7

DYNASTIC POLITICS, COMMERCE AND CRUSADE, 1324–1369

HENRY II died before dawn on 31 March 1324 at Strovolos. Later that same day a hastily arranged gathering of liege men swore to protect the rights of his nephew, Hugh of Lusignan, against all challengers until such time as he could be proclaimed king. Henry was buried next day, and then on 2 April, using Bartholomew of Montolif as his spokesman, Hugh claimed the throne at a meeting of the High Court. The assembled vassals formally recognized him as his uncle's successor and did homage. Coronation as king of Cyprus followed on 15 April in Nicosia cathedral. A month later there was a second coronation ceremony, this time at Famagusta: as the unnamed author of this section of the *Chronique d'Amadi* explained,

> the vassals and the prelates had decided that since he could not be crowned in the city of Tyre as the Saracens held the land, there was no better place in Cyprus for him to receive the crown of Jerusalem . . . [1]

The new king – not to be confused with his namesake and cousin, the eldest son of Amaury of Tyre – was the son of Guy, another of Henry's brothers. Guy had died when Hugh was three years old, and the king had brought him up in the royal household. In about 1318 he was appointed to the post of constable of Cyprus, the office once held by his father, and, although it is nowhere stated explicitly, it is likely that by the end of the reign Henry was intending that Hugh should succeed him.[2] In any case, Hugh was the only male member of the royal family resident in the island at the time of his uncle's death and so was a strong natural contender for the throne.

The chronicler tells of speedy action to effect his accession but glosses over the fact that his right to be king was open to dispute. As someone writing later in the century was to note, the High Court recognized that Hugh should have the kingdoms of Cyprus and Jerusalem in preference to the late king's sisters, Alice and Helvis. The text of Bartholomew of Montolif's speech to the Court on 2 April has been preserved. In it he made no direct reference to Hugh's two aunts but

[1] 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité', p. 419; 'Amadi', pp. 401–3 at p. 403.
[2] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 113, 121.

instead devoted the bulk of what he had to say to setting out arguments from precedent to show that a male claimant to the throne was to be preferred to a female even if she were the closer relative of the previous monarch: thus in 1185 Baldwin V, and not his mother, had succeeded Baldwin IV of Jerusalem; in 1261 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan had taken the regency of Cyprus in preference to his mother, and in 1269 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan (now Hugh III of Cyprus) had become king of Jerusalem instead of Maria of Antioch. Objections could probably have been raised against the use of any of these instances as precedents for the legal principle that was being asserted – indeed, it is clear that Bartholomew had either misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented the accounts of the decisions taken in the 1260s – but the High Court must have been satisfied, and it accepted Hugh as the rightful king.[3]

As many people must have realized, the succession principle being advanced in 1324 directly contradicted the view taken only a decade earlier. When in 1315 James II of Aragon married Maria of Lusignan, Henry's eldest sister, it had been accepted that he was marrying the heiress to the throne. Furthermore, despite Bartholomew's assertions to the contrary, in the past it had been accepted that the rules governing the succession to the kingdom were the same as those governing the succession to fiefs, and in feudal custom a sister was regarded as a closer relative of the deceased, and hence a nearer heir, than a nephew.[4] But did either of Hugh's aunts actually want the crown? Maybe they were content to waive their rights, and the specious arguments put up by Hugh and his procurator served only to salve the consciences of all concerned. In any case Hugh must have seemed a much more attractive prospect than either of them. Alice, the elder sister, was the widow of Balian of Ibelin, prince of Galilee; Helvis, the younger, had never married; both women would have been in their forties.[5] It is not surprising therefore that the vassals should have rallied to him. However, there may have been a deeper reason for their support. Balian of Galilee had been a leading supporter of Amaury of Tyre and had suffered in consequence, dying in Kyrenia castle in 1316. As has been seen, the divisions caused by Amaury's usurpation and its aftermath long persisted, and it could well be that the knights who had stood by Henry in 1306–10 and who had been high in his favour ever since feared a reversal of their fortunes should Alice come to power. What was more, Alice's accession might provide the cue for Amaury's surviving sons to return to Cyprus. Like Hugh, they were nephews of the late king, and their restoration to their father's lands in the island could well have been a prelude to their eventual accession.

[3] John of Ibelin, pp. 3–4; 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité', pp. 419–22. For the 1260s, Edbury, 'Disputed Regency', pp. 4–19 *passim*.

[4] For James II, above pp. 137–8. For Latin Syrian inheritance custom, Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 14–16. For an instance of precedents from feudal succession used to establish rights to the regency (and hence to the throne), Edbury, 'Disputed Regency', pp. 12–13.

[5] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 117–19.

In 1324, however, they were in no position to mount a challenge for the throne. Hugh, the eldest, had died a few years earlier, and in 1323 the second brother, Henry, together with his mother, had been killed in one of the periodic outbursts of blood-letting to which the Armenian royal family were prone. The next brother, Guy, was away in Byzantium where he was to have a distinguished period of service; eventually, in 1342, he became king of Armenia only to fall victim to an assassin two years later. But despite his varied career, Guy never posed any real threat to his cousin in Cyprus, and neither he nor any other member of his house were able to regain possession of their patrimony.[6] One of Hugh IV's first recorded actions on becoming king was the institution of judicial proceedings against the vassals who in 1310 had been at Kormakiti and had resisted the restoration of Henry II. These proceedings ended in the confiscation of their fiefs, and it could well be that the main purpose of this exercise was to ensure that there was no chance of Amaury's erstwhile supporters forming the nucleus of an opposition party around his sons.[7]

King Hugh married twice. His first wife was Maria of Ibelin, a daughter of Count Guy of Jaffa, and she bore him a son also named Guy. She died, and in 1318 Hugh obtained a dispensation from the pope to take as his second wife her distant kinswoman, Alice of Ibelin. Alice gave birth to at least eight children, five of whom grew to maturity: the future Peter I was born on 9 October 1329; John, later prince of Antioch, seems to have followed fairly quickly, while James, who was to reign as King James I (1382–98), was evidently several years younger and was probably born during the 1340s.[8] With four sons and also two daughters Hugh had ample opportunity to forge dynastic links with western European royalty. Hitherto the Lusignans had had little success in this respect. Negotiations with the English royal family in the 1250s had come to nothing, as had attempts to marry one of Henry II's sisters to King Philip IV of France after the death of his wife in 1305. The only royal marriages had been with the house of Aragon, and then, as has been seen, to no great effect.[9] But Hugh did better: one of his sons married into the French royal house; three of his other children renewed the association with the Aragonese.

In January 1330 Guy, Hugh's eldest son, married Maria, the daughter of Louis of Clermont duke of Bourbon.[10] Since 1316 Louis, who was a grandson of St Louis

[6] For Amaury's sons, Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 220–8. According to the late and unreliable John Dardel (p. 23), Henry had designated Amaury's eldest son, Hugh (d. 1318/23), as his successor.

[7] 'Amadi', p. 403.

[8] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 186–7, 212–13; *idem*, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 122–3, 124–40. For Peter's date of birth, William of Machaut, *La prise d'Alexandrie ou chronique du roi Pierre Ier de Lusignan*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Geneva, 1877), p. 5.

[9] Above, pp. 85, 137–8. For negotiations with Philip IV, Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II*, II, 46.

[10] O. Troubat, 'La France et le royaume de Chypre au XIVe siècle: Marie de Bourbon, impératrice de Constantinople', *Revue historique*, CCLXXVIII (1987), 4–6. See Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 140–2, 144–9, 158–65.

and a second cousin of the then king of France, had been at the centre of French crusade plans as the prospective leader of a preliminary *passagium*.[11] It must have seemed that in marrying his heir-presumptive to the child of this leading western enthusiast for an expedition to recover the Holy Land, Hugh had achieved a notable success. Not only would the royal dynasties of Cyprus and France be joined henceforth by ties of blood, but Louis would now have an added incentive to press for a crusade, since his new son-in-law stood to inherit the crowns of both Cyprus and Jerusalem. Furthermore, the marriage meant that in the event of a French-led expedition regaining the Holy Land, Hugh would be in a stronger position to press his claim to a revived Latin Kingdom against the rival claims of that other cadet line of the French royal family, the Angevin kings of Naples. As it happened, Louis of Clermont's dreams of a crusade came to naught; with the fresh outbreak of war with England in 1337 – the start of the so-called Hundred Years War – all thoughts of a French campaign were shelved. Nor did Guy's marriage to Maria work out according to expectations. At first all went well: in the late 1330s Guy was beginning to take part in state affairs, and from 1338, if not earlier, he held the office formerly occupied by his father and grandfather of constable of Cyprus.[12] But then in 1343 he died. He left Maria a widow – she was to live until 1387 – and a son named Hugh.[13]

In 1337 a papal dispensation was obtained for Hugh IV's daughter, Eschiva, to marry Ferrand, the younger half-brother of King James II of Majorca. Once again there was to be a link between the royal houses of Cyprus and Aragon.[14] Ferrand already had close associations with Cyprus: as the son of Ferrand of Majorca the elder and Isabella of Ibelin, he was the king's second cousin. But this marriage too failed to fulfil expectations. The wedding took place in 1340, whereupon Hugh and Ferrand quarrelled so violently that Ferrand believed his life to be in danger. The matter came to the attention of King Peter IV of Aragon and Pope Benedict XII, both of whom made it clear to Hugh that he could expect Aragonese reprisals if any harm befell him.[15] Then, at some point after the middle of 1342, Ferrand left

[11] C. J. Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the Assemblies of 1319–20 and the Crusade', *BIHR*, LVII (1984), 19–20; *idem*, 'Philip VI and the Recovery of the Holy Land', *EHR*, C (1985), 37–8; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 21, 26, 233–4, 235–6.

[12] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 178. A Venetian document of *c.* 1336 names him as marshal. *I libri commemoriali della republica di Venezia regesti (1293–1778)*, ed. R. Predelli and P. Bosmin (Venice, 1876–1914), II, 69.

[13] For a papal letter of condolence dated September 1343, Clement VI, *Lettres closes, patents et curiales se rapportant à la France*, ed. E. Déprez *et al.* (Paris, 1901–61), no. 423, cf. no. 422. For Maria's later career, Troubat, 'Marie de Bourbon', pp. 6–17.

[14] Benedict XII, *Lettres communes*, ed. J.-M. Vidal (Paris, 1903–11), no. 4833, cf. nos. 7088–9, 7330–32.

[15] For Peter IV, J. Zurita, *Anales de la corona de Aragon*, vol. VII, ch. 55 (vol. II, fo. 148 of the Saragossa edn of 1610); Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 203–6. For Benedict XII, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, ed. C. Baronius and O. Raynaldus, new edn by A. Theiner (Bar-le-Duc/Paris, 1864–82), 1341, §44; Benedict XII, *Lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que la France*, ed. J.-M. Vidal and G. Mollat (Paris, 1913–50), no. 3220, cf. no. 2508.

for western Europe where he died a few years later. His widow and infant daughter remained in Cyprus. In a lengthy memorandum written before his departure, he catalogued the indignities he had suffered at Hugh's hands. It is an extraordinary story of petty vindictiveness and humiliation, of threatened violence to Ferrand and actual violence against members of his household. Bound up with the attacks on himself were attacks on the Franciscans and on his own mother and step-father, Count Hugh of Jaffa. Ferrand recounted how he himself was accused of treason and forcibly separated from his wife.[16] There was doubtless another side to the story, but evidence is lacking which might explain matters from the king's point of view. It may be significant, however, that at the same time as he wrote to Hugh IV warning him of the possible consequences if the rift were not healed, the pope also wrote to Ferrand enjoining him to moderate his youthful intemperance and show due deference to his father-in-law.[17] The memorandum seems to suggest that the quarrel may have begun with a dispute over Eschiva's dower, but what, if anything, lay behind the charge of treason remains a mystery.

Despite, or perhaps because of, this unhappy episode, Hugh then arranged a second marriage with the house of Aragon. In 1343 he petitioned for and was granted a papal dispensation for his son John to wed Constance of Sicily.[18] Constance had been aged about fourteen when in 1317 she had married Henry II. After his death her re-marriage had been the subject of considerable discussion. Among the possible suitors were Humphrey of Montfort, King Hugh's half-brother and lord of Beirut, and Peter, count of Ribargoza, a son of James II of Aragon. The pope refused the necessary dispensation in both instances. Eventually, in 1331, she married King Leo V of Armenia, only to be widowed a second time when Leo was assassinated in 1341. By 1343 she would have been aged about forty, and, especially in view of the fact that there had been no children of her second marriage, there can have been little expectation that she would bear any children for her third husband, a youth who cannot then have been aged more than about twelve or thirteen. Two considerations may have motivated Hugh. He no doubt intended that John should be provided for out of Constance's dower income in Cyprus and Armenia and hence at no cost to himself, and it is possible that in promoting the marriage he was hoping to repair some of the damage his quarrel with Ferrand may have done to his relations with the Aragonese. In all events, Constance seems to have died within a few years, and by 1350 John was free to marry again. His second wife was drawn from the Cypriot nobility.[19]

[16] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 182–203; Hill, II, 295–7.

[17] Benedict XII, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, no. 3221. There is corroborative evidence for Hugh accusing Ferrand of trying to escape from Cyprus. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 204–5. The fact that in 1345 the pope reissued Ferrand's marriage dispensation could be evidence for earlier attempts to impugn its validity. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Dispenses matrimoniales', p. 90 note 40.

[18] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Dispenses matrimoniales', pp. 74–5 no. 88 and note 47 (p. 90).

[19] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 110, 130–1. Cf. R. O. Bertrand, 'Jean XXII et le mariage de Constance de Chypre avec l'infant Pierre d'Aragon', *Annales de Midi*, LXIII (1951).

A third and far more significant marriage between one of Hugh IV's children and a member of the Aragonese royal family occurred in 1353 when Peter married Eleanor, the daughter of the Infante Peter of Ribargoza. Hugh had previously arranged for him to marry his cousin, Eschiva of Montfort. In 1339 the pope had turned down a request for a dispensation on the grounds that the couple were too closely related to each other and that Eschiva was appreciably older than Peter, but in 1342 the new pope, Clement VI, acceded to the king's petition thanks to the intervention of a cardinal who happened to be a distant kinsman of Eschiva. Eschiva was a wealthy heiress whose inheritance included the Cypriot land of the lords of Beirut, and, as in the case of his other son, the king had clearly been aiming to provide Peter with a livelihood without dipping into his own resources. At the time of this first marriage, Peter had been a younger son, but by the early 1350s he was regarded as Hugh's heir – he was even spoken of, wrongly, as *primogenitus*. By then he was widowed. It was important that his new bride should be of an age to be able to provide him with a successor; more immediately, his enhanced status meant that his father could use his marriage to further Cypriot interests in the wider context of international diplomacy.[20]

It is not difficult to understand why King Hugh should have sought to marry his children to Aragonese royalty. Through its various branches it controlled Sardinia, Sicily and the Balearic islands, besides Aragon itself, and had suzerainty over Athens. Merchants from the Aragonese lands were thrusting and ambitious and were regular visitors to Cyprus. Hugh clearly recognized the advantages to be had from uniting his family with one with so wide a nexus of power and influence. What was more, the Aragonese shared the Lusignans' antipathy to the Angevin kings of Naples and to the Genoese. But it is noticeable that Hugh's offspring married members of cadet lines and not into the king of Aragon's immediate family. The kingdoms of Majorca and Sicily were of far less weight politically than Aragon itself, and just as Guy, Hugh's heir in 1330, had married a member of a junior branch of the Capetian house, so Peter, Hugh's heir in 1353, married into a junior branch of the Aragonese. Hugh evidently valued these diplomatic links, but even during his reign, when Cyprus is generally thought to have been at the height of its prosperity, the Lusignans could not deal with the royal houses of France and Aragon quite on equal terms.

Largely because the narrative sources for Cypriot history fall almost silent for much of his reign, Hugh IV himself remains a somewhat shadowy figure. Visitors to the island could regard him as a pious ruler and lover of justice,[21] but to set against their reports there is Ferrand of Majorca's depiction of him as a vicious tyrant. Ferrand's portrait would seem to find support in the chroniclers' accounts

[20] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Dispenses matrimoniales', pp. 72–3 no. 87; pp. 86–7 no. 8 and note 80 (p. 93).

[21] Hill, II, 304–6. Cf. P. L. M. Leone, 'L'encomio di Niceforo Gregora per il re di Cipro (Ugo IV di Lusignano)', *Byzantion*, LI (1981).

of a later episode. In 1349 Hugh's two eldest sons, Peter and John, much against their father's wishes, left Cyprus secretly to visit western Europe. Hugh went to considerable trouble and expense to bring them back and on their return shut them up in Kyrenia castle. According to Leontios Makhairas he only kept them there for three days, but William of Machaut tells of Peter being in prison for two months and nine days, and the fact that the pope is known to have intervened to secure his release may suggest that William's report is nearer the truth.[22] Peter had been created count of Tripoli in the mid-1340s, probably at the same time as his brother John became prince of Antioch. But apart from his marriages and the 1349 escapade, little is known of his career before he became king. William of Machaut reports that he had founded his chivalric order, the Order of the Sword, before his accession, which, if true, would suggest an early beginning for his interest in martial exploits and his appreciation that, if he were to wage a successful war against the Muslims, he would need to appeal to western knights and their values.[23]

On 24 November 1358 Hugh had Peter crowned king of Cyprus.[24] Coronation in the life-time of the previous monarch seems to have been without precedent in the kingdom, although it was a practice that had been used extensively in earlier centuries in France and had occurred once, in 1183, in Jerusalem. It has to be assumed that the ceremony was brought forward in an attempt to pre-empt a claim to the throne from the king's grandson, Hugh of Lusignan. Ever since Guy's death in 1343 the problem had been looming as to who was now the rightful heir to the throne: was he Peter, the king's eldest surviving son, or Hugh, the son of his deceased first-born? In Cyprus, as earlier in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, feudal inheritance custom favoured the surviving son on the grounds that he was a closer relative than a grandson to the last in seisin. However, according to Hugh and his mother's relatives in the West, his parents' marriage contract had contained a clause explicitly guaranteeing the rights of any son born to them to inherit the throne in the event of Guy dying before his father, and in 1344 they had induced Pope Clement VI to bring this provision to King Hugh's notice. But it is not at all clear that their contention was valid: the text of the contract as published by Mas Latrie contains no such clause.[25] What does seem certain is that there was no love

[22] Leontios Makhairas, §§79–85; William of Machaut, p. 18. For papal concern, Clement VI, *Lettres closes, patents et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France*, ed. E. Déprez and G. Mollat (Paris, 1960–1), nos. 2278, 2494.

[23] Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 126, 130. For the Order of the Sword, William of Machaut, pp. 11–16; D'A. J. D. Boulton, *The Knights of the Crown: The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe, 1325–1520* (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 241–8.

[24] Leontios Makhairas, §86. The same writer (§90) then says that he was crowned on Sunday 24 November 1359, but it is likely that this later date is a rationalization, making the coronation follow Hugh's death in October.

[25] Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, no. 825. The pope qualified his endorsement of the claim with the words 'sicut fertur'. For the contract, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 144–9. For an echo of the claim, *Chronographia Regum Francorum*, ed. H. Moranvillé (Paris, 1891–7), I, 276.

lost between Hugh and his daughter-in-law and grandson. After Guy's death the king had been reluctant to allow Maria of Bourbon and her child to leave Cyprus, and in 1344, at the instance of her family, the pope wrote asking Hugh to settle her dower and let her go to the West. Maria eventually left the island in 1346. The following year she married Robert of Taranto, prince of Achaea and titular Latin emperor of Constantinople. Hugh appears to have gone to Europe with his mother and to have lived there until after his grandfather's death. The king seems not to have held himself bound to provide for them: disputes over the payment of Maria's dower in Cyprus continued to the end of her life, and, although in the 1350s the pope wrote to King Hugh more than once asking him to provide an income for his grandson, so far as is known these requests fell on deaf ears.[26]

Hugh IV died on 10 October 1359, and on Easter Day, 5 April 1360, Peter was crowned king of Jerusalem in Famagusta by Peter Thomas, a Carmelite friar who was the papal legate in the East.[27] Meanwhile news of the old king's death reached the West. Hugh of Lusignan complained to Pope Innocent VI about Peter's accession, arguing once more that by the terms of his parents' marriage contract he himself should have become king. Hugh, who could number the king of France among his supporters and whose step-father was well-regarded as the papal curia, had a sympathetic reception, and in May 1360 Innocent wrote a strongly worded letter to Peter demanding an explanation.[28] At this juncture a Cypriot mission led by a knight named Raymond Babin arrived in Avignon to inform the pope of Peter's accession and protest about the papal legate whose insensitivity towards the Greeks had stirred up inter-communal violence in the island. According to Leontios Makhairas, Raymond made the best defence he could against Hugh's claim and lectured the pope on the principles of Cypriot law. Innocent then wrote to Peter again, this time taking a softer line: he was to rule well, and he was to do justice to Hugh. The fact that Peter had received coronation at the hands of the legate must have weakened the pope's position, but he nonetheless continued to favour Hugh, conferring on him the office of Senator of Rome.[29]

Peter responded to these developments by dispatching an embassy led by the marshal of Cyprus, John of Morphou. It had reached Avignon by November 1361, and by the following January John had made contact with the king of France.

[26] Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, nos. 825, 2455–6, 2458; Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, ed. P. Gasnault *et al.* (Paris 1959–), nos. 863, 2014, 2372; Troubat, 'Marie de Bourbon', pp. 6–8, 16–17.

[27] Philip of Mézières, *The Life of St Peter Thomas*, ed. J. Smet (Rome, 1954), pp. 91–2; Leontios Makhairas, §104.

[28] *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 1360, §§15–16; N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières (1327–1405) et la croisade au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1896), pp. 115–16.

[29] *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 1360, §§13–14; Leontios Makhairas, §§101–2, 105–8. For the chronology, Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 117 note 4. For Hugh as Senator (12 August 1360), Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', p. 141. For Maria of Bourbon's antipathy towards Peter Thomas on account of his role in Peter's coronation, Philip of Mézières, *St Peter Thomas*, p. 94.

Evidently the ambassadors were able to make some progress towards achieving a settlement on the basis that Hugh would renounce his claim in return for a substantial annual pension.[30] It would seem, however, that there was no final agreement. Leontios Makhairas says that the French king pressed the pope to re-open the case and that Peter was summoned to defend himself in person; if Leontios is to be believed, it was this summons rather than Peter's wish to rally support for his military ambitions that lay behind his departure to the West in October 1362. However, letters of the newly elected Pope Urban V dated 29 November 1362, in which Peter was urged to treat Hugh generously on condition that he accept him as king, belie this version of events while confirming that the dispute was still not ended: it would appear that the pope, ignorant of Peter's impending visit, envisaged that the remaining differences could be resolved by a further embassy. In the event the king arrived in Avignon in March 1363, and there he and Hugh were eventually reconciled.[31] Hugh was to receive an annual income of 50,000 bezants, much of which was provided by assigning him the important rural centre of Lefkara. By the beginning of 1365 Peter had also conferred on him the honorific title of prince of Galilee. Hugh was present on the Alexandria crusade, and then at the end of 1367 he accompanied his uncle on his second visit to the West. After that he seems to have stayed in Europe, only returning to Cyprus shortly before his death in the mid-1380s.[32]

There is not the slightest hint that Hugh's claim to the throne found any support within Cyprus itself. At the time of his grandfather's death he had been living in Europe for a number of years, and so he must have been virtually unknown in the island. Once Peter had been crowned he would have had no realistic prospect of supplanting him. On the other hand, Hugh could still prove an embarrassment, and failure to reach a satisfactory composition might well have cost Peter dear in terms of diplomatic and military support. Both the pope and the king of France were prepared to believe that Hugh had a good case, and Cypriot practice was by no means general in the West: when in 1377 precisely the same dynastic situation arose in England, it was accepted that the grandson of the late king and not his eldest surviving son should ascend the throne. No king would want to have a pretender lurking on the side lines, especially if he was as well connected as Hugh of Lusignan, and there could well be something to be said for the suggestion that Peter's enthusiastic espousal of the crusading project that was being aired at the time of his arrival in Avignon in 1363 arose, at least in part, from his determination

[30] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 741; Leontios Makhairas, §108. For the date of the embassy's presence at Avignon, W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les grâces papales, autres que les dispenses matrimoniales, accordées à Chypre de 1305 à 1378', *EKEE*, VIII (1975–7), 233, 243.

[31] Leontios Makhairas, §§129, 131; Urban V, *Lettres secrètes et curiales se rapportant à la France*, ed. P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat (Paris, 1902–55), nos. 119–20.

[32] Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, p. 66 and note 3; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', pp. 141–2.

to ingratiate himself with the papacy and thereby ensure papal endorsement for his rule in the face of Hugh's challenge.[33]

By the 1320s the fear that the Mamlūk sultanate would follow up its conquest of Latin Palestine with an invasion of Cyprus had ceased to be a major preoccupation. A generation had passed since the fall of Acre, and there had been no attack. Such seaborne depredations that there were had been the work of Christian, not Muslim, shipping, and, far from receiving papal subsidies to help in defence, there was a steady flow of funds out of Cyprus to the *curia* to help meet the requirements of successive popes. Indeed, it has been calculated that between 1328 and 1343 the papal collectors raised a total of 55,750 florins in taxes on the Church in the island.[34] On the other hand, awareness that the king of Cyprus was also by rights king of Jerusalem remained ever present. As has been mentioned, Hugh IV, Peter I and Peter II had each had separate coronations at which they had received the crown of Jerusalem; the titles of Prince of Antioch, Count of Tripoli and Prince of Galilee were revived for princes of the royal blood; members of the aristocracy were appointed to the fine-sounding, but, it is presumed, entirely ceremonial grand sergeantries of Jerusalem. We have seen that in the time of Henry II there had been raids on Syria and Palestine and attempts to co-ordinate military efforts with the Mongols, and that on at least two occasions Henry's ambassadors at the papal curia had submitted proposals for bringing about the destruction of the Mamlūk sultanate. Henry had also tried to enforce the embargo on trade by policing the seas, even if the effectiveness of his measures was limited. Western merchants trading with the Muslims often had the acquiescence, if not the connivance, of their home governments, and Henry too had been prepared to allow his merchants to trade in the Muslim-held ports of the mainland.

In the first few years of Hugh's rule some important changes can be detected. The 1320s see the beginning of papal licences permitting traders to buy and sell in the Mamlūk lands. In 1318 Cypriot naval patrols had relieved a Genoese merchant operating from Chios of a cargo of mastic apparently destined for Egypt, but in 1320 and again in 1322 and 1325 the Genoese lords of Chios were obtaining indults from the pope which specifically allowed them to export this commodity to Alexandria, and in 1326 the Genoese received permission to trade in Lattakia over a two-year period.[35] Whereas Henry II and his officers had been censured by Pope John XXII in the early 1320s for their failure to act against illicit trade, in 1326 we

[33] Atiya, *Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 322–3.

[34] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p. 204, cf. pp. 178, 184, 220–1.

[35] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 720 note 1; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos. 15644, 21494; J. Delaville Le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes jusqu'à la mort de Philibert de Naillac (1310–1421)* (Paris, 1913), pp. 367–8, cf. pp. 9–10; Balard, *Romanie génoise*, p. 745. At the same period absolutions for merchants involved in illicit trade became more readily available. J. Trenchs Odena, '"De Alexandrinis" (El comercio prohibido con los muslmanes y el papado de Aviñón durante la primera mitad de siglo XIV)'. *Anuario de estudios medievales*, X (1980).

find Hugh IV being allowed to send Cypriots to the sultanate with merchandise, and there are a number of other examples of papal licences exempting Cypriots from the trading prohibitions in the following decades. In 1329 the new patriarch of Jerusalem who was then about to set out for Cyprus, was empowered to absolve forty persons from the automatic sentence of excommunication incurred for breaking the embargoes. Eventually, in the mid-1340s the Venetian state galleys began to trade with Egypt on a regular basis, and from then on it would seem that the popes were far more concerned with the fees for licences or for absolutions for trading without licences than with maintaining the economic blockade.[36] Under these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that Hugh appears to have stopped his uncle's practice of employing a naval flotilla in an attempt to impose the embargo.

There is no doubt that in the reigns of Henry II and Hugh IV Cyprus enjoyed considerable prosperity. Ludolf of Sudheim's description of the opulence of the island in about 1340, the numerous churches in Famagusta which can be dated to the first half of the century and which survive to this day in varying stages of decay, and the numismatic evidence which points to an abundance of silver being available to the mints all attest this fact.[37] Equally, there can be no doubt that this wealth owed much to the advantageous position of the island in the pattern of international trade. As explained in a previous chapter, after the fall of Acre Asiatic spices and other goods that were in demand in western Europe were acquired by Famagusta-based middle-men from the ports of Cilicia and Syria and then re-sold to western merchants in Famagusta itself. It was a flourishing commerce which owed something of its success to the papal attempts to ban Latin merchants from trafficking direct with the Muslims, and it was encouraged by the authorities in Cyprus who in making some attempt at enforcing the ban could channel east–west trade through the ports under their control. With Asiatic goods changing hands in Cyprus, there was a far greater opportunity for the island to prosper than formerly when westerners came simply to take on fresh supplies and buy such agricultural products or manufactures – foodstuffs, salt, cloth – as were available. Dealings in local produce had always contributed to the general level of prosperity; what was new was that from the end of the thirteenth century Famagusta became a major entrepôt and not just a port of call for ships *en route* for Syria.[38]

Patterns of commercial activity, however, are never static, and around the middle of the fourteenth century there were two significant developments. The

[36] Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo', pp. 131–3; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 206–9.

[37] For Ludolf, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 210–17. For the churches of Famagusta, C. Enlart, *Gothic Art and the Renaissance in Cyprus*, trans. and ed. D. Hunt (London, 1987), pp. 210–303. For mint output, D. M. Metcalf, 'The Gros grand of Henry II', (1983), pp. 198–200; *idem*, 'The Gros grand and the Gros petit of Hugh IV of Cyprus', *Revue numismatique*, 6th ser., XXVII (1985), 156–7.

[38] Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 38–42, 54; Jacoby, 'Famagusta', *passim*.

first concerned trade routes. There is no way of quantifying the value of commerce on the various routes between Asia and the West, but there is reason to believe that the Cypriot share in this trade was beginning to show signs of dwindling. Goods from India and the Far East could come by ship up the Red Sea, across to Alexandria and thence to Europe, or alternatively overland through Persia either to Trebizond on the Black Sea or to the ports of Cilicia and northern Syria. But political changes, in particular the end of Ilkhanid rule in Persia in 1335, made these latter routes insecure. How far political instability impeded the merchant caravans bound for the Mediterranean is not clear, but if less merchandise was finding its way to the ports on the mainland opposite Cyprus, Famagusta would suffer in consequence. The route through Tabriz to Trebizond was certainly disrupted, and this in turn seems to have prompted western merchants to make greater use of Alexandria and so be all the readier to take advantage of any relaxation of the papal prohibitions on trading there.[39]

In the 1330s and early 1340s, however, Famagusta's commerce would appear to have remained buoyant. The evidence for the Venetian state galleys in this period shows that the numbers of ships and the level of investment on the Famagusta route were only slightly less than on the route to Constantinople.[40] Once the Venetian government stopped sending galleys to Ayas, Famagusta's Armenian competitor, in 1334, and especially after Ayas fell to the Mamlūks in 1337, east–west trade through northern Syria and Cilicia would have been concentrated even more on Cyprus. But from 1345 the republic's state-sponsored galleys, now sailing with papal permits for commerce with the Muslims, began going regularly to Alexandria. Henceforth Venice was sending about the same number of galleys to the East each year as previously – usually between six and eight – but now only half were bound for Cyprus, the others being destined for Egypt. In the three years 1357–9 a total of fourteen galleys were equipped for Alexandria and only nine for Famagusta.[41] The Venetian state galleys would have carried only a fraction of the total trade between East and West. But in all probability the re-routing of a part of this traffic from Cyprus to Alexandria was symptomatic of a more general trend away from the island. If so, it would confirm the impression that less merchandise was available for sale there, and imply that Cyprus was now less attractive as a destination for European investors and ship-owners.[42]

The other significant change with implications for the island's prosperity was

[39] Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 64–6.

[40] *Ibid.* pp. 54–5 and table II; P. Racine, 'Note sur le trafic Veneto-Chypriote à la fin du moyen âge', *BF*, V (1977), 312–13.

[41] P. W. Edbury, 'The Crusading Policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359–1369' in P. M. Holt (ed.), *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades* (Warminster, 1977), pp. 96–7; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 69, 78–80 and table III; Racine, 'Note sur le trafic', pp. 315–17.

[42] The continuing re-export of Asiatic goods through Cyprus in the early 1360s is attested by the notarial register of Nicola de Boateriis. *Nicola de Boateriis, notaio in Famagosta e Venezia (1355–1365)*, ed. A. Lombardo (Venice, 1973). Cf. Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 80–1.

the mid-fourteenth-century demographic catastrophe which overtook the entire Mediterranean world, not least Cyprus itself. There can be no doubt that in 1348 the Black Death struck the island extremely hard, and, although no statistics survive, it is likely that here, as elsewhere, the mortality resulted in a reduction of the population by between one third and one fifth. Thereafter epidemics broke out in the island from time to time – the next recorded outbreaks being in 1362 and 1363 – and the population continued to fall. It was a trend which was to continue until late in the fifteenth century.[43] The precise effect of the Black Death and later plagues on commercial activity is a matter for some debate, but, with fewer producers and fewer consumers throughout the Mediterranean world, the region's economy undoubtedly contracted. Individual families or communities may have been better off and so better able to purchase foreign goods, but, even so, the volume and hence the value of international commerce diminished. The population loss would have affected all aspects of economic activity, and everywhere there would have been vacated properties and a shortage of labour. In Cyprus, Famagusta – never a healthy place and with its economy heavily dependent on seaborne trade – would have been particularly hit.

The changing trade routes combined with the economic effects of the Black Death must have meant a significant reduction in the overall volume of the trade passing through the island. It is therefore likely that even before Peter I began his war with the sultanate in 1365 and before the Genoese invasion of 1373, Cyprus and in particular the port of Famagusta were showing signs of recession. Numismatic evidence indicates that mint output per year in Peter's reign was less than in the early part of the century, and this too would suggest that the economy was slowing down.[44] One immediate consequence of the decline in the value of trade would have been the fall in the revenues from tariffs and other commercial charges flowing into the royal coffers. It is against this background that relations between Hugh IV and Peter I and the western merchant communities have to be considered. Cyprus needed the westerners. If they stopped coming; the island's prosperity would suffer. But they were also important from the point of view of security: the commercial revenues they generated helped pay for defence; their ships could be employed against marauders or hired to bring in arms and men. If for any reason Cyprus ceased to attract merchants from the West, then western Europe would no longer have a stake in protecting the island from Muslim attack. Any indication that overseas commerce was in decline would therefore have been a matter for considerable anxiety, and it is not surprising that relations between the government and the merchants were a matter of the utmost delicacy.

During the central decades of the fourteenth century the Cypriot authorities

[43] For 1348, above, p. 15 note 9. For 1362–3, Leontios Makhairas, §135; Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, pp. 97–100. Cf. Arbel, 'Cypriot Population', p. 184.

[44] D. M. Metcalf, 'A Decline in the Stock of Currency in Fourteenth-Century Cyprus?', *CS*, pp. 264–7.

kept on better terms with the Venetians than with any of the other major trading communities. Immediately after Hugh IV's accession there were problems over the republic's commercial franchises in the island, and at one point Venice instructed her merchants to boycott Cyprus. But in 1328 the king confirmed the privileges originally granted by Amaury of Tyre in 1306, and from then onwards relations were much better.[45] As will be seen, Hugh co-operated with the republic in the anti-Turkish leagues which began in the 1330s, and from time to time Venice showed her appreciation by conferring citizenship on leading Cypriots or on westerners prominent in royal service.[46] In 1349, however, a dispute in Famagusta involving a Venetian merchant and a Sicilian escalated into a major riot in which, according to the Venetian report, the local populace and several royal officials forced their way into the republic's *loggia*, broke open boxes of legal records, wounded at least thirty Venetians and struck the consul. At first the Venetians demanded vengence and reparations as well as greater security for their community, but they added – and this is perhaps a significant concession on their part – that if any of their people were guilty they were to be punished to the king's satisfaction. Then, on learning that the king had imposed adequate penalties on the perpetrators of the riot, they apparently dropped their demands for further restitution. Tension undoubtedly existed between the merchants and the local inhabitants, but at governmental level there was no desire to allow a quarrel of this type to lead to a major breach.[47]

Early in his reign, in 1360, Peter I renewed Venice's privileges and at the same time clarified various issues concerned with jurisdiction over Venetian nationals. But it was probably inevitable that their franchises would still give rise to disputes. In 1361 the Cypriots complained of people falsely claiming to be Venetians, of merchants importing merchandise belonging to non-Venetians and fraudulently claiming customs exemptions, and of Venetian ships taking Cypriot passengers on board who lacked the requisite exit papers.[48] But these complaints were of little consequence. In December 1362 and again from late 1364 until June 1365 Peter stayed in Venice itself. The Venetians were clearly appreciative of his gestures on their behalf at the time of the Cretan revolt of 1363–4, and they agreed generous terms for transporting his crusading forces to the East.[49] But when in 1365 Peter and his crusaders destroyed Alexandria, this long tradition of harmony and co-operation came to an abrupt end.

[45] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 135, 137–40, 142–4; *Duca di Candia Bandi (1313–1329)*, ed. P. R. Vidulich (Venice, 1965), no. 403.

[46] Thomas of Montolif, the marshal of Cyprus, in 1328; Guy Babin, a prominent vassal, in 1332; Thomas Picquigny, the *bailli* of the *secrète*, and Guy of Ibelin, the seneschal of Cyprus, both in 1334; Uomobuono (Ognibene), the king's physician, in 1358, and another royal physician, Guido da Bagnolo, in 1360. *I libri commemoriali*, II, 44, 54, 57, 281, 312.

[47] 'Nouvelles preuves' (1874), pp. 102–3.

[48] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 229–32, 233–5; D. Jacoby, 'Citoyens, sujets and protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIIIe au XVe siècle', *BF*, V (1977), 181.

[49] Setton, *PL*, I, 252–3.

In marked contrast, relations between Cyprus and Genoa had been consistently poor ever since the thirteenth century. As has been seen, Henry II's reign had been punctuated by violent incidents, and, although in 1329 and 1338 there were treaties intended to settle outstanding differences, the violence continued. There is evidence for disorder involving the Genoese in 1331 and for fighting between Genoese and Venetians in Famagusta in about 1344 and in 1368.[50] In 1343–4 and again in 1364–5 the government in Genoa was preparing for war with Cyprus. What prompted the threatened hostilities in the 1340s is not entirely clear, although the peace terms proposed in 1344 were largely concerned with redefining the terms of Henry I's 1232 trading privilege and reveal something of the perennial disputes beteeen the royal officers and the Genoese merchants.[51] In 1364 Cyprus and Genoa were again in danger of a full-scale conflict, this time following a violent affray in Famagusta. According to Leontios Makhairas, it began when two deserters from a Cypriot ship were each sentenced to having an ear cut off. They claimed to be Genoese nationals and hence outside the jurisdiction of the court, whereupon the Genoese crew of a galley that was about to take provisions to Satalia mutinied and absconded with their ship to Chios. The Genoese *podestà* arranged for the galley's return, but as it drew near to Cyprus some Sicilian mercenaries from another Cypriot vessel boarded it and killed some of the seamen. There then followed a serious altercation between the *podestà* and two senior royal officials in Famagusta, the *bailli*, John of Soissons, and the admiral, John of Tyre, and yet more blood was shed. The *podestà* instructed all Genoese subjects to leave Cyprus and his order was confirmed later in the year when another Genoese came from Europe to investigate. Peter was then in the West preparing for his crusade, and the pope, afraid that a war with Genoa would put paid to the chances of the expedition taking place, took urgent steps to restore peace. In April 1365 an agreement was reached in Genoa with the king's envoys giving way to all the Genoese demands. The Cypriots were obliged to extend the commercial franchises enjoyed by Genoese merchants, and among the more humiliating provisions they had to accept was the stipulation that the two royal officers involved in the affair should go into exile.[52]

It is clear that throughout these years the Genoese authorities were engaged in a series of long-running conflicts with the Cypriot government over the ill-defined rights their merchants supposedly enjoyed. Who precisely counted as Genoese and how cases of disputed Genoese nationality were to be resolved were contentious issues, especially as Genoa numbered among her subjects the inhabitants of her colonies in the Aegean and Black Sea regions as well as people descended from the

[50] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 150–8, 166–79 (for 1331 see p. 177); *DVL*, I, 287–9; Leontios Makhairas, §250. [51] Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, no. 833, cf. nos. 360, 575.

[52] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 254–66; Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, nos. 1027, 1034–5, 1102, 1602, 1609, 1619, 1649–50, 1681, 1700, 1724; Leontios Makhairas, §§145–9, 153–6; Hill, II, 312–16. Leontios Makhairas states (§155) that Peter refused to agree to the exiling of his officers, but he then indicates (§§173–4, 209) that he complied.

population of the Genoese quarters in the ports of Latin Syria. Most of these people, the so-called 'White Genoese', would have had only the most tenuous connections with Genoa itself, but, except when charged with theft, kidnapping or homicide, they nevertheless came under the jurisdiction of the *podestà* and not that of the royal judicial officers. Included among them were some prominent burgess families, and their legal exemptions must have been the occasion of considerable resentment. Since the thirteenth century the Genoese had enjoyed freedom to trade and freedom from tariffs, but the degree to which the Cypriot officials could nevertheless supervise their activities and check that they were not abusing their rights was another long-running source of dispute. In all probability the Cypriots were trying to curtail the freedom they had given the Genoese, and the Genoese for their part reacted strongly against any attempts to constrict their commerce and impede its profitability.[53]

Catalan merchants evidently traded regularly in Cyprus as well as in Alexandria. Their compatriots who engaged in piracy were a source of annoyance, but there is nothing to suggest that legitimate merchants had any major complaints or that they themselves caused trouble.[54] On the other hand, the southern French merchants who traded through Montpellier were involved in a protracted dispute over the tariffs they should pay. The rights and wrongs of the issue, which was first raised in 1352, are obscure, but in 1362 the Montpellerins had the pope write to Peter I on the subject, and it emerges from this correspondence that the royal officials had been charging twice as much as the merchants claimed they should. In 1363 Peter gave instructions that tariffs were to be charged at the same rate as in his father's reign, and then in 1365 he granted a new privilege, apparently conceding the Montpellerins' requests. Their original grant dated from as far back as 1236, and from the scattered references to their activities it seems that men from Montpellier and the other ports of southern France had a significant role in the island's commerce, although not on the same scale as those from Venice and Genoa.[55]

The early part of Hugh IV's reign coincided with the end of the illusion that the French royal dynasty would provide the leadership and the resources needed to recover the Holy Land. The idea that France could and would re-establish Christian rule in the East had been avidly fostered by Philip IV and his sons in the first quarter of the century. But, as has been seen, nothing was achieved. Periodic bouts of administrative, diplomatic and propagandist activity had failed to

[53] Edbury, 'Cyprus and Genoa', pp. 121–5.

[54] Hill, II, 291, 310; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 46, 50, 87.

[55] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 219–20, 250, 268–72; A. C. Germain, *Histoire du commerce de Montpellier* (Montpellier, 1861), II, 259–61; Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, nos. 115, 1895.

produce a crusade: the practical difficulties were too large, and despite the sincerity of French intentions, the price of failure too great.[56] Charles IV's projects had ground to a halt in 1323, and it was not until 1331 that the new king, Philip VI, came forward with a fresh scheme for the liberation of Jerusalem. This new initiative derived part of its impetus from the patriarch of Jerusalem, who was now back in France after conducting Maria of Bourbon to Cyprus for her marriage to Guy of Lusignan and who had taken the opportunity of being in the East to visit Palestine and Cairo. At the end of 1331 the pope authorized crusade preaching in France, but it was only in 1333 that he came to an agreement with the king over the financial arrangements and preparations could begin in earnest. But once again the plans foundered. Philip could not raise enough money sufficiently quickly; the threat of war with England as well as the pope's own lack of enthusiasm for the venture undermined its chances of success. In 1335 the Mamlūks invaded the kingdom of Armenia, and the following January the pope ordered the suspension of crusade preaching in Cyprus on the grounds that it was dangerously provocative. Then in March he formally cancelled the whole project. The moneys raised in France and the French fleet that was being assembled were subsequently deployed against the English in the opening phase of the Hundred Years War.[57]

While plans for this abortive crusade were still in train, Cyprus had become involved in a different sphere of activity. The kings of France may have been thinking in terms of the restoration of Christian rule in the Holy Land, but the Venetians and the Knights of St John in Rhodes were more concerned at the growth of Turkish piracy and at the threat to Christian possessions and to Christian shipping posed by the *ghazi* emirates of western Anatolia. The idea of concerted action against the Turks had its origins in the mid-1320s, but the diplomatic manoeuvrings required to bring the interested parties together took time. At first the Venetians concentrated on forming a Christian naval league in conjunction with Rhodes and Byzantium. Philip VI and Pope John XXII were then induced to participate. In their eyes the proposed expedition was to serve as a *primum passagium* to prepare the way for Philip's projected crusade to Jerusalem. Another party to the alliance was Hugh IV. The Venetian Senate agreed to invite him to participate in November 1333, and the following March the league, now comprising Venice, Rhodes, France, the Papacy, Byzantium and Cyprus, was finalized. The Cypriots were to contribute six galleys out of a total of forty. In the late summer of 1334 the combined Christian fleet made a series of assaults on Turkish shipping in the Aegean, culminating in a victory in the Gulf

[56] Housley, 'Franco-Papal Crusade Negotiations', pp. 182–4; Tyerman, 'Sed nihil fecit?', *passim*.

[57] Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the Recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 25–52; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 23–4, 28–9.

of Adramyttion.[58] The alliance and the campaign that followed from it mark a significant new departure, and, although papal efforts to organize a similar league for 1335 failed to make any progress,[59] the idea of joint naval operations, especially once French schemes for a full-scale crusade to Palestine had collapsed, was to remain prominent.

From this point onwards Hugh seems to have become increasingly involved in conflict with the Turks. In 1337 Christian interests in the East suffered a major setback when the Mamlūks seized the Armenian port of Ayas,[60] but the same year the king won what would seem to have been an important victory over the Turks, and a few years later a visitor to Cyprus, Ludolf of Sudheim, noted that Alaya, Anamur, Siq and Satalia – in other words of a large portion of the Turkish-controlled southern coastlands of Asia Minor – paid the Cypriots tribute.[61] Perhaps emboldened by these successes, perhaps worried by continued raids on Christian territory and Christian shipping, Hugh took the initiative in 1341 by dispatching Lambertino della Cecca, bishop of Limassol, on a mission to Rhodes, Venice and Avignon to propose a new Christian alliance. Lambertino was a Bolognese and a papal chaplain who had previously served as a member of the embassy that had negotiated the marriage of Guy of Lusignan and Maria of Bourbon and had then acted as a royal procurator at the papal court in the time of Benedict XII. His past diplomatic experiences and the fact, attested by his appointment in 1344 to the bishopric of Brescia, that he was held in high regard at Avignon meant that he was well qualified to conduct these negotiations.[62] The response at Venice was sympathetic but lacking in substance, and it was not until the beginning of 1343 that the Venetians, pressed by the new pope, Clement VI, formally acceded to the league which now consisted of themselves, Cyprus, the Hospitallers and the papacy. It proved to be a cumbersome process to bring the league into being – another Cypriot embassy was at the curia in the summer of 1343[63] – but eventually, in the spring of 1344, the allied powers assembled their

[58] P. Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident. Recherches sur 'La geste d'Umur Pacha'* (Paris, 1957), pp. 90–100; E. A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade. Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice, 1983), pp. 29–33; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 25–6.

[59] Benedict XII, *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France*, ed. G. Daumet (Paris, 1899–1920), nos. 28, 40, 54; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 34; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 25, 28.

[60] Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cilician Armenia', pp. 137–43 (correcting the previous confusion over the date of the fall of Ayas).

[61] Benedict XII, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, no. 1673; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 216.

[62] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 180–1; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 41–3. For Lambertino's career, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 140, 144–5; Benedict XII, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, nos. 732, 3020; *idem*, *Lettres communes*, nos. 867, 2696, 3392, 4078, 8766, 8787, 8947; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etat et origine du haut clergé de Chypre avant le Grand Schisme d'après les registres des papes du XIIIe et du XIVe siècle', *MEFR*, XCI (1979), 278–9.

[63] Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, no. 311.

naval forces. They were under the overall command of Henry of Asti, the Latin patriarch of Constantinople, and Cyprus contributed four galleys out of a total of twenty.[64]

The Christian forces mustered at Negroponte and in May destroyed a substantial Turkish fleet at Pallena, the western prong of the Chalkidike peninsula. Then at the end of the October they overran the port of Smyrna, hitherto a major centre for Turkish seaborne depredations.[65] The capture of Smyrna has deservedly been described as 'the most positive and lasting success achieved by Latin co-operation in the Levant during the fourteenth century'[66] – the Christians hung on there until 1402 – but only the harbour area was secured, and it soon became apparent that no further advance was possible. In January 1345 a number of the leaders, including Henry of Asti and, according to one writer, the marshal of Cyprus, were killed in a surprise attack.[67] Henceforth attempts to sustain the Christian naval union were subsumed under the need to defend this precarious toe-hold on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. Although credit for the league of 1344 belongs primarily to Pope Clement VI, the fact that King Hugh had actively promoted it is clear evidence of his determination to resist Turkish advance and of his realization that the security of his kingdom was best served by alliances with those western powers with whom he had a common interest in defending the sea lanes to Europe.

Hugh's commitment persisted. In 1346, at the time of the crusade of Humbert of Viennois, he made it clear that the Christian alliance should be extended, provided that the other participants agreed,[68] and although there seems to be no definite evidence for Cypriot involvement in the naval victory over the Turks at Imbros in 1347, it would appear that he continued to provide ships for action in the Aegean until 1348 when a truce was made with the Turkish ruler of Ephesus.[69] However, after the acquisition of Smyrna the Christian effort lost momentum. The failure of Humbert's crusade, ill-feeling between the Hospitallers and the Venetians, and the onset of the Black Death of 1347–8, together with Hospitaller reluctance to assume overall responsibility for Smyrna's defence, combined to sap resolve. Nevertheless in August 1350, after Turkish assaults had been resumed, the league was revived. Cyprus was to supply two galleys and Venice and Rhodes three each to police the coast of Asia Minor for

[64] Lemerle, *Aydin*, pp. 181–4; Setton, *PL*, I, 183–90.

[65] Lemerle, *Aydin*, pp. 187–90; Setton, *PL*, I, 190–1.

[66] A. T. Luttrell, 'Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the Fourteenth Century', *PBSR*, XXVI (1958), 203.

[67] Lemerle, *Aydin*, pp. 191–3; Setton, *PL*, I, 192–3; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 50–1. Cf. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 184 note 1.

[68] Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, nos. 2580, 2591, cf. nos. 2748, 2957; *idem*, *Lettres closes . . . les pays-autres*, no. 1079.

[69] Setton, *PL*, I, 212, 216–18; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 53–5. Cf. Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, no. 4130.

the next ten years, and the parties also agreed that, together with the pope, they would share the costs of garrisoning Smyrna.[70]

But before these new measures could become operative, war broke out between Venice and Genoa, and in September 1351 Pope Clement was obliged to admit that the alliance had foundered and that the allies were no longer bound by their undertakings to supply ships and money. At the same time he told the Cypriot clergy to stop preaching the crusade in the island on account of the plague.[71] Even so, he still expected Hugh to do his utmost to help defend Smyrna, and his successor, Innocent VI (1352–62), showed himself equally determined to maintain the Christian occupation and keep the league in being. In November 1353 the new pope told King Hugh, the doge of Venice and the master of the Hospital to pay the 3,000 florins each owed as their contribution to Smyrna's defence, and there is evidence to show that he did indeed use this money to organize supplies for the garrison.[72] In 1355 the pope was again chivvying the powers for their annual payment of 3,000 florins, and from papal letters of that year it would appear that Hugh regarded himself as bound to provide either this sum in cash or the two galleys he had promised in 1350. It also emerges that the pope was assigning 3,000 florins from the clerical taxes raised in Cyprus as his share of the money required to maintain the Christian foothold in Smyrna.[73] In 1356, their war with Genoa over, the Venetians approached Innocent with an eye to reactivating the 1350 league. The pope thereupon wrote to the authorities in Venice, Cyprus and Rhodes, ordering them to furnish galleys as stipulated in 1350 and dispatch embassies to Avignon to renegotiate the treaty. Eventually, on 20 March 1357, the league was renewed for five years: the Venetians, Hospitallers and Cypriots each undertook to provide two galleys to police the seas, and in addition the pope expected each of the parties to provide 3,000 florins annually for Smyrna's defence.[74]

In piecing together this history of Cypriot participation in the naval leagues of the 1340s and 1350s we are heavily dependent on the surviving papal correspondence which has much to say about what the popes expected, less about what was actually being done. In any case the effectiveness of a patrol of, at most, six to eight galleys operating in the Aegean to curb Turkish raids and piracy is open to doubt. Nevertheless, the king did take his responsibilities seriously. Although the popes had to remind all the participants of their obligations, the impression is left that Hugh was reasonably conscientious in

[70] Luttrell, 'Venice and the Knights', pp. 203–4; Setton, *PL*, I, 218–22. Cf. Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, no. 4661.

[71] Clement VI, *Lettres closes France*, nos. 5052, 5056; *idem, Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, no. 2496; Setton, *PL*, I, 222–3.

[72] Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, no. 2377; Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 618, cf. nos. 642, 645–6, 689, 693.

[73] Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes*, nos. 80, 1630–2, 1788, 1791.

[74] *DVL*, II, 26–8, 35–9; *I libri commemoriali*, II, 264; Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 2006; Luttrell, 'Venice and the Knights', pp. 205–6; Setton, *PL*, I, 230–1; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 37–8.

keeping to his undertaking to provide money and ships. When in 1360 Leontios Makhairas mentions the Smyrna galleys, he was evidently referring to a well-established element in the naval resources of the kingdom, and in this connection it is probably worth noting that in the mid-1350s Angelo of Arezzo, the captain of Hugh's galleys, made what would seem to have been a substantial bequest to support the defence of Smyrna.[75] On the other hand, there is no way of knowing whether Hugh did anything to assist the Byzantine emperors John VI Cantacuzenus and John V Palaeologus in response to papal requests made in 1353 and 1356, although it would seem that he had sent aid to the Armenians in the mid-1340s.[76] But the evidence clearly demonstrates that for most of his reign Hugh was active in seeking to curb Turkish depredations. In view of Cyprus' dependence for its prosperity on trade with the West, it was essential to keep the seas free for merchant ships to operate. Even though Smyrna was distant, Turkish piracy in the waters around Rhodes and Crete posed a direct threat to the shipping lanes and to Cypriot commerce, and so it was as much to Hugh's advantage as it was to the Hospitallers' or the Venetians' to take action against them.

What Hugh did not do was antagonize the Mamlūks of Egypt and Syria. It was not simply that he dared not come into conflict with them unaided. Cypriot commerce with the West, especially after the Mamlūk conquest of Ayas in 1337, depended extensively on the availability in the island of goods that had been shipped through Mamlūk-controlled ports,[77] and so war was not only dangerous, it would have been economically disastrous. It seems to have been to avoid antagonizing the sultan that Hugh had had Pope Benedict XII order the cessation of crusade preaching in Cyprus in 1336, and the same reasoning may have been partially responsible for similar instruction from Clement VI in 1346 and again in 1351.[78] Those who fought in the leagues directed against the Turks enjoyed the status and privileges of crusaders, but what motivated the powers that constituted those leagues was self-interest and security rather than Christian idealism. It was important for the mutual political and economic well-being of Cyprus, Venice and Rhodes to make war on Turkish corsairs; there was no advantage in attacking the Mamlūk sultanate, even if it did have control over the Christian Holy Places.

With the accession of King Peter I (1359–69), we come to the most famous period of Cypriot involvement in the crusading movement.[79] In October 1365 Peter led

[75] Leontios Makhairas, §§114, 119; Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes* nos. 2019, 2087.

[76] Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes*, nos. 215, 2270. For Armenia, Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, no. 1490, cf. nos. 2502–3; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers in Cilician Armenia', p. 130.

[77] Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 38, 54, 80–1.

[78] Benedict XII, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, nos. 732–3; Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . les pays autres*, nos. 1081, 2496.

[79] For modern accounts, Hill, II, 318–60; Setton, *PL*, I, chapters 11–12. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, remains useful.

the expedition which sacked Alexandria and so delivered the most notable blow struck by a Christian army against the Mamlūk sultanate at any point in its history. From 1362 until 1365 he had been in the West recruiting support for his crusade, and the war that followed lasted until 1370. This burst of military activity stands in marked contrast to the more cautious policy pursued by Hugh IV, so much so that Hugh has often, mistakenly, been thought of as a peace-loving monarch. It is generally said that Peter was obsessed with the idea of winning back the Holy Land: he sought to re-live the heroic and, by the mid-fourteenth century, almost legendary events of the First Crusade; he wanted to gain for himself his ancestral kingdom of Jerusalem and restore the places associated with the life and passion of Jesus to Christendom. There can be little doubt that these aspirations were indeed entertained by Peter Thomas, the papal legate who had crowned Peter as king of Jerusalem in 1360 and who was to represent the pope on the 1365 expedition, and by Philip of Mézières, a Frenchman who was Peter's chancellor and who devoted the remainder of his life – he survived until 1405 – to trying to organize his own military order, the Order of the Passion, and re-kindle crusading enthusiasm in the West. Propaganda close to the event presented Peter's crusade as having traditional goals: Pope Urban V's bulls described the expedition as being 'for the recovery of the Holy Land', and Philip of Mézières' contemporary hagiographical *vita* of Peter Thomas took it for granted that what was envisaged was the reconquest of the Holy Land by a Christian army fighting with the aid of God.[80]

The chief objection to this interpretation of Peter's intentions and motivation is that it is hard to believe that the king could really have believed that his army could take Jerusalem from the Mamlūks and then defend it against the might of the Muslim world. The difficulties and expenses involved in protecting such island or coastal strongholds as Rhodes and Smyrna against appreciably less formidable opponents must have argued against so ambitious an undertaking. So when Peter launched his attack on Alexandria, it may well be that his expectations were quite different from those expressed in the contemporary crusading *excitatoriae* which were designed primarily to elicit alms and whip up support in Europe. When in 1363 the crusade was proclaimed, the leader was to be not Peter but the king of France. Peace with England had been restored in 1360, and Pope Urban V and others in the West then set about reviving the idea of a French-led crusade such as had dominated thinking until the mid-1330s. A royal crusade might restore the battered reputation of the French monarchy, and, although conditions in France – war-torn and impoverished after years of conflict with the English – meant that the whole idea was far-fetched, it may well be that King John II was desperate for such kudos and perhaps such finance as

[80] *Annales ecclesiasatici*, 1363, §§15–19; Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, nos. 476–89; Philip of Mézières, *St Peter Thomas*, pp. 102, 103, 128, 131, 134. Cf. Peter I's letter to the Florentines, almost certainly drafted by Philip of Mézières. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 236–7.

his status as a crusader might bring. Papal crusade propaganda thus harked back to an earlier tradition which demanded that Jerusalem should be the goal for a *passagium generale* led by the heir of St Louis. As Frenchmen, Philip of Mézières and Peter Thomas would have been familiar with this tradition, even though the war with England had lost it the prominence it had had earlier in the century. So when King John died in 1364 and Peter assumed his role as the leader of the crusade, it was as leader of a crusade for which the formal terms of reference had already been set.

Had the history of the previous half century been one of raid and counter-raid by Cypriots and Mamlūks on each other's territory, the Alexandria crusade could be explained as simply an aggravation of hostilities, but in fact there is no evidence whatever for Cyprus-based attacks on the sultanate since the beginning of the century. In certain respects, however, Peter did continue earlier policies. Hugh IV had helped contain Turkish aggression by participating in the capture of Smyrna, by seeking to curb piracy and by placing the emirates of southern Anatolia under tribute. Peter's first military and naval exploits clearly show him following in his father's footsteps. In August 1361 he led his fleet against Satalia on the coast of Asia Minor. Although he had Genoese and Hospitaller support, he seems to have relied primarily on his own Cypriot resources. The town was stormed, the Muslim ruler expelled, and a Christian garrison installed. Satalia had in effect become a second Smyrna, except that here the Cypriots could claim sole credit for its capture and took sole responsibility for defence. Turkish counter-attacks in 1361, 1362 and 1370 were beaten off, but in 1373, with the Genoese invasion of Cyprus imminent, it was handed back.[81] The acquisition of Satalia was accompanied by raids on other places along the coast of Anatolia including Myra, Anamur, Siq and Alaya and by the re-imposition of tribute on the local emirates. There were also naval skirmishes. John prince of Antioch continued to take firm action while Peter was in Europe, and after 1364 we hear of no more Turkish piratical attacks on Cyprus itself for the remainder of the reign.[82] Satalia was probably the most important trading centre on the southern coast of Asia Minor and a useful port of call for ships sailing between Cyprus and the West. There had been attempts to capture it early in the thirteenth century. In Turkish hands it posed a threat to communications with Europe; in Cypriot hands it had considerable strategic and commercial potential.[83]

Earlier, in 1360, Peter had taken another mainland port, Gorhigos (the ancient Corycus), under his protection. Gorhigos had previously been under Christian rule, but its Armenian inhabitants had despaired of their own king's ability to

[81] Leontios Makhairas, §§117–28, 132–4, 317, 366–8. For other references, Hill, II, 320–3.

[82] Leontios Makhairas, §§116, 137–44, 150–2, 208, 318.

[83] J. H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean 649–1571* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 95–7, 158, 165–73 *passim*. For the thirteenth-century attempt to gain Satalia, above, p. 43.

defend them and were begging Peter to assume control. It was to remain under Cypriot jurisdiction until 1448, and Peter showed that the townspeople's confidence was well placed when in 1367 he fought off a major attack by the Turks of the nearby emirate of Karamania.[84]

In October 1362 Peter left his brother John in charge in Cyprus and set sail for the West. He took with him the papal legate, Peter Thomas, the chancellor, Philip of Mézières, and an appropriate retinue of nobles and servants. The royal party arrived in Venice early in December. There the king was honourably received, and he and the doge were able to discuss the dangers threatening Christian interests in the East. Moving on from Venice at the beginning of January, Peter travelled via Milan to Genoa where on 5 March he reissued the commercial privileges granted by Henry I in 1232.[85] Finally, having spent about a month in each of the two great maritime cities of northern Italy, he arrived at the papal court at Avignon on 29 March 1363. Two days later, on Good Friday, King John , who had been residing near by since the previous November, and a host of barons and nobles took the Cross. So too did Peter himself. That same day the crusade was formally proclaimed. It was to be led by the French king and would start on 1 May 1365.[86] Never before had a crowned king of Cyprus visited western Europe. How far his voyage was motivated by the need to settle Hugh of Lusignan's claim to the throne and how far by a premeditated desire to pose as a leader of Christendom in its conflict with the Muslim remains unclear. The principal Cypriot chronicler of these events, Leontios Makhairas, made only a single passing reference to the idea of recovering Jerusalem and explained Peter's voyage as being his response to the nephew's challenge and the need to justify his accession to the pope.[87] But Leontios was mistaken in his belief that the pope had summoned Peter to appear in person to answer Hugh's claim. Nor is there any hint in earlier papal correspondence that the pope had been anticipating that the king would join the crusade, although two surviving letters from Peter – one to the rulers of Florence, the other to the seneschal of the kingdom of Naples – written before his departure from Cyprus make it plain that further warfare was at the forefront of his mind.[88]

Although the crusade was for 'the recovery of the Holy Land', the precise

[84] Leontios Makhairas, §§112–16; Hill, II, 348–9.

[85] Hill, II, 324–5; Setton, *PL*, I, 242–3. For Peter in Venice, see the account by Gian Giacomo Caroldo in 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), p. 68. For the Genoese privilege, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 248–9.

[86] Setton, *PL*, I, 244–5.

[87] Leontios Makhairas, §129. Cf. §131 for the reference (and that only in one ms.) to Jerusalem as Peter's goal.

[88] Above, p. 149. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 236–7; J. A. C. Buchon, *Nouvelles recherches historiques sur la principauté française de Morée et ses hautes baronnies* (Paris, 1843) II, 134–5. In his letter to the Florentines Peter spoke of the recovery of the Holy Land and an expedition to be ready on 1 March 1364. Perhaps he was hoping to recruit Italian mercenaries as he had done previously. Leontios Makhairas, §109.

strategy as conceived by the pope and the king of France in 1363 is by no means certain. Urban's bulls show a degree of ambiguity as to whether the immediate goal was the Mamlūk sultanate or the areas in the Aegean and the Balkans under pressure from the Turks. However, he was evidently impressed by Peter, whose capture of Satalia must have stood him in good stead, and in May 1363 he announced that the Cypriot king would lead a preliminary expedition ahead of the main crusading army. It was laid down that he could recruit no more than 200 nobles, 2,000 horse and 6,000 foot in the West, but exactly what they should do was not specified.[89]

Peter stayed at the papal court until the end of May and then set off on an extended tour of Europe to publicize the crusade and seek recruits. His travels took him through France and thence to England where in November he was entertained by King Edward III. Christmas he spent in Paris, and then, in the opening months of 1364, he visited Plantagenet-controlled areas in western France.[90] For the crusade to be a success there had to be peace in Europe, but since the cessation of hostilities between France and England in 1360 bands of unemployed mercenaries, the so-called 'Free-Companies', were terrorizing the countryside and even threatening the security of Avignon. Urban hoped that this problem could be solved by recruiting these *routiers* for the crusade, and it may be that it was thought that Peter would stand a better chance of enlisting them than the pope's own agents. But attempts to involve the Free Companies were to little avail, and by February Urban had stopped trying and was issuing indulgences for anyone willing to wage war to suppress them. With the *routiers* still at large, it was difficult attracting volunteers for the crusade.[91] In April 1364 King John died. His death meant that recruitment among the French nobility would now be even harder, and it also meant that the headship of the crusade in effect devolved upon Peter. Peter himself attended John's funeral and the consecration of his successor. He then set off on a second stage of his tour which took him through Germany, Bohemia and Poland, and he eventually arrived back in Venice on 11 November.[92]

Quite apart from the political and military troubles in Europe, two episodes in the East threatened the crusade's prospects. In the summer of 1363 the Venetian settlers in Crete rose in rebellion against their home-government. Peter was expecting to rely heavily on Venetian shipping to transport his army to the East, but, with the republic's naval and military resources tied up in suppressing the revolt, the future of the whole expedition was now in doubt. In November Peter

[89] Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 41–3, 125, 248.

[90] Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 173–85; Hill, II, 325–7. Evidently Peter spent longer in the West than Urban intended. In November 1363 the pope wrote telling him to return to the East: Setton, *PL*, I, 246 note 108.

[91] Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 487; Setton, *PL*, I, 248; N. Housley, 'The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy and the Crusades, 1356–1378', *Traditio*, XXXVIII (1982), 271–2; *idem*, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 42, 249.

[92] Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 186–99.

offered to go in person with some of his crusade recruits to help crush the rebels, and the following January the Venetian government undertook to convey 1,000 horsemen and 2,000 foot wherever they wished in the East to continue their crusade on the understanding they would first assist in bringing the rebellion to an end. In the end the authorities managed without the crusaders' aid and broke the backbone of the rebellion before it could seriously interfere with Peter's plans.[93] The other incident which placed the crusade in jeopardy has been outlined already. In 1364 a dispute in Famagusta over punishments inflicted on two Genoese mariners who had deserted from a Cypriot ship escalated into a violent affray which in turn threatened to plunge Cyprus and Genoa into a major war. It was only in April 1365 when Peter's representatives conceded all the Genoese demands in what must have been regarded as a most abject climb-down that this danger was averted.[94]

Peter's fleet sailed from Venice in June and rendezvoused at Rhodes with the forces from Cyprus under the prince of Antioch in August. The king had spent just over two and a half years in the West. He had enjoyed lavish hospitality throughout his stay, but in practical terms his success in persuading western nobles, knights and footmen to join his expedition had been limited. Indeed, Philip of Mézières tells of Peter Thomas comforting the king, downcast at the meagre result of his labours. Philip mentions figures of 600 armed men paid for by the king and almost 500 horses in the fleet sailing from Venice, and tells of the master of the Hospitallers providing about 100 knights from Rhodes. But he puts the total under Peter's command at about 10,000 armed men (with 1,400 horses) and including about 1,000 'nobiles armati'.[95] The impression left by these statistics is reinforced by the various figures given for the size of the fleet. Philip of Mézières says that the prince of Antioch brought almost 60 ships from Cyprus to Rhodes and that the total for the fleet was almost 100 ships of different types, not counting those provided by the Hospitallers. Leontios Makhairas believed that there were 165 ships at Rhodes, of which 108 were from Cyprus. According to Leontios, Peter and the westerners had been transported in sixteen galleys from Venice and the Knights of St John provided a further four. Even allowing for the discrepancies in the arithmetic and the widely differing capacity of the vessels in the Christian fleet, it would seem that, for all Peter's efforts to find recruits in the West, the force which attacked Alexandria in October 1365 consisted in the main of his own Cypriot vassals and men-at-arms together with foreigners already present in the East.[96]

[93] Hill, II, 327 note 2; Setton, *PL*, I, 249–57. [94] Above, p. 155.

[95] Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, pp. 120–1, 125, 127–8.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 127; Leontios Makhairas, §§162, 167. Cf. 'Amadi', p. 414 (92 Cypriot ships, including 33 galleys, out of a total of 165). Arab estimates put the fleet at 70–100 ships. Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, p. 89. See also A. T. Luttrell, 'English Levantine Crusaders, 1363–1367', *Renaissance Studies*, II (1988), 148–50.

The fleet set sail from Rhodes on 4 October. Only then did the king make known publicly his decision to attack Alexandria. Partly the secrecy which had hitherto surrounded the crusade's destination would have been to keep the Muslims guessing; partly to prevent those European merchants with business interests there from trying to stop the expedition taking place or alerting the Mamlūks. Certainly the secret had been well kept: the Venetian authorities were in the dark as letters written at the time of Peter's departure the previous June make clear.[97] The fleet made speedy progress, arriving off Alexandria on 9 October. Next day the Christian ships came close inshore, and the forces disembarked, routing the troops that attempted to prevent their landing. The garrison seems to have been taken wholly by surprise and was evidently insufficient and inadequately commanded to make much resistance. Peter's men were able to force an entry into the city by setting fire to the custom-house gate, and, once they were inside, the Muslim defenders fled. The crusaders then indulged in a fury of indiscriminate massacre and destruction. The property of the western merchants was seized along with anything else of value. Also destroyed were two of the three landward gates, but for which, according to an-Nuwairī, the author of the fullest Arabic account of the sack, the Christians would have been able to retain the city.[98]

The problem now was what to do next. The main Mamlūk forces were billeted in Cairo and would doubtless make for Alexandria as quickly as possible. But with the city gates in ruins and after the failure of an attempt to destroy a key bridge over the Nile canal at Fūwah and so impede the Egyptian army's progress, it was realized that Alexandria was untenable. Peter had been unable to keep his forces under control, the city could not be defended, and the crusaders were anxious to make off with their loot. The Christian sources agree that Peter himself was all for holding Alexandria, but although he had the support of Philip of Mézières and Peter Thomas, the two most ardent exponents of the crusade ideal, the westerners and, if Philip is to be believed, the Hospitallers and Peter's own brothers insisted on withdrawing. And so, on 16 October, as the Mamlūk troops entered Alexandria from the direction of Cairo, Peter and the last of his men made off for Cyprus.[99]

[97] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 751–3. There is later evidence to suggest that the Venetians did know of the intention to attack Egypt. 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), p. 79 note 1. For a discussion of whether the pope knew, Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 249–50.

[98] For the sack of Alexandria, with reference to the sources and earlier literature, Setton, *PL*, I, 266–71.

[99] Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, pp. 133–4, 138; William of Machaut, pp. 100–9; Leontios Makhairas, §§172–3. For the Hospitallers and Peter's brothers, Joga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 301–2, citing Mézières' unpublished 'Oratio tragedica' of 1389/90; the near contemporary life of St Peter Thomas mentions only westerners. For the army's departure, see Setton, *PL*, I, 272.

Spectacular though the events of October 1365 might seem, the positive achievement had been slight, and on the debit side Cyprus was now plunged into war with the sultanate. From the Christian point of view it was just as well that the ingrained antipathy to naval activity and seaborne military campaigns which characterized the regime for much of its history meant that the Mamlūks were in no position to launch a retaliatory attack. After the sack of Alexandria they did set about building a fleet, but it was never completed and so Cyprus itself escaped unscathed.[100] Not all western Europe applauded what had been done. In particular, the Venetians and the other western merchants were incensed by the disruption of their trade. Merchandise had been lost in the pillage or confiscated by way of reprisal; merchants and other westerners who had been in the sultan's lands at the time were held captive. For Peter to have capitalized on the destruction of Alexandria, further large-scale assaults on the coasts of Egypt and Syria were required. Once news of the events of October reached the West there was a chance that prospects of further military glory and booty would add fresh recruits to Peter's forces, and, indeed, during 1366 some adventure-seeking nobles such as the Gascon Florimond of Lesparre did come to Cyprus. But hopes that the count of Savoy, the king of France or the ablest of the French commanders, Bertrand du Guesclin, would come east proved vain. Rumours of peace were in the air – Leontios Makhairas accused the Venetians of falsely spreading them – and few western leaders were prepared to go to the trouble and expense of equipping a force of men-at-arms for service with the Cypriots only to risk finding on their arrival that hostilities had ceased.[101]

For their part, the Mamlūks expected further attacks, and almost at once they began pressing the trading cities, themselves anxious for a return to normality, to work for peace. It seems that by the beginning of 1366 they had sent embassies to Venice and Genoa, and in January the Venetians in their turn dispatched ambassadors to the sultan to secure the release of the imprisoned merchants and restore normal relations. The Mamlūks, however, insisted that there could be no treaty with Venice until a settlement was also reached with Cyprus. The Venetians now had every reason to put pressure on Peter to open negotiations. They had a measure of success: Peter was persuaded to divert his fleet from a projected assault on Beirut, the most important port on the coast of Syria, to Asia Minor, and to invite a Muslim embassy to Cyprus. The envoys met the king in Nicosia early in June, but Peter made unrealistic demands as the price of peace – the cession of the former territories of the kingdom of Jerusalem coupled with the release of the captives and customs exemptions for Cypriot traders – and he

[100] D. Ayalon, 'The Mamluks and Naval Power – a Phase of the Struggle between Islam and Christian Europe', *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, I (1965), 1–12 (see p. 6 for the fleet begun after 1365).

[101] Leontios Makhairas, §§175, 186–7; Hill, II, 335–6.

then sent his own ambassadors back to the sultan for further discussions. In effect he was playing for time while he built up his forces for a fresh assault. The Venetians, on the other hand, seem to have believed, or at least they pretended to believe, that peace was imminent, and they even persuaded the pope to issue new licences for them to trade with Egypt. But towards the end of June Peter sent Philip of Mézières to the West to make it clear that he was planning a new invasion of the sultanate for that August and to seek military and diplomatic support. Pope Urban rescinded the Venetian trading licences, and the Venetians responded by forbidding their subjects to participate in Peter's expedition and by placing an embargo on the export of arms and horses to Cyprus. They also arranged for a gift of falcons to be sent to the emir Yalbughā, who as atabak al-'asakir was the dominant figure in Cairo.[102]

The new campaign took longer than expected to muster. It was not until October that Peter's diplomatic contacts with the sultan came to an end with the imprisonment of his envoy and the Mamlūk seizure of those westerners who had been unwise enough to resume trading. By November the fleet was ready. It consisted of 56 galleys and 60 other vessels and included a contingent from Rhodes. It was thus comparable in size to the fleet which had destroyed Alexandria the previous year. Its departure, however, was delayed by the king's illness, and, so Peter alleged in a letter in which he remonstrated with the Venetians over their obstructive behaviour, by his desire to give Venetian merchants in the Mamlūk ports the chance to get away. It was not until the beginning of January that the armada could set sail, and when at last it did it was dispersed in a storm. Fifteen galleys, including the one commanded by Florimond of Lesparre, sacked the Syrian port of Tripoli. The other ships retired to Cypriot waters without, so it would seem, striking a blow.[103]

This fiasco would appear to have marked a turning-point. Peter would have known that military failure or inaction would in itself deter further support from the West. He was also coming under increased pressure from the Catalans and Genoese as well as from the Venetians to make peace. The sultanate had far greater resources than he had, and warfare was expensive. As early as October 1366 the pope had made it clear that Peter could expect no major financial support from papal taxation revenues and had begun advising him to put an end to hostilities. So when fresh Mamlūk envoys arrived in Cyprus in February, Peter was disposed to engage in serious negotiations. A draft peace treaty was prepared, and in March an embassy headed by James of Nores, the turcopolier of Cyprus, was sent to Cairo to secure its ratification. But the sultan refused.[104]

[102] *Ibid.* 335–43; Setton, *PL*, I, 274–8.

[103] Leontios Makhairas, §§190–1, cf. II, 119–20; William of Machaut, pp. 130–2. For Peter's letter to Venice, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 286–8.

[104] *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1366, §13; Leontios Makhairas, §§189, 192–3, 197–8. For the draft treaty, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 291–302. Cf. William of Machaut, pp. 132–5, 172–9.

Peter's attention had been diverted by a Turkish attack on Gorhigos in February and March, and then in May his own garrison at Satalia mutinied. Both necessitated decisive military action, and in all probability these events encouraged the Mamlūks to drive a harder bargain.[105] In June James returned from Egypt accompanied by Muslim envoys who were to negotiate a new, less favourable, treaty. They found the king in Rhodes, whence he had gone after suppressing the Satalia mutiny, but he was in no mood to accept peace at any price. He imprisoned the envoys and set about organizing his forces for yet another assault on the ports of northern Syria. The fleet sailed in late September and attacked Tripoli. It then moved northwards, ravaging Tortosa and Valania. Unable to force a landing at Lattakia, it pressed on to the Cilician ports of Malo and Ayas where the Christians broke into the town but met strong resistance at the landward castle. By early October the raid was over. Peter decreed that any Christian captain who would engage in privateering against the Mamlūks could use Famagusta as a base.[106]

This raid was the last that Peter was to lead. Soon after his return to Cyprus he set off on a second visit to Europe. The chroniclers explain his going in terms of his need to satisfy his honour in a dispute with the Gascon lord, Florimond of Lesparre: in the summer of 1367 while at Rhodes, Peter and Florimond had become involved in a heated argument which ended with an undertaking between them to fight a duel at the court of the king of France.[107] But Peter must also have been anxious to revive the flagging western interest in his war. He sailed to Naples and in March 1368 reached Rome where Pope Urban had been residing since the previous October. At Easter the pope effected a reconciliation between the king and his adversary, apparently on Peter's terms.[108] But the king had lost the papal backing he had hitherto enjoyed. The pope had already resumed issuing permits for the Venetians to trade in Mamlūk ports, and now, with Peter in Rome, he insisted that the king allow Venetian and Genoese ambassadors to negotiate peace on his behalf. In May Peter yielded to papal pressure and gave instructions that the embassy was to ask for the same terms as had been set out in the draft treaty of 1367. He then travelled to Venice and sailed for Cyprus in late September. Any hopes he may have had of gaining further military or financial aid had been in vain.[109]

The closing phase of the war can be briefly told. The joint Venetian and Genoese embassy to the sultan was unsuccessful. Then in January 1369 Peter was murdered. Later that year the regent, John prince of Antioch, who had

[105] Leontios Makhairas, §§194–5, 200–1; William of Machaut, pp. 135–72.

[106] Leontios Makhairas, §§202–5, 209–13; William of Machaut, pp. 179–217 *passim*; *Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois*, pp. 188–91 (recording an otherwise unknown attack on Jaffa); Hill, II, 352–4. For privateering, Leontios Makhairas, §§213, 219–22.

[107] Leontios Makhairas, §§206, 214; William of Machaut, pp. 224–45.

[108] Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 369–72.

[109] *DVL*, II, 123–6; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 291–308; Hill, II, 356–8.

repeated Peter's decree encouraging privateering at Muslim expense, sent out a small raiding party which attacked various ports along the coasts of Syria, Cilicia and Egypt. Eventually negotiations involving Cyprus, Rhodes, Genoa, Venice and the Mamlūk sultanate were resumed, and after a long and difficult round of diplomatic activity peace was finally ratified in October 1370.[110]

The story of Peter's war is thus one of high hopes and a spectacular start followed by loss of momentum, military and diplomatic stalemate, increasing frustration and finally a peace agreement which, so far as can be ascertained since the actual text has not survived, brought Cyprus nothing.[111] But the question remains: what was Peter hoping to achieve? It was suggested earlier that the idea of winning back the Holy Land was merely propaganda designed for consumption in the West. Jerusalem as the goal of the venture was all very well as an element in the *excitatoriae* for the crusade or in the subsequent *apologiae* for Peter's actions, but it was never a practicable proposition and Peter must have known it. However, if the occupation of Satelia can be seen as a development of earlier policies, is it not possible that the attempted occupation of Alexandria or its destruction, can also be explained in such terms? So far as the negotiations of 1367 and 1368 are concerned, the surviving draft treaty from 1367 makes it clear that at that time Peter's foremost aim was to get the sultan to concede preferential commercial facilities, tariff reductions, and legal franchises and guarantees for Cypriot merchants trading in his lands. He was thus using aggression and the threat of aggression not to make territorial gains in areas once under Christian rule, but to derive commercial advantages for his subjects at the expense of the Mamlūk regime and, by implication, at the expense of the Cypriots' competitors in Egypt and Syria, the merchants from the West. And herein perhaps lies the clue to the entire strategy. As has been seen, Cyprus' own prosperity was in decline; increasingly western merchants were bypassing the island and dealing direct with the Muslims. Had Peter been able to hold Alexandria, he could have exploited its commerce for his own advantage and so once again obtained control over a substantial portion of east–west trade. But having failed to hold Alexandria, he could still hope to restore Famagusta to something of its former prosperity by disrupting the existing commercial patterns and by obtaining favourable terms for his own merchants who might then be better placed to act as middlemen, re-selling eastern goods to westerners. If the war waged against Turkish corsairs and the acquisition of Satalia were intended to safeguard and extend Cypriot commercial interests, why not the war waged against the sultan and the attempted acquisition of Alexandria?

After its glorious start, the final episode in Peter's reign comes as a sad anticlimax. By the time he returned empty-handed from his second visit to the

[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 359–60, 372–6. Cf. Urban V, *Lettres communes*, ed. M.-H. Laurent *et al.* (Paris, 1954–86), nos. 26767, 26795. [111] For the 1370 treaty, Hill, II, 376.

West, the prospects for any lasting advantage to Cyprus from the hostilities were fast ebbing away. A sense of failure must have been all-pervasive, and, as stories preserved by the various chroniclers imply, the effect on Peter seems to have been to weaken his judgement. Several instances can illustrate this point. They range from the quarrel with Florimond of Lesparre and the king's acceptance of his challenge to a duel to the scarcely credible incident in which on the day before his death Peter had imprisoned and threatened to execute John Gorap, the steward of his household, for failing to provide oil for the asparagus.[112] Even in the context of the exaggerated chivalric ideals of the fourteenth century, for a king to travel far from his kingdom with the intention of fighting a duel with a foreign nobleman indicates a complete lack of any sense of proportion. Yet the narrative accounts of the reign present this duel as the principal reason for the king's journey to Europe in 1367, and, although they may be accused of highlighting only the most sensational aspect of his visit, their perspective on this episode finds support in a contemporary papal letter in which the king was ordered to desist and told that the engagement would be a derogation of his royal dignity.[113]

Eleanor of Aragon had borne Peter two children: a son, who was to succeed him as king, and a daughter.[114] According to Leontios Makhairas, whenever Peter was away from home he would have his servant put one of Eleanor's shifts by his bed, '. . . and when the king lay down to sleep he would take the shift in his arms (because of the love which he had for the queen) and thus he would sleep'.[115] Nevertheless, he took mistresses, and by 1367 his behaviour had become sufficiently notorious for the pope to issue a rebuke. The sources mention two women, both members of the lesser nobility: Joanna L'Aleman, concerning whom Leontios gave a lurid account of the queen's attempts to induce a miscarriage, and Eschiva of Scandelion.[116] While Peter was in the West in 1367–8 rumours began to circulate that the queen in her turn had taken a lover, John of Morphou, the marshal of Cyprus and since 1365 titular count of Edessa. It is difficult to know whether there was any substance to them, although there is no indication that the pair had any association after Peter's death when presumably there would have been less cause for discretion. The controller of the royal household in the king's absence was a knight named John Viscount, and he was foolhardy enough to write to the king to inform him of the rumours, adding that he himself did not believe them. On his return Peter tried to find out the truth but was confronted by a wall of silence. He summoned his vassals, who, fearful of the likely repercussions if they corroborated the controller's report, preferred to perjure themselves and told the king that Viscount had

[112] Leontios Makhairas, §279. Richard, 'La révolution', p. 109.

[113] Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 2567; William of Machaut, pp. 224–45; Leontios Makhairas, §214.

[114] For a possible second daughter, Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan', p. 147.

[115] Leontios Makhairas, §130; cf. §§216, 242.

[116] *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1367, §13; Leontios Makhairas, §§234–8, 245, 248–9, 280.

concocted the story himself out of spite for the queen. He was thereupon thrown into prison and died soon afterwards. The effect of this episode was to foster an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. The nobles were ashamed, and Peter, who had a shrewd idea of what had been going on, gave vent to his feelings by adopting a truculent attitude towards them and by going out of his way to be offensive to their womenfolk.[117]

The stage was set for the final drama. Peter, the king's son who would have been aged about twelve at the time, coveted a pair of greyhounds belonging to James of Jubail and was furious when James refused to give them to him. When the king came to hear of the matter, he made overtures to buy the dogs, but James and his father, Henry of Jubail, refused to sell. The king was not prepared to countenance this rebuff; he stripped Henry of his office of viscount of Nicosia and had both him and his son locked up; at the same time he made preparations to marry Henry's daughter to an artisan and then had her tortured when she tried to hide. The other nobles learnt of these developments with consternation. The king had set about destroying an old and distinguished family on the most trivial of pretexts and had acted illegally by imprisoning a liegeman without due legal process and by attempting to disparage his daughter. There was no knowing whom he might turn on next. They persuaded the king's two brothers, John prince of Antioch and James, the later King James I, to intervene, but when they broached the subject Peter grew angry and refused to make amends. John and James then conferred with the nobles, and they decided to go in a body to demand that the king renew the oaths concening good government and the maintenance of law that he had sworn at his accession. But some of the vassals decided that he would only go back on his promises, and so they resolved to kill him. In the early hours of the morning of Tuesday 16 January the party consisting of the royal princes, the knights who were set on murder and some others who were apparently unaware of their intent set off, on their way releasing the Jubails and also John Gorap from prison. They gained admission to the king's private apartments. There three of their number, Philip of Ibelin lord of Arsur, Henry of Jubail and John of Gaurelle, struck Peter down with their swords; others, including John Gorap and also James of Nores the turcopolier, who had not been privy to the plot but who wanted to identify himself with the conspirators, further mutilated his body.[118]

That at least is a summary of the tale as told by the Cypriot chroniclers. The murder is portrayed as the outcome of a quarrel arising from a petty dispute in the course of which the king, whose behaviour had already cost him the trust and

[117] Leontios Makhairas (§§239–49, 251–9) gives a detailed account vitiated by some chronological impossibilities. Richard, 'La révolution', p. 108. Machaut (pp. 248–54) has a similar story although with differing nuances.

[118] Leontios Makhairas, §§261–81; William of Machaut, pp. 254–71; 'Amadi', pp. 422–6. For the date and further comment, P. W. Edbury, 'The Murder of King Peter I of Cyprus (1359–1369)', *Journal of Medieval History*, VI (1980), 222–4.

goodwill of many of his men, had victimized a noble family. It is a story of passion, fear, intrigue and violence, and as such may well have grown in the telling. In one important respect, however, the testimony of Leontios Makhairas and the later sources dependent on him or on the sources he himself had used should be called into question. The Cypriot writers were careful to disassociate Peter's brothers from the plan to murder the king. Allegedly they had agreed to get him to renew his coronation oaths and had gone with the murderers thinking that this was what they were going to do. Once in the royal apartments the actual murderers rushed at the king and stabbed him to death before the two princes of the blood-royal realized what was happening. So although they were present at the murder, they were innocent of the king's blood. But to writers in the West there was no doubt that they were guilty men: they were either in the conspiracy, urging the murderers on, or, according to some accounts, struck the fatal blows themselves. William of Machaut, whose *Prise d'Alexandrie* is a full-length biography of King Peter, Philip of Mézières, Froissart, Christine of Pisan, and the anonymous author of the *Chronographia regum Francorum* – to mention only a few of the better known writers and sources – are agreed on their complicity.[119] When we take into consideration circumstantial evidence provided by the Cypriot chroniclers – the brothers' presence at the murder, the time of day that the incident occurred, the fact that the actual murderers went unpunished during the prince of Antioch's regency (1369–72), and the fact that the queen held Prince John personally responsible – it is difficult to accept that James and John were indeed free from guilt.[120] In all probability Leontios Makhairas and later writers either drew on an 'official' account of Peter's death, put out by the regime headed by the prince of Antioch which came to power immediately after the murder, or repeated historical traditions current at the court of James I (1382–98) or his son Janus (1398–1432) which would naturally have avoided accusing the then king or his father of regicide and fratricide.

There is, however, no evidence for long-term personal ill-feeling between the king and his brothers. John of Antioch had a fine record as the regent while Peter was in the West in 1362–5 and 1367–8 and as a military commander. According to Leontios Makhairas, Peter intended to imprison John and James together with those knights he knew hated him, but this section of his account has the air of a piece of literary fantasy and presents chronological difficulties which make it impossible to accept as it stands.[121] On the eve of the murder there occurred the stormy scene at which the brothers tried to remonstrate with the king on behalf of the Jubails, and perhaps it was only then that the vassals convinced them that

[119] Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 394 note 5; Edbury, 'Murder of Peter I', pp. 224–5 and note 5 (p. 231).

[120] Leontios Makhairas (§§290, 325) shows that John Gorap and Philip of Arsur continued to enjoy favour. For Eleanor and John of Antioch, see §§553–4.

[121] Leontios Makhairas, §260.

Peter meant them harm.[122] On the other hand, of the knights mentioned as being party to the murder Henry of Jubail and John Gorap were victims of the king's wrath and, especially in view of the fate of John Viscount, would have had good cause for wanting to see Peter dead. Philip of Arsur had quarrelled with the king much earlier in his reign and had gone to the length of having the pope intercede on his behalf. By late 1366 he was back in royal service, and in 1367 he accompanied Peter on his journey to the West.[123] But evidently the reconciliation was only temporary. Otherwise the knights named in our sources had good records of service. James of Nores had been turcopolier since before 1344 and had an outstanding military and diplomatic career. Raymond Babin, in whose house the conspirators were said to have met prior to the murder, had also been a prominent counsellor from the time of Hugh IV. Henry of Jubail was a regular participant in Peter's campaigns, while John of Gaurelle had gone with the king on his first visit to the West. With the exception of John Gorap, whose family is not known before 1350, all these men were descended from Cypriot vassals who were present in the island by the opening decades of the thirteenth century and who could trace their ancestry in the East back to the twelfth.[124]

Although the narrative sources explain the murder primarily in terms of personalities and the breakdown of mutual confidence and respect, there can be no doubt that there were other factors lying just below the surface which had prompted disaffection. Later on the day of the murder the High Court was convened to make provision for the regency occasioned by the minority of the heir to the throne, and the assembled vassals took the opportunity to issue an *ordonnance* designed to remedy a number of abuses. This enactment thus provides an invaluable guide to their grievances at the time.[125] Two clauses would seem to derive directly from the treatment of the Jubail family: the necessity for a judgement in the High Court before the king could lay hands on the person or fief of a vassal was re-affirmed, and the rights that a lord had over the marriage of heiresses or widows were summarized with emphasis on the point that the woman had to be married to a man of comparable social standing. Other clauses sought to defend the vassals' legal position in more general terms: they were to be able to swear to defend one another in the face of unjust legal actions by their lord; they were to have their rights and fiefs and not be made to perform services over and above what was due; the High Court was to meet regularly, at least once a month; and, to obviate doubt as to the customs to be employed, a copy of the legal treatise by the thirteenth-century count of Jaffa, John of Ibelin, was to be deposited in safe keeping for use as a work of reference.

[122] *Ibid.* §§269–71.

[123] Edbury, 'Murder of Peter I', p. 226 and note 9 (p. 231).

[124] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–7.

[125] For the text, 'Bans et Ordonnances', pp. 378–9. For the date (given incorrectly in the printed edition), Edbury, 'Murder of Peter I', p. 231 note 10.

Almost all the other clauses can be linked directly to the effects of Peter's wars on Cyprus. Henceforth the king was not to declare war, make peace or recruit more than a hundred men-at-arms without the vassals' consent. Evidently they took the view that they had been insufficiently consulted in the past. Another clause sought to restrict the right of mercenaries to discharge themselves at will. The number of men employed in the armed forces was a matter of some delicacy: the authorities were still trying to exert military pressure on the Mamlūks in the hope of getting favourable terms for peace, and unless they could hold their armies together they would be unable to do so. The problem was that, while no satisfactory conclusion to the fighting was in prospect, Cypriot resources were insufficient to maintain the war-effort. Indeed, the opening clauses of the *ordonnance* have much to say about the strains on royal finances due to the war. It would appear that special taxes for military purposes had been extended beyond the agreed terminal dates and the revenues put to other uses. Furthermore, in making his financial demands the king had managed to bypass the High Court and so had avoided consulting the vassals over taxation. He had also been alienating crown assets – the royal salt works are singled out for special mention – again without proper consultation.[126]

Clearly the war had been costing far more than the ordinary revenues of the Cypriot crown could sustain, and the king had been resorting to various expedients, some of which were of questionable legality or wisdom, to support his military endeavours. Leontios Makhairas has other information to illustrate this state of affairs: the wealth accumulated by Hugh IV had been used up in the expeditions against the Turks at the beginning of the reign; before each of the king's visits to the West revenue had been raised by allowing individuals to purchase immunity from the poll tax; as early as 1366 the king's counsellors had been showing concern at the cost of the military expeditions.[127] Other evidence shows that at the time of his death Peter was heavily in debt.[128] Royal insolvency, unsanctioned exactions and the dissipation of the sources of royal income were matters of concern to the king's leading subjects and were precisely the sort of issues that would generate ill-will.

But if the vassals resented the king's arbitrary behaviour, his failure to consult them on important questions of military or fiscal policy, and the consequences of the cost of warfare, they also felt threatened by his patronage of the foreign nobles he had welcomed into his service. Foreigners had received military commands;[129] Peter's chivalric order, the Order of the Sword, had been explicitly designed to appeal to them,[130] and he had rewarded them generously.

[126] Richard, 'La révolution', pp. 111–15. [127] Leontios Makhairas, §§157, 182, 215.

[128] Gregory XI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France*, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1962–5), nos. 13, 20, 128, 134, 291, 718.

[129] See, for example, Leontios Makhairas, §§167, 190, 200; William of Machaut, pp. 138–45.

[130] M. H. Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven/London, 1984), pp. 183, 185, 194–5.

Brémond of La Voulte, for example, had received the valuable estates of Polemidhia and Ayios Reginos near Limassol, and among other recipients of fiefs or annuities were the Greek John Lascaris Calopheros, the Frenchman Geoffrey of Ligier Luc, and the Genoese Ottobuono of Cathania.[131] The desire to avoid losing face in front of his western knights was probably the primary reason for Peter's acceptance of Florimond of Lesparre's challenge. Writing about twenty years after the murder, Philip of Mézières (another of the king's westerners) commented on the Cypriots' jealousy of the foreigners in royal service, and it is certainly true that after Peter's death there was a reaction against them as well as against other favourties such as John Moustry and the king's mistress, Eschiva of Scandelion.[132]

Indeed, the presence of foreign troops and nobles on Cypriot soil may have been an important consideration in persuading the Cypriots that the king would have to be killed. Because Peter had a significant force of men-at-arms at his disposal which he could call on independently of the traditional royal army officered by his vassals, he was in a position to threaten his own nobles should they try to concert action against him. The nobles feared that if they tried to restrain the king by getting him to renew his coronation oaths he would no more abide by them in the future than he had in the past and would simply wait for a convenient moment to strike back. Similarly, they would have known that suspending him from the exercise of royal authority as had happened to Henry II in 1306 would not work, since Peter could look elsewhere – in particular to the foreigners in his service – for support. The vassals were not the only element in the power-structure in Cyprus, and so to ensure that their action would be effective they had to pre-empt the possibility of a royal counter-coup. Nothing short of removing the king permanently would suffice.

Peter's murder highlights the effects the war had been having on Cypriot society. The strains and disappointments had clearly taken their toll on the king himself and must go some way at least to explaining his erratic and provocative behaviour. To pay for the war he had borrowed heavily and had disposed of crown assets, thereby leaving a legacy of insolvency for his successors. The nobles too were under pressure. They seem to have been happy to play their part in the campaigns but were worried by the costs involved and by the threat to their own position posed by the introduction of new men from outside. Another group who must have been concerned at the financial implications of the conflict and who could well have been apprehensive about the likely long-term commercial consequences if no satisfactory conclusion could be achieved were the Cypriot merchants. Many of them came from the non-Latin population of Famagusta, and they would already have suffered from the disruption of trade

[131] Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 358–9; Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignan*, pp. 80, 84, 91; Gregory XI, *Lettres secrètes . . . les pays autres*, nos. 1540, 2290.

[132] Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 386–7; Edbury, 'Murder of Peter I', p. 229.

between Famagusta and the ports under Mamlūk control. Some, such as Joseph Zaphet, who in the mid-1360s had transferred his activities to Montpellier, or the Nestorian Lakha brothers, whose fabulous riches were described by Leontios Makhairas, were clearly the equals of western merchants in terms of wealth and business acumen.[133] It was for this class's benefit that Peter had pressed for commercial privileges in his abortive negotiations with the sultanate in 1367 and 1368. These were the people who should have been the first to be able to profit from the capture of Alexandria or from the revival of trade through Cyprus following a Mamlūk defeat, and it is scarcely surprising that when in 1368 the peace negotiations were entrusted to members of the Genoese and Venetian mercantile communities – their rivals – they failed.

The sack of Alexandria and the raids that followed greatly damaged the interests of the western merchants. As mentioned previously, in 1366 the Venetians forbade their ships to carry men and war materials to Cyprus, and they were accused of spreading rumours of an armistice so as to deflect further recruitment in the West. Their object was to make peace with the sultan, get their own merchants and merchandise released, and, furnished with fresh papal licences, resume trading as soon as possible. The Catalans pursued a similar policy. In the spring of 1366 their king, Peter IV of Aragon, sent ambassadors to the sultan disassociating himself from the 1365 expedition and requesting the release of the Catalan merchants who had been interned by way of reprisal. At the same time he took action against those of his subjects who were known to have joined in the pillage at Alexandria, and, when early in 1367 Philip of Mézières came to Aragon in search of military assistance for Peter's war, he declined the help. After 1365 trade between Europe and the sultanate resumed remarkably quickly, although subsequent Cypriot raids and privateering and the uncertain temper of the Mamlūk government meant that the merchants' security remained precarious.[134]

The war had soured relations between Cyprus and the western mercantile communities as well as severely jeopardizing the Cypriots' own trade in the ports of the sultanate. But from 1366 an additional threat to the island's commerce loomed: the Venetian government began sponsoring galleys and cogs on a new route to Beirut.[135] If changing trade routes in Asia had encouraged the growth of Alexandria as an emporium for Far Eastern and Indian spices while routes through Cilicia and northern Syria and thence via Cyprus declined, any development of direct trade between Syria and the West – and Beirut, as the

[133] J. Combes, 'Un marchand de Chypre, bourgeois de Montpellier' in *Etudes médiévales offertes à M. le doyen Augustin Fliche* (Montpellier, 1952), pp. 33–9; Leontios Makhairas, §§91–6.

[134] M. Sáez Pomés, 'Un viaje del literato Felipe de Mézières a Catalunya en 1367', *Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón*, IV (1951), 434–5; *idem*, 'Los Aragoneses en la conquista saqueo de Alejandria por Pedro I de Chipre', *ibid.*, V (1952), 385–91; Ashtor. *Levant Trade*, pp. 91–102.

[135] Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 96, 100.

principal outlet for Damascus, was the most important port on the Syrian coast – would strike another blow at Cyprus. It would mean that the western merchants would be bypassing Famagusta and, by dealing direct with the Muslims, would be cutting out the Cypriot middlemen. Up to a point western merchants had always traded in Syrian ports, but now that the Venetian government was actively promoting this route, it was likely that the proportion of trade flowing directly between Syria and the West would increase to the further detriment of Cyprus. Indeed, changing trade routes and the effects of the Black Death coupled with the loss of goodwill as a result of the sack of Alexandria spelled the end of Cyprus' prosperity through long-distance trade. Peter's war, which arguably had been intended to enable the island to recover something of its share of international commerce, probably succeeded in aggravating its decline. It had been a gamble that had failed. The Genoese capture of Famagusta in 1373 and the pillaging which accompanied it were to be the final disaster.

From the point of view of western Christendom and with the benefit of hindsight, the crusade can be seen as a great mistake. The campaigns of the 1360s against Egypt and Syria diverted attention to the eastern Mediterranean and away from the Aegean at precisely the time the Ottoman Turks were consolidating their position on the European side of the Bosphorus. Within a generation they had overrun much of the Balkans. So far as Europe was concerned, the theatre of conflict with the Muslims had now shifted decisively, and Cyprus was left as a distant and irrelevant outpost. With the minor exception of Marshal Boucicault's raid on Syria in 1403 and apart from occasional acts of piracy, there were to be no more Christian assaults on the Mamlūk sultanate. To that extent, the Alexandria expedition was the final chapter in a saga which had begun with the First Crusade and the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, although whether Peter also expected to be able to recover the Holy City as his apologists claimed is by no means certain.