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THE REIGN OF HENRY II

THE MUSLIM conquest of Acre and the other cities on the coast of Syria in 1291 transformed the political situation in the East. Whilst the loss of his mainland territories meant that King Henry no longer had to commit resources in their defence, Cyprus itself was now vulnerable as the sole outpost of western Christendom in the eastern Mediterranean. The only other Christian state in the region was the Cilician kingdom of Lesser Armenia. At Jubail the Muslims allowed the Genoese Embriaco family to retain possession under their suzerainty for a few years,[1] but otherwise, with this one minor exception, the whole of the Levantine coastlands from the Gulf of Iskenderun to Egypt and beyond had come into the control of the Mamlūk sultanate. The immediate danger was that the Mamlūks might try to follow up their successes by invading Cyprus. On the other hand, there were plenty of people in the West prepared to pay at least lip-service to the idea that a new crusade should be organized to win back the Holy Land. But in the event there was no Mamlūk invasion; nor was there a crusade to recover Jerusalem.

Cyprus had been noted as a haven for refugees from Muslim advance from as early as the 1240s,[2] and in 1291 large numbers of survivors from Syria escaped thither. Many of them, both Franks and Christian Syrians, were reduced to poverty, and their condition must have been made worse by a series of harvest failures in the mid-1290s. The king and his mother are said to have done much to alleviate distress: in 1296 Henry issued an ordinance designed to control the price of bread, and he is also reported to have recruited refugee knights and sergeants into his service. Even so, in 1295 King Charles II of Sicily was making some not altogether disinterested provision for feeding impoverished *nobiles*.[3] A number of leading families from the kingdom of Jerusalem had acquired property in Cyprus long before, but many people lost their entire means of support in the disasters of 1291. After the fall of Acre, the Templars and Hospitallers established their headquarters in the island, and Cyprus also

[1] R. Irwin, 'The Mamlūk Conquest of the County of Tripoli', *CS*, p. 249.

[2] La Monte, 'Register of Nicosia', no. 61.

[3] 'Gestes', p. 818; Marino Sanudo, p. 232; J. Richard, 'L'ordonnance de décembre 1296 sur le prix du pain à Chypre', *EKEE*, I (1967–8), 45–51; Housley, 'Charles II of Naples', pp. 530–2, 534–5.

became the home for other religious communities that had fled the Muslim conquests. Many of the non-Latin inhabitants from the Christian ports in Syria who came to Cyprus crowded into Famagusta. It has been claimed that these people, mostly Arabic-speaking Christians, may well have outnumbered the Greeks there, and without doubt the 'Suriens', as they were known, came to play a major part in Famagusta's rise as a commercial centre at this period.[4]

Once news of the fall of Acre reached the West, Pope Nicholas IV began taking measures designed to make good the losses. He called for a crusade to be ready to set out in the summer of 1293; he ordered provincial church councils to meet to consider the recovery of the Holy Land; he took up the suggestion that a new military Order be formed by merging the Templars and Hospitallers; he announced a ten-year ban on all trade with the lands of the Mamlūk sultanate; he sent envoys to the Mongols, and then, at the beginning of 1292, he was organizing aid for Cilician Armenia.[5] His death in April 1292 and the ensuing papal vacancy which lasted for over two years meant that most of these initiatives came to nothing: there was no crusade and no merged military Order, although the trade boycott continued to form a cornerstone of papal policy. However, the pope had evidently taken the threat to Cyprus seriously, and he was able to arrange for a fleet of twenty galleys to be sent to Cypriot waters. It sailed in 1292 under the command of the Genoese Manuel Zaccaria, and in the East it was joined by fifteen galleys provided by King Henry. Together they attacked Alaya on the southern coast of Asia Minor and then raided Alexandria, although in neither place did they score any great success.[6] According to the Christian writers, the raid on Alexandria provoked the sultan, al-Ashraf Khalīl, into planning a conquest of Cyprus, and they then describe how his emirs, alarmed by his ambitions and arrogance, thereupon had him murdered. The Arabic sources confirm that his death came about as the result of conflict among the military elite. An extended period of internecine feuding and blood-letting then followed with the result that a Mamlūk offensive against the island was now out of the question.[7]

So far as Cyprus was concerned, the internal political strife in Egypt was most

[4] J. Richard, 'Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIIIe siècle', *BF*, VII (1979), 168–70; D. Jacoby, 'The Rise of a New Emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the Late Thirteenth Century', *Μελέται καὶ Ὑπομνήματα*, I (1984), 150–4.

[5] Nicholas IV, nos. 6778–835, 6850–6.

[6] 'Gestes', p. 820; *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de'suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII*, ed. L. T. Belgrano and C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo (Rome, 1890–1929), V, 143–4; J. Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte (fin XIIIe-début XIVe siècle)', *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres: Comptes Rendus* (1984), 123. For evidence to suggest that only half Zaccaria's fleet was available for the raid, Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre', note 16; this would seem to confirm Marino Sanudo's report (p. 232) that twenty-five galleys took part.

[7] 'Gestes', pp. 820–1; Marino Sanudo, p. 233; 'Amadi', pp. 229–30. More generally, R. Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate* (London/Sydney, 1986), pp. 79–82, 85–6.

opportune. In 1293 war broke out between Venice and Genoa, and as a direct consequence a western naval presence in the East could no longer be guaranteed. On the other hand, the military Orders were now organizing their own flotillas. In 1293 we read of two Templar galleys setting sail for Cyprus in the company of some Venetians, and at the same time the Hospitallers, with papal encouragement, were developing their naval arm. Charles II of Sicily alluded to ten galleys in Cyprus belonging to the Order, and in 1297 Pope Boniface VIII made reference to its ships engaging in conflicts with the Muslims.[8] The king too had his galleys, although clearly there were not many of them, and it could well be that at this period he was simply chartering western vessels to operate in his service as occasion demanded.[9]

One of the main tasks for these ships was the enforcement of the papal prohibition on western trade with the Mamlūks. Nicholas IV's bull had allowed that in the case of flagrant breaches of his ban the merchandise concerned should be the prize of whoever should seize it. There was thus an incentive for captains who undertook to police the seas, and it would seem that certain individuals did take advantage of the ban for their own profit. One of the roles envisaged for Manuel Zaccaria's fleet in 1292 was the interception of illicit trade, and from a lawsuit before the Genoese *podestà* in Famagusta in 1297 we learn of a Genoese privateer who had chartered a *linh* which he had armed for action 'against the Sarracens and against those going to places prohibited by the Holy Roman Church'.[10] King Henry kept a small number of galleys at sea to arrest ships trading with the Mamlūks, and they ranged as far as Corfu in search of their quarry. He maintained his patrols from the 1290s until at least as late as the second decade of the fourteenth century, but, although Cypriot sources show ships being taken and merchants incurring the automatic sentence of excommunication, the efficacy of these measures in curbing the considerable volume of European trade with Egypt and Syria must have been extremely limited.[11] Henry, in common with all crusade publicists, remained wedded to the

[8] *Annali Genovesi*, v, 167; 'Gestes', pp. 828–9. For the Hospitaller fleet, Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, pp. 200–1, 330. The Hospitaller admiral first appears in 1299. For a Templar admiral in Cyprus in 1301, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (3 luglio 1300–3 agosto 1301)*, ed. V. Polonio (CSFS 31; Genoa, 1982), no. 413.

[9] For instances of galleys in royal service, 'Gestes', p. 830 (1293); 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), p. 52 (*c.* 1298); *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (6 luglio–27 Ottobre 1301)*, ed R. Pavoni (CSFS 32; Genoa, 1982), no. 163 (1301).

[10] *Notai Genoevesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (11 Ottobre 1296–23 Guigno 1299)*, ed. M. Balard (CSFS 39; Genoa, 1983), no. 88; Richard, Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo', pp. 121–2, 123; N. Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 204–5. For the military Orders enforcing the ban, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 119–20; *Cart. gén. Hospitaliers*, no. 4467.

[11] Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo', pp. 123–8. For examples of an excommunication and the arrest of a ship, *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 32) nos. 13, 163; cf. *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 31), no. 61. For other allusions to the embargo in early fourteenth-century notarial materials from Famagusta, *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 31), no. 78; *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare atti rogati a Cipro*, ed. M. Balard (CSFS 43; Genoa, 1984), pp. 37, 347.

theory that to weaken the sultanate and so make the recovery of the Holy Land possible it was necessary to starve it of war materials, *mamlūk* slaves and other seaborne merchandise and so constrict its military capacity and general economic welfare.[12] In practice, however, notwithstanding the papal embargo and the royal patrols, trade between Famagusta and the Syrian ports under Mamlūk rule flourished.[13]

A more positive prospect for the recovery of the Holy Land lay in the hope of a Mongol alliance. Since the early 1260s the idea of co-operation between a crusade from Europe and an invasion by the Ilkhan of Persia had been prominent in western plans for expelling the Mamlūks from Syria, and it was widely imagined that the Mongol leaders themselves would embrace Christianity and hand Jerusalem back to the Franks. However, in 1269 and 1271 the Ilkhan had failed to send enough support, and in 1280–1 it was the Christians who let down their ally. There were further expectations of a Mongol campaign against Damascus at the beginning of 1291.[14] After the fall of Acre hopes for co-operation continued, but western Christendom was wholly unprepared when the Ilkhan Ghazan, with Armenian and Georgian support, invaded Syria in October 1299. Apparently it was only after his campaign had begun that he sent a messenger to Cyprus calling on the king and the military Orders to send troops. The messenger turned up in November; the Christians were unable to agree what to do; a second messenger arrived at the end of the month, urging them to hurry, but they had still made no move when on 24 December Ghazan inflicted a decisive deafeat on the Mamlūks near Hims. In January 1300 Damascus surrendered. But the following month Ghazan retired to Persia, and it was not long before the Mamlūks were able to re-occupy the territory he had seized.[15]

It was only after Ghazan's departure that Henry attempted to take advantage of the collapse of Mamlūk power in Syria. He sent two galleys and two *taridae* with forty mounted men and sixty footmen to Botron with instructions to stay there and work on the fortifications at the nearby town of Nephin until he himself could bring up the main body of his forces. However, the local Christian peasantry told the commanders of the expeditionary force that it would be easy for them to seize the fortress of Mont Pelerin at Tripoli. The Cypriots set off only to be ambushed by a much larger Muslim army. The survivors retreated to Botron and thence to Cyprus.[16] A second expeditionary force under Guy of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, and John of Antioch sailed to Jubail and Nephin

[12] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 118–25; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes et curiales relatives à la France*, ed. A. Coulon and S. Clémencet (Paris, 1906–72), no. 1690; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 200.

[13] Below, pp. 133–4, 151.

[14] J. Richard, 'The Mongols and the Franks', *Journal of Asian History*, III (1969), 52–5.

[15] 'Gestes', pp. 844–8; 'Amadi', pp. 234–5; Irwin, *The Middle East*, pp. 99–101.

[16] 'Amadi', pp. 235–6.

apparently with the intention of making contact with Ghazan. On learning that he had withdrawn, the commanders decided to stay in Jubail, which had already been seized on his own account by a Genoese sea-captain, but the local Muslim forces were able to re-group and expel them.[17] The failure of these expeditions to establish a bridgehead meant that the main Cypriot endeavour, when eventually it was ready, had to content itself with a seaborne raid. On 20 July sixteen galleys and some smaller ships – by Cypriot standards a sizeable fleet – set sail for Egypt. There they pillaged the coast near Rosetta before moving on to Alexandria, which they declined to attack, although they did seize and burn a Muslim ship coming from Alaya. They then sailed north to Acre and on to Tortosa and Maraclea where a Hospitaller shore-party was taken by surprise and lost a knight and twenty footmen. After that they returned via Armenia to Cyprus. It is difficult to understand how anyone could imagine that a naval demonstration of this kind might contribute to the prospects for a Christian recovery of the Holy Land.[18]

Ghazan's winter campaign of 1299–1300 had been a considerable, albeit temporary, success. His army had occupied Damascus and overrun Palestine as far as Gaza. In western Europe rumour magnified his achievement into a complete conquest of the Holy Land. The truth was that he could not hold his position – it has been suggested that the reason for his withdrawal was as simple and as basic as the shortage of fodder for his horses – and by May 1300 the Mamlūks were back in control.[19] The failure of the Cypriots to secure a foothold and co-ordinate their efforts was an additional, if minor, setback. Ghazan, however, was set on re-establishing his position in Syria and planned a second expedition to take place during the winter of 1300–1. This time the Cypriots were ready for him. In November 300 mounted men under Henry's brother, Amaury of Tyre, went to Tortosa. With them sailed the forces of the Templars and Hospitallers. If the figures given by the chroniclers are correct, Amaury's men numbered considerably more than the Cypriot contingent at the fall of Acre in 1291 or any other thirteenth-century expeditionary force to Syria, and it has to be assumed that it represented the maximum that the king could muster. At Tortosa they awaited the Mongols. But no Mongol invaders appeared, and, when the Cypriots started to come under attack, they withdrew to the offshore island of Ruad. It was not until the following February that the Mongols entered northern Syria. They were commanded not by Ghazan who was ill, but by his general Qutlugh-shah, and were joined by the king of Cilician Armenia and by Count Guy of Jaffa and John of Jubail who had gone from Cyprus to Armenia to await his coming. The Mongols ravaged Syria as far as Hims and then, without

[17] 'Gestes', p. 848. [18] *Ibid.*, pp. 848–9; Marino Sanudo, p. 242; 'Amadi', pp. 236–7.

[19] S. Schein, '*Gesta Dei per Mongolos* 1300. The Genesis of a Non-Event', *EHR*, XCIV (1979), 805–19; D. O. Morgan, 'The Mongols in Syria, 1260–1300', *CS*, pp. 231–5.

having achieved anything in concert with the main Cypriot army, abandoned their campaign.[20]

The lord of Tyre's men returned to Cyprus leaving the Templars to hold Ruad, which later in 1301 the pope confirmed as a possession of the Order. After that nothing much seems to have happened until the following year a Mamlūk force, large enough to require twenty galleys for its transport, arrived to expel the Templar garrison and so prevent any future use of Ruad in combined operations with the Mongols. The Templars were besieged in a tower on the island and sought terms for surrender. An agreement was reached, but the Muslims went back on their word and carried off the brothers of the Order into captivity after slaying the rest of their troops. Attempts to relieve the garrison from Cyprus had been too slow.[21] When early in 1303 Qutlugh-shah once more led the army of the Ilkhanate into Syria, he was defeated near Damascus. Ghazan died in 1304, and after his death there were no further major Mongol offensives aimed at conquering Syria.

The fall of Ruad marked the end of Cypriot-based efforts to regain the Holy Land. On three occasions, in 1229, 1301 and 1303, the Mongols had entered Syria , and on three occasions there had been no effective co-operation with the Christians. But in Europe it was still anticipated that there would be other Mongol expeditions and that Christendom might yet profit by them. Diplomatic exchanges between the Ilkhans and the West continued, with Mongol embassies in Rome in 1302 and 1304. A Hospitaller memorandum of about 1307 called on the papacy to station a force of 1,000 mounted men and 4,000 arbelasters with sixty galleys in Cyprus and Rhodes to enforce the commercial blockade; in the event of a Mongol invasion of Syria, this force, it was argued, would be in place to attack Egypt. The author made the point that, as Egypt would be denuded of troops to face the Mongol threat, a direct attack would be more sensible than the deployment of Christian resources nearer the likely battle zone; when the Cypriots and military Orders had gone to Tortosa, the Muslims of Egypt had rejoiced.[22] This proposal enshrined just one of a number of divergent views which were being put forward at about this time as to the strategy to be pursued during a future crusade to the Holy Land. Writing in 1311, King Henry II also came out in favour of a direct assault from Cyprus on the centre of Mamlūk power in Egypt, whereas in 1307 Hayton of Gorhigos, an Armenian who set

[20] 'Gestes', pp. 849–50; Hayton, 'La flor des estoires de la terre d'orient', *RHC Arm*, II, 198–9; 'Amadi', pp. 237–8.

[21] 'Gestes', pp. 850, 852–3; 'Amadi', pp. 238–9. For the papal grant, Boniface VIII, *Registres*, ed. G. Digard *et al.* (Paris, 1884–1939), no. 4199. The Teutonic Order may also have been involved in the Tortosa expedition. *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 31), no. 245.

[22] Housley, 'Charles II of Naples', pp. 532–3; B. Z. Kedar and S. Schein, 'Un projet de "passage particulier" proposé par l'Ordre de l'Hôpital 1306–1307', *BEC*, CXXXVII (1979), 211–26. A papal plan for a crusade drawn up in 1307 envisaged a Mongol invasion of the Holy Land. N. Housley, *The Italian Crusades* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 95–6.

great store by the prospect of collaboration with the Mongols, had argued for an expedition to enter Syria from Cilicia. A few years later the Venetian Marino Sanudo favoured a campaign against Egypt but was against using Cyprus as a base.[23]

There was, however, a consensus in the West that both Cyprus and Cilician Armenia ought to be defended against further Muslim attack. Although Cyprus had remained unscathed after 1291, Armenia was losing territory and was under considerable pressure from the Mamlūks. In 1298 and 1307 the Armenians were appealing to the West for aid, and from 1307 there is evidence for the pope sending financial assistance.[24]. What was not so clear was the western attitude to the Lusignan dynasty. In the treaty of Caltabellotta of 1302 agreed between King Charles II of Sicily and his Aragonese rivals, it was laid down that the heirs of the actual ruler of the island of Sicily, Frederick of Aragon, should be compensated with Cyprus, Sardinia or a kingdom of similar standing in return for surrendering Sicily to Charles or his successor. The parties to this agreement, and Pope Boniface VIII who subsequently ratified it, can have had little legal justification for disposing of the Lusignan regime in so casual a manner. Presumably the basis for this provision lay in the expectation that they could acquire the claim to the throne of Cyprus advanced by the counts of Brienne since 1267. In 1289 Hugh of Brienne had tried to interest the king of Aragon in his claim, and, although nothing seems to have resulted from this approach, the fact that several years later the rulers of Naples and Aragon, apparently with papal complaisance, could contemplate the removal of the Cypriot dynasty shows just how isolated Henry II had become. The idea of using the Brienne claim to justify the removal of the Lusignans was then taken up by the French royal servant and publicist, Peter Dubois, who suggested that a son of the king of France should head a combined military Order and that this man should also rule in Cyprus.[25] As events turned out, neither the French, nor the Sicilian Angevins nor the Aragonese had the opportunity to oust the Lusignans from their island kingdom. All the same, if westen Europe ever had launched a major expedition to recover the Holy Land, King Henry might well have had reason to be apprehensive.

The Lusignans' title to the crown of Jerusalem had been disputed with the Angevins of Sicily since the 1270s. In the late 1290s Charles II was using his claims to Jerusalem as a diplomatic bargaining counter in his negotiations with the Aragonese: thus in 1295 there was a suggestion that he might grant his rights to James II of Aragon, and in 1299 he was offering them as part of the dowry for his daughter were she to marry the effective Sicilian ruler, Frederick of Aragon.

[23] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 122; Hayton, pp. 248–52; Marino Sanudo, pp. 37–9.

[24] Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, p. 12 and note 9; Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, pp. 252, 255.

[25] Boniface VIII, no. 5348 at col. 853; Peter Dubois, *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, pp. 133, 140. Above, pp. 35–6. Cyprus is not known to have been mentioned in subsequent peace negotiations between the Angevins and the Aragonese.

For their part, the Aragonese were certainly interested: in 1309–11 they were trying to get Charles' successor, King Robert, to renounce his title as king of Jerusalem in Frederick's favour.[26] The popes remained neutral, refusing to address either the king of Cyprus or the king of Sicily as king of Jerusalem in their correspondence, but, with the Angevins' claims being recognized by the Aragonese as well as by their cousins, the kings of France, and with some people proposing that in future the Latin kingdom should be governed by the head of a united military Order,[27] Henry II's chances of being restored to the throne of Jerusalem should a western crusade succeed in wresting Palestine from the Mamlūks must have seemed slender.

These challenges to the Lusignans' rights to Jerusalem almost certainly goaded the fourteenth-century kings of Cyprus into asserting themselves all the more strongly. In his formal written *acta* and his diplomatic correspondence, Henry was careful to style himself *Jerusalem et Cypri rex*, and, although contemporaries might often refer to him for convenience as just 'king of Cyprus', his full title received widespread recognition in the West.[28] Henry's successors inaugurated their reigns with separate coronation ceremonies, receiving the crown of Cyprus in Nicosia and the crown of Jerusalem in Famagusta, and Hugh IV and his descendants appointed Cypriot nobles to the titular dignities of Seneschal, Constable, Marshal, Chamberlain and Butler of Jerusalem. From the mid-1340s we find the princes of the blood-royal being given the honorific titles of 'count of Tripoli', 'prince of Antioch' and 'prince of Galilee', titles redolent of their crusading ancestry. Later in the fourteenth century the kings started conferring titular Latin Syrian lordships on prominent nobles, the earliest being the county of Rouchas (or Edessa) accorded John of Morphou in 1365.[29] In addition, the kings displayed their dual title in their armorial bearings – the Cross of Jerusalem quartered with the Lusignan badge, a lion rampant on barruly field[30] – and they also expressed their rights to Jerusalem on their coinage. At some point, probably in the 1290s, Henry II introduced a new silver

[26] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 94–5, 97; J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1971), p. 66 note 61.

[27] A. J. Forey, 'The Military Orders in the Crusading Proposals of the Late-Thirteenth and Early-Fourteenth Centuries', *Traditio*, XXXVI (1980), 333–5.

[28] For examples of Aragonese use, J. E. Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II de Aragón. Su vida familiar* (Barcelona, 1948), II, nos. 138, 155; for Venetian use, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 136, cf. p. 117. Cf. *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 32), no. 163.

[29] The titles 'prince of Antioch' and 'count of Tripoli' first appear in 1345, that of 'prince of Galilee in 1365. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 126, 130, 141. For John of Morphou, Leontios Makhairas, §172. Cf. J. Richard, 'Pairie d'Orient latin: les quatre baronnies des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, ser. 4, XXVIII (1950), 85–6.

[30] Hill, II, 69–72; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'L'héraldique de Chypre', *Cahiers d'héraldique*, III (1977), 143–4.

coin, the *gros grand*, together with its half, the *gros petit*. The earliest examples show the Lusignan lion, although on a plain field, but this coinage was soon replaced by a new issue with a somewhat lower weight standard and a fresh design which not only proclaimed Henry's title to Jerusalem in the legend, but also had the Cross of Jerusalem prominently displayed on the reverse. *Gros* with the Cross of Jerusalem continued to be minted as a major element in the royal coinage until the end of Lusignan rule in the late fifteenth century.[31]

Besides the royal iconography and ceremonial, there were many other reminders of the association of Cyprus with the Latin Kingdom. After 1291 the prince of Galilee, the count of Jaffa and the lords of Beirut and Arsur, descendants of the actual occupants of these lordships, were resident in the island, and they remained there until in the course of the fourteenth century one by one the lines failed. Many other knights and lesser men had sobriquets indicative of their ancestry in the ports and cities of Latin Syria. Almost twenty years after the Mamlūk conquest of the Syrian littoral there were knights in Cyprus, for example Thomas of Picquigny and James of Fleury, who were still being referred to as 'knights of Acre', and Peter Le Jaune was being described as a 'knight of Tripoli' as late as 1323.[32] The presence of the military Orders and other religious corporations from the Holy Land added an ecclesiastical dimension. In the first half of the fourteenth century the titular Latin patriarch of Jerusalem was from time to time resident in the island, and in 1295 Pope Boniface VIII amalgamated the diocese of Tortosa in the former county of Tripoli with Famagusta.[33] James of Verona, who was visiting Cyprus in 1335, and Nicolo da Martoni, who was there in 1394, were told that the women in the island wore black in mourning for the loss of Acre and the other cities of Syria.[34] Memories of Latin Syria and its associations with Cyprus were firmly implanted in the island's consciousness.

As the reign wore on Henry's brothers and vassals became more and more exasperated by his inability to handle the difficulties facing the kingdom. In the 1290s soured relations with Genoa aggravated the problems arising from the

[31] Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, pp. 56–60. The *gros* is known from a document of June 1301, and there is a possible reference from April 1299. *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 31), no. 413; *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 39), no. 122. The lighter series with the Cross of Jerusalem would seem to have been introduced before 1306. D. M. Metcalf, 'The Gros grand and the Gros petit of Henry II of Cyprus', *Numismatic Chronicle*, CXLII (1982), 85–6. Amaury of Tyre issued a coin with a dimidated shield showing the Cross of Jerusalem and Lusignan lion on a barruly field. For the Cross of Jerusalem on seals, 'Amadi', p. 432; J. Richard, 'La situation juridique de Famaguste dans le royaume des Lusignans' in *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations (XIIe–XVe s.)* (London, 1976), XVII, pp. 224–5.

[32] 'Processus Cypricus', ed. K. Schottmüller, *Der Untergang des Templer-Ordens* (Berlin, 1887), II, 162; 'Gestes', p. 866; John XXII, *Lettres communes* ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1904–47), nos. 17172, 17250. [33] Boniface VIII, no. 306. [34] Hill, II, 188–9.

new political situation. Whether the Genoese still retained a sense of grievance against the Lusignans for their part in their defeat and expulsion from Acre during the War of St Sabas is not known, but there can be no doubt that in the early years of Henry's reign matters took a decided turn for the worse. In 1288 the authorities in Genoa managed to antagonize the king by refusing to ratify a new commercial agreement.[35] It was then Henry's turn to cause resentment, when, in 1291 directly after the fall of Acre, he granted trading privileges to Pisa and Barcelona, Genoa's rivals in the western Mediterranean.[36] In 1293 the war which five years later was to culminate in the Genoese victory over the Venetians at Curzola broke out. Several incidents in this conflict took place in or around Cyprus, and the surviving accounts leave no doubt that sympathies in the island lay with Venice. Thus, when in 1294 a Venetian fleet arrived at Limassol and damaged the Genoese tower and *loggia*, Henry, far from being outraged, is reported to have offered its commander some friendly encouragement. The Venetians then made for Famagusta where the royal castellan seems to have recognized that under the terms of their privilege he was obliged to defend the Genoese merchants, but all he would do was recommend that they take refuge in Nicosia. After that the fleet sailed on to Cilicia, attacking rival interests as it went, until in the appoaches to Ayas it suffered an overwhelming defeat at the hands of a smaller Genoese force. On another occasion, in 1297, a Venetian seized a Genoese ship from under the castle at Famagusta and set it on fire with impunity in full view of both Cypriot and Genoese, and from the following year there is further evidence for Cypriot partiality with a report of royal officials warning some Venetians of a Genoese privateer.[37]

The Genoese victory over their rivals evidently had the effect of increasing their assertiveness, and they now demanded compensation from Henry for the damage inflicted on their shipping in Cypriot waters during the war. These demands were refused, and in March 1299 the Commune ordered all their citizens, except those who had resident status as *burgenses*, to leave the island. In other words, they threatened a trade boycott. Henry responded by calling on everybody who had a claim against the Genoese to make sworn depositions before him: he may also have given instructions that no one was to do business with them, that they were to be prevented from leaving Cyprus and that their merchandise was to be confiscated. How the issues were resolved or what transpired as a result of these proclamations is not known, but trade continued, and by the early part of 1301 relations were sufficiently normalized for the

[35] *Annali Genovesi*, v, 91. Henry rescinded the 1288 agreement in 1292. *Liber Iurum Reipublicae Genuensis* (*Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, vols. VII, IX), II, cols. 275–6.

[36] *Memorias históricas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, ed. A. de Capmany y de Montpalau (Madrid, 1779–92), II, 56–7; *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll'Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all'anno 1531*, ed. G. Müller (Florence, 1879), pp. 108–9.

[37] Hill, II, 208–9; Edbury, 'Cyprus and Genoa', pp. 112–13.

Genoese government to appoint a new *podestà* in the island.[38] But with Genoese corsairs active in Cypriot waters and with the Cypriot government committed to upholding the papal ban on direct trade between western Europe and Mamlūk Egypt, tensions remained. Matters again came to head towards the end of 1305 when a Genoese attack was said to be imminent. Henry began by ordering Genoese nationals to leave his kingdom; he then rescinded this command, making it plain that if they wanted to continue to enjoy their privileges they would have to behave: they were to swear oaths that they would defend the interests of the kingdom and that, at the king's request, they would leave the coastal towns and reside in Nicosia. It is unclear whether any particular incident had given rise to these developments, but clearly the quarrel had reached major proportions: later in 1306 the pope had to warn the Genoese that the conflict was impeding his proposed crusade and urged them to make peace with the king.[39] When in April of that year Amaury of Tyre and the baronage suspended Henry from his royal functions, it was his failure to act on the advice of his men in dealing with the Genoese – 'like mortal enemies' they had defied the king and the people of his realm – that came high on the list of the grievances advanced to justify their seizure of power.[40]

Henry also found himself at odds with the military Orders. After the fall of Acre both the Hospitallers, or Knights of St John, and the Templars had established their headquarters in Cyprus, but relations between them and the crown had been far from easy. Both Orders were major landowners in the island; both received massive subventions from western Europe, and Henry had no control over the substantial numbers of armed men they maintained in his kingdom. Since 1291 they had been looking for a fresh role to play in the struggle against the Muslims. In the case of the Hospitallers, uncertainty and demoralization in the aftermath of the loss of Latin Syria found expression in a series of internal wrangles. But from 1306 the Order undertook the occupation of the strategically significant island of Rhodes and so regained a worthwhile sense of purpose.[41] The Templars, on the other hand, had, at least outwardly, a less

[38] Jacoby, 'Famagusta', pp. 162–3; M. Balard, 'L'activité commerciale en Chypre dans les années 1300', *CS*, p. 255. For Henry's response, 'Bans et Ordonnances des rois de Chypre', *RHC Lois*, II, 363; 'Amadi', pp. 255–6. It is not entirely certain that the description of Henry's anti-Genoese orders in 'Amadi' relates to this episode.

[39] 'Bans et Ordonnances', p. 368; *Regesti Clementis papae V*, ed. cura et studio monachorum Ordinis S. Benedicti (Rome, 1885–92), nos. 752–3; 'Documents chypriotes du début du XIVe siècle', ed. C. Kohler, *ROL*, XI (1905–8), 446; 'Amadi', p. 241. For piracy in these years, Hill, II, 210–12. (The 'Chronique d'Amadi' (p. 238), the best source for the incident, does not identify the culprits responsible for the abduction of the count of Jaffa as Genoese.)

[40] 'Texte officiel de l'allocution adressée par les barons de Chypre au roi Henri II pour lui notifier sa déchéance', ed. L. de Mas Latrie, *Revue des questions historiques*, XLIII (1888), 535; 'Gestes', pp. 859–61; 'Amadi', p. 249.

[41] Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, pp. 200–9; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1291', pp. 161–5.

difficult time after 1291, but their failure to find a new *raison d'être* left them vulnerable to the attacks in the West which were to lead to their suppression. The wealth and power of the Orders could well have given the king cause for apprehension. More immediately, the fact that they both maintained good relations with his rival, King Charles II of Sicily, would have placed their support for the regime in Cyprus in question. William of Villaret, Hospitaller master in the years 1296–1305, had been one of Charles' counsellors; James of Molay, master of the Templars from 1292 or 1293 until the suppression of the Order, was prepared to act as his agent in his distribution of largesse in Cyprus in the mid-1290s; both Orders looked to Charles' kingdom as a source of supplies for their establishments in Cyprus.[42] Relations between the Templars and the Lusignans had been acerbic since the 1270s when the then master, William of Beaujeu, had championed the rights of Charles I of Anjou to the throne of Jerusalem and King Hugh III had retaliated by seizing the Order's properties. Early in his own reign Henry had complained to the pope about continuing ill-will, and in 1298 the pope was telling James of Molay and the king to make up their quarrels. James was to come out strongly against Henry at the time of Amaury of Tyre's assumption of power.[43]

It is difficult to know how far the Orders and the king were failing to see eye to eye over military policy. In 1299, during Ghazan's first Syrian campaign, the Latins' inability to respond was said to have been the result of disagreements between Henry and the heads of the Orders, although at other times they did co-operate on raiding expeditions. Maybe the Orders were keener than the king on a forward policy against the Muslims: it was the Templars who took charge of Ruad in 1301–2, and between 1300 and 1305 the Hospitaller master, William of Villaret, led two sizeable expeditions to Armenia. On the other hand, there is evidence from 1306 that Henry had been trying to stop the Knights of St John arming ships in his kingdom.[44] What is certainly true is that both Orders found themselves in dispute with the king over domestic matters within Cyprus. The Orders' own members were themselves exempt from taxation, but in the 1290s Henry had been making their servants and the serfs on their lands pay the poll tax that he had introduced shortly before the loss of Acre. His right to do so was hotly disputed. There were also complaints that he had seized on a papal prohibition against the Orders acquiring more estates to prevent them obtaining

[42] Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, p. 207; M. Barber, 'James of Molay, the Last Grand Master of the Order of the Temple', *Studia Monastica*, XIV (1972), 95; Housley, 'Charles II of Naples', pp. 530–1. For Charles' export-licences for the Orders, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 91–2, 97–8; *Cart. gén. Hospitaliers*, nos. 4495, 4535–6, 4538, 4589, 4605, 4855 bis, 4855 ter.

[43] For Hugh III, above, pp. 78, 95–6. For Henry's complaint, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 108–9 (the references to Acre would point to date for this document of before 1291 rather than 1307 as suggested by Mas Latrie). For James of Molay in 1306, Barber, 'James of Molay', pp. 102–3.

[44] For 1299, 'Amadi', p. 234. For Hospitaller expeditions to Armenia, Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, pp. 199–200. For 1306, *Reg. Clementis V*, nos. 1247–8, cf. no. 1250.

any fresh property at all, and among the charges levelled against him in 1306 was one that he had subjected them to interminable delays in the courts.[45]

On 26 April 1306 Amaury of Lusignan lord of Tyre, the king's brother and heir-presumptive, declared Henry too ill to rule and, adopting the title of 'governor and rector' (*gubernator et rector*), assumed control of the kingdom. The majority of the leading vassals, including almost all the members of the powerful Ibelin clan, were behind him, and his seizure of power was effected without resort to violence.[46] Amaury had formulated a list of complaints to justify his action, and the theme of a speech read out for him on that day by Hugh of Ibelin, a senior member of his family, was that 'the needs of the kingdom have not been and are not being attended to as is necessary . . .'[47] This indictment and further charges drawn up subsequently to impress the pope[48] have been alluded to already: the king had failed to provide for the security and well-being of the kingdom; despite the advice of his vassals he had done nothing to avert the danger posed by the Genoese; nor had he taken action to counter the sultan's threatened naval attack or send aid to the kingdom of Armenia which had suffered much in recent years at the hands of the Muslims; he was accused of inaction in the face of hostile shipping, of allowing Cyprus to become increasingly isolated both diplomatically and militarily, and of failing to arrange food supplies at a time of famine, even when foreign corn had been on offer; everyone was concerned at the absence of military preparedness; what was more, with delays of up to twenty years, there was no justice to be had so that heirs were disinherited and the clergy and the military Orders were denied redress for injuries they had suffered. The charges are couched in rather general terms, and while it is clear that the Genoese threat had been a major preoccupation, it is impossible to know how much substance lay behind some of the other accusations. There seems, for example, to be no evidence to corroborate the belief that the Muslims were planning an attack on Cyprus at the time.[49]

It is not hard to understand why the vassals should have rallied behind Amaury. Henry's government was discredited by inconsequential military activities and an inability to deal effectively with friend and foe alike. Hugh of

[45] Hill, II, 198–9; Riley-Smith, *Knights of St. John*, pp. 204–5. For the Orders' numbers, Riley-Smith, *ibid.*, p. 328 and note 3. For judicial delays, 'Texte officiel', p. 536.

[46] 'Gestes', pp. 857–62; Leontios Makhairas, §§ 42–54; 'Amadi', pp. 241–50.

[47] 'Texte officiel', pp. 534–8 at p. 535. The document is reprinted from this edition as footnotes in 'Gestes' at pp. 858–60, and 'Amadi' at pp. 242–5. Cf. 'Documents chypriotes', ed. Kohler, pp. 442–3. For Hugh, a grandson of John I of Beirut and son of Baldwin the Seneschal, Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 173–4.

[48] For documents presented at the curia presumably at the beginning of 1308, 'Documents chypriotes', ed. Kohler, pp. 440–52.

[49] D. P. Little, *An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography: An Analysis of Arabic and Biographical Sources for the Reign of al-Malik an-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalā'ūn* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 141–2.

Ibelin's speech, while maintaining a show of due deference to the crown, emphasized the idea that the feudatories were behaving responsibly in demanding the good government that had not been forthcoming and to which they felt entitled. Hugh reminded the king that for the previous seventeen years the knights had willingly allowed their fiefs to be taxed, and he assured him that his interests and the interests of his kingdom were uppermost in his vassals' minds: for the good of his kingdom and his own good, in view of his illness, he should hand over power to his brother. Lack of adequate leadership from an ailing and inactive monarch goes a long way to account for the widespread support given Amaury in 1306, but the narrative sources provide an additional explanation: Henry had relied on the counsel of his maternal uncle, Philip of Ibelin the seneschal of Cyprus, to the exclusion of all his other vassals, and this denial of their rightful role as royal advisers rankled.[50]

Unlike his brother, Amaury had a good record as a vigorous and capable leader. In 1289 he had commanded the Cypriot contingent at the defence of Tripoli. He had then acquitted himself well as Henry's *bailli* in Acre until 1291, and he later came to play a prominent role in campaigns of 1299–1301 during Ghazan's invasions of Syria.[51] Although the charges levelled at Henry do not say so in as many words, it is likely that the vassals were dissatisfied with the king's conduct of military operations at the time of the Ilkhan's expeditions: he was later accused of failing to allow supplies to be sent to Amaury's forces on Ruad, and it is noteworthy that all the Cypriot knights named as commanders or emissaries during the years 1299–1301 and who are known to have participated in the events of 1306–10 supported Amaury.[52] Despite the obvious hostility of the sources, the lord of Tyre emerges as an abler and perhaps more attractive figure than his brother. He even had the rare distinction of having a philosophical treatise dedicated to him, although it would probably be stretching the evidence too far to deduce from this that he was an educated man and patron of the arts.[53]

As heir-presumptive, Amaury would have been especially anxious that the kingdom he hoped to inherit would be safe and secure, and he would also have felt more aggrieved than the other nobles by the king's exclusive reliance on his

[50] 'Gestes', pp. 857; 'Amadi', p. 241.

[51] 'Gestes', pp. 803–4, 849–50; *Annali Genovesi*, v, 94; Hayton, pp. 199, 320–1, 328; 'Amadi', pp. 218, 220–1, 236, 237.

[52] 'Documents chypriotes', ed. Kohler, pp. 447–8. Five knights are named in the sources: Bertram Fassan ('Amadi', pp. 236, 341); Baldwin of Picquigny and Raymond Viscount ('Gestes', p. 848; 'Amadi', p. 236; Kohler, 'Documents chypriotes', pp. 442, 443); John of Antioch ('Gestes', p. 848; Kohler, 'Documents chypriotes', p. 442; 'Amadi', pp. 261, 273, 392); and John of Jubail ('Gestes', p. 850; 'Amadi', pp. 237, 261, 269, 341).

[53] A. Thomas, 'Notice sur le manuscrit latin 4788 du Vatican contenant une traduction française avec commentaire par Maître Pierre de Paris de la *Consolatio Philosophiae* de Boèce', *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale et autres bibliothèques*, XLI (1923), 30–1.

uncle, Philip of Ibelin. Later writers insinuated that he struck in 1306 because he was afraid he would be cheated of his hopes of succeeding to the throne, but commentators nearer the events are silent on this point and the charge should probably be discounted.[54] He may have had a particular concern for the kingdom of Lesser Armenia. Dynastic relations with Cyprus had long been close. Early in the thirteenth century two of King Hugh I's sisters had married into the Armenian royal family, and in 1237 King Henry I had married a sister of Hetoum I.[55] More recently there had been several more unions, and these have to be seen as a part of a process whereby common interest in the face of Muslim advance drew the two kingdoms together. Twice, in 1286 and 1290, papal dispensations were obtained for a daughter and a son of Hugh III to marry a daughter and a son of the Armenian Leo III (1269–89), and on the strength of these grants Margaret of Lusignan married Thoros, who was to reign briefly as King Thoros III in the mid-1290s, and Amaury married Isabella, Thoros' sister. Another of Hugh III's daughters seems to have married Constantine of Neghir, a brother of King Hetoum I.[56] These were difficult years for Armenia, with persistent Mamlūk incursions and protracted fratricidal struggles within the ruling house. Although the Hospitallers had given military aid to Armenia, in 1306 Henry was accused of doing nothing to help, and there is no reason to suppose that this accusation was ill-founded. Amaury's concern for the well-being of his wife's family inheritance is understandable, all the more so in the light of evidence that his own daughter by Isabella was married or at least betrothed to her cousin, the young king of Armenia, Leo IV.[57]

Henry was in no mood to acquiesce in Amaury's seizure of power, but it rapidly became apparent that he was isolated. Only his mother and her brother, Philip of Ibelin, and a cousin, John Dampierre, stood by him. Otherwise the vassals and burgesses all swore to support Amaury. Outside Nicosia the new regime was readily accepted. At Kyrenia the acting-castellan was hesitant, but even here there was no appreciable delay in recognizing Amaury's rule. Henry himself seems to have been kept under virtual house arrest. Three days after the initial

[54] John Dardel, 'Chronique d'Arménie', *RHC Arm.*, II, 22–3 (alleging that Henry was going to resign his authority to Amaury anyway and then changed his mind); Lusignan, *Description*, f. 138 (claiming that Amaury feared Henry would marry and have children, thereby barring him from the throne). More reliably, in 1311 it was being said that in the absence of any surviving brothers Henry would be succeeded by his eldest sister. Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 46.

[55] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 98–102.

[56] Honorius IV, *Registres*, ed. M. Prou (Paris, 1886–8), no. 512; Nicholas IV, no. 2667; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 111–12, 116–17, 119–20.

[57] S. Der Nersessian, 'The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia', *HC*, II, 655–8; T. S. R. Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom' in *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 28–30; A. T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers' Interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1291–1375', *ibid.*, pp. 121–3. For Leo IV and Isabella, Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 228–9. There is no clear evidence for the date of the betrothal; it could post-date Amaury's assumption of power.



Figure 4 A simplified genealogical table illustrating the relationship of the principal members of the Ibelin and Lusignan families at the time of the usurpation of Amaury of Tyre.

move the masters of the Hospitallers and the Templars came forward to mediate. Negotiations were said to have lasted for almost three weeks, but in the end Henry came to terms. The king retained the homage and fealty of the liege men and avoided giving formal recognition to Amaury as 'governor' of the kingdom. Together the king and the 'community of vassals (*hommes*) of the said kingdom of Cyprus' issued a document recording the terms of the settlement. It consists largely of a statement of financial arrangements to meet the needs of the king and other members of the royal family together with measures to pay off Henry's debts. The king was required to sell his moveable property to satisfy his creditors and provide dowries for his unmarried sisters. He was, however, allowed a household retinue to include ten vassal knights and ten stipendiary knights. In the concluding paragraphs the parties promised to observe good faith and not to take any action to undermine the form of government ordained by the vassals, a clause which the narrative accounts of these events gloss as meaning that neither party would complain to the pope about what had been done. Amaury now took complete control of the royal administration. Philip of Ibelin and John Dampierre were obliged to swear to support the new regime, and Henry and his household withdrew to the royal estate at Strovolos where he occupied himself with his falcons.[58]

Now that his takeover was complete, Amaury had to ensure that he did not repeat Henry's mistakes. Towards the Genoese he appears to have been conciliatory. In 1308 his ambassador to the West, Hayton of Gorhigos, obtained confirmation of a peace agreement which presumably had been drafted before his departure the previous year. In November 1306 the Genoese authorities had made Amaury a substantial loan, and in 1308 their *podestà* in the island led a demonstration against the king as a token 'of the good will he had for the lord of Tyre'. Evidently relations were much improved.[59] Amaury's first recorded diplomatic move, however, was to award trading privileges to Genoa's great rival, the republic of Venice. Hitherto the Lusignans had avoided making formal concessions to the Venetians whose trading rights in Cyprus dated from Byzantine times. In the thirteenth century there had been requests for privileges, but successive governments had fobbed the Venetian ambassadors off. In 1302 the Senate had dispatched a fresh embassy, and Amaury's grant, dated 3 June 1306, should be seen as the culmination of the negotiations which had then been set in train and which it can be assumed had been begun before Henry's overthrow. Clearly Amaury was anxious to gain as much good will in as many quarters as possible.[60]

In May 1306 the Knights of St John entered into an agreement with some Genoese privateers for an expedition to conquer Rhodes. The initial discussions

[58] 'Amadi', pp. 249–53; Leontios Makhairas, §§ 51–61. For the diploma, 'Texte officiel', pp. 538–41. It is reprinted from this edition as footnotes in 'Gestes' at pp. 860–2, and 'Amadi' at pp. 245–8. [59] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 152; 'Gestes', p. 866; 'Amadi', pp. 261–2, 280.

[60] 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), pp. 54–6; *DVL*, I, 42–5; 'Gestes', p. 862.

had taken place secretly, since the most prominent of the Genoese, Vignolo de' Vignoli, was wanted by the Cypriot authorities for his depredations, but it is clear that in contrast to Henry, who had made difficulties for the Order over the arming of ships, Amaury was prepared to aid the Knights and was happy to allow them to use Cyprus as a base. A small Hospitaller force set sail from Cyprus in June 1306, and in September the Order sent to the island for reinforcements. The campaign was protracted, and mopping-up operations apparently continued until 1310. At some stage Amaury himself dispatched two galleys to help, and when a Genoese ship carrying supplies from Constantinople for the beleaguered garrison diverted from Rhodes to Cyprus because of unfavourable weather and fear of the Order's shipping, it was seized at Famagusta and handed over to the Hospitallers.[61] Whether Amaury sent much assistance to the Armenians is less clear. In 1306 the pope had made a general appeal on their behalf, and the following year they were recruiting mercenaries, presumably with official approval, in Nicosia. The regime in Armenia also looked to the Ilkhan of Persia for support, but towards the end of 1307 the young king, Leo IV, and his regent were murdered by a Mongol emir. Amaury continued to enjoy amicable relations with Oshin, Leo's uncle and successor. The new king was Amaury's wife's brother, and, although there is no direct evidence that he ever received any military support from Cyprus, Oshin readily took charge of his brother-in-law's exiled opponents.[62]

Initially Amaury was in a strong position, but with the passage of time his support began to crumble. According to the *Chronique d'Amadi*, Henry recovered from his illness in 1307, and from then on, as dissatisfaction with Amaury increased, so the king's own body of supporters grew. It is unclear how long the relative freedom he enjoyed at Strovolos lasted, but at some point, apparently in the early months of 1307, Amaury became alarmed by reports that individual knights had been making secret contact with the king and decided to arrest him. Henry, however, avoided his brother's men and, slipping into Nicosia, took refuge in his palace. There he remained under virtual siege until in April 1307 the bishop of Famagusta managed to smooth things over.[63] Amaury's move had been prompted by the fear that the king could still appeal to the loyalty of his vassals, and, as events were to prove, with good reason: all the knights attached to Henry's household in 1306 were to emerge as royal supporters, as did many others.[64] Although Henry had come to terms in 1306, he had refused to

[61] Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, pp. 215–16; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1291', pp. 164–6; *idem*, 'The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306–1421', *HC*, III, 283–6.

[62] For papal support, *Reg. Clementis V*, nos. 748–51. For recruitment in Nicosia, 'Amadi', p. 270. In a parallel passage Florio Bustron (pp. 156–7) says that Amaury sent Leo 300 cavalry and 1,000 foot.

[63] 'Amadi', pp. 253–4; Leontios Makhairas, §61.

[64] For a list of the ten vassal knights chosen in 1306 (together with the royal kinsmen, Philip of Ibelin and John Dampierre), 'Amadi', p. 252. All ten were involved in the royalist movement of 1308 ('Amadi', p. 264); two, Aimery of Mimars and Hugh Beduin, were later exiled ('Amadi', pp. 299,

accept his suspension from the exercise of royal authority and acknowledge the legality of Amaury's position. It was only after the collapse of a royalist movement early in 1308 that he agreed to accept his brother's demand to be appointed governor for life, and so blatant was the duress under which this concession was exacted that the Franciscans declined to witness the instrument recording it. Even so, Henry's retention of the vassals' homage gave rise to practical difficulties, and in August 1309 Amaury was once more demanding that Henry make a public declaration that would confer permanent legality on his rule. The issue was still unresolved in 1310 when the king was in exile in Armenia.[65] So long as Henry refused to acquiesce in his removal from power, Amaury's detractors, both at home and abroad, could label him a usurper.

In 1307 Amaury's seizure of power and Henry's continued antagonism took on a fresh dimension when both parties turned to the pope as arbiter. The *Chronique d'Amadi* claims that Amaury unjustly accused his brother of appealing to the pope and so infringing their settlement of May 1306, and that he himself then broke it by sending an embassy. But this account is biased against Amaury, and its hostility becomes ever more strident in tone as events progressed. The Cypriot narratives record that Amaury sent three embassies, one led by the Armenian nobleman and monk of Bellapaïs, Hayton of Gorhigos, which sailed in the late spring of 1307, another which ended in shipwreck the following December, and a third, comprising two knights, John of Brie and John Lombard, which had reached the papal court by February 1308.[66] On the other hand, they pass over in silence the fact that Henry also sent at least one embassy which had arrived at the papal court at some point before the end of January 1308.[67] Hayton's mission was to denigrate the king and obtain papal confirmation for Amaury as governor for life. Either he or John of Brie and John Lombard brought written evidence to demonstrate the justice of Amaury's seizure of power. This included the text of Hugh of Ibelin's speech of April 1306 and the settlement of May, together with versions of these documents in Latin and a third document, apparently concocted specifically as ammunition to be used at the papal court, which emphasized Amaury's enthusiasm for military action against the Mamlūks and Henry's indifference.[68] For his part Henry

338, 373); three others, Anseau of Brie, Reynald of Soissons and John Babin, were prominent members of the royalist party which held Famagusta after Amaury's murder ('Amadi', p. 362).

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 302–12 *passim*, 328–9; Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', pp. 68–70.

[66] 'Gestes', p. 871; 'Amadi', pp. 254, 267. For the date of the third embassy, *Reg. Clementis V*, nos. 2469, 2471.

[67] *Reg. Clementis V*, no. 3543. For papal indults issued in April 1308 at Henry's request, see nos. 2699, 2736.

[68] 'Amadi', p. 280. The documents survive in the Vatican archives. For the additonal document, 'Documents chypriotes', ed. Kohler, pp. 444–52. Luttrell ('The Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1291', p. 166 note 4) has drawn attention to an unpublished second version of the May settlement dated 31 January 1307.

complained that Amaury and his supporters had deprived him of the governance of his kingdom, had despoiled him of his goods and treasury and had subjected him and his adherents to a whole range of injuries. The claims and counter-claims were laid before the pope who on 23 January 1308 commissioned Archbishop Nicholas of Thebes and Raymond of Piis, a papal chaplain, to investigate and, if possible, effect a reconciliation.[69]

Hayton was well received by the pope, but although he had offered 10,000 florins and perhaps more for papal recognition, he returned to Cyprus in May 1308 having failed in his mission.[70] Amaury's representatives evidently hoped that by stressing his commitment to the crusade and to defending Cyprus against Mamlūk attack, they could convince the pope of his worthiness and so win papal approval for his government in the island. The idea of a crusade to the East lay close to Pope Clement's heart, and, as he told Archbishop Nicholas and Raymond of Piis, he regarded Cyprus as the springboard for a Christian invasion of the Holy Land. But he nevertheless stopped short of endorsing Amaury's rule.[71] It is difficult to be sure how far Amaury's espousal of crusading was a ploy to win papal support and how far it was genuine and fuelled by real fears of Mamlūk invasion plans. In the summer of 1308 a messenger from Amaury told the pope that the sultan was preparing a fleet of eighty galleys, and from a letter probably written at about the same time to the king of Aragon, we learn that the shipwrecked embassy of 1307 had been taking Amaury's detailed response to a papal request for information on conditions in the East. This same letter also spoke of the governor's hopes for action to recover the Holy Land.[72]

How much substance lay behind the 1308 invasion-scare is open to question. According to al-Maqrīzī, the Mamlūks were concentrating their military activities far away in the Yemen, although he also noted that they were refortifying the castle of Mont Pelerin at Tripoli.[73] But even if there were no immediate threat to Cyprus, it is nevertheless possible that Amaury believed that there was, and in any case the Mamlūk depredations in Armenia in recent years had been real enough. It was reportedly as a precaution against Muslim attack that work on the fortifications at Famagusta was in progress in this period, although, by a curious irony in view of Henry's alleged indifference to the defence of his kingdom, it was at his request, and not Amaury's, that in April 1308 Pope Clement issued indulgences for those assisting in this task.[74] Then in

[69] *Reg. Clementis V*, no. 3543.

[70] 'Amadi', 278–80; Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', pp. 72–3; *Reg. Clementis V*, nos. 2434–7.

[71] *Reg. Clementis V*, no. 3543; N. Housley, 'Pope Clement V and the Crusades of 1309–10', *Journal of Medieval History*, VIII (1982), 30–1.

[72] *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium hoc est historia pontificum Romanorum qui in Gallia sederunt ab anno Christi MCCCV usque annum MCCCXCIV*, ed. S. Baluze, new edn by G. Mollat (Paris, 1914–27), III, 84, cf. p. 86; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 680–1.

[73] al-Maqrīzī, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Egypte*, ed. and trans. M. Quatremère (Paris, 1837–45), II, part 2, pp. 278–81.

[74] *Reg. Clementis V*, no. 2736; 'Amadi', p. 291, cf. pp. 326–7.

August the pope took action to defend the Christians in the East by announcing a crusade. He had come to realize that the political situation in Europe precluded a large-scale expedition to recover the Holy Land, but he could channel the resources at his disposal into a more limited expedition – what crusade theorists termed a *passagium particulare* – to be commanded by the Hospitallers and designed to defend Cyprus and Armenia and prevent illegal trade with Egypt: 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot would be deployed in the East for five years, and the enterprise was scheduled to begin in the spring of 1309.[75]

The pope's reluctance to validate his rule was not the only unwelcome piece of news Hayton had to report to Amaury. He also brought papal letters, including presumably the bull *Pastoralis praeeminentiae* of November 1307, ordering the arrest of the Templars stationed in Cyprus. The initial round-up in France, the start of the train of events which ended in the Order's suppression, had occurred in October, but news of this startling development is unlikely to have preceded Hayton's return to Cyprus by more than a few weeks. Whereas the Knights of St John had on the whole remained non-committal, the Templars had consistently supported Amaury, and in recent months their senior officer then in the island, the marshal Ayme d'Oselier, had given vent to his hostility to Henry on at least two occasions.[76] Amaury must have found himself in a difficult dilemma: should he stand by the Order and incur the wrath of the pope and also of King Philip of France, or should he obey the papal instructions and turn against his allies on the basis of accusations which, as later investigations in Cyprus were to reveal, hardly anyone in the island seems to have believed? In the event he obeyed, and, as his subsequent letter to the pope makes clear, he sought to enhance his reputation at the curia by his efficiency in organizing the arrests despite the fact that the Templars in Cyprus were well armed and notwithstanding rumours of impending Muslim attack.[77] Although Amaury acted promptly, his initial approach, which appears to have been to treat the members of the Order as gently as possible while complying with the papal instructions, broke down when they proved unco-operative. At the end of May there was a brief military showdown, and they surrendered. Amaury's officers took charge of their lands, arms and moveable property, and the Templars themselves, said to number eighty-three knights and thirty-five sergeants, were confined on their estates.[78]

The arrest of the Templars would not have mattered so much to Amaury, had it not been for the fact that there was by then a sizeable backlash among the

[75] Housley, 'Pope Clement V', pp. 32–2.

[76] *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium*, III, 85. For the papal bull, M. Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 73–4. For Templar support for Amaury, 'Amadi', pp. 248, 260–1, 266, cf. p. 267. Templar hostility to Henry continued after their arrest. 'Amadi', pp. 360, 392.

[77] *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium*, III, 84–6. For scepticism about the charges, Barber, *Trial of the Templars*, pp. 218–20.

[78] For a detailed account, 'Amadi', pp. 283–91. Cf. Hill, II, 233–6; Barber, *Trial of the Templars*, pp. 216–18.

Cypriot vassals against his rule and in favour of a royal restoration. In January 1308 news had reached Nicosia that about sixteen knights together with some turcopoles and footmen were setting off from Paphos to aid the king. It is not clear whether they were acting with the king's knowledge or at his bidding, but, before they could get far, Amaury had armed his followers, and Henry, fearing arrest, had put the royal palace at Nicosia into a state of defence. Amaury's supporters, including the Templars and the Genoese besieged him there. Henry's men were outnumbered, and after four days they surrendered without a fight. The *Chronique d'Amadi* names twenty-four vassals and fifteen stipendiary knights who were with the king. All the vassals were incarcerated except for the seneschal, Philip of Ibelin, who was banished to his estate at Alaminos, John Dampierre, who was sent to Karpasia, and four others whom Henry was allowed to retain in his household. Meanwhile the Paphos knights had failed to rally support at Limassol and, on learning of the situation in Nicosia, had dispersed. Twelve were later imprisoned.[79]

The Paphos rebellion had comprised vassals of middling rank – indeed, the knights at Limassol had hung back from joining when they realized that there was 'no notable leader, that is, none of the barons of the king's following' with them.[80] But soon afterwards[81] Amaury's position was impaired by the defection of two leading nobles, Rupen of Montfort and Baldwin of Ibelin. It was reported that Rupen and members of his household were plotting to capture Amaury and restore the king. Rupen denied the allegation but was nevertheless confined to his mother's estate at Lapithos. Baldwin was denounced by two knights who bore him a grudge and accused of conveying Amaury's secret plans to Henry; he too was restricted to a rural estate. Both men later supported the king, although, from the way in which the chronicler recounted these episodes, their defections would seem to have been due more to Amaury's willingness to believe stories of plots – evidence in itself for his growing sense of insecurity – than to Henry's ability to detach his brother's adherents. Rupen, as heir to the Cypriot inheritance of the lords of Beirut, and Baldwin, the senior representative of his branch of the Ibelin family, were major figures. At the same time yet more knights were rounded up. Then, in April, Amaury had Philip the Seneschal and Baldwin of Ibelin sent into exile in Armenia. Meanwhile the other notable royal supporter, John Dampierre, had died; he had been beaten up for attempting to communicate with the king.[82]

So in the early months of 1308 Amaury was taking stern measures against those he suspected of being disloyal. His policy was successful in the sense that it

[79] 'Amadi', pp. 259–66. Cf. 'Gestes', pp. 865–6. [80] 'Amadi', p. 265.

[81] The date is given *ibid.* (p. 267) as the end of June ('Al uscir del mese di zugno'), but this is impossible as Baldwin was exiled in April (pp. 275–6). Perhaps 'zener' (January) should be read for 'zugno'.

[82] *Ibid.*, pp. 267–9, 271–7, 329. Cf. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 137–8, 157, 159–60.

put an end to overt opposition from the vassals, but the extent of the disaffection – almost seventy individuals are named as royal supporters in the chroniclers' accounts of that year – suggests widespread hostility. Against this background, the failure of his diplomatic offensive to win papal backing for his regime, not to mention the requirement that he arrest the Templars, must have come as a major setback. Although Cyprus remained quiet for the remainder of 1308 and throughout 1309, Amaury's difficulties increased. The harvests failed; two of his leading supporters, Guy of Ibelin and John lord of Arsur, died, and in April 1309 he was more or less openly rebuked from the pulpit by two Franciscans for his treatment of the king.[83] An additional concern, and one which was henceforth to preoccupy him, was the crusade proclaimed in August 1308 for the following spring. The prospect of a large force of professional soldiers arriving in Cyprus at the behest of a pope who had so far declined to recognize his government and including many, who, as subjects of the king of France or the Angevin king of Sicily, would be out of sympathy with Lusignan claims to the kingdom of Jerusalem and might well be unconvinced of the family's rights to the crown of Cyprus was alarming.[84] At the very least the crusade could lead directly to Henry's restoration and to reprisals against Amaury and his supporters; conceivably it could end with the Lusignans turned off the throne of Cyprus for good.

The crusading expedition was repeatedly postponed, and, when early in 1310 it did at last set sail, it spent its time consolidating Hospitaller control in Rhodes and never actually reached Cypriot waters at all.[85] But Amaury was not to know. In May 1309 the grand commander of the Hospital arrived in Nicosia with a papal letter informing the Cypriots that the crusade plans were well advanced and that the master of his Order, Fulk of Villaret, was to act as commander. At the end of July Amaury summoned all the vassals in the kingdom to come, but without their horses and arms, to an assembly in Nicosia. There he gave instructions for them to get ready to join in the crusade 'for the aid of the Holy Land' which was expected soon, but he added that if the crusaders proved to have other intentions, 'namely to harm us and the kingdom of Cyprus', they should be prepared to have to defend themselves.[86] Then followed a period in which Henry was subjected to consideable pressure to put the legality of Amaury's rule beyond doubt by naming him governor for life, but , despite the abuse and privations he had to suffer at this time, he resolutely refused. In September Amaury was sending more royalist knights into exile in Armenia, although by then it must have been obvious that the crusade was not going to arrive until after the winter.[87]

[83] 'Amadi', pp. 292–3, 298, 300. [84] Above, pp. 107–8.
[85] Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, pp. 223–5; Housley, 'Pope Clement V', pp. 37–8.
[86] 'Amadi', pp. 298–9, 300–1. [87] *Ibid.*, pp. 302–13, cf. p. 299.

Towards the end of 1309 the Knights of St John were moving towards outright opposition to Amaury. Early in 1308 the grand commander, Guy of Séverac, had been one of those who had forced Henry into recognizing Amaury as governor, and in August 1309 he and the marshal, Simon le Rat, had again been employed in putting pressure on Henry. But then Amaury became suspicious of Simon's good faith and stopped him visiting the king. In October stories were circulating in Armenia of plots to get Henry away from Cyprus to Rhodes and also to rescue Philip the Seneschal and Baldwin of Ibelin from Armenia and take them to Rhodes also. A similar rumour appeared in May 1310: the king was to be rescued from his place of exile in Armenia by a Genoese galley acting with the connivance of the master of the Hospitallers.[88] By now Rhodes had become a haven for royalist supporters: two knights are reported to have fled thither in March 1310; at around the same date Rupen of Montfort, who in 1309 had accompanied his mother on an unsuccessful bid to acquire the duchy of Athens, decided to remain there; in June 1310, after Amaury's death, the chronicler noted Rupen's return to Cyprus in the company of twelve other knights who had taken refuge with him.[89] So whereas in the summer of 1309 Amaury could still hope that a Hospitaller-led crusade might be content to leave him undisturbed as ruler of Cyprus, it was not long before he could be virtually certain that it would not.

By October he had decided on a change of approach. He sent his wife to arrange with her brother, King Oshin, to accept Henry as a prisoner in exile, and at the beginning of February he had the king escorted to Cilicia. He then released the royalist knights he had been holding in custody, threatening them with the confiscation of their fiefs if they tried to act against him.[90] It was a skilful move. By freeing his prisoners, Amaury was able to amake a conciliatory gesture, and, by placing Henry in custody in Armenia, he had removed the greatest threat to himself. It would be difficult for any royalist movement to prosper without the king, and, if a crusade intent on resotoring him were to come, it would have to contend with the authorities in both kingdoms. Exiling the king might not be popular, but it would serve to secure Amaury's position.

In March 1310 the papal envoy, Raymond of Piis, at last arrived in Cyprus. He had been commissioned by the pope to investigate the possibility of conciliation as far back as January 1308. Amaury is said to have feared that the crusade was following close behind him and to have redoubled the work on the fortifications of Famagusta as a precaution. In an interview with Raymond he justified his assumption of power, and explained that he dared not hand back power to Henry for the simple reason that he knew how vindictive he would be. The upshot was that Raymond undertook to go to Armenia to see the king and

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 302, 311, 312, 313–14; Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', pp. 70–1.
[89] 'Amadi', pp. 297, 325, 354; Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', p. 71.
[90] 'Amadi', pp. 314–25.

induce him to make peace with his brother. The negotiations were inconclusive – rumours that the Hospitallers and Genoese were scheming to rescue Henry and take him to Rhodes evidently perturbed Amaury so much that they prevented any progress in the discussions – and then, on 5 June, Amaury was murdered. So great had been his paranoia that, after he had been reported missing and before his body was found, his widow was prepared to believe that he had fled in fear of the coming crusade.[91]

Our heavy dependence on just one source, the anonymous compilation known as the *Chronique d'Amadi*, means that it is difficult to view the circumstances of Amaury's murder, or indeed much else that took place between 1306 and 1310, except from its standpoint.[92] Almost certainly the author of the original recension of this section was at work soon after Henry's restoration. He seems to have been closely associated with the court and the knights who had now come to prominence as royal counsellors, and his purpose was clearly to celebrate the fortitude of the king and the heroism of those of his vassals who had remained loyal. He was extremely well-informed: for example, he recounted the arrest of the Templars in 1308, Amaury's ill-treatment of the king in August and September 1309 and Henry's deportation in February 1310 in enormous detail, and his account of the period between Amaury's death in June 1310 and the king's return to Cyprus at the end of August is so full as to suggest that he or his informants must have kept a journal.[93] But for the period between February and June the narrative is much thinner, and it omits any reference to developments as important as the riot in Famagusta in which several Genoese were killed, the rumoured plot to get Henry to Rhodes, or the start of the trial of the Templars.[94]

Amaury's murderer was one of his household knights, an obscure member of a well-established family named Simon of Montolif. But although it gives a detailed account of the actual killing, the *Chronique d'Amadi* offers no discussion of his motive. There is no suggestion that Simon had acted in collusion with the king's sympathizers, and the impression is left that the royalist

[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 328–9, 330, 332; Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', pp. 66–71.

[92] The *Chronique d'Amadi* is an Italian translation of a lost French original and is named after Francesco Amadi, the sixteenth-century owner of the manuscript. For its relationship with the other narratives which describe the events of these years, see Kohler's introduction to 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *RHC Arm.*, II, pp. cclii–cclviii; Leontios Makhairas, II, 8–11.

[93] 'Amadi', pp. 283–91, 302–12, 315–25, 329–79.

[94] For the anti-Genoese riot, *Reg. Clementis V*, no. 9256. The Templar process in Cyprus started in May 1310, 'Processus Cypricus', pp. 147–400. The hearings of 1–5 May (pp. 152–65), however, would appear to date to 1311 (as indicated by the text at p. 152), and not 1310 as assumed by the editor and by Hill (II, 271) and Barber (*Trial of the Templars*, pp. 218–19). Had 1310 been correct, it would have to be assumed that Philip the Seneschal and Baldwin of Ibelin were both brought to Cyprus from their captivity in Armenia for the trial, and that Rupen of Montfort and James of Montolif were both induced to forsake their refuge in Rhodes. 'Processus Cypricus', pp. 152–3, 155, 158–9. For James of Montolif in Rhodes, 'Amadi', p. 325.

knights in Famagusta who were henceforth to acquire a crucial role were as surprised as anyone by the turn of events. After the murder Simon totally disappeared. The chronicler's story is of a man acting independently and committing murder for reasons of his own. In all probability it should be accepted at face value, and Amaury's death viewed as a private homicide. It is nevertheless worth asking whether there might have been a conspiracy and then a cover-up. There could have been political reasons for someone writing shortly after these events to want to conceal royalist complicity. In his narrative the chronicler described how Simon cut off Amaury's head and then, deciding that it would be too awkward for him to carry, cut off his right hand and took that instead. But why? Was he simply a psychopath, or did he need to prove that he had done the deed?[95] Two late fourteenth-century writers believed that there had been a conspiracy. Little weight need be given to John Dardel's assertion that 'the lords of Cyprus treacherously encompassed Amaury's death' – his account is ill-informed and distorted – but Philip of Mézières' claim that the murderer acted by arrangement with other royalist knights cannot be discounted so easily.[96] However, the conspiracy theory is at best unproven. For a conspiracy to have succeeded in suborning one of Amaury's favourites, for the perpetrator to have accomplished his mission and then to have been spirited away, perhaps for good, and for the whole scheme to have been hushed up so effectively that it left hardly any clues in the surviving sources argue strongly against it ever having existed.[97]

Irrespective of whether Henry's supporters had engineered the murder, they were soon able to take advantage of it. Many of the royalist sympathizers among the knights had congregated in Famagusta. According to the *Chronique d'Amadi* Amaury had posted them there as part of his panic measures at the time of the arrival of Raymond of Piis the previous March. In Nicosia the lord of Tyre's counsellors proclaimed Aimery of Lusignan, his younger brother,

[95] 'Amadi', pp. 329–32, cf. pp. 349–51.

[96] John Dardel, p. 23; Philip of Mézières, *Le Songe du Vieil Pelerin*, ed. G. W. Coopland (Cambridge, 1969), II, 227–8; *idem*, 'Épistre lamentable et consolatoire sur le fait de la desconfiture lacrimable du noble et vaillant roy de Honguerie par les Turcs devant la ville de Nicopoli' in *Oeuvres de Froissart: Chroniques*, ed. J. M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1867–77) XVI, 485.

[97] The issue is obscured still further because there were at least two men named Simon of Montolif in Cyprus in the opening decades of the fourteenth century, there were members of the family on both sides in the 1306–10 crisis, and it is not possible to reconstruct the family tree. The murderer was the son of Thomas of Montolif; in 1308 he denounced Baldwin of Ibelin ('Amadi', p. 329, cf. pp. 267–9). At about the same time another Simon of Montolif, brother of the bishop of Paphos (fl. 1302–3), was *bailli* of Paphos ('Amadi', p. 265); maybe he was the 'knight of Nicosia and Paphos' who testified in the Templar trial in June 1310 ('Processus Cypricus', pp. 385–6). In 1314 a Simon of Montolif was, with John and Thomas of Montolif, a guarantor of the terms of the marriage contract of James II of Aragon and Maria of Lusignan. Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 105.

governor in his place, and they immediately sent instructions to the castellan of Famagusta, John of Brie, to hold the city on their behalf. But on 6 June, the day after the murder, the knights in Famagusta, supported by representatives of the Italian communes, declared openly for the king, and John was powerless to resist them. When later in the day messengers arrived from Nicosia requiring them to swear an oath to Aimery, they refused. Instead they took the castellan and a handful of others who remained opposed to the king into custody. When news of these events reached Paphos and Limassol, the knights there also declared for the king, as did the garrison at Kyrenia.[98] Henry's partisans at Famagusta were led by Aygue of Bethsan, a descendant of the twelfth-century holders of the Jerusalemite lordship of that name who initially, in 1306, had fallen into line behind Amaury. Most of his associates were, like him, members of old-established knightly families who had emerged as royal supporters by 1308. Famagusta was placed in a state of defence and the king's banner flown. Aygue was elected 'Captain of the barons, faithful knights and communities of the kingdom of Cyprus'.[99]

The nobility was now split into two camps: Henry's partisans in Famagusta and elsewhere, and his opponents clustered around Aimery of Lusignan in Nicosia. Neither party was prepared to start a full-scale civil war; both preferred to wait and see which had the greater reserves of military strength and popular support. However, the Hospitallers were acting in close collaboration with the knights at Famagusta, and on 26 June and again a month later they brought substantial forces from Rhodes to reinforce the royalists.[100] It was their presence that undoubtedly tilted the military balance decisively against Aimery's party.

The chief problem was how to get the king away from his gaoler, King Oshin, and back to Cyprus. The initial overtures to Oshin left no doubt that Henry's release was going to require some extremely delicate negotiations. The Hospitaller grand commander, Guy of Séverac, led a delegation to Armenia from Famagusta, but the story was put about that the royalists, with Hospitaller help, had killed not only Amaury but also his wife, Isabella, who was Oshin's sister, and their offspring. As a result Guy was obliged to flee, and the king and the other Cypriot exiles held in Armenia were confined more rigorously. The royalists then formulated a scheme, the essence of which was that Henry and the others should be exchanged for Isabella of Tyre and her children. In the meantime Isabella had taken refuge in the archbishop's residence in Nicosia. On

[98] 'Amadi', pp. 333–6, 340–1, 343–4. For Venetian support for the royalists, *Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie*, ed. F. Thiriet (Paris/The Hague, 1966–71), I, 296.

[99] 'Amadi', pp. 335–6. For Aygue in 1306, *DVL*, I, 42; Leontios Makhairas, §59 (where Αγγε or Αγκε should be rendered 'Aygue' rather than 'Hugh'). For a convenient though not exhaustive list of his associates, 'Amadi', p. 362; cf. pp. 252, 264, 269. For his title and its variants, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 117, 136; 'Amadi', p. 336.

[100] 'Amadi', pp. 354, 370–1.

11 June the king's supporters made contact with the queen-mother, the two papal representatives, Raymond of Piis and the legate Peter of Pleine-Chassagne bishop of Rodez, and the leading members of Aimery's party. Aimery realized that he was outnumbered and that the royalists controlled the ports, and so on 13 June he and his followers swore to work for Henry's restoration in return for the queen-mother's undertaking to do her best to secure their pardon and to get Henry to ratify various legal transactions with which they had been involved.[101]

Raymond of Piis then headed a second embassy to Oshin, but, thanks to the obstructive tactics of Isabella of Tyre, it too ended in failure. Attempts to smuggle Isabella and her children out of Cyprus and so deprive the royalists of their bargaining counter, served to heighten the tension, and the queen-mother had her work cut out to save Aimery of Lusignan and his men from the wrath of their opponents. As the royalists, reinforced by the Knights of St John and exiles returning from Rhodes, tightened their grip, so Aimery and his followers were driven to desperate measures. They tried to secure ecclesiastical protection for themselves by taking crusading vows, and then, in mid-July, they abandoned Nicosia and took refuge at Kormakiti, a village near the promontory of the same name about twenty-five miles north-west of Nicosia. Aimery's supporters were said to have included forty knights, and their entire force was put at 226 mounted men and 400 foot. Shortly afterwards the royalists took control of Nicosia. At a public gathering a letter from the king, apparently written before Amaury's death, was read out in which Henry appointed the master of the Hospitallers his deputy in Cyprus and promised pardon to all who would rally to his side. It was then announced that in the master's absence in Rhodes the government was to be headed jointly by Aygue of Bethsan and Albert l'Aleman, the Hospitaller preceptor in Cyprus; dire penalties were threatened against anyone who hindered the king's return.[102]

A third embassy to Armenia, on this occasion led jointly by the papal legate and Raymond of Piis, was more successful. On 4 August Oshin agreed to the exchange, although the negotiators had to accept clauses guaranteeing and enlarging Amaury's heirs' landed possessions and binding the king to take responsibility for most of Amaury's debts. News of the agreement was greeted with general rejoicing, and, despite the truculence and prevarications of Isabella of Tyre, the arrangements went ahead smoothly. Henry was released in return for Isabella and her children on the quayside at Ayas and landed at Famagusta on 27 August.[103]

Aimery of Lusignan and his forces remained at Kormakiti. The king sent a

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 336–40, 344–8. For Peter of Pleine-Chassagne, *Reg. Clementis V*, nos. 4392, 4494–516. He was the papal legate on the crusade and had arrived in Cyprus shortly before Amaury's death. The archbishopric of Nicosia was vacant at this period.

[102] 'Amadi', pp. 351–69 *passim* (for the crusading vows, p. 355).

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 366, 371–80. For the text of the agreement, Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', pp. 76–90.

formal summons to the vassals there to come to Famagusta, but they refused. Maybe they feared for their personal safety – a prominent member of their party, Henry of Jubail, who was in hiding in Nicosia, was murdered at about this time – and perhaps they had small hope of clemency even if they obeyed. However, resistance was short-lived. The leaders tried to arrange shipping for themselves to escape to Armenia, but, when several of them slipped away from the main encampment to make a rendezvous, the boat failed to appear. They came back to find that in the meantime the rank and file had surrendered on discovering that their commanders had deserted them. By then the king had ordered the arrest of all who had been at Kormakiti, and so they now became isolated fugitives. Balian of Ibelin, the prince of Galilee and husband of one of the king's sisters, Philip of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, Hugh of Ibelin and Walter of Bethsan allowed themselves to be taken into custody and threw themselves on the king's mercy; Aimery of Lusignan went into hiding but was discovered; Philip of Ibelin, known as Philip the Younger, was taken off a ship bound for Armenia when it put into Famagusta.[104]

Henry had no reason to be generous to his former opponents. He had been stripped of his authority and humiliated over a four-year period, and he had then had to suffer six months in exile. The Kormakiti knights had disobeyed his summons and had been in arms against him. But up to a point he was merciful: instead of having them sentenced to death as traitors and their heirs disinherited, he simply had them imprisoned. Perhaps he was content to take only such steps as were necessary to secure his return to power; maybe he was aware that if he struck any harder at what was after all a significant and well-connected section of the nobility he would provoke a fresh wave of criticism. However, in June 1316 Balian of Galilee and the other surviving leaders were put in the dungeons at Kyrenia and fed only on bread. They died within a few weeks.[105] What had prompted this treatment then is not clear. Nor is it clear why in 1318 Balian of Galilee's sisters, Alice, Maria and Eschiva, should have been locked up. All three had been closely associated with the king's former opponents: Alice was the widow of Walter of Bethsan and Maria the mother of Philip count of Jaffa, while Eschiva was said to have been the wife of Amaury of Tyre's eldest son.[106] It is difficult to avoid the assumption that the deaths in Kyrenia and the imprisonment of the women were signs of Henry's lingering vindictiveness and perhaps also of pressure from his own partisans. Even so, he did not confiscate his opponents' fiefs. That was left to his successor, Hugh IV, who in 1324 at the

[104] 'Amadi', pp. 380–9 *passim*.

[105] *Ibid.*, pp. 385–91 *passim*, 397–8. Aimery of Lusignan had died some time before 19 April 1316. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 703. Possibly Henry had waited until his brother's death before moving against his associates. For evidence that in 1311 it was being said that Aimery would not be released, below, p. 137.

[106] 'Amadi', pp. 399–400. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 163–5.

beginning of his reign had the High Court declare the fiefs of the vassals who had been at Kormakiti forfeit. But Hugh also released the remaining prisoners including the noblewomen confined in 1318.[107]

Henry's restoration and the arrest of the Kormakiti knights was not quite the end of the story. In 1311 there was a plot to take over the kingdom in the name of Amaury's eldest son, release the anti-royalist prisoners and place the government in the hands of the marshal of the Templars, Ayme d'Oselier. It was betrayed, and the authorities had little trouble in dealing with it. A number of knights were exiled, and four ringleaders were sentenced to death by drowning.[108] This episode did, however, highlight the problems that the presence of Amaury's heir might cause. In the 1310 agreement with King Oshin, the young Hugh of Lusignan's inheritance had been guaranteed and augmented. In November 1310 he and his mother, Isabella of Tyre, had returned to Cyprus from Armenia in the company of Philip the Seneschal, Baldwin of Ibelin and the other prisoners that Amaury had sent to Oshin, and who were now being repatriated. Hugh was not old enough to have played an active part in the events of 1306–10, and it would appear that Henry duly allowed him to take possession of his father's fiefs. The following May Isabella, with the king's permission, took her sons and household back to Armenia. According to John Dardel, Henry had made it plain to Hugh that he could only have leave of absence for one year; if he remained abroad any longer he would lose his fiefs, presumably on the grounds that he would not be available to perform his feudal services. But Hugh did remain abroad, and so the king carried out his threat. After that neither Hugh nor any of Amaury's other descendants were able to persuade Henry or his successors to restore their inheritance. Just as Henry had at first shown a degree of moderation in his dealings with his defeated opponents only to stike them down later, so too he began by keeping his obligations to Hugh under the 1310 treaty but then found a pretext for disinheriting him.[109]

The effects of the 1306–10 upheavals on Cypriot society are not easy to assess. The fortunes of individuals varied according to whether or not they managed to join the royalist side before it was too late, but there does not seem to have been any major shift in the overall structure of the nobility. Some great men and also a number of lesser figures lost out, but, of the leading magnate families, the Dampierres and the Montforts were unaffected, while many of the Ibelins managed to avoid retribution. The most heavily punished branch of the family were the descendants of Baldwin, the mid-thirteenth-century seneschal of Cyprus: Balian of Galilee, Philip the Younger, and John and Hugh of Ibelin all died in Kyrenia, but Baldwins's direct heir, his grandson and namesake Baldwin of Ibelin, was the man who defected to Henry in 1308 and then spent over two

[107] 'Amadi', pp. 401–2, 403. [108] *Ibid.*, pp. 392–3.

[109] *Ibid.*, pp. 390, 391–2; John Dardel, pp. 23–4, cf. pp. 24–41 *passim* for a self-evidently tendentious account of the family's subsequent efforts to the recover its fiefs.

years in custody in Armenia. The only other Ibelin to suffer imprisonment and death after the king's restoration was Philip of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, and here it is evident that his brother, Count Hugh, succeeded in regaining a position of wealth and prominence. Of the other branches of the clan, the descendants of Guy, the former constable of Cyprus, had almost all supported Henry from the outset, and the Ibelin lord of Arsur in 1310 was a minor and so escaped punishment.[110] After 1310 the Ibelins continued to hold high office as seneschals of Jerusalem and Cyprus, and they provided King Hugh IV with both his wives.[111] But in the course of the fourteenth century each branch failed in the male line; their eventual disappearance from the forefront of political life came about more because of this dynastic accident than because of the overwhelming support they had given Amaury of Tyre in 1306.

Among the well-established knightly families that opposed the king and suffered as a consequence, only the Mainboeufs can be pinpointed as disappearing completely from from the records after 1310.[112] On the other hand, the families whose members emerged as Henry's staunchest supporters and who were subsequently rewarded with titles and positions of trust were all established in Cyprus long before 1306, and it is not possible to identify any house coming to prominence from complete obscurity as a direct result of deeds performed during these critical years. In so far as it is possible to tell, it would seem that on the whole the vassals were politically articulate and that they were responsive to the needs of the kingdom and not simply motivated by self-interest. What was more, although feelings clearly ran high, there was remarkably little physical violence during the period between Henry's overthrow in 1306 and his return from exile. Nevertheless, the whole episode left a number of scars, and as late as 1325 King Hugh IV was seeking to set aside the enmity between two noble families which dated from the time of Amaury's rule by arranging for them to intermarry.[113]

Amaury's usurpation and the circumstances of Henry's return left a difficult series of problems in their wake. For example, provision had to be made to give retrospective legality to the routine business that had been transacted in the High Court, the office of the auditor or the *secrète*.[114] More importantly, the crown's

[110] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 157, 159–60, 166–7, 172–4 (Seneschal branch); pp. 213–14, 215–16 (Jaffa branch); pp. 144, 147 (Arsur branch); pp. 178–9, 185–6, 190–1 (Constable branch). By 1306 the Beirut branch of the family had died out in the male line; the heir to the title was Rupen of Montfort.

[111] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 117–19.

[112] For their role in 1306–10, 'Amadi', pp. 269, 275, 326, 352, 355, 359, 386, 390, 392. Cf. C. Clermont-Ganneau, 'Nouveaux monuments des croisés recueillis en Terre Sainte', *AOL*, II (1884), part I, pp. 458–9.

[113] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Dispenses matrimoniales', no. 58, pp. 68–9 and n. 31 (p. 90); cf. nos. 49–50, 53–4 (pp. 66–7).

[114] 'Bans et ordonnances', pp. 368–70.

finances were in serious disarray. Later in the fourteenth century Philip of Mézières alleged that Amaury had impoverished the royal domain, and he recounted the story of how Henry had declined to accept a subsidy proffered by the clergy, knights and burgesses and pursued instead a policy of financial stringency, vowing not to eat off silver or gold until he had paid all his debts; so successful was his retrenchment that within two or three years he had put the royal finances back on a sound footing. Philip had been chancellor of Cyprus in the 1360s and was presumably repeating a tradition current at that time, but it is nevertheless difficult to know how much credence his story deserves.[115] However, Amaury had been a big spender. He is reported to have seized the funds Henry had set aside for the dowries of his sisters and then to have raised a further 400,000 white bezants in taxation in 1310 as part of his preparations to defend Cyprus against the possible invasion by the crusading army that was then expected. In his 1310 treaty with King Oshin, Henry accepted the obligation to pay all but 50,000 bezants of the debts contracted by his brother, and the chronicler estimated the balance as amounting to 600,000 bezants.[116]

One debt incurred by Amaury that Henry did not repay was the sum of over 30,000 bezants outstanding from a loan of 70,000 borrowed from the commune of Genoa in November 1306.[117] As soon as the king was back in control in Cyprus, relations with the Genoese sank back to the level that had been a feature of the earlier part of his reign. Early in 1310 there had been a riot in Famagusta in which some Genoese had been killed. Amaury had promised satisfaction, but Henry refused to be bound by his brother's undertaking. Retaliation in the form of a raid by privateers on the coast near Paphos followed in 1312, and the next year the pope was calling for a cessation of hostilities and urging the emperor, Henry VII, to bring pressure to bear on Genoa. For his part, the king ordered the Genoese at Famagusta to hand in their arms and move inland to Nicosia, although he soon allowed them to resume their affairs.[118] But by 1316 the conflict had reached major proportions. A fleet of eleven galleys again raided the coast near Paphos, whereupon Henry interned all Genoese resident in Cyprus. According to an Aragonese report, the Commune's merchant galleys had ceased coming to Cyprus and trade with the West was generally disrupted. In 1317 the pope was licensing Genoese clerics beneficed in Cyprus to live away from the island, and King James II of Aragon was instructing his envoys on what to do if Henry tried to use the Genoese war as a pretext for not paying the next instalment of his wife's dower. (James had married Henry's sister Maria two

[115] Philip of Mézières, 'Épistre lamentable', pp. 485–8; *idem*, *Le Songe du Vieil Pelerin*, II, 228.

[116] 'Amadi', pp. 312–13, 326–7, 373; Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', p. 79.

[117] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 152, cf. p. 154 (for further unsettled loans by individuals Genoese to Amaury totalling 24,972 bezants).

[118] *Reg. Clementis V*, nos. 9256–7; 'Amadi', p. 393–5.

years previously.)[119] Hostilities then seem to have subsided. In 1318 the pope reported that Genoa had decided against sending a war fleet to Cyprus, and in 1319 he was enjoining a truce on the belligerents. Negotiations were begun, but, although the internees were released in 1320, the pope was still trying to get Henry to come to terms in 1323, and it was not until 1329 that the parties concluded a definitive settlement, including an agreement to repay the 1306 loan.[120]

There can be no doubt that Cypriot attempts to enforce the papal embargo on trade with the Muslims had exacerbated the escalating spiral of quarrels over unpaid debts and the depredations of privateers. Disputes arising from attempts by both Amaury and Henry to police the seas persisted far into Hugh IV's reign. Arresting ships engaged in illicit commerce inevitably led to protestations of innocence and demands for restitution and compensation as well as giving rise to violent reprisals. In 1311 King Henry sent a memorandum to the Council of Vienne on the subject of the recovery of the Holy Land in which he recounted a cautionary tale of Genoese retaliation when the Hospitallers in Rhodes had intercepted one of their galleys *en route* from Alexandria. He also described his own efforts to put a stop to trading in Muslim ports. In 1329 it was agreed that the claims of Genoese merchants who alleged they had been falsely accused of illegal trade should be referred to the pope, and, although Pope John XXII gave rulings on certain cases, others dating from the time of King Henry and his brother were still unresolved as late as 1338. From 1310 there is evidence for government officials taking pledges from merchants which would be forfeit if they then traded in ports subject to the Mamlūk sultan, and it is clear that the Cypriot authorities were taking a tough line with any Genoese they believed to be breaking the embargo.[121] On the other hand, it is clear from papal correspondence that, at least towards the end of the reign, Henry and his officers were turning a blind eye to Cypriots who traded with the Mamlūks.[122]

The advantages of enforcing the ban on western merchants going to Muslim ports while allowing Cyprus-based traders to operate freely were obvious. So long as the westerners traded in Syria, Cyprus was no more than a port-of-call where they could take on water and fresh supplies and trade in local products, but, by curtailing their access to the mainland ports, the way became open for Famagusta to become a major entrepôt. The local entrepreneurs could bring in Asiatic merchandise and there sell it for re-export to Europe. They would enrich

[119] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 706; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 2735–6; Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 167; 'Amadi', p. 398.

[120] For papal efforts from 1318, Hill, II, 280–1. For the settlement, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 150–8.

[121] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 119–22, 156–7, 172–3; *Notai Genovesi* (CSFS 43), p. 347; Edbury, 'Cyprus and Genoa', pp. 117–19.

[122] John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 14103, 18100, 18119, 20386; Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo', p. 130.

themselves, the royal treasury could levy taxes, and the Cypriot economy as a whole, stimulated by the demand for services to cater for this trade, would flourish.[123] On the other hand, the king and his advisers were well aware of the military value of starving the sultanate of war materials and in particular of the *mamlūk* slaves who were taken to Egypt as youths and trained to form the elite corps in the army. Many of these slaves originated from central Asia and were shipped to Egypt from the Black Sea ports on Christian vessels. In his crusade memorandum of 1311 King Henry inveighed against the 'evil and false Christians' who transported slaves, wood, iron, pitch, victuals and other necessities to the Muslims, and he went on to mention that in the previous summer his own patrols had intercepted a Genoese galley taking timber from Asia Minor to Egypt. The prevention of European ships transporting slaves was a theme that was to be echoed in a second memorandum which the Cypriot ambassadors presented at the papal court in 1323.[124] Henry was also prepared to confront Muslim shipping. In 1311 he claimed that his galleys had had numerous successes, and among the events of 1318 the chronicler recorded that a flotilla sent out against the Muslims burnt one of their merchantmen.[125]

The problem was that Cyprus lacked the resources to police the seas adequately, let alone weaken the Mamlūk sultanate on land. The memoranda produced in 1311 and 1323 were both based on the premise that western assistance was necessary for any effective Christian military action in the East, and both advanced the view that a strong naval presence to dominate the waters of the eastern Mediterranean and prevent supplies reaching the Mamlūks was an essential prerequisite before a general passage to recover the Holy Land could be launched. It was a view which had been incorporated into the original plan for the Hospitaller crusade of 1309–10. But it was also taken for granted that the French royal family would take the lead in any major campaign in the East. The legacy of St Louis lay heavy upon the last Capetians with the result that the whole ethos of their kingship was inextricably bound up with the rhetoric of crusading. At the Council of Vienne in 1312 King Philip IV of France announced that he would lead a crusade to recover the Holy Land, and the following year he and his sons took the Cross for an expedition which was to start by the spring of 1319. However, for a variety of reasons a full-scale crusade was never a practicable proposition, and all that happened in 1319 was that King Philip V fitted out ten galleys which he intended to send to Cyprus where they would be deployed against ships trading with Egypt. At this point the Angevin king of Sicily intervened and persuaded the pope to allow him to make use of these ships

[123] E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), 39–42; Edbury, 'Cyprus and Genoa', pp. 116–17.

[124] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 119, 122; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 1690. Cf. M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe–début du XVe siècle)* (Genoa, 1978), 289–310 *passim*.

[125] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 121–2; 'Amadi', p. 399.

in an attack on Genoa, and they were then lost in a naval battle in the course of the ensuing campaign.[126] In 1323 Philip's successor, Charles IV, set about organizing a second fleet, but the plans went awry, the king found himself at odds with the papacy over funding, and, although ships were assembled, the project foundered when towards the end of the year conflict between France and England flared up in a dispute over Gascony.[127]

The abortive preparations in 1323 took place against a background of disturbing news from the East. In 1315 the sultan had doubled the tribute paid by the king of Lesser Armenia since 1297, but repeated defaults led to punitive raids, and in 1322 the Mamlūks overran Ayas, the kingdom's principal port. Henry sent help, and his ships were able to ferry some of the survivors from Ayas across to Cyprus. The Armenians had been appealing to the pope for aid for some time; now, with the Mamlūks threatening to invade Henry's kingdom in retaliation for his assistance, the Cypriots too sent appeals to the West. At the end of 1322 Pope John XXII authorized the preaching of the crusade in support of Cyprus and Armenia throughout western Christendom. Really what was needed was a permanent western naval presence in the East to stop illegal trade, lend aid to Armenia and prevent any invasion of Cyprus. But all Charles IV was proposing was an interim measure whereby a squadron would be sent to the East for just one year. As contemporaries pointed out, such an expedition would be in eastern waters for a few months at most and was hardly likely to achieve anything significant; its presence would only serve to antagonize the sultan still further. In the event there was no expedition, and in 1323 the Armenians and Mamlūks agreed a truce. Ayas was recovered, the refugees returned home, and the threat to Cyprus receded.[128]

Henry's military assistance for Armenia in 1322 is particularly striking in view of the bad relations which had prevailed between the two kingdoms since his release in 1310. The circumstances of his captivity provide sufficient explanation for Henry's hostility, and instances such as the refuge at Ayas afforded the Genoese ships which had raided Paphos in 1312 must have aggravated the situation. Perhaps commercial rivalry between Ayas, which was the only Christian-held town of any consequence on the whole of the Levantine littoral, and Famagusta also contributed to the ill-feeling. In about 1318 the two kingdoms came to blows. What happened is not recorded, but in 1319 and again in 1320 John XXII was enjoining Henry and Oshin to abide by a truce that had been agreed, and in 1321 he alluded to a war between Cyprus and Armenia

[126] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 100–1; *idem*, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 14–18, 20–2; C. J. Tyerman, 'Sed Nihil Fecit? The Last Capetians and the Recovery of the Holy Land' in J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (eds.), *War and Government in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984), 170–6.

[127] N. J. Housley, 'The Franco-Papal Crusade Negotiations of 1322–3', *PBSR*, XLVIII (1980), 166–85; Tyerman, 'Sed Nihil Fecit?', pp. 176–81.

[128] Housley, 'Franco-Papal Crusade Negotiations', pp. 168–74, 181; Irwin, *The Middle East*, p. 120.

which had prevented the execution of papal mandates issued four years earlier. As late as 1323 he was trying to get Henry and the new king of Armenia, Leo V, to reach a peace agreement.[129] Closely bound up with this conflict was Henry's refusal to abide by the undertakings he had made in 1310 with regard to Amaury's widow and heirs. They were deprived of their lands in Cyprus , and from a papal letter it would appear that in 1319 Henry had still not fulfilled his promise to pay off Amaury's debts. His non-adherence to the 1310 treaty was still a bone of contention in 1323.[130]

These tensions between the two kingdoms may well have contributed to strained relations between the Knights of St John and the Armenians. The Hospitallers had been staunch supporters of Henry at the time of his imprisonment, and in 1310 King Oshin had been prepared to believe that they had been responsible for Amaury's death. In 1318 the pope intervened to stop him harassing the Order, but it later transpired that he had seized its Armenian estates. Although the Knights evidently recovered some of their properties, and although they had helped in the defence of Armenia in 1322, other properties were still being withheld several years later.[131] They were, however, more than compensated by their acquisition of the Templar estates in Cyprus. The investigation into the Templars detained in Cyprus began in 1310 and apparently continued in 1311; later that year the pope had ordered a fresh trial, but it is not known whether any conclusion was ever reached. The Order was formally abolished at the Council of Vienne in March 1312, and in November 1313 letters announcing its suppression and the transfer of its property to the Hospital were read out at an assembly convened in Nicosia cathedral. It is no doubt testimony to the good relations that the Hospitallers enjoyed with King Henry that, in sharp contrast to what happened in many places in the West, the transfer seems to have been effected promptly. This windfall meant that the Knights of St John had become by far the largest landholders in the island after the king; in 1317 the Preceptory of Cyprus owed an annual responsion of 60,000 bezants to the Order's headquarters in Rhodes.[132]

The Order also actively promoted the most significant diplomatic initiative of

[129] John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 9953, 12389, 13975, 18098–9; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 1227; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cilician Armenia', pp. 126–7; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *Bullae* et *Litterae* adressées par les papes d'Avignon à l'Arménie cilicienne, 1305–1375 (d'après les Registres de l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano)' in D. Kouymjian (ed.), *Armenian Studies in memoriam Haïg Berbérian* (Lisbon, 1986), p. 712 no. 7, cf. nos. 3–4.

[130] John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 9953, 18104; C. Kohler, 'Lettres pontificales concernant l'histoire de la Petite Arménie au XIVe siècle', *Florilegium Melchior de Vogüé* (Paris, 1909), pp. 314–15. Above, p. 128.

[131] Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cilician Armenia', pp. 124–8; Rudt de Collenberg, 'L'Arménie cilicienne', p. 710.

[132] 'Amadi', p. 395; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1291', pp. 167–9; Hill, II, 272–4; Barber, *Trial of the Templars*, pp. 231–8.

the later part of Henry's reign, the negotiations with Aragon which in 1315 led to the wedding of the king's sister, Maria, to King James II. It would seem that the idea for this marriage grew out of conversations between the Aragonese and Cypriot envoys to the papal court in 1311. There then followed an exchange of embassies, in which leading Hospitallers featured prominently, and which in May 1314 led to a contract of betrothal.[133] What attracted the Aragonese was the prospect that Maria would inherit the throne on Henry's death. By the early 1310s the king was over forty and still unmarried. There was little likelihood of his having children of his own. In theory, his heir was his one remaining younger brother, Aimery. But Aimery was kept under lock and key from 1310 until his death, probably early in 1316, and in 1311 the Cypriot ambassador at Avignon made it clear that he was not going to be let out alive. After Aimery, Henry's next heir was Maria, the eldest of his sisters. The Aragonese negotiators were explicitly told to establish whether the customs of the kingdom of Cyprus would give the throne to one of Henry's nephews, a son of one of his deceased brothers, in preference to his sister, and they evidently received favourable assurances on this point.[134] Had all gone to plan, after Henry's death James would have ruled Cyprus as Maria's consort, and in due course the throne would have passed to their descendants; James' heir by an earlier marriage would inherit Aragon, but Cyprus, like the island of Sicily and the kingdom of Majorca, would come to be governed by a cadet branch of the Aragonese royal house. To make an Aragonese succession even more probable, it was suggested in the course of the negotiations that another of Henry's sisters could marry James' son Alphonso, although in the event nothing came of this proposal.[135]

From the Cypriot point of view there was much to be said for marrying Maria to James. With the demise of Henry's heir-presumptive, Amaury of Tyre, in 1310 provision had to be made for the succession to the throne, and no one would have relished the prospect of the kingdom being ruled by an ageing spinster. The Aragonese wanted to extend their political influence throughout the Mediterranean, and their merchants were keen to increase their share of east–west trade. The marriage would give them a direct interest in the well-being of Cyprus and would mean that they would bring assistance at times of danger. On the other hand, they were the bitter foes of the French, and a close understanding between Aragon and Cyprus could serve to deter a French-led crusade to the East from threatening the Lusignan regime. James II had long since adopted a pragmatic approach in his dealings with the Mamlūks, and, although there was a break between 1306 and 1314, in the course of his reign he had sent a number of

[133] Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 46–7, 76–9, 81–3, 89–95, 100–1, 104–5, 106–8; A. T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cyprus: 1310–1378', *Κυπριακαὶ Σπουδαί*, L (1986), 156–8.

[134] Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 76, cf. p. 46. Cypriot feudal custom favoured a sister as a closer heir than a nephew. [135] *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 91, 107.

embassies to Cairo. Among other things he had urged that he be allowed the role of protector of the Christian Holy Places and the Christian inhabitants of the sultanate. Relations generally were good, and Catalan merchants frequented Egyptian ports; indeed, in the 1290s James had encouraged his merchants to trade with Egypt, although later, when political pressures in Europe forced a change, he pocketed the fines imposed on them by the Church for breaking the embargo.[136] Unlike the French, whose crusading plans threatened to leave Cyprus exposed to Mamlūk reprisals once their campaign had ended, James was not going to go out of his way to antagonize the sultan, and his contacts with the government in Cairo must have encouraged the belief that an Aragonese alliance was one of the surest ways of guaranteeing the island's security against the possibility of Muslim attack.

Maria of Lusignan's marriage to the reigning monarch of one of the most powerful Mediterranean kingdoms was arguably the best match ever made by a member of the Cypriot royal house. But it was not a success. There were no children, although, as she would seem to have been born during the 1270s, this is scarcely surprising. Indeed, in view of her age, it is perhaps odd that the Aragonese should have gone ahead with the union at all. James' correspondence with Cyprus after 1315 gives no hint that he was disappointed with his bride, but later, after her death, he complained that she had been too old and had not proved companionable.[137] She died in 1322. Aragonese hopes of obtaining the throne of Cyprus had thus come to nothing. There is no record of any tangible advantage for Cyprus being derived from her marriage, and formal contacts between the two kingdoms were chiefly concerned with Henry's procrastinations over paying the balance owed on her dower.[138] On the other hand, Maria's marriage evidently paved the way for links with two junior branches of the Aragonese royal house. In 1316 Isabella of Ibelin, the daughter of Henry's uncle Philip the Seneschal, married Ferrand, the younger son of King James I of Majorca. But Ferrand, who by virtue of a previous marriage was laying claim to the principality of Achaea, died in battle against his rivals in the Morea within a month of the wedding.[139] Then in 1317 Henry himself married Constance,

[136] A. S. Atiya, *Egypt and Aragon: Embassies and Diplomatic Correspondence between 1300 and 1330 A.D.* (Leipzig, 1938), *passim*; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 20–2, 33–7.

[137] See in particular James' letter to the bishop of Tusculum written shortly after her death. Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 290–1, cf. pp. 142–3, 288–9. Rudt de Collenberg ('Les Lusignan', pp. 115–16) suggests she was born in 1273, although without giving reasons; a date in 1270s is indicated by the fact that at least three younger daughters were born to her father, Hugh III, who died in 1284. James clearly had misgivings about Maria's age: in 1312 he instructed his ambassadors to enquire about the ages of Henry's sisters, and they then seem to have tried to persuade the Cypriots to have Henry's youngest sister designated as his heir and let James marry her. Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 76, 82.

[138] Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 151–3, 154–5, 160–3, 164–5, 166–8, 174–5, 206–7.

[139] 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), pp. 56–64; 'Amadi', p. 397; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 192–3. For Ferrand, P. Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', *HC*, III, 110–14.

daughter of King Frederick of Sicily. Isabella of Ibelin gave birth to a posthumous son, but Henry's marriage, like Maria's, was childless. According to James of Aragon, writing in 1326, Henry was impotent: Constance's virginity had remained intact.[140]

Despite the failure of these dynastic unions to leave their mark on future developments, Cyprus was clearly moving into the Aragonese sphere of influence at this period. In addition, the island continued to enjoy good relations with Venice.[141] But generally Henry's rule in Cyprus after 1310 makes a sorry spectacle. If the long-running disputes with Genoa and Armenia were not enough, in April 1323 we find the pope telling the patriarch of Jerusalem to make peace between Henry and the Hospitallers. It appears that Henry had also incurred excommunication for failing to proceed against illegal trade with the Muslims, and for detaining clerics and suppressing papal letters.[142] It was reported to James of Aragon that he spent too much time on hunting and hawking and not enough on governing his realm, with the result that evil flourished. Previously, in 1316 an Aragonese envoy, Francis des Forn, had regaled King James with a portrait of a sickly king, difficult of access and guarded by his confessor, a Franciscan friar named Aimery; his court was dominated by a coterie made up of the queen-mother and her brother Philip of Ibelin the seneschal, the man whom an earlier visitor had described as a 'fomentor of rancour and slander', together with Brother Aimery and Hugh Beduin, a knight. It should, however, be born in mind that Francis' mission was to extract the arrears of Maria of Lusignan's dower from the king, and he was having to explain away his lack of progress to his master.[143]

Hugh Beduin is a good example of a knight who had supported Henry during Amaury of Tyre's rule and had thereafter remained high in his service. In 1314 he held office as *bailli* of the *secrète* and took part in an embassy to Aragon; in 1322 he was captaining the king's galleys and then, in the early years of Hugh IV's reign, bore the title of admiral of Cyprus.[144] Another knight with a similar record was Bartholomew of Montolif. Like Hugh, Bartholomew had supported the king in opposition to Amaury of Tyre; in 1317 he had been entrusted with the responsibility of bringing Henry's bride, Constance, to Cyprus, and then in 1324

[140] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 718; 'Amadi', pp. 398–9.

[141] See, for example, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 137.

[142] John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 18100–1, 18103, 18106, cf. no. 18119. Other papal letters written at this time concern the pope's efforts to make peace between Cyprus and Armenia and between Cyprus and Genoa (nos. 18098–9, 18102, 18104). For tension between Henry and the Hospitallers in 1316, Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cyprus: 1310–1378', p. 158.

[143] Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 294; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 703–7. For Philip, Perrat, 'Un diplomate gascon', p. 69.

[144] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 150, 162; *DVL*, I, 210, 214; Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 101, 105, 107; 'Amadi', pp. 252, 253, 264, 299, 338, 390, 395, 397, 400, 401. For other references, 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), p. 63; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 14681, 16909.

he acted as Hugh IV's procurator at the formal hearing at which Hugh claimed the throne; the new king then gave him the post of chamberlain of Cyprus.[145] But in 1321, in the middle of what was clearly a distinguished career as a royal servant, Bartholomew was accused of extortion. Sometime earlier there had been a riot which had resulted in the Greek bishops in Cyprus being imprisoned; the pope ordered their release, but allegedly Bartholomew, to whom the papal letters had been entrusted, demanded a substantial sum of money from the bishop of Solia before he would deliver them.[146]

If true, this allegation must reflect badly on Henry's choice of counsellors and calls to mind the comment made in 1316 by Francis des Forn who said of him 'there is no lord poorer . . . in counsel than he'. Indeed there was much for which the king could be criticized.[147] He had failed to remain on good terms with the Genoese and the Armenians; he had even quarrelled with his allies, the Knights of St John; in an attempt to develop links with the Aragonese, he had contracted two marriages, one for himself, one for his sister, which he must have known would not be consummated. His lack of competence had already led to his suspension from the exercise of authority, and it would seem that in the closing years of his reign things were no better. But despite Henry's personal shortcomings, the reign witnessed some important developments. The fall of Acre and the loss of Latin Syria had not led to Muslim attacks on Cyprus. Instead the Lusignan regime had had to adjust to the new circumstances in which it found itself, and the king, by his raids and by his attempts to enforce the embargo, had given visible expression to his desire to play a full part in any future crusade. In addition, the regime had survived a major political crisis which could easily have ended in civil war and even in the removal of the dynasty. That there should have been tensions within the ruling class and quarrels with Genoa and Armenia was perhaps inevitable and cannot be attributed solely to Henry's unimpressive performance as a monarch; to some extent they were part of the legacy of the disasters of 1291. Coming to terms with that legacy was not easy. What perhaps made it less of a problem was the fact that Henry's reign marked the beginning of a period of commercial prosperity unparalleled in the island's history.

[145] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 167, 178; 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité', pp. 419, 421; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 28468, 62662; 'Amadi', pp. 269, 362, 397, 399, 402.

[146] *Acta Ioannis XXII (1317–1334)*, ed. A. L. Tăutu (Città del Vaticano, 1952), no. 36 at p. 74.

[147] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 706.