4

Chasing the Chimera in Spain: Edmund of Langley in Iberia, 1381/82

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On 22 June 1381, Edmund of Langley, earl of Cambridge, at the head of a diverse expeditionary force that included English, Castilian, Gascon, and Portuguese elements, set sail from the Devonian ports of Plymouth and Dartmouth bound for Lisbon and eventually the Portuguese frontier with Castile. This expeditionary force was assembled and sent to Iberia as part of John of Gaunt's grand strategy to make good his claim to the Castilian throne. In November 1382 Earl Edmund and what was left of his army returned to England in Castilian ships paid for by his one-time enemy, John I of Castile.

Although contemporary English chroniclers found little to report in regards to the earl of Cambridge's time in Iberia,[2] modern historians, often drawing on Portuguese and Castilian chronicle sources that were critical of the English,[3] have interpreted the Portuguese expedition of 1381/82 as one of the greatest failures of English arms in the middle stages of the Hundred Years War. A number of historians over the last century have devoted attention to Edmund of Langley's time in Portugal. In 1904, Sidney Armitage-Smith argued that the "blundering half-measures of the Government [in London] and [Edmund of Langley's] incompetence,"[4] led to the failure of John of Gaunt's grand strategy. Half a century later, in 1955, Peter Russell argued that the campaign was a complete disaster from the

1 I wish to thank those who attended "The Soldier Conference: England's Wars, 1272–1399" for their comments on a shorter version of this article. I am also grateful to Tiago Viula de Faria, who drew my attention to several articles by Portuguese historians that impinged on the campaign and kindly discussed a number of issues contained herein at length.

2 The *Westminster Chronicle, 1381–1394*, ed. L. C. Hector and Barbara Harvey (Oxford, 1982); *Knighton's Chronicle, 1337–1396*, ed. and trans. G. H. Martin (Oxford, 1995); and Adam of Usk's *Chronicle, 1377–1421*, ed. and trans. Chris Given-Wilson (Oxford, 1997) all fail even to make mention of the Portuguese expedition. The only other major chronicle of the period, Thomas Walsingham's, devotes only one brief paragraph to the entire episode. *The St Alban's Chronicle: Volume I: 1376–1394*, ed. and trans. by John Taylor, Wendy Childs and Leslie Watkiss (Oxford, 2003), pp. 408–10.

3 Fernando Lopes, *The English in Portugal, 1367–87*, ed. Derek Lomax and R. J. Oakley (Warminster, 1988). Pedro Lopez de Ayala, *Cronicas Los Reyes de Castilla*, ed. Cayetano Rosell, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1878).

4 Sidney Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt* (reprint: New York, 1964), p. 268. For his full discussion of the earl of Cambridge in Portugal in this period see pp. 260–69.

outset, and every aspect of the expedition, from both a Portuguese and an English perspective, was lacking in proper guidance, effective organization and competent leadership. Edmund of Langley, Russell found, not only was possessed of "monumental stupidity"[5] but also displayed "an almost incredible lack of intelligence" in Iberia.[6] More recent scholarship relying less on chronicles and more on documentary evidence has moderated Russell's judgmental opinions,[7] and a number of most recent studies in both English and Portuguese have added to our understanding of this very complex and chaotic time in the Portuguese political world.[8]

In light of more recent studies, this article seeks to reinterpret Edmund of Langley's Iberian campaign in a broader diplomatic and military context, and it will turn on three points. First, that the success of the campaign was compromised at the outset by diplomatic blundering on the part of the principals involved. The negotiations that resulted in the secret Treaty of Estremoz that John of Gaunt and Ferdinand I of Portugal signed in July 1380 were conducted at the same time that the Portuguese Cortes of Torres Novas (which broke up in August of that year) was meeting to secure a marriage alliance between Ferdinand I and John I of Castile.[9] Thus, the Portuguese political community had been assembled to support,

5 Peter E. Russell, *English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Reigns of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955), p. 313.

6 Russell, *English Intervention*, pp. 339–40.

7 The most recent commentary on the expedition from the English perspective is Nigel Saul, *Richard II* (Yale, 1997), pp. 95–99. Saul makes no value judgments in regard to Langley's leadership but generally adopts Russell's version of events. Anthony Goodman, *John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 1992), pp. 113–14. See also, Anthony Goodman, "Before the Armada: Iberia and England in the Middle Ages," in *England in Europe*, ed. Nigel Saul (New York, 1994), pp. 108–20. G. L. Harriss, *Shaping the Nation: England, 1360–1461* (Oxford, 2005), p. 415; Adrian Bell, *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 19–20. Douglas Biggs, "'A Voyage or Rather an Expedition to Portugal': Edmund of Langley in Iberia, 1381/82," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 7 (2009), pp. 57–74.

8 Joao Gouveia Monteiro, *A Guerra em Portugal* (Lisbon, 1998). Maria Joao Violance Branco, "The Nobility of Medieval Portugal (XIth–XIVth Centuries)," in *Nobles and Nobility in Medieval Europe*, ed. Anne Duggan (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 223–45. Cesar Oilbera Serrano, *Beatriz d Portugal: La Pugna Disastica Avis-Trastamara* (Santiago de Compostella, 2005). Judite Antonieta Goncalves de Freitas, "The Royal Cancellery at the end of the Portuguese Middle Ages: Diplomacy and Political Society," *e-Journal of Portuguese History* 7 (2009), pp. 1–23. Rita Costa-Gomes, *The Making of a Court Society: Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval Portugal* (Cambridge, 2003). Antonio Maria Braga de Macedo de Castro Henriques, "State Finance, War and Redistribution in Portugal, 1249–1527" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of York, 2008). Rita Costa-Gomes, *Dom Fernando* (Lisbon, 2009). Tiago Viula de Faria, "Tracing the 'Chemyn de Portyngale': English Service and Servicemen in Fourteenth-Century Portugal," *Journal of Medieval History* 30 (2011), pp. 1–12. Antonio Castro Henriques, "The Rise of the Tax State: Portugal, 1371–1401," *e-Journal of Portuguese History* 12 (2014), pp. 66.

9 The diplomacy and the conduct of the campaign itself took place against a trying political backdrop of a divided Portugal and a vacillating and infirm king. Many Portuguese nobles were conscious and jealous of their hereditary rights and worked diligently to ensure that the Crown would not wield too much power over them. Branco, "Nobility of Medieval Portugal," p. 233; Gomes, *D. Fernando*, pp. 171, 173.

and give money for, one policy while the king was pursuing another. From the English perspective the alliance seemed solid but, rather than a committed Portuguese ally, what Edmund of Langley found upon his arrival in Lisbon in July 1381 was a royal court and political community deeply divided over the entire question of the war with Castile, the allegiance to the Roman pontiff, Urban VI, and the alliance with England. The second point concerns the earl of Cambridge's time in Portugal. He brought a solid Anglo-Gascon force to Iberia and intended to use it to good effect. While Edmund of Langley demonstrated significant influence in the Portuguese political world, he found some issues to be beyond his influence and control. Nevertheless, through careful diplomacy and tact, the earl was able to convert some of his Portuguese political opponents to his cause, allowed his troops to conduct raids that were not devoid of success, defused a potential mutiny by his own troops, and left an imprint on the Portuguese military that lasted long after he had left Iberia in 1382. The last point of the article will consider the issue of the supposed mutiny by soldiers against Edmund of Langley in Portugal. Who were these mutineers and, as best as can be discerned, what effect did they have on events? In the end, it will be seen that Langley achieved some level of diplomatic, political, and military success in Portugal, even though the transformative military success that he sought eluded him.

The diplomatic aspects of the earl of Cambridge's ill-fated Portuguese expedition had their origins in the convoluted political world of the first five years of Richard II's reign. John of Gaunt had claimed the Castilian throne through his wife Constance since 1371, and the fact that Edmund of Langley married her sister Isabel the following year meant that the two princes found it easy to allow their ambitions free reign in the Iberian peninsula. Even though Ferdinand I of Portugal had proven a less than reliable English ally on no fewer than three occasions before 1380,[10] it suddenly seemed that a confluence of fortuitous events had occurred which enabled John of Gaunt and Edmund of Langley to believe the situation in Iberia had turned in their favor.[11]

The opening salvos of the Great Schism in 1378 afforded a myriad of possibilities for diplomatic realignments in Iberia, and English intervention in Navarre against Castile that same year seemed to signal promise for the future of English arms there. In May 1379 Henry II died after a brief illness and left the Castilian throne in the hands of the seemingly weak and inept John I. King John appeared so unpopular with his nobility that Castile seemed to teeter on the verge of open insurrection and civil disorder. According to the Portuguese chronicler Ferdinand Lopes, King Ferdinand of Portugal sensed this weakness too, and wished to make war on Castile following the death of Henry II so as to exact

10 Ferdinand had been humiliated in 1373 following Henry II's siege of Lisbon, which forced him to make a peace he did not wish. Violet Shilington, "The Beginnings of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," *TRHS*, New Series 20 (1906), pp. 120–21; Edgar Prestage, "The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," *TRHS*, 4th Series 17 (1934), p. 73.

11 Armitage-Smith thought these events provided Gaunt with "a golden opportunity," *John of Gaunt*, p. 268.

revenge for the late Castilian king's victories over Portuguese arms in the previous decade.[12] Thus, Ferdinand I opened negotiations with Richard II for a renewal of the alliance of the early 1370s, over and against the objection of his counsellors.[13]

As the new decade dawned political and military matters in France and Iberia, from the English perspective at least, seemed to only get better. On 16 July came the passing of France's greatest fourteenth-century soldier, the Constable Bertrand du Guesclin. Du Guesclin's death was followed a bare two months later, on 16 September, by that of Charles V, which left the French crown in the hands of his twelve-year-old son, Charles VI. With the most competent French politicians and military leaders gone, French policies were bound to drift. The stars seemed aligned for Gaunt and Langley to give free rein to their Iberian ambitions, and for Ferdinand to exact his revenge against his one-time oppressor.

One key to understanding the way Anglo-Portuguese diplomacy flowed in these years rests with the person of John Ferdinand Andeyro.[14] He was a Castilian nobleman and a supporter of Pedro the Cruel who had remained loyal to the king after his fall from power. Following Pedro's murder he fled to Lisbon, where he gave his lands around the city of Coruna to Ferdinand I. However, it was not long before Henry II conquered these lands, and Andeyro and other Galacian noblemen became exiles clustered around the Portuguese royal court or earning their living as soldiers of fortune.[15] Andeyro appears to have been more ambitious than most, and travelled to England, where he soon attached himself to John of Gaunt and Constance of Castile. He rose high in Gaunt's councils and can be found at Gaunt's court as early as 1371.[16] Throughout the 1370s and into the 1380s Andeyro was a fixture at the Savoy and played an integral part in the negotiations first between Edward III and Ferdinand I, and then between John of Gaunt and the Portuguese king. John of Gaunt retained Andeyro in 1376 with a fee of £20,[17] and the Galician exile was clearly part of a Lancastrian court culture that possessed European ambitions rather than merely English ones.[18]

12 Vincente Palenzuela, "Relations Between Portugal and Castile in the Later Middle Ages – 13th–16th Centuries," *e-Journal of Portuguese History* 1 (2003), pp. 1–18.

13 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, pp. 58–59.

14 Peter Russell traced his career and his relationship with John of Gaunt in his article, "Joao Fernandes Andeiro at the Court of John of Lancaster," *Revista de Universidade de Coimbra* 14 (1938), pp. 20–30.

15 Gomes, *Court Society*, pp. 120–21.

16 Andeyro received a New Year's gift of a silver goblet in 1372 from Gaunt, *John of Gaunt's Register, 1372–1376*, ed. Sydney Armitage-Smith, 2 vols., Camden Society, 3rd Series, 20–21 (1911), 21: #915.

17 *John of Gaunt's Register, 1379–83*, ed. Eleanor C. Lodge and Robert Somerville, 2 vols., Camden Society, 3rd Series, 56–57 (1938), 1:8.

18 Simon Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity, 1361–1399* (Oxford, 1991), p. 12. Russell, "Andeiro at the Court of Lancaster," pp. 20–30.

It seems that Gaunt and Langley thought quite a lot of Andeyro, who was perhaps twenty years the brothers' senior, and the Castilian exile painted a picture of Iberian affairs that led the titular king of Castile to change English diplomatic policy. Neither Edward III nor the Black Prince had ever entered into Iberian affairs without the support of Aragon (usually along with Mohammed V of Granada).[19] Although much diplomatic activity took place between Richard II and Peter III of Aragon throughout 1380, nothing came of these negotiations.[20] In any event, it is possible that Andeyro argued to Gaunt that such diplomatic efforts in the direction of Aragon were superfluous. Peter III was old and sickly and there was going to be no possibility of Aragonese troops coming to Gaunt's aid unless Aragon was directly attacked.

The treaty of Estremoz that Andeyro negotiated with Gaunt in Ferdinand's name was sealed on 15 July 1380,[21] and was reinforced by a letter of promise from both Ferdinand and Queen Lenor to support Edmund in making war against Castile.[22] The treaty provided for the Portuguese king to expect an initial force of English troops of 1,000 men-at-arms and 1,000 archers to arrive in Lisbon in 1381. They were to be paid by the English crown for one-quarter of a year and then Ferdinand would take over the burden of paying the men. Nevertheless, Earl Edmund put a significant amount of his own personal wealth behind the venture. On 4 May 1381 the earl received a letter patent giving his executors, in the event of his death, full income from his lands and his 500-mark annuity at the Exchequer to clear any debts that he would incur in Iberia.[23] The English expeditionary force was to be billeted in towns and castles, and to undertake military operations against the Castilian king in conjunction with Ferdinand I to recover the lands rightfully belonging to John of Gaunt. Most importantly, the treaty provided for the marriage of Edmund of Langley's young son, Edward of Norwich, who was eight years old, to Ferdinand's daughter, Beatrice.[24] Thus, if Ferdinand I died while Langley's son Edward was still a minor, Edmund of Langley would have become the de facto ruler of Portugal. When this scheme is combined with Gaunt's plan to invade the seemingly unstable kingdom of Castile from the Bordealais, there was reason to hope that the two Iberian kingdoms would swiftly fall into the hands of Plantagenet princes. Historians have tended to disparage this scheme as being impossible,[25] but it is worth noting that the impossible *had* been achieved before. The world had been turned upside down by English victories at Crécy and Poitiers,

19 Joseph O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca, 1975), p. 526.

20 Russell, *English Intervention*, pp. 283–301.

21 The original treaty dated 15 July 1380 in Portuguese is preserved in two copies the National Archives, TNA E 30/398A and TNA E 30/1283. For a printed text of the treaty see, Thomas Rymer, *Foedera*, 10 vols. (London, 1750), 3:103–04. Richard II confirmed and English alliance with Ferdinand I on 14 May 1381, *Foedera*, 3:120.

22 TNA E 30/1282.

23 *CPR, 1381–1385*, p. 8.

24 The treaty also stipulated that Edward of Norwich would have become joint ruler of Portugal after Ferdinand I's death. For a discussion of the treaty, see Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 299.

25 Russell, "Andeiro at the Court of Lancaster," p. 21.

and then had been transformed into political and diplomatic reality by the treaty of Brétigny and the Peace of Calais. Who was to say that it could not or would not happen again?

If the diplomacy that sent Edmund of Langley to Portugal was questionable, if not flawed from the outset, the earl's conduct of the campaign was not. The army that he led to Portugal was a robust one.[26] In late 1380 the English government roughed out a force composed of 1,500 men-at-arms and an equal number of archers.[27] These numbers were enhanced even further by the end of January 1381 to include 1,903 men-at-arms and 1,589 archers, for a grand total of 3,492 men.[28] As armies from the third quarter of the fourteenth century went, Langley's force was heavy in men-at-arms, since most forces raised in this period tried to keep the ratio of men-at-arms to archers at 1:1.[29] This force was created through ten indentures for war, with Earl Edmund himself;[30] Sir William Beauchamp;[31] Sir Matthew Gournay;[32] Sir Thomas Fychet;[33] Sir Thomas

26 James Henry Ramsay, "The Strength of English Armies in the Middle Ages," *English Historical Review* 29 (1914), pp. 221–27; A. E. Prince, "The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III," *English Historical Review* 46 (1931), pp. 353–71.

27 TNA C 47/2/49/2.

28 Lokington accounted to the Exchequer for nearly £7,000 in wages for troops on 2 August 1381, Anthony B. Steel, *Receipt of the Exchequer* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 44–45.

29 Andrew Ayton, "English Armies in the Fourteenth Century," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 21–38. Adrian Bell, Anne Curry, Andy King and David Simpkin, *The Soldier in Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 2013), pp. 95–96.

30 On 27 January 1381 Edmund of Langley received an indenture of receipt for £1,721 12s 10d for his soldiers' wages (TNA E 43/609). On 26 February 1381 the Issue Roll records a payment of 1,000 marks at the hands of his receiver, John Lincoln (TNA E 403/483, m. 19), which was supplemented by another £880 drawn out of the Exchequer on 6 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 23). The payments of the 1,000 marks and the £880 entered on the Issue Roll for Edmund of Langley were not additional revenue for wages but, rather, represented only a portion of the total of £1,721 to come from the Exchequer and which was allocated out of the treasury in convenient installments over time. For the brief biography of Edmund of Langley by Beltz see, George F. Beltz, *Memorials of the Most Noble Order of the Garter* (London, 1841), pp. 136–40.

31 Sir William Beauchamp received an indenture for war on 24 February 1381 (TNA E 101/70/2/615), and he drew £857 10s 8d on 22 January 1381 (TNA E 43/578). His receiver, William Bettenham, drew £433 6s 8d out of the Exchequer on 26 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 19), and £440 more on 6 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 19). For his relationship with John of Gaunt, see Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, pp. 19, 72, 110, 264, 272.

32 Although no indenture for war for Gournay survives, an indenture acknowledging his receipt of £867 12s 4d on 24 February 1381 does (TNA E 43/591). The Issue Roll records a payment to his receiver, Peter Skidmore, of £433 6s 8d on 26 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 19) and £440 more on 6 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 23), and a further £450 at the hands of John Gentry on 8 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 24).

33 Sir Thomas Fychet received an indenture for war on 24 February 1381 (TNA E 101/70/2/614), and an indenture of receipt of £144 12s 4d on 23 January 1381 (TNA E 43/612). The Issue Roll records a payment of £66 13s 4d at the hands of his receiver, Thomas Edyngton) on 28 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 19), and a further payment of £44 on 8 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 24). Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

Symond;[34] Bermond Arnaud de Preissac; the Sultan of Trau;[35] Thierry "the Canon" Robessart, a veteran of the Free Companies;[36] Fernando Rodreguez and John Alfonso;[37] John Andeyro;[38] and John Gutieriez, Bishop of Dax.[39]

There was no want of military experience among these captains. Not only were all of them veterans of many campaigns, but many were familiar with Iberian affairs and a number had served with the earl of Cambridge in the past. Edmund of Langley himself had begun his military life in 1359 at the age of seventeen. The earl had spent much of the 1360s and 1370s fighting in France alongside his father and elder siblings, or leading his own expeditions. Although Anthony Tuck argued that "Edmund would do anything in battle except actually fight it,"[40] contemporary accounts and his physical remains demonstrate otherwise.[41]

Sir William Beauchamp served as the army's constable, and had the task of bearing John of Gaunt's royal Castilian banner. He was one of Gaunt's most important retainers.[42] He had served with Gaunt at Nájera in 1367 and on the duke's great – if fruitless – *chevauchée* through France in 1373. Beauchamp has

34 Sir Thomas Symond received an indenture for war on 24 February 1381 (TNA E 101/68/8/199), and an indenture of receipt for £29 12s 8d on 22 January 1381 (TNA E 42/191). The Issue Roll records a payment of £40 which he himself received on 28 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 19), and a further payment of £26 13s 4d at the hands of Thomas Edyngton on 8 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 24). Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282.

35 The Sultan of Trau received an indenture for war on 24 February 1381 (TNA E 101/68/8/197), and an indenture of receipt for £384 4s on 23 January 1381 (TNA E 42/261). The Issue Roll records a payment to him of £133 6s 8d at the hands of Richard Merlyng on 26 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 19), and a further payment at his own hands on 8 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 24).

36 Robessart received an indenture for war on 23 January 1381 (TNA E 101/39/22), but his indenture of receipt of monies does not survive. The Issue Roll records a payment to him of £133 6s 8d at the hands of Thomas Rotheby on 28 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 19), and a further payment of £86 at Rotheby's hands on 8 April (TNA E 403/483, m. 24).

37 Rodreguez and Alfonso received an indenture for war on 24 February 1381 (TNA E 101/68/8/198) and an indenture of receipt for £212 15s 6d on 22 January 1381 (TNA E 101/39/18). No record of payments out of the Exchequer to either of these men, or their receiver, may be found.

38 Although no indenture for war for Fernandez survives, he received an indenture of receipt for £488 4s 8d on 22 January 1381 (TNA E 43/590). The Issue Roll records payment to him at the hands of Alfonso of Spain of £133 6s 8d on 28 February 1381 (TNA E 403/483 m 19), and a further £176 on 8 April 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 23). Peter Russell identified him as John Ferdinand Andeyro ("Andeiro at the Court of Lancaster," pp. 29–30), but Edouard Perroy was not so sure: *L'Angleterre et le grand schisme d'Occident* (Paris, 1933), pp. 218–20.

39 Although neither an indenture for war nor an indenture of receipt of money survives for Gutieriez the Issue Roll records a payment of £817 6s 8d at the hands of his receiver William Fernandez on 6 April 1381 (TNA E 403/483, m. 23).

40 J. A. Tuck, *Richard II and the English Nobility* (London, 1973), p. 8.

41 When Edmund's tomb was opened in 1877, Professor George Rolleston, Linacre Professor of Anatomy and Physiology at Oxford, examined the contents. In his opinion, Edmund of Langley's skeleton showed the signs of multiple wounds either from battle or from tournaments. John Evans, "Edmund of Langley and his Tomb," *Archaeologia* 96 (1885/86), p. 325.

42 Beltz, *Order of the Garter*, pp. 227–31.

also served under Sir John Chandos in 1375, and his position among the armigerous was such that he was invested with the Order of the Garter a year later.[43] Although Anthony Goodman suggests that Beauchamp's relationship with Gaunt ended abruptly in 1374,[44] Sir William's presence on the Portuguese campaign, combined with his solid support of Henry IV until his death in 1411, suggests that the bonds between Beauchamp and the House of Lancaster were strong to the end of Sir William's life.[45]

Sir Thomas Fychet and Sir Thomas Symond, who rounded out the English captains, were well known to the earl of Cambridge. Fychet had served in Edward, Lord Despenser's contingent between 1372 and 1374,[46] and been a part of Edmund of Langley's 1375 French expedition.[47] Symond had served with Sir Robert Knolles in France in 1370, and then in Edmund of Langley's contingent that went to France in 1372.[48]

Thierry "the Canon" Robessart was a Hainaulter who had come to England in the service of Queen Philippa. He fought on a number of campaigns with the English in the 1350s and 1360s, including the Nájera campaign, and was used as an ambassador by Richard II in the 1370s and 1380s.[49] Bermond Arnaud de Preissac, the Sultan of Trau, was a Gascon who had been with the Black Prince at Poitiers in 1356 and at Nájera in 1367. Throughout the Black Prince's tenure as Prince of Aquitaine Arnaud had been one of Prince Edward's closest friends and confidants.[50] Arnaud's military experience was substantial by 1381 and his standing within Richard II's inner circle was such that in 1380 he was appointed as a Knight of the Garter.[51]

The final portion of the expeditionary force was the Castilian-exile contingent totalling 470 men, or about 17% of the force. The captains of these companies ranged from important political figures with their own ambitions, such as John Andeyro and John Gutieriez, bishop of Dax, down to two Castilian knights in Gaunt's service, Ferdinand Rodreguez and John Alfonso.

43 Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 72; Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 302; Charles Ross, "The Yorkshire Baronage" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University, 1950), p. 246.

44 Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, p. 279.

45 He was made Lord Abergavenny in 1389 and remained close to the house of Lancaster after serving on many commissions and undertaking other duties in support of Henry IV. Douglas Biggs, "Then You Perceive the Body of Our Kingdom: The Royal Affinity of Henry IV, 1399–1413" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1996), p. 243.

46 TNA E 101/32/26, m. 3.

47 TNA E 101/34/5, m. 2.

48 For his service with Knolles, see TNA E 101/30/25, m. 1. For Symond's service with Langley, see TNA E 101/32/20, m.1.

49 Robessart served as an ambassador to the duke of Jülich in 1379, to the count of Flanders and Holland and duke of Brabant that same year, and to the count of Holland in 1387. *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II*, ed. Edouard Perroy, Camden Society, 3rd Series, vol. 48 (1933), #4, 5, 78.

50 H. J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–1357* (Manchester, 1958), p. 215.

51 Beltz, *Order of the Garter*, pp. 264–69.

Although Russell argued that such a heterogeneous force was bound to lead to difficulties of command and control in the field,[52] Edmund of Langley's army was not unlike other forces that were deployed in the Iberian Peninsula throughout the last half of the fourteenth century. The Black Prince's expedition in 1367 contained Gascon, Castilian, and English elements.[53] Henry of Trastamara's army of the same date contained French, Castilian, and Aragonese troops, and the forces led by Pedro "the Cruel" in 1368/69 contained Castilian, English, Genoese, and even Muslim forces from Grenada and North Africa.[54] Although the army that Edmund, earl of Cambridge led to Iberia in 1381 was a solid one full of veteran leadership, the political world that the earl and his army entered was a chaotic one.

Reaching Lisbon in early July put Edmund of Langley at the very epicentre of the Portuguese political world and Portuguese dynastic politics. The 1370s and 1380s were a very fluid time in Portuguese politics because of the influx of Castilian nobles,[55] and the arrival of the English army in July 1381 added another faction to the already chaotic Portuguese political community. Nevertheless, affairs seemed to begin well for the English cause in the first weeks after their arrival. It seems that Ferdinand I and Edmund of Langley were well disposed towards each other from the outset, and perhaps their shared love of hunting and hawking helped to form a bond between them.[56] The fact that Edmund knighted Ferdinand I on the eve of the "battle of Badajoz" in August 1382 also speaks to a strong and positive personal relationship between the two men.[57] The king saw to the Anglo-Gascon force's being well taken care of, and ordered the city of Lisbon to commit some of the taxation it owed the crown to buy wine for Edmund of Langley and his army.[58]

It can be demonstrated that the earl of Cambridge carried much weight with the king and within the Portuguese political community throughout most of his time in Iberia. Lopes claimed that Edmund took many Portuguese knights into his household,[59] and as the months passed the earl was called to counsel Ferdinand I on several occasions.[60] One of the best measures of Edmund of Langley's standing within the Portuguese political community may be evidenced by his intercession with the king following the arrest of both Sir Ferdinand Gomes and King

52 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 303.
53 Hewitt, *Black Prince's Expedition*, pp. 14–42.
54 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 147.
55 Gomes, *Court Society*, pp. 120–21.
56 Gomes notes that hunting was one of Ferdinand I's passions and he spent much money on the sport (Gomes, *Court Society*, p. 196), while Edmund of Langley's love of hunting and hawking comes from an often-quoted passage from John Hardyng, *The Chronicle of John Hardyng* (London, 1812), pp. 340–41.
57 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 139.
58 Henriques, "State Finance and War," p. 211. Froissart claimed that Thierry "the Canon" Robessart told Edmund of Langley in early 1382 that they had been "marvelously well taken care of . . . [but had] never received any money," Froissart, *Chronicle*, p. 688.
59 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 121.
60 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 123.

Ferdinand's half-brother, John, the master of the military order of Avis. Gomes, who accompanied the Canon Robessart on a raid into Castilian territory, greatly angered the king and Ferdinand placed him under arrest.[61] The falling out between the king and his half-brother, John, Master of Avis, over the war policy with Castile also angered Ferdinand to the point that John of Avis too was placed under arrest. Lopes claims that things would have gone ill for both Gomes and the Master of Avis, had not they appealed to Edmund of Langley, who intervened on their behalf.[62] Edmund travelled to the royal court at Santarem from his headquarters on the Castilian frontier near Villa Viscoa and used his influence with King Ferdinand to gain the release of both Gomes and John of Avis.[63]

Not only did Edmund successfully intercede for the master of Avis' life, but he clearly befriended John. After the master's release and his meeting with Earl Edmund, John of Avis not only reversed his anti-war stance but even joined the Canon Robessart with a significant force of Portuguese knights, men-at-arms, and archers for the canon's next raid into Castilian territory. The friendship between Edmund of Langley and John of Avis appears to have been strong and, following the death of Ferdinand I in 1383, the master of Avis wanted to quit Portugal and the political chaos there and travel to England to fight for Richard II because he had such good friends in England.[64] The only English friend of equal social status that John of Avis would have met before 1383 was Edmund, earl of Cambridge. It is also clear that the master of Avis was impressed with Edmund of Langley's military prowess. Lopes credits Edmund of Langley with bringing "modern" methods of warfare to Portugal, specifically battlefield deployment with forces divided into a van, a main body, and a reserve. In fact, the master of Avis was so impressed with Edmund's military deployment that as King John I of Portugal he copied the well-known English style of army deployment and used it to defeat the Castilians at Aljubarrota in 1385, which secured Portuguese independence.[65]

While the earl of Cambridge's influence in the Portuguese political world is not difficult to demonstrate at one level, it did have its limits and these helped to slow down and stifle military operations. One of the limits on the earl's influence was his erstwhile ally, John Andeyro. Russell thought that his elevation to be count of Ourem in December 1381 meant that he had abandoned the earl of Cambridge for his own ambitions at that time.[66] Andeyro had begun a notorious affair with

61 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 107. Froissart calls him Ferrand but the stories are so similar that it is most likely the same knight, pp. 687–88, 691.

62 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 107.

63 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 121.

64 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, pp. 166–69.

65 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 180. Indeed, the Portuguese deployment at Aljubarrota with archers on the wings and men-at-arms in the center behind concealed pits is reminiscent of classic English deployments from the Hundred Years War. João Gouveia Monteiro, "The Battle of Aljubarrota (1385): A Reassessment," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 7 (2009), 75–103.

66 Russell, "Andeiro at the Court of Lancaster," p. 30.

Queen Leonor de Teles, possibly in the spring of 1381. Many thought that their liaison produced a son, who was born on 19 July 1382, and Andeyro's standing in the royal court was such that he was named co-regent with Queen Leonor after Ferdinand's death.

A second limitation on Earl Edmund's influence on Portuguese affairs rests in the defection of the Castilian exile, John Gutierrez, bishop of Dax. Gutierrez had joined Gaunt's household after the duke's marriage in 1372 and rose high in his counsels. Following Ferdinand's change of allegiance to the Roman pontiff, Urban VI made Gutierrez bishop of Lisbon, in spite of the fact that the sitting bishop appointed by Clement V, Martin of Zamora, remained in place. Gutierrez too left Edmund's army and looked to his own interests rather than those of Edmund of Langley or John of Gaunt.

The loss of these two captains, and most likely also of the two Castilian knights (John Alfonso and Ferdinand Rodreguez), was of great significance to Langley's cause. It removed a total of 232 men-at-arms and 237 archers from Langley's force; a total of 469 men or 17% of Earl Edmund's total army.[67] Not only did their loss deplete the army's ranks, but it also removed two important captains with the most Iberian military and diplomatic experience from Langley's host, which only served to make things more difficult for the earl and his cause.

A third limitation of Edmund's influence on affairs centers on Edward of Norwich's marriage. In spite of what appears to have been a good relationship between the king and the earl, Ferdinand was slow when it came to alienating lands that he had promised to Edmund of Langley.[68] As an heiress, the Infanta Beatriz came with a healthy dowry that Ferdinand transferred to Earl Edmund only on 15 November 1381, well after the marriage in July,[69] and young Edward remained with the king and his wife rather than with Edmund on the frontier.[70] Thus, any move against royal wishes, such as personally leading an expedition into Castile before the king was ready, could have had dire consequences for Edmund of Langley and his eldest son.

The conduct of the campaign itself became bogged down for military and logistical as well as political reasons. Ferdinand Lopes claimed that a lack of mounts for Edmund of Langley's expeditionary force slowed movement to the frontier,[71] and while it is possible that the lack of horses slowed the campaign, it

67 It is difficult to know exactly how far down this defection to individual soldiers' own interests went. Russell claimed that most of the Castilian exiles either made their peace with John I of Castile or, like Ferdinand Alfonso de Zamora (who joined the retinue of Ferdinand I) or John Alsonso de Baezea, joined John of Aviz. Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 343 n. 1.

68 There seems little doubt that Edmund of Langley received a significant amount of wealth as part of Beatrice's dowry, but it is not known how much income he realized from these estates or how he spent the money.

69 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 319.

70 Froissart, *Chronicle*, p. 693.

71 Monteiro has demonstrated that Ferdinand's operatives were busy gathering horses for Edmund's army as late as December 1381. Monteiro, *Guerra em Portugal*, p. 156. Ayala, *Cronicas*, 2:75.

seems more logical to assume that a combination of events delayed Anglo-Portuguese moves toward the frontier. In late July, John of Castile had crossed the border with a significant force. He then besieged the Portuguese frontier fortress of Almedia, about 220 miles from Lisbon, which fell to him on 9 August. Ayala claimed that John I sent a message to Ferdinand and Edmund offering open battle at a place of their choosing,[72] but Lopes makes no mention of any such challenge on the part of the Castilian king. It is possible that King John halted due to ill health,[73] or a fear that John of Gaunt might be lurking in the Bordealais, but it is also possible that internal divisions within Castile kept King John from venturing too far into Portugal.[74] What can be said with some certainty, however, is that King John had some fear of his English opponent. In late August 1381, in letters to Peter III of Aragon, King John expressed open concern as to the military potential of the 2,000 men-at-arms under Edmund of Langley's command.[75] In wisdom or in great folly, the reputation of the English man-at-arms in Iberia after Nájera cast a long shadow.[76] Whatever the case, King John chose not to advance, for fear of getting himself embroiled in a campaign further southwest into Portugal.

A second factor that delayed a more vigorous prosecution of the war was Queen Leonor Teles and her family. In early 1382 the queen announced that she was pregnant.[77] Many in the Portuguese political community believed that the child was John Andeyro's and not the king's,[78] which threatened the current political and diplomatic reality of Iberia. If the queen were to deliver a son, whether it was Andeyro's or not, then both the decision of the Cortes of Torres Novas, which had betrothed Beatrice to John I's son, and the betrothal of Beatrice and Edward of Norwich via the Treaty of Estremoz would be rendered moot. Thus, all concerned had good reason to wait on the queen.[79] The queen's family was a concern because her brother, John Teles, had been captured at the battle of the Guadina on 17 June 1381, along with some 6,000 sailors and twenty galleys. The men were dragged off to prison in Seville. The fact that John Teles lay in John of Castile's hands weighed heavily on the queen's mind, and her

72 Ayala, *Cronicas*, 2:76.

73 Russell claimed that John fell ill with a liver complaint and was "in some danger of dying in the field." *English Intervention*, p. 315.

74 Monteiro, *Guerra em Portugal*, p. 524.

75 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 314.

76 L. J. Andrew Villalon, "Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera, 1367," in *Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald Kagay (Leiden, 2005), p. 36.

77 The child, a son, was born on 19 July 1382, and thus Queen Leonor would have conceived her son sometime in early or mid November 1381.

78 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 334.

79 Queen Leonor's son died after only four days. Some claim that the king ordered the child murdered, but whatever the case, political equilibrium was restored with the child's death. Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 334, n. 1; Lopes, *English in Portugal*, pp. 129–31.

brother's release was one of the most important provisions of the 1382 peace treaty after the "battle of Badajoz."[80]

While the main actors waited on the queen to deliver a child, ancillary events occurred that impacted on the campaign. In late December 1381 Langley moved his headquarters to Villa Viscosa, about thirty-five miles from the Castilian border. Ferdinand and the court remained at Santarem, one of the king's favourite residences, about 130 miles away from Langley in the Tagus valley.[81] The reasons for this divided deployment are unclear, but keeping the Portuguese army at Santarem did act as an effective block to John of Castile's moving down the Tagus valley from his position at Almedia, about 180 miles distant. Perhaps the king and Edmund of Langley hoped that by moving the Anglo-Gascon force to the frontier about 187 miles south of Almedia, they would draw John I and his Castilian army away from Almedia to the south.

Once Edmund's force reached the frontier they began to conduct raids. Froissart claimed that Ferdinand had forbidden any raiding of Castilian territory, and the king withheld the Anglo-Gascon soldiers' pay to express his royal displeasure with the English for disobeying him.[82] Plundering the local countryside and raiding were, of course, common practice for all armies in the Hundred Years War. The Black Prince allowed the plundering of the Anglo-Gascon frontier during the winter months of 1355–56,[83] and there is no doubt that the pain and suffering endured by the local populace at the hands of raiding enemies worked in bringing the enemy to battle again and again.[84] There is no doubt that Earl Edmund did not take part in any of these raids personally; like his elder brother in Gascony in 1355, such things were beneath him. But, just as importantly, if Ferdinand forbade such raiding, Cambridge needed deniability, and with his eldest son still at Ferdinand's court, the earl could use the excuse that he could not control his men, rather than frustrate the king and the anti-war faction at court.

While historians have seen these military excursions as raids in force,[85] these were more than mere raids. Upon reaching the Castilian frontier in late December 1381, Edmund of Langley moved into the monastery of St. Augustine in Villa Vicosa, about fourteen miles from the border and thirty-five miles from Badajoz, the nearest Castilian border town of any size. The remainder of the English force was billeted in Borba, Estremoz, Evora, and smaller towns nearby.[86] While Ferdinand ordered no action to be taken against Castilian territory,[87] both English

80 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 143. Gomes, *D. Fernando*, pp. 191–93.
81 Gomes, *Court Society*, p. 320.
82 Froissart, *Chronicle*, p. 678.
83 Hewitt, *Black Prince's Expedition*, pp. 89–90.
84 Clifford Rogers, "By Fire and Sword: *Bellum Hostile* and 'Civilians' in the Hundred Years War," in *Civilians in the Path of War*, ed. Mark Grimsley and Clifford Rogers (Lincoln, NE, 2008), p. 57.
85 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 320.
86 Lopez, *English in Portugal*, p. 83.
87 Froissart, *Chronicle*, p. 678.

and Portuguese captains had no trouble in disobeying his orders. The king's prohibition against military activity seems strange and is perhaps a measure of Ferdinand's inexperience with military affairs. Keeping men under arms for extended periods was a tricky affair in the latter half of the fourteenth century. The Black Prince had maintained a significant force in Bordeaux throughout the winter of 1355/56, but only with pay at numerous – if irregular – intervals.[88] But, even with this level of pay, the English forces began raiding across the French frontier in November 1355, and raiding continued throughout the winter.[89] Especially in times of general inactivity, soldiers fell to acting as Free Companies and went into business for themselves until a more promising campaign came along.[90] While Lopes claimed that the Portuguese peasantry caused a significant amount of casualties to the Anglo-Gascon soldiers who acted as Free Companies, such a claim is difficult to substantiate.[91] Lopes himself claims that the 2,500 English soldiers at Badajoz in August 1382 could have defeated the entire Castilian army by themselves,[92] and it was unusual for ill-armed and untrained peasants to fight trained soldiers. Peasants usually grabbed their valuable possessions and fled to a walled town or castle where they might find safety.[93]

Part of the reason why the Anglo-Gascon expeditionary force turned to raiding resulted from a lack of pay. Supposedly, Arnaud de Preissac, the Sultan of Trau, complained to Edmund of Langley in March 1382 that the men had received no pay for six months.[94] Another part of the reason for the Anglo-Gascons to ignore the king's command was voiced by Thierry "the Canon" Robessart, who came to Iberia to undertake feats of arms. He refused to sit idly by and in the early months of 1382 gathered a force of 400 men-at-arms and 800 archers, over 46% of the entire Anglo-Gascon force, and pillaged his way to the castle of Fighiere, about twenty miles away from his base. He stormed the castle and, though wounded, took the place under terms with all of its provisions and booty.[95] In April, the canon, apparently recovered from his earlier injuries, approached the earl of Cambridge, seeking permission to launch another raid. Edmund told Robessart that he needed to wait on orders from John of Gaunt and that he had come to Portugal "merely to reconnoitre the country."[96] But, the earl continued, he could not prevent Robessart and his colleagues from undertaking another expedition, although the king would be angry.

88 Hewitt, *Black Prince's Expedition*, pp. 83–85.
89 Hewitt, *Black Prince's Expedition*, pp. 81–84.
90 Rogers, "By Fire and Sword," pp. 58–59. Phillipe Contamine, "Les compagnies d'aventure en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans," *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome* 87 (1975), pp. 371–73.
91 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 151.
92 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 148.
93 Rogers, "Fire and Sword," p. 46.
94 Froissart, *Chronicle*, pp. 686–87.
95 Froissart, *Chronicle*, pp. 679–80.
96 Froissart, *Chronicle*, p. 686.

Accordingly, Robessart marched south from his base at Barrancos with 400 men-at-arms and 400 archers and scoured the country to the south, taking the castles of Ban and la Courtisse before storming the town of Jaffre, about forty miles from Seville. At Jaffre the canon sacked and pillaged a rich monastery and gathered significant amounts of booty.[97]

The last of the raids that we know of took place in the spring of 1382 and was the largest of the three. On this occasion Thierry Robessart, along the grand master, John of Aviz, led a large army from Arronches toward the town of Ouguela, about twenty miles distant. Lopes claims that John of Aviz brought 200 cavalry and 4,000 infantry and that the total force consisted of 800 cavalry, 500 archers and 6,000 foot soldiers; a total of 7,300 men.[98] This substantial force stormed the walls of Ouguela, ransacked the place, and took everything of value.

Historians have interpreted these raids as part of a rebellion against Edmund of Langley's weak leadership, resulting from the fact that Ferdinand I had no money to pay the English. But, not only did Ferdinand maintain a significant army in 1381–82, he also had more than enough money to pay the Anglo-Gascon force – which, it seems, he eventually did. There seems little doubt that Ferdinand assembled an army of some size in the autumn of 1381 in response to John I's invasion, and that some of that force moved with him from Lisbon to Santarem that December. There is no indication that the king's army was sent home until after the "battle of Badajoz" in August 1382 – a period of ten or eleven months. When the king and the army moved to Evora in mid 1382, Ferdinand ordered "war-machines, carts, bombards and other provisions to be prepared."[99] All of these items were expensive to build and/or maintain, as were troops under arms. Edmund of Langley's army of just under 3,000 men drew £7,000 for one-quarter of a year. As Gomes suggests, raising an army through feudal dues was a thing of the past by 1380, and troops were raised by indenture, which was an expensive affair.[100] Lopes' claim that Ferdinand had 6,000 men-at-arms alone at Badajoz in August 1382 seems difficult to accept. If all of these men had been under arms since December 1381 the cost to the Portuguese treasury for nine months' wages would have been roughly £81,000. Even if one accepts Ayala's figure of 3,000 men-at-arms and 3,000 archers at Badajoz,[101] the amount of money to keep this force for nine months comes in at over £50,000. No matter which figures one wishes to accept, the king was responsible for paying significant amounts of money out of the treasury to keep an army in the field.

Lopes claimed that Ferdinand called a Cortes to ask for money for the English and their mounts, which could have generated taxation for other military purposes.[102] But it is clear that no meeting of the Cortes took place between the

97 Froissart, *Chronicle*, pp. 686–88.
98 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, pp. 128–29.
99 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 83.
100 Gomes, *Court Society*, p. 224.
101 Ayala, *Cronicas,* 2:77.
102 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, pp. 68–69.

Cortes of Torras Novas in August 1380 and Ferdinand I's death in 1383.[103] In late 1381 the king's tax collectors imposed themselves into the collection of municipal taxes "without notice, let alone consent."[104] By March 1382 the king ordered a new subsidy, the *pedido* (Portuguese for "request") by royal command. When this tax was combined with the extension of the existing *sisa*, or sales tax, on wine sales and everything sold in Portugal in 1382, the king realized over 400,000 *libras* of income.[105] This was a significant amount of money, especially because Ferdinand had a habit of debasing his currency to put more money into circulation.[106] Thus, it seems that King Ferdinand had enough money to successfully prosecute a prolonged war and pay the English.

In the end several factors derailed the campaign and led Ferdinand to sue for peace. Judging from the provisions of the peace treaty it seems possible that Ferdinand I, who had precious little in the way of military success behind him, did not believe that his army, even supplemented by about 2,500 Anglo-Gascons, could defeat Castile on its own, especially considering that the majority of his galley fleet, some of his friends, and some of his wife's relatives, were in the hands of the Castilians. It was also clear that the great protagonist in all of this "Chemyn de Portyngale," John of Gaunt, was nowhere near to fulfilling his promise from 1380 to assemble an army in Bordeaux and sweep into Castile from the north. The court in London had received a number of letters over the preceding months from both Ferdinand and Edmund of Langley asking when Gaunt would arrive, and while the duke of Lancaster vainly tried to get a parliamentary subsidy to raise troops, none was forthcoming. Rather than assemble forces on his own, John of Gaunt vacillated, awaiting another, hopefully more pliant, Parliament to secure a subsidy. But it seems that patience in the Portuguese court had worn thin. Ferdinand sent his chancellor, Lawrence Fogaca, to London to meet with Gaunt, but it seems to have become abundantly clear to Fogaca that the titular king of Castile had no real plans to move forward or even to gather an army. The Portuguese chancellor left London on 5 July,[107] and probably arrived at Ferdinand's court by the end of the month with news of Gaunt's inactivity. Even though John of Gaunt, in letters to Peter III of Aragon on 26 August, stated that he would arrive in Castile from the Aquitaine with a powerful army by the spring of 1383,[108] the duke's moment had passed. In spite of the fact that Ferdinand had mobilized an army of some size and amassed a significant amount of cash to pay for it and (finally) the Anglo-Gascon contingent,

103 Antonio Castro Henriques, "State Finance, War and Redistribution in Portugal, 1249–1527" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of York, 2008), pp. 210–12.

104 Henriques, "State Finance," p. 210.

105 Antonio Castro Henriques, "The Rise of the Tax State in Portugal, 1371–1401," *e-Journal of Portuguese History* 12 (2014), p. 59.

106 Henriques, "State Finance," pp. 185–87, 198–99.

107 Edourad Perroy, *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II,* # 32, pp. 19–20.

108 Rymer, *Foedera*, 4:149.

to many in the Portuguese political community Gaunt's claims probably seemed like empty promises.[109] Thus, peace was the only viable option in the minds of both Ferdinand I and John I.[110]

The third part of this article will consider the issues of rebellion in the ranks of Edmund of Langley's army and its effect on the overall outcome of the campaign. Lopes claimed that discipline problems within the Anglo-Gascon force were an issue within weeks of their landing in Lisbon, and roving bands of English soldiers ransacked homes, belittled and/or threatened members of the local population, and took what they wished. Lopes further stated that on each occasion of violence Edmund punished the transgressors, but that these punishments were not a deterrent to further acts of violence.[111] While these events were no doubt disconcerting, what happened in Portugal in 1381 was not unlike many other post-1360 military expeditions, where discipline in the ranks, especially among the Free Companies, proved difficult to maintain. Even a commander traditionally seen as a strong leader by historians – Bertrand de Guesclin, "The Black Dog of Broceliande" – encountered no end of difficulty in controlling the Free Companies under his command during the Nájera campaign of 1367, and Robert Knolles faced similar difficulties with his men in Brittany in 1370. Even Henry of Bolingbroke could not control a small contingent of a bare 300 men when he went on crusade to Prussia in 1392.[112]

Froissart related that there was a threat of rebellion in Earl Edmund's army over the non-payment of wages, though Lopes made no mention of a munity of any kind. But historians, following Russell,[113] have claimed that a serious mutiny occurred in the Anglo-Gascon ranks in Portugal. Yet, there is little to substantiate these claims in the documentary evidence. Froissart's story is that a group of ring-leaders, frustrated with a lack of pay, who would not listen to the entreaties of either Sir William Beauchamp or Sir Matthew Gournay,[114] raised the standard of St. George and prepared to attack Portuguese towns on the frontier unless Ferdinand I paid them their back wages in full.[115] Froissart named the

109 While it may seem unusual for two belligerent powers to make peace so quickly, this was relatively common in the chaotic world of Iberian politics in the fourteenth century, see Don Kagay, "Shifting Alliances: The Unstable Bond Between Castile and Aragon in the late Fourteenth Century," in *The Emergence of Leon-Castile, c. 1065–1500*, ed. James Todesca (London, 2015), pp. 121–40.

110 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, pp. 147–51; Gomes, *D. Fernando*, pp. 312–14.

111 Lopes, *English in Portugal*, p. 77.

112 As Cliff Rogers suggests, the scale and duration of the campaigns in the Hundred Years War "grew beyond the ability of the fledgling royal states that waged [them] to control fully." Rogers "Fire and Sword," p. 63. Douglas Biggs, *Three Armies in Britain* (Leiden, 2006), pp. 10–11.

113 Russell clearly took what appear to be unrelated incidents and conflated them into "a rebellion," Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 331.

114 Two of John of Gaunt's trusted retainers as well as the marshal and constable of the army, respectively.

115 Froissart, *Chronicle*, pp. 688–89.

ring-leaders as Sir John Sounder, who claimed to be a natural son of the Black Prince, and William Helmon, along with the German knight, Sir Thomas Simon, and the Gascon, the Lord of Chateauneuf, supporting the cause of the "rioters." In the end, the Canon Robessart and Earl Edmund calmed the "rioters," and Edmund's subsequent visit to King Ferdinand produced his soldiers' pay in full. Whether or not the events in question transpired as Froissart related them, they are perhaps more interesting than significant. What may be said with some certainty is that none of the men Froissart identifies as ring-leaders can be found in any documentary evidence as being a member of an English military expedition from 1370 to 1400. This, coupled with the fact that Froissart variously identified the natural son of the Black Prince by the names John Fondree and John Soultier as well as John Sounder, and that he identified William Helmon as William Hemon and William Hermon, makes one wonder if they were not fictitious individuals.[116]

There are, however, entries on the Patent Rolls of quite real named individuals who supposedly "behaved so rebelliously that [Edmund of Langley] could not accomplish the object of the expedition." Letters patent ordering the arrest of the perpetrators were ordered on three separate occasions between 1381 and 1383.[117] The letters ordered the arrest of only seventeen men. As a group they were both few in number as well as remarkably undistinguished in terms of military experience and social status. In fact, they seem to have been difficult to find, considering that letters patent ordering their arrest were being sealed as late as 24 June 1384, eighteen months or more after they arrived home.[118] Judging from their surnames, the majority of these "rebels" came from Cornwall or Wales.

Only three men of this group can be found to have had any military experience prior to 1381, and none can be considered significant. Sir Henry Ilcombe, named as a mutineer with his two brothers Baldwin and William, had served in William Montague, earl of Salisbury's retinue on the failed La Rochelle expedition of 1372.[119] Stephen Cardon, an esquire from Haverford, had served as a member of a standing garrison in Wales in 1377,[120] and Thomas Northbury had received pay as a man-at-arms with Thomas of Woodstock, earl of Buckingham, both at sea and in Gascony in 1378.[121]

Of the seventeen men named only three received payment for their involvement on military campaigns after 1383. Stephen Cardon, esquire, served in the

116 Froissart, *Chronicle*, p. 689.

117 *CPR, 1381–85*, 24 November 1383, p. 256; 3 July 1384, pp. 348–49; 24 June 1384, p. 494. The seventeen named individuals were: Sir Henry Ilcombe, Richard Cressy, John Bolton, Stephan Cardon (esquire), John Farwey, John Dunmowe (archer), William Felton, John Fawy, William Ilcombe, Baldwin Ilcombe, Robert Neel (esquire), Richard Glyne, William Wyther, William Peutrie, John Lyile, Thomas Northbury, and John Lancelagon.

118 *CPR, 1381–1385*, p. 494.

119 TNA E 101/32/30 m. 6.

120 TNA E 101/34/29 m. 11.

121 TNA E 101/37/29 m. 1; E 101/42/13 m. 2.

garrison at Calais in 1386 and on the earl of Arundel's naval expedition the following year,[122] while Robert Neel served with Arundel at sea in 1387,[123] and John Dunmowe, an archer, along with Robert Neal served at sea with Arundel in 1388.[124]

These men's subsequent careers do not appear to have been harmed by their involvement in whatever mutinous activities they undertook in Portugal. Sir Henry Ilcombe was no stranger to illegal behaviour and petitioned the chancellor in 1385 because he was falsely accused of rape,[125] and he and his brothers sought and received a royal pardon at the request of Isabella of Castile, countess of Cambridge and Edmund of Langley's wife, for all crimes.[126] Yet, the same Henry Ilcombe rose to be coroner for Cornwall in 1394/95, and then escheator for the county from 1395 to 1399. He went on to serve as an MP for Cornwall in 1388 and 1395, and then for Lostwithiel in 1402 and 1407.[127]

It is impossible to discern exactly what "mutinous activities" these men undertook. Perhaps they were some of those who Lopes claimed broke into Lisbon houses in the autumn of 1381; they may have been scapegoats, but it is difficult to accept the claim that seventeen men of such remarkable insignificance could have organized and led a mutiny that derailed the entire campaign. Thus, it is difficult to substantiate that a major mutiny took place against Edmund of Langley in Portugal, and that the earl "sought to explain his failure by blaming everything on the mutinies."[128]

What in the end can we take from this brief survey? The political situation in Iberia was highly volatile in 1381/82, full of competing ambitions among kings, princes, nobles, clergy, gentry, and civic corporations alike. The treaty that John of Gaunt and Ferdinand I concluded in 1380 may have represented the duke of Lancaster's best chance to make good his claim to the Castilian throne, but it was flawed from the outset. Historians have interpreted a clause in John of Gaunt's will offering to pay for any of his brother's debts save for those incurred by Edmund in Portugal to mean that Gaunt never forgave Edmund of Langley for not succeeding where his elder brother thought he should.[129] But it may be that that clause in the will says more about Gaunt than about Langley. Perhaps it was easier for John of Gaunt to blame his brother for what had happened in Iberia than to face the fact that Andeyro, who was playing his own hand, had

122 TNA E 101/40/25 m. 1; E 101/40/33 m. 14.
123 TNA E 101/40/34 m. 21.
124 TNA E 101/41/5 m. 13d.
125 TNA SC 8/118/5858.
126 *CPR, 1381–1385*, p. 534. It is not known if the family sought pardon for activities surrounding crimes in England or for crimes against Edmund of Langley in Portugal, *The House of Commons*, ed. J. S. Roskell, Linda Clarke and Carole Rawcliffe, 4 vols. (Stroud, 1992), 3:472–74.
127 *House of Commons*, 3:472–74, see also http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386–1421/member/ilcombe-sir-henry [accessed 22 July 2015].
128 Russell, *English Intervention*, p. 343.
129 Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, p. 421.

duped the duke of Lancaster into believing in a Chimera – something that was not there.

Nevertheless, Edmund of Langley's fifteen months in Iberia were not the complete disaster that some have claimed. He navigated a very delicate political world fraught with deep divisions that produced some reasonable successes and left a military legacy that long outlasted the earl's time in Portugal. In the end, however, no amount of English pressure, graduated or otherwise, would move Ferdinand to suffer a longer and more expensive war, or John I of Castile to trust his crown to a decision on the battlefield.

What Edmund of Langley's campaign in Portugal lacked was John of Gaunt to come to his aid. The brothers' entire strategy depended on both of them being engaged and active. Unlike his younger brother, who committed a significant amount of his own wealth to the campaign, when push came to shove, John of Gaunt clearly refused to employ his own substantial resources to fund an expedition, and without Gaunt sweeping south like a wolf from the fold out of the Bordealais, there were few substantive things that Edmund of Langley could achieve on his own. Was Edmund of Langley's campaign therefore doomed from the outset? I do not want to seem a "Lancastrian determinist" here, but without John of Gaunt's presence in Iberia, Edmund of Langley was left to chase a Chimera, and one that was not even of his own making.