9 *Expenditure*

The money collected by so many and various means was expended by the commune principally on the assertion of its powers against recalcitrant subjects and hostile neighbours. Certainly the payment of officials was a major routine item and the general expense of administration and bureaucracy, contributions to religious bodies and the extension of the commune's rights were all significant costs. Yet armies and policing usually accounted for a considerably greater sum than all other forms of expenditure combined and it seems likely that there was no year in the later thirteenth century in which this was not the case. Military exigencies had done much to form the commune's institutions and self-awareness and they remained of paramount importance. The obligation to serve in the field was as fundamental as that of serving in the council-chamber and the notion and reality survived of a citizen army, reinforced rather than diluted. Overlordship in the contado could be asserted only with the support of armed force. To survive as a power in the turbulent world of the Tuscan cities Siena had to garrison its own territories and appear potentially threatening to those of its neighbours. Meanwhile the politics of the peninsula drew it into a still wider military network.

It will however be convenient to start with the cost of official salaries, normally the principal non-military item. An analysis of the expenditure recorded in the Biccherna volume for the second half of 1257 suggests that about 8 per cent of the total for that period went on 'routine' salaries (omitting extra payments for special tasks). Of the approximately 3,500 l. paid in salaries about a quarter went to the Podestà (900 l.) and the same to the Capitano del Popolo. Other important payments were to watchmen and guards (674 l.), to fiscal officials (330 l.) and judges (315 l.) Messengers were numerous but their fixed pay in this period came to little over 100 l. These figures have obvious deficiencies – for example judges, tax-gatherers and messengers, in addition to their salaries, received payments based on work accomplished – but they help to assess the commune's ongoing financial commitment to salaried officers.[1]

Consideration of expenditure later in the century suggests that the salaries offered to the major external officials were soon to rise greatly. By the 1290s it

1 Based on *B.* 18. For the inadequacy of the Biccherna volumes as guides to the total finances of the commune see above pp. 181–4.

was normal for the Podestà to receive around 3,000 l. or even more for his six-month tenure. In 1296 his salary was 3,700 l., the Capitano's 1,200 l. Some deductions must be made for amounts paid by the Podestà to his own subordinates. Nevertheless it appears that by this time something like half the regular outgoings on salaries was received by this one official. The Capitano's salary had increased also, but his share of the total remained about the same.[2] The large sum paid to the Podestà may be connected with Siena's position within the Tuscan Guelf world, or one that she sought to assert, for to offer a high salary to the city's leading official was to emphasize the city's own eminence.

The Podestà's salary rise should be seen also as part of a general increase of expenditure on diplomacy within the Guelf alliance. In 1291, when the Podestà was already on a salary of 3,000 l., Siena had three lawyers permanently retained as advocates at the papal court at a salary of 25 l. each per annum. No doubt they had other business and this retainer would not have been their sole income. The conduct of diplomacy by emissaries was another growing expense. In the same year of 1291 an ambassador despatched to Perugia remained in receipt of salary and expenses for almost four weeks. A few years later a single mission to Boniface VIII's court cost over 400 l. in salaries. Yet another expensive aspect of the Tuscan diplomatic fabric was the appointment of a special councillor to accompany the commander of the Guelf cavalry tallia. This representative of the commune received when on duty a salary of 2 l. a day, which in one half-year period involved a payment of 219 l.[3]

Payments of this sort towards the Guelf alliance, a kind of military-diplomatic insurance policy, illustrate the difficulty of drawing distinctions between military and other expenditure and thus of calculating military expenses as a percentage of the total. Naturally there were also purely domestic items such as the alms paid regularly to ecclesiastical, particularly mendicant and monastic, institutions and, in famine years, money and food given to assist the hungry. Perhaps the greatest outlay, together with official salaries, on non-military (or not directly military) purposes was on the purchase of lands and rights in the contado. This forward policy was indeed written into the constitution in the form of a commitment to 'increase the city and jurisdiction of Siena . . . buying or otherwise acquiring castles in whole or part and acquiring rights'.[4] Money thus spent was after all capital investment on which direct returns could be expected, a form of expenditure calculated to strengthen the commune's finances.

2 Bowsky, *Finance*, p. 316 (app. 4); B 113, ff. 159–61v.
3 CG 42, f. 32v; B 104, ff. 72, 91, 98v; 114, f. 219.
4 Bowsky, *Finance*, pp. 26–30; *Cost. 1309–10*, 2, p. 503.

THE CONDUCT OF WAR

Despite the expense of administration, diplomacy and territorial aggrandisement it remains true that the commune spent most of its money on armed strength. Force was displayed and war conducted in many different ways. The Sienese had no hesitations about how their aggressive strength might be deployed. As a councillor explained, defining the intentions of a proposed campaign against Arezzo (1290), this should be *ad depopulationem et destructionem inimicorum et rebellium existentium in civitate Aretii et exterminium ipsorum finale*: the aim was depopulation, destruction, extermination[5] – with no half-measures or mealy-mouthed pretexts! But an all-out assault was exceptional and the clash of arms in a full-scale trial of strength a rarity, whereas campaigning and manoeuvring were virtually an annual routine. In a period of fifty-seven years (1251–1307), there were only two years of complete peace; in forty of those years campaigns were conducted by troops of the Sienese commune, and in fifteen other years men were under arms in preparation for fighting.[6]

The launching of a campaign required preparation and indeed clauses in the constitution insisted on delay. Even when the necessary three conciliar meetings had given approval, much had to be settled about the size and nature of the force needed, stores and armaments, measures required concerning pay, rewards, compensation, fines for absentees and special powers during hostilities.[7] The process of reaching and approving these decisions could last three or four weeks, even in an atmosphere of urgency. Clearly exceptions were sometimes made. When news reached Siena (9 December 1286) that the recently departed Podestà and his entourage had been set on within a few miles of Siena, the cavalry and infantry forces of the city and the zone where the assault had taken place were called to arms at once (*incontinenti*). The Council's proposal was to summon every available man without delay in opposition to an insolent band of robbers. Unfortunately there is no record of exactly what ensued in these very exceptional circumstances.[8]

Clashes on a considerable scale in the open field were very rare; they occurred at Montaperti (1260), Colle (1269) and Pieve al Toppo (1288). The element of risk when on campaign was normally not great and the pleasure of manoeuvring in the country in agreeable weather must often, for those on horseback, have been

5 CG 39, f. 64v.

6 Based on *RIS*, *CS*, pp. 54–89, 192–236, 255–312 and B and CG for these years. It should be noted that there are no surviving Biccherna volumes for the two hypothetically peaceful years, 1299 and 1305.

7 E.g. CG 30, ff. 26–34 (7–31 October 1285); see above, p. 51.

8 CG 32, f. 33r and v.

considerable. Military activities for the Sienese were normally confined to Tuscany, so that home was not distant, though exceptions were not unknown. Service in the Alban Hills (in Boniface VIII's campaign against the Colonna, which did involve some fighting), in Apulia, in Liguria and in Romagna, was the lot of some Sienese contingents.[9]

The norm was garrison duty. The Sienese held fortresses scattered over their territory, often with quite small bodies of men; these were seen as observation posts capable of holding out briefly against attack while assistance was summoned. Presumably they were also places of retreat for the rural population, who were the main victims of the persecutory mode of warfare which then prevailed. In a normal year the Sienese would have some seven, ten or even eleven places garrisoned, each of them by no more than a dozen men, so often a hundred men were involved in all, though that number would sometimes be multiplied by two or three. In 1266, with Ghibelline Siena under much pressure, the garrison at Monteriggioni was increased to forty, while there was a force of about 350 at Grosseto. Monteriggioni was the invariable northern bulwark against Florence, the other usual strong points being, to the south-east Monticchiello, and in the Maremma Montelaterone, Montorsaio and Campagnatico. The last two were in part the property of the Sienese commune, the former purchased in the 1250s, the latter in the 1280s and 1290s.[10]

It is misleading to think of a thirteenth-century soldier as a man whose sole task was to fight or overawe the forces of the enemy. There was a total lack of distinction between military and police functions,[11] and in practice an armed Sienese was quite as likely to be overawing Sienese subjects suspected of reluctance to pay their taxes or of intent to sell grain illegally outside the contado as he was to be facing the commune's external foes. It seems to have been a matter of routine – at least in years of poor harvest – to set up a force to police the boundaries in the hope of deterring Sienese *comitatenses* who might smuggle their grain across the border to get better prices in a market uncontrolled by their suzerain. Sometimes it was also thought advisable to use armed men to serve as a guard for those engaged in sowing.[12]

Raiding was the characteristic form of military activity, and defensive tactics consisted primarily in attempting to absorb raids with the minimum of damage. Though they participated in successful Guelf campaigns against Arezzo, the Sienese were quite often on the defensive; they suffered raids as well as inflicting

9 See above, p. 124.

10 Based on B (for 1268, B 42 and 43). For the places mentioned see also *Repertorio*, pp. 18, 27–8, 104–6, 129–30; on the *castra* see also Redon, pp. 27–30.

11 Bowsky, *Commune*, p. 123.

12 E.g. CG 3, ff. 91v–92v; 5, f. 19; *B.* 26, pp. 37–8; 118, f. 217v (see also B 67, f. 33).

them. It is difficult to know how many armed men they placed in the field at times of maximum effort, partly because they often called men for very brief periods, i.e. a few days only. When they had recourse to both Italian and transalpine mercenaries, in the heyday of the Guelf alliance, it is likely that as many as 1,000 horsemen were sometimes on the payroll. Occasionally infantry from the contado, also employed for engineering tasks, were called in very large numbers. The campaign against Arezzo in 1292 may have used 3,000 men, but even this was no more than half the force that the Florentines could call out.

CAVALRY SERVICE

The obligation of the wealthier citizens to serve in the community's cavalry force was common to all the independent Italian cities and the militia system was in force in Siena long before the period covered by this book. Indeed it was characteristic of the communes that military institutions were evolved early and did much to shape the financial and other governmental ones. They involved the appointment of many officials and commanders. In each Sienese terzo the cavalry force had a *dominus*, also a standard-bearer who had two counsellors, a banner-bearer and four captains; the infantry had a similar force of officers. There were also six men chosen 'to distribute horses', i.e. to select those who should bear the *cavallata*, or cavalry obligation, within the city, and the same number for the same office in respect of the contado.[14]

The men drawing up the city's list had a delicate task. It was far from easy to determine who was capable of undertaking the upkeep, care and handling of a valuable war-horse. The list rapidly lost its utility if not kept up-to-date, and while exclusion from it would be felt as a slight by an enthusiastic equestrian, inclusion was a mixed blessing. When a man died who had had the obligation of keeping and raising a horse, the heir might be a woman or there might be no heir; it was often long before the succession was settled, and there might be a lengthy period of provisional co-inheritance. Families and *consorzerie* with jointly owned wealth also complicated matters, and there were usually some horses 'owed' with no able-bodied person to ride them ('more horses than riders', as an official complained),[15] for instance when those owing mounted service were children or elderly or in poor health. Also a continuous process of partition of the cavalry obligation was inevitable as inheritances were divided in succeeding generations.

The consequences of all these factors show clearly in a list of 1288 recording

13 B 79 and 80; Bowsky, *Commune*, pp. 146, 158; *Florentine Studies*, p. 96.
14 CG 9 (1260), ff. 35v–6, 96.
15 *B.* 13, p. 154.

ninety-eight horses due.[16] Of these, fifty were owed jointly and, more seriously, only twenty-one of them constituted an obligation shared equally between brothers or joint heirs; twenty-nine were owed by more complicated combinations of relations or *consorzi*. The wealthy would only contribute to the full extent of their means to the city's mounted strength if some Sienese were allotted the obligation of providing more than one horse. This development added the complications of multiple obligation – which necessarily involved service by a substitute rider – to those of shared obligation.

In principle at least, the person who owed service of one or more horses received payment to cover the upkeep of his steed. Stabling and fodder were expensive items and a man receiving an allowance on this account (20 l. per annum in 1252, 27 l. in 1275, 30 l. in 1288) was not necessarily making a profit or even breaking even.[17] But this subsidy was an expensive institution which often lapsed when there was no military urgency, and it was unlikely to be paid throughout an entire year: those summoned for service always received pay, whereas the routine payments for maintenance were spasmodic. Compensation was invariably offered for horses injured or killed, and for this purpose it was necessary that an agreed valuation should be placed on every animal beforehand. The maximum and minimum valuations authorized in 1275 – 70 l. and 40 l. – were large sums,[18] and very considerable amounts were paid out under this heading – no doubt war-horses were subject to many ills – despite the precaution of fixing maxima. The obligation to provide a substitute rider (*equitator*) when the person involved could not serve in person, either because he owed service of more than one horse or for some other reason, has already been mentioned.

The *cavallata* was thus a costly matter for the commune, though it was also one absolutely central to the city's military means. The expense of the maintenance allowances had always to be weighed against military exigencies, and this may account for a tendency to aim at a reasonably low figure when deciding on the size of force to be raised. The rather patchy evidence which survives suggests that it was normal to levy a *cavallata* of between 200 and 300 horse.[19] It may be that to seek more than this number of equestrians in thirteenth-century Siena would have been unrealistic and that the contrast with contemporary Florentine obligations – which were two or three times this number – is an index of the demographic disparity between the two cities. Yet there were times when the Sienese set their sights higher, aiming at a force of 500 or 600 horsemen, so that

16 B 97, ff. 126–9.

17 *B.* 13, p. 150; CG 20, ff. 36v–7v; 35, f. 24.

18 CG 20, f. 37.

19 Examples: *B.* 13, pp. 49–58 (270); 33, ff. 30v–5 (c. 200); CG 15, f. 27 (200); 18, ff. 144v–9v (246); 20, ff. 36v–7v (200); B 121, ff. 312–18 (285). For Florence see *Florentine Studies*, pp. 94–5.

the principal constraint may have indeed been financial. A proposal in 1292 to raise the levy from the agreed level of 300 to 380 seems an indication that at least that number of local horses and riders could be found.[20]

It was very unusual to call out the city's entire militia force *en bloc*. Each terzo had its own *cavallata*, divided into troops of twenty-five, while the contado also had a threefold division, each region being linked to one of the terzi. Most common was the summons of one terzo at a time, hence, for example, the reference to the campaign 'when the *Camollenses* were in the army against Torri di Maremma'. The decision as to which terzo should serve was sometimes reached by drawing lots.[21]

It has already been mentioned that fines for non-performance of military service were a significant source of revenue. Since it was realized that absentees would be numerous, special penalties were often discussed and fixed before a campaign was launched. The fine for the first day of absence was set very high, thereafter a gentler level prevailed. There was a constant struggle to deal with problems which confronted the *cavallata* system in the forms of youth, age, sickness, absence abroad and the joint obligations of *consortes*. If the obligation fell on a minor, his guardian became responsible. If a member of a *consorzeria* was unable to reach agreement about sharing with his fellows, he nevertheless had to make a down payment of money to the commune. A neighbour was held responsible for stabling the horse of someone who was away. The sick and elderly had to maintain a horse even if they were unable to ride it. These were among the clauses of the lengthy ordinances promulgated in a Council meeting in 1275,[22] yet the ingenuity and firmness displayed simply could not make these problems disappear.

No subject discussed in Council was more contentious than the cavalry obligation and none more certain to arouse protests of injustice, often from men who did not rank among the Council's more familiar voices. The most common complaint was that the obligation was levied on the wrong people. In one characteristic discussion (January 1285), one speaker wished multiple obligations to be dropped (i.e. nobody should owe more than a single horse), while another wanted an end to all dues of less than one horse. Someone else wanted a total levy of 500 instead of the 300 proposed. Such debates were numerous. There were calls for the abolition of all partial obligations except for a simple 50/50 division. Some wanted a change to a system of money commutation in the case of women and minors. Apart from fractional dues, the biggest problems were set by those who ingeniously used their 'due' horse for the performance of paid service by their retainers or who alleged exaggerated or even false claims for compensa-

20 B 36, f. 76v; 97, ff. 126–41v; CG 43, f. 42.
21 *Const. 1262*, p. 66n; B 80, f. 20v; CG 16, ff. 80–1.
22 CG 20, ff. 36v–7v.

tion. The use of retainers was a particularly vexed question and it was illegal for a *famulus, serviens, familiaris* or *domicellus* to have responsibility for a *cavallata* horse, no doubt because of the suspicion that his loyalty might lie with his master rather than with the commune. Again and again there were complaints of 'injustice and iniquity in the *cavallata*' and of the burden falling on the wrong people. To quote a typical speech, 'the balance should be equal'.[23]

Three petitions heard in a single conciliar session (November 1306) illustrate well the difficulties of administering the cavalry obligation.[24] The first petitioners were two brothers, members of the Tolomei family, who claimed that they had been assessed at two horses but fined in respect of three. The next, Imiglia, widow of the prominent banker Orlando Bonsignori, stated that though she had made payment (of 12 l. 10s.) for the notional quarter share of one horse owed by her, she had somehow been fined for non-payment, the fine amounting to 21 l. 10s. (50s. for the first day, 5s. for each of the seventy-six following days). Lastly a man who had lived for more than twenty years in France complained of the condemnation in respect of his due of a three-quarters share; in his absence, he claimed, arrangements for payment had been made and carried out. All three petitions were successful. Evidently Sienese bureaucracy had its shortcomings.

Another subject of controversy was the date from which the *cavallata* year should be reckoned, and a more serious one was the question of service by those whose loyalty was suspect. In 1272 the Ghibellines set a particularly awkward problem: since they comprised a fair proportion of the wealthier citizens it would have been absurd to exempt them all from cavalry service, but it seemed paradoxical to expect them to serve the Guelf cause to which the Sienese had recently been converted. The obvious solution was to force them to pay but forbid them to participate in person and this was adopted.[25]

Sometimes men volunteered to appear in the lists of the *cavallata* obligation. There were periods when it was in fact run as a voluntary system, though payments were made for the maintenance of the volunteers' mounts. To serve on horseback was, after all, an honour, an indication of social distinction. Substitute riders were inevitable in many cases: in 1261, at the height of Ghibelline Siena's triumphs, bodies of Sienese cavalry sent to aid Pisa and oppose Arezzo comprised eighty-nine and 188 respectively; of these forty-eight in one group and 154 in the other were substitutes. Twenty years later fifty-seven *cavallata* horsemen went on service in the contado to Grosseto and Civitella in the Maremma of whom only eighteen were serving in person. When the Guelf alliance drew the Sienese into

23 CG 29, ff. 36–7; 35, ff. 21–3v; 43, f. 42; 64, ff. 83–5v; 65, ff. 118–22v.
24 CG 69, ff. 96–101v.
25 B 65, ff. 118–22v; 51, f. 7; CG 15, f. 27.

somewhat notional participation in a papal war in Romagna (1281) eighteen men of the *cavallata* were summoned for service there, but all of them sent substitute riders.[26]

Mercenary horsemen supplemented the native Sienese cavalryman but did not replace him, and there was no continuous process of declining participation. Many later instances occur of large-scale cavalry service performed in person. Because payment was made to the 'holder' of the horse, not its rider, the records often fail to specify how many rode in person – this applies, for example to the 500 cavalry who served against Arezzo in 1288 and to the 285 called in the summer of 1307 – but in 1313 more than 150 of the *cavallata* certainly served in person for over a month at Colle, and such participation continued for long afterwards.[27] Why, indeed, should there have been a decline, unless one accepts some general theory of natural human enervation? There was no general retreat to the office and counting-house, away from the countryside. There were always young men who enjoyed spending part of the summer on horseback, as later generations could testify from experience in the yeomanry regiments and their equivalents. The tendency for *cavallata* rates of pay to decrease in the late thirteenth century also suggests a relatively plentiful supply.

INFANTRY SERVICE

The infantryman's obligatory service, which involved his own modest weapons as well as his personal presence, was a much more straightforward matter. As with the cavalry due, the organization was by terzi, with everything on a larger and simpler scale. Many in the city owed service as crossbowmen and had to keep their own crossbows, each of which was worth about 1 l. 10s., though there were also more elaborate crossbows, quasi-artillery weapons which cost much more and were not individually owned.[28] In 1253 all three terzi sent crossbowmen for an average period of only about one week; 783 men served, under two commanders.[29] The numerous crossbowmen received the same pay as other infantry, much below that of their mounted colleagues. The rate varied considerably – from 1s. to 4s. a day – with no tendency to a general increase in the second half of the thirteenth century; it is not clear what governed these variations.[30] There were also infantry who served as *pavesarii*, carrying large shields which cost rather less than 1 l. each.[31]

26 B 33, ff. 30v–5; 80, ff. 103v–4, 124–5v.
27 B 97, ff. 126–9; 121, ff. 312–18; Bowsky, *Commune*, pp. 145–6.
28 *B.* 26, p. 91; 27, ff. 62, 65, 83r and v (cost of crossbows).
29 *B.* 14, pp. 131–56.
30 See table 8, p. 194.
31 B 35, f. 18 (cost of shields: 10 l. 2s. for fifteen).

Table 8. *Rates of pay for Sienese infantry*

Year	Rate per day	Source
1250	4s.	*B.* 10, pp. 56–60
1251	3s. 6d., 4s.	*B.* 11, pp. 48–62; 12, pp. 26–66
1253	1s. 6d. (c)	*B.* 14, pp. 131–56
1257	1s. 4d. (some c), 1s. 6d.	*B.* 26, p. 29
1258	1s., 1s. 4d.	*B.* 27, p. 139
1259	1s. 4d.	B 30, f. 13v
1261	1s., 2s. (c)	B 33, ff. 27v–8, 35v–8, 52–6v
1263	1s.	B 36, f. 30
1267	1s. 2d., 1s. 6d. (c)	B 40, f. 11v
1268	3s. (some c)	B 43, ff. 40–3v, 89
1273	3s.	B 55, ff. 27–8v
1276	2s.	B 65, f. 38
1281	3s. (c), 3s. 4d., 3s. 5⅓d.	B 80, ff. 60 and v, 69v–71v, 97v
1282	2s., 2s. 4d., 2s. 8d., 4s.	B 82, f. 100v; 83, ff. 85v, 88v, 91
1289	3s. (c)	B 101, f. 75

(c)=crossbowmen

Summons of infantry were normally piecemeal affairs and it does not seem possible to estimate the total potential force available. A *levée en masse* was a constitutional possibility but not a historic reality. Even when a notional general call-up was proclaimed (as in April 1272, for all Sienese aged between eighteen and seventy), the purpose of the levy was probably financial, the imposition of fines for absence, as much as military. The penalties for not performing military service were not merely financial; defaulters were ineligible for office or membership of the main council.[32]

THE CONTADO'S MILITARY SERVICE

The contado's military service obligations differed in various ways from those of the city and this was particularly true of cavalry service. Certain subjects had specific military dues laid down in the terms of their subjection or relationship. The Pannocchieschi owed personal horsed service to the commune as citizens, whereas the men of their lordship could not be compelled to serve 'this [i.e. the Sienese] side of the monastery of San Galgano'. The town of Montalcino owed Siena full service on horse and foot, while Montepulciano owed infantry service only (1294). When the Sienese called the foot of one of the city's terzi,

32 CG 15, ff. 68v–9; *Const. 1262*, p. 142n.

Montepulciano had to send 200 men, if two terzi were called, 400, and in the unlikely eventuality of a total call-up, 500.[33]

Nobles of the contado were not eligible to receive *cavallata* payments, their obligation coming into a separate category.[34] Their cavalry potential was considerable since many had retinues prepared to serve on horseback, but obedience was a quite different matter. In 1252 Siena called on Count Aldobrandino (Aldobrandeschi), the Ardengheschi counts 'and other nobles of the contado' for cavalry contingents; this was successful in the case of the Count of Elci and Rosso of San Lorenzo (probably one of the Ardengheschi), but apparently not in that of the others named. A few years later (1257) two men were despatched to ride through the contado 'to summon cavalrymen to be sent to Florence to serve the Florentines'. The levy of a *cavallata* of one hundred in the contado on 1275 shows that the contribution made by the subject territory to the commune's cavalry strength was sometimes a quite important one.[35]

In the contado as in the city the pattern of military organization had been established before the mid thirteenth century and particularly in the course of the bitter struggle with Florence in 1229–35. The contado infantry, as mentioned above, had a triple division in that each terzo of the city was associated with a particular section of the contado for the purpose of military liability, hence a reference (for instance) to representatives sent *per comitatum Terzerii Civitatis* 'to send men and communities to the army at Torniella' and payment to a man *quando iviit per comitatum Terterii Civitatis* 'to present lists of crossbowmen and archers'.[36]

The basis of the summons could be different for different parts of the contado, for example in 1272 the entire eligible male population in the area between the rivers Merse and Ombrone were called as infantrymen, whereas elsewhere the summons on this occasion was restricted to five men per thousand tax-payers (*allibrati*). One of the five was to be armed with bow or crossbow and all were to come with rations for at least a month.[37] With planning on such a scale it is scarcely surprising that as many as 3,000 contado infantrymen should be in the field simultaneously. In 1304 lists of *comitatenses* liable for infantry service were drawn up – the outside age-limits on this occasion, more realistically than in 1272, were twenty and sixty – and the level of fines for absence proclaimed. The penalty was to fall both on the individual and on his village or community, the former paying 1 l. for the first day and 10s. a day thereafter, the community 3 l.

33 *CV*, 3, pp. 846–52, 992–8, 1387–93.
34 *Const. 1262*, p. 66n.
35 *B.* 13, pp. 36, 116; 17, p. 181; CG 20, ff. 36v–7v.
36 *B.* 16, p. 64; 34, f. 28.
37 CG 15, f. 69.

and 1 l. The community was also responsible for paying the troops it provided – periods of actual service, as opposed to readiness, were always paid – and the sums thus disbursed were deductible from the community's tax obligations to Siena[38]

A common use of contado infantrymen was for engineering and pioneer operations. In 1306 seventy-five men from Asciano found themselves employed in destroying the fortifications of Rapolano. Sometimes they were sent further afield, even as far as Liguria in the Guelf campaign of 1273, but presumably this was avoided when possible and peasant soldiers were always regarded as potential deserters, particularly at the time of the grape harvest.[39]

Conscripts and other soldiers were offered not merely pay but medical treatment and compensation for various misfortunes, and doctors accompanied the army on campaign. Sienese wounded who survived the attentions of their medical officers were brought back to the city and if necessary received hospital treatment. The outcome of a conciliar discussion about the extension of these advantages to German mercenaries (1260) is not recorded, but it is likely to have been favourable.[40] The attitude illustrated by the *mendum* (compensation) clauses in the laws of the medieval communes[41] is evident also in some other forms of liberal treatment. Siena offered five years free of taxation to the son of any soldier killed on garrison duty, and full pay for the entire period of his captivity to any mercenary taken prisoner (1267).[42] That such offers may have been inspired by temporary difficulties in recruiting rather than humanitarian motives does not make them less interesting.

MERCENARIES

Since men serving by virtue of an obligation were paid for the period of their service, and quite often for the upkeep of horses when not serving, the difference between them and mercenaries does not lie in the receipt of pay. Nor, since mercenary troops were sometimes recruited in Siena or its contado, is the distinction one between locals and men from elsewhere. The line can only be drawn between those called to arms on account of an obligation and those who enlisted by choice. It might indeed be clearer if mercenaries were styled 'volunteers'.

Ambiguities of nomenclature often make it difficult to know what was the basis of service of the Tuscan *masnadieri* who made up the small garrisons of the

38 Bowsky, *Commune*, pp. 146, 148, 158.
39 B 118, f. 250v; 55, f. 22; CG 3, f. 41.
40 B 101, ff. 62, 88v; *Const. 1262*, p. 95; *Cost. 1309–10*, 1, pp. 95, 304; CG 9, ff. 126v–7.
41 *Const. 1262*, pp. 165–7.
42 CG 12, f. 46.

fortified places in the contado. *Masnadieri* were members of a *masnada* (band, troop: the Old French word is *mesnie*, the English *meinie*). The *masnadieri* 'de Castillione Senense et de Campili et de Titinano' (1252) may be *from* these three places or *at* them (which is probable), or quite possibly both. A list of Sienese who served at Campagnatico for some weeks in the summer of 1257 is clearer: these men *iverunt ad soldos pro comuni* (went for pay, on behalf of the commune), they were *milites* (cavalrymen) and also *soldanerii* (mercenaries). Their pay was 5s. a day, that of their commander 12s. They came from all parts of the city and must have been recruited from men who were short of a summer-time occupation or down on their luck. Two were members of grand Sienese families, Selvolesi and Codenacci, others gave their occupations as tailor, doublet-maker and tile-maker.[43]

The man recruited as a volunteer mercenary in Siena itself was a comparative rarity by the mid thirteenth century. In the second half of the century the principal development in Italian military organization was the growth of small companies, mainly of cavalry, raised and commanded by a leader who was styled the 'constable'. These constabularies, the prototype of the great mercenary companies of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were recruited from many parts of Italy and beyond, the principal regions of ultramontane supply being within the present states of France, Spain and Germany. In the 1230s the mercenaries who fought on the Sienese side against Florence were recruited *ad hoc* in their own regions. At that period there do not seem to have been bodies of men seeking continuous service together through negotiation of new contracts. In those campaigns most of Siena's mercenaries had been from central Italy (Tuscany, Umbria, the Marches) and some from further north (Liguria, Lombardy, Emilia). Genoese crossbowmen were already renowned and were numerous. Frenchmen and Germans were very rare indeed.

By the 1250s all this had altered. Imperial campaigning had brought many Germans to the peninsula in the 1240s. Siena had Germans on the pay-roll in the early 1250s, the groups then being *compagnie* and *capitanerie* (in the Biccherna accounts). In the following decade the commanders cease to be referred to as *capitanei* and become *conestabiles*.[44] The crystallization of their constabularies is a gradual process, one sign of it being the negotiation of contracts between the employing communes and the commanders to cover the conditions of service. Few of the early contracts (*condotte*) have survived, but the date of those which have serve to establish the chronology of this development. The earliest ones at

43 *B.* 13, p. 35; 18, pp. 80–1, 99–100.

44 *B.* 12–14. For constabularies see *Florentine Studies*, pp. 84–94 and Waley, '*Condotte* and *condottieri* in the 13th century' in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 61 (1976).

Siena relate respectively to the employment of eighty-seven Umbrian cavalry for two months and forty-five Bolognese cavalry for the same period, the former agreed at Spoleto on 27 September 1253, the latter at Pistoia ten days later.[45] The terms covered pay, compensation for horses and the possibility of taking prisoners and of being made captive. Some years after this Siena had eight constabularies, averaging round forty or rather fewer, in its employ and most – possibly all – of the constables were Germans.[46]

The heyday of the Guelf tallia system in the 1280s saw the full acceptance of the constabulary as the normal unit for mercenary recruitment. The Biccherna volume for the first half of 1280 records nineteen constabularies on the strength varying in size from seventeen to sixty-one men, though most of them numbered between twenty and forty. Some of the constables were from Spain and southern France (Pedro of Navarre, William the Catalan, Bertrand of Fourcalquier), others locals from Montevarchi and the Maremma. In the second half of the same year the number employed had fallen to thirteen, nine of these being companies already used in the January to June period.[47]

The principal advantage of the constabulary system from the commune's viewpoint must have been ease and continuity in recruitment. To send out men to likely places such as Spoleto and Genoa to search for individuals willing to enlist had been intensely time-consuming. The constable was the essential middleman, both recruiting officer for the commune and commanding officer. Moreover continuous employment could lead to the foundation of a tradition of familiarity and even loyalty, thus removing or at least weakening the standard criticism of the mercenary, that he was fickle and uncommitted to any cause. André of Villejuif (presumably a Frenchman) was in Sienese employment as a constable intermittently for eleven years (1286–96), and two local leaders of constabularies served even longer, Naldo of Foiano (San Lorenzo a Merse) between 1280 and 1295 and Neri of Staggia between 1290 and 1311.[48] The existence of the Guelf military alliance meant that a constable could have a long career without necessarily remaining on the roll of a particular commune. William the Catalan, for example, was in Sienese service from 1277 to 1286 and thereafter with the Bolognese (1288–90) and Florentines (1290–92).[49]

Though the occasional proto-company of crossbowmen is encountered and

45 Dipl., AGC, 27.9.1253 and 7.10.1253.

46 B 38, f. 17; 40, f. 55 (the 1267 payments suggest twenty-five as the number of some constabularies).

47 B 76, ff. 36–61; 78, ff. 26v–45.

48 B 76, 78, 80, 94–7, 99, 101, 103–4, 106–14; Bowsky, *Commune*, p. 152.

49 For William, *Florentine Studies*, pp. 88–90 and '*Condotte* and *condottieri*' (cited above, n. 44), pp. 16–18.

infantrymen serving as mercenaries were quite common,[50] the constabulary was normally a body of cavalry. Twenty-five seems to have been considered a manageable number for a unit of Sienese horsemen[51] and the constabularies also numbered twenty-five or a multiple of that number, frequently fifty, sometimes one hundred. Obviously their usefulness to the communes as means of recruitment was enhanced if the company was a large one. When the Sienese had the system in full working order they were sometimes paying more than a thousand mercenaries in the course of a year (1281),[52] though few of these were kept on the strength for more than a few weeks. At this period the rates of pay of cavalry mercenaries tended to fall – at least in terms of purchasing power – which suggests that there was something of a buyer's market.

Apart from the wandering foreign companies of horsemen – Germans in the 1250s and 60s, Provençal and French in the 1270s and 80s – there were many bodies of Italian mercenary troops. These tended to come from those regions where rural lordship remained the prevailing social pattern, and lords still had bodies of horsed retainers or 'clients'. The Counts of Sarteano are the outstanding instance of a 'feudal' family to which Siena regularly turned as a source of cavalry in many successive generations. As early as 1266 it was suggested that a Count of Sarteano should be employed together with two subordinate commanders. The same dynasty can be found in the service of Florence and Perugia, and probably other employing communes could be traced.[53] Another zone of seignorial survival was Latium and in particular the southern Campagna. In 1281 Siena employed Pietro of Anagni and Giacomo 'of the Campagna' who between them had one hundred horsemen, Andrea of Sezze with forty-one and altogether in that year at least seven constabularies from the Campagna.[54]

The mercenary companies brought with them new problems of control. It was natural that the commune should have appointed, from a quite early date, officials with special responsibility for mercenaries, since questions must have arisen about terms of recruitment, valuation of horses, claims for compensation, involvement in internal dissensions and so on. The office of three *domini masnate* seems to have been a permanent one, but this did not prevent the periodical appointment of special officials concerned with mercenaries (*super soldatis et militibus soldatis*).[55] A close eye was presumably kept on mercenaries claiming implausible sums in respect of injured horses. There were regular parades (*mostre*)

50 E.g. B 80, ff. 60r and v (50 crossbowmen), 69v–71 (200 crossbowmen etc.), 87 (122 infantry).
51 Above, p. 191.
52 B 79, 80.
53 *Florentine Studies*, p. 93; '*Condotte* and *condottieri*', pp. 20–1; CG 12, f. 32v.
54 B 80, ff. 23, 56, 62, 65v, 68v, 75, 78v, 81v, 88, 93v, 96–7.
55 E.g. B 92, f. 73; CG 36, ff. 51–72; Bowsky, *Commune*, p. 155; *Cost. 1309–10*, 2, pp. 524–5.

at which the men and their horses underwent inspection, a precaution against the notorious tendencies of armies to draw pay and rations for non-existent individuals ('dead souls').

By 1286 (and probably sooner) the constables had been compelled to provide pledges, through Sienese guarantors, for satisfactory service; when one of them deserted (*aufugit a servitio comunis*) in that year his four guarantors had to pay over the considerable sum of 94 l. each. The fund from which this payment was made had probably been deposited by the mercenaries with the landlords on whom they were billeted, to judge from earlier arrangements. Six years later another constable, Oddo of Romagna, was at fault and this time the pledge forfeit amounted to 294 florins divided equally between six local guarantors.[56] The mercenaries were also liable to deductions for duties evaded or inadequately performed. In 1295 the officials concerned with the *masnada* levied a fine totalling 666 l. 17s. 10d. on various constables and their horsemen 'for services not performed' (*pro servitiis non factis*).[57] Two clauses in the vernacular constitution deal with the general political control of mercenaries. They had to be billeted near the centre of the city and were forbidden (1306) to bear on their harness, shield or helmet the coat of arms of any Sienese citizen or *comitatensis*.[58]

The problem of maintaining authority over the companies could also be tackled in another manner, by the appointment of an overall commander. Although the Podestà was regarded as the 'natural' commander of the commune's forces, it was never easy to combine that role with his normal administrative and judicial functions. The appointment of a commander for a particular campaign was presumably seen as a way of securing better control of the troops (such a captain could be given a special temporary jurisdiction over his men)[59] as well as procuring the tactical and strategic advantages of a single command, preferably in the hands of an experienced leader. The office of Captain of War (which at first was always for a single campaign only) makes its appearance in the north Italian communes in the 1270s and spread to Tuscany soon afterwards. Siena, like Pisa, appointed its first Capitano di Guerra in 1289. The man in question was an Umbrian, Marquis Oddo of Valiana, brother of the marquis Guiduccio who had commanded Perugia's mercenary forces in 1282. In 1289 Oddo's own troop was quite small, but when he was re-employed in 1291 his men were organized in three constabularies and numbered about a hundred. This innovation remained an isolated experiment for some time but further brief appointments were made

56 B 92, f. 41v; 108, f. 52v; Dipl., AGC, 27.9.1253.
57 B 112, f. 77.
58 *Cost. 1309–10*, 2, pp. 239–40, 514–15.
59 E. Casanova, 'Ordinamenti militari senesi del 1307', *ASI*, fifth s. 24 (1899), pp. 1–12.

in 1300 and 1302, and in later decades the Capitano di Guerra was to secure a much wider field of authority.[60]

The growth of the constabulary system must be considered in association with that of the military and diplomatic nexus which might be styled the 'tallia' system. The *tallie* offered the nascent companies the prospect of prolonged employment, which itself favoured increased cohesiveness. As early as 1254 Siena, under attack from Florence, had a share or military contribution agreed with its allies (*tallia comunis Senarum*).[61] The later development of the Guelf diplomatic network has already been mentioned.[62] By the early 1270s Siena was paying regular contributions to finance an agreed proportion of the alliance's cavalry force, and on occasions sent contingents to serve in campaigns as far afield as Liguria (1273) or Romagna (1281). William the Catalan's lengthy career in the service of Siena, Bologna and Florence illustrates the military consequences of the Guelf alliance. The tallia system could result in Siena having financial responsibility for as many as 380 horsemen out of a total cavalry force of 1,500 (1292), as well as the city being required to despatch cavalry to campaign on behalf of Florence and Charles of Valois against Pistoia (1302).[63] The fabric of this Guelf alliance survived to make possible the very large armed forces which confronted Henry VII's imperial army of 1310–13.

THE COST OF WAR

It would be misleading to discuss military expenditure in terms of men alone, though the cost of constructing and maintaining fortifications and of supplies, weapons and ammunition fell much below that of soldiers.

Fortifications were a commitment of the highest importance. The condition of the contado's garrison fortresses was a compulsory subject for regular discussion in Council and that this was no mere matter of routine is shown by its consequences in February 1291. The outcome of this agenda item on that occasion was the decision that a 'merchant' accompanied by a notary should be sent on a tour of inspection of the fortifications throughout the contado, to investigate the condition of the walls and other defences as well as the supply of military stores. They were to furnish a written report to the Eighteen (predeces-

60 B 99, f. 95; 101, ff. 87, 89v, 150; 106, ff. 114v, 158; 493, ff. 29v, 30v, 64; 495, ff. 72v, 76, 81, 85 (there are some inaccuracies in Bowsky's reference to Oddo, *Commune*, p. 46, the date being misprinted as '1298'); for the later history of the captaincy of war see Bowsky, *Commune*, pp. 46–54; for Count Guiduccio see A. I. Galletti in *BDSPU*, 71 (1974), pp. 92, 98.

61 Above, p. 115; *B.* 15, p. 135.

62 Above, pp. 119–25.

63 CG 43 f. 42; B 116, ff. 272, 306, 356–7v; 117, ff. 235, 245, 269v. For the wider context of this development, see P. Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1980), pp. 205–6.

sors of the Nine), in which particular attention was to be paid to stores which were missing and appeared to have been stolen. The Eighteen would then take any necessary action.[64]

A clause in the constitution required the appointment of three officials to be responsible for the custody of the contado strongholds, in particular Montepulciano, Castiglioncello del Trinoro, Rocca d'Orcia and Grosseto. The Chamberlain and Provveditori had to keep an inventory of arms and stores held in each of these places.[65] Everywhere the upkeep of defensive works was an obligation falling on local residents, but their labour was bound to be inadequate when schemes were ambitious. The construction of a new keep at Monticchiello (on Siena's eastern frontier, near Montepulciano) was a task undertaken in the 1250s at very considerable expense. Around the same time 2,000 blocks of stone were purchased for construction work at Campagnatico, a major stronghold in the Maremma.[66]

After the triumph of 1260 and a victorious siege in the following year it was decided to strengthen Montepulciano, so often a menace to Siena in the past; it was now to become an outlying bulwark of Sienese power. This involved the construction of a new defence system and hence much destruction, since a fortress was to be erected in what had been the very centre of the town. In a short period the cost of labour alone on this project ran to 1,350 l. and houses and open spaces in the zone marked out for military 'development' had to be purchased.[67] The treatment of Montepulciano was less harsh than that of Montalcino, where the destruction was general but apparently not motivated mainly by strategic intentions. A similar measure was passed with reference to Mensano, though in that instance self-interest eventually prevailed over rancour and the place escaped demolition through the decision to build a fortress there.[68]

The foundation of new towns in the Maremma was also essentially a strategic matter and often an expensive one, though the costs were spread over a very lengthy period. The authorization of the expenditure of 600 l. on the walls of Castelfranco Paganico in March 1300 was exceptional only in that it related to a short-term scheme which was part of a campaign to hasten the completion of this place and Roccalbegna.[69]

The constitution collected and translated into the vernacular in 1309–10

64 CG 41, ff. 60–1.
65 *Const. 1262*, p. 374.
66 *B.* 26, pp. 78, 101, 120, 139, 151, 167; 29, p. 39 (for these places see also *Repertorio*, pp. 27, 129–30).
67 B 33, ff. 40v, 42v–3, 59, 90; 35, f. 26; *Repertorio*, pp. 100–3.
68 B 35, f. 23; *Const. 1262*, pp. 186–8, 385; *Repertorio*, pp. 31–2. For Montalcino see above, p. 107.
69 CG 57, ff. 85v–6.

includes detailed measures concerning military equipment and stores. Weapons and tents were the responsibility of three *signori della Camera* (an office paid in wartime only) who had to be men with a minimum tax assessment of 200 l. Purchases were to be made by the Biccherna officials, who had authority to spend up to 1,000 l. on weapons, ammunition and shields. Two officials were responsible for tracing lost crossbows. Four contado fortresses (Monticchiello, Roccalbegna, Campagnatico and Sant'Angelo in Colle) were designated as places for storage of food supplies – biscuit, salt, beans and vinegar – and other stores such as rope, crossbows and bolts. Each garrisoned fort had to have its own inventory, besides a general inventory in two copies to be held in Siena. The stocking of these strongholds was allocated to yet more officials, the three *Fornitori*, who had also to be men of substance, of a minimum assessment of 3,000 l., no doubt so that they should be less subject to the temptations arising from their task.[70]

The big marquees or pavilions used on campaign (they may be seen in the famous painting of Guidoriccio in the Palazzo) were valuable objects which must have required supervision and repair. One of the tasks of the Chamberlain was to check their condition and that of the commune's crossbows at least once a quarter.[71] Although men called for service were expected to bring rations with them, it was normal to provide an army on campaign with food, and when the arrival of a cavalry force was expected fodder would also be purchased or distrained in the contado.[72] What is striking about these aspects of the commune's administration, as with many others, is the vast effort dedicated to carrying out the city's business, in human skill, time and labour, as well as in financial resources.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The commune's military organization also requires consideration in terms of development and change. The period between the first appearance of communal militias and that of fully-formed mercenary companies has been seen as a crucial one in the evolution of specialized infantry.[73] The Sienese evidence does not support this contention. As mentioned above, crossbowmen were very numerous in Siena's own citizen armies in the 1250s. Sometimes they were accompanied and presumably protected by infantry with large shields, *pavesarii*,[74] but this was not an innovation. Italian crossbowmen played an important part in Palestine much earlier, for instance at Jaffa in 1192, so that in an era of predominantly

70 *Cost. 1309–10*, 1, pp. 219–20.
71 'Breve 1250', p. 24.
72 CG 15, f. 69; *B.* 30, p. 143; 61, f. 1.
73 See, e.g., Pieri in *RSI*, 50 (1933), pp. 597–609.
74 B 33, ff. 35v–8; above, pp. 193–4.

defensive fighting the crossbow had achieved pre-eminence in Italy long before the mid thirteenth century.[75]

The small troops of mercenaries whose advent and crystallization did indeed provide an important element of novelty in this period, who brought change and heralded far greater changes, rarely included archers or any type of infantry.[76] In the vast majority of cases they were simply an assembly of horsemen, accustomed to use their steeds, no doubt, for moving around the countryside, on patrol or in pursuit of work, rather than in a mounted charge. They will have been armed with swords, but not necessarily with lances. Indeed these men may well never have practised a charge, still less performed one in battle. The role of the horse was to provide transport for them and their possessions, perhaps also to inspire awe when raiding or on police duties.

The cavalry obligation persisted as a fundamental aspect of the city's military, social and financial way of life. Armed men needed the mobility which the horse provided whether they were raiding and threatening 'enemy' peasants, enforcing fiscal or agrarian measures in their own commune's countryside, or merely on the watch as a garrison or patrol. In an engagement the horse could assist pursuit or facilitate escape, but confrontational occasions such as Montaperti were totally exceptional and armed men were normally recruited with the intention of avoiding them rather than of gaining glory on the field of battle.

75 See P. Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1980), pp. 166–8; J. F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages* (Amsterdam-NY-Oxford, 1977), p. 194.

76 Two instances: *B.* 14, pp. 120, 182 (crossbowmen and archers, 1253); 121, ff. 243v, 260v (cavalry and infantry in a Catalan company, 1307).