

## CHAPTER 7

### Baybars's intervention in Seljuq Rûm

At that time the Sultan of Egypt entered with his power into the realm of Turkey. He killed and drove out all the Tartars that were there and took many lands and cities, because a traitor that Abagha had made head official [*chevetaine*] of Turkey, who was called Parvana, had turned and became obedient to the Sultan of Egypt, and exerted himself to drive the Tartars out of Turkey.

Het'um<sup>1</sup>

Mamluk incursions over the border may have disconcerted the Īlkhāns and their local commanders and confederates, but they did not seriously endanger the integrity and security of the Īlkhānid kingdom. In 675/1277, however, Baybars mounted a major invasion of Rûm, in the course of which he defeated a Mongol army at Abulustayn (Elbistan) and occupied the Seljuq capital of Qaysāriyya (Kayseri, Caesarea). Baybars's goals are not known. Perhaps he had hoped to wrest Seljuq Rûm from the Mongols, thinking that he would find significant support from various military elements in that country. Possibly, however, his plan was more modest, and he had only launched a massive raid in order to destabilize the Mongols, test their reactions and try his own troops.

#### Early Mamluk interest in Seljuq Rûm

In the aftermath of the victory at Köse Dagħ (641/1243), the Mongols gained control over the Seljuq kingdom in Rûm. Mongol rule, however, was indirect, and the Seljuq sultans, or rather their senior officials and officers, still ran the country, although under Mongol supervision. Actual Mongol presence in Rûm was minimal. This changed with the approach of Hülegü. Baiju (or Baichu), the Mongol commander in western Iran, who hitherto had camped in the Mughan plains, was ordered to take his troops and herds to Anatolia, in order to make room for Hülegü. This movement of Mongol troops meant two things: increased interference in Seljuq affairs, and less grazing lands available for Seljuq commanders and their soldiers.

<sup>1</sup> *RHC, Ar*, 2:179.

Around the time of Hülegü's arrival in northwest Iran, the Sultanate of Seljuq Rûm was divided between two brothers, 'Izz al-Dîn Kaykâwûs and Rukn al-Dîn Qilich Arslan. Relations between the two brothers, each with his supporters among the notables of the kingdom, had never been good. Both brothers joined Hülegü for the conquest of northern Syria, including the siege of Aleppo, and returned to Rûm when Hülegü set out for the East. Open warfare broke out between them in 659/1261, when Hülegü, having suspected 'Izz al-Dîn of secretly communicating with the Mamluks, ordered Rukn al-Dîn to move against him. Rukn al-Dîn, with Mongol support, advanced towards Konya, his brother's capital. 'Izz al-Dîn fled first to Anṭalyâ and then to Constantinople, where he was initially well received by the Emperor Michael Palaeologus.<sup>2</sup>

These events were not without interest for Baybars. In late 659 or very early 660/1261, he had sent envoys to 'Izz al-Dîn. They met with this ruler at Anṭalyâ, where he had retreated after being dislodged from Konya. The envoys brought with them a letter from Baybars, which sought to encourage 'Izz al-Dîn and promised him assistance. But 'Izz al-Dîn remained undecided about what action to adopt and the envoys returned to Egypt. His situation continued to deteriorate and he eventually fled to Constantinople.<sup>3</sup>

Baybars's envoys probably returned some time in the spring of 660/1262, accompanied by two envoys from 'Izz al-Dîn, who brought with them a letter, in which 'Izz al-Dîn asked for assistance and offered Baybars one half of his kingdom. He also sent signed, blank *iqṭā'* deeds for Baybars to distribute as he saw fit. The Sultan received the envoys well, and ordered the organization of an expeditionary force of an unknown size, placing it under the command of Nâşir al-Dîn Oghulmush al-Silâhdâr al-Şâliḥî. For good measure, and perhaps to encourage him, this amir was granted an *iqṭā'* worth 300 horsemen in Rûm and/or Âmid and its environs.<sup>4</sup> These preparations seem to have been little more than a propaganda measure. 'Izz al-Dîn was not in a position to distribute such largesse, and it is unlikely that Baybars entertained serious hopes of success in this endeavor. The dispatch of a Mamluk force would surely have led to the loss of valuable troops. In addition, our primary source, Ibn 'Abd al-Zâhir, makes no more mention of this campaign, so it can be assumed that it never got off the ground. Baybars al-Manşûrî writes, after citing this author, that while preparations for the expedition were underway news came of 'Izz al-Dîn's defeat, and the plan was dropped.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after this mission, another letter arrived from 'Izz al-Dîn. This told of

<sup>2</sup> On the period from Köse Dag to 'Izz al-Dîn's defeat, see: Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 269–79; Holt, *Crusades*, 173–4. For the deterioration of relations and the eventual conflict between the two brothers, see: Ibn Bībî, 295; *Zubda*, fols. 51b–53b; Yûnînî, 2:113–14; Bar Hebraeus, 442. <sup>3</sup> Yûnînî, 2:160–1, where Anṭalyâ is written Anṭakiya.

<sup>4</sup> *Rawḍ*, 125–7; Nuwayrî, MS. 2m, fols. 153b–154a; Ibn al-Furât, MS. Vienna, fols. 2b–3b; Maqrîzî, 1:469–70. Originally, *Rawḍ* implies that 'Izz al-Dîn's envoys arrived in Sha'bân/July–August, but Oghulmush's commission (*tadhkira*) is dated the end of Jumâda II/mid-May.

<sup>5</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 54b; whence 'Aynî, fol. 86a.

how his enemy (i.e. Rukn al-Dīn and supporters) had been so disconcerted by the news of ʿIzz al-Dīn's agreement with Baybars that they had fled. ʿIzz al-Dīn had sent an army to besiege Konya.<sup>6</sup> This was mere bluster, and Baybars seems to have understood it as such. In Rajab 661/May 1263, envoys from the Golden Horde arrived at Baybars's court. Among other matters, the message that they brought from Berke called on Baybars to assist ʿIzz al-Dīn, presumably in the latter's endeavors to regain his kingdom. The envoys from the Golden Horde were accompanied by representatives of ʿIzz al-Dīn himself.<sup>7</sup> There is no record that Baybars was moved to act on this matter.

### Contacts between the Pervāne and Baybars

The dominant figure in Seljuq Rūm during the period parallel to Baybars's reign was Muʿīn al-Dīn Sulaymān b. Muhadhdhab al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Daylamī, known usually as the Pervāne.<sup>8</sup> Essentially, he was the strongman of the Seljuq regime, while only nominal power was in the hands of the sultan. The Pervāne had the dual role of representing the Seljuq kingdom *vis-à-vis* the Mongols, and acting as the latter's agent in Rūm. Professor Cahen has aptly described the Pervāne as "a true dictator under the Mongol protectorate," and sums up his achievement thus:

The period extending from the flight of ʿIzz al-Dīn or, alternatively, from the appointment a little earlier of Muʿīn al-Dīn Sulaymān (still known as the *pervane*) as the real head of the government under Rukn al-Dīn, until his tragic death in 1277, marks a stage in the decline of the Seljuqid State, an attempt to strike a balance – a difficult feat which, save at the end, he managed to achieve – between the desire to retain the Mongols' full confidence and the re-organization of the State in some of its traditional aspects, particularly as a Muslim State. The task was not easy but, whatever his personal ambitions, it may be thought that Muʿīn al-Dīn succeeded in giving the inhabitants of Rūm a respite, or indeed a period of recovery, after the ordeals of recent years.<sup>9</sup>

An essential condition for the Pervāne's effective control was the compliance of the Seljuq Sultan. Initially, he could not have found a more cooperative candidate than Rukn al-Dīn, who – it is reported – devoted himself mainly to the pursuit of pleasure. At some point, however, the Sultan began to chafe at the Pervāne's control, and plotted his removal. The Pervāne, however, acted first. According to al-Yūnīnī, as early as 664/1265–6 and again

<sup>6</sup> *Rawḍ*, 128; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 3b; cf. Maqrīzī, 1:470, who inserts Hülegü after ʿadīw (enemy). See also Holt, *Crusades*, 159–60, 174.

<sup>7</sup> *Rawḍ*, 171; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 165a–b; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 30a; Maqrīzī, 1:495. For ʿIzz al-Dīn's fate, Canard, "Un traité," 215–16; Geanakoplos, *Emperor*, 181–2; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 279.

<sup>8</sup> The Persian title *pervāne*, written *barwānāh* in Arabic, literally means "butterfly," but had the additional meanings of "official letter" and "commander" or "supervisor." See: Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 221–2; F. Steingass, *Persian-English Dictionary* (rpt., London, 1977), 245; cf. Boyle, "Il-Khāns," 366. <sup>9</sup> Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 222, 280.

in 666/1267–8, the Pervâne calumniated the Sultan before Abagha, accusing him (falsely) of sympathy and contact with the Mamluks. The Īlkhān gave permission to have him killed. Soon afterwards, the Pervâne arranged for Rukn al-Dīn's execution by several of the Mongol officers stationed in Rûm. His successor was his son Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw III. Since the new sultan was a mere boy (the sources give his age from two to ten years old), there would be no question of his resisting the Pervâne's tutelage.<sup>10</sup>

For several years, little is heard of the Pervâne or Rûm in general, a phenomenon which Professor Cahen attributes to the relative stability in that country.<sup>11</sup> At the beginning of the 670s, the north Syria–Rûmī frontier began to heat up and the Pervâne and Seljuq Rûmī troops played an important role in the military activities of the Mongols, participating in Samaghar's raid into northern Syria in Rabīʿ II 670/November 1271. Several months later (Shawwāl/May 1272), separate envoys from both Samaghar and the Pervâne arrived together in Damascus, and thus began a period of "negotiations" between Baybars and Abagha, from which nothing tangible resulted. Rûmī amirs and troops, but not the Pervâne himself, participated in the unsuccessful Mongol siege of al-Bīra in Jumādā I 671/November–December 1272.<sup>12</sup>

Samaghar had been the senior Mongol officer in Rûm for some time, perhaps since Baiju's execution.<sup>13</sup> In one place Baybars al-Manṣūrī calls him the commander of the Mongol *tümen* in Rûm.<sup>14</sup> Whatever the exact number of soldiers under his command, he had several missions: to maintain order and loyalty to the Mongols, to fight the often troublesome Türkmen, and to intervene in north Syria when called upon to do so.<sup>15</sup> The impression gained is that the Pervâne and Samaghar had found a *modus vivendi*, as no friction is noted in the sources.

The situation became more complicated with the arrival of Abagha's

<sup>10</sup> Yūnīnī, 2:347, 387–8, 403–6; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 147a–b; Maqrīzī, 1:571–2; ʿAynī, fol. 98b; Ibn Bībī, 299–303; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 284. The Mamluk sources place the execution of Rukn al-Dīn s.a. 666, while Ibn Bībī has him die in AH 664.

<sup>11</sup> Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 284.

<sup>12</sup> For these campaigns and diplomatic *démarches*, see ch. 5.

<sup>13</sup> Baiju was executed at Hülegü's orders, probably around the same time that he was eliminating the Jochid princes in his army, some time in the period following ʿAyn Jālūt; Jackson, "Dissolution," 217 n. 138, 233; see Nuwayrī, 27:384. Perhaps Baiju was initially succeeded by Shiremūn the son of Chormaghun, but cf. Qalqashandī, 5:361–2. Another Mongol officer ca. 1260 was Alinjaq (= Alinaq?) Noyan, who was sent with a force and was based near Aqsaray; al-Karīm Āqsarāyī, *Musāmamat al-akhbār*, ed. O. Turan (Ankara, 1944), 68. The fact that he is not heard of again in the sources at this time either indicates the modest nature or the short duration of his command; cf. J.M. Smith, Jr., "Mongol Nomadism and Middle Eastern Geography: Qishlāqs and Tümens," in D.O. Morgan *et al.* (ed.), *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, forthcoming; I am grateful to Prof. Smith for kindly sending me a draft of this paper.

<sup>14</sup> *Tuhfa*, 74; the equivalent passage in *Zubda*, fol. 76b (whence ʿAynī, fol. 104a), reads that he was the governor (*nāʾib*) in Rûm. Qalqashandī, 5:361–2, calls him the son of Baiju, and gives him the title of *shahna*. See also Mostaert and Cleaves, "Trois documents," 436; Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 2:824–5.

<sup>15</sup> Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 283, who adds that the Mongol troops, from ca. 1261 onward, were stationed in almost all of Asia Minor. The basis for this last statement is not clear. See also *ibid.*, 331, on the source of the livelihood of these troops.

younger brother, Ejei, in 669/1271.<sup>16</sup> Ejei seems to have enjoyed some type of joint governorship with Samaghar.<sup>17</sup> Abagha's reasons for sending the former are unclear, but they perhaps included the desire to find an appanage for his younger brother, to get him away from the center of the empire, and to place an extra check on the power of both the Pervāne and Samaghar.<sup>18</sup> The presence of the additional Mongol troops who had accompanied Ejei strained the resources of the kingdom even more, and must have also grated on the Pervāne and the Rūmī amirs. Ejei had made financial demands on the Pervāne (and it seems also the state treasury). Around 670/1271, therefore, the Pervāne went to Abagha (he was accompanying Baybars's envoys),<sup>19</sup> and spoke to him secretly of recalling Ejei. He claimed that Ejei was planning to kill him, was aspiring to become ruler of Rūm and to place himself under the protection of Baybars. Abagha promised the Pervāne that both Ejei and Samaghar would be recalled, and that Toqa (also: Toqu, Toqai) Noyan would be sent in their place. Upon returning to Rūm, the Pervāne saw that the promised change of governors had been delayed, while Ejei's demands became even greater.<sup>20</sup>

This, then, was the background to the Pervāne's secret correspondence with Baybars, although it has been suggested that perhaps Baybars's victories against the Mongols were another factor that attracted the Pervāne to seek his help.<sup>21</sup> In 672/1274, the Pervāne sent an envoy to Baybars, who presented a request that Baybars dispatch an army against the Mongols in Rūm. The Sultan was asked to keep Ghiyāth al-Dīn as sultan and the Pervāne as his regent. Baybars's response was carefully chosen. He first demanded that a large amount of money be paid in advance for the costs of sending an army. The Sultan then added that since his horses could not negotiate the roads at this time, he would only come next year.

Baybars had not committed himself too far, but left room for further negotiations if the Pervāne had indeed been serious. But by the time the envoy returned to the Pervāne, Abagha had finally withdrawn Ejei, along with Samaghar, and replaced them by Toqa Noyan as promised. The Pervāne's position having thus improved, at this time he did not send a response back to Baybars, especially as he did not see any aid coming his way in the immediate future.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Yūnīnī, 2:457. Ejei is mentioned in Rūm as early as 666/1267–8, when he returned with the Pervāne and Samaghar after their visit to Abagha; *ibid.*, 2:387–8. This must have been only a temporary stay. For Mongol commanders in Rūm in AH 666, see: *ibid.*, 2:404–5.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 62, mentions their council (*majlis*).

<sup>18</sup> See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 285. <sup>19</sup> See ch. 5, p. 127.

<sup>20</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 78–9; whence Yūnīnī, 3:33–4; cf. the confused version in Qirtay, fol. 99a. Toqa was the son of Ilge Noyan (see ch. 3, p. 51); Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:102.

<sup>21</sup> Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 285.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 79; Yūnīnī, 3:34. For the above, see also Thorau, *Baybars*, 235–6. According to 'Aynī, fol. 116a, Samaghar was reappointed governor (*nā'ib*) in Rūm after the battle of Abulustayn. There seems to be some confusion in Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:102, who writes that after his accession, Abagha sent Toghu (= Toqa) Bitikchi ("secretary") and Tudawun to Rūm, where they took part in a battle, and were replaced by Samaghar and Kuharkai (?). The author is apparently mistaken in ascribing Toqa and Tudawun's arrival at this early date.

According to Ibn Shaddād, when Baybars came to Syria in 673/1275, the Pervāne was afraid that the Sultan might actually fulfill his promise and invade Rūm. While this no longer served his immediate purpose, the Pervāne may have wanted to keep all his options open. Thus, he sent to Baybars and told him to invade Lesser Armenia, and advised him to invade Rūm the following year with the Pervāne's assistance.<sup>23</sup> It would appear, however, that Baybars had planned to raid Lesser Armenia even before the arrival of the Pervāne's message.<sup>24</sup>

It is clear that, in spite of the personnel changes enacted at the Pervāne's request, Abagha did not have complete faith in him. Toqa Noyan had arrived with orders to conduct a fiscal survey of Rūm. Henceforth, the Pervāne and his officers were not to govern and issue orders except in Toqa's presence. The Pervāne saw that he had no choice but to submit. Toqa then conducted an inspection tour of the country and sent a great deal of revenue back to Abagha.<sup>25</sup>

At the end of 673/ca. late spring 1275, the Pervāne, Toqa Noyan and Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn were ordered to report personally before Abagha. En route, they ran into Ejei in eastern Anatolia, on his way back to Rūm to resume his command. This disconcerted the Pervāne and Toqa alike, the latter surely because he understood that Ejei's return meant the reduction of his own authority. For the time being, however, they sent presents to Ejei to mollify him. After assorted machinations at the Mongol court, the party set out to return to Rūm. At Sīwās, news was received that Ejei had struck the Pervāne's representatives (*nuwwāb*, perhaps governors), including Ḍiyā' al-Dīn ibn Khaṭīr. The Pervāne and Toqa thereupon conspired to get rid of Ejei and wrote to Abagha to this effect. Ejei, having heard of this letter, in turn sent to Abagha and accused the Pervāne and Toqa of embezzling revenues. Abagha answered his brother that he should disregard the Pervāne and kill him if he wanted. The Pervāne, however, intercepted this message, and acted quickly. He first sent presents to placate the Īlkhān, and then obtained written statements from various Rūmī notables that Ejei was out to kill him and Toqa, and planning to surrender Rūm to the Sultan of Egypt. By then, Abagha had probably had enough of these incriminations and ordered everyone involved to come to the *ordo* (Rabī' I 674/August-September 1275). Ejei was removed from his position, several of his followers were killed and the Pervāne and Toqa Noyan returned to Rūm.<sup>26</sup>

The Pervāne, however, continued to play a double game. Soon after his return to Rūm, orders were received for both the Mongol units in Rūm and the Seljuq troops to take part in a new attack against al-Bīra. Before the expedition, the Pervāne wrote to inform Baybars, promising that when the

<sup>23</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 107; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:177–8; Mufaḍḍal, 226–7.

<sup>24</sup> For other reasons for Baybars's raid to Lesser Armenia, see ch. 5, p. 134.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 108; Yūnīnī, 3:89; Mufaḍḍal, 227–8. Cf. Qirtay, fol. 100a; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:178. <sup>26</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 122–4; Yūnīnī, 3:112–14.



Sultan's army approached the Mongol army, he and the Rūmī amirs would turn on the latter. According to Ibn Shaddād, during the siege itself (Jumādā II 674/November–December 1275),<sup>27</sup> the Pervāne sent 400 troops across the Euphrates to scout and raid. His hope was that this force would be caught by the Sultan and annihilated. Instead, these soldiers captured three of the Pervāne's couriers returning from Baybars, carrying the latter's agreement to the Pervāne's plan described above. This letter was brought to the Mongol commanders, who accused the Pervāne of perfidy. The Pervāne, however, pleaded his innocence, and claimed that this was a trick of King Leon of Lesser Armenia. The Mongol leaders ostensibly accepted these excuses, although secretly they thought differently. They were, however, wary of the possible divided loyalties of the Muslim, mainly Rūmī, soldiers and amirs, and this was one of the reasons they gave up the siege. The incriminating letters were subsequently sent on to Abagha. The case against the Pervāne was growing.<sup>28</sup>

Some unclear points remain in the above account. If the 400 troops sent by the Pervāne were Rūmīs, why would he want them killed, and why did they hand over his couriers to the Mongol leaders? If they were Mongols, how is it that they were obeying his orders? There are no clear-cut answers to these questions. On the other hand, however, Ibn al-Furāt and al-ʿAynī, evidently following Baybars al-Manṣūrī, state that it was Abtai, the Mongol commander, who sent the 400 troops after he found out about the Pervāne's contacts with the Sultan.<sup>29</sup> This makes more sense than Ibn Shaddād's version.

## Events leading to the invasion

The events in Rūm preceding Baybars's invasion at the end of 675/early summer 1277 come fast and furious, and are somewhat confusing. Our main source, Ibn Shaddād, provides us with a huge amount of information, although some of it is undated. He is cited by a number of fourteenth-century Syrian writers. The befuddlement is compounded by the additional evidence found in Ibn al-Furāt and al-ʿAynī, seemingly derived from some now-lost folios of Baybars al-Manṣūrī's *Zubda*, which does not completely tally with Ibn Shaddād's account. For convenience's sake, in the following discussion, the two accounts will be referred to as those of Ibn Shaddād and "Baybars al-Manṣūrī."

When the Rūmī army returned to its country after the ignominious conclusion of the siege of al-Bīra (674/1275), the Pervāne met with a group of Rūmī amirs. Ibn Shaddād writes that they adopted an anti-Mongol resolution

<sup>27</sup> See ch. 5, pp. 136–7.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 126–7; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 212a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:41–2; Kutubī, MS. Kōpülü, fol. 41a; Yūnīnī, 3:115.

<sup>29</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, 7:42; ʿAynī, fol. 108b, citing Baybars al-Manṣūrī. This portion of *Zubda* is lost, but see *Tuhfa*, 82.

when they realized the damage done by the discovery of the Pervâne's contact with Baybars. Incipient anti-Mongol feelings now probably came to the fore, and the amirs, together with the Pervâne, decided that they could no longer afford not to act. They agreed to write to Baybars, expressing their loyalty, and calling on him to come to Rûm to their assistance against the Mongols. These amirs were Ḥusām al-Dīn Bījār al-Bābiri (governor of Kharput/Khartabirt), his son Bahā' al-Dīn Bahādur (governor of Diyār Bakr, i.e. the environs of Āmid), Sharaf al-Dīn Mas'ūd b. Khaṭīr (governor of Nigde/Nakīda), his brother Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd, and Amīn al-Dīn Mikā'il. When word of this plot reached other Rūmī amirs, they refused to have a part in it, perhaps out of self-interest or fear of the Mongols. Surprisingly, for all their protestations and claims of loyalty (*iliyya*) to the Mongols, they did not inform them of this "traitorous" action.

Baybars, when he received the request of the Pervâne and the others, sent back thanks, but stated that he was unable to launch a campaign at this time, due to the lack of water. At the end of "grazing season" (*al-rabī*),<sup>30</sup> he would set out for Rûm. Besides such "objective" circumstances, the Sultan may have been waiting to receive more substantial proof of the new-found loyalty of these Rūmī amirs.

Towards the end of 674/late spring 1276, the Pervâne set off to Abagha, taking with him the sister of the Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn, who was to become the Ilkhān's wife. According to Ibn Shaddād, the Pervâne left after despairing of Baybars's arrival. "Baybars al-Manṣūrī" gives a different account: after receiving evidence of the Pervâne's traitorous activities during the siege of al-Bīra, Abagha had sent several times ordering the Pervâne to come and explain himself. After repeatedly putting off his visit, and excusing himself with the need to prepare the Sultan's sister for her marriage to Abagha, the Pervâne finally set off.

Different accounts are also given of subsequent events. According to "Baybars al-Manṣūrī," before setting off for Abagha, the Pervâne sent the army of Rûm (or rather only that part loyal to him) to Abulustayn, evidently to wait for Baybars. Among the amirs there were the Pervâne's son 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī, Sharaf al-Dīn b. Khaṭīr, his brother Ḍiya' al-Dīn, and Sayf al-Dīn Turantay (governor of Amāsiyya). On his way to Abagha, the Pervâne arranged for the amirs to return to Qaysāriyya, where they were to write to Abagha warning him of Baybars's imminent attack on Rûm. The amirs did as he wished, and only a small force under Sayf al-Dīn Abū Bakr Jandar Beg, the governor of the area, remained at Abulustayn. The Pervâne hoped, it would

<sup>30</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 128–9; whence, Dhahabī, MS. 279, fol. 59a; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 41b; Ibn Kathīr, 13:269; Yūnīnī, 3:116–17. See also Khawaiter, *Baibars*, 69. The modern meaning of *rabī*, "spring", is inadequate here. More appropriate is the classical sense of "season of herbage," or even fall-winter (i.e. when the rains fall and thus the herbage grows); see Lane, s.v. *r-b-*, 1:1018–19. If Baybars was to set out after spring, his troops and horses would surely have suffered from a lack of water, and the latter would have lacked pasturage.



seem, that at a time of crisis, the Īlkhān would not dare to dispense with his experience.

Ibn Shaddād, on the other hand, does not mention the presence of the amirs in Abulustayn in this context. Instead, the Pervāne sent to Bijār, lord of Kharput, and his son Bahādur (Professor Cahen calls them Kurds), and urged them to flee to Baybars. Bahādur had been involved in the murder of several Mongols, so he and his father had good reason to disappear. Possibly, the Pervāne also wanted them to encourage Baybars to come to Rūm. Bijār and Bahādur were preceded to the Sultanate by two Mongol officers, the brothers Sögetei (< Sh-K-T-'-Y / S-K-T-'-Y) and Ja'urchi (? < J-'-W-R-J-Y), who were also involved with Bahādur in the murder of the Mongols; in addition, Bahādur was married to their sister. All of these *wāfidiyya* arrived in Egypt in early 675/early summer 1276.<sup>31</sup>

Some time around this time, two raids were launched by the Mamluks into Īlkhānid territory. The first was to Dunaysir, in the territory of Mārdīn, from which the raiders returned safely after wreaking much havoc.<sup>32</sup> The second raid was to the Rūmī frontier. Baybars sent a detachment of 1000 troops there under Bektūt al-Atābakī, who was joined by a contingent from Aleppo. Bektūt's mission was to reconnoiter and raid (*kāshifan wa-mughīran*) and to bring messages to sympathetic Rūmī amirs. Ibn Shaddād tells us that the specific reason that the Sultan had sent this force was to make contact with Sharaf al-Dīn b. Khaṭīr, who after the Pervāne had gone to Abagha had written Baybars to encourage him to come to Rūm. At Abulustayn, Bektūt ran into the force under Sayf al-Dīn Jandar Beg. The latter had initially asked Bektūt to stay and fight with them against the Mongols. Bektūt demurred and convinced Jandar Beg and the others to return with him. Baybars, then in northern Syria, met them near Ḥārim and received them warmly.<sup>33</sup>

Before setting out to return to Syria, Bektūt had sent letters from Baybars to the Rūmī amirs, who were somewhere near Qaysāriyya. Sharaf al-Dīn b. Khaṭīr, Tāj al-Dīn Güyü and the others agreed that each amir would write to Baybars individually and express his loyalty to him. In these letters, they were to inform Baybars that the Pervāne had gone to Abagha and that they were on their way to Qaysāriyya, where Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn was located, in order to

<sup>31</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 153–6; whence *inter alia* Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:188–91; Yūnīnī, 2:164–5. “Baybars al-Manṣūrī”: Ibn al-Furāt, 7:42–3; Aynī, fol. 108b. Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 286–7 (his source must be Bar Hebraeus, 455), who writes that Bijār was responsible for the assassination of Sarkis, the Armenian bishop of Erzinjan; cf. Ibn Shaddād, 169. See also Ibn al-Ṣuqāṭī, 54–5. Sögetei's daughter was eventually married to Qalawun and was the mother of the Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:251; Maqrīzī, 1:709.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 185–6; Yūnīnī, 3:186–7.

<sup>33</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 154–5; Yūnīnī, 3:165–6; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:65–6 (here follows Ibn Shaddād); cf. Ibn Bibī, 311. Bektūt's mission appears to be the same episode described by Bar Hebraeus, 454, in which 1000 Egyptians joined a number of Türkmēn in the summer of 1276, and fought an Armenian force at Mar'ash; see Thorau, *Baybars*, 237 and n. 83. Jandar Beg's son Ḥusayn became an important amir in the Mamluk Sultanate in the early fourteenth century; Ṣafadī, *Wāfi*, 12:347–50.

draw the other amirs into the plot. Sharaf al-Dīn b. Khaṭīr also ordered that the Rûmī army should split up and attack local Mongols. The Qaramanid Türkmen, who were also in contact with Baybars, exploited the growing disorder to attack the Mongols and increase their control. Whether this was in conjuncture with the Rûmī amirs remains a moot point.<sup>34</sup>

Sharaf al-Dīn and his cohorts arrived at Qaysāriyya, and camped outside the city. The Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn was in the city, together with Muhaddhab al-Dīn, the son of the Pervāne. Güyü and Turantay, who before had ostensibly at least agreed with Ibn Khaṭīr, were now in the city and unenthusiastic about events. When Güyü came out to meet Ibn Khaṭīr, an argument ensued, and Ibn Khaṭīr killed him and another amir. For the time being, Turantay pretended agreement with Ibn Khaṭīr. Muhaddhab al-Dīn wanted no part in these seditious activities and was able to get away from Ibn Khaṭīr and withdraw to the family castle of Dokat. Ibn Khaṭīr, together with Turantay, and the Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn, rode to his castle of Nigde. From there, Ibn Khaṭīr sent his brother Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, and Turantay his son Sinān al-Dīn, to Baybars to express their loyalty.<sup>35</sup>

These amirs, along with their entourages and other officers, met Baybars near Homs on 13 Ṣafar 675/27 July 1276. The Sultan was not at all pleased with this unexpected development. He complained that they had acted precipitously, and that he had promised the Pervāne that he would come to Rûm at the end of this year. Most of the army was in Egypt, and Baybars was in no position to go to Rûm with the few troops then at his disposal. In spite of his displeasure, the Rûmīs were well received. Ḍiyā' al-Dīn tried to convince him to enter Rûm even with a small army, but to no avail. Baybars, however, did dispatch a small force under Balaban al-Zaynī to bring the Seljuq Sultan, Ibn Khaṭīr, Turantay and the rest of the loyal amirs to Syria. Balaban reached as far as Kaynûk (Ḥadath al-Ḥamrā'), the scene of a Mamluk raid in 671/1273,<sup>36</sup> when he heard of the Pervāne's return to Rûm with a large Mongol army (supposedly 30,000 men) under Tudawun. Balaban thus aborted his mission. Baybars, thinking himself unsafe in northern Syria with the small force which accompanied him, then returned to Egypt, taking the Rûmī *wāfidiyya* with him. He entered Cairo on 13 Rabī' I/17 August, and began making preparations for the invasion of Rûm.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 157–9; whence Mufaḍḍal, 245–7; Yūnīnī, 3:167. For the revolt of the Türkmen, see also Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 288, and below.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 159–60; Yūnīnī, 3:167–9; Mufaḍḍal, 247–8. The account in Ibn Bībī, 311–13, generally agrees with Ibn Shaddād, and provides some additional details. The "Baybars al-Manṣūrī" version (Ibn al-Furāt, 7:43; 'Aynī, fol. 108b; cf. Maqrīzī, 1:621), does not contradict the above, but is much less detailed. Cf. Khowaiter, *Baibars*, 70–1.

<sup>36</sup> See ch. 5, p. 131, where this place's location is discussed.

<sup>37</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 160–1, who adds that the army was accompanied by Abagha's brother Mengü Temür; Yūnīnī, 3:169–70; Mufaḍḍal, 250–2. Ibn al-Furāt and 'Aynī (s.a. 674, as cited in the previous note), state that Tudawun was accompanied by Toqa, and their army was composed of 30,000 "noble Mongols" (*min a'yān al-mughul*). In the annal for AH 675, Ibn al-Furāt (7:66–7; whence Maqrīzī, 1:625–6) and 'Aynī (fol. 110a–b) repeat much of this

Sharaf al-Dīn ibn Khaṭīr was very disconcerted by the arrival of such a large Mongol force. It was clear, for the time being at least, that the Pervāne was back in the Mongol camp, and had abandoned his flirtation with Baybars. Ibn Khaṭīr considered resisting, but was persuaded to abandon such an idea, given the overwhelming size of the Mongol force. He then fled to one of the forts under his control, Qal'at Lu'lu', in the hope of fortifying himself in it. Its commander, however, proved treacherous, and handed him over to the Mongols. Tudawun held a trial (*yarghu*) for all those involved in the contacts with Baybars. Ghiyāth al-Dīn was absolved after he claimed that due to his young age he had been manipulated. Ibn Khaṭīr was executed after being beaten; his organs were cut up and circulated around the Seljuq kingdom. Turantay, whose ambivalent attitude toward Ibn Khaṭīr's actions must have been recognized, was able to buy his freedom for a large fee. Some personages got themselves off the hook by claiming that they had feared suffering the same fate as Güyü if they resisted Ibn Khaṭīr. Other officers were too unequivocally implicated and were thus executed. During his interrogation, Ibn Khaṭīr had accused the Pervāne of having initiated the conspiracy and maintained contact with Baybars. The Pervāne, slippery as ever, was able to get him to rescind his accusations, and once again escaped punishment. The Pervāne then made an attempt to restore order in the country. The effect on the rebellious Türkmen, however, was evidently minimal.<sup>38</sup>

The pro-Mongol sources have a general idea of the Pervāne's communication with Baybars, although without details or specific dates. Ibn Bibī writes that envoys came from Syria every day and visited Sharaf al-Dīn b. Khaṭīr, bringing word that Baybars would soon come to Rūm with a large army.<sup>39</sup> Waṣṣāf, after describing the incident of the ring,<sup>40</sup> reports how the Pervāne lost his faith in Abagha and began to correspond with Baybars, asking him to come to Rūm.<sup>41</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn only writes that in 674/1275–6, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn b. Khaṭīr and the son of the Pervāne went to Baybars and incited him to attack Rūm.<sup>42</sup> Bar Hebraeus tells that King Leon of Lesser Armenia warned the Mongols several times that the "Egyptians" were planning to attack Rūm. The Pervāne, however, either because he was in league with the Egyptians or out of hatred for the Armenian king, called this information spurious, and was able to lull the Mongols into a false sense of security.<sup>43</sup> It is evident, in light of

information in a different form, and add details. Tudawun (sometimes written Tudun) was the grandfather of Chuban, the strongman in the first half of Abū Sa'īd's reign (up to AD 1327); Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:102.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 162–5; Yūnīnī, 3:171–3; Ibn Bibī, 313–16; Thorau, *Baybars*, 237–8; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 288–9. Aqsarāyī, 103–4, has Abagha's brother, Qonghurtai, together with Toqa and Tudawun at this time, and later (p. 106), they spend the winter together near Dalūja (today Delice, ca. 100 km east of Ankara); Smith, "Qishlāqs," forthcoming. Qonghurtai is not mentioned in any other source at this juncture, and it thus seems that Aqsarāyī is mistaken in placing him here. <sup>39</sup> Ibn Bibī, 313. <sup>40</sup> See ch. 6, p. 147.

<sup>41</sup> Waṣṣāf, 86, who places this, along with Baybars's offensive to Rūm, before the Mongol attack against al-Bīra (671/1272); *ibid.*, 87–8. <sup>42</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:143–4.

<sup>43</sup> Bar Hebraeus, 456–7 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 501–2); Canard, "Arménie," 243.

what has been seen above along with further developments, that the Mongol commanders in Rūm also had a fairly clear idea of these contacts.

### The campaign of 675/1277

During the winter of 675/1276–7, Baybars finally decided to launch his offensive. Professor Cahen has suggested that the Sultan may have been motivated by a desire to keep the support of those remaining military elements in Rūm who had expressed their loyalty to him. Perhaps, Baybars believed that even after the defeat of his imprudent supporters, he still enjoyed significant support among the Türkmen, some Rūmī amirs and even the Pervāne himself. With this support, and together with his own forces, Baybars may have thought that by invading Rūm he could wrench it away from the Mongols.<sup>44</sup> The advantages to be gained from a successful campaign to Rūm are clear: the northern border of the Sultanate would be secured, resources would be denied to the Mongols, Lesser Armenia would be cut off from its patron, the Mongols would lose their outlet to the sea, and last, but not least, an Islamic country would be saved from the Mongol yoke.

It is possible, however, that Baybars's goals were more modest from the beginning. Perhaps this campaign was conceived as nothing more than a large-scale raid, whose aim was to cause damage and confusion among the Mongols. Another object of this campaign may have been the desire to test both the Mongol reaction and the performance of his own troops.<sup>45</sup> As the Mamluk historians left us no record of Baybars's goals for the campaign, all of this must remain speculative.

On 20 Ramaḍān 675/25 February 1277, Baybars set out from Cairo with the majority of the Egyptian army. Five thousand troops were left in the capital under Aq Sunqur al-Fāriqānī, as was the heir apparent, al-Malik al-Saʿīd. Passing through Damascus, Baybars entered Aleppo on the first of Dhū 'l-qaʿda/6 April. The next day, he continued his march to the north. Evidently most of the Syrian armies joined him on this campaign, except for the Aleppan army under the governor Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Mujallā, which was sent to the Euphrates near al-Sājūr, in order to prevent any Mongol incursions into Syria. Nūr al-Dīn was joined by the leader of the Syrian bedouins, ʿIsā b. Muḥannā. The Mongol commanders in the area received word of the arrival of this force at the Euphrates, and sent a group of Khafāja bedouin to attack it. Nūr al-Dīn, however, was ready for them, and they were defeated.<sup>46</sup>

Meanwhile, the Sultan, together with most of the army, was moving north.

<sup>44</sup> Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 288; see also Khowaiter, *Baibars*, 71–2.

<sup>45</sup> I am grateful to Professor Ayalon for this suggestion.

<sup>46</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Taʾrīkh*, 159–61; Yūnīnī, 3:175–6; Ibn al-Ṣuqāʿī, 109–10. Except for Yūnīnī, the various writers who generally base their reports on Ibn Shaddād (Ibn al-Dawādārī, Qirtay, Dhahabī, Kutubī, Ibn Kathīr, Mufaḍḍal, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, ʿAynī) will usually not be cited in the following discussion unless there is a variant account. The narrative in Ibn al-Furāt is found for some reason in MS. Vienna, fols. 161a–174b, although this should be in *ibid.*, 7:68.

Leaving his heavy baggage at Ḥaylān, a village near Aleppo, Baybars advanced north via ʿAyn Tāb and Dulūk, until he reached Kaynūk (Ḥadath al-Ḥamrā' = Başpınar, in the area of Gölbaşı). From there, the Mamluk army reached the Gök Su, or al-Nahr al-Azrak, which was crossed with some difficulty, probably on Monday, 6 Dhū 'l-qaʿda/12 April. Having spent the night at the river, the Mamluks advanced on 7 Dhū 'l-qaʿda/13 April to the part of the Taurus now called the Nuruhak Dağ, entering a pass called Aqcha (Arabic: Aqjā/Aqshā) Darband ("The Whitish Defile").<sup>47</sup> The pass, the identity of which will be discussed below, was crossed albeit with some hardship, and the army came out onto an open area (*waṭ'a*) and spread out.<sup>48</sup>

This opening seems to have been merely a widening in the pass, and the Mamluks had still to advance through the mountains. An advance force under Sunqur al-Ashqar was sent ahead. On the 9th (15 April), Sunqur's force encountered a Mongol cavalry detachment (*katība*), numbering 3000 troops, under Karay. The Mongols were driven back and some prisoners were taken. News then reached the Sultan that the Mongol (*al-mughul*) army under Tudawun, along with the Pervāne and Rūmī troops, were close by and was camped at the Jayḥān, that is, near the town of Abulustayn. The Mamluks spent the night of 10 Dhū 'l-qaʿda (still 15 April), in the hills, and the next morning were ready to descend into the plain of Abulustayn. From the heights, the Mamluk soldiers looked down upon the Mongol army arranged on the plain.<sup>49</sup>

Ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, Ibn Wāṣil's continuator who accompanied the Mamluk army into Rūm, tells a slightly different story: the Muslims having reached Aqcha Darband, a lightly armed force (*jarā'id*) was sent ahead to the outlet of the pass, so as to prevent the Mongol *yazak* (vanguard) from taking up position there. The Mamluk force indeed managed to get there first, and

<sup>47</sup> This name must have been well known by contemporaries. Both Het'um (2:179: "le pas Blanc") and Rashīd al-Dīn (ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:144), mention it in their descriptions of the events this year in Rūm.

<sup>48</sup> In modern Turkish this should be Akça Boğazi, but I did not find such a name on the map. The most detailed map I was able to consult was 1:200000 Turkey (South African Survey Co., Aug. 1941, based on a map from 1931), sheet F.11, Elbistan.

<sup>49</sup> *Rawḍ*, 456–8; the folios of the first part of this letter were lost in the MS., but the passage is cited in Qalqashandī, 14:142–3, and thus the editor of *Rawḍ* rectified the lacuna. The passage is also cited, with changes and omissions, in ʿUmārī's section on Rūm, edited by F. Taeschner as *ʿUmārī's Bericht über Anatolien in seinem Werke Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār* (Leipzig, 1929), 3–6; see the review by R. Hartmann, in *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, 34/11 (1931), 972. Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 171 (whence Yūnīnī, 2:176; Mufaḍḍal, 257–9), basically relates the same information, shorn of flowery prose, and with additional details. Also Nuwayrī, fol. 258a–b; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 163b; Maqrīzī, 1:628. It is difficult to determine the exact relationship between Ibn Shaddād's account of the events leading up to the battle and that of Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, who accompanied the Sultan in this campaign. It would seem that the former author used the latter's report, but he also inserts details from other sources. Cf. Thorau, *Baybars*, 238. The plain of Abulustayn is referred to in *Rawḍ*, 458 (cf. ʿUmārī, ed. Taeschner, 6; Maqrīzī, 1:628 and n. 6) as *sahrā' h-w-n-i*. This can be identified with Hono Deresi, a valley north of the modern town of Efsus, which runs into the northwest of the plain that stretches north of Abulustayn; see also Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey*, 2:488.

defeated the Mongols, who withdrew to a location called *Ra's al-'Uyûn* (location unidentified), where the rest of the Mongol forces joined them.<sup>50</sup>

An examination of the modern map<sup>51</sup> suggests that the Mamluks took a route which more-or-less follows the present-day road: this generally led north from Kaynûk, crossing the Gök Su after some 15 km, and proceeded north on the eastern side of this stream. On the other hand, T. Sinclair's comprehensive work on eastern Turkey contains a map which shows an early medieval road on the west side of the Gök Su, which crosses the stream about 25 km from Kaynûk.<sup>52</sup> In both cases, the road continues to the northwest for a few kilometers, and then turns to the west. The Mamluks could have then followed a route which works its way to the northwest through the mountains to Abulustayn. Before it reaches the plain of Abulustayn, the road splits, so the Mamluks could have approached the Abulustayn plain from the south or the southeast. Between the Gök Su and Abulustayn there are two places where the passage widens out to form an open area. Either of these could be the *waṭ'a* referred to in the sources. Somewhere along this pass through the mountains must have been the Aqcha Darband of the Mamluk sources. Perhaps a remnant of this name is found in Derbent Deresi, a valley about 25 km southeast of Abulustayn, although this may be just a generic name applied to this particular defile.<sup>53</sup> Assuming that the Mamluks took the first suggested route (i.e., crossing the Gök Su after some 15 km), the whole route from crossing the river to the plain of Abulustayn would have been about 70 km, which the Mamluks could have covered in the three days which the sources give for this march.<sup>54</sup>

The Mongol commanders in Rûm, Toqa and Tudawun, had received word from Lesser Armenia of the impending Mamluk offensive, and also it would seem of its intended route. These two commanders, as well as Toqa's brother Uruqtu, moved with their troops towards Abulustayn from their *qishlaq* (winter camp) at Qirshehir (140 km north of Nigde).<sup>55</sup> It seems that Tudawun exercised overall command. At some point they were joined by the Pervâne and Rûmî troops. Al-'Umarî writes that the night before the battle, the Mongols camped at Nahr Zamân, the source (*aşl*) of the Jayhân river. This

<sup>50</sup> 'Abd al-Raḥîm, in Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 186b.

<sup>51</sup> See the map cited in n. 48 above. Başpınar, the modern name of Kaynûk, does not appear on the map, but rather the village of Aksaray, which Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey*, 4:79, says is a former name for Başpınar.

<sup>52</sup> Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey*, 4:78; see also 2:452–3. On 4:77, Sinclair writes: "In recent times a track climbed northward directly from the site of Hadath toward the Elbistan plain . . . . Not far to the north-east of Hadath, moreover, a track from the Elbistan plain joined the medieval road to Malatya . . ." See also *ibid.*, 2:478–9.

<sup>53</sup> Hartmann (review of 'Umarî, ed. Taeschner, 972), seems to be referring to this Derbent. Cf. Krawulsky, *Iran*, 389, who identifies Aqcha Darband with the modern Akçadağ (38° 22' N, 37° 58' E), which seems unlikely, as this mountain is about 70 km in a straight line to the northwest of Abulustayn.

<sup>54</sup> This suggested path appears to be identical to Darb al-Ḥadath/al-Salam, an earlier name for a pass through the Nuruḥak Dağ; see Ory, "al-Ḥadath," *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 3:19–20.

<sup>55</sup> Aqsarāyî, 113 (see Smith, "Qishlāqs," n. 70); Rashîd al-Dîn, ed. 'Alfzādah, 3:144.



might be identified with the Khurman stream (Hormān Cayı), which flows into the Jayhān from the northwest;<sup>56</sup> the Mongols were thus riding into the Abulustayn plain from that direction. The Mongol troops (*al-mughul*) were arranged in eleven *ṭulbs* (squadrons), each with a thousand horsemen, or slightly more. A Georgian contingent – numbering 3000 men according to Bar Hebraeus – was organized as a separate *ṭulb*. Thus, Baybars al-Manṣūrī states that the Mongols had twelve divisions. The Rūmī troops, whose numbers are not given, were stationed away from the Mongol army. The Mongol commanders did not trust them and feared that they would act treacherously in the battle. It is not clear why they actually brought them along to the battlefield. Perhaps they thought that this was the best way of keeping an eye on them. The story reported by Bar Hebraeus and Ahrī that the Pervāne succeeded in getting the Mongol commanders drunk on the eve of the battle would seem to be mere slander, belied by the spirited fighting they and their soldiers demonstrated during the battle.<sup>57</sup>

It is worth dwelling on the size of the Mongol army. Previously, the Mamluk sources had spoken of the 30,000 troops which these commanders had brought with them to Rūm earlier that year. The Mongol army at this battle, however, was much smaller. It is unclear where the remainder of the Mongol army had been found. Perhaps part of the army had returned to the east. Alternatively, it was stationed elsewhere in Rūm. There is information that Qutu, the grandson (*sibt*) of Baiju, commanded a force which had a winter camp at Nigde, and was not present at the battle.<sup>58</sup> The fact that there is no more information on Qutu or his force in Rūm may indicate that this contingent was not very significant. Possibly, the original figure of 30,000 was simply inflated. Interestingly enough, Rashīd al-Dīn writes that Toqa, Uruqtu and Tudawun each commanded a *tūmen*.<sup>59</sup> It would seem, however, that Uruqtu – Toqa's brother – was subordinate in rank, since he is not mentioned by either the Mamluk or other Persian sources in this or any other capacity during the battle. In either case, this evidence is an indication that in reality a *tūmen* does not automatically equal 10,000 soldiers. Shāfi' b. 'Alī, in his biography of Qalawun, states that the Mongols only had 5000 horsemen in this battle.<sup>60</sup> This figure can be rejected as an attempt by this author to belittle the achievement of Qalawun's predecessor. As Baybars had with him the majority of the Egyptian and Syrian army, he thus probably enjoyed a numerical superiority of some degree over his opponents, who numbered some 14,000 troops all told (not counting the

<sup>56</sup> Instead of *Z-M-'N, R-M-'N* is read, from which *khurmān* (> Horman in modern Turkish) can be reconstructed; see Hartmann, review of 'Umarī, ed. Taeschner, 971; see also Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey*, 2:484–5.

<sup>57</sup> *Rawḍ*, 458–9; 'Umarī, ed. Taeschner, 6; Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 171–2; Yūnīnī, 3:176; *Zubda*, fol. 83a; Bar Hebraeus, 457 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 502); Ibn Bībī, 316–17; Ahrī, *Ta'rikh-i shaykh uways*, ed. van Loon, 138. <sup>58</sup> Āqsarāyī, 108; Smith, "Qishlaqs," forthcoming.

<sup>59</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:144.

<sup>60</sup> *Faḍl*, fol. 55b. Ibn Abd al-Rahīm, in Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 187a, gives the Mongols 7000 men; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 389, has that the Mongols numbered only 3000 horsemen.



Plate 3. Plain of Abulustayn (Elbistan), as seen from the east edge of the plain, just where land begins to rise. The picture faces south; on the left are the hills to the east (photograph: T.A. Sinclair)

Rūmīs, who did not participate in the fighting). Until the battle was joined, it would seem – at least according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir – that the Mongol commanders did not realize either the large size of the Mamluk army, or that the Sultan himself was leading the campaign.<sup>61</sup>

The battle began on Friday 10 Dhū 'l-qaʿda/15 April 1277. According to Ibn Shaddād (and those who follow him) the Mongols started the fighting by launching a concerted attack of their Left and smashing the Sultan's standard-bearers (*sanjaqiyya*). A group of Mongols succeeded in penetrating this unit and reached as far as the Mamluk Right. It would seem then that the Mamluk army had not had time to organize itself, because otherwise it is difficult to understand why the Sultan's standard-bearers were positioned in front of the Right. Dr. Thorau, on the other hand, suggests that this information can be interpreted to mean that the Mongols had smashed through the Mamluk Center (where the standard-bearers normally should have been) to the Mamluk Right. In any case, Baybars saw the severity of the situation, and set off himself, presumably accompanied by at least a few troops, to deal with the Mongols. In the midst of this, Baybars saw that the Mongol Right was giving the Mamluk Left a beating and the situation was critical. He thus ordered a

<sup>61</sup> *Rawḍ*, 458 (cf. ʿUmarī, ed. Taeschner, 6, in which this information is missing); Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 165a.

force from the army of Hama to reinforce his Left.<sup>62</sup> It was probably during the initial, critical stage of the battle that the bedouin irregulars in the Mamluk army melted away.<sup>63</sup> The situation having been stabilized, the entire Mamluk army then counter-attacked. Here perhaps the numerical advantage of the Mamluks began to influence the course of the battle, which now turned against the Mongols. Rather than retreating, the Mongol troops dismounted. Perhaps the reason for this move was that the Mongol horses had been exhausted, although it seems more likely that the Mongols were staying put in order to fight to the death.<sup>64</sup> The Mongols put up a fierce fight, but it was no use and in the end they were defeated. Some Mongols escaped and took up position in the hills. When these Mongols were surrounded, they also dismounted, and fought until they were killed.<sup>65</sup>

Most of the elements of the above account are found in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s version of the battle. According to him, however, the Mamluks poured out of the hills and attacked the Mongols first, led by some of the personal mamluks of the Sultan and others of his entourage.<sup>66</sup> Only subsequently are the Mamluks’ difficulties mentioned, and then briefly and in an unclear manner. This is certainly a deliberate rewriting of events to present the Sultan in a positive light. Presumably, to write that the battle initially did not go in his favor would have been deemed improper. Unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s work, Ibn Shaddād’s biography is sympathetic to its subject without being obsequious. There is no reason why he would have invented Baybars’s difficulties. The general concurrence of his account with some of the Persian sources only strengthens the conclusion that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir suppressed information that might have been considered unflattering.<sup>67</sup>

In spite of the fact that the Rūmī army had been placed off to the side, and evidently had not taken part in the fighting, a number of Rūmī amirs were taken captive. Others came of their own volition and submitted. The Pervāne himself escaped and headed for Qaysāriyya (see below), but his son Muḥaddhab al-Dīn was captured. A number of Mongol officers were also taken prisoner, and some were freed. Toqa was killed, while there is some disagreement as to whether Tudawun was captured or killed in battle. Ibn ‘Abd al-

<sup>62</sup> Thus in Ibn Shaddād, etc. *Mufaḍḍal*, 260, states that it was the prince of Hama himself who ordered this movement of troops. Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:199, writes that Baybars ordered this prince to go to the aid of the Mamluk Left. It would seem that Mufaḍḍal changed the account in his source.

<sup>63</sup> Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 259a. In general, Nuwayrī abridges *Rawḍ*, 476–8, but he adds this information that is not found in the original.

<sup>64</sup> On dismounting as a Mongol tactic, see below and ch. 10, p. 223.

<sup>65</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta’rikh*, 172; Yūnīnī, 3:176; Mufaḍḍal, 259–61; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fols. 52b–53a. Ibn Bibī, 317, writes of how the Mongols initially succeeded in splitting the Mamluk lines. Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:144, tells how the Mongols fought dismounted. Cf. the reconstruction of the battle in Thorau, *Baybars*, 238–9, and Martínez, “‘Il-Xānīd Army,” 156–8, which is based on D’Ohsson, *Histoire*, 3:482–9.

<sup>66</sup> *Rawḍ*, 259–60; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 165b; Maqrīzī, 1:268–9.

<sup>67</sup> For a decidedly unflattering account of Baybars’s behavior during the battle, see Yūnīnī, 3:273 (s.a. 676).

Zāhir writes that some of the Mongol amirs were spared, while others were put to death. The captive Mongol common soldiers were spared, two of whom – Qipchaq and Salār – became mamluks of Qalawun and subsequently rose to become important Mamluk amirs.<sup>68</sup>

Rashīd al-Dīn and Ibn Bibī report that most of the Mongol troops were killed in the battle. Bar Hebraeus states that 5000 Mongols and 2000 Georgians died in the fighting. Ibn Duqmaq writes that half of the Mongol force was killed while the remainder fled the battlefield. An interesting figure is provided in Ibn Shaddād. Some two weeks later, when Baybars was on his way home from Rūm, he passed by the battlefield and ordered a count of Mongol dead. The number was 6770 Mongols (*min al-mughul*). It appears that Mamluk casualties were relatively few.<sup>69</sup>

The day after the battle Baybars set off for the Seljuq capital of Qaysāriyya. During the march, there had been some apprehension of a Mongol ambush. Precautions were taken, but these proved unnecessary. Sunqur al-Ashqar had already set off in that direction immediately after the battle in pursuit of those Mongols who had succeeded in escaping the carnage. He came upon a group of Mongols, who evidently had not participated in the battle, and their families. Some Mongols were captured, but under cover of the approaching night the remainder were able to escape. Sunqur reached Qaysāriyya, bringing an *amān* (guarantee of safety) for the local inhabitants and orders that markets be set up outside the city. Dirhams carrying the name of Baybars were also to be struck, signifying his rule over the country.<sup>70</sup> The Sultan and the main part of the army reached the city on Wednesday, 15 Dhū 'l-qa'da/20 April, where they were warmly received by the population. Baybars spent the next few days in impressive ceremonies, but he was surely aware that he was still a long way from gaining real control over Rūm.<sup>71</sup>

The Pervāne, who had done so much to bring Baybars to Rūm, now kept his distance. Either immediately after the defeat or even during the fighting itself, he fled to Qaysāriyya. Taking the Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn, he made his way to his stronghold of Dokat. From there, he wrote to Baybars, now in Qaysāriyya, congratulating him on his sitting on the Seljuq throne. Baybars in turn sent back and called on the Pervāne to present himself, in order that he could be rewarded and reconfirmed in his position. The Pervāne answered that he would arrive in fifteen days. Ibn Shaddād adds that the Pervāne's intention

<sup>68</sup> *Rawḍ*, 461–3; Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 173–4, 336–7 (for the fate of the Rūmī prisoners); *Zubda*, fols. 83b–84a. On Tudawun's fate, see below.

<sup>69</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:144; Ibn Bibī, 317; Bar Hebraeus, 457 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 502); *Rawḍ*, 460; Ibn Duqmaq, 282. Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 172–3, 178; cf. Mufaḍḍal, 268, who adds that the number of Rūmī and Georgian dead almost equaled that of the Mongols.

<sup>70</sup> As far as I know, no exemplars of Baybars's dirhams struck in Rūm have come to light.

<sup>71</sup> *Rawḍ*, 463–7; Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 175–6 (whence Yūnīnī, 3:180). These two sources give detailed, but not identical itineraries of Baybars's march to Qaysāriyya. Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fols. 167b–169b (whence Maqrīzī, 1:629–31), conflates these two accounts (also later for the Sultan's return, see below). See also: Hartmann's review of 'Umari, ed. Taeschner, 972–3.

was to keep Baybars in Rūm until Abagha could arrive with a large army and deal with the invaders. Baybars, however, was not taken in. The same author recounts that the Mongol general Tudawun, now in Mamluk captivity, was interviewed by Sunqur al-Ashqar and informed him of what the Pervāne had in mind. It is not clear, however, why a Mongol officer would have wanted to tip off his opponent to a plan that might have led to rectifying the recent Mongol defeat. In addition, some sources report his death in the battle. In any event, it is clear that Baybars understood that he could expect no assistance from the Pervāne, as originally hoped.<sup>72</sup>

At first glance, the Pervāne's behavior seems difficult to explain. Granted that Baybars's invasion had caught him off guard, and he had no choice but to accompany the Mongol commanders off to battle. But Rūm was now rid of the Mongol overlords, and Baybars was ostensibly willing to recognize the Pervāne in his former position, as *de facto* ruler of the kingdom. Perhaps the Pervāne found the reality of Baybars's lordship too chafing. Or possibly, and this would seem to be more likely, the Pervāne saw that even in the short run Baybars would be unable to hold Rūm, and one way or the other the Mongols would regain the country. The Pervāne thus thought it best to ingratiate himself with the Īlkhān by drawing the Mamluks into a confrontation with a fresh Mongol army.<sup>73</sup>

Besides the failure of the Pervāne to rally to the Sultan's banner, other no less important factors caused Baybars to withdraw from Qaysāriyya. Supplies were running low, equipment was in need of repair and the prospect of the imminent arrival of a new Mongol army while he was far from his bases convinced Baybars that he should return to Syria soon. On Tuesday, 20 Dhū 'l-qa'da/25 April, the Mamluk army set off for home. En route, the commander of the Mamluk vanguard, 'Izz al-Dīn Aybeg al-Shaykhī, deserted to the Mongols. The reason given for this desertion was Aybeg's desire to revenge himself for a beating which Baybars had earlier dealt him. Aybeg later provided Abagha with information on the battle. While marching, Baybars received another letter from the Pervāne calling on him to delay his departure. The Sultan's answer was full of reproaches for the Pervāne's failure to fulfill his part of the agreement. At the same time, Baybars let it be known that he was heading for Siwās, so as to mislead the Pervāne (and thus the Mongols) as to his true intentions. Instead, the Mamluk army marched quickly to the southwest, taking a different route than before, probably in order to find fresh foodstuffs. On the way, Taybars al-Wazīrī was sent with a force to raid an Armenian town called al-Rummāna (?), location unknown), whose inhabitants had hidden some Mongols there when the Mamluks had earlier marched this way. Baybars passed the battle site at Abulustayn, and soon reached the pass

<sup>72</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 176–7 (whence Yūnīnī, 3:181–2; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fols. 169a–170b; Maqrīzī, 1:631). The account in *Rawḍ*, 467–8 is substantially the same, but some details differ.

<sup>73</sup> See the comments in Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 287, 289; Thorau, *Baybars*, 239.



by which he had originally entered the country. The Sultan remained with the rearguard until the army entered the pass.<sup>74</sup> The march through the pass was accomplished with some difficulty. By 6 Dhū 'l-ḥijja/16 May, the army was at Ḥārim, where it rested and reorganized. At this point, envoys of Muḥammad Beg, the chief of the Qaramanid Türkmen, reached the Sultan. These Türkmen, having earlier declared their loyalty to Baybars, had raised the banner of revolt against the Mongols and succeeded in taking Konya. Baybars was certainly in no position to assist them now except with words of encouragement. After celebrating 'Īd al-Aḏḥā (10 Dhū'l-ḥijja/20 May), Baybars moved south and reached Damascus in early Muḥarram 676/early June.<sup>75</sup>

Abagha, having received word of the Mongol defeat from both the Pervāne and Mongol survivors, soon came to Rûm at the head of a large army. On the other hand, Rashīd al-Dīn states that the Īlkhān set out only in Ṣafar 676 (ca. July 1277). He contradicts himself, however, by saying that this was in the spring. The events described in Ibn Shaddād also belie this chronology. When he arrived in the country, Abagha was met by the Pervāne and Ghiyāth al-Dīn. Any doubts that Abagha harbored as to the Pervāne's treachery were removed when the Mamluk renegade Aybeg al-Shaykhī informed him of the details of his contacts with Baybars. For the time being, however, Abagha suspended judgement on the Pervāne, perhaps – as Professor Cahen suggests – because he realized that no one else could rule Rûm as efficiently as he. Surveying the battlefield, Abagha was furious. In revenge, he ordered the massacre of the Muslim civilian population in eastern Rûm and large numbers were killed. According to Ibn al-Shaddād, Abagha sent an army of 30,000 towards Syria, but upon comprehending the size of Baybars's army (again, from information received from Aybeg al-Shaykhī), he called his forces back. Rashīd al-Dīn writes that Abagha contemplated sending an army to Syria that summer, but his officers persuaded him to wait until the winter; this expedition, of course, was never sent. Abagha's army was having logistical difficulties of its own, and this prompted the Īlkhān to call back his troops and subsequently to withdraw from the country with a good deal of his army. To restore order, which included putting down the Qaramanid rising, Abagha entrusted the country to his brother Qonghurtai and Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, the *ṣāhib-dīwān*. Abagha

<sup>74</sup> In al-Anṣārī's military guide (*A Muslim Manual of War*, ed. and tr. G. T. Scanlon [Cairo, 1961], 57), Baybars's wait at the pass for the completion of his army's entrance through it is given as an example of behavior to be adopted by commanders in similar circumstances. *Heṭ'um*, 2:179, wishfully writes that at this point the Mamluks were attacked and defeated by a Mongol force.

<sup>75</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 177–9 (whence Yūnīnī, 3:182–3); *Rawḍ*, 467–71. Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 172a, writes that it was reported that Baybars only ordered that his dead be buried, while Maqrīzī, 1:632, reports this, adding that this was done to give the impression that only a few Mamluk soldiers were killed relative to the many fallen Mongols. For the Qaramanid uprising, see: Ibn Shaddād, 177, 179–81; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 289; Ibn Bībī, 321–6. Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 172b (whence Maqrīzī, 1:633) adds information about the envoys from the Qaramanids not found in Ibn Shaddād.



then returned to his *ordo*, along with the Pervāne. At first Abagha evidently intended to turn a blind eye to the Pervāne's crimes, but the unequivocal evidence and the outcry from among the Mongol nobles and, especially, the noblewomen, convinced him to have him put to death. Ibn Shaddād states that the execution took place during the first ten days of Muḥarram 676/4–14 June 1277; Rashīd al-Dīn dates it at the beginning of Rabiʿ II/ca. early September. According to Hetʿum, as an act of revenge, the Pervāne's flesh was eaten by Abagha and the senior Mongols.<sup>76</sup>

The actions of Aybeg al-Shaykhī would seem to have served Mamluk interests quite well. The information he conveyed blackened the Pervāne even more in Abagha's eyes. This could have been Baybars's retribution for the Pervāne's disregard for the deal between them. Likewise, Aybeg's intelligence on the size of the Mamluk army conveniently helped to convince the Īlkhān to call back his army. Rashīd al-Dīn throws some more light on this character: Aybeg [al-]Shāmī came in Ṣafar 676/ca. July 1277 with ten men. After a warm reception, he was made governor of Malaṭya. When he arrived there, however, he expropriated a large amount of money from the population and fled back to Syria.<sup>77</sup> Perhaps, therefore, Aybeg's desertion had been staged by the Sultan, in order to feed specific information to the Īlkhān. Aybeg having accomplished his mission, took the first opportunity to return to the Sultanate. The fact that Aybeg was one of Baybars's cronies as early as 657/1258–9 does lend some credibility to this story.<sup>78</sup> In lieu of more concrete evidence, however, this remains not much more than an intriguing hypothesis.

Ibn Bībī and Rashīd al-Dīn state that when Abagha arrived in Rūm he sent a threatening and disparaging letter to Baybars, in which the Sultan was challenged to a battle with the Mongol army.<sup>79</sup> The Mamluk sources make no mention of this letter. Perhaps in the confusion after Baybars's death the letter was lost in the shuffle. It is difficult to imagine that two independent, albeit pro-Mongol, sources would simultaneously fabricate a letter. On the other hand, the veracity of Rashīd al-Dīn's detailed answer from Baybars, who conveniently blamed the Pervāne for the invasion of Rūm, might well be doubted, since had the letter arrived, been read by the Sultan and been answered, it could be expected that some record would have been found in at least one of the Mamluk sources.

Baybars, soon after the return to Damascus, had received word that the Mongols were planning an invasion of Syria. After consulting with the senior amirs, the decision was taken to prepare the army for an expedition to the

<sup>76</sup> Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 289–92; Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 181–4; cf. Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fols. 172a–173a, who has additional information; *Zubda*, fol. 85a; Mufaḍḍal, 271 and n. 1; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:144–7; Bar Hebraeus, 457–8 (= Ibn al- Ibrī, 502–3); Ibn Bībī, 318–20; Boyle, “Īl-Khāns,” 361; Hetʿum, 2:180.

<sup>77</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:147, who seems to be consistently several months behind Ibn Shaddād. <sup>78</sup> Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:38; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 7:100.

<sup>79</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:145–6; Ibn Bībī, 319.

north. Before any real action could be taken, news came that Abagha had called off his campaign and thus Baybars did the same. The Sultan could now relax with a clear mind after the exertions of the previous months. His death on 28 Muḥarram 676/1 July 1277 took everybody by surprise, and occasioned a cloud of rumor and innuendo which has yet to be completely dispersed.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>80</sup> Thorau, *Baybars*, 240–3, 268; Irwin, *Middle East*, 57–8.