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Imperial Policy and Military Practice in the Plantagenet Dominions, c. 1337–c. 1453[1]

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At the outbreak of the Hundred Years War in 1337 the Plantagenet dominions, in addition to England, comprised Gascony, Wales, parts of Ireland, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and, theoretically, Scotland. The war would add to these lordships. Calais and its March were conquered in 1347; in 1360 the Treaty of Brétigny appended extensive lands to the duchy of Gascony, creating the short-lived principality of Aquitaine; Normandy was captured between 1417 and 1419; and the 1420 Treaty of Troyes established control over Paris and much of northern France.

This paper explores distinctions and common features in certain matters of policy and military practice that were applied throughout these dominions during the period of the Hundred Years War. In so doing it draws on a small area in the remarkably rich field of medieval military scholarship which has flourished so abundantly over the last twenty years or so. The quality and scale of this remarkable growth is in no small part due to the work of members of *De re militari*. For so long, military history was to be found in a niche area of scholarship, and rather a narrow niche at that, but the importance of medieval warfare and the medieval soldier, both in specific terms and in the ways in which it and they impacted upon political, diplomatic, and cultural affairs more widely, is now largely accepted.[2]

This subject is, however, one shaped by historiographical divisions as well as developments, because it is, with certain notable exceptions, only relatively

1 I am very grateful to Kelly DeVries for the invitation to deliver the 2015 Journal of Medieval Military History Annual Lecture to *De re militari* at the International Conference on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo. Thanks are also due to Cliff Rogers for his helpful and generous comments as a respondent to the lecture, on which this paper is based, and to the anonymous reader for the *JMMH*.

2 The development of the *Journal of Medieval Military History*, published since 2002 by Boydell and Brewer and edited by Bernard S. Bachrach, Clifford J. Rogers, Kelly DeVries, and John France, is one of the clearest manifestations of this development in medieval military scholarship. See also http://www.deremilitari.org. For a brief overview of these developments see David Simpkin and Andy King, "Introduction: Developments in Late Medieval Military History and the Historiography of Anglo-Scottish Warfare," in *England and Scotland at War, c.1296–c.1513*, ed. Andy King and David Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 1–14.

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recently that scholars of the later Middle Ages have begun to think in holistic terms of the relationship between England and her dominions in France, Britain, and Ireland. Instead, work involving the various and, in some ways, disparate Plantagenet lordships has tended to comprise two – often distinct – areas of inquiry. These may be categorised, somewhat simplistically, as, first, insular studies, sometimes called the "New British History," a term used to describe the collective analysis of Britain, Ireland, and the surrounding smaller islands – what J. A. Pocock called the Atlantic archipelago (and which he conceived as a sub-continental island group).[3] And, second, considerations of Anglo-French relations, chiefly concerned with the origins and conduct of the Hundred Years War. As a result of this we are faced with two distinctive historiographical traditions that overlap thematically but exist, nonetheless, semi-independently of one another.[4] Furthermore, there also remains a small yet significant chronological divide which separates the periods before and after the Lancastrian usurpation of 1399. While this is a less marked division than that which is said to indicate the end of the Middle Ages (c. 1485/c. 1500), it is important, nonetheless, and has influenced approaches to these subjects.

Fortunately, students and scholars of military history have been less constrained by such artificial divisions. The Hundred Years War, of course, straddles the chronological frontier even though a number of the conflict's characteristics changed in the fifteenth century. More significantly, many of the key points of intersection between insular studies and the Anglo-French tradition were military in nature. They may be found in major issues of politics and international diplomacy such as the various roles Scotland, Scottish troops, and policy makers played in the Hundred Years War.[5] Hostility north and south of the "Border" (a suggestive term in this context) has long been recognised as important in exacerbating Anglo-French tensions in the prelude to the Hundred Years War. Indeed, the chronicler Henry Knighton (d. c. 1396) tells us that the war began because Edward III (r. 1327–77) "had been at such pains to humiliate the Scots."[6] Michael Brown is surely correct when observing that the war "provides a much stronger framework for consideration of the English and Scottish polities than did their relationships across the British Isles."[7] Wales also played an important role in the struggle, with

3 J. G. A. Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," *The Journal of Modern History* 47 (1975), p. 606.

4 David Green, "The Hundred Years War, Colonial Policy and the English Lordships," in *The Hundred Years War (Part III): Further Considerations*, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2013), pp. 237–38. See also Peter Crooks, "State of the Union: Perspectives on English Imperialism in the Late Middle Ages," *Past and Present* 212 (2011), p. 9.

5 J. Campbell, "England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century," in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J. R. Hale, R. Highfied, and B. Smalley (London, 1965), pp. 184–216; Norman Macdougall, *An Antidote to the English: The Auld Alliance, 1295–1560* (East Linton, 2001), pp. 28–96.

6 *Knighton's Chronicle*, ed. and trans. G. F. Martin (Oxford, 1995), p. 3.

7 Michael Brown, *Disunited Kingdoms: Peoples and Politics in the British Isles, 1280–1460* (Harlow, 2013), pp. 5–6.

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soldiers taking up arms in the service of both Plantagenet and Valois rulers: thousands of troops were recruited for Edward III's early campaigns, and there were several professional military companies that served in French ranks in the middle stages of the conflict.[8] Ireland, too, was significant, despite its less direct involvement in the Anglo-French war. It provided a source of manpower for English armies, albeit a small one, and there is no doubt that the ebb and flow of English military commitments across the Channel had a major impact on the nature of politics on the other side of the Irish Sea.[9]

This, however, is not an attempt to denigrate insular studies. The (no longer) "New British History" has reshaped fundamentally our conception of Britain and Ireland and the interrelationships between their constituent nations and regions in the period from the end of the eleventh century to the start of the fourteenth. Just as significantly, it can play a vital role in aiding our understanding of English political attitudes and Plantagenet policies implemented elsewhere, notably in France. It has, however, rarely been applied to the period of the Hundred Years War.

By the time the war began, so Rees Davies taught us, the tide had turned on what he termed *The First English Empire*.[10] Following a period of intense Anglicisation, political and cultural, within Britain and Ireland, implemented most forcibly during Edward I's reign (1272–1307), different priorities emerged, shaped by local conditions and the increasingly voracious demands of the Anglo-French conflict. As a result, studies of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries have tended to focus on individual nations or on bi-lateral relations between two nations. There are, of course, exceptions to this "rule" to be found in important works by Steven Ellis, Alexander Grant, Ralph Griffiths, Brendan Smith, and the godfather of such comparative studies, John Le Patourel. In a series of articles and books Le Patourel was perhaps the first to conceptualise the Plantagenets' territorial possessions, wherever they were held, as a partially unified political system. As early as 1965 he noted that the government of the various lands under Plantagenet control (Anjou, Maine, Touraine, Normandy, Aquitaine, England, Brittany, Ponthieu, Calais, Wales, parts of Ireland, and, briefly, parts of Scotland) had each been the subject of a great deal of study but the notion that they formed a governmental unit or, indeed, a unit of any kind

8 A. D. Carr, "Welshmen and the Hundred Years' War," *Welsh History Review* 4 (1968), 21–46; Adam Chapman, "Wales, Welshmen, and the Hundred Years War," in *Hundred Years War (Part III)*, ed. Villalon and Kagay, pp. 217–32; M. Siddons, "Welshmen in the Service of France," *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies* 36 (1989), 161–84.

9 J. A. Watt, "The Irish Colony under Strain, 1327–99," in *A New History of Ireland, Volume II: Medieval Ireland 1169–1534*, ed. Art Cosgrove (Oxford, 1987), pp. 374–97; Art Cosgrove, "England and Ireland, 1399–1447," ibid., pp. 525–32; Robin Frame, *English Lordship in Ireland, 1318–1361* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 153–56.

10 R. R. Davies, *The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles, 1093–1343* (Oxford, 2000), esp. pp. 172–90. See also Brendan Smith, "Lordship in the British Isles, c. 1320–c. 1360: The Ebb Tide of the English Empire," in *Power and Identity in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Rees Davies*, ed. Huw Pryce and John Watts (Oxford, 2007), pp. 153–63.

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for a significant duration had rarely been suggested nor explored in any detail.[11]

Subsequently, Robin Frame extended the chronological parameters of insular studies up until 1400, and he also argued for the need to expand the geographical area of consideration. After evaluating the political evolution of the British Isles and Ireland as a whole, the next step should be to include the Plantagenets' French estates in the analysis.[12] This was necessary, he believed, because English continental ambitions, expressed in the Hundred Years War, directly influenced the tenor of Anglo-Celtic relations.[13] In essence, Plantagenet aspirations in France (re)defined and intensified a sense of English national identity that in turn led to a greater awareness of political, cultural, and social differences between England and her neighbours in Britain and Ireland.

Works on national identities, of which there have been several, have recognised the importance of warfare and military affairs in nation-building both conceptually and in terms of the construction of governmental structures.[14] Many of these

11 S. G. Ellis, "From Dual Monarchy to Multiple Kingdoms: Unions and the English State, 1422–1607," in *The Stuart Kingdoms in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Allan I. MacInness and Jane H. Ohlmeyer (Dublin, 2002), pp. 330–40; Alexander Grant, *Independence and Nationhood: Scotland 1306–1469* (Edinburgh, 1991); R. A. Griffiths, "The Island of England in the Fifteenth Century: Perceptions of the Peoples of the British Isles," *Journal of Medieval History* 29 (2003), 177–200; see the essays collected in John Le Patourel, *Feudal Empires: Norman and Plantagenet*, ed. Michael Jones (London, 1984).

12 With regard to two of the most significant lordships, Robin Frame remarked, "The political histories of Gascony and Ireland have been explored in some detail … and each has been separately related to the financial and political crises that occurred in England as a result of the Hundred Years War. [He was referring specifically to the period immediately following the reopening of the struggle in 1369.] There is, however, room to consider them together, in the setting of the Plantagenet lands as a whole." "Overlordship and Reaction, c. 1200–c. 1450," in *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History*, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer (London, 1995), pp. 77–78, 80. This approach was adopted by David Green in "Lordship and Principality: Colonial Policy in Ireland and Aquitaine in the 1360s," *Journal of British Studies* 47 (2008), 3–29. See also Robin Frame, *The Political Development of the British Isles, 1100–1400* (Oxford, 1995); and Robin Frame, "Exporting State and Nation: Being English in Medieval Ireland," in *Power and the Nation in European History*, ed. Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 143–65.

13 R. R. Davies, "The English State and the 'Celtic' Peoples, 1100–1400," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 6 (1993), pp. 12–13; R. A. Griffiths, *King and Country: England and Wales in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 1991), pp. 33–53; Sean Duffy, "The British Perspective," in *A Companion to Britain in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. S. H. Rigby (Oxford, 2003), pp. 165–82; W. Mark Ormrod, "Edward III and his Family," *Journal of British Studies* 26 (1987), 398–422.

14 See, for example, C. T. Allmand, "National Reconciliation in France at the End of the Hundred Years War," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 5 (2008), 149–64; Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France*, trans. Susan R. Huston, ed. Frederic L. Cheyette (Berkeley, 1991), esp. pp. 158–66; Ardis Butterfield, *The Familiar Enemy: Chaucer, Language and Nation in the Hundred Years War* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 17–24, 111–43, 311–16; David Green, "National Identities in the Hundred Years War," in *Fourteenth Century England 6*, ed. Chris Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2010), 115–30; Andrea Ruddick, *English Identity and Political Culture in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 18–20, 23–30.

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studies also highlight regional cohesion and/or variations within the British Isles, Ireland, and France which the Hundred Years War fabricated or amplified. Indeed, the French *apanages* such as Brittany[15] and Burgundy[16] created, in part, by and because of the war provide intriguing case studies of identity development in this period. So, too, do those idiosyncratic areas such as Gascony,[17] Normandy,[18] Navarre,[19] and Flanders,[20] which each manifested a distinct identity while being torn between more powerful polities seeking to draw them into their respective national orbits. Some similar forces can be seen at play in those semi-autonomous territories within England and off its coastline – areas such as the palatinate of Cheshire,[21] the bishopric of Durham,[22] and the Channel Islands. As Tim

15 Among many works by Michael Jones see "'Mon Pais et ma Nation': Breton Identity in the Fourteenth Century," in *War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. C. T. Allmand (Liverpool, 1976), pp. 144–68; and "Brittany and Wales in the Middle Ages: Contacts and Comparisons," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymrodorion*, n.s., 11 (2004), 19–49.

16 M. G. A. Vale, "England and the Burgundian Dominions: Some Cultural Influences and Comparisons," in *L'Angleterre et les pays bourguignons: relations et comparaisons*, ed. J.-M. Cauchies (Neuchâtel, 1995), pp. 7–13.

17 Robin Harris, *Valois Guyenne: A Study of Politics, Government and Society in Late Medieval France* (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 3–11, 109–13, 137–38, 152–56; Margaret Wade Labarge, *Gascony: England's First Colony, 1204–1453* (London, 1980), pp. 117ff; Guilhem Pépin, "Petitions from Gascony: Testimonies of a Special Relationship," in *Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance*, ed. Gwilym Dodd, Anthony Musson, and W. Mark Ormrod (York, 2009), pp. 120–34; Andrea Ruddick, "Gascony and the Limits of Medieval British Isles History," in *Ireland and the English World in the Late Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Robin Frame*, ed. Brendan Smith (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 68–88; M. G. A. Vale, *English Gascony, 1399–1453: A Study of War, Government and Politics during the Later Stages of the Hundred Years' War* (Oxford, 1970), esp. pp. 1–10, 154–215.

18 C. T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy, 1415–1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation* (Oxford, 1983), esp. pp. 81–104, 241–67; Philippe Contamine, "The Norman 'Nation' and the French 'Nation' in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," in *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages*, ed. David Bates and Anne Curry (London, 1994), pp. 215–34.

19 Roland Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1909–31), 1:73–91, 115–19, 440–43, 450–52; 2:1–11, 20–24, 120–28, 420–32; Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II: Trial by Fire* (London, 1999), pp. 102–42; idem, *The Hundred Years War, vol. III: Divided Houses* (London, 2009), pp. 333–40.

20 J. Van Herwaarden, "The War in the Low Countries," in *Froissart: Historian*, ed. J. J. N. Palmer (Woodbridge, 1981), 101–17; J. J. N. Palmer, "England, France, the Papacy and the Flemish Succession, 1361–9," *Journal of Medieval History* 2 (1976), 339–64.

21 Michael J. Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and Lancashire Society in the Age of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 5–52, 67–89, 162–91; Philip J. Morgan, *War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277–1403* (Manchester, 1987), esp. pp. 149–84.

22 Mark Arvanigian, "The Durham Gentry and the Scottish March, 1370–1400: County Service in Late Medieval England," *Northern History* 42 (2005), 257–73; Christian D. Liddy, *The Bishopric of Durham in the Late Middle Ages: Lordship, Community and the Cult of St Cuthbert* (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 76–123; Tim Thornton, "Fifteenth-Century Durham and the Problem of Provincial Liberties in England and the Wider Territories of the English Crown," *TRHS* 6th series 11 (2001), 83–100.

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Thornton has noted, a characteristic of the "New British History" has been to view relationships within the Plantagenet lordships in terms of English central imperatives and imperial expansion versus regional and national resistance in Ireland, Wales, and Scotland. Because of this, those areas without a "national" historiographical tradition such as the Channel Islands have often been excluded from the debate.[23] The Hundred Years War provides a context within which the roles and mutual relationships of such areas can be examined and compared constructively.

Again, it is the case that many scholars of military history have not felt restricted in this way, or have recognised the permeability of national and regional frontiers, not least because their *dramatis personae* – soldiers, military governors, and others – ranged across such wide territorial areas. Members of the royal family with military concerns played out their lives on a broad canvas, and similarly geographically diverse careers can be found among those of lesser social status. We can think of individuals such as Henry of Grosmont (c. 1310–61), Thomas Rokeby (d. 1357), and John Talbot (c. 1387–1453). Collectively, these men served in Brittany, Gascony, Ireland, the Low Countries, Normandy, Paris, Scotland and Wales and their respective borderlands, and also held various offices elsewhere in England and France.[24] Their experiences took in the Plantagenet dominions, both insular and continental, almost in their entirety. Broader prosopographical analyses have also demonstrated the huge scope of some less prominent medieval careers. Among these the project on "The Soldier in Later Medieval England," directed by Anne Curry, is of particular importance from a military perspective. It reveals "One of the most distinctive features of military service in the late fourteenth century [to have been] the geographical range of activity."[25]

Furthermore, although it diminished over the course of this period, an international chivalric ethos bound sections of the military aristocracy together in spite of national disputes and regional entrenchments.[26] Membership of the new military orders, a vibrant tournament culture, and common service in the crusades continued to link the European secular elite as did a sense of fellowship linked

23 Tim Thornton, *The Channel Islands, 1370–1640: Between England and Normandy* (Woodbridge, 2012), p. 7.

24 Kenneth A. Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster, 1310–1361* (London, 1969); Robin Frame, "Thomas Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire, Justiciar of Ireland," *Peritia* 10 (1996), 274–96; Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven, "Ireland in the 1350s: Sir Thomas de Rokeby and his Successors," *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland* 4th series 97 (1967), 47–59; A. J. Pollard, *John Talbot and the War in France 1427–1453* (rev. ed. Barnsley, 2005).

25 "The Soldier in Later Medieval England": http://www.medievalsoldier.org/; Adrian Bell, Anne Curry, Andy King, and David Simpkin, *The Soldier in Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 2013), p. 123.

26 For recent considerations of this see David Green, *The Hundred Years War: A People's History* (New Haven, 2014), pp. 23–42; and Craig Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War* (Cambridge, 2013), esp. pp. 19–53.

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to knighthood and nobility. One of the best known examples of such links and their practical manifestation can be seen during the Crécy campaign of 1346 when Raoul de Brienne, constable of France (and count of Eu and Guines, d. 1350) and Jean de Melun, count of Tancarville (d. 1382) defended Caen against the forces of Edward III. Once the English army entered and began to ransack the town, Froissart tells us,

> the Constable and the Count began to fear that they might be drawn into [the truly horrible carnage which was taking place] and fall into the hands of archers who did not know who they were. While they were watching the massacre in dismay, they caught sight of a gallant English knight with only one eye, called Sir Thomas Holland . . . They recognized him because they had campaigned together in Granada and Prussia and on other expeditions, in the way in which knights do meet each. They were much relieved when they saw him and called out to him as he passed . . . When he heard [them] Sir Thomas was delighted, not only because he could save their lives but also because their capture meant an excellent day's work and a fine haul of valuable prisoners.[27]

As this suggests, the international ransom market experienced something of a golden age in this period. It has been explored by Rémy Ambühl, Chris Given-Wilson, and others, and their work reveals that aristocratic links of this nature continued to exist throughout the war, even though they sometimes lessened as it progressed with the result that captors did not always treat their prisoners with the care which chivalric tradition prescribed.[28]

Literary texts, many of a military character, also circulated, and some authors journeyed extensively, crossing social and political frontiers in search of patronage and inspiration.[29] Travels such as these could take authors beyond the borders of Britain and France, although not necessarily beyond the reach of the Hundred Years War – many subsidiary areas in Flanders, Italy, and the Iberian peninsula were drawn into the orbit of the conflict and the impact of those

27 *Froissart's Chronicles*, ed. and trans. Geoffrey Brereton (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 75.

28 Rémy *Ambühl*, *Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War* (Cambridge, 2013), esp. pp. 31–38; Chris Given-Wilson and Françoise Bériac-Lainé, *Les prisonniers de la bataille de Poitiers* (Paris, 2002), esp. pp. 108–26.

29 For example: Sir Thomas Gray, *Scalacronica, 1272–1363*, ed. and trans. Andy King (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. lvi–lviii; *The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context and Translation*, ed. and trans. Richard W. Kaueper and Elspeth Kennedy (Philadelphia, 1996), pp. 18–28; Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Peace*, ed. and trans. Karen Green, Constant J. Mews, and Janice Pinder (Philadelphia, 2008), pp. 5–21, 41; Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, ed. Charity Cannon Willard, trans. Sumner Willard (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 1–9; C. T. Allmand, "Fifteenth-Century Versions of Vegetius' *De Re Militari*," in *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France,* ed. Matthew Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 30–45. On Chaucer's career and possible connections with Ireland see Rory McTurk, *Chaucer and the Norse and Celtic Worlds* (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 34–66. On Froissart's patrons see Peter Ainsworth, "Jean Froissart: Chronicler, Poet and Writer," *The Online Froissart*, ed. Peter Ainsworth and Godfried Croenen, version 1.5 (Sheffield: HRI Online, 2013) http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/onlinefroissart; G. T. Diller, "Froissart: Patrons and Texts," in *Froissart: Historian*, ed. Palmer, pp. 145–60.

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regions on the struggle and their contribution to the Anglo-French war have been explored very effectively in the three volumes edited by Donald Kagay and Andrew Villalon.[30]

And yet, despite the fact that the impact of the Anglo-French struggle was felt throughout Britain and Ireland, if unevenly, the Hundred Years War has retained its own historiographical space.[31] This particularism is understandable, given some characteristics of the conflict, and yet it can be seen as almost perverse, given that the war was driven, in part at least, by the Plantagenets' wish to retain the remnants of their Angevin inheritance in France and regain that which had been lost. Whether or not the French Crown was a driving ambition for the English at particular times in the struggle, English war aims were, surely, shaped by a general awareness of the loss of "imperial" territories in France, both Norman and Angevin. Malcolm Vale drew our attention to the Angevin antecedents of the struggle,[32] and Mark Ormrod has shown the continuing allure of those and the family's other ancestral territories for Edward III, especially in the 1350s and 1360s, not only in France but elsewhere in Britain and Ireland.[33] Anne Curry and others have noted a similar appeal for Henry V (r. 1413–22).[34] According to the *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, the 1415 Normandy campaign was driven, in part, by England's historic (and divine) claim to the duchy. The king, it said, was compelled to act following "a ruling from the Supreme Judge" because otherwise he faced a "perpetual disinheritance" of his estates in France which had been usurped and withheld from him.[35]

Because of the continuing importance of these ancestral associations there would seem to be obvious points of comparison between the territories to which the Plantagenets laid claim across the Channel and those in Britain and Ireland. However, questions undoubtedly remain over the extent to which those territories were viewed as similar by the Plantagenets, were treated similarly, or were administered collectively. This is reflected in uncertainty and debate regarding the appropriate terminology for the *dominia transmarinia* – the king's lands other than England. Should the constituent elements be considered lordships, colonies,

30 L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, eds., *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus* (Leiden, 2004); idem, *The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas* (Leiden, 2008); idem, *Hundred Years War (Part III)*.

31 Brown, *Disunited Kingdoms*, pp. 4–6.

32 M. G. A. Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy 1250–1340* (Oxford, repr. 2000).

33 W. Mark Ormrod, *Edward III* (New Haven, 2011), pp. 414–45.

34 G. L. Harriss, "Introduction: The Exemplar of Kingship," in *Henry V: The Practice of Kingship*, ed. G. L. Harriss (Oxford, 1985), p. 29; Anne Curry, "Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?" in *England and Normandy*, ed. Bates and Curry, pp. 241–52.

35 *Gesta Henrici Quinti: The Deeds of Henry V*, ed. and trans. J. S. Roskell and F. Taylor (Oxford, 1975), p. 15; J. J. N. Palmer, "The War Aims of the Protagonists and the Negotiations for Peace," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971), pp. 54–55.

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or dominions?[36] Were the Plantagenets perhaps adopting a policy mirroring the Valois model? John Hardyng (1378–1465) commented that both Normandy and Gascony were possessions akin to the French royal *apanages*: "And Normandy and Guyan as appent remayn should to him [Henry V] and his heyres."[37]

If, however, the terminology should reflect the precise nature of the relationship between each territory and the English crown, is any generic title appropriate? Indeed, there is a danger here that if we adopt a holistic approach which considers the Plantagenets' dominions within the British archipelago as directly comparable to those from continental Europe we ignore significant differences between those estates. As Peter Crooks has noted, the territories were far from heterogeneous, with varying relationships to England. They had clear differences in law, custom, and status, and administrative practices were fragmented.[38]

Some disparities were particularly marked. Gascony had been in English control for nearly two hundred years when the Anglo-French war began. It has been described as England's first colony, and yet, unlike Wales and Ireland, it experienced little settlement by the English and no sustained attempts to construct a society on an English model. Nor did it experience the imposition of a new ruling class, something again evident in Wales and parts of Ireland.[39] It would not be easy to impose a cohesive "imperial policy" or implement a common military strategy in areas which differed to such an extent topographically, socially, politically, and in their historical relationships with the Plantagenets. Yet, if the Hundred Years War was, from an English perspective, an attempt to reconstitute the Angevin Empire in some form, then the territories in France surely must be thought of as part of the same collective as those in Britain and Ireland.

The question of whether "empire" is an appropriate designation for this collection of lordships is perhaps even more contentious. Despite the claims of English monarchs to be emperors in their kingdom (*rex in regno suo imperator est*) in accordance with Roman Law, there was no collective noun to describe the wider realm in such imperial terms.[40] Philippe de Mézières (c. 1327–1405)

36 See R. R. Davies, "Lordship or Colony?," in *The English in Medieval Ireland*, ed. James F. Lydon (Dublin, 1984), 142–60.

37 *The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. Henry Ellis (repr. New York, 1974), p. 379. See also Robin Frame, "English Policies and Anglo-Irish Attitudes in the Crisis of 1341–1342," in *England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven*, ed. James F. Lydon (Dublin, 1981), p. 96. He noted that Edward III hoped Lionel of Clarence's Irish lands "would form a significant part of an *apanage* of a cadet branch of his own family."

38 Peter Crooks, "Before Humpty Dumpty: The First English Empire and the Brittleness of Bureaucracy, 1259–1453," in *Empires and Bureaucracy from Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Crooks and T. H. Parsons (forthcoming Cambridge, 2016), pp. 355–56.

39 Labarge, *Gascony: England's First Colony*; Robin Frame, "Overlordship and Reaction, c. 1200–c. 1450," *Ireland and Britain, 1170–1450* (London, 1998), pp. 77–78; James F. Lydon, "Ireland and the English Crown, 1171–1541," *Irish Historical Studies* 29 (1995), p. 294.

40 For a consideration of various aspects of the Plantagenet dominions, including the suitability of the term "empire," see Peter Crooks, David Green, and W. Mark Ormrod, eds., *The Plantagenet Empire, 1259–1453: Proceedings of the 2014 Harlaxton Symposium* (Donnington, forthcoming

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may have addressed Richard II (r. 1377–99) as the "excellent King of Great Britain" (*tresexcellent roy de la Grant Bretaingne*) in his *Letter* of 1395, but no monarch claimed an imperial title.[41] Indeed, it would have been difficult to make such a claim explicit, given the close links between a number of "true" emperors and the Plantagenets, such as Edward III's position as vicar-general to Lewis of Bavaria (1338–41), and Henry V's friendship with "the most superillustrious prince, Sigismund, king of Hungary, the emperor."[42]

John Le Patourel, of course, did conceive of England's collective continental and insular possessions in imperial terms, although not necessarily for the entirety of the Hundred Years War. With regard to the period between 1066 and some time in the fourteenth century, he believed that we should not conceive of England and France as traditional "national" units but as parts of "a 'greater Angevin empire' [which] retain[ed] its identity through periods of growth, transformation and decline."[43] If correct, there are, then, good reasons to think in "imperial" terms, although we should certainly not think of this Plantagenet Empire as "a reified or stable entity" – Henry V's authority within his diverse lordships and vision of his realm differed considerably from that of Edward III, and still more from those of Richard II or Henry VI (r. 1422–61 / 1470–71).[44] Nonetheless, this imperial construct offers something rather more than just a conceptual lens through which to view the diversity and interconnections of the Plantagenet dominions. Those collected territories mattered to contemporaries – certainly when they were lost or under threat. In 1450, John Gresham lamented in a letter to John Paston, "Today it is told Cherbourg is gone and we have now not a foot of land left in Normandy."[45] And, as the Yorkist manifesto of 1460 had it,

2016). It is worth noting that imperial conceptions of royal authority on both sides of the "English" Channel contributed to the growing tension which exploded in the Hundred Years War. The relationship established by Louis IX and Henry III at the Treaty of Paris in 1259 became increasingly untenable in the face of ever-increasing claims of regal sovereignty made by both Capetian and Plantagenet lawyers: *English Historical Documents, III*, ed. H. Rothwell (London, 1975), pp. 376–79; Pierre Chaplais, "The Making of the Treaty of Paris (1259) and the Royal Style," *English Historical Review* 67 (1952), 235–53; W. Mark Ormrod, "England, Normandy and the Beginnings of the Hundred Years War, 1259–1360," in *England and Normandy*, ed. Bates and Curry, p. 198; Walter Ullmann, "This Realm of England is an Empire," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 30 (1979), 175–203.

41 Philippe de Mézières, *Letter to King Richard II: A Plea Made in 1395 for Peace between England and France*, ed. and trans. G. W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1975), pp. 21, 93.

42 Ormrod, *Edward III*, 201–3; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, p. 13.

43 John Le Patourel, "The Plantagenet Dominions," *History* 50 (1965), pp. 289–90. He also noted the difficulties associated with the name "Plantagenet," which was not used as a hereditary surname until the 15th century. See further J. S. Hamilton, *The Plantagenets: History of a Dynasty* (London, 2010), p. 1.

44 Peter Crooks, David Green and W. Mark Ormrod, "The Plantagenets and Empire in the Late Middle Ages," in *Plantagenet Empire* (forthcoming). See also Michael J. Bennett, "Richard II and the Wider Realm," in *Richard II and the Art of Kingship*, ed. Anthony Goodman and James L. Gillespie (Oxford, 1999), pp. 187–204; John Watts, *Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 13–38.

45 *Paston Letters*, ed. James Gairdner, 3 vols. (London, 1872–75), 1: no. 103.

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"enemies to the commonweal . . . have allowed all the old possessions which the king had in France and Normandy, Anjou and Maine, Gascony and Guienne, won and gained by his [Henry VI's] father of most noble memory, and his other noble ancestors [to be] shamefully lost or sold."[46]

It also seems that the movement of people within the dominions had, by this stage, given them a collective social and political identity, although this might not be expressed in a positive sense. For example, during a political crisis in 1341, the Anglo-Irish wrote to Edward III, pleading for assistance. They reminded him that "whereas various people of your allegiance, as of Scotland, Gascony and Wales often in times past have levied war against their liege lord, at all times your English liege people of Ireland have behaved themselves well and loyally."[47] In a similar fashion, when, in 1440, Parliament sought to tax those resident in England but born elsewhere it soon faced complaints from the considerable numbers of Irish, Normans, Channel Islanders, and Gascons who argued that as loyal servants of the king they should not be treated differently from Englishmen.[48] As Ralph Griffiths observed, "Those who were subject to English kings formed a complex series of interlocking and interrelated communities, between them enjoying several systems of law, acknowledging different traditions and bodies of custom, and speaking a number of languages; but they also had a common identity that derived from their history, status, and treatment as the king's subjects."[49]

There may be, however, other multi-regional/international models which can be applied more appropriately to these various territories, including that most

46 *An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI*, ed. John Silvester Davies (London, 1856), pp. 86–90. Such attitudes might be recast in the latter stages of the war when mercantile interests focused on the need to maintain trading opportunities across the Irish Sea and the English Channel. See *Libelle of Englyshe Polycye–A Poem on the Use of Sea Power, 1436*, ed. George F. Warner (Oxford, 1926); John Scattergood, "*The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye*: The Nation and its Place," in *Nation, Court and Culture: New Essays on Fifteenth-Century English Poetry*, ed. Helen Cooney (Dublin, 2001), pp. 28–49.

47 *Statutes and Ordinances, and Acts of the Parliament of Ireland. King John to Henry V*, Henry F. Berry (Dublin, 1907), pp. 342–45.

48 This particular incident is detailed in the records collected in the University of York project directed by W. Mark Ormrod: "England's Immigrants,1330–1550: Resident Aliens in the Late Middle Ages": http://www.englandsimmigrants.com. See also Anne Curry, "Introduction: Parliament of 1439–40," *Parliament Rolls of Medieval England*, ed. Chris Given-Wilson et al. (Woodbridge, CD-ROM, 2005); "Parliament of 1439–40: Text and Translation", item 14, ibid.

49 R. A. Griffiths, "The English Realm and Dominions and the King's Subjects in the Later Middle Ages," in *Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society: Essays Presented to J. R. Lander*, ed. J. G. Rowe (Toronto, 1986), pp. 84–85. See also Curry, "Lancastrian Normandy," p. 236. She notes that the Plantagenet lordships shared or had imposed upon them a common political identity deriving from their position as lands subject to the kingdom of England (*pays subgiet au royaume d'Angleterre*), and those who lived in them were, by definition, the king's subjects. For a discussion of the concept of "allegiant identity" see Ruddick, *English Identity*, pp. 229–56.

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"tyrannical" of all, the state.[50] Broadly speaking, this period coincides with the development in England of what some have seen as a state, perhaps a "war state," which reshaped priorities throughout the Plantagenet lordships and encouraged the development of many of the institutions of government required to launch repeated military operations on an unprecedented level.[51] Endemic warfare necessitated the extension of control by central institutions over what their governors considered the periphery. But what the wider community considered the periphery remained a matter of perspective, one that varied considerably depending on whether one was looking out from Bordeaux or Beaumaris, Limerick or Limoges, Rouen or Rochester.

If such a state did emerge, then its critical development lay in the wars Edward I and Edward III launched between c. 1280 and c. 1360.[52] The military, financial, and political pressures of endemic conflict led to a series of transformations in the machinery of administration, taxation, and bureaucracy. Now, there is a clear danger here of anachronism, certainly of teleology, when discussing the evolution of the state or, indeed, the very existence of a state in the Middle Ages,[53] but there seems little doubt that the pressures of war in this period changed (and changed significantly) the nature of government and political society in England and throughout her dominions. As a consequence of these developments the scope of royal policy could and did increase dramatically. There were, however, running concurrently, a number of new and significant limiting factors. Royal policy might now grow in its aspirations, but as it did so it needed to accord with the wishes of the "community of the realm" whose members manned those new institutions and offices, fought in the extended campaigns, and helped to pay for them. Consequently, the Plantagenets could, once more, aspire to "imperial power," but only in a manner which recognised the ambitions and concerns of a restructured and changing body politic. This was, after all, policy constructed in the aftermath

50 Michael Clanchy, "Does Writing Construct the State?," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 15 (2002), 68–70; R. R. Davies, "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 16 (2003), 280–300; Jean-Philippe Genet, *La genèse de l'État moderne: Culture et société politique en Angleterre* (Paris, 2003), p. 13; Steve Hindle, "When and What was the State? Some Introductory Comments," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 15 (2002), 63–65; W. Mark Ormrod, "The English State and the Plantagenet Empire, 1259–1360: A Fiscal Perspective," in *The Medieval State: Essays Presented to James Campbell*, ed. J. R. Maddicott and D. M. Palliser (London, 2000), 197–214; Susan Reynolds, "There Were States in Medieval Europe: A Response to Rees Davies," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 16 (2003), 550–55; J. R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton, 1970), esp. pp. 57–88; John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 23–34.

51 G. L. Harriss, "Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England," *Past and Present* 138 (1993), 28–57; Richard W. Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 1–5, 384–86.

52 For a wide-ranging discussion of these issues see Crooks, "Before Humpty Dumpty," esp. pp. 365, 389–91.

53 See for example David Canadine, "British History as a 'New' Subject," in *Uniting the Kingdom?*, ed. Grant and Stringer, pp. 25–27.

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of Magna Carta (1215), the baronial wars of the 1250s and 1260s, circumscribed by the deposition of Edward II (1327), and, later, limited by the growing power of Parliament. If this was an imperial monarchy, it was also a strangely limited one – forming what John Fortescue (c. 1397–1479) described as *dominium politicum et regale*.[54]

It was, however, through grand, imperial aspirations, and specifically through military policy, that Edward III sought to restore the English monarchy to a position of respect after the indignities it had suffered in his father's reign.[55] War with Scotland and France was the means he chose to unite the "community of the realm" in common cause with the monarchy – of firmly reattaching the head of state to the body politic. The English war machine that Edward I crafted in the conquest of Wales had stuttered on occasion in Scotland and suffered a number of chastening defeats, most famously at Bannockburn (1314), but Edward III recognised the opportunities, nonetheless. Bannockburn, of course, taught the English no end of a lesson: it emphasised the enormous potential of disciplined infantry against cavalry (in this case the schiltrom formation), the significance of topography when choosing precisely where to give battle, and offered unimpeachable evidence of the importance of a clear chain of command.[56] Such lessons were hardly new, whether or not we wish to see the developments they encouraged as part of a military revolution, but they certainly brought about a further change in English military thinking – one of which Robert Bruce was well aware. Despite his great successes, on his deathbed Robert I (r. 1306–29) is said to have warned his successors of the dangers of facing the English in battle.[57] Such advice was not taken to heart and the consequences became brutally clear on the fields of Dupplin Moor (1332) and Halidon Hill (1333). This abrupt reversal in military fortunes is attributable, however, to failures among the Scottish commanders as well as English tactical advances, and to the greater

54 Sir John Fortescue, *De laudibus legum Anglie*, ed. and trans. S. B. Chrimes (Cambridge, 1942), pp. xiii, xxxix–xl, 85, 89–91. By the terms of the revised coronation oath of 1308 the king (Edward II) swore to uphold "the rightful laws and customs which the community of the realm shall have chosen." Thomas Rymer, ed., *Foedera, Conventiones, Literae etc*., 3 vols. in 6 pts. (London, 1816–30), 2/1:33, 36.

55 Nigel Saul, *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England, 1066–1500* (London, 2011), pp. 93–114; Richard Barber, *Edward III and the Triumph of the English: The Battle of Crécy and the Company of the Garter* (London, 2013), esp. pp. 97–112.

56 Michael Brown, *Bannockburn: The Scottish War and the British Isles, 1307–1323* (Edinburgh, 2008), esp. pp. 5–23. On Scottish military developments in this period see Steve Boardman, "Highland Scots and Anglo-Scottish Warfare, c. 1300–1513," in *England and Scotland at War*, ed. King and Simpkin, 231–54; Michael Prestwich, "The Wars of Independence, 1296–1328," in *A Military History of Scotland*, ed. Edward M. Spiers, Jeremy A. Crang, and Matthew J. Strickland (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 133–57, esp. pp. 145–46; Alastair J. Macdonald, "The Kingdom of Scotland at War," in ibid., 158–81, esp. pp. 158–60.

57 Ranald Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327–1335* (Oxford, 1965), p. 111.

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resources which England could direct into her military campaigns.[58] Furthermore, despite success in individual engagements, the English, for reasons of geography and topography, as well as financial limitations and political commitments elsewhere, could not wholly impose their lordship in Scotland, nor truly incorporate it into the "Plantagenet Empire."

English interest in Scotland waxed and waned over the course of the Hundred Years War; sometimes in inverse proportion to her commitments in France, sometimes the two theatres were interlinked, as in 1346 when the battle of Neville's Cross followed hard on the heels of the English victory at Crécy. As already noted, Edward III's ambitions may have shifted throughout his reign. Perhaps victory at Poitiers (1356) made the claim to the French throne seem an achievable goal – something more than a mere token to be exchanged in a diplomatic game. Whether or not this was the case, a restoration of some or all of the Angevin Empire seems to have remained a consistent ambition, one expressed, for example, in what Le Patourel described as Edward's "provincial strategy" by which he competed with the Valois kings for authority and the allegiance of regional French powers on a case-by-case basis.[59] It can also be seen in the negotiations which preceded and followed the Reims campaign of 1359–60.[60] During lulls in the war with France, such as that which followed the Treaty of Brétigny-Calais, his attention and that of his successors could be redirected to other parts of the empire. This was certainly so in Ireland, where English control had begun to lessen by 1337. Serious attempts were made – in the 1350s (under Thomas Rokeby), 1360s (under Lionel of Clarence), and 1390s (under Richard II) – to reinforce royal authority over the diminishing lordship and, indeed, to extend that authority.[61] This proved difficult, however, because of political fragmentation among the Irish themselves, and the English inability to sustain

58 Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 112–28; Alastair J. Macdonald, "Triumph and Disaster: Scottish Military Leadership in the Later Middle Ages," in *A Military History of Scotland*, ed. Spiers, et al., 255–82; Clifford J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360* (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 10–76. For later Anglo-Scottish encounters see David Rollason and Michael Prestwich, eds., *The Battle of Neville's Cross, 1346* (Stamford, 1998); John Sadler, *Border Fury: England and Scotland at War, 1296–1568* (Harlow 2006).

59 J. Le Patourel, "Edward III and the Kingdom of France," *History* 43 (1958), 172–89.

60 For the Treaty of Brétigny-Calais see Rymer, ed., *Foedera,* 3/1: 343; Delachenal, *Charles V*, 2:400–7; Chris Given-Wilson and Françoise Bériac, "Edward III's Prisoners of War: The Battle of Poitiers and its Context," *English Historical Review* 116 (2001), pp. 813–14, 829–30; Clifford J. Rogers, "The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1354–1360 Reconsidered," in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. James Bothwell (York, 2001), pp. 193–214; Craig Taylor, "Edward III and the Plantagenet Claim to the French Throne," in ibid., pp. 155–70.

61 Watt, "The Anglo-Irish Colony under Strain, 1327–99," pp. 352–96. In the period 1361–76 over £91,000 was spent on wages alone for armies sent to Ireland (£16,000 from Irish sources): P. Connolly, "The Financing of English Expeditions to Ireland, 1361–1376," in *England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. James F. Lydon (Dublin, 1981), p. 117; D. Johnston, "The Interim Years: Richard II and Ireland, 1395–9," in ibid., 175–95.

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a sufficiently large force in Ireland for sufficient time, given commitments elsewhere.

Nonetheless, even when England's attention turned away from her immediate neighbours in Britain and Ireland after the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, these areas were not ignored. Indeed, the pressures of war increased the need to exploit national and extra-national resources (perhaps this serves as another manifestation of the war state). Consequently, governors of the various lordships were usually charged with improving the profitability of their territories, in the hope that they could operate independently and, in time, return funds to the English treasury.[62] In addition, defensive preparations were necessary; improvements to fortifications were made, and measures taken, when the opportunity arose, to assert English dominance.[63] The need to pursue such policies was shaped by certain basic political and military priorities – to ensure that taxes were paid, soldiers recruited, and colonial territories did not become safe havens for Valois allies or agents.[64]

Because of such common concerns, policies within Britain and Ireland were often mirrored, sometimes in a distorted form, in France, where two main phases of military success led to major colonial ventures. The key periods of English territorial expansion in the Hundred Years War came in the early 1360s and in the ten years or so after 1415. Both of these were founded, in part, on battlefield successes – Poitiers and Agincourt – and the treaties that followed them, albeit indirectly (Brétigny-Calais, and Troyes, 1420). However, the English encountered major problems when seeking to exploit these successes for extended periods of time. In general, it proved extremely difficult to convert military gains into long-term political and economic advantages and to establish effective civil administrations in conquered territories. This became of even greater concern in fifteenth-century France when the *chevauchée* strategy gave way to one of occupation.[65]

62 See, for example, the Black Prince's appointment as lieutenant of Gascony (10 July 1355): *Black Prince's Register* [hereafter *BPR*], 4:143–45; and prince of Aquitaine (19 July 1362): Rymer, ed., *Foedera*, 3/2: 667–70.

63 Examples of repairs to fortifications: 1) Gascony – Bayonne (19 July 1380), The National Archives (London) [hereafter TNA]: C 61/94:1; regarding funds for ongoing improvements to the walls of Bourg, Libourne, and Saint-Émilion during the reign of Henry IV see C 61/107:145; 111:20; 112:47. The Gascon Rolls Project, which greatly facilitates this kind of study, may be accessed at http://www.gasconrolls.org. 2) Channel Islands: in 1369, fearing an attack, Edward III ordered preparations for the defence of the islands. This came in 1372 when Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri (Owen of Wales) attacked Guernsey with a force of about 600 men. The campaign proved inconclusive. In 1373, Bertrand du Guesclin, constable of France, launched a further assault. In the 1390s the programme of fortification continued at Castle Cornet and Beauregard Tower in Guernsey: Thornton, *Channel Islands*, pp. 12, 15.

64 Green, "The Hundred Years War, Colonial Policy and the English Lordships," pp. 238–42.

65 Christine Carpenter, "War, Government and Governance in England in the Later Middle Ages," in *The Fifteenth Century VII: Conflicts, Consequences and the Crown in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. Linda Clark (Woodbridge, 2007), p. 22; Green, *Hundred Years War*, pp. 155–76.

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The situation in Ireland was similar. The colony suffered regularly from Gaelic Irish raids such as those which the Mac Murchadhas orchestrated in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. These hostilities alternated with periods of truce with the Dublin administration. In practice, when the colony had sufficient resources it could enforce the submission of Gaelic chiefs. If sizable forces were available to competent commanders such as Thomas, duke of Clarence (lieutenant of Ireland, 1401–3, 1408–9) and John Talbot (lieutenant of Ireland, 1414–19, 1446–47) they could achieve considerable successes, but these were never consolidated fully and before long the colony was thrown back on the defensive. A letter to Henry V in 1418 urged him to maintain a strong army in Ireland because "Irish enemies and English rebells yf they may espie the contrary … will rise agayne unto wars."[66]

Clearly, such a situation did not lead to stability, but even if it had, what sort of society did the English Crown seek to create in these areas? Here, an awareness of both historiographical spheres can be especially instructive because it seems highly likely that what might be called the English "colonial tone" in France was set in Wales and Ireland. One scholar who noted this is Christopher Allmand, who raised the intriguing notion that the English feared that Normandy in the 1420s might become home to a "middle nation" like that identified in Ireland – one distanced politically and culturally from the "mother country," but also distinct from and disliked by the indigenous population.[67]

In Ireland those of the "middle nation" are usually equated with people labelled "degenerate" in legislation that the Dublin Parliament enacted in 1297, and described in similar terms in the Statute of Kilkenny (1366). While most Anglo-Irish noblemen, born and raised in Ireland, identified with English culture and did not seek to intermarry with their Irish neighbours, learn the Irish language, or adapt to Gaelic customs, their customs and language inevitably underwent a process of acculturation.[68] This became a cause for considerable unease in London and Dublin.

66 Cited by Art Cosgrove, "The Emergence of the Pale," in *New History of Ireland*, ed. Cosgrove, p. 545. On warfare in Ireland see Robin Frame, "The Defence of the Irish Lordship, 1250–1450," and Katharine Simms, "Gaelic Warfare in the Middle Ages," both in *A Military History of Ireland*, ed. Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 76–98, 99–115.

67 C. T. Allmand, "La Normandie devant l'opinion anglaise à la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans," *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes* 128 (1970), p. 355; James F. Lydon, "The Middle Nation," in *The English in Medieval Ireland*, ed. Lydon, pp. 1–26. See further Maurice Keen, "The End of the Hundred Years War: Lancastrian France and Lancastrian England," in *England and her Neighbours, 1066–1453: Essay in Honour of Pierre Chaplais* (London, 1989), pp. 297–311.

68 *Statutes and Ordinances*, ed. Berry, pp. 430–69; Sparky Booker, "An English City: Gaelicization and Cultural Exchange in Late Medieval Dublin," in *Medieval Dublin X*, ed. Seán Duffy (Dublin, 2010), pp. 287–98; Seán Duffy, "The Problem of Degeneracy," in *Law and Disorder in Thirteenth-Century Ireland: The Dublin Parliament of 1297*, ed. James F. Lydon (Dublin, 1997), pp. 87–106; David Green, "The Statute of Kilkenny (1366): Legislation and the State," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27 (2014), 236–62; James F. Lydon, "Nation and

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The differences between English attitudes to French and Celtic societies meant that this was, in reality, not such a deep concern in Normandy, but it was problematic all the same, as the process ran counter to bureaucratic, political, and cultural trends in England.[69] Administrations throughout Plantagenet territories became subject to what Rees Davies described as a "mentality of uniformity," and this was the case whether they were in France, Britain, or Ireland. As Davies said, this insistence on uniformity prevented England "from reaching out effectively and constructively to the other peoples and power centres of the British Isles, except possibly on its own terms."[70] In a similar fashion Le Patourel argued that governmental procedures in all these disparate territories were brought increasingly under English control and followed increasingly regularised patterns. He, however, attributed the remaining differences evident between English administrations in Celtic countries and those in France to the fact that rule in the latter was based on inheritance rather than conquest.[71] Whether this argument holds true for the English acquisitions in France during the Hundred Years War is questionable. Calais, much of the principality of Aquitaine, and those lands in Normandy and northern France acquired by Henry V were the product of conquest or, at the least, a diplomatic settlement secured through military force. Indeed, those territories which Henry V captured before sealing the Treaty of Troyes were referred to explicitly as the *pays de conquête*.

Furthermore, the prosecution of the war and the transference of staff and officers throughout the king's lordships ensured considerable similarities of policy and practice between England, the English colonies in the British Isles, and those in France. In this period the Crown (or perhaps the state) began to intrude into new areas as it sought to standardise a range of social and commercial activities. Attempts to regulate and restrict social and economic mobility in England, such as the labour legislation, sumptuary and game laws, have much in common

Race in Medieval Ireland," in *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. Simon Forde, Lesley Johnson, and Alan V. Murray (Leeds, 1995), p. 105.

69 Such attitudes have been explored in great detail in various works by R. R. Davies, R. Bartlett, John Gillingham, Matthew Strickland, and others. See, for example R. R. Davies, "The Peoples of Britain and Ireland, 1100–1400. Pt. 1: Identities," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 4 (1994), 1–20; Robert Bartlett, "Colonial Aristocracies of the High Middle Ages," in *Medieval Frontier Societies*, ed. Robert Bartlett and A. MacKay (Oxford, 1989), pp. 23–47; Matthew Strickland, "Killing or Clemency? Changing Attitudes to Conduct in War in Eleventh and Twelfth-Century Britain and France," in *Krieg im Mittelalter*, ed. Hans-Henning Kortüm (Berlin, 2001), pp. 93–122; and John Gillingham's collected essays published as *The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, National identity, and Political Values* (Woodbridge, 2000).

70 Davies, *First English Empire*, p. 201. See also R. R. Davies, *Domination and Conquest: The Experience of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, 1100–1300* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 120. With regard to both Cheshire and the Channel Islands, Tim Thornton has noted increasing English concern over central control and the imposition of uniformity. "Centralisation and uniformity are axiomatic, precociously distinctive of the British Isles": *The Channel Islands*, p. 6.

71 Le Patourel, "Plantagenet Dominions," pp. 289, 303–6.

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with methods enacted throughout the dominions of the Plantagenet Empire to prevent degeneracy or acculturation.[72]

There remained, however, substantial differences between the various lordships, which meant that uniformity proved more difficult to impose in some areas than others. The numbers of English settlers, the relationship between the settler communities and England, and the resources – military and financial – available to governors and lieutenants to impose "colonial" authority all varied. As a consequence, English administrations were usually compelled to work with existing power structures and employed local men in official positions. In Gascony and Aquitaine the good will of the aristocracy had to be maintained because its members played a vital role in the defence of the duchy/principality.[73] The duchy also provided considerable numbers of crossbowmen throughout the war, although it was rare for other troops to serve far from the region, except in those campaigns which the Black Prince led in the 1350s and 1360s.[74] After the Treaty of Troyes recruitment patterns changed because Frenchmen could serve Henry V as regent of France. It was not long, however, before anxieties about non-"English" troops arose once more as military and political conditions deteriorated. Consequently, at a muster in 1430 in Normandy officials were to reject for service anyone who was not English, Irish, Welsh or Gascon.[75]

Irish troops were also recruited to serve within Ireland itself and overseas, although this, too, might be restricted on occasion, and stipulations were sometimes made that archers serving in Ireland had to be born in England. Hence, in an aborted campaign of 1392 not only were the Gaelic-Irish excluded from

72 After the Ordinance of 1349 and Statute of 1351, labour legislation became a major feature of parliamentary business. This included the 1388 Statute of Cambridge. Sumptuary legislation was adopted, annulled, and readopted after October 1363 (see also the parliaments of April 1379 and September 1402). Richard II passed the game laws in January 1390. For details of these see the relevant entries in the *Parliament Rolls of Medieval England*, ed. Given-Wilson; and for further discussion Chris Given-Wilson, "Service, Serfdom and English Labour Legislation, 1350–1500," in *Concepts and Patterns of Service in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. Anne Curry and Elizabeth Matthew (Woodbridge, 2000), 21–37; Green, "Statute of Kilkenny," pp. 244–50; N. B. Harte, "State Control of Dress and Social Change in PreIndustrial England," in *Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F. J. Fisher*, ed. D. C. Coleman and A. H. John (London, 1976), pp. 139–40.

73 "La défense du duché est abandonée au principal des nobles du pays": Pierre Capra, "Les bases sociales du pouvoir anglo-gascon au milieu du xive siècle," *Le Moyen Age*, 4th ser., 30 (1975), p. 276. See also Pierre Capra, "L'évolution de l'administration anglo-gasconne au milieu du xive siècle," *Bordeaux et les îles britanniques du xiii^{e} au xx^{e} siècle* (Bordeaux, 1975), p. 23.

74 For the 1355–56 campaigns see Richard Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince* (Woodbridge, 1978), pp. 113–47; H. J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–57* (repr. Barnsley, 2004); Peter Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356* (Woodbridge, 2011); Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp. 348–84; idem, "The Black Prince in Gascony and France (1355–56) According to MS78 of Corpus Christi College, Oxford," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 7 (2009), 168–75; Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, pp. 174–87, 190–249.

75 Bell, Curry, et al., *Soldier in Late Medieval England*, pp. 242, 245, 249–50.

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service but also the Anglo-Irish (that is, the English born in Ireland). This concern with the national identity of soldiers continued during the lieutenancy of Thomas, duke of Clarence, although it may be that, as on the Scottish Marches, the Crown wished to ensure that its money was spent on reinforcements from outside Ireland rather than on paying wages to men who were obliged to serve anyway.[76] Whatever the motivation, in Ireland there was, by contrast, a need to entrust administrative and military responsibilities to the local nobility. One of the chief problems with implementing this process of delegation lay in the vendettas which divided the aristocracy. Indeed, this was a concern throughout the Plantagenet dominions and a growing problem within England itself as tension developed around the Lancastrian usurpation, and in the political friction which led to the Wars of the Roses. In Wales private war (reminiscent of the native bloodfeud or *galanas*) was virtually institutionalised; Aquitaine was riven by prolonged feuds such as that between the houses of Foix and Armagnac, just as Ireland was torn between the Butlers and Geraldines.[77] The Talbot–Ormond feud, which developed after John Talbot's appointment in Ireland in 1414, was so divisive that it caused John Swayne, archbishop of Armagh (d. 1439x42) to remark, "all this lond is severed."[78]

In Wales, high office was usually restricted to those of English descent, but local government remained largely in Welsh hands. By the middle years of the fourteenth century around 80% of offices below the rank of sheriff were held by Welshmen.[79] Welsh soldiers were also very prominent in a number of military expeditions in the early exchanges of the Hundred Years War. Perhaps as many as 7,000 Welshmen fought for England in the course of the Crécy–Calais campaign (1346–47).[80] Ten years later, Avesbury referred to "a great number of Welshmen" (*magnaque numero Wallensium*), although there actually seems to have been a relatively small Welsh contingent both in the *grande chevauchée*

76 Bell, Curry, et al., *Soldier in Late Medieval England*, p. 244.

77 Peter Crooks, "Factions, Feuds and Noble Power in the Lordship of Ireland, c. 1356–1496," *Irish Historical Studies* 35 (2007), pp. 434–36. See further Justine Firnhaber-Baker, *Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250–1400* (Cambridge, 2014), esp. pp. 125–32, 159–68.

78 *The Register of John Swayne, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland, 1418–1439*, ed. D. A. Chart (Belfast, 1935), p. 111.

79 James Given, *State and Society: Gwynedd and Languedoc under Outside Rule* (Ithaca, 1990), 158–59; R. A. Griffiths, *The Principality of Wales in the Later Middle Ages: The Structure and Personnel of Government, I: South Wales, 1277–1536* (Cardiff, 1972), pp. xviii–xix.

80 TNA E 403/336/44; *BPR*, 1:7, 13, 68–69, 80; George Wrottesley, ed., *Crécy and Calais from the Public Records* (Collections for a History of Staffordshire edited by the William Salt Archaeological Society, xviii), p. 58; Andrew Ayton, "The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346," in *England and Normandy*, ed. Bates and Curry, pp. 261–62 n. 55; *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, ed. J. Goronwy Edwards (Cardiff, 1935), pp. 193, 236–37.

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led by the Black Prince in 1355 and at the battle of Poitiers.[81] Welsh troops – around 1,000 – also participated in the Reims campaign of 1359–60.[82]

Welsh military service declined after 1360, in part because recruitment by indenture became problematic for local lords who could not bear the associated costs. In consequence, with the exception of Gregory Sais (d. 1390), no Welsh captain achieved particular prominence in English service in the middle period of the war.[83] Welsh soldiers were, however, raised on occasion to defend the principality against French invasion, and some Welshmen were recruited for Richard II's first campaign to Ireland (1394–95).[84] The Glyn Dŵr revolt had a further impact on recruitment: because of the rising only five hundred soldiers from south Wales were recruited for the Agincourt campaign; Welshmen from the north became especially distrusted, although some may have served with troops from Cheshire and Lancashire.[85]

With regard to military recruitment within England, the Hundred Years War brought men together from throughout the country, and many fought in a number of different operational theatres. As Anne Curry's project has shown, in the period from 1369 until the end of the war, of those soldiers who fought in more than one campaign, more than a third of them saw action in at least three different regions. This was in spite of the fact that some regional specialisation proved inevitable: men from the eastern and southern coasts, from Kent, Devon, and towns such as Bristol, tended to serve at sea, while the Scottish Marches were usually patrolled by men from north of the River Trent.[86] Matters of lordship

81 Robert of Avesbury, *De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii*, ed. Edward Maunde Thompson (London, 1889), p. 425; Delachenal, *Charles V*, 1:124 n. 4; D. L. Evans, "Some Notes on the History of the Principality of Wales in the Time of the Black Prince, 1343–1376," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymrodorion* (1925–26), pp. 62–63, 80.

82 TNA E 101/393/11 f. 115–115v.; *BPR,* 3:331, 349–50, 367–68; Rymer, *Foedera,* 3/1:415; *The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340*, ed. Mary Lyon, Bryce Lyon, and Henry S. Lucas (Brussels, 1983), pp. 356–62; Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, p. 158.

83 A. D. Carr, "A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War: Sir Gregory Sais," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1977), 40–53.

84 Bell, Curry, et al., *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp. 238–39.

85 Anne Curry, "Sir Thomas Erpingham: A Career in Arms," in *Agincourt, 1415*, ed. Anne Curry (Stroud, 2000), p. 66; C. T. Allmand, *Henry V* (New Haven, 1997), p. 209. Welsh troops, however, were recruited in Henry's later campaigns, for example in 1420: TNA E 403/645/6.

86 The following are chosen from among many examples: Sir John Braham saw service in seven different theatres of war including the south coast of England (in 1369, to defend against invasion), with Robert Knolles in France (1370), in Brittany (1379–80), Portugal (1381, 1385), Spain (1386), and Ireland (c. 1395). John Crophull served in Flanders (1383) and Berwick (1386) and Ireland (1389–92). John Lynford took out protections for virtually every front of England's wars in the late 14th century – in Brittany, Flanders, Portugal, Spain, and the Scottish borders. Owain Glyn Dŵr served Richard II in the years before his revolt, in the garrison at Berwick under Gregory Sais in 1384, and possibly with the same commander in the Scottish expedition of the following year, before twice serving at sea with the earl of Arundel in 1387 and 1388. Janico Dartasso served in Calais, on the Scottish border, at Calais, in

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might also be important: the survey highlights the role of the Black Prince in drawing soldiers from Cheshire to serve in Aquitaine, and on the development of traditions of regional military service in less likely areas such as Norfolk.[87] In the fifteenth century patterns of recruitment did change when military service tended to be more geographically confined because the war effort focused so heavily on northern France.

In this context, garrison duty became particularly important. The command of castles in occupied France, as on the Scottish Border, was usually entrusted to men of proven military ability, including members of the royal circle such as the king's chamber knights, and officers might be transferred from one location to another.[88] Major castles and towns also played important symbolic roles. Calais, for example, served, in the words of David Grummitt, as "a showcase of English royal power to foreign visitors and the splendour of its buildings, the garrison and its captains needed to reflect this." However, as well as being able to cover costs and undertake significant political and diplomatic functions the captains' most important role was military.[89]

During the periods of major colonial expansion English control over large towns might be achieved through force, (re)settlement, or other means. In the principality of Aquitaine the Black Prince sought to establish good relations with urban communities by confirming the privileges of many towns and gaining support among politically important families and individuals. In Poitou, Saintonge, La Rochelle, and elsewhere, various liberties were confirmed or increased, and even though administrative offices usually went to Englishmen, roles in justice

Ireland, and France. Bell, Curry, et al., *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp. 114–15, 123–24, 231, 246. See further R. R. Davies, *The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 129–52; Simon Walker, "Janico Dartasso: Chivalry, Nationality and the Man-at-Arms," *History* 85 (1999), 31–51.

87 Bell, Curry, et al., *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp. 227–29, 233–35. See also P. J. Caudrey, "The Erpingham Window and the Norfolk and Suffolk Roll of Arms: War, Memory and Society in Fifteenth-Century East Anglia," *Norfolk Archaeology* 46 (2013), 467–80; Daniel P. Franke, "War, Crisis, and East Anglia, 1334–1340: Towards a Reassessment," in *Hundred Years War (Part III)*, ed. Villalon and Kagay, pp. 187–216; David Green, "Edward the Black Prince and East Anglia: An Unlikely Association," in *Fourteenth Century England 3*, ed. W. Mark Ormrod (Woodbridge, 2004), 83–98.

88 Chris Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in England, 1360–1413* (New Haven, 1986), p. 171.

89 For example, Sir John Radcliffe, Gloucester's lieutenant in Calais during the 1436 Burgundian siege had served in France since 1413 and perhaps at Agincourt. He was successively *bailli* of Evreux (Normandy), constable of Bordeaux, captain of Fronsac castle, seneschal of Aquitaine, and lieutenant of Calais. In 1429 he was nominated to the Order of the Garter. Similarly, once Gloucester resigned his post his successors were tested military men. Sir Thomas Rempston, lieutenant of Calais, November 1437–February 1439, had first served in Henry V's 1415 campaign and had held captaincies of several castles in Normandy in the 1420s and 1430s, and he was seneschal of Aquitaine, April 1440–July 1442. See David Grummitt, *The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558* (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 65–67.

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and finance were offered to locals.[90] Lionel of Clarence employed a similar policy in Ireland: he gave charters, grants, or privileges to nineteen towns and tried to secure the support of significant individuals and families.[91] In both cases this approach did not prove particularly successful. An alternative was to expel the inhabitants and completely repopulate the town with English settlers as Edward III did at Calais in 1347.[92] In establishing the Norman colony Henry V adopted elements from both approaches – his policy shifted between brutality and leniency. At Harfleur, Cherbourg, and Caen hostages were taken and there were mass expulsions. The king then sought to populate the towns, which were his "par droite de conquête," with a substantial English presence – men who would defend, maintain, or augment his conquests: "une sorte de colonisation militaire."[93] Henry, John, duke of Bedford (1389–1435), and their lieutenants and successors, saw the conquest of Normandy as the first stage in a wider programme of expansion, one that would require something more than passive support for the English regime. They gave the colonists a personal stake in maintaining *La France Anglaise* while also ensuring that they had specific responsibilities to do so. Henry's ruthlessness ensured that he faced little resistance elsewhere. Later, he and his successors sought to create a spirit of conciliation while maintaining an intimidating military presence. Towns such as Bayeux and Rouen had their privileges confirmed and townsmen were encouraged to petition the king in the hope that they would see him as a just and legitimate ruler. Achieving a balanced relationship between ruler and ruled was vital for the political, social, and military health of the Plantagenet Empire – it was, though, a balance rarely achieved.[94]

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90 Rymer, ed., *Foedera*, 3/1:548; Pierre Chaplais, "Some Documents Regarding the Fulfilment and Interpretation of the Treaty of Brétigny," *Camden Society* 3RD ser., 19 (1952), pp. 52–53 and nn. 1–2; Robert Favreau, "Comptes de la sénéchaussée de Saintonge, 1360–2," *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes* 117 (1959), pp. 76–78; Robert Favreau, "La cession de La Rochelle à l'Angleterre en 1360," in *La "France anglaise" au moyen âge*, ed. Robert-Henri Bautier (Paris, 1988), pp. 222–27.

91 P. Boissonnade, *Histoire de Poitou* (Paris, 1941), pp. 136–37; Delachenal, *Charles V*, 4:18–20, 67; Émile Labroue, *Bergerac sous les Anglais* (Bordeaux, 1893), p. 66; Green, "Lordship and Principality," pp. 20–27; Arlette Higounet-Nadal, *Périgueux au XIVe et XVe siècles* (Bordeaux, 1978), p. 148.

92 Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, I: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990), pp. 576–83. Expulsion, of course, was not a realistic option in the Anglo-Irish lordship since the "English" urban elite in this period formed the bedrock of colonial society.

93 Léon Puisseux, *L'émigration normande et colonisation anglaise en Normandie au XVe siècle* (Paris, 1866), p. 66.

94 C. T. Allmand, "The Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy, 1417–50," *Economic History Review*, 2ND ser., 21 (1968), 461–79, esp. pp. 463–66; Anne Curry, "Towns at War: Relations between the Towns of Normandy and their English Rulers, 1417–1450," in *Towns and Townspeople in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. John A. F. Thompson (Gloucester, 1988), pp. 149, 157–61; Green, "The Hundred Years War, Colonial Policy and the English Lordships," pp. 247–50.

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There are many advantages in thinking broadly about the Plantagenet dominions, and military historians have helped to show the way to the wider academic community, and have suggested new avenues for study. To some degree, these advantages and avenues are self-evident. When considering the later medieval period it has become a truism to state that the sea served as means of transportation as much as it did as a barrier, and if this was so it must have provided a means of transportation to Ireland, just as it did to France. Similarly, there is no question that matters of national and regional policy were interrelated and the exigencies of war waged on a scale hitherto unknown required the Plantagenets to exploit resources from throughout their estates – men and money, foodstuffs and fodder, armour and arrowheads. Attempts were also made to transfer military strategies throughout Britain, Ireland, and France. Defensive concepts, especially the use of castles and fortified towns, could be exported easily. Offensive tactics, however, proved more problematic. If English raiding tactics in France were, as Clifford Rogers and others have argued,[95] intended to bring the enemy to battle, then how might such an approach have been employed in those areas, such as Wales and Ireland, where a cohesive military force rarely existed that would consider engaging in such a battle? Warfare in Ireland, for example, focused chiefly on cattle-raiding and hostage-taking. Richard II found no need to fight a battle during his two campaigns across the Irish Sea. Sustained sieges were also virtually non-existent, since the walled towns and other major fortifications east of the River Shannon were in "loyal" English/Anglo-Irish hands. In Wales we can find some exceptions to this pattern, such as the battle of Shrewsbury (1403), during the Glyn Dŵr revolt. There, however, the Lancastrian army faced not only Welsh troops but also those recruited by Archibald Douglas (1372–1424) as well as the Percys' archers who wreaked such damage that Thomas Walsingham tells us, "the men on the king's side fell like the leaves that fall in the cold weather after frost."[96] In general, therefore, military conditions in Wales, Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, Scotland, differed from those the English encountered in France. There the countryside was ripe for raiding and exploitation through *chevauchées* and demands for *appatis*, respectively, and the enemy might be lured into a set-piece battle.

Does this indicate a failure of Plantagenet thinking? The restoration of the "empire" depended on a successful military policy. And success would be achieved through a single or a short series of major military victories that utterly destroyed the enemy hierarchy. Without this, despite the new resources

95 See Clifford J. Rogers, "The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages," *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 1 (2002), 1–19; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, esp. pp. 8–9, 296–308, 357–58, 421–22. For further discussion of battle-seeking and battle-avoidance strategies see Stephen Morillo, "Battle Seeking: The Contexts of Vegetian Strategy," *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 1 (2002), 21–41; and John Gillingham, "'Up with Orthodoxy!' In Defense of Vegetian Warfare," *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 2 (2004), 149–58.

96 *The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham (1376–1422)*, trans. David Preest, ed. James G. Clark (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 328.

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available, a piecemeal extension of power was never going to be sufficient to gain control in France, and in the meantime the deployment of resources over the Channel meant a slackening of English authority elsewhere. Edward I's experiences in Scotland should have pointed the way. Victory in battle was one thing, but if that victory was not absolute Plantagenet power could not be established over the country as a whole. The later Plantagenets' dream of empire was a real aspiration, and one which seemed attainable at certain points in the Hundred Years War because of the success of English military strategies. It proved, however, to be something of a chimera. It was one thing to conceive an imperial policy, quite another to implement it.

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