

## The Parliament of the Crown of Aragon as Military Financier in the War of the Two Pedros<sup>1</sup>

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One of the most memorable speeches in American presidential history was that delivered on December 8, 1941, when Franklin D. Roosevelt demanded a declaration of war against Japan before a joint session of Congress. What the president demanded from the legislature was not only a formal recognition of the war's existence, but an open-ended though unstated pledge of assistance – especially of the financial sort – until the conflict came to a military or diplomatic conclusion.<sup>2</sup> Though remarkable in the governmental history of the United States, such calls for money to fight wars were quite normal in the British “mother of parliaments” and in other medieval assemblies. To review how one set of later medieval parliamentary institutions came to the aid of its embattled king, this paper will explore the repeated efforts of the estate assemblies of Aragon and Valencia (*Cortes*) and Catalonia (*Corts*) in support of the crafty statesman, Pere III [Pedro IV] (r. 1336–87), during the largest conflict between the polities of Christian Spain, the later-named War of the Two Pedros (1356–66).

Like all parliamentary assemblies of the medieval world, those of the Crown of Aragon sprang from the royal court, that ill-defined collection of noble and ecclesiastical advisers along with the king's relatives and body servants.<sup>3</sup> When the count of Barcelona or the king of Aragon or Valencia needed either “advice” (*consilium*) or “aid” (*auxilium*) – this usually meant soldiers or the money to pay for them<sup>4</sup> – he

<sup>1</sup> I extend my hearty thanks for the suggestions and information provided by the anonymous readers for this article, which have assuredly improved it.

<sup>2</sup> “‘A Date Which Will Live in Infamy,’ FDR Asks for Declaration of War,” *historymatters*. [gmu.edu/d/5166](http://gmu.edu/d/5166) [accessed January 18, 2014].

<sup>3</sup> Luis Felipe Arregui Lucea, “La curia y las Cortes en Aragón,” *Argensola* 4 (1953), 1–36, esp. pp. 4–7; Thomas N. Bisson, “The Problem of Feudal Monarchy, Catalonia, and France,” in *Medieval France and her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History* (London, 1989), study 12, pp. 237–55, esp. pp. 240–41, 245–46; J. C. Holt, “The Prehistory of Parliament,” in *The English Parliament in the Middle Ages*, ed. R. G. Davies and J. H. Denton (Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 1–28, esp. pp. 4–6.

<sup>4</sup> For the average size of military forces of the Crown of Aragon and Castile-León in the mid fourteenth century, see Nicolás Agrait, “Monarchy and Military Practice During the Reign of Alfonso XI of Castile (1312–50),” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 2003), 62–71; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “La organización militar en Cataluña en la Edad Media,” *Revista de Historia Militar* 45 (2001), 119–222, esp. 175–76; Jorge Saiz Serrano, “Guerra y nobleza en

summoned his churchmen, nobles, and townsmen to meet in an expanded session of his court. This “full,” “distinguished,” “praiseworthy,” “solemn,” or “general court” was called into existence by the king and after it had acceded to the king’s wishes, it was adjourned and ceased to be, having existed only as an “occasion, an occurrence, and not yet a separate court.”<sup>5</sup> Despite this shadow life, the national assemblies of eastern Spain became important adjuncts to the long periods of war against Islam practiced by the great reconquest warrior, Jaume I (Jaime I) (r. 1214–76).<sup>6</sup> By the end of his life, such meetings functioned in all of his peninsular territories of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, and by 1287 they had all gained legal recognition of their existence.<sup>7</sup>

Besides their legislative and judicial functions, the fiscal role of the Crown of Aragon’s assemblies was surely the most significant to a king immersed in the complexities of war. After he had run through funds provided by military taxes such as the *redemptio exercitus* and *defectus servitii*, which allowed payment in lieu of military service, “arbitrary exactions” (*questiae*), “tithes” (*decimae*) granted from local ecclesiastical revenues, and loans from local and foreign moneylenders, he had no option but to turn to his national assemblies.<sup>8</sup> The first fonts of money

la Corona de Aragón. La caballería en los ejércitos del rey (siglos XIV–XV),” (Ph.D. diss., Universidad de Valencia, 2003), pp. 114–24.

- 5 Donald J. Kagay, “The Emergence of ‘Parliament’ in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon: A View from the Gallery,” in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O’Callaghan*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and Theresa M. Vann (Leiden, 1998), pp. 222–41, esp. pp. 223–24; Antonio Marongiu, *Medieval Parliaments: A Comparative Study*, trans. S. J. Woolf (London, 1968), p. 51; A. R. Myers, *Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789* (New York, 1975), pp. 64–65; Evelyn S. Procter “The Development of the Catalan Courts in the Thirteenth Century,” *Estudis Universitaris Catalans* 22 (1936), 581–607; H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, *Parliaments and Great Councils in Medieval England* (London, 1961), p. 9.
- 6 Donald J. Kagay, “The Development of the *Cortes* in the Crown of Aragon, 1064–1327,” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1981), pp. 93–114; Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Les Corts de Catalunya i la creació de la Diputació del General o Generalitat en el marc de la guerra amb Castella (1359–1369),” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* [hereafter AEM] 34/2 (2004), pp. 875–938. The rulers of the Crown of Aragon bear both Catalan and Aragonese names and their regnal numbers may also be different. To be consistent, I will list both Catalan and Aragonese names and numbers in the first instance and utilize the Catalan version thereafter.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 97–99, 111–12, 128–29, 132–35, 139–41, 169, 189, 201–6; Procter, “Development,” pp. 20–21.
- 8 Robert I. Burns, S.J., “The Crusade against Murcia: Provisioning the Armies of James the Conqueror, 1264–1267,” in *Jews, Muslims, and Christians in and Around the Crown of Aragon: Essays in Honour of Professor Elena Lourie*, ed. Harvey J. Hames (Leiden, 2004), pp. 35–63, esp. p. 62; Luis J. Fortún Perez de Ciriza, “Relaciones financieras entre Sancho el Fuerte de Navarra y los monarcas de la Corona de Aragón,” in *Jaime I y su época [X Congreso de la Historia de la Corona de Aragón]* (Zaragoza, 1976), Comunicaciones 3, 4 and 5, pp. 171–82; Donald J. Kagay, “Army Mobilization, Royal Administration, and the Realm in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon,” in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Robert I. Burns*, ed. P. E. Chevedden, D. J. Kagay, P. G. Padilla, and L. Simon, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1995–96), pp. 2:95–115, esp. pp. 102–4; Joseph F. O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia, 2003), p. 154.

that the royal warrior could tap in a parliamentary setting were traditional imposts (the *bovatge* in Catalonia and the *monedatge* in Aragon and Valencia) which the members of the national assembly granted in exchange for the king's promise to avoid devaluation of the coinage for a specific time limit.<sup>9</sup> When these funds were not available or had run out, the king was faced with the grueling prospect of requesting a subsidy from the members of his assemblies. If the conflict endured for year after year, the sovereign had no choice but to make concessions that would alter his relationship to these bodies. With the decade-long border conflict Pere fought with Pedro I of Castile (r. 1350–66/69) (thus “the Two Pedros”), the royal dependence on the parliament in order to keep troops in the field caused just such primal changes to the Crown of Aragon's constitution.

While the conflict between Aragon and Castile lasted a full ten years, its origins stretched back for over a century to a simmering rivalry between Jaume I and his son-in-law, Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252–84) that erupted into full-scale war when Jaume II (Jaime II) of Aragon (r. 1292–1327) overran Castile's southern region, Murcia.<sup>10</sup> When these barely suppressed bad feelings erupted in the late summer of 1356 as the result of a Catalan privateer's attacking two merchantmen allied to Castile in sight of Pedro I himself,<sup>11</sup> Pere found himself in charge of long lines of lightly defended frontier.<sup>12</sup> After a fall replete with raid and counter-raid, the Aragonese king faced the new year with the same problems and little money to deal with them. He thus entered into a period of five years during which he attempted to survive from one military grant to another, despite the frustration and political loss of face this might cause him.<sup>13</sup>

- 9 Thomas N. Bisson, *Conservation of Coinage: Monetary Exploitation and its Restraint in France, Catalonia, and Aragon, c. 1000–1225 AD* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 90–95; Josiah Cox Russell, “The Medieval *Monedatge* of Aragon and Valencia,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106, no. 6 (1962), 483–504, esp. p. 484; Ferran Soldevila, “A preposít del servei del bovatge,” *AEM* 1 (1954), 753–87.
- 10 Robert I. Burns, S. J., “Warrior Neighbors: Alfonso el Sabio and Crusader Valencia: An Archival Case Study in his International Relations,” *Viator* 21 (1990), 146–202; Josep-David Garrido i Valls, *La conquesta del su València i Múrcia per Jaume II* (Barcelona, 20002); Josep-David Garrido i Valls, *Jaume I i el regne de Múrcia* (Barcelona, 1997).
- 11 Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Causes i antecedents de la guerra dels dos Peres,” *Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura* 63 (1987), 445–508; Maria Rosa Muñoz Pomer, “Preliminares de la Guerra de los Dos Pedros en el Reino de Valencia (1356),” *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante* [hereafter *AUA*] 1 (1982), 117–34, esp. p. 121.
- 12 For Pere's developing defensive policy against Castile, see Donald J. Kagay, “Defending the Western and Southern Frontiers in the War of the Two Pedros: An Experiment in Nation-Building,” *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 23 (2002), 77–107, esp. pp. 81–82; Donald J. Kagay, “The War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366): Aragon's Successful Administrative Strategy of Asymmetrical Defense,” *Imago Temporis. Medium Aevum* 6 (2012), 191–222.
- 13 For works on various phases of the War of the Two Pedros, see Alfonso Antolí Fernández, “La conquista de Jumilla por el Infante Don Fernando,” *Murgetana* 23 (1993), 55–73; Manuel Becerra Hormiga, “La Corona de Aragón de los Dos Pedros. El Corso,” in *Relaciones exteriores del Reino de Granada* “IV Coloquio de Historia Medieval Andaluza,” ed. Cristina Segura Graiño (Almería, 1988), pp. 307–21; José Vicente Cabezuolo Pliego, *La Guerra de los Dos Pedros en las tierras Alicantinas* (Alicante, 1991); Julia Campón Gonzalvo, “Consecuencias de

Since Aragon and Valencia contained all the borderlands threatened by Castile, the majority of Pere's assemblies until 1362 took place in those realms.<sup>14</sup> In the late spring of 1357, when Pedro I was launching a number of offenses across the Aragonese border, Pere summoned a national assembly of Aragon's four estates – the clergy, nobles, knights, and townsmen – to Cariñena to the southwest of Zaragoza for July 30, 1357. Describing in his opening speech the dire conditions on the war front, the king was assured by his people that they would help him as “true and faithful vassals are bound to for their natural lord.”<sup>15</sup> After a week of consultation, they made good on their declaration of allegiance by pledging they would approve a general subsidy that would pay for 700 frontier knights for the next two years. This promise was clearly not free, however, but was larded with conditions. The parliamentarians and not the king would collect the grant, set the daily salary level for heavily armored and lightly armored horsemen, and immediately stop this flow of funds if peace was declared with Castile. They would also choose the captains for service on the Aragonese frontier and warned them to maintain control over their troops or suffer the same legal fate that “robbers” would.<sup>16</sup>

Temporarily stopping the bleeding on the western frontier, Pere turned to another exposed borderland, that of Valencia. Coming before the principal churchmen, aristocrats, and townsmen at the principal cathedral (*Seu*) of the southern capital on December 30, 1357, he begged them for money because of the “war unjustly waged by the Castilian king.” Though “listening solemnly” to his request, the members of the assembly would not be able to turn to the pressing matter of a war subsidy for over a week because of the procedural *minutiae* that had to be attended to.<sup>17</sup> The appeal to the southern kingdom that Pere would

la Guerra de los Dos Pedros en el Condado de Denia,” *AUA*, 8 (1990–91), 57–68; Mario Lafuente Gómez, “Aproximación a las condiciones de vida en Aroca y su entorno durante la Guerra de los Dos Pedros (1356–1366),” *Studium. Revista de humanidades*, 15 (2005), 53–87; Mario Lafuente Gómez, *Un reino en armas: La guerra de los Dos Pedros en Aragón (1356–1366)* (Zaragoza, 2014); Antonio Ramón Pont, “El Infante Don Fernandom Señor de Orihuela en la Guerra de los Dos Pedros (1356–1366),” *AUA*, 2 (1983), 63–92.

<sup>14</sup> For the general history of the Aragonese *Cortes* and the Valencian *Corts*, see Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, “Los Cortes de Aragón en la Edad Media,” in *Los Cortes de Castilla y León en la Edad Media*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1987), 2:492–539; and Sylvia Romeu Alfaro, “Los Cortes de Valencia de la Edad Media,” in *Cortes de Castilla*, 2:540–74.

<sup>15</sup> *Cartas de reino de Aragón 1357–1451. Extractos y fragmentos de procesos desaparecidos* [hereafter *CRA*], ed. Angel Sesma Muñoz and Esteban Sarasa Sánchez (Valencia, 1976), 20. For parliamentary proceedings of Pere III in Aragon, see *Acta Curiarum regni Aragonum*, vol. 2, *Cortes de Pedro IV/1*, eds. José Ángel Sesma Muñoz y Mario Lafuente Gómez and vol. 3, *Cortes de Pedro IV/2*, ed. Carlos Laliena Corbera, 4 vols. to date (Zaragoza, 2008–13).

<sup>16</sup> Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter *ACA*], Cancillería real, Registro [hereafter *R.*] 557, ff. 8–10v; *CRA*, 24–33; Sylvia Romeu Alfaro, “Aportación documental a las Cortes de Valencia,” *Anuario del historia de derecho epsilon* [hereafter *AHDE*] 43 (1973), 385–428, esp. pp. 398–404.

<sup>17</sup> Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter *ACA*], Cancillería real, R. 557, ff. 1–2v; Romeu Alfaro, “Aportación,” pp. 388–90, 392. See also José Rius Serra, “Cortes de Valencia de

make was clearly connected to a call for solidarity with the Aragonese. On February 22, 1357, months before the Valencian *Corts* opened, Pere wrote to Valencia, Jativa, and the “other royal villages of the kingdom of Valencia” to ask for their financial help to pay for 500 or 600 horsemen and up to 2,000 infantry soldiers for up to three months. The king claimed “we have not spared ourselves personally from hard work,” and, like any good ruler, he had “safe-guarded ... the good government of ... [his] realms and lands” while he was struggling to win a “just and licit war” which he hoped God would bring to a “swift and good end.” The Valencian townsmen were thus called on to emulate their counterparts in Aragon who had suffered great losses in the war but had still persevered by “their labors and hosts.”<sup>18</sup> When Pere finally reconvened the *Cortes* on January 8, 1358, he was infuriated to discover that the estates could not agree on how a subsidy for Valencia should be funded. When he demanded from them a “good and useful response,” the estates began to discuss seriously where the money would come from to support up to 500 border troops for the next two years.<sup>19</sup> For the next several weeks, Pere waited with mounting frustration as the estates appointed two sets of “negotiators” (*tractadores*) who asked for a copy of the Cariñena grant to guide their own deliberations. With this model to go by, they finally came up with a plan for financing the frontier garrisons for the next two years and pledged that the funds would begin flowing some six months later.<sup>20</sup>

As he entered the third year of war with his “principal enemy,” Pere turned for help to his territory that had been least touched by the conflict, Catalonia. Because of the war Pedro “was waging and carrying out unjustly,” Pere now had to have Catalan “help and aid.” They were to be ready to give this openly and “without bringing up any excuse,” especially since the Castilian king was busy occupying large swaths of Aragonese borderland, including the important town, Tarazona. When the Aragonese king stood before the Catalan *Corts* at Barcelona on August 25, 1358, he was shocked by the absence of so many of his barons who had expressed no interest in “foreign wars” (that is, those fought outside of Catalonia) and were much more concerned in protecting themselves from the court clique headed by the royal favorite Bernat de Cabrera and his son and namesake, the count of Osona.<sup>21</sup> Only after two months of frustrating delay

1358 (20 de Febrero),” *AHDE* 17 (1946), 663–82; Silvia Romeu Alfaro, “Catálogo de Cortes valencianas hasta 1410,” *AHDE* 40 (1970), 581–607, esp. p. 593; Vicent Lluís Samó Santonja, *Les Corts valencienes, 1240–1645* (Valencia, 1997), p. 157.

18 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 152v–53.

19 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 557, ff. 3v–6; Romeu Alfaro, “Aportación,” pp. 392–95; Simó Santonja, *Corts*, p. 162.

20 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 557, ff. 13v–25v; Romeu Alfaro, “Aportación,” pp. 406–27; Simó Santonja, *Corts*, p. 162. For the 1358 subsidy, see María Rosa Muñoz Pomer, “La oferta de las Cortes de Valencia de 1358,” *Saitabi: revista de la Facultat de Geografia i Història*, 36 (1986), pp. 155–66.

21 *Colección de las cortes de los antiguos de Aragón y de Valencia y del principado de Cataluña* [hereafter *CAVC*]. ed. Fidel Fita and Bienvenido Oliver, 27 vols. (Madrid, 1896–1922), vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 505–21; Ramon d’Abadal i de Vinyals, *Pere el Cerimoniós i*

spent in maddeningly torpid parliamentary procedure and in frustrating talks with his recalcitrant barons was Pere able to divert the attention of the *Corts* to the pressing matter of the “evil undertakings of the Castilian king.”<sup>22</sup> With the election of eighteen negotiators on October 18, Pere had finally maneuvered the assembly into abandoning any further “shame and damage” through delay and entering into the funding phase of the meeting. Within a day, the Barcelona assembly agreed to a military subsidy that would be raised by a “hearth tax” (*fogatge*), an impost on every “household” (*foch*) in Catalonia, including the lands of Pere’s half-brother, Prince Ferran, which formerly had been exempt from such taxation.<sup>23</sup>

After his long stay in Barcelona, Pere spent Christmas in Lerida near the Aragonese border, but was forced to cut short his vacation because of Castilian troop movements. He hurriedly transferred the court to Zaragoza, which he entered on January 3, 1359, and ordered the *Cortes* to meet on January 22 in the Aragonese capital. On that day he came before the estates, warning them that he “could not sustain the war without [their] help.”<sup>24</sup> To prop up the defense of the Aragonese borderlands, he demanded funds to pay for a hybrid force of 1,320 knights and 1,000 infantry for one month. As in earlier Catalan and Valencian meetings, the Aragonese estates took a much greater role in the collection and dispersal of war funds than the king intended, with the appointment of “deputies” (*deputados*) who had “full power” (*pleno poder*) to carry out their duties which would remain in effect for the length of the grant and thus last beyond the term of the *Cortes*. This effectively gave them powers and responsibilities normally reserved for royal officials. The parliamentary deputies thus fully supervised the collection of the war taxes, oversaw the recruitment of the required 2,320 troops, and periodically delivered their pay.<sup>25</sup>

*els inicis de la decadència política de Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1972), pp. 84–85, 88–89; Donald J. Kagay, “The ‘Treasons’ of Bernat de Cabrera: Government, Law and the Individual in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon,” in *War, Government, and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2007), study VIII, pp. 39–54, esp. p. 41; J. B. Sitges, *La muerte de D. Bernardo de Cabrera* (Madrid, 1911), p. 5. For fiscal sessions of the Catalan *Corts*, see Manuel Sánchez Martínez, y Pere Orti Gost, *Corts, Parlaments i Fiscalitat a Catalunya: els capítols del donatiu (1288–1384)* (Barcelona, 1997).

<sup>22</sup> *CAVC*, I, pt. 2:534–36, 561–64.

<sup>23</sup> *CAVC*, I, pt. 2:623–99, 719–29; José Luis Martín, “Las Cortes catalanes en la guerra castellano-aragonesa,” in *La Corona de Aragón en el siglo XIV [VIII CHCA]*, 2 vols. (Valencia, 1969–70), 2:79–90, esp. pp. 81–82. For *fogatge*, see J. M. Pons Guri, “Un fogatjament desconegut de l’any 1358,” *Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona* 30 (1963–64), 322–498, esp. pp. 334–36. For Tarazona campaign, see Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, “La conquista de Tarazona en la Guerra de los Dos Pedros (Año 1357),” *Cuadernos de historia Jerónimo Zurita* 10–11 (1960), 69–98, esp. pp. 85–87; Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), *Chronicle* [hereafter *Pere III*], trans. Mary Hillgarth, ed. J. N. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 2:512–13 (VI:11–12).

<sup>24</sup> *CRA*, 37, 39; *Pere III*, 2:527 (VI:28).

<sup>25</sup> *CRA*, 40–42.

Almost as soon as the king had temporarily attended to Aragon's threatened borders, he was forced to deal with a far greater danger: Pedro's formation of a huge Castilian, Portuguese, and Granadan fleet that he would unleash in the spring of 1359 on the Valencian and Catalan littoral as well as against the exposed Balearic Islands.<sup>26</sup> To deal with this "urgent crisis and necessity" that directly touched the "good state and reformation of the principate of Catalonia," Pere in May summoned another Catalan assembly for August 1 at Vilafranca de Penedes to the southwest of Barcelona. Because of the pressing Castilian threat during the summer, the Aragonese king put off the meeting for a full month and then again to Michaelmas (September 29). He again prorogued the meeting until the feast of Saint Luke (October 18) and changed the site to Tarragona on the Catalan coast below Barcelona. Because of "other unexpected matters," including the stunning victory of Pere's captain, Enrique de Trastámara, over Pedro and a small Castilian force near the Araviana River on August 29, the Aragonese king altered the meeting time of the *Corts* once more, to October 10, and changed its location to Cervera, a small town to the southwest of Tarragona.<sup>27</sup> Meeting first with the Catalans on Saturday, October 12, he then spent over two months in impatiently waiting for the assembly to reimburse him for the "great expenses ... incurred because of the affairs of the war."<sup>28</sup> By December 18–19, the king had solved this problem by gaining another "free will gift" from the "provident and pure will" of the Catalans in the form of a

<sup>26</sup> Pere III, 2:522–26; Pero López de Ayala, *Coronica del rey don Pedro*, ed. Constance L. Wilkins and Heanon M. Wilkins (Madison, 1985), pp. 104–5 (10th year, chaps. xii–xiii). For Aragonese and Castilian naval development in the fourteenth century, see Manuel Calderón Ortega and Francisco Javier Díaz González, "Los almirantes sel 'siglo de oro' de la Marina castellana medieval," *En la España Medieval* 24 (2001), 311–64, esp. pp. 314–15; José Ramón Cervera Pery, *El poder naval en los reinos hispánicos (La marina en la edad media)* (Madrid, 1992); Archibald R. Lewis and Timothy J. Runyan, *European Naval and Maritime History, 300–1500* (Bloomington, 1990), pp. 72–77; Lawrence V. Mott, *Sea Power in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Catalan: The Catalan–Aragonese Fleet in the War of the Sicilian Vespers* (Gainesville, 2003), pp. 196–204; Florentín Pérez Embid, *El Almirantazgo castellano hasta las Capitulaciones de Santa Fe* (Seville, 1944); J. A. Robson, "The Catalan Fleet and Moorish Sea Power (1337–1344)," *English Historical Review* [hereafter *EHR*] 74, no. 292 (1959), 386–408, esp. pp. 402–04. For sea war with Marinids, see Eduardo Aznar Vallejo, "La guerra naval en Castilla durante la baja Edad Media," *En la España Medieval* 32 (2009), 167–92; O'Callaghan, *Gibraltar Crusade*, pp. 129–36, 196–97; Florentino Pérez Embid, "La marina real castellana en el siglo XIII," *AEM* 6 (1969), 141–86.

<sup>27</sup> *CAVC*, II:1–37. For battle of Araviana, see Ayala, *Coronica*, p. 108 (10th year, chap. xxii), Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, "La contraofensiva aragonesa en la Guerra de los Dos Pedros: Actitud militar y diplomática de Pedro IV el Ceremoniosos (años 1358 a 1362)," *Cuadernos de Historia Jerónimo Zurita* [hereafter *CHJZ*] 14–15 (1963), 7–30, esp. pp. 15–17; Jeronimo Zurita y Castro, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Angel Canellas Lopez, 8 vols. (Zaragoza, 1967–1985), 4:383–87 (IX:xxv).

<sup>28</sup> Pere III, 2:529 (VI:27); *CAVC*, II:39; Martín, "Cortes catalanes," pp. 82–83. Pere is surely incorrect in saying that he first met with the *Corts* on October 8, since he had written from Barcelona that he would be in Cervera "without fail" on Saturday, October 13. As it was, he arrived a day early. The king remained in Cervera until December 20.

*fogatge* to be assessed at  $\frac{1}{2}$  florin, 20 sous or 12 dinars per household.<sup>29</sup> This amounted to an annual sum of 144,000 libras, which would maintain 1,800 horse-men on Catalonia's threatened borders until May 1, 1361.<sup>30</sup> This total was divided equally between the urban estate on one hand and the combined ecclesiastical and noble estates on the other. In the agreements hammered out with these bodies, Pere declared that the granting of such subsidies had a long history with the Catalan *Corts* in his own reign. Such assemblies had already supported his conflicts with the Genoese, against the warlike nobility of Sardinia, and now with his "public enemy," Pedro of Castile.<sup>31</sup> Beside the crucial matter of money, Pere also approved statutes issued by the *Corts* that disallowed lawsuits during the national emergency musters (*Princeps namque*), forbade private feuds during the war, with the threat of ejection from the peace and truce for the participants, and severely warned his subjects to avoid harboring deserters from his armies and fleets.<sup>32</sup>

As the war entered its fourth year in 1360 and a papal legate, Gui de Boulougne, attempted to establish an acceptable peace agreement,<sup>33</sup> Pere was forced to plug holes in his southern frontier defenses, especially in the exposed borderland wedged between the Valencian capital and the Castilian outpost of Murcia. To recover "some castles [of the region] that had been unwarrantedly and unjustly occupied" by forces of the Castilian king, Pere commanded that a *Cortes* convene at Valencia on May 12, 1360. When he was drawn away by his troops' recapture of Tarazona at the same time, he violated parliamentary custom and royal law by sending his ten-year-old son, the crown prince Joan, to preside over the meeting that convened in the Franciscan monastery at Valencia on the scheduled day. Sitting on a throne as the estates took their places, the prince turned over

<sup>29</sup> *CAVC*, II:55–133, 391; Martín, "Cortes catalanas," p. 83. For the coinage types mentioned in Pere's war parliaments, see Joaquín Botet i Sisó, *Les monedes catalanes*, 3 vols. (Barcelona, 1808–11); Robert I. Burns, S.J., *Society and Documentation in Crusader Valencia*, vol. 1 of *Diplomatarium of the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia. The Registered Charters of its Conqueror, Jaume I, 1257–1276*, 4 vols. to date (Princeton, NJ, 1985–2007), pp. 108–10; M. Crusafont i Sabater and A. M. Balaguer, "La numismática navarro-aragonesa alto medieval: Nuevos hipótesis," *Gaceta Numismática* 81 (1986), 35–66; Felipe Mateu Llopis, "Sobre el curso legal de la moneda en Aragón, Cataluña, Valencia, y Mallorca, siglos XIII y XIV," in *VII Congrès d'història de la corona d'Aragó*, 3 vols. (Barcelona, 1962–64), 2:517–28.

<sup>30</sup> *CAVC*, II:383–85.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, II:385–87, 389–90.

<sup>32</sup> *CAVC*, II: 41, 52; Martín, "Cortes catalanas," p. 83 (note 11). For the national emergency muster, see *The Usatges of Barcelona: the Fundamental Law of Catalonia*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), p. 80 (art. 64); Donald J. Kagay, "The National Defense Clause and the Emergence of the Catalan State: *Princeps namque* revisited," in *War*, study 1, pp. 57–97; Manuel Sánchez Martínez, "The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2003), pp. 293–329.

<sup>33</sup> For Gui de Boulougne's diplomatic mission in 1358–61, see Ayala, *Coronica*, pp. 99–101 (10th year, chap. v); José María Mendi, "La primera legación de Cardenal Guido de Boulougne a España (1358–1361)," *Scriptorum Victoriense* 12 (1964), 125–224; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:369–70 (IX:xxi).



the opening ceremony to his cousin, Count Alfonso of Denia, who brusquely demanded more money for the Valencian war effort, which often seemed on the point of collapse. Though the estates quickly appointed negotiators to work out a subsidy, they soon felt Joan's wrath for what seemed to him their do-nothing attitude. He warned them that Pedro was on the point of attacking the Valencian town of Orihuela and thus a force of 500 horsemen had to be dispatched immediately to thwart this offensive. Without this relief party, a "flowing multitude of Christians and pagans [Pedro I's Muslim allies]" would spread "ruin and damage" across the land.<sup>34</sup> Moved by the earnest appeal of the young boy, the Valencian estates set to work with a will, but in a way that would eventually make Joan's father nervous. They appointed an "executive committee" (*general*) that would immediately name its own "deputies, syndics, and procurators." This group had the responsibility of collecting the subsidy pledged by the *Cortes*, which came to 65,000 *libras*, but was also allowed to sell war bonds, float loans, recruit, station, and pay troops, and purchase provisions and other supplies for these troops. After some wrangling about the division of the grant among the estates, a final agreement was brought to Joan and the *Cortes* for final approval on June 7, 1360. Not fully satisfied with the salary arrangement for the 500 horsemen, Joan prorogued the meeting until November 1, when he hoped his father could be present. This later session, however, apparently never took place and this Valencian unfinished business moved Pere to seek a more general solution to his military finance problem. Despite the ultimate failure of the 1360 *Cortes*, it marked the beginning of Pere's use of his family members as replacements in his national assemblies and demonstrated that the parliamentary executive committees in all his realms were not novelties, but had come to stay.<sup>35</sup>

When the papal legate finally nailed down a formal peace treaty at Terrer in May, 1361, Pere joyously prepared to abandon the gnawing responsibility of war. After Pedro abrogated the treaty with a surprise attack on Calatayud in July, 1362, the Aragonese king found himself in straightened fiscal circumstances once again and unable to put troops on his threatened frontiers.<sup>36</sup> Unwilling to risk the delay and frustration of individual meetings of his major

34 Sylvia Romeu Alfaro, "Cortes de Valencia de 1360," *AHDE* 44 (1974): 675–712, esp. pp. 678–81, 684–90; Romeu Alfaro, "Catalogo," pp. 594–95; Simó Santonja, *Corts*, pp. ([0–9])64–67. For distribution of subsidies in the 1360 assembly, see Maria Rosa Muñoz Pomer, "Cortes y Parlamentos de 1360. Acuerdos y distribución de donativos," *Estudios en recuerdo de la profesora Sylvia Romeu Alfaro*, 2 vols. (Valencia, 1989), 2:643–57. For Prince Joan, see Francisco de Asis de Bofarull y Sans, *Generación de Juan I de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1896), 22–29 (docs 1–2); Rafael Tasis i Marca, *Pere el Cerimoniós i els seus fills* (1957; repr., Barcelona, 1980), 165–67. For Count Alfonso of Denia, see Campón Gonzalvo, "Consecuencias," 57–58.

35 Romeu Alfaro, "Cortes de Valencia de 1360," pp. 690, 700, 706–9; José Martínez Aloy, *La Diputación de la Generalidad del reino de Valencia* (Valencia, 1930), p. 145.

36 For Peace of Terrer, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1074, ff. 129v–130; R. 1103, f. 83v; R. 1181, f. 73v; Pere III, 2:534–35 (VI:32); Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *Entre la paz y la guerra: La corona Catalano-Aragonesa y Castilla en la baja Edad Media* (Barcelona, 2005), 396–412; Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "The Southern Valencian Frontier during the War of

lands, the Aragonese king turned to a theoretically known but practically untested form, the “parliament” (*parlamentum*), which gathered estates from Aragon, Catalonia, Majorca, and Valencia.<sup>37</sup> To facilitate travel for the estates, he scheduled the meeting in the centrally located place of Monzón on the Aragonese border with Catalonia for October 12, 1362. After several delays, he convened the large assembly in the main royal castle on the hills above the city and across the Cinca River. Despite several postponements, the members of the various national delegations knew well what the king wanted, since he had repeatedly warned them in the preceding weeks that he would call for their aid concerning “subsidies, provisions, and other preparations for the [defense of the] commonwealth of our kingdoms and lands.”<sup>38</sup>

Meeting the large conclave divided by realm and estate on November 23, 1362, Pere asked his people to “help and stand by” their sovereign against the “iniquity of the Castilian king.” The members of many different national assemblies had grown used to this kind of crisis oratory and had come to know what was expected. Despite the appointment of negotiators whose job was the establishment of an over-arching grant that would pay for the many classes of captains and troops scattered across the Crown of Aragon’s borders, these appointees failed to make any progress in putting forth a subsidy acceptable to the entire body and were replaced on February 4, 1363 by thirty-three deputies elected from the estates of the four lands. Within two days, the new representatives brought to the floor a grant proposal for 250,000 *libras* to be collected over the next year in sums appropriate for the population and fiscal standing of the four lands. When Pere asked if the full parliament accepted the arrangement, they shouted “in a thunderous voice, ‘Yes! Yes!’ repeating it many times.”<sup>39</sup>

Even with the relatively pointless attainment of this declaration of acceptance, Pere’s anger was soon to flare against the estates of his several realms over a number of issues. Despite the great danger that faced the entire Crown of Aragon, Pere had trouble controlling his anger when faced with a “surfeit of debates and legal

the Two Pedros,” in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, pp. 75–116, esp. p. 106. For surrender of Calatayud, see Zurita, *Anales*, 4:445–48 (IX:xlui).

37 For the provenance of the term “parliament” in eastern Spanish political history, see *CAVC*, I, pt. 2:459; XI:465; *Glossari general lullia*, ed. Miguel Colom Mateu, 10 vols. (Mallorca, 1985), 4:84; Kagay, “Emergence,” pp. 228–29 (note 21); Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, *La Cortes de Aragón en la Edad Media* (Zaragoza, 1979), pp. 69–70.

38 “Actas de las Cortes Generales de la Corona de Aragón de 1362–63,” ed. Josep Maria Pons Guri, in *Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón* [hereafter *CDACA*] ed. Prospero Bofarull y Moscaró et al., 50 vols. to date (Barcelona, 1877–), 48:13; Donald J. Kagay, “A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362–1363) as Military Financier,” in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, pp. 117–48, esp. p. 126. For layout of Monzón in the early modern period, see Richard L. Kagan, ed., *Spanish Cities of the Golden Age: The Views of Anton van Wyngaerde* (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 150–54.

39 *CDACA*, 48:56–63; Ricard Albert and Joan Gassiot, eds., *Parlaments a les corts catalanes* (Barcelona, 1928), pp. 10–11; Suzanne F. Cawsey, *Kingship and Propaganda: Royal Eloquence and the Crown of Aragón c. 1200–1450* (Oxford, 2002), p. 74.

questions.” When his handling of the war became the subject of some of these parliamentary exchanges – if only indirectly – he shouted that “no knight, living or dead, could defend our crown [as we have].” In this same session of February 11, 1363, he accosted the estates by saying that if the frontier troops who faced danger daily should find out about the parliament’s shameful and selfish delays, they would order the entire assembly to follow the king to the endangered borders “on horseback, on foot, or only with the shirts on their backs.”<sup>40</sup>

Despite Pere’s explosive frustration, the Monzón parliament went about its work in its own plodding way. Most of the delay centered on the division of the general subsidy among the various realms and their estates. The Valencian delegation spent most of the second half of the meeting attempting to avoid responsibility for approval of yet another impost on their people by claiming that their credentials as parliamentary proctors did not allow them to agree to such a fiscal agreement. The Aragonese members wanted a fluid military grant, the collection of which would cease if the Castilians overran more of their threatened territory. The Catalan delegation broke into a bitter dispute between estates. The clerics and nobles fought over the extent of the subsidy that their ecclesiastical and aristocratic fellows at home would be bound to pay. At the same time, the representatives of the larger Catalan cities, Barcelona and Perpignan, attempted to shift these fiscal duties to the region’s smaller urban sites headed by Lérida. Suffering in silence through this confused parliamentary strife, the king finally saw the grant in its final form brought to the floor of the *parlamentum* on March 3, 1363. When he asked the large conclave if they accepted the grant, they answered “in a single shout, ‘It pleases us! It pleases us!’”<sup>41</sup> All the royal frustration of the past five months had finally been rewarded with general military support – or so the king thought.

After the immense effort of forcing long-term grants from all his lands in the Monzón assembly, Pere was soon disappointed on two fronts. The collection of such parliamentary subsidies invariably took longer than the scheduled term for this operation and even in regard to the collection of tax revenues, neither the king nor his officials exercised much control over how this money was used; this fell under the purview of the parliamentary deputies. Thus, even more financially embarrassed than he had been before the great assembly of 1362–63, Pere was forced to instruct his Sicilian-born queen, Elionor, to sell several of her properties, pawn her jewelry (yet again), and take out a short-term loan to help him make ends meet.<sup>42</sup> Though given a much-needed respite from incessant war

40 CDACA, 48:63–64; Cawsey, *Kingship*, p. 137; Kagay, “Government,” p. 130; Albert and Gassiot, eds., *Parlements*, pp. 25–26.

41 CDACA, 48: 64–69; Kagay, “Government,” pp. 130–31. For Pere’s strategies of control over the deputies, see Gómez Lafuente, *Reino*, pp. 187–91.

42 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1404, ff. 9, 16v–17v; José-Luis Martín, “Las Cortes de Pere el Cerimonioso,” in *Pere el Cerimoniós i la seva època*, ed. Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 1989), pp. 99–111, esp. p. 107; Martín, “Cortes catalanas,” pp. 84–85. On April 22, 1357, Pere had instructed his wife, Queen Elionor, to pawn her banner and greatest jewels” to

spending by the negotiation of yet another peace treaty, this time at Murviedro (modern Sagunto) on July 2, 1363, the Aragonese king was again quickly dragged back onto a war footing when Pedro violated the pact a few months later, forcing Pere to come once again before his assemblies, in desperate need of military funding.<sup>43</sup>

After spending Christmas of 1363 at Barcelona, Pere traveled to Zaragoza in the new year, and while at the Aragonese capital called a Catalan *Corts* for Tortosa on February 25, 1364. The reason for the meeting must have sounded all too familiar to the recipients of this summons: Pedro had violated the peace treaty and “without reason had occupied many castles, cities, and towns of Aragon and Valencia.” Thus for the “good estate, protection, and defense of their homeland, the king had to negotiate with the Catalan estates.”<sup>44</sup>

Because of “certain pressing matters,” including Pedro’s siege of the Valencian capital and the “dangerous scarcity of food” that this caused across his southern kingdom, Pere had no choice but to set out for Valencia, leaving Queen Elionor, who served as governor and lieutenant general of Catalonia, to open the assembly, at Barcelona rather than in Tortosa, on March 10, 1364. The queen, a fine orator in Catalan, told the *Corts* that her husband was rushing to free his Valencian subjects from the Castilian “path of perdition,” and so she was standing in his stead. She then reminded the Catalans of how deeply their own land had suffered from Pedro’s naval raiders, and warned the hesitant estates that if Pere’s other territories fell to the Castilian invaders, Catalonia would quickly come under attack. Since the king’s exchequer was being stretched to breaking point by the Valencian campaigns, Catalonia would have to come up with 120,000 *libras* to defend its own frontiers for the next year. This sum, to be raised by yet another *fogatge*, would be used to pay frontier troops, and to fit out war galleys and compensate their crews.<sup>45</sup>

The Catalans grudgingly accepted the need for their help, but complained bitterly concerning the “great and intolerable expenses incurred on both land and sea,” saying that the population of the Pyrenean regions were not willing to pay their fair share of a military subsidy. After months of haggling, the divisions between the estates of yet another *fogatge* were brought before the full assembly on July 16, 1364. The system established for the collection of these funds was

help with the “immense expenses that weigh us down from the waging of the Castilian war.” ACA, Cancillería Real, R. 1152, f. 172; *Documents Historichs Catalans del Segle XIV: Colecció de cartas familiars correspodents als regnats de Pere de Punyaleit y Johan I*, ed. Josep Coroleu (Barcelona, 1889), p. 59.

<sup>43</sup> ACA, Cancillería real, R. 728, f. 163; R. 1192, f. 9v; Masiá de Ros, *Relación*, 2:512–17 (doc. 229/151); Ferrer i Mallol, “Frontera,” pp. 285–89; Ferrer i Mallol, “Southern Valencian Frontier,” pp. 106–8; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:461–64 (IX:xlvi–xlvii).

<sup>44</sup> Pere III, 2:542 (VI:37); *CAVC*, II:135–41.

<sup>45</sup> *CAVC*, II:148–50 (art. 1). For the career of Queen Elionor, see E. L. Miron, *The Queens of Aragon: Their Lives and Times* (London, 1913), pp. 187–96; Mark D. Johnston, “Parliamentary Oratory in Medieval Aragon,” *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 10 (1992), 99–117, esp. p. 106.

so cumbersome that for the next six months after its approval Pere, still fighting in Valencia, grumbled that he was “in great need and peril for the lack of money.” He thus begged his long-suffering wife to recall the members of the Barcelona assembly and order them to come up with an initial installment of 20,000 *libras* to tide him over.<sup>46</sup> Because of her husband’s desperate meddling, the queen emerged as a tragic and somewhat ridiculous figure over the next several months. Though she had already adjourned the Barcelona assembly, she ordered it to reassemble for All Saints Day (November 1), with the fervent hope that Pere could be present. When his plans changed due to military operation in southern Valencia, she moved up the meeting time for the *Corts* until October 18 and changed the site back to Tortosa, which was nearer the Aragonese and Valencian frontiers. When the king proved unable to keep even this appointment, Elionor reset the meeting date for November 4 and changed its site to Lèrida. When the meeting finally convened, neither the king nor the principal members of the first two estates were present and so the queen was forced to postpone the *Corts* again – this time until November 19.<sup>47</sup> Furious at a problem much of which was of his own making, Pere took matters into his own hands, ordering the Catalans to meet him at Tortosa on January 5, 1365. Appearing in a parliamentary meeting for the first time in two years, the king suffered through three months of seemingly endless parliamentary procedure until April 7, when the peripatetic assembly finally gave him what he wanted by “exerting themselves most valiantly” with the vote of 350,000 *libras*, again to be raised by a hearth tax.<sup>48</sup>

Despite this grant, Pere’s constant campaigning around Orihuela and Murviedro in the first half of 1365 eventually depleted the funds that were trickling from parliamentary subsidies dating back to Monzón in 1363 and forced the king to call out another Catalan *Corts* for Barcelona on July 17. Because of his constant Valencian campaigning during the summer of 1365, the responsibility for running the meeting again fell to his long-suffering wife. “Sitting on a throne in royal garb,” in one of the large chambers of the royal palace in the Catalan capital, Elionor turned over the delivery of the opening speech to her counselor, Jaume de Faro, who said that the collection of the Tortosa *fogatge* had been badly botched and now the estates should turn to salt duties and the sale of future tax revenues to make up the difference. Unless this was done, Catalonia would “suffer irreparable damage” from the new fleet Pedro I was rumored to be forming in the Andalusian ports.<sup>49</sup> Because many of Catalonia’s great nobles were on war service with the king, Elionor allowed lesser nobles to take their place – which, though expedient, was clearly against parliamentary precedent. When these procedural matters had been ironed out, the queen charged the assembly with “correcting and clarifying” the Tortosa subsidy, but also ordered them to find an additional 65,000 *libras*, over and above

<sup>46</sup> *CAVC*, II:168–70.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 179–80.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. ([0–9])81–204, 255–69; Pere III, 2:568–69 (VI:54).

<sup>49</sup> *CAVC*, II:332–36, 339–40.

the Tortosa grant, which had to be raised by September through the use of another *fogatge*. According to the queen, this new and quite unexpected impost was to be used to support royal military operations in Valencia for the next few months. After enduring bitter complaints from the estates about the expenditure of new taxes for the defense of foreigners (as the Aragonese and Valencians were considered to be by the Catalans), the queen came before her parliamentary critics once more on August 4, 1365. "Vexed and burdened with great expenses," they dictated to Elionor their own fiscal solution to fund royal military operations. To simplify matters, they offered all their own tax revenues for the next three years, but insisted that no man on active military service should be called on to pay this impost. They also demanded that the earlier *fogatge* of Monzón and that of Tortosa which had not been fully collected should be considered null and void, since all of Catalonia had already suffered great economic distress from the "great grants and subsidies already enacted for the defense of the commonwealth."<sup>50</sup>

With the foul mood of the estates crystal clear to the queen, she postponed the assembly until August 22, when she met with the Catalans in the large chamber of Barcelona's Franciscan monastery, normally reserved for the city's administrative head, the Council of 100. Furious at the meeting's "many intricacies, great delays, and postponements," she screamed that her reasonable requests should have been fulfilled in "two or three days," and if they had been, her husband and their king would then be safe. Elionor again demanded the immediate payment of the sum she had talked of in July, but now (surely through the king's request) raised it to 100,000 *libras*. Calling together the assembly once more on August 24, she met her disgruntled subjects on the "cloister grass of the Franciscan monastery," and heard their final terms, which must have been highly insulting to her. The estates were willing to raise 55,000 *libras* (the first sum demanded of them) "under certain conditions," but they would not contribute an extra *sou* to fill out the higher amount. They also proved adamantly opposed to revisiting the Tortosa subsidy, which in their minds was clearly a dead letter.<sup>51</sup>

With in-fighting among the estates and the gathering hatred against the crown, the queen quickly seemed to lose control of the *Corts*, proroguing it fourteen times in the next three weeks. When she finally convened the assembly once more on September 21, the raucous estates would hardly let the queen speak. When silence was finally enforced, the Catalans witnessed one of the finest examples of a "harangue" (*arenga*) in eastern Spanish parliamentary history. Skillfully following the rules of rhetorical form to describe the dire threat to Catalonia from external invaders, Elionor reminded her audience of the many services the Catalans had rendered to the Aragonese crown in the past. At the

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 353–57; Manuel; Sánchez Martínez, "Negociación y fiscalidad en Cataluña a mediados del siglo XIV: las Cortes de Barcelona de 1365," in *Negociar en la Edad Media*, eds. Manuel Sánchez Martínez et al. (Barcelona, 2005), pp. 123–164.

<sup>51</sup> *CAVC* III:58–66. For the Council of 100, see Felipe Fernández Armesto, *Barcelona: A Thousand Years of the city's Past* (Barcelona, 1991), pp. 28–30; J. Lee Shneidman, *The Rise of the Aragonese–Catalan Empire 1200–1350*, 2 vols. (New York, 1970), 1:197–99.

end of the fifteen-minute speech, she dropped a bombshell of her husband's making when she asked for yet another grant, this one to hire the Free Companies who were currently streaming across the Pyrenees in search of martial employment. Elionor then told her troublesome subjects that they had caused her "great anxiety, confusion, and sadness of heart."<sup>52</sup> With this bravura performance, the queen forced her advantage against the stunned estates, whose resolve quickly evaporated, leading them to revise the Tortosa grant and have these changes quickly approved in the last session of the *Corts*, a meeting attended by Pere, the crown prince, and the clearly exultant queen.<sup>53</sup>

In comparison with the dramatic events of the Catalan *Corts* of 1364–65, the Aragonese *Cortes* of the same period was carried out with less emotion, but was marked with the same schedule of disruptions occasioned by Pere's absence on campaign in Valencia. First calling the Aragonese national assembly to Zaragoza for August 18, 1364, the king was forced to leave for the southern kingdom before the *Cortes* convened, and was not able to revisit his parliamentary duties in Aragon until the delayed Aragonese meeting finally opened on August 14, 1365 at Zaragoza. After failing to get his fourteen-year-old son, Joan, formally acclaimed as his heir and representative in Aragon by the conclave, he brought before the estates his principal reason for summoning the meeting: the funding of 1,000 knights for fourteen months of frontier service. Without much debate, the Aragonese agreed to the royal demand, but only on their own terms. They pledged 26,600 *libras* for the first three months and set daily military salaries at six or seven *sous*, depending on the equipment the horsemen possessed. They would also purchase from the subsidy proceeds all the provisions and equipment the border troops needed, but took care to set acceptable prices for these commodities. The impost collection would be carried out in each territorial district under the supervision of two urban citizens and a notary. Every two months, they and their fellows across the kingdom would transport the receipts to the cathedral of the Holy Savior at Zaragoza, where the money would be deposited in a strong box with four locks. An appointee from each of Aragon's four parliamentary estates kept the keys. The head of the kingdom's judiciary, the *Justicia*, inspected the tax rolls, acted as the paymaster for troops on active duty, and reimbursed soldiers for losses while on campaign, especially for horses. As in Catalonia, none of these funds from Aragonese rate-payers could be spent on "foreign" military operations, that is, for those outside of the kingdom. With this separation of powers, the deputies appointed by the *Cortes* saw many of their earlier duties decreased, but were still held responsible for preventing or punishing the "many frauds and uprisings" that were often spawned with the gathering and dispersal of so much money.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup> *CAVC*, II:367–72; Albert and Gassiot, eds., *Parlaments*, pp. 27–33; Pere III, 2:272–73 (VI:57); Cawsey, *Kingship*, pp. 29, 116; Johnston, "Parliamentary Oratory," pp. 105–9.

<sup>53</sup> *CACV*, II:372–76, 445.

<sup>54</sup> *CRA*, pp. 47–51, 56–60; María Rosa Muñoz Pomer, "Las Cortes de Cullera-Valencia de 1364," *Saitabi: revista de la Facultat de Geografia i Història*, 35 (1985), pp. 87–94; Pere III,

With the beginning of the Castilian civil war in March, 1366, Pere's assemblies were freed from the onerous task of raising domestic military funds, but still had to deal with the passage of foreign troops through their territories. Fearful of the mercenaries who had sold their services to either Pedro I or Enrique de Trastámara (now referred to as Enrique II) and had already sacked the Aragonese town of Barbastro, an Aragonese *Cortes* held at Zaragoza in 1366 attempted to prevent "dangers and scandals" to the capital by setting up barricades across its major thoroughfares and routing the mercenaries through less-populated urban districts down to the Ebro River and toward Castile's eastern border.<sup>55</sup> Aragonese assemblies in the next year, first at Tamarite de Litera near Monzón and then at Zaragoza, took up the same issue of diverting mercenary troops traveling to and from the Pyrenean passes before and after the bloody conflict at Nájera (April 3, 1367).<sup>56</sup> The Catalans, meeting at a *Corts* in Barcelona during October of the same year, did much the same thing to direct the Black Prince out of Spain, while keeping Catalan territory safe.<sup>57</sup>

The national assemblies of 1356–66 had proved critical both for Pere and for the development of parliamentary institutions in eastern Spain. Because of the need for constant supervision across extended periods which the war subsidies required, the Aragonese and Valencian *Cortes* and the Catalan *Corts* each developed an "executive committee" (*diputacio, general*) that could remain active long after the assembly proper had been adjourned by the king. This delegation, which was clearly a creature of the assembly proper and made up of some of its members who were given special and very specific duties, would quickly develop into a separate wing of parliamentary government.<sup>58</sup>

The temporary corps of deputies utilized to actualize the subsidy pledges of the full national assembly became a kind of "shadow government" that worked at all levels to raise and disperse these funds. At the top of this organization stood three

2:558–59 (VI:48); Zurita, *Anales*, IV:535 (IX:lxii). The Aragonese rejected Pere's request to make Joan the governor of Aragon since this honor could not be bestowed until he was twenty-one.

55 Kenneth Fowler, *The Great Companies*, vol. 1 of *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), p. 169. Mario Lafuente Gómez, "Comportamientos sociales ante la violencia bélica en Aragón durante las guerras con Castilla (1356–1375)," *Historia instituciones derecho* 35 (2008), 241–68, esp. pp. 260–61; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:535, 539 (IX:lxii–lxiii).

56 *CRA*, pp. 63–64.

57 *CAVC*, III:16–28.

58 Ferrer i Mallol, "Corts," pp. 875–938; Kagay, "Government," pp. 146–47; Ignacio Rubio y Cambroneró, *La Deputació del General de Catalunya*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1950), 1:135–53; Peter Rycraft, "The Role of the Catalan *Corts* in the later Middle Ages," *EHR* 351 (1974), 241–69, esp. pp. 249–49; José Angel Sesma Muñoz and J. A. Armillas, *La Diputación de Aragón: El gobierno aragonés del reino y la comunidad autónoma* (Zaragoza, n.d.), pp. 27–45; José Angel Sesma Muñoz, "Las transformaciones de la fiscalidad real en la Baja Edad Media," in *XV Congrés d'història de la corona d'Aragó [El poder real en la Corona de Aragón (Siglos XIV–XVI)]*, 5 vols. (Zaragoza, 1993), vol. 1 (Ponencias), pp. 238–91, esp. pp. 386–89.



or four men – depending on the number of estates in their national assembly – who remained in the capital and directed the entire subsidy administration. They kept accurate records of the tax collections, stored the funds in the capital or turned them over to bankers designated by the crown, sold war bonds, negotiated loans, marked all official documents with a “common seal,” paid frontier troops, punished the malfeasance of any deputies or their agents, and replaced deputies who had been removed for cause or who had died on the job. Although endowed with such far-ranging powers, they could not collect more than the amount of money agreed to by the national assembly nor could they spend or borrow money under the authority of the office that had nothing to do with the war effort.<sup>59</sup> Though swearing to “conduct themselves well and loyally in their office” and not to make any false “deduction or diminution” from the subsidy funds, these temporary parliamentary agents were subject to powerful temptation in collecting and maintaining the huge sums agreed to in the national assembly. If such malfeasance was discovered, it was punished “in house” and not by the royal government.<sup>60</sup>

The underlings in the subsidy process consisted of the “collectors” (*cullidores*, *culidores*) who gathered the impost funds, the “distributors” (*distribuydores*) who transferred the money to central locations, the “receivers” (*recedores*, *reebedors*) who took control of the tax receipts, locking them in specially designed strong boxes with multiple locks, the “overseers” (*oidores*, *difinidores*, *administrators*), and the “treasurers” (*tesoreros*, *clavaris*, *consellers*) who maintained general fiscal records based on the audits of the other officials. All of the parliamentary records referring to the subsidy process were turned over to officials of the royal treasury, but only after several years had elapsed. In one of the decade’s assemblies, that of Cervera in 1359, even this mark of good faith was avoided with the directive that after the term of subsidy collection had expired, all of its pertinent papers were to be handed to the administrators, who were instructed to burn all of these records “so they could not remain to be discovered in the future.”<sup>61</sup>

With this corps of parliamentary agents on the ground during the term of the subsidy, the deputies, far more than the royal officials, oversaw the entire military operation that posted troops along the Crown of Aragon’s frontiers that were in danger of Castilian attack. They paid the soldiers their wages, usually in monthly installments, checked the “muster lists” (*mostres*) provided by each unit’s commander, paid off individual “IOUs” (*albaras*, *albaranes*), and issued “estimates for the value of service mounts” (*estimes*). Because this last operation as well as the replacement of horses lost or wounded on campaign cost a good deal of money, the deputies began to have the service mounts branded, and

<sup>59</sup> *CDACA*, 48:87–88, 90, 105, 130 (arts. 1, 3, 13–14, 20); *CAVC*, II:152, 154–57, 164, 168, 261, 275–79, 280–82, 284–86, 432 (arts. 9, 11, 15, 20, 22, 24, 26, 50–51, 68–69, 73, 76, 78–81, 85–87, 92); Kagay, “Government,” p. 137.

<sup>60</sup> *CAVC*, II:396–98.

<sup>61</sup> *CDACA*, 48:87–88, 90, 105, 108–9, 120, 130, 133 (arts. 1, 3, 7, 13–15, 20); *CAVC*, II:153–54, 262, 392–93, 395–98, 402, 422, 431–32 (arts. 9, 41, 52–54); Kagay, “Government,” p. 138.

then used special herds maintained near the front to replace killed or wounded horses rather than providing monetary reimbursement to soldiers who had suffered the loss of a horse. Occasionally, the deputies in the field had to serve as quartermasters responsible for buying provisions in bulk and transporting them to the front.<sup>62</sup>

In any other situation, the deputies, like any other subjects of the Aragonese king, had to obey him or his agents in all matters that touched on national security. Because of the parliamentary statutes issued during the Castilian war that Pere, his queen, and the crown prince had to swear to uphold, these rulers and their officials had to give way to the administrative actions of the deputies in regard to the collection and use of pledged subsidies. If the king or his subordinates interfered with these parliamentary operations, the deputies were instructed by the estates not to obey any such royal orders.<sup>63</sup> If this interference continued, the national assemblies would then declare the entire subsidy process null and void. Even with this built-in security, both the estates and the deputies remained worried that the crown would come to view their extraordinary efforts as a normal duty. To block this eventuality, they had written into every subsidy arrangement which they enacted a clause that stated that none of their actions in regard to the military impost could be considered by the crown as a legal precedent prejudicial to their age-old privileges. This also applied to the estates and their deputies, who could take no official or legislative actions that would infringe upon any urban "grants, privileges, liberties, usages, and exemptions."<sup>64</sup> In more than one of these parliamentary sessions, the estates were able to manipulate their king into making concessions which he surely had no intention of granting at the beginning of an assembly. At Cervera, for example, the king had to agree that he would refrain from extorting loans from the Catalans during the term of a subsidy, would waive all sorts of legal, commercial, and military fines during the same period, and would prevent his officials from intervening in the strictly local legal affairs of the clergy, nobles, and townsmen of the principate for the next five years.<sup>65</sup>

Though the collection of war funds began as an ad hoc operation, the overlapping terms of subsidies meant that their collection developed into a fiscal custom that the estates and their deputies developed and drew from their long experience in the Castilian war. Besides loans, future revenue sales, salt duties, and other money-making schemes, the estate assemblies of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia principally relied on the hearth tax, which was assessed at 10 to 20 *sous* or 12 *dinars* per household unit. These funds were not all collected at the

<sup>62</sup> *CDACA*, 48:84, 87, 105, 116, 119, 131–33, 135, 149, 188 (arts. 5–6, 8, 11, 14, 18, 40, 54); *CAVC*, II:422, 431–32 (arts. 41, 53–54); Kagay, "Government," p. 138.

<sup>63</sup> Lafuente Gómez, "Reino," 190–91.

<sup>64</sup> *CAVC*, II:150–51, 160–62, 164–65, 295, 299–34, 391–92, 397–99, 401, 420, 436–40 (arts. 3, 26, 32, 34, 36, 39, 79, 86, 93, 107, 115, 121).

<sup>65</sup> *CAVC*, II:399–401.

same time, but were staggered over several months. The collectors compiled extensive lists of householders that included both Jews and Muslims, but disallowed the mingling of payments between estates. Thus, churchmen largely paid into the subsidy with their ecclesiastical fellows, and this same distinction was applied to nobles and townsmen. If any of the householders proved unable to pay their full tax bill, the shortfall was divided by the collectors among an entire community or estate. The overlapping terms of subsidy collection between 1357 and 1365, along with the “great and immoderate expenses” which the conflict consumed, meant that the *fogatge* became an over-fished fiscal pond by the last year of the war and forced Pere III to look to even less-effective monetary sources and to long for peace.<sup>66</sup>

Pere III’s role in the remarkable parliamentary developments within the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros seems to point to a strain of disastrous weakness. One modern historian has claimed that during this period the increasing power of Pere III’s assemblies was due to the fact that he had “lost the initiative in policy and finance.”<sup>67</sup> In reality, the Aragonese king, who was militant without a taste for combat,<sup>68</sup> had little option than to surrender, at least temporarily, a good deal of his own power and that of his government in order to hold off a brutal enemy on as many as three fronts.<sup>68</sup>

Despite Pere’s submission to the parliamentary “shadow government” during the years of the Castilian war, his own administration remained, and at times was called on to get involved in the tax-collection process. On at least two different occasions (in 1359 and 1360), the Aragonese king had to step in when individuals and entire parliamentary estates refused to pay into the subsidies approved by a national assembly. Claiming that the accused were guilty of a treason by which the “direction of the war is thrown into disarray,” Pere instructed his own officials to “constrain by the exercise of justice” those who preferred non-payment of crucially needed subsidies to the seminal duties of both subjects and vassals. Any official who did not quickly carry out the king’s orders would incur his “ire and indignation” – never a baseless threat. In this way, Pere demonstrated that, even with the emergency powers gained by his parliaments, the royal government could ultimately claim superior power.<sup>69</sup>

From the vantage point of the national assemblies, the war years imposed on them an unprecedented burden, but provided an equally novel opportunity.

66 *CAVC*, I, pt. 2:629–725; II:55–133, 160–62, 293, 295, 300, 391–92, 395, 399, 401, 403–4, 406–7, 434–35 (arts. 4, 10, 15, 27, 33, 52, 54, 56, 58, 61, 75–76, 82, 92, 106, 108, 117); *CDACA*, 48:92, 100–1, 114, 120–21, 138 (arts. 2, 17, 23, 26, 29, 50, 53–54; Kagay, “Government,” pp. 134–35; José Iglesia Font, “El fogaje de 1365–1370,” *Memorias de la Real Academia de Ciencias y Artes* 34 (1962), 254–62; Martín, “Cortes catalanas,” pp. 85–86; Pons i Guri, “Fogatge,” p. 351.

67 Bisson, *Medieval Crown*, p. 118.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 119; Kagay, “Government,” pp. 146–47.

69 *ACA*, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 95v, 95, 145r–v.

These bodies had been asked to raise military funds since the time of Jaume I, but as these commands became more frequent and called for ever-greater sums, the national assemblies responded by functioning as the kind of corporation they were already familiar with among the regular and monastic clergy as well as the military orders, the various ranks of the nobility, and the townsmen who, after all, made up the parliamentary estates. The deputies whom the estates chose to carry out the fiscal schemes they had voted for were very much like procurators, who had been essential to the functioning of the assemblies for over a century. They were given “full and sufficient power” to carry out the duties assigned them by their principals, the estates. Though these agents were thus limited by the members of the national assembly, they did not answer to the king or his corps of officials during the tenure of their office, which was constituted by the term of the grant. By this simple fact, the national assemblies which totally depended on the king for their existence were now given a permanent existence by the executive committees of deputies, eventually called the *Deputació del General*, *Generalitat*, and *Generalidad* in the various realms of the Crown of Aragon, which stretched down to modern times.<sup>70</sup> In a sense, then, both king and parliament survived the long crisis, and, by doing so, pointed to the much-changed government arrangement that would persist in eastern Spain until the accession of the Hapsburgs in the sixteenth century.

<sup>70</sup> José Martínez Aloy, *La diputación de la generalidad de Valencia* (Valencia, 1930); Kagay, “Parliament,” pp. 146–47; Ignacio Rubio y Cambronero, *La Deputació del General de Catalunya*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1950), 1:135–53; Peter Rycraft, “The Role,” pp. 241–69, esp. pp. 249–49; José Angel Sesma Muñoz and J. A. Armillas, *La Diputación de Aragón: El gobierno aragonés del reino y la comunidad autónoma* (Zaragoza, n.d.), 27–45; Sesma Muñoz, “Las transformaciones,” pp. 238–91, esp. pp. 386–89.

**Appendix. War Parliaments of the Crown of Aragon, 1357–65**

<i>Location, Title</i>	<i>Realm Represented</i>	<i>Opening Date Closing Date</i>	<i>War Funds and Troops Pledged</i>
Cariñena <i>Cortes</i>	Aragon	July 30, 1357	700 horsemen – two years
Valencia (city) <i>Cortes</i>	Valencia	December 30, 1357	500 horsemen – two years
Barcelona <i>Corts</i>	Catalonia	August 25, 1358	<i>fogatge</i>
Zaragoza <i>Cortes</i>	Aragon	January 22, 1359	1,320 knights – one month 1,000 infantry – one month
Vilafranca de Penedes/  Tarragona/ Cervera <i>Corts</i>	Catalonia	October 12, 1359	<i>fogatge</i> (½ florin, 20 sous, or 12 dinars per household) 288,000 <i>libras</i> 1,800 horsemen – two years
Valencia (city) <i>Cortes</i>	Valencia	May 12, 1360 June 7, 1360	65,000 <i>libras</i> (unpledged) 500 knights (unpledged)
Monzón <i>parlamentum</i>	Aragon Catalonia Majorca Valencia	November 23, 1362 March 3, 1363	250,000 <i>libras</i> – two years
Tortosa/ Barcelona <i>Corts</i>	Catalonia	March 10, 1364 July 16, 1364	120,000 <i>libras</i> – one year 20,000 <i>libras</i> (unpledged) <i>Fogatge</i>
Tortosa/ Lérida/ Tortosa <i>Corts</i>	Catalonia	November 4, 1364 April 7, 1365	350,000 <i>libras</i> <i>Fogatge</i>
Barcelona <i>Corts</i>	Catalonia	July 17, 1365	65,000 <i>libras</i> <i>fogatge</i> (unpledged) Revision of Tortosa grant
Zaragoza <i>Cortes</i>	Aragon	August 14, 1365	26,600 <i>libras</i> 1,000 knights – 14 months

