

The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History

Michael Lower

https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198744320.001.0001

Published: 2018 **Online ISBN:** 9780191805707 **Print ISBN:** 9780198744320

CHAPTER

5 The Peace of Tunis

Michael Lower

https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198744320.003.0006 Pages 123–143

Published: May 2018

Abstract

By late August 1270, the Tunis Crusade was in the hands of Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily. A long-running battle for Syria had been transposed, not only into a different region, but seemingly into a different register. Like Charles, al-Mustansir of Tunis tended to negotiate rather than fight across religious frontiers. But that dynamic was about to change. Charles and al-Mustansir were facing each other at the head of large and fractious armies. The temptation to use the military force at their disposal would be strong, and not only because it could help them gain a better bargaining position. On both sides, there was mounting pressure to activate the conflict. To keep their divided armies together, Charles and al-Mustansir might just have to use them. The negotiators were now in charge, but to get the settlement they wanted, they were going to have to fight for it first.

Keywords: Charles of Anjou, al-Mustansir of Tunis, Treaty of Tunis, tribute, conversion, medieval Mediterranean trade, North African Christianity, religious difference, crusade, jihad

Subject: European History, History of Religion, Medieval and Renaissance History (500 to 1500)

Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

The End of the Grand Alliance

In the early summer of 1270, two Greek envoys went looking for Louis IX. John Bekkos, chartophylax of Hagia Sophia, and Constantine Meliteniotes, archdeacon of the clergy at the imperial court, left Constantinople and took the *Via Egnatia* overland to Valona (modern Vlorë, Albania) on the Adriatic. Fearful of arrest, they avoided Apulia, where Angevin control was firmer, and sailed directly to Sicily. They landed at Capo Passero on the southern tip of the island. It was only then that they learned that Louis had already left on his crusade and was camped on the other side of the Sicilian Straits. Unwilling to risk a long stay in Angevin territory, they set sail into a storm and arrived at Carthage in mid-August. Despite their fortuitous discovery of the king's whereabouts, they arrived too late to fulfill their mission. Louis was too ill to receive them and his death soon after saddened them, since they had hoped he could prevent his brother from invading Byzantium. When they realized that Charles was due in the camp at any moment, they fled as quickly as they could. The next day, two more sets of envoys arrived. They represented the other eastern partners in the coalition that Louis had tried to assemble against Baybars: King Hethum I of Armenia and the Mongol Ilkhan Abaqa. King Philippe III of France received them and placed one of his tents at their disposal. Amid the hardships of the crusader camp, they took their meals on silver plate. And yet, as Primat says, "at first, no one knew why they had come." Whatever plans Louis had made for coordinating with the Mamluks' regional rivals had disappeared with him.[1] The alliance he had forged to fight the battle for Syria had collapsed.

p. 124 The crusade was now in the hands of the king of Sicily, who had been seeking a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis for the past eighteen months. Baybars was his negotiating partner, not his enemy. The sultan,

in any case, was thousands of miles away and the Bedouin contingents he had dispatched to Tunis would not be arriving any time soon. The battle for Syria had been transposed, not only into a different region, but seemingly into a different register. Like Charles, al-Mustansir tended to negotiate rather than fight across religious frontiers. After a difficult start, the two dynasts had been negotiating to resolve their differences. But the dynamic of their relationship was also about to change. It would no longer be a matter of Brother Berenger calmly discussing the rate of the import fee on Sicilian wheat with his Hafsid counterparts, as he had been doing just a few months before. Now, Charles and al-Mustansir were facing each other at the head of large, expensively assembled, and fractious armies. The temptation to use the military force at their disposal would be strong, and not only because it could help them gain a better bargaining position. On both sides, there was mounting pressure to activate the conflict. To keep their divided armies together, Charles and al-Mustansir might just have to use them. The negotiators were now in charge, but to get the settlement they wanted, they were going to have to fight for it first.

The Angevin Expedition to Tunis

Charles's arrival in Carthage on August 25, 1270 was greeted with relief. The crusaders had been expecting him for weeks. Amaury of la Roche had told them on July 24 that he would be coming soon, and Olivier of Termes had reported on the 29th that he could be expected within the week.[2] Whether these representations were deliberately false, designed to keep the army from attacking the Hafsids, is hard to confirm. But they were certainly inaccurate. Charles had no chance of crossing over to Tunis by the end of July. Unlike Louis, he had not been preparing for the expedition for the past three years. A fresh examination of the Angevin registers suggests that it was only in mid- to late June 1270 that he committed himself to crusading in person in the Maghreb. Despite other pressing priorities, and a lack of money, ships, and sailors, he was able to mount a multistage naval expedition—from Naples to Palermo to Trapani to Tunis—in about eight
p. 125 weeks. For comparison, the first ↳ mission to Achaia in early 1270 was organized in about the same amount of time. Although everyone thought he was late, Charles was actually right on time.

The first signs that Charles was coming to Tunis appear in orders issued in late June 1270. The master of the naval arsenal for two mainland provinces of the *Regno*—the Principato and the Terra di Lavoro—was instructed on June 22 to assign two galleys and four *teride* to the protonotary of Amalfi. Powered by sails and oars, Charles's galleys were large fighting vessels whose crews alone numbered about 150 men, including officers, marines, and 108 rowers. The *teride* were specialized horse transports, each capable of holding thirty animals.[3] The following day, Charles purchased enough flour to supply a month's worth of ship's biscuit for nine galleys and nine *teride*. This was more than what was required to transport him and his retinue from Naples to Palermo. With eighteen vessels, over 1,500 men, and 270 horses, this was not a shuttle service. It was a war fleet.[4]

Issuing orders for a squadron was one thing; paying for it was another. Only the week before, on June 14, Charles had told the cardinals that he could only offer half of the annual tribute he owed the papal curia due to the weight of his expenses. To pay for the ships, he instructed the *secreti* of the Principato, Terra di Lavoro, and the Abruzzo to contract loans. Lack of funds hampered the gathering of food supplies for the expedition as well. Pierre of Stampis, master of the king's kitchens, explained to the Angevin curia that the livestock he had gathered in Calabria could not be transported to Messina and Palermo because there was no money available for shipping.[5]

Ready or not, Charles sailed for Palermo around July 5, just a few days after Louis departed from Aigues-Mortes. The ships, sailors, and food for the crossing to North Africa were going to have to be assembled on the island, where Charles had never set foot and Angevin control was far from total. Almost three years after Conrad Capece had launched the Hohenstaufen insurrection, Charles's soldiers were still chasing him around the Sicilian interior. Regardless, by July 14 a fresh stream of orders was flowing from Palermo: for
p. 126 repairs to the royal *teride*; for 500 packloads ↳ of wheat and 1,500 of barley to feed the king's soldiers and horses; then, two days later, "for the greatest possible quantity of flour and biscuit available" for the fleet.[6] Money was still lacking. On the 17th, Charles wrote to the Pisans to complain that he had not received the 4,000 gold ounces they owed him as part of the settlement that allowed them to resume trading in the *Regno*.[7]

On July 18, the French and Genoese crusaders disembarked on the Halq al-Wadi. Two days later, Charles sent two royal ships from Naples to Trapani, from where they could open a line of communication with the

crusade. It was presumably one of these boats that brought Amaury of la Roche to the camp outside Carthage with his message of procrastination. Until his expeditionary force was ready, Charles would have to try to control the crusade from a distance. With Louis in North Africa, there was no longer any reason to keep the destination a secret. On the 21st, the Angevin curia referred to Tunis for the first time in an instruction to the justiciars of the *Regno*. Merchants trading in the kingdom usually operated under a system of export control that provided the crown with significant revenue.[8] To encourage them to supply the crusaders, Charles waived export fees on wheat, wine, barley, meat, weapons, horses, and wood. To trade under these terms, merchants had to post sureties with an Angevin port official, which they could only redeem by presenting a certificate from a marshal of the crusader army attesting that the provisions had in fact been sold to "the people of the host." Charles was happy to help his brother's crusade, but he was not going to be ripped off in the process.[9]

Charles soon confirmed the obvious. He informed the *secretus* of Calabria on July 27 that Louis had brought his Christian army to Tunis and taken Carthage by assault. Wishing to come to his brother's aid "by our powerful fleet," he commanded supplies from Calabria to be sent to Trapani without delay. The *secretus* replied that he could not provide what was requested—1,000 steers, 600 cows, 1,500 pigs, and 10,000(!) chickens—without harming the subjects under his care. The wheat needed for the ship's biscuit was not coming in fast enough either. Charles criticized the justiciar of Bari and the *secretus* of Apulia for failing to
p. 127 procure it. Finding crews for the ships was no easier. Men had to be ↳ compelled to serve on pain of having their homes and grapevines destroyed; even in the face of such compulsion, desertion rates were high. Money was still tight and Charles had to resort to expedients. He diverted 250 gold ounces from his daughter Isabelle's marriage dowry to cover his mounting expenses. In mid-August, as the Catalans were rustling cattle around Tunis, Charles had to borrow 2,000 *livres tournois* from an ailing Louis and 6,000 from Alphonse of Poitiers. Once borrowed, the money was redistributed to other crusaders in the camp, including the counts of Roussy and Luxembourg and the archdeacon of Chartres. Charles was piling debt on debt to launch his campaign.[10]

On August 18, Charles moved from Palermo to Trapani, where he issued his last orders before departure. He was worried about the security situation in Sicily in his absence. The lingering insurgency made the Tunis expedition a calculated risk. In the long run, appearing in force before al-Mustansir might secure the southern borders of the *Regno* and revive the commercial exchange across the Sicilian Straits that was crucial to its economy. In the short term, though, the remaining Sicilian dissidents might profit from Charles's absence.[11]

The First Battle

Charles had earned a reputation as a field commander through his victories at Benevento and Tagliacozzo. After five weeks of inactivity in the face of Hafsid raids on their camp outside Carthage, many crusaders were ready to fight, if for no other reason than to defend themselves more actively. Taking the offensive also opened up the prospect of gaining spoils and consolidating the spiritual rewards that the expedition was meant to offer. There was anxiety in the army over whether the suffering they had endured was earning them the indulgence. The two men who had promised that going to North Africa would fulfill the crusade vow—Louis IX and the papal legate—could no longer reassure them on this score. By taking the fight to the infidel, the soldiers could affirm that they were worthy of the spiritual rewards of holy war. They looked to the "Sicilian lion" to lead them to victory.[12]

p. 128 Eventually, it would become clear that Charles's ultimate aims diverged from those of the crusaders he had inherited from his brother. At first, however, their ambitions aligned. In order to maximize his leverage against al-Mustansir, Charles needed to pose a credible military threat. The crusaders, strengthened by fresh supplies and reinforced with troops, were eager to demonstrate their worth. Tapping into their hunger for plunder and fear for their vows, he exhorted them in the language of religious division and conflict: "Let's go now, by God, and we will attack all together with a good will against these enemies of the faith; and God the all powerful will assist us."[13]

Not only could Charles speak the language of war, he had a plan for how to fight one. Before he left Sicily, someone from the crusader camp seems to have tipped him off about the strategic importance of al-Bahira, the large but shallow lagoon that separated Tunis from the halq al-Wadi. The Hafsids were transporting food to their camp, which lay some distance from the city, across the lagoon by boat. By taking control of the

waterway, Charles could cut this supply line and outflank the Hafsid camp. With this in mind, Charles brought with him flat-bottomed barges that could intercept Tunisian vessels and shuttle crusaders across the lake.[14]

Toward the beginning of September 1270, Charles ordered his men to drag the barges across the halq al-Wadi onto al-Bahira. Recognizing the threat that this posed to his position, Yahya b. Salih al-Hintati, commander of the Hafsid forces, launched a strong attack to block this operation, bringing up troops on barges, with support from horsemen coming around from Hafsid headquarters. Up to this point, the Hafsid cavalry had limited themselves to harassing raids and feigned retreats. This time, they sustained their assault and did not withdraw. Here, finally, was a chance for the crusaders to engage. Armed with bows and lances, lightly armored, and riding fast small horses, the Hafsid cavalry had so far proved elusive, especially because, as Primat reported:

> Our men are very heavily armed with hauberks and shields, and shoulder harnesses, and other armor. They [the French knights] cannot follow them [the Hafsid cavalry] for long, because the horses on which they are mounted are heavy from their own weight, and from the weight of their arms, such that they cannot move freely. If they cannot follow for long, they have to go back.[15]

With a chance to fight at hand, Charles called the French barons to battle. Philippe of Montfort and the count of Artois were the first to respond and were soon joined by many others. Fighting at close proximity with
p. 129 swords ↳ and lances, they forced the Hafsid soldiers back toward the lake. Some tried to escape on the barges that had brought them to the battlefield, but they found to their horror that the sailors, panicked by the crusader advance, had already fled. Surrounded by the crusaders next to the lake, Hafsid soldiers died in large numbers by drowning or slaughter.

The Hafsid losses could have been greater. A dust storm pinned the crusaders back as they tried to advance on the Tunisian camp. Some Hafsid cavalry, more accustomed to the local conditions, were able to retreat through the storm on horseback. The crusaders did not escape unscathed from the battle either. The new marshal, Renaud of Pressigny, the admiral, Florent of Varennes, and several other French lords died, either in battle or by misadventure during the dust storm. The landscape was dotted with irrigation wells that claimed several unsuspecting victims. Although they had suffered heavy casualties in the battle, the crusaders claimed a victory for themselves. Pierre of Condé boasted in a letter home that the bodies of the "Saracen" dead covered the ground for half a league around.[16]

Charles rapidly consolidated crusader control over al-Bahira, launching his barges on the water and ordering more to be built. He also started construction of a wooden castle that would command the shore. The work involved was extensive, since Charles had in mind a two-story structure that required a lot of wood, which had to be gathered and sawn into boards.[17] This elaborate building program had advantages beyond the tactical. It gave the crusaders something to do while Charles and al-Mustansir entered into back-channel negotiations to end the crusade.

Negotiations

The emir was under pressure to reach a settlement. Ifriqiya had been suffering food shortages before the crusaders arrived. A two-month blockade of the port of Tunis, combined with a number of extra mouths to
p. 130 feed, had made matters worse. With the loss of tactical control over the lake, ↳ resupplying the campaign headquarters had become more challenging. Disease was rampant in the city. The crusaders heard rumors that al-Mustansir was hiding in an underground grotto to avoid the bad air that was blamed for the outbreak. Since Tunis was effectively under a trade embargo, the Hafsid treasury was starved of revenue even as it hosted the Bedouin tribesmen who had joined the jihad against the Franks. In any case, it was not clear how much longer they would be willing to stay involved. Summer was turning into autumn, when the Bedouin migrated to their southern pasturelands. Some believed they were losing interest in the fight. Al-Yunini reported that the Franks were paying them as much as 40,000 dinars a day to stay on the sidelines—a statement that may not be strictly accurate, but is at least indicative of the rifts that were emerging in al-Mustansir's fragile coalition.[18] While losing the Bedouin would be unfortunate, letting the war drag on long enough for Baybars's reinforcements to arrive would be a disaster. Accepting help from the sultan would involve a loss of face. Every day that passed made it that much harder to keep the diverse Hafsid army together. The historian al-Khazandari tells a story that may reflect the emir's desperation to keep his soldiers engaged. Al-Mustansir is supposed to have promised them a dinar for each ear of a Frank they brought to him. The time to make peace had come.[19]

Rather than building on his military success, Charles was also ready to negotiate. As the work on the barges and the wooden castle went on, he requested a new shipment of supplies from the *Regno*, this time from the Terra di Lavoro, the province that lay north of Naples.[20] This was perhaps a sign that the provinces nearer to the conflict were running out of food for the crusader army. Money remained scarce as well. On September 9, Alphonse of Poitiers lent Charles another 8,000 *l.t.*[21] Two days later, Charles appointed a procurator to collect the 4,000 gold ounces that the Pisans owed him.[22] By the 24th, the loans he had taken out earlier were falling due. He wrote to the archdeacon of Palermo in some desperation: "Truly," he declared, "just as we have often on other occasions written to you, we are suffering a great lack of money at present."[23] The question for Charles was how to negotiate in light of his parlous finances. Should he accept whatever al-
p. 131 Mustansir offered in order to liquidate the campaign as ↳ soon as possible, which would stanch the flow of cash hemorrhaging from the Angevin treasury, or should he try to recoup his losses and perhaps even profit over the long haul, by holding out for more?

Charles opted to take the long view. With a large army at his disposal, he would never have a better chance to extract a settlement that would satisfy his financial and security demands. Despite this advantageous position, he negotiated with al-Mustansir for a month without result. Tunis was suffering, but the emir was not yet willing to accept peace on Charles's terms. He had declared a jihad against the Franks and many volunteers had responded to the call. He did not want to alienate them by abandoning the campaign too quickly. Within his inner circle of advisors, there were factions that favored pursuing the conflict. Federico of Castile and Federico Lancia were likely to face expulsion under the terms of any peace agreement with Charles.[24] For them, the crusade was the continuation of the war against the Angevins begun four years before. At the same time, the emir was receiving reports that all was not well within the crusader camp, despite the modest victory they had won. Many crusaders were ill, the death toll continued to mount, and some had taken to drink to deal with the boredom and fear of the long campaign.[25] Al-Mustansir knew how much it cost to keep an army in the field and was prepared to hold tight for a little longer as Charles explored the limits of his patience and treasury.

For the time being, Charles kept his negotiations with al-Mustansir secret.[26] In late September, Philippe III recovered from his illness and rejoined the crusader council. He faced conflicting pressures. On the one hand, demonstrating his worth on the battlefield could help him gain legitimacy as a ruler in the eyes of the barons, knights, and ordinary soldiers. On the other hand, he had just become the king of a realm that was thousands of miles away. The men in charge of it were a secular lord of modest rank and an abbot—their authority derived more from the privileged relationships they had enjoyed with the late king than their own status. Under the circumstances, it would be tempting to return home as soon as possible. For Philippe III, however, the chance to win prestige by confronting the infidel was irresistible. He agreed to Charles's proposal of ↳ an all-out attack on the Hafsid camp. For a second time, Charles would marshal the
p. 132 aggression of his French kinsmen to improve his negotiating position.

On October 2, 1270, the army of France went out in full battle array. The footsoldiers, archers, and crossbowmen took up the most advanced position, followed by the knights grouped into "battles" according to affiliations of family, lordship, and region. Pierre, count of Alençon, along with a contingent of Hospitaller knights, remained behind to guard the crusader camp. Horns sounded, the oriflamme was raised aloft, and the army advanced in good order toward the Hafsid soldiers who had come out to see what was going on.

Faced with the massed ranks of the crusaders, the Hafsids reverted to their traditional tactic of *al-karr wa-l-farr*, advance and withdrawal. If they could lure the crusaders into a headlong charge, the tightly formed Frankish "battles" would break up and the smaller groups of cavalry could be rounded on, isolated, and attacked. Since the crusaders had seen this tactic several times already, the Hafsids left behind plunder to encourage their adversaries to break formation to collect it. Charles was also familiar with *al-karr wa-l-farr*: he had used it against Conradin at the battle of Tagliacozzo two years earlier. The shout went down the lines to hold formation and maintain the advance toward the Hafsid camp.

The Tunisians now faced a hard choice. They could defend the camp, which was packed with wood, military hardware, food, and many sick and wounded men. The risk was that they might take heavy casualties fighting in close quarters against the heavy French cavalry, supported by crossbow fire. If they lost their army trying to save the camp, only the walls of Tunis would remain to protect the city, while the suburbs would be exposed to conquest. To preserve the soldiers who were still fit enough to fight, Yahya b. Salih al-Hintati withdrew them beyond the camp, ceding it to the crusaders.

Charles and Philippe III now had a decision of their own to make. If they pursued the Hafsid army past the camp, they might be able to pin it down and destroy it, clearing the way for the conquest of Tunis. But continuing the pursuit was fraught with risks. They did not know the terrain and feared it might be like the land around the Carthage camp, which was dotted with dangerous wells, caves, and hiding places where the enemy could wait in ambush. Then there was the question of whether the knights and footsoldiers would follow them past the camp, which they wanted to sack. The crusade had not enriched anybody yet. Carthage had been a disappointment in this regard, yielding some barley and nothing else. The Hafsid camp might finally offer up some of Tunis's fabled wealth.[27]

p. 133 Beyond these tactical issues lay a larger strategic reality: Charles did not want to conquer Tunis. Whatever the motivations of Philippe III and his barons, Charles remained committed to settling with al-Mustansir. In a letter to Mathieu of Vendôme, abbot of Saint-Denis and co-regent of France, Pierre of Condé described Charles's approach to the campaign as a continuation of his previous negotiations with the emir:

> The king of Sicily had asked our barons at the beginning of the war, that they should not threaten the king of Tunis until they had received his [Charles's] message. I believe this was because there were discussions about peace between [al-Mustansir] and [Charles] and about the tribute that should be collected again from the king of Tunis…These talks had been suspended for some time, and our army invaded the kingdom of Tunis. Once Charles had joined our army, and found his brother dead, he decided that he would acquire by violence what he had previously sought after through negotiations.[28]

By allowing the crusaders their plunder, Charles could preserve the larger prize of Tunis, its trade with Sicily, and its tribute money for himself.

Releasing weeks of frustration, the French knights and footsoldiers tore into the Hafsid camp. They removed everything edible they could find, including flour, cows, and sheep, pulled down the tents and pavilions, and killed the sick where they lay. Once everything valuable had been taken away, they gathered together the fabric, tent poles, and wood, set the corpses of the sick Hafsid soldiers they had killed on top of the pile, and set the whole thing on fire. Then they marched back to their own camp near Carthage. The Tunisians were outraged by the slaughter of their sick companions and offended that their corpses had been cremated in violation of Islamic norms.[29]

The Treaty of Tunis

Charles announced the victory of October 2, 1270 in a triumphant letter to Pierre of Montbrun, chamberlain of the Holy See. He celebrated how the crusaders had "put to fire and ruin" the Tunisian headquarters and declared that "we and our nephew [i.e. Philippe III], together with the whole Christian army, intend to
p. 134 besiege the city of Tunis and its Saracens, ↳ hoping in God, for whose praise this affair was begun, that an end very much to be wished for will be accomplished for these same Saracens."[30] The last clause was a marvel of careful exposition, which implied but did not directly state that the victory would allow Charles to destroy Tunis. In fact, the battle of October 2 marked a different kind of turning point for the crusade. On both sides, the focus turned to ending the conflict.

For al-Mustansir, the situation had become dangerous. Al-Khazandari reported that the Muslims would have surrendered the country to "al-Francis" (Louis IX) if God had not had other plans.[31] The emir retained the better part of his army, but had sustained heavy losses of men, equipment, and supplies. He considered withdrawing inland to al-Qarawayn, but then thought better of it and ordered a trench to be dug around his headquarters so it would be harder to infiltrate the next time. In a self-conscious display of unity, his advisor Abu Said grabbed a shovel and dug alongside the workers.[32] In the meantime, al-Mustansir sent Abu Zayyan Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Qawi, emir of the Banu Tujin, to start a fresh round of negotiations. Charles was ready to talk. The autumn sailing season, which sometimes brought terrible storms, was approaching. So too was Prince Edward of England, who had departed from Aigues-Mortes and would expect to share in the proceeds of any settlement. Reaching an agreement quickly would gain Charles more money and a safer passage home.

The basic contours of a settlement were plain to see: al-Mustansir would pay an indemnity to the crusaders to secure their withdrawal. Charles and al-Mustansir, however, wanted something more than that. Over several weeks in October 1270, they crafted a treaty that wound down the crusade and settled the whole array of issues that had troubled their relationship since the Angevin invasion of Sicily in 1266. Their commitment to a lasting peace is reflected in the length of the truce they eventually signed: fifteen solar years.

The peace was finalized on October 30, 1270. On November 5, al-Mustansir swore to observe the provisions
p. 135 of the treaty in the presence of Godfrey of Beaumont, chancellor of Sicily.[33] The main signatories were ↳ al-Mustansir, Charles, Philippe III, and Thibaut of Navarre. The French barons and knights, including specifically Baudouin of Constantinople, Alphonse of Poitiers, Guy of Flanders, and Henri of Luxembourg, were also committed to observe the agreement, as was Prince Edward of England, although he had not yet arrived. The terms were recorded in Arabic and a European language, possibly Old French. Only the Arabic version has survived. The text shows the influence of Old French usages, transliterating *comte* ("kamt") rather than *comes* and calling Charles of Anjou "Jarl" rather than Carolus (as in Latin) or "Sharun," the name he is called in Arabic historical sources. These formulations are suggestive, but they do not preclude the possibility that a Latin version was redacted as well.[34] Two European sources (Pierre of Condé and Primat) had access to the treaty and offer versions of its main provisions that agree with those given in the Arabic version, while providing additional detail on points of concern to the crusaders.[35] These variations are a standard feature of medieval Mediterranean interreligious treaty making: each party to an agreement would present the terms in as palatable a form as possible to its domestic audience.

Personal Security, Merchant Privileges, and Shipwreck

The foundation of economic exchange between Hafsid Ifriqiya and the northern Mediterranean was safe and secure movement for travelers between and within the two regions. This principle was enshrined in treaties that al-Mustansir had signed with Genoa, Venice, and Pisa in the 1250s and 1260s and that Abu Zakariya had signed with the Hohenstaufen a generation before. The Angevin–Hafsid proxy war from 1266 onward had disrupted trade between Sicily and Ifriqiya as well as central Mediterranean commercial exchange more generally, since Italian, Provençal, and Iberian merchants had also suffered from increased piracy in the Sicilian Straits and the unrest in Sicily during the insurgency. To restore calm to the markets, the Treaty of Tunis called for all Muslim travelers to be under God's protection in the lands of the signatory Christian kings, who engaged themselves to suppress piracy emanating from their shores. If Muslim visitors suffered injuries to their persons or goods, the kings were liable for reparations.

p. 136 The treaty afforded the same protection to subjects of the kings trading in Hafsid territory, as well as to their Christian allies. The emir would safeguard their sales, purchases, and travel within his domains. They would trade according to their accustomed usages, and property that had been confiscated during the hostilities would be returned. To further restore confidence in the Ifriqiyan commercial economy, Christian and Muslim ships were declared off-limits to attack when anchored in a Hafsid port.[36]

Other provisions of the treaty dealt with shipwreck. In many medieval European kingdoms, the *Regno* included, the crown would claim whatever washed ashore from a shipwreck. The signatory princes agreed not to enforce this custom on Muslim ships that broke up in their ports, or even on Christian ships with a Muslim aboard. Muslim people and property thrown on to their shores were to be safeguarded and returned.[37]

Enemies and Exile

Al-Mustansir had antagonized Charles by sheltering Hohenstaufen exiles from the *Regno*. Political refugees flowed from Ifriqiya to the northern Mediterranean as well. In 1236, Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen had received a nephew of Abu Zakariya named ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, who had fled Tunis claiming he wanted to be baptized by Pope Gregory IX.[38] Over papal objections, Frederick refused to surrender the young man, or alternately the young man refused to forgo imperial protection. In the end, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz did not convert and spent his life serving in the emperor's Muslim guard. The Treaty of Tunis attempted to curtail this traffic in exiles by forbidding all parties from sheltering the enemies of the others. The Christian kings could not receive the emir's enemies in their domains or provide aid to anyone trying to harm Hafsid towns or subjects. By the same token, "Every enemy person of the said kings shall be obliged to leave the lands of the commander of the believers, and can never be received there again."[39] In his version of the treaty, Primat identified Federico of Castile and Federico Lancia as particular targets of this provision.[40] At least formally, al-Mustansir was renouncing his support for the Hohenstaufen insurgency. The broad language of the provision in the Arabic version of the treaty also left open the possibility that the emir might be barred from
p. 137 allying with other enemies of the Christian kings. ↳ A few years after the crusade, for example, when Charles was at war with the Genoese, he would insist on the basis of this "enemies" clause that al-Mustansir could not trade with them.[41]

Christianity in Ifriqiya

The Latin Christian communities of Hafsid Ifriqiya—merchants, mercenaries, and captives—were free to practice their faith in chapels built for their use and with clergy imported from Europe. Like other Christian minorities in the *dar al-Islam*, they could not proselytize publicly or seek to convert Muslims in other ways. The Treaty of Tunis affirmed these traditional rights in a carefully crafted provision:

> The monks of the Christians or their priests may be in the lands of the emir of the believers and he gives them a place where they can build their residences and houses of prayer, and places for burying their dead. The said monks and the priests may preach and pray in a loud voice [*mijharan*] in their churches [*fi kanaisihum*], and they may serve God according to what is accustomed in their practice and what they are used to in their countries.[42]

If we numbered the clauses of the truce, this would be the sixth. Pierre of Condé placed it second in his version of the treaty and summarized it correctly. Primat moved it into first place and offered a more expansive rendition:

> And it was arranged in the following fashion between our men and the king of Tunis. And first that in all the cities and noble places of the kingdom of Tunis, and in all the lands subject to the kingdom and those that would be subject to it, from now on, priests and religious would have churches and buildings and cemeteries, and would inhabit these places solemnly and in peace, and would ring their bells and would celebrate the divine service, and would perform in common the office of preaching, and would perform and administer the sacraments of the church to Christians who would live there.[43]

Primat's account was technically accurate, but gave the impression of a broader Christian presence in Ifriqiya than the Arabic treaty did. "A place [*sakan*]" has turned into "all the cities and noble places of the kingdom." Other European chroniclers would exaggerate the crusade's accomplishments in the realm of
p. 138 Christianization even further. In his universal ↳ history, the French dynastic chronicler Guillaume of Nangis explained that the Muslims had:

> entered into agreements with the Christians. Among which were said to be these especially…that in monasteries built in honor of Christ's name in all the cities of that kingdom the faith of Christ was to be freely preached by brothers minor [Franciscans] and preacher [Dominicans] and by whosoever else wished to do so, and those wishing to be baptized were to be baptized freely.[44]

The claim that Christian missionaries could freely baptize Muslims in post-crusade Ifriqiya was false. But it fed into a growing sense among some commentators on the expedition that its primary aim had been to re-Christianize North Africa.[45] The authentic treaty provision was more limited in scope and traditional in intent, but it broke new ground in one important respect. It affirmed the rights to residence and worship that the Christian communities of Hafsid Ifriqiya had long enjoyed in practice but that had never before been explicitly confirmed in a treaty.[46]

Withdrawal and Indemnity

In return for their departure, the emir agreed to pay the crusaders 210,000 gold ounces, each worth 50 *sous tournois*, giving the payment a total value of 525,000 *l.t.* in French currency.[47] This was a lot of money. It was more than the 400,000 *l.t.* Louis had paid to free his army from captivity in 1250, although he had also surrendered Damietta to secure his own release.[48] The Hafsid indemnity can also be compared to the annual income of the French crown, which was estimated at the time of Louis's first crusade to be 250,000 *l.t.*, or less than half what al-Mustansir paid the crusaders to leave.[49] Half of the total would be handed over immediately, with the balance paid out in two equal installments over the following two years. Charles would receive one-third, or 70,000 gold ounces, as would Philippe III, with the remainder distributed among
p. 139 the leading French ↳ barons, including Thibaut of Navarre.[50] Given his late arrival, Charles had done well to claim a third of the spoils from the crusade.

The Tribute

The final provision of the treaty is also the best known:

> It is added to the present covenant that there will be paid [*yuwada*] to the illustrious Charles, by the grace of God king of Sicily, for the past five years, ending at the date of the present letter, that which was ordinarily paid to the emperor. It will be equally paid to the said illustrious king, counting from this day and in advance, each year, double what was paid to the emperor.[51]

The choice of the verb *wada* is notable. It was traditionally used to describe blood money: the payment made to a kin group to stop it from taking revenge for the injury or death of one of its members. The implication here is that al-Mustansir was buying peace from Charles. What may once have been a wheat import fee had become a definitive tribute: a fixed annual payment that seemed to promise political subordination in return for peace.

Pierre of Condé provided the amounts involved, which the Arabic text did not disclose: al-Mustansir would pay five years of arrears at the original rate of 12,000 gold ounces, with the rate doubling to 24,000 gold ounces for the future annual payments. The emir was thus liable for an immediate lump-sum payment of 60,000 gold ounces. After months of haggling and a crusade, a compromise had emerged. Charles had given up his demand of back payments "from the time of Manfred and Frederick" in return for two concessions from al-Mustansir: (1) adding two more years of arrears to his original offer of three (i.e. agreeing to back payments from 1265 rather than 1267); and (2) doubling the rate for the next fifteen years. This was good business for both parties. Although the political implications were troubling, al-Mustansir had secured peace with a powerful neighbor and regained access to the Sicilian wheat market for a reasonable price under the circumstances. The benefits to Charles were similar: a stabilized southern frontier, an export market for his prized commodity, and a small but steady stream of money for a cash-strapped Angevin administration.[52]

p. 140

Responses to the Treaty

The public announcement of the truce laid bare the divisions in the crusade army that Charles's initial burst of military activity had papered over. In the council of leading magnates, there were some who wanted to accept the truce under certain conditions, while others, according to Primat, "believed that they should kill as many Saracens as they could find and that the said city of Tunis should be destroyed along with the entire country, and then they should leave everything thus destroyed." While Thibaut of Navarre immediately embraced the treaty Charles had negotiated, Philippe III took longer to convince. In the end, though, the king gave way. His wife was pregnant, his counselors were telling him that the Tunisian climate was a health risk, his expenses were mounting, and he doubted that conquering Tunis would help the crusader states of Syria. Even if the attack succeeded, he would have to occupy the city with a substantial garrison, which would leave the expedition shorthanded for the next stage of the campaign. Always susceptible to his uncle's influence, he agreed to sign the truce.[53]

The council's eventual decision to accept the agreement led to wider unrest, as the "common knighthood and community of people" pressed for an attack on Tunis that would allow them to "carry out vengeance against the enemies of the Christian faith" and capture "the spoils of the enemy."[54] The disappointment in Charles among the non-noble crusaders was palpable. Having called on them to risk their lives in two encounters with the Hafsids, he was accused of exploiting their willingness to fight for his own selfish ends. The "common people," reported Guillaume of Nangis, accused Charles of arranging the truce only in order to return the tribute.[55]

On one level, this was a dispute over money. By sparing Tunis the sack and providing an indemnity to the leaders, the truce funneled the profits of the crusade to them and denied ordinary crusaders any share. On another level, though, the debate was over the role of crusading in Mediterranean interreligious relations. The opponents of the treaty were careful to couch their argument for sacking the city in the vocabulary of all-out religious war. So was the purpose of the crusade to destroy an intractable enemy or provide leverage for a negotiated settlement? Were the Muslims strategic partners whose survival could prove lucrative in the
p. 141 ↳ long run or a religious Other that had to be eliminated? Both positions had partisans on the European side of the Tunis Crusade.

Just as Charles of Anjou's peace negotiations proved controversial in the crusader camp, al-Mustansir's pragmatic approach to saving his city elicited a range of responses among his subjects. Like Charles, the emir had pursued a diplomatic resolution to the conflict after beginning his campaign with a call to holy war. Not everyone was happy with the change in approach. It may be significant that the tribal chief Ibn ʿAbd al-Qawi, who was somewhat of an outsider, handled the final negotiations, rather than one of the great Almohad shaykhs of Tunis. This could suggest that there was some resistance to the settlement among the Almohads, which would be ironic in light of the criticism they received during the campaign for their lethargic approach to the jihad.[56] There was also some disapproval in the pious circles where the holy war had been promoted. The religious Ibn ʿAjlan refused a request to sign the treaty as a witness.[57]

Overall, though, al-Mustansir received little criticism for paying the crusaders to go away. He encountered no resistance when he asked his subjects to pay a special tax to fund the indemnity, which was said to be ten mule-loads of silver. Ibn Khaldun reported that, "The people eagerly reimbursed him this sum."[58] Moreover, opposition to the treaty among the *ʿulama* was far from universal. Two important Maliki jurists witnessed

the Treaty of Tunis: Ibn Abi al-Dunya, who founded a law school in Tripoli, which he called al-Mustansiriyya to honor the emir; and Ibn Zaytun, who revived the Maliki *madhab* (school of jurisprudence) in Tunis in the mid-thirteenth century.[59] There was a range of views within Islamic jurisprudence on the permissibility of paying tribute to Christians and few jurists forbade the practice outright. Instead, most were concerned to identify the precise conditions under which a tribute could be paid without reproach. The Tunisian response to the truce with the crusaders—general approval combined with isolated opposition—fitted comfortably within this jurisprudential tradition, which gave al-Mustansir the latitude he needed to act pragmatically to defend his people.[60]

Religious Difference and the Search for Peace

p. 142

Conflict across religious frontiers was a powerful cultural expectation in the Mediterranean environment in which al-Mustansir and Charles of Anjou operated. Both dynasts used this expectation to mobilize support when they first confronted each other in North Africa. The unusual circumstances in which they found themselves—two rulers accustomed to interreligious negotiation facing each other with large and anxious armies—meant that the lasting and durable settlement they sought would be difficult to achieve without some degree of initial confrontation. As the campaign progressed, both turned to approaches that did not conform as neatly to contemporary norms of Muslim–Christian conflict. Charles negotiated a financial settlement behind the backs of his fellow crusaders, while al-Mustansir used Christian mercenaries to wage his jihad and agreed to become a Sicilian tributary to end the crusade.

As the mixed response to the Treaty of Tunis shows, some felt betrayed by the turn to negotiation and accused the dynasts of manipulating a holy war for worldly ends. Their frustration is not surprising. Crusaders had risked their lives for what they had been told was a sacred cause, only to be denied any spiritual or financial compensation for their sacrifice. Without a pope to decide, no one could say whether the Tunis Crusade would count as an indulgence-worthy expedition. Charles and the other leaders had taken the Hafsid money and would not be sharing it out. On the other side, jihad warriors had been called away from the fight and made to pay for a peace they may not have wanted.

But these expressions of betrayal should not obscure the more nuanced dynamic that played out over the final phase of the expedition. Preaching holy war against each other did not prevent al-Mustansir and Charles from making a deal; it made the deal possible. The initial appeal to ideologies of interreligious conflict proved essential to the final achievement of the settlement. On the Tunis Crusade, powerful affirmations of difference served as the handmaidens to peace.

Mutual acknowledgement of difference was a touchstone of the Treaty of Tunis. The agreement envisioned a system of interreligious relations based on distinct religious groups enjoying reciprocal rights and responsibilities. Muslims traveling in Christendom had a right to security and safety that was granted to them *as Muslims*, not as merchants, diplomats, or subjects of a particular ruler. The same criteria determined the rules on shipwrecks: vessels carrying Tunisians that wrecked in northern Mediterranean
p. 143 waters could not be claimed by Christian kings because, and only ↳ because, the people on board were *Muslims*. The clause that regulated Christian worship in Hafsid Ifriqiya applied to all Christians who wanted to live there, whether they were Genoese, Venetians, Pisans, Catalans, Provençals, or Sicilians.

Not every provision of the treaty was structured around religious identification. As an agreement among four signatories—al-Mustansir, Charles, Philippe III, and Thibaut of Navarre—the treaty reflected their interests. The "enemies" clauses, for example, were strictly political. But in this sphere, too, the treaty imagined difference as a stabilizing force. By recognizing the distinct ambitions and right to existence of each state, the agreement formalized peaceful relations between Hafsid Ifriqiya and the kingdoms of Navarre, Sicily, and France. It was an unexpected result for a crusade meant to confront Mamluk Egypt. By the time the crusaders were ready to leave, a new diplomatic and commercial network had taken shape, which spanned the central and western Mediterranean and reached as far north as the Île de France. Louis IX's last crusade had aimed to destroy difference, either by making the Muslims into Christians through conversion or by eliminating them altogether. Instead, his campaign ended in a treaty that turned difference into a path to peace. For the next fifteen years, a non-aggression pact would bind the "most Christian" kings of Capetian France to the Hafsid "caliphs" of Tunis.

Notes

1 Primat, p. 73; Deno John Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282: A Study in Byzantine–Latin Relations* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1959; repr. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973), p. 226; Borghese, pp. 69, 250–4; Louis Bréhier, "Une ambassade byzantine au camp de Saint Louis devant Tunis," *Melanges offertes à M. Nicolas Iorga* (Paris: J. Gamber, 1933), pp. 139–46; Paul Lemerle, "Saint Louis et Byzance," *Journal asiatique* 258 (1970): pp. 25–35.

2 Sternfeld, pp. 239, 243.

3 John Pryor, "The Galleys of Charles I of Anjou, king of Sicily ca. 1269–84," *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 14 (1993): pp. 33–103; Juho Wilskman, "The Conflict between the Angevins and the Byzantines in Morea in 1267–1289: A Late Byzantine Endemic War," *Byzantina Symmeikta* 22 (2012): p. 41, fn. 24.

4 *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 82, nos. 350–1 (Lefevre, no. 139); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 30, no. 138 (Lefevre, no. 140).

5 *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 80, no. 346 (Lefevre, no. 131); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 30, no. 137 (Lefevre, no. 138); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 41, no. 184 (Lefevre, no. 155).

6 *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 45, no. 199 (Lefevre, no. 164); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 45, no. 198 (Lefevre, no. 162); *RCA*, vol. 5: pp. 48–9, no. 215 (Lefevre, no. 165).

7 *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 90, nos. 383–6 (Lefevre, n. 62, note 47).

8 *RCA*, vol. 5: pp. 9–10, nos. 38–9 (Lefevre, no. 168); for Angevin control of the grain trade in Sicily, see Michel de Boüard, "Problèmes de subsistances dans un État médiéval: Le marché et les prix des céréales au royaume angevin de Sicile (1266–1282)," *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* 54 (1938): pp. 493, 498.

9 *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 46, no. 205 (Lefevre, no. 174).

10 Lefevre, no. 178; *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 42, no. 186 (Lefevre, no. 190); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 18, nos. 97–8 (Lefevre, no. 198); Sternfeld, p. 339 (appendix A, no. 26); *RCA*, vol. 5: pp. 240–1, no. 141 (Lefevre, no. 201).

11 *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 42, no. 188 (Lefevre, no. 204); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 50, no. 219; Sternfeld, p. 254.

12 For the nickname, see Primat, p. 74.

13 Primat, p. 75.

14 Lefevre, no. 188; Sternfeld, p. 259.

15 Primat, p. 74.

16 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to the treasurer of Saint-Frambaud of Senlis, September 4, 1270," in *Spicilegium*, vol. 3: p. 667; Thibaut of Champagne, "Letter to Eudes of Chateauroux, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, September 24, 1270," in Antoine-Jean Letronne, "Sur l'authenticité d'une lettre de Thibaud, roi de Navarre, relative à la mort de saint Louis," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes* 5 (1844): pp. 105–17; Primat, pp. 74–7; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367).

17 Primat, p. 77.

18 Al-Yunini, vol. 2: p. 456.

19 Primat, p. 79; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367); al-Khazandari, pp. 152–3.

20 *RCA*, vol. 6: p. 10, no. 29 (Lefevre, no. 213).

21 *RCA*, vol. 6: p. 20, no. 71 (Lefevre, no. 214).

22 *RCA*, vol. 6: p. 21, no. 76 (Lefevre, no. 216).

23 *RCA*, vol. 6: p. 28, no. 85 (Lefevre, no. 223).

24 Sternfeld, p. 262.

25 Al-Khazandari, p. 152.

26 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, November 18, 1270," in *Spicilegium*, vol. 3: pp. 667–8.

27 Primat, pp. 77–9; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367); Charles of Anjou, "Letter to Pierre of Montbrun, October 4, 1270," in Léopold Delisle, *Instructions adressées par le comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques aux correspondants du ministère de l'instruction publique et des beaux-arts. Littérature latine et histoire du moyen âge* (Paris: Leroux, 1890), pp. 73–7.

28 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, November 18, 1270."

29 Primat, pp. 78–9; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367).

30 Charles of Anjou, "Letter to Pierre of Montbrun, October 4, 1270."

31 Al-Khazandari, p. 151.

32 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 670 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 367).

33 The standard edition of the text, with an accompanying French translation, is de Sacy, pp. 448–77; de Sacy's French translation is reprinted in *Traités*, pp. 93–6. Pierre Garrigou-Grandchamp produced a revised edition in 1912, which Mohammed Talbi corrected when he reissued the article in which Garrigou-Grandchamp's version originally appeared: see "Documents divers," pp. 245–82. For the date of the treaty, see de Sacy, pp. 473–6; *Traités*, pp. 137–40 (in his historical introduction); Sternfeld, pp. 368–72; Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 62, fn. 1. I follow Brunschvig's chronology.

34 De Sacy, pp. 472–3.

35 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, November 18, 1270"; Primat, p. 81.

36 "Documents divers," pp. 259–60, 262–3.

37 "Documents divers," pp. 260, 263.

38 *Epistolae selectae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Karl Rodenberg, in *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, 3 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883–94), nos. 694, 700; Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 465.

39 "Documents divers," pp. 260–1, 264, 266.

40 Primat, p. 81.

41 *RCA*, vol. 10: p. 21, no. 78 (Lefevre, no. 389).
42 "Documents divers," pp. 260, 264. Note that *kanais* (churches) is spelled with "ya" here, not "hamza," as it is in Modern Standard Arabic: *kanaʾis*.
43 Primat, p. 81.
44 Guillaume of Nangis, *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis*, ed. Hercule Géraud, 2 vols (Paris: J. Renouard, 1843), vol. 1: p. 238.
45 Guillaume's universal Latin history is one of at least eight chronicles to claim that the Tunis Crusade opened up North Africa to Christian missionizing: Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches Toward the Muslims* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 168–9.
46 *Traités*, p. 139 (historical introduction).
47 "Documents divers," pp. 261, 265. For the calculations, see Strayer, vol. 2: pp. 516–17.
48 Joinville, p. 346 (Smith, p. 230).
49 *RHGF*, vol. 21: pp. 513–15; William Chester Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 78–9.
50 *RCA*, vol. 6: p. 43, no. 151 (Lefevre, no. 264); *RCA*, vol. 6, p. 374, no. 1885 (Lefevre, no. 297).
51 "Documents divers," pp. 261–2, 266.
52 Pierre of Condé, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, November 18, 1270."
53 Primat, p. 80; Pierre of Condé, "Letter to Abbot Mathieu, November 18, 1270."
54 Primat, p. 80.
55 *Gesta Ludovici*, p. 478.
56 Al-Khazandari, pp. 151–2; al-Yunini, vol. 2: p. 456.
57 Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 63, fn. 2.
58 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 671 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 368–9).
59 Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 63, fn. 2; vol. 2: p. 291.
60 Michael Lower, "Tribute, Islamic Law, and Diplomacy: The Legal Background to the Tunis Crusade of 1270," in *The Papacy, Religious Life, and Crusade in the Early Thirteenth Century*, ed. Jessalynn Bird (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, forthcoming).