



Boydell Press

Chapter Title: Latin Response to the Turks: The Naval Leagues

Book Title: Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291-1352

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Published by: Boydell & Brewer; Boydell Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt17mvjq5.10>

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Latin Response to the Turks: The Naval Leagues

Twenty to thirty armed galleys should be sent to inflict damage on the Sultan and his lands and people, as well as on the ships and vessels of the Turks who are the most evil persecutors of the Christian faith [...] And truly, unless this fleet and protection are sent ahead, they do not see how the *passagium* can succeed, because the iniquity and audacity of the Turks increases daily.

Doge Giovanni Soranzo of Venice, letter to King Philip VI of France advising him on a crusade to the Holy Land, 11 May 1332.¹

During the crusades to the Holy Land of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, western (primarily Italian) naval power had repeatedly triumphed against Muslim fleets in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. Within a few decades most of the important ports on the Syrian coast had been seized by the Franks – largely thanks to the support of the Italian republics – and much of the significant Muslim naval presence in the region had been quashed. However, over the course of the thirteenth century the Latin grasp of the Levantine seaboard began to weaken significantly, culminating with the loss of Acre to the Mamluks in 1291. Although the Italians still remained the most active merchants in the eastern Mediterranean after this point, they had lost a major foothold on the Syrian coast. Within three decades after the fall of Acre, the presence of the Italian merchant colonies in the East – integral to western naval dominance in the region – was further compromised by a new Muslim foe, the Turks of the Anatolian maritime beyliks, who by then threatened Romania and the few remaining Latin possessions in the eastern Mediterranean.² As was noted in the previous chapter, the depredations of the Turks against the Latins of Romania were primarily carried out by sea, usually consisting of raids on the Aegean islands and the Greek mainland, the seizing of goods and, where possible, the enslavement of the Christian population. Over the course of the fourteenth century, a new strategy in crusading warfare would evolve to combat the Turkish

¹ *DVL*, vol. I, doc. 110.

² For a background of naval warfare and the role of the maritime republics during the crusades, see E. Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare: 1000–1500* (London, 2002), pp. 35–42 and also Carr, 'Between Byzantium, Egypt and the Holy Land', pp. 75–87.

menace: the naval league. This was an allied Christian fleet of galleys, usually formed by the local Latin powers with the help of the papacy, for which the participants were sometimes awarded crusader privileges. As can be seen from the advice of Doge Giovanni Soranzo above, the naval league was a strategy which reflected the realities of warfare in the Aegean, where the fragmented political situation led to a departure from grandiose plans to recover the Holy Land and more closely reflected the concerns of the local Latin protagonists.

Crusading after the Fall of Acre

The collapse of Byzantine power in Asia Minor and the rise of the Turks in the Aegean, although known in the West, was not the chief concern of the crusading powers at the end of the thirteenth century. Instead their minds were focussed on the recovery of the Holy Land, brought into sharp focus after the fall of Acre on 18 May 1291, which ended almost two hundred years of Latin settlement in the Levant. Not surprisingly, the news of the collapse of the city re-awakened crusading fervour in western Christendom and ushered in a period of heightened enthusiasm for the recovery of Jerusalem. This resulted in the formation of various military strategies and proposals which would profoundly influence crusade thinking throughout the fourteenth century.³ One of the most significant developments in crusade planning after 1291 was the growth of interest in the use of economic apparatus to facilitate the recovery of the Holy Land, as propagated by a number of the crusade theorists in their *De recuperatione terrae sanctae* treatises – memoranda written between 1291 and 1336 suggesting ways in which the Holy Land might be recovered.⁴ These writers commonly advocated a strict economic blockade of Mamluk Egypt, similar to the papal trade embargo that had been in place in one form or another since at least the Third Lateran Council of 1179. The embargo prohibited trade in war materials, such as iron, timber and weapons, as well as slaves, and was punishable by excommunication.⁵ The theorists believed that this blockade could be easily enforced by the superior naval forces of the crusading powers, and would

³ Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 264–5; Housley, *Later Crusades*, p. 22.

⁴ The most detailed assessment of the crusade theorists is given by Leopold, *How To Recover the Holy Land*. See also *Projets de croisade (v. 1290 – v. 1330)*, ed. J. Paviot (Paris, 2008); Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 47–154; J. Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle*, 2 vols (Paris, 1886), vol. 1, pp. 13–27; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 74–111; and the introduction to William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 1–11.

⁵ For a background to the embargo, see Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, *passim*; Christ, *Trading Conflicts*, pp. 113–19.

starve the Mamluks of war provisions and pave the way for the easy liberation of the Holy Land.

Of the theorists, the Franciscan friar Fidenzio of Padua was amongst the first to adopt this strategy. He wrote that the Mamluks were especially vulnerable to a trade embargo as their strength depended on the import of war materials and other goods from the West, as well as the tariffs levied on Christian merchants, and slaves to sustain their army. According to Fidenzio, a fleet of no less than thirty galleys would be needed to cut off Egypt in preparation for a general crusade.⁶ This idea of economic warfare was henceforth adopted by other theorists writing immediately after the fall of Acre, including Charles II of Anjou and Ramon Lull, as well as those of the fourteenth century, such as William of Adam and Marino Sanudo.⁷

In August 1291, in an effort to gain the cooperation of the maritime republics – essential for the effective enforcement of the trade embargo – Pope Nicholas IV urged Genoa and Venice to make peace with one another in order to prevent any trade with Egypt. This was followed by the proclamation of a total ban on all trade with Muslims, which would form the backbone of papal decrees for the rest of the Avignon period.⁸ A handful of small-scale expeditions were planned and launched to the East after this point on the pretext of implementing the strategies of the theorists by restricting trade with the Mamluks. For example, Nicholas IV ordered that a fleet of twenty galleys, funded by the Templars and the Hospitallers, should be raised to protect Cyprus and Cilician Armenia against an Egyptian attack and to prevent merchants from illegally trading with the infidel. In 1292, the Genoese captain Manuel Zaccaria was placed in charge of this fleet which, according to a report made by him, was to be used to protect Cyprus and enforce the blockade on Egypt. A short time later, Zaccaria's flotilla raided the ports of Candelore (Alanya) on the south-eastern coast of Asia Minor and Alexandria in Egypt.⁹ This was followed in 1304 when Frederick III of Sicily, who had previously refused to spearhead a crusade

⁶ For Fidenzio of Padua see *Projets de croisade*, ed. Paviot, pp. 53–169; Leopold, *How To Recover the Holy Land*, pp. 116–23; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 91–102.

⁷ For more on these see Leopold, *How To Recover the Holy Land*, pp. 8–51, 119–35; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 91–111.

⁸ On Nicholas IV, see Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 120–22, and see pp. 122–45 for the embargo after this point. See also Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 17–71; G. Ortalli, 'Venice and papal bans on trade with the Levant: The role of the jurist', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 10 (1995), 242–58; A. Cocci, 'Le projet de blocus naval des côtes égyptiennes dans le *Liber secretorum fidelium Crusis* (1321c) de Marino Sanudo il Vecchio (1279c–1343)', in *La Méditerranée médiévale: Perceptions et représentations*, ed. H. Akkari (Paris, 2002), pp. 171–88.

⁹ J. Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte (fin XIIIe-début XIVe siècle)', *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (1984), pp. 120–34, at p. 123; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 77–8. The report of Manuel Zaccaria is in ASVat, RA 54, fols

to Constantinople, asked for and received papal permission to send ten ships under the command of his half-brother Sancho of Aragon to capture Byzantine islands in the Aegean which he claimed were to be used as a base for enforcing the embargo.¹⁰

Origins of a Naval League

The earliest Latin naval operations in the Aegean, like the naval leagues which followed, tended to be undertaken by a coalition of resident Christian states. This was because none of the local Latin rulers in the Aegean were powerful enough to dominate the region alone and, as many of them shared common enemies such as the Greeks or Turks, it made practical sense for them to ally with one another. This was especially the case for the new arrivals in the Aegean – the Hospitallers on Rhodes and the Genoese on Chios – both of whom ruled islands inhabited by native Greeks which lay within eyesight of the Turkish coast. Their hold on these domains must have felt particularly fragile in these early years and the simple matter of self-preservation which led them to ally with one another goes some way to explain the genesis of a united Latin fleet in the Aegean.

One of the earliest coalitions to be struck up was that between the Knights Hospitallers and the Genoese, which would form the basic strategy for the defence of the eastern Aegean islands in the early 1300s. This began in May 1306 when the Hospitaller Master Fulk of Villaret made an agreement with the Genoese corsair Vignolo de Vignoli and his companions Baldo Spinola and Michael della Volta for an initial attack on Rhodes.¹¹ The details surrounding the conquest remain obscure but by 1306 the Knights, with the help of these Genoese captains, had managed to secure a foothold on the island.¹² At this stage it is unlikely that Pope Clement V knew of Fulk's intention to seize Rhodes, especially as no mention of the island had been made in previous Hospitaller correspondence with the papacy over a planned crusade.¹³ Nevertheless, in September 1307, the pope granted

467v–468; it was copied into an appendix of the registers of Benedict XII. A summary is in Benedict XII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 2, doc. 8378.

¹⁰ Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 138, 145, 147.

¹¹ The text of the original Hospitaller agreement of 1306 is in J. Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre: 1100–1310* (Paris, 1904), pp. 274–276.

¹² For details of the initial expedition, see Luttrell, 'The Genoese at Rhodes', pp. 745–9; Idem, *Town of Rhodes*, pp. 75–8; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 10–11.

¹³ Such as in a treatise written by Fulk of Villaret for Clement V: *Projets de croisade*, ed. Paviot, pp. 189–98, 221–33; B.Z. Kedar and S. Schein, 'Un projet de "passage particuliere" proposé par l'ordre de l'Hôpital, 1306–7', *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 137.2 (1979), 211–26, at 211–20. See also A.T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers and the papacy, 1305–1314', in *Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst-, und Landesgeschichte: Peter Herde zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed

Rhodes *in perpetuum* to the Order.¹⁴ The Hospitallers clearly valued Genoese assistance, partly because they provided ships and were more familiar with Rhodian waters, but also because both considered the Venetians as their mutual rivals in the region. The corsairs, in return for their assistance, requested and received certain privileges from the Hospital. For Vignolo, these included the retention of a *casale* on Rhodes and the grant of another *casale* on the island, as well as one third of the revenue and produce from the surrounding islands.¹⁵ After this point, the Knights entered into further negotiations with other citizens of Genoa, agreeing a formal pact with certain shipbuilders in the city in 1308–9 for the construction of some of the vessels for a planned *passagium* to be led by Fulk of Villaret; an important and lucrative contract which included the construction of twelve galleys and one *navis magna*.¹⁶ This Hospitaller fleet departed for the East in 1310, and although the ostensible aim was to defend the kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia, it was instead used to consolidate the conquest of Rhodes, probably without the prior knowledge or consent of the pope.¹⁷

Once the Hospitallers were established on the island they formed commercial links with the Turks from the coastal regions of nearby Menteshe, from where they shipped animals and provisions to Rhodes.¹⁸ However, their relationship with Genoese merchants operating in the area soon began to deteriorate as the Knights began to seize Genoese vessels which had transgressed

K. Borchardt and E. Bunz, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 595–622, at pp. 599–601 (repr. in Idem, *Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2007), item V); J.S.C. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c.1050–1310* (London, 1967), pp. 220–2; C. Georgiou, 'Propagating the Hospitallers' *passagium*: Crusade preaching and liturgy in 1308–9', in *Islands and Military Orders, c.1291–c.1798*, ed. S. Phillips and E. Buttigieg (Farnham, 2013), pp. 53–63, esp. pp. 61–2.

¹⁴ See S. Schein, 'Philip IV and the crusade: a reconsideration', in *Crusade and Settlement: Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and Presented to R.C. Smail*, ed. P.W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 121–6, at pp. 123–4; A.T. Luttrell, 'The island of Rhodes and the Hospitallers of Catalunya in the fourteenth century', in *Els Catalans a la Mediterrània Oriental a l'Edat Mitjana*, ed. M.T. Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 2003), pp. 155–65, at pp. 155–7 (repr. in Idem, *Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2007), XVIII); Luttrell, *Town of Rhodes*, pp. 171–2.

¹⁵ Luttrell, 'Feudal tenure and Latin colonization at Rhodes', pp. 756–7.

¹⁶ *Cartulaire général des hospitaliers*, ed. Delaville le Roulx, vol. 4, nos. 4830, 4840–1; Luttrell, 'The Genoese at Rhodes', pp. 752–3. See also Thiriet, *Assemblées*, vol. 1, doc. 192.

¹⁷ Much ambiguity surrounds the latter stages of the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes, a full discussion is given by Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks', p. 83, n. 10; Idem, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Prospectives, problems, possibilities', in *Die geistlichen Ritterorden Europas*, ed. J. Fleckenstein and M. Hellmann (Thorbecke, 1980), pp. 243–66, at p. 250 (repr. in Idem, *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291–1440*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 1982), I); Idem, *Town of Rhodes*, pp. 75–8, 171–4; Idem, 'Hospitallers and the papacy', p. 603; Menache, *Clement V*, pp. 105–6.

¹⁸ Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 7, doc. 7631; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 11.

the papal embargo on trade with Muslims; an action which also indirectly resulted in the earliest conflicts with the neighbouring Turkish beyliks. The first instance of this came in 1312 when a Genoese corsair named Antonio Spinola paid Masud, the emir of Monteshe, 50,000 gold florins to attack Rhodes and seize Hospitaller operatives in his ports. However, this ploy failed spectacularly when the Knights defeated Masud's forces off Amorgos and later seized a number of castles in the coastal regions of his lands.¹⁹

After Monteshe was initially beaten back, the bulk of Turkish maritime aggression towards the Latins in the Aegean shifted to the neighbouring beylik of Aydin to the north. In response to this, the Hospitallers made another pact with Genoese merchants in the Aegean, this time with the lords of Chios, Martino and Benedetto II Zaccaria, whose family had come into control of the island during the first decade of the century.²⁰ The Zaccaria were a natural target of the emirs of Aydin for two main reasons. First, Chios lay closest to the two principal ports of the beylik, Ephesos and Smyrna, making it both a threat and a convenient target. Secondly, the Zaccaria controlled the towns of Old and New Phokaia, situated on the Anatolian coast on the northern border of Aydin and with them the highly valuable alum mines nearby.²¹ The Genoese presence at Phokaia was therefore a thorn in the side of the emirs of Aydin, but also a potentially valuable acquisition if it was conquered. Little is known of the exact terms of the agreement between the Hospitallers and the Zaccaria, except for a fleeting reference to a treaty made before 1319 'for a united fleet to be equipped against the Turks'.²² This agreement evidently allowed the two sides to benefit from shared intelligence and enabled a network of communication to be established between Chios and Rhodes, a system that was put to good use when their combined forces crushed a fleet from Aydin in the encounter off Chios in the summer of 1319. In terms of the evolution of a naval league in the Aegean this encounter was especially significant. As was noted in the previous chapter, the reports of it were widely disseminated in the West, which brought it to the attention of both Pope John XXII, who was later to

¹⁹ Finke, *Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, vol. 2, pp. 298–302, doc. 146; *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. Mas Latrie, vol. 1, p. 391; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 12; Luttrell, 'The Genoese at Rhodes', pp. 758–9; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks', p. 85; Luttrell, 'Feudal tenure and Latin colonization at Rhodes', 757; Luttrell, 'Notes on Foulques de Villaret', pp. 82–7.

²⁰ Probably sometime between 1305 and 1307, see Carr, 'Trade or crusade?', pp. 118–19, n. 18.

²¹ In c.1310 the Phokaia passed to the stewardship of the Cattaneo della Volta family, although they still owed fealty to the Zaccaria on Chios: Mazarakis, 'A martinello of Manuele and Paleologo Zaccaria', 116–17.

²² Document in J. Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 1310–1421* (Paris, 1913; repr. London, 1974), p. 365, doc. 2. See also M. Carr, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their alliances against the Turks', in *Islands and Military Orders, c.1291–c.1798*, ed. S. Phillips and E. Buttigieg (Farnham, 2013), pp. 167–76, at pp. 168–9.

give his backing to the first naval league, and to the crusade theorists, many of whom already advocated the idea of a united fleet of Christian galleys to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and enforce the trade embargo.²³ Gradually this concept of a fleet to be used for the economic blockade began to be merged with a naval league against the Turks, as one united Christian fleet began to be regarded as sufficient for achieving both objectives.²⁴

This idea was articulated by one of the main promoters of a naval league and of the economic blockade, Marino Sanudo, who wrote in a marginal note inserted into his crusade treatise, the 'Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis', in c.1322/3, that a fleet of galleys should be assembled to make the Aegean 'more secure from Turkish raids and the inroads of other Saracens, and [...] from the Catalan Company and other evil doers'. This flotilla was to be made up of one vessel each from Martino Zaccaria, Guglielmo Sanudo of Naxos, the titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople and the archbishop of Crete, as well as two from the Hospitallers, and four from the king of Cyprus.²⁵ This proposition reflected the situation in the Aegean Sea, where the Venetians were defending their possessions from the Turks and Catalans in the western regions and the Hospitallers and the Zaccaria were doing likewise along the eastern coast. At the time of writing this marginal note Sanudo was at the courts of Avignon and Paris advising the pope and French king on the best ways of launching a crusade to aid Cilician Armenia and to liberate the Holy Land. It was probably during this time that he first began to make tentative efforts to combine a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean with Franco-papal proposals to aid Cilician Armenia, probably airing his idea of a common anti-Turkish union.²⁶ A few years later, in March 1325, Sanudo's plan was adopted by the *Serenissima* which discussed the possibility of forming a *societas* against the Turks, presumably

²³ See, for example, the letters from the Hospitallers to the pope in Gatto, 'Martino Zaccaria', 337–9, doc. 1; Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, pp. 365–7, doc. 2 (summaries in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 2, docs 8374, 10269), and the references to the Zaccaria in William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 53–5, 65–7, 81; 'Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum', pp. 457–8. The dissemination of the reports of this battle and other encounters are discussed fully in Chapter 2, pp. 47–9.

²⁴ See Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum', pp. 22–33; Lock trans., pp. 49–67; William of Adam, *How To Defeat the Saracens*, pp. 49–53; Leopold, *How To Recover the Holy Land*, pp. 119–35; Cocci, 'Le projet de blocus naval des côtes égyptiennes', pp. 171–88.

²⁵ Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum', pp. 30–1 (marginal note); Lock trans., pp. 62–3 (who misses out the Hospitaller galleys). The dating of this note is uncertain, but most probably 1322/3, see Jacoby, 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie', 247, n. 181; Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', 823, n. 6; cf. A. Magnocavallo, *Marino Sanudo il Vecchio e il suo progetto di Crociata* (Bergamo, 1901), p. 85; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 378. The titular patriarch of Constantinople was Nicholas, the archbishop of Thebes (1308–31), who could presumably raise money from his see for the galley.

²⁶ For example, Sanudo suggested that reinforcements for the Cilician *passagia* should be made available from Rhodes and Romania, see Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 63–4.

for the protection of its possessions from the combined attacks of the Turks and Catalans.²⁷ From this point onwards these assaults became increasingly threatening and by April 1327 the situation had become so severe that Negroponte was on the brink of falling to the Catalans.²⁸ Probably because of the intensification of the war in Greece, the *Serenissima* began to act upon its decision to form an alliance against the Turks made two years earlier, dispatching letters in July 1327 to the duke of Crete and the bailies of Negroponte and Constantinople, instructing them to discuss with the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II, Martino Zaccaria, the master of the Hospitallers and others about the possibility of forming 'a *societas* against the Turks for the defence of our lands'.²⁹ Unfortunately the text of the discussion has been lost, but it is known that in December of that year, ten galleys were dispatched from Venice for the protection of the Adriatic and Romania, which may have been connected to this union against the Turks.³⁰ Likewise, ambassadors were sent to and from Venice and Constantinople, but the sources are silent as to their specific mission.³¹ Still, it is clear that the plans of the Venetian authorities for the defence of their territories in the 1320s centred on combining forces with the allied eastern Aegean powers and the Byzantines to form a pan-Aegean naval league.

The Naval League of 1333–1334

By the early 1330s the plans for a naval league began to progress more quickly and in 1331 the Venetian Senate ordered the bailies of Negroponte and the duke of Crete to unite in opposition to the Turks.³² In the following July the doge urged the lords of Crete and Negroponte to form a union with the Hospitallers, Niccolò Sanudo the Duke of Naxos and Bartolommeo II Ghisi the Lord of Tenos and Mykonos, and also dispatched envoys to Constantinople to discuss the possibility of Byzantine involvement in a coalition.³³ Martino Zaccaria, who had previously featured in a potential

²⁷ *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, p. 296, doc. 175; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 379–80; idem, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 313–14; Jacoby, 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie', 248; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 15; Idem, 'The Catalans of Athens', 830.

²⁸ See Marino Sanudo, 'Epistolae', ed. Bongars, letters 3, 5, 16, 20; Cerlini, 'Nuovo lettere di Marino Sanudo', letters 2, 5; Roddy trans., letters 7, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26; Thiriet, *Assemblées*, vol. 1, docs 457–9; Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', 831–3.

²⁹ *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, p. 341–2, docs 194, 202.

³⁰ *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, p. 348, doc. 270.

³¹ *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, pp. 349, 51, docs. 284, 315; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, p. 314; Idem, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 381.

³² *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, pp. 434, 437, 444, 453, docs 264, 302, 36, 159, 159.

³³ Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 108–9, doc. 5; *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 2, pp. 46–7, doc. 158; Loenertz, *Les Ghisi*, pp. 157, 215–16.

league, was however absent: he had lost Chios to the Byzantines in 1329 and was imprisoned in Constantinople, although he was to feature again in a naval league after his release in 1337.³⁴ Shortly after communications had been sent to the potential participants, the baillie of Negroponte, Petro Zeno, and the captain of the Adriatic Gulf, Petro de Canale, were given full powers to create a union with all interested parties.³⁵ Provisions were then shipped to the East for the Venetian galleys, and the Greek emperor gave his assent to the alliance, informing the doge that Petro de Canale would act as his representative in the forthcoming discussions. On 6 September, Canale, now a representative of both Venice and Byzantium, met with the Master of the Hospitallers, Hélión of Villeneuve, and a number of Venetian plenipotentiaries at Rhodes to finalize the arrangements for the league. The record of the meeting reported that the envoys had entered mutually and harmoniously into a 'union, confederation, league and alliance' for the 'exaltation and praise of the divine name' and the confusion of the Turks. It was decided that twenty armed galleys would be furnished for a period of five years; of these the Greek emperor would provide ten, Venice six and the Hospitallers four. This fleet was to gather in the harbour of Negroponte by 15 April 1333, then it would be ready to proceed against the naval and land forces of the 'Agarenes and Turks'.³⁶ In addition, Canale and Villeneuve agreed that the captain-general of the fleet should be a Venetian.³⁷

However, the date of the mobilization of the fleet at Negroponte came

³⁴ See Carr, 'Trade or crusade?', p. 132.

³⁵ DVL, vol. 1, docs 113–14, 116; Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 22; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 384–6; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 91–2. In early 1332, the Senate also ordered emissaries to be sent to Naples in order to recruit King Robert for the alliance, although he never committed to a league: N. Housley, 'Angevin Naples and the defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the naval league of 1334', *Byzantion* 51 (1981), 548–56 (repr. in Idem, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2001), XIII); D. Abulafia, 'Venice and the kingdom of Naples in the last years of Robert the Wise: 1332–43', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 48 (1980), 186–204, at 189–90. Also the Catalans stated that they were willing to assist Venice against the Turks, but the Republic, probably suspicious of their motives, rejected the offer: Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens', 834–5.

³⁶ DVL, vol. 1, doc. 116–17. This agreement has been studied in detail by many scholars. For a recent comprehensive narrative of events, see Ivanov, '*Sancta Unio*', 153–5. See also, Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, pp. 87–8; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 91–2; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 180–1; Loenertz, *Les Ghisi*, pp. 157–8; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 24–5; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 25–6. For Byzantine, Hospitaller and Catalan perspectives, see Setton, *The Catalan Domination of Athens*, pp. 36; D.J. Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades: 1261–1354', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K.M. Setton, 6 vols (Madison, 1969–1989), vol. 3, pp. 27–68, at pp. 50–1; Nicol, *Last Centuries of Byzantium*, pp. 177–9; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello', 386.

³⁷ DVL, i. doc. 117, p. 229.

and went with no sign of action. One factor for this delay was the outbreak of a revolt on Crete in the summer of 1333, which prevented the armament of two galleys of the league and diverted Venetian resources in the region.³⁸ In the meantime, the members of the coalition discussed the idea of allying with some of the beyliks against Aydin, before the Venetian Senate decided that the galleys for the league should be made ready for the following May (1334).³⁹ At this point, the *Serenissima* made efforts to extend the league to other interested parties, including Philip VI of France and Hugh IV of Cyprus.⁴⁰ Crucially, during the negotiations of the second half of 1333 and early 1334, Pope John XXII, who had not yet fully committed himself to the Venetian league, for reasons which are discussed in Chapter 5, also agreed to lend his support. In the following months the kings of France and Cyprus followed suit.⁴¹ In early 1334, the participants agreed that the fleet would consist of a total of forty galleys: ten to be provided by Venice, ten from the Hospitallers, six from the Byzantines, six from Cyprus and eight from the papacy and France together. This fleet was to assemble at Negroponte in May and serve for five months.⁴²

In the winter of 1333–4, whilst the Franco-papal flotilla was under construction in France, the Venetian galleys already in the Aegean engaged the united Turkish forces of Umur of Aydin and Suleiman, the emir of Sarukhan, near the Morea, as well as those of a Slavonic pirate named Zassi who was possibly in league with the Turks. Around this time the

³⁸ For the rebellion, see F. Thiriet, 'Sui dissidi sorti tra il Comune di Venezia e i suoi feudatari di Creta nel Trecento', *Archivio Storico Italiano* 114 (1956), 699–712, at 702–5; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 26–7.

³⁹ Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 37–9; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 28–9.

⁴⁰ John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 5276; Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 37; Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades*, p. 157; Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, p. 98.

⁴¹ *AE*, vol. 24, pp. 511–16, ch. 13–19; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, docs 5247, 5324; John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 12, doc. 60781, 60898–900; *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 122, 124; Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 136–41, docs 20, 27. This is discussed in detail by S.M. Theotokes, 'E prôte summachia tôn kuriarchôn kratôn tou aigaiou chata tês kathodou tôn tourkôn archomenou tou 14 aïonos', *Epeteris Etaireias Byzantinon Spoudon* 7 (1930), 283–98, at 287–8; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 93–6; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 181–2; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 30–1; Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, p. 98.

⁴² 'Die Protokollbücher der päpstlichen Kammerkleriker: 1329–1347', ed. H. Schröder, *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 27 (1937), 121–286, at 256–62; *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 126–7; John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 5485; Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 139–41, 44–7, docs 27, 36, 41. Some scholars, including Ivanov, have claimed that Robert of Naples also contributed galleys to the league. However, the silence of any contemporary sources attesting to the presence of Neapolitan galleys in the Aegean makes this highly unlikely. See Ivanov, 'Sancta Unio', 167, n. 131, and a more thorough discussion by Housley, 'Angevin Naples and the defence of the Latin east', 555.

Venetians may have also launched an assault on the harbour of Smyrna itself.⁴³ In the summer of 1334 the Franco-papal force joined with the fleet of the Venetians, Hospitallers and Cypriots in the Aegean, bringing the league, with the exception of the Byzantine galleys, up to full strength.⁴⁴ Thereafter, the fleet attacked the emirates of Aydin, Karasi and Sarukhan along the north-eastern coast of Asia Minor. In the autumn of 1334 a major battle took place near the Gulf of Adramyttion, opposite Lesbos, and on the land nearby, where a fleet belonging to Yakhshi, the emir of Karasi, was defeated. Marino Sanudo described several encounters during this time in a letter to Hugh of Cyprus. Unfortunately the letter is badly damaged and is undated, obscuring the events it describes. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Sanudo claimed that the crusaders destroyed a number of Turkish vessels on the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin (8 September), and again on the 11th, 14th and 17th of September, during which the son-in-law of Yakhshi was killed.⁴⁵ The battle was important enough to attract the attention of several western chroniclers, including Giovanni Villani in Florence and the French continuator of William of Nangis at St Denis.⁴⁶

When compared with other crusade projects of the early fourteenth century, the league accomplished a great deal in a relatively short period of time. The numbers of sources which report the battle at Adramyttion suggest that it was undoubtedly an important Christian victory and in the months that the fleet patrolled the Aegean, the Latins enjoyed a level of

⁴³ The exact chronology of these events is obscure. See the discussions in Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 29–30, and Ivanov, ‘*Sancta Unio*’, 166, n. 123.

⁴⁴ Andronikos III never contributed galleys to the naval league, although according to Nikephoros Gregoras he did furnish a number of galleys in 1335, but by this time the league had disbanded: Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 1, bk. 9, ch. 5, pp. 523–5; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 37–8; cf. H. Inalcik, ‘The rise of the Turkish maritime principalities in Anatolia’, 192.

⁴⁵ Kunstmann, ‘Studien über Marino Sanudo’, 811–12 (letter 7); Roddy trans., p. 296 (letter 35). In another letter written by Sanudo in Venice on 22 October (presumably before news of the battle had reached him), Sanudo mentioned that 200 Turkish vessels were at Adramyttion: de la Roncière and Dorez, ‘Lettres inédites et mémoires de Marino Sanudo l’ancien’, 35–6 (letter 3); Roddy trans., 301–2 (letter 37).

⁴⁶ Giovanni Villani, *Nuova cronica*, vol. 3, bk. 12, ch. 18, p. 58; William of Nangis and Continuator, *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 à 1300, avec les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 à 1368*, ed. H. Géraud, 2 vols (Paris, 1843), vol. 2, p. 145; Ludovico Bonconte Monaldesco, ‘Fragmenta Annalium Romanorum’, *RIS* 12 (Milan, 1728), cols. 527–42, at col. 537; *AE*, vol. 25, p. 5, ch. 11. The exact chronology of the battle remains obscure. See the different opinions given by Theotokes, ‘E prôte summachia’, 283–98; Lemerle, *L’émirat d’Aydin*, pp. 97–100; Laiou, ‘Marino Sanudo Torsello’, 387; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 29–33; Ivanov, ‘*Sancta Unio*’, 170–2; V. Laurent, ‘Action de grâces pour la victoire navale remportée sur les Turcs à Atramyttion au cours de l’automne 1334’, *Eis Mnemen K.I. Amantou* (Athens, 1960), pp. 25–41.

security not yet experienced in the fourteenth century.⁴⁷ This was primarily because the league took advantage of the maritime supremacy which the Latins enjoyed at the time and it built upon an established tradition of minor maritime alliances which had been in place since the early 1300s. The Hospitallers and the Zaccaria had demonstrated that when their resources and intelligence were pooled together they were capable of resisting even the greatest of attacks from the beyliks. When the two other major Latin players in the East – Venice and Cyprus – also consolidated their forces in alliance, the combined Latin forces were strong enough to go on the offensive against the Turks. Interestingly, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, it is the participation of the papacy and the French in the 1333–4 naval league that has attracted the most attention from scholars even though their contributions were belated and of less consequence to the overall achievements of the league than those of the Venetians, Hospitallers and Cypriots, whose galleys were already successfully patrolling the Aegean.

The Naval Leagues of the Smyrna Campaign (1343–1352)

No naval league materialized during the pontificate of Benedict XII, the reasons for which are discussed in Chapter 5, but his successor, Clement VI, oversaw the formation of two naval leagues, the first in 1343, which formed the preliminary wave of the Crusade of Smyrna, and the second in 1350. The first operation was officially proclaimed as a crusade by Clement VI in the summer of 1343, although negotiations between the Hospitallers, Cypriots and Venetians had been ongoing since 1341. In total it was decided that twenty galleys were to be fitted out for this league: six from Venice, six from the Hospitallers, four from the papacy, and four from Cyprus, a number slightly lower than the league of 1333–4 and with the absence of the French. The fleet was to gather at Negroponte on the Feast of All Saints (1 November) 1343.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ This view is shared by Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, p. 98, and Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades', p. 51.

⁴⁸ ASVat, RV 157, fols 1v–3, ep. 19, 23–4, RV 62 fols 48, 49v–50 (8 Aug 1343); Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 341; summaries in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 332, 336, 337. The campaign has also been the focus of many other studies, see in particular Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 103–12; N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières, 1327–1405, et la croisade au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1896), pp. 33–62; Gay, *Le Pape Clément VI*, pp. 32–80; Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 293–318; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 180–203; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 195–223; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 41–62; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 33–6; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 59–62; D. Wood, *Clement VI: The Pontificate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 184–91; Demurger, 'Le pape Clément VI et l'Orient', pp. 207–14; Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378*, pp. 102–9.




Figure 4. Engraving depicting the harbour fortress and acropolis of Smyrna.

Once the captains of the galleys were appointed and other logistical considerations taken care of, the fleet assembled in the Aegean in the winter of 1343–4. In the following spring naval operations were undertaken against the Turks, which initially achieved a similar level of success to those in 1333–4. In one encounter in May, the crusader galleys won a notable victory against the Turks at Longos, a harbour on Pallena (the western promontory of the Chalkidike peninsula), where they ambushed and burned a fleet of some sixty vessels and captured a close relative of a Turkish emir.⁴⁹ In October this was followed by an even more impressive feat when the crusaders launched a surprise attack on Smyrna, where they managed to capture the harbour and harbour fortress of the city from Umur Pasha, but not the acropolis overlooking the city which remained in his hands (see Fig. 4).⁵⁰ Thereafter,

⁴⁹ See John Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum Libri IV*, vol. 2, bk. 3, ch. 69, pp. 422–3; Guglielmo Cortusi, *Chronica de novitatibus Padue et Lombardie*, p. 109; John of Winterthur, *Chronica*, ed. C. Brun, *MGHSS*, n.s. 3 (Berlin, 1955), p. 250; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 187–8; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 190–2; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 49; Leonhard, *Genua und die päpstliche Kurie in Avignon*, p. 173. It is probably this encounter which led Clement VI to send three letters, in July and August 1344, congratulating the crusaders on their progress overseas: Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 987–8, 1027.

⁵⁰ For the assault on Smyrna, see Enveri, *Le destân d'Umûr Pacha*, pp. 111–13 (verses 1913–68); Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 2, bk. 13, ch. 4, p. 689; John Kantakouzenos,

it is likely that some of the combatants on the galleys remained to garrison the fortress at Smyrna, but the league, presumably now somewhat depleted in strength, still managed to repel an assault from the Turks led by a high-ranking naval officer, Mustafa, who was captured.⁵¹

These initial successes, however, proved to be short-lived, as on 17 January 1345 the crusade leaders, including the papal legate Henry of Asti, and the captains of the papal and Venetian galleys, Martino Zaccaria and Petro Zeno, were killed outside the walls of the city.⁵² The Venetians and the Hospitallers diverted reinforcements to Smyrna in the spring, but soon after the Aydin-oglus began launching new raids in the Aegean from their other ports, especially Ephesos.⁵³ In the wake of this setback and the ensuing stalemate, Clement VI looked to the West for a suitable commander to lead a relief army to Smyrna and revive the fortunes of the failing crusade. The most enthusiastic and possibly only response to Clement's call came from Humbert II, the young and wealthy Dauphin of Viennois. He took the cross and was officially named as captain-general of the Christian army in May 1345. After marching through northern Italy, where chronicles report many people taking the cross, Humbert, accompanied by an army of around one hundred knights and eight hundred footsoldiers, sailed from Venice for the Aegean, reaching Negroponte in December 1345, where he joined up with six galleys from the league; the four papal galleys and one each from the Hospitaller and Venetian contingents.⁵⁴ When in the Aegean, Humbert made several unsuccessful attempts to recruit allies to bolster his force before he was attacked by a Genoese fleet commanded by Simone Vignoso who went on to capture the island of Chios, which Humbert had been considering as a potential base for the crusaders.⁵⁵ After this setback, the dauphin sailed to Smyrna, arriving in July 1346. Despite Humbert's arrival, however, after this point the unity of the league began to crumble as the Venetians sought peace with the Turks and the Hospitallers sided with the Genoese, even preventing Venetian ships from entering the port at Smyrna.⁵⁶ This infighting, plus the outbreak of disease amongst the crusader camp, forced Humbert to withdraw to Rhodes, whence he soon

Historiarum Libri IV, vol. 2, bk. 3, ch. 68, pp. 419–20; and the various letters reporting the victory in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 1350–I, 1395, 1397, 1462, 1464; *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 150.

⁵¹ Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, p. 78; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 50.

⁵² This is also discussed in Chapter 4, p. 91.

⁵³ *Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum (1340–1350)*, ed. P. Ratti-Vidulich (Venice, 1976), docs 34–5, 49–50, 53–4; Thiriet, *Assemblées*, vol. 1, doc. 513; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 51.

⁵⁴ See Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 239–41; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 146–8; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 197–202.

⁵⁵ Leonhard, *Genua und die päpstliche Kurie in Avignon*, pp. 176–9.

⁵⁶ See A.T. Luttrell, 'Crete and Rhodes: 1340–1360', in *Acts of the International Congress of*

after departed for western Europe.⁵⁷ Fortunately for the crusaders, by 1347 the Hospitallers and the Venetians had managed to settle their differences and in the following spring the galleys of the league, combined with Hospitaller reinforcements, won a notable victory against the Turks of Aydin and Sarukhan off the island of Imbros.⁵⁸ In the spring of 1348 the Latins were given another boost when Umur was killed at Smyrna, apparently shot by an arrow when assaulting the walls of the harbour fortress.⁵⁹

However, the progress of the crusaders was quickly put on hold by the arrival of the Black Death. The great pandemic had been contracted by the Genoese during the siege of Caffa by the Mongols of the Golden Horde in 1346, after which it was carried to Constantinople the following May and then to the western coast of Asia Minor and the European side of the Straits in autumn.⁶⁰ By 1348 it had spread to most parts of Anatolia and the Aegean, where it reportedly killed more than in any other area.⁶¹ The disease also reached Italy and southern France, where it is estimated that up to half the population of Avignon died during a seven-month period.⁶² The Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani, who is one of the most reliable informants on both western European and Aegean affairs, leaves a vivid testimony of the progress of the plague from the eastern Mediterranean:

Having grown in strength and vigour in Turkey and Greece and having spread thence over the whole Levant and Mesopotamia and Syria and Chaldea and Cyprus and Rhodes and all the islands of the Greek archipelago, the said pestilence leaped to Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica and Elba, and from there

Cretan Studies II (Athens, 1974), pp. 167–75, at pp. 170–3; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 52–3. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, pp. 129–32.

⁵⁷ For Humbert's crusade at Smyrna see Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 245–6; J.-P. Valbonnais, *Histoire du Dauphiné et des princes qui ont porté le nom de dauphins*, 2 vols (Geneva, 1721–2), vol. 1, pp. 334–44; M.C. Faure, 'Le dauphin Humbert II à Venise et en Orient (1345–1347)', *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 27 (1907), 509–562; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 195–223.

⁵⁸ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, docs 3336–7; *Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum*, docs 164–5; Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, p. 108; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 53–4; cf. J. Sarnowsky, 'Die Johanniter und Smyrna 1344–1402 (Teil 2: Quellen)', *Römische Quartalschrift* 87 (1992), 47–98, at 50, doc. 3.

⁵⁹ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 2, bk. 16, ch. 7, pp. 834–5; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 227–9.

⁶⁰ O.J. Benedictow, *The Black Death, 1346–1353: The Complete History* (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 57–74; M.W. Dols, *The Black Death in the Middle East* (Princeton, 1977), 52–5; S. Barry and N. Gualde, 'La Peste noire dans l'Occident chrétien et musulman, 1347–1353', *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 25.2 (2008), 461–98.

⁶¹ See the account of Giovanni Villani, *Nuova cronica*, vol. 3, bk. 13, ch. 84, p. 486.

⁶² G. Mollat, *The Popes at Avignon: 1305–1378*, trans. J. Love (London, 1963), p. 40; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 187.

soon reached all the shores of the mainland [...] And many lands and cities were made desolate. And the plague lasted till –.⁶³

Here Villani deliberately left a blank space after the word 'till' to be filled in once the disease had been lifted from Florence – a task that was never fulfilled: Villani too fell victim to the Black Death before completing his work.

Considering the virulence of this pandemic, it comes as no surprise to learn that crusading operations were severely hampered by this outbreak. To add to this, Romania was suffering a severe shortage of grain caused by the closure of the Black Sea markets, discussed fully in Chapter 6. The crusaders were thus forced to seek a truce with Aydin, the negotiations for which dragged on for some years.⁶⁴ By the time the leaders of the league met at Avignon in 1350 to discuss its future, the Turks had begun launching new raids into the Aegean, which led to the renewal of the league and not the agreement of a truce. This new league was officially confirmed in August 1350, when it was decided that a small flotilla of eight galleys was to be assembled in the Aegean; three each provided by Venice and the Hospitallers, and two more from Cyprus. However, only a few weeks later war broke out between Venice and Genoa, thus ending any hopes of a Venetian contribution to this league. Due to the Venetian-Genoese war, the lack of funds and the ravages of the Black Death, less than a year after it was re-formed, this second naval league was officially dissolved by Clement VI in the summer of 1351.⁶⁵ A year later the pope, who had done so much to facilitate the formation of two naval leagues, died.

⁶³ Giovanni Villani, *Nuova cronica*, vol. 3, bk. 13, ch. 84, p. 487; F. Schevill, *A History of Florence: From the Founding of the City through the Renaissance* (New York, 1936), pp. 238–40; Benedictow, *Black Death*, p. 69.

⁶⁴ The economic crisis in the Black Sea is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, pp. 127–9.

⁶⁵ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 3, docs 4661, 5051–4, 5056; Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 2193; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 219–23; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 56–60.