

The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History

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CHAPTER

4 The Crusade Begins

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Abstract

King Louis IX of France departed on the Tunis Crusade in March 1270. The campaign was beset with challenges from the outset. Louis had contracted with the Genoese for an expeditionary fleet, but they were two months late delivering the boats. Bored and drunk crusaders rioted in the streets of Aigues-Mortes as they waited out the long delay. When the crusade did set sail, it made for Cagliari on Sardinia rather than the Near East. Shocked by their arrival, the Pisan garrison that controlled the city at first refused the crusaders entrance inside its walls. At a council of war held on the king's warship *Montjoie*, the decision to divert the crusade to Tunis was announced to a stunned rank and file. A peaceful port city was about to move from the periphery to the center of the history of the crusades.

Keywords: King Louis IX of France, al-Mustansir, emir of Tunis, Carthage, Sardinia, Aigues-Mortes, Cagliari, crusade warfare, medieval ship, conversion

Subject: European History, History of Religion, Medieval and Renaissance History (500 to 1500)

King Louis IX had been trying to make good for the disaster of his first crusade for the better part of two decades by the time he assembled his family and leading barons at Saint-Denis in March 1270 for the launch of his second. The chance for redemption was now at hand. For all who took the spiritual dimension of crusading seriously, waging holy war was a penitential act. In order to be efficacious, it had to be carried out in a state of spiritual purity. As the formula of the Holy Land crusade indulgence ran, only those who were "truly penitent" could earn full forgiveness of the punishment due to sin.[1] To achieve this status, Louis had remade himself and his realm since his return from Syria.

These efforts intensified in the run-up to the crusade. To win prayers for the new campaign, he made gifts from the relics of Christ's passion, which were among the most precious he possessed and for which he had built Sainte-Chapelle. The bishop of Clermont, the Dominicans of Rouen, and a convent in Blois received these spiritual treasures.[2] Louis also toured the kingdom, visiting areas that had not seen much of him before: Tours, Ham, Vendôme, and Meaux. As he traveled, he dispensed justice to his subjects. To ease the burden of his presence on the communities he visited, he reduced the traditional charge on a town for hosting the royal court—the *gîte*.[3] No one—save perhaps the clergy, from whom he continued to collect the tenth—could accuse him of financially exploiting his people for the sake of the crusade this time around. His Christian people, that is. He imposed another *captio* (taking) on Jewish moneylending, and stepped up conversion efforts among the Jews of Paris, compelling them to attend sermons by the Dominican and converted Jew Brother ↳ Paul Christian.[4] He had done everything he could to be ready. All that remained were the rituals of departure.

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At Saint-Denis, he gathered his sons around him. Jean Tristan, count of Nevers, Pierre, count of Alençon, and Philippe le Hardi (the bold), the heir to the throne, would all be going on the crusade. This in itself was a testament to how important the campaign was to Louis. When King Jaume I of Aragon had set out on his crusade, he had brought his illegitimate sons along while prudently leaving his heir, Pere, behind. If Louis's

crusade went badly, the Capetian dynasty faced extinction. In the church, Louis prayed for a better result. He heard mass sitting among the monks in the choir, below the raised seat of the abbot. When it was done he received the pilgrim's scrip (a small purse) and staff. Then the banner of Saint-Denis—the oriflamme—was taken up from the altar. This was the standard of the French army on the march. Louis recommended the kingdom to the protection of its patron saint, a gesture he meant literally.[5] Along with Simon, lord of Nesle, he appointed Mathieu of Vendôme, abbot of Saint-Denis, as regent in his absence.[6] The abbot blessed the king, his sons, and other leading barons before sending them on their way.

They began the journey to the Holy Land—which is still where everyone thought they were going—that same day. The king spent the first night of the march in the forest of Vincennes. It was a place of deep significance to him. It was there, often sitting under a tree, that he had built his reputation as a just king to his Christian subjects. The next morning, he said goodbye to his wife, Marguerite of Provence. She had come on his first crusade and helped save it from ruin. She had held on to Damietta after Louis was captured in the delta, thus preserving the key bargaining chip that enabled the crusaders to ransom themselves. She had pleaded with the Italian merchants not to abandon the city from her sickbed, having just given birth to Jean Tristan, the future count of Nevers who was now joining his father on the new campaign. It is hard to imagine what she felt as she watched Louis lead her son away. As it turned out, she would not see either of them again.[7]

From Vincennes, Louis progressed slowly toward Aigues-Mortes. The May 10 due date for the arrival of the
p. 102 Genoese fleet meant he was in no hurry. He passed through Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, Melun, Sens, ↳ Auxerre, and Vézelay. By mid-April, he had reached Cluny, where he celebrated Easter and stayed for four days. From there, he picked up the Rhône River valley, following it south through Mâcon, Lyon, and Vienne, before crossing the river at Beaucaire and turning southwest toward Aigues-Mortes and the Mediterranean.[8]

Aigues-Mortes

Louis arrived to find that few others had kept to the schedule announced two years before. He was not happy to see so few crusaders in the port. When he was out riding with the bishop of Paris a few days after his arrival, he complained, like the older man he was, about how "few men today…have the needs of the cross and Holy Church at heart."[9] In fact, it was just as well that not many crusaders had arrived, because there were no ships to sail them anywhere. The Genoese fleet was nowhere to be seen.

Soon enough, crusaders, if not ships, began to appear. The army that assembled for Louis's second crusade was diverse and fairly large by the standards of the day. At its core were the king's family and household: his brother Alphonse, his sons, his daughter Isabelle, countess of Champagne and queen of Navarre, his son-in-law Thibaut V, count of Champagne and king of Navarre, his nephew Robert of Artois, the knights and longtime counselors Pierre le Chambellan (the chamberlain), Alphonse of Brienne, Bouchard of Vendôme, Gautier of Nemours, Herbert of Villiers, and Érard of Valery among many others. Joining them were the leaders of aristocratic French families that had filled the ranks of crusading expeditions for generations: the counts of Flanders, Saint-Pol, Ponthieu, Guines, Eu, Dreux, Fors, Luxembourg, Auxerre, Dammartin, Roussillon, and Brittany. Although Queen Marguerite stayed home, many French noblewomen participated in the campaign, not just Isabelle of Navarre but also the countess of Poitiers, the countess of Artois, and Isabel of Aragon, Philippe le Hardi's wife.[10] There were contingents from outside the northern French lands as well, from Provence, Catalonia, and Frisia. Delayed by heavy winds off Borkum, the Frisians had only
p. 103 reached ↳ Flanders by May 1270.[11] Prince Edward of England, to whom Louis had loaned 70,000 *livres tournois* for expenses, was not due in Aigues-Mortes until late August. Given the size of the contingents involved, they may have needed to stagger the departures of the French and English–Gascon expeditions, even if it meant a less concentrated military strike against Baybars.[12] Other crusaders made arrangements to depart from Marseille, while Louis may also have brought a small force of Turcopoles, Turkish-speaking (but not necessarily Muslim) mounted archers who were often employed as auxiliaries in the crusader states.[13] When the Genoese finally appeared, they brought a sizable force of sailors and marines. Their plan was to regain a foothold in Acre, where they had been losing ground to Venice and Pisa.[14] The best estimates we have for the size of Louis's second crusade place it between 10,000 and 15,000 participants.[15]

Aigues-Mortes was not big enough to hold all the crusaders who had gathered there. Many barons fled the crowds and growing summer heat for villages above the port, where they could wait for the Genoese in greater comfort. Alphonse of Poitiers chose Aimargues, while Louis stayed in Vauvert.[16] The delay allowed

another diplomatic embassy from Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos to catch up with the king before he set sail. The envoys' request, and what they could offer in exchange, remained the same as before: church union with Rome in return for restraining Charles of Anjou. Whether either of these conditions could be met was debatable. Although Pope Clement IV had died a year and a half earlier, the College of Cardinals had yet to elect his successor. While the envoys regarded Louis as the de facto leader of western Christendom during the papal interregnum, he explained to them that he alone could not end the schism. Nor was it clear that he could keep Charles away from Byzantium. As of mid-May 1270, Louis had failed to extract a commitment from Charles to join his own crusade, let alone a promise not to pursue other interests in the eastern Mediterranean. What Louis could do, though, was pass along Michael's request for negotiations to the cardinals sitting in conclave in Viterbo. This was a greater concession than it might seem at first glance. The
p. 104 envoys could return home safe in the knowledge ↳ that the king was open to further discussions over union and would not be diverting his army to Constantinople in a replay of the Fourth Crusade.[17]

From Vauvert, Louis moved to Saint-Gilles, where he celebrated Pentecost on June 9. By now, the ships had arrived in Aigues-Mortes, but they still needed fitting out for the sea journey. In the king's absence, the situation in the port city had deteriorated. The footsoldiers fought among themselves as they waited around for something to happen. A pitched battle broke out in the streets between northern French soldiers and a momentarily united confederacy of Provençals and Catalans. In the "raging tumult" that ensued, the French drove the Provençals and the Catalans back toward the harbor. When the southerners jumped in the water and tried to swim for the boats, the French followed them in up to their necks. If the chronicler Guillaume of Nangis is to be believed, over a hundred men died in the battle. He blamed the violence on "the evil-doing of malignant spirits," though lingering tensions over the Albigensian Crusades (1209–29) and Aragonese–Capetian rivalry over Provence might have played a part as well. When Louis learned what had happened, he rushed back to town and had the instigators hanged from a gibbet. The episode was taken as a bad omen for the coming campaign.[18]

Breaches were opening in the united front Louis had hoped to present to Baybars. Over the last few days before departure, the king did what he could to repair the damage. Once the ships were ready, he waived the fine the Genoese owed him for being late, which was not a bad idea since he would soon be entrusting himself to their care on the open seas.[19] He also wrote to his regents Mathieu of Vendôme and Simon of Nesle with some final instructions for the kingdom. Since his return from Egypt, he had taken harsh measures to suppress blasphemy. With departure in sight, he feared he had not done enough. "If perhaps regarding this," he worried, "some reform or addition needs to be made, the better to punish this divine offense, you should be zealous to carry out what could effectively abolish from our kingdom whatever manner of habitual sin, or the corruption of such a criminal habit." Prostitution remained a concern as well. He ordered the regents to "entirely exterminate" prostitutes from the realm, while also taking care to "fully purge" the land of "shameful things, shameful men, and public malefactors."[20] To the last, he struggled to realize his vision of a kingdom morally purified before God.

On July 1, 1270, Louis heard mass and boarded the *Montjoie*. The next morning, with his son Pierre, count of
p. 105 Alençon, he set sail for Sardinia, ↳ where the fleet would halt for a council of war. Philippe le Hardi and Jean Tristan sailed with their families on their own ships. They found the Gulf of Lion every bit as difficult as Jaume of Aragon had eighteen months before. After two days of good sailing, they ran into foul weather. The sea calmed again once they left the Gulf, but they encountered more storms as they neared Sardinia. As the ships were tossed about in the high seas, the water supply became contaminated and many crusaders fell ill. Louis decided it was a good time to modify his will.[21]

After five days had passed with no sign of landfall, the northern French crusaders, landlubbers all, began to wonder if the Genoese sailors knew what they were doing. For the first time, a French admiral was in command of the fleet. It is not clear, however, whether Florent of Varennes, a knight from Picardy, had any nautical experience. Genoese crews were working the boats and Genoese captains were sailing them. The crusaders grumbled that they should have reached Cagliari in four days and that some of the ships had become lost at sea. In response, the Genoese mariners produced a map so the king could see where they were. This is the first appearance in a medieval French source of a map being used for naval navigation.[22] Reassured that they were drawing close to Cagliari, Louis allowed the sailors to ride the waves at night under low sail to avoid foundering on the shore. Two days later, on July 8, the *Montjoie* made anchor. After eight days and many storms, with no fresh water and numerous invalids, the crusaders had completed the first stage of their voyage.[23]

Florent of Varennes went to the citadel above the port to ask for fresh water and vegetables. The Sardinian garrison was not welcoming. He was not allowed into the castle and went away with just a few supplies. The next day, Florent came back, this time with Pierre le Chambellan. They asked to bring the sick ashore to recuperate. The governor of the citadel hesitated over this modest request. He could allow the king and some of his men into the citadel, but only on condition that they could protect him and his men from the Genoese. The castle belonged to the Pisans, archenemies of Genoa, enthusiastic Ghibellines, and, until April 1270, dogged opponents of Charles of Anjou. Without penetrating Muslim territory, Louis had led the crusade into a hostile environment.

p. 106 The governor eventually allowed the sick to be housed in a Franciscan convent located outside the castle, closer to the harbor. The Genoese stayed on the ships. Louis and his counselors were allowed to come ashore, but they found the houses unsuitable, so they remained on their boats. Local residents provided a market, but food was scarce and the prices high: a chicken that could be bought for four *deniers* of Genoese money before the crusaders arrived now cost two *sous*.[24]

The problems that the crusade encountered in Cagliari were predictable. Louis and his advisors knew that Genoa and Pisa were rivals: they had been trying to broker a peace among the maritime republics for years. Louis was also aware of Charles's own designs on Sardinia and Pisan hostility toward them. On the logistical side, it is not clear that anyone in Cagliari knew the crusade was coming. Sardinia was not prosperous: how could it resupply an army of 10,000–15,000 people without advanced warning? The contrast with Louis's first crusade is stark. He had stockpiled grain in Cyprus in such quantities and for so long that the piles, with the wheat sprouted on the tops, looked like small hills from a distance.[25] Nothing like that was in place in Cagliari. There is a surprisingly improvised quality to the opening stages of the king's final crusade, which suggests that the decision to stop in Cagliari was made at the last minute.

By July 11, 1270, the rest of the crusaders had arrived. Louis called together his advisors, the leading barons, and the papal legate, Raoul Grosparmi, cardinal-bishop of Albano, for a council of war on the *Montjoie*. Over July 12 and 13, Louis consulted with them about "where they could go that would be to the greater profit of Holy Church and for the exaltation of the Christian faith," and urged them "that they should take care according to the times and the state of affairs, and that they discern what would best profit men."[26] These words come from the chronicler Primat, our best source for the council, and they are worth taking seriously. In Primat's account, Louis defined the mission in a general way. He did not ask the crusaders how they could defeat Baybars, or even reconquer the Holy Land, but rather how they could aid the church, exalt the faith, and gain profit for themselves under current circumstances. Reframing the goal of the crusade in these broader terms paved the way for the king's next move: the suggestion to bring the army to Tunis before moving on to Egypt or Syria. This idea would not have come as a total surprise to many on the deck of the
p. 107 *Montjoie*. Sardinia made little sense as ↳ a halt on the way to the Levant. More suitable options included Cyprus, where Louis had stayed for several months in 1249 en route to Damietta, or Syracuse, where he had been planning to meet Charles of Anjou until late May 1270. Stopping in Cagliari implied that the crusade was headed for the central Mediterranean. While some at the meeting may have guessed what was afoot, one of them knew for certain. Louis had had to tell the legate in advance, because only he could settle a point that was bound to arise: if the crusaders went to Tunis, would they gain the indulgence for aiding the Holy Land? It was only after the cardinal-bishop of Albano had reassured them on this front that discussion of the proposal could begin.

Consultation was an integral feature of medieval European military culture. Louis adhered to this principle to a degree that, to modern eyes at least, verged on the impractical. During the battle of Mansura on his first crusade, he had pulled his advisors out of combat for extended tactical discussions on several occasions, even when acting faster might have averted the disaster. He simply would not give orders without the agreement of his counselors. However predetermined the outcome of the council of Cagliari may appear, it was not an empty exercise. Louis's proposal was unprecedented: no crusade had ever gone to Tunis before. He needed his leading barons to agree to the plan. After "several opinions" had been expressed over two full days of discussion, they did.[27]

There were several reasons why the barons might have found the plan appealing. Tunis was closer to France than Syria or Egypt. If the expedition did not advance beyond this initial stage, they could be home within a year, rather than the two or three that the Holy Land campaign would require. Tunis was also known to be

rich; its reputation as a commercial powerhouse had begun to spread north of the Alps. At the same time, it was not considered aggressive or confrontational. Al-Mustansir's military campaigns were directed against rivals in Ifriqiya and the Maghreb, not Europe. The plunder gained from conquering the city might be enough to make their fortunes and fund the next phase of the campaign. The parallel with the Fourth Crusade—when some northern French crusaders agreed to support a Byzantine pretender's bid for the throne on the promise of a massive cash reward—is obvious. Tunis also had the advantage of not being Egypt. The Egyptian campaign was not a distant memory for the barons. Some of them had lived through its
p. 108 horrors—the disease, the near-starvation, the humiliations and deprivations of captivity—and all of them ↳ knew someone who had. In the meantime, Baybars had strengthened the country's defenses and degraded those of the crusader states. Tunis was a softer target. Under the circumstances, it was easy to become convinced of something that was not really true: that al-Mustansir was Baybars's ally and supplied him with weapons and soldiers, and that a strike against the emir would eliminate a source of aid to the crusader states' greatest enemy.[28]

With the first goal of the campaign decided, the expedition prepared to leave Cagliari. Rumors were circulating that some crusaders were planning to torch the place before they left. Primat was sorry that Charles of Anjou had not been around to deal with the garrison, which he would have destroyed "in only a moment." Thankful that Louis was not willing to turn his arms on fellow Christians, a delegation from the citadel presented the king with twenty jars of Greek wine. He refused the gift and asked them to look after the invalids he was leaving behind. On July 15, 1270, the fleet sailed for Tunis.[29]

Tunis

A smooth and rapid crossing swept the crusaders into the port of Tunis just two days later. The Hafsid capital was taken by surprise. European ships were still moored in Tunis's harbor and European merchants were working in its *funduks*. Genoese traders watched their compatriots arrive with crossbows and war galleys, ready to place them and their trading partners under siege.[30]

There is never a good time to be attacked by a large naval expedition from overseas. That said, al-Mustansir was probably in a better position to withstand this kind of event than he ever had been before. In 1267, workers completed the restoration of an old Roman aqueduct that was the major water source for Tunis. Over seventeen years of construction, they had repaired the arches and conduits and added two extensions, one emptying into a reservoir near the Great Mosque, the other into the pleasure garden at Abu Fihr. The water supply was still far from ample, but it was improved; Tunis would be able to withstand a longer siege as a result.[31]

The following year saw the resolution of another domestic challenge: Dawawida Bedouin resistance to
p. 109 Hafsid rule. Despite two unsuccessful ↳ revolts, the Dawawida remained a force in their strongholds south of Qasantina. Fear of another uprising was one reason al-Mustansir had not intervened more directly in Sicily during the Hohenstaufen insurgency. Back in Ifriqiya, the shoe was on the other foot. Over the course of 1268, the emir executed a classic counterinsurgency strategy against the tribe. First, he assembled a coalition of rivals who stood to gain from their downfall. These included the Bedouin Kuʿub, Dabbab, and some clans of the Banu Hilal, along with the Berber Sadwikish. Combining these with his Christian mercenary guard, he led the allies against the Dawawida and drove them south into the Sahara. Once the Bedouin were removed from their traditional homeland, he tried to divide them by luring one of their factions to his side. To maintain the facade of official intransigence toward them, he opened up a back channel line of communication. He asked Abu Hilal-Iyad, an Almohad shaykh and the Hafsid governor of Bijaya, to cultivate a leading member of the tribe. Abu Hilal found his man in Mahdi b. ʿAsakir, the head of the Banu ʿAsakir, one of the two main branches of the Dawawida. In return for being named chief of the entire tribe, Mahdi b. ʿAsakir agreed to settle with al-Mustansir. This left the emir free to deal with the other branch of the Dawawida, the Banu Masʿud, who were now dangerously isolated. Their leader, Shibl b. Musa, led a delegation to the emir's camp at Zaghaya, which included his brother and several cousins. On their arrival, al-Mustansir arrested them and had their baggage pillaged; he then had their heads cut off and sent south for public display in Biskra. Having decapitated the leadership, he launched a surprise attack against the remainder of the Banu Masʿud and drove them from their camp, taking large quantities of plunder in the process. The survivors of the assault fled west into exile with the ʿAbd al-Wadids of Tlemcen. Al-Mustansir returned to Tunis, momentarily free of internal threats to his rule.[32]

External threats were another matter, however. Under al-Mustansir, peaceful trade overseas had funded state-building at home. As 1269 turned into 1270, this pattern threatened to reverse itself. No sooner had he marginalized his major Bedouin rivals than relations with the Capetians deteriorated. The embassy al-Mustansir had sent to Naples and Paris in autumn 1269 had not resolved the diplomatic crisis. Nor, apparently, had Brother Berenger's visit to Tunis in May 1270. The risk of an attack from either Charles or Louis was remote, but it was not beyond the bounds of possibility. It is unlikely that Brother Berenger had
p. 110 hidden from al-Mustansir the extent of the military build-up on Sicily and the ↳ (presumed) imminent arrival of Louis's crusade there: this information was a source of leverage in the negotiation over the wheat import license. Louis's long procession southward from Saint-Denis to Aigues-Mortes had also allowed time for rumors about his intentions to circulate in the Islamic Mediterranean. Ibn Khaldun reported that "these preparations [of Louis IX] spread great inquietude along all frontiers of importance."[33] By late May 1270, Baybars had received intelligence that Louis was on the move.[34] Given his own difficulties with the French king and his brother, it was only prudent for al-Mustansir to take precautions against an external attack. He ordered the walls of coastal towns to be repaired and grain depots to be set up in the major seaports. He may also have restricted European merchants from trading inland, although they remained active in Tunis.[35]

Al-Mustansir's major concern on the eve of the crusade was the reliability of his army. Reflecting the social, ethnic, linguistic, and tribal diversity of the polity he ruled, it was heterogeneous in the extreme. Usually he liked it that way, because the diversity prevented one group from dominating the rest and allowed him to play off the various factions against each other. Arabic sources describe six major components of the military force he could deploy against the crusade: (1) the Almohad shaykhs and their followers, the ruling group from which the Hafsids had originally emerged; (2) the Bedouin tribes who had rallied to the emirate during the campaign against the Dawawida, such as the Kuʿub, Dabbab, and perhaps some elements of the Banu Hilal; (3) Berber tribes, including the Sadwikish, Wulhasa, and Huwara; (4) an Andalusi contingent under the command of Ibn Abi al-Husayn, which had been formed by Abu Zakariya and retained by al-Mustansir; (5) the Christian mercenary guard; and (6) the *jund*, which consisted of small security details stationed in Tunis and assigned to the more important provincial centers, such as Bijaya; they were more akin to a police force than an army unit. Other elements could be added to this list as well, although firm evidence of them operating against the crusaders is lacking. The Hafsid emirs often employed the *Ghuzz* (Turkish archers), Christian freedmen and renegades (as distinct from the free Europeans who served in the elite mercenary guard), and an urban militia (the so-called *ʿabid al-mahkzan*: "slaves of the government").[36]

The groups varied in their allegiance to the emir. The Bedouin tribes were the least committed to his
p. 111 dynastic project, followed closely by the ↳ Almohad shaykhs. The most loyal were the outsiders who could not afford to defy him: the Andalusis and the Christian mercenaries. A complicating factor in this conflict was the Latin Christian religious identification that the mercenaries shared with the invaders. The political differences, however, were stark. The mercenaries were mainly aligned with the Aragonese–Catalan–Hohenstaufen axis, while the crusaders were drawn primarily from Capetian and Angevin lands. Relations among these groups were more nuanced than a simple binary can express, but the opposition was strong enough to convince Jaume of Aragon, Louis's putative partner in the Holy Land crusade, to dispatch Catalan knights to Tunis once he realized it might fall to the French.[37] The mercenaries, in fact, would oppose the crusade more energetically than some of the emir's Muslim contingents.

Carthage

Al-Mustansir faced a predictably divided council as he grappled with how to respond to the crusade. His Almohad advisors urged him to oppose a crusader landing. Once the Franks had consumed the food and water on their boats, they would have to withdraw. The Andalusis saw the situation differently. If the crusaders moved off Tunis, they might go to another town on the coast that was not as well protected, take it, and launch their invasion of the emirate from there. It would be better to let them come ashore where they would meet the stiffest resistance. The Andalusis also pointed out that it was difficult to land a large army in front of Tunis. The medieval city stood behind a lake that lay between it and the Mediterranean. It appeared as if the crusaders were going to disembark on the narrow peninsula that in turn separated the lake from the sea, which is known today as the Halq al-Wadi, or La Goulette. Why not let them set up camp there and suffer the consequences? To his later regret, al-Mustansir accepted this line of argument. He would not oppose a crusader landing.[38]

The opening stage of the Tunis Crusade raises a question of semantics, or perhaps philosophy: can we call it a crusade when both sides refuse to fight? While al-Mustansir kept his troops inside the walls of Tunis, Louis refused at first to let his off the ships. Louis would only allow Florent of Varennes to explore the port of Tunis once it became clear that the ships anchored there had been abandoned. Meeting with no opposition,
p. 112 the ↳ admiral reported back to the king that he had occupied the peninsula and was in need of reinforcements for the advance inland. Louis was unhappy to hear this and complained that he had only sent Florent to reconnoiter, not actually to conquer anything. Louis consulted with his barons and after much discussion they decided to send Philippe Évreux and the master of the artillery down to the admiral. If they were happy with what they saw, they could all stay; if not, they should bring him back. After a quick look around, they hustled Florent back to the *Montjoie*, a decision that provoked grumbling among some who favored a more dynamic approach to crusading warfare.[39]

Medieval commanders usually liked to avoid pitched battles because they feared taking casualties. But even in this context, Louis's approach to combat stood out as exceptionally risk-averse. After the conquest of Damietta in 1249, Louis had delayed his advance up the Nile for several months to wait for Alphonse of Poitiers to arrive with reinforcements. Mansura—the great set-piece confrontation of that campaign—scarred him for life. So he may have been reluctant to engage the Tunisians because he preferred once again to wait on developments. At the same time, his inaction is consistent with the conversion plan that his confessor Geoffrey of Beaulieu laid out in his account of the crusade. The idea was to make a show of force before the city to provide an excuse for al-Mustansir to accept Christianity. That is exactly what happened at the beginning of the Tunis Crusade: the army appeared, but it did not attack.[40]

The next morning, July 18, Louis allowed the crusaders off the transports. Pierre of Condé thought the disembarkment was so chaotic that a hundred men could have stopped them if they had tried. But the crusaders encountered no opposition and began to set up camp on the Halq al-Wadi. As al-Mustansir's Andalusi advisors had anticipated, they soon discovered how difficult it was to deploy there. For a start, there was no fresh water. To find some, the Genoese proposed an attack on Carthage, which lay to the north of the peninsula. Much of the ancient city had fallen into ruins, save for a castle protected by deteriorating walls. Since Carthage was still inhabited, the Genoese reasoned, it must have a water source. The sailors offered to lead the operation, but asked the king for back-up. After considerable debate, Louis agreed to provide them with four "battles," the standard combat unit into which medieval European armies were organized, along with 500 crossbowmen. The rest of the army would stand guard over the camp during the
p. 113 assault. When the Genoese advanced toward Carthage, they found their way blocked by a tower that ↳ guarded the northern exit off the Halq al-Wadi. Here they encountered resistance for the first time when the emir's soldiers tried to prevent them from breaking out on to the mainland. But the tower garrison gave way, allowing the sailors a clear run at the fortress of Carthage. They brought up their scaling ladders, climbed the walls, ran into the streets of the town, and cleared it: "every Saracen they could find they would cut off his head like they would a sheep." There was a network of caverns and tunnels underneath the town. When some Carthaginians tried to hide underground, the Genoese set fires to smoke them out. The corpses of those who suffocated were left to rot underground, filling Carthage with the smell of decomposing human flesh.[41]

Once the city was taken, the crusaders moved off the peninsula. Louis set up his tent just outside the castle in a valley dotted with irrigation wells. He preferred that to the unwholesome atmosphere inside the fortress. But life in the crusader camp was still uncomfortable. There was searing heat, which peaks in Tunis in late July and early August, and high winds that covered everything and everyone in dust and sand. Louis issued orders that no one should leave the camp without permission. This made sense in theory, because the crusaders were unfamiliar with the country and vulnerable to ambush, while the king himself remained determined to avoid confrontation. In practice, though, it was agonizing. The crusaders would see a footsoldier returning from patrol cut down in front of them, but would take no action to save him out of fear of violating the king's command.[42]

Al-Mustansir regretted not having torn down the walls of Carthage sooner.[43] The crusaders now had a base of operations from which they could blockade the port, maintain their own supply lines to Sicily, Sardinia, and southern France, and advance on Tunis, if they wished. Still, he did not attempt to retake the fortress. Instead, he deployed his army about halfway between Carthage and Tunis, roughly where the airport is today.[44] He needed to block the path toward his capital because ↳ the city walls only surrounded the old
p. 114 medina, and large suburbs to the north and south lay unprotected beyond them.[45]

After establishing his headquarters, al-Mustansir sent out a call for reinforcements. Two allies from the west responded. Abu Hilal-Iyad, the governor of Bijaya, brought troops from the area around Qasantina, while Abu Zayyan Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Qawi came at the head of the Banu Tujin, Zenata Berbers who supported al-Mustansir's claims in the central Maghreb against the ʿAbd al-Wadids of Tlemcen.[46] In an attempt to attract recruits and unify his disparate forces, al-Mustansir declared a jihad against the invaders. Citing the Qurʾan, he proclaimed to the people of Ifriqiya:

> Go forth (whether equipped)
> Lightly or heavily, and strive
> And struggle, with your goods
> And your persons, in the Cause
> Of Allah. That is best
> For you, if you (but) knew.
>
> (Qurʾan, 9: 41)[47]

His appeal proved effective. Ibn Khaldun said that, "the pious, jurists, marabouts, all ran to aid the jihad in person."[48] Other Arabic sources also refer to jurists (*al-muttawiʿa*—holders of a diploma from the Great Mosque of Tunis) participating in the struggle against the crusaders.[49] Recruitment was heavy in the Sahel and around al-Qayrawan. Two popular shaykhs joined the holy war: Abu ʿAli Salim al-Qadidi and Abu ʿAli ʿAmmar al-Maʿrufi, better known as Sidi ʿAmmar.[50]

Propaganda emphasized the value of a unified Islamic response to the crusade. A Tunisian poet named Ahmad b. Ismail al-Zayyan addressed a song of defiance to King Louis and his Franks:

> Oh Frenchmen, this city is Egypt's sister
> Prepare yourself for every bad thing possible that could happen to you.
> This time the house of Luqman will be a tomb.
> And your guards will be Munkar and Nakir.[51]

p. 115 According to Islamic tradition, Munkar and Nakir are the angels who interrogate the dead in their graves. Ibn Luqman was the head of the Ayyubid secretariat who had once owned the house where Louis had been imprisoned in Egypt. The reference to Ibn Luqman alludes to another poem that circulated in Egypt and the Maghreb during the run-up to Louis's second crusade. Writing before the destination was revealed, the Mamluk court poet Jamal al-Din b. Matruh predicted a bad end for the Frankish king if he attacked Egypt again:

> Give the Frenchman, if you love him, a true statement from those who offer sound advice:
> 'May God requite you for the slaughter that has befallen the worshippers of Jesus the Messiah!
> You came to Egypt, thirsting to conquer it and reckoning the drumbeat but a gust of wind;
> And so Time has carried you to a disaster which has made narrow what was broad in your eyes:
> While through your fine strategy you have brought all your men to the inside of the tomb;
> Of fifty thousand not one is seen who is not dead or a wounded prisoner.
> God grant you [more] triumphs of this ilk, that Jesus may perhaps find relief from you.
> If the Pope was satisfied with this, perchance fraud has emanated from the counselor!'
> And tell them, if they think of coming back to take revenge or for some sound purpose:
> 'Ibn Luqman's house is still there; the chains and the officer Sabih have not gone away.'[52]

Sabih al-Muʿazzami was an Ayyubid cavalry officer who guarded Louis when he was a prisoner in Egypt. This sardonic depiction of Louis as a deluded and incompetent servant to his faith first appeared in Ibn Wasil's

account of the king's crusades. When later chroniclers included the poem in their histories, they often set it within a framing narrative of personal confrontation. Baybars sends an envoy to Paris, who recites the poem to Louis in person.[53] The king is appropriately intimidated, thinks better of seeking revenge on Egypt, and
p. 116 heads to Tunis instead. By celebrating ↳ Tunis as "Egypt's sister," the Hafsid court poet offered his retort to this stratagem. Wherever Louis attacked the *dar al-Islam*, he would encounter the united strength of the community of believers.

As the crusaders established themselves on North African soil, an opportunity arose to turn this idealized vision of confrontation into reality. The problem was that if Egypt and Tunis were sisters, they were not the kind that got along. Dueling claims to the caliphate stoked tensions between them. While al-Mustansir made no effort to reach out to his overbearing neighbor, Baybars saw both a threat and an opportunity in Louis's landing before Tunis.

By the late spring of 1270, the sultan was taking precautions against Louis's return to the Levant. To facilitate troop movements in and out of the capital, Baybars linked the island bases of his Mamluk regiments to the mainland with bridges of boats. On learning that Frankish ships had captured two Muslim vessels in Alexandria harbor, he rushed back to Cairo, thinking that the Frankish attack had begun. It turned out to be a false alarm. Word arrived soon after from the governor of Alexandria that a crew from Crete had arrived in the port city with unexpected news: the Franks had landed in North Africa, defeated the Muslims, and were approaching Tunis. Though Tunis was about 1,600 miles west of Cairo, Baybars seems to have been concerned about Louis advancing on to his western flank. At the same time, dispensing aid to the Hafsids would project Mamluk power into the central Mediterranean. Baybars wrote to al-Mustansir that help was on the way and ordered the Bedouin tribes loyal to him around Barqa (Cyrenaica) to set out for Tunis. Along the way, they were to dig out wells for further reinforcements to follow. It looked as if Baybars was going to muscle in on al-Mustansir's jihad with the Franks, whether al-Mustansir welcomed his involvement or not.[54]

Stalemate

As classically conceived, the external jihad entailed a struggle to expand the *dar al-Islam*. Al-Mustansir, however, had something different in mind. Once established in his camp, he remained rooted to the spot. "He always remained seated in his pavilion," remarked Ibn Khaldun, while al-Yunini added that, "the lord of Tunis did not lead out his subjects to fight."[55] He placed command of day-to-day operations in the hands
p. 117 of the Almohad ↳ Yahya b. Salih al-Hintati, while surrounding himself with a coterie of advisors. Among these were several other Almohad notables and Federico of Castile, who had returned from leading the anti-Angevin insurrection in Sicily.[56] His presence was another sign of the emir's unconventional approach to holy war.

Yahya b. Salih al-Hintati's remit was limited. He was not to engage the enemy directly, but rather wear it down and exhaust its resources through ambushes, raids, and ruses. Pierre of Condé reported that:

> Many Saracens vexed us, and the call to arms was often made twice a day. But the Saracens did not dare approach our army en masse; they limited themselves to killing those they found alone, or scavenging or raiding too far…Whenever our men followed them, they fled; when our men retired, they provoked and plagued them with lances.[57]

What made this strategy especially effective was Louis's own reluctance to commit to combat. However provoked the crusaders were, he would not allow them to leave the camp to chase the Tunisians.

Charles of Anjou also encouraged his brother's ultra-cautious approach. After Louis had written to him from Sardinia asking him to join the crusade, Charles sent his envoy Amaury of la Roche, grand prior of the Templars of France, to Tunis. Amaury arrived about July 25, too late to prevent the capture of Carthage. After that, though, he was a relentless advocate for stasis. He told Louis that Charles would be coming soon and that in the meantime the crusaders should not pursue the Tunisians beyond the camp. Charles was not opposed to punishing al-Mustansir for his role in the Hohenstaufen insurrection, but it would do Charles no good if Tunis were conquered without him. It was not just a question of losing out on the spoils. While French rule over Tunis would increase the security of his southern frontier, it would also deprive him of the tribute payment. With Charles's advice confirming his own inclinations, Louis continued to sit tight.[58]

The Hafsids could not know how unwilling Louis was to march on Tunis. They began to play tricks on the crusaders to keep them away from the city. On July 25, 1270, two Catalan knights approached the crusader camp and asked to be taken to the king. When he received them, they told him that the "king of Tunis" had imprisoned his Christian mercenaries. If the crusaders advanced on Tunis, he would have the mercenaries
p. 118 beheaded. If the crusaders stayed away, he would set the soldiers free. Among the mercenary prisoners, ↳ the knights singled out Federico of Castile by name, perhaps because he was related to Louis through Blanche of Castile, the king's mother. Federico, of course, was not the emir's prisoner; he was his aide-de-camp. By purporting to treat his Christian mercenaries as hostages, al-Mustansir was turning a potential drawback of using them in the campaign against the Franks—their shared religious identification—into an advantage.[59]

The next day, the Hafsids tried a more elaborate ruse. As told by the chronicler Primat, the brothers Alphonse and Jean of Brienne were keeping watch when three Hafsid cavalry officers approached and asked to be made Christians. Jean led them back to his tent and placed them under guard. When he returned to his post, he found a hundred more Tunisian soldiers waiting, all clamoring for baptism. Distracted by their shouting, he failed to notice yet another group of Hafsid soldiers, who sprang an ambush on his men and killed up to sixty before escaping unharmed. Jean returned to his tent to confront his three Hafsid prisoners. With the help of a Dominican translator, the spokesman for the troika blamed the ambush on a jealous rival. He could prove the truth of his story if Jean would allow one of his companions to return to the Hafsid camp. This companion would then round up goods to sell and another 2,000 soldiers to cross over to the crusader side. If the man failed to return, Jean could deal with him as a traitor. Jean brought this proposal to the king, who was skeptical. But rather than let the man suffer the consequences of his deception, Louis ordered him and his companions to be returned to their own lines. Incredulous at their good fortune, the men returned home, having arranged the killing of some sixty crusaders and gotten a good look inside the crusader camp. Their release was accompanied by murmuring in the crusader camp at the "astonishing simplicity" of the Christians.[60]

However improbable it may sound, it is unlikely that this story is entirely confected. Primat's chronicle is associated with the royal abbey of Saint-Denis. Why invent a tale that reflected so poorly on two distinguished French barons (Alphonse of Brienne was the count of Eu, while Jean was the butler of France) and the king himself? The ruse played on the crusaders' expectation that Tunisian Muslims were open to conversion. In this sense, it can be seen as a continuation of the conversion gambit that the Tunisian envoys attempted during their embassy to Paris in October 1269.

After the ambush, Louis had a trench dug around the crusader camp. Amaury of la Roche supervised. In the
p. 119 meantime, pressure was building ↳ on al-Mustansir to do something about the crusaders. Much of the criticism was aimed at the Almohad shaykhs who were serving as his commanders and military advisors. Al-Yunini insisted that everyone who fought the crusaders was a Bedouin, a Berber, or one of the "common people."[61] Al-Khazandari reported that of the 3,000 Almohad cavalry available, "not one among them went out to fight the Franks." Only the "rabble" and the "mob" were willing to confront the enemy. He personified the lethargic Almohad response in the figure of a "man among the Almohads" who used henna and lounged around his house all day. When the *ghazi* warriors came in after a hard day's fighting the infidel, he would politely inquire, "May God's blessing be upon you, how did the war go for you today?" When asked why he would not go out and fight, he claimed he was waiting for the emir to call him to battle.[62]

Toward the end of July, al-Mustansir's calls to engage the enemy became more frequent as he stepped up his raids on the Franks. Amaury of la Roche's trench-work surrounded the crusader camp but left a gap between it and the lake of Tunis. Beginning on July 27, and continuing regularly thereafter, the Hafsids would send raiding parties shooting through this gap toward the port.[63] The aim was to threaten the noblewomen staying on the ships and disrupt the crusader supply chain, which relied on deliveries from overseas. These raids became larger and more ambitious as Hafsid strategy shifted toward drawing the crusaders into battle. The Bedouin horsemen in particular tempted the Franks with their feigned retreats, the fighting style known in the Maghreb as *al-karr wa-l-farr* ("attack and withdrawal").[64] Always, though, when the moment of truth arrived, Amaury of la Roche would call the crusaders back: "Lords, why do you want to go out? You have waited so long for the noble king of Sicily, who is supposed to be coming in two or three days, and now you want to go out and fight the Saracens?"[65]

Disease and Death

Amaury's growing influence over tactics reflected a vacuum in the upper echelon of crusade leadership. The cause was an epidemic of disease, which Pierre of Condé described as "a certain fever" or "a certain fever
p. 120 with ↳ weakness," Primat as "stomach flu" and "ague fever," and Geoffrey of Beaulieu only as "great and deadly."[66] The vagueness of these descriptions makes it difficult to identify the culprit. Dysentery is often thought to have been responsible.[67] During his first crusade Louis suffered so badly from it that he had to have the seat of his pants cut away in order to continue on the march. That said, the accounts of the Tunis epidemic do not describe the loss of fluids that accompanies the disease. In any case, conditions in the crusader camp outside Carthage were conducive to the outbreak of various kinds of bacterial illness. Many people were living in a relatively confined space and the tents offered little protection against the summer heat. Access to fresh food was limited. On August 2 and 3, Louis sent to Sardinia and Sicily for supplies. The crusaders were relieved when a shipment of pigs and chickens arrived from Sicily on the 10th, although shortages remained severe. The policy of confining the soldiers to camp did not help. Those who felt less constrained by the king's prohibition went on raiding parties for food. On August 14, a hundred Genoese sailors, led by four Catalan knights, rowed over in their galleys to a Tunisian cattle hold, where they rustled seventy cows and forty calves. The livestock was welcome, but it was not enough. The water supply remained a problem as well. As the campaign dragged on, the corpses of humans and animals found their way into nearby rivers, wells, and lakes and fouled the drinking water. Al-Khazandari blamed the crusaders' troubles on hashish in the water. Why was it there? Even he could not explain it.[68]

In early August, the king's son Jean Tristan fell ill. He was brought down from the tents to the ships, but failed to recover and died on August 3. His corpse was treated in typical fashion for French nobles of the time. The flesh was boiled away and the bones were packed up with aromatics for transfer back to France. Born in sorrow on his father's first crusade (thus his nickname, Tristan), Jean died in similar circumstances on the king's second. But Louis did not receive the heartbreaking news right away, because he himself had become sick the night before, along with another son, Philippe. This left the third royal sibling, Pierre, count of Alençon, with an agonizing choice: should he tell his father and brother what had happened, and risk
p. 121 further endangering their health? Or should ↳ he deceive them until they began to convalesce? Pierre opted for secrecy. A week passed, and the king began to feel a little better. He asked his confessor, Geoffrey of Beaulieu, how Jean was doing. Louis was becoming suspicious and worried for his son. Rather than answer, Geoffrey began to cry. After finally composing himself, he told the king the truth.[69]

The pace of the epidemic accelerated. The papal legate had passed away on August 7; the archdeacon of Paris succumbed on the 20th; the marshal, Gautier of Nemours, and the count of Vendôme on the 23rd. Many others would die in subsequent weeks, including Thibaut of Navarre, his wife Isabelle, Pierre le Chambellan, and Alphonse of Brienne. The same diseases that devastated the crusader camp struck Tunis as well, leading to many deaths among the soldiers and civilians of the city. Sidi ʿAmmar, the shaykh who had answered al-Mustansir's call to jihad, died in the Hafsid camp. His tomb remained a site of popular veneration into the twentieth century.[70]

Louis's recovery on August 10 proved temporary. By the night of August 23, his doctors believed he would not live until morning. At midnight, he received last rites from Geoffrey of Beaulieu. The next day, however, his fever receded a little. He received the Eucharist frequently and prayed aloud to Saint-Denis (patron of France), Sainte-Geneviève (patron of Paris), and Saint James (patron of pilgrims). He lay on a bed covered over with ashes, a mark of the penitent. A massive cross was set before him. As the fever came on again, he moved his lips while his confessors recited the prayers, but no sound came out. The intimates surrounding his deathbed strained to hear his final words. Were they prayers to Saint James? ("Lord, be the guardian and sanctifier of your people"); or to Saint-Denis? ("Grant us, we ask, for the sake of your love, that we may despise worldly success and fear none of its misfortunes"); or a verse from the psalms? ("I will go into your house, I will worship toward your holy temple, and I will give glory to your name"); or simply "O Jerusalem, O Jerusalem"? He died on August 25, 1270, at about three o'clock in the morning. His son Philippe found solace in the realization that he passed away "at the very hour in which the Lord Jesus Christ, the son of God, breathed his last while dying on the cross for the life of the world."[71]

p. 122 Not long before Louis died, a galley had appeared in the port of Tunis. The captain of the boat told the king's chamberlains that Charles of Anjou would be landing later that day. After so many delays and hesitations, Charles had finally joined the crusade, when his brother's death was near and his dream of a grand crusade

had been shattered. When the chamberlains brought the news to Louis, he opened his eyes and smiled. Did he smile in anticipation of seeing his brother, or at the timing of the visit? Several hours later, Charles came ashore. Primat believed that he was about a third of a league (perhaps about a mile) from the camp when Louis passed away. Charles visited his brother Alphonse and his nephew Philippe, who was still sick. Then he went into the royal pavilion and saw Louis's corpse. He fell to the ground and kissed its feet with tears in his eyes. After his retainers helped him back up, he washed away the signs of his distress with a towel. Composing his face into the mask of command, he went out into the camp. The crusade that had worried him for years was now in his hands.[72]

Notes

1 For Pope Innocent III's classic formulation, see his proclamation of the Fifth Crusade in the bull *Quia maior*: Georgine Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz' III* (Weimar: H. Bohlaus, 1929), pp. 88–97.
2 Jean Richard, *Saint Louis* (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 551–2; William Chester Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 215.
3 Jordan, *Louis IX*, pp. 147–50.
4 Michael Lower, "Conversion and St. Louis's Last Crusade," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 58 (2007): pp. 223–5.
5 Primat, p. 39; *Gesta Ludovici*, p. 440.
6 Sternfeld, pp. 332–3 (appendix A, no. 20).
7 Primat, pp. 39–40; *Gesta Ludovici*, pp. 440–2. For Marguerite of Provence in Damietta, see Joinville, pp. 378–80 (Smith, p. 244).
8 Primat, pp. 39–40; *Gesta Ludovici*, pp. 440–2; Sternfeld, p. 200; Mollat, p. 290; Richard, *Saint Louis*, p. 556.
9 Primat, p. 40.
10 Primat, p. 39; *Layettes*, nos. 5706 (countess of Poitiers), 5699 (count of Fors); "Liste des chevaliers croisés avec Saint Louis en 1269," *RHGF*, vol. 20: pp. 305–8; Louis IX, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu July 25, 1270," in *Spicilegium*, vol. 3: p. 664; Mollat, p. 290; Richard, *Saint Louis*, p. 550.
11 Sternfeld, p. 218; Richard, *Saint Louis*, p. 550.
12 Simon Lloyd, "The Lord Edward's Crusade, 1270–2: Its Setting and Significance," in *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich*, ed. John Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Cambridge: Boydell Press, 1984), p. 124.
13 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir, p. 373; al-Khazandari, p. 151.
14 *Annali Genovesi*, vol. 4: pp. 131–2.
15 Strayer, p. 515; Mollat, p. 294.
16 *Layettes*, no. 5706; Primat, p. 41.
17 Sternfeld, pp. 334–7 (appendix A, no. 22); *Layettes*, nos. 5691–3.
18 Primat, p. 40; *Gesta Ludovici*, p. 442.
19 Sternfeld, p. 218.
20 Louis IX, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu of Saint-Denis, June 25, 1270."
21 Primat, pp. 41–2; *Gesta Ludovici*, pp. 442–4; *Layettes*, no. 5730.
22 Jacques Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), p. 172.
23 Primat, pp. 41–2; *Gesta Ludovici*, p. 444.
24 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270," in *Spicilegium*, vol. 3: pp. 664–6; Primat, p. 43.
25 Joinville, pp. 222–4 (Smith, p. 178).
26 Primat, p. 44.
27 Primat, p. 44; *Gesta Ludovici*, p. 446; Geoffrey of Beaulieu, p. 21 (*Sanctity of Louis IX*, p. 116); Louis IX, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, July 25, 1270"; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270."
28 A number of chroniclers, all drawing on a lost common source, make these final points, including the continuation of Gerard of Frachet, the continuation of Otto of Freising, the anonymous *Gesta Ludovici* and the chronicle of Bernard Gui: see Sternfeld, p. 378.
29 Primat, pp. 44–5; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270."
30 *Annali Genovesi*, p. 132.
31 Paul Sebag, *Tunis: Histoire d'une ville* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), p. 133.
32 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 661–3 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 356–9); Brunschvig, vol. 1: pp. 48–9; Rouighi, p. 35.
33 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 666 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 362).
34 Ibn al-Furat, vol. 1: p. 177, vol. 2: p. 140.
35 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 666 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 362).
36 Al-Yunini, vol. 2: pp. 454–6; al-Khazandari, pp. 151–2; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 668–70 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 365–7); Brunschvig, vol. 2: pp. 75–82.
37 *L'Espagne catalane*, p. 121.
38 Al-Yunini, vol. 2: p. 455; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 667–8 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 364–5).
39 Primat, p. 45; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270."
40 Geoffrey of Beaulieu, p. 22 (*Sanctity of Louis IX*, p. 118).
41 Primat, p. 47; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270"; *Annali Genovesi*, pp. 132–3.

42 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 668 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 365); Primat, p. 47; Louis IX, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, July 25, 1270"; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270."
43 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 668 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 366).
44 Mohamed Talbi, "Saint Louis à Tunis," in *Les croisades*, ed. Robert Delort (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1988), p. 73.
45 Sebag, *Tunis*, p. 130.
46 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 669 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 366); Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 60.
47 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *An English Interpretation of the Holy Qur-an with Full Arabic Text* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1937), p. 279.
48 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367).
49 Al-Yunini, vol. 2: p. 455. I am grateful to Nabil Matar for help rendering this term.
50 Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 60.
51 Al-Maqrizi, vol. 1 (part 2): p. 365; English translation: Francesco Gabrieli, "Saint Louis in Tunisia," in *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, trans. E. J. Costello (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 303–4; al-Shammaʿ, p. 71.
52 Ibn Wasil, pp. 71–2 (*Seventh Crusade*, p. 149). This is Jackson's excellent translation.
53 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 666–7 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 363); Ibn al-Shammaʿ, p. 71; Muhammad b. Abi al-Qasim b. Dinar al-Qarawani, *Al-Muʾnis fi akhbar Ifriqiya wa-Tunis* (Beirut: Dar al-Masira li-l-Sihafa wa-l-Tibaʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1993), pp. 159–60; French translation: *Histoire de l'Afrique*, trans. Edmond Pellissier de Reynaud and Abel Remusat (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1845), pp. 228–9.
54 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zahir, pp. 373–4; Ibn al-Furat, vol. 1: pp. 179–80, vol. 2: 141–2.
55 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367); al-Yunini, vol. 2: p. 455; al-Khazandari, p. 152; Ibn al-Shammaʿ, p. 73.
56 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 669 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 366).
57 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270."
58 Primat, p. 50; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the prior of Argenteuil, July 27, 1270."
59 Primat, p. 48; *Gesta Ludovici*, p. 452.
60 Primat, pp. 48–9; *Gesta Ludovici*, pp. 452–4.
61 Al-Yunini, vol. 2: p. 456.
62 Al-Khazandari, pp. 151–2.
63 Primat, p. 56; *Gesta Ludovici*, pp. 454–6.
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