

## VENETIAN AND ARAGONESE/CATALAN RELATIONS: PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATION IN 1398-1404\*

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Within the Crown of Aragon/Catalonia's jurisdiction, animosity towards "Italians" had a long history. This attitude, held by merchants, cities, or the King, was a reaction to Italian commercial practices. While usually dormant and unexpressed except by an occasional individual, it periodically became overt during the later middle ages. This hostility then was expressed through protectionist legislation and sometimes even violence.<sup>1</sup> Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol found notices of such incidents in records for 1227, 1265, 1269, 1277, 1291, 1298, 1311, 1326, 1330, 1337, 1342, 1353, 1368, 1386, 1398-1403, and beyond. The actions taken in the decrees range from bans on trading between Catalonia and particular foreign ports (Alexandria in 1227), to bans on foreigners settling in particular cities such as Barcelona (particularly Tuscans in 1269), to confiscation of goods and expulsion for people of defined "nationalities" (1277, 1291, 1311 and 1330), to variations on these themes.<sup>2</sup> The results of each new promulgation were that the targeted merchants had to leave the country, pay indemnities in order to stay, or pay taxes from which they had previously secured exemptions. If they wanted to continue trading in the region, these businessmen then had to petition the Aragonese/Catalonia government for relief from the measure or its repeal, or appeal to their home governments to send diplomats to rene-

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\* This paper derives from research on Venetians and the Western Mediterranean for my dissertation, and now for a book forthcoming from E. J. Brill. I could not have pursued the topic of diplomats in Aragon/Catalonia without Maria Theresa Ferrer i Mallol's article on Italians in this region as the foundation. I am deeply indebted to Emily Sohmer Tai for taking time out of her research while in Barcelona to secure for me copies of the pertinent Aragonese legislation cited by Ferrer i Mallol. I offer this paper in celebration for the promotion of my dissertation supervisor, David S. H. Abulafia, to the position of Professor of Mediterranean History at Cambridge University.

<sup>1</sup> Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, 'Els italians a terres Catalanes (segles XII-XIV),' *Anuario de estudios medievales* 10 (1980): p. 462.

<sup>2</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, pp. 395-401.

gotiate trade rights. Venetians were one of the groups targeted by a number of these protectionist decrees.

Between the years 1398 and 1404, Aragon/Catalonia underwent one of its periodic spasms of anti-Italian sentiment. The cities of Valencia and Barcelona led the other mercantile centers in promulgating legislation that identified certain groups of foreigners who were to be excluded or restricted from trading in their jurisdictions. The series of decrees in these years show how the motivations for protectionist legislation were the delicate balance of four forces: 1) royal policy that benefitted the country by encouraging citizens in economic activities; 2) royal policy that benefitted the state by use of economically advantageous agents—i.e. foreign merchants; 3) the rights of political units within the kingdom to promote their own interests; and 4) the desire of investors to secure the raw materials needed for textile production. While the events of 1398 to 1404 were not directed solely against Venetians, because of the unusually rich surviving documentation, examining the progression according to the impact on Venetians illuminates the various royal, civic, and foreign motivations for applying or fighting such legislation. Copies of the various decrees, exemptions, attempts at negotiation, and merchant reaction still exist in archives in Barcelona, Venice, and in the greatest collection of mercantile letters for this period—those of Francesco di Marco Datini, the merchant of Prato. The documents show the protectionist legislation, but also that the Venetians used their options and connections well so that their business was only slightly affected.

### *Rationale behind the legislation*

The reasons for hostility towards Italians predated the Venetian penetration into Iberia in the first years of the fourteenth century, but quickly spread to them.<sup>3</sup> In the thirteenth century, five, if not more, episodes of hostility ended in some form of Catalan/Aragonese protectionist legislation against Italians—mostly Genoese, Pisans, and Tuscans. In 1265, for example, Catalan merchants successfully procured a royal expulsion of all Italians and a ban on Tuscans establishing trading houses in Barcelona.<sup>4</sup> Venetians usually followed other Italians in penetrating and discovering the potential for trade in the Western Mediterranean and

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<sup>3</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 462.

<sup>4</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 394.

beyond. Some settled in their chosen market while others hired merchants already there to be their agents. Still others, including ship-captains, visited the region periodically. Wherever they went to trade or live—Sicily, Puglia, North Africa, Aragon/Catalonia, Castile, Portugal, France, Flanders, England, etc.—in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they were likely to meet pre-existing identity-based hostility that was periodically channeled into commercial restrictions. Venetians became quickly identified as just another group of “Italians”. In Aragon/Catalonia, their habit of using other Italians as agents to carry out their business, did not help to differentiate them or protect them from the animosity. Native merchants resented and were jealous of the large amounts of money for investment that the Italian firms present had immediately available, or could get by means of credit instruments. Other economic, but non-commercial, problems were blamed on Italians and used as justification for their persecution, such as the insufficient cash available from money-changers and banks for paying off debts, and that precious metals were so rare in Aragon/Catalonia.<sup>5</sup>

The arrival of the Venetians in Aragon/Catalonia, and the beginning of the fourteenth century, did not change the reasons or timing for the flare-ups of hostility against foreigners and attempts to legislate protection of their markets. Documentation, however, survives in greater quantity for these incidents giving a more detailed picture of the motivations. Many of the protectionist decrees were initiated or promulgated by cities or regions that functioned as political units. For example, when the Kingdom of Majorca was handed back to Jaume II in 1326, the Barcelonans asked for the expulsion of Italians to be continued and extended to merchants who had secured exemptions.<sup>6</sup> Most of the protectionist legislation was issued by the King, even if the impetus came from the cities and regions. Sometimes the Crown was the persecutor and issued decrees favoring domestic commerce. In 1332, for example, Alfonso IV banned foreigners from trading in Valencia in order to favor development of internal markets and industry, virtually cutting off the

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<sup>5</sup> Abbot Payson Usher, *The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe*, (Cambridge MA: 1943), p. 244; Frederic Lane, *Andrea Barbarigo: Merchant of Venice: 1418-1449* (Baltimore, 1944), p. 135; John Day, *The Medieval Market Economy* (Oxford, 1987), p. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 397. For the history of the Kingdom of Majorca, see: David Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994).

wool supply to foreigners. The text of the prohibition against the Italians says that he wanted to stop the financial losses of his people at the hands of Italian usurers and improve conditions through his legislation.<sup>7</sup> Much of the royal legislation that survives, however, favors the Italians in order to bring international financial resources to Aragon/Catalonia. For example, in 1356 Pietro IV made a treaty with Venice as part of his efforts to encourage Italian investment in his country. He also ordered his governors in Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca, and Ibiza, and city officials of Barcelona and Valencia, to protect Venetians and treat them well.<sup>8</sup> After these orders excited resentment and attacks on Venetians, Pietro IV ordered his people, in 1358, to stop molesting the foreigners for the good of the kingdom.<sup>9</sup>

Many reasons existed for this Catalan/Aragonese hostility toward Italians in general and Venetians in specific. One issue that caused antagonism was the treaties which the different "nations" in Italy made with the royal court. These usually exempted the preferred merchants from paying all or part of the import and export duties. For example, in 1390, John I ordered that foreign merchants would import merchandise without paying tariffs on goods as they arrived in port.<sup>10</sup> The King, however, did not similarly reduce the fees for native shippers leading to impassioned resentment. Another royal action that seemed to favor foreigners was Martin the Humane's requirement, in 1398, that Majorcans had to lighten the regulations that they had put in place against Venetians. The new decree conceded to Venetians the ability to sort all merchandise on their galleys without paying tariffs or being forced to bring these goods to shore where they would be liable to charges for handling and storage. Moreover, he did not demand that Venetians change the rules about which items foreigners were permitted to load on their state-sponsored and state subsidized galleys traveling to Flanders—rules which were disadvantageous to his own merchants and shippers.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Pedro López Elum, 'El acuerdo comercial de la Corona de Aragón con los Italianos en 1403 "Dret italia"' *Ligarzas* 7 (1975): 171, 183-184.

<sup>8</sup> Riccardo Predelli, ed., *I Libri Commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia—Regestri*, Vol. 2, bk. 4 (Venice, 1878), pp. 239, 249, 251.

<sup>9</sup> Predelli, *Commemoriali* 2, p. 271.

<sup>10</sup> López Elum, *El acuerdo*, p. 173; Riccardo Predelli, ed., *I Libri Commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia—Regestri*, Vol. 3, bk. 8 (Venice, 1883), p. 205.

<sup>11</sup> Pierre Macaire, *Majorque et le commerce international (1400-1450)* (Lille, 1986), p. 378.

A second reason behind the hostility was that the King issued royal privileges to individual Italians in return for a rich "gift" of some precious commodity such as Damascene silks, cloth of gold or fifty florins. This type of grant usually freed the giver from paying any taxes within Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon.<sup>12</sup> This deprived the places where the individual worked of substantial sums of money needed for local administration. Antonio di Alessandro of Florence made just this sort of deal with the King, and with the bailey of the Catalans in order to secure the ability to trade in the region. To each, he said in 1400, at Christmas time he had given cloth-of-gold from Damascus in order to gain trade concessions.<sup>13</sup> Native merchants could neither afford these rich offerings for swaying royal policy, nor did they have any other way to secure similar privileges from the King. Not being able to avoid the import, export, loading, and handling charges left Catalan merchants at a serious disadvantage.

Italian business practices were another factor that angered the residents of Aragon/Catalonia. Through most of the Middle Ages, the Italian cities including Florence, Genoa, and Venice were the leaders in developing business techniques. These made the movement, use, and accumulation of money easier. In spite of church regulations against selling for more than the "just price" and charging usurious interest, and spectacular bankruptcies caused by royal repudiation of loans, the Italians were the leading source and users of money in the fourteenth century. They developed tools, such as bills of exchange, credit, insurance, and ways to acceptably charge interest, which gave them a tremendous advantage, in terms of fund liquidity, over local merchants. Because of their networks of companies, Italians could move money around Europe simply through written instruments, not with coins. The Catalans consistently singled out this feature of Italian practice, branding it 'usury', when justifying attempts to defend domestic markets from foreigners.<sup>14</sup> Alphonso IV's prohibition against Italian participation in Catalan mar-

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<sup>12</sup> Daniel Girona Llagostera, 'Itinerari del rey Martí,' *Anuari de l'Institut Estudis Catalans* 4 (1911-12): 129-130.

<sup>13</sup> Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, *Real Cancilleria*, Registro 2195, fols. 30r-30v (hereafter ACA Reg); Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 408.

<sup>14</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, pp. 390-405; Federigo Melis, 'La lana della Spagna mediterranea e della Barberia occidentali nei secoli XIV-XV,' in *Mercaderes italiani en España, siglos XIV-XVI* prólogo de Felipe Ruiz Martín (Seville, 1976), pp. 147-148 [reprinted from *La lana come materia prima. Atti della prima Settimana di Studio, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Florencia* (1974).]

kets cites just these features as clever and unfair ways of gaining and advantage.<sup>15</sup>

Another issue that created hostility was that Italian merchants tended to buy and sell large quantities of one or a few commodities instead of dealing in a wide variety. Venice-based merchants sent a variety of goods to Aragon/Catalonia, but they focused on buying materials for the Italian textile industry, primarily raw wool and dyes. They tried, whenever possible, to buy in bulk directly from the source instead of waiting for the appropriate market day to arrive and buying through middlemen. The Aragonese government preferred that wool be sold in June at large fairs, the most important of which was at San Matteo. Italian merchants, including Datini's employees buying for Venetian investors, however, tried to assure that their customers got the volume and quality they wanted by buying ahead of these fairs. If they could be present at the shearing, they would; some, however, had no compunction about speculating by paying a down-payment while the flocks were in their winter pastures, or even in the summer ones the previous year.<sup>16</sup> For example, Tuccio di Gennaio, while working at San Matteo in the later 1390s, tried to reserve wool eight or nine months in advance of the main market.<sup>17</sup> Italians could afford this practice because they had vast amounts of capital backing their purchases; native merchants could not offer that amount of money up front. While Italian money and advance-buying may have been beneficial for the producers and for the merchants, it undercut the native textile industry. Because they did not have the money to be able to buy materials such as wool at the source, potential local industrialists had to pay higher prices for the inferior remaining merchandise offered at the government-mandated

<sup>15</sup> Lopez Elum, *El acuerdo*, p. 183. Alfonso says: *Propter fraudes et dolos quos lombardi et italici ex in cogitatis astutiis et subdolis machinationibus, circa negociaciones et comercia eorundem seu pocius imporba fenera frequenter exercent quibus gentes nostres pannum exauste voragine, varia dispendia pasciunt volentes indepnitibus civum et habitaturum civitatis et Regni Valencie regie provisionis sollicitudine providere.*

<sup>16</sup> Claude Carrère, 'Aspects de la production et du commerce de la laine en Aragon au milieu XV<sup>e</sup> siècle,' in *La lana come materia prima: I fenomeni della sua produzione e circolazione nei secoli XIII-XVII*, ed. Marco Spallanzani (Florence, 1974), pp. 210-211; Carla Rahn Phillips and William Phillips, *Spain's Golden Fleece: Wool Production and the Wool Trade from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore, MD and London, 1997), pp. 172-179; Melis, *La lana*, pp. 148-149.

<sup>17</sup> Giampiero Nigro, 'Els operadors econòmics Italians als països catalans entre els segles XIV i XV. El cas de Tuccio di Gennaio,' in *València, un mercat medieval*, ed. Antoni Furio (Valencia, 1985), pp. 56-57.

market days. Bolts of fabric made from this, when compared to similar Italian fabrics, were usually more expensive and thus less attractive in whatever market they were offered.<sup>18</sup>

A further reason for protectionist legislation pertained especially to Venetians. The Aragonese and Catalans merchants were convinced that Venetians were trying to gain advantages in Western Mediterranean markets, while not giving equal opportunities to foreigners wanting to trade in the Adriatic. The Venetians used some of their largest round ships for voyages to Aragonese and Catalan waters. By 1398, they established the routine of sailing to each of the region's ports where they expected to pick up cargo instead of waiting at an emporium for freight to be brought to them. The Valencians and Barcelonans felt that this Venetian practice was a conscious decision not to employ, and thus pay, the native merchant-marine. Parallel to this activity, the Venetians were well known at this time, and in modern literature, to want to regulate the movement of all ships in the Adriatic, even those belonging to cities situated along its shores such as Ragusa. The term "monopoly" is often applied to Venetian aspirations to control this sea.<sup>19</sup> Catalan merchants were not content to allow foreigners to rule the waves, determine who could trade in what market, or dictate what merchandise would be available in their country. They, just like the Venetians, wanted to travel to foreign markets and exploit them, including Venice because of the extraordinary range of goods available there. The Venetians, however, did not willingly throw open their city to foreigners or offer the sorts of benefits—tax reliefs on imports, exports, and port expenses in order to attract business—as they secured from the Aragonese kings.

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<sup>18</sup> On the textile industry in the various parts of Aragon/Catalonia, see: Abulafia, *Mediterranean Emporium*, pp. 216-219; Macaire, *Majorque*, pp. 105-115; Claude Carrère, *Barcelone, centre économique à l'époque des difficultés 1380-1462* (Paris, 1968), pp. 423-425; Phillips and Phillips, *Golden Fleece*, pp. 195-202; Manuel Riu Riu, 'Aportación a la organización gremial de la industria textil catalana en el siglo XIV,' in *VII Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1962), pp. 547-548; David Abulafia, 'Commerce and the Kingdom of Majorca 1150-1450,' in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Robert I Burns S.F.*, Vol. 2, *Proceedings from 'Spain and the Western Mediterranean'*, ed. P. Chevedden, D. Kagay, and P. Padilla (Leiden, 1996), pp. 369-373.

<sup>19</sup> The text that gives rise to this characterization of Venetian ambitions, "Ogni merce che entra nell'Adriatico o esce dall'Adriatico deve toccar Venezia", is quoted by Susan Mosher Stuard from the records of the *Cinque Savi*, (*A State of Deference: Ragusa/Dubrovnik in the Medieval Centuries* (Philadelphia, 1992), pp. 28, 53. Most other authors, however, simply state that Venice monopolized long-distance trade in the Adriatic. For example, see Robert López and Irving Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World* (New York, 1955), p. 130.

Finally, Catalan jealousy of the Italians was an indirect expression of the internal struggle between the towns and the crown for the power to promulgate taxes, and exceptions to them. The Catalans felt that the King was favoring the foreigners in order to undermine the cities' power and rights to self-determination. Similarly, the King saw city-legislation as a challenge to his authority.<sup>20</sup> At the turn of the century, Martin the Humane pursued these policies at the expense of certain regions in order to benefit the whole country and to keep the balance of power favorable to the monarchy.<sup>21</sup>

### *Protectionist Decrees*

In 1398, after a number of years of relative calm, anti-Italian sentiment which affected Venetians broke out in Aragon/Catalonia. On 16 July, the civil governors of Valencia expelled all Italians from their city, under the threat of confiscation of their goods. The Florentines, Pisans, Lucchese, and all others were given just ten days to leave. The government, however, subsequently exempted the Venetians from the order, because they had been popular allies in the war against the Genoese, known to Venetians as the "War of Chioggia," two decades before.<sup>22</sup> Even though Venetians technically were released from the necessity to leave the region, the fates of other Italians, especially Datini employees whom they used as agents, interested them immensely. Thus, when merchants back in Venice heard about the decree, they worried and readjusted their investments away from Valencia if they could. Antonio Contarini, for example, informed the Datini company that his ship would avoid Valencia and go to Tortosa instead.<sup>23</sup> Not surprisingly, those Italians who held royal privileges to trade in Aragon/Catalonia immediately appealed to Martin

<sup>20</sup> Carrère, *Barcelone*, p. 25; Pierre Macaire, *Majorque*, p. 378.

<sup>21</sup> Alvaro Santamaria Aránzlez, *El Reino de Mallorca en la primera mitad del siglo XV*. Monograph of *IV Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón*. (Palma de Mallorca, 1955), pp. 25-35; L. P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain, 1250-1500* (Chicago and London, 1990), p. 228; A. Gimenez y Soler, 'La Corona de Aragón y Granada 1350-1458' *Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona* 8 (1908) 30: 353-361.

<sup>22</sup> Archivio di Stato di Prato (hereafter ASP), Datini 926, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Luca del Sera, 20 August 1398, 29 August 1398, 2 September 1398, 5 September 1398, 4<sup>o</sup> October 1398.

<sup>23</sup> ASP, Datini 926, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Luca del Sera, 20 August 1398, 3 October 1398.



the Humane, because this action countermanded the concessions for which they had paid substantial sums. As a result of their outcry, on 16 August the King ordered the Valencian jurists to revoke the decree and all legislation stemming from it; he judged that the decree undermined his authority, especially to give and withdraw privileges.<sup>24</sup> This result fueled instead of cooled hostility against Italians. Even though they had been exempted from the order, Venetians experienced this animosity: Francesco Serranero was assaulted in Valencia in early September. The King had given Francesco a formal document recording the privileges he would enjoy in and around Valencia for ten years starting 5 August 1396.<sup>25</sup> Martin the Humane angrily responded to the assault with an order to Valencians to cease such activity and specifically reconfirmed his protection and the trade privileges previously given to Serranero.<sup>26</sup> Hostility towards Italians continued at such a level, however, that in April 1400 the King had to reissue the order regarding Serranero and demand that the Valencians pay restitution for the assault.<sup>27</sup>

The next decree was aimed specifically at Venetians. On 3 August 1399, the Valencians promulgated an order which said that no Venetian ship could load or unload in their port, or in Barcelona and Majorca.<sup>28</sup> King Martin the Humane justified his support of this decree by saying that he acted in response to legislation created by the Doge. This supposedly mandated a monopoly for Venetian ships on wares transported through the Adriatic and to Venice.<sup>29</sup> While a response to the Venetian legislation was a major factor in the Catalan action,<sup>30</sup> other events prob-

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<sup>24</sup> ACA Reg 2115, fols. 163r-167r; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 407. The four documents recorded on these pages impose several penalties for people trying to countermand royal licenses for Florentines and other Italians. The King refers back to the decrees of Alfonso IV as precedent and guides for how those given the gift of royal favor should be treated.

<sup>25</sup> Leopold Piles Ros, 'Actividad y problemas comerciales de Valencia en el Cuatrocientos,' in *VI Congreso de historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Madrid, 1959), pp. 412, 424.

<sup>26</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, pp. 406-407; ACA, Reg. 2171, fol. 6v; ACA Reg. 2191, fol. 84r.

<sup>27</sup> ACA Reg. 2128, fol. 33v; Martin I Cancilleria, *Cartes Reales*, Caja 4, n. 286, April 8, 1400; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 464.

<sup>28</sup> ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 20 September 1399; Carrère, *Barcelona*, pp. 604-605.

<sup>29</sup> ACA Register 2229, fols. 175v-176r; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 465. King Martin's pronouncement sums up the Venetian legislation as saying, "nisi cum naviles vel aliis marinis vassis venatorum a terris portubus plagis seu litoribus dicta communus extraner neque illa alicuale navigare" {sic.}.

<sup>30</sup> Sevillano Colom saw the Venetian action as the only reason for the Aragonese

ably contributed to the issuance of the ban on Venetian ships. The order coincided with the return from the Barbary of the ships involved in the Crusade of 1399. While the crusading armadas were away in 1398 and 1399, Venetians and others became accustomed to circulating between Aragonese/Catalan ports in order to assemble their cargoes, instead of waiting in one central loading-spot. The many captains of Valencian and Majorcan ships involved in the armadas returned to find that their former jobs of moving goods to the big international ships no longer existed. They must have made known their need for work hauling merchandise between the minor ports in the region and the great emporia. The writer for Datini's Majorcan office notes another possible contributing factor—a shortage of coin throughout Aragon/Catalonia.<sup>31</sup> Yet another contributing factor was that while the Venetians had paid reparations for Catalan ships damaged in the War of Chioggia, the Aragonese court had not as yet paid similar sums for the Venetian ships damaged at that time, and had resisted all forms of pressure to do so to date.<sup>32</sup> The negotiations surrounding this matter only resulted in a preliminary treaty on 9 July 1400.<sup>33</sup> These reparations were raised again four years later, and apparently finally resolved. Whatever the reasons were that truly motivated the Valencians and King Martin to promulgate the legislation, the Valencian intent to enforce the ban on Venetian ships was demonstrated within a few days. The port officials

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directive. He says, 'En 1399, en reprisal contra ciertas medidas, como la de Venecia, que decretó el monopolio del transporte, en favor de su marina mercante, Martín el Humano dispuso un medida similar, con lo quo trataba de impulsar la propia marina de la Corona de Aragón y poner trabas a la presencia y actividades de los mercaderes italianos en sus Estabos, entre los cuales las Baleares.' Francisco Sevillano Colom, 'Mercaderes y navegantes mallorquines. Siglos XIII-XV,' in *Historia de Mallorca*, Vol. 8, ed. J. Mascaró Pasarius (Palma de Mallorca, 1978), pp. 66-68.

<sup>31</sup> Giampiero Nigro, 'Le vicende economiche incentrate su Maiorca rivissute attraverso il carteggio Datinianiano nel 1392-1400' (unpublished *tesi*, Florence, 1971), pp. 771-773, 791.

<sup>32</sup> Emily Sohmer Tai, 'Honor Among Thieves: Piracy, Restitution, and Reprisal in Genoa, Venice, and the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon 1339-1417,' (PhD Dissertation; Harvard University, 1996), pp. 306-308.

In an effort to secure the long-standing reparations, the Venetian Senate authorized their Nuncio, Fantino Michel, who was negotiating with King Martin, to license seizures of Catalan ships in order to make up the sum, or to turn to the King of Sicily and threaten similar actions against him. Archivio de Stato di Venezia (hereafter ASV), *Senato misti*, reg. 44 (copia), fols. 298v-299r, 21 January 1399.

<sup>33</sup> Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca and Maria Francesco Tiepolo, 'Cronologia Veneziana del Quattrocento,' in *La civiltà veneziana del Quattrocento* (n.d.), p. 185; Predelli, *Commemoriali* 3, pp. 269, 277-278.

in Valencia forced Marco Verzoni, who was in the port of Valencia, to unload his ship and sail away empty.<sup>34</sup> This last act was the most provocative to Italian minds; their correspondence buzzes with discussion and concern about what would happen.

Venetian shipping routes to the Western Mediterranean changed very suddenly at the beginning of 1400. Starting with Marco Verzoni in January, all vessels, even the state galleys, used Ibiza as their principal port in the region. Ibiza became the off-shore port through which all Venetian business with the region funneled. Both Venetian merchants writing from Venice and their correspondents in the region shifted their thinking to place Ibiza at the center of the commodity gathering and redistribution network. While diplomatic efforts to find a mutually workable arrangement for Venetian ships to be present in Aragon/Catalonia dragged on, merchants began sending Iberian goods to the island. Note that the Valencian legislation of 1399 was directed at Venetian ships. Venetian merchants remained in the city handling large investments; they now counted the trip to Ibiza as part of the "local transport to the primary emporium" where goods would be loaded onto Venetian ships. The Valencian legislation, therefore, was effective at redressing the local complaint that Venetian ships were taking business away from local ships by imposing this new leg of the journey. Meanwhile, the Catalan merchants resident in Venice hurried to the *Signoria* to plead their own innocence. The Venetian Senate, probably because of its interest in settling the long-standing war reparations, did not order any decisive action.<sup>35</sup> The issue of Venetian ships in Aragonese/Catalan waters would not be resolved until 1404.

The principal piece of protectionist legislation in this series was promulgated by the King on 15 January 1401.<sup>36</sup> Martin the Humane was

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<sup>34</sup> Antonio Contarini claims that the ship forced to unload was *Nicolo Verzoni*. Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi, however says it was *Marco Verzoni*, which is also the identity preferred by Carrère. ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 23 August 1398, 29 August 1398; ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 17 September 1399, 31 October 1399; Carrère, *Barcelona*, pp. 25, 605.

<sup>35</sup> ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Luca del Sera, 29 August 1399, 20 September 1399; ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 44 (copia), fol. 416r, 21 August 1399.

<sup>36</sup> López Elum, El acuerdo, p. 173; Antonio de Capmany y de Monpalau, *Memorias históricas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, Vol. 2, pt. 1, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1962), pp. 396-401. This is the text of the decree of expulsion. It does

determined finally to subdue Sardinia. In 1400, he called a Parliament to meet in Tortosa to discuss the issue and to act decisively. For two years, Valencia and the other major Catalan cities had been in dialogue about their resentment of Italians; the Parliament offered an opportunity for these cities to force the King to bring about a general expulsion. In September 1400, the Datini agent in Majorca informed the office in Florence that he had heard that it was certain that soon all Italians, except Genoese and Pisans, would be expelled for two years from all lands belonging to the King of Aragon.<sup>37</sup> In November, he related that the government of Barcelona had banned all foreigners, except Genoese, Pisans, and those Italians working for the king as dyers, and that Valencia would soon follow suit.<sup>38</sup> The mention of the dyers suggests that a minor goal of the Aragonese/Catalans was to foster their own textile industry. In anticipation of the expulsion order, companies like Datini's explored every available option, even to the point of trying to secure citizenship for individual employees.<sup>39</sup> Supported by Valencia, Tortosa, Peñíscola, and other maritime cities, Barcelona led a move at the Parliament of Tortosa to block the King's war in Sardinia unless he gave in to their demands. With no other option available, in January 1401 Martin the Humane duly promulgated the anticipated legislation ordering Florentines, Lucchese, Sienese, Tuscans, Lombards and all Italians "on this side of the sea" (*citra mare*), to leave his lands.<sup>40</sup> The edict charged the Italians with the old favorite charges of being usurers, committing fraud, and convincing the king to act against the welfare of his own state. It gave them three months to remove themselves and their goods.<sup>41</sup>

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not, however, include the names of the exempt Florentines. Another version is ACA Reg. 2197, 10r-14v; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 411. Barcelona i la política Mediterrània Catalana: el Parlament de 1400-1401 in *XIV Congresso di Storia della Corona d'Aragona: La Corona d'Aragona in Italia (secc XIII-XVIII)* Vol. 2, pt. 1 (Sassari-Alghero, 1990), pp. 427-443.

<sup>37</sup> Nigro, *Vicende economiche*, p. 909: 'Apresso so dubita che tutti'italiani ecetto geno-vesi e pisani non posino stare in nesuna parte dove e' re d'Araghona abia signoria, e questo cerchano certe merchadieri per invidia; e' re c'à guidati per 2 anni e pocho ne son pagati, non crediamo vengha chontro, e avanti 2 anni pasino pensiamo la chosa arà altra fine e non posiamo credere averci a uscire per detta chagione, sapreteche ssi farà.'

<sup>38</sup> Nigro, *Vicende economiche*, pp. 911, 912, 916, 1050.

<sup>39</sup> Nigro, *Vicende economiche*, p. 923. Cristofano made the suggestion about citizenship in his letter dated 14 December 1400.

<sup>40</sup> ACA Reg. 2197, fols. 10r-14v; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 411; Capmany y de Monpalau, *Memorias históricas*, pp. 396-401.

<sup>41</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, pp. 408-409; López Elum, *El acuerdo*, p. 173; Mario del Treppo, *I mercanti catalani e l'espansione della Corona d'Aragona nel secolo XV* (Naples, 1972), pp. 221-226. The Commessaria di Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi says that the Florentines

In reality, this order hurt only the “smaller” trading nations with representatives in the region, such as Venice; the dominant Genoese and Pisans were expressly excused because they were subject to other legislation. Although the decree demands the cancellation of all licenses, “graces”, and concessions,<sup>42</sup> a select group of the most important Tuscan merchants and firms, including Francesco Datini and his chief agents Cristofano di Bartolo, Luca del Sera, and Simone d’Andrea, were awarded exemptions in it. In a recapitulation of the fortunate few in September 1401, King Martin explained that these had all given him gifts of cloth of gold from Damascus or a sum of money in return for personalized privileges lasting five or ten years.<sup>43</sup> Catalan resentment of these “gift-based” concessions was so bitter that in December, the King had to issue an additional order protecting these individuals, including Datini and his three principal agents.<sup>44</sup>

As soon as the expulsion of Italians was issued at the Parliament of Tortosa, Venetians looked for ways to continue investing in the region while obeying the directive. They already were not sailing their vessels to Valencia because of the legislation of 1399. A few Venetians, such as the wool-buyer Girolamo di Lionardo, still were resident on the mainland; these reluctantly “consigned” their goods to one of the privileged merchants allowed to remain,<sup>45</sup> and looked for a place to stay until they could return. Girolamo di Lionardo, for example, was one of a number of Italians who found the island of Ibiza, in spite of being a possession of the Crown of Aragon/Catalonia, to be a safe haven.<sup>46</sup>

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given a privilege to stay in Aragon/Catalonia only had a limited time—20 months; Flavia Zaccaria, ‘I rapporti economici tra Venezia e Bologna alla fine Trecento (Studio su documenti dell’Archivio Datini di Prato)’ (unpublished *tesi*, Florence, 1990), pp. 234-235.

The summary of the charges (Capmany y de Monpalau, *Memorias históricas*, p. 397) says: . . . quod fieri non debuit neque debet, tam ex eo quia privilegia prenarrata, impetrata concessoque in et ob favorem rei publice civitatum et regnorum ipsorum, penitus inutilia remanerent, quam ob fraudes et dolos quod dicti Florentini, Luquesii, Senenses, Toscani, Lombardi atque Italici, aggere perniciose, suffulti excogitatis astuciis et machinationibus subdoli, atque fallacibus circa negociaciones et commercia eorumdem, in quibus non desunt voragines et in temporibus duplicia fenera usurarum execere frequenter, immo frequentissime non verentur.

<sup>42</sup> Capmany y de Monpalau, *Memorias históricas*, p. 398.

<sup>43</sup> ACA Reg. 2133, fols. 46r-47r; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 408.

<sup>44</sup> ACA Reg. 2175, fol. 58v; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 408.

<sup>45</sup> ASP, Datini 994, Carteggio Valenza, letter Ibiza to Valenza, Tuccio di Gennaio to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 22 May 1401.

<sup>46</sup> ASP, Datini 994, Carteggio Valenza, letter Ibiza to Valenza, Giovanni di Gennaio to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Luca del Sera, 22 May 1401; ASP, Datini 885, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Ibiza to Barcelona, Tuccio di Gennaio to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d’Andrea, 8 May 1401.

The Venetians discussed in the Datini letters, however, did not lose their ability to trade in the region; they used Datini personnel as agents and indirectly benefited from their privileges. Bernardo Bon, the Venetian consul for Majorca, arrived back in Venice before 17 February 1401, bringing news of the situation and the course events were likely to take.<sup>47</sup> Meanwhile, Venetian representatives—either the Venetian consul in Barcelona, Silvestro Ubach, or possibly one of the Florentine merchants who handled Venetian orders, such as Luca del Sera—tried to negotiate with the Parliament of Tortosa. They argued that technically Venetians were not “Italians” because they did not fit the description of “*citra mare*”. Venice, they pointed out, was on the Adriatic Sea, not the Tyrrhenian. The King accepted this reasoning and, on 9 July 1401, he declared the Venetians not to deserve the “*nom de Italiano*” and exempted them from the exclusion order.<sup>48</sup> Even before the exemption was issued, however, some Venetian merchants including Girolamo di Lionardo had returned to their homes in Valencia.<sup>49</sup> This new ruling, and similar concessions, enraged the Catalan maritime cities. On 25 February 1402, they pressured the King into reversing all exclusions, again prohibiting Venetians from personally trading in the region.<sup>50</sup> Again, representatives went to the King on behalf of Venetians. Their efforts were quickly rewarded; on 13 March 1402, before Bon could possibly have arrived back in the Western Mediterranean, the King revoked the reversal of the concession for the Venetians. Again the primary reason the King gave was that Venetians did not deserve the name of “Italian”.<sup>51</sup> Martin the Humane, resident in Valencia and thus able to change opinion there, worked to soften the protectionist stance of the Catalan towns. In April 1402, Majorca gave in and renounced the expulsion of Italians at about the same time that the King suggested that the island’s governor, council, and merchants should open the markets to Florentines

<sup>47</sup> ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Bernardo Bon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 17 February 1401.

<sup>48</sup> ACA Reg 2196, fols. 116r-116v; ACA Reg 2131, fols. 147r-147v; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 411.

<sup>49</sup> ASP, Datini 921, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Valenza to Barcelona, Girolamo di Lionardo to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Luca del Sera, 4 June 1401; 30 June 1401; 9 August 1401. Girolamo mentions how he saw the Venetian ships arriving and loading easily.

<sup>50</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 411; López Elum, *El acuerdo*, p. 174; ACA Reg 2175, fols. 68r-68v; ACA Reg 2131, fol. 147v.

<sup>51</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 411. López Elum, *El acuerdo*, pp. 174, 185-187 (the text of the exemption); ACA Reg 2131, fols. 147v-148v.

as well as Venetians.<sup>52</sup> Soon only Barcelona remained as intransigent as ever. On 13 October, the King reinstated free trade for all Italians, provided that they would follow certain procedures. He ruled that they could buy wool only at certain times of the year, sell their own goods or buy Aragonese/Catalan goods only with permission from the King, and use non-usurious contract forms. Most importantly, he ordered that they must pay the regular import and export taxes; he abolished the yearly “gift” to the King. He also ruled that all Italians could return to Aragon/Catalonia. They were restricted, however, to living and trading only in Barcelona, Valencia, Majorca, Tortosa, Perpignan and Ibiza. They could use non-Catalan ships only with the permission of the Barcelonan Consul of the Sea.<sup>53</sup> These rules were formalized into the “*Dret Italia*” on 3 January 1403. The central clause was that all foreigners had to pay 3 *dinari* of tribute on every *libra* worth of goods imported into Aragon/Catalonia.<sup>54</sup> While Italians fulfilled the legislation at first, within a few years even Datini personnel “forgot” to pay this duty.

Venetian troubles in Aragon/Catalonia were not yet over. The legislation of January 1403 decreed that Venetians could conduct only as much business in Aragon/Catalonia, and at the same rates, as Catalan merchants could in Venice. This ruling struck at the heart of the dispute which had initially shut Venetian ships out of Valencia in 1399—the inequity of high tariffs levied on Catalan ships which visited Venice while, by royal command stemming from the 1390 ruling by King John I, foreign ships paid none in Aragonese waters.<sup>55</sup> The Venetian government and Aragonese officials began to negotiate seriously only after Valencian ships confronted and molested the 1402 Flanders galleys on their return voyage at the end of the year. A few months later, in March 1403, the Catalans demanded that the Venetian Flanders galleys should pay a fee for passing through Catalan waters. The Senate ruled that conditions were now so bad between the two countries that

<sup>52</sup> ACA Reg 2174, fols. 77r-77v; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 416.

<sup>53</sup> ACA Reg 2197, fols. 211r-212r; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 417.

<sup>54</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, pp. 411-419; López Elum, *El acuerdo*, pp. 174-175, 188-195. The Datini office in either Valencia or Barcelona secured a copy of the order and, on 25 December 1402, forwarded it to Florence: Giovanni Livi, *Dall'archivio di Francesco Datini mercante Pratese* (Florence, 1910), pp. 52-53.

<sup>55</sup> ASP, Datini 928, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 18 January 1403, 10 March 1403.

a fully qualified ambassador was needed to settle the differences. On 24 March 1403, the Senators elected and commissioned Antonio Spalatino, who was the Venetian diplomat with the most extensive experience in Iberian countries available.<sup>56</sup> This opening of dialogue was enough to encourage nervous merchants such as Antonio Contarini to invest anew.<sup>57</sup> Not all Aragonese/Catalan efforts at this time, however, were aimed at hurting or restricting the Venetians. Between mid-March and mid-April, Martin the Humane issued a series of decrees in favor of Venetians who wanted to trade in Barcelona but were being excluded and persecuted by the city's merchants.<sup>58</sup> Eventually, on 16 July, he decreed that the Barcelonans would not be able to exclude Venetian merchants any more. In the middle of the summer, Spalatino wrote home reporting little progress. He said he needed more documentation about past pirate events in Sicily, Catalan and Venetian clashes in the War of Chioggia, and Venetian intentions. The Senate sent Spalatino a long document, which contained the sums still outstanding on the ships attacked in Sicily, and instructions about the concessions needed to ensure future free trade.<sup>59</sup> Spalatino continued his negotiations. On 20 November, he signed a pact securing free trade for Venetians and finally settling the problem of Sicilian reparations.<sup>60</sup> Catalans received complete rights to trade in Venice and to bring their ships to the port of Venice. They were to pay the same export tax—2 1/2% as Venetians paid in Venice; this was also to be the level both paid in Catalonia.<sup>61</sup> Before Spalatino could leave Aragon/Catalonia, however, he had to negotiate again with Martin the Humane.<sup>62</sup> This time, among other issues, they discussed restrictions on the kind of commercial activities permissible in Ibiza. In April 1404, Martin the Humane lifted the prohibition on Italians who wanted to trade with Aragon/Catalonia and Castile at the

<sup>56</sup> ASP, Datini 1083, Carteggio Majorca, letter Venice to Majorca, Paris Soranzo to Cristofano di Bartolo, 17 December 1402; ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 46-i (copia), fol. 231v, 16 March 1403; ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 46-i (copia), fol. 235v, 24 March 1403.

<sup>57</sup> ASP, Datini 928, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 24 March 1403 and 2 April 1403.

<sup>58</sup> ACA Reg 2137, fols. 110v-111r; ACA Reg. 2136, fols. 143r-v.

<sup>59</sup> ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 46-ii (copia), fols. 350v-357v, 10 September 1403.

<sup>60</sup> ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 46-ii (copia), fol. 416r, 15 January 1404.

<sup>61</sup> Gian Lucca Baldi, 'Le lettere della Commissaria Gaddi di Venezia indirizzate alle Compagnia Datini di Firenze (1400-1406)' (unpublished *tesi*, Florence, 1992), 12 January 1404.

<sup>62</sup> ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 46-ii (copia), fol. 432r, 29 January 1404.



same time, or to carry goods from both on the same voyage.<sup>63</sup> In May 1404, the Venetian government accepted the proposals that all Venetian ships had to go to Valencia where they had to pay the export tax. These vessels could not use Ibiza for anything except loading salt and needed victuals even though the export tax charged on the island was only 1.5% while in Valencia the rate was 2%. The King formally issued this legislation on 19 July 1404.<sup>64</sup> The Venetian government meanwhile welcomed Catalan ships to Adriatic waters and ports. The treaty included a clause guaranteeing Catalan ships the ability to carry goods between their home ports and Venice. The tax rate for either country importing into the other was supposed to be equal according to the reports of the Commessaria di Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi.<sup>65</sup> Valencian ships coming to Venice had to pay the Venetian export tax of two and one-half percent. In addition, they could not import salt, since that was a commodity controlled and subsidized by the Venetian state.<sup>66</sup> Incidentally, the new accord also excluded Venetian ships from Tortosa and the Castilian port of Cartagena.<sup>67</sup>

Once foreigners had lived under the new rules for a brief period, conditions within Aragonese/Catalan lands returned to the *status quo* which Venetians, and other Italians, needed for trade. Anti-Italian sentiment died down for a while. Occasionally in the next few years, the King or various towns passed legislation affecting Venetian trade in the region. On 4 March 1406, for instance, Martin imposed a *gabella*, or tax, on all Venetian ships sailing in his waters. The Venetian Senate protested because Catalan ships were not charged similar taxes for sailing in Venetian waters, as agreed upon in the 1404 treaty. Eventually Martin had to cancel the *gabella*.<sup>68</sup> For the next decade, Venetian diplo-

<sup>63</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, p. 421; Girona Llagostera, *Itinerari* 5, p. 547.

<sup>64</sup> ASP, Datini 929, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Commessaria Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi e Antonio di San Bartolomeo to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 24 May 1404, and 31 May 1404; Patricia Gonnelli 'Momenti e aspetti dell'Economia Veneziana rivissuti attraverso la corrispondenza Venezia-Firenze dell'azienda fiorentina di Bindo Piacitti' (unpublished *tesi*, Florence, 1972), p. 694; ACA Reg 2267, fols. 141r-v.

<sup>65</sup> Baldi, Commessaria, p. 357, 12 January 1404, pp. 343-350.

<sup>66</sup> Baldi, *Lettere Commessaria*, pp. 350, 356, 392.

<sup>67</sup> ASP, Datini 929, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea 10? June 1404; ASP, Datini 929, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Giovanni di San Nigi e Gherardo Davizi to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 14 June 1404.

<sup>68</sup> Freddy Thiriet, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Roumanie*, Tome 2, 1400-1430 (Paris, 1959), pp. 57-58.

mats continued to press the issue of whether or not their citizens had to abide by rules applied to "Italians". They had made their own treaty with Aragon/Catalonia; the existence of this agreement, together with Venice's location provided them with arguments that they did not have to abide by these rules. In 1416, however, royal legislation finally and unequivocally defined Venetians as Italians.<sup>69</sup>

### *Effects on commerce*

How did all these pieces of protectionist legislation affect Venetians who wanted to trade in Aragon/Catalonia? Those merchants, investors, and ship-captains named and discussed in the sources may have had to change the exact routes and places where they did business, but overall the scale of investment and the strategies they used were not seriously affected. During 1398-1404, Venetian activity actually was greater with Aragon/Catalonia because of events in other parts of the Mediterranean.<sup>70</sup>

The most significant change in Venetian methods for trade in the region was the use of Ibiza as an emporium and the principal port starting in 1400. The change appears to have been initiated by the ship-captains and merchants, not by diplomats. While Martin the Humane, the Catalan towns, and Italian diplomats struggled over anti-Italian sentiment in 1401-2, the Venetian merchants attained above "normal" levels of commerce because of investing more and being able efficiently to ship it by using the off-shore depot of Ibiza. They succeeded in arranging with the chief Datini agent on the island, Giovanni di Gennaio, that he would handle all Venetian ships and act as the intermediary who would assemble goods for transit.<sup>71</sup> In December 1400, he told Luca del Sera that he was 'a friend of the Venetian consul'; he therefore could secure favors on behalf of the Datini companies.<sup>72</sup> The agreement meant that Venetian merchants with a connection to the Datini companies could continue to traffic in Iberian goods. Antonio Contarini says that the decision to use Ibiza was based on the consistent Ibizan courtesy to and support for Venetian ships.<sup>73</sup> His comment suggests that

<sup>69</sup> Ferrer i Mallol, *Els italians*, pp. 423-424; López Elum, *El acuerdo*, p. 176. The texts of the discussion and the final judgement are reproduced on pp. 194-199.

<sup>70</sup> The detailed proof of this premise will be presented in my forthcoming book.

<sup>71</sup> ASP, Datini 1072, Carteggio Majorca, letter Ibiza to Majorca, Giovanni di Gennaio to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Cristofano di Bartolo, 16 September 1400.

<sup>72</sup> ASP, Datini 994, Carteggio Valenza, letter Ibiza to Valenza, Giovanni di Gennaio to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Luca del Sera, 13 December 1401.

<sup>73</sup> ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini

the Ibizan people could decide to act independently and take advantage of the sudden opportunity to expand their business, instead of conforming to the policy in the rest of the Catalan ports. It also implies that Venetians were sufficiently familiar with the island's people and facilities to know that her use would be advantageous in the short-term and if the dispute dragged on for some time.

The number of ships visiting Ibiza's port grew proportionately to the amount of goods now being shipped there. Prior to 1400, the primary reasons ships would visit the island were to stock up on fresh water or load salt as a secondary part of the cargo and additional ballast. Ibiza also was known as a pirate haunt. As soon as the exclusion of Venetian ships from Valencia was announced, Venetians such as Paris Soranzo suggested this alternative, and ordered that their merchandise be sent to Ibiza. Paris even proposed to the Datini agent in Majorca that if Ibiza were also closed, then Pisa or even Ancona should be used as the place where his investment goods would be gathered for shipment to Venice. He demonstrated the mathematics for one shipment, showing that, even though an extra shipment fee was added to the price of the wool, the export tax in Ibiza was lower, and thus beneficial to shippers.<sup>74</sup> Wool from the mainland and the other Balearic islands became available in large quantities. One document from 1400 names nineteen ships which made twenty-one voyages (a rate of approximately nine voyages per month) from Valencia to Ibiza between August and mid-October. These ships—some Valencian, some Genoese, and the rest probably Catalan—brought 1,942 sacks of wool and twelve of *boldroni*; the smallest load consisted of four sacks, the largest of two hundred, and the average was ninety-two.<sup>75</sup> These numbers suggest that most of the vessels were small local ships, usually used along the coast to move goods to the central emporium.

Both Venetian merchants writing from Venice and their correspondents in the region began to consider placing Ibiza at the center of the commodity gathering and redistribution network. Marco Verzoni was

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fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 17 April 1400.

<sup>74</sup> ASP, Datini 1082, Carteggio Majorca, letter Venice to Majorca, Paris Soranzo to Cristofano di Bartolo, 7 February 1400; ASP, Datini 1083, Carteggio Majorca, letter Venice to Majorca, Paris Soranzo to Cristofano di Bartolo, 15 March 1400, 4 December 1400.

<sup>75</sup> ASP, Datini 1171, Filze Valuti e Carichi, Scritti (pencilled number 1167), without date.

the first to sail his ship to Ibiza from Venice, after having been forced away from Valencia empty. In a letter to Cristofano di Bartolo in Majorca, dated 22 February 1400, he explained that the *Signoria* had ordered that no Venetian ship go to Barcelona, Valencia, or Majorca. In another letter, Bindo Piaciti says that the government ordered ships not to use Ibiza at this time.<sup>76</sup> While diplomatic efforts to find a mutually workable arrangement for Venetians to be present in Aragon/Catalonia dragged on, merchants began sending Iberian goods to the island. In February 1400, for example, Piero Zion sent a consignment of leather to Ibiza for loading on the first available ship heading for Venice.<sup>77</sup> At the beginning of January 1400, when the fleet of galleys sailing to Flanders in the coming year was discussed for the first time, the Senate ruled that their Captain must seek official permission from the Venetian government before he would be allowed to stop in Majorca. This suggests that the government's preference for retribution was an embargo, rather than continued attempts to please the Aragonese/Catalans. In December 1400, Simone Lappaccino wrote to Datini, who was temporarily in Bologna, saying that he had asked the *Signoria* to bargain with Martin the Humane for the use of Ibiza, but had been ignored. The reality was that the ship captains were already using Ibiza as their emporium of their own accord; the government did not yet feel the situation warranted interference from Venice.<sup>78</sup> The Datini letters show that the first command from the *Signoria* which specifically directed ships to use Ibiza and not other ports dates to January 1401.<sup>79</sup> Antonio Contarini notes that the *Signoria* repeated the order to stay away from Majorca, Valencia and Barcelona in March 1401.<sup>80</sup> The flow of ships between Ibiza and the mainland grew in 1401 and 1402, and declined slightly in 1403. Venetian ships sailed to Ibiza to pick up goods, in spite

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<sup>76</sup> Federico Melis, *Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII-XVI* (Florence, 1972), pp. 188-189, 229; ASV, *Senato misti*, reg. 44 (copia), fols. 482v-483r, 29 January 1400; ASP, Datini 1082, letter Venice to Majorca, Marco de Verzoni to Cristofano di Bartolo, 22 February 1400; Zaccaria, I rapporti, p. 183.

<sup>77</sup> Enrico Bensa, *Francesco di Marco da Prato* (Milan, 1928), pp. 383-384. Bensa says that this document was written in Venice; internal evidence, however, shows that the author was probably in Valencia.

<sup>78</sup> Zaccaria, I rapporti, p. 141.

<sup>79</sup> ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Bindo di Gherardo Piaciti to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 20 January 1401.

<sup>80</sup> ASP, Datini 927, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini, 20 March 1401.

of some merchants' complaints that the merchandise was not in good shape and the export tax was too high.<sup>81</sup> Venetian money poured into Aragon/Catalonia for investment in these years: the nature of the sources used for this paper does not allow long-term comparisons, but out of the years 1398-1404, the years when goods were shipped through Ibiza were the most busy. Individual merchants reacted differently to the various expulsion decrees. Some made no comment at all about the topic in the letters. Others would say they were going to withdraw from the market, change their mind, and then continue to dither even when conditions were good. Antonio Contarini was a good example of this attitude. By December 1402, he was so concerned about the whole situation that he told the Datini office in Barcelona that he wanted to liquidate his stocks, pay the King to allow a ship to collect them, and pull out of Catalonia entirely. To secure permission for this removal of his goods, he instructed the Datini office in Avignon to send the large pearls which they had on consignment from him to Luca del Sera in Valencia. He resolved that in the future he would get his wool through Castile and the port of Cartagena.<sup>82</sup> In March 1403, however, he completely changed his mind. He placed an order for the value of his entire year's consumption of raw wool—3,000 *roves*; the pearls paid for Datini agents to transport the wool to Ibiza and load it on to Venetian ships.<sup>83</sup> A portion of this merchandise was among the goods on Antonio Coppa's ship which was seized in October 1403 by Genoese pirates. A small naval clash between the navies of Genoa and Venice<sup>84</sup> led to an outburst of pirate attacks over the next year.

The number of ships and the sums for investment in the region between mid-1403 and December 1404 show that conditions were changing. The new threat of Genoese state-sponsored piracy affected trade

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<sup>81</sup> Massimo Innocenti, 'L'intenso carteggio datiniano scambiato da Venezia con Barcellona nel 1400-1410, con le valide aperture sul Mediterraneo e l'occidente che esso determina' (unpublished *tesi*, Florence, 1973), pp. 1300, 1334.

<sup>82</sup> ASP, Datini 928, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 16 December 1402.

<sup>83</sup> ASP, Datini 928, Carteggio Barcelona, letters Venice to Barcelona, Antonio Contarini fo di Messer Marin di San Pantaleon to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini e Simone d'Andrea, 31 March 1403, 2 April 1403.

<sup>84</sup> ASP, Datini 928, Carteggio Barcelona, letter Venice to Barcelona, Compagnia Luigi Davanzati e Luca di Matteo to Compagnia Francesco di Marco Datini Simone d'Andrea, 27 October 1403. Bindo Piaciti wrote to the Datini company in Florence with the same news on the same day. Gonnelli, *Momenti*, p. 619.

very highly. Five ships left Venice in summer 1403 heading towards Ibiza; two were attacked and captured by pirates and the other three fled when approached by pirates. Meanwhile, the Venetians interested in trade in Aragon/Catalonia adjusted their strategies to fit the situation. They sent letters of exchange and other forms of "paper money" by which they moved capital only in account books, not by using coin, in order to continue investing in the region. The goods which the money bought were sent to Venice by alternate routes, such as overland, by ships to Ancona, or on Catalan ships.<sup>85</sup> These methods were used, however, not because of protectionist legislation in Aragon/Catalonia but because of other events, problems, and peoples. By 1405, the wave of anti-Italian hostility had spent itself, both sides had made adjustments and given ground, and both now turned to problems with other trading partners.

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<sup>85</sup> Venetian investment activities will be discussed in detail in my forthcoming book.

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