspiracy that led to Tūrānshāh's death. But the Baḥriyya, who were strong enough to depose the sultan, were unable to gain control of the state. True, another former mamluk of al-Ṣāliḥ, the amir Aybeg, gained ascendency, but he showed himself to be an active opponent of the Baḥriyya, as did his mamluk and eventual successor Qutuz, the other strong sultan of this decade. Only with the victory at ʿAyn Jālūt was the Baḥriyya, led by Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, able to assert itself as the leading group within the Egyptian and Syrian military elite.[65]

Two points interest us here. The first is that Baybars and most of the Baḥriyya, totalling some 700 mamluks, were forced to abscond to Syria in 652/1254. The Sultan Aybeg, afraid of their power, had felt strong enough to confront them, and began by murdering their leader, Fāris al-Dīn Aqtay. Baybars and his comrades fled for fear of their lives, and spent the next several years alternately serving al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, and al-Mughīth ʿUmar, ruler of Karak.[66] Only on the eve of the Mongol invasion of Syria did Baybars and several of his comrades return to Egypt, both alienated by al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's inability to adopt a decisive policy towards the Mongols and aware that serving the Syrian Ayyūbids had little future.

The second point is the rise to power of Qutuz, originally a mamluk of the recently assassinated Aybeg (655/1257). Ruling first through the son of the latter, Qutuz at the end of 657/1259 succeeded in deposing this puppet-sultan and placed himself on the throne, using as a pretext the need for a strong leader in the face of the Mongol advance, certainly a cogent argument. It was soon after this that Baybars and Qutuz, actual killer of the late Baḥrī leader Aqtay, were reconciled and Baybars returned to Egypt.[67]

On the eve of the Mongol invasion, Muslim Syria was essentially divided up among three Ayyūbid princes. Most important was al-Nāṣir Yūsuf b. al-ʿAzīz Muḥammad, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus. Aleppo had long been in his family, but it was only in 648/1250, with the assassination of Tūrānshāh, also ruler of Damascus, that al-Nāṣir Yūsuf was able to gain control of that city. In Hama ruled al-Manṣūr Muḥammad b. al-Muẓaffar Maḥmūd. He was, however, completely subservient to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. In Karak, al-Mughīth

[64] This was a common phenomenon in Mamluk society; see D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army," pt. 1, *BSOAS* 15 (1953):217–20.

[65] On the end of the Ayyūbid rule in Egypt and events during the subsequent decade, see: Irwin, *Middle East*, 21–9; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 302–30; Holt, *Crusades*, 82–89; Thorau, *Baybars*, 33–58; Levanoni, "The Mamluks' Ascent to Power," 121–44.

[66] D. Ayalon, "Le régiment Bahriya dans l'armée mamelouke," *REI* 19 (1951):135–6; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 326–33, 341–4; Irwin, *Middle East*, 30.

[67] Irwin, *Middle East*, 29, 32–3; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 345; Thorau, *Baybars*, 51–66. See also below.

ʿUmar b. al-ʿĀdil Abū Bakr b. al-Kāmil Muḥammad had established himself in the same year that al-Nāṣir Yūsuf took Damascus. He not only maintained his independence from Damascus, but with the support of the Baḥriyya and other freebooters attempted several times to take both it and even Egypt. During al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb's reign, several smaller Ayyūbid principalities – Bosra, Baalbek and Banias – had been eliminated and integrated into the united sultanate of Egypt and Damascus. These were also absorbed by al-Nāṣir Yūsuf when he gained control of Damascus. The last prince of Banias, al-Saʿīd Ḥasan, was still alive and languishing in prison in the fortress of al-Bīra on the Euphrates. We are to meet him again in the service of the Mongols. Likewise, the former prince of Homs, al-Ashraf Mūsā b. al-Manṣūr Ibrāhīm, deposed by al-Nāṣir Yūsuf in 646/1248 and given the very minor principality of Tall Bāshir instead, was also to throw in his lot with the Mongols. In fact, after 651/1253–4, out of hatred for al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, al-Ashraf was corresponding with the Mongols. He evidently encouraged them to invade Syria, thus hoping he would be able to win back his own principality or even take al-Nāṣir's place.[68]

Grousset has described al-Nāṣir Yūsuf as "une personage médiocre et sans courage."[69] Perhaps this is overstating the case somewhat, but al-Nāṣir reveals himself, at least in the later part of his regime, to be extremely irresolute in times of crisis, and his "indecision and lack of personal courage"[70] during the Mongol invasion of Syria was to have far-reaching consequences for Muslim Syria, let alone for himself. Al-Nāṣir had formally submitted to the Mongols many years before Hülegü's arrival on the scene. As early as 641/1243–4, there is information that al-Nāṣir, still only prince of Aleppo, as well as the current Ayyūbid ruler of "Syria" (evidently meaning Damascus, that is, al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl) sent an envoy to Arghun Aqa, the newly arrived Mongol viceroy in the conquered areas of the Islamic world, then at Tabrīz.[71] It is reported that from the subsequent year (642/1244–5) al-Nāṣir Yūsuf was paying tribute to the Mongols.[72] This may or may not be identical with the annual tribute which he paid to Baiju, commander of Mongol forces in western Asia since 1241.[73] In 643/1245–6, al-Nāṣir sent a relative as an envoy to Güyük Qa'an in Mongolia, who returned with *yarlighs* defining al-Nāṣir's obligations to the Qa'an.[74]

[68] For al-Ashraf's pro-Mongol sympathies, see Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir'at al-zamān* (Hyderabad, 1954–61), 2:311–12. For events in Syria in the decade before the Mongol invasion, see Humphreys, *Saladin*, ch. 9; Thorau, *Baybars*, 51–8.

[69] R. Grousset, *L'Empire des steppes* (rpt., Paris, 1949), 434; cited in Boyle, "Îl-Khāns," 350.

[70] Humphreys, *Saladin*, 321.

[71] Juwaynī, 2:244 (= tr. Boyle, 2:508); Boyle, "Îl-Khāns," 338.

[72] Ibn Shaddād, *al-Aʿlāq al-khaṭīra*, vol. 3: *Taʾrīkh al-jazīra*, ed. Y. ʿAbbāra (Damascus, 1978), 485; summary in H.F. Amedroz, "Three Arabic MSS on the History of the City of Mayyāfāriqīn," *JRAS* (1902):806. Previously, Ibn Shaddād (*Aʿlāq*, 3:472–3) reported that the Mongols raided the environs of Aleppo in AH 641–2. This was surely connected to the sending of tribute and possibly the dispatch of the embassy the previous year.

[73] Ibn al-ʿAmīd, *Kitāb al-majmūʿ al-mubārak*, in C. Cahen (ed.), "La 'Chronique Ayyoubides' d'al-Makīn b. al-ʿAmīd," *BEO* 15 (1955–7):163.

[74] Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:237–42 (summarized by Amedroz, "Arabic MSS," 803); Juwaynī, 1:205, 212 (= tr. Boyle, 1:250, 257); Bar Hebraeus, 411 (= Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 448); Simon de Saint-

Some years later, in 648/1250, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf dispatched another mission to the Mongol capital of Qaraqorum. The mission, which was to express submission to the soon-to-be elected Möngke Qa'an, was led by al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī, who later played an important role in dissuading al-Nāṣir Yūsuf from resisting Hülegü in 1260. It was probably at this time that al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī began secretly serving the Mongols. The mission returned to Damascus late in 649/1251, bringing tokens of Möngke's recognition of al-Nāṣir's submission and his confirmation as a Mongol vassal.[75] This same year (649/1251–2), there is mention of envoys sent by Baiju to demand what appears to be additional tribute.[76]

From this time until the conquest of Baghdad by Hülegü in 656/1258, there is no explicit record of additional missions between al-Nāṣir Yūsuf and the Mongols. Other Ayyūbids, however, felt it wise to dispatch envoys or even to go personally before the Qa'an in order to express their submission and to arrange their position in the emerging Mongol order. Al-Kāmil Muḥammad b. al-Muẓaffar Ghāzī, ruler of Mayyāfāriqīn, arrived at Möngke's court at the end of 650/February 1253, as part of a pledge to end a Mongol siege of his city. When al-Kāmil reached the Qa'an's court he found there the heirs apparent of Mosul and Mārdīn, as well as Leon (Layfūn), prince of Cilician Armenia.[77] Al-Kāmil, however, was to throw off allegiance to the Mongols as soon as he returned to his city in early 655/1257.[78] William of Rubruck reports that when he arrived at Möngke's court at the end of AD 1253, he met a Christian from Damascus who claimed he was on a mission for the Sultan of Mont Real (= Shawbak) and Crac (= Karak), "who wished to become a tributary and friend of the Tartars."[79] This "sultan" is al-Mughīth ʿUmar, who evidently thought it expedient to ingratiate himself with the Mongols at this time, although he was not yet in any immediate danger from them.

For some unknown reason, with the coming of Hülegü to Iraq, al-Nāṣir Yūṣuf changed his mind about the wisdom of his submissive policy. Al-Nāṣir had probably been called upon, like all the other princes of the Muslim world who had already submitted in one form or another, to assist Hülegü in his conquest. This demand was made even before Hülegü crossed the Oxus.[80] Ibn al-ʿAmīd writes that al-Nāṣir paid no attention to Hülegü when he conquered Iran, not sending him an envoy or gifts. This especially galled the Khan, since previously al-Nāṣir had sent gifts to Baiju, now his subordinate.[81]

When news that Baghdad had been taken reached Damascus, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf again reversed his policy, and sought to reconcile Hülegü by sending

Quentin, *Histoire des Tartares*, ed. J. Richard (Paris, 1965), 112 (I am grateful to Dr. Jackson for this last reference).

[75] Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 163; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, MS. Vatican Ar. 726, fol. 145b; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:67–8; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 334–5, and 466 nn. 40–1.

[76] Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:237–8; Amedroz, "Arabic MSS," 802–3.

[77] Yūnīnī, 1:431; 2:75–6; Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:476–81; trans. in C. Cahen, "La Djazira au milieu du treizième siècle d'après ʿIzz ad-Dīn Ibn Chaddad," *REI* 8 (1934):121–2; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 335, 466 n. 42. [78] Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:481, 484.

[79] Tr. Jackson, 184 (= ed. Van den Wyngaert, 253); see n. 1 there.

[80] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:67–8. [81] Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 163, 167–8.

him gifts and submissive messages. It appears that al-Nāṣir hoped, at least for a while, to prevent a Mongol attack by tendering his submission, although in an equivocal manner. Al-Nāṣir's ambivalent policy and his frequent changes of heart were a mixture of his own indecisive nature plus the divided opinions of those around him. On the one hand, there were the "defeatists," who counselled a submissive policy to the Mongols. Prominent members of this group were the Ayyūbid al-Ṣāliḥ Nūr al-Dīn Ismāʿīl b. Shīrkūh and the high bureaucrat al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī, both secretly loyal to the Mongols.[82] Other members of this "peace-party" were the previously mentioned Ayyūbid al-Ashraf Mūsā, also in contact with the Mongols, Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Iftikhār Yāqūt, the *amīr ḥājib* (Chief Chamberlain), and the merchant, Wajīh al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Takrītī.[83] The Kurdish amirs (probably the Qaymariyya) were also known for their "defeatist" opinions.[84] On the other hand, the militant approach was represented by Baybars al-Bunduqdārī (at least from mid-657/1260, when he returned to al-Nāṣir's service), the amir ʿImād al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Mujīr (?), and the amirs from the Nāṣiriyya, that is, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's own mamluks.[85]

According to Rashīd al-Dīn, envoys of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf arrived in Baghdad as early as 19 Rabīʿ I 656/26 March 1258. Hülegü, however, had already left the city on 23 Ṣafar/12 March for his *ordo* (camp) in Azerbaijan, so they set out after him.[86] Upon arriving they were given a letter written in Arabic by the Shīʿī scholar, Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, now in Hülegü's entourage.[87] Rashīd al-Dīn gives the text of a letter,[88] but this may be a rendition of a later missive (see below), since the first line of both are similar. The text of the actual letter may be the first of three letters sent by Hülegü to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, which are related in the admittedly late source *Ta'rīkh al-khulafā'* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). This letter, transmitted only by al-Suyūṭī, was perhaps also composed by al-Ṭūsī. It describes how Hülegü came to Iraq, conquered Baghdad and killed the Caliph because of his falsehood. Al-Nāṣir Yūsuf is commanded to give his answer: does he submit to or will he resist Hülegü. As a final note, al-Nāṣir is told to level his fortresses.[89] Although it is not stated so here, it would seem that it was conveyed to al-Nāṣir, either in writing or verbally, that he was to come to Hülegü.

Still in 656/1258–9, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf responded to Hülegü's letter by dis-

[82] Yūnīnī, 2:126–7; on al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī, see n. 90 below.

[83] Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 170; Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:486; *idem*, *Ta'rīkh al-malik al-ẓāhir*, ed. A. Ḥuṭayṭ (Wiesbaden, 1983), 48. [84] Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 220b–221a.

[85] Yūnīnī, 2:127; 3:243, plus the sources cited in ch. 2, nn. 59–60. On the struggle between the "defeatists" and "militants" among the Syrian amirs and officials, see Ayalon, "Aspects," 27–8.

[86] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:62–3. Ibn al-Kathīr, *Bidāya wa'l-nihāya*, (rpt., Beirut, 1977), 13:203, writes that Hülegü left Baghdad in Jumādā I 656/May-June 1258.

[87] On this scholar, see: R. Strothmann, "al-Ṭūsī," *EI*[1], 4:980–1.

[88] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:63.

[89] Suyūṭī, *Ta'rīkh al-khulafā'* (Miṣr [Cairo], 1351/1932), 314; trans. in H.S. Jarrett, *History of the Caliphs*, (Calcutta, 1881), 499.

patching his young son al-ʿAzīz, along with al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī and several amirs. They brought with them gifts of various kinds. When Hülegü asked why al-Nāṣir had not come himself, the excuse was offered that he could not leave Syria in the face of the Frankish threat. Hülegü, however, was not placated by this answer, although publicly he pretended that he accepted it, and treated al-ʿAzīz well. During his stay, al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī spoke several times secretly with Hülegü and urged him to invade Syria. This mission stayed some time with the Mongols: Ibn al-ʿAmīd writes that they only returned on 15 Shaʿbān 657/7 August 1259. They reported that Hülegü had received the present, and was in good spirits and was no longer angry with al-Nāṣir Yūsuf.[90] They also brought another letter from Hülegü. Again it is recounted that the Caliph was killed for his falsehoods. When al-Nāṣir received this letter, he was to come with his soldiers and his wealth in order to submit to the "sultan of the world, supreme king of the face of the earth" (*sulṭān al-arḍ shāhinshāh-i rūy-i zamīn*). Al-Nāṣir was not to delay his envoys as previously. The letter states that there is nowhere to hide from the Mongols. Like the previous letter, this one is accompanied by citations from the Qur'ān and Arabic poetry. The message, however, is purely Mongolian: submit to the lawful ruler of the earth or be prepared to be destroyed.[91]

Also early in 657/1258–9, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf sent another envoy, the author ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Shaddād al-Ḥalabī. His mission was to travel to the besieged city of Mayyāfāriqīn, in order to meet with the Mongol commander Yoshmut, the son of Hülegü, and to get him to desist from attacking the city. Soon after he set out, Ibn Shaddād ran into Mongol envoys at Hama, presumably on their way to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. Ibn Shaddād eventually reached Yoshmut, although he and his companions suffered from Mongol depredations en route. He was unsuccessful in convincing the Mongol commander to give up the siege. Instead, the Mongols tried to use Ibn Shaddād to draw out the ruler of Mayyāfāriqīn, al-Kāmil, from his besieged city. After some wrangling and threats, Ibn Shaddād agreed, but nothing came of this intervention. He subsequently returned to Syria with no message.[92]

The third extant letter was brought probably at some point in late 657/1259 by Mongol envoys (*ilchis*). The letter is addressed to al-Nāṣir and his amirs, two of whom are named. It opens with a recapitulation of the taking of

[90] Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 168; Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb*, MS. Bibliothèque Nationale, ar. 1703, fol. 140a–b; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 203b, 217b; Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyāda and S.ʿA-F. ʿĀshūr (Cairo, 1934–73), 1:410–11; Ibn al-Ṣuqāʿī, *Tālī kitāb wafayāt al-aʿyān*, ed. J. Sublet (Damascus, 1974), 78, 167; Ibn Kathīr, 13:215.

[91] Qirtay [Qirṭāy] al-Khaznadārī, *Ta'rīkh al-nawādir*, MS. Gotha 1655, fol. 57a–b; cited in Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 218b; Maqrīzī, 1:415–16. A parallel letter, with both similar and convergent parts, is found in Suyūṭī, 315 (= tr. Jarrett, 499–500), who calls this the "second letter." See also W. Brinner, "Some Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Documents from Non-archival Sources," *IOS* 2 (1972):121.

[92] Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:491–9. For a discussion and partial translation of this passage, see Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence," 354–7; see also Y. Koch, "ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Shaddād and his Biography of Baybars," *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale* 43 (1983):251 and n. 9.

Baghdad and the reason the Caliph was killed. Then comes a long description of Mongol might, their right to conquer the world and the fate of those who resist. Finally, there is a call to submit or face the consequences.[93]

By now, however, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf had adopted a defiant attitude towards the Mongols. He sent off a belligerent answer to Hülegü, contrasting the latter's disbelief with his own Islam. Hülegü's call for submission was spurned and he declared himself ready for war.[94] Towards the end of 657/1259, having heard of the Mongol advance towards Syria, al-Nāṣir both sent an envoy to Egypt to ask for help,[95] and set up camp at Barza, some 5 km to the north of Damascus. It is said that besides his army he was joined by bedouins, Persians, Kurds, Türkmen and volunteers of unspecified origin (*mutaṭawwi'a*).[96] Al-Nāṣir's new-found resolve, however, was short-lived, and his natural indecisiveness soon got the better of him, leading in the end to the disintegration of his army, the end of his kingdom and his own capture and eventual death.

Two other political entities were found in or near Syria at this time. The first of these were the Crusader states, namely the Principality of Antioch and County of Tripoli in the north and the so-called Kingdom of Jerusalem centered at Acre. Already in 1246, it is reported that Bohemond V of Antioch, along with King Het'um of Cilician Armenia (see below), had become a tributary of the Mongols.[97] In 1259, as the Mongols approached Antioch, his son and successor, Bohemond VI, went with his father-in-law, the same Het'um, and made his submission to Hülegü. From here on, Antioch was to pursue a distinctly pro-Mongol policy, without, however, being able to enjoy any significant Mongol protection.[98] Further south, the Kingdom at Acre, ruled by the barons, heads of the military orders, and the local representatives of the Italian communes, adopted a much less sanguine approach towards the Mongols. As early as the end of 1256, they had been expecting a Mongol invasion of Syria and were quite disconcerted by the prospect. At this date at least, the Franks of the Syrian coast saw no advantage to be gained by the intrusion of the Mongols into their country and sought neither to make an alliance with them nor to tender their submission.[99]

[93] Ibn al-'Ibrī, 484 (cf. Bar Hebraeus, 434); Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-a'ṣār* (rpt., Teheran, 1338/1959–60 of ed. Bombay, 1269/1852–3), 43–4; Brinner, "Documents," 127–36 (esp. 120–1, for a discussion of Ṭūsī's authorship of the letter). This text was used, with appropriate changes, by Hülegü in his letter to Qutuz in 658/1260; see below in chap. 2. A shorter and somewhat different version of this letter is found in Suyūṭī, 314–15 (= tr. Jarrett, 500), who lists this as Hülegü's "third letter." This last mentioned version is also found in Dhahabī, *al-Mukhtār min ta'rīkh al-jazarī*, MS. Köprülü 1147, fol. 83b, but it is stated there that this was a letter from Hülegü which was read to the people of Damascus after al-Nāṣir Yūsuf had fled. The short Arabic text in Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alīzādah, 3:63, is apparently based on this third letter, as the opening sentence is the same in both.

[94] Waṣṣāf, 44–5; Brinner, "Documents," 136–43; Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence," 360.

[95] See Humphreys, *Saladin*, 345.

[96] Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 146b; Kutubī, *'Uyūn al-tawārīkh*, vol. 20, ed. F. Sāmir and N. Dāwūd (Baghdad, 1980), 214.

[97] Jackson, "Crisis," 488; Prawer, *Histoire*, 2:421–2.

[98] Runciman, *Crusades*, 3:306; Cahen, *Syrie*, 702–3.

[99] Jackson, "Crisis," 489–90; Cahen, *Syrie*, 708–9 and n. 22.

The second force, not centered in Syria proper, was the Kingdom of Cilicia or Lesser Armenia, with its capital at Sīs. Its king, Hetʿum, quickly made his submission to the Mongols after the defeat they had dealt his neighbors, the Seljuqs of Rūm, in 1243. Four years later, Hetʿum sent his brother, the constable (and historian) Smpad, to the Qa'an at Qaraqorum. Smpad returned in 1250. In 1253 Hetʿum himself went to the Mongol court and was absent for three years. His namesake and relative, the historian, Hetʿum, would have us believe that it was the Armenian king himself who prevailed on Möngke to send Hülegü west, in order to conquer Baghdad and liberate the Holy Land, which would then be returned to the Christians. This report can be questioned, not least because of the historian Hetʿum's well-known tendency to rewrite history as he would have liked to have seen it.[100] On the other hand, as Professor Cahen has suggested, perhaps King Hetʿum brought to Möngke's attention the Mediterranean areas about which he had not yet given any serious thought. King Hetʿum was a major influence in bringing his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch, into the Mongol camp, although political realities also must have played their part. From the beginning, the Armenians were the main pro-Mongol boosters among the Christians, and from an early date both Armenian rulers and writers made attempts to interest the Christian west in a Mongol–Christian alliance against the Muslims. After the first Mongol setbacks in Syria in 1260, the pro-Mongol policy of the Armenian king as well as his raids into northern Syria were to target his kingdom for attack by the Mamluks.[101]

[100] Hetʿum (Hayton or Hethoum), "La Flor des estories de la Terre d'Orient," *RHC, Ar*, 2:163–5; Jackson, "Crisis," 485–6.

[101] Runciman, *Crusades*, 294; T.S.R. Boase, "The History of the Kingdom," in *idem* (ed.), *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (Edinburgh, 1978), 25–6; S. Der Nersessian, "The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia," in K.M. Setton, *History of the Crusades*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1962), 652–3; Cahen, *Syrie*, 696, 700–1; M. Canard, "La royaume d'Arménie-Cilicie et les Mamelouks jusqu'au traité de 1285," *Revue des études arméniennes* 4 (1967):217–19.