



Boydell Press

Chapter Title: The Papacy and the Naval Leagues

Book Title: Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291-1352

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Published by: Boydell & Brewer; Boydell Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt17mvjq5.12>

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The Papacy and the Naval Leagues

We grant to those faithful who proceed with the flotilla or in another fashion in support of the Christians in the regions of Romania against the unbelievers [i.e. the Turks] [...] that [same] forgiveness of their sins which is granted to those who cross over in aid of the Holy Land, and as a reward for the just, we promise them an increase in their eternal salvation.

Pope Clement VI, letter decreeing crusade measures in support of the naval league against the Turks, 30 September 1343.¹

Throughout this discussion of the naval leagues and their strategies, a fundamental question in understanding how they fit into the wider crusading movement needs to be addressed. Contrary to what is commonly thought, the leagues were not papal-led operations from the outset, neither were they always associated with a general crusade to the Holy Land; instead they were initiated by the resident Latin powers of the eastern Mediterranean, largely independent of papal control and with minimal influence from the great powers of western Europe. As a result only some of the participants in these campaigns received the rewards usually associated with a crusade. To understand how the leagues – and crusading against the Turks in general – fitted into wider crusade thinking, it is first necessary to analyse their connection with other papal crusade initiatives. Once this has been undertaken the implementation of crusading mechanisms in the Aegean theatre will be analysed, with specific attention given to the indulgences granted for the leagues and other campaigns against the Turks.

The Leagues in the Context of Papal Crusading Strategy

John XXII and the First Naval League

By the time of the election of John XXII in 1316, the Latin powers in the Aegean had already formed their own initiatives against the Turks. These soon evolved into the concept of a naval league which was adopted by the Venetian government in the mid 1320s. The Venetians set about recruiting other powers to the league and in the sketchy records of the negotiations

¹ *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 78–80, doc. 22.

that followed evidence emerges of formal attempts to bring the papacy into the coalition. The first instances of this seem to have come in the late 1320s when embassies in Venice and at the papal curia discussed the idea of forming a fleet against the Turks.² However, despite these measures, the point of concrete papal commitment to the naval league only came in the late summer of 1333, some ten years after Marino Sanudo had first proposed a provisional flotilla and eight years after the Venetians had adopted the same strategy.

There were several reasons for the pope's reluctance to lend his support to the league. These were interconnected and centre around the position which the Byzantines occupied between the crusade priorities of the French, Angevins and papacy, on the one hand, and those of Venice on the other. First, although the Venetians, the Angevins and the papacy shared a common interest in defending Frankish territories in Greece and the western Aegean, their policies in this regard diverged markedly during the 1320s. The papacy, along with Martino Zaccaria, supported the defence of Angevin Greece from the Catalans and also the Greeks of Mistras, whilst Venice sought peace with these groups and instead focussed its attention on a maritime response to the Turks. Evidence of the papal support of the Angevins can be found in the plans of the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople, Philip of Taranto, in the early 1320s, who repeatedly attempted, but failed, to raise an army to campaign in Achaia.³ The initiative in defending Angevin lands in Greece passed to Philip's younger brother, John of Gravina, who had been invested with the principality of Achaia in 1318.⁴ John's plans reached a climax in 1325 when he managed to lead an expedition to the Morea against the Greeks and Catalans, but despite receiving the support of several Frankish lords upon his arrival in Greece, including Martino Zaccaria and

² In 1328–9 the archbishop of Thebes travelled to Avignon by way of Venice. His mission was to promote an Angevin-led union against the schismatics and infidels in Achaia, but the idea of a galley fleet against the Turks was also discussed: ASVat, *RV* 115, fols 93v–4, ep. 413 (15 Aug 1328); summary in R.-J. Loenertz, 'Athènes et Néopatras: Régestes et documents pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des Duchés catalans (1311–1395)', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 28 (1958), 5–91, at 37, doc. 34; Marino Sanudo, 'Epistolae', ed. Bongars, pp. 312–13 (letter 20), 315–16 (letter 22); Roddy trans., pp. 201–13 (letter 26), 213–17 (letter 27). In 1330 the doge wrote to the pope to secure formal papal support for a naval league: Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 779 (letter 2); Roddy trans., pp. 255–6 (letter 30); *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, p. 434; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 383–4.

³ For these events, see A. Cagesse, *Roberto d'Angiò e i suoi tempi*, 2 vols (Florence, 1922–30), vol. 2, pp. 307, 316.

⁴ Once Philip of Taranto became the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople in 1313, he ceded the principality of Achaia to Matilda of Hainault and her husband Louis of Burgundy. A succession struggle followed the death of Louis in 1316 and the principality was taken from Matilda and granted to John of Gravina in 1318. For these events see Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', pp. 109–15; B. Berg, 'The Moreote expedition of Ferrando of Majorca in the Aragonese Chronicle of Morea', *Byzantion* 55 (1985), 69–90.

the duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, the enemy refused to meet his army in the field and he was forced to return to Italy within a year.⁵ In 1331, a similar campaign was also launched, this time by the titular duke of Athens, Walter of Brienne, for which he and his followers were granted the full crusade indulgence by the pope.⁶ This crusade was intended to wrest the duchy of Athens from the Catalans, but Walter was forced to return to Italy a year later because of financial problems before he could win any meaningful victories.⁷ Throughout this time John XXII made repeated attempts to draw the Venetians into the Angevin-papal coalition, in 1318–20, 1324 and 1328, but Venice declined these overtures on every occasion.⁸ Furthermore, in the early 1330s, despite the pope's insistence, the Republic also refused to support Walter of Brienne's crusade to the Morea, instead choosing to make peace with the Catalans.⁹

The unwillingness of the Venetians to engage with the papal-Angevin initiatives in the Morea is evidence of the wider differences in attitudes towards the Greeks at this time. This leads to the second factor, which was that Venice's plans for a Christian alliance against the Turks depended on the involvement of the Byzantine emperor and his Greek subjects. Considering that a crusade against the Greeks had formed a substantial component of papal policy in the Aegean up to this point, as discussed in Chapter 1, it comes as little surprise that the Byzantines were not yet regarded as trustworthy allies by the pope. Negotiations for church union from 1324 to 1327 had temporarily thawed relations between the Greek and Latin Churches, but after they had broken down papal policy once again reverted to one of hostility towards the Greeks. This was demonstrated by a letter of April 1330, in which John XXII wrote that Andronikos III and the Greek 'schismatics' were threatening Hospitaller Rhodes.¹⁰ Moreover, in a letter of July 1332

⁵ Caggese, *Roberto d'Angiò*, vol. 2, p. 317; Housley, 'Robert the Wise and the naval league of 1334', 549.

⁶ *DOC*, doc. 150 (14 Jun 1330).

⁷ Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, pp. 38–41.

⁸ The Angevin-papal appeals and Venetian refusals are found in *DOC*, doc. 89–91, 94 (1318); *Commerce et expéditions militaires de la France et de Venise au moyen âge*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1880), pp. 43–4 (1319) = vol. 3 of *Mélanges historiques: Choix de documents*, 5 vols (Paris, 1873–86); *DVL*, vol. 1, docs 82–3 (1320); *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, p. 266, bk. 5, docs 62, 66 (1320); *DOC*, doc. 122 (1324); *ASVat*, *RV* 115, fol. 93v (15 Aug 1328); Housley, 'Robert the Wise and the naval league of 1334', 551.

⁹ *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 2, pp. 38–9, bk. 15, docs 126–7.

¹⁰ John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 4174, 4308–10. A year later the pope awarded indulgences to those who would join a Hospitaller *passagium* to the East: *ASVat*, *RV* 116, fol. 218v, ep. 954; summary in John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 4604 (19 June 1331). This may have been connected to the defence of Rhodes, although it seems more likely that it was issued in connection with a licence for the Hospitallers to visit the Holy Sepulchre issued a few days earlier: John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 4591 (11 June 1331).

(only a year before the final papal agreement to take part in the league) the pope condemned the Venetians for harbouring and welcoming 'schismatics and enemies of God' into their lands, presumably referring to the Republic's conciliatory attitude to the Greeks and Catalans. On this occasion the pope even went as far as to state that the depredations the Venetians were suffering at the hands of the Turks were a result of divine retribution, meted out for a lack of vigilance towards these 'schismatics and heretics'.¹¹

Relations with Byzantium also hint at another factor. In the late 1320s John XXII had shifted his attention increasingly towards a crusade to recover Jerusalem, promoted by the new French King, Philip VI of Valois. Philip immediately showed an enthusiasm for such a mission and from 1328 to 1333 he was granted papal support, in the form of church tithes and indulgences, for his *passagium generale* which initially was to depart before March 1334.¹² It was widely believed that the agreement of church union with the Byzantines would be greatly beneficial to a Holy Land crusade. Union would, for example, enable Latin Christians to focus all of their attention on the liberation of Jerusalem, to which it was hoped the Byzantines would also lend their assistance.¹³ By the time preparations were begun for Philip VI's crusade the earlier negotiations for church union had broken down, but a few years later, on the eve of the scheduled departures of the league and the Holy Land crusade in 1332–4, negotiations for church union were once again opened with the Byzantine emperor. This was again justified on the basis that union would be beneficial to the liberation of Jerusalem, but also that it would help rid the Aegean of the Turkish threat.¹⁴ Although Andronikos III never accepted the proposals, it seems that union was still perceived by the pope as a pre-requisite to the consignment of assistance to Byzantium and therefore of papal commitment to the league. This, along with papal preference for an Angevin or Brienne campaign in the Morea, shows that Venetian policy in regard to the Greeks was out of step with that of the papacy and helps to explain why John XXII did not commit to an initiative led by the Venetians until the very last moment.

¹¹ *AE*, vol. 24, p. 499, ch. 23.

¹² See *AE*, vol. 24, pp. 478–80, ch. 30; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 13, doc. 58207 (5 Dec 1331); John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 5207–5227 (26 Jul 1333); *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 68–70, doc. 18; J.B. Henneman, *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322–1356* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 91–105; Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', 25–52.

¹³ See, for example, Marino Sanudo, 'Epistolae', ed. Bongars, pp. 290–1 (letter 2), 294–7 (letter 4), 299 (letter 7), 299–300 (letter 8), 301 (letter 9); Roddy trans. pp. 113–15 (letter 2), 116–20 (letter 3), 123–28 (letter 6), 136–45 (letter 8), 145–49 (letter 9).

¹⁴ John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 12, docs 60898–900, 61258; *AE*, vol. 24, pp. 515–16, ch. 19; Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', pp. 791–9 (letter 5); 799–808 (letter 6); Roddy trans., pp. 272–81 (letter 33), pp. 281–92 (letter 34); Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 390.

If union negotiations and divergent attitudes towards the Greeks help to explain why the pope was reluctant to lend his support to the league, they do not necessarily explain why the papacy committed to the league when it did, especially as church union was never agreed. In order to answer this question, we need to look at an overarching requirement for papal support of the naval league: that is, the linking of it to the larger Franco-papal campaign to the Holy Land. The union negotiations of 1332–4 linked the crusade to Jerusalem with the fight against the Turks, but even before they were undertaken the Venetians had already taken care to connect the two campaigns explicitly in a way that was not dependent on reconciliation with the Greeks. This came in November 1331 when Philip VI wrote to Doge Giovanni Soranzo for logistical advice concerning his proposed crusade.¹⁵ Soranzo took this opportunity to expand his plans for the naval league by linking it to the forthcoming French expedition; in his reply of May 1332, he provided the king with the advice he requested for the recovery of the Holy Land and also stressed the need to blockade Mamluk ports and protect the Aegean from the Turks, ‘the most evil persecutors of the Christian faith’. In particular, the doge stressed that provisions would be needed from the Black Sea if the general crusade to the Holyland was to succeed. The king would therefore need to help drive the Turks and their fleets from the Aegean before the *passagium generale* could depart. The notion of a preparatory blockade on Egypt was not original in itself, but the doge’s letter marks the first occasion on which it was recommended that a fleet intended for combating Turkish piracy could be used as a *passagium particulare* to pave the way for a crusade to the Holy Land. By doing this, the Venetians directly linked the Turkish expansion into the Aegean with the liberation of Jerusalem – the clearest example yet that the concept of a fleet intended to enforce the trade embargo had evolved into an anti-Turkish league.¹⁶

It is only after the Franco-Venetian negotiations of 1331–2 that the pope began to show a firm interest in supporting the naval league, as it could now be linked with the French *passagium generale* and incorporated into a wider, three tiered crusade. The first wave would be the naval league, followed by another *passagium particulare* (to land a provisional force of troops in Asia Minor), and then finally the *passagium generale* led by Philip of France, which was now to depart for the Holy Land in August 1336.¹⁷ Evidently, the king and the pope recognized that the chance to participate in a league

¹⁵ DVL, vol. I, doc. 109.

¹⁶ DVL, vol. I, doc. 110. The month before this letter was sent, Marino Sanudo had also written to Philip VI in a similar vein, advocating that a league be formed to combat the Turks as a precursor to the main crusade, although he was less explicit about the reasons why the Turks needed to be subdued: F. Kunstmann, ‘Studien über Marino Sanudo’, 791–8 (letter 5); Roddy trans., pp. 272–81 (letter 33).

¹⁷ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 24–6.

against the Turks, for which the Venetians had already done the majority of the organization, was too good an opportunity to miss, especially when the league could prove integral to the success of a general crusade as the doge had suggested. In late August 1333, John XXII took the first active steps in assisting the Venetian league by appealing for more rulers to join the Christian alliance.¹⁸ At the same time the pope wrote to the doge that clerical ambassadors had been dispatched to Venice to discuss the participation of the papacy in the coalition.¹⁹ It is also at this point that John XXII urged Andronikos III to accept the union of churches and a common front against the Turks.²⁰ Finally, on 10 October he wrote of the Turkish threat to the archbishop of Embrun, whom he sent to negotiate the formation of a league with the doge and Robert of Naples.²¹ The embassy from the papal curia arrived in Venice in December, where logistical considerations were agreed upon, and in the early months of 1334, Venetian and Hospitaller ambassadors at the papal curia finally settled the arrangements for the league.²²

In March a contract was drawn up on behalf of John XXII which commissioned the construction and armament of four galleys in Marseille for the league. Amongst other things, each galley was to consist of between 174 and 180 oars and was to carry twenty-five marines plus retainers, scribes and other suitable officials, and adequate provisions and equipment were to be supplied. Moreover, the crews were expected to fight on land and sea and to obey every command of the pope. These galleys, which would each cost 600 florins a month to maintain, were to join four more from the king of France before sailing to the Aegean.²³ In the same month, the French knight John of Cepoy was appointed as the captain of the Franco-papal flotilla and indulgences were granted to him and those who were to accompany him overseas.²⁴ The papacy was now fully committed to the expedition

¹⁸ John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 5247, 5324; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 12, doc. 60781; Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 136–8, doc. 20. Philip of France joined the league in November 1333; *Commerce et expéditions*, ed. Mas Latrie, vol. 3, pp. 101–4, docs 3–4; G. Tabacco, *La casa di Francia nell'azione politica di Papa Giovanni XXII* (Rome, 1953), pp. 312–36; Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', 32–7.

¹⁹ *AE*, vol. 24, pp. 511–12, ch. 13; *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 115; Ivanov, 'Sancta Unio', 162.

²⁰ See above, note 14.

²¹ *AE*, vol. 24, pp. 513–14, ch. 15.

²² *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 124; Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 139–41, bk. 16, doc. 27; Theotokes, 'E prôte summachia', 287–8; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 181–2.

²³ *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 71–4, doc. 20.

²⁴ Three documents announcing Cepoy's appointment as captain were dispatched on 19 May 1334: *AE*, vol. 25, p. 4, ch. 10; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 5485–6; summaries in John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 5484; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 13, doc. 63890. The indulgences were issued on the same day: Appendix, doc. 4, pp. 160–1; ASVat, *RA* 46, fol. 560v; *RV* 107, fol. 243r, ep. 729–30; summaries in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 13, docs 63170–1.

and had decreed spiritual rewards for the participants. However, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, it should be understood that the spiritual privileges granted for the league were less than those awarded for Philip VI's crusade to the Holy Land, and probably unconnected to that mission. Nevertheless, the creation of a united naval league, at a time when most other attempts to form any kind of coherent front against the Turks had failed, was in many ways a remarkable success. It proved that by the 1330s the threat of the Turks had permeated beyond the Latin states of Romania to the courts of both France and the papacy. However, for both John XXII and Philip VI, a crusade against the Turks still ranked far below one aimed at recovering Jerusalem. Venice had after all been forced to connect the naval league to the recovery of the Holy Land in order to secure their participation. As Housley has suggested, the 1334 league constitutes the strongest evidence yet of the shift in crusade strategy from complicated and expensive plans to recover the Holy Land to expeditions organized first and foremost by the Latin powers with a vested interest in the East – in this case the merchant crusaders of Venice.²⁵ As a consequence, the first naval league was a Venetian project until just a few months before it sailed to the Aegean. John XXII had certainly not agreed to contribute galleys, nor had he granted any papal privileges for the project before this time, both of which make clear that his role in planning the league has traditionally been overstated.²⁶

The Reduction of Papal Involvement under Benedict XII

Benedict XII was elected pope on 8 January 1335, only a few months after the victory of the league at Adramyttion. Initially, the new pope gave the crusade plans he had inherited his full support. He wrote to various Latin rulers about the equipping of galleys for the naval league, granted indulgences to the new papal captain Hugh Quiéret and even ordered the construction of four papal galleys in Marseille.²⁷ These galleys, to be accompanied by five provided by the French, were to set out in May and serve

²⁵ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 25; Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', 184.

²⁶ Examples of the overstated influence of the papacy in these years include: Nicol, *Last Centuries*, p. 177, who implied that the initiative for organizing the league fell to the pope after Venice's initial proposals of 1327. This argument has been followed by Geanakoplos, who commented that the pope's role before 1334 had been 'decisive behind the scenes during earlier negotiations', and Housley, who wrote that Venice had prepared the league 'under the papal aegis' in 1330–1; Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades', p. 51; Housley, 'Robert the Wise and the naval league of 1334', 551. A revised sequence of events is given by Ivanov, '*Sancta Unio*', esp. 162–7.

²⁷ These indulgences were identical to those granted to John of Cepoy in the previous year: ASVat, RV 119, fols 132–3, ep. 343–8 (20 April 1335); summaries in Benedict XII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 1, docs 2247–50, 2253. For the galleys, see Benedict XII, *Lettres à la France*, docs 28, 40, 54; Benedict XII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 1, doc. 2467.

in the Aegean for five months. Benedict also lent support to the general passage being organized by Philip VI to the Holy Land by confirming his predecessor's bulls relating to the crusade, including the continuation of the clerical tenth for the expedition.²⁸

After this brief flurry of activity, however, a number of external factors dampened Benedict's enthusiasm for the crusade and prevented a naval league, or any other campaign to the East, from materializing. The most serious of these were the escalation of the conflict between France and England, marking the beginning of the Hundred Years' War, and the difficulties afflicting the financial institutions of Europe, which would eventually lead to the collapse of the Italian banking houses in the 1340s. In the case of the latter, this had a particularly detrimental effect on the relationship between the Hospitallers and the papacy. The Order had amassed massive debts during its seizure of Rhodes, but it had returned to solvency in around 1335 after making repeated payments to the Florentine banking houses. After this point it even amassed a credit with the banks, who until at least 1339 also acted as the official bankers to the papacy. Benedict XII was aware of the difficulties the banking houses were experiencing in the 1330s, and was unwilling to jeopardize their precarious position by allowing the Hospitallers to expend the credit they had amassed on a prolonged campaign against the Turks.²⁹

The outbreak of war with England resulted in the French galleys, which had been equipped for use against the Turks, being diverted to the English Channel in early 1336, which scuppered the plans for a renewed naval league in the Aegean.³⁰ At this point, the preparations for Philip VI's general passage to the Holy Land also began to break down because of financial problems and the emerging Anglo-French war. For the papacy and the French Crown, this was a repeat of the same old story; King Philip required security with England and sufficient church finance before fully committing to a general passage, but Benedict was unwilling to allow the crusade tenth to be used for purposes not directly linked with the crusade, especially when Europe was in such a state of disorder. Even if the French considered their own security as an integral prerequisite for the general passage, the papacy had

²⁸ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 27–9; Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', 37–8.

²⁹ See Carr, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes', pp. 172–3; A.T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers and their Florentine bankers: 1306–1346', in *Karrissime Gotifride: Historical Essays Presented to Professor Godfrey Wettinger on his Seventieth Birthday*, ed. P. Xuerab (Msida, 1999), pp. 17–24, at pp. 21–2 (repr. in Idem, *Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2007), item VI); E.S. Hunt, *The Medieval Super Companies: A Study of the Peruzzi Company of Florence* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 134–9, 234–5.

³⁰ See de la Roncière, *Histoire de la Marine Française*, vol. 1, pp. 389–91; Depréz, *Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans*, p. 127; Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', 47; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 34.

refused to grant church tenths for the defence of France.³¹ In March 1336, Benedict wrote to the French king that the Holy Land crusade had been cancelled.³² Benedict, unlike his predecessor, was concerned with church reform and unity rather than the suppression of the infidel, a factor which characterized his policies in the eastern Mediterranean.³³ For example, his primary initiatives in the region concerned the combating of the Catalan 'schismatics', and bringing the Greeks and Armenians back into the fold of Rome, rather than resisting the Turks in the Aegean, an area to which he gave comparatively little attention.³⁴

Despite these difficulties and the cancellation of the crusade plans, this period did not mark the end of appeals from the Latin rulers in the East for papal assistance in reassembling the naval league. In 1336, for example, the Knights Hospitallers and the Venetians sent ambassadors to the papal curia to ask for support in forming an allied fleet in the Aegean, but these overtures were rejected by the pope. The Hospitallers and Venetians did still manage to assemble a small fleet at Crete in the summer of that year, but after failing to receive any papal support they undertook no concerted action in the Aegean.³⁵ In fact, this response was to be characteristic of Benedict's pontificate, as is demonstrated by his unwillingness to aid Hugh of Cyprus, the most active of the eastern rulers in resisting the Turks at this time. According to a sixteenth-century continuation of the *Liber Pontificalis*, in 1336 and again in 1337, Hugh sent fleets of galleys against the Karaman Turks, defeating them on both occasions and even managing to kill a prominent Turkish captain.³⁶ Another victory (or possibly the same one) was reported in a papal letter of February 1338, where Hugh was praised for his

³¹ For this in general see H. Jenkins, 'Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII: 1334–1342' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1933), pp. 5–25, 34–5.

³² Benedict XII, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 786; *AE*, vol. 25, p. 78, ch. 44. Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', 44–7; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 29, 180–1; Jenkins, *Papal Efforts for Peace*, pp. 23–5; Depréz, *Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans*, pp. 23–4, 410–13.

³³ See F. Giunta, 'Benedetto XII e la crociata', *Anuario de estudios medievales* 3 (1966), 215–34; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 27–31; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers and their Florentine bankers', pp. 21–2.

³⁴ For Benedict's policies in regard to the Greeks, Catalans and Armenians see Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy*, pp. 196–9; Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades', pp. 53–7; Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, pp. 42–7.

³⁵ ASVen, *Deliberazioni Misti del Senato* 17, fol. 60v (8 Jun 1336); *Venezia-senato: deliberazioni miste*, ed. F.-X. Leduc *et al.*, 20 vols (Venice, 2004 – ongoing), vol. 4 (*Registre XVII, 1335–1339*), pp. 250–2, docs. 664–7; A.T. Luttrell, 'Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the fourteenth century', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 13 (1958), 195–212, at 203 (repr. in Idem, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West, 1291–1440: Collected Studies*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1978), V).

³⁶ *Le Liber Pontificalis*, vol. 2, p. 527; Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, p. 100.

‘glorious victory against the Turks, the blasphemers of the Christian name’.³⁷ A few years later, the travel writer Ludolf of Sudheim even reported that many of the coastal towns of southern Asia Minor were paying tribute to him.³⁸ However, despite Hugh’s actions, papal support for Cyprus was not forthcoming, which led the king in 1341 to take the initiative of dispatching an ambassador, the bishop of Limassol, Lamberto Baldwin della Cecca, to Rhodes and Venice in order to establish a new coalition and to put pressure on the pope for his support.³⁹ From the correspondence of Lamberto it is apparent that the Hospitallers had also (unsuccessfully) appealed to the pope repeatedly for assistance against the Turks in these later years and that the Venetians were also willing to add their weight to a coalition and to make petitions at the papal curia.⁴⁰

In the end these appeals to the pope came too late, as in April 1342, before any action could be taken, Benedict XII died, leaving his response to the Cypriot embassy unknown. Nevertheless, the pope’s unwillingness to contribute to any revival of the league had resulted in the resident Latin powers taking the initiative for themselves. Therefore, because Benedict’s pontificate marked the greatest disassociation between the papacy and the plans to protect the Latin East during this period, it became the time when the organization and the initiation of crusades was further transferred to the merchant crusaders, who formed strategies increasingly independent of the papacy.

Clement VI and the Crusade of Smyrna

It is ironic that the detachment of the papacy from the defence of the Latin East under Benedict XII actually contributed to the swift formation of a new naval league only a year after his death in 1342. This occurred when the new pope, Clement VI, adopted the plans first instigated by Hugh of

³⁷ Benedict XII, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 1673; *AE*, vol. 25, p. 140, ch. 72; Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, p. 100; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 2, p. 299.

³⁸ Ludolf of Sudheim, ‘De itinere Terre Sancte’, p. 337; Stewart trans., p. 44. It has been claimed that a report was written in 1340 to one of Benedict’s cardinals by Martino Zaccaria which lists sixteen galleys serving overseas, eight of which were patrolling the waters of Cyprus. However, this document – copied into an appendix of the registers of Benedict XII – was in fact written by Manuel Zaccaria during the Apostolic vacancy in 1292–4: see Ch. 3, note 9; ASVat, *RA* 54, fols 467v–468; summary in Benedict XII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 2, doc. 8378; Richard, ‘Le royaume de Chypre et l’embargo’, p. 123; cf. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, p. 100.

³⁹ The letter is published in L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l’île de Chypre*, vol. 2, pp. 180–1; summary in *I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia regesti*, ed. R. Predelli, 4 vols (Venice, 1876–83), vol. 2, doc. 563.

⁴⁰ The letter is published in G. Fedalto, *La chiesa latina in Oriente*, 3 vols (Verona, 1973–8), vol. 3, p. 51; Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, pp. 100–1; Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus*, p. 158.

Cyprus for a league with the Hospitallers and Venice. In this sense, Clement's participation in the 1343 league bears a close resemblance to that of John XXII ten years earlier, in that much of the groundwork had already been undertaken. However, from the very outset, Clement's involvement in the league was far greater than that of his predecessor, especially in terms of finance, organization, level of control asserted over the fleet and privileges granted to the participants.

Clement's commitment to the league is not surprising considering his dedication to crusading, evidence of which can be found in his earlier life when, as archbishop of Rouen, he had preached a sermon in Paris in 1332 after which King Philip VI had taken the cross for his aborted crusade to the Holy Land. Moreover, the pope's skills as a diplomat undoubtedly enabled him to progress negotiations for the expedition quickly, ultimately allowing him to succeed in launching a successful crusade to the East where many others had failed.⁴¹ This is demonstrated in the earliest months of his pontificate, when Clement took measures to secure Venetian participation in the league and also wrote letters of encouragement to the other prospective members, reminding them of the threat posed by the Turks and the necessity for naval action against them.⁴² The pope also took steps to ensure that he maintained greater control over the league than John XXII had by appointing a papal legate, the patriarch of Constantinople, Henry of Asti, as the head of the fleet; a measure not taken in the league of 1334.⁴³ To further ensure papal authority, instructions were sent to the various ecclesiastical and lay authorities involved in the enterprise, including the captains and patrons of the galleys, ordering them to accept Henry's authority under penalty of ecclesiastical censure.⁴⁴ At this point, the old papal favourite Martino Zaccaria was appointed as captain of the papal galleys for the league.⁴⁵ To ensure the success of the expedition the pope also made attempts to encourage peace within Christendom before the fleet set out. The government of Genoa was asked to cease hostilities against King Hugh of Cyprus, who was apparently willing to make amends for past injustices in the interests of the faith.⁴⁶

⁴¹ For more on Clement's early career and character, see Wood, *Clement VI*, esp. pp. 1–18; Mollat, *The Popes at Avignon*, pp. 37–42; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 121–2.

⁴² ASVat, RV 157, fols 1v–3v, ep. 19–25; RV 62, fols 48–50v; summaries in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 332, 333–8, 341, 414–17; Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 216–19, bk. 20, doc. 9; Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 142; *I libri memoriali*, vol. 2, p. 117, bk. 4, doc. 18; Loenertz, *Les Ghisi*, pp. 162–3, 306–7; Demurger, 'Le pape Clément VI et l'Orient', 208–9.

⁴³ DOC, doc. 181; summary in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 340.

⁴⁴ See the summaries in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 340, 388–90, 404–13 and also J. Muldoon, 'The Avignon Papacy and the frontiers of Christendom: The evidence of Vatican Register 62', *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 17 (1979), 125–95, at 164–6.

⁴⁵ Appendix 4, doc. 5, pp. 161–2; Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 368, 404–5.

⁴⁶ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 360.

Henry of Asti was instructed to attempt to pacify relations between the Catalans of Athens and Walter of Brienne, to ensure peace in Greece.⁴⁷ The Byzantines were repeatedly called on to put an end to the church schism and help aid the league.⁴⁸ Above all, the kings of France and England were urged to respect the recently signed Truce of Malestroit and stem the rising tide of war which threatened to engulf northern Europe.⁴⁹

When the fleet was active in the Aegean, Clement continued in his attempts to maintain authority over its actions, evidence of which exists in the large number of papal letters dispatched from Avignon to the papal legate and the other members of the league. For example, he wrote to Henry of Asti on several occasions ordering him to ensure that the league was not diverted from action against the Turks, especially by Martino Zaccaria whom he suspected of attempting to recover his old domain of Chios.⁵⁰ After the death of the crusade leaders, including Martino Zaccaria and Henry of Asti in January 1345, the pope was also quick to appoint new officials for the league, as well as to console the crusaders who remained at Smyrna.⁵¹ Clement VI's involvement increased even further during the campaign of Humbert of Viennois to Romania when he advised the dauphin on many strategic matters, including the negotiations with the Byzantines over the use of Chios as a base of operations.⁵² Even during the final years of the Smyrna campaign, when the crusaders sought a truce with the Aydin-oglus, the pope continued to maintain close control over what was to be agreed.⁵³

In terms of finance, Clement also committed more church money to the league than any of his predecessors. In 1343 and 1345 he levied a tithe on ecclesiastical benefices in over sixty dioceses in Europe and the East for the league against the Turks.⁵⁴ This was greater than any crusade tithe levied since the Vienne tenth of 1312 and constituted the first to be levied especially for a crusade against the Turks. The pope also went to great lengths raising money through other means, such as by allowing spiritual privileges to be made available in exchange for payment. In particular Clement offered a plenary indulgence to all who would make a financial contribution to the expedition equal to that which they would have spent if they had campaigned for one year.⁵⁵ In terms of contribution, according to Housley, the money

⁴⁷ *DOC*, doc. 182–3; summary in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 465.

⁴⁸ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 466–71, 490–3, 522–3, 547.

⁴⁹ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 448–52; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 189; Demurger, 'Le pape Clément VI et l'Orient', 211.

⁵⁰ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 405, 1113–14, 1464.

⁵¹ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 1570, 1582, 1704.

⁵² Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 237–51.

⁵³ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 253–8.

⁵⁴ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 368–70, 464, 559, vol. 2, docs 1855–6, 2203–6.

⁵⁵ *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 78–80, doc. 22.

Clement spent on the maintenance of the papal galleys for the expedition represented 'the most substantial papal contribution to the defence of the Christian East' for the entire period of the Avignon Papacy.⁵⁶ The specific amount spent on the Smyrna expedition was probably in the region of 110,000–150,000 florins which, although considerably less than the amount spent on the pope's Italian wars, still constituted a significant proportion of the overall papal budget.⁵⁷ In fact, during the latter years of the Crusade, Clement claimed that financial support from the Church could no longer be relied upon because the 'tithes and other subsidies' could not be raised.⁵⁸

The pope also decreed the most generous spiritual rewards yet for a campaign against the Turks, the details and effects of which will be discussed later in this chapter, and he made compromises which his predecessors had been unwilling to make in the interests of the Crusade. In June 1346, at Humbert's request, the pope agreed to suspend the sentences of excommunication and interdict imposed on the Catalan Company for three years in the hope that they too would contribute to the aid of the crusaders at Smyrna.⁵⁹ This is in stark contrast to Benedict XII, who obstinately refused to incorporate the Catalan Company into any plan for the defence of the Latin East, and in 1339 even summoned Archbishop Isnard of Thebes to Avignon to stand trial for wrongfully relaxing the ban of excommunication.⁶⁰ Clement was also not ignorant of the restrictions on trade caused by the Crusade of Smyrna and the aggressive Tartar policies in the Black Sea. These were seriously compromising the ability of the Venetians and others to commit to the league, so throughout the duration of the campaign he granted the Republic and other crusaders trade licences allowing them to trade with Mamluk lands, a measure which his predecessors had been reluctant to take.⁶¹ Bearing this in mind it is reasonable to conclude that Clement did not envisage the Smyrna crusade as forming part of a wider strategy to conquer Jerusalem, as John XXII considered the first naval league. In fact Clement only once – in 1348 – mentioned the possibility of recovering the Holy Land at the time of the Smyrna expedition, but even on this occasion there is little evidence to suggest that the campaign was seriously considered

⁵⁶ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 138, 196–8. See also Demurger, 'Le pape Clément VI et l'Orient', 210–11; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers and their Florentine bankers', pp. 21–2.

⁵⁷ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 301–2; cf. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 184–7.

⁵⁸ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, doc. 2957; Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, docs 2024, 2060.

⁵⁹ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, docs 2580–95; *DOC*, docs 188–9; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 205–6; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 255–6.

⁶⁰ See Setton, *The Catalan Domination of Athens*, pp. 45–6.

⁶¹ These trade licences are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, pp. 132–7.

as forming part of a preliminary crusade to Jerusalem, or that, crucially, contemporaries ever viewed it in that manner.⁶²

The position of the leagues in the wider context of papal crusading strategy was therefore a complicated and sometimes ambiguous one. For the league of 1333–4, it is clear that the campaign was first and foremost a Venetian initiative to reduce Turkish piracy in the Aegean. It is only after it was suggested as a *passagium particulare* for a general crusade to the Holy Land that it began to assume any of the characteristics of a crusade, and even then it clearly ranked below an expedition to liberate Jerusalem. The second league was, however, a different matter altogether. It was regarded as an expedition largely separate from attempts to liberate the Holy Land, but still enjoyed greater papal involvement than any of the previous Aegean campaigns. Nevertheless, the leagues were ultimately a product of the Latin powers of the East and the new breed of merchant crusader who made up their numbers.

Crusade Mechanisms in the Aegean Theatre

Now that the level of papal involvement in the naval leagues has been outlined, it is possible to undertake a detailed analysis of the crusade mechanisms allocated for them. These can subsequently be compared with those decreed for other campaigns in the Aegean as well as elsewhere. These mechanisms included the papal proclamation of an expedition and the preaching of the cross, the granting of indulgences and other privileges to participants, the taking of the cross and the crusade vow by recruits, and the raising of funds through tithes, donations and the redemption of vows.⁶³ Most of these mechanisms have been touched on already and in many senses reflect the level of papal involvement in the leagues, as outlined above. However, the mechanisms differed considerably from campaign to campaign and benefit from a more thorough analysis. Indulgences, for example, were not always the same; on some occasions participants were awarded the ‘full’ plenary indulgence given to crusaders for the Holy Land, but sometimes only lesser spiritual privileges were allocated, such as a plenary indulgence in the case of death on campaign, or for a specific duration of service (see the examples in Appendix). In addition, the status of the recipients was not always equal or clearly defined; for some campaigns it was stipulated that all contributors would benefit from papal benefits, but for others only

⁶² See Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 1605; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 32; cf. Demurger, ‘Le pape Clément VI et l’Orient’, 207–14, esp. 212–14; Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 914.

⁶³ For more on crusade mechanisms, see J.S.C. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 4th edition (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 27–48, 53–69.

specific individuals or contingents were singled out. Finally, some of these privileges were issued on petition by those who were fighting or seeking to recruit crusaders, whereas some were granted at the behest of the papacy. Thus, when analysed in detail these mechanisms reveal the subtle variations between the leagues and other initiatives against the Turks, as well as the spiritual priorities and concerns of the crusaders who participated in them.

Of these mechanisms the indulgence is an especially revealing indicator. It was the most important privilege for participants, in that it was widely understood to be the complete cleansing of sin which guaranteed the crusader access to heaven.⁶⁴ By the end of the twelfth century a plenary indulgence (full remission of sins) was granted to crusaders going to the Holy Land and those who paid for others to go in their place. Indulgences were also granted for fighting in other theatres, such as against the Moors in Iberia, heretics in southern France, or pagans in the Baltic. In the Aegean, the crusade indulgence was first granted in 1205 by Innocent III to those who fought in support of the Latin empire, and then more widely by his successor Honorius III who extended spiritual privileges as the position of the Latins in Romania became increasingly imperilled. Once Constantinople was recovered by the Byzantines in 1261, plenary indulgences were then granted to those who would fight against the Greeks in order to restore the Latin empire.⁶⁵ This occurred in 1304 and 1306, when indulgences were granted by Benedict XI and Clement V to those who would support Charles of Valois in his planned expedition to Constantinople, discussed in Chapter 1. In 1312 similar indulgences were extended to his son-in-law Philip of Taranto for his mission to Greece, planned in conjunction with Philip VI's crusade to the Holy Land. A few years earlier, in 1308, Clement had also granted indulgences for the Hospitaller *passagium* to the East, but Rhodes and the Greeks were not designated as the target of that mission.⁶⁶ By the 1320s indulgences began to be issued for fighting against the Turks, first by John XXII in November 1322 in the principality of Achaia, and then a month later for the defence of Cilician Armenia and Cyprus. In 1323 and 1325, indulgences were extended to those fighting with the Zaccaria for the defence of Chios and the neighbouring lands, and they were also granted for the first naval league in 1334 and for the aborted follow-up campaign a year

⁶⁴ The indulgence and other privileges have been summarized by Chrissis, 'New frontiers', pp. 21–3. For the crusade indulgence in general, see J.A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison, 1969), pp. 145–53; M. Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre: 1244–1291* (Leiden, 1975), pp. 52–98. On indulgences issued during the Avignon period, see Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 124–58.

⁶⁵ For more on the implementation of indulgences in Romania, see Chrissis, 'New frontiers', pp. 22–33; Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece, passim*.

⁶⁶ See Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 3, docs. 2988–90. For more on the preaching of the Hospitaller *passagium*, see Georgiou, 'Propagating the Hospitallers', *passagium*, pp. 53–63.

later. Finally in 1343 Clement VI issued indulgences for his great expedition which would capture the harbour-fortress of Smyrna a year later.⁶⁷

Indulgences *in articulo mortis*, 1322–1334

To look specifically at the conditions attached to these indulgences and the other mechanisms associated with these campaigns, it is worth noting that the planned crusades to Greece and Constantinople in 1304–6 and 1312 followed a long tradition of crusading against the Greeks and were themselves intended to help pave the way for a general passage to the Holy Land.⁶⁸ Because of this, full crusade preaching was decreed, including the taking of the cross by participants, and plenary indulgences equal to those granted for crusaders going to the Holy Land were issued. This contrasts with the status of the earliest papal-endorsed actions against the Turks, authorized by John XXII. For these there was no preaching of the cross or the taking of vows by recruits and full remission of sins was only awarded to those who would die in ‘war or battle’ or of wounds received thereafter and not solely for participation. These are indulgences granted *in articulo mortis*.

It should also be highlighted here that indulgences *in articulo mortis* were all awarded on petition, which meant that the recipients (or their representatives) had visited the papal chancery to make a successful supplication, usually in the presence of the pope. Because of this, these privileges should be seen as representing the initiatives of the recipients, rather than the papacy. As such, when extracts of the original petitions survive, they can be extremely useful in revealing how merchant crusaders projected their own motivations to the pope. As Housley has suggested, indulgences *in articulo mortis* had become the standard papal response to a situation which required some spiritual reward for military service, but could not be afforded full-scale crusade preaching; either because it would not benefit from such a measure, or because the Church could not allow for the necessary expense or organization. As a result, the papal curia was far more liberal in its granting of indulgences *in articulo mortis* than in preaching a general crusade. These indulgences were also less complicated for the recipient; it is unlikely that any took the cross, since the legal framework of the vow would be hard to implement. Instead the soldier would be granted the indulgence at the point of death, after a priest had heard his confession.⁶⁹

The first instances of indulgences *in articulo mortis* being decreed for fighting against the Turks came in 1322 when they were awarded to ‘all

⁶⁷ These indulgences are summarized in Appendix, pp. 149–52.

⁶⁸ *Le registre de Benoît XI*, doc. 1007 (20 Jun 1304); Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 1, doc. 247 (14 Jan 1306); Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 7, doc. 7893 (7 May 1312). For more on this, see Chapter 1, pp. 27–31.

⁶⁹ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 112–13, 132–3.

of the faithful of Christ located throughout the principality of Achaia'.⁷⁰ These were, however, not granted for fighting exclusively against the Turks, but also for combating 'the schismatic Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans [...] and other diverse nations of infidels'. The exact identity of the 'faithful' in Achaia is unfortunately unclear. It is possible that they were Angevin vassals who had sought the privileges for the ongoing campaigns in the region, such as those planned by Philip of Taranto and John of Gravina. However, the absence of the Catalan Company from this bull of indulgence makes this far from certain: the Catalans were the primary threat to Angevin interests at this time and it seems unlikely that they would have been omitted from the indulgence if it was in any way connected to them.⁷¹ Still, these indulgences are illustrative in another manner. They demonstrate that although some residents in Achaia were concerned with the threat posed by the Turks, the need to defend the region from the Greeks, Bulgars and others was regarded as being equally important.

A month later John XXII granted plenary indulgences 'as for the Holy Land' to those who fought in aid of the kingdoms of Cyprus and Armenia against the Mamluks and 'other infidels', which included the Tartars and possibly the Karaman Turks, but it was not for another year that he would decree spiritual privileges for fighting specifically against the maritime beyliks in the Aegean.⁷² On this occasion, indulgences for three years were allocated to Martino Zaccaria and those who served under him (re-issued in 1325).⁷³ Like the Achaia indulgences these were awarded *in articulo mortis* and were not accompanied by full crusade preaching. But in contrast to the earlier indulgences, on this occasion the pope was far more specific in identifying the intended recipients and their target. As the letter reads, fighters were to be recruited specifically from the Aegean and Black Sea regions ('all those faithful to Christ who could be found from the island of Crete all the way to the state of Caffa') and they were to serve Martino Zaccaria against the 'Turks and other infidels' on Chios and the lands nearby (it is unclear who these 'other infidels' were). In addition, the pope also awarded Martino protection against wayward Christians and potential rivals. This is

⁷⁰ Appendix 4, doc. 2, pp. 158–9; ASVat, RA 18, fol. 152v, ep. 209; RV 74, fol. 93v, ep. 209 (20 Dec 1322); summary in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 4, doc. 16672.

⁷¹ Cf. the comments of Housley, 'Angevin Naples and the defence of the Latin East', 549, n. 6.

⁷² The indulgences were awarded to those 'who go in aid and succour of the kingdoms of Armenia and Cyprus against the [Mamluk] Sultan and other infidels'. The 'other infidels' referred certainly to the Tartars, who are mentioned often in the bulls, but possibly also to the emir of Karaman (*Haramanus Turcomanorum*) referred to in one of the documents: John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 2, docs. 1571–3, the reference to Karaman is in doc. 1572, col. 208.

⁷³ Appendix 4, doc. 3, pp. 159–60; Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', 344–5, doc. 5 (20 Feb 1323); ASVat, RA 22, fol. 450v; RV 78, ep. 882 (28 Apr 1325); summaries in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 4, doc. 16977, vol. 5, doc. 22117.

seen in the final clause of the letter, which decreed that anyone who formed an 'alliance, association or coalition' with the Turks and attacked Martino Zaccaria, his possessions, or any of those who were fighting for him, would incur sentence of excommunication. The specificity of these conditions is striking and mirrors both the importance of the concession, which marks the first instance of crusading privileges being allocated specifically against the Turks, and the high standing of the recipient at this time.

These papal letters are consequently very important for establishing how Martino Zaccaria projected his own motivations to the papacy. It is sometimes claimed that merchants were devoid of pious motivations and that they used crusading merely as a veneer to exploit economic advantage.⁷⁴ This undoubtedly has an element of truth to it. After all, by defending the Christians of the Aegean, Martin Zaccaria was also protecting his own interests in the region, be they the mastic farms on Chios, the alum mines at Phokaia, or the trade routes which his industry relied upon. Nevertheless, the pope was evidently convinced that his actions were primarily motivated by the desire to defend Christians from the Turks, as is represented in the wording of the original petition. This saw the subtle blending of crusade rhetoric with personal protectionism: Martino made much of the numerous victories he had won over the Turks (presumably referring to events around 1319), that he was paying for his army from his own funds, and that he was maintaining his forces specifically in order to hold back the Turkish advances. Finally Martino stressed his concern over the spiritual wellbeing of his followers and the importance of the indulgence in this regard.

In comparison, the status of the indulgences granted for the first naval league in May 1334 to John of Cepoy are more ambiguous.⁷⁵ This confusion arises from the planned general passage to the Holy Land to be led by Philip VI of France, for which the preaching of the cross was decreed and full plenary indulgences were granted in 1331 and again in July 1333.⁷⁶ As was shown earlier, the naval league only became connected to Philip's *passagium* in the late summer and the winter of 1333–4, when the French and the papacy formally agreed to contribute galleys and thus designate it as a *passagium particulare*. This fact makes the status of the indulgences issued earlier unclear: did participants in the naval league receive the same indulgences as those going on the Holy Land crusade? Or could the Holy Land indulgences be commuted to fighting the Turks in the Aegean? One would imagine that both would have been likely, considering the obvious benefits to the *passagium particulare* that this would bring, but in fact the

⁷⁴ See Introduction, p. 5, for more on this.

⁷⁵ See above, note 24; Appendix 4, doc. 4, pp. 160–1; ASVat, RA 46, fol. 56ov; RV 107, fol. 243r, ep. 729–30 (19 May 1334); summaries in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 13, docs 63170–1.

⁷⁶ See above, note 12 and Appendix.

sources suggest that neither was possible. First, the indulgences issued for Philip's Holy Land crusade make no mention of the Turks whatsoever and should not be considered as connected to the league, because they were granted before the two campaigns were combined.⁷⁷ Secondly, the indulgences issued to John of Cepoy were of a lesser kind: they were not accompanied by preaching or the taking of the cross, and were granted *in articulo mortis* for fighting specifically against the Turks in Romania, suggesting that those granted for the Holy Land crusade were not valid for the participants of the league.⁷⁸ This is extremely interesting as hitherto the privileges for Philip VI's *passagium* have been conflated with those of the naval league, which in fact, was still of a lesser status than the crusade to the Holy Land.⁷⁹

To add to this rather confusing appearance of parallel (but separate) spiritual privileges, the documents granting the indulgences to Cepoy do not make it clear whether they applied to all of the members of the league or just those of the French and papal contingents who were to accompany him overseas. At some point Cepoy may have had authority over the entire league, but this is not sufficient to suggest that those members of the Venetian, Hospitaller and Cypriot contingents already serving in the Aegean would have been retrospectively granted any spiritual rewards.⁸⁰ Either way, it should be realized that Cepoy and his followers were awarded less significant privileges for their participation in the league. Indeed, the indulgences were not as generous as many others granted by John XXII in these years, including those issued 'as for the Holy Land' to both Philip VI for his proposed crusade against the Moors in 1326 and to Walter of Brienne for his campaign to liberate the duchy of Athens from the Catalans in 1330.⁸¹ The preference given to the French king is not surprising considering his prominence in the crusading plans of these years, but the crusade preached on behalf of Walter of Brienne is further indication that the Angevin cause in

⁷⁷ See the following papal bulls: ASVat, RA 44, fols 73–136; RV 104, fols 3–34, ep. 7–26; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 5207–27; summaries in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 12, docs 61202–60. Contemporaries also do not seem to have linked the indulgences for the Holy Land crusade to the naval league, for example: *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 67–8, 70–1, docs. 17, 19; William of Nangis, *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis*, vol. 2, pp. 130–5.

⁷⁸ To further complicate matters, it seems that the indulgences for the Holy Land *passagium* were also to be preached to the Byzantines if they accepted union, as is indicated in a papal letter of July 1334: Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy*, pp. 195–6.

⁷⁹ Cf. the comments of Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, pp. 97–8 and Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 30–1.

⁸⁰ For Cepoy's status during the campaign, see AE, vol. 25, p. 4 (ch. 9); John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 5247; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 251.

⁸¹ John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 3, doc. 2739 (14 March 1326); DOC, doc. 150 (14 June 1330). Walter's crusade was preached in Southern Italy and Greece: *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 63–4, doc. 15.

Greece still took precedence over a crusade against the Turks. This therefore confirms that, even in terms of spiritual concessions, John XXII's support of the naval league was less than that of other operations. In fact, in spiritual terms, the papal privileges granted for the naval league were no different from those granted in other areas of Greece and the Aegean during the 1320s. The real change in the stance of the pope towards the league was that he agreed to contribute and finance four galleys from the papal camera – a commitment which suggests that this campaign against the Turks was regarded as more important than those of previous years, even if this was not reflected by the spiritual privileges.

As would be expected, indulgences *in articulo mortis* were commonly sought by harassed local authorities in theatres where specialized fighters were already active, such as for armed defence against *routiers* in France or Italy.⁸² Does this therefore suggest that the pope did not consider that full-scale crusade preaching was necessary to attract specialist recruitment in the Aegean theatre, or just that it was too difficult or costly for the Church to implement? As seen in the previous chapter, both the naval league and the forces fighting for the Zaccaria were made up primarily of maritime personnel, such as sailors and oarsmen, along with some professional soldiers. The recruitment of maritime participants had certainly been an issue with full crusade preaching in the past. In 1213, for example, Innocent III had sought to demand maritime assistance in the crusading bull *Quia Maior*.⁸³ Whereas Clement V had taken measures to encourage specialized maritime participation for the Hospitaller *passagium* in 1308 by specifically stating that sailors, rowers, commanders and other crewmen were to be awarded indulgences.⁸⁴ Clement VI may have also have been referring specifically to sailors and other maritime participants when he decreed that indulgences were to be awarded to 'all those who proceed with the flotilla, or in another fashion [...] by land or by sea' in 1343.⁸⁵

For indulgences granted *in articulo mortis*, it is unfortunately extremely hard to determine the exact numbers of recipients, or indeed how many requests were made for these privileges at the papal curia.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, contemporary sources suggest that the numbers fighting for the Zaccaria were high. Indeed, according to William of Adam, who wrote his treatise

⁸² See N. Housley, 'The mercenary companies, the papacy and the crusades, 1356–1378', *Traditio* 38 (1982), 253–80, at 260–1, 264 (repr. in Idem, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2001), XV).

⁸³ *The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095–1274*, ed. and trans. L. Riley-Smith and J.S.C. Riley-Smith (London, 1981), p. 122, doc. 26.

⁸⁴ Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 3, doc. 2988; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 137, n. 70.

⁸⁵ *Documents on the Later Crusades*, p. 80, doc. 22.

⁸⁶ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 113. Some examples of the indulgences can be seen in Appendix 1, pp. 149–52.

tise sometime between 1316 and 1318, they held one thousand infantry, one hundred horsemen and two fully-armed galleys on Chios.⁸⁷ These numbers should not necessarily be taken at face value, but other contemporaries, such as the anonymous *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*, written in 1331–2, confirm that Martino Zaccaria had significant military forces at his disposal.⁸⁸ To add to this it seems that, despite its many difficulties, the first naval league did not appear to have suffered from any serious recruitment problems. Indeed, attracting soldiers for a *passagium particulare* may have been relatively easy, as is indicated by a Cypriot report of 1323 which stated that the response to a *passagium particulare* would be so high that it might turn into a general passage.⁸⁹ This is not to say that the smaller campaigns waged against the Turks were met with the same level of popular enthusiasm as those preached for the Holy Land. Two popular crusades of the early fourteenth century, the ‘Crusade of the Poor’ of 1309 and the *Pastoureaux* or ‘Shepherds’ Crusade’ of 1320, are examples of the uncontrollable passions which were aroused when people thought that a general passage might materialize.⁹⁰ But it is possible that full-scale crusade preaching was not deemed by John XXII as being suitable, or necessary, for the recruitment of the personnel needed for a primarily maritime campaign against the Turks in the Aegean, which for the majority of his pontificate was of a lower status than other crusading initiatives.⁹¹

Privileges for the Crusade of Smyrna

Clement VI, in contrast to his predecessor, granted privileges for the second naval league that were more generous than any awarded in the past. He decreed full-scale crusade preaching for the campaign on 30 September 1343 in the bull *Insurgentibus contra fidem*, dispatched to the clergy of Italy, Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and Romania.⁹² The bull instructed the prelates to begin publicly preaching the word of the cross to the faithful

⁸⁷ William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 49–51.

⁸⁸ ‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, vol. 2, p. 457. Also see Carr, ‘Trade or crusade?’, pp. 128–9.

⁸⁹ John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 2, doc. 1690; N. Housley, ‘Costing the crusade: budgeting for crusading activity in the fourteenth century’, in *The Experience of Crusading*, ed. M. Bull and N. Housley, 2 vols (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 45–58, at p. 56.

⁹⁰ On these popular crusades, see Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 233–8; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 22, 144–6, 148–9; M. Barber, ‘The *Pastoureaux* of 1320’, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32 (1981), 143–66; Guard, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade*, pp. 137–9.

⁹¹ Housley, ‘Costing the crusade’, pp. 56–7.

⁹² *Documents on the Later Crusades*, pp. 78–80, doc. 22; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 144–8. Many crusaders from England also responded to the preaching in 1343–4, even though it was not extended to England until the following year. Participants often travelled to the East via Avignon, where they petitioned for safe conducts and indulgences: Guard, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade*, pp. 33–6.

in their individual cities and dioceses, with the sign of the cross to be given to all who wished to receive it, in order that they could 'rise up manfully against the unbelievers'. To pay for the fleet, tenths of church revenues and incomes were to be granted as well as certain other subsidies. But since the matter entailed 'extraordinary expenditure', even greater assistance was required, which it was hoped would take the form of charitable help from the faithful.

Indulgences and remission of sins were granted to those who wished to participate or contribute in another way. Those who accompanied the fleet in person at their own expense and who remained on campaign for one year were to receive full remission of sins 'as for the Holy Land', which included an additional increase of heavenly reward (*salutis eterne augmentum*). Those who died whilst on campaign, or afterwards from wounds received on the campaign, would also receive the same indulgence. In an attempt to attract specific recruitment and to raise money for the expedition, the pope also specified that a similar but slightly lesser privilege was granted to those faithful who contributed to the expedition but who could not take part in person. This referred specifically to those who sent suitable soldiers at their own expense, in accordance to their means, those who took part at another's expense, and those who offered as much from their own goods as they would have spent on campaign for one year. Recipients of this indulgence were promised the same remission of sins (*concedimus eandem veniam peccatorum*), but without the *salutis eterne augmentum* clause relating to an increase in their heavenly reward.⁹³ Chests were also to be placed in churches and proceeds collected by papal agents.

During the second wave of the crusade, led by Humbert of Viennois, Clement continued to show full support for the expedition, extending the preaching campaign to such a level that it resulted in one of the greatest outbursts of popular enthusiasm seen in the fourteenth century. In July 1345 indulgences were decreed for Humbert's crusade and the pope ordered Franciscan, Augustinian, Dominican and Carmelite friars to undertake preaching, which was also extended to England.⁹⁴ To further bolster recruitment, Clement wrote to the archbishop of Smyrna in 1346 granting him the power to commute vows, except those of religion and chastity, to participation in the Smyrna expedition; the first such example of vows being

⁹³ The exchange of indulgences for money was last introduced by Clement V for the Hospitaller *passagium* of 1308–9, although in that instance a scale of lesser indulgences was established with a specific sum to be paid for each, see Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 135–9.

⁹⁴ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, docs 1855–6; W.E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327–1534*, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA, 1939), vol. 2, pp. 531–2. On the participation of English crusaders in the Smyrna campaigns, see Guard, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade*, pp. 33–8.

commuted for a crusade against the Turks.⁹⁵ The response to this preaching campaign was, according to contemporaries, exceptionally high. This was no doubt aided by the appearance of “miracle stories” which circulated in the west during the summer of 1345.

One such story can be found in a letter purporting to be written by Hugh IV of Cyprus to Queen Joanna of Sicily, which circulated in parts of Italy and France. The letter described an exaggerated victory of 200,000 *crucesignati* over a force of 1,200,000 Turks on a plain between Smyrna and Ephesos in June 1345. During the encounter the Christians were on the brink of defeat until the figure of John the Baptist appeared above the army. He assured the crusaders of divine assistance and the promise of ‘eternal life’ to those who died, after which they arose as if they had never done battle and attacked the Turks again and again, eventually killing 70,000 of them and winning the battle.⁹⁶ The emphasis this story gives to the promise of eternal reward suggests that it was used as a recruitment aid for preachers, a factor which may have prompted contemporaries to comment on the generous privileges awarded by the pope at this time.⁹⁷

Another miracle, reported by a Pistoian chronicler, recounts the appearance of the Virgin in a small church at L’Aquila in Abruzzo. The Virgin appeared above the church altar carrying the infant Christ, holding a cross in his hand. On hearing this, all of the townsfolk flocked to the church, where the Virgin remained until the third hour, more resplendent and beautiful than the sun. According to the chronicler, all of the children born that day in L’Aquila had the imprint of the cross on their right shoulder.⁹⁸ The chronicler mentioned that because of this miracle ‘many *Aquilani* and others from the countryside took the cross and went to fight against the infidels’.⁹⁹ Indeed, many other contemporaries attest to the large numbers of Italians taking the cross for the second wave of the Smyrna expedition. The Florentine Giovanni Villani wrote that 400 men from Florence, 350 from Siena, and many others from Tuscany and Lombardy departed for the East.¹⁰⁰ A chronicler from Bologna commented that three groups set out from his city between October 1345 and April 1346, the first two consisting

⁹⁵ ASVat, RV 169, fol. 3v ep. 10 (6 May 1346); summary in Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 980.

⁹⁶ Letter published in Jorga, ‘Une lettre apocryphe sur la bataille de Smyrne’, 28–31. It is discussed in detail by Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 201–2; Gay, *Clément VI*, pp. 66–7; Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 51–6. The chronicler of Pistoia recounted the same battle, probably after having read the letter or heard it read to him: *Storie pistoresi* (1300–1348), pp. 215–16.

⁹⁷ For example, Giovanni Villani, vol. 2, bk. 13, ch. 39, pp. 390–1; ‘Cronica di Bologna’, col. 393; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 202.

⁹⁸ *Storie pistoresi*, p. 214.

⁹⁹ *Storie pistoresi*, p. 214.

¹⁰⁰ Giovanni Villani, vol. 3, bk. 13, ch. 39, pp. 390–1.

of forty men, the last of over one hundred.¹⁰¹ The necrology of the convent of Santa Maria Novella at Florence also named six Dominicans who took the cross for the crusade.¹⁰² In addition to this, many participants from northern Europe travelled through northern Italy en route to the East and are attested to in the fighting at Smyrna.¹⁰³ The enthusiasm surrounding the crusade is encapsulated by the somewhat overblown comments of the Anonimo Romano who stated that there was not a city, town or state in the whole of Christendom from which innumerable men did not flock to take the cross.¹⁰⁴

As Housley has suggested, Clement VI approved of the popular enthusiasm shown towards the crusade and the miracle stories which helped to inspire it. On 21 July, he wrote in a letter to Edward III of England that 'it is clear from amazing miracles that the mercy of divine goodness is working in various lands in favour of the said task'. The pope went on to describe the appearance of 'shining crosses' in very many lands, which had given health benefits to those who were 'burdened with ailments'. Moreover, he claimed that an 'innumerable multitude' of nobles and powerful people, especially from Italy, were preparing to go on crusade against the Turks 'to avenge the injuries of the crucified Redeemer'.¹⁰⁵ The Smyrna campaign thus inspired an outburst of widespread popular enthusiasm on a similar scale to that shown for the 'Crusade of the Poor' in 1309 and the *Pastoureaux* in 1320. In the end, the arrival of so many crusaders at Smyrna – especially with the army of Humbert of Viennois – ended in disaster as overcrowding combined with the heat of the summer and a lack of provisions caused disease to break out.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the measures Clement took to foster enthusiasm for this crusade were successful and the high level of response can in part be attributed to him.

¹⁰¹ 'Cronica di Bologna', cols 393–4, 399.

¹⁰² *Necrologio di S. Maria Novella: testo integrale dall'inizio (MCCXXXV) al MDIV*, ed. S. Orlandi, 2 vols (Florence, 1955), vol. 1, docs 377, 344, 371, 376, 389, 443, pp. 70–100; M.D. Papi, 'Santa Maria Novella di Firenze e l'Outremer domenicano', *Toscana e Terrasanta nel Medioevo*, ed. F. Cardini (Florence, 1982), pp. 87–101, at pp. 99–100.

¹⁰³ See Guard, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade*, pp. 33–8; Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', 117; ASVat, RS 7, fol. 79v (30 Nov 1344); RS 23, f. 49r (8 July 1351); *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Petitions to the Pope (1342–1419)*, ed. W.H. Bliss *et al.*, 20 vols. (Dublin, 1896–, in progress), vol. 3, pp. 186, 213.

¹⁰⁴ Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, p. 115.

¹⁰⁵ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, doc. 1844, p. 26; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 146–7.

¹⁰⁶ See Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 246 and the Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, pp. 16–17, who claimed that there were over 15,000 men at Smyrna before Humbert's arrival. This is undoubtedly an inflated number, but nevertheless is suggestive of the overcrowding in the city.

Papal support for the Crusade of Smyrna therefore contrasts starkly with the mechanisms allocated by John XXII to those fighting the Turks during the 1320s and 1330s. In many ways this was a reflection of how the two popes viewed a crusade against the Turks. During the pontificate of John XXII military action against the Turks was organized and initiated by the resident powers in the Aegean, to whom the pope awarded indulgences, but did not initiate full crusade preaching. Even for the naval league in 1333–4, for which the papacy contributed four galleys, the organization of the campaign was predominantly in the hands of the Venetians. The pope only lent his support in the final months and seemingly only once the Venetians had demonstrated how a fleet for use in the Aegean could be linked to a greater crusade to the Holy Land. Clement VI also responded to initiatives already undertaken by the local maritime powers in the Aegean, but unlike John XXII he took up the mantle of control and committed the full arsenal of crusading mechanisms to the cause, including preaching, church tithes, and the full crusade indulgence ‘as per the Holy Land’. The dramatic response to the Crusade of Smyrna, not just from the maritime powers but also from those who had little or no connection to the Aegean, demonstrated that when a crusade against the Turks was awarded full papal support it could attract substantial enthusiasm on a level comparable to other crusading initiatives of the period.