



Boydell Press

Chapter Title: Cross-Cultural Trade in the Aegean and Economic Mechanisms for Merchant Crusaders

Book Title: Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291-1352

Book Author(s): Mike Carr

Published by: Boydell & Brewer; Boydell Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt17mvjq5.13>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Boydell & Brewer and Boydell Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291-1352*

Cross-Cultural Trade in the Aegean and Economic Mechanisms for Merchant Crusaders

For the undertaking in defence of the Faithful in overseas lands cruelly harassed by the Turks and other Infidels [...] we grant you licence to send one galley, together with merchandise and sailors, to Alexandria and other overseas regions and lands held by the Sultan of Babylon.

Pope Clement VI, letter to Garin of Châteauneuf,
Hospitaller prior of Navarre, 3 May 1345.¹

Naval power from the Latins in the East, at times with assistance from the French Crown and the papacy, came to form the forefront of crusading against the Turks in the Aegean, culminating in the naval leagues of the 1330s and 1340s. But the merchants and mariners who made up the Aegean fleets were not just motivated by a desire to defend the faith from the infidel; their interests were also inseparably intertwined with the web of cross-cultural commerce in the eastern Mediterranean. This often resulted in a dilemma for the participating merchant states, as they attempted to balance peaceful commercial relations in the East with the need to defend their lands from Muslim aggression, and the inevitable disruption to trade that this caused.² The commercial priorities of these merchant crusaders were far removed from those of the traditional crusading powers of western Europe and consequently posed new problems for the Church, which had to re-orient its policies to accommodate the new political-economic situation in the Aegean region, whilst not being seen to be completely relaxing its policy towards trading with infidel. As a result of this, trade licences, such as that granted to Garin of Châteauneuf above became a prominent feature of papal crusading policy.

¹ ASVat, RV 138, fols. 268v–269r, ep. 524.

² For an overview of the effects of warfare on commerce, see J. Preiser-Kapeller, 'Liquid frontiers', esp. pp. 121–30.

Initial Conflicts between Commerce and Crusade in the Aegean

During the first half of the fourteenth century successive popes promulgated a 'total embargo', which theoretically forbade trade with the entire Muslim world. This prohibition was then reiterated by the authorities of the maritime republics, who provided detailed lists of the penalties for those who broke the papal decrees, even though in reality these reiterations were not always carried out in full. The trade ban had a mixed impact on Mediterranean commerce: it did not result in the complete isolation of Muslim lands from Latin merchants, as many private individuals still broke the embargo, but it was sufficient to force the re-direction of much Christian trade from Egypt to lands further north; a factor which was accentuated by the loss of the Holy Land and the expansion of Latin colonies in the Aegean and the Black Sea.³ Because of this, when a more aggressive military policy was adopted by the Latin states against the Turks, the papal embargo had the unforeseen consequence of cutting off a vital source of revenue needed to fund crusading activities in the Aegean by restricting trade with Mamluk lands.

The Zaccaria

The dilemma this posed to Latin merchant crusaders is most clearly represented by the Genoese Zaccaria family, whose fortunes were intrinsically linked with the defence of their lands from the Anatolian Turks and the export of goods to northern Europe and the Mamluk sultanate. The Zaccaria specialized in two main commodities. The first of these was alum, which was extremely valuable and had a number of uses: it was the most effective fabric mordant (fixative for dyes) known at the time, an important product for preparing and softening leather, and it was considered to be an effective styptic as well as having numerous other medicinal benefits.⁴ The Phokaia mines under the control of the Zaccaria were the most productive of the time and produced alum of an extremely high quality, only bettered by that of Karahissar (Koloneia) in north-eastern Anatolia.⁵ Importantly for the Zaccaria, although the Phokaia mines were situated in *Turchia* just north of Smyrna, the Turks do not seem to have played any part in the extraction of the chemical or its shipment: the Zaccaria employed Greek miners (some

³ These points are discussed in detail by Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, esp. pp. 117–62.

⁴ For more on alum, see C.S. Singer, *The Earliest Chemical Industry: An Essay in the Historical Relations of Economics and Technology Illustrated from the Alum Trade* (London, 1948), esp. pp. 79–135; Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, pp. 769–81; D. Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XIe–XVe siècles', in *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. P. Borgard, J.-P. Brun and M. Picon (Naples, 2005), pp. 219–67.

⁵ Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica Della Mercatura*, pp. 367–70; Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, pp. 353–5, doc. 176.

3,000 by 1305),⁶ and exported the commodity to the textile industries of northern Europe.⁷ For this reason, when the Zaccaria resorted to military action against the Turks from 1319 onwards, the trade in alum does not appear to have been adversely affected.

However, this was not the case for the other main commodity that the family specialized in; the unique Chiote product of mastic gum.⁸ Mastic was highly valued as an aromatic chewing gum and for its medicinal properties. It was popular in Europe, but even more so in the Islamic world, especially Mamluk Egypt.⁹ By the time the Zaccaria had engaged in concerted military operations against the Aydin Turks in 1319 several factors had effectively cut off the mastic trade at a time when the revenue was needed most, as is illustrated by a petition of the brothers Martino and Benedetto II Zaccaria to Pope John XXII in 1320. According to them, the conflict with the Turks and civil war in Genoa had prevented Christian merchants from exporting mastic from Chios to the West. This left the Saracens as the only ones shipping the product from the island, as Christian merchants were forbidden from visiting Mamluk lands. The brothers claimed that the loss of revenue caused by these obstructions had forced them to release soldiers from their employ, which in turn was compromising their ability to resist the Turks; a factor which gravely imperilled both the Christians on Chios and on the neighbouring islands. The pope was evidently moved by the Zaccaria appeals and in response issued the brothers with a special licence (*licentiam*) to generate money for their operations against the Turks. This 'trade licence' allowed the family unrestricted right to ship mastic to the lands of the Mamluk sultan for a period of two years and to bring back other merchandise, except explicitly forbidden goods (i.e. war materials and slaves), on their same ships without incurring any of the penalties usually imposed for

⁶ Ramon Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East*, pp. 127–8.

⁷ See Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, pp. 219–20, doc. 108 (8 Jul 1268); *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes*, ed. Doehaerd, vol. 3, docs 1356–7 (12 May 1278), 1530 (29 Oct 1298); Archivio di Stato di Genoa, Notai Antichi, Not. Andreolus de Laneris, vol. 1, fols 37v–38r, 40r–v (29–30 Oct 1298).

⁸ Mastic was a gum extracted from the *Pistacia lentiscus* tree, which although native to the Mediterranean, only produces high-grade gum on Chios. For more on mastic production, see P. Freedman, 'Mastic: A Mediterranean luxury product', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 26 (2011), 99–113; C. Belles, *Mastiha Island*, trans. C. Sachtouri (Athens, 2005), pp. 29–95, 245–83; J. Perikos, *The Chios Gum Mastic* (Athens, 1993), pp. 13–21.

⁹ Sanudo claimed that the import tax levied on the product generated much revenue for the sultan: Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum', pp. 24–5, 33, 46; Lock trans., pp. 53, 66, 85. See also the comments by Ludolph of Sudheim, *Description of the Holy Land, and of the Way Thither*, p. 29; William of Boldensele, 'Des Edelherrn Wilhelm von Boldensele Reise nach dem gelobten Lande', p. 32. This is discussed by Carr, 'Trade or crusade?', pp. 119–20; Freedman, 'Mastic', 102, 105.

breaking the trade embargo.¹⁰ It was renewed for four years in 1322 and for a further three years in 1325.¹¹

It is unfortunate that the lack of notarial documents relating to Chios under the first Genoese occupation means that determining the effectiveness of the mastic licence is extremely difficult. With the exception of sporadic mastic shipments, such as one to Liguria in 1327, evidence of exports from the island during the 1320s is scarce.¹² This is especially the case for exports to Mamluk lands, which despite being mentioned in the Cairo Geniza do not exist for this particular period.¹³ Nevertheless, various sources provide glimpses of the wealth and prosperity of Chios in the 1320s, which could plausibly have been a result of the papal privileges. It has been claimed that the high quality of gold and silver coinage struck on the island is a reflection of the high level of economic prosperity, which was a direct result of the steady inflow of Byzantine and Italian money from the sale of mastic.¹⁴ This seems likely considering the comments of the contemporary Turkish *Manaḡeb al-ʿarefin*, which stated that in the late 1320s the forces of Umur of Aydin carried away 'more mastic than can be described' from Chios (*Sagez Adasi*).¹⁵ Another source, John Kantakouzenos, who was present during the conquest of the island by the Byzantine emperor in 1329, claimed that the annual income of Martino Zaccaria had reached 120,000 *hyperpyra*; a huge sum which equates to roughly one-fifth of the annual imperial revenue under Andronikos III.¹⁶ Contemporaries also commented on the large forces which the family were able to maintain in the defence of their island which

¹⁰ The document is in printed in Appendix 4, doc. 1, pp. 157–8. See also Carr 'Trade or Crusade?', pp. 125–6.

¹¹ ASVat, *RA* 17, fols 242–242v; *RV* 73, ep. 1071 (25 Jun 1322); *RA* 23, fol. 143; *RV* 79, ep. 1449 (29 Jan 1325); summaries in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, vol. 4, doc. 15644, vol. 5, doc. 21494. In the 1340s more licences were granted to permit mastic shipments to Egypt, but by then the Zaccaria had lost control of Chios and there is no evidence that these later mastic licences were connected with the war against the Turks: ASVat, *RS* 9, fol. 168r (3 Sep 1345), *RS* 18, fols. 39v, 42r (18–19 Nov 1348); summaries in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', docs 13, 38–9.

¹² *Les relations commerciales entre Gènes, la Belgique et l'Outremont: d'après les archives notariales génoises (1320–1400)*, ed. L. Liagre-de Sturler, 2 vols (Brussels, 1969), vol. 1, doc. 46.

¹³ Some earlier examples are preserved in the letters of Jewish merchants: S.D. Goitein, *Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders* (Princeton, 1979), pp. 99, 131, 133, 196.

¹⁴ This point is made by Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East*, pp. 289–91. Also see Mazarakis, 'The Chios mint during the rule of the Zaccaria family', 43–52; G. Lunardi, *Le monete delle colonie Genovesi* (Genoa, 1980), pp. 179–88; G. Schlumberger, *Numismatique de l'orient Latin*, vol. 2, pp. 413–15.

¹⁵ Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki, *The Feats of the Knowers of God (Manaḡeb al-ʿarefin)*, trans. J. O'Kane (Leiden, 2002), p. 665.

¹⁶ John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*, vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 10, 12, pp. 371, 379–80; Carr, 'Trade or crusade?', p. 128.

makes it likely that the mastic licences achieved their objective of helping the Zaccaria finance their war against the Turks.¹⁷

The process of granting licences to reduce the total embargo to a selective one, by allowing trade with Muslims – always in non-prohibited merchandise – was not a new development in itself.¹⁸ As early as 1198 Innocent III had granted the Republic of Venice temporary permission to trade in ‘clean’ merchandise with Egypt in order to persuade the doge to participate in a forthcoming crusade.¹⁹ Similarly, only a year before the fall of Acre – when Egypt had become the primary focus of papal trade sanctions – news of a truce had persuaded Nicholas IV to allow Christian merchants to transport victuals and other non war materials between Egypt and the Holy Land as long as the truce lasted.²⁰ However, the Zaccaria licence was different. It marked the first occasion when a trade concession was awarded specifically in order to facilitate military action against the Turks, or *contra Turchos* as it will be referred to here. This formed the first part of a wider policy introduced by John XXII of using trade licences to shift the focus of anti-Muslim military endeavours in the Mediterranean; one which would gradually be expanded to include the conflict with Muslims in Granada from the late 1320s, and would eventually come to form an integral part of papal-merchant strategy against the Turks in the 1340s (see Appendices 2 and 3).²¹

Venice

The Venetians were also the recipients of trade licences granted *contra Turchos*, but their situation in the Aegean was more complex than that of the Zaccaria, which meant that initial negotiations with the papacy proved to be less fruitful. Venetian commercial links with the Muslim rulers of western Anatolia were an extension of formal commercial relations begun with the Seljuks in the early thirteenth century. These increased after the Seljuk domain collapsed during the Mongol invasion of 1243, when merchants began regularly to frequent the port of Makre in the lands of Mentеше.

¹⁷ See Carr, ‘Trade or crusade?’, pp. 128–9.

¹⁸ See the examples from the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries given by Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, esp. pp. 41–87.

¹⁹ A.J. Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade: Revised Edition* (Leiden, 2008), pp. 23–4 (3 Dec 1198).

²⁰ Nicholas IV, *Les registres de Nicolas IV: Recueil des bulles de ce pape*, ed. M.E. Langlois, 2 vols (Paris, 1905), vol. 1, doc. 4403 (21 Oct 1290); Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, p. 121.

²¹ John XXII granted licences allowing Christian rulers to send ships to Mamluk Egypt in order to recoup losses incurred in fighting Muslims in Iberia: J. Trenchs-Odena, ‘“De Alexandrinis” (El comercio prohibido con los Musulmanes y el papado de Avignon durante la primera mitad del siglo XIV)’, *Anuario de estudios medievales* 10 (1980), 237–320, at 269–70, docs 4 (7 Oct 1328), 6 (1 Feb 1331), 7 (12 Jul 1331). He also granted a licence to Walter of Brienne, permitting him to send two cogs to Alexandria: ASVat, RV 98, fol. 216v, doc. 475; summary in John XXII, *Communes*, vol. 10, doc. 52188 (5 Jan 1331).

By the early years of the fourteenth century, the deeds of Candian notaries and rulings of the Venetian Senate show that Cretans were operating on the Turkish mainland and were regularly importing commodities such as soap, horses and slaves to their island, as well as grain and other foodstuffs which were of extreme importance to the Aegean colonies and to Venice itself.²² Although documents relating to the official commercial relations with the Turks remain scarce during this early period, it seems likely that the good relations between Crete and Monteshe resulted in a formal treaty being made between the two sides sometime before 1318.²³

During these years the Venetians appealed to the papacy for permission to trade with the Mamluks, but unlike the Zaccaria they could not cite war with the Turks as a legitimate reason for needing this concession. Instead, Venetian appeals centred around the argument that the prosperity of the Republic was derived from overseas trade and not from land, fields, vineyards or other possessions, as was the case with most other states. This was an argument first put forward in the Venetian licence of 1198 and formed a basis of subsequent petitions thereafter.²⁴ A supplication for a papal licence based on this rationale was discussed by the Venetian Senate in October 1317, where it was deemed a reasonable request by the papal legate who suggested that an envoy be sent to the pope.²⁵ In early 1319 the matter was raised again and the Senate authorized 5,000 florins to be sent to ambassadors at the papal curia to purchase a licence.²⁶ However, no papal records suggest that the Venetian petition was granted and in early 1323 the Senate and the authorities on Crete re-iterated the papal decrees that no Venetian 'dare go to Alexandria or to other lands subjected to the Sultan with any things or goods or send to said lands anything in any way'.²⁷ What followed was a period of strict embargo whereby state-sponsored trade with Egypt was halted until 1344.²⁸ During this time Venetian galleys going eastward were organized into just two official convoys: one to Cilician Armenia and Cyprus, or just Cyprus, and the other, called 'galleys of Romania', to Constantinople and the Black Sea.²⁹

²² For more information on this, see Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 163–5.

²³ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 3–7, 18.

²⁴ See above, note 19, and Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 55–8.

²⁵ *I libri commemoriali*, vol. 1, pp. 183–4, docs 64–5 (3, 5 Oct 1317).

²⁶ *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, pp. 201, 207, docs 277, 353 (Feb–May 1319). See also Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, p. 136.

²⁷ *Duca di Candia: Bandi (1313–1329)*, ed. P. Ratti Vidulich (Venice, 1965), pp. 129–30, doc. 342 (15 Apr 1323) quotation from Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, p. 138. The order was originally made by the Senate on 18 January 1323: *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, p. 265, doc. 239.

²⁸ For a detailed discussion of reasons behind this, see Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 133–45; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 44–63; cf. Ortalli, 'Venice and papal bans on trade', 242–58.

²⁹ F.C. Lane, 'The Venetian galleys to Alexandria, 1344', in Idem, *Studies in Venetian Social and Economic History*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1987), XIII, pp. 431–3, at p. 431.

This restriction of the Republic's official trade with Egypt coincided with the start of Turkish-Catalan raids against the islands of the western Aegean and mainland Greece, which increasingly compromised trade with Anatolia. From this point onwards the Venetian authorities had to strike a difficult balance between the facilitation of local trade with the beyliks on the one hand, and the enforcement of the papal embargo and military action against the Turks on the other. At first, the authorities on Crete resorted to a policy of appeasement with the Turks and Catalans in order to safeguard regular shipments from Anatolia. This resulted in a series of temporary truces which seem to have allowed some local trade with Monteshe.³⁰ But by the mid 1320s it became apparent that the Aydin Turks were posing the main threat to Venetian possessions. This allowed the Cretan authorities to cement their ties with Monteshe further, forming a new treaty with Emir Orkhan in 1331.³¹ However, the re-opening of trade with Monteshe compelled the Senate to impose an embargo on trade in Turkey a year later.³² This action further compromised the shipment of necessary provisions to Venetian territories, which was a significant problem considering the imminent arrival of the forces of the first naval league in the Aegean. Consequently, in late 1333, a Cretan embassy was sent to Venice to request permission to negotiate another agreement with Orkhan of Monteshe so that horses, animals and corn might be secured from his territories. The Senate accepted the Cretan proposal and also declared that the previous prohibition imposed on trade in Turkey only applied to Venetian subjects and not to foreigners employed by the Venetians. This ruling therefore allowed the duke of Crete to import goods from the Turks through the use non-Venetian intermediaries.³³

After the victories of the naval league, a new prohibition was introduced on trade in *Turchia* by the Senate in 1335.³⁴ However, by this time the financial burden of maintaining galleys in the Aegean for almost two years was beginning to be felt by the Republic. Perhaps as a response to this, the Senate granted the Venetian captain of the league permission to transport passengers within the Aegean, probably to subsidize the expense of maintaining the galleys.³⁵ In 1336 the *Serenissima* also issued new orders which

³⁰ See Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 13–16, 18.

³¹ Full text in Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 187–9, doc. 1331M, discussed at pp. 18–20.

³² Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 20, 28 (Jun 1332).

³³ For these negotiations, see Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, pp. 130–3, doc. 14 (16 Nov 1333); Thiriet, *Sénat*, vol. 1, doc. 38; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 28.

³⁴ Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, p. 160, doc. 6 (20 Jun 1335).

³⁵ Theotokes, *Thespismata*, vol. 2.1, p. 159, doc. 1 (6 March 1335); Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 34. The galleys were initially expected to partially subsidise themselves through the transport of merchandise on their outward journey: *Documents on the Later Crusades*, p. 73, doc. 20, but in May 1334 John XXII ruled that no goods were to be carried as they

specifically instructed the captain of the league to capture as many Turkish ships as possible, again probably to alleviate the expense of the galleys, this time through prize money and confiscated cargoes.³⁶ Once the league had disbanded the Cretans sought another treaty with the Turks, this time with Aydin as well as Monteshe, in 1337.³⁷ These treaties provide a good insight into the concerns of the Republic at this time. As Venice and Monteshe had held commercial agreements before 1337, the clauses of this treaty were mostly concerned with amending the trading rights of Venetians in the emirate, such as the restoration of weights and measures, the securing of tax privileges, and an order that the Turks cease the construction of dwellings in the district allocated to the Venetians. There was also one clause which provides a good example of the importance of grain imports from *Turchia*. This specifically stipulated that the *shinik* – a measure commonly used for cereals – be restored to its previous status.³⁸ Unlike the agreement made with Monteshe, the treaty concluded with Aydin was the first to be made between the two parties. The majority of the clauses of the treaty therefore refer to settling the conditions necessary for commercial exchange, such as the fixing of customs duties, the establishment of a consul in Theologo (Ephesos) and the granting of an area for Venetian merchants. As well as this the treaties provided a good opportunity for the Venetians to gain a foothold in the alum trade – previously dominated by the Genoese – by allowing them access to one of the most productive alum mines of the period, that of Kutahya in the landlocked emirate of Germiyan.³⁹ The Venetians were able to do this by forcing Monteshe and Aydin to abolish the *appalto* (a state monopoly) on alum shipments from Kutahya to their ports of Ephesos and Balat, from where it could be shipped by Venetians to the West.⁴⁰ By securing the best possible trade agreements with the Anatolian Turks the Republic had therefore succeeded in securing preferential trade in

might hold up progress: John XXII, *Lettres secrètes*, vol. 4, doc. 5495 (30 May 1334); Housley, 'Costing the crusade', p. 47.

³⁶ Theotokes, *Thepismata*, vol. 2.1, p. 168, doc. 21 (15 Feb 1336). Naval forces were often expected to partially pay for themselves through the capture of enemy ships: Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, p. 60.

³⁷ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 34–7, 190–200, docs 1337A, 1337M.

³⁸ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, doc. 1337M, p. 198 (clause 23).

³⁹ According to Pegolotti, Kutahya produced around 12,000 *cantara* of alum per year, compared with 14,000 from Phokaia: Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica Della Mercatura*, pp. 367–70; Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, pp. 353–5, doc. 176.

⁴⁰ See Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, doc. 1337A, p. 192 (clause 12), doc. 1337M, p. 199 (clause 28); Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun', 246; Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 26, 77–8, 89–90. An *appalto* was a common form of monopolistic concession in the late medieval Mediterranean, see C.F. Wright, 'Florentine alum mining in the Hospitaller islands: the *appalto* of 1442', *Journal of Medieval History* 32 (2010), 175–91.

a market which had hitherto been dominated by their fiercest commercial rival.

Economic Crises during the Crusade of Smyrna

The Closure of Eastern Markets

Despite the ability of the Venetians to secure some commercial agreements with the Turks, the instability of trade in the Aegean region led Venetian representatives at the papal curia to launch fresh appeals for permission to trade in Egypt, in 1327–8 and again in 1337.⁴¹ These appeals reiterated the arguments made in earlier supplications but again seem to have fallen on deaf ears. However, by the 1340s, when the crusade against the Turks coincided with the widespread breakdown of trade in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, supplicants at the curia – including the Venetians – began to cite their commitment to the crusade and the economic pressure that this entailed as a justification for receiving licences. Consequently the pontificate of Clement VI resulted in a dramatic increase in the awarding of trade licences, especially those granted *contra Turchos*.

The change in policy must be understood in relation to the economic background in the Mediterranean at the end of the 1330s and beginning of the 1340s. Venetian trade in Anatolia was presumably stable in the years immediately after the treaties of 1337, but by the summer of 1339 Turkish raids resumed and began to impede trade in the Aegean region once again.⁴² To add to this, in 1337 the Armenian port of Lajazzo had been captured by the Mamluks, further restricting the opportunities for lawful trade for Latin merchants.⁴³ More problems arose a year later when the Senate passed a law prohibiting its merchants from trading with the Mongol Ilkhanate, and forbade them from purchasing Ilkhanate goods in any other lands, including the markets of Constantinople, Tana and Cyprus. The prohibition was to be proclaimed on an annual basis and those who broke it would be fined 1,000 pounds; an enormous sum which must have forced a high level of compliance. The ban was imposed in retaliation for abuses Venetian merchants had suffered in Ilkhanate lands, which had damaged trade as well as the honour

⁴¹ *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 105 (1327); *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, vol. 1, pp. 361–71, docs 31, 98, 127, 137, 138 (Jun–Nov 1328); *The Records of the Venetian Senate on Disk, 1335–1400*, ed. B. Kohl (New York, 2001), doc. 179 (30 Nov 1337). See also Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 46, 65–6.

⁴² Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 41–2.

⁴³ Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 46, n. 178.

of the city.⁴⁴ This was coupled with another Venetian ban in 1341, this time against trade in the principality of Achaia for similar reasons.⁴⁵

An even more serious threat to the economic stability of the whole Mediterranean region arose in the northern Black Sea in the early 1340s. By this time Venetian and Genoese merchants were well established in the Black Sea, whence they exported large amounts of grain to European markets from their colonies in Caffa and Tana. Relations had been good, but in 1343 a fight broke out in Tana which led to a mob attack on the Venetian residents there. During the clash considerable blood was shed which prompted the khan of the Golden Horde to expel all Latin merchants from Tana, after which he also laid siege to Genoese Caffa and prohibited all grain exports from the region. To make matters worse, Latin communities in Trebizond were also attacked by the local population and forced to submit to harsh restrictions.⁴⁶ In response the Venetians and the Genoese made an agreement to ban all trade with the Golden Horde. Even though some individual merchants still traded in Crimea after this point, it was not until 1347 that the two republics made peace with the khan and officially reopened commercial links.⁴⁷

As relations with the Tartar khan began to break down, the Venetians and the other Latin powers stepped up their crusade plans against the Turks by dispatching galleys to the Aegean. It may even be that the Crusade of Smyrna was launched because of Venetian fears over trade. This is intimated by a contemporary from Rimini who suggested that the Turks had broken trade agreements relating to grain with the Venetians, and also by the less reliable Anonimo Romano who reported that Umur had provoked the crusade by raising taxes on Venetian merchants without just cause.⁴⁸ However, it seems unlikely that these commercial factors motivated the

⁴⁴ *Venezia-senato: deliberazioni miste*, vol. 4 (*Registre XVII, 1335–1339*), pp. 459–62, docs 1204–8 (17 Dec 1335); Stantchev, 'The medieval origins of embargo', 392. The Genoese may have implemented a similar ban a few years later: S. Karpov, 'Black Sea and the crisis of the mid XIVth century: an underestimated turning point', *Thesaurismata* 27 (1997), 65–78, at 69.

⁴⁵ *Venezia-senato: deliberazioni miste*, vol. 6 (*Registre XIX, 1340–1341*), pp. 195–7, docs 380, 386 (13 and 15 Jan 1341).

⁴⁶ For the Black Sea crisis, see Karpov, 'Black Sea and the crisis of the mid XIVth century', 65–78; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 45–9. For Latin possessions in Caffa and Tana, see E.Č. Skržinskaja, 'Storia della Tana', *Studi Veneziani* 10 (1968), 3–45 and Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, pp. 114–18, 199–215.

⁴⁷ Karpov, 'Black Sea and the crisis of the mid XIVth century', 70; Stantchev, 'The medieval origins of embargo', 393–4.

⁴⁸ Marco Battagli of Rimini, *Marcha (1212–1354)*, ed. A.F. Massèra, *RISNS* 16.3 (Città di Castello, 1913), pp. 50–1, his exact words are '[the crusade] happened on account of agreements of grain, which had existed between the Venetians and the Turks, and because of other depredations of the Turks carried out by them tyrannically'; Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, p. 103. See also Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 44; Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 59, 70.

Venetian contribution to the crusade: the conflict with the Turks actually exacerbated the economic situation in the Aegean, which is something the *Serenissima* surely would have been aware of. The damage done to trade is demonstrated in a letter written from Crete in October 1344, where a group of merchants complained that it was not possible for anyone to come or go from Turkey.⁴⁹ By September 1345 things had got so bad that the Cretan administration reported that there was famine on the island.⁵⁰ The grain shortage resulted in a general rise in prices, the effects of which were felt most severely in Romania, but also as far afield as Italy. In the face of these problems it comes as no surprise that Latin merchants increasingly turned to the Mamluk sultanate for the shipment of grain to supply Aegean markets as well as those of western Europe. Evidence of this is given by a letter of a merchant in Candia of December 1344, which showed that the Aegean region had become dependent on food supplies from Alexandria.⁵¹

Trade Wars and Rivalries

The closure of so many markets in the eastern Mediterranean further accentuated the rivalries between the Latins of the East, whose concerns over the security of their colonies prompted them to engage in policies of economic protectionism and opportunism which proved to be detrimental to crusading operations.⁵² This can be seen clearly in the activities of the Genoese in regard to the naval leagues. Considering the history of animosity between the maritime republics, it comes as no surprise that Genoa refused to contribute 'officially' to the leagues, which were considered to be Venetian-dominated campaigns designed to further the interests of the Republic. As a consequence some Genoese in the Aegean pursued their own agenda in order to consolidate or recover the possessions of their countrymen overseas. This occurred as early as the first naval league when Domenico Cattaneo, the Genoese ruler of Phokaia, declined to contribute to the fleet but instead launched a failed campaign to conquer Byzantine Lesbos with the assistance of the Hospitallers at the beginning of 1335.⁵³ A similar situation arose during the Smyrna campaign in 1346 when the Genoese fleet commanded

⁴⁹ *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello*, pp. 23–6, doc. 9 (5 Oct 1344).

⁵⁰ *Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum*, pp. 33–6, doc. 67 (24 Sep 1345).

⁵¹ *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello*, pp. 29–30, doc. 12 (28 Dec 1344).

⁵² On economic protectionism, see Stantchev, 'The medieval origins of embargo', 386–90.

⁵³ Cattaneo had been compelled by the emperor to recognize his suzerainty after the conquest of Chios in 1329. After this his position at Phokaia was weakened considerably and he was forced to pay tribute to the neighbouring Turks, see Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 37–8. The chronology of the Lesbos attack is obscured by the conflicting Byzantine accounts: John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*, vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 29–32, pp. 476–95; Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, vol. 1, bk. 11, ch. 1–2, pp. 523–31; P. Schreiner, *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, 3 vols (Vienna, 1975–9), vol. 1, p. 76, vol. 2, pp. 246–7, vol. 3, p. 30.

by Simone Vignoso actively refused to assist Humbert of Viennois in his planned capture of Chios as a base of operations. Instead, Vignoso attacked Humbert's fleet off Negroponte and seized Chios for himself, followed by the Phokaias.⁵⁴ The ship owners led by Vignoso set up a cooperative, known as the Mahona, which would rule the island until 1566.⁵⁵ In the years immediately after the conquest of Chios, they offered no support to the crusade and instead proceeded to raid Venetian possessions after the outbreak of war between the two sides in 1350. Obviously not all Genoese hindered crusading operations: the Zaccaria, for example, were main players in the Turkish conflicts up to 1329. However, even the appointment of the illustrious Martino Zaccaria as captain of the papal galleys of the league in 1343 appears to have been ill-thought out by the pope, who had to introduce measures to prevent Martino from diverting the crusade to Chios. Even though this was not done, Clement still felt it necessary to permit the papal legate to replace Martino as captain if he failed to carry out papal orders.⁵⁶

The Venetians for their part were equally concerned with commercial rivalries during the Smyrna Crusade. They were already suspicious of the motives of Martino Zaccaria, and even though he was killed by the Turks in January 1345, their commitment to the crusade began to cool. This can be seen in the conduct of the Venetians towards Humbert of Viennois. His force arrived at Negroponte in late 1345, but the Venetian authorities were unwilling to supply him with the vessels he needed to sail to Smyrna. In the following May they eventually agreed to his demands, but six months later the Republic was reprimanded by the pope for preventing crusaders who wished to travel to Smyrna from departing from Venice.⁵⁷ By this time the Hospitallers had entered the fray on the side of their old allies the Genoese, who had just captured Chios under Vignoso. In the autumn of 1346 the Hospitallers imposed a new customs duty on Venetian merchants trading in their territories, and although the Cretan government sent an ambassador to protest, the Hospitallers refused to back down. In response, the Cretan administration decreed in March 1347 that all Cretan trade with Hospitaller territories be prohibited, under threat of heavy punishment.⁵⁸ A few months later, a merchant wrote from Crete that the trade routes to Rhodes had been

⁵⁴ Giorgio Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, ed. G. Petti Balbi, *RISNS* 17.2 (Bologna, 1975), pp. 145–7; Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 243; Leonhard, *Genua und die päpstliche Kurie in Avignon*, pp. 176–83.

⁵⁵ On the Mahona see P.P. Argenti, 'The Mahona of the Giustiniani: Genoese colonialism and the Genoese relationship with Chios', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 6 (1979), 1–35; Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp. 210–11, 219–24, 237, 243, 308.

⁵⁶ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 405 (16 Sep. 1343), 1113–14 (18 Sep 1344), 1464 (1 Feb 1345); Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 244–5.

⁵⁷ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, doc. 2956 (28 Nov 1346); Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 1273.

⁵⁸ Thiriet, *Assemblées*, vol. 1, docs 532, 533, 539; *Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum*, docs

closed.⁵⁹ Given these difficulties it is possible that the Venetians sent ambassadors to Umur to agree a truce at this time, as is claimed by the Anonimo Romano. His account – admittedly of an anti-Venetian stance – even went as far as to say that the Venetians prevented supplies from reaching Smyrna by blockading the port and that they fleeced the crusaders in the city of all their money.⁶⁰ At this time the Republic also sought to re-open trade in the Black Sea by making a treaty with the Tartars. But once again, this measure seems to have resulted in conflict with the Genoese who captured a Venetian vessel there, in an attempt to exclude their rivals from the Black Sea. The Venetians duly retaliated by seizing Genoese ships. These actions were the prelude to the Venetian-Genoese war which would break out in 1350.⁶¹

By now the Hospitallers were also suffering from the consequences of the economic collapse in the region and decided to agree a one-year truce with Hizir of Aydin.⁶² According to the Anonimo Romano, the Knights were preventing Venetian ships from coming to Smyrna and were even supplying weapons to the Turks.⁶³ In reality, by this time operations against the Turks were starting to wind down; the papal galleys had already ended their service and the Black Death was beginning to take its toll in the Aegean. Consequently truce negotiations were opened with the Aydin, first with Umur, but then with Hizir, after the death of his brother in the early summer of 1348.⁶⁴ Even though every party was in need of peace by this stage, once again old rivalries acted to derail negotiations. The representatives of the Latins in the negotiations with Hizir were Bartolommeo of Tomari, the canon of Negroponte, and Octavian Zaccaria, the son of Martino. The Venetians were suspicious that Octavian Zaccaria would push for Genoese interests and wrote letters of protest to the pope over this.⁶⁵ By 1349 Turkish raids resumed once again and the truce negotiations were cancelled. Even though the naval league was temporarily renewed, the rising tensions between

124, 126, 128, 132, 138, 147, 149; Luttrell, 'Crete and Rhodes', pp. 171–2; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 48–9.

⁵⁹ *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello*, doc. 36, p. 73 (16 May 1347).

⁶⁰ Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, pp. 115–16; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 51–2; Carr, 'Humbert of Viennois and the Crusade of Smyrna', 248.

⁶¹ See Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 48–9.

⁶² Full text in Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 201–4, doc. 1346A.

⁶³ Anonimo Romano, *Cronica*, p. 116.

⁶⁴ For the negotiations with Umur, see Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, docs 1563–4 (20–1 Jan 1348); Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 2, doc. 3728 (5 Feb 1348). The full text of the draft treaty with Hizir is in *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 168; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, doc. 1348A, pp. 205–10; discussion in Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 55–6; Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 226–31; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 214–17.

⁶⁵ M. Brunetti, 'Contributo alla Storia delle relazioni veneto-genovesi dal 1348 al 1350', *Miscellanea di Storia Veneta* 9 (Venice, 1916), pp. 1–160, at pp. 33–4; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 56–7.

Venice and Genoa prevented it from taking any concerted action against the Turks. The escalation of the skirmishes in the Black Sea led the Venetians to dispatch a fleet of around thirty-five galleys to the Aegean in 1350 under the command of Marco Ruzzini, the newly appointed Captain General of the Sea. Ruzzini's fleet attacked fourteen Genoese galleys in the harbour of Castro near Negroponte, capturing ten of them. The Genoese response was to send a fleet of sixty-four galleys to the Aegean in the following year. In order to boost their strength, the Venetians allied themselves with the Greeks of John Kantakouzenos and the Aragonese. Subsequent sea battles were fought in the waters of the Aegean, the Bosphorus, off Modon in the Peloponnese and in the western Mediterranean. A truce was made in 1355, by which time concerted action against the Turks had well and truly taken a back seat.⁶⁶

Trade Licences Granted by Clement VI

Considering the rivalries between the Latins in the Aegean and the detrimental effect this had on the already poor economic situation in the region, it is unsurprising that trade licences, similar to those granted to the Zaccaria in the 1320s, were sought by the Venetians and the other Latins operating in the eastern Mediterranean. These licences represent an important evolution in papal crusading strategy as economic mechanisms began to be employed by the popes in order to facilitate the participation of merchant crusaders in campaigns in the Mediterranean, especially against the Turks. The trade licences fall into three different categories: the first consists of licences which were used strictly *contra Turchos*, i.e. those that permitted trade with Mamluk Egypt in order to subsidize directly expenses incurred in fighting the Turks (as was the case with the Zaccaria licences of the 1320s); the second category is made up by those licences that have an indirect reference to the conflict with the Turks, usually ones in which the recipients cited a connection with the crusade in their supplication in order to improve their chances of success; the third and final category contains 'general' or 'standard' licences which have no connection to the Turks, and consequently will not be discussed here.⁶⁷

There are a total of eight licences granted by Clement VI which fit into the first category (see Appendix 2).⁶⁸ One of the first of these – and certainly the most well known – was granted to the Venetians in 1344. The decision to make a petition for this licence was taken by the Senate in December 1343,

⁶⁶ For more on the Venetian-Genoese war of 1350–5, see Lane, *Venice*, pp. 174–9; Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare*, pp. 104–7.

⁶⁷ The third category of licences is studied in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', 12–14.

⁶⁸ Some of these licences are also discussed by Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 145–52.

after the closure of the eastern markets had begun to restrict severely the activities of Venetian traders. The Senate supported the idea of re-opening trade with Egypt and decided that two ambassadors should be sent to the curia 'as soon as possible' to implore the pope about this, the argument being that the Venetians were suffering significant economic hardship after the 'loss or obstruction' of the trade routes running to Tana and the Black Sea.⁶⁹ Unfortunately the original Venetian petition has been lost, but in the papal response of April 1344, Clement VI recalled the words used by the Venetian ambassadors in their supplication. From this we can reconstruct the tenor of the request and interestingly here the first specific link is made between the Venetians' petition and their participation in the naval league: the pope wrote that the Republic had been incurring 'very great and intolerable labours against the Turks', and that he wished them to continue to 'proceed favourably' in their military activities. Clement ended his letter by granting the *Serenissima* permission to send six galleys and four cargo ships to Mamluk lands for a five-year period, in acknowledgement of their 'sincere zeal and firm purpose [...] for the work of the holy faith and also for the exaltation and increase of God's Church'.⁷⁰ Two months later the Senate instructed its ambassadors at the papal curia to pay up to 5,000 florins for this privilege. This was a considerable sum of money, but far less than the total amount the Venetians would be able to recoup from this trade.⁷¹ A year after that, the licence was amended on petition from the Venetians so that seven galleys could be sent for each cargo ship, because of the continued danger from piracy and the relative security of oared vessels.⁷² The immediate economic results of the 1344 concession are fairly clear. Only four months after the papal licence had been dispatched from the curia, the Senate agreed to send ambassadors to the Mamluk sultan with orders to

⁶⁹ ASVen, *Misti del Senato*, reg. 21, fol. 83v (30 Dec. 1343); *Venezia-senato: deliberazioni miste*, vol. 8 (*Registre XXI, 1342–1344*), pp. 341–2, doc. 657. A full translation of the deliberation is given by Lane, 'The Venetian galleys to Alexandria', p. 433.

⁷⁰ DVL, vol. 1, doc. 144 (27 Apr 1344); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 3.

⁷¹ *I libri commemoriali*, vol. 2, pp. 140–1, doc. 134 (30 Jul 1344). It is difficult to calculate the monetary value of the Venetian licence, but it must have been extremely high. To give it some context there is an example of two merchants being granted a licence for one cog, as they were unable to use their old licence to trade in merchandise worth up to 10,000 florins. This suggests that a licence for one cog was equivalent in value to a licence permitting 10,000 florins of trade: ASVat, RS 22, fol. 45r; summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 56. King Peter of Aragon also complained to the pope that his licence for one cog only yielded him 400 florins of profit, suggesting that the licence would usually expected to generate far more money: RV 168, fol. 348r–v, ep. 382; RS 12, fol. 81r; summaries in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', docs 14–19. The value of licences is also discussed by Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 149–50.

⁷² The licence was now for thirty-four galleys only: Appendix 4, doc. 6, p. 162; ASVat, RS 9, fol. 139v (15 Aug 1345); outgoing papal letter in *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, vol. 1, doc. 162; summaries in Clement VI, *Lettres autres que la France*, doc. 756; Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 12.

obtain a commercial treaty so that galleys could sail directly to Egypt the following year.⁷³ This facilitated direct trade with Egypt on a grand scale, the level of which had not been seen since the early fourteenth century. For example, in 1346 around nine tons of Egyptian alum were shipped from Crete to Venice by a Siennese trader.⁷⁴ At the end of 1347 a merchant wrote from Alexandria to Venice that a cog sailing from Messina with a rich cargo of merchandise was being awaited every day. The author emphasized that the shipment had a licence from the pope.⁷⁵ Hereafter, other bulky goods were also shipped to and from Alexandria without the risk of papal sanction.

To return to the rhetoric used by the pope, it is clear that although the Venetian Senate did not originally instruct its ambassadors to make mention of the conflict against the Turks, the supplicants were still able to recognize the value of including such information when they stated their case at the curia.⁷⁶ The 1344 licence marks a turning point in papal relations with Venice vis-à-vis trade in Mamluk Egypt and is therefore of great importance. For the first time, the papacy agreed to Venetian appeals to relax trade with Egypt, as long as Venice was a willing participant in its crusading projects. In doing so it also directly mirrored the rhetoric and justification of the Zaccaria licences granted twenty years previously.

As well as the Venetian licence, Clement VI also issued many more concessions to those who were engaged in the crusade against the Turks. Two were issued to the Hospitaller prior of Navarre, Garin of Châteauneuf, in 1344 and again in 1345. He was awarded a permit to send a total of three galleys to Alexandria so that the proceeds could be used to help maintain Hospitaller forces in the Aegean for the 'defence of the faithful in overseas lands who are cruelly molested by the Turks and other infidels'.⁷⁷ Considering the greater capacity of cargo ships, this licence was not hugely generous – and nowhere near as valuable as that granted to the Venetians – but it was presumably sufficient to subsidize the upkeep of the Hospitaller

⁷³ *Venezia-senato: deliberazioni miste*, vol. 9 (*Registre XXII, 1344–1345*), pp. 170–7, docs 344–59 (19 and 23 Aug 1344); Lane, 'The Venetian galleys to Alexandria', p. 435; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 67–9.

⁷⁴ *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello*, pp. 56–8, docs 25–6 (10 Apr and 12 May 1346); Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun', p. 242; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, p. 69.

⁷⁵ *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello*, pp. 110–12, doc. 58; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, pp. 69–70.

⁷⁶ The link between the licence and the naval league is also discussed by: M. Carr, 'Papal trade licences, Italian merchants and the changing perceptions of the Mamluks and Turkish beyliks in the fourteenth century', in *Diasporic Groups and Identities in the Eastern Mediterranean (1100–1800)*, ed. G. Christ *et al.* (Rome, 2015), pp. 489–97; Ashtor, *Levantine Trade*, pp. 66–7; Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, p. 131.

⁷⁷ ASVat, RV 138, fols. 124v–125r, doc. 442 (21 Oct 1344), 268v–269r, doc. 524 (3 May 1345); summaries in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 1176, 1677; Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', docs 8, 10.

galleys and the garrison of the recently conquered fortress at Smyrna. The records of the papal camera show that the Hospitallers made a payment of 200 florins for the hire (*locagio*) of one of these galleys; but this must have been a small amount compared with what the Hospitallers hoped to generate from the licence.⁷⁸

A similar licence was issued in 1347 to Barnabò Gerardi, who had been appointed as the papal captain of Smyrna for the following year. He was granted permission to send two cogs to Mamluk lands in order to subsidise the expenditure he would incur when travelling to the East with 'three hundred horsemen and four hundred armed infantry for the whole year'.⁷⁹ This licence is unusually detailed in the information it provides and gives an insight into the numbers of crusaders fighting in the papal contingent in the year immediately after the withdrawal of the army of Humbert of Viennois. Gerardi's force was a considerable size and would have cost around 31,680 florins per year to maintain if relatively modest estimates for salary figures are used.⁸⁰ Although it is unclear how much of this the licence was intended to cover, it nevertheless suggests that a permit for two cogs would generate a substantial sum of money. Once the crusade was underway, the pope was also willing to issue licences to recompense individuals for past expenditure in fighting the Turks. This was the case in April 1347, when a concession was awarded to Petro of Lucingio, the husband of the illegitimate daughter of the dauphin of Viennois, for permission to send one galley to Mamluk lands 'to relieve some of the expenses he has incurred against the Turks'. This was not as generous as the other examples, but Petro, who accompanied his father-in-law on crusade, had presumably incurred less expense during this campaign.⁸¹

In the second category are those licences that were not granted strictly *contra Turchos*, but were probably connected to the conflict in the Aegean in some way (see Appendix 3).⁸² An example of this can be found in the supplications made by King Hugh IV of Cyprus for permission to trade in Egypt in 1349. Here the petitioners mentioned that their king was maintaining four galleys in the Aegean 'for the defence of the Christian faith against the Turks'. The king was subsequently granted a licence to send two galleys

⁷⁸ *Die Einnahmen der Apostolischen Kammer unter Klemens VI*, ed. L. Mohler (Paderborn, 1931), p. 357 (6 May 1345).

⁷⁹ ASVat, RS 13, fol. 167r (4 May 1347); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 32.

⁸⁰ This is based on salary figures of 2.4 florins a month for each infantryman and 5.6 florins a month for each cavalryman, taken from Housley, 'Costing the crusade', p. 47. For Gerardi's force, this would equate to a total of 2,640 florins per month (960 florins for infantry and 1,680 florins for cavalry).

⁸¹ ASVat, RS 13, fol. 145r (23 Apr 1347); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 30. Outgoing papal letter in ASVat, RV 140, f. 313v, no. 1401 (22 Apr 1347). For more on Petro, see Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', 116.

⁸² This link is also made by Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 147–8.

to Mamluk lands for three years.⁸³ Unlike the examples discussed above, there is no specific evidence to show that this licence was awarded *because* of the conflict with the Turks, but the fact that the petitioners mentioned the Cypriot contribution to the league, and that this was recorded by the papal scribes, suggests that this factor was important. Similarly, Humbert of Viemois was granted an incredibly generous licence to send twelve galleys and two cargo ships to prohibited lands, possibly because of his prior commitment to the crusade.⁸⁴ Other prominent crusaders also made numerous successful petitions for licences, such as Martino Zaccaria and his sons Octavian and Manfred, who received three separate licences permitting trade for one cargo ship, one galley and 25,000 florins worth of merchandise during the period of the Smyrna campaign.⁸⁵ In addition to this, the pope granted a licence to one merchant because of the disruption to trade caused by the war against the Turks, and on another occasion he granted a licence to subsidize the war in Granada, but specifically banned trade with the Turks.⁸⁶ Finally, a curious supplication was made in 1344, where Peter of Arborea in Sardinia promised to send four galleys to serve against the Turks for six months, as part of a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. This decision was made because the threat from the Turks had prevented him from travelling on one galley as he had originally intended.⁸⁷ It may be because of this pious act that three years later Peter was allowed to send one cargo ship to Mamluk lands.⁸⁸ In total around 30 per cent of the trade licences issued by Clement VI had some connection to the conflict with the Turks; a figure which confirms the importance of the licensing system to crusades in the Aegean.⁸⁹

Clement VI's policy of granting licences *contra Turchos* should not, however, be seen in isolation. It formed part of a wider policy of facilitating crusading action in the Mediterranean through the temporary alleviation of particular economic difficulties. For example, he continued John XXII's policy of granting licences to facilitate the war against Muslims in

⁸³ ASVat, RS 19, fol. 251r (19 Apr 1349); RS 20, fol. 147r (1 Sep 1349); summaries in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', docs 40, 46. Hugh was granted another licence in 1350 for another two galleys for five years: RS 21, f. 246r (10 May 1350); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 53.

⁸⁴ RS 21, f. 10r (24 Sep 1349); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 48.

⁸⁵ ASVat, RS 4, fol. 225r (17 Oct 1343), RS 20, fols. 44r, 45v (18 Jun 1349), 82r (3 Jul 1349); summaries in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', docs 1, 43–5.

⁸⁶ ASVat, RS 9, fol. 122r (4 Aug 1345); RS 12, fol. 81r (28 Oct 1346); summaries in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', docs 11, 19.

⁸⁷ ASVat, RS 7, fol. 79v (30 Nov 1344).

⁸⁸ ASVat, RV 140, fol. 300v–301r, doc. 832 (27 Mar 1347); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 29.

⁸⁹ See Appendices 2 and 3, and the summaries of Clement VI's licences in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', 120–8.

the western Mediterranean, such as to James II of Majorca who was twice granted licences to help support eight galleys against the enemies of the faith in the Straits of Gibraltar.⁹⁰ More importantly, the pope also granted a licence to the Genoese in Caffa in order to help finance their war against the Mongols.⁹¹ This was a particularly generous concession of two round ships and five galleys, valid for the duration of the war. This licence cannot be linked to the crusade against the Turks *per se*, but it suggests that the officials at the papal curia had an intimate knowledge of the dire economic situation in the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean at that time and were concerned about the consequences of this for the Latins in the East.

Further evidence of this attitude is given by two licences which – rather surprisingly – permitted trade in *Turchia*. The first of these was issued in 1345 to an Anconitan merchant resident in Constantinople, who was allowed to import 1,000 *modii* of victuals and other things specifically ‘from the lands of the Turks [...] for the aid and need of Christians’.⁹² The second more generous exemption was granted two years later to one Greek and two Genoese merchants resident in Constantinople, Pera and Genoa, to import 20,000 *modii* of grain ‘from any region and beyond any region of Turkey to Constantinople and the lands of the faithful’. In this case the petitioners stressed that the licence would be used to aid the faithful affected by the ‘grave famine’ in the region.⁹³ These examples demonstrate the seriousness of the economic difficulties affecting the Aegean region at the time and show that the pope was willing to grant trade privileges to alleviate famine, even if it meant permitting temporary trade with the Turks on two occasions.

Trade Licences and Papal Finances

If the above licences mostly concern the recompensing of individuals who participated in the naval leagues, then it is also worth discussing the impact of the licensing system on papal finances. The Crusade of Smyrna, and to a lesser extent the 1333–4 naval league, were expensive undertakings which were beset by financial difficulties. Marino Sanudo estimated that the price of vessels, crews and supplies for his proposed flotilla of ten galleys to blockade Mamluk lands would cost 102,000 florins per annum. This figure of 850 florins per galley per month is a useful comparison with the leagues:

⁹⁰ ASVat, RV 168, fol. 348r–v, doc. 382 (8 Feb 1346); RS 12, fol. 81r (28 Oct 1346). James was later granted two other licences, but which make no mention of the defence of the faith: RS 13, fol. 189r (13 May 1347); RV 180, fol. 278r, doc. 867 (17 Mar 1348); summaries in Carr, ‘Crossing boundaries’, docs 14, 19, 33, 35, and also Trenchs-Odena, “‘De Alexandrinis’”, 270–1, but with some inaccurate resumes and references.

⁹¹ ASVat, RS 11, fol. 117r (4 Aug 1346); summary in Carr, ‘Crossing boundaries’, doc. 18.

⁹² ASVat, RS 9, fol. 168r (3 Sep 1345); summary in Carr, ‘Crossing boundaries’, doc. 13.

⁹³ ASVat, RS 13, fol. 50v (30 Jan 1347); summary in Carr, ‘Crossing boundaries’, doc. 21.

John XXII paid the slightly lesser sum of 600 florins a month for the maintenance of his four papal galleys in 1334, but these were initially expected to generate additional funds to cover provisions through the shipment of goods on their outward journey.⁹⁴ The cost of these galleys for the initial five-month period of service was therefore an affordable, but not inconsiderable, sum of 12,000 florins. Clement VI paid the higher amount of 800 florins a month per galley in 1343, as well as a stipend of 150 florins for the galley captains.⁹⁵ The second league was active for a far greater length of time and Housley has calculated that the pope spent between 112,846 and 144,346 florins on his galleys from 1344 to 1347.⁹⁶ This was already a considerable amount, but it did not include the costs of supplies and the hire of extra soldiers which were incurred when the nature of the expedition changed from a flotilla to an army for defending land, as was the case when the harbour fortress of Smyrna was taken.

Funding the papal contribution to the crusade was therefore a difficult undertaking and it appears that licences were used to try and complement more traditional fundraising mechanisms such as clerical taxation and the sale of indulgences. Evidence for this can be found in a licence granted to Mathieu Gayta of Clermont-Ferrand in November 1343, before the second naval league had assembled in the Aegean. Unlike the examples discussed above, Mathieu did not participate in the crusade against the Turks, but instead petitioned for a licence to send one cargo ship to trade in Mamluk Egypt to help fund a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. This was granted by the pope, but on condition that one-quarter of the proceeds be paid for the subsidy against the Turks levied in that same year.⁹⁷

Considering the problems in financing the crusade it is of little surprise that the payment of wages became a significant issue.⁹⁸ Initially the funds were to be handed to the *patroni* of the galleys and the papal captain Martino Zaccaria, who would distribute the wages amongst their crews.

⁹⁴ See *Documents on the Later Crusades*, p. 73, doc. 20.

⁹⁵ Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum', pp. 30–1; Lock trans., pp. 60–2; Housley, 'Costing the crusade', p. 47.

⁹⁶ Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 301–2; Housley, 'Costing the crusade', p. 48.

⁹⁷ ASVat, RS 5, fol. 49r (16 Nov 1343); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 2. Outgoing papal letter in: ASVat, RV 137, fol. 145r, no. 502–3; summaries in Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, docs 528–9. Interestingly, in September 1344 a merchant named Johannes Fererius acting as the agent of Mathieu Gayta, was loading goods onto a vessel in Beirut, captained by a Genoese, Franciscus Ultramarinus. In the documents tracing the journey of Ultramarinus, it is repeatedly stated that he was travelling with a papal licence for his vessel (*absoluti cum dicta chocha per dominum sacrum papam*), which may have been a reference to the licence granted to Gayta the previous year: *Gènes et l'outre-mer: Actes notaries de Famagouste et d'autres localités du Proche-Orient (XIVe–XVe s.)*, ed. M. Balard, L. Balletto and C. Schabel (Nicosia, 2013), section 1.II, p. 34 and docs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15.

⁹⁸ See Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 195–8.

However, soon after Martino's death it emerged that these funds had not been distributed properly.⁹⁹ Centurione Zaccaria, one of the captains of the galleys and the son of Martino, appealed successfully to the pope for the payment of 1,200 florins which he claimed was due to his father.¹⁰⁰ But four years later it emerged that Conrad Piccamiglio, the captain of one of the other papal galleys, along with his brother Manuel, were still awaiting the payment of 2,700 florins for their services, which equates to eighteen months' wages. On this occasion the pope used a trade licence to address the problem, granting the Piccamiglio brothers permission to send four galleys to Mamluk lands over a five-year period. This was presumably deemed sufficient to compensate them for their outstanding wages, although it was less than the licence the brothers had originally requested (for merchandise worth up to 25,000 florins).¹⁰¹

To add to this, there is the example discussed earlier of the papal captain of Smyrna, Bernabò Gerardi, who was granted a licence to help pay for the army he was to hold in the city for one year, the salaries for which would have amounted to over 30,000 florins. How much of this amount was covered by the licence is impossible to say, but it presumably subsidized payments which would otherwise have been taken from the papal coffers.¹⁰² The licences granted to the Hospitallers can also be linked to the wages of crusaders. By 1345 the Knights were acting as papal creditors for the league by subsidizing wages until papal funds had been shipped to the Aegean.¹⁰³ In fact, in 1344–6, Garin of Châteauneuf, the prior of Navarre and procurator-general of the Hospitallers at the papal curia, received several payments from the papal treasury for the wages of the crews. As was seen earlier, in 1344 and again in 1345 he was awarded licences to send three galleys to Alexandria for the 'defence of the faithful in overseas lands'.¹⁰⁴ Were these licences designed to mitigate some of the wages owed by the pope? Unfortunately papal records of the licences do not provide that level of information, but it is tempting to connect them to papal expenditure on the crusade, and even if the licences were not used in lieu of papal payments, then the awarding of them would have at least sweetened the deal for the Hospitallers, who had been forced to subsidize papal payments at this time.

There is also evidence to suggest that trade licences were sold in order to generate income for the papacy. Calculating the amount with any degree

⁹⁹ Clement VI, *Lettres à la France*, vol. 1, doc. 1713, vol. 2, docs 1834, 2281. This is discussed in detail by Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 196–7; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 202–3.

¹⁰⁰ Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 203.

¹⁰¹ ASVat, RS 22, fol. 98r (11 Jul 1350); summary in Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 59.

¹⁰² See above, note 80.

¹⁰³ See Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 196–7.

¹⁰⁴ See above, note 77.

of accuracy is, however, extremely difficult. Stefan Stantchev has illustrated the problems by highlighting the vast differences in the amounts received for licences over a period of time: in 1361, for example, a licence for six galleys was sold to the Venetians for 9,000 florins, meaning that each galley was worth 1,500 florins, whilst sixteen years earlier, in the time of Clement VI, the Hospitallers paid only 200 florins to the pope for one galley. These discrepancies mean that very different amounts of revenue can be calculated: using the price of a cog at 900 florins, and the highest price for a galley (1,500 florins), Stantchev has calculated that Clement VI could have received just over 200,000 florins in total during his ten-year pontificate, or 20,000 florins per year. That is an impressive 11 per cent of his annual revenue of 187,000 florins; but compare this with the lower calculation for galleys (200 florins) and the total revenue is 68,100 florins, or 6,810 florins per year, so only 3.6 per cent of annual revenue.¹⁰⁵

To further complicate things, Stantchev has not used the data from the payment for another licence made during Clement VI's pontificate: the 5,000 florins paid by Venice for four cogs and six galleys in 1344. This licence was amended in 1345, when each cog was exchanged for seven galleys, turning it into a licence for thirty-four galleys. From this we can calculate the relative price of each vessel type: each cog was valued at 1,029 florins and each galley at 147 florins, making a cog the same value of seven galleys and the total of both licences 5,000 florins. If this is then multiplied by a rough estimate of the known vessels for which Clement issued licences,¹⁰⁶ then the total revenue for his pontificate comes to 65,562 florins, or 6,556 florins per year. That is just under 3.5 per cent of Clement VI's annual revenue; a very similar number to Stantchev's lowest estimate, albeit using very different data.

However, one should question whether the amount paid by the Venetians can be considered as representative of licences more generally. The Venetians were, after all, a special case who were paying for an exceptionally large privilege which was also issued in connection to their crusading commitments overseas. The evidence for other payments for licences is also far from reliable in this manner. Take, for example, the Hospitaller licence for two galleys used by Stantchev in his calculations. The only record of payment for this licence is found in the papal camera, where it is stated that the Hospitallers paid 200 florins to the pope for the hire of one galley

¹⁰⁵ Stantchev's calculations are based on 900 florins per cog, multiplied by the licences issued for fifty-three cogs and 102 galleys: Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 152–3. Clement's annual revenue is calculated by W.E. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1934), p. 14.

¹⁰⁶ This is fifty-two cogs and eighty-two galleys before the amendment of the Venetian licence and forty-eight cogs and 110 galleys after. My numbers are slightly different to those given by Stantchev and are based on the licences analysed in: Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', 120–8.

(*pro locagio unius galee*).¹⁰⁷ Was this then the payment for the whole licence, or was another payment made at a later date? It is tempting to argue that the Hospitallers paid a further 200 florins at another time, but there is no evidence in the papal accounts to suggest that this was the case. Therefore this record should not be considered as a payment for a licence in its own right.¹⁰⁸

The unreliability of the data demonstrates the pitfalls of attempting to calculate the precise amounts that licence sales generated. However, having said that, it is probable that Clement VI's income was at the lower end of the scale and possibly even lower than the more conservative estimates given above. This is on account of the fact that presumably some licences were not sold for cash at all: in particular those granted *contra Turchos*, and those which were designed to mitigate expenditure on the crusade. In these instances it would have been counter-productive if the recipients were compelled to pay large sums of money in exchange for their privileges. It should also be remembered that Clement granted licences to papal favourites as well as to help facilitate pious deeds. Presumably these too would have been offered either free, or at a discounted rate. That is not to say that payments were not made for licences – the Venetians are proof that they were – but it seems logical that the costs would have been minimal compared with the benefits they would bring to the recipient. But still, if it is accepted that licences unconnected to crusading generated more revenue, then it is plausible that the money from licences could have covered a reasonable portion of the papal crusading budget if it was intended for that purpose.

If the practice of issuing licences *contra Turchos* was begun by John XXII in the 1320s, then it reached its apogee during the pontificate of Clement VI. In fact, his ten-year reign marks the high point of licensing for the entire Avignon period, where at least forty-eight cogs and 110 galleys were permitted to trade in Mamluk lands (including the galleys detailed in the amendment made to the Venetian licence in 1345).¹⁰⁹ In terms of vessels, this number is almost four times that for the entire period between 1291 and 1342, and around half of the total from 1352 to 1378.¹¹⁰ On the one hand, this can be

¹⁰⁷ *Die Einnahmen der Apostolischen Kammer unter Klemens VI*, p. 357.

¹⁰⁸ Evidence also exists of lay rulers selling licences to their subjects, such as in 1344 when King Peter IV of Aragon received a payment from Pedro de Mediavilla and Arnaldo Llorens of 6,000 Barcelonan *solidos* for a licence to send one cog to Mamluk lands: L. de Meneses, 'Florilegio documental del Reinado de Pedro IV de Aragón', *Cuadernos de historia de España* 13 (1950), 181–90, at 188–90, doc. 11 (1 Jun 1344); Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', doc. 5; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, p. 69.

¹⁰⁹ See Carr, 'Crossing boundaries', 120–8, and Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, p. 153, who gives the slightly different number of fifty-three cogs and 102 galleys.

¹¹⁰ These figures are taken from Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, p. 152, who points out that the *Registra Supplicationum* – the main source for licences – is not extant for all of this period. On the licences issued after 1352, see Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 150–1.

seen as an example of the greater shift of merchant influence over crusade policy in the fourteenth century – as the licences were more often than not granted on petition from those operating in the East. But on the other hand, they can be viewed as the emergence of a pragmatic papal economic policy which was ideally suited to the situation in the Aegean, where crusading against the Turks often coincided with a breakdown of trade in the eastern Mediterranean.¹¹¹ In fact, the licences should be regarded as the product of the attempts of both merchants and the papacy to reconcile the otherwise opposing notions of crusade and economic embargo with trade in Muslim lands. In this sense the licences were an evolutionary step away from crusade theory at the turn of the fourteenth century – which placed so much importance on the blockade of Egypt – to one which focussed instead on the defence of Christian territories from the Turks and the relaxing of trade with the Mamluks.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Cf. the comments of Stantchev who argues that the embargo was above all a pastoral tactic rather than an object of foreign policy: Stantchev, 'The medieval origins of embargo', 398–9.

¹¹² In some senses this was a step closer to the views of Emmanuele Piloti, who, seventy years later, argued that the embargo could not be enforced because Levant trade was too important to Christians, see: Christ, *Trading Conflicts*, pp. 116–18.