3

The Transportation of English Armies to France 1324–1360

Preparing the Fleet: A Timetable for Invasion

In Chapter 1 the discussion centred on the underlying bureaucratic procedures employed by the clerks, and the varying methods available to the kings of the period, when it came to raising a fleet. It was found that Edward II and Edward III had nine methods that they could exploit to raise a supply or transport armada. But the analysis did not investigate the time-scale involved in these operations. In short, how long did the government take to assemble a feet of ships from the issue of the first requisition order to the arrival of the last vessel at the port of embarkation?[1] This is, in fact, a complicated question to answer for two reasons. First, the size of the intended fleet had obvious implications for the length of time it would take to assemble it. Second, because the transport flotillas were raised in conjunction with the recruitment of the land-based forces, any delay in the latter would affect the former.

By examining four transport fleets between 1324 and 1359 it is possible to offer some broad conclusions on this question. The armadas in question are the St Sardos fleet, the 1338 Low Countries armada, the Crécy fleet and the Reims flotillas of 1359. These transport fleets provide a range of challenges to study. For example, the St Sardos campaign was the only significant expedition launched against France by Edward II, while the 1338 fleet was Edward III's first endeavour to the continent. The 1346 Crécy armada is important because of its size and the 1359 flotilla is the first visible royal transport fleet in the sources that can be assessed after the capture of Calais in 1347.

[1] Most ships began and completed their service within a week of each other. Although there are exceptions to this rule these are very much in the minority. It is difficult to know exactly when the ships would sail within the month or so that they were in service. Obviously, some vessels would arrive at the embarkation port earlier than others. However, if we take the middle part of the service as an indication of when most of the fleet was ready to sail this should provide a date with which to say the fleet-raising process had ceased. Of course the last ship to arrive would mark the point when the fleet was fully assembled.

The St Sardos campaign has a complicated chronology, but essentially it involved three separate expeditions. The first to sail in May 1324 was the earl of Kent's force; this was followed in September 1324 by a larger contingent, while the final fleet sailed from two ports in May and June of 1325 under the command of the earl of Surrey. The earliest orders for the requisitioning of ships were issued on 10 May 1324.[2] Although one of these orders stipulated that the arrested vessels were to be made ready within three days, and therefore could have transported the earl of Kent, that they could be requisitioned, manned, victualled and forwarded to the embarkation port in such a short space of time remains highly unlikely. This shows that on occasions the government had unrealistic expectations. They may have issued such an order however to induce a sense of urgency in the officials that were organising this fleet, or they may have simply been reacting to unfolding events in Gascony. Nevertheless, Kent's flotilla is not visible in the pay records and therefore it cannot be used in this analysis. The armada that set sail in September 1324, however, is fully recorded in the payrolls. As such the initial orders issued on 10 May were probably intended, in the main, for the fleet that was planned to sail in June.[3] The first arrest orders were issued to eighty-eight ports.[4] Over three days in May demands were issued for a specific number of ships from twenty-six of the eighty-eight ports already asked to contribute vessels to the fleet.[5] In all, they were requested to provide sixty ships and send them to Plymouth.[6] This gathering of ships was to coincide

[2] *CCR, 1323–27*, pp. 182–84; *Foedera*, II, i, p. 552.

[3] The June fleet was delayed until September before finally setting out from Plymouth in that month. See R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 83, who details the organisation of the fleets and the delays they suffered.

[4] *CCR, 1323–27*, pp. 182–83, 187–88. There are five separate orders issued over the period of 10, 20, and 26 May. However, when the actual number of individual ports is untangled from these requests there are eighty-eight.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 187.

[6] R. A. Kaner 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 86, slightly differs in his interpretation of these orders. He suggests that a total of thirty-four ships were to be sent to Plymouth. However, there were two sets of orders issued; one on 10 May the other on 20 May (*CCR, 1323–27*, pp. 182–83 records the first two orders that were issued on 10 May, while *CCR, 1323–27*, pp. 186–87 notes the third order issued on 26 May). The first orders contained two quite separate lists of ports and the numbers of vessels they were expected to supply should, therefore, be added together (when this is completed it can be seen that the demand was for sixty-eight ships). The confusion arises when on 26 May a third order was issued for a specified number of ships to be arrested from a list of ports. However, all the ports listed in this last order had actually been recorded in the previous two demands. Four of the ports have their expected shipping contributions increased from one ship to two, while Southampton and Weymouth have their shipping contributions decreased from a total of sixteen vessels to eight. Why this was so is difficult to answer. They could of course already have provided eight ships and were only required to find a further eight. Alternatively, it may be that the projected size of the army meant fewer ships were needed. When these three orders are untangled the actual number of ships that these twenty-six ports were to contribute to the fleet numbered sixty.

with the recruitment of the land-based forces that were to arrive at Plymouth on 8 July.[7] On 16 July efforts were increased to place the gathering fleets under central control when John de Crombwell was appointed admiral.[8] In addition, on 22 and 25 July three of the king's own ships were placed into active service and their masters were given the right to choose mariners.[9] By 4 August a further five royal ships were added to this contingent.[10] A total of sixty ships, therefore, had been requested, but given the fact that the crown issued orders to eighty-eight ports the evidence suggests that the king had greater ambitions than this.

The evidence shows that in 1324 the crown's original plan involved issuing the first arrest order in May. This, it was hoped, would give the clerks sufficient time to assemble a fleet by June. That the government would manage to gather an armada and organise a land army in the space of one month, however, has to be doubted. In fact the fleet did not sail until September 1324, though it is not certain whether this was due to the failure of the clerks in raising a sufficient flotilla or the commissions of array in assembling a land army. The evidence certainly suggests that it was not the fault of the former because Huggate's accounts clearly show that the majority of this fleet (66%) had been at the port of embarkation since the end of July.[11] That more mariners were admitted to the waiting ships throughout July, August and September does not detract from the fact that the fleet had been assembled. Thus, the clerks had taken roughly two months from the issue of the first order to requisition a fleet.

The discussion above has shown that in 1324 Edward II's officials were diligent in assembling a fleet in a short space of time. Were Edward III's officials as successful as Edward II's had been in 1324? Of course Edward III's first transport fleet to the continent in 1338 was much larger than the 1324 flotilla, so one would expect that it took longer to organise. In fact the 1338 armada had actually been planned for the previous year, and by 25 July 1337 a fleet of sixty-one ships had been assembled. On 17 August a further thirty-two vessels, from thirteen south-western, ports were added to the gathering fleet, and on 29 August fifty-seven recently requisitioned ships joined the armada, bringing its total size to 150 vessels.[12] This of course took place during the height of the trading season. However, the eventual break-up of this fleet in late 1337 owed more to Edward's diplomatic wrangling with the Low Countries princes, rather than with his own

7 R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 88.

8 *CPR, 1324–27*, p. 3; *Foedera*, II, i, p. 562.

9 *CPR, 1324–27*, p. 7. These were Richard Fille, master of the *James*, manned by 80 mariners; John Dyve, master of the *Nicholas*; Andrew Rosekyn, master of the *Margrete*.

10 *CPR, 1324–27*, pp. 7, 14. These were the *Godyere*, commanded by Thomas Fauxet and operated by 40 mariners; the *Maudelyne*, commanded by Theobald de Barton with 40 mariners; the *Cog Seinte Piere*, commanded by William Ede and 30 mariners; the *Cog Notre Damme*, commanded by William Lucas; and the *Valence*, commanded by John Petit.

11 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94r–99v.

12 E101/19/39.

administration or the procrastination of shipmasters. The result of the diplomatic problems meant that the requisitioning process was not restarted until February 1338, and recourse to Norwell's Wardrobe accounts shows that by the middle of July Edward's officers had raised a sufficient transport fleet.[13] In short, Edward's administration had taken five months to assemble an armada. It is important to remember, however, that this fleet was over four times the size that of the 1324 flotilla.

How did Edward's government fare in 1346 when it raised the largest fleet of the fourteenth-century? The organisation for the 1346 fleet is complex. This was due in part because the orders, and efforts, to arrest ships seem to have been ongoing operation throughout the later part of 1345, when a transport flotilla had already been assembled and sailed to Flanders.[14] After the murder of Jacques van Artrevelde, Edward's ally in Flanders, the king returned to England and the 1345 campaign ended. But although this expedition had come to nought, the crown immediately set about raising a fleet of ships for another intended attack against France. Even though the orders seem rather late in the year for a second campaign to take place it does, nonetheless, seem that Edward did intend to sail back to either France or Flanders for a military venture. The first orders that were issued for the requisitioning of ships, after the collapse of the 1345 Flanders intervention, came on 28 August, when the earl of Arundel, Robert Ufford, Reginald Donnington and Phillip Whitton were told to arrest all ships of thirty tuns and over, from all the ports in England, and to make them ready at Portsmouth for a week after Michaelmas.[15] Although to contemplate raising a sizeable fleet of ships in such a short space of time would seem ambitious, requisitioning officials were dispatched immediately to ports all over the kingdom. During September the arresting process was intensified and the mariners of five ships were already receiving advances on wages.[16] That further vessels were raised, and their crews issued with advances on their wages is beyond doubt. Henry de Baa, William Redcliffe, John Montgomery and Griffin ap Cadwaldre were all paid expenses for arresting ships during the months of October and November 1345.[17] Moreover, during the same period the earl of Arundel and Adam de Kilum expended a further £940 5s 8d on advances on mariners' wages.[18] This is a significant sum and shows that by November 1345 a fleet of ships must have been arrested and made ready for service, but the onset of winter meant that the second planned

[13] *Norwell*, pp. 363–86.

[14] E101/390/12, fols 2r–3r. This records the payment of wages to mariners and arresting officials in addition to wages made over to the crews of the galleys of Bayonne amounting to £238 1s 6d dated 23 April to 18 July 1345. Therefore, the 1345 fleet had been raised and paid by July 1345.

[15] *Foedera*, III, i, p. 57.

[16] E101/390/12, fol. 3v.

[17] *Ibid*., fols 3v and 4v.

[18] *Ibid*.

campaign of 1345 would have to be postponed. Consequently, the gathered fleet was given permission to break up and return to their home ports.

It was at this moment, after the cancellation of 1345 ventures, that Edward and his council must have been discussing and formulating the plan for the Crécy expedition. It has been convincingly argued, in a recent book, that the Crécy exploit was planned from the outset of the campaign and did not occur as the result of a last minute change of plan because of the direction of the prevailing winds.[19] The king must have had in mind something almost immediately because before the ships that were arrested in 1345 were allowed to return to their home ports the crown had secured an agreement from the shipmasters that they would return in the following year. Indeed, it was only two months later, in January 1346, when requisition officials were again searching England's ports for suitable ships.[20] It seems that Portsmouth was appointed to be the gathering point for all the vessels, and as such Gawain Corder was ordered to send the ships of Kent and Sussex to that port by 16 February.[21] But during February problems began to surface in the arresting process and by the end of the month the ships of London had still not been sent to Portsmouth. Furthermore, a severe storm caused the waiting fleet to scatter, which led Edward once more to postpone his plans and to issue a new departure date for a fortnight after Easter.[22] Yet again, however, an over-optimistic sailing date had been set by the crown for the embarkation of the army, and during April requisitioning officers were still visiting ports. For example, on 6 April Richard de Cotenhale and John Montgomery were searching the ports of the south and west coast for ships, and four days later, Walter Harewell was sent to the northern ports, while Robert de Barton was seconded to Montgomery as an extra member of the southwest team.[23] By this stage Edward and his advisors were getting desperate for sufficient ships, and orders were issued giving permission to the officials to arrest any vessel, even those as little as ten tuns burthen.[24] This order reveals the scale of Edward's up-and-coming campaign. In raising previous transport fleets that had usually involved the transportation of anything up to 5,000 men, Edward had not been required to arrest such small vessels; clearly this expedition was to be of a different magnitude.

By the end of April the requisitioning clerks had already managed to gather two large flotillas of ships at Portsmouth and Sandwich and the officials in charge of this operation, John de Baddeby, Thomas Clerc, Reginald Donnington,

19 A. Ayton and P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, especially Chapter 2 by Dr Ayton on the 'Crécy Campaign'. This follows on from the work of C. J. Rogers in *War cruel and sharp*, Chapter 10.

20 E101/390/12, fol. 5r.

21 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 66.

22 *Foedera*, III, i, pp. 70, 71.

23 E101/390/12, fol. 5v; E403/336, m. 41.

24 C76/21, m. 5d.

John de Watenhul, John Hotton, Henry Raleshale, Griffin ap Cadwaldre and Robert de Holin, had issued advances on wages totalling £2,064 3s 9d for the mariners awaiting at the two ports.[25] During May the fleet was still increasing in size as John Hotton sent the mariners of London to the embarkation points and issued them with £94 4s 9d in wages. Moreover, Peter Reninard, a mariner of Bayonne, was provided with £34 2d for himself and seventy-eight mariners, while Robert Flambard continued the active requisitioning of more ships.[26] The evidence related above shows that by early to mid June 1346 Edward's officials had requisitioned and organised a large fleet of ships, at two ports, for the transportation of his army to Normandy. So far his clerks had issued a total of £2,192 8s 8d in advance wages to mariners.

To conclude, the evidence relating to the preparations for the 1346 campaign shows that the fleet was raised in two stages. The first of these occurred in late 1345. However, the ships that had been collected by December of that year were eventually given permission to return to their home ports, though this was conditional on their returning to the king's service in 1346. The second part of the operation took place in 1346 between the months of January and July. So, although it looks like the crown had raised the largest fleet of ships ever assembled in the fourteenth century in six to seven months the vessels that were requisitioned in 1345, which must have returned to service in 1346, surely saved the crown some two months of extra preparation. Given this fact it is not going too far to suggest that the Crécy transport armada really took over nine months to prepare.

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The three fleets detailed above were organised and raised in a period before the English government had control of a safe port on French soil. This changed in 1347 when Edward III captured the strategically important town of Calais. How, if at all, did the capture of Calais affect the fleet-raising procedure? The transportation of the 1359 force that consisted of the best-equipped army ever assembled by Edward III is the ideal place to evaluate this question. In 1359 some 10,000 mounted men required transportation to Calais, which meant that the demands on the merchant fleet were significant. The first orders for the arrest of ships were issued to Guy Brian, admiral of the west, on 16 December 1358. This writ requested that all available ships of 76 tuns and below should be requisitioned for service.[27] Two days later a similar request was sent to Robert Morley, admiral of the north.[28] In addition to these orders the admirals were sent a list of towns and ports that had been required to build barges for the crossing, and

[25] E101/390/12, fols 6v, 7r; E403/336, mm. 42, 43, 44.

[26] E403/336, mm. 42–44; E101/390/12, fol. 8r.

[27] *Foedera*, III, i, p. 412. This order in itself is interesting because it looks as though the crown did not intend to arrest large vessels for this transport fleet. This is certainly borne out by the evidence on the Exchequer accounts, which lists the tunnages of the arrested ships.

[28] *Ibid.*

they were to report back by the end of January 1359 and to provide the crown with a list of the arrested ships, with their masters, their home ports and the names of the men who had provided security for the appearance of these vessels at the embarkation port.[29] On 5 June these orders were repeated and the ships were to be ready at Sandwich by 8 July.[30] By this stage eleven ships, from ports situated on the east coast, had been allocated to the Black Prince's officers for the supply needs of the assembled forces at Sandwich.[31] On 7 June the king ordered the arrest of mariners to serve on seventeen ships, which were also to be ready for early July.[32] The crown also secured the services of eight further ships from Gravelines, Sluys and Dunkirk, which were procured throughout August.[33]

It is clear, therefore, that the English government was attempting to raise a large transport fleet, which was to be ready at Sandwich by early July. As such the first requisition orders had been issued in December 1358. Thus the timetable involved for raising this armada was similar to that of the 1346 expedition. Yet the 1359 campaign is complicated by the changes implemented by the crown after 1342.[34] This meant that a section of the land-based force organised its own transportation. As such the payrolls only cover five of the six fleets that sailed. These show that the first contingents of the army sailed in August 1359. The first to take passage was several contingents of the royal household followed by a smaller force that sailed aboard twenty-one vessels. After this small flotilla the duke of Lancaster embarked in September and he was followed in October by the earl of March, before the king finally took ship a week or so after March.[35] Therefore, in order to raise a sufficient fleet for the 1359 expedition the crown's officials had taken some eight months.

The discussion above has shown that the length of time required to raise a fleet was conditioned by the size of the land-based army that needed transportation. That the flotilla in 1324 only took some two months was because the army for that campaign was relatively small and mainly consisted of foot soldiers, whereas the fleets of 1338, 1346 and 1359 had to freight armies ranging from 3,000 to 15,000, mainly mounted men. The evidence suggests that any armada

29 R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', pp. 170–71.

30 *Foedera*, III, i, pp. 427–28.

31 R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 174. In addition nine ships where employed by the seneschal of Gascony for his transport needs. These came from Dartmouth (5), Fowey (2) and Plymouth (2). These were crewed by 241 mariners and carried forty men-at-arms and forty archers, see E101/27/19.

32 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 428. These vessels and their masters did serve in the expedition. See *ibid.*, and E101/27/31; E101/27/36; E101/27/37

33 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 444.

34 On 1342, see above pp. 43–46 and below pp. 158–65.

35 Fifteen members of the royal household began receiving pay in August 1359. Sir William Grandson was the first to begin receiving pay on 3 August 1359, although he was not a member the household. The first of the household to be paid wages was Simon Bisset on 16 August 1359, see E101/393/11, fols 81r, 82v, 83v, 84r, 85, 85v.

that was over 400 vessels would take the government at least five months to assemble. Thus, from 1338 onwards to raise a fleet of transport ships would take the administration anywhere between five to nine months. The following section will analyse the size and composition of royal transport fleets between 1324 and 1359 in order to see more clearly the demands that were placed on the English merchant fleet. It is important to stress that although the following analysis appears to provide accurate calculations of the size of the fleets in operation, because of the nature of the sources these should be taken as impressions or estimations as to the magnitude of the armadas in question for three reasons. First, every fleet that sailed in this period contained many ships that, for a variety of reasons, served for no pay and are thus 'invisible' in the payrolls. Second, the clerks who compiled the accounts could, and did, adopt ingenious procedures that were designed to simplify those records, but which make the accuracy of such documents questionable.[36] Third, there are expeditions, such as those of 1340 and 1346, in which the surviving source material is fragmentary. Consequently, it is only possible to provide approximations as to the possible size of the fleets. Nevertheless, the impressions that such an analysis creates are extremely valuable in highlighting the involvement of the English merchant fleet in the wars conducted during this period.

Two Transport Fleets of Edward II's Reign, 1324–1325

The outbreak of the war of St Sardos in 1324 came at an unfortunate time for Edward II. Two years earlier he had crushed the rebellion of the earl of Lancaster but since that time his rule in England had rested on a foundation of fear rather than deference. The architects of this policy were Edward's closest advisors, the two Despensers and Walter Stapeldon.[37] The problem posed by St Sardos was how to allow Edward personally to campaign in France while his advisors remained in England? If they stayed behind their political opponents were sure to make an attempt on their lives, but if they went France they also expected to face the full wrath of the French king who had a particular dislike of

[36] On problems relating to the sources and the ingenious accounting procedures sometimes adopted by the clerks, see A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, Chapter 5; A. Ayton and P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, p. 177; D. Grummitt, *The Calais garrison: war and military service in England, 1436–1558* (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 44–49.

[37] There are several studies that provide a detailed account of Edward's reign, how the Despensers influenced him and the effect the War of St Sardos had on the political framework. The best are: T. F. Tout, *The place of the reign of Edward II in English history* (Manchester, 1914): Chapter 4 and 6 deal with the Despensers and the problems of Gascony; N. Fryde, *The tyranny and fall of Edward II, 1321–1326*; M. Vale, *The Angevin legacy*, pp. 227–44; M. Buck, *Politics, finance and the church in the reign of Edward II: Walter Stapeldon treasurer of England* (Cambridge, 1983) Chapters 7, 9 and 10; R. M. Haines, *King Edward II: Edward of Caernarfon, his life, his reign, and its aftermath, 1284–1330* (London, 2003).

them because of their treatment of his sister, Edward's wife. Thus a compromise was reached. Edward would send his half brother, the earl of Kent, and while he campaigned in Gascony, Edward would direct the campaign from afar. Bearing in mind Edward's disastrous war leadership, at first sight, this method of directing the conflict seems to have offered some advantages. Unfortunately, the earl of Kent was no more a general than his half-brother.

The chronology of the campaign has been outlined above and it essentially involved three separate expeditions.[38] Two of these sailed in 1324 while the third sailed in 1325, under the command of the earl of Surrey. The aim of this discussion is to analyse these fleets in order to understand their size, structure, and how many men and horses they were required to transport. There are problems in attempting this, however, and the major stumbling block to a detailed analysis concerns the payroll evidence relating to the transport fleet of the earl of Kent. As Kent set sail in May 1324 any Exchequer account relating to his flotilla would be dated to the seventeenth year of Edward II's reign. Yet no such payroll exists. We must conclude, therefore, that the transport fleet consisted of ships serving for no pay or that the payroll for this expedition has since been lost. Nevertheless, Kent's force was rather small, consisting of only a few hundred men and the transport needs for such a force would probably not have exceeded twenty ships.

Fortunately, the armada that set sail in September 1324 is fully recorded in the payrolls. Over three days in May demands were issued for a specific number of ships from twenty-six of the eighty-eight ports already asked to contribute vessels to the fleet. In all, they were requested to provide sixty ships and send them to Plymouth. The gathering of these vessels was to coincide with the recruitment of the expeditionary forces. Therefore, a total of sixty ships had been requested. But can we arrive at a more accurate estimate of the final numbers of ships that eventually appeared at Plymouth to transport the army?

There are several extant Exchequer accounts relating to the wages of mariners who served in the St Sardos expedition; however, the majority of these payrolls cover the fleets that transported the earl of Surrey in 1325. The set of accounts drawn up by Nicholas Huggate reveal the transport fleet that freighted the September 1324 army.[39] In all Huggate paid wages to 81 ships' crews, which were contributed by forty-one ports. In addition a further 25 ships freighted supplies along with the army.[40] These eighty-one ships served from May to November, but with staggered start dates suggesting that the transportation of troops was achieved using several small fleets. The numbers of mariners who manned these ships was 1,182, including masters and constables (this rises to 1,372 if we include

[38] See pp. 00–00 above.

[39] BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94r–99v.

[40] These vessels were supplied by twenty-two ports, of which sixteen (72.7%) were located in the south and west and five (22.7%) north of the Thames, while a Spanish port contributed one ship, the *Seintemary*, commanded by Fernando de Fain. The largest single supplier of ships was Dartmouth, which provided seven vessels (15.9%) manned by 190 mariners (15.9%).

the mariners aboard the eight king's ships). This suggests that the majority of the ships were ready and waiting for the retinues whose recruitment had begun in June. In addition to the eighty-one ships paid by Huggate, a further three ships from London also joined the fleet, as did two extra vessels contributed by the port of Blackeneye, which were provided at that port's own cost.[41] Finally, seven ships of the king further bolstered the armada.[42] This brought the overall size of the September transport fleet to ninety-three individual ships.

One important question that remains to be considered is what was the size of the land-based army these vessels had to transport, and how many horses would these troops have brought with them? The St Sardos *vadia guerre* is a difficult source, with many of the recorded retinues being small in size, while large numbers of foot soldiers served throughout the whole campaign.[43] Nevertheless, by utilising these pay accounts, it is possible to suggest that eight bannerets, eighty-six knights, 369 esquires and 216 men-at-arms sailed on the September fleet. Accompanying these mounted troops were 1,700-foot soldiers. This would have meant that, on average, each ship would have had to carry twenty-five individuals. Of course, this was not how the fleet was arranged, because some ships were specifically equipped to freight the army's horses.[44] But this average of men per ship seems reasonable for the vessels of the period. The mounted contingents are likely to have brought with them roughly 1,500 horses. We know that 706 of these were valued before the steward of the household prior to the campaign but only the most expensive horses brought would be valued in such a way.[45] Taking as our guide this estimate of 1,500 horses, each ship would have to carry on average sixteen horses. This is indeed entirely plausible. For example, we can calculate the tunnage of forty-eight out the ninety-three ships that transported the English contingents to Bordeaux in 1324. The total tunnage of these forty-eight vessels was 5,960 tuns, giving an average of 124 tuns per ship. If we were to assume that for every two-tuns of ship one horse would be transported it is not inconceivable that up to 1,000 horses could have been transported to Bordeaux in 1324.[46]

In conclusion, it seems that the fleet that set sail from Plymouth between May and September 1324 numbered ninety-three ships.[47] The fact that the initial

41 *CCR, 1323–27*, pp. 214, 225.

42 *CPR, 1324–27*, pp. 7, 14.

43 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 30r–53r; the foot soldiers are recorded on fols 75r–93v.

44 *Ibid*., fols 8r, 8v.

45 E101/16/9, mm. 1, 2, 1d, 2d; E101/16/38, mm. 1, 1d, 2; E101/17/2, mm. 1, 1d, 2, 3, 3d, 4. i.e., one per man-at-arms providing that they were valued at 100s or more.

46 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94r–98r.

47 The majority of the ships came from ports south and west of the Thames, which contributed fifty vessels (53%) and 1,239 mariners (59%), this includes the 190 mariners noted as serving on the king's ships.

orders specifically requested the ports to contribute sixty ships, and that a total of ninety-three eventually appeared (albeit seven of them being the king's) shows that the raising of a fleet could be a precise operation. It will be remembered at this point that in Chapter 1 it was noted that before the requisition process was initiated crown officials would visit local port communities and meet with port men and shipowners in order to discover how many vessels that port or community could provide. What the discussion on the St Sardos fleet-raising procedure shows is that these consultations provided the crown with accurate data that was used to prepare the arrest orders.

The Earl of Surrey's Transport Fleet, 1325

John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, was dispatched to Gascony on 22 May 1325.[48] Yet his departure followed months of delays. The original plan for his deployment had been 17 March, and commissions had been working toward this goal since the previous October. In the end, the transport ships sailed in two separate fleets from Portsmouth and Harwich.[49] The flotilla that freighted the earl of Surrey's forces was the largest of the three armadas to depart for Bordeaux between May 1324 and June 1325. The payrolls relating to the maritime service for this particular fleet are spread throughout four separate manuscripts.[50] Of these, only two contain the records for the ships involved in the actual transportation of Surrey's troops and horses, as the other accounts relate to a fleet of supply ships bound for Gascony later in the year.[51]

These individual sources reveal the structure and size of each of the flotillas that operated during the 1325 phase of the war. The most informative payroll for the earl of Surrey's ships is the account of Walter de Otterhampton.[52] He records the wages paid to eighty-four individual ships contributed by 26 ports.[53] The numbers of masters, constables and mariners who served on this fleet was 2,148.[54] The majority of these ships, sixty-one (72%), began their paid service

48 This is when the ship that transported him, the *Cog de Touz Seintz*, commanded by Roger atte Hurne of Southampton, began its paid service. See BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 98r.

49 C61/36, m. 21; R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 97.

50 E101/16/35; E101/16/40; E101/17/3; BL, Add MS 7967, fols 98r–99v.

51 E101/17/3; BL, Add MS 7967. These list the transport ships.

52 E101/17/3, mm. 1b, 2, 6b, 7, 9.

53 Of these ports twenty-three (88.4%) are located in the south and west while three (11.5%) are situated north of the Thames on the east coast. Those ports in the south and west supplied eighty-eight vessels (97%), while the ports on the east coast contributed two (3%).

54 1,843 (96.5%) of these men operated ships from the south and western ports, and sixty-four mariners (3.5%) manned the east coast vessels. The largest supplier of ships was the port of Teignmouth, which provided nine vessels (11.2%) operated by 154 mariners (8.4%). But the port that supplied the greatest number of seamen was Dartmouth, which contributed eight ships manned by 218 mariners (11.8%). This number includes the seventy-five mariners that

in March and served through until May, while twenty-three (27%) served from April to May. The cost of these eighty ships to the crown was £1,213 14s 6d, while an added expense of £38 2s 3d was paid to the sheriff of Southampton for fitting out sixteen ships for '*equus ad arma*'.

The accounts of Nicholas de Huggate for this campaign also contain relevant entries on ships that served in the Warenne transport fleet. Six vessels are recorded in Huggate's accounts with dates of service that accord with the second flotilla that set sail from Harwich. This conclusion is drawn by noting that six ships started their service in May and completed it by June.[55] This second transport flotilla, relating to the earl of Surrey's army was therefore not as large as the initial armada, which had set sail in May.[56]

In addition to these payrolls relating to the transport fleets of 1325 there are also related accounts that show seventy-three ships accompanied the earl carrying supplies.[57] One of these is an account compiled by John Sturmy. This lists the names of fifty-four ships from twenty-five ports. Unfortunately, the document does not record the crew sizes of these ships; but it is interesting in the sense that it is linked to two further Exchequer accounts.[58] In the early months of 1325 Richard de la Pole entered into several indentures with local sheriffs and castle custodians in order to raise provisions and arms for Warenne's forces. One of these indentures was sealed between de la Pole and Henry de Fauconberge, sheriff of Nottingham. Fauconberge agreed to supply springalds and quarrels for the campaign.[59] This he must have achieved for in the Sturmy account he is recorded as freighting the *Margrete* of Ravenser, commanded by John Hardroneray, from the port of Hull. In all de la Pole and his suppliers sent thirteen ships to Gascony, and of these, three appear in the expenses of John Sturmy. Furthermore, ten ships from Sturmy's account are also enrolled in Huggate's records.[60] These are provided with dates of service, and apart from one vessel, all of these ten ships began their service in June, placing them in the second of the Warenne transport fleets. Finally, any discussion of maritime activity during the war of St

served on board three ships recorded in Huggate's accounts, which should be included in this fleet.

55 BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 98r.

56 The twenty-nine ships that formed this second fleet were supplied by eighteen ports. Only four (22.2%) of these vessels were from ports situated south and west of the Thames while the rest were located on the east coast. 731 masters, constables and mariners operated this flotilla. The largest suppliers of ships were the ports of Brightlingsea and Ipswich, which both contributed five vessels each and 220 seamen. But the five ships from Ipswich provided 160 of these men, suggesting that that their vessels were somewhat larger than those of Brightlingsea.

57 E101/16/40, rolls 1–4. This source records the expenses of John Sturmy, admiral of the northern fleet.

58 E101/16/34; BL, Add MS 7967.

59 E101/16/34, no. 7.

60 E101/16/40; BL, Add MS 7967, fols 98r–98v.

Sardos must take into account the service of the Cinque Ports. In mid-July 1325 they sent a fleet of twenty-one ships out to sea for 28 days. This fleet was not involved in transportation duties and its purpose was to protect the southern coastline from predatory French ships.[61]

The discussion above reveals, therefore, that in the spring and summer of 1325 there were 163 ships involved in the transportation of troops to Gascony. But how many men and horses were transported in Warenne's army and was this number of ships sufficient for the task? It has been calculated that the whole force of 1325 would have been 5,357 strong. Of these, 4,750 were foot soldiers and 607 were knights, esquires and men-at-arms.[62] It is likely that these soldiers brought with them roughly 1,500 horses including baggage and pack animals. This would result in each ship in the fleet having to freight, on average, thirty-three men and thirteen horses.

In conclusion, this section has shown that 163 ships were involved in the transportation of soldiers to Gascony. If we include the supply ships and the twenty-one vessels provided by the Cinque Ports, then from May 1324 to August 1325 some 301 ships operated throughout the whole campaign. On board these vessels there were probably 6,000 mariners.[63] The 183 ships specifically involved in troop transportation had to freight 1,300 mounted men and 6,400 foot soldiers and possibly as many as 3,000 horses, including baggage and pack animals. On average this would mean that each vessel would have had to carry forty-five men and eighteen horses in addition to supplies of food and arms. Again, based on the Exchequer evidence of the capacity for ships from this period, this is entirely plausible. The cost of the maritime arm of the campaign to Edward's treasury was £2,969 4s 4d. In all, the organisation of the campaign appears to have performed reasonably well. Of course there were delays, but this dogged almost every campaign of the period, and the majority of the ships were requisitioned in time and in sufficient numbers for the troops to be able to board once they had been mustered. In addition, a fleet of ships was also raised to perform a coastal protection service during a delicate time in the negotiation of the peace treaty at the end of the campaign. In essence, the organisational capabilities of the English government in requisitioning transport fleets allowed Edward II to attempt an offensive campaign in continental Europe to safeguard his possessions. This experience, of raising a large transportation and supply fleet, would be utilised and developed further by Edward III, whose continental ambitions

[61] E101/17/10, mm. 1–3. On board these vessels were 1,006 masters, constables and mariners. Only three of the Cinque Ports supplied vessels for this fleet: Winchelsea, Sandwich and Rye. Winchelsea contributed the largest number of ships (fourteen vessels manned by 672 seamen).

[62] The troop numbers are discussed in detail by R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', pp. 98–99.

[63] This is an estimate because forty-four ships are provided with no exact crew numbers.

required armadas that could transport tens of thousands of men and animals, and giving the king unprecedented access to the continent. It is to these armadas that this study now turns.

Five Transport Fleets for Edward III's Armies, 1338–1359

The previous section examined the only army transport fleets that sailed to France during the reign of Edward II. Although when compared to his son's continental armadas this number of transport fleets seems paltry it should be kept in mind that Edward II had raised flotillas of considerable size throughout his Scottish expeditions. Indeed, as we have already seen, it is unlikely that Edward III ever matched the 1322 fleet his father sent to Scotland. This being said, the experience gained by the administrative staff through a sustained fleet-raising programme between 1322 and 1337 provided a useful foundation for Edward III's officials thereafter. Through a detailed investigation of each of the five transport fleets raised between 1338 and 1359, it will be shown just how large were the maritime dimensions of Edward III's continental expeditions.

In 1337 Edward III officially declared war against Philip of Valois, and although he raised a fleet of some 150 ships during the summer of that year the English king was unable to launch his expedition.[64] The reason for this delay lay more with Edward's complicated diplomatic talks with the Low Countries princes, rather than a failure in English logistical organisation. That the embassies were delayed during 1337 was no surprise because much rested on Edward III's first continental ventures between 1338 and 1340. He had painstakingly built a large coalition of allies at the enormous cost of £382,000.[65] Although Edward ultimately failed during these years to realise his goal of bringing the French king to battle, the experience gained by Edward's administration, in mobilising and organising two transport fleets, placed his bureaucratic staff in the ideal position to raise even larger armadas during the 1340s and 1350s. Nevertheless, as the foregoing discussion on the logistics of the war of St Sardos has shown, Edward had the framework of a system in place with which to construct a transport fleet that could be further developed to achieve better results. Considering this latter point, the question is just how successful was Edward III in 1338 in raising a transport fleet?

There are several payrolls that are of relevance to the 1338 armada, which provide us with the evidence to quantify the maritime contribution to that campaign.[66] These individual accounts are of great value because close inspection

[64] E101/19/39.

[65] B. Lyon, 'Infrastructure and purpose', p. 66.

[66] E101//20/27; E101/20/39; E101/21/7; E101/21/8; E101/21/9; E101/21/10; E101/21/12; E101/22/38; *Norwell*.

of these particulars, and their comparison with the *vadia nautarum* section in the Wardrobe book of William Norwell, shows that, in some cases, many vessels were recorded in the particulars that never made it into Norwell's final accounts. For example, in 1338 John de Watenhul compiled a document for the admiral of the southern fleet that records the details of 130 ships.[67] Yet when this payroll is compared with the *vadia nautarum* we find that thirty-two ships listed on the Watenhul document are not recorded in *Norwell*. On the other hand, 165 vessels in the Wardrobe book are not provided with exact dates of service, but their start and completion dates can be discovered by using the Exchequer accounts, which do provide exact dates for the majority of the 165 ships. A similar payroll was also compiled by the admiral of the northern fleet for the vessels requisitioned under his orders.[68] 124 individual ships arrested from nineteen ports and manned by 4,290 masters, constables and mariners are recorded on this account. Yet comparison with the Wardrobe book shows that one vessel that was recorded on this latter document is absent from Norwell's final accounts. A second payroll, which notes the wages paid to 122 ships' crews, also has two vessels that are absent from the Wardrobe book.[69] Finally, a further ship that participated in the transport fleet of July 1338 can be found by examining a set of 165 indentures agreed between Nicholas Pyk and various shipmasters. This ship, called the *Cog Touz Seintz*, is absent from the Wardrobe book, the reason for this probably being that this ship's crew had their wages paid in the form of victuals and not money.[70]

In addition to the vessels mentioned above that are not included in the *vadia nautarum*, we need to take account of those crews who forfeited their wages because of a series of piratical attacks that took place between August 1338 and early 1339.[71] Problematically of the three sources that provide evidence for these attacks only the order demanding an investigation into the involvement of East Anglian ships (dated to March 1340) provides a definitive list of the vessels involved.[72] As no English fleet was at sea between April 1339 and June 1340 it is clear that the order dated to March 1340 records an incident of piracy that occurred earlier than April 1339. Complications arise in determining which fleet these vessels sailed in because between July 1338 and March 1340 four English

67 E101/21/7.

68 E101/21/12.

69 E101/21/10.

70 E101/20/39, no. 30.

71 *CPR, 1338–40*, pp. 491–92 lists sixty-four east Anglian vessels involved in one act. *CPR, 1338–40*, p. 143 records an incident that occurred in August 1338. E101/21/11 seems to cover an incident of piracy committed by members of the Cinque Ports. I am grateful to Mr Stephen Pegg for highlighting the third of these. The record of the August incident does not include the names of the ships involved.

72 E101/21/11 does list the ships involved but the document is difficult to read with any accuracy.

flotillas operated in the Channel. The first fleet to sail was the transport armada in July 1338. This was followed in December 1338 by a second flotilla of twenty-six ships freighting wool to Flanders.[73] In the winter of 1338–39 a small fleet from the Cinque Ports sailed to and burnt Boulogne, while in the months of March and April 1339 Robert Morley was at sea with a fleet of warships.[74] Unfortunately, only two payrolls survive and they record the ships that were involved in the 1338 transport fleet and the wool flotilla. By examining both the names of the ships and the masters recorded in the order dated to 1340 and comparing these with the two surviving payrolls it appears that some of the shipmasters involved in piracy sailed in both the transport fleet and the wool flotilla, while other shipmasters cannot be placed in either the 1338 transport fleet or wool flotilla.

This suggests that there were at least two incidents of piracy committed between August 1338 and January 1339.[75] We know that one of these occurred in August 1338.[76] Further, the inclusion in the 1340 order of ships and masters that only sailed in the wool flotilla argues that some vessels from this fleet committed a second act of piracy in the winter of 1338–39. A possible third incident involving Cinque Port ships seems to have been committed by the fleet that burnt Boulogne in the winter of 1338–39.[77] That the fleet under Morley's command committed any attacks against allied shipping can be discounted, as the only recorded action that involved this fleet concerns an attack on a flotilla of Genoese vessels.

This leaves us with the suggestion that the sixty-four ships listed in the 1340 order were involved in one of the two attacks that occurred between August and December 1338. It is also worthy of note that thirteen ships listed in the 1340 source are only recorded with the names of their owners. This means that these vessels cannot be compared with the two surviving payrolls. When the fifty-one ships in the 1340 order that are recorded with their masters are compared to the payrolls it can be seen that twelve masters who served in the July 1338 transport armada did take part in one of the attacks, but they did so commanding different ships to the ones they manned in the transport fleet. For them to be part of August 1338 attack they would have had to change ships in Flanders, after they had disembarked the army. This seems unlikely and we can therefore be

73 E101/21/13, m. 3, records the wool fleet and was composed entirely of East Anglian vessels.

74 For the Cinque Port fleet, see *Murimuth*, p. 103 and for the Morley flotilla, see N. A. M. Rodger, *Safeguard of the Sea*, p. 97. It is likely that the £452 20d spent by John Crabbe and Thomas Drayton on mariners wages included payments that were issued to the mariners serving in Morley's fleet. The payments were issued in April and June 1339, see E101/21/31; E101/22/8.

75 There is confusion in the *Patent Roll* order itself. For example, the master William Rodyng is repeated twice as commander of two different ships. This provides evidence that he must have taken part in two acts of piracy as commander of two different vessels. He is recorded as master of the *Cog John* and the *Evangelist*.

76 *CPR, 1338–40*, p. 143.

77 E101/21/11.

certain that these twelve ships were not part of the transport fleet. Five vessels named in the 1340 order sailed in just the wool fleet, while thirteen ships and shipmasters that sailed in the 1338 transport fleet were involved in one of the two piracy incidents between August 1338 and the winter of 1338/39, but were still recorded in the Wardrobe book. The leaves us with twenty-one ships and masters that participated in one of the acts of piracy, but which are 'missing' from the two surviving payrolls. It is suggested here that these twenty-one ships were part of the 1338 transport fleet but where struck off the final payrolls as punishment for this act. This is argued because it is unlikely that flotilla freighting the wool would have been any larger than the twenty-six visible ships recorded in the payroll. Moreover, subtracting, or taking away, pay from ships' crews that were involved in misdemeanours was a punishment that was enacted in 1342 and on this occasion such measures were organised through the Wardrobe. Consequently, the twenty-one ships that are missing from the payrolls should be added to the 1338 transport fleet.[78] The absence of twenty-one vessels, and not all the sixty-four, can be explained by the method of punishment imposed on the owners and master of the vessels involved. In order to be forgiven for this act of plunder, these ships' crews had to re-pay the owners of the attacked vessel £16,527 17s 1d as compensation for their losses. It seems likely that the ships struck out of the final payroll failed to honour this agreement.[79]

Turning now to the overall numbers of vessels and mariners listed by Norwell as receiving pay for their involvement in the transportation of Edward's army, in a recent article Bryce Lyon suggested that 370 vessels were requisitioned for the purpose of transports.[80] Manning this fleet were 12,263 masters, mariners and other maritime personnel. Closer inspection of the *vadia nautarum* reveals the names of 340 individual ships in the transport fleet. Of these 340 ships 165 have been recorded with only the number of days they served and not exact dates of service, but, as was pointed out previously, these details can be gleaned from the surviving Exchequer particulars.[81] All these ships were in active service

[78] Of course it could be argued that these ships should be subtracted from the transport fleet, this would make the fleet smaller than the one recorded in the tables. However, it is important to bear in mind that the figures provided in this book are given as impressions of the fleet sizes and are not an accurate rendering of their true size

[79] It is also important to note that in 1342 only eighty-eight ships out of 230 forfeited all of their pay. As such different punishments were meted out to different shipmasters. The twelve ships and masters that still appear in the Wardrobe Book, but participated in the piracy incident, must have made some compensation payments. Although it would not be unreasonable to argue that the government punished individual shipmasters and shipowners in various ways with the result that some received pay, while others did not. This is exactly what occurred during the 1342 expedition.

[80] B. Lyon, 'Infrastructure and purpose', p. 67. It has to be noted that in his introduction to Norwell's Wardrobe book Lyon gives a different number: 361 ships. See *Norwell*, p. ciii.

[81] E101/21/7; E101/21/10; E101/21/21.

throughout June until early August 1338.[82] In addition to the ships that participated in the transport fleet, Norwell's account includes nineteen further vessels that are recorded under the heading of individual magnates' names and other prominent personalities involved in the Low Countries expeditions, such as William de la Pole.[83] Six of these ships were involved in the transportation of William Montagu and William de Bohun. Montagu owned four of these six ships and these presumably transported him along with his retinue to Flanders. This assumption is based on the names of the vessels, three of which incorporate Montagu's name.[84] A total of 420 masters, constables and mariners manned these six ships. The remainder of the thirteen vessels in this section of the Wardrobe book were involved in various aspects of the campaign. For example, the two ships owned by de la Pole were utilised for the freighting of the king's wool to Brabant, while the barge, the *Spinnace*, and a ship simply described as the *magna nave* under the command of Robert Camerario, were employed during the spring of 1340 to guard the sea.[85]

Considering the evidence detailed above, if we include the fifty-seven ships absent from Norwell's final accounts and the vessels enrolled under the magnate's names, the number of vessels involved in the transportation of the king's army in 1338 rises to 403 ships.[86] Manning these vessels were 13,346 masters, constables, mariners, carpenters, clerks and pages.[87] But how many men and horses did these 403 ships have to transport to the Low Countries in 1338? It has been calculated that the contingents of men taken by Edward III to Antwerp in 1338 numbered 1,400 men-at-arms, 2,500 archers and an indeterminate number of Welsh infantry.[88] These land-based contingents probably brought over with

[82] See *Norwell*, p. ciii, for an investigation on the numbers of ships that served at particular periods.

[83] *Norwell*, p. 384.

[84] For example, one of the ships was called the *Cristofre Mountagu*, while another was named the *Magdaleyne Mountagu*. The two vessels recorded under the name of the earl of Northampton were both from the port of Ipswich, but their dates of service run for four months after the king had sailed, see *Norwell*, p. 384.

[85] *Norwell*, p. 385.

[86] It could be argued that the twenty-one ships that were struck out of the Wardrobe book did not take part in the 1338 transport fleet, with the result that the fleet would have numbered some 382 vessels.

[87] The ports situated south and west of the Thames supplied 204 (50.8%) ships operated by 7,105 (53.2%) maritime personnel. While the ports located north and east of the Thames contributed 199 (49.2%) vessels manned by 6,241 (46.7%) seamen. Yet by far the largest single supplier of ships was the port of Great Yarmouth, which provided sixty-one vessels (15.2%) operated by 2,574 (19.2%) sailors. Indeed, this port contributed more vessels to the fleet than were recorded through the Exchequer because several ships were struck out of the final payroll as punishment for their involvement in the act of piracy discussed earlier.

[88] A. Ayton, 'The English aristocracy', p. 179. Dr Ayton points out the difficulty of drawing firm conclusions about the service of the Welsh foot during the campaigns of 1339.

them anywhere up to 10,000 horses, including those specifically required for baggage and haulage.[89] Therefore, each of the 403 vessels of the transport fleet of 1338 would have had to freight, on average, twelve men (this includes a rough estimate of 1,000 Welsh foot) and twenty-five horses. This is an entirely reasonable estimate that the ships of the period, especially when gathered in such large numbers, could have achieved.

In conclusion, in 1338 the first transport fleet of the Hundred Years War, numbered 403 ships, manned by 13,346 maritime personnel. The ports south and west of the Thames provided the majority of the ships and the manpower for the armada. The dates of service of these vessels also show that this fleet sailed as one large convoy to Antwerp so as to discourage any French aggression. These 403 ships transported roughly 5,000 land-based personnel. In all, despite the vagaries of the communication network, the operation was most efficiently managed.

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After Edward disembarked at Antwerp in July 1338 he began a frustrating stay in the Low Countries in which he had to cajole his allies into beginning the campaign. It was not until the following year that Edward's large coalition moved into the field. Thus began a march of destruction that although intended to draw a hesitant Philip VI into battle actually ended in an indecisive standoff. Nevertheless, on 24 June 1340 Edward did get the battle he craved, but not on land directly facing his enemy Philip VI, but at sea in the harbour of Sluys. The fleet that Edward took charge of, and which subsequently sailed to Sluys on 22 June, was the second of the Low Countries transport armadas. Unfortunately, owing to the absence of a complete set of payrolls for the naval contingent, the size of the fleet that Edward entered the battle with on the afternoon of 24 June has caused problems for historians. Indeed, the 1340 fleet is puzzling in terms of not only how it was raised and paid for, but also why there is a gap in the payroll evidence. The fact that an estimated 150 ships are absent from the relevant payroll is an intriguing mystery. This being said it is possible to explain why there is an absence in the pay records and by doing so can we provide some clues the eventual size of the fleet that engaged the French armada.

There are several possible explanations that can be postulated as to why we are lacking a full set of pay details of this fleet. Perhaps the most likely of these relates to the way in which the mariners were eventually paid for this campaign. In 1340 Edward had struggled to requisition a fleet of sufficient size and it is

[89] The amount of victuals transported over with the army in the Low Countries campaigns amounted to roughly 4,000 quarters of grain and various quantities of meat. If we suggest that it would take four horses to freight one cart loaded with four quarters of wheat, then it would have required some 1,000 horses for the baggage train. The principle seems to have been one horse per quarter, see J. Masschaele, 'Transport costs', p. 269.

possible that ad hoc arrangements and guarantees were made to shipowners with regard to the payments that would be made to the crews of the participating vessels.[90] We also know that the king claimed to have captured 190 ships from the French fleet during the engagement at Sluys.[91] The prize money from such a large number of captured vessels would certainly have been a considerable sum. This could have been used in various ways. For example, the ships' crews could have taken their share of the booty and this could have been given in lieu of their wages or, indeed, could have replaced their wages altogether, thus removing the need to include these ships in the usual payrolls. The mariners of a ship that had captured a prize at sea were entitled to one-quarter share of the booty. The king could claim one quarter and the owners of the vessel another quarter. The admiral of the fleet had the right to a proportion of the booty, usually amounting to two captors' shares if he participated in the engagement and one if he did not.[92] This being so the whole system of dividing prizes taken during maritime engagements was still very much in flux during this period. For example, in 1319 Edward II allowed the east coast vessels serving in his fleet to retain all the booty they captured from Scottish shipping. Similarly, in 1336 the king again granted to his sailors all that they could capture at sea. This trend continued and in the fifteenth century it was usually the practice to allow private ships to keep the gains made through attacking enemy vessels.[93] Of course, the mariners should still have received their wages, as the right to prize was an additional bonus. Yet the king had prerogatives he could enforce in order to gain more than the quarter he would normally take.[94] Further, it should be recalled that during this campaign Edward was desperately short of funds and he may well have used the captured ships as a means of meeting some of his debts.[95] It is likely that Edward would have sold these captured ships to his allies, the Flemings, and set the money he gained through doing so against his mounting debts. That

[90] J. S. Kepler, 'The effects of Sluys on naval impressment', pp. 73–74.

[91] N. H. Nicolas, *History of the royal navy*, II, p. 61, which prints a letter written by Edward to his son after the battle in which the king claims to have captured 190 ships; M. Prestwich, *Armies and warfare*, p. 278.

[92] T. J. Runyan, 'The English navy in the reign of Edward III', p. 161; *Black book of the admiralty*, ed. Sir T. Twiss (London, 1871), I, 20–21, articles 18 and 19.

[93] See R. G. Marsden, 'Early prize jurisdiction and prize law in England', *EHR* 25 (1909), pp. 675–97, pp. 675–76.

[94] B. E. R. Formoy, 'A maritime indenture of 1212', *EHR* 41 (1926), pp. 556–59. But, see also N. H. Nicolas, *History of the royal navy*, I, p. 140, who sates that, 'ships and goods captured from the enemy became part of the property of the king; but prize money seems to have been as ancient as the English navy itself, though the amount depended entirely on the sovereign's bounty'.

[95] It was not unknown for the king to award captured ships to persons who paid money directly to him. This was usually described as the king giving favour to a particular individual. However, it is more likely that these payments were in fact bribes of a sort. See R. G. Marsden, *Law and custom of the sea*, I, pp. 104–05.

there is no evidence in the records of the sale of these ships should come as no surprise, because the king's gains through ransoms rarely left a mark in the administrative accounts.[96] What is striking, however, is that two years after the battle several ships' crews that participated in the encounter had still not received their wages.[97] This shows that there was a chronic shortage of funds during 1340.

Another possible explanation for an absence of a payroll could be that the mariners were paid in the form of consignments of wool. We know that after the collapse of the wool scheme the king took control of what had been deposited in the staple.[98] He could have used this wool as a means of payment in lieu of wages to both soldiers and mariners. Yet it is more likely that this wool was used to set against debts that had accumulated over the two years he had spent on the continent, an interpretation that is reinforced by the lack of evidence in the Chancery rolls of wool shipments given over to mariners in place of their wages. Perhaps the most intriguing of the possible explanations of the missing payroll for the Sluys fleet relates to the absence of a surviving Wardrobe book. It is known that after Norwell had completed his term of office William Cusance replaced him as keeper.[99] There is no indication that Cusance summarised his transactions as keeper into a Wardrobe book that was then sent to the Exchequer for audit, which may explain the survival of the household journal roll for the Sluys campaign.[100] Such documents do not always exist for other keepers, such as William Edington, suggesting that they were discarded when a full set of accounts were sent to the Exchequer. It is therefore possible that there was a separate journal roll for the Sluys campaign, including a section on mariners' wages that has since been lost. In part this latter document would have been an early draft of the *vadia nautarum*. It is noteworthy that on the surviving journal roll there is a membrane that records the wages paid to the sheriffs, bailiffs and other officers of the maritime counties for arresting ships for the transport fleet.[101] It is beyond doubt that these officials would have arrested ships for the armada and these vessels must have been recorded elsewhere. It is possible that the royal ships that are enrolled on the journal roll were accounted for separately

96 For an enlightening discussion on ransoms gained from prisoners of war and the difficulty in calculating the returns gained by the king in such agreements, see C. Given-Wilson, 'Edward III's prisoners of war: the battle of Poitiers and its context', *EHR* 116 (2001), pp. 802–33. Given-Wilson notes that although what Edward paid the person who had captured one of the enemy is sometimes recorded on the Issue Rolls he also observes that 'it is no easy task to discover the amounts for which Edward III eventually ransomed the prisoners whom he had acquired', p. 817.

97 The crews manning the ships of King's Lynn at the battle were still waiting for their wages in April 1342, see *CCR, 1341–43*, pp. 556–57.

98 See C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, pp. 146–54.

99 Tout, *Chapters*, VI, p. 27.

100 E101/389/8.

101 *Ibid.*, m. 6.

and that is why they appear in that pay account.[102] This would not be unusual because the royal vessels that fought at Sluys are also visible on the account compiled by Thomas Snetesham.[103]

The survival of the journal roll becomes important when we note a piece of evidence that is hinted at by one of the many chronicle accounts of the battle. This notes that the ship carrying the king's Wardrobe was attacked, captured and all the crew except one woman and two men put to death.[104] On board this ship could have been documents that related to the first phases of the fleet-raising procedure, such as the ship lists mentioned in Chapter 1. If the French had captured or destroyed these lists, the Wardrobe would have had no means of accurately recording all the vessels involved in the engagement. The payments owing to the mariners for their wages would therefore have been made in a much less formal and fully recorded way than normal. The survival of the journal roll for this campaign could well be linked to this incident. Finally, another possibility is that because of the hurried nature of the requisition process in the weeks preceding the battle it is possible that the admirals paid the wages of several ships' crews out of their own pockets, or some other procedure, and that the crown 'returned' these sums to them after the battle. This would in part explain why on 15 July 1340 Robert Morley, admiral of the north, was paid £1,100 'in recompense due to him'.[105] As such perhaps the fleet of 1340 was raised and paid for by a mixture of private initiatives and booty gained from the battle.

The loss of the Sluys payroll has resulted in the fact that most historians have generally relied on the estimates of chroniclers for the size of the fleet.[106] Yet these chronicle estimates are far from consistent. C. J. Rogers, for example, follows the estimate of the Lanercost chronicle, which puts the fleet at somewhere between 120 and 147 vessels.[107] However, the *Meaux* chronicle and *Polychronicon* suggest that the armada numbered 200 ships, while Le Baker and Murimuth have much higher estimates totalling 260 ships.[108] N. A. M. Rodger has suggested that the Sluys fleet could have numbered up to 320 vessels; but he

[102] *Ibid.*, m. 16.

[103] E101/22/38.

[104] *Hemingburgh*, II, p. 357.

[105] *CPR, 1340–43*, p. 12. G. R. Cushway, 'The lord of sea', p. 314 interprets this order slightly different and suggests that Morley had been granted this money as a reward for his services at Sluys. However, it seems more likely that he was given this money because he had expended some of his own personal money (as did many of Edward III's captains) on mariner's wages. Indeed, the grant of venison for the rest of his life recorded in the same order is more likely to be the reward of his services.

[106] For example T. J. Runyan, 'Feeding Mars', p. 98; H. S. Lucas, *Low Countries and the hundred years war, 1326–1347* (Philadelphia, 1976), pp. 283, 398.

[107] C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 192; *Lanercost*, p. 333; J. S. Kepler, 'The effects of the battle of Sluys', pp. 74–75 favours Baker's estimate of 260 ships.

[108] *Melsa*, III, p. 44; *Polychronicon*, p. 335; *Baker*, p. 68; *Murimuth*, p. 105.

seems to have mistaken the 1338 transport fleet with that of 1340, as the source he cites is the Wardrobe accounts of Norwell.[109] In fact the only vessels serving in 1340 that are recorded by Norwell remained in service throughout the year, these being the king's ships and those that appear under the sub-headings of individual magnates. Given the fact that Murimuth provides accurate information regarding the Brittany transport fleets, and bearing in mind the size of the land contingents transported in June 1340, a fleet of 200 ships would seem to be of the right magnitude.[110]

The absence of a full payroll, however, does not mean that we are completely ignorant of the ships that participated in the engagement at Sluys. There are several important Exchequer accounts that detail the names of some of the ships and masters involved.[111] By using these we can piece together the fleet of 1340. The preparations for the fleet had begun in the spring of 1340, when in March the sheriffs and bailiffs of the maritime counties were paid 30s 6d for arresting ships from forty-three ports.[112] Interestingly, in 1340 Robert de Causton, sheriff of Suffolk, found that there were 155 individuals within his bailiwick who could contribute 177 ships to a fleet.[113] Unfortunately, the document appears to have no more precise date attached to it than 1340, so it is difficult to know if it was compiled before or after the battle of Sluys.[114] However, from the available sources, which we can date to the battle of Sluys we can account for sixty-six individual ships, by name, which participated in the engagement.

The first account records twenty-seven ships that were provided by the men of Great Yarmouth and which served from 19 May to 28 June 1340; operating these vessels were 1,335 masters, constables and mariners.[115] Ostensibly these vessels were arrested as supply ships, but as the king gained knowledge that the French had assembled an armada to blockade his re-entry into the Low Countries they formed part of the battle fleet that Edward was now preparing. The second payroll records the wages paid to twenty-three ships. Eight were the king's personal vessels, including the *Cog Thomas*, which Edward himself sailed in, and a ship called the *Cog Montagu*, which was owned by the earl of Salisbury. Apart from the *Cog Thomas*, which served for ninety-seven days, all the other

109 N. A. M. Rodger, *Safeguard of the sea*, pp. 492–97 and the section headed 'sources'.

110 On Murimuth's estimate for the size of the Brittany fleet and his accuracy, see C. L Lambert, 'An army transport fleet', pp. 22–25.

111 E101/21/31; E101/21/33; E101/22/25; E101/22/30; E101/22/31; E101/22/38; E101/389/8, m. 16.

112 E101/389/8, m. 6. Thirteen of these ports were located on the east coast while the remainder were situated south and west of the Thames.

113 C47/2/32, mm. 1–4. Given that the king sailed from a Suffolk port it is tempting to link this document to the battle. However, it is simply a list of those who could supply ships and not a list of those that definitely did.

114 The document is dated 14 Edward III.

115 E101/22/25, mm. 1–4.

vessels' recorded in this account served from 24 June for a period of between nine and twenty-six days. Manning these ships were 1,011 masters, constables, clerks and mariners. Yet the largest crew compliment was that aboard the *Cog Montagu*, whose 124 mariners even outnumbered the crew aboard the king's flagship.[116]

The remainder of the evidence for the ships that can be known by name to have participated in the battle can be gleaned from five further Exchequer particulars and two chronicle accounts. One of the Exchequer accounts records the wages paid to the sailors of two ships provided by Thomas and William Melcheburn of King's Lynn.[117] Further evidence for ships that participated in the engagement comes from a pair of indentures. The first of these was issued on behalf of Richard Fille, but he is known from the Sluys payroll (E101/389/8). However, the second indenture contains the names of eight further royal ships, one of which, the *Barge de Abevile*, is not recorded on the Sluys payroll.[118] In the indenture we are not given the crew size of this vessel, but the same ship appears in another account, and that does provide the exact crew details.[119] A further vessel that participated in the battle, but not enrolled in any other document, is also recorded on this same Exchequer account: the *Margrete*, commanded by Ralph Wiwynch with six mariners.[120] Another Exchequer document provides more than a glimpse of another ship that was at Sluys. The interesting point about this document is that enrolled with the ship's details is a full crew list. This vessel was called the *Godbefor*, commanded by John Halfknight, and manned by forty-five mariners including the constable Richard de Hilderburworthe.[121]

The final piece of evidence concerning the ships known to have been involved in the June transport fleet comes from an account compiled by John Watenhul on behalf of the earl of Warwick. The original plan was for Warwick to leave England with the earl of Oxford at the end of March. This equates with the requisition orders, which appear on the Sluys payroll. Yet the vessels for Warwick were not arrested until the end of April. In addition, the evidence from the *vadia guerre* account for the army suggests that Warwick was present at the battle of Sluys, and so we must conclude that the ships enrolled by Watenhul were those that transported Warwick with the June fleet.[122] As such the eight vessels that appear on this account should be added to the fleet that engaged the French.[123]

[116] E101/389/8, m. 16.

[117] E101/21/33. The ships were the *Magdeleyne*, operated by eighty mariners, and the *Seintemaricog*, which was manned by sixty seamen. They both served from 15 May to 28 July.

[118] E101/22/31. These indentures are repeated in E101/20/39, nos 80, 113.

[119] John Giboun commanded the ship with a crew of thirty mariners.

[120] E101/22/38, m. 1.

[121] E101/22/30.

[122] For Warwick's service dates at this time, see A. Ayton, 'Edward III and the English aristocracy', p. 176 n. 36.

[123] E101/22/39. Manning these eight ships was a total of 297 masters, constables and mariners. All eight ships were supplied by ports located on the east coast.

Of these sixty-six ships that participated in the battle of Sluys, which we can name individually from payroll evidence, the ports north of the Thames supplied forty. The king's ships, including Montagu's, accounted for fourteen vessels (this is because four more of Montagu's ships appear in Norwell's Wardrobe book with dates of service that suggest they participated in the battle).[124] Manning these sixty-six ships was 3,120 maritime personnel, with 1,772 (56.7%) of these men being contributed by the ports north of the Thames, while the ports south and west of the Thames provided 1,348 (43%) mariners (including the king's and Montagu's ships).[125] In addition to the payroll evidence, we can add a further five ships to the English fleet of June 1340, bringing the known number of ships to seventy-one.[126] Of course these figures assume that ships from the northern fleet were manned by mariners located in that admiralty. This is the most likely scenario although it should be stressed that during the preparations for an expedition it is likely that mariners from the northern admiralty may have been added to ships from the southern admiralty.[127] In the absence of better data however it is best to assume that ships from the northern fleet were manned by mariners form that admiralty, and vice versa.

It is beyond doubt that more vessels than this were present at the battle on the English side. We know, for example, that King's Lynn supplied ships for the fleet but without comprehensive surviving payroll evidence we have to fall back on the chronicle estimates.[128] We know too that Edward transported 1,300 men-at-arms and 1,000 archers in June 1340.[129] Bearing in mind that the previous fleet of 1338 numbered 403 ships and had to transport 5,000 men, then a fair estimate

[124] The ports south and west of the Thames can only be shown to have contributed three ships to the fleet. But thirteen of the vessels are not recorded with any port of origin.

[125] The remaining 355 were operating the ships, which were accorded no port of origin.

[126] *Hemingburgh*, II, p. 357, notes a galley of Hull being involved in the battle; *French chronicle of London*, p. 77, mentions a ship of London provided by William Hansard. However, Hansard actually contributed three ships to the Sluys fleet and these were the *Jonette*, the *Cogge of All Hallows* and the *Seintemaricog*: see G. Milne, *The port of medieval London* (Stroud, 2003) p. 116. There was also a ship of Sandwich involved in the engagement contributed by the prior of Christchurch, see H. S. Lucas, *The Low Countries and the hundred years' war*, p. 400.

[127] During the preparations for the St Sardos expedition mariners were admitted to ships while they were in the port of embarkation. This suggests that these men were not the 'normal' crew that would operate these vessels. What is interesting though is that of the nineteen ships that mariners added to their existing crews while they waited at Southampton, only one vessel was from the northern admiralty, see BL, Add MS 7967, fols 95v–97v.

[128] *CCR, 1341–43*, pp. 557–58.

[129] A. Ayton, 'Edward III and the English aristocracy', p. 176. G. R. Cushway, 'The lord of the sea', pp. 308–09 gives the much higher number of 10 earls, 49 bannerets, 589 knights, 1,012 armed men, 7,590 archers and 12,000 mariners. For this he relies on the evidence recorded on C47/2/33. However, Cushway seems to be unaware that the *vadia guerre* for the Sluys army exists in E101/389/8.

for the size of the Sluys fleet would be along the lines of Murimuth's and Baker's testimony: that is in the region of 200 to 260 ships.[130] This would place, on average, between eight and fifteen men on each ship for transportation purposes. Of course, we know from the accounts compiled after the war of St Sardos that the ships in a transport flotilla would normally be separated into those specifically fitted out to carry horses and those for the freighting of the men, but this would not have affected the Sluys fleet because before it departed Edward had removed the horses from the ships.[131] In addition, Edward had sighted the French fleet twenty-four hours before he engaged them.[132] One suspects that Edward placed all of his men on a smaller number of ships with which he could press forward the attack with vigour. This would ensure superior numbers of men-at-arms and archers would be brought to bear against the less specialised combatants likely to be manning the French ships. But precisely how many ships from the English fleet actually engaged the French remains a mystery. It has been suggested that the English fleet would have formed up with the men-at-arms standing on the ships in the centre, whilst the archers would be placed in the vessels that offered flanking positions.[133] This argument seems to follow on from Froissart's suggestion that archers usually formed up on the flanks with men-at-arms in the centre. This interpretation has recently been challenged, however, and it has been suggested that archers were probably dispersed amongst the men-at-arms, although some archers would naturally find themselves on the flanks of the army.[134] Evidence from contemporary manuscripts, which show ships containing both archers and men-at-arms, certainly corroborates this idea.[135] Such positions would ensure that before grappling with the enemy English archery was brought to bear at the point where it was most needed, and in effect 'softened' the target for the men-at-arms. Indeed, it is doubtful what impact archers would have been placed on the flanks. The result of this would be that some French vessels faced some ships full of archers and other only containing men-at-arms. Finally, it is also known that at some point during the battle the Flemings also attacked the

[130] If the list of 163 ships that Robert Causton could provide did indeed sail in the Sluys fleet then when these are added to the seventy-one known ships the overall number of vessels involved would come remarkably close to Muriumth's and Baker's testimony.

[131] C.J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 190.

[132] *French chronicle of London*, p. 76.

[133] T. J. Runyan, 'The cog as a warship', in *Cogs, caravels and Galleons*, pp. 54–55 states that Edward 'placed his most powerful ships in the van'. See also G. R. Cushway, 'The lord of the sea', pp. 306–07 who also accepts this view.

[134] A. Ayton, P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, pp.353–59.

[135] BL, Add MS 42130, fol. 161v. This shows men-at-arms and archers in the same vessels. The Beaumont Pageants also show archers and men-at-arms aboard the same vessels, see BL, Cotton MS, Julius E.IV, fols 18v, 25v. Also, see J. Flatman, *Ships and shipping in medieval manuscripts* (London, 2009), pp. 93–105, which shows a variety of contemporary representations of archers in ships.

French vessels from their rear, thus adding more ships to the allied contingent during the engagement.[136]

If we now take all the evidence together and calculate the numbers of ships that participated in both of the Low Countries campaigns, we find that a known 474 vessels manned by 16,556 mariners were involved in the transportation of soldiers and the battle of Sluys.[137] But the major obstacle to gaining a full understanding of the maritime contribution to the Low Countries campaigns is the lack of a full payroll for the 1340 ships. If we were to assume that this fleet numbered 260 ships, and only sixty-six of these can be identified, then there could have been as many as 630 individual vessels requisitioned for the use of transports during the two campaigns.[138] But without a full set of payrolls to compare both fleets this must remain speculative.

The evidence relating to the period 1324–40 suggests, therefore, that Edward III's continental aspirations were on a much grander scale than his father's. Indeed, Table 3.1 below shows that between the years 1338 and 1340 Edward III's officials requisitioned over twice the number of ships that Edward II's clerks had for the St Sardos expeditions. In fact if we consider that the St Sardos fleets were two separate flotillas, and that the largest number of ships raised before 1338 for any single continental expedition were the 163 vessels involved in the earl of Surrey's transport flotilla of 1325, a marked increase can be seen in the demands for shipping in the twelve years from 1325 to 1338. This is especially true when we also consider that ships were still being deployed in the Scottish theatre of operations.

[136] C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 197.

[137] The ports north and east of the Thames contributed 8,103 (49.2%) mariners, while those ports located to the south and west of the Thames provided 8,453 (51%) mariners. The actual number of individual ships was 448 because by comparing all the payrolls, Exchequer accounts and Chancery evidence, we find that twenty-four ships serving in the 1338 fleet also participated in the Sluys fleet. The methodology on individual ships is discussed more fully in Appendix 2.

[138] Although we know the name of three of William Hansard's ships we do not know who commanded them, therefore it is impossible to compare them to other ships in the Low Countries campaigns to see if Hansard's vessels had previously served in the 1338 London ships.

Table 3.1 The fleets of St Sardos, 1338 and 1340

Campaign	Ships	Northern ships	Southern ships (inc. Royal ships)	Number of ports	Number of mariners
St Sardos	301	105	195	52	4,488
Low Countries	474	239	235	78	16,556

Note: The figures in the table do not take account of individual ships. This issue is analysed more fully in Chapter 4. The aim of the table is to show the total size of the fleets put into operation. In the St Sardos fleets one vessel was foreign: the *St Mary*, from Spain and commanded by Fernando de Faim, see BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 98r. This includes the 1324 and 1325 fleets.

*

The sources relating to the 1342 expedition are complex, and a large amount of comparative analysis is required. Such an examination of the sources, however, reveals that the logistical problems faced throughout this campaign in Brittany, and the changes in fleet-raising procedure that they prompted, make the first English intervention in the duchy perhaps one of the most influential expeditions launched by Edward III. The main issue was that in 1342 the English crown faced, for the first time, the problem of requisitioning more than one transport fleet simultaneously. In addition, a number of factors, both external and internal, changed the course of English involvement within Brittany. Raids by the Scots into northern England and events in the Breton civil war itself forced the English king to transport his army in three stages.[139] The first to sail was Walter Mauny in March 1342, followed by the earl of Northampton in August and the king in October. By examining the preparations in the summer of 1342 it can be seen that the crown was attempting to create a ferry fleet system by utilising the same ships on three occasions. Thus the ships that formed the earl of Northampton's transport fleet were ordered to return to freight the forced under the king.[140] In addition, the armada waiting to transport the earls of Oxford and Pembroke also suffered from some problems, not least because the fleet waiting at Plymouth seems to have been too small to transport the force that was to serve with the earls. This resulted in the king seconding two vessels from the Plymouth flotilla to serve in his own fleet later in the year.[141] The remaining fifty-five ships could only transport the 800 Welsh foot. Yet, it is even doubtful that many of the

[139] For a discussion of the possible strategies of the Brittany campaign and how these were affected by the availability of sufficient numbers of ships, in addition to other factors involved in the preparations for the expedition, see C. Lambert, 'An army transport fleet', pp. 1–13. On the Breton situation, see M. Jones, *The creation of Brittany* (London, 1988); *idem*, *Ducal Brittany, 1364–1399: relations with England and France during the reign of duke John IV* (Oxford, 1970); *idem*, 'Edward III's captains in Brittany, 1343–45', in *England in the fourteenth century*, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 1986).

[140] *CCR, 1341–43*, p. 651.

[141] *CCR, 1341–43*, p. 651; E101/23/22 records the fifty-seven ships waiting to transport the two earls. The two vessels which were transferred to the king's fleet were the *Blythe* of Great

Welsh eventually disembarked in Brittany as 600 were forced to take refuge on the Isles of Scilly, due to a storm, and the remaining 200 only served for twelve days until 19 November.[142] These issues show that the English administration was grappling with a complex logistical problem with the result that three fleets eventually sailed during 1342 with each flotilla consisting of vessels from the previous armada.

The resulting administrative procedures designed to manage the logistical process has left behind a series of problematic sources. This is especially so with regard to both the earl of Northampton's and the king's fleets. For example, in the *vadia nautarum* of William Edington only sixteen ships are recorded as having received pay for the earl's crossing.[143] Considering that Northampton had in the region of 1,100 men under his command, this number of ships is too small for their transportation. Murimuth on the other hand states that the earl's transport fleet numbered some 260 vessels, which seems a more realistic indication of its true size.[144] This apparent and sizeable lacuna in Edington's accounts can be compensated for by examining other, related source material; particularly the evidence recorded in the Chancery enrolments and calendared documents. Indeed, close scrutiny of the Chancery documents and related Exchequer accounts reveals the size and composition of the earl's transport fleet. As noted those ships participating in the earl's flotilla were required to return to England to transport the king. However, at least thirty-one vessels failed to honour that demand and as a punishment they forfeited their pay and were thus struck out of Edington's final accounts.[145] A further problem encountered by the king and Northampton was that after the earl had disembarked in Brest, numerous vessels left Brittany and headed for Gascony to load up with wine. While some had been given permission to do this many had not. Again, the offending ships' crews were penalised by forfeiting their wages.[146] The fact that Northampton authorised some ships to travel to Bordeaux shows that there was not a shortage of sailing craft during 1342; otherwise the earl would have steadfastly refused permission for any vessel to sail to Gascony.[147]

Yarmouth, commanded by Thomas le Smyth, and the *Seintemarie* of Ipswich, commanded by Robert Asshe, see E36/204, pp. 224, 232, 234 for their service in the king's fleet.

142 The two earls never sailed to Brittany; however, a small contingent of the foot under their command did attempt a crossing. It also seems that the Welsh foot made it no further than the Isles of Scilly. See *CPR, 1343–45*, p. 494; E101/23/22 m. 3 details the dates of service of the Welsh. But see also A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 259 and Table A, p. 263.

143 E36/204, p. 238.

144 *Murimuth*, p. 126.

145 *CCR, 1341–43*, pp. 621, 651–52, 664, 688, 697–98.

146 *CCR, 1342–43*, p. 688.

147 Although these orders create the appearance that Edward was failing to find sufficient ships (hence why Northampton's transport ships were asked to return) this would be the wrong way to view these demands. In fact looked at differently what they provide evidence for is the argument above.

In addition to those ships that were struck off the payrolls a further forty vessels served in Northampton's transport fleet in return for pardons. Thirty-three of these were involved in the '*Taryte* affair'. This act of piracy was discussed in Chapter 1.[148] The warrants accompanying the offer of these pardons were all dated to 28 May 1342, so it must be assumed that these ships did serve in the August armada that transported the earl of Northampton. This interpretation is reinforced by one order stating any ships from Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn that were involved in the incident are 'to go to Orwell for the passage of the said earl of Northampton and other lieges to Brittany, with victuals and necessaries'.[149] Yet there are interpretational difficulties with regard to the thirty-two ships visible in the calendared sources. For example, the shipmaster/owner Nicholas Pyk was certainly serving with more than one vessel but, unfortunately, no precise details are provided that show the number of ships that he served with.[150] Similarly, in another warrant five shipmasters from Ipswich are mentioned, all of whom plundered the *Taryte*, but the names of their vessels are not recorded with them.[151] This creates problems when the ship *Katerine* from Ipswich, but not its master, is named elsewhere as being involved in the attack against the *Taryte*.[152] Is it to be assumed that this ship is one of the infamous five vessels? It is impossible to say, but for the purposes of this book it has been counted as a separate vessel. All the pardons relating to the Ipswich ships were dated 17 July 1342 and it must therefore be presumed that these vessels participated in the earl of Northampton's expedition. Furthermore, another seven ships are visible in the pardons recorded among the *Ancient Correspondence*.[153] Thus, using the calendared and Chancery sources we can add forty ships to the sixteen recorded in the Wardrobe accounts.

The final piece to the puzzle of the earl of Northampton's transport fleet can be found in two Exchequer accounts dated to 1342. One is a document compiled by John de Watenhul for his expenses in arresting 117 ships from the ports between Portsmouth and Bristol during April 1342.[154] The second Exchequer source records a further 145 ships, which were enrolled on the pipe roll of 1342.[155] These 145 ships received payments in July to keep them in port so that they would not leave before the army was ready to be transported. It is likely that

148 *CCR, 1341–43*, pp. 499, 501, 502, 529, 554, 621; *CPR, 1340–43*, pp. 433, 471, 477, 483, 491–92, 513, 538, 594.

149 *CCR, 1341–43*, p. 501.

150 *Ibid.*, p. 529.

151 *CPR, 1340–43*, p. 477.

152 *Ibid.*, p. 594.

153 SC1/39, nos 93, 157; SC1/40, nos 10–20; SC1/41, no. 66. These pardons are analysed more fully in Chapter 4.

154 E101/22/39.

155 E372/187, mm. 42, 48.

these 145 vessels are included in the 117 arrested by Watenhul earlier in the year and that these would have formed the earl of Northampton's fleet.

The fact Northampton sailed ahead of the king can be put down to several reasons, the main one being that by August the position of the Montfortist Bretons had deteriorated seriously, and urgent reinforcements were required to bolster them. Added to this was the fact that all the ships currently under arrest in England had been requisitioned for several months, and it was feared that these vessels would sail away from the embarkation port. Thus the decision was made to send Northampton ahead of the main force, the intention being that the ships that transported him would return to form part of the king's fleet later in the year.

Evidence recorded in the *vadia nautarum* relating to the king's transport fleet also appears less than wholly satisfactory. There we find 378 ships' crews receiving wages for the passage of the king and his army in October 1342.[156] However, there are also 230 'deserter' vessels recorded on the *Close Rolls* to consider.[157] These are ships that left Brest and Vannes in October and November without permission from the king and whose crews as a consequence forfeited their pay. These punishments are further evidenced by comparison with the Wardrobe Book. This reveals that eighty-eight ships listed in the *Close Rolls* are absent from the final Wardrobe accounts. Indeed, when the mariners' pay details recorded in the Wardrobe book are examined more closely it is noticeable that 142 ships were docked pay, presumably as a punishment for deserting the king. For example, the *Clement* of London, commanded by John Blakeson, and manned by twelve mariners, received just over £5 in wages when the dates of service assigned to the ship show that the crew's pay should have totalled £8 10s.[158] In short the crews of 142 ships were docked pay, while eighty-eight ships' crews received no pay at all.

Another important document relating to the king's transport fleet can now be found among the Chancery Miscellanea records at the National Archives.[159] This comes in the form of a ship list containing the names of 330 vessels, along with their masters, and grouped by their port of origin. The list records 144 ships from ports located north of the Thames and 186 from ports within the confines of the southern admiralty. The roll is a return by Edington for the wages of the ships' crews that transported the king and Walter Mauny to Brittany in October 1342. However, for several reasons this document is not quite what it seems. First, comparison with the *vadia nautarum* reveals that the roll lacks forty-eight ships that appear there. Second, five vessels that are listed on the roll are not recorded in the mariners pay accounts of the Wardrobe book.[160] Apart from these discrepancies, there are direct similarities between the two documents. The

156 E36/204, pp. 221–40.
157 *CCR, 1343–46*, pp.128–32.
158 E36/204, p. 221; *CCR, 1343–46*, p. 128.
159 C47/2/35, mm. 1–5.
160 *Ibid*., mm, 4–5.

order of the ports listed on the Chancery roll is more or less the same as that recorded in the Wardrobe accounts. In addition, the same anomalies appear in both sources. For example, Henry Goldeneye, master of the *Godyer* of Rye, is repeated twice in both Edington's accounts and the Chancery roll.[161] There are also slight differences between the two. One example is that in the Wardrobe accounts Edington records the home port of eighteen ships as Dover whereas the Chancery list places them in Sandwich.[162] In addition, when the forty-eight ships that are recorded in the Wardrobe accounts, but not the Chancery miscellanea roll, are compared to the 230 'deserter' ships noted above we find that only six out of these forty-eight vessels are noted as deserters. This means that their absence from the Chancery roll cannot have been because they forfeited their pay.

A further important Exchequer account with relevance to the king's transport fleet is a compensation record of money paid to shipowners for the damage that their vessels incurred while on active service.[163] This account consists of two files with details of the payments issued. Only forty-five of these can be compared directly with the payroll contained in the Wardrobe accounts, as the other names recorded in this document are of the ships' owners and not their masters. The former are not listed in Edington's accounts. Of these forty-five ships and masters, thirty-two are recorded in the Wardrobe book and all these vessels completed their service in October and November 1342, which places them in the king's transport fleet. Again, the absence of thirteen ships from the final accounts is difficult to explain as none of these were among the deserter ships. Finally, evidence of one more ship that participated in the king's flotilla, though absent from the Wardrobe's final payroll accounts, can be gained by examining a collection of accounts compiled by Thomas Snetesham.[164] This source includes receipts for supplies of food and wages issued to mariners who served on board royal ships. Included are several indentures that record *prest* payments issued to mariners during the Brittany campaign. Examination of these receipts, and comparisons with the Wardrobe book, reveals that Cok Gold, master of the *Margret Spinnace*, is not included in Edington's final pay accounts, although the indenture recorded by Snetesham shows that he did participate in the Brittany transport fleet.

Taken together, the evidence from various Exchequer and Chancery documents allows us to propose a more accurate picture of the size and composition of all three Brittany transport armadas. The first fleet to sail was Walter Mauny's in the spring of 1342. The Wardrobe payroll accounts for this particular flotilla

[161] E36/204, p. 229; C47/2/35, m. 2. Henry did not serve in two of the three fleets during 1342 and he only participated in the earl of Northampton's transport fleet. See also pp. 00–00 above.

[162] *Ibid.*, p. 225; *ibid.*, m. 2. For a fuller explanation of why this confusion occured, see Chapter 4, pp. 176–78.

[163] E101/24/9 (a) and (b).

[164] E101/22/38, no. 4.

are full and detailed and Mauny's fleet consisted of thirty-six ships operated by 931 masters and mariners.[165] Mauny had under his command 343 soldiers, so over twice as many mariners were required to operate the ships that transported his force over to Brittany. Mauny's small army consisted of 1 banneret, 21 knights, 111 esquires and 210 mounted archers. Taking this into consideration it is estimated that this force would have taken to Brittany roughly 600 horses; but if the horses of the non-combatants are included, this could have added a further 100 to150 horses that required transportation.[166] Therefore, each ship within the fleet would, on average, have had to transport twenty-one horses.[167]

The earl of Northampton's transport flotilla was the second of the three fleets to leave England in 1342. Given that Northampton led a force that was over three times larger than Mauny's, his transport armada was inevitably a much larger affair. As was noted above, this fleet suffers from source material that is difficult to interpret, and this makes any analysis of the ports that supplied the ships and the numbers of mariners who served on board difficult. For example, although the document complied by John de Watenhul tells us that he requisitioned 117 vessels from the southern admiralty, we are not told which individual ports contributed which ships and how many. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace some of the ports involved in supplying ships for the earl of Northampton's transport fleet. For example, the pardons issued to several shipmasters do mention the vessels' home ports. There is also an order that was sent out to thirty-eight ports requesting that they provide the earl with ships for his forthcoming campaign.[168] As with Mauny's transport flotilla the majority of these ports were situated

[165] The number of ports that contributed these thirty-six vessels numbered 14. Of these ports 10 were situated south and west of the Thames, 3 were located north of the Thames and 1 was the port of Sluys in Flanders. The largest supplier of vessels was the port of Sandwich, which furnished six vessels manned by a complement of 215 (23%) seamen, followed by Winchelsea, which provided four ships manned by 172 (18.4%) mariners. However, this particular port also supplied the largest single ship of the Mauny transport fleet, the *Seintemariecog,* commanded by Richard Passelewe, which had a crew of 52 seamen.

[166] The evidence relating to the non-combatants is gained from the indenture of the earl of Arundel dated 1387 that stipulated how many servants the earl would take with him on campaign. The earl was allowed twelve for himself and each man-at-arms was allowed one; see A. R. Bell, *War and the soldier in the fourteenth century* (Woodbridge, 2004), p. 51. It has been presumed that their lord would provide the servants with horseflesh. Indeed, in 1415 John Mowbray brought with him on campaign tents, horses, armour, weapons, livery for his men, armourers, cooks, surgeons, priests and victuals, all of which cost him £1,000, more than he in fact received in wages, see G. Harriss, *Shaping the nation: England 1360–1461* (Oxford, 2005), p. 133.

[167] The majority of the ships in this fleet (18) began their service in March with twenty-four vessels staying on active service until 29 June, and two further ships serving until 1 July. Five of the vessels would seem to have left service early and therefore were not likely to have transported Mauny back to England. Mauny's fleet cost the crown £981 4s 8d, which was almost twice the amount paid out to his troops whose service cost the crown £609.

[168] *Foedera*, II, ii, p. 1201.

south and west of the Thames.[169] In total, fifty-one ports contributed 204 ships to the earl of Northampton's transport fleet but only 13 per cent of these ports were located within the sphere of the northern admiralty.

It is difficult to calculate the numbers of mariners who operated these vessels owing to the nature of the evidence. The Watenhul arrest document and the pipe roll entries give no indication of the numbers of mariners. However, the sixteen vessels recorded in the mariners payroll accounts contained in the Wardrobe book are provided with full crew sizes. Averaging out the crew numbers from these sixteen ships (twenty-one mariners per ship) and then extrapolating the results allows us to suggest a total of 5,000 for the whole fleet. Considering that the earl had 1,100 soldiers under his command, it can be seen that the maritime arm of his expedition required the mobilisation of perhaps four or five times more men.[170]

The armada that transported the king was the last, and by far the largest, of the three fleets to embark for Brittany in 1342. The king sailed out of Portsmouth on 16 October and arrived at St Mathieu ten days later.[171] In total, seventy-eight ports supplied vessels for the king's fleet. However, as with the transport flotillas of Mauny and the earl of Northampton the majority of the ports were situated in the southern admiralty's jurisdiction.[172] These seventy-eight ports supplied the king with 487 ships. Of these, 378 vessels were recorded in the Wardrobe

169 Of the seventeen that are recorded within the Chancery and *Ancient Correspondence* documents only seven are situated north of the Thames. The thirty-eight ports mentioned above contain no ports located north of the Thames.

170 An army of this size would have taken approximately 2,200 horses with them, a figure that rises to 2,500 if we take into account the non-combatants. Considering the numbers of horses that would have required transportation each ship would have had to freight twelve horses. The cost in mariners' wages to the crown was far less than would otherwise be expected from a fleet of this magnitude owing to the free service of the 'pardon ships', and of those vessels' crews who had their pay forfeited. In all crown secured the services of these ships for just over £545.

171 Edward seems to have waited at the Isle of Wight until 25 October. He sailed into Brest harbour on 27 October: see E36/204, pp. 31–32.

172 Forty-five ports were located between the River Thames and Bristol, while thirty were in the area controlled by the northern admiral, three ports were foreign and the king's own ships were counted as a separate category. The three foreign ports were Sluys, Bayonne and a Catalonian port. The largest single provider of ships was Great Yarmouth, which contributed thirty-two (6.5%) vessels manned by 902 mariners. London supplied twenty-seven (5.5%) ships crewed by 545 seamen. The Cinque Ports contributed a total of fifty-two ships (10.6%) operated by 1,347 mariners. Apart from Great Yarmouth the ports located within the remit of the northern admiral which furnished the largest number of vessels were Hull, which provided eighteen (3.7%) manned by 371 mariners, followed by Gosforth, which contributed fourteen (2.8%) and 368 mariners. The largest single ship in the transport fleet was one of the king's own vessels, the *George*, which was operated by 166 mariners, including two masters. The next largest vessel was the *Edward* of Sluys, which was manned by 124 mariners. The largest ship supplied by an English port, other than the king's own ships, was the *Berthelmeu* of Great Yarmouth, commanded by Richard Bet, and crewed by 63 mariners. The smallest

pay accounts while a further 109 are listed within several other sources.[173] The number of seafarers is difficult to assess because 134 vessels have no crew sizes assigned to them. But we know that 8,796 masters and mariners served on board 348 ships, which gives us an average crew size of twenty-five. Applying this figure to the remaining vessels suggests that roughly 11,800 mariners manned the king's transport fleet.[174]

The king's transport fleet of 487 vessels freighted an army that consisted of 3,800 men (4,350 including non-combatants), all of whom were mounted.[175] This force would have required the transportation of 5,000 horses, and on average each ship would therefore have had to freight ten horses to Brest in the autumn of 1342. None of the vessels, except the king's, served after 10 December 1342.[176] Of those ships for which we have accurate sailing dates, nearly two-thirds had completed their service in October, while a third ceased to be paid in November 1342, while all the king's ships served into 1343.

In conclusion, if all the ships that sailed in 1342 were added together the overall number of vessels would be 727. However, what these figures represent is 'ship-voyages', not individual ships – to account for repeat service.[177] Taking such cases into account, it can be suggested that in 1342 the number of actual ships involved in the transportation of English troops to Brittany numbered 610. This number concerns the vessels specifically involved in transportation duties, but the maritime contribution to the campaign went beyond this. For example, five masters were issued with letters from the Chancery allowing them to prey on French vessels that were supplying the forces of Charles de Blois in Brittany.[178] In addition, four further vessels were used to supply the king's forces with wine while he was in Brittany and John Montgomery, admiral of the western fleet,

vessels had no more than 10 mariners the *Blithe* of Dover, commanded by Peter Rede. See E36/204, pp. 221, 222, 226, 229, 234–36, 239, 240

173 Eighty-eight deserter ships from *CCR, 1341–43*, pp. 128–32; five from C47/2/35; thirteen from the compensation account (E101/24/9 (b), one vessel from the document compiled by Thomas Snetesham that records the payment made to the master Cok Gold (E101/22/38, no. 4), and two ships from *CCHR*, 5, p. 3.

174 The overall known numbers of mariners that served in 1342 totalled 10,402. Of these the English contingent numbered 9,762 mariners of which the ports located between the Thames and Bristol contributed 6,393 (65%), while the northern ports supplied 3,369 (34%) masters and mariners. The rest were foreign.

175 A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, pp. 14, 259.

176 The last requisitioned merchant ship to leave service was the *Trinite* of London, commanded by William Clerbaud, which completed its service on 10 December 1342. See E36/204, p. 221.

177 It is only possible to compare eighty-seven of the earl's transport ships to the other two fleets. However, the fact that only thirty-one were ordered to be arrested for failing to return must mean that the majority of the ships did so. None of the other vessels, the forty pardon ships and the sixteen visible in the Wardrobe accounts can be seen to have served in the king's fleet.

178 *CCR, 1341–43*, p. 546.

was on board the *Edward* of Winchelsea, which he used as a ship of war with a crew including men-at-arms and archers.[179] We must not forget, moreover, the fifty-five ships that transported the Welsh foot to the Isles of Scilly.[180] Indeed, by taking this extra dimension into consideration, the maritime arm of the invasion numbered some 675 ships. The cost to the crown for the all three fleets came to £8,026 4s 8d.[181]

The analysis above has shown that the numbers of men required for the maritime dimension of the Brittany campaign far exceeded those employed ashore as soldiers. However, throughout this expedition Edward encountered problems, mostly caused by the ferry system the crown had implemented to transport the army. The result of this was that the king required many ships' crews to stay on active service for an extended period of time. As we have seen many chose not to. In Chapter 1 it was suggested that this expedition was a catalyst that forced Edward to adopt new methods when faced with the necessity of raising more than one fleet for transportation to the continent by introducing an element of privatisation in the fleet-raising procedure. Positively the problems faced by the English in 1342 show that the government was capable of adapting to rapidly changing events. The experiences and the knowledge gained through such problems allowed the administration to develop new techniques in ship requisition that would prove valuable during 1346 when the king wished to transport to France the largest English army raised in the fourteenth century.

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Although the transport fleet of 1346 is perhaps the most important armada of the period it is also, unfortunately, the most difficult to assess. This is because the original pay account relating to the 1346 expedition has been lost, and as such we have to consult several other sources that, nonetheless, still allow a detailed study of the size and composition of the Crécy transport fleet of 1346.[182] The

[179] E101/23/18 records the wine ship, while E101/21/36, mm. 2–4 gives details of Montgomery's ship. The men on board Montgomery's vessel were only paid half wages, presumably because they had no horses with them.

[180] Kermond's account only includes two northern ports (Great Yarmouth and Ipswich) and of the three ships these two ports provided, two were seconded to the king, see E101/23/22, m. 3. The fifty-five southern vessels were manned by 1,176 mariners, while the one northern ship with a visible crew had 17 mariners onboard.

[181] This includes the compensation money from E101/24/9 (a) and E101/24/9 (b). As we have seen, it is difficult to assess the numbers of mariners on board these ships, particularly those in the earl of Northampton's transport flotilla. Nevertheless, a rough total of 12,000 maritime personnel would seen reasonable, particularly if we assume that many seamen served more than once during the campaign, when they returned to transport the king after the earl of Northampton had disembarked at Brest.

[182] The sources are three manuscripts: BL, Harleian MS 3968, fols 132r–133v; BL, Harleian MS 246, fols 15v–16v; BL, Add MS 38823, fols 65r–67v. The several published sources are: Robert Brady, *Complete history of England*, 2 vols (London, 1685, 1700), II, appendix, pp. 86–88;

most important sources for the 1346 transport fleet are three manuscript transcriptions dating to the early-modern period, which contain a list of ports and the numbers of ships they contributed to the fleet. Furthermore, there are also six surviving published works. Three of the published volumes also include port lists that are similar to the ones recorded in the three manuscripts, while the remaining three provide totals, without port lists, for the overall contribution of the maritime arm of the campaign.[183] By utilising one of the manuscript sources along with the reliable work of Robert Brady a detailed picture emerges of the 1346 transport armada.[184]

The three surviving manuscripts appear to have been copied from the now lost *vadia marinariorum* section of Wetwang's final Wardrobe accounts that were submitted to the Exchequer after his term of office.[185] All three follow the same format of listing each port individually with a record of the numbers of ships and mariners that the port contributed. Further, they all group the ports according to the southern and northern admiralties, with the contributions made by several foreign ports attached to the end of the lists.[186] The end of each of the southern and northern admiralty sections, and the list of foreign ships, is concluded by an overall total. But a closer inspection and comparison reveals differences between these three manuscripts. For example, the port named as Milford in BL, Harleian MS 3968 is called Alyseford in BL, Add MS 38823. This suggests that these two documents may have been transcribed from an earlier copy (or copies), which is now lost. The complications continue when the numbers of ships and mariners assigned to particular ports are compared. For instance, in Harleian MS 3968 Faversham is recorded as having supplied two ships manned by twenty-five mariners. However, this same port in Add MS 38823 is listed as contributing two ships operated by fifty-three seamen. Further, the port of Woodhouse, according to Harleian MS 3968, furnished one vessel crewed by

A collection of ordinances and regulations for the government of the royal household (London, 1790), pp. 3–8; J. Bree, *The cursory sketch of the state of the naval, military and civil establishments during the fourteenth-century, with account of Edward III, in Normandy and France in the years 1345 and 1346, to the taking of Calais* (London, 1791), pp.110–12; J. J. Champollion-Figeac, ed. *Lettres de rois, reines, et autres personages des cours de France et d' Angleterre*, 2 vols (Paris, 1847), II, pp. 86–92; R. Hakluyt, *The principal navigations, voyages, traffiques and discoveries of the English nation made by sea*, vol. 1 (Glasgow, 1903), pp.297–299; *The brut*, ed. W. D. Brie, part II, p. 541.

183 The three sources that have transcriptions of the port lists are: *A collection of ordinances*; R. Hakluyt, *Principal navigations*; Champollian-Figerac, *Lettres des rois*.

184 R. Brady, II p. 86.

185 For a stimulating and enlightening discussion of Wetwang's now lost accounts, see Ayton and Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, especially Chapter 2 appendix 1 by Dr Ayton, 'Reconstructing Walter Wetwang's lost *vadia guerre* accounts for the Crécy–Calais campaign'. Wetwang died in November 1347, so another clerk would have drawn up his accounts, see Ayton and Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, p. 230, n. 1.

186 For example, on each manuscript the second entry is the port of London, which we are told contributed twenty-five ships manned by 662 mariners.

twenty-two mariners, while Add MS 38823 records this port as supplying one ship but only twelve seamen.[187]

When the third manuscript is also compared against the other two further differences arise. The main problem that affects Harleian MS 246 is what seems to be a major transcription error in the northern port list.[188] The three manuscripts list the northern ports in the same order until the port of Dunwich. At this point Harleian MS 246 misses out the ports of Gosford and Harwich. In addition, the transcriber of Harleian MS 246 seems to have mistakenly recorded the total numbers of ships and mariners contributed by several ports. For example, the previous two manuscripts agree that Gosford contributed thirteen ships with 303 mariners, while the transcriber of Harleian MS 246 assigns these totals to the port of Orford.[189] Since that scribe seems also to have confused the total numbers of ships and mariners provided by the port of Orford, with those contributed by Ipswich, the usefulness of Harleian MS 246 should perhaps be questioned.[190] Consequently, by comparing the manuscripts with each other and the surviving published works it is possible to discard the two manuscripts that seem less reliable (BL, Harleian MS 246 and BL, Add MS 38823). Yet none of the three manuscripts contain the earliest details of the 1346 transport fleet as this is embedded in the *Brut* chronicle.[191] Unfortunately, like Brady, the *Brut* provides no more than the number of ships and mariners involved in the expedition. It is worthy of note, however, that Brady and the *Brut* use the same words to describe the fleet, which suggests common consultation of Wetwang's book of accounts.[192]

As we can see all three manuscripts have interpretational issues associated with them. This being said it has been noted previously that BL, Harleian MS 3968 provides information that the other manuscripts do not, and for this reason

[187] BL, Harleian MS 3968, fols 132r, 133r; BL, Add MS 38823, fols 65r, 66v. It is also worth noting that the compiler of Harleian MS 3968 originally recorded a total of 298 mariners for Faversham but crossed that total out and then wrote the new total of 25 alongside it.

[188] Although this could have arisen because the compiler of BL, Harleian MS 246 used a different copy of Wetwang's accounts than the previous two transcribers. The northern ports in BL, Harleian MS 246 are recorded on fol. 16v.

[189] Gosford is recorded on BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 133r and BL, Add MS 38823, fol. 67r. It has been asserted before that Gosford did not actually exist and that what in fact the scribes were recording was simply an invention for a well-known collection point of ships at the estuary of the River Crouch, see R. G. Marsden, 'The mythical town of Orwell', *EHR* 21 (1906), pp. 93–98, p. 96.

[190] Ipswich contributed 12 ships manned by 239 mariners according to BL, Harleian MS 3968 and BL, Add MS 38823 while BL, Harleian MS 246 gives the number of 3 ships operated by 62 mariners. On BL, Harleian MS 246 Ipswich is recorded on fol. 16v.

[191] *Brut*, p. 541; Ayton, and Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, p. 233.

[192] Both Brady and the *Brut* use the words, 'barges, balyngers and vitteliers', to describe the types of ships used in the fleet. The original copy of Wetwang's foreign accounts must have contained this phraseology as in no other source consulted by this book do those descriptive words appear. *Brut*, p. 541; R. Brady, II, p. 86.

it is suggested as the source most likely to offer the most accurate details of what the Wardrobe accounts would have recorded.[193] Consequently by following the above procedure and by relying on the figures given by Brady as a guide, and by consulting BL, Harleian MS 3968 to understand the individual contributions of the northern and southern ports it is possible to reconstruct the 1346 transport fleet. Brady is considered the most reliable because we know that he directly consulted Wetwang's Wardrobe accounts because he states that the information contained in his book was gained 'from a roll in my possession'.[194] Yet what also seems evident is that Brady did not include the foreign ships and rounded up his numbers for the fleet. He states that the armada numbered some 700 barges, ballingers and ships, which were manned by 16,000 mariners.[195]

The conclusion reached here is that by consulting Brady in conjunction BL, Harleian MS 3968 it is possible to understand the individual shipping contributions made by the northern and southern ports to the transport fleet of 1346. In total eighty-nine ports supplied ships for the transport fleet.[196] These eighty-nine ports contributed 747 ships manned by 15,917 mariners.[197] The ports from the southern admiralty supplied 493 (66%) ships while the northern ports furnished 216 (28.9%) vessels with the foreign contingent amounting to thirty-eight (5%) ships.[198] Unfortunately, the port list provided in this manuscript does not record the names of the vessels, or their masters, and so it is possible to name only a few of the king's ships along with their masters.[199] It could be argued, of course, that embedded within the early modern manuscript's overall totals are numerous

193 See the section in A. Ayton and P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy* by Dr Ayton, 'Reconstructing Walter Wetwang's lost *vadia guerre* accounts for the Crécy–Calais campaign,' which highlights the potential of BL, Harleian MS 3968.

194 R. Brady, II p. 86.

195 *Ibid*. That Brady did round up the fleet numbers is entirely plausible. For example, Brady presents the army's service as one continuous period from 4 June 1346 to 12 October 1347. Yet it is more likely that in Wetwang's accounts each retinue or contingent had several dates of service attached to it.

196 Of these, the majority, fifty-one (57.3%), were located in the southern admiralty while thirty-three (37%) were situated north of the Thames and the remaining five (5.6%) were foreign ports.

197 The actual number recorded by the manuscript is 746 ships. However, it is known that the Prince of Wales' ship, the *Thomas*, also participated in the fleet. See *BPR*, III, p. 413.

198 The ships of the southern admiralty were operated by 9,597 (60%) seamen, while the northern vessels required 5,515 (34.6%) mariners to staff their contingent of ships, and 805 (5%) mariners. The largest single supplier of ships to the fleet was the port of Great Yarmouth, which contributed forty-three (5.7%) vessels operated by 1,950 (12.2%) maritime personnel. The port from the southern fleet, which provided the most ships, was London whose contingent numbered twenty-five (3.3%) vessels manned by 662 (4.1%) mariners. The king himself supplied a sizeable proportion of the fleet and his own ships amounted to twenty-five (3.3%) vessels operated by 419 (2.6%) seamen.

199 For example, *CCR, 1346–49*, p. 95, shows that the *George*, commanded by Robert Salmon, participated in the transport fleet of 1346. He was sent back from Caen to Winchelsea in 1346.

vessels that did not sail in 1346, but in fact operated during the siege of Calais in 1347, as the manuscripts themselves suggest. That there may be ships recorded by the early modern copyists that operated during the siege is likely. Nevertheless, for two reasons the numbers of vessels that have been included in the transport fleet instead of the siege flotillas should be relatively small. First, in 1347 the admirals did not account through the Wardrobe but through the Exchequer in England for the fleets they raised to operate during the siege. Second, because of the method employed by the admirals in paying the mariners the only flotilla that was likely to have been included in the final Wardrobe accounts is the ferry fleet that operated from June to September 1347. Can we therefore be more accurate as to the size of this ferry fleet? It is unlikely that this flotilla was large and by using the book of foreign receipts recorded by Walter Wetwang we can estimate its size.[200] Throughout June to September Wetwang's assistant William Huggate issued nine advances to mariners totaling £626 8s 3d. The first installment that was issued in June totaled £140. If we were to say that each ship had a crew of twenty mariners (an average crew size that is consistent with the majority of the fleets in this book) and that an advance to the crews on board each vessel for their first quarter of wages would come to about £8 (that is the first month's payment out of three months served), then it possible that we are looking at a fleet that numbered some twenty-five ships. Taking this into account the size of the 1346 transport fleet should be viewed as somewhere in the region of 720 ships, manned by an estimated 15,000 mariners.

In 1346, therefore, we have an English transport fleet numbering between 720 and 747 ships that freighted Edward's army to la Hougue on 12 July. The size of the force that these vessels were required to transport was indeed impressive, and in terms of men deployed it was the largest army ever taken to France by Edward III. It is estimated that the retinues that made up the three divisions of the army numbered some 2,500–3,000 men-at-arms and 2,500–3,000 archers, the latter being mostly mounted. The arrayed troops, provided by the towns and shires of England and the Welsh lordships, added a further 8,000 men, most of whom, around 5,000, would have been archers. With the inclusion of the non-combatant element that accompanied every medieval army the number of men requiring transportation to Normandy in 1346 would have been in the region of 15,000–20,000.[201] The number of horses requiring transportation would have been in the region of 15,000 (especially if we include those for the baggage train). This would mean that each ship, on average, would have had to freight twenty men and twenty horses to La Hougue; but given that some of the ships of the fleet would have had limited carrying capacity, the normal burden may well have been rather more than this.

[200] E101/390/12, fols 17r–21r.

[201] The most detailed assessment of the English army in 1346 is given in Ayton and Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, especially the Chapter by Dr Ayton, 'The English army at Crécy', pp. 168, 171, 174, 181–89.

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After Edward's army arrived and disembarked at La Hougue, the ships that had transported his force were no longer required, although Edward did retain a fleet of vessels to harry, burn and destroy French shipping and ports along the coast. This policy was implemented to prevent any chance of French naval aggression during Edward's campaign, but it also allowed the English sailors to settle some old scores. This fleet certainly did its work thoroughly, 'burning and destroying all the seacoast from Barfleur to the foss of Colevill near Caen'; and, according to Edward himself, it sank over 100 French ships in the process.[202] But on 26 July as Edward's army moved deeper inland the fleet was no longer required, and after the earl of Huntingdon fell ill it was disbanded and sent home.

Yet the maritime communities were soon called upon again, when in September 1346 Edward besieged the French town of Calais. Evidence concerning maritime participation throughout this siege is contained in three surviving financial accounts.[203] Two of these provide details of the contributions made by the ports north of the Thames and by those towns located within the southern admiralty, all of which seem to have been used solely for prosecuting the blockade of Calais. The third document provides evidence of what seems to be a separate ferry fleet, which operated throughout June to September 1347.[204] Apart from the reinforcements that arrived with John Montgomery in September 1346 the maritime involvement, and thus the transportation of troops and the blockading of Calais, did not begin until April 1347.[205] The first fleet arrived in April 1347 and was under the command of the admiral of the north, John Howard. Howard had earlier been ordered to find and deploy eighty ships of war; each crewed by sixty mariners and with twenty archers on board. To pay for such a fleet Howard was authorised to use the subsidy that Edward had been granted by parliament.[206] The ships under Howard did not arrive as one fleet; rather they appeared in small numbers over the course of three months. Nevertheless, by June, a month when the service of all the ships in Howard's fleet overlapped, the admiral had managed to assemble on the seas around Calais a fleet of forty-six ships manned

[202] Nicolas, *History of the royal navy*, II, p. 92; *Avesbury*, p. 359; R. Barber, ed. *The life and campaigns of the Black Prince*, p. 18, which records a letter written by Bartholomew Burghershh to the archbishop of Canterbury on 29 July and details some actions of the fleet around Caen.

[203] A more detailed account of the siege can be found in C. L. Lambert, 'The siege of Calais by Edward III: a reappraisal', *Journal of Medieval History* (forthcoming, 2011). This article is to be included in a special edition of *Journal of Medieval History*.

[204] E101/21/36; E101/25/24; E101/390/12, fols 17r–21r.

[205] This suggestion is reinforced by examination of Walter Wetwang's receipt book (E101/390/12, fols 10v–12v), which shows that no ships' crews were being paid in the winter of 1346–47.

[206] E101/25/23. This contains hundreds of indentures between Howard, the collectors of the subsidies and individual ports. This account is directly linked to E101/25/24.

by 2,996 masters, constables and mariners.[207] The majority of these vessels (26) served until 15 September.[208] A total of fifteen ports supplied these ships all of which, except Bruges, were situated on the east coast. [209] The crew sizes aboard these ships were large: only two vessels had fewer than forty mariners, and the rest had crews of at least seventy-three.[210] The crew sizes alone suggest that this fleet was involved in the military arm of the siege, rather than transportation duties. This interpretation is reinforced by the evidence relating to the tunnage of the ships in Howard's fleet, which shows that some of the vessels were only forty tuns burthen, and would therefore not have required crew sizes of this magnitude.[211] In addition to the fleet under Howard's command, by 5 March 1347 four of the king's own ships were plying the waters around Calais.[212]

Some days after the first ships in Howard's fleet arrived outside Calais another flotilla of warships under the command of John Montgomery augmented it. Montgomery had actually sailed to Calais earlier in the operation when in September 1346 he commanded the fleet that carried the reinforcements under William Fraunk. Unfortunately the details of this fleet are now missing; presumably they were recorded in the lost accounts of Walter Wetwang. Fortunately, however, we have the pay details of the fleet he commanded during the second phase of the siege of Calais throughout April, May and June 1347.[213] This account, however, which was sent to the Exchequer for audit, poses some interpretational difficulties. On 14 October 1347 Montgomery had died and therefore the executor of his will, Andrew Peverel, compiled the account, which was obviously left in

[207] E101/25/24, nos 1–46.

[208] Eleven served up to 1 August and eight only served from April to June, while the *James* of Bruges has no dates of service attached to it.

[209] Great Yarmouth contributed the most vessels to the fleet supplying fifteen (32.6%) vessels manned by 1,156 (38.5%) seamen. In addition to the crew sizes we are also told the tunnages of these ships. The largest ships were the *Edmond*, commanded by William Rondyng, of Great Yarmouth and the *Berthelmeu*, commanded by Richard Tynwhit (numbers 23 and 25), both of which were 180 tuns, with the overall mean average size of the ships coming to 89 tuns.

[210] The *Floyne*, commanded by William de Balyng of Great Yarmouth, which was crewed by 33 mariners and 1 constable and the *Flouve*, commanded by John Mose of Harwich, which was operated by 32 mariners and 1 constable were the ships with crew sizes smaller than forty, these are recorded on numbers 5 and 15.

[211] For example, in 1324 the *Marie* of Great Yarmouth commanded by Thomas Swathe, which freighted troops to Gascony was 300 tuns and had a crew of seventy mariners, including a constable, see BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 98r. Further, in the 1338 Low Countries transport fleet the *Cristiane* of Weymouth commanded by Walter atte Loue was a ship measured at 90 tuns burthen and was operated by a total crew of twenty-seven, including a constable and a boy; see E101/21/7, m. 3. As such ships serving in 1347 at measured 40 tuns had crew sizes comparable with vessels at 300 tuns.

[212] E101/390/12, fol. 12v. These five ships of the king's were later recorded amongst the sixty-one vessels under Montgomery, who seems to have taken control of the royal vessels during the siege.

[213] E101/21/36.

some disarray.[214] There are 122 entries on the account, which on closer inspection can be reduced to sixty-one individual ships due to the repetition of some of the ships and their masters. What these payments record is the advance on the crews' wages. For example, thirty-eight mariners and one constable, manned the *Rodecog*, commanded by Henry Whasselede, and this crew was paid £4 towards their wages for seventeen days service.[215]

That these sixty-one ships served during the siege can be deduced from the source. It is true that Peverel states that some of the ships were employed on the king's business, possibly diplomatic service, and that the account runs from 1340 to 1346. But these potential complications can be discounted for the reason that diplomatic fleets of the Edwardian era usually consisted of between two to four vessels.[216] Therefore, we may conclude that the sixty-one ships contained in this account, which served at the same time, cannot have been employed in diplomatic activities. Moreover, although Montgomery was admiral of the southern fleet in 1342, it is unlikely that these ships participated in that campaign because the wages paid to the crews of the ships in 1342 were processed through the Wardrobe accounts of William Edington. Only the particulars of John Kermond were audited separately from Edington's accounts, and that was due to the nature of his appointment as the clerk in charge of sending the reinforcements to Brittany while the Wardrobe was with the king.[217] In addition, because the ships began service in April the dates of service and the crew sizes in Peverel's account point to the siege of Calais and a military operation.

All except three of the sixty-one ships under Montgomery's command were supplied by ports south and west of the Thames.[218] Thirty-three of the ports were located in the southwest and 3,533 mariners manned the ships. Their periods of service ranged between seventeen and twenty-five days through April and May 1347, although the king's eight ships, which Montgomery took command of, participated in the siege served through June. This marked a clear increase in the maritime resources during the siege and matched the increase in troops that were arriving in May owing to the threat of the French forces that were gathering under Philip VI.

The third source that relates to the maritime involvement in the siege of Calais is the record of payments issued to mariners as preserved by Wetwang in his book of foreign receipts. During the summer of 1347 William Huggate (described as 'clerk of the ships') made a series of nine advances on wages to ships' crews. The inclusion of these payments in Wetwang's accounts suggests that Huggate was obviously operating under the umbrella of the keeper of the

214 *Complete peerage*, vol. 9, pp. 136–37.

215 E101/21/36, m. 4.

216 An exception was the Bishop of Lincoln's diplomatic flotilla in 1337, which was unusual because of its importance.

217 Kermond's account is recorded on E101/23/22.

218 The northern port that contributed ships was Great Yarmouth.

Wardrobe. There are only two possible reasons why Huggate would issue such large sums of money on nine separate occasions. First, what we could be seeing are nine separately raised fleets of transport ships that were disbanded after they had made just one crossing to Calais. This would mean, of course, that Edward's army was only reinforced, and those troops who had fallen ill taken back to England, nine times throughout the siege. The second, and more likely, explanation is that these nine payments were issued to the same flotilla of vessels, which were used repeatedly over a four-month period. It is argued here that what in fact Huggate issued money for was a ferry system, constituted in June 1347 and stationed at Sandwich, for the sole use of the transportation of reinforcements to the siege.[219] That this fleet was a sizeable entity can be seen by examining the total amounts issued by Huggate from June to September, which totaled £614 1s 4d. The likelihood is that these payments were only advances on wages and so the fleet must have contained twenty-five to fifty vessels.[220] The evidence, therefore, seems to suggest that from April to September Edward had procured the services of at least 107 ships for the prosecution of the siege of Calais manned by 6,527 seamen.[221] In order to create a fleet of this size Edward relied on the contributions from thirty-five ports with a little over half (18) of these located in the southern admiralty.[222]

It is now possible to propose some overall conclusions about the role of shipping during the campaigns of 1346 and 1347. In all ninety-two ports contributed ships for the king's campaigns in the fourteen months that the expeditions

[219] Indeed, the implementation of a ferry system was not a new development. Henry II also operated such a system during his reign as a means of keeping in regular contact with his domains in France; see N. A. M. Rodger, 'The naval service of the Cinque Ports', pp. 641–42.

[220] Huggate issued his first payment of £140 on 27 June. He then paid another £58 16d in the first week of July, followed by three more payments in this month on the 9, 10 and 28 July. He made three similar payments throughout August before making his final payment in September. The first payment that Huggate issued was for £140. If we were to say that each ship had a crew of twenty and the advance on their wages was for their first quarter (i.e. one month at roughly £6–£8) then the fleet probably numbered twenty-five ships.

[221] This number of ships should not be taken to be the overall maritime contribution to the siege. There were many vessels involved in the supply operation. For example, in early 1347 the sheriff of Essex sent seven ships from Colchester loaded with supplies to Edward's forces. These ships mainly freighted malt and oats and the wages of the mariners and the costs of the supplies came to £93 6s 8d, see E101/556/37. However, the supply operation during the siege is beyond the scope of the above analysis.

[222] The northern ports supplied forty-five (43%) individual vessels manned by 2,996 (48%) mariners, while the ports located in the southern admiralty provided fifty-eight ships (55%) operated by 3,431 (55%) seamen. One ship was provided by Bruges (the *James*) and three vessels were from Bayonne (the *Katerine*, commanded by John Markyn; the *Gercer*, commanded by Arnold de la Ralde and the *Katerine*, commanded by Arnold Tulhous). The foreign vessels were manned by 102 mariners.

ran for.[223] These ports provided a maritime contribution numbering 853 ships, manned by 23,907 masters, constables and mariners.[224] The southern ports contributed about two-thirds of the ships to the 1346 and 1347 naval operation, but only half of the mariners, indicating that on average the ships from the northern admiralty were larger. These figures speak for themselves in many respects. That the naval operations of 1346 and 1347 were of a great magnitude is borne out by the fleet sizes and numbers of mariners shipped. This investment of resource helped to bring victory at Crécy and, perhaps more importantly, English control of a port on French soil. Did control of Calais, change the way transport fleets were raised and deployed? The problem in answering this question relates to the lack of source material for the 1355 expedition, and therefore the only available major campaign that sailed to Calais, which can be analysed in detail, is the last personal expedition to France by Edward III in 1359.

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The campaign of 1359–60 was to be Edward's last great mobilisation of men, under his personal command, to fight on French soil. The force that Edward led out of Calais in early November was the 'best equipped army Edward had ever assembled'.[225] The men under Edward's command totalled 3,000 men-at-arms and 5,000 mounted archers.[226] This, of course, meant that the number of ships required for the transportation of such a large, fully mounted force, should have been of the same order of magnitude as that assembled for the Crécy campaign of 1346.[227] As such, the number of horses that required shipment must have been large. We know, for example, that 10,861 horses, which were shipped back from France, were recorded through Farley's accounts.[228] Yet, throughout the summer

[223] Of these, fifty-three (57.6%) ports were located south and west of the Thames while thirty-three (35.8%) were east coast ports and six (6.5%) were foreign.

[224] Owing to the nature of the evidence relating to the Crécy fleet, namely, that the manuscripts do not provide the masters' names or the names of the ships it is difficult to correlate the 1346 fleet with those serving through the siege. However the king's eight ships serving in 1347 would surely have been among the 25 ships, which served in the transport fleet of 1346 so the number of individual ships should perhaps be 835. The ports south and west of the Thames provided 547 (64%) of these vessels while the east coast ports furnished 265 (31%) ships and the foreign element numbered 38 (5%) ships. The king's ships have been added to the southern admiralty. The ports north of the Thames supplied 10,286 (46%) of these maritime personnel and those vessels south and west of the Thames required 11,081 (50%) mariners to operate them while the foreign contingent of seamen numbered 907 (4%). The ship of Bruges has no crew size attached to it so the foreign contingent should perhaps be raised to 850 mariners.

[225] C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 396.

[226] A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 268.

[227] Indeed, the *Chronicon anonymi Cantvariensis*, p. 50 says the fleet numbered a thousand ships in addition to numerous small boats. This comment is in line with the chronicle assessments of the size of the 1346 transport fleet.

[228] A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 268.

and autumn of 1359 the actual number of transported horses must have been close to 30,000, if we include those in the large baggage train that supported the army.[229] But the preparations for the campaign, particularly the requisitioning of sufficient ships, were troublesome for the king.[230] This resulted in the army being transported in six separate crossings. The first to take passage in August were several contingents of the royal household. After this fleet a second smaller flotilla of twenty-one ships freighted a second part of the army, followed in September by the duke of Lancaster. In October the earl of March sailed to Calais a few days ahead the king.[231] The final fleet was made up of the retinue captains who had received payments from the crown to hire their own ships.[232] This section analyses the number of ships raised and assess the reasons for the dearth of shipping that afflicted this particular campaign.

Although the organisation of the fleets was similar to the Brittany expedition of 1342 it is clear from the way the fleets sailed in 1359 that this expedition was organised in a different way from previous campaigns in that some retinue captains organised their own shipping. By examining four payrolls that record the wages paid to mariners we can piece together these fleets. One series of accounts runs from 27 June to 6 August 1359, while one further particular, compiled by Robert de Crull, records the wages paid to eight vessels, which participated in all three separate voyages and which served from 20 August to 4 November 1359.[233] Close scrutiny of the payrolls relating to this campaign show quite clearly that there were in fact six separate fleets that sailed between August and October. Although many of the ships involved were undoubtedly used more than once, they nevertheless comprised six individual fleets. For example, the first four payrolls record a total of 438 ships that must have transported members of the royal household, among other men-at-arms, who began their paid service in August.[234] Considering the number of ships involved in this first fleet the

[229] On the baggage train and its possible size, see Jean le Bel, ii, pp. 312–13. Thomas Walsingham stated that the baggage train numbered 'a thousand wagons and carts', see R. Hakluyt, *Principal navigations*, p. 301, in which Hakluyt records a passage from Walsingham.

[230] *Scalacronica*, p. 171.

[231] Fifteen members of the royal household began receiving pay in August 1359. Sir William Grandson was the first to begin receiving pay on 3 August 1359, although he was not a member the household. The first of the household to be paid wages was Simon Bisset on 16 August 1359, see E101/393/11, fols 81r, 82v, 83v, 84r, 85, 85v.

[232] A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 270.

[233] E101/27/22; E101/27/23; E101/27/24; E101/27/25; E101/27/31. Furthermore, E101/27/16 records some purchases of equipment for three of the king's ships that formed this August fleet. They were the *George*, commanded by John Gybon, which sailed on 12 August, the *Godbeyte*, commanded by John Ruck, which sailed on 12 August and the *Welfare*, commanded by Bartholomew Stygen, which sailed on 28 August.

[234] Although the ships were in port by June it is unlikely that they sailed before August. Indeed, much like the land-based retinues it is likely that the mariners started to receive pay when they arrived at the port, not when they began transporting the army. See A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 146.

household contingents must have been placed in charge of a sizeable force. Alternatively, this first fleet could have been used to freight the horses and supplies for the army, with certain members of the royal household sent across with such supplies.

The second fleet is embedded within these four pay accounts and consisted of twenty-one vessels out of the original fleet, which served again sometime after August.[235] On the first payroll (E101/27/22) they were in service for thirteen, fourteen or twenty days, while on the second particular (E101/27/25) all the ships received pay for either eight or six days. That we are seeing two different fleets is beyond doubt because the majority of these ships are recorded with different crew sizes on the two payrolls. For example, Simon Robyn from Cromer, master of the *Eleyne*, served on board this ship with a crew of five mariners in the first crossing to Calais, while on his second voyage there were six.[236] What seems to have occurred is that after the first fleet sailed in the summer, twenty-one vessels returned to England and transported another small contingent of men sometime after August. These twenty-one ships formed part of a small flotilla of vessels that served alongside eight of the king's ships (about which, more below) during late August and early October.

In all 438 ships are recorded as having received payment for transporting the first contingent, with a further eight vessels hired from the Low Countries ports.[237] The exact numbers of mariners who manned these vessels is difficult to assess with any accuracy owing to the condition of some of the payrolls. For example, on one of the accounts that records the wages issued to mariners serving on east coast vessels, seventy-one ships' crews cannot be ascertained.[238] But we can decipher the tunnages of thirty of these vessels. Averaging the tunnages of these thirty ships allows us to suggest a mean tunnage for forty-four others. Using the same account, and the tunnages of the ships where we can see the crew sizes, it can be speculated that these seventy-one ships were crewed by up to fourteen mariners each. A further account suffers from the same problems, but by applying the same method it is possible to average out the tunnages and therefore place an estimated number of mariners on the six ships' crews that are irretrievable from the account.[239] In total, 6,149 mariners operated these ships

[235] These are found by comparing E101/27/22, mm. 3, 4 with E101/27/25, m. 2. The ships are all from ten ports located on the east coast.

[236] E101/27/22, m. 3; E101/27/25, m. 2.

[237] 368 (83.7%) ships were contributed by ports north of the Thames and 70 (14.5%) from ports located south and west of the Thames.

[238] E101/27/22.

[239] E101/27/24.

(this does not include the eight Low Countries ships).[240] Eighty-seven ports provided the ships of which seventy-two where located north of the Thames.[241]

Therefore, the above Exchequer accounts show that during July and August 446 ships operated by 6,149 mariners, contributed by eighty-seven ports, formed the first two transport fleets of the Reims campaign. Given the number of ships involved in this first armada, and by comparing it to the transport fleets of the Low Countries and Brittany campaigns, it is probable that 3,000–4,000 men could have been transported in the first contingent.[242] The third fleet to sail did so in September and was a small flotilla that transported the duke of Lancaster. Lancaster was sent ahead of the king because of the problems at Calais stemming from the foreign mercenaries that had appeared in large numbers during the summer months. By the time it came to September they were becoming restless and the king needed to send a figure of high repute to gain some order.[243] Lancaster's small fleet is enrolled on a particular compiled by Robert de Crull.[244] This records eight royal ships with dates of service indicating four separate crossings, ranging throughout the summer and autumn of 1359.[245] For example, the *Godebiet*, commanded by John Ruck, and crewed by one constable and thirty-one mariners, sailed from London to Calais on 23 August. After this the vessel's service was extended, with the addition of a further nine mariners from 24 August to 30 September. On 1 October with the subtraction of one mariner, but the addition of one page, the same ship served until 14 October. Finally, from 15 October to 4 November the vessel sailed with a crew of one constable,

[240] Of these, 4,788 (77.8%) manned the ships from the ports north of the Thames, while 1,064 (17.3%) operated those ships contributed from the ports south and west of the Thames. The remaining, 297 mariners operated the king's ships.

[241] The port that supplied the most ships was Great Yarmouth, which contributed forty-nine (10.2%) vessels operated by 658 (10.7%) mariners. This was followed by Hull with twenty (4.1%) ships crewed by 372 (6%) seaman. The largest provider of shipping from the ports south and west of the Thames was Dartmouth, which contributed nine (1.8%) vessels. Unfortunately, the numbers of mariners from Dartmouth are difficult to calculate owing to the condition of the document. However, an average tunnage of 103 tuns per ship can be gained from the payroll, which permits us to estimate that mariners that served on board these nine ships would be 300.

[242] Of course we do not know the exact tunnages for the Brittany fleet. However, the majority of the Reims vessels seem to have been of a small size. Nevertheless, because the Reims army was a fully mounted force the number of men shipped to Calais could be a little smaller than those transported in the earlier campaigns, which contained large numbers of foot soldiers.

[243] Lancaster must have sailed for Calais at some point in September because he was in the town just after 29 September 1359, see C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 401, n. 84.

[244] E101/27/31.

[245] *Chronicon anonymi Cantvariensis*, p. 52, says that March's retinue consisted of 350 men-at-arms and 600 archers. Therefore, if eight ships performed four crossings it would be the equivalent of twenty-four vessels, which seems an adequate number of ships to transport March's retinue.

forty mariners and one page. Although it has been pointed out previously that Lancaster was transported along with 300 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers the payrolls relating to the shipping evidence do not seem to corroborate this statement.[246] It is doubtful that such a large force set sail with Lancaster, unless they did so in the hired ships. In fact it is more likely that Lancaster took command of the forces that were already stationed in Calais. Or alternatively a large section of his men, along with members from the royal household, had sailed in the first fleet in August, or in the twenty-one vessels that sailed subsequently.

The fourth fleet to sail was that of the earl of March in October. It is beyond doubt that March was shipped in the same eight royal vessels that Lancaster had used a month earlier. Indeed, we know that March, according to Thomas Gray, embarked for Calais six days before the king and then made a *chevauchée* in the surrounding area.[247] Given that the king sailed to Calais on 28 October the earl of March must have crossed on the 22nd of the same month.[248] The disembarkation of March seems to fit in exactly with the dates of service of these eight ships.[249] Throughout their periods of service it is likely these royal vessels made several crossings to and from Calais during the course of which they transported March. We know, for example, that a section of the retinue captains were required to hire their own transport vessels and that they were compensated for this by the crown. However, the earl of March received no such payment from the crown for his outward voyage.[250] This suggests that March along with his retinue embarked on the ships requisitioned and paid for by the crown. The fifth contingent to sail utilised the same eight ships as March and this was the flotilla that freighted the king and his household. We know that the king crossed the Channel aboard the *Philip* and this is likely to have been the same *Philip*, commanded by Bartholomew Stygan, and manned by fifty-six mariners, which is enrolled by Crull and completed its period of service on 30 October.[251] The sixth and final fleet to sail consisted of those captains who had to pay for their own passage and who were later reimbursed by the crown for doing so. It is likely that this fleet sailed sometime in October close to or before the king's small fleet. In fact what seems to have occurred throughout 1359 is that rather than retinues being transported as whole units in the same fleet, soldiers from the same retinues were actually embarked piecemeal on different ships. The

246 See, for example, C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 401. Roger's account is largely based on chronicle evidence with regard to the transport of Lancaster's forces.

247 *Scalacronica*, p. 171.

248 *CCR, 1354–60*, p. 656.

249 March began his paid service on 5 September, see E101/393/11, fol. 79v.

250 A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, table A, p. 265. Although March died while on campaign, and thus would not have required re-passage payments, he should still have received payment for his outward passage if he had hired his own ships.

251 *CCR, 1354–60*, p. 656; E101/27/31. Stygen had previously served as master of the *Welfare* in the August fleet.

result of this was that the earl of Lancaster may have arrived in Calais both after and before some of his retinue.

The above analysis has shown that from July to mid-October 446 ships transported the first five contingents of the army to Calais (household members; Lancaster; March and the king). Comparisons with other transport fleets of the period would suggest that an estimated 2,000–3,000 men were freighted on these vessels. This, of course, would have left some 6,000 men in England still awaiting transportation to Calais. How was this passage achieved? It has already been noted that some of the captains serving in this campaign had to hire their own shipping. However, of the 400 or so companies known to have served on this expedition only twenty-five received passage payments from the crown.[252] These twenty-five retinues consisted of 1,800 men-at-arms and 2,150 mounted archers.[253] Moreover, in those cases where passage payments were made, a comparison of the numbers of horses retinue captains shipped from England to Calais with those they brought back usually shows that the July–August fleet transported some of the horses as well. For example, Farley's payroll tells us that the Black Prince transported 1,369 horses to Calais but he brought back 2,114.[254] This seems to suggest that 745 of the horses were actually transported ahead of the Prince's arrival in the July–August armada. It would seem, therefore, that the 446 ships involved in the July–August fleet not only transported many of the land-based contingents but also freighted large numbers of horses from those retinue captains who had to arrange shipping themselves. One can see why this was the case for it would make the work of the retinue captain, in hiring his own ships, much easier if the part of his 'kit' that required the most room aboard ship had already been freighted over to Calais.

In summary, then, the payroll evidence relating to the Reims campaign seems to suggest that the land-based contingents were transported over to Calais in six separate stages. As noted above, only twenty-five captains who sailed in the final armada had to find their own ships, but these did include very large retinues consisting of nearly 4,000 men. To what extent did these retinue captains hire the same ships that freighted the first two portions of the army? This question poses some problems not least of which is why did Edward simply not order the ships to return to Sandwich after they had transported the July-August section of the army and then extend their paid service? We know, for example, that this is what happened in 1356 when Lancaster's army was carried in two separate journeys by the same ships.[255] There are two likely explanations for the king not taking what appears to be the easiest option. First, Edward would have recalled

252 A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, Table B, pp. 268–69.

253 E101/393/11, fols 83r–86v.

254 A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 270.

255 *Avesbury*, p. 462. Lancaster's force, however, in 1356 was likely to have been quite small when compared to the army of 1359, thus allowing a smaller number of ships to be used in this way.

the fiasco that had occurred during the Brittany campaign of 1342, when the disobedience of certain shipmasters caused problems throughout the expedition. Second, as we have already seen in Chapter 1, after the Brittany expedition of 1342 the crown had included an element of privatisation in the fleet-raising procedure in order to compensate for the problems that long periods of naval service could bring. Nevertheless, in 1359 if we assume that there were 4,000 troops requiring transportation after the first two fleets had sailed a further 400–500 vessels would be required. The evidence suggests that, in order to secure the 800 or so ships that would be required to transport the whole army to Calais, the crown decided on six fleets. The crown provided five of these fleets in the traditional manner, while the twenty-five captains who had to organise their own transportation privately hired ships to form the sixth armada.

In conclusion, my analysis has shown that during the period 1325 to 1338 there was a notable increase in the size of English transport fleets to the continent. Thereafter, Table 3.2 shows that the 1340s saw the peak (in terms of size) of Edward III's transport fleets. After the 1346 expedition the changes in the fleet-raising procedure that had been initiated after 1343 meant that the armadas of the 1350s, although transporting armies of comparable size, were in fact smaller. Indeed, the 1350s transport fleets were more comparable to the 1338 Low Countries expeditions. Table 3.2 compares the size of the royal-led transport fleets deployed to France between 1342 and 1359, and it is clearly shown that the fleet of 1359 was much smaller than those of 1342 and 1346.

Table 3.2 Comparisons between the 1340s fleets and that of 1359

Campaign	Ships	Northern fleet	Southern fleet	Ports	Mariners
Brittany	675	219	444	80	10,420
Crécy	747	216	493	84	15,917
Calais	107	46	61	35	6,527
Reims	446	368	70	87	6,149

Note: During the Brittany campaign twelve ships were foreign; at Crécy thirty eight were foreign and one foreign vessel participated in the siege of Calais. In 1359 eight ships were hired from the Low Countries.

*

So far we have examined the fleets that performed service during royal-led expeditions. However, as part of the English war strategy transport armadas were also raised to carry the king's lieutenants to various locations in France. The importance of these flotillas should not be underestimated. The fact that the earl of Lancaster had been transported on 148 ships in 1345 meant that Edward III faced a much smaller French army on the field at Crécy.[256] A similar operation

[256] For the earl's fleet, see E101/25/9. In 1346 the duke of Normandy was kept in the south-

was launched in 1355 when the king and the earl of Lancaster sailed in one fleet to northern France, while the Black Prince was transported to Bordeaux. The following analysis examines this latter transport flotilla with the aim of showing, as an example, that the fleets of the lieutenants were an integral part of English naval logistical operations.

The 1355 Transport Fleet for the Black Prince

Rather than merely a footnote in the history of the Hundred Years War, the fleet that transported the Black Prince to Aquitaine in 1355 deserves to be regarded as one of the most important of the period. The first order for the arrest of ships was issued on 10 March 1355, when the ports located between the Thames and the Cinque Ports were requested to provide ships for the passage of the earl of Warwick and others to Gascony.[257] On 27 April 1355 more orders were issued for the requisitioning of vessels for the passage of the Prince. All ships above twenty tuns burthen from the ports of the Thames to King's Lynn, King's Lynn to Berwick, London to Exeter and from Exeter to Wales, were to be arrested.[258] By 6 May the sheriff of Cornwall was asked to provide bridges to aid the transport of the Prince's horses and on 27 May John de Hoggeshawe, lieutenant of John de Beauchamp, was ordered to accompany the Prince, taking charge of the maritime resources. The following day an order was sent to eight shipmasters to arrest 234 mariners to serve on board their vessels.[259] The last request for ships was delivered on 16 July when William Sturmy was to requisition all ships from Bayonne and the Channel Islands and to send them to Southampton for the Prince. However, it is doubtful if these ships made it to the embarkation port as none of the extant payrolls relating to the fleet of 1355 include any vessels from Bayonne or the Channel Islands.[260]

The requisitioning orders were wide ranging: every possible port was to be searched for available shipping. But how many vessels were finally raised and

west of France fighting Lancaster's forces, a strategy that prevented the duke from marching north in time to participate in the battle of Crécy.

257 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 297.

258 *Ibid*., pp. 298–99.

259 *Ibid*., pp. 299, 300, 302.

260 As the Prince did not sail until 9 September sufficient time was allowed for the Bayonne and Channel Islands ships to join the flotilla assembling at Plymouth. Perhaps one of the reasons for their failure to appear was the frequent storms that lashed England and the Channel during the summer of 1355. The king's fleet was seriously delayed for over a month in July due to the storms: see J. Sumption, *Trial by fire* (London, 1999), pp.166–68, although Sumption confuses the fleets of 1355 by suggesting that the earl of Lancaster had a separate flotilla to the king, as does Hewitt (*Black Prince's expedition,* p. 38). However, C. J. Rogers (*War cruel and sharp*, p. 293, n. 38) argues convincingly that Lancaster was in fact part of the king's fleet and that therefore there were only two flotillas in 1355, not three.

which ports contributed these ships to the fleet? The eventual size of the Prince's transport flotilla of 1355 can be established by examining three Exchequer accounts.[261] The first of these documents records the wages paid to the crews of forty-nine ships provided by the ports situated on the east coast. Some 271 masters, mariners and pages are decipherable, though the manuscript is in appalling condition.[262] The next Exchequer account records the ships contributed by the southern ports that had assembled at Southampton by 8 May.[263] In total, 14 ports provided thirty-nine ships manned by 872 seamen.[264] The third account details more ships supplied by the ports situated on the east coast: 20 ports, which furnished ninety-one ships manned by 1,560 masters, mariners and pages.[265] If we include the eight vessels recorded in *Foedera* with the information given in the payrolls it is possible to argue that Prince's transport fleet numbered 187 ships, manned by 2,937 mariners that were provided by thirty-five ports.[266]

[261] E101/26/36; E101/26/37; E101/26/38.

[262] E101/26/36 is in appalling condition and has been marked as 'unfit' by TNA and it is disintegrated in many parts. However, by following the lines made by the clerk from the ship names to the record of the crews wages it is possible to account for forty-nine ships.

[263] E101/26/37. It is worth noting that the ships gathered at Southampton seem to have been solely for the transport of the earls of Warwick and Suffolk, while the prince sailed from Plymouth, see D. Green, 'The household and military retinue of Edward the Black Prince' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 1998), vol. 1, p. 44.

[264] The ports that supplied the largest number of ships were the ports of Hannelhoke, Shoreham and Dover (five ships each). Hannelhoke's ships were the largest and as such this port contributed more mariners (124; one ship has no crew size).

[265] H. J. Hewitt, *Black Prince's expedition*, pp. 40–42, pp.179–81 nos 138–67 are the references he cites for the Prince's fleet. Hewitt only utilises one of the surviving accounts (E101/26/37) and does not include E101/26/36 in his discussion of the preparations of the fleet. He notes E101/26/38, but he argues that this account does not make any mention of the mission the ships recorded on it were engaged in, so he does not include it among the ships that transported the Prince. However, because the account starts on 12 July 1355, it could not be related to the king's and Lancaster's transport fleet of that year because on 10 July they were already at sea having sailed from the Thames estuary. Therefore, the likelihood is that E101/26/38 does indeed record the wages paid to the mariners who had transported the Prince to Gascony.

[266] E101/26/36 is too badly damaged to see many ports although Grimsby, Barton and Swynflete can be made out. All these except Swynflete appear on E101/26/38. Again the true numbers of seamen operating these vessels are difficult to determine due to the damage on the first account. However, assuming that the ships in the fleet had an average crew size of sixteen, the forty-three ships for which no crew sizes is known could be said to add a further 736 mariners to the fleet. It could therefore be tentatively suggested that the east coast ports supplied 140 (74.8%) ships operated by 2,296 (62.5%) mariners, thus making the east coast by far the largest contributor. The port, which provided the most ships, was Great Yarmouth, which contributed twenty (10.6%) ships crewed by 323 (8.7%) mariners. But the largest single ship was the *Seintemaricog* of 200 tuns, commanded by John Wilydon, but owned by Henry Finch of Winchelsea, and manned by fifty mariners, see E101/26/37, m. 3. Finally, it is also known that the Prince himself sailed on one of the above vessels, the *Cristofre*, which is recorded on one of the Exchequer accounts. See E101/26/38; H. J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's expedition*, p. 40; D. Green, *The battle of Poitiers, 1356* (Stroud, 2002) p. 28. Three more ships

The actual size of the army under the Prince is difficult to establish because no muster rolls survive for this campaign.[267] It is known that the Prince, as part of his indenture with the king, agreed to provide 433 men-at-arms and 700 archers, of which 400 were to be mounted and 300 on foot. [268] In addition, the earls of Warwick, Oxford, Salisbury, and Suffolk brought retinues, as did Sir Reginald Cobham and Sir John Lisle. It has been suggested that their combined recruits numbered some 500 men-at-arms and 800 archers, giving an overall strength of 933 men-at-arms and 1,800 archers in the Prince's army.[269] This force would have brought with it some 2,000 horses, assuming that not too many serving personnel purchased their mounts in Bordeaux (which was permitted under the terms of the indenture).[270] This would mean that, on average, each ship in the fleet transported fourteen men and ten horses.

Table 3.3 Numbers of ships involved in transport fleets, 1324–1360

Total number of English ships	3,099
Southern fleet	1,718
Northern fleet	1,381
Foreign ships	59
Total number of mariners	66,276
Southern mariners	37,181
Northern mariners	27,687

Note: The table includes all the ships that served, such as the twenty-one Cinque Port ships that served in 1325, regardless of the fact that these were not strictly transport ships. The king's own ships have been added to those of the southern fleet. The largest number of ports that were asked

were ordered to be prepared: the *James*, the *Gilane* and the *Margret of the Tower*. These were to be manned and made ready for service in the Prince's fleet (C76/33, mm. 9, 12). However, it is difficult to say whether they actually sailed with the Prince.

267 The best guide to the size and composition of the Prince's army can be found in H. J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's expedition*, pp. 14–26 and appendix C, which lists, as far as the sources will allow, the men that served under the Prince at Poitiers.

268 *BPR*, IV, pp. 143–44.

269 D. Green, *Poitiers*, p. 23, who differs slightly from earlier interpretations. For example, A. E. Prince, 'The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', *EHR* 46 (1931), pp. 351–71 estimates that Warwick brought 120 men-at-arms, Suffolk, 60; Salisbury, 55; Cobham, 30; Lisle, 60; Hewitt, *The organisation of war*, p. 35 states that Lisle's retinue numbered 20 knights, 39 esquires and 40 mounted archers and Hewitt places the total strength of the Prince's force at 2,600 men (*Black Prince's expedition*, p. 21). However, given the size of the Prince's transport fleet and by comparing it to those fleets were we know how many men were transported in it is likely that the force numbered some 1,500–2,000 men. The ports north of the Thames provided 4,899 of these mariners while the ports south and west of the Thames contributed 2,949 mariners while foreign ports provided 172.

270 *BPR*, IV, p. 144. It is likely that the number of horses that were shipped to the Gascon expeditions was much smaller than the numbers freighted to the northern campaigns.

to supply ships was eighty-eight in 1324. However, on closer examination the largest number of ports that actually supplied ships to one fleet was the eighty-seven ports that contributed ships to the 1359 transport fleet. Although the table shows that both admiralties contributed roughly the same numbers of ships and mariners, the direct comparative evidence from the 1324–25, 1338–40, 1342 transport fleets and the Crécy ship list show that most transport fleets were composed of ships mainly provided by the south and western ports (for e.g. in 1342 the southern ports supplied 7,051 mariners compared to the 3,369 of the northern ports and 444 ships compared to the 219 of the northern ports). In addition, it must be taken into account the lack of evidence relating to the southern admiralties participation in the major campaigns of 1345, the siege of Calais and the 1359 Reims campaign. If all the evidence material were available for these campaigns it would probably weight the contribution in favour of the south and western ports by 60% to 40%. The table also includes twenty-six ships that were employed to transport diplomatic embassies to the Low Countries in 1337, the Holy Roman Empire from 1338–40, and Brittany in 1341. In addition, there are also a further 194 ships that were used to transport seneschals and king's lieutenants along with their forces to Brittany and Gascony in the years 1342 (Oliver Ingham), 1345 (the earl of Northampton to Brittany), 1345 (Ralph Stafford to Gascony), 1345 (the earl of Derby to Bordeaux), and 1359 (John de Cherleton to Bordeaux). If we include the Prince's fleet with those of the other lieutenants' fleets that sailed between 1337 and 1359 it is possible to say that 413 ships participated in the transportation of these ambassadors, officials and soldiers (this includes the thirteen vessels that transported Ralph Stafford to Bordeaux in 1345). The total number of constables, masters, mariners and pages operating these 413 ships was 8,809. If we make allowances for the 'invisible crews' who served on board thirty-eight of these vessels, the overall number of active seamen could rise to as many as 9,500. Of these 413 vessels it can be stated that 188 ships were contributed by ports north of the Thames and the ports situated south and west of the Thames supplied 215 ships, while five were foreign vessels. See E101/20/16; E101/21/33; E101/23/5; E101/25/3; E101/25/9; E101/27/19; *Foedera*, III, i, pp. 32, 34, 35; *CCR, 1341–43*, pp. 630–31, 651–52, 664, 666, 697–98; *CPR, 1340–43*, pp. 567–68, 570. Finally, 1,408 mariners operated foreign vessels. The total number of mariners includes the estimated 'invisible' mariners from various campaigns, whereas the individual admiralty numbers do not.