



Boydell Press

Chapter Title: A New Enemy: The Emergence of the Turks as a ‘Target’ of Crusade

Book Title: Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291-1352

Book Author(s): Mike Carr

Published by: Boydell & Brewer; Boydell Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt17mvjq5.9>

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A New Enemy: The Emergence of the Turks as a ‘Target’ of Crusade

Christianity endures the greatest danger in the remotest parts where Christians dwell: obviously the parts where they are neighbours with the Tartars, also in parts where they are neighbours with the Spanish Moors, and also where Christians have borders by the sea in the eastern region with the Turks, the most evil Saracens who rule almost all of Asia Minor.

Marino Sanudo Torsello, letter to Cardinal Bertrand du Pouget, 10 April 1330.¹

Marino Sanudo's words are characteristic of a Venetian writing in the early 1330s – a period of intense Turkish raids on the Republic's possessions in the Aegean, which eventually led to the formation of the first naval league in 1333. But Sanudo's words do not characterize all western views of the Turkish beyliks for the whole time-span of this study. Unsurprisingly, no single source can provide such a thing, as no uniform view ever existed. Instead the perception of the Turks in the eyes of western Christendom gradually evolved over time, from one of ambivalence and ambiguity to one of fear and aversion, as the beyliks emerged as the sole target of a crusade mid-way through the century. Still, even during this process of growing animosity, not all views of the Turks were necessarily negative; instead they remained complex and multifaceted, being constantly influenced by a plethora of external factors. It is these inconsistencies as well as the overlying trend of rising hostility that this chapter aims to map out.

The Emergence of the Turkish Beyliks in Anatolia

The expansion of Latin trade in the Aegean and Black Seas during the second half of the thirteenth century coincided with the emergence of Turkish warrior-nomads on the old Seljuk-Byzantine frontier. A pivotal point in this demographic transformation was the Mongol victory at the

¹ Kunstmann, ‘Studien über Marino Sanudo’, 781 (letter 2); Roddy trans., p. 259 (letter 30).

battle of Köse Dağ in 1243, which resulted in the reduction and submission of the Seljuk Sultanate to the Mongols in Anatolia.² The gradual weakening of Mongol authority in the following decades led to the creation of numerous autonomous tribal domains in the area. These gradually evolved into a patchwork of Turkish principalities, known as emirates in Arabic, or beyliks in Turkish, centred around the ruling house of a head Turkish chieftain from which they often took their name.³ The beyliks were usually ruled by a senior emir, or *ulu beg*, who delegated power to his younger sons who sometimes took the title of *beg* or *pasha*. By the end of the thirteenth century these beyliks, probably motivated by a hybrid holy war and tribal-warrior ethos, had firmly established themselves in the Aegean hinterland of Anatolia – something which had not been achieved since the initial Seljuk expansion of the eleventh century.⁴

The first of the beyliks to be established was that of Menteshe, situated to the south of the Meander valley, which by the last decades of the thirteenth century controlled the coastal region of classical Caria, commanding the cities of Milas (Mylasa), Balat (Palatia/Miletus) and Peçin. The early years of Menteshe remain obscure, but by 1311 it is known that the beylik was ruled by an emir, or *ulu beg*, called Masud.⁵ In about 1307 a rival principality, that of Aydin, was formed to the north of Menteshe, under Emir Mehmed, who established his capital at Birgi (Pyrgion) and controlled the coastal cities of Smyrna and Ephesos.⁶ Menteshe and Aydin were accompanied by the beyliks of Sarukhan and Karasi to the north, which occupied the coastal regions stretching from just north of New Phokaia to the Dardanelles, and

² C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History c.1071–1330*, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), pp. 268–360; P. Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (Harlow, 2005), pp. 74–5.

³ On the establishment of the Anatolian beyliks, see R.P. Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory* (Ann Arbor, 2007), pp. 1–12; Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, pp. 1–9; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 4–12, 105–21; Idem, *Studies in pre-Ottoman Turkey and the Ottomans* (Aldershot, 2007); Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 1–32, 64–72; W.L. Langer, and R.P. Blake, 'The rise of the Ottoman Turks and its historical background', *American Historical Review* 37 (1932), 477–80. For a Byzantine perspective: S. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971), esp. pp. 135–42.

⁴ For the motivations of the beyliks see, for example, P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies into the History of Turkey, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. C. Heywood (London, 2012), pp. 56–9 (= *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938), pp. 33–7); H.W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany, 2003), esp. pp. 5–13.

⁵ On the establishment of Menteshe, see P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.-15. Jahre* (Istanbul, 1934), pp. 58–87; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 105–12.

⁶ On the establishment of Aydin see Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 19–26; H. Akin, *Aydin Oğulları tarihi hakkında bir araştırma* (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 15–28; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 108–9, 112–16.

by Hamid and Karaman on the southern coast of Asia Minor, extending from the southerly border of Monteshe, near Makre, to beyond Candelore in the east.⁷ In addition, there were the principalities of Germiyan and the Ottomans which were both initially landlocked and sandwiched between the maritime beyliks and the remaining Byzantine lands in north-western Anatolia (see Maps 1 and 2).⁸ By the late 1270s there is evidence that the coastal beyliks had begun trading with the Venetians and by the end of the century they were encroaching upon both Latin and Greek possessions in the Aegean Sea.⁹

There are few Muslim sources relating to the beyliks from this period, especially those written by the Turks themselves. Because of this, it can be difficult to get a sense of the inner workings of the different ruling families and their relations with one another. Fortunately however, the famous fourteenth-century travel writer Ibn Battuta journeyed through Anatolia in the early 1330s, leaving an invaluable account of the beyliks, packed with colourful anecdotes and details about the different Anatolian emirs, their lands and their dynastic struggles, which would increasingly come to the attention of European writers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Battuta first reached the south coast of Anatolia at the end of 1330, aiming to cross the peninsula on a somewhat roundabout route to India. He arrived by sea at the port of Alanya (Candelore) in the beylik of Karaman, from where he proceeded westward to Antalya and, after a brief detour into Cilician Armenia, northwards through the Aegean hinterland to the lands of Monteshe, Aydin, Sarukhan, Karasi and finally Osman.¹⁰ On the whole Battuta was very impressed with these regions and their rulers, many of whom he met in person and who will come to feature prominently in this study. In particular, Battuta spoke highly of the emir of Monteshe, Orkhan (c.1319–37), the son of Masud, whom he considered to be an especially honourable ruler, handsome in both figure and conduct. Battuta was

⁷ That is, from modern-day Fethiye (Makre) to Alanya (Candelore).

⁸ More information on the formation of these beyliks is given in C.E. Bosworth, *The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual* (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 213–42; Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, pp. 1–9; Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*, pp. 1–12; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 105–16; C. Cahen, 'Les principautés turcomanes au début du XIV^e siècle d'après Pachymere et Gregoras', *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 32 (1979), 111–16; E.A. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Ottoman Emirate (1300–1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 11–13 January 1991* (Rethymnon, 1993).

⁹ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 3–7; H. Theunissen, 'Ottoman-Venetian diplomatics: the Ahd-names. The historical background and the development of a category of political-commercial instruments together with an annotated edition of a corpus of relevant documents', *Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies* 1.2 (1998), 1–698, at 68–9.

¹⁰ For Battuta's itinerary see R.E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century* (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 137–58.



Figure 2. The castle of Peçin, built by the emirs of Menteshe.

particularly impressed by the court Orkhan held, which was attended by scholars, amongst them doctors of law and philosophy. Apparently Orkhan had recently taken up residence in the city of *Barjin* (Peçin), on the hill overlooking Milas, which according to Battuta had many fine buildings and mosques.¹¹ Today the extensive ruins of the castle of Peçin and the surrounding city, although mostly dating from the later fourteenth century, are still evidence of a sizeable urban area – one which must have been founded by an emir with considerable resources (see Fig. 2).

Next on his journey was Aydin, situated to the north of Menteshe. Here Battuta visited the founder of the Aydin-oglus, Mehmed Beg (c.1313–34), at the town of Birgi. The traveller was well looked after and entertained, leading him to praise his host as ‘one of the best, most generous and worthy of sultans’. As with Orkhan, Mehmed also held a court of scholarly sophistication, where Battuta was pleased to meet many intellectuals, as well as the emir’s eldest sons, Hizir and Umur Pasha, the rulers of Ephesos and Smyrna respectively. However, not everything was harmonious amongst the Aydin-oglus; one of Mehmed’s youngest sons Suleymanshah had recently angered his father by fleeing to Orkhan at Peçin, who was also his father-in-law; a sign of the strife between the beyliks at this time.¹² The town of Birgi was situated inland from Smyrna and had been made the capital by the Aydin-oglus some years before where they had built (in c.1312) a large

¹¹ Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 429–30; Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, pp. 135–7.

¹² Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 438–44.



Figure 3. Ulu Cami, Birgi, built by Mehmed Aydin-olgu in c.1312.

architectural complex centred on an *ulu cami*, or great mosque, which still stands today.¹³ This structure was grander than anything undertaken by the other beyliks in these years and is an indication of the comparative power and wealth of Aydin. Certainly, in terms of architectural achievement Aydin surpassed many of its rivals, including even the early Ottomans (see Fig. 3).

Battuta and Hizir had already met whilst at Birgi, but an over-familiarity, or lack of common courtesy on the part of the former, seems to have strained relations between the two when they crossed paths again at Ephesos. Here Battuta failed to dismount when greeting the Turkish lord on the outskirts of the city, giving such offence that no kindness was extended to him during his stay. The traveller understandably did not dwell in Ephesos and instead proceeded to Smyrna where he met the emir's other son Umur, whom he had also first encountered at Birgi. In contrast to Hizir, the lord of Smyrna was very generous, at one point even giving Battuta a Greek slave girl as a gift. Not surprisingly Umur made a very good impression on Battuta whose account resounds with praise for the emir, not least for his pious military

¹³ For photographs and descriptions, see R.M. Riefstahl, *Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia* (Cambridge, MA, 1931), pp. 26–30, 105; G. Goodwin, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (London, 1971), p. 17. See also Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, pp. 134–5; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 89–90.

endeavours against the Christians.¹⁴ This view of Umur was also shared by other writers, both Muslim and, more surprisingly, Christian; a reflection of the impact he had on contemporaries of all faiths and cultural backgrounds. Umur also features heavily in western sources, in fact more than any other Anatolian lord of the period, making him a significant player in the changing perception of the Turks. His portrayal in contemporary European literature will be discussed later in this chapter.

Finally, Battuta worked his way through the northern beyliks, where he met the emir of Sarukhan at Manisa (Magnesia), travelled past Christian-held Phokaia, and into Karasi, visiting the son of the emir Yakhshi at Bergama (Pergamum). He then ventured inland, reaching Bursa (Proussa), where he stayed for some days with the Ottoman emir, Orkhan (c.1324–62), the son of Osman, known as the legendary founder of the Ottoman dynasty. By this time the Ottomans had already conquered large swathes of Byzantine Asia Minor and were beginning a period of expansion which would see them dominate the region over the next half-century. Battuta was clearly impressed with their military achievements, and especially those of Orkhan whom he claimed was 'the king of all the Turkmens and the richest in wealth, lands and military resources'. Such was the disaster wrought on the region by the Ottomans, remarked Battuta, that a vast stretch of wasteland, of eighteen days' march across, extended eastward from their border to the remaining Greek-ruled territories in Anatolia. Less than fifteen years after Battuta had left the region, Orkhan annexed the neighbouring beylik of Karasi and brought his armies across the Dardanelles into Thrace. By the time of the emir's death in 1360, the Ottomans were poised for the conquest of south-eastern Europe.¹⁵

Early Western Views of the Turks

Amity, Ambiguity and a Period of Transition

Emperor Alexios I's appeal to the pope for military aid at the Council of Piacenza in 1095, which led to the preaching of the First Crusade, was in many ways a result of the Turkish domination of eastern Asia Minor, characterized by the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert in 1071.¹⁶ Consequently, the crusading movement was closely linked to the Turks from the outset, with the result that even before the fourteenth century and the rise of the Ottomans, a vague and rather amorphous idea of the Turks existed in the

¹⁴ Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 444–7.

¹⁵ Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 447–52, 499–500; Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta*, pp. 151–23.

¹⁶ See Hillenbrand, *Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol*, pp. 3–25; P. Frankopan, *The First Crusade: The Call from the East* (London, 2012), esp. pp. 87–100.

West. However, many of the ruling Turkic elites of Anatolia in the fourteenth century were ethnically and linguistically different from those of the eleventh century, having arrived on the second great wave of Turkish migration from Central Asia, in the wake of the Mongol onslaught of the thirteenth century. To further complicate things, the inhabitants of *Turchia*, as the region was known in the West, or Rûm to other Muslims, were often divided into communities of differing religious, linguistic and political affiliations. The Ottoman ruling class, for example, was predominantly but not exclusively Muslim, and mostly Turkish speaking, although not all as a native tongue; consequently 'Turk' was only one of many ethnicities ruled by that class.¹⁷ Confusingly, throughout the period these peoples were, with few exceptions, referred to as *Turchi* in Latin sources – a rather nebulous phrase which did not reflect the ethnoreligious complexity of the region – or alter in accordance with the political changes in the peninsula which occurred on either side of the rise and fall of the Seljuk empire; beginning with the influx of various Turkmen peoples in the eleventh century and ending with the establishment of the Turkish beyliks at the end of the thirteenth.¹⁸

The armies of the First Crusade fought these *Turchi* (predominantly the Seljuks) on many occasions. Peter the Hermit's undisciplined force was routed by them in 1096, whilst the main crusader army famously defeated the Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum a year later.¹⁹ During the Second and Third Crusades, Latin armies also crossed Asia Minor, coming into conflict with the Seljuk Turks once again. In 1147, for example, the German contingent led by Emperor Conrad III was crushed at Dorylaeum, but on the Third Crusade, Frederick Barbarossa fared better, capturing the Seljuk capital of Konya in 1190 before his death a few months later.²⁰ It is interesting to note that many of the crusade chroniclers understood the difference

¹⁷ See Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, pp. 1–4; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 117–21.

¹⁸ The exceptions being the twelfth- and thirteenth-century works of William of Tyre and Simon of Saint-Quentin, who together provide a great deal of information on the Seljuks, from the time of their migration into Asia Minor until the advances of the Mongols: William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, 2 vols (Turnhout, 1986), vol.1, pp. 114–17; Simon of Saint-Quentin, *Histoire des Tartares*, ed. J. Richard (Paris, 1965), pp. 62–86. See also G.G. Guzman, 'Simon of Saint Quentin as historian of the Mongols and the Seljuk Turks', *Medievalia et Humanistica* 3 (1972), 155–78, at 161–7; A.V. Murray, 'William of Tyre and the origin of the Turks: On the sources of the *Gesta Orientalium Principum*', in *Gesta Dei per Francos: Etudes sur les croisades dédiés à Jean Richard*, ed. M. Balard, B.Z. Kedar and J. Riley-Smith (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 217–29; Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, p. 150.

¹⁹ T.S. Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History* (London, 2004), pp. 89–113.

²⁰ J.P. Philips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (London, 2007), pp. 177–84, 195–206; C.J. Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (London, 2006), pp. 417–30.

between the Anatolian Turks and other Muslim groups, such as the Saracens (*Saraceni*), who occupied lands outside of Anatolia.²¹ In fact, the Turk was occasionally described as a lesser kind of infidel in crusade chronicles, one who was sometimes praised in battle and whose character was preferred to the perfidious Greek or Saracen. One well-known example comes from the anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum* who, when narrating the battle of Dorylaeum in 1097, commended the Turks for their military prowess and even compared their lineage to that of the Franks.²² Similarly, the principal chronicler of the Second Crusade, Odo of Deuil, also commended the Turks on occasion, although this was often to emphasize the comparatively evil behaviour of the Byzantine Greeks, whom he blamed for the failure of the Second Crusade.²³

In general, however, the reaction of the Latin writers towards the *Turchi* of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was overwhelmingly negative. They were usually labelled as pagans, heathens or idolaters, despite their monotheist beliefs, and were condemned for the damage they inflicted on the crusader armies passing through Anatolia.²⁴ In the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the use of the earlier crusades as a motif for inspiring a new crusade against the Ottoman Turks was a popular one, especially by Renaissance humanist writers who were keen to draw parallels between the two eras.²⁵ This was a method also adopted by some writers of the early fourteenth century. The crusade theorist William of Adam, for example, sought to justify his recommendation that a crusade should travel through Anatolia by stating that 'no crusade has ever been made in which the Turks did not attack our army'.²⁶ The anonymous author of the *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*, who was heavily influenced by William of Adam, also believed (mistakenly) that Peter the Hermit had easily subjugated the Turks on his way to Jerusalem, thus setting a precedent for his plan.²⁷ Still, apart from these writers, it is surprising to find that few other authors

²¹ See, for example, *Gesta Francorum et Aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, ed. and trans. R. Hill (London, 1962), pp. 18–21. However, it was still rare for other medieval chroniclers to make ethnic and geographic distinctions between different Muslim groups: J.V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York, 2002), pp. 105–34.

²² *Gesta Francorum et Aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, pp. 20–1.

²³ See, for example, Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, ed. and trans. V.G. Berry (New York, 1948), pp. 140–1.

²⁴ See, for example, Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 105–34.

²⁵ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, pp. 19–30; P. Orth, 'Papst Urbans II. Kreuzzugsrede in Clermont bei lateinischen Schriftstellern des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts', in *Jerusalem im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter. Konflikte und Konfliktbewältigung – Vorstellungen und Vergegenwärtigungen*, ed. D. Bauer, K. Herbers and N. Jaspert (Frankfurt a. Main, 2001), pp. 367–405.

²⁶ William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, p. 75.

²⁷ 'Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum', pp. 502–5; Leopold, *How To Recover the Holy Land*, pp. 149–50.

directly linked military action against the Anatolian beyliks in the fourteenth century to the famous conflicts between the Seljuks and the crusaders in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, despite the clear parallels that existed between them. Maybe writers of the fourteenth century were aware of the differences between the beyliks and the Seljuks, even if they referred to them both as *Turchi*.

In fact, the few sources which do mention the beyliks at the turn of the fourteenth century, rather than describing them in terms of overt hostility, instead refer to them as friends and allies, influenced by a mixture of admiration and political expediency, or, in the case of the papacy, with an attitude of ambivalence, stemming from a general ignorance of who the Turks of the beyliks were and an underestimation of their military potential. In these years, the focus of the crusading powers in western Europe was also firmly set on those groups of the eastern Mediterranean which had previously been the target of a crusade, namely the Byzantine Greeks and the Mamluks, with the result that the Turks were often regarded in a positive light in comparison to these older and, seemingly more dangerous, foes.

A combination of these factors, and the underlying pragmatism of a mercenary company operating on the fringes of Christendom, helps to explain the remarkably pro-Turkish attitude of the chronicler Ramon Muntaner, a member of the Catalan Company who served in Anatolia during the early 1300s. The Catalans allied with a band of Anatolian warriors under the command of a warlord known as Xemelic whom Muntaner remembered with much fondness:

[I]f ever any people have shown obedience to a lord, these Turks showed it to us; and if ever people had been loyal and true, these Turks were always so towards us. They were also very skilled at arms and in many other matters, and thus did they stay amongst us as brothers; and at all times did they form a separate army at our side.²⁸

Of course Muntaner's views, although probably genuine, were heavily influenced by external political factors, not least his strong feelings of animosity towards the Byzantines and their emperor, who he claimed had betrayed the Catalan Company by killing their leader Roger of Flor. Although the Catalans had avenged themselves on the empire, it is not surprising that Muntaner, echoing Odo of Deuil some two centuries earlier, portrayed the Turks as worthy adversaries in contrast to the Greeks, whom he considered to be the real enemies of his people. Nevertheless, on reading Muntaner's account, one is left with an impression of the author's genuine regard for the Turks, even during the periods at which the Catalans were engaged in war with them; proof that relationships between different cultural groups in the

²⁸ Ramon Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East*, p. 110.

eastern Mediterranean were as often divided along the lines of pragmatism as along those of faith.

A similar viewpoint is also provided by the early work of Marino Sanudo, someone who like Muntaner had first-hand experience of the East, but was writing about the beyliks from a far more detached perspective. Sanudo's point of view is especially important because he had spent much of his life travelling in the eastern Mediterranean and later advising the papacy and the nobility of western Europe on the best way to liberate the Holy Land.²⁹ In his proposal for a crusade against Mamluk Egypt, found in book two of the *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, written in 1312–13, Sanudo advocated a deal in which the crusaders could enter into friendly negotiations with the Turks of the Asia Minor littoral (*Turchis qui morantur in Turchiae maritima*). In particular, he believed that the crusaders could purchase provisions and war materials from the beyliks of Karaman, Hamid and Monteshe, who occupied the southern coast from the ports of Candelore to Makre (*Clandeloro usque Macrum*).³⁰ Sanudo was probably influenced by Venetian merchants in the Aegean, who had been intermittently trading with the Turks of these regions, in particular from Makre, which was part of the Monteshe principality by that time.³¹ His proposal is interesting on two accounts: first, in the context of the period, Sanudo is unusual in specifying which Turks the crusaders should deal with. As shall be seen, papal sources were very vague in this regard and even the Venetian archives more often refer to *Turchi* and *Turchia* without any further elaboration. Secondly, as someone familiar with both eastern Mediterranean and European politics, Sanudo was especially well placed to judge how the Turks could fit into attempts to liberate the Holy Land. In this sense, his opinions must be taken as representative of those who were trading in the Levant, even if his idea of an alliance with the beyliks gained no particular support in the papal curia or other European courts at the time.

The views of the papacy towards the Turks in these early years, although never as positive as those expressed by Muntaner and Sanudo, still shared the common belief that the Greeks and Mamluks were the real enemies of the Roman Church in the East. Consequently, papal sources remain surprisingly ambivalent, and also ambiguous, in their representations of the Turks, especially in comparison to the Byzantine Greeks who remained the principal target of a crusade in the Aegean region. Although it is fair to say that the *Turchi* found in papal documents in these early years – being infidels – were never looked upon in a positive manner by the popes,

²⁹ On Sanudo's life, see Marino Sanudo, *Book of the Secrets*, trans. Lock, pp. 1–20.

³⁰ Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum', p. 67; Lock trans., p. 117.

³¹ See, for example, *Pietro Pizolo, notaio in Candia*, ed. S. Carbone, 2 vols (Venice, 1978–85), vol. 1, pp. 70–1 doc. 141, pp. 139–40, doc. 293, vol. 2, pp. 114, doc. 936, pp. 159–60, doc. 1040, p. 161, doc. 1042; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 3–7.

they were rarely represented in distinct terms and were clearly not regarded as an important component of crusade preaching. Take, for example, the planned French and Angevin crusades to Greece and Constantinople in the early fourteenth century, which dominated crusade negotiations during the pontificates of Popes Benedict XI and Clement V.³² These expeditions were being planned at a time when the papacy and other western powers were well aware of Turkish incursions into Byzantine-ruled Asia Minor, yet they remained strictly crusades against the Byzantine Greeks, with the aim of re-establishing the Latin empire and paving the way for a later expedition to the Holy Land. This is illustrated by the crusade bulls issued for these missions which justified them on the grounds that the Greek emperor and his people were schismatics and usurpers of the imperial throne. The crusade army would thus be used specifically to liberate Greece and Constantinople, with indulgences only being granted to those who fought against the Byzantines and not the Turks, to whom no reference is made.³³

Still the proposed crusades against the Byzantine empire do mark the first important step in the evolution of a more hostile perception of the Turks in western literature, one in which *Turchi* began to feature in the papal crusading documents, even though these promoted expeditions overwhelmingly anti-Greek in focus and justification. Evidence of this can be found in the acknowledgement of the Turkish threat to Christian lands in two bulls issued in connection with the crusade of Charles of Valois in 1304 and 1306. In these documents the pope called on the crusaders to seize Constantinople from the weakened Greek emperor, in case it should fall to the Turks:

If (which God forbid!) it should happen that that same empire fell to the Turks and other Saracens and infidels, by whom the said Andronikos is being continually attacked, it would not thereafter be easy to rescue [the empire] from the hands of those same peoples. O what serious danger and huge confusion the whole Roman mother Church and the whole Christian religion would suffer if (which may God avert!) such a loss were to occur!³⁴

In a letter asking Venice to join the expedition, Clement V even stated that the 'souls of the Parthians or the Turks' would be broken at the appearance of the crusading armies.³⁵ This acknowledgement of the danger posed by

³² These projects are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, pp. 28–30.

³³ *Le registre de Benoît XI*, ed. C. Grandjean, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome (Paris, 1903), docs 1006–8; Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 1, docs 243–8, vol. 7, doc. 7893, these indulgences are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (pp. 108–9). For a background of justifications for crusading against the Greeks see Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*; Chrissis, 'New frontiers', pp. 17–41.

³⁴ *Le registre de Benoît XI*, doc. 1006; Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 1, doc. 243.

³⁵ Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 1, doc. 248. According to Laiou, an equivalent letter sent by the pope to Genoa made far more of the Turkish threat to the Byzantine empire than that sent to Venice: Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 204–5. However, her references are

the Anatolian beyliks is important because it suggests that the papacy was willing to sanction a crusade against the Greeks as a means of defending Christian lands in the East from the Turks; a wholly original justification for a crusade against the Byzantine empire and a sign of the growing threat of the Anatolian beyliks, both in the Aegean region and in the consciousness of western Europe.

The same justification of protecting eastern Christians from the Turks was also probably used by Charles of Valois in an alliance he attempted to form with Greek rebels in 1307. These rebels were natives of Asia Minor and their letters to Charles reflect the need of a strong outside ruler to defend the eastern borders of the empire from the Turkish onslaught.³⁶ Unfortunately, the responses of Charles to the rebels do not survive, but the negotiations are nevertheless evidence that a crusade to recover Constantinople could be promoted as a mission to defend eastern Christians from the advances of the Turks.

This method of using the threat posed by the Anatolian beyliks to justify a campaign against Greeks can also be found during the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes, where once again, Greek territories were the primary target, but in which *Turchi* also featured. Although the Hospitaller campaigns were almost certainly not envisaged by the pope as a means of defending the Latins of the Aegean from the Anatolian beyliks, some evidence of anti-Turkish motivations in the sources do exist, usually justified along the lines they had colluded with Greek 'schismatics'.³⁷ For example, contemporary accounts stated that the island was inhabited by the 'impious Turks' who were living there under the rule of the emperor of Constantinople.³⁸ Similarly, a papal document of 1307 confirming the possession of Rhodes to the Hospitallers also made mention of the 'schismatics and infidels' who

unclear and the manuscripts she cites do not seem to show this: Paris, Archives Nationales, J509, docs 16, 16bis.

³⁶ Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 212–20; Booramra, 'Athanasios of Constantinople', 38–9. The relevant letters are published in H. Moranvillé, 'Les projets de Charles de Valois sur l'Empire de Constantinople', *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 51 (1890), 63–86, at 82–6; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, Appendix II, pp. 341–3; summaries in C. du F. Du Cange, *Histoire de l'Empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs français jusqu'à la conquête des turcs*, ed. J.A. Buchon, 2 vols (Paris, 1826), vol. 2, p. 344, doc. 22.

³⁷ Collaboration with enemies of the faith as a justification for a crusade could cut both ways. For example, crusades against the Byzantines had often been justified on the grounds that they had colluded with the infidel, see J. Harris, 'Collusion with the infidel as a pretext for western military action against Byzantium (1180–1204)', in *Languages of Love and Hate: Conflict, Communication and Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean*, ed. S. Lambert and H. Nicholson (Turnhout, 2012), pp. 99–117.

³⁸ See Bernard Gui, 'E Floribus Chronicorum (Quarta Vita)', in *Vita Paparum Avenionensium*, ed. S. Baluze and G. Mollat, 4 vols (Paris, 1914), vol. 1, pp. 59–80, at pp. 62–9; Amalric Auger, 'Actus Romanorum Pontificum (Sexta Vita)', in *Vita Paparum Avenionensium*, ed. S. Baluze and G. Mollat, 4 vols (Paris, 1914), vol. 1, pp. 89–106, at p. 93.

opposed the Order during the invasion.³⁹ It is unlikely that the Turks had actually settled on Rhodes before 1306, but they had raided the island in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and some were employed by the Greeks to garrison the fortress of Phileremos in preparation for the Hospitaller invasion.⁴⁰ These references highlight the increasing threat which the maritime beyliks posed to the islands of the eastern Aegean by 1306; a situation recognized by Master Fulk of Villaret who tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a treaty by which the Hospitallers could hold Rhodes as subjects of the Greek empire on condition that they defended it from Turkish attack.⁴¹

The Maritime Beyliks as the *inimicus Christi* in the Aegean

Up until this stage, with the exception of the first-hand accounts of Muntaner and Sanudo, the western image of the Turks was a hazy one, particularly that expressed in papal sources. However, after the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes, which brought the Order into contact with the Anatolian beyliks and soon led to conflicts with Menteshe and later Aydin, the image of the Turks came more sharply into focus in European literature as individual emirs and dynasties began to emerge slowly from the indistinct references to *Turchi* found in earlier sources. As this image became more defined, the instances where the Turks were condemned for colluding with the Greeks also decreased, as the Anatolian beyliks began to transform exclusively into the new 'enemy' in the East in contrast to the Greeks who began to be considered as an ally.

The first example of this came in 1311, in a papal letter dispatched to Genoa, where Pope Clement V revealed that certain Genoese traders operating in the Aegean had allied themselves with *Madachia*, a powerful Turkish lord, and had paid him 50,000 gold florins to make various assaults on the newly established Knights Hospitallers on Rhodes.⁴² A few months after the letter was dispatched, envoys reported to the pope at the Council of Vienne that the Order had defeated a Turkish fleet at Amorgos, probably sent by

³⁹ Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 2, doc. 2148.

⁴⁰ *Cronaca del Templare di Tiro: 1243–1314*, ed. L. Minervini (Naples, 2000), p. 326; A.T. Luttrell, *The Town of Rhodes: 1306–1356* (Rhodes, 2003), p. 76.

⁴¹ George Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, vol. 4, bk. 13, ch. 33, pp. 698–701; A.T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks: 1306–1421', in *Christians, Jews and Other Worlds: Patterns of Conflict and Accommodation: the Avery Lectures in History*, ed. P.F. Gallagher (Lanham, 1988), pp. 80–116, at p. 83 (repr. in Idem, *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and Their Mediterranean World*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1992), I).

⁴² Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 7, doc. 7631, cf. doc. 7632. See also A.T. Luttrell, 'The Genoese at Rhodes: 1306–1312', in *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed età moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. L. Balletto, 2 vols (Genoa, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 743–61, at pp. 758–9 (repr. in Idem, *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces, 1306–1462*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1999), I).

this same *Madachia*.⁴³ A year after this, in 1313, Master Fulk of Villaret claimed in a document that the Knights had captured a number of fortresses in *Turchia*, most likely in the coastal lands belonging to this *Madachia*.⁴⁴ The Turkish lord was Masud, the emir of Monteshe. His naming in the letter is the first specific reference to an emir of the fourteenth-century Anatolian beyliks in a papal document and one of the first to be found in any source of western European origin.⁴⁵

The letter and the subsequent communications over the conflict between Masud and the Hospitallers are especially important as they reveal a network of international correspondence stretching between the Latin Aegean powers and the papacy which helped to shape a new image of the Turks. At the time of these events, the pope was presiding over the Council of Vienne – one of the greatest ecclesiastical gatherings of its day. This was crucial as the Council was called primarily to suppress the Knights Templars, who had been arrested in France and put on trial on the orders of Philip IV in 1307.⁴⁶ Despite protestations from the pope, Philip had pressured the papacy to condemn the Order and to ensure that Templar goods in France were transferred to the French Crown. At the Council of Vienne Clement resisted calls to condemn the Templars, but instead agreed to suppress the

⁴³ The battle at Amorgos is also discussed in Chapter 4 (pp. 88–91). It is reported in H. Finke, *Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, 2 vols (Münster, 1907), vol. 2, pp. 298–302, doc. 146; *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols (Paris, 1891–3), vol. 1, p. 391.

⁴⁴ The letter is published in A.T. Luttrell, 'Feudal tenure and Latin colonization at Rhodes', *The English Historical Review* 85 (1970), 755–75, at 757, 771–3 (repr. in Idem, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West, 1291–1440: Collected Studies*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1978), III). The capture of castles in Turkey is also mentioned in various versions of the *Brief Lives of the Masters of the Hospital*, see A.T. Luttrell, 'Notes on Foulques de Villaret, Master of the Hospital 1305–1319', in *Guillaume de Villaret, 1er recteur du Comtat-Venaissin 1274, Grand Maître de l'Ordre des hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jerusalem, Chypre 1296* (Paris, 1985), pp. 73–90, at pp. 82–7 (repr. in Idem, *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1992), IV) and also by Ludolph of Sudheim, who claims that the Hospitallers had also forced the Monteshe Turks to pay them tribute: Ludolph of Sudheim, 'De itinere Terre Sancte', ed. G.A. Neumann, in *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, 2 vols (Paris, 1881–4), vol. 2, part 2, pp. 305–77, at p. 331–2; Stewart trans., pp. 34–7; Luttrell, *Town of Rhodes*, pp. 214–19.

⁴⁵ Other early references to the Anatolian emirs include Ramon Muntaner, who mentions the beyliks of *Sesa* (Sasa or Karaman) and *Tin* (Aydin) and Marino Sanudo, in his *Istoria*, who talks of Masud and two of his sons Orkhan and *Strumbrachi*. However, these accounts were written some years after the death of Masud, unlike the papal letter of 1311: Ramon Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East*, p. 55; Marino Sanudo, *Istoria di Romania*, p. 209.

⁴⁶ On the trial of the Templars, see M. Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 2006).

Order and to transfer its goods to the Hospitallers.⁴⁷ The events of the Council were thus of direct relevance to the Hospitallers, who were eager to demonstrate that they were actively defending the faith overseas. Bearing this in mind, it seems likely that Fulk of Villaret deliberately portrayed the defence of the Aegean against the Anatolian beyliks – of which Masud was the main protagonist – as the new *raison d'être* of the Hospital. Indeed the dates of the reports from the Rhodes support this. The Hospitaller emissaries who first reported the Monteshe–Genoese alliance to the pope, did so during the opening weeks of the Council, probably in October or November 1311. Similarly, a crusade proposal from King Hugh of Cyprus, which also mentioned the Genoese conflict with the Hospital, reached the pope while he was at Vienne in 1311.⁴⁸ Finally, and most crucially, the report of the Hospitaller victory over Masud's fleet off Amorgos in early 1312 was delivered to the pope on or just before 22 April – barely twenty days after the Templars had been suppressed, and just ten days before the decision was made to transfer the goods of the Temple to the Hospital.⁴⁹

The Council of Vienne therefore gave the Hospitallers a pan-European audience and meant that the key players in a crusade were all aware of the conflict between Monteshe and the Order. Representatives were invited to the Council from all over western Christendom: from Italy, France, Germany, the Iberian Peninsula, the British Isles, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.⁵⁰ The sources mentioning the conflict between Masud and the Hospitallers reflect this international scope – they include papal letters dispatched to Genoa, Cyprus and Rhodes, an Aragonese ambassador's report, and a French chronicle written on Cyprus. Consequently, what may have previously been regarded as a trivial and obscure conflict between the Hospitallers and a little-known beylik, was in fact blown into international significance by the crucial role it played in ensuring the future of the Order at the Council of Vienne. The repeated references to Masud and Monteshe during such a momentous occasion thus helped to raise the profile of the Turks within the collective consciousness of western Christendom at this time.

The feelings of trepidation towards the Turks fostered during the Council of Vienne were further augmented a few years later by the first reports of Turkish raids on Venetian colonies in the Aegean and Greece, which reached the mother-city with increasing frequency after the summer of 1318. From this point, defending the Republic's possessions from these attacks became

⁴⁷ N.P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I to Vatican II*, 2 vols (London, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 333–5.

⁴⁸ See M.L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols (Paris, 1852–61), vol. 2, pp. 118–25, esp. 119–20.

⁴⁹ Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks', pp. 85–6; Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, pp. 270–2.

⁵⁰ See Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, p. 221.

a common topic of debate in the Senate and Great Council, the archives of which provide a vivid testimony to the threat which the maritime beyliks now posed to Venetian colonies and trade in the region. In one letter, dated June 1318, the duke of Crete wrote to the doge with alarm that the Turks, in alliance with the Catalans of Athens, had inflicted 'damage, depredation and much plunder on the islands of the Archipelago', including a raid on Santorini where 'many beasts and other things' had been seized, and the sack of Karpathos where a fleet of sixteen armed ships had captured around three hundred men and animals and taken them back to Asia Minor.⁵¹ The perpetrators of these raids are not identified specifically in the sources; they are referred to as indistinct *Turchi*, originating from *Turchia*, with no reference to a particular Turkish lord, unlike the Hospitaller reports of Masud. Still, judging from a letter from the duke of Crete – which commented that the Turks in question had broken a treaty by attacking Venetian possessions, probably in reference to a previous trade agreement between Crete and Monteshe – it is reasonable to assume that the Turks in this instance were from Monteshe as well.⁵² Also, it may be the case that *Turchia* in this instance was understood to mean more specifically the regions of Monteshe, as was the case in Venetian and Cretan administrative documents written twenty years later.⁵³ On many occasions, however, the identity of the Turks would have been hard to determine for the Venetian authorities as they originated from various regions of Anatolia and were not affiliated to one particular beylik; it is known that many Turks were shipped across the Aegean by the Catalans to serve with them against the Venetians and others launched raids on their own volition, thus partly explaining the generic allusions to 'Turks' and to 'Turkey' in the Venetian sources.⁵⁴

The same ambiguity is not found in the next major encounter, this time between the Latin rulers of the eastern Aegean islands of Chios and Rhodes (the Genoese Zaccaria family and the Hospitallers) and the Turks of Ephesos (i.e. Aydin). The first conflicts occurred towards the end of the second decade of the century, especially in 1319 when a sizeable Turkish fleet from Ephesos was defeated by an allied Hospitaller and Zaccaria force. Two letters survive written to the pope reporting the Christian victory, one by the captain of the Hospitaller fleet, Albert of Schwarzburg, and the other by

⁵¹ DVL, vol. 1, doc. 61; DOC, doc. 96, see also DVL, vol. 1, doc. 63; DOC, docs 98, 101; Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', 826–9.

⁵² See Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', 825–6.

⁵³ See Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 118–19.

⁵⁴ See, for example, DOC, doc. 98, where it is reported that two Turkish ambassadors will be taken to Turkey by the Catalans to recruit a number of Turks: *habuimus etiam per ipsam fidedignam personam quod armatur Athenis etiam unum aliud lignum quod deferre debet duos ambaxatores ipsius domini Alfonsi [...] cum duobus ambaxatoribus Turchorum in Turchiam, qui vadunt pro accipiendo Turchos in bona quantitate, a mille usque ad mille et quingentos.*

the temporary governor of the Order overseas, the papal *vicarius* Gerard of Pins. These letters provide a remarkable account of events: they describe in detail the preparations of the Hospitallers and the Zaccaria after they had heard of news from Ephesos; the tense waiting game once the Turks had set sail from the port; and the final encounter in the waters off Chios. Here, after a hard-fought battle lasting the whole day, the Christians emerged victorious, apparently killing or wounding over two thousand Turks and destroying twenty of their ships with only a handful escaping in the night.⁵⁵

As was the case with the Hospitaller victories over Masud, the news of this battle spread rapidly throughout Christendom. It reached Florence where the chronicler Giovanni Villani wrote of a Turkish admiral attacking Rhodes, and also Cyprus, where it featured in an anonymous sixteenth-century Italian source, probably an adaptation of a contemporary French original.⁵⁶ Other victories won by the Zaccaria over the Turks also began to reach western Europe in these years, further fuelling the growing awareness and trepidation of the emerging maritime beyliks. This is demonstrated by the garbled references to their exploits in a diverse variety of sources, such as in the crusade treatise of William of Adam. He makes numerous mentions of the lords of Chios, at one point writing that without their vigorous persecution of the Turks 'no man, woman, dog, cat, or any living creature' could remain on any of the nearby islands.⁵⁷ This was a view mirrored by Marino Sanudo and the author of the *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*, as well as the Anonimo Romano who later wrote that Martino Zaccaria was a 'noble and talented master of war'.⁵⁸ Even the German pilgrim Ludolf of Sudheim, who journeyed through the East between 1336 and 1341, wrote of Martino Zaccaria (*Nycolao de Sya*) sailing to the rescue of a Hospitaller force stranded on Kos (*Lango*) and killing over six thousand Turks on the island.⁵⁹ Contemporary Greek writers and a later Ottoman source also allude to these

⁵⁵ Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, pp. 365–7, doc. 2; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', 337–9, doc. 1. For more on this battle, see Chapter 4, pp. 88–9, and also Carr, 'Trade or crusade?', pp. 122–5.

⁵⁶ Giovanni Villani, *Nuova cronica*, vol. 2, bk. 10, ch. 120, p. 323; *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, vol. 1, p. 400. These accounts of the battle vary slightly from those given in the letters, but they probably refer to the same event, see Carr, 'Trade or crusade?', pp. 123–5.

⁵⁷ William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 53–5, 65–7, 81.

⁵⁸ Marino Sanudo, 'Epistolae', in *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ed. J. Bongars, 2 vols (Hannover, 1611; repr. Jerusalem, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 289–316, at pp. 297–8 (letter 5); Roddy trans., pp. 156–60 (letter 15); 'Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum', pp. 457–8; Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, p. 74.

⁵⁹ Ludolph of Sudheim, 'De itinere Terre Sancte', p. 333; Luttrell, *Town of Rhodes*, pp. 214–15.

encounters; a testament to their importance and their widespread dissemination at the time.⁶⁰

An Aegean Legend: Umur Pasha and His Impact in the West

The account of Ibn Battuta given at the start of this chapter provides a vivid confirmation of the growth in confidence and authority of the Turkish maritime beyliks, demonstrated in particular by the Aydin-oglu Mehmed beg who, as seen earlier, had launched numerous raids from his ports into the heart of Venetian, Hospitaller and Genoese territories. After the capture of Chios by the Byzantines in 1329, which was followed by the seizure of the harbour-fortress at Smyrna from the Genoese, the fleets of Aydin were able to launch raids into the Aegean with even more regularity and destructiveness.⁶¹ The situation became so desperate that by April 1332 the duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, had concluded a treaty with the Aydin Turks.⁶² Two months later, in June, the Venetian Senate discussed whether Negroponte as well should conclude 'some arrangement with the Turks'.⁶³ These were undoubtedly those of Aydin as it is known from a later Ottoman source that the island became a tributary of the Aydin-oglus later in that year.⁶⁴

At this point, the Cretan authorities also consulted the Knights Hospitaller about the possibility of forming an alliance with rival Turkish emirs against Aydin. In one instance, it was suggested that an agreement should be formed with Orkhan of Mentеше (*Orchani Turcus*), and in another it was recommended that the Venetians ally themselves with *Carmignanus*, the emir of Germiyan or possibly Karaman.⁶⁵ The Venetian government, the *Serenissima*, even wrote to the pope about the inability of the Turks to unite in defence of themselves: 'although the power of the perfidious Turks is great, nevertheless there are several Turkish states in those regions, of which each one is distinct from the others, and one could not quickly render aid

⁶⁰ See, for example, Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 1, bk. 8, ch. 10, p. 438; Enveri, *Le destân d'Umûr Pacha*, pp. 51, 55–6.

⁶¹ See Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 56–9; H. Inalcik, 'The rise of the Turkish maritime principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 9 (1985), 179–217, at 190–1.

⁶² ASVen, *Misti del Senato*, reg. 15, fol. 7 (2 Apr 1332); summary in Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 2.

⁶³ ASVen, *Misti del Senato*, reg. 15, fol. 17v (13 Jun 1332); R.-J. Loenertz, *Les Ghisi: Dynastes vénitiens dans l'Archipel, 1207–1390* (Florence, 1975), doc. 39, pp. 213–4; Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 15.

⁶⁴ Enveri, *Le destân d'Umûr Pacha*, pp. 69–73 (verses 599–744, esp. 685–90). The baillie Petro Zeno agreed to pay a tax to Umur: *Il s'engagea à payer le harac* (verse 689).

⁶⁵ ASVen, *Misti del Senato*, reg. 16, fols 38v–39v, 43 (November–December 1333); Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1., pp. 129–30, 138, docs 13, 23; summaries in Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, docs 38–9; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 28.

to another'.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the divisions amongst the Turks did little to dampen the concern over the threat which they posed, as was expressed in numerous papal letters written in these years, which demonstrate that the Turks could no longer be easily subjugated.⁶⁷ Marino Sanudo confirmed the danger which the beyliks now posed and went so far as to warn that they were on the brink of expanding into the Adriatic Sea and the European kingdoms beyond.⁶⁸ Even Giovanni Villani, writing in Florence at the time, commented on the tribute being exacted by the Turks on the Latins in the Aegean.⁶⁹ By the early 1340s they had reduced many more of the Aegean islands to tributary status and had devastated Thrace, Macedonia, central Greece and the Peloponnese.⁷⁰

By this time, the former Byzantine port-cities of Smyrna and Ephesos, where many raids were launched from, had grown into prosperous trade centres under the house of Aydin.⁷¹ Greek slaves were numerous and cheap in these markets, whilst the cost of Turkish slaves in the region had rocketed because of their comparative scarcity.⁷² Two western pilgrims, William of Boldensele and Ludolf of Sudheim, who journeyed in the East between 1335 and 1341 both commented on the wealth and prosperity of Ephesos and its Turkish inhabitants, in contrast to the impoverished Christian minority who still resided there.⁷³ Another eyewitness, Matthew, the Orthodox arch-

⁶⁶ DVL, vol. 1, doc. 124; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 181–2.

⁶⁷ For example John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 5207, 5247, 5269–76, 5324, 5329, 5404, 5423, 5429, 5438, 5442, 5485, 5486, 5495. See also DVL, vol. 1, doc. 115; AE, vol. 24, pp. 292–3, ch. 31, pp. 499–500, ch. 22–4, pp. 511–14, ch. 13–16; vol. 25, pp. 7–11, ch. 3–5.

⁶⁸ Writing to Bertrand, the bishop of Ostia and papal legate, in 1330: Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 755–89 (letter 2); Roddy trans., pp. 222–70 (letter 30). Sanudo expressed his concerns over the Turkish incursions in many other letters, for example, 'Epistolae', ed. Bongars, pp. 291–4, 297–8, 304–7, 312–16 (letters 3, 5, 16, 20–3); A. Cerlini, 'Nuovo lettere di Marino Sanudo il vecchio', *La bibliofilia* 42 (1940), 321–59, at 349–54 (letter 2); Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 791–813 (letters 5–7); C.B. de la Roncière and L. Dorez, 'Lettres inédites et mémoires de Marino Sanudo l'ancien (1334–1337)', *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 56 (1895) 21–44, at 43–4 (letter 9); Roddy trans., letters 7, 15, 18, 23, 26–8, 33–5, 42.

⁶⁹ Giovanni Villani also recounted the same event but without distinguishing who the Turks were: *Nuova cronica*, vol. 2, bk. 2, ch. 201, p. 765.

⁷⁰ John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*, vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 38, p. 537; Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 2, bk. 12, ch. 7, p. 597.

⁷¹ See C. Foss, *Ephesus after Antiquity: A Late Antique, Byzantine and Turkish City* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 144–5; Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War*, pp. 170–2.

⁷² Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 444–5. See also Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State*, p. 49.

⁷³ William of Boldensele, 'Des Edelherrn Wilhelm von Boldensele Reise nach dem gelobten Lande', in *Die Edelherrn von Boldensele oder Boldensen*, ed. C.L. Gotefend (Hannover, 1855), pp. 18–78, pp. 31–3; Ludolf of Sudheim, 'De itinere Terre Sancte', p. 33; Stewart trans., pp. 30–1.

bishop of Ephesos, remarked on the extensive size of Smyrna which he said provided the ideal refuge for pirates.⁷⁴ In economic terms Aydin was booming at this time; coins were struck at Ephesos for the first time in a thousand years and the beylik regularly featured in the trading manual of Florentine merchant Francesco Pegolotti, one of the first European commentators to provide specific information about trade with the Anatolian principalities.⁷⁵ He described the weights and measures used by the Aydin-oglus and compared them to those used in Italy and the Aegean islands. From his handbook it is known that at Altoluogo, an Italian name for Ephesos, the Turks sold raw materials, such as alum, grain and rice, and bought finished products, especially dyed European fabrics of azure, vermilion and emerald.⁷⁶

Although the reign of Mehmed Beg saw the establishment of Aydin as a major Anatolian power, it was his son Umur Pasha, famed for his audacious attacks on the Latins in the Aegean, who became regarded as the greatest Turkish warrior of his generation. Umur's exploits became so legendary that an epic poem was written documenting his life, probably reproduced from a lost contemporary source in around 1465 by the Ottoman poet-chronicler Enveri. His *Düstürnâme*, or 'Book of the Grand Vizier', was dedicated to Mahmud Pasha, the grand vizier of Mehmed the Conqueror and contains a whole section (Book 18) devoted to Umur's heroic exploits against the Franks.⁷⁷ In it the emir is depicted as a brave jihad warrior, commanding a warship named *Gāzī*, who wrought terrible afflictions on the Latins of the Aegean.⁷⁸ One particular passage gives a dramatic example of how many Turks during Umur's lifetime and afterwards regarded his feats:

⁷⁴ Matthew, Archbishop of Ephesus, *Die Briefe des Matthaios von Ephesos im Codex Vindobonensis Theol. Gr. 174*, ed. D. Reinsch (Berlin, 1974), p. 344. For more on Matthew and his visit to Smyrna and Ephesos, see Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, pp. 342–8.

⁷⁵ The coins were Latin imitations, a silver coin minted in Ephesos was modelled on the *gigliati* of Robert of Naples. Similar coins were also struck by the emirs of Sarukhan and Monteshe: Foss, *Ephesus after Antiquity*, pp. 150–1; J.T. Wood, *Discoveries at Ephesus: Including the Site and Remains of the Great Temple of Diana* (London, 1877), pp. 181–3.

⁷⁶ Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica Della Mercatura*, pp. 55–7, 92, 104, 367–70; *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents*, ed. and trans. R. Lopez, and I.W. Raymond (New York, 1967), pp. 353–5.

⁷⁷ The author followed closely the lost work of Hadji Selman, who may have been a contemporary of Umur and perhaps a comrade-in-arms: Enveri, *Le destân d'Umûr Pacha*, pp. 27–33; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 9.

⁷⁸ Enveri, *Le destân d'Umûr Pacha*, pp. 52–5 (verses 145–224); Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, pp. 78–80; E.A. Zachariadou, 'Holy war in the Aegean during the fourteenth century', in *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. B. Arbel, B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby (London, 1989), pp. 212–25, at pp. 219–20 (repr. in Idem, *Studies in pre-Ottoman Turkey and the Ottomans* (Aldershot, 2007), XVII).

Arriving in Izmir, the Pasha [Umur] planned a new holy war.
 He prepared to fight day and night. For which the Lord was pleased.
 He still wished to see his sword shedding blood,
 he still wished to make his enemies groan,
 he even wished to boil the sea
 and to make his horse leap into the country of the Franks.⁷⁹

Such were his deeds that the cult of Umur, which sprung up after his death and was especially promoted by the Ottomans, continued amongst Turkish sailors of the Aegean for many centuries.⁸⁰ Even the Byzantine contemporary Nikephoros Gregoras awarded Umur the highest praise by stating that he was more civilized than barbarian and possessed some Hellenic culture.⁸¹ The appearance of Umur in such a work as the *Düstürnâme* is a testament to his reputation as a *gâzî* warrior as held by the Ottoman sultans of the late fifteenth century. In a similar manner, the *türbe* (tomb) of the emirs of Aydin at Birgi contains a dedication to Mehmed Beg, dated to 1334, which reads 'This turbeh has been constructed for the Grand-Emir, the wise, the warlike, the defender of the faith, the founder of pious works, the Sultan of the Gâzîs, Murbâriz ed-duala wa'd-dîn Muhammed b. Aydin – may God enlighten his resting place!'.⁸² This too has been used to provide further confirmation of the *gâzî* ethos of the House of Aydin.⁸³

In the end, Umur's aggression triggered the Crusade of Smyrna, a response from the Latins which became as legendary as the emir's original deeds. For the most part the Crusade was a success, as it managed to restrict the piratical activities of Aydin and eventually led to the death of Umur in 1348. The Crusade captured the imagination of contemporaries. It featured in a number of northern Italian chronicles as well as a host of miracle stories and other apocrypha which circulated in the West at the time.⁸⁴ It was also recounted on occasion in the writings of the French knight Philippe de

⁷⁹ Enveri, *Le destân d'Umûr Pacha*, p. 55 (verses 225–35).

⁸⁰ Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, p. 69.

⁸¹ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 2, bk. 13, ch. 4, pp. 649–50; D.M. Nicol, *The Reluctant Emperor: A Biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and Monk, c.1295–1383* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 34–5. Umur Pasha was, however, understandably vilified in the pro-Latin speech of Demetrius Kydones, written in 1366, who wrote of the emir that 'while living, no evil was unexpected': J. Ryder, 'Demetrius Kydones' "History of the Crusades": reality or rhetoric?', in *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean*, ed. M. Carr and N.G. Chrissis (Farnham, 2014), p. 105.

⁸² P. Wittek, 'Turkish architecture in southwestern Anatolia. Part II', *Art Studies* (1931), 173–212, at 201; Riefstahl, *Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia*, p. 105.

⁸³ The most famous example being that by Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 33–7; ed. Heywood, pp. 56–9.

⁸⁴ See, for example, Giovanni Villani, *Nuova cronica*, vol. 3, bk. 13, ch. 39, pp. 390–1; 'Cronica di Bologna', in *RIS* 18 (Milan, 1731), cols. 242–792, at 393–4, 399; *Storie pistoresi (1300–1348)*, ed. S.A. Barbi, *RISNS* 11.5 (Città di Castello, 1927), pp. 214–16; N. Jorga, 'Une lettre apocryphe sur la bataille de Smyrne', *Revue d'orient Latin* 3 (1895), 27–31. This is

Mézières, who fought at Smyrna as a young man and wrote fifty years later that Umur (*Morbaissant*) was the most powerful of the Turkish lords at that time.⁸⁵ As a result of the Crusade of Smyrna, the emir began to feature more heavily in western sources than any other Turk. He is referred to in person by his Latin name, *Morbasanus*, rendered in Italian as *Morbasciano* and in French as *Morbaissant* (a corrupted form of 'Umur' plus 'Bassanus', a common Latin transliteration of 'Pasha').

One Italian source, the Anonimo Romano, provides a rather fictitious but colourful description of this *Morbasciano*, recounted during the story of a Venetian embassy sent to him to try and negotiate a truce during the Crusade of Smyrna. According to the source, the envoys found Umur sitting on the ground, leaning on his left arm in a thoughtful mood. He was elegantly clad in silk and enormously fat, his stomach protruding like a barrel. He drank almond milk and was served sweetmeats, eggs, rice and spices, served on richly painted earthenware dishes, which he ate in great quantities with a golden spoon. When asked if he was afraid of the imminent arrival of a crusading army led by Humbert of Viennois, Umur replied that he had nothing to fear as long as his two friends were thriving. When the ambassadors asked, 'Who are these friends of yours?', Umur nonchalantly replied 'they are Guelph and Ghibelline!'.⁸⁶ This highly fictitious account was undoubtedly intended to reflect more on the policies of the Venetians and the factional infighting that hindered the Crusade of Smyrna than Umur's actual character, but the lively description nevertheless provides a good example of the impact which *Morbasciano* had made upon the European imagination at this time.

However, the ultimate step in the definition of Umur Pasha in the West came after the wide circulation of a apocryphal epistle allegedly written by *Morbasanus* to Pope Clement VI which circulated probably just after the Crusade of Smyrna, at a similar time as the Anonimo Romano.⁸⁷ In this epistle *Morbasanus* wrote that the Venetian people, who 'live with neither law nor morals', had tricked the pope into launching a crusade against him,

discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 (pp. 116–17) and also by Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 146–9.

⁸⁵ Philippe de Mézières, *Une épître lamentable et consolatoire*, pp. 213–14; Idem, *Le songe du Vieil Pelerin*, ed. G.W. Coopland, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1969), vol. 2, p. 501.

⁸⁶ Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, pp. 84–5; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 207.

⁸⁷ The date at which the epistle was first composed and circulated is extremely difficult to determine, although in the salutation it is said that *Morbasanus* and his brothers were *imperatoris Organi collaterales pugiles*, suggesting that they fought on the side of Emperor Orkhan, who is most likely the Ottoman sultan who died in 1360. Aydin was not subordinate to the Ottomans until 1390, but they began to attract the attention of the Christian world in 1354 after their capture of Gallipoli. The circulation of the epistle in the later 1350s, at a similar time to that of the *Aninomo Romano*, written in c.1357–60, therefore seems plausible. See the background to these events in Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 63–75.

based on unfounded accusations of Turkish raids. What is more, the Turks were also descendants of the Trojans, thus making them bound to the Italians by ties of blood and the true inheritors of the lands of Romania, unlike the Venetians who had seized them illicitly. This shared ancestry, coupled with the fact that the Turks were innocent of shedding Christ's blood and of occupying the holy places, wrote *Morbasanus*, made the Crusade against him both unnecessary and against the tenets of the Christian faith.⁸⁸ The *Epistola Morbasiani* periodically reappeared throughout the fifteenth century, finally being considered as the answer of the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II to the famous letter of conversion written to him by Pope Pius II.⁸⁹ These versions continued to circulate into the sixteenth century and beyond, appearing in German and French translations, as well as in Latin and Italian, the language of the original fourteenth-century variants.⁹⁰ As was seen earlier, during the reign of Mehmed II Umur also resurfaced as the protagonist in the biographical poem of Enveri, evidence of his impact on both Christian and Muslim writings. The wording of the *Epistola Morbasiani* was even echoed in an account of the Crusade of Smyrna added to the chronicle of Guglielmo Cortusi.⁹¹ The influence of *Morbasanus* on the European imagination was so strong that Giovanni Boccaccio himself drew his inspiration from him for the character of Bassano, king of Cappadocia, in the *Decameron*. This character makes only a brief appearance in Boccaccio's tale,

⁸⁸ A fourteenth-century Latin version of the letter has been published by J. Gay, *Le Pape Clément VI et les affaires d'Orient (1342–1352)* (Paris, 1904), pp. 172–4 and an Italian version, most probably from the first quarter of the fifteenth century, by G. Toffanin, *Lettera a Maometto II: (Epistola ad Mahumetem)* (Napoli, 1953), pp. 181–2.

⁸⁹ See, for example, Weimar, Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek, Q 108, fols 314v–315v; Q 109/9, fol. 62r–v.

⁹⁰ Along with Dr Cristian Caselli, I have identified over eighty manuscripts variants of the *Epistola Morbasiani* although they have not yet been edited. Examples of the later variants, include: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2915, fol. 114r–116v (fifteenth–sixteenth century); Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Ital. 90, fols 1–4 (seventeenth century). German translations include: Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cgm 216, fols 162v–163r; Cgm 317, fols 142r–v; Cgm 4692, fols 10v–13v; Clm 9503 [Ob. Alt. 3], fol. 353v. Some (but not all) of the manuscripts have been identified by Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, pp. 35–7 and also by B. Wagner, *Die 'Epistola Presbiteri Johannis': Lateinisch und Deutsch* (Tübingen, 2000), pp. 20–4; B. Wagner, 'Sultansbriefe', *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon* 11 (2004), 1463–4.

⁹¹ These are the words: *Morbassan, qui se scribit dominum Achaie et imperatoris Organi colateralem et pugilem, cum multitudine equitum supervenit*: Guglielmo Cortusi, *Chronica de novitatibus Padue et Lombardie*, ed. B. Pagnin, *RISNS* 12.5 (Bologna, 1941–9), p. 109. They are clearly influenced by the salutation of the *Epistola Morbasiani*, which reads: *Morbasianus hebenesi cum fratribus Cerabi et Inbahit imperatoris Organi collaterales pugilles et in partibus Acaie domini*. Guglielmo finished writing his chronicle in the 1350s and was living at a very advanced age in 1361: Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, p. 190, n. 135.

where he marches on Smyrna, slaying its ruler Osbech, before entering the city in triumph.⁹²

Given Umur's widespread appearance in a range of sources during the time of the Crusade of Smyrna, it is both surprising and unfortunate that references to him in papal documents remain minimal. In fact, he seems to feature in just two of the many letters concerning the Crusade. The first occasion was in January 1345, when the pope wrote that *Marbassanus* 'the chief commander of the Turks' had been 'completely defeated and triumphantly put to flight' by the crusaders during the capture of the harbour-fortress of Smyrna. The second was three years later, in August 1348, when the pope expressed his joy at the reports that *Marbasanus*, 'the leader of the Turks', had been killed during an assault on the fortress.⁹³ Unfortunately these two references provide no extra clue as to the papal view of Umur and can be seen as extremely limited in comparison to the rich descriptions found in the Anonimo Romano and the *Epistola Morbasiani*. In a sense, these laconic allusions are characteristic of papal correspondence, which rarely refers to a Turkish lord by name, or in much detail. Having said that, a fleeting reference to a certain 'lord of the Turcomans' known as *Haramanus* was made in papal documents of the early 1320s (probably in reference to the emir of Karaman), and Umur's older brother Hizir (*Chalabus*) is mentioned during the negotiations for a truce at Smyrna after 1348.⁹⁴ However, along with Umur and Masud, these individuals remain the exception.

Rhetoric and Justification for Crusading against the Turks

By the mid-point of the fourteenth century, descriptions of the Turks, although at times still vague, were beginning to become more clearly articulated than in earlier years; specific references had been made to the emirs of Monteshe (Masud and Orkhan) and to those of Aydin (Umur and Hizir), whilst the lords of Germiyan and Karaman had also been alluded to. In addition, the beyliks of Monteshe and Aydin were regularly identified, in

⁹² Giovanni Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, pp. 124–5 (II.7). Boccaccio refers to Osbech as the 'King of the Turks'. He has traditionally been linked to Uzbek, the khan of the Golden Horde, although Kinoshata and Jacobs, who have studied this story in detail, suggest that Osbech is in fact Umur Pasha. However, they do not make the obvious link between Bassano and *Morbassanus*: S. Kinoshita and J. Jacobs, 'Ports of call: Boccaccio's Alatiel in the medieval Mediterranean', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 37.1 (2007), 163–95, at 179–81. A hundred years earlier the term *Turchia* could refer to Cappadocia: Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 117, n. 505.

⁹³ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 1397; Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 1697.

⁹⁴ John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 2, docs 1571–3, 1691; Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 2078.

one way or another, as those responsible for the attacks on Venetian, Hospitaller and Zaccaria territories in Romania.

The Avignon popes granted numerous spiritual and economic privileges in response to the growing menace of the Anatolian beyliks, both in order to encourage participation in military action against them and to legitimize them fully as a target of holy war. These concessions were first issued by Pope John XXII and included grants of indulgences for fighting against the Turks in various locations at different times and 'trade licences', which supposedly facilitated the maintenance of a defence force to be used against the Turks on Chios.⁹⁵ Benedict XII, the successor of John XXII, was altogether far less favourable towards a crusade against the Turks than his predecessor, but he also granted indulgences for fighting against them in 1335, but at no other time.⁹⁶ The final pope to feature in this study, Clement VI – whose pontificate was dominated by the Crusade of Smyrna – was the most proactive of all the Avignon popes in this regard. He issued numerous extensive spiritual and economic privileges, including the full 'Holy Land' crusade indulgence for participation in the Crusade of Smyrna and trade licences to the Venetians and many others.⁹⁷

The motivations of the popes, merchants and crusaders who granted and received these privileges will be the focus of Chapters 5 and 6 of this book, so the composition and makeup of these mechanisms will not be discussed here in detail. Even so, from the brief description of the privileges outlined above, a corollary pattern can be drawn between the evolving image of the Turks in the West and the papal response to it. In basic terms, as the beyliks became regarded as more of a threat, more privileges were granted for resisting them and, as shall be shown later in this book, these privileges became increasingly generous. Also, the earliest grants of indulgences connected to the Turks, issued in 1322, included other non-Latin groups, specifically the Greeks, Alans, Bulgars, Mongols and Mamluks, and not just the Turks. As was noted earlier, the Turks had been mentioned as colluding with the Greeks during the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes and in the grants of indulgences of 1322 a similar pattern can be seen at work; at first the Turks were regarded as one of many threats in Romania by the Church, but within a year they began to feature in indulgence grants as the primary non-Latin 'enemy' – a further reinforcement of the hardening attitudes towards them at the papal curia during the 1320s.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ These are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, pp. 120–3, 132–7.

⁹⁶ ASVat, RA 48, fols 194–194v; RV 119, fols 132v–133, ep. 343–7 (20 Apr 1335); summary in Benedict XII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 1, doc. 2250.

⁹⁷ See, for example, *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 78–80, doc. 22; *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 144.

⁹⁸ This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, pp. 109–11.

However, when addressing the western image of the Turks, the most important feature of these privileges was the distinct 'anti-Turkish' rhetoric which accompanied them, most strikingly expressed in the actual documents granting the privileges and the other letters of the Avignon popes, or in the writings of the crusade theorists. In the main, the popes justified the need to carry out military action against the Turks on the grounds that their piratical raids into the Aegean and Greece were leading to the widespread and evil enslavement of the Christian population of Romania, a factor which, if left unchecked, would lead to the permanent eradication of the Latin colonies in the region. The great Levantine slave trade had traditionally been carried out between the Black Sea regions and Egypt or western Europe, but since the emergence of the beyliks at the end of the thirteenth century a subsidiary trade had been established from the western Anatolian coast to Crete and then to Europe, with the Turks raiding the Aegean islands and selling their captives, who were usually Orthodox Greeks, to the Latins.⁹⁹ Mentions of Turkish piratical acts and of the general 'oppression' of the Christians in the East was a common feature in the correspondence of John XXII and was also a motif he expressed when calling for resistance against the Catalans in Greece, who it was claimed were in the practice of selling Moreote slaves to the Turks.¹⁰⁰ It was, however, Clement VI who utilized enslavement most heavily as a motivation tool for confronting the Turks. This is most vividly expressed in the bull proclaiming the Crusade of Smyrna in 1343, where he wrote that:

For some time past [the Turks] have mobilised the strength of their nation and used a great number of armed vessels to invade by the sea the Christian territories in the region of Romania, and other neighbouring places in the hands of the faithful. Raging atrociously against the Christians and their lands and islands, they have taken to roaming the seas, as they are doing at present, despoiling and depopulating the settlements and islands of the Christians of those parts, setting them ablaze, and what is worse, seizing the Christians themselves as booty and subjecting them to horrible and perpetual

⁹⁹ The Levantine slave trade is discussed in detail by M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, vol. 1, pp. 289–310, vol. 2, pp. 785–833, and with specific reference to the Aegean by Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 160–3. Also see the studies by Epstein, *Purity Lost*, pp. 52–95, 162–6; B. Arbel, 'Slave trade and slave labour in Frankish and Venetian Cyprus (1191–1571)', in Idem, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th–16th Centuries*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2000), IX, 151–90; G. Christ, 'Sliding legalities: Venetian slave trade in Alexandria and the Aegean', in *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Mediterranean Region during the Medieval Period (1000–1500)*, ed. C. Cluse and R. Amitai (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 210–29; Barker, *Egyptian and Italian Merchants in the Black Sea Slave Trade*, esp. pp. 355–409.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, *DOC*, doc. 120; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 2, docs 1571–3, vol. 3, doc. 2410, vol. 4, docs 5247, 5404; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 4, doc. 16672, vol. 13, doc. 63890.

slavery, selling them like animals and forcing them to deny the Catholic faith.¹⁰¹

Condemnation of the Turks for enslaving Christians, especially the Greeks, also emanated from other circles. The Calabrian monk Barlaam, for example, made much of the endemic problem in his calls for a joint Byzantine and Latin campaign against the Turks, and even stated in the late 1330s that the liberation of Greek slaves was an essential prerequisite of church union.¹⁰² A more distant commentator, the Dominican Riccold of Monte Croce, who spent ten years of his life in Baghdad and travelled extensively in western Asia, also noted the selling of many Greek captives by the Turks on his journey through Anatolia in 1288.¹⁰³ Even Francesco Petrarch, who was notoriously hostile towards the Byzantines, deplored the widespread enslavement of the Greeks in a letter to Cardinal Giovanni Colonna written mid-way through the century.¹⁰⁴

The Turks were also condemned for their role in the slave trade by the crusade theorists, who used it to emphasize their barbarity and savageness.¹⁰⁵ An especially moving testimony is given by William of Adam, who recounted seeing bands of over two thousand Greeks, being led 'like flocks of sheep', to be sold in the markets of the East. Among these he regularly saw pregnant mothers clutching their children as they were dragged off to their doom. In his tract William also went to great lengths in attacking those Latin merchants who participated in the trade. In particular he condemned the Genoese, whom he referred to as the *Alexandrini*, because they sailed to and from Alexandria, where they sold slave children as well as prohibited merchandise. The prominent role of the Genoese in the slave trade was also depicted by others, namely Boccaccio in the *Decameron*.¹⁰⁶ In fact the Zaccaria of Chios, whom William mentioned often, were amongst the only traders to attempt to disrupt the evil activities of their countrymen, a factor which helps to explain William's admiration for them.¹⁰⁷ An image of the Turk enslaving helpless Christians was also a common theme adopted by Marino Sanudo when calling upon western rulers to unite in the face of the

¹⁰¹ *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 78–80, doc. 22. Other examples include Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 332–41, 360, 368, 433–4, 591, 1704.

¹⁰² *AE*, vol. 25, pp. 160–1, ch. 22–3.

¹⁰³ Riccold of Monte Croce, *Pèlerinage en Terre Sainte et au Proche Orient: Lettres sur la chute de Saint-Jean d'Acre*, ed. R. Kappler (Paris, 1997), pp. 76–9.

¹⁰⁴ N. Bisaha, 'Petrarch's vision of the Muslim and Byzantine East', *Speculum* 76 (2001), 284–314, at 312.

¹⁰⁵ For example, Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 797 (letter 5); Roddy trans., p. 280 (letter 33). On the theorists and the slave trade, also see Barker, *Egyptian and Italian Merchants in the Black Sea Slave Trade*, pp. 373–95.

¹⁰⁶ Giovanni Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, p. 356 (V.7).

¹⁰⁷ William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 9, 49–51, 79–83.

Turkish advances.¹⁰⁸ In a letter to the king of France of 1332 he even wrote that the Turks had captured 25,000 people from Greek and Latin lands in their piratical raids of the previous year.¹⁰⁹ Clearly, the enslavement of Christians in the East was a very real problem and one which weighed heavily on the consciousness of the crusading powers in the West. Even hatred of the Greeks, as Petrarch and William of Adam demonstrated, could be put aside for the common good of the Christians in Romania.

As news of increasing Turkish raids into the Aegean began to reach Europe in the 1330s and 40s, the justification of protecting the Christians from enslavement by the Turks progressed to one which stressed the need to defend Christian lands, not just in Romania, but also in the Adriatic and kingdoms of western Europe from the advances of the Turks. As in many other instances, Marino Sanudo was one of the main propagators of this theme, warning in 1332 that the Turks would come into the Adriatic Sea 'ravaging the land and sea completely' unless aid was forthcoming.¹¹⁰ Popes John XXII and Benedict XII did not share the same concern as Sanudo voiced at this time, but Clement VI, in a letter of 1345, wrote that the Turks would have advanced as far as Naples if it were not for the victories of the crusaders at Smyrna.¹¹¹ These prophetic warnings of course proved to be true, as was demonstrated in the late 1360s by Petrarch, who wrote with fear that the Turks were 'crossing over from there [Turkey] toward us and true Catholicism'.¹¹²

Running in parallel with this hardening of rhetoric was a gradual shift in the terminology used to identify the different ethnic groups of the Muslim eastern Mediterranean. By the second and third decades of the fourteenth century the term *Turchus* began to feature more heavily in the sources, replacing the ubiquitous *Saracenus*, which had hitherto dominated the diction of Latin writers.¹¹³ On occasion also, the two terms began to be blended together, such as by William of Adam who used the word *Saraceni* to describe the Egyptians and as a modifier for the Turks, such as for the

¹⁰⁸ For example, *DOC*, docs 129, 136, 147; Cerlini, 'Nuovo lettere di Marino Sanudo', 348–5 (letter 22); Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 755–88 (letter 2); Roddy trans., pp. 127–36 (letter 7), 156–60 (letter 15), 173–82 (letter 18), 217–20 (letter 28), 222–70 (letter 30).

¹⁰⁹ Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 791–9 (letter 5); Roddy trans., pp. 272–81 (letter 33).

¹¹⁰ Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 791–9 (letter 5); Roddy trans., pp. 272–81 (letter 33).

¹¹¹ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 1704.

¹¹² Francesco Petrarch, *Letters of Old Age: Rerum Senilium Libri I–XVIII*, ed. and trans. A.S. Bernardo *et al.*, 2 vols (Baltimore, 1992), vol. 1, p. 255 (7:1); Bisaha, 'Petrarch's vision of the Muslim and Byzantine East', 284. For the influence of these attitudes on crusading in the fifteenth century, see Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat*, pp. 22–4.

¹¹³ S.C. Akbari, *Idols in the East: European Representations of Islam and the Orient, 1100–1450* (Ithaca, 2009), p. 285.

Turchi Saraceni, which could mean either the ‘Turkish Saracens’, or the ‘Saracen Turks’.¹¹⁴ The letters of Marino Sanudo also share this characteristic. In them the Turks are clearly distinguished from the Saracens or Agarene peoples, but in a letter of 1330, they are described as ‘the worst Saracens’, an indicator of Sanudo’s conviction that they were the main threat to the Latins of Romania by the 1330s.¹¹⁵ This method of denigrating the Turks by comparing them to other Muslim powers, albeit to less favourable ones, was also widely adopted by the Renaissance humanist writers of the fifteenth century.¹¹⁶ By 1453 this literary and symbolic shift had gone full-circle, and Muslims were commonly considered as ‘Turks’ and not ‘Saracens’ as had been the norm in earlier centuries.¹¹⁷

In some senses, the more refined perception of Muslim groups expressed by fourteenth-century writers, especially of regional, political and ethnic difference, can be seen as one of the earliest examples of a shift from a medieval to an early modern form of Orientalism.¹¹⁸ Indeed, the anti-Turkish rhetoric which was born in the fourteenth century directly influenced those Renaissance humanist writers of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, especially in their portrayal of the Ottomans.¹¹⁹ As Peter Lock has suggested, Marino Sanudo should be regarded as an important early humanist, like his contemporaries Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, even though he is rarely thought of in this way. He did not contribute to the development of the Italian language in the same manner, but his approach to knowledge, verbal presentation and sourcing, including Classical references, should earn him a place amongst the early humanists.¹²⁰ In terms of descriptions of the Islamic East, and of the Turks in particular, many later humanist writers were also undoubtedly influenced by authors such as Sanudo and William of Adam,

¹¹⁴ William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 18, 73.

¹¹⁵ Kunstmann, ‘Studien über Marino Sanudo’, 778 (letter 2); Roddy trans., p. 255 (letter 30); P. Lock, ‘Sanudo, Turks, Greeks, and Latins in the early fourteenth century’, in *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204–1453*, ed. M. Carr and N.G. Chrissis (Farnham, 2014), pp. 135–49, at p. 139. Interestingly, in the ‘Liber Secretorum’ written earlier in the century, the Turks are on one occasion described as Agarenes (‘those wicked Agarenes’): Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, p. 29; Lock trans., p. 59. This blending of Turks and Agarenes was also an occasional feature of other diplomatic correspondence, for example in the Hospitaller document drawing up the provisional naval league in 1332: *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 116.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, pp. 203–37.

¹¹⁷ Orth, ‘Papst Urbans II’, pp. 367–405, esp. pp. 379, 386. See also Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat*, pp. 18–61.

¹¹⁸ See Akbari, *Idols in the East*, pp. 19, 285.

¹¹⁹ The Florentine humanist Benedetto Accolti, for example, used the ‘Liber Secretorum’ of Marino Sanudo in his work, alongside more traditional crusade sources: Orth, ‘Papst Urbans II’, pp. 382–3. See also Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, pp. 149–52; Trivellato, ‘Renaissance Italy and the Muslim Mediterranean in recent historical works’, 140–5.

¹²⁰ Marino Sanudo, *Book of the Secrets*, trans. Lock, p. 5.

especially in the complex distinctions they drew between different Muslim groups of the East. To suggest, for example, that medieval crusade rhetoric focused on a narrow strip of land in the Levant, whilst ignoring the wider Muslim world, would be to underestimate drastically the complex descriptions provided by those writers of the early fourteenth century and the impact they had.¹²¹

Moreover, in the same way that not all humanist writers drew a consistently negative picture of the Turks, neither did their late-medieval forebears. The best example of this can be found in the representation the Turkish lord Umur Pasha (*Morbasiānus*) in the sources discussed earlier, especially the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century variants of the *Epistola Morbasiani* which bridge the gap between medieval and humanist representations of the Turks better than any other. In the letter, Umur became a legendary figure detached from the real individual, in which features of civility and prudence were articulated alongside those traditionally associated with the *inimicus Christi* as was commonly displayed in papal rhetoric. For example, *Morbasiānus* was portrayed as a civilized lord who shared some values belonging to western culture; he was rational, tolerant and well-versed in the Classics – a noble descendant of the Trojans and kinsman of the Italians, for whom he had a 'hidden affection'. He was exacting just revenge for the blood of Hector by subjugating the Greeks and was lawfully attacking the Venetians who had wrongly seized his ancestral lands in Romania. He was also familiar with the Christian religion, complaining that crusaders with 'remission of their sins' had recently arrived in his lands, but had no justification for attacking the Turks as they revered Christ as a prophet and were innocent of shedding his blood. He even reminded the pope that Christians could not forcibly convert Muslims as it was against their faith.¹²² In addition, *Morbasiānus* expressed his hatred of the Jews for crucifying Christ, thus tapping into the prevailing anti-Semitic feelings of the time.¹²³

It is, however, important to stress that the letter was written primarily as a piece of anti-Venetian propaganda. The author was someone who opposed Venice and its participation in the Crusade of Smyrna, most probably a commercial rival of the Republic, such as a Genoese or Florentine. The portrayal of *Morbasiānus* in a positive light, and as an enemy of

¹²¹ This is suggested by Bisaha, 'Petrarch's vision of the Muslim and Byzantine East', 285–6; Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, pp. 14–19.

¹²² Gay, *Le Pape Clément VI*, pp. 172–4; *Lettera a Maometto II*, ed. Toffanin, pp. 181–2; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 231–2.

¹²³ See R. Po-chia Hsia, 'Religion and race: Protestant and Catholic discourses on Jewish conversions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', in *The Origins of Racism in the West*, ed. M. Eliav-Feldon, B. Isaac and J. Ziegler (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 265–75; R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 27–45.

Venice, must therefore be understood principally as a mechanism used by the author to criticize the policies of the Republic overseas. Likewise the anecdote discussed earlier of the Venetian embassy visiting Umur, found in the Anonimo Romano, can also be interpreted as a method to paint the Venetians in a bad light and more importantly, to deplore the infighting between the different Latin factions during the Crusade of Smryna and on the Italian peninsula.¹²⁴ This strategy of using Turkish rulers as a mouthpiece to underline the internal deficiencies within Christendom would become commonplace amongst the Renaissance humanists, for example, by Coluccio Salutati in 1397.¹²⁵ More than anything, the regard shown to Umur in the *Epistola Morbasiani* demonstrates that commercial rivalries and necessity regularly cut through faith-based prejudices in the Mediterranean. This may also partly explain the stance of Boccaccio; he was a writer who came from a merchant family and was highly aware of the necessities of trade, thus his portrayal of Muslims was perhaps more accommodating than most.¹²⁶ As will be shown later on in this book, the conflict between the image of the Turks as propagated by the papacy and the realities of cross-cultural interaction on the ground in the Aegean posed some significant difficulties for the implementation of a crusade in the region, where the commercial and spiritual interests of the emerging merchant crusaders were often difficult to reconcile.

¹²⁴ See above, note 86; Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, pp. 84–5.

¹²⁵ Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, p. 74.

¹²⁶ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, pp. 18–19.