

## CHAPTER 8

### Baybars's posthumous victory: the second battle of Homs (680/1281)

Mengü Temür [brother of Abagha] was wounded at the battle [of Homs in AH 680], and he was greatly saddened for what had happened to him and his army, when he had been so close to victory.

Ibn al-Furāt<sup>1</sup>

Baybars did not live to see the long-expected Mongol invasion of Syria, which led to the confrontation north of Homs in Rajab 680/October 1281. Professor Ayalon has written: "Though this battle was won by Ǧalāwūn, the real architect of the victory was undoubtedly Sultan Baybars, who, in the seventeen years of his rule . . . built a war-machine which, in spite of the decline it underwent during the four years following his death, proved to be strong enough to beat one of the mightiest armies which the Mongol Īlkhāns ever put into the field."<sup>2</sup>

#### The Mamluks after Baybars's death

The Mamluk–Īlkhānid front was relatively quiet in the first years after Baybars's death. The lack of an external danger meant that the Mamluk elite could indulge in factional squabbling and jockeying for power with relative impunity. When the Mongol threat again became a reality in 679/1280, the Mamluk factions were able, if not to reconcile their differences, at least to find a *modus vivendi*. Those members of the military society who persisted in plotting against Qalawun were eliminated.

Baybars's son al-Malik al-Saʿīd Berke Khan succeeded his father without any problems. Once on the throne, al-Saʿīd set about limiting the power of the Ṣāliḥī amirs, that is, his father's *khushdāshiyya*, and other senior amirs, including those of the Ẓāhiriyya (the mamluks of Baybars). Bilig al-Khaznadār, his father's trusted mamluk and *nāʾib al-saltāna* (viceroys), who had seen to

<sup>1</sup> 7:234.

<sup>2</sup> D. Ayalon, "Ḥims, Battle of," *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 3:402. See also the comments in Ayalon, "Yāsa," pt. C1, 128–9.

al-Saʿīd's accession to the throne, soon died under suspicious circumstances. Other important amirs were thrown in jail, although some were soon released. In their place al-Saʿīd promoted his own mamluks, although as *nāʾib al-saltāna* he appointed Küvendük al-Sāqī, a mamluk of Baybars who had been educated with him. It is not surprising that the veteran amirs were not pleased by this development and reacted accordingly. This personal change and the resulting reaction of the senior officers is an example of the recurring pattern in Mamluk society of new sultans attempting to strengthen their own position by cultivating their personal mamluks at the expense of the established amirs.<sup>3</sup>

At the instigation of his *khāṣṣakiyya*, al-Saʿīd sent off Qalawun and Baysari, perhaps the two most powerful Ṣāliḥī amirs, to raid Lesser Armenia in the spring of 677–8/1279. Al-Saʿīd's intention was to remove these two, along with other Ṣāliḥī amirs, from the center of affairs. He planned to consolidate his power at their expense during their absence, and to have them arrested on their return.<sup>4</sup> Qalawun and Baysari must certainly have been aware of the reasons for their dispatch to the north. This did not, however, prevent them from executing their orders. Each commander had some 10,000 troops under him; Qalawun was to raid Cilicia, while Baysari was to take Qalʿat al-Rūm. Qalawun reached as far as Ṭarsūs. He remained in the country for thirteen days, engaging in looting, killing and the taking of prisoners. Baysari raided the environs of Qalʿat al-Rūm, but was unable to take the castle.<sup>5</sup>

Al-Saʿīd, however, did not succeed in realizing his designs for these amirs. The *nāʾib* Küvendük fell out with the Sultan and his *khāṣṣakiyya*, and was removed from his post. He thereupon sent to Qalawun and Baysari to inform them of the plans to have them arrested. Upon their return, Küvendük made common cause with them, and together they succeeded in forcing the abdication of al-Saʿīd, who was sent off to Karak (Rabīʿ II 678/August 1279). Qalawun, however, was not yet powerful enough to make himself sultan; Baybarsid sentiment was still too strong, and other Ṣāliḥī amirs may have set their sights on the throne. Another son of Baybars, the seven-year-old Sulamish, was declared sultan with the title al-Malik al-ʿĀdil. Qalawun, however, was named his *atabeg* (guardian), and in this capacity was the true ruler of the Sultanate. Sunqur al-Ashqar became governor of Damascus, while ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybeg al-Afram was named the *nāʾib al-saltāna* in Egypt. This situation was not to last long. “The amirs and *khāṣṣakiyya* were prepared to be compliant, having experienced Kalawun's bountiful patronage. There was,

<sup>3</sup> Irwin, *Middle East*, 62–3; Holt, *Crusades*, 99–100. On this general phenomenon, see Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure,” pt. 1, 108–10; Little, *Introduction*, 116.

<sup>4</sup> *Zubda*, fols. 90b–92a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:117, 140; Maqrīzī, 1:650. Shāfiʿ (*Faḍl*, fol. 16a) states that the idea for this raid was initially raised by Qalawun himself. This must be an attempt to portray Qalawun as a loyal officer, and not a disposer of sultans.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, ed. Eddé, 319–20; *Faḍl*, fol. 16a; Yūnīnī, 3:297; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 271b; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:141; Maqrīzī, 1:652; Bar Hebraeus, 461–2, provides details of Baysari's campaign, and writes that the Muslims entered Cilicia in order to conduct the leader of the Qaramanid Türkmens, who feared the Mongols and Armenians, to Syria; see also Irwin, *Middle East*, 63.

therefore, no opposition when on 21 Rajab 678/27 November 1279, he proposed that the state required a ruler of mature years. Al-ʿĀdil was thereupon deposed, and sent to al-Karak to join his brother. Kalavun then became sultan with the title of al-Malik al-Manṣūr.”<sup>6</sup>

One of Qalawun's first tasks was to consolidate his power by placing his mamluks in positions of authority, and limiting the power of the mamluks of his predecessors. He did not move against the senior Ṣāliḥī amirs in Egypt, perhaps because of a mixture of *khushdāshiyya* feelings, respect for their power and experience and the need for their support in both external and internal affairs. In fact, he commissioned (or recommissioned) as amirs several Ṣāliḥīs who had been languishing in obscurity.<sup>7</sup> The problem was primarily the Ṣāḥiriyya, the mamluks of Baybars, who were the backbone of the Mamluk army<sup>8</sup> and harbored much antipathy towards Qalawun and his Manṣūrī mamluks. Qalawun knew he could not depend upon them, and began to eliminate them from the ranks of the amirs and the army at large. Qalawun had started arresting particularly troublesome Ṣāḥiris while *atabeg*.<sup>9</sup> The thinning out of the ranks of the Ṣāḥiriyya must have continued after he became sultan, although it is impossible to give numbers for those arrested at this time or later.<sup>10</sup> The process was not unambivalent: once the Ṣāḥiriyya was broken, some of the Ṣāḥirī amirs were released from prison after Qalawun became sultan; a few had their commission returned to them. In addition, some Ṣāḥiris who had never been amirs received their first commission.<sup>11</sup> Qalawun must have hoped that these new amirs would remain loyal to him out of gratitude. It is clear that Qalawun could not completely dispense with these first-rate troops, desirable as it might have been from the point of view of internal Mamluk politics. In spite of the massive acquisition of new mamluks<sup>12</sup> and the enrolment of the sons of the Baḥriyya in the army,<sup>13</sup> it would take years before the Ṣāḥiriyya would be replaced. The Mongols, of course, would not necessarily wait so long.

Qalawun's more pressing problem, however, was the revolt of Sunqur al-Ashqar in Damascus. Taking the title al-Malik al-Kāmil, Sunqur declared

<sup>6</sup> Quote from Holt, *Crusades*, 100–1. See L. Northrup, “A History of the Reign of the Mamluk Sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (678–689 AH / 1279–1290 AD),” Ph.D. diss., McGill Univ. (Montreal, 1982), 122–30; Irwin, *Middle East*, 63–5.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, 7:150; Maqrīzī, 1:658. See Northrup, “Qalāwūn,” 130–3.

<sup>8</sup> “They were the majority of the army in Egypt”: Yūnīnī, 4:8; Kutubi, MS. Kōprülü, fol. 111b. This statement is, of course, not literally true, because of the presence of the large *ḥalqa*, the amirs' units and other royal mamluks. But the Ṣāḥiriyya, because of its numbers, training and experience, was the most important unit in the army.

<sup>9</sup> *Tuhfa*, 90; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:150; Maqrīzī, 1:658.

<sup>10</sup> Qirtay, fol. 106b, writes that after Qalawun became sultan he arrested and killed a group of Ṣāḥiriyya and Saʿīdiyya (mamluks of al-Saʿīd), and thus “the gate of the Citadel was empty of troops.” This is surely an exaggeration, but it gives a sense of the extent of the purges.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, 7:150; Maqrīzī, 1:658, 671–2.

<sup>12</sup> On Qalawun's massive purchase of mamluks over his reign, see Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fol. 45a.

<sup>13</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, 7:150; Maqrīzī, 1:658; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:303 (in Qalawun's obituary); Qirtay, fol. 106b; Ayalon, “Baḥriya,” 139.

himself an independent ruler. His authority extended to southern Palestine, and initially he had the backing of both the governor of Aleppo and al-Manṣūr of Hama. He also enjoyed the support of the bedouin leaders ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā (*amīr al-ʿurbān* in the north and east) and Aḥmad b. Ḥujjā (of the Āl Mirā, *amīr al-ʿurbān* in the south). Sunqur, however, was unable to translate this support into military success. His troops were worsted in an engagement with a pro-Qalawun force at Gaza in Muḥarram 679/May 1280. Qalawun then sent an army under Sanjar al-Ḥalabī, who ironically had led a similar revolt some twenty years before, to Damascus. Sunqur met Qalawun's army near Damascus in Ṣafar/June. During the fighting, he was abandoned by the troops from Aleppo and Hama. Sunqur was defeated and fled to the Syrian desert with ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā. The majority of Muslim Syria now came under Qalawun's control.<sup>14</sup>

Sunqur and ʿĪsā went to al-Raḥba, but they failed to win over its governor. Isolated in the desert and expecting the approach of Qalawun's troops, Sunqur despaired. Seeing no other alternative, he and ʿĪsā thereupon wrote to Abagha, informing him of the disunity in the kingdom, and called on him to invade Syria and offered their support. The years which Sunqur spent with the Mongols in relatively comfortable captivity might have contributed to his willingness to turn to them in his hour of need. It seems that other officers with Sunqur also wrote to Abagha at this time.<sup>15</sup> Sunqur then rode to the fortress of Ṣahyūn (Saone) in northern Syria, where he had already sent his wealth and family. Having control over several nearby fortresses, he essentially created a small principality in the area. Sunqur now waited to see how matters would develop. ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā meanwhile remained on the eastern fringes of the Syrian desert.<sup>16</sup>

It is possible that Sunqur's decision to go to Ṣahyūn was prompted by a last-minute recoil from going over to the infidel enemy. According to Ibn al-Dawādārī, Sunqur wrote not to Abagha but to ʿAṭā' Malik Juwaynī, the Mongol governor of Baghdad (and famous historian). Juwaynī sent to inform Abagha of this development. Pending further instructions from the Ilkhān, he sent to Sunqur to calm him. Thereupon, ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā rebuked Sunqur for the disaster he was about to cause Islam, and suggested that he should wait upon events in one of his Syrian castles. Mufaḍḍal relates this account with some differences: both Sunqur and ʿĪsā wrote to Juwaynī, and it was *fuqahā'* (Muslim jurists) who prevailed on Sunqur to desist from anti-Muslim activi-

<sup>14</sup> Northrup, "Qalāwūn," 134–6; Irwin, *Middle East*, 65–6; Holt, *Crusades*, 65. On the role of the bedouin in this revolt: Ibn al-Furāt, 7:169–70; Maqrīzī, 1:674–7; Yūnīnī, 4:36, 40–1.

<sup>15</sup> Maqrīzī, 1:697 (s.a. 680), writes that after the battle of Homs, a Mongol letter case was captured containing letters to the Mongols from Sunqur and other amirs connected to him, in which the Mongols are encouraged to invade Syria; no letter from ʿĪsā is mentioned. These letters would appear to date from around the time of Sunqur's stay in the desert. The ultimate source of this information is unclear.

<sup>16</sup> *Zubda*, fols. 104a, 105a; Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fols. 4b–5a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:170, 172; Maqrīzī, 1:677–8; Irwin, *Middle East*, 66. Cf. Northrup, "Qalāwūn," 144–6. Ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, in Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 189a, notes that Sunqur wrote to Abagha after he reached Ṣahyūn.

ties.<sup>17</sup> Both of these versions are problematic. Ibn al-Dawādārī's account is contradicted by both Bar Hebraeus and Waṣṣāf, who categorically state that ʿĪsā was a party to this correspondence.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, it seems improbable that Sunqur and others would run into *fuqahā* in the middle of the desert, even in a bedouin encampment. But perhaps these accounts give a somewhat imaginative expression to Sunqur and ʿĪsā's Muslim consciences getting the better of them, and thus they were prevented from taking the final step of joining the Mongols. For what it is worth, Waṣṣāf states that it was Juwaynī himself who initiated the contact with Sunqur and ʿĪsā, after news reached him of their arrival in the environs of ʿĀna and Ḥadītha.

### The Mongol invasion of 679/1280

The letter or letters that Sunqur al-Ashqar, ʿĪsā and possibly others sent to the Mongols helped prompt Abagha to take advantage of the infighting among the Mamluks and to intervene in Syria. Perhaps Abagha had been tempted by earlier reports of instability,<sup>19</sup> but he had his own problems to deal with before he could turn his attention to Syria: in the winters of 677/1278–9 and/or 678/1279–80, Negüderi Mongols from present-day Afghanistan raided Fārs and Kirmān; in the latter year, fighting flared up on the border with the Golden Horde;<sup>20</sup> the same year, some type of epidemic affecting men and livestock swept Iraq, the Jazīra and parts of Iran.<sup>21</sup>

Sunqur al-Ashqar's letter would have reached Abagha just as he put these problems behind him. The prospect of the Mamluks in disarray and a large chunk of the local military class willing to assist him was too good an opportunity to pass up, and thus in the summer of 679/1280 Abagha sent a large army into Syria. According to the Arabic sources, the Mongol army was organized in three corps: the first, from Rūm under Samaghar, Tanji (?) and Taranji (?);<sup>22</sup> the second, from the east (the Jazīra evidently), under his nephew Baidu, along with the ruler of Mārdīn; and the third and major part of the army under Mengü Temür (direction unspecified). The last mentioned were evidently also to go through Rūm. An Armenian force joined the Mongols as well. Bar Hebraeus, on the other hand, writes that the Mongols were led by Qonghurtai, another younger brother of Abagha. The impression gained is that the actual forces which participated in the offensive were relatively modest

<sup>17</sup> Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:237–8; Mufaḍḍal, 315–17; cf. Qirtay, fol. 111a, who also states that ʿĪsā convinced Sunqur not to flee to the Mongols.

<sup>18</sup> Bar Hebraeus, 463 (= Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 503); Waṣṣāf, 103. The chronology of the material in Waṣṣāf is confused: the Sunqur al-Ashqar affair is described after the battle of Homs of 680/1281 (*ibid.*, 89–90).

<sup>19</sup> *Faql*, fol. 27b, states that on hearing of Qalawun's accession the Mongols made plans to enact revenge for earlier defeats.

<sup>20</sup> See above, ch. 4, p. 88. Ibn Kathīr, 13:287, has some knowledge of these conflicts.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 407–8.

<sup>22</sup> Perhaps Tanji is a distorted form of Taiju (see below, p. 195), or even Nabji (Ibn Shaddād, *Ta'rikh*, 156).

in size. Perhaps only an advanced force actually penetrated into northern Syria. When the Mongols saw that Sunqur al-Ashqar was staying put in Ṣahyūn (see below), the offensive was called off, but not before heavy damage was inflicted on the country. Mongol troops gained temporary possession of ʿAyn Tāb, Baghrās and al-Darbassāk, and reached as far as Aleppo, which had been abandoned by its garrison and most of its inhabitants. From 21 to 23 Jumādā II/27–9 October, they looted the city and put many buildings to the torch, including the main mosque.<sup>23</sup>

News of the Mongol invasion reached Syria at the beginning of Jumādā II 679/late September 1280. The Egyptian expeditionary corps in Syria and Syrian troops gathered near Hama. They were joined by the force which had been besieging the castle of Shayzar, where Sunqur al-Ashqar's confederate al-Ḥājj Özdemür was holed up; this force discontinued the siege and fell back, upon hearing of the Mongol advance. The army of Aleppo, having retreated before the Mongols (as in previous similar cases), also met up with this force at Hama. In the middle of Jumādā II, scouts were dispatched to discover the whereabouts of the Mongols. Meanwhile, refugees from north Syria poured into Damascus and the Baalbek area. It is reported that only those who were incapable of travelling remained in the north. The commanders of the force at Hama wrote to Sunqur at Ṣahyūn, berating him for having induced the Mongols to come by the disunity which he had brought about. (Evidently, the letters of Sunqur etc. to the Mongols were not yet known.) They called upon him to join them in order to repulse the Mongols. Sunqur agreed in principle and along with al-Ḥājj Özdemür took up position outside their castles to see what would happen next. Sunqur may have regretted his earlier actions and have seen the need to resist the Mongols, but he still did not trust Qalawun's officers. When word of the Mongol withdrawal from the country reached Sunqur, he returned to his castle. The amirs at Hama responded to this news by sending forces in different directions: one rode to ʿAyn Tāb, while others went to the Euphrates and al-Bīra. After reconnoitering the country, the forces returned in mid-Rajab/ca. mid-November 1280 to the south.<sup>24</sup>

Shāfiʿ b. ʿAlī tells that Qalawun initially received word of the expected Mongol invasion from his informants (*mukātibūn*) and his intelligence agents (*quṣṣād akhbārīhi*). Baybars al-Manṣūrī confirms this information, although he speaks only of *quṣṣād*.<sup>25</sup> This might well explain how the Mamluks knew of the names of the Mongol commanders and organization of their army. When news of the actual raid arrived from Syria, the Sultan made ready to set out. He

<sup>23</sup> *Zubda*, fols. 104b–105a, 108a, 140a (King Leon set fire to mosque in Aleppo); *Tuhfa*, 94–5; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:185; Maqrīzī, 1:681; Yūnīnī, 4:45–6; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 279, fol. 64b (cites Yūnīnī by name); *Faḍl*, fol. 28a–b; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 412, who writes of 50,000 Mongol horsemen sent under Mengü Temür; Bar Hebraeus, 463 (= Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 503); cf. Runciman, *Crusades*, 3:390. Waṣṣāf, 103, would seem to be referring to this expedition, but his chronology is confused; see above, n. 18, and below.

<sup>24</sup> Yūnīnī, 4:44–5; Dhahabī, MS. 279, fol. 64a; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 124a; *Zubda*, fol. 105a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:185–6; Maqrīzī, 1:682–3, 697; Northrup, "Qalāwūn," 147–9.

<sup>25</sup> *Faḍl*, fol. 28b; *Zubda*, fol. 105a.



also had his son al-Malik al-Šāliḥ ‘Alī declared as his heir-apparent. Qalawun left for Syria on 29 Jumādā II 679/2 November 1280. Upon reaching Gaza some two weeks later, the Sultan received word that the Mongols had withdrawn from the country, so he returned to Egypt. Baybars al-Manṣūrī’s claim that it was the news of the Sultan’s departure for Syria that convinced the Mongols to withdraw from there is nothing more than an attempt to laud his patron’s power: the Mongols left Aleppo several days before Qalawun set out from Cairo.<sup>26</sup>

On 1 Dhū ‘l-ḥijja 679/23 March 1281, Qalawun again left Egypt with his army for Syria. Possibly, he had decided that the time had come to inspect Damascus and personally to assert his authority in that city. It seems also likely, however, that he had a premonition, perhaps via his intelligence service, that another Mongol offensive was imminent. The length of his stay in Damascus and the presence then of most of his army with him lend strength to this latter supposition.

By the 17th of the month (8 April), Qalawun was at al-Rūḥā’, near Acre. There he received the hitherto rebellious bedouin chief ‘Īsā b. Muḥannā, who now submitted to the Sultan. Qalawun pardoned him and apparently at this time returned the title of *amīr al-‘urbān* to him, along with his *iqṭā‘*. During the period of ‘Īsā’s rebellion, his command and *iqṭā‘* had been split up among other chiefs. This arrangement must have proved less than satisfactory, since ‘Īsā’s transgressions were so summarily forgiven. Like Baybars before him, Qalawun must have realized that no one could rule the bedouin as well as ‘Īsā, and that it was impossible to control them while ‘Īsā was in rebellion. The other major bedouin leader who participated in Sunqur al-Ashqar’s rebellion, Aḥmad b. Ḥujjā, had already submitted to the Sultan’s forces immediately after Sunqur’s defeat, and evidently had then been reconfirmed as *amīr al-‘urbān* in the south.<sup>27</sup>

On 10 Muḥarram 680/1 May 1281, Qalawun moved inland to Lajjūn, where he received Frankish envoys who returned with his own envoys who had been in Acre. A truce (*hudna*) for ten years and ten months was agreed upon with the Hospitallers in Acre, in spite of the raid that their comrades from Marqab had launched the previous year at the time of the Mongol incursion, and the defeat they had subsequently administered to a Mamluk force.<sup>28</sup> Another truce was signed with Bohemond VII, the ruler of Tripoli, for the same period of time.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Tuhfa*, 95; *Zubda*, fols. 105a, 108a–b; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:190–1; Maqrīzī, 1:682–3; Yūnīnī, 4:46, 52; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:239; Ibn Kathīr, 13:292; *Faql*, fol. 29a (Shāfi‘’s chronology for this year is confused).

<sup>27</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, 7:171, 177, 195, 200; Maqrīzī, 1:677, 679, 684; Yūnīnī, 4:54; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 125a; Ibn Kathīr, 13:292.

<sup>28</sup> On this raid, see: *Tuhfa*, 95; Yūnīnī, 4:52–3; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:239; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:195; Maqrīzī, 1:684 (he writes that the Franks helped the Mongols); Bar Hebraeus, 463 (not in Arabic version); Runciman, *Crusades*, 3:390.

<sup>29</sup> Prætor, *Histoire*, 2:520, citing Marino Sanudo, *Secreta Fidelium Crucis*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* [Hanover, 1611], 228, suggests that perhaps Franks from Tripoli attacked the Biqā‘ at the time of the Mongol raid.

Qalawun's willingness to reach an agreement with the Franks, in spite of their truculent behavior, is an additional indication that he feared another Mongol invasion into Syria, and thus wanted to guard himself against Frankish intervention from the Mongols' side. Although the *hudna* arranged by Baybars in 670/1272 with Acre still had another year to run, negotiations were also held to renew it, and evidently some type of formula was agreed upon.<sup>30</sup>

At some point before Qalawun arrived in Palestine, a Mongol embassy had arrived in Acre seeking Frankish support. According to a letter to Edward I, dated 5 October 1280, from Geoffrey, Bishop of Hebron, this envoy stated that the Mongols would soon invade Syria with 50,000 cavalymen plus infantry. The Franks were called upon to assist with provisions and men.<sup>31</sup> There is no record of any response from the Frankish leaders to this offer and their subsequent actions indicate that they decided to adopt a neutral course. For the Franks, this was perhaps a missed opportunity. The presence of several hundred armed knights with the Mongols or, even more importantly, somewhere behind the Mamluk lines might well have caused great difficulties to Qalawun at the time of the Mongol offensive.

During the negotiations with the leaders of Acre, the Sultan received word from his informants in that city<sup>32</sup> that there was a conspiracy in his own camp: Küvendük al-Khaznadār had joined together with a number of Ṣāhirī amirs and had written to the Frankish leaders, calling on them not to agree to the Sultan's terms, because he would shortly be killed and the Franks would receive what they wanted. Qalawun reacted vigorously. He confronted many of the conspirators, who did not deny the charges. Küvendük and many other amirs were executed. Others, however, fled to Sunqur al-Ashqar along with some 300 horsemen.<sup>33</sup>

Qalawun entered Damascus on 19 Muḥarram 680/10 May 1281. Soon afterwards, an army was dispatched to the north to besiege Shayzar, which was controlled by Sunqur's ally al-Ḥājj Özdemür. But with continuing reports of an imminent Mongol offensive (see below), Qalawun saw it was best to reconcile Sunqur. Envoys went back and forth between Ṣahyān and Damascus, and by 4 Rabīʿ I/23 June, a *ṣulḥ* (peace) was agreed upon. Sunqur was to surrender Shayzar, but in exchange he was to receive several towns and forts.

<sup>30</sup> *Tuhfa*, 96; Yūnīnī, 4:86; Dhahabī, MS. 279, fol. 64b; Ibn Kathīr, 13:292–3; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:204–5; Maqrīzī, 1:685; Prawer, *Histoire*, 2:520–1; Runciman, *Crusades*, 3:390–1; Northrup, “Qalāwūn,” 149–50.

<sup>31</sup> Cited in R. Röhrich, “Les batailles de Hims (1281 et 1299),” in “Études sur les derniers temps du royaume de Jérusalem,” *AOL* 1 (1881):638 n. 20. See also Runciman, *Crusades*, 3:390–1; Prawer, *Histoire*, 2:520.

<sup>32</sup> See Amitai, “Espionage,” 178. Shāfiʿ (*Faql*, fol. 59b) names the informant (*mukātib*) as “Jawān Khāndak.” Runciman (*Crusades*, 3:391), whose source is not clear, reports that Roger of San Severino, Charles of Anjou's representative in Acre, sent to Qalawun to inform him of Küvendük's letter.

<sup>33</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 110a; *Tuhfa*, 97; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 20b; Yūnīnī, 4:86–7; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 134b; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:206–7, who writes that Saʿīdī amirs were also involved, as were Tatars, i.e. *wāfidiyya*; Maqrīzī, 1:685–6; Northrup, “Qalāwūn,” 152.



His control of the other castles already in his hands was recognized. Sunqur was also given *iqṭāʿāt* for 600 horsemen; presumably, these land-holdings were not only in his own “principality.” Around the same time, Qalawun reached an agreement with al-Malik al-Masʿūd Khaḍir, Baybars’s son who ruled Karak (al-Saʿīd Berke Khan having died in Dhū l-qaʿda 678/March 1280), in which Khaḍir’s autonomy was recognized.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, on the eve of the Mongol invasion, Qalawun had rectified some of the damage of the preceding years. Due to purges, the army was perhaps smaller than it had been in Baybars’s heyday and, more importantly, an unknown number of experienced Zāhiri amirs and mamluks had been eliminated. The confusion of al-Saʿīd Berke Khan’s reign and even the initial period of Qalawun’s rule had certainly not been conducive to the orderly training and strengthening of the army. But at least differences within the military society had been papered over, if not actually solved. No less important, a working relationship with the leaders of the Syrian bedouin had been reestablished. Given the events of the previous years, the Mamluks were probably as ready as they could have been to meet their enemies.

### The battle of Homs<sup>35</sup>

Qalawun must have had a fairly good idea that another Mongol invasion of Syria was in the offing, because there is no other reason to explain his remaining in Damascus with most of the Egyptian army throughout the first third of AH 680 (which began on 22 April 1281). Most likely, the source of much of this information was the intelligence service that Qalawun had inherited from Baybars.<sup>36</sup> At the end of Rabīʿ II and the beginning of Jumādā I (ca. mid-August 1281), *quṣṣād* arrived bringing more exact intelligence: Mengü Temür, the brother of Abagha, had come to Rūm at the head of the Mongol army and was currently somewhere between Qaysāriyya and Abulustayn. Subsequent reports from *quṣṣād* spoke of a Mongol army of troops heading for Syria. Scouts were ordered out from ʿAyn Tāb to reconnoiter to the north. Near Abulustayn, these scouts ran into a Mongol reconnaissance force, defeated them and captured a senior Mongol officer. The captive was brought before Qalawun at Damascus on 20 Jumādā I/6 September, and related detailed information on the Mongol numbers and commanders.

<sup>34</sup> *Zubda*, fols. 111a–112a; *Tuhfa*, 97–8; Yūnīnī, 4:88–9; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:208–10; Maqrīzī, 1:686–8; Holt, *Crusades*, 141.

<sup>35</sup> For previous reconstructions of the battle, see: Ayalon, “Himṣ,” 402–3; J. Glubb, *Soldiers of Fortune: The Story of the Mamlukes* (New York, 1973), 111–15; Runciman, *Crusades*, 3:391–2; D’Ohsson, *Histoire*, 3:525–32; Weil, *Geschichte*, 1:125–8; Röhrich, “Études,” 638–41; F. H. ʿAshūr, *al-ʿAlāqāt*, 116–22; Northrup, “Qalāwūn,” 156–9; Smith, “ʿAyn Jālūt,” 329 n. 63; Martinez, “ʿIl-Xānid Army,” 159–65.

<sup>36</sup> Shāfiʿ (*Fadl*, fols. 28b, 29b, 40a, 43b–44a) provides information on the activities of intelligence operatives and informants in the period from Qalawun’s accession to the battle of Homs. The confused chronology of the events described therein makes it difficult to place some of this evidence in its proper context.

Baybars al-Manṣūrī writes that he gave the figure of 80,000 Mongols (*al-mughul*) and added that the Mongol offensive was to start in early Rajab (ca. mid-October). Shāfi' b. 'Alī tells that the captive's information tallied with intelligence which had arrived via a secret letter (*mulatṭaf*) from Diyār Bakr.<sup>37</sup>

The Sultan ordered preparations for the battle, and the units began leaving Damascus for the assembly point on the plain outside the city. A contingent of 4000 bedouin of the Āl Mirā tribe under Aḥmad b. Ḥujjā arrived. Other bedouins, groups of Syrian Türkmen and a contingent from al-Mas'ūd Khaḍir of Karak came to join the army, as did the portion of the army which had remained in Egypt. By 26 Jumādā II/12 October, the entire army was assembled and ready to march.<sup>38</sup>

The question was to where. A major disagreement over strategy erupted between Qalawun and the senior amirs. The Sultan wanted to wait for the Mongols near Damascus, while the majority of amirs were for advancing to Homs. The reasoning of each side is not completely clear. Shāfi' b. 'Alī reports that the Sultan thought the proximity of Damascus's citadel would be an advantage in case of a defeat. Perhaps, as Blochet has suggested, the Sultan wanted to be in a better position to flee to Egypt if the Mongols were victorious. The amirs, on the other hand, may have been averse to abandoning all of northern Syria to Mongol depredations. Qalawun eventually conceded to the opinion of the amirs. Certain early fourteenth-century writers would have us believe that this decision was not exactly reached through compromise. When many of the amirs – led by Sanjar al-Ḥalabī and Baysari – saw that Qalawun was unwilling to move to the north, they struck camp, saying that they would fight the Mongols at Homs with or without the Sultan; in the latter case Taybars al-Wazīrī would lead them. Bektash al-Fakhrī counselled Qalawun that if he did not act decisively at this point, he would lose his kingship. Qalawun saw that he had no choice and set out to join the amirs. The whole army advanced to Homs, where it waited for the arrival of the Mongols.<sup>39</sup> While this story does not correspond to the usual image of Qalawun's resolute leadership, it should not be rejected outright. It is clear

<sup>37</sup> Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 135b; Mufaḍḍal, 324–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:241–2; *Tuhfa*, 98; *Zubda*, fol. 112b (thus Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fols. 7b–8a; whence Ibn al-Furāt, 7:212–13; shorter version in Maqrīzī, 1:690); *Faql*, fols. 44a–46b, who writes that Mengü Temür himself was almost captured by the Mamluk scouts.

<sup>38</sup> Yūnīnī, 4:91. 'Umārī, ed. Krawulsky, 142, describes in detail the dazzling finery of Aḥmad's bedouin (whence Qalqashandī, 4:209–10, Maqrīzī, 1:690–1 [not in parallel passage in Ibn al-Furāt, 7:213]). See *Faql*, fol. 40a–40b, who tells *inter alia* that even bedouin from Egypt were ordered to come, a doubtful assertion.

<sup>39</sup> Jazarī, fol. 16a, whence: Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fols. 135b–136a; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:241–2; Mufaḍḍal, 325–6 (see Blochet's comment, 326, n. 5). *Faql*, fols. 41b–42a, describes the disagreement, but not the amirs' insubordination. Baybars al-Manṣūrī (and those who follow him: Nuwayrī, Ibn al-Furāt and Maqrīzī) make no mention of this incident. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 7:302, reports that Qalawun sent his army before him and then he himself followed at the end of Jumādā II.

that opinions were sharply divided among the leadership of the military society, and it would seem that Qalawun's rule was still far from absolute. In addition, this may well be an indication of an anti-Qalawun strain in Mamluk historiography.

The Mongols were already advancing into north Syria. Some of the Mamluk sources tell a story in Abagha's obituary (*s.a.* 680) that Abagha was against sending an army into Syria, but that he had been convinced by his younger brother Mengü Temür to give him an opportunity to conquer the country.<sup>40</sup> This anecdote is not very credible. Abagha's long-term plans for Syria are clear from his repeated attempts to launch a joint offensive against the country with the Franks (see chapter 4). Rashīd al-Dīn writes that the reason behind this offensive was the Ilkhān's desire to exact revenge for Baybars's invasion of Rūm and other "disorders" that the Mamluks had caused.<sup>41</sup> Finally, it is difficult to believe that Abagha would have committed a good part of his army to a campaign that he really did not want in the first place. Abagha sent his army into Syria because he wished to defeat the Mamluks and conquer Syria. The actual command of this army was not entrusted to Mengü Temür, "who [according to Rashīd al-Dīn] was still a youth and inexperienced in war," but to two senior officers, Tukna and Dolabai.<sup>42</sup> Why Abagha, who had led Mongol armies on several occasions in the past, now chose not to command the invading force personally remains an unanswered question.

The Mongol army advanced from Abulustayn to Mar'ash, and from there to 'Ayn Tāb, which they reached towards the end of Jumādā II (ca. the first half of October). Continuing south, they bypassed Aleppo, which had again been abandoned by its troops and inhabitants. The Mongol army, according to intelligence reports that the Sultan received, numbered 80,000 men, of whom 50,000 were Mongols (*al-mughul*) and the rest Georgians, Seljuq troops from Rūm, Armenians, Franks and "renegades" (*murtadda*). The Armenian and Georgian contingents were led by their kings, Leon and Dmitri respectively. The Franks may have been members of the military orders from the castles in Lesser Armenia, knights from Tripoli, or just mercenaries. As for the "renegades", these may have been the troops of the Muslim rulers of the Jazīra or elsewhere who were subservient to the Mongols. These renegades could also have been equivalent with the (Muslim) Persians (*al-a'jam*) mentioned by Shāfi' and Abū 'l-Fidā'. The Mongol army advanced slowly through Syria, which some writers remark was unusual for the Mongols. The large size of the army appears to have necessitated a deliberate and thorough foraging effort. The Mongols also by-passed Hama, although they wrought havoc in the surrounding agricultural area. Al-Manṣūr and his army had withdrawn to

<sup>40</sup> Yūnīnī, 4:101; Ibn Kathīr, 13:297; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:234.

<sup>41</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:162. <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*; Boyle, "Il-Khāns," 363.

Homs before the arrival of the Mongols. In their march through Syria, the Mongol commanders were assisted by the knowledge of “the weak spots [in the positions] of the Muslims” (*‘awrāt al-muslimīn*) provided by a Mamluk deserter.<sup>43</sup>

Abagha chose to remain close to Syria, but not to enter the country itself. With a small force of perhaps 3000 men, he took up position across the Euphrates from al-Raḥba on 26 Jumādā II/12 October. From this vantage point, Abagha planned to wait for news of the outcome of the battle. Qalawun, upon hearing of the arrival of Mongol troops near al-Raḥba (he did not know that the Īlkhān was with them), sent a reconnaissance force out to investigate the situation. Shāfiʿ adds that the Sultan also ordered that ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā take his bedouins to the Euphrates, but later rescinded this order.<sup>44</sup>

There is some disagreement as to when Qalawun reached Homs: Shāfiʿ says two weeks before the battle; al-Yūnīnī states this was on Sunday 3 Rajab 680/18 October 1281, while Baybars al-Manṣūrī has Monday 11 Rajab/26 October. Perhaps the earlier dates represent Qalawun’s arrival in the area of Homs, while the later one is when Qalawun took up position in the plain to the north of the city. Having reached the location of the prospective battle, the Sultan concerned himself with preparations. The Sultan was joined by ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā and his bedouins, al-Manṣūr and the army of Hama, and the army of Aleppo under its governor, Sanjar al-Bashqardī al-Ṣāliḥī. Units which had been dispatched to the north before Qalawun had left Damascus probably rejoined the main army at this time. Either on 8 or 12 Rajab/23 or 27 October, Sunqur al-Ashqar arrived from the north, along with al-Ḥājj Özdemür, Etmish al-Saʿdī and other amirs who had joined him. Sunqur had made it a condition of his joining the Sultan that after the battle he should be permitted to return to Ṣahyūn. The sources give the impression that Qalawun wrote to Sunqur only upon reaching Homs, but surely negotiations must have commenced previously.<sup>45</sup>

During the time that Qalawun was waiting for the arrival of the Mongols, he received more precise intelligence of the battle order and size of the Mongol

<sup>43</sup> *Faql*, fols. 41a, 42b–43a, 44a, 53a; *Zubda*, fol. 113a–b; *Tuhfa*, 98–9; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:213–15; Maqrīzī, 1:691–2; Yūnīnī, 4:91; Abū ʿl-Fidāʾ, 4:16; Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie*, 594; Bar Hebraeus, 564 (AD 1281, but 681 in Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 504). On the appearance of Frankish soldiers in Mongol armies, see: J. Richard, “An Account of the Battle of Hattin Referring to the Frankish Mercenaries in Oriental Moslem States,” *Speculum* 27 (1952):173–4. For the continued, albeit reduced, presence of Franks in Lesser Armenia, see Riley-Smith, “The Templars and the Teutonic Knights in Cilician Armenia,” in Boase, *Cilician Kingdom*, 116–17. On the possibility that Hospitallers from Marqab may have participated in this campaign, see Amitai-Preiss, “Mamluk Perceptions,” 59–60.

<sup>44</sup> *Faql*, fols. 41a–b, 43a–b, who claims that the Mongols surrounded the castle; *Zubda*, fol. 112b; *Tuhfa*, 99, who states that Abagha was accompanied by the lord of Mārdīn; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:214; Maqrīzī, 1:691; Yūnīnī, 4:91; Ibn Kathīr, 13:294; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlīzādah, 3:162, who writes of fighting with the defenders of al-Raḥba; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 415.

<sup>45</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 113a; *Tuhfa*, 99; Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fol. 8a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:213–14; Maqrīzī, 1:691; Yūnīnī, 4:92; *Faql*, fols. 42b–43a.

army.<sup>46</sup> A Mongol soldier had fled to Hama and told the governor that al-Manṣūr had left in his stead, that the Mongol army numbered 80,000, of which 44,000 were in the Center (*qalb*) and would be heading for the Mamluk Center; in addition, the Mongol Right was strong. The deserter's advice was that the Sultan should strengthen his Left wing and guard his banners (*sanājiq*). This information was sent to Qalawun by pigeon post.

With this information, Qalawun arranged his army in the plain north of Homs. The modern map shows a network of irrigation canals extending from Homs to the northwest, along the east bank of the Orontes. If these canals existed in some form in the thirteenth century, and it can be assumed that they did to some degree, then that would mean that the Mamluk army was arranged to the north and northeast of the city. Qalawun reinforced his Left, as the Mongol deserter suggested. Baybars al-Manṣūrī provides us with a detailed breakdown of the Mamluk order of battle. The unique nature of such evidence in early Mamluk historiography justifies its presentation here (see Fig. 1). In the Mamluk Right were al-Manṣūr and the army of Hama;<sup>47</sup> Lachin al-Manṣūrī, the governor of Damascus, and its army (*ʿaskar al-shām*, which refers here only to Damascus); Baysari; Aydegin al-Bunduqḏār; Taybars al-Wazīrī; Aybeg al-Afram; Kushtoghdi al-Shamsī; plus all the amirs of 40 and 10, and *ḥalqa* commanders and troops assigned to them. In the flank (see below) of the Right were the Syrian bedouin commanded by ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā, who included the Āl Mirā led by Aḥmad b. Ḥujjā. In the Mamluk Left, which had been strengthened, were Sunqur al-Ashqar and his supporters from among the Ṣāḥiriyya; Etmish al-Saʿdī; Bilig al-Aydemūrī; Bektash al-Fakhrī; Sanjar al-Ḥalabī; Bajka (?) al-ʿAlāʾī; Bektūt al-ʿAlāʾī; Jabrak (?) al-Tatarī; and others (presumably amirs of 40, 10, etc.) assigned to them. In the flank of the Left were the Türkmen and the army of Ḥiṣn al-Akrād (led by its governor Balaban al-Ṭabbākḥī). In the *jālīsh* (vanguard) of the Mamluk Center were the *nāʾib al-saltāna* Turantay and his soldiers (along with the amirs and soldiers assigned to him), Abajī al-ḥājib and Bektash b. Geremūn (the son of the *wāfiḍī* leader), along with the royal mamluks of the Manṣūriyya (i.e. personal mamluks of Qalawun). The Sultan himself took up position behind this vanguard, with some of his mamluks, his entourage (*al-alzām*) and various office holders.<sup>48</sup> According to al-Maqrīzī, whose source is unknown,

<sup>46</sup> Qalawun also received intelligence on Mongol troops coming in from the direction of Tripoli, but this turned out to be a false alarm; see Amitai-Preiss, "Mamluk Perceptions," 60.

<sup>47</sup> Abū 'l-Fidā', 4:26, writes in his description of the siege of Acre (s.a. 690) that the normal location of the forces of Hama was in the extreme Right (*bi-ra's al-maymana*) of the Mamluk army. See below for this expression.

<sup>48</sup> *Tuhfa*, 99–100; *Zubda*, fols. 113b–114a; whence Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fol. 8a–b (cites Baybars al-Manṣūrī by name); Ibn al-Furāt, 7:215 (also names Baybars's *Zubda* as source); Maqrīzī, 1:692–3; Dhahabī, MS. Laud. 279, fol. 65b (= MS. Aya Sofya 3014, fol. 98a), also gives most of this information, albeit in a different fashion. Martinez, "Il-Xānid army," 161–2, analyzes some parts of Ibn al-Furāt's rendition of Baybars al-Manṣūrī's passage, but makes several mistakes: first, there is no justification for reading instead of *jālīsh* the word *jāwīsh*, which he




Fig. 1. Line of battle at Homs (680/1281)

the Sultan had with him 800 royal mamluks and 4000 *ḥalqa* troops; then the Sultan took up position on a nearby hill (*tall*) with 200 of his mamluks. If he saw that any squadron (*ṭulb*) was in a difficult position, he planned to reinforce it with a force of 300 royal mamluks. Al-Maqrīzī also mentions that Kurdish amirs were present, but does not specify their exact location.<sup>49</sup> Most of Qalawun's own mamluks must have been fairly young and inexperienced,

understands to be “sargeant” [*sic*]. In the Mamluk armies there was nothing resembling a “battalion of sargeants.” The term *jālīsh* is frequently found, makes perfect sense here, and is clearly read, in both Baybars al-Manşūrī and Ibn al-Furāt. On p. 165, Martinez must be referring to these so-called “sargeants” when he writes that the Mamluk Center had a “screen of infantry.” This last statement is completely unjustified. Secondly, there is no basis for the statement that the troops of Hışn al-Akrād “were apparently similar to the Turcomans and hence made up of Kurds as the place name implies.” The name of the fort had nothing to do with its garrison. Thirdly, ʿIsa b. Muhannā (head of the ‘urban, not ‘arbān as written), was not present at the next battle of Homs in AH 1299, since he died in 683/1284; rather his son, Muhannā b. ʿIsa, was there. <sup>49</sup> Maqrīzī, 1:693.



since the majority of them were surely purchased after he had become sultan.<sup>50</sup> The location of those royal mamluks whom Qalawun had inherited from his predecessors and elsewhere is not specified, although they were probably found in both the *jālīsh* of the Center and the force with the Sultan. The locations of the armies of Aleppo and Homs are not specified in the sources.

The placement of the Türkmén (along with the contingent from Ḥiṣn al-Akrād) and bedouin in the Left and Right flank respectively is not without problems. Baybars al-Manṣūrī writes that these two groups were at the “head” (*ra’s*) of the wings. Al-Dhahabī, however, who evidently had an independent source, says that the bedouin and Türkmén were at the extreme end of the Right and Left wings. In addition, Baybars al-Manṣūrī had earlier spoken of how the Sultan had organized his army into Center, Right wing, Left wing and two flanks (*janāḥayn*). Later, when he provides details, he does not mention the *janāḥayn*. Perhaps, then, he intended that *ra’s al-maymana* meant *janāḥ al-maymana*, and so on.<sup>51</sup> Finally, ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā’s subsequent attack on the flank of the Mongol Left (see below) suggests that he was placed to the east of the Mamluk Right.

Whatever the exact number of troops with the Sultan, it would seem that the major portion of the Center was actually in its *jālīsh*. Possibly, the *jālīsh* was flush with the Left and Right wing, while the force with the Sultan was actually a reserve behind the front. It seems that the Center, *jālīsh* and all, was relatively weak compared to the two wings. This seems strange considering the intelligence that the Sultan had received of the strength of the Mongol Center. However, as will be seen, the battle was fought over a wide front. Rather than stretch his army too thin, Qalawun may have thought to concentrate his forces in the Left and Right. It is unclear if any one officer had command over either of the wings, but according to the contemporary Hospitaller Joseph de Cancy, Sunqur al-Ashqar was commander of the Left while Aybeg al-Afram had charge of the Right.<sup>52</sup>

It is impossible to determine the exact number of the Mamluk army. No specific figures are provided by the Mamluk sources. Certain writers, however, state that the Mamluks numbered half of the Mongol army, which they give at 100,000 men. This figure may well have originated in Qalawun’s victory announcement to Damascus, and seems to be exaggerated.<sup>53</sup> Half of this

<sup>50</sup> In *Zubda*, fol. 115b, it is reported that later in the battle Qalawun was surrounded only by a small group of young mamluks. In *ibid.*, fols. 98b–99a, Baybars al-Manṣūrī lists thirty-nine mamluks, including himself, who belonged to Qalawun before he became sultan.

<sup>51</sup> Dhahabī, MS. Laud 279, fol. 65b (= MS. Aya Sofya 3014, fol. 98a).

<sup>52</sup> Joseph de Cancy, in W.B. Sanders, “A Crusader’s Letter from ‘the Holy Land’,” *Palestine Pilgrim’s Text Society* 5 (1896):7. Dhahabī (as cited in previous note) writes that Baysari was at the “head” (*ra’s*) of the Right, while Sunqur al-Ashqar was at the “head” of the Left. As seen above, this would seem to refer to their positioning on the respective wings, i.e., at the far end, rather than to the command over the wings.

<sup>53</sup> Yūnīnī, 4:93, 95; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:243; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 136a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:216. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, in Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 189b, also mentions 100,000, but MS. 1702, fol. 442a, has 120,000. Cf. Maqrīzī, 1:693.

number would be 50,000, which is the figure offered by Joseph de Cancy for the Mamluk army.<sup>54</sup> One wonders about the source of Joseph's information. I would suggest that the appearance of this figure in de Cancy and the indirect figure in the Mamluk sources was merely a coincidence, and that neither figure is credible. Without attempting to quantify the size of the Mamluk army at Homs, I will limit myself to stating that it represented virtually the entire military capability of the Sultanate and probably numbered several tens of thousands.

On the eve of Thursday 14 Rajab/29 October (still Wednesday, 28 October), the Mongols left Hama and began moving to the south. The Mongols advanced over a large front. Rashīd al-Dīn says that the troops were spread over four farsakhs (ca. 24 km), while Baybars al-Manṣūrī states that the Mongol Right was at Hama while that flank of their Left was at Salamiyya, a slightly longer distance. Perhaps this front may have been reduced as the Mongols drew closer to their enemy. Professor Smith appears to be correct that this "over-dispersal" was a result of a need to forage for food and pasture the horses. It also led to confusion on the battlefield, as the commanders in both wings had no idea what was happening on the rest of the battlefield. The Mamluk commanders had the same problem.<sup>55</sup>

There is a wide disparity in the sources about the size of the Mongol army. As mentioned before, the Mamluk sources variously give the figures of 100,000 and 80,000, although in one place al-Maqrīzī (his source is unknown) says that Abagha sent 25,000 picked troops with Mengü Temür. The pro-Mongol sources provide the following figures: Bar Hebraeus – 50,000; Joseph de Cancy – 40,000; Het'um – 30,000; Waṣṣāf – three *tūmens*.<sup>56</sup> The lower figures of 25–30,000 may perhaps be rejected, because it is difficult to believe that Abagha would attempt the conquest of the country with such a modest army, seemingly smaller than what Qalawun could put in the field.<sup>57</sup> Possibly, however, these lower figures represent the numbers of actual Mongols (and Turkish nomads) in the Mongol army. The highest figure of 100,000 can be rejected as an attempt by Mamluk authors and secretaries to magnify the Mamluk achievement by exaggerating Mongol numbers. The figure of 80,000 also seems to be an exaggeration, in spite of its repeated appearance in Mamluk intelligence reports, not least because of the great difficulty a Mongol army of this size would have had in feeding itself.<sup>58</sup> We are left then with the figure of 40–50,000 Mongol troops, including auxiliaries.<sup>59</sup> These figures, of

<sup>54</sup> Joseph de Cancy, 7.

<sup>55</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:162; *Zubda*, fol. 113b; Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," 239 n. 68.

<sup>56</sup> Maqrīzī, 1:693; Bar Hebraeus, 464 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 504); Joseph de Cancy, 7; Het'um, 182; Waṣṣāf, 89 (cf. Āyatī, 55, who writes "30,000 horsemen").

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," 329 n. 63, who accepts a figure of 25–30,000.

<sup>58</sup> See the discussion in the next chapter.

<sup>59</sup> Both Weil, *Geschichte*, 1:127 n. 2 and d'Ohsson, *Histoire*, 3:525–6, thought the figure of 80,000 was exaggerated. Weil suggests that Mengü Temür led 30,000 Mongols and 15–20,000 allied troops, while D'Ohsson offered the figure of 45,000 troops altogether.

course, are far from certain, but seemingly they give an approximate idea of the size of the Mongol army.

In spite of the tip that Qalawun received from the Mongol deserter on the size of the Mongol Center (44,000 Mongols), this division, curiously, is hardly mentioned in the subsequent fighting. This is another reason to doubt the figure of 80,000 Mongols, which supposedly contained the 44,000. It must be concluded that either the information was intentionally false,<sup>60</sup> or that the Mongols subsequently changed their battle formation. Rashīd al-Dīn names the commanders of the Mongol army: in the Right wing were Mazuq Aqa and Hinduqur; in the Left were Alinaq, Taiju Bahādur (< Baghatūr), “prince” Hūlejū and Qara Bugha;<sup>61</sup> in the center were Tukna and Doladai, evidently the real commanders of the expedition, along with Mengü Temür.<sup>62</sup> There is some confusion here: from subsequent events, it is clear that the Mongol “Left” of Rashīd al-Dīn is the Mongol “Right” of the Mamluk sources, as well as of Bar Hebraeus and Waṣṣāf, while Rashīd al-Dīn’s Mongol “Right” is the Mongol “Left” of the other sources. To prevent confusion, henceforth the divisions of the Mongol army will be called as they appear in the Mamluk sources. Another Mongol commander not mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn was Samaghar, who must have come with the Rūmī contingent. From Joseph de Cancy we learn that he was also in the Mongol Right with 3000 Rūmī troops, along with 2000 “Tartars,” 1000 Georgians and an unspecified number of Armenians under their king. Bar Hebraeus states that there were 5000 Georgians (presumably under their King) in the Right, as was the Armenian army under King Leon and a contingent of Oirat Mongols. Waṣṣāf places Alinaq in the Mongol Right, together with an officer named Ayaji. Het’um writes that the Armenian King was in the Mongol Right, but has “Halinaq” (Alinaq) commanding the Mongol Left; the latter was probably in the Right as suggested by Rashīd al-Dīn (which he called “Left”) and Waṣṣāf.<sup>63</sup> The Mongol order of battle is also shown on figure 1.

The two armies met early Thursday morning, 14 Rajab/29 October, somewhere between Homs and Rastān, a distance of some 25 km. The

<sup>60</sup> Thus suggests Glubb, *Soldiers of Fortune*, 113, but the Mongol deserter’s advice regarding the Mamluk Left was certainly for the Mamluks’ good. Qalawun’s strengthening of this wing, however, was not sufficient to prevent its defeat. On the Mongol use of false information to weaken the will of the enemy, see H.D. Martin, “The Mongol Army,” *JRAS* 1943: 46.

<sup>61</sup> In text: Buqāy. This Qara Bugha may be identified with the Mongol commander in Baghdad, who defeated the Caliph al-Mustansir’s army in 660/1261. See ch. 3, p. 58.

<sup>62</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:162–3.

<sup>63</sup> Bar Hebraeus, 464 (= Ibn al-‘Ibrī, 504); Joseph de Cancy, 8; Het’um, 183; Waṣṣāf, 89–90, who first mentions that Mengü Temür came with three officers: Alinaq, Ayaji and Arghasun (?) commanding 3 *tümens*; the last-mentioned is not heard of again. On p. 90, Waṣṣāf mentions Qurmushi, in the Center with Mengü Temür. Waṣṣāf’s confused chronology (see above, nn. 18 and 23) detracts from the credibility of his account and the names which he mentioned; perhaps he has added the names of commanders who took part in the raid of AH 679 into the events of the subsequent year. On the other hand, as Rashīd al-Dīn does not mention Samaghar, who was surely at the battle, it is conceivable that these officers mentioned only in Waṣṣāf were also present in 680.

Mongols and their horses must have been quite tired since they had probably ridden most of the night. The Mamluk troops on their part had spent the night in full gear. Essentially there were two separate battles which had little to do with each other. To the west, the Mongol Right (what Rashīd al-Dīn calls the Left) under Alinaq, launched an attack against the Mamluk Left, in which Sunqur al-Ashqar *et al.* were found. The Mamluk Left broke under the force of the Mongol attack and fled. The extreme left flank of the Mamluk Center was also defeated. Retreating Mamluks reached as far as Damascus, Safad, Gaza and even Egypt. Some of the amirs, however, succeeded in rejoining the Mamluk Center and are mentioned later in the battle. The Mongol Right pursued the defeated Mamluk troops past Homs, killing people (including commoners, volunteer infantry and grooms [*ghilmān*]) found outside its walls and looting baggage on their way. The pursuing Mongols reached as far south as the Lake of Homs, where they dismounted and rested. Expecting their comrades to join them soon, they had no idea that the fighting had not also gone in favor of the rest of the Mongol army.<sup>64</sup>

Professor Martinez has attributed this victory of the Mongol Right to the presence of non-Mongol troops in this division, and the fact that these auxiliary troops were of a heavier nature than the Mongols themselves.<sup>65</sup> There are several problems with this suggestion. First, there has been little research on the Armenian, Georgian and Seljuq armies, and therefore the basis for this comparison is unclear.<sup>66</sup> Secondly, the Armenian troops, at least, had often met the Mamluks in the past, and had almost invariably been bested. There is no reason to think that they contributed to the victory now. Finally, the numbers given by the various sources above show that the numbers of the auxiliary troops were not large (several thousand at the most), while the names of Mongol commanders which Rashīd al-Dīn provides hint at the great number of Mongol troops in the Mongol Right.<sup>67</sup> In fact, it is the apparent large size of the Mongol Right which appears to have led to the Mongol victory at this side of the battle.

The Mamluks were faring better on the other side of the battlefield. The initial attack of the Mongol Left had rocked the Mamluk Right, but the Mamluks held firm. The Mamluks then counter-attacked and drove back the

<sup>64</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alṭzādah, 3:162; Bar Hebraeus, 464 (= Ibn al-Ibrī, 504); Het'um, 183; Joseph de Cancy, 8–9; *Zubda*, fol. 115a–b; *Tuhfa*, 100; Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fols. 8b–9a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:216, 220; Maqrīzī, 1:693–4; Jazarī, fol. 16a; Yūnīnī, 4:93; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 279, fol. 65b; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 136a–b. Ibn al-Furāt, 7:218, cites Ibn Mukarrim's lost work, *Dhākhīrat al-kātib*, who reports that the Mamluk Left fled without even a fight. *Faql*, fol. 47b, noted that when Qalawun saw the retreat of his Left, he went after it (to stop its rout). This is, of course, nonsense. <sup>65</sup> Martinez, "Il-Xānid Army," 162–5.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 163, writes that a Danishmandid contingent was present at the battle, and that they "were probably medium-to-heavy cavalry." No evidence is adduced for either part of this statement. Martinez (*ibid.*) makes another unsubstantiated assumption: "From the point of view of weight, the majority of the Mongols were probably somewhere in between the Western or Westernized auxiliaries and the Turcomans, though nearer to the former than to the latter."

<sup>67</sup> I assume, following Smith ("Ayn Jalūt," 310), that when Rashīd al-Dīn mentions a commander, he is referring to a *tūmen* commander.

Mongols. There is some disagreement in the Mamluk sources on how this came about. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, who was in the Center (although it is not clear if he was in the *jālīsh* or with the Sultan), writes of how the Mongol squadrons (*aṭlāb*) charged one after the other. The Mamluk Right counter-attacked and drove the Mongols towards the Mamluk *jālīsh*. Thereupon, the Sultan ordered an unspecified force, evidently those troops in his vicinity (including Baybars al-Manṣūrī), to follow him. The Mamluks attacked, protecting the Sultan and routing the Mongol Left. This led to the demoralization of the Mongol Center, where Mengü Temür was found, and its withdrawal.<sup>68</sup>

No other version mentions the Sultan at this point, and it would seem that Baybars al-Manṣūrī may have been less than truthful in his attempt to laud his patron's bravery. In fact, some Mamluk sources state that throughout the battle Qalawun "stood firm" under his banners. Al-Jazarī goes even further, and writes that Qalawun had the banners furled, and his location was not known. This historian reveals himself to have a distinctly non-panegyric view of Qalawun in this battle. Whether this was as a result of "objective" reporting or an anti-Qalawun bias is unclear.

After the Mamluk Right stood its ground and repelled the Mongol attack, a group of amirs were (supposedly) inspired by Qalawun's stand to lead a counter-attack against the Mongol Right. These amirs included those of the Mamluk Right (Baysari, Taybars), the Center (Turantay), and even from the recently defeated Left (Sunqur al-Ashkar, Bektash al-Fakhrī, Etmish al-Sa'dī). During this assault (or possibly assaults), ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā arrived with his bedouin and attacked the Mongols on the flank. This brought about the final rout of the Mongol Left. A variant of this story is that ʿĪsā raided the baggage of the Mongol Left. The Mongols turned around, and were then attacked in the rear by the Mamluks and routed. The Mamluks then continued on to the Mongol Center.<sup>69</sup>

It was in the Mongol Center that the fate of the battle was decided. Hetʿum comments on Mengü Temür's inexperience, as does Rashīd al-Dīn, and on how he was nonplussed upon seeing a column of bedouin heading his way. The Mamluk sources relate the story differently: one version has it that Mengü Temür panicked at some point and was then thrown from his horse and injured. Another version of events is that the Mamluk amir, al-Ḥājj Özdemür (Sunqur al-Ashqar's confederate), made out as if he were deserting to the Mongols. When brought before Mengü Temür, he struck and wounded him

<sup>68</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 115a; cf. the version in *Tuhfa*, 100, which is more rhetorical and less detailed.

<sup>69</sup> Jazarī, fol. 16a; Yūnīnī, 4:93–4; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 279, fol. 65b; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:216–18, who also cites Jazarī, who in turn quotes the *amīr jandar* Shams al-Dīn Ibn al-Maḥaffdār (Ibn al-Furāt: Ibn al-Jumaqdār; Maqrīzī, 1:693. For the second version of ʿĪsā's attack, see: Jazarī, fol. 16a, whence: Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:243; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 136b; Mufaḍḍal, 327–8. Bar Hebraeus, 464 (= Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 504), tells of a bedouin ambush on the Mongol Left. Joseph de Cancy, 8–9, has the Mongol Left, under Mengü Temür himself, driving back the Mamluk Right; this is contradicted by all other sources.

before he himself was killed. The first account is more credible, as the second version has too much of a legend about it. In either case, it is clear that Mengü Temür was wounded, and this caused confusion in the Mongol Center. The Mongols then dismounted, either to attempt a stand around the wounded prince or because their horses were exhausted. The latter reason seems unlikely, since the Mongol Center had yet to participate in any real fighting. At this point, the Mamluks, seeing the dismounting of the Mongols (and sensing their weakness), attacked and routed the enemy. The Mongols withdrew, taking Mengü Temür with them.<sup>70</sup>

The majority of the Mamluk Center and Right went off in pursuit of the fleeing Mongols, leaving Qalawun behind with a relatively small force numbering some 300 or 1000 troops. At this point, the victorious Mongol Right returned to the scene of the battle. These Mongols, who had been waiting leisurely south of Homs for the arrival of the rest of their army, had become uneasy when it did not appear. Scouts were sent back, and they returned to report the Mongol defeat. The commanders of the Mongol Right had no choice but to turn back in order to join the main Mongol army. Heading for Rastān,<sup>71</sup> their path brought them close to Qalawun's position. Seeing the approaching Mongols, and aware of his own precarious position, the Sultan ordered that his banners be furled and the drums stay silent. The Mongols passed by without perceiving the Sultan's presence, thus letting slip the opportunity for turning the tables on the Mamluks.

The Mamluk sources are not unanimous about subsequent events. Some, including Baybars al-Manṣūrī, state that the Mongols passed by and the Sultan watched them join the Mongol exodus from the battlefield. Others, e.g. al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Furāt, describe how Qalawun seized the opportunity and launched an attack with his small force to the rear of the Mongol Right. They were routed and fled the field in disorder. Thus, by nightfall, the Mongol defeat was complete.<sup>72</sup> It appears that the second version is less credible. It is hard to believe that Baybars al-Manṣūrī would pass over in silence such a courageous

<sup>70</sup> Het'um, 183; Jazarī, fol. 16a; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:243–4; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fols. 136b, 143b; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:217, 236–7; Mufaḍḍal, 329, states that Özdemir continued his attack until he reached Mengü Temür, whom he wounded before he himself was killed. *Faql*, fol. 48a, states that Mengü Temür was wounded by an arrow in the neck, while Waṣṣāf, 90, reports that he was hit while already retreating. Waṣṣāf, who does not mention that the Mamluk Right had previously attacked the Mongol Left before moving on to the Mongol Center, does report that the Mamluk Right was composed of the army of Hama and “bedouin archers” (*rumāt-i ‘arab*). Rashid al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:162–3, writes merely that Mengü Temür panicked and fled.

<sup>71</sup> *Tuhfa*, 101.

<sup>72</sup> A few troops with the Sultan, who does not attack the Mongols: *Zubda*, fol. 115b; Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fol. 8b. 300 troops with the Sultan, who does not attack the Mongols: Jazarī, fol. 16a–b; Kutubī, MS. Köprülü, fol. 136b; Mufaḍḍal, 329–30; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:243–4. 1000 troops with the Sultan, who does attack the Mongols: Yūnīnī, 4:94; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 279, fol. 66a; Ibn Kathīr, 13:295 (the drums keep beating and the Mongols attack the Sultan); Ibn al-Furāt, 7:217–18; Maqrīzī, 1:695. Shāfi‘ (*Faql*, fols. 48b–49) describes this episode differently: Qalawun orders the banners unfurled and the drums beaten, and then launches an attack against the Mongols. Shāfi‘, it seems, was particularly interested in presenting the Sultan in a heroic light.



action by his patron had it really happened. It is also difficult to accept that other authors would deliberately suppress information of a complimentary nature to the Sultan, even if they might have had an anti-Qalawun bias. Neither Het'um nor Bar Hebraeus mentions Qalawun's attack on the Mongol Right (although the latter writes of a subsequent skirmish between them and Mamluk troops), but rather describes their withdrawal as fairly organized.<sup>73</sup> The only conclusion which can be drawn is that certain authors, or rather one who was later copied, invented a story to present the Sultan in a more heroic role. In the eyes of this writer or writers, this might well have been necessary, since Qalawun had actually done very little in the battle itself.

The Mongol army split up into smaller groups, each trying to make its way out of the country. Some Mongols and their allies went to the north, while others headed east via Salamiyya and the desert. The retreat soon turned into a rout. Pursued by both regular Mamluk troops and nomadic irregulars, harrassed by local inhabitants and plagued by hunger, thirst and exhaustion, many of the Mongol soldiers were killed in the retreat. Ibn al-Furāt tells of a *melée* between retreating Mongol and Georgian troops, ostensible allies, over horses, in which many troops from both groups were killed. At the Euphrates, numerous Mongols either drowned in the river or were caught hiding in reedbeds, which were set on fire at the Sultan's orders. The garrisons of al-Bīra and al-Raḥba attacked groups of Mongols passing their way, inflicting heavy casualties and capturing many. At Baghrās, the Mamluk garrison attacked and virtually annihilated a large group of Armenians. Baybars al-Manṣūrī (followed by other authors) may well be correct when he writes that more Mongols were killed during the retreat than in the battle itself. Even more Mongols would have been killed were it not for Khafāja bedouins who showed them the way through the desert and fords over the Euphrates.<sup>74</sup>

Mamluk losses were evidently much lower than those sustained by the Mongols, although perhaps the figure of 200 Muslim dead given in one account is too low. Ibn al-Furāt gives us the names of eleven amirs killed in the battle, while two more are found in the obituaries in al-Yūnīnī and al-Dhahabī's chronicles.<sup>75</sup> Among the wounded was the scribe (and later historian), Shāfi' b. 'Alī, who had been present at the battle and was subsequently wounded in the temple by an arrow, and thus blinded for the rest of his life.<sup>76</sup>

There is no single reason why the Mamluks had been victorious at Homs. One contributing factor was the evident fatigue of the Mongol troops and

<sup>73</sup> Bar Hebraeus, 464 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 504); Het'um, 183.

<sup>74</sup> *Tuhfa*, 101; *Zubda*, fols. 116a–117a; Nuwayrī, MS. 2n, fol. 9a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:218, 221–2; Maqrīzī, 1:695–6, 698; Yūnīnī, 4:97; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:244; Mufaḍḍal, 330; *Faḍl*, fol. 51a–b; Bar Hebraeus, 464 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 504); Het'um, 183–4; de Caney, 9–10, who has the Rūmīs under Samaghar robbing the Armenians during the retreat.

<sup>75</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, 7:219; Maqrīzī, 1:696, 705 (who mentions some civilian casualties not found in Ibn al-Furāt); Yūnīnī, 4:96, 108, 120; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 279, fols. 66a, 116a.

<sup>76</sup> Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, MS. 2964, fol. 53.

horses, who had been on the move all night. An additional reason was Mengü Temür's inexperience, along with the apparent lack of a single authoritative commanding figure among the Mongol officers. The failure of the officers of the Mongol Right to maintain contact with the rest of the army, and thus the lack of assistance they could have provided at a critical juncture, should also be mentioned. The Mamluks on the other hand had been at the site of the battle for at least three days, probably longer. Thus they had had an opportunity to rest and prepare themselves. While Qalawun's part in the battle, both in the actual fighting and as a commander, was somewhat limited, he may have had an important symbolic role: some writers state that his stand on a hill behind the frontline under his banners inspired his troops and officers alike. Al-Jazarī's evidence, however, casts some doubt on this information. The Mamluks had luck on their side, because the Mongol Right, upon passing Qalawun on their return, did not see him (or perhaps ignored him). Had they attacked, the result might well have been different. There is also the morale factor: the Mamluks were fighting on home territory for the survival of their kingdom; evidence of this fervor is seen in the amirs' desire to move north from Damascus to meet the Mongols. The Mongols may well have wanted to conquer Syria and avenge previous defeats, but a reverse would not have endangered their kingdom. As at 'Ayn Jālūt, the Mamluks were probably driven by the feeling that they were fighting for their lives, their kingdom and their religion.

Qalawun remained on the battlefield for several days. News of the victory was sent to Damascus and Cairo. The day after the battle he dispatched a force to the north. The armies of Hama and Aleppo subsequently set out for their cities. Sunqur al-Ashqar also left for Ṣahyun, although several of the amirs who had been with him elected to remain with the Sultan. On 22 Rajab/6 November, Qalawun entered Damascus to great acclaim, as droves of Mongol prisoners were paraded before him.<sup>77</sup> With the Mongol danger thus removed, at least for the foreseeable future, the Sultan could now turn his attention to other matters, not the least of which was the further reduction of the Frankish possessions.

There is some disagreement over Abagha's whereabouts during the battle. Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf report that the Ilkhān left al-Raḥba for the east by the end of Jumādā II/15 October, after occupying himself with hunting. On the other hand, the Mamluk sources tell that Abagha remained at al-Raḥba, waiting for the results of the battle. Fighting broke out with the defenders of the castle, although the description in some sources of a Mongol siege is surely exaggerated. The earliest news of Mengü Temür's defeat was brought by the first Mongol survivors who reached him. Some Mamluk writers tell that Abagha realized that the celebrations inside al-Raḥba (its inhabitants had received word via pigeon post) could only be a result of good tidings – from a

<sup>77</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 117a; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:218; Maqrīzī, 1:696; Yūnīnī, 4:94–6.

Muslim point of view – from the front. In either case, the Īlkhān withdrew from al-Raḥba to Hamadhān. While *a priori* it would seem that the Persian historians should have had a better idea of Abagha's actions during this period, some of the Mamluk writers report that their source for this information was the Mongol deserters who subsequently fled to the Sultanate, reaching Damascus on 23 Sha'ḥbān 680/7 December 1281.

Whatever Abagha's exact timetable, he was furious at the Mongol defeat and planned another offensive the next year to exact revenge. His death later in 680/1282 prevented the realization of this plan.<sup>78</sup> Almost twenty years were to pass before another Īlkhān attempted again to invade Syria.

<sup>78</sup> Yūnīnī, 4:101; Ibn al-Furāt, 7:221–2, 234–5; Maqrīzī, 1:698; *Zubda*, fol. 117a; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:162, who has Abagha leave al-Raḥba long before the news of the battle reached him; Waṣṣāf, 98; Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," 363–4. During the month after the battle, 200 Mongol *wāfidiyya* arrived in Damascus, bringing news that Mengü Temür had died, and of how Abagha had been at al-Raḥba and subsequently withdrawn; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:248; Mufaḍḍal, 334. These *wāfidiyya* might have been the the source of other information on the battle.