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Genoa and the Fourth Crusade

WHILE the part taken by Venice in the fourth crusade has received its full share of attention from modern writers, very little has as yet been written on the attempt of Genoa to secure a share in the spoils of the Byzantine empire, and on the extent to which the policy of the conquerors from the moment when Constantinople had fallen was influenced by a desire to thwart the ambition of this interloping power. The struggle with Genoa was naturally the concern of the Venetians in a higher degree than of the Franks, and it is from Venetian and Genoese sources that the story must be constructed. The views advanced in the following pages were suggested to me by a study of unpublished Venetian chronicles and are supported in large measure by the Marquis Serra's *Storia dell' antica Liguria* (1835), which appears to be based on unpublished Genoese documents.

Among all the Italian cities that had enjoyed trading rights in the Eastern Empire, the Genoese had been conspicuous for the violence that they alternately suffered and inflicted.¹ Venice had possessed a quarter in Constantinople and free trade throughout the greater part of the empire since 1084; Pisa had received her quarter in the capital and had been allowed to import gold and silver free and other articles subject to a 4 per cent. duty in 1111, but Genoa was still without a quarter and still paid 10 per cent. till 1155, when the emperor Manuel, apparently in search of allies to support his forward policy in Italy, granted the Genoese a reduction of duties to 4 per cent., a quarter in Constantinople, and the right to form settlements in other cities of the empire. The Genoese did not long enjoy their new privileges in peace. In 1162 their merchants and settlers were expelled from Constantinople by the Pisans, and the emperor was loth to restore them the district they had occupied. After vainly offering them a substitute on the further side of the Golden Horn the emperor Manuel in 1170 granted them a quarter within the city and renewed their privileges, empowering them to trade at all ports except the two Black Sea ports of Rossia and Matracha. Next year the Genoese quarter was pillaged afresh, probably by

¹ For the relations between the Italian cities and Constantinople under the Comnèni and Angelii, see Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant*, i. (1885), pp. 190–264.

Greeks, though the emperor laid the blame at the door of the Venetians. The Genoese refused to accept this explanation, but the emperor seized the opportunity to rid himself of the Venetians and on their refusal to compensate the injured Genoese and to rebuild their ruined houses, he ordered the arrest of all Venetians in the empire and placed an embargo on their goods and ships (12 March 1171). A four years' war between Venice and the empire followed, at the end of which Venice was restored to all her privileges. There is no evidence to show whether the Genoese merchants ever received any compensation for their losses; we only know that their claims were still unsatisfied when in 1174 the republic of Genoa sent an embassy to Constantinople to demand reparation.

But a worse disaster awaited both the Genoese settlers and their rivals. A revolution at Constantinople in April 1182, which had placed the guardianship of the young emperor Alexius II in the hands of the infamous Andronicus Comnenus, was the signal for a general rising of the native population against the 'Latins,' many of whom had supported the fallen regent, the empress Mary of Antioch. The quarters belonging to the Italian traders were now reduced to ashes, while they themselves, so far as they did not escape by sea, were either massacred without respect to age or sex, or sold into slavery to the Turks. Even the sick in the hospital were butchered. The survivors with forty-four galleys and many other ships made their way, pillaging and slaughtering on both banks of the Propontis and of the Hellespont, into the Aegean, where their ravages were continued in the maritime districts of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. They found ten more galleys at Chrysopolis in Macedonia, and, adding these to their fleet, set out upon further deeds of piracy, which are not recorded. William of Tyre² asserts that the spoil gained on this cruise of vengeance repaid with high interest all the losses incurred at Constantinople.

The massacre of 1182 and the reprisals taken are a turning point in the history of the relations between the Italian commercial cities and the Eastern Empire. The desire for revenge, the taste of plunder in this year, and the growing disorganisation of the government at Constantinople contributed to a rapid development of piracy in which the Genoese are particularly conspicuous. References to piracy become more frequent as the years advance. In the charter of 1192 the emperor Isaac refers in general terms to the piracy practised by Genoa since the catastrophe of 1182.³ Already in 1191 we learn from the chronicle attributed to Benedict of Peterborough⁴ that many of the Greek islands were uninhabited because of pirates, and in many of them pirates dwelt. The condition of Pamphylia and Lycia was not

² xxii. 13, Migne, *Bibliotheca Patrum Latina*, 201 (1855), col. 861.

³ Miklosich et Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Gr. Medii Aevi*, iii. (1865), pp. 25 *et seq.*

⁴ *Gesta Henrici II et Ricardi I* (ed. Stubbs, 1867), ii. 198.

less pitiable. According to the same authority at this date the castle and town of Vetus Satalia, identified with Side, had been destroyed by pirates, and Nova Satalia, the ancient Attalia, had been fortified by the emperor Manuel. On the river 'Winke' or Phineca in Lycia there was a castle called 'Reswz,' which had been destroyed by pirates. The river itself was called Portus Pisanorum, from the Pisan pirates that frequented it, and when Philip II of France visited it in 1191 he found there and captured four pirate galleys that had done great harm to Christians. Further west at Crachous, or Kekova, were fair and great ruins on either side of the harbour, 'and no one dwells in them, from fear of pirates.'⁵

It was some years before the Italian cities recovered their position at Constantinople. Some traders returned in spite of the strained relations existing after the massacre of 1182, but these had to defend themselves by force against a popular attack in 1186. Venice regained her privileges in 1187, while Pisa regained hers in February 1192, and Genoa hers in April of the same year, the Genoese receiving an enlargement of their quarter. But the restoration of public peace did not lessen the activity of the pirates. In November 1192 the emperor Isaac had to complain of an outrageous insult committed by a Genoese and a Pisan pirate. The Genoese pirate was no less a person than the notorious sea-rover Guglielmo Grasso,⁶ who afterwards became admiral of Sicily and count of Malta. His Pisan colleague is not named in the emperor's letter of remonstrance to Genoa, but in a subsequent letter to Pisa⁷ the emperor names two Pisan commanders, Gerardo Roto and Guido Zaco. The Pisan commander is called Fortis (Forte) in a passage which Jacopo d'Oria (A.D. 1294) derived from the books of the cathedral at Genoa and inserted in the *Regni Iherosolymitani Brevis Historia*;⁸ in this it is also stated that he dwelt at S. Bonifacio, which at that time was Pisan territory. The two pirates entered the harbour of Rhodes peaceably, and then slew the unarmed people they met on the coast and carried off anything on which they could lay their hands; they then proceeded to the 'Issian and Pamphylian' sea, attacked any vessels they found there, slaughtered the crews and passengers,

⁵ *Gesta Henrici II et Ricardi I*, ii. p. 195.

⁶ Hopf (Ersch u. Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyklopädie*, lxxxv. s.v. Griechenland [1867], p. 182) makes Guglielmo Grasso the son of Margaritone of Brindisi. This is refuted by Desimoni, *Giornale Ligustico di Archeologia*, iii. (1876), p. 226. Gerola, *Atti dell'I. R. Accademia degli Agiati in Rovereto*, anno 1902, fasc. ii. p. 165, quotes Desimoni for the statement that he was the son of Enrico Grasso, consul of Genoa in 1181; but Desimoni makes no such statement, and no Enrico Grasso was consul either in 1181 or in any other year.

⁷ *Documenti degli Archivi Toscani, Documenti sulle Relazioni delle Città Toscane coll' Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi* (1879), p. 66.

⁸ L. T. Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi Continuatori*, i. (1890), p. 141. The same story with the same name is to be found in Jacopo da Varazze in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, xvii. (1726), col. 43.

and seized the goods ; among others they captured a Venetian vessel,⁹ which was on its way from Egypt to Constantinople carrying envoys with rich presents from Saladin to the emperor Isaac, some commercial agents from both sovereigns, and other merchants. The corsairs slaughtered every man they found on board with the exception of some Pisans and Genoese, and took the spoil to themselves. They next captured a 'Lombard,' probably an Apulian vessel, on which the bishop of Paphos was sailing from Constantinople to Cyprus. The bishop was made a prisoner, and two passengers, of whom one was a Pisan, were allowed to escape with their goods ; but otherwise the 'Lombard' vessel received the same treatment as the Venetian. The emperor naturally seized some Genoese and Pisan wares by way of surety, while he demanded recompense from the two republics. Satisfaction was given him by both in the following year, and the Genoese government disavowed Grasso and his comrades, who, it declared, were already outlaws and would be punished if they ever set foot again on Genoese soil. According to Jacopo d'Oria and Jacopo da Varazze, Forte's portion of the spoil included one of the three crosses now at Genoa. He carried it home with him to S. Bonifacio, where it was captured by the Genoese in 1195, but, instead of being restored to the emperor, it was deposited in the cathedral at Genoa. Jacopo da Varazze adds the statement that Forte was granted Genoese citizenship upon surrendering the cross. Whether Grasso ever returned to Genoa is uncertain, but when he was captured by Markward in 1201, the Genoese sent a galley to attempt his liberation.¹⁰

In 1194 a fleet of five Pisan pirates established itself at Abydos under pretence of waging war against Venice ; it was dislodged by the imperial navy, but other pirates soon seized the same position and carried their ravages within sight of Constantinople. The emperor vainly sought compensation from the Pisan republic. In 1195 war was openly declared between Venice and Pisa, and though peace was concluded in the following year, the war was renewed in 1199. It was carried on not only at sea but within the walls of Constantinople itself.¹¹

During the year 1196 a Venetian fleet stationed at Abydos refused to obey an order of the home government to return. Heyd has suggested with some plausibility that it had been invited to stay by the Venetian colony at Constantinople in order to prevent reprisals from the Pisans in the Archipelago. We do not however read of this fleet indulging in any hostile act against the Greeks. About 1198

⁹ In his letter of complaint the emperor uses the plural number, but in rehearsing the facts in his charter of the following year he uses the singular, perhaps as the result of more accurate information.

¹⁰ Ogerio Pane in Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi*, ii. (1901), p. 81.

¹¹ Nicetas, Bonn ed., p. 713 ; Migne, *Bibliotheca Patrum Graeca*, 139 (1865), col. 920.

we come across one of the most redoubtable of all the Genoese pirates, Gafforio. He appears for the first time in September 1195 as 'admiral of the victorious fleet of the Genoese,' in which capacity he received a charter from Henry of Champagne, count palatine of Tyre and lord of Acre, the husband of Queen Isabella of Jerusalem;¹² afterwards he became a simple merchant, trading with Constantinople, but, having been cheated by the imperial admiral Michael Stryphnus, he turned pirate, built and equipped vessels of war, and plundered the coast towns and the Archipelago. Then he crossed to Asia and pillaged Adramyttium. The Emperor Alexius III sent against him the Calabrian Giovanni Stirione, who, as Nicetas informs us,¹³ had once been a pirate and the worst of pirates, but had taken service under Isaac Angelus. At Sestos Gafforio surprised and captured the whole fleet, consisting of thirty vessels, and went on his way ravaging the coasts and islands and levying blackmail from the inhabitants. Alexius next amused him with negotiations, in the course of which Gafforio was in his turn captured and killed, and all his ships save four fell into the hands of the conquerors. It was probably as a punishment for the acts of Gafforio that the palace of Calamanus at Constantinople was transferred from the Genoese to the Germans.

The Marquis Serra¹⁴ asserts on the authority of Coronelli¹⁵ that Gafforio's cousin brought back his body to Genoa, along with the four remaining ships. The Genoese, he states, declared their treaty with Alexius broken, and despatched to Crete a fleet of twenty-three galleys, which in the following year (1199) captured and garrisoned a port which Serra identifies with Fraschia. The inhabitants, far from well disposed to the Byzantine government, were unable or unwilling to expel them. It is difficult to believe that so large an expedition could have passed unrecorded in the numerous contemporary chronicles and documents which have been published. The number of ships suggests a confusion with Enrico Pescatore's expedition of 1206, which, according to Nicetas,¹⁶ was composed of five round ships and twenty-four triremes (*σκάφη τρίκροτα*). That Fraschia should have been seized in 1199 is probable enough. The capture of a single port is a very different matter from the conquest of an island, and we cannot therefore suppose that the authority used by Serra has simply transferred the conquest to too early a date; but the conquest can hardly have been made by the public forces of the city, or it would have been mentioned in the preamble to the

¹² *Monumenta Historiae Patriae, Liber Iur. Reipubl. Genuensis*, i. (1854), 411.

¹³ Nicetas, Bonn ed., p. 636; Migne, *Bibl. Patr. Gr.* 139 (1865), col. 857.

¹⁴ *Storia dell'antica Liguria*, i. p. 434.

¹⁵ *Isolario*, p. 204. It does not follow from this that Coronelli was Serra's only authority; he has a curious habit of referring to none but published authorities.

¹⁶ Nicetas, Bonn ed., p. 843; Migne, col. 1029.

next treaty between Genoa and the empire, in which there is no suggestion that there has been open war between the two states. It is more likely to have been a private venture. Hopf asserts¹⁷ that there had long been a Genoese colony in Crete under four rectors or consuls, a statement for which he quotes no authority, but which might easily be traced to its source by a reference to his manuscript papers at Berlin.¹⁸

Another adventure of the year 1199 introduces us for the first time to another famous Genoese corsair. In that year, according to the Marquis Serra,¹⁹ the pirate Leone Vetrano with four galleys attacked Corfu. This island had been conquered in 1185 by the Norman king, William II of Sicily, from whom it had been held as a fief by the sea-robber Margaritone of Brindisi,²⁰ and had barely been restored to the Eastern empire, when its possession was thus again disputed. Leone Vetrano, according to Serra, captured and garrisoned a castle near Cape Polacro, on the west side of the island of Corfu, perhaps on the site of the later castle of Sant' Angelo. From Corfu he passed on to the Peloponnese, where he captured the two Messenian ports of Methone and Corone. Methone had long been famous as a nest of pirates and had suffered destruction for this reason at the hands of King Roger of Sicily.²¹ Mr. Miller²² asserts that Vetrano made himself master of the island of Corfu, but this seems to go beyond what our authorities warrant.

In March of the same year we have a letter from the emperor Alexius III²³ to the Genoese podestà in which allusion is made to the destruction of Gafforio and the desire expressed by the Genoese

¹⁷ *Ubi supra*, p. 221.

¹⁸ Not one of the Cretan histories has yet been published, though there are extant two histories of some size covering this period—Antonio Calergi's and Andrea Cornaro's. This is the more remarkable considering the elaborate care with which both the prehistoric and the Venetian remains on the island are being described. Hopf had studied both the histories to which I have referred, but he makes several categorical statements in this part of his work which are not borne out by his authorities where these can be traced.

¹⁹ *Storia dell'antica Liguria*, i. pp. 434, 435.

²⁰ Hopf, *ubi supra*, p. 181, erroneously inclines to regard Margaritone as a Genoese. See Desimoni, *ubi supra*, pp. 226, 227.

²¹ *Gesta Henrici II et Ricardi I*, ii. 199. Hopf, p. 213, and Mr. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (1908), p. 24, assert that it was destroyed by the doge Domenico Michieli in 1125, apparently basing this statement on a passage in the *Chronicle of the Morea* (ed. Schmitt, 1904), 1692–4, which, however, probably refers to its destruction by the great Venetian armament of the year 1206. A reference to a forcible capture of Methone by Boniface has been found in an obscure passage in Raimbaud de Vaqueiras. See Savj-Lopez in *Bausteine zur Romanischen Philologie, Festgabe für A. Mussafia* (1905), pp. 188, 189. But the reading in Raimbaud is very doubtful; the only historian that mentions Methone on the outward journey is the Anonymus Halberstadensis (Riant, *Exuviae Sacrae* [1877] i. p. 15), who says nothing of the capture of the city.

²² *Op. cit.* p. 2.

²³ Miklosich et Müller, *Acta et Dipl. Gr. Medii Aevi*, iii. pp. 46, 47.

government for a renewal of free intercourse with the empire. The emperor expresses his willingness to treat, but informs the Genoese that pirates from their city are still cruising in his dominions and doing no little damage under pretext of their war with Pisa ; he warns the republic that for any steps he may take against the pirates, the empire is not to be held responsible, but the pirates themselves. In April 1201 we find him attempting a less bold method of dealing with the pirates than that suggested at the conclusion of this letter. In that month he granted a safe-conduct to the Genoese Guglielmo Cacallaro with authority to hire the crews of the Genoese corsairs to enter the imperial service.²⁴ How far this attempt was successful we have no means of knowing.²⁵ In the year 1204 we find Genoese established in the castle of Apalire in Naxos, but we do not know how long they had occupied it, nor do we know whether they were nominally in the imperial service or not.

A survey of this record of piracy, in which the Genoese easily take the first place and the Pisans the second, might lead to the expectation that the emperor would have felt a preference for the Venetians over the other great maritime cities. But with Alexius III., who occupied the Byzantine throne from 1195, the reverse was the case. The peaceful supremacy of Venice in the commerce of his dominions was intensely distasteful to the emperor. He could hardly be expected to make Genoa his prime favourite, but he encouraged the rivalry of Pisa,²⁶ and according to Nicetas he even stirred up war between Pisa and Venice.²⁷ The treaty rights of Venice were often ignored, while those of Pisa and Genoa were extended. The emperor Isaac's treaty with Venice was not renewed till 1198. The Pisans received a renewal of their privileges in 1199 along with a special decree guaranteeing their position at Thessalonica and Halmyros, and on 13 October 1201 a complete reconciliation was effected between the emperor and the Genoese, whose privileges were renewed and whose quarter in Constantinople was increased.²⁸

The Venetians, long accustomed to an unquestioned supremacy in the markets of the empire, looked with jealousy on the growing privileges of their neighbours and formed a natural longing for some change of government which might restore them to their pristine

²⁴ Miklosich et Müller, *Acta et Dipl. Gr. Medii Aevi*, iii. pp. 48, 49.

²⁵ Appalling descriptions of piracy in the neighbourhood of Attica in the reigns of Andronicus I and Isaac II are to be found in the correspondence of Michael Acominatus (ed. Lampros) ii. (1880), pp. 42, 43, 68, 75. Aegina was their principal lair. There is no mention however of their nationality, from which we may infer that they were Greek. See also Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 9.

²⁶ In a Pisan document of 1197 we find that the Pisans had engaged to expel pirates from the empire (*Documenti sulle Relazioni Toscane*, p. 72), and in a document of 1199 we find an entry of money spent by the Pisan government for escorting an imperial ship to Chios (*ibid.* p. 77).

²⁷ Nicetas, Bonn ed., pp. 712, 713; Migne, col. 920.

²⁸ For the date see Heyd, i. 241, 242.

favour and might, perhaps, arrest the growth of piracy from which Venice with her extensive commerce had far more to lose than to gain. The theory of a deep-laid plot by which Venice was supposed to have arranged the diversion of the Fourth Crusade in concert either with the Egyptian sultan or with Philip king of the Romans may be regarded as extinct.²⁹ But it would have been too much to expect that the doge should have resisted the proposal of the young Alexius Angelus that the crusaders should place him on the throne of Constantinople. The success of the expedition meant that the throne would be occupied by an emperor who owed his position to Venice and who would be prepared by way of recompense to grant to Venice a decided advantage over the other Italian cities. It is interesting to observe that Venice, which had exacted a heavy price from the crusaders, appears to have demanded very little from the young Alexius. On this occasion the leaders of the crusade extorted promises that could never be fulfilled, but the doge was content with demanding compensation to the extent of 30,000 marks for the Venetian property seized by the emperor Manuel in 1171.³⁰ This demand was strictly analogous to the demands often made, but always in vain, by the Italian republics when opening negotiations with the Eastern Empire. There was no word of any denunciation of the treaties which Alexius III had made with Pisa and Genoa. Such a denunciation could not have been claimed without giving a selfish colour to the whole expedition, and would have placed Venice publicly in the wrong in the eyes of the world. The doge trusted to the influence of Venice with her own *protégé* to secure her retention of the lion's share of the commerce of the empire.

To the other Italian cities the expedition must have appeared to differ from its predecessors in degree rather than in kind. Venice had, as has been seen, engaged in war with the empire in the years 1171–5, and the Italian colonies had been wont to take part in dynastic struggles. In 1190 the Pisans had even offered to supply Frederick Barbarossa with ships for the siege of Constantinople. The Pisans and Genoese must have expected their position at Constantinople, always very precarious in the case of the Genoese, to be weakened, but they had endured worse troubles than were likely to arise from the accession of the young Alexius. During the assault on Constantinople in July 1203 the Pisans naturally threw in their lot with the Greeks and defended the emperor who had shown them favour against the pretender supported by their enemies. Since the

²⁹ For a compendious critical summary of the discussions that have centred round the Fourth Crusade, see Kretschmayer, *Geschichte von Venedig*, i. (1905), pp. 480–489.

³⁰ So Andrea Dandolo in Muratori, *Scriptores*, xii. (1728), 321. Hugh of St. Pol, *Oesterreichische Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., *Diplomataria et Acta*, xii. (1856), p. 305, states the sum promised at 200,000 marks, but this, of course, is merely payment for the expenses of the war. A like sum was promised to the crusaders.

restoration of Isaac Angelus was the work of the Greeks who had fought for his brother, the Pisans suffered no punishment for fighting on the losing side. But the great fire of August 1204 altered the whole situation. The Greeks, as was their wont, refused to discriminate between Latins, and the whole Italian population in consequence, Pisans and Genoese included, found their only safety in the camp of the crusaders. When the usurpation of Murzuphlus and the murder of Alexius IV converted the dynastic struggle into a war of conquest, there was no longer a question of restoring the Pisan and Genoese colonists. As the ally of a lawful emperor restored to his own, Venice had only claimed the full discharge of all just debts; she did not seek to oust others from their rights: as a partner in conquest, she looked forward to a different position. The treaties of the Comneni and Angeli would lapse with the destruction of their state; Venice made a new bargain with the creators of the new empire.

By a treaty concluded in March 1204, in anticipation of the capture of Constantinople, Venice was to receive full payment of the debts owing to her and half the spoil of the city remaining after all debts were paid both to Venetians and crusaders; an emperor was to be chosen by twelve electors, six of whom were to represent Venice and six the crusaders; she was also to have three-eighths of the territory of the empire and three-eighths of the capital city and was to retain all the privileges that she had possessed in the Greek empire; moreover no person belonging to any state that might at any time be at war with Venice was to be permitted to enter the empire until peace should be restored; finally, the patriarch was to be elected by the Venetian clergy if the emperor was a crusader, by the crusading clergy if the emperor was a Venetian. It was of course understood that the emperor would be elected from the crusaders, so that the patriarchate was definitely assigned to the Venetians. The actual distribution of territory was to be the work of a joint commission of Venetians and crusaders.⁵¹ The commercial clauses of the treaty are important. The Venetian privileges are no longer dependent on the will of the emperor, but are part of the constitution of the empire and are secured in Constantinople and in any ports that may fall to the Venetian share by an actual territorial lordship. The Pisans as being at war with Venice are expelled from the empire; they can only recover their rights by making peace with Venice, while the Genoese in the event of a quarrel with Venice are liable to forfeit any rights that the new rulers may grant them. The trading rights of the other Italian cities are in fact made conditional on the goodwill of Venice.

Constantinople was captured on 13 April 1204, and the

⁵¹ See the text of the treaty in *Oesterreichische Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. pp. 445-452.

question of the election of an emperor presented itself at once. There were only two candidates for the dignity, Baldwin, count of Flanders, and Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, leader of the crusade. The choice really lay with Venice, which possessed half the votes in the college of electors and could therefore turn the scale in favour of either candidate. But before making his selection the doge took steps to secure that the choice should entail no bloodshed and should not be followed by a disruption of the crusading army. An arrangement was made, to which both candidates assented, that the unsuccessful competitor should be invested with 'all the land beyond the strait towards Turkey, and the isle of Greece [*i.e.* the Peloponnese].'³² It is nowhere stated that this arrangement was the work of Dandolo, but Dr. Gerland in his valuable monograph on the Latin empire³³ attributes it to him, and I have no doubt that he is right in doing so. We have however the clear testimony of Robert de Clary³⁴ that it was at Dandolo's suggestion that the two palaces in Constantinople were placed in the keeping of the whole army pending the election.

The election resulted in favour of Count Baldwin of Flanders, and there has been much speculation on the reasons which led the doge to take his side. The favourite theory is that the doge feared that the Latin empire under Boniface might become too powerful and might oppose Venetian interests, while Baldwin was too weak to resist the influence of Venice. Dr. Gerland,³⁵ who supports this view, has to admit that the doge's foresight for once deserted him. Venice had in fact no interest in the weakness of the empire. Her commercial supremacy gave her the utmost interest in the maintenance of its stability both against foreign foes and against internal disorders. Venice had had experience of a weak rule at Constantinople for twenty-four years and was not likely to prolong such a situation deliberately. No man had struggled harder than Dandolo to hold the crusaders together before the conquest was won, he had endeavoured to prevent the election of an emperor from resulting in the secession of the defeated party, and he was destined later in the year to take the lead in healing the breach between the two chiefs.³⁶ But though it was important to Venice that the empire should be strong, it was still more important that the empire should support her claims to commercial supremacy or commercial monopoly.

³² Villehardouin, *Conquête de Constantinople* (1874), p. 152; Kretschmayr, i. p. 314, erroneously substitutes Hellas and Crete for the Peloponnese.

³³ *Geschichte des Lateinischen Kaiserreiches von Konstantinopel*, i. (1905), p. 4.

³⁴ Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (1873), p. 72.

³⁵ *Op. cit.* pp. 2, 3.

³⁶ Gibbon (ed. Bury, vi. [1898], p. 414) rejects, but Sir Rennell Rodd (*The Princes of Achaia and the Chronicles of the Morea* [1907], i. 62) accepts the idea that Venice feared an increase of Boniface's power in Italy. It is difficult to see how the position of Venice in Italy could have been affected.

Whatever the new emperor was to be, it was necessary that he should not be a friend of Genoa or Pisa.

This motive seems to be suggested, though with some confusion, by Nicetas.³⁷ With him the Piedmontese marquisate of Montferrat and the Ligurian city of Genoa are both in accordance with Byzantine usage included in *Λαμπάρδια*.³⁸ Dandolo, he says, reflected that Boniface was sprung from Lombardy, which lies on the sea coast and from which it would be easy to invade either the Venetian territories or the Eastern Empire. The fear was in fact that Boniface might make common cause with the Genoese. This idea was suggested, but not developed, by Sir Edwin Pears,³⁹ and it is easy to see how closely it corresponds with the facts. Both the geographical position of his marquisate and the history of his house inclined Boniface to close relations with the Ligurian city. There were fairly well marked spheres of commercial influence in northern Italy. Venice landed goods at Verona and sent them northwards by the Adige and Brenner road ; she had no commercial treaty with any city west of Cremona.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Genoese commerce made its way by the roads north and west of Pavia and Milan and along the Po. Montferrat was well within her sphere. Fortune had indeed thrown Boniface into alliance with Venice ; he had taken the command of an army that had already contracted with Venice for transport beyond sea, but the commerce of his native land was in the hands of Genoa, and he might be expected as emperor to encourage the ambitions of that city.

There were moreover more definite personal ties that bound the Montferrat family to Genoa. Conrad of Montferrat had received active support from Genoa in the Holy Land. We read nothing of Venetians in the history of his wars, but we find that in the defence of Tyre he was aided by the Pisans and Genoese, and that in his contest with Guy of Lusignan for the crown of Jerusalem his cause, though opposed by the Pisans, was warmly supported by the Genoese. Boniface himself had in 1191 prosecuted the marquises of Incisa for seizing the Genoese envoys to France and England, and had been rewarded by Henry VI with the fiefs of the culprits.⁴¹

³⁷ Bonn ed., p. 789; Migne, col. 981.

³⁸ Compare Cinnamus (Migne, *Bibl. Patr. Gr.*, 133 [1864], col. 320), ἐκ Λιγούρων ιππέων, οὓς Λομπάρδους ἡμῖν δονμάζουσι ἄνθρωποι. *Ibid.* col. 589, καὶ τὸ Λιγούρων εἴτ' οὖν Λαμπάρδων ἐτροπώσατο ζθνος. *Ibid.* col. 656, οἱ πολὺ τὸ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ Οὐέννυετοι Λαμπάρδοις μηνίσαντες ἦτε γνώμας ἀπορραγεῖσι τῆς αὐτῶν ἐπανέστησάν τε αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος καθελόντες ἐπὶ μεγίστοις αὐτοὺς ἐξημίλασαν. In all these passages *Λομπάρδοι* or *Λαμπάρδοι* clearly means Ligurians or Genoese ; on the other hand the full form *Λογγιβαρδία* is used in Nicetas (Bonn. ed. p. 121, Migne, col. 428) for Apulia, and *Λογγιβαρδικός*, *Λογγιβάρδοι*, appear to have the same sense in Miklosich and Müller, *Acta et Dipl. Gr.* iii. 38.

³⁹ *The Fall of Constantinople* (1885), p. 368.

⁴⁰ For the Venetian and Genoese spheres of commercial interest, see Kretschmayer, i. 359.

⁴¹ Toeche, *Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte*, Heinrich VI (1867), p. 169.

In 1194 he had accompanied the Genoese on their expedition in support of Henry VI's invasion of the kingdom of Sicily and had along with the seneschal Markward and the Genoese podestà received the surrender of Gaeta.⁴² In 1202 he had mediated in the fruitless negotiations for peace between Pisa and Genoa.⁴³ His relations with Genoa were certainly not terminated by his union with Venice in the Fourth Crusade. In the summer of 1204 an attempt was made by Genoa to purchase from him the island of Crete. When in 1205 he wished to send the captive emperor Alexius III with his wife and nephew to Philip, king of the Romans, he entrusted them to the famous Genoese seaman Enrico di Carmadino, who happened to be at Thessalonica with a galley belonging to the Genoese town of Porto Venere. In this galley they were brought to Genoa, where they were met by Boniface's son Guglielmo, who conducted them to Montferrat.⁴⁴ It was in like manner by the Genoese captains Ogerio and Rubaldo Porco that Boniface's daughter Agnes was brought to Thessalonica in 1206 to become the bride of the emperor Henry.⁴⁵ Boniface as the unsuccessful candidate was now entitled to receive Asia Minor and the Peloponnese, but he negotiated an exchange with the emperor Baldwin, in virtue of which he was invested with the 'kingdom of Thessalonica,' instead of the land promised him.⁴⁶

It is easy to imagine with what indignation and dismay the news of the conquest of Constantinople was received at Genoa.⁴⁷ The revolution which placed Alexius IV on the throne might have portended an increase of Venetian privileges, but he was as likely to quarrel with his benefactors as with their rivals. Now the ownership of three-eighths of the empire and the commerce of the whole seemed destined to fall into the hands of Venice, and Genoa might well expect to be excluded from every port where she could not find an entrance by force. But in this time of confusion force could be

⁴² Otobon in Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi*, ii. 46, 47.

⁴³ Ogerio Pane, *ibid.*, ii. 83.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 95. See also Gerland, *Gesch. des Lat. Kaiserr. von Konstantinopel*, i. p. 105.

⁴⁵ Desimoni, *Giornale Ligustico* (1876), p. 225 and (1878), p. 244; Ogerio Pane, *ubi supra*, ii. 104, with Imperiale's note *in loc.* Desimoni, *Giornale Ligustico* (1878), p. 249¹, suggests that the Pietro Vento mentioned by Hopf, *ubi supra*, belonged to the Genoese family of Vento; but, unfortunately, Pietro Vento appears to be a mistake for Pierre de Vaux.

⁴⁶ Villehardouin, p. 156. Gerland, *op. cit.* p. 20, Kretschmayr, i. 317, and Sir Rennell Rodd, *Princes of Achaia*, i. 64, understand that Macedonia and Thessalonica were given in exchange for Asia Minor alone without the Peloponnese. But Villehardouin's phrase 'cele terre,' coming immediately after a mention of both districts, implies that both were exchanged. Boniface is recorded to have done homage for the kingdom of Thessalonica immediately after the exchange, but no mention is made of homage for the Peloponnese. The Peloponnese is not mentioned in Boniface's treaty with Venice of 12 August, and it is included in the act of partition in October, which would not have been the case if it had been already assigned.

⁴⁷ See the vigorous language of Ogerio Pane.

applied in almost every quarter. Genoese corsairs were, as has been seen, already established in Corfu, Methone, Naxos, and Crete, and would doubtless be willing to convert themselves into lawful conquerors at a moment's notice. Indeed it is difficult to see how a Genoese mind could be expected to regard these corsairs as less entitled to hold any lands they might win than were the adventurers who had enrolled themselves under the banner of the cross or the lion of St. Mark.

In such circumstances her old friendship with Boniface offered to Genoa a chance of interfering without committing an act of open hostility against the conquerors. According to the marquis Serra, who is doubtless relying on some Genoese source, it was Boniface who first opened negotiations with Genoa ; according to the Venetian chronicles,⁴⁸ it was the Genoese that first approached him. Either before or after these negotiations had been begun, there was a rupture between Baldwin and Boniface. Boniface's kingdom had still to be conquered, when in July Baldwin subdued and garrisoned the principal places in Thrace and then proceeded to Macedonia. Against this Boniface protested as an infringement of his rights, and, while Baldwin was receiving the submission of Thessalonica, Boniface laid siege to Adrianople, which was held for Baldwin by Eustace of Saarbrücken. While Boniface vainly attempted to rouse the Greeks against their garrison, Eustace sent word of his situation to Constantinople, which was then occupied by the doge Enrico Dandolo, Count Louis of Blois, and some minor barons. Dandolo and Count Louis immediately despatched Geoffroy de Villehardouin, Manassier de l'Isle, Marco Sanudo, the doge's nephew, and the Veronese Ravano dalle Carceri to bring Boniface to reason.

The quarrel between the two leaders of the crusading host must have seemed a godsend to the Genoese. According to the marquis Serra's narrative,⁴⁹ the most detailed that we possess, Boniface offered to sell to Genoa the island of Crete, which had been promised him by the young Alexius Angelus at Corfu⁵⁰ in May 1203. The

⁴⁸ The oldest chronicle which mentions these negotiations, and that from which the rest seem to derive their information, is one that ends in the year 1475 (*Codex Marcianus*, It. Cl. vii. 51, f. 71 a). Though in no sense contemporary, it appears to draw from good sources. Thus, unlike Andrea Dandolo, it knows that Crete was not included in the treaty of partition, and it is able to give the terms of the treaty of Adrianople, which it calls 'segurtade,' a name obviously based on the name 'securitas' which the actual documents give to Boniface's acknowledgment of the money paid by Venice. This chronicle also contains lists of commanders of warships, which, as will be seen, are consistent with what we know from other sources as to the movements of some of the Venetian captains at this date.

⁴⁹ *Storia dell'antica Liguria*, ii. 10.

⁵⁰ I know of no authority for the occasion of the promise except Galeotto del Garretto (*Monumenta Historiae Patriae, Scriptores*, iii. [1848], 1141). Galeotto is the best informed of the Montferrat historians, and the occasion mentioned by him is certainly the most probable.

council of the republic met and accepted the offer, but was un-pardonably dilatory in nominating the envoys to transact the business with Boniface, and while these were on their voyage to the east, Dandolo heard of the transaction and immediately despatched envoys of his own to Boniface. It is not certain whether there was time for negotiations with Genoa itself between the breach with Baldwin and the Venetian embassy, but it is possible that Boniface desired to sell his somewhat useless island independently of his quarrel with the emperor. The Venetian chronicler merely speaks of Genoese, which would leave it open for the proposal to have come from the heads of the dispossessed Genoese colony at Constantinople; both sources are agreed that negotiations were in progress when the doge's vigilance discovered the course that events were taking and anticipated the designs of the Genoese.

It would appear that the embassy to Boniface from Constantinople was entrusted with both a public and a secret message. Villehardouin⁵¹ records neither the names of the two Italian envoys nor the treaty they concluded, though its text with their names attached is preserved to us both in Venetian and in Montferrat sources. Villehardouin himself and Manassier de l'Isle had at least one stormy interview with Boniface, but at last he agreed to accept the mediation of the doge, Count Louis, Coenon of Béthune, and Villehardouin. He was doubtless won to this course by the offers made by the doge, who deftly turned the quarrel into a means of bringing Boniface under the influence of Venice. A treaty was signed by Boniface and the two envoys of the doge on 12 August 1204. By this treaty,⁵² which has frequently been misunderstood, Boniface resigned to the Venetian republic all his rights to the island of Crete, to the 100,000 hyperpers promised him by Alexius IV, to a fief granted to his father by the emperor Manuel, to the city of Thessalonica and its appurtenances (apparently the same as the kingdom of Thessalonica granted him by Baldwin), and to any territory within the empire of Constantinople then held or thereafter to be held by the Venetians; in consideration of his resignation he was to receive the sum of 1000 marks of silver, together with possessions west of the Bosphorus of sufficient extent to produce an annual revenue of 10,000 gold hyperpers (about 4500*l.*⁵³), on the sole condition of maintaining and defending the possessions and dignity of Venice in the empire of Romania against all persons whatsoever, saving his fealty to the emperor. If at any time Boniface or his heirs or lieutenants should fail to perform their duty, Venice was to be

⁵¹ P. 168.

⁵² For the text see *Oesterreichische Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. 512–515.

⁵³ See Miller, *The Latins in the Levant*, p. 29; Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig*, i. 356, 498, 499.

entitled to reclaim the 1000 marks of silver, and to resume possession of all the territories with which she had invested him. An interesting feature of the treaty is to be found in the reservation by which Boniface's duties to the emperor are not made to devolve upon Venice, but are to be performed by Boniface and his heirs as a prior obligation, taking precedence over his new duty to Venice.

It will be observed that Boniface resigns a money claim which is not likely ever to be realised, and an unspecified fief to which he has shadowy claims, together with a definite lordship of Crete, to which he might have a better claim, and a kingdom of Thessalonica of indefinite extent,⁵⁴ to which he has an indisputable right, and receives in exchange a sum of ready money together with a fief of definite value, which is doubtless intended to be no other than the kingdom of Thessalonica, for which he has already done homage to the emperor. The effect of the treaty is therefore (1) a sale of Crete to Venice, (2) an undertaking by Venice to see that the kingdom of Thessalonica becomes a reality, and (3) a defensive alliance—for the free tenure on which the lands are to be held amounts to nothing more—between the new kingdom of Thessalonica and the Venetian republic so far as her new possessions are concerned, against all enemies except the emperor.⁵⁵ It is probable that the treaty had been planned by the doge before his envoys left Constantinople. At all events, the 1000 marks were paid over on the very day on which the treaty was signed, and the presence of the ready money may have been a strong inducement to Boniface to sign.⁵⁶

The motive of Dandolo in concluding this treaty is clear enough. In the first place he held, as on an earlier occasion, that the conquest of the empire could not be achieved except by the united action of all parties. Nothing was more important than to effect a reconciliation between Baldwin and Boniface. For the moment it might

⁵⁴ The kingdom of Thessalonica is, of course, the kingdom granted by Baldwin, not the 'honour of the Thessalonians' (Robert of Torigni, *Chronicles of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, Rolls Series, iv. [1889], p. 285), bestowed on Raynero of Montferrat on the occasion of his marriage. It is not certain on what occasion Guglielmo of Montferrat received his fief from Manuel. He resided for several months at the Byzantine court in 1148, and he sent an embassy to Constantinople in 1168 or 1169. His son Conrad took up arms in Manuel's cause in Italy in 1179, and his son Raynero married the emperor's daughter Maria in 1180. Perhaps the last would be the most likely occasion for such a grant.

⁵⁵ Among recent writers Dr. Gerland appears to interpret the treaty correctly, though, in my opinion, he has misjudged the motives of Venice. Sir Rennell Rodd (*i. e.* 69) supposes that the land to be granted to Boniface would be taken out of the Venetian sphere (*i.e.* in Epirus), and that no homage would be due to the emperor for it. But this is clearly not implied in the text. Mr. Miller (p. 29) appears to have overlooked Boniface's renunciation of Thessalonica, and treats the territory promised by Venice as part of the price paid for Crete.

⁵⁶ The text of Boniface's acknowledgment of the money is to be found in numerous chronicles and collections of documents. A critical text is given by Dr. Cervellini in *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, xvi. (1908), pp. 274, 275.

appear that there was a danger of a coalition between Boniface and Genoa against Venice and the emperor whom she had seated on the throne of Constantinople. For this reason and for commercial reasons it was essential to prevent an alliance between Boniface and Genoa, and to prevent Genoa from acquiring a footing within the territories of the empire. The simplest way to counter the Genoese bid for Crete was for Venice to buy it for herself. The historians of the fourth crusade do not mention Alexius' promise, which is ignored in the treaty of March 1204, but if Genoa was willing to purchase the island, Venice could not expect Boniface to resign his claim without some compensation; the island had still to be conquered and the alliance of Boniface was well worth 1000 marks. The claim to 100,000 hyperpers, so lavishly promised by Alexius IV, was not likely to be realised in any case; it was at best an excuse for war against Baldwin, and Boniface lost nothing by abandoning it. The Venetian suzerainty was intended to be nominal—it was not to interfere with the fealty already owed to Baldwin—but the obligation to defend the possessions and dignity of Venice was intended to be real. It was aimed, not against Baldwin, but against Genoa, and it placed Boniface under obligation to resist the attempts of Genoa to acquire territory in the east. In return Venice guaranteed to Boniface that his kingdom of Thessalonica should become an actuality. By making herself responsible for its value, she made it clear to Boniface that sufficient pressure would be brought to bear upon Baldwin to overcome any resistance on his part. It is quite a mistake to suppose with Dr. Gerland⁵⁷ that Dandolo's object was to maintain the Latin empire in a weak condition by promoting strife between the two leaders. On the contrary, the treaty healed the strife and promised to secure the co-operation of Boniface against Genoa. Some difficulty was experienced in inducing Baldwin to accept the proffered mediation, but the forces that made for peace were too strong for him, and eventually he gave way and reinvested Boniface with the kingdom of Thessalonica.

Meanwhile a commission was at work on the partition of the empire between the emperor, the Venetians, and the crusaders. In the beginning of October⁵⁸ the commission drew up the scheme of division. The act by which this was accomplished has often been published and has been edited with a geographical commentary and full *apparatus criticus* by Tafel and Thomas.⁵⁹ The best map illustrating the treaty is that in Spruner-Menke's atlas, which rejects some of the wilder conjectures of Tafel and Thomas. It is customary to praise the skill with which Venice secured for herself the places which would be of most service for her trade, but it may be doubted

⁵⁷ *Gesch. des Lat. Kaiserr. von Konstantinopel*, i. 26.

⁵⁸ For the date see Heyd, i. p. 269.

⁵⁹ *Oesterreichische Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. 452–501.

whether this praise has not been somewhat extravagant. Venice received the whole of the Adriatic coast and adjacent islands, presumably because this part of the empire was the nearest to her. Elsewhere she received only scattered territories, which were probably selected for commercial reasons, but the chief centres of her trade were by no means all reserved for her. Thessalonica had been assigned to Boniface already, and while Venice received Rhaedestus and Adrianople, Abydos was allotted to the emperor, and Halmyros to the crusaders. In the main the imperial and crusading territories were continuous, and Venice received nothing in the Aegean except the islands of Euboea, Andros, Aegina, and Salamis.⁶⁰ Of the places where Genoese corsairs had established themselves, Corfu, Methone, and Corone fell to Venice, whose claim to Crete was acknowledged by the silence of the act of partition, while Naxos was allotted to the crusaders.

The news of the sale of Crete had not long remained a secret. The marquis Serra informs us that when the Genoese envoys returned from their fruitless errand, the council of the republic sent an ultimatum to Venice, requiring that city to choose between renunciation of the island and war; Venice chose war, and the great struggle between the two republics began. It is however incredible that an open declaration of war could have escaped the notice of our published authorities. The warfare that now began was in the first instance a private warfare, though the Genoese republic was afterwards dragged into it. It was a curious situation. Venice and Genoa were each at war with Pisa, and now Venice and Genoa were practically at war with each other.

Without much delay, a number of Genoese citizens banded themselves together under the leadership of Enrico Belamuto and Guglielmo Porco⁶¹ and collected a force of six⁶² galleys, with which they went on a predatory expedition to the Levant. In the harbour of Methone they succeeded in capturing a ship bearing a quantity of money together with some relics of the saints and crosses, and

⁶⁰ Tafel and Thomas are certainly wrong in their conjecture ‘cum Cycladibus Nisia’ for ‘Conchilari. Canisia.’ Menke, *Hand-Atlas* (1880), *Vorbemerkungen*, p. 40, reads ‘Cum Chilari. Canisia,’ identifying Chilari with Kjari in Albania and Canisia with Konitza in Epirus. These are in the same neighbourhood as the Colonia mentioned just before. The Cyclades are included in the ‘Dodecanisos’ assigned to the crusaders. Tafel disputes this interpretation, but it is the regular meaning of the word ‘Dodecanesos,’ and is admitted by Tafel in the case of the privilegium of 1199, on which the partition treaty was based. See his article in the Munich *Historische Abhandlungen*, v. (1849), *Symbolae criticae*, i. 62–64.

⁶¹ This act of piracy is recorded in a contemporary letter of Innocent III (4 November 1204), printed by Count Riant, *Exuviae Sacrae*, ii. 56, 57, and is also narrated in the contemporary Genoese annals of Ogerio Pane (Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi*, ii. 93). I accept Count Riant’s emendation ‘Porcus’ for the ‘Portus’ of Innocent’s letter.

⁶² So Ogerio Pane. Pope Innocent says seven galleys.

some rich presents sent by the emperor Baldwin to Pope Innocent III and to the Order of the Temple in Lombardy. These were being conveyed under the care of Brother Barozzi, a Venetian, who was Master of the Temple in Lombardy. The gifts from the emperor to the pope are said to have consisted of a carbuncle worth 1000 marks of silver, a precious ring, five pieces of velvet, and an altar-pall. The gifts intended for the Temple were more numerous : two icons, one containing three marks of gold and the other ten marks of silver with the wood of the true cross and many precious stones, two golden crosses, nearly 200 topazes, emeralds, and rubies, a crystal ampulla, two silver cups, a gilt reliquary, two silver boxes, and a silver ampulla. The actual money seized by the corsairs only amounted to fifty marks of silver. Innocent, when demanding restitution, made no mention of relics, but we learn from Ogerio Pane that many reliques of the saints were captured. One of the pirate galleys belonged to Porto Venere. Its contents were brought to Genoa and distributed among the Genoese churches.

The pope, in a letter dated 4 November 1204, called upon the archbishop of Genoa to see that restitution was effected, and threatened the city of Genoa with interdict, intimating that if the interdict should prove unsuccessful, they were to expect punishment from the pope and the emperor of Constantinople. The reply to the pope's letter is not preserved, but there exists a decree of 3 January 1205, by which the Genoese podestà conceded certain commercial immunities to the men of Porto Venere in return for the gift of a holy cross.⁶³ Jacopo d'Oria,⁶⁴ basing his statements on the books of the cathedral at Genoa, asserts that the cross was made of the wood of the true cross and adorned with silver and was captured by the Genoese pirate Deodedelo, who brought it to Genoa. According to Jacopo da Varazze⁶⁵ the capture was effected by Dodeo⁶⁶ of Fornariae, who presented the holy cross to the community and cathedral of Genoa, where it is still to be seen, but retained the reliques in the hope of selling them. Jacopo da Varazze takes credit to himself for having secured them for the church of the Dominican order.

The conduct of the Genoese in seizing and retaining these treasures may have been morally no more culpable than that of the Venetians and crusaders who had seized them at Constantinople, but the action was an open challenge to the conquerors and was accepted by them as such. The exact details of the Venetian expedition to

⁶³ *Monumenta Historiae Patriae*, Liber Iurium, i. 521, 522.

⁶⁴ *Regni Iherosolymitani Brevis Historia* in Belgrano, *Ann. Gen.* i. 141.

⁶⁵ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* ix. 43.

⁶⁶ Ogerio Pane mentions a certain Dondedelo Bos, doubtless the same person, as a Genoese seaman and companion of Guglielmo Porco in the year 1205: Belgrano, *Ann. Gen.*, ii. 97.

Naxos are a little difficult to piece together, but it would appear that Daniele Barbaro⁶⁷ is right in separating it from the larger expedition which achieved the conquest of the Archipelago. All the chronicles which contain a detailed account of the conquest of Naxos place it in the time of Enrico Dandolo and make it consist of a few public galleys, armed and equipped at the expense of Marco Sanudo. On the other hand, wherever the names of the conquerors of the Archipelago are given, they are represented as forming a company and as sailing during the reign of Pietro Ziani, while from Biondo downwards the Venetian chroniclers know of a decree of Pietro Ziani, inviting citizens and friends of Venice to make conquests in the empire of Romania. Daniele Barbaro is alone in speaking of two distinct expeditions to the Archipelago, but he is also alone among Venetian chroniclers in knowing of the piratical Genoese expedition of 1204, and there is every reason to believe that he had before him some good authority. His later statements as to the movements of Marco Sanudo can be checked by the documents in which his name appears. It is a curious feature of Venetian history that it has to be constantly constructed from statements made by authors writing several centuries after the events which they record.

According to Daniele Barbaro, the doge had, shortly before the Genoese expedition, sent home to Venice the greater part of his fleet. He considered it impossible to make any resistance with the galleys at his disposal, but Marco Sanudo, his nephew, the negotiator of the treaty of Adrianople, requested and obtained the use of eight galleys without crews, and these he armed and equipped at his own expense and took with him on an expedition to Naxos, probably at some date in the late autumn or winter of 1204–5.⁶⁸ The chronicle ending in 1360 states that the ships were manned with valiant men from Venice; in all probability the crew would be picked from seamen that volunteered for the purpose. Arriving at Naxos, the fleet moored, as Sauger informs us, in the harbour of Potamides, a little to the west of the south end of the great mountain barrier which intersects the island from north to south. Here the army landed successfully in spite of the resistance of the islanders and immediately advanced to the fortress of Apalire. The remains of this fortress may still be seen about three miles

⁶⁷ I have not inspected all the manuscripts of the chronicle that goes by this name, but of those which I have seen the Cod. Marcianus It. Cl. vii. 790 appears to preserve the best text. Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig*. i. 394, gives 1511–1570 as the date of Daniele Barbaro.

⁶⁸ For the history of the conquest of Naxos the primary authorities are a group of chronicles, the oldest of which (Cod. Marcianus It. Cl. vii. 102) ends in 1360. One chronicle in this group, that of Enrico Dandolo, has been used by Hopf and Mr. Miller, but never published. Some details, especially topographical, are supplied, probably from local tradition, by the Jesuit Sauger, *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs de l'Archipel*, Paris (1688, 1699), whose work is only accessible to me in a modern Greek version, *Ιστορία τῶν ἀρχαίων δούκων κ. τ. λ.*, translated by Karales, Syra, 1878.

inland across a flat country. There stands the isolated ridge called Castro-Apalire, marked on the admiralty chart as 'Paleokastro Middle age ruin.' The east side of the ridge, which runs north and south, is almost a sheer descent ; the ascent from the west is easier, but steep and toilsome, and is rendered the more difficult through being covered with scrub. A little below the summit on this side a wall, the lower part of which is still standing, ran along the whole length of the ridge, and above this traces of another wall may be seen, guarding the narrow level space on the summit. In places there would appear to have been no fewer than three walls. The north end of the position was the site of a specially strong fortress, of which not only the foundations, but some arches of the superstructure still remain. The solid masonry of the west wall of this fortress is well preserved and with its great bastion presents an imposing appearance to the traveller mounting the hill side. The north wall of the fortress was over six and a half feet thick, as I found by measuring the lower portion which still stands. There are two wells and a small chapel on or near the summit. My knowledge of architecture does not permit me to conjecture how much of the present structure is older than the Latin conquest, but it can easily be seen that the place was almost an ideal stronghold for a pirate company, and it has the advantage of commanding a wide view which includes the whole island to the west of the line of mountains and stretches far over the sea and other islands to north, west, and south.⁶⁹

The castle, as the chroniclers inform us, was held by the Greeks, supported by a large force of Genoese. Marco Sanudo appears to have formed the siege without delay. Sauger states that it lasted five weeks. One day, according to the chroniclers, when all his men had landed to engage in fighting, Marco Sanudo, fearing that they would flee if they failed to gain the day, set fire to his galleys. In this way the need of activity was brought home to every man, and they attacked the fortress with such vigour that it could hold out no longer. The group of chroniclers who form our main authority do not tell us whether the ships were actually destroyed or not. A chronicle which Stefano Magno⁷⁰ calls 'F. C.' states that Marco Sanudo burned them. Daniele Barbaro says that he sank them, and adds that the Greeks and Genoese, who were defending 'the city,' took to flight, and that some of them, especially the Genoese, escaped upon small boats, but all who were captured were slain. The story of the destruction of the galleys sounds romantic, but it rests on the same authority as the rest of the story of the

⁶⁹ Mr. Miller (*op. cit.* p. 570) states that Apalire had been the Byzantine capital of the island of Naxos. I do not know on what authority this statement rests. The Byzantine cathedral, now known as Aïmamas, is in the neighbourhood of Potamia.

⁷⁰ *Annali Veneti*, Codex Vindobonensis Foscarini, n. 6239, f. 79 b.

conquest, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, should probably be accepted. The island of Naxos is universally stated to have submitted after this victory and Daniele Barbaro adds that Marco Sanudo fortified it well, and left a sufficient garrison in it when he departed. He was not invested with it till a later date; but, although the island had been assigned to the crusaders by the treaty of partition, no objection appears ever to have been made to its occupation by a Venetian nobleman. He had in fact conferred a service on the whole empire by wresting it from the Genoese, who had shown themselves as much the enemies of the emperor as of Venice. The Venetian commonwealth equally abstained from making any claim to this conquest by one of its citizens, and Marco Sanudo ultimately received his investiture as duke of the Archipelago, not from the doge, but from the emperor.

Daniele Barbaro states that after the conquest of Naxos, Marco Sanudo with the knowledge and approval of his uncle, the doge, went to Venice to induce the republic to undertake the conquest of the whole Archipelago.⁷¹ It is clear from the documents that bear his name that Marco Sanudo did return to Venice in the year 1205, but he did not leave Constantinople till after his uncle's death, in June of that year. Before that event occurred it had become plain that the conquerors had a hard struggle before them both on land and on sea. In February 1205 the city of Adrianople, which had fallen to the share of Venice, revolted, and the Wallachian prince Joannisa was summoned to its aid. The emperor Baldwin appeared before the city on 29 March, and on 1 April he was joined by the doge. On 14 April the emperor was wounded in battle and captured by the Wallachians, but the Venetians had had no share in the disaster, and the doge, assisted by Villehardouin, rallied the defeated army and retreated in safety. Meanwhile Enrico Pescatore, a Genoese citizen, who had succeeded his father-in-law, Guglielmo Grasso, as count of Malta, had sent three ships under the command of Armanno Visconti and Alberto Gallina to cruise in Greek waters. They fell in with two Venetian vessels which they chased in an easterly direction for several days. The Venetians scuttled one of their vessels, but the Maltese ships caught it in time to seize a large part of its cargo, and a few days later 'by the mercy of Christ' captured the other vessel also. Altogether 200 bales of cloth, a vast quantity of money, 1200 bucklers and many other arms, and 900 men fell into their hands. They placed the men on shore, but retained the spoil.⁷²

⁷¹ Cod. Marcianus It. Cl. vii. 790, f. 149 *a*.

⁷² The Maltese ships proceeded to the Syrian coast; the crews were afraid to put in at Tyre and Acre, but after some time they landed at Tripoli, where they were employed by Bohemund, prince of Antioch, to reduce the revolted castle of Nefin. This they accomplished, defeating a Turkish army which had advanced to the relief

The great doge died of a fever on 1 June 1205.⁷³ He is rightly regarded by his countrymen as a hero. It was he that guided the crusade to its successful issue, and his was the presiding genius in the new empire in the first year of its existence. If the Latin empire was destined soon to crumble into dust, it was otherwise with the greatness of his native city. Venice now entered upon the most glorious period of her existence, in which her trade was to receive the widest expansion; and when a fresh wave of Turkish conquest broke upon the restored Greek empire, Venice with her own new possessions and the new possessions of her citizens became the bulwark of Christendom and challenged the Muslim supremacy in Greek lands and waters for centuries after the Greeks had ceased to be able to protect themselves.

It was felt that the time had come to invite further assistance from the west to complete the conquest of the eastern empire. Dandolo had, as has been seen, arranged for his nephew to return to Venice to ask for succour. The crusaders simultaneously made an appeal for further Frankish volunteers. After deliberation on the part of the barons of Romania a letter to the pope was drawn up, which was signed by Henry of Flanders, acting as regent for his captive brother, on 5 June. Similar letters appear to have been sent to France and Flanders, and a bishop and two knights were appointed to convey them to their destinations.⁷⁴ It is interesting to observe that the Venetians are not once mentioned in the letter to the pope. The crusaders are still a distinct and compact body, who seek recruits in the traditional manner of crusaders; their position is quite different from that of a national state like Venice which has made a national conquest.⁷⁵

But before the Venetian envoys departed, a great step was taken in the organisation of the Venetian conquests. For two years the Venetians of Romania had been accustomed to the government of a doge on the spot, and they not unnaturally regarded the enlarged Venetian quarter at Constantinople with the numerous new possessions of the republic in the east as too important to be governed by a number of separate *vicecomiti* or *consoli*, appointed

of the castle. In return for these services Bohemund renewed to Visconti and Gallina on behalf of the people of Genoa a charter of privileges which had been granted in 1203. The charter is dated July 1205, which gives a *terminus ad quem* for the capture of the Venetian vessels. *Monum. Hist. Patr.*, Liber Iurium, i. 522, 523; Ogerio Pane in Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi*, ii. 99–102.

⁷³ I see no reason for questioning this date, which is given by Andrea Dandolo. Dr. Gerland (*op. cit.* i. 57) rejects it, because the death of Dandolo is not mentioned in the letter to Pope Innocent, signed by the regent Henry of Flanders on 5 June. But the letter may have been drawn up before 1 June, and it makes no mention at all of the Venetians.

⁷⁴ Villehardouin, p. 230.

⁷⁵ For the text of the letter to the pope see Migne, *Bibl. Patr. Lat.* 215 (1855), cols. 706–710.

by the mother city. Accordingly an assembly of Venetian citizens in Constantinople was held, which elected Marino Zeno to be 'Podestà of the Venetians in Romania and Dominatore of a fourth and a half of the empire of Romania.' The title is significant. The Venetians in Constantinople claimed to elect a ruler not only for themselves, but for all the Venetian citizens and Venetian territories in the east. In fact they aimed at erecting the Venetian territory in Romania into a dependent republic, which should be a very fair copy of the mother city. The podestà was immediately surrounded, like the doge, by a council. His first document is signed not only by himself, but by six *giudici*, two *giudici del comune*, three *consiglieri*, one *camarlingo*, one *avogadore del comune*, and one *conestabile*, in addition to non-official persons.⁷⁶ Three of these officers it will be observed, are described as *del comune*, which means that they were officers of the mother city, to which the word *comune* appears to be always confined. The *giudici* and *avogadri del comune* are found to be frequently coming and going between Venice and Constantinople, as may be proved by the lists in which their names appear.

The first act of Marino Zeno is dated 29⁷⁷ June 1205. In this document the *giudici del comune* are Pietro Michiel, who had negotiated the treaties with Isaac II in 1187⁷⁸ and with Alexius III in 1199,⁷⁹ and Marco Sanudo, who had negotiated the treaty of Adrianople and effected the conquest of Naxos.⁸⁰ This act, which was apparently laid before the assembly that elected the podestà,⁸¹ prohibits every Venetian from alienating to any person other than a Venetian any possession that he may have received or may hereafter receive in the empire of Romania. The principle here asserted became a guiding principle of Venetian policy. The republic did not conquer more than a small fraction of the territory assigned to it in the partition treaty, but it maintained the principle that any land acquired by a Venetian citizen whether within or without the Venetian territory was not to pass into the hands of an enemy of

⁷⁶ *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. 559–561. For the history of the election of Marino Zeno, *ibid.* 567.

⁷⁷ Erroneously given as 2 June by Tafel and Thomas, *ibid.* 558.

⁷⁸ Andrea Dandolo in Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.*, xii. 313.

⁷⁹ *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. 246–278. This document is rich in information about the government of the Venetian colony at Constantinople.

⁸⁰ Hopf asserts, Ersch u. Gruber, lxxxv. p. 222, that Marco Sanudo was sprung from the Venetian colony at Constantinople. The only authority for this statement appears to be his father's (or grandfather's) surname of 'Costantinopolitani.' See Marino Sanudo Torsello in Hopf, *Chroniques Greco-Romanes*, p. 99. But Zabarella explains that this elder Marco had negotiated a treaty with the Eastern Empire and formed many friendships in Greece, particularly in the Archipelago (*Tito Livio Padovano* [1669], p. 55). The frequency with which Marco Sanudo and his brothers were elected officers at Venice is clear evidence that they belonged to the mother city.

⁸¹ It claims to have been made 'conlaudatu populi Venetie et de aliis gentibus.'

Venice.⁸² This principle is exemplified in the title assumed by Marino Zeno, who claims not merely territorial authority within the Venetian sphere as Dominatore, but a personal authority over all Venetians in Romania as Podestà. The decree may also be taken as having a reference to Marco Sanudo's conquest of Naxos, and to the further conquests in the Archipelago which he was projecting.

The task of securing the adhesion of the mother city to the arrangements made at Constantinople and of obtaining the forces necessary for further conquests appears to have been entrusted to the two *giudici del comune*, Pietro Michiel and Marco Sanudo. The two envoys probably arrived at Venice on 20 July.⁸³ They probably brought the news of the doge's death and of the steps which had been taken at Constantinople. Rainerio Dandolo, the son of the old doge, who had been acting as vice-doge at Venice, considered the action of the colony at Constantinople too important to be the subject of a merely verbal message and despatched four envoys, among whom Ruggiero Premarino⁸⁴ may be noted, to Constantinople in order to have the transactions placed in writing.⁸⁵ Rainerio Dandolo then summoned an assembly of all the Venetian citizens. These met in St. Mark's church and chose forty electors, including Pietro Michiel and Marco Sanudo. The electors almost immediately agreed upon Pietro Ziani, who was at once invested with the ducal office.⁸⁶

The new doge appears to have been by no means satisfied with the step taken by the Venetians at Constantinople. He was determined to assert the authority of the mother city. The new régime at Constantinople was indeed acknowledged, but Corfu, Albania, and a part of Epirus were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Constantinopolitan podestà, and it seems to have been taken for granted that Crete, which lay outside the 'fourth and a half' of the empire of Romania of which Marino Zeno was *dominatore*, was to belong directly to the mother city. The territories thus reserved had in fact been partly conquered by Venice this summer. The patriarch, Thomas Morosini, had set out for Constantinople in early

⁸² This doctrine is emphatically laid down in the letter addressed to Queen Joan I of Naples in 1363; see Gerland, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des Lateinischen Erzbistums Patras (Scriptores Sacri et Profani*, Fasc. v.) (1903), p. 143.

⁸³ This is the date when, according to Marino Sanudo, in Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xxii. (1733) p. 535, the galley bearing the news of Dandolo's death reached Venice. The *Historia Ducum Veneticorum*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, xiv. (1883) p. 94, merely says 'in July.' The official intimation of the doge's death was probably brought by the two envoys. It is difficult to see why it should not otherwise have been brought much sooner.

⁸⁴ Perhaps the same as the Ruggiero Premarino who had been among the electors of Orio Mastropiero in 1178. See Dandolo in Muratori, xii. 315.

⁸⁵ *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. 567, 568.

⁸⁶ For an account of the election see the *Historia Ducum Veneticorum, ubi supra*. The names of the electors are given by Andrea Dandolo, Muratori, xii. 345.

summer and had conquered Ragusa, Durazzo, and Corfu on the way.⁸⁷ No public assistance was to be granted to Marino Zeno, but the republic undertook the complete conquest of that portion of the Eastern Empire, which it had reserved for itself, and merely permitted the private conquest and occupation of other territories. In fact Pietro Ziani divided the Venetian share into two portions: the one portion was to be conquered and ruled by the Venetian *comune*; the other portion was left to Marino Zeno and private individuals to conquer and administer, and Venice gave a general licence to her citizens and allies to conquer and occupy lands, presumably with the consent of the emperor or other feudal suzerain, without in any way limiting them to the Venetian dominions.

The text of this decree is not preserved, and the earliest record of its existence is to be found in Biondo⁸⁸ who merely states that the doge gave the Venetian citizens liberty to retain for themselves whatever they might capture, with the exception of certain larger territories which were reserved for the republic (*praeter maiora Reipublicae reservata*). Navagero⁸⁹ gives the decree in a slightly fuller form, as does also Sabellius.⁹⁰ It is probable that these writers had the text of the decree before them or used authorities who had access to the decree. Reference appears to have been made in the preamble to the expense already incurred on the crusade and the heavy cost which the republic would have to bear in order to conquer the whole of the territory assigned her. This is made a reason for permitting citizens and allies to conquer, with the exception of certain specified territories, islands in or places round the Ionian and Aegean seas, under their own auspices and to transmit them to their heirs, provided that they should not alienate them to any but Venetians. There is no reservation of the rights of the republic over the conquests made; the ultimate sovereignty in these would doubtless be governed by the partition treaty, and it is important to observe that the licence extended to allies, so that the decree would cover the conquest of Euboea by Ravano dalle Carceri of Verona and his kinsmen. Biondo and Sabellius both state that the decree specified the territories reserved for the Venetian *comune*, but they do not name them. Happily, the decree is in existence by which Marino Zeno renounced his claim to these territories⁹¹ and there can therefore be no doubt of their identity.

The decree at all events set Pietro Michiel and Marco Sanudo

⁸⁷ Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant*, i. 277, asserts that the flotilla that accompanied Morosini in 1205 threw a garrison into Spinalonga in Crete, but I have not been able to find any authority for this statement.

⁸⁸ *De Origine et Gestis Venetorum*, in *Thesaurus Antiquitat. et Hist. Italiae*, tom. v. (1722), pars I. 14 C.

⁸⁹ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xxiii. (1733), 986 C.

⁹⁰ *Rerum Venetarum*, dec. i. lib. viii. (1718) tom. i. pars I, p. 185.

⁹¹ Oesterr. *Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., *Diplom. et Acta*, xii. 569-571.

free to organise a private expedition to the Aegean. Daniele Barbaro⁹² informs us that after obtaining the Venetian decree, Marco Sanudo and his 'compagnia' sent envoys to Constantinople and received the emperor Baldwin's consent to their expedition. The emperor's consent was of course necessary for an expedition that was not to confine itself to the Venetian share of the empire, but it would have to be given by the regent and not by the captured emperor. We find that Pietro Michiel was once more in Constantinople on 29 September,⁹³ when he signed a record of the election of Marino Zeno and of the decree prohibiting the alienation of fiefs held by Venetians. This record, which was made at the instance of the envoys sent out by Rainierio Dandolo, was couched in a humble strain and was careful to represent that the election of Marino Zeno had only been a temporary measure and that the Venetians at Constantinople were ready to accept any podestà or *rettore* whom the doge and his council might send out. In the month of October, Marino Zeno with the consent of his council and people definitely renounced all claim to the territories which the mother city had reserved for herself.⁹⁴ In the same month the regent Henry and the podestà Marino Zeno confirmed the treaty of partition and more closely defined the duties that the empire and the republic owed each other. By the treaty as confirmed,⁹⁵ the Venetians as well as the Franks were bound to follow the emperor from 1 June to 29 September in each year, whenever the emperor and Frankish magnates on the one hand and the podestà and his council on the other hand should have agreed that the emperor should go on an expedition for the conquest or defence of the empire. The only exception applied to those knights whose lands lay close to those of an enemy or who were themselves attacked. In the event of an attack by a 'principalis persona,' service might be extended beyond the ordinary term. The same treaty granted afresh to the Venetians liberty of commerce throughout the empire, and repeated the provision that no man at war with Venice should be received or permitted to abide within the empire.

It is probable that this definite promise that the Venetians should bear their share in the wars of the empire encouraged the regent to authorise private conquests by Venetians. He had in fact almost as strong a motive as the Venetians for clearing out the pirates' nests in the Aegean, which must have seriously hampered his communications with western Europe. It is likely that the seizure of his brother's presents in the previous year was not the only insult that he had to avenge. But the first conquest made

⁹² Cod. Marcianus It. Cl. vii. 790, f. 153 b.

⁹³ Erroneously dated 2 September by Tafel and Thomas, *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xii. 566–569.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 569–571.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 571–574.

under Pietro Ziani's decree did not need the emperor's sanction. Marco Dandolo, a cousin of the late doge,⁹⁶ and Jacopo Viadro⁹⁷ conquered Callipolis, a city which had been assigned to Venice by the partition treaty,⁹⁸ and Marco Dandolo became lord of that city.

Armed with the necessary authority both from the republic and from the emperor, Marco Sanudo proceeded to form a company for the conquest of the Archipelago, but before his expedition was ready, events had happened which engaged the public forces of his city. In the year 1206, as Ogerio Pane informs us,⁹⁹ Enrico Pescatore attacked Crete with ships, galleys, huissiers, boats (*bucis*), and other armed pirate vessels. Nicetas,¹⁰⁰ who evinces a special animosity against the Genoese, gives the numbers as five round ships and twenty-four triremes—a very large navy for a count of Malta, even though, like Pescatore, he was admiral of the kingdom of Sicily. The expedition was in all probability a joint undertaking of many Genoese adventurers, just as the expedition which Sanudo was preparing was a joint undertaking of many Venetian adventurers. Pescatore, who may have been able to use Fraschia as a base, met with complete success, and, as a Venetian chronicler informs us, took almost all the cities, fortresses, and castles, and subjugated the island to himself.¹⁰¹ Dr. Gerola gives a list of the more important fortresses which, according to the Venetian chroniclers, were either erected or strengthened by him. We are told that he even meditated the conquest of all the neighbouring islands and provinces, and that he asked the pope's permission to be crowned king. But in a few months' time it became clear that it would tax his powers to the utmost to hold what he had already gained. It may be supposed that his large armament did not long hold together. His allies would desire to return home with their plunder, and it is probable they did not anticipate the blow that Venice was preparing. As Dr. Gerola remarks, the words of Nicetas show that the Genoese conquest was at least unpopular with the Greek

⁹⁶ So Hopf, *Geschichte der Insel Andros* in *Sitzungsberichte der k. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. xvi. (1855), Philosoph.-Hist. Classe, genealogical table after p. 130. Capellari, *Campidoglio Veneto*, Cod. Marcianus It. Cl. vii. 15, makes the conqueror of Gallipoli the grandson of Enrico's cousin, Marco.

⁹⁷ 'Viadio,' in the printed text of Andrea Dandolo (Muratori, *Rerum Ital. Script.* xii. 334), is clearly an error for 'Viadro,' which is found in Laurentius de Monacis (1758), p. 143, and in both manuscripts (Marc. Lat. Cl. x. 36 a and 237) of the unpublished Latin chronicle ending in 1360. Both these chronicles are at this place little better than transcripts of Andrea Dandolo.

⁹⁸ The context of Nicetas' record of this event (ed. Bekker, p. 820; Migne, *Bibl. Patr. Gr.* 139, col. 1009) seems to indicate that it took place in the autumn of 1205.

⁹⁹ Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi*, p. 104.

¹⁰⁰ Bonn ed., p. 843; Migne, *Bibl. Patr. Gr.* 139, col. 1029.

¹⁰¹ *Historia Ducum Veneticorum in Monum. Germ. Hist.*, Scriptores, xiv. 95. The fullest account of the conquest is to be found in Dr. Gerola's article, *La Dominazione Genovese in Creta*, in *Atti dell' I. R. Accademia degli Agiati in Rovereto* (1902), pp. 140–155 and notes.

inhabitants. About the same time Morosini's conquest, Corfu, probably encouraged by Leone Vetrano, who may still have held his castle at Cape Polacro, shook off the Venetian yoke, and gave provisions to the corsairs.¹⁰²

The statements of the chronicles as to the Venetian expeditions of this year are a little confused, but it would appear that two armaments, each consisting of about thirty galleys, were despatched in succession to the Levant.¹⁰³ Of the earlier expedition we read little. It was commanded by Jacopo Baseio and consisted of twenty or thirty ships.¹⁰⁴ The fleet cannot have sailed before July, in which month Baseio witnessed a document at Venice,¹⁰⁵ but it probably sailed before the news of the Genoese successes had reached Venice, and was entrusted with no more important task than to deal with Genoese pirates in the Levant. It betook itself to the eastern Mediterranean, the scene of Pescatore's piracy of the previous year, and captured three Genoese ships at Famagosta, in Cyprus.

The news of the double Genoese success in Crete and Corfu naturally stirred the Venetians to a special effort. According to Andrea Dandolo,¹⁰⁶ the inhabitants of Crete had requested succour against Pescatore; such an event would not be at all inconsistent with the subsequent revolts of Crete against Venice, but it would of course be rash to suppose that the messengers who came to Venice represented the whole population of the island. At all events it was determined to equip a second expedition and to place

¹⁰² Martino da Canale in *Archivio storico Italiano*, viii. (1845), p. 346; Andrea Dandolo, Muratori, *Rerum Ital. Script.*, xii. 335.

¹⁰³ Dr. Gerola, who has studied a large number of Venetian Chronicles, understands that there was only one expedition, consisting of thirty warships and eight horse transports under Giacomo Baseio, and thirty merchantmen under Dandolo and Premarin. This is improbable, because the achievements of these two years are always attributed to Dandolo and Premarin, who cannot therefore have held subordinate positions. It will moreover be seen that among the captains serving with Dandolo and Premarin we find some of the most distinguished names of the time, whereas the captains serving under Baseio are without exception persons otherwise unknown. Dr. Gerola, while citing many inferior chronicles, has unfortunately overlooked Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 51, which, as was seen above, was particularly well informed about the sale of Crete, and is generally well informed about naval expeditions, being able in most cases to give the lists of captains. This chronicle recognises two distinct expeditions—one under Baseio, which sailed to Famagosta, and one under Premarin, which sailed to Spinalonga. A similar distinction seems to be intended by Stefano Magno, *Annales Veneti*, Cod. Vindobonensis Foscarini, n. 6239, f. 87 a, who seems to make Baseio sail first with thirty galleys and large ships, whereupon Dandolo and Premarin were made captains of the 'galie de mercantia,' and sailed on the famous expedition to Corfu and Crete.

¹⁰⁴ Twenty according to Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 51, where the names are given, including Candian Sanudo. Gerola, *Atti dell' I. R. Accademia degli Agiati in Rovereto* (1902), p. 166, quotes the list from Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 30, which gives twenty-nine names of captains of galleys and eight of other ships. Candian Sanudo is not among them.

¹⁰⁵ Oesterr. *Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xiii. (1856), p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xii. 335.

it under the command of some of the foremost men of the state. Ruggiero Premarino, after obtaining the written record of Marino Zeno's election as podestà¹⁰⁷ had probably returned to Venice. On 5 August 1206 he is found at Ferentino on an embassy to the pope, from whom he received a reply at that date. In September 1206 he and Pietro Michiel sign a receipt to the doge Pietro Ziani¹⁰⁸ for payment of expenses incurred on an embassy to Constantinople, presumably the embassy of the previous autumn, though it would appear that the two envoys were really at Constantinople simultaneously on two distinct missions. Giovanni Gradenigo, who had signed as *avogadore del comune* at Constantinople on 29 June 1205, had also returned. A fleet of thirty galleys, in some chronicles described as merchant galleys, was equipped and placed under the command of Rainerio Dandolo, who had for three years been vice-doge for his father, Enrico Dandolo, with Premarino as vice-captain and twenty-nine *sopracomiti* of individual galleys, among whose names we find Pietro Michiel, Marco Sanudo, and Giovanni Gradenigo.¹⁰⁹ In addition to Venetians, the ships carried 600 Lombard and Romagnolese horsemen.¹¹⁰

The best account of this expedition is to be found in the chronicle of Martino da Canale.¹¹¹ We there read that it first made its way to Corfu, which was captured by storm after a fiercely contested battle; after which they sailed to Crete with all their company and heard news that there were four Genoese galleys in the harbour of Spinalonga; these they captured and then sailed hither and thither about the sea, 'capturing their enemies as falcons capture birds.' As Dr. Gerola very pertinently remarks,¹¹² they were not sufficiently encouraged by their success to attempt the conquest of Crete. The fleet appears then to have returned home, but it is noteworthy that Marco Sanudo and Giovanni Gradenigo remained in the east, where they witnessed a document at Constantinople in February 1207.¹¹³ The document itself is interesting as being the first where Marino Zeno gives Pietro Ziani the title of 'Dominatore of a fourth and a half of the empire of Romania,' a title which we find Zeno using for the last time in the *Pactum Adrianopolitanum* of the spring of 1206, but which Pietro Ziani had not yet assumed in

¹⁰⁷ The record is dated 29 September 1205. See above, p. 51.

¹⁰⁸ Cigogna, *Inscrizioni Veneziane*, vol. iv. (1834), p. 538. See also Gerola, *op. cit.* p. 167.

¹⁰⁹ The list is given in Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 51, and also in Stefano Magno, Cod. Vindobonensis Foscarini, n. 6239.

¹¹⁰ Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 54, f. 160 a; Gerola, *op. cit.* p. 142 and note.

¹¹¹ *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 346.

¹¹² *Op. cit.* p. 143.

¹¹³ Wrongly dated February 1206 in *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xiii. 4-11.

July of that year.¹¹⁴ Henceforth it was to be a title of the Venetian doge, not of the Constantinopolitan podestà.

It must have been soon after this that Marco Sanudo gathered the fleet with which he effected the conquest of the Archipelago. According to Daniele Barbaro, who does not know of his share in the naval warfare of 1206 and his return to Constantinople, the expedition had been organised at Venice, presumably during the year 1205–6.¹¹⁵ Daniele Barbaro professes to give the names of Sanudo's companions, but the names he gives are simply those of families which afterwards reigned in Greek lands, several of which can have had no part in the expedition. It is said to have contained both Venetians and foreigners, but such foreign names as have come down to us have at most a very doubtful title to be included in the list. The best of the chronicles that date this expedition place it in the year 1205–6,¹¹⁶ but this is inconsistent with the movements of Sanudo as traced above. The date 1207 is given by Zabarella¹¹⁷ and Sauger,¹¹⁸ who probably both obtained it from some genealogy or family tradition. Certainly the tradition of the ducal family of Naxos on this point is worth more than that of the Venetian chroniclers, and the date is probably correct. It is also supported by the often well-informed chronicle, Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 51,¹¹⁹ which places the event after Premarino's expedition to Spinalonga, but before the expulsion of Pescatore from Crete.

The expedition was entirely successful. Marco Sanudo himself acquired the lordship of Paros, Melos, and Thera, and many smaller islands; Marino Dandolo, a nephew of the late doge,¹²⁰ received Andros as a fief from Marco Sanudo; Ravano dalle Carceri is generally mentioned by Venetian chroniclers as acquiring Euboea as his share in this conquest; but this had been already conquered by Jacques d'Avesnes, and had probably passed into the hands of Ravano and his comrades before this date.¹²¹ Andrea and Geremia Ghisi acquired Tenos, Myconos, Scyros, and Scopelos, which they held direct from the emperor, while Filocalo Navigaioso became Grand Duke of the island of Lemnos.¹²²

¹¹⁴ *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xiii. 18, 19.

¹¹⁵ Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 970, ff. 153b, 154a.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Andrea Dandolo, in Muratori, xii. 334, from whom the date has been transferred to other chronicles.

¹¹⁷ *Tito Livio Padovano*, p. 56.

¹¹⁸ P. 6.

¹¹⁹ f. 73^a.

¹²⁰ So Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 486; Capellari, *Ιστορία τῶν ἀρχαίων δούκεων, Campidoglio Veneto*, Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 15, makes him a brother of the conqueror of Callipolis.

¹²¹ See Stefano Magno, quoted by Hopf, *op. cit.*, p. 179; Miller, *op. cit.* p. 45.

¹²² See Andrea Dandolo, *ubi supra*; Miller, pp. 43–45. Hopf, *loc. cit.* wrongly cites Stefano Magno as asserting that Filocalo Navigaioso was 'non nisi brevissimum tempus' Megaducha of Stalimene (Lemnos). What Magno really states is that the conquest was completed in a very short time. For a complete account of the Latin baronies in the Archipelago see Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, in the

It will be observed that Pietro Michiel, who had been most closely associated with Sanudo in the past, had no part in this conquest. He was one of ten Venetian citizens to whom the republic by a decree of July 1207 granted hereditary fiefs in Corfu.¹²³ Meanwhile the great Venetian armament, probably reinforced to some extent, sailed forth again on 7 April 1207. In this year, as Martino da Canale informs us,¹²⁴ they scoured the sea with their full company, and captured the great buccaneer Leone Vetrano, with nine galleys, which they brought to Corfu; and there they hanged Vetrano and treated the other robbers as they deserved.¹²⁵ Next they sailed to Methone, which, as has been seen, would appear to have been one of Vetrano's nests, and captured and demolished the town because it had harboured pirates who had often plundered the Venetians.¹²⁶ Then, according to da Canale, they captured and garrisoned Corone. Andrea Dandolo however seems to suggest that the garrisoning took place later.¹²⁷ From Corone the armament passed on to the city of Candia, which it took. Rainerio Dandolo, failing to persuade the government to garrison Methone and Corone, obtained permission to garrison these towns at his own expense, which he accordingly did. Corone meanwhile had been captured, though probably not garrisoned, by Guillaume de Champlite. Hence arose a dispute which was finally terminated in favour of Venice by a treaty concluded at Sapienza in June 1209.¹²⁸

The capture of Candia was followed by the capture of the greater part of Crete, but Enrico Pescatore still held out in his fastnesses, of which Palaeocastro proved the most impregnable. Genoese corsairs still roamed the seas, although their old haunts had one by one fallen into the hands of Venice. The execution of Leone Vetrano had finally determined Genoa to engage in a public war, but meanwhile Venice made peace with Pisa, and on 5 August 1207

Sitzungsberichte der k. Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. xxxii. (1859), Philosoph.-hist. Classe, pp. B 365–528.

¹²³ *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., D. et A. xiii. 54–61.

¹²⁴ *Arch. stor. Ital.* viii. 348.

¹²⁵ One group of chronicles mentions another captured pirate, Enrico Bellapola. See Gerola, *Atti dell' I. R. Accademia degli Agiati in Rovereto* (1902), p. 144.

¹²⁶ It seems probable that Methone was captured from the Greeks, not from the prince of the Morea. Neither the Venetian chronicles nor the Chronicle of the Morea (ed. Schmitt, 1890–1711) mentions any fighting between Venetians and Franks on this occasion. When Guillaume de Champlite and his men came to Methone, they found it ἔρημον καὶ χαλασμένον, 'empty and dismantled,' and the chronicler explains that the Venetians had dismantled it because the Greeks used to practise piracy on the Venetian ships (1691–4). This so clearly refers to the dismantling by Dandolo and Premarino that it is astonishing that any other explanation of the passage should have been attempted. Guillaume de Champlite must have reached the place in 1207, after the Venetian fleet had passed on to Crete, and before Rainerio Dandolo had sent a garrison to occupy his conquests. This involves a little rearrangement of the chronology of the conquest of the Morea, but that is not a serious matter.

¹²⁷ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xii. 335.

¹²⁸ *Oesterr. Geschichtsquellen*, 2^{te} Abth., Diplom. et Acta, xiii. 96–100.

Venice and Pisa joined in an alliance against Genoa. In November 1208 Genoa succeeded in concluding a truce with Pisa, which was converted into a peace in the following April. In the same year Pescatore, deprived of all his fortresses except Palaeocastro, sent to Genoa for assistance. Aid was forthcoming, and Pescatore had the honour of capturing Rainerio Dandolo, who died five days later in prison. Most chroniclers make Angelo Querini the next Venetian commander in Crete. But the Venetian sources are confused, and our safest information is that which comes from Genoese sources. In 1210 Pescatore left a garrison in Palaeocastro and appeared in Genoa to beg further aid. A treaty was signed¹²⁹ in virtue of which Pescatore, if successful, was to give Genoa the fullest commercial privileges, was to repay her expenses on the war, and was to grant her a right of succession to the island in the event of the failure of his line. In return for these promises Pescatore received eight galleys and four other warships, but three of his galleys were captured in a battle off Rhodes, and though his transport ships made good their escape to Genoa Pescatore appears to have received none of their supplies. Finally at the end of 1210 or beginning of 1211 Pescatore consented to surrender his fortress, stipulating for a marriage between his nephew Armano and a lady of the Baseio family, who was to receive a dowry of 15,000 hyperpers. It was of course understood that the money would be paid by the Venetian republic,¹³⁰ and in one good chronicle¹³¹ at least the bride is not mentioned and the money is regarded as the direct price of Pescatore's surrender.

In 1212 the peace between Venice and the count of Malta was followed by a two years' truce with Genoa, soon converted into one of three years. Meanwhile the fortune of Venice was far from constant. Corfu fell into the hands of the Greek despot of Epirus; Crete had hardly been saved, first from a Greek revolt, and afterwards from Marco Sanudo, the duke of the Archipelago, who was engaged in a kind of private war with Jacopo Tiepolo, the duke of Crete. In 1213 or 1214 there was a violent recrudescence of piracy. At last in 1217 the corsair, Alamanno Costa, an old comrade of Pescatore, had collected fourteen or fifteen ships of different kinds, with which he stationed himself at Fraschia. Paolo Querini, the duke of Crete, placed large numbers of nobles of the city on board six galleys and two merchant ships, and gave battle. One Genoese galley alone escaped; Alamanno himself was captured and confined in a cage.¹³² On 11 May of the following year a ten years' peace was concluded between Venice and Genoa and the persistent attempt of Genoa to grasp some fragment of the fallen empire of the Greeks was at an end.

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¹²⁹ See the text in Gerola, *Atti dell' I. R. Accademia degli Agiati in Rovereto* (1902), p. 158.

¹³⁰ Gerola, *op. cit.* p. 149.

¹³¹ Cod. Marc. It. Cl. vii. 54, f. 160 b.

¹³² See Gerola, *op. cit.* p. 154.