

Mallorcan merchants in the medieval Maghrib: mercantile strategies in the port of Hunayn in the mid-fourteenth century

María Dolores López Pérez* and José Ignacio Padilla Lapuente

Departamento de Historia Medieval, Paleografía y Diplomática, Universidad de Barcelona, Spain

By the end of the Middle Ages, the Maghrib had become one of the largest suppliers of wool in the western Mediterranean. Its produce was soon forwarded to the marketplaces of the Crown of Aragon, where it would be redistributed to the textile centres of southern Europe. The boarding of a massive shipment of wool belonging to almost 100 Mallorcan merchants in a North African port gives us an insight into the procedures applied by the League of Hunayn in its attempts to monopolize the wool export trade in the sultanate of Tlemcen. This is the first record of a mercantile operation carried out by this association and sheds light on the mechanisms at work in the supply and transport of goods to the port of Mallorca. This wide-ranging commercial activity, which renewed trade with the Maghrib after the War of the Straits, required the chartering of a large ship from Barcelona which was used to cover the Sicilian and overseas routes, skippered by Arnau Espaer and Romeu d'Olzinelles. The particular details of this commercial undertaking are enriched by the ship's accounting records.

Keywords: League of Hunayn; Tlemcen, Maghrib; Mediterranean trade; wool; chartering agreement

Introduction

The presence of Catalan merchants in North Africa is documented as early as the mid-twelfth century, although the orientation of their trading interests towards the Barbary Coast would not play an important role within the economic and commercial network of the Crown of Aragon until the early 1200s. By this time, Catalans were trading in ports such as Ceuta and Bejaia, but they soon expanded their activities to other cities in the central Maghrib and may also have reached the Atlantic ports of Morocco. Whatever the case, from the first decades of the thirteenth century onwards, Catalan commercial expansion made itself felt, to a greater or lesser degree, in all the ports of the Maghrib. This presence would intensify after the conquest of Mallorca.¹

In these markets the Catalans inevitably encountered large numbers of Italian traders, who had been present throughout the Maghrib from a very early date. Military pressure and commercial initiatives were combined in the earliest stages of development of cities such as Gaeta, Salerno, Amalfi, Genoa, and Pisa in an attempt to protect their traders. However, regular commercial exchanges did not develop until the twelfth century, when treaties were signed and suitable conditions for carrying out trade were established. The Almoravids, aware of the importance of trade as a key source of income, took the initiative through treaties with Pisa in 1133, and with Genoa in 1137,² which are clear evidence of their predisposition to capitalize on the opportunities offered. Nevertheless it was their successors, the Almohads, and above all the Berber states that emerged after the collapse

*Email: mdlopez@ub.edu

of the empire, that implemented policies that encouraged the presence of foreign traders within their lands.³

In the first instance the Genoese and Pisans took advantage of these commercial openings. The clauses of the treaties with Genoa of 1153 or 1154 (the year in which it was signed remains uncertain) and of 1161 and 1176 are the starting point for the economic operations of their traders in the Maghrib. The Genoese chronicler Caffaro recalls how in 1161 the Almohad caliph granted the Genoese the conditions they needed for their commercial activities: freedom of movement, safety on land and at sea, privileged fiscal treatment, and perhaps, as Petti Balbi has pointed out, the right to establish a *fondaco*.⁴ Inside the Almohad lands, Ceuta was the main objective of the Genoese investments.⁵

The Pisans, also interested in trade with the Maghrib, tended to focus on the markets of the eastern area, with a preference for Tunis and Bejaia, where they may have acquired *fondacos* as early as 1133 or more probably from 1157 onwards.⁶ The treaty signed in 1186 granted them the freedom to trade in the lands of Ceuta, Oran, Bejaia, and Tunis,⁷ although from the early thirteenth century onwards they had to focus on the Ifriqiyan ports.

With the arrival of the Hafsids dynasty, the number of ports where unloading could take place under the protection of the sultan's safeguards increased. Annaba, Mahdia, Gabès, and Sfax, where the interests and rivalries of the Pisans and Genoese converged (but also those of the Venetians, Provençals, or Catalans, whose trade is documented by the signing of treaties ensuring their safety and protecting their investments),⁸ were added to the ports of Tunis and Bejaia. In any case, the principles governing this activity would change in the following decades.

From the mid-thirteenth century onwards, Genoese interests were mainly directed towards the Tunisian area, while at the same time their contacts with the western Maghrib decreased.⁹ Florentines and Luccans traded in these ports under Genoese and Pisan patronage; meanwhile Venice, a late arrival on the Maghrib commercial scene,¹⁰ operated between Tunis, Bejaia, and Ceuta. In contrast, the inhabitants of Marseilles traded in the markets of Ceuta from the early 1200, although subsequently, from the middle of the century onwards, they favoured the eastern markets of Bejaia and Tunis. As for the Catalan-Aragonese traders, they continued to gain new positions in the race for the Maghrib, where they finally imposed their commercial hegemony in the fourteenth century.¹¹

The port of Hunayn in the Mallorcan commercial networks

The inclusion of Mallorca within the territories controlled by the monarchs of the Crown of Aragon marked a turning point in relations with the Maghrib, as the island overtook Barcelona in terms of the frequency of contacts and the amount of capital invested. North Africa gradually became the main area of activity for Mallorcan merchants, so much so that it came to be their preferred area of operation; in fact, in some points in the central Maghrib in the fourteenth century they managed to oust their competitors from Barcelona, Valencia, and Italy. One of these North African markets was the port of Hunayn, the principal maritime entry point for the sultanate of Tlemcen.¹²

Hunayn had acquired considerable importance under Ziyyanid rule. The reasons for its revival was its role as the main exit port on the Mediterranean for the extensive region surrounding the capital of Tlemcen, and, above all, the diversion of the trans-Saharan gold routes, which, from the early fourteenth century and especially from 1320 onwards, had moved away from the Atlantic region and now converged on the Mediterranean ports of Tlemcen, Ifriqiya, and Egypt.¹³

The lands controlled by the Abdalwadids had gradually acquired a leading position in the exchanges with Europe. Nevertheless, they were far from being the predominant political force in the mid-fourteenth century. In fact, this convulsive period was characterized by the expansion of Marinid domination over the Maghrib. With the consolidation of the Banu Marin dynasty after the last Almohad caliph had been deposed in 1269, they pursued an expansionist policy towards the east, over lands held by the Ziyyanids and the Hafsids, and also towards the Iberian Peninsula. We should also mention the activity of the Benemerines on the other side of the straits at various times between 1275 and 1344, when what is known as the War of the Straits came to an end.¹⁴

The Marinid sultan Abu'l Hasan 'Ali brought on the final phase of this conflict. His reign, which started in 1331, ushered in a radical change in policy. The strengthening of state power enabled the Marinids to make their final intervention in the Peninsula, which nonetheless culminated in resounding defeat at the Battle of Río Salado in 1340. The triumph of the Christian coalition paved the way for the conquest of the stronghold of Algeciras in 1344 by an army made up by troops from Castile and the Crown of Aragon, and for the negotiation of a truce between the parties involved in the conflict.

On 25 March 1344 the Peace of Algeciras was signed between Alfonso XI of Castile and Yusuf I of Granada, suspending hostilities for a period of 10 years. Both the Marinid sultanate and the Crown of Aragon subscribed to the agreement. A few days afterwards, Abu'l Hasan indicated his acceptance of the terms established, while Peter the Ceremonious began taking steps towards the signing of a bilateral agreement with Granada and Morocco. This treaty was finally signed on 25 February 1345, after ambassadors had been exchanged.¹⁵

The second priority of Abu'l Hasan's foreign policy was the reunification of the Maghrib. Thanks to the dynasty's military strength, which was soon made clear to the other powers that controlled the area, the Marinids were able to occupy Tlemcen between 1337 and 1347 and between 1352 and 1359, as well as Tunis, in 1347 and between 1352 and 1358, in campaigns led by Abu'l Hasan himself and by his son, Abu Inan.¹⁶

The accounts by the brothers Abu Zakariya Yahya and Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun offer two not always identical but highly detailed versions of the Marinid occupation and the Ziyyanids' short-lived recovery. According to Abu Zakariya Yahya, the Marinid sultan started his conquest of the region in 1335; his first objective was the conquest of Nedroma and of Hunayn, prior to installing his camp in Tassala. From there, Abu Zakariya Yahya explains, the Marinids marched towards Oran, which was taken, and subsequently on the capital at Tlemcen.¹⁷ Nevertheless, his brother Abd al-Rahman offers a different version of the events: Abu'l Hasan took control of Hunayn and the surrounding territory while his troops besieged the city of Tlemcen.¹⁸ The capital finally fell under the sway of the Marinids in May 1337.

The conquest of coastal areas was a strategy aimed at isolating the capital and preventing the arrival of both merchandise and revenue from customs controls, but it also hindered any type of help that might have been sent on behalf of the Nasrids or even the monarchs of the Crown of Aragon or Mallorca.¹⁹ The dates leave no room for doubt. In 1335 Tlemcen was besieged, and immediately afterwards not only Hunayn, but also Oran, Miliana, Ténès, and Algiers were occupied, cutting off any possibility of supplies being received.²⁰

Interestingly, some historians attribute this rampant Marinid expansion to a desire to recover 'commercial leadership', in the words of Mohamed Kably,²¹ by means of controlling the markets where the trans-Saharan routes terminated and where the greater part of the exchanges with European traders took place. The considerable income provided

by the customs posts, which generally charged 10% on all the merchandise imported by European merchants, was ample justification for this interest.²² In this case, it is clear that one of the objectives of this expansionist policy was an overriding interest in recovering control of the trade routes. As for the Ziyyanids, the historian Mahmoud A. Bouayed has suggested that there was a connection between the relative weakness of the sultanate of Tlemcen – exposed to the danger of invasion not only from the Marinids but also from their neighbours further to the east, the Hafsids – and the priority that they had given to the development of trade, increased by the north–south route that connected the sub-Saharan region with the port of Hunayn.²³

Whatever the causes, the capital of the Abdalwadids, Tlemcen, is known to have been conquered in 1337,²⁴ after several years of siege. The period of Marinid occupation would last until 1348, when internal disagreements led to an outbreak of violence as a consequence of the dynastic struggle between Abu'l Hasan 'Ali and his son, Abu Inan. As a result the Marinids were temporarily driven away, and the throne was recovered by members of the family of the last Ziyyanid sultan, Abu Tashfin I, who had been assassinated during the siege of the capital.²⁵

In November 1344, during the Marinid occupation of the territory around Tlemcen, a vessel set sail from Mallorca for Hunayn, captained by Arnau Espaer and Romeu d'Olzinelles. The accounts of this voyage are preserved in the Barcelona Cathedral Archive.²⁶

Its arrival at the port of Hunayn coincided with the period of peace guaranteed by the initial agreement between Castile and Granada, and which was subsequently taken up by the Crown of Aragon and Morocco. The negotiations that would lead to the definitive signing of a treaty between Peter the Ceremonious and the Nasrid and Maghrib sultans in February of the following year were still under way; this situation undoubtedly favoured the restoration of Mallorca's contacts with the lands under Marinid rule to levels equivalent to (or in fact even higher than) those in place prior to the outbreak of war.

The contacts between 'Christian' and 'Muslim' countries were marked by the existence of a permanent state of war, which was only interrupted by the declaration of a truce for a strictly limited period of time. Once an armistice had come to an end or had been broken, the period of hostilities might well return. Nevertheless, the absence of diplomatic relations did not mean that there was open conflict and commercial exchanges were not brought to a complete standstill. There were too many economic interests in play, not only those of the Catalan-Aragonese commercial sector, but also those of the North African sultans themselves, for whom customs duties represented a major financial resource.

Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the periods of declared open warfare such as the War of the Straits had serious repercussions for trade. Generally speaking, the measures adopted responded to the needs of the immediate situation, since it was in the common interest to reach a compromise in order to reduce the substantial economic losses that must have been incurred. The outbreak of the war had meant a decline in commercial activity, brought on by the merchants' fear that their safe conducts would not be respected, but also by a royal prohibition that forbade navigation and commercial contact with the area of North Africa. The existence of commercial infrastructure in the leading cities, which found its material expression in the construction of *fondacos*, and the substantial investments made by Catalan-Aragonese traders, together with the extended duration of the conflict, forced the monarch to qualify the prohibition and to provide the traders with special licences in order to alleviate their losses.²⁷

There is no doubt that the recommencement of diplomatic contacts and the signing of peace agreements favoured the return of merchants and the recovery of the high levels of trade that are recorded immediately after the end of the conflict. For example, as will be discussed below, the cargo exported in a ship chartered by Espaer and d'Olzinelles included unusually high quantities of wool. Such a large amount may have been needed to meet the demands of Mallorcan merchants, but also perhaps foreign ones, possibly due to a lack of supplies and market readjustments during the war years.

The chartering of Arnau Espaer and Romeu d'Olzinelles' ship

The volume preserved in the Barcelona Cathedral Archive is, as the scribe himself defines it, a *quadern de carregar* – a register in which the goods loaded on board Arnau Espaer and Romeu d'Olzinelles' vessel were recorded while it was moored in the port of Hunayn. The annotations in the register enable us to trace how, over a period of almost one month – from 11 November to 8 December 1344²⁸ – the Mallorcan merchants renting the ship gradually brought their cargo on board prior to departure for the island.

For the moment, we have no record of the shipping contract, although the information provided by the register itself and other documentary collections enable us to reconstruct the conditions of the commercial agreement with a certain degree of detail.

Arnau Espaer and Romeu d'Olzinelles, citizens of Barcelona, were the masters of the vessel, although at no moment is this category specifically mentioned. This does not mean that they were the owners. The high cost of building and maintaining the different categories of vessel (always a reflection of their capacity and characteristics), meant that ownership was never restricted to just one individual, but was spread across a certain number of shareholders or *parçoners*. As a result, these undertakings tended to be of a collective nature, in which, from the moment when the conveyance contracts of the parts were signed, the joint owners were subject to a series of obligations, but also enjoyed a series of rights, such as their entitlement to a proportional part of the profits.²⁹ The high cost of such ventures was one of the reasons for joint ownership, and it was also a method that enabled investors to spread their risks by purchasing shares in more than one society.

As this was a shared property, the position of master of the ship was usually entrusted to the largest shareholder in the shipping company. So both Espaer and d'Olzinelles would have owned a substantial number of *setzenes*, although we do not know the exact percentages that each of them possessed. The considerable cost of building a high-tonnage ship such as the one in question would have implied a substantial outlay for each of the participants; the amply documented careers of Espaer and d'Olzinelles bear witness to their economic capacity and to their ability to carry out investments of this kind.

Arnau Espaer belonged to a small group of rich Barcelona merchants who played a very active role in exchanges with the Orient in the first half of the fourteenth century.³⁰ Nevertheless, the greater part of his business was carried out in Mallorca, where he lived for several years and where he established close ties with the Mallorcan merchant sector.³¹ This would explain the shipping contract that he signed with traders from the island to cover the Hunayn–Mallorca route with his ship.

Espaer's economic position is reflected by the fact that he was a founder member of one of the leading fourteenth century Catalan companies, run by the Mitjavila family.³² Established in 1334, the society's total capital amounted to 17,840 *lliures*,³³ its main participants were Pere de Mitjavila, Bernat de Puigmoradell, and Espaer himself.³⁴ There were five managers or management associates, chosen less on account of their ability to invest in the company than on account of their knowledge of areas in the Mediterranean,³⁵

and 10 *comanda* partners.³⁶ The Mitjavilas' coverage of the Mediterranean area was guaranteed by the presence of these associates and also of the *comanda* partners in Sardinia and Sicily, where the greater part of their investments were concentrated; permanent agents were set up in Cagliari and Palermo, respectively.³⁷ The company also operated in Flanders, where it had an itinerant agent based in Bruges;³⁸ and in the markets of Beirut, Cyprus, and Alexandria,³⁹ where it enjoyed a privileged position thanks to Pere Mitjavila's close collaboration with the monarchy;⁴⁰ and of course in Barcelona, Valencia, and Mallorca, where they could rely on intermediaries and, in the case of the Mallorcan market, the direct intervention of Espaer himself. Nevertheless, the data supplied by Víctor Hurtado do not attest to the company's or Espaer's participation in trade with North Africa, although there are records of Arnau Espaer's involvement in the dispatching of remittances to Flanders.⁴¹ The few references, to be exact only two, to the company's investments in Maghrib markets are both recorded in the city of Cagliari and refer to short-term contracts like *comandas*.⁴²

The company, initially established for a period of two years, was finally dissolved four years later, in 1338. Nevertheless, the organization of this trading society was in fact far more complicated. Hurtado has been able to document the existence of parallel companies, which sometimes even acted within the principal company itself. One of them must have been formed by the two main partners, Espaer and Mitjavila, and received the name of the Society of Pere de Mitjavila, even though the partners and the composition of the capital were different.⁴³ Operations of this society are recorded until 1342, two years before the journey to Hunayn that concerns us here. Were the two merchants still associated in some way in 1344? It is difficult to be sure. At the current stage of research there is no evidence of the establishment of new associations or even occasional collaborations between Mitjavila and Espaer.

The profits generated by the different companies probably enabled Espaer to accumulate sufficient capital to purchase a part (almost certainly a considerable one) of the ship that sailed to Hynayn.⁴⁴ Alongside him was Romeu d'Olzinelles. The two must have met during the years that the company was active. According to various entries in the Mitjavilas' account book, the society negotiated to lease Guillem Sa Riera and Pere Comte's cog for a voyage to Alexandria. The scribe of the vessel was Romeu d'Olzinelles, and Arnau Espaer made himself personally responsible for transporting the merchandise to that Egyptian port. Undoubtedly, the journey established the foundations for future ventures,⁴⁵ among them the joint ownership of vessels. There is a record of them having owned a vessel, the Bayonne cog named the Santa Ana, which also belonged to Pere de Mitjavila.⁴⁶ It was probably after the company had been dissolved in 1342 that Espaer and d'Olzinelles took the decision to participate as majority owners in the building of the ship that would carry out the journey to Hunayn two years later.

One of Jaume Tarascó's account books provides a considerable amount of information about the vessel captained by Espaer and d'Olzinelles, since he held the post of scribe on board the ship and was a partner in its ownership.⁴⁷ The document in question, which has been studied by Elisa Varela, is particularly difficult to interpret. Tarascó does not demonstrate any special interest in indicating and specifying the year in which the entries were made although they can often be identified thanks to the fact that the day of the week and month were recorded. The greatest difficulty arises from the fact that the entries do not seem to have been recorded in chronological order.⁴⁸

Nevertheless the contents of the book itself clarify the cause of this apparent state of confusion. Sometime after the summer of 1346, the ship captained by Espaer and d'Olzinelles suffered a fire, which led to the liquidation of the societies associated with the

most recent trading operations and the dissolution of the shipping company.⁴⁹ The accounts and entries in the book must have therefore been aimed at settling the societies that had been formed on the most recent voyages, and rendering accounts of the common expenses of the ship and its crew, as well as liquidating the vessel's joint ownership company.

Jaume Tarascó appears to have worked from a very young age as a scribe on several vessels; in the period that concerns us, he held this position on board Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ship. The accounts record payment of his salary as a scribe and crew member.⁵⁰ He also held a share in the ownership of the vessel – at least a 1/16 part or *setzena*. However, he soon sold half of his *setzena* to Gaubert La Grialtrull.⁵¹ A later accounting note on this transaction indirectly reveals that the estimated sum total value of the ship was some 4731 *lliures*, so the half *setzena* or 1/32 part would have amounted to slightly more than 147 *lliures*.⁵²

We also know the salaries of some of the officers and sailors on board. The master Romeu d'Olzinelles, for example, received the sum of 43 *lliures* 7 *sous* as his salary for one year and 19 days, while the other master, Arnau Espaer, was to obtain 25 *lliures* and 10 *sous* for his salary, corresponding to eight months and 25 days.⁵³

The vessel captained by Espaer and d'Olzinelles had a large capacity and was well equipped for sailing. The accounting entries indicate that it was able to transport substantial amounts of cargo – for example, the almost 3000 *salmes* of wheat that it carried to the coasts of Sicily in the summer of 1346. Its crew numbered some 80 members, of whom almost 60 were sailors and the rest were officers.⁵⁴ It was a round sail-powered ship, with a high cargo capacity, devoted mainly to commercial transport.

After the fire and the liquidation of the shipping society, Espaer and d'Olzinelles went their separate ways. In 1347 it is recorded that Romeu d'Olzinelles was captaining new vessels associated with another of the great Barcelona merchants of the mid-fourteenth century, Joan Lombarda.⁵⁵

Espaer's close relations and contacts with the Mallorcan commercial sector were the main reason for the leasing of his vessel to cover the Hunayn–Mallorca route. Nevertheless the choice of the ship must have been determined both by its characteristics and its capacity. In the mid-fourteenth century the Maghrib routes were generally covered from the port of Mallorca by low tonnage vessels, *barques* and *llenys*,⁵⁶ well suited to short, frequently sailed routes.⁵⁷ The limited cargo capacity of these ships facilitated the process of loading and unloading, since there was no need to wait in port for days, or even months, until the cargo was fully laden; these vessels were ready to leave in a short time, thus ensuring fluid communications and fast transmission of news. The chartering of a Barcelona ship is indicative of the scale of the business involved in this undertaking and of the size of the cargo that had to be transported from Hunayn to Mallorca.⁵⁸

Who were these merchants? Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ledger offers very little information on this point and on the nature of the shipping contract. Nevertheless the list of the merchants who loaded cargo and their identification through contemporary documentary evidence indicates that the contract was negotiated by the Hunayn league of merchants for the exclusive use of its members.

For nearly a month Espaer and d'Olzinelles' vessel loaded goods belonging to about 100 merchants, whose names are recorded (but not their place of origin). However, some of them have been identified and all, without exception, are citizens of Mallorca with substantial business interests in various areas of the Maghrib, including Hunayn. Their names are Guillem Descós,⁵⁹ Antoni Gassó,⁶⁰ Pere Pocví,⁶¹ Guillem Figuera,⁶² Pere Cayet,⁶³ Francesc Pasqual,⁶⁴ and Pere Saconamina.⁶⁵ More interesting is the information

regarding the activities of Guillem de Vaquerises. In 1352, together with Ramon de Bruguera, Vaquerises was appointed as representative of the Hunayn league and made responsible for negotiating the association's charters,⁶⁶ a post held by Pere de Puigmalver and Guillem Ferrer in 1345.⁶⁷ Puigmalver does not appear as the owner of any cargo, but in Mallorca he received the cargo belonging to Pere Escrivà.⁶⁸ Similarly, Joan de Tarragona, also from Mallorca and a member of the league, took responsibility for the cargo owned by Miquel Mitja.⁶⁹

In brief all the merchants whom we have been able to identify had Mallorcan citizenship and invested not just in Hunayn but in other North African centres as well. In some cases, the documentation shows that they belonged to an association known as the Hunayn league. All these circumstances, together with the nature of the cargo (comprising almost exclusively wool from the Maghrib), show beyond any doubt that the Hunayn merchant association, represented by two of its members, was responsible for chartering *Espaer* and *d'Olzinelles' nau*.

The associations of Mallorcan charterers and the Hunayn league

The Hunayn league was an example of a common phenomenon, a commercial association. The intensive development of the Mallorcan mercantile network and its dependence on the markets of the Maghrib were the reason why, from the first half of the fourteenth century onwards, the merchants involved in trade with the Maghrib and Granada tried to guarantee their investments by controlling the means of transport. This led to the emergence of *ordinacions* or 'leagues' of merchants, which ensured that their members had access to the transport they needed; examples are the associations of Algiers, Mostaganem and Mazagran, and Hunayn, in Ziyyanid lands; Alcudia (modern-day Ghassâsa) under the control of the Marinids; and Almería in the Nasrid sultanate, all of which are documented from the 1340s.⁷⁰

The origin of these associations goes back to the opening years of the fourteenth century, coinciding with the reign of James II of Majorca. Their establishment reflects an attempt to protect Mallorcan interests in the Muslim markets where the island's merchants had made their largest investments. Within its general programme for the reorganization of the kingdom, the monarchy is likely to have played some role in the consolidation of this foreign strategy.

One of the main functions of these leagues was to negotiate and to obtain means of transport for the exclusive use of their members, thereby mitigating the difficulties inherent to the individual signing of shipping contracts. By joining forces, merchants could obtain more advantageous prices and, above all, they could control the loading times and the ports of call on the journey. Every year the associations would appoint one or two procurators with responsibility for renting whole vessels that were later subleased to the members of the league. The contracts preserved following the regulations in Algiers show that those chartering had a maximum of eight days to find a vessel whenever one of their members or a majority asked them to do so. This internal norm is also likely to have been applied in the league of Hunayn.

The different types of contracts agreed on the Mallorcan affreightment market were charters *a quintarades*, *a escar*, or *a escar d'alt a baix*. The first type, *a quintarades*, involved the payment of a different fee for each of the products loaded, calculated according to the unit of weight or measurement and in accordance with the distances between the different ports of call, as well as the type of vessel used for transport. Charters *a escar*, in contrast, involved the payment of an amount for all or for part of the ship in

relation to a voyage or for a fixed period of time. Contracts *al través* or *d'alt a baix* differed in that payment was charged not as a fixed price, but rather according to cargo units or the vessel's capacity. In this case the shipping fee was, as a consequence, determined not for the whole ship, whether full or empty, but for a sum for each *salma* or barrel.

The shipping contracts negotiated in the Mallorcan market for the Mallorca–Maghrib route in the middle of the fourteenth century was divided more or less equally between *a quintarades* and *a escar*. By the beginning of the fifteenth century *a scar* contracts had become more popular.⁷¹ But was this trend also found in the contracts directly negotiated by the associations? They tended to lease the entire ship, using contracts *a escar* before subsequently subletting the available space to merchants who were members of the association. This enabled them to control not only the route and the ports of call, but also prevented any merchants who were not members of the league from loading cargo.

In the case that concerns us here, the chartering of Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ship seems to have been carried out by means of a contract *ad scar* or for a fixed sum for the whole vessel and for a limited period, the time needed to cover transport from the port of Hunayn. An accounting entry in the third book used by Jaume Tarascó, who had acted as scribe on board the vessel, recognized that a sum in the region of 1410 *lliures* had been received *de nòlit* for the voyage between Hunayn and Mallorca. This was probably the fee that the league had paid for renting the vessel to cover the operation with this North African port, which is why it was credited to the joint owners of the ship.⁷²

Tarascó's accounts suggest that the ship's operators preferred fixed-fee charter contracts for large commercial operations. After the Hunayn voyage, in the summer of 1345, the *nau* undertook a long-distance journey to the coast of Sicily which produced huge profits for the shipping society.⁷³ To judge by the entries in the accounts, the cargo of the ship on that occasion comprised a total of 2898 Sicilian *salmes* of wheat.⁷⁴ Consequently, it was a single cargo, and the shipping contract stipulated that it should be transported from Mallorca to the Sicilian ports of Trapani and Messina. The leasing of the ship would finally bring the shipping company the substantial sum of 3038 *lliures* in income.⁷⁵

Let us return to the Hunayn league. The official and private documentary evidence for this association makes it possible to outline some of its most prominent features. The greater part of the information about its organization is derived from complaints presented to the Mallorcan authorities against its members accused by other such operators of overstepping the mark.⁷⁶ These records confirm that Mallorcan merchants became part of such associations voluntarily, even though the members of the Hunayn league may have used coercive tactics to persuade new operators to join.

Although the league is documented from 1341 onwards, its origins should undoubtedly be sought at an earlier date; an exhaustive analysis of the extant Mallorcan repositories might well confirm its foundation in the opening years of the fourteenth century.

Nevertheless, a crucial difference between the Hunayn league and other associations of this kind is that the joint chartering of vessels does not seem to have been their main objective; rather, they aimed to establish a purchasing association that would provide them with a monopoly in the wool market, while parallel to this it guaranteed the transport of the raw material in vessels leased by the association's procurators.⁷⁷ There are hints in the documentary evidence that the monopoly was extended to include any other merchandise that might be purchased in the market of Hunayn. So the difficulty in intervening in purchasing operations in a foreign market was offset by the effective control over the means of transport.

Initially, these associations were exclusively constituted by Christian merchants from Mallorca, but from the mid-fourteenth century Jews resident on the island were allowed to join. In the case of the Hunayn league, it is not until 1351 that we find a deed admitting Jewish merchants, provided they were from Mallorca. The reference is quite significant since it explains why all the merchants involved in the voyage of 1344 were Christians, despite the evidence of close ties between the Jewish commercial sector of the island with the North African markets, especially with Hunayn.⁷⁸

The identification of some of the members of the league who appear in notarial contracts enables us to confirm that the members of the Hunayn association had wide interests throughout the area of the Maghrib. Nevertheless, the merchants registered in the league were expected to purchase raw material collectively; it was strictly forbidden to do business on an individual basis, either when acquiring products or organizing transport.⁷⁹ In practice, fraud was common, even among the members of the association.⁸⁰

We know the names of some of the charterers appointed by the association. In 1345 the procurators were Pere de Puigmalver and Guillem Ferrer;⁸¹ in August 1351 the charterers were Antonio Nigri and Pere de Coma,⁸² but by November of the same year they had been replaced by Bernat Ferrer and Ramon Frexe;⁸³ in the following year, 1352, Ramon de Bruguera and Guillem de Vaquerises were responsible for negotiating charters for the league.⁸⁴

The consequences were clear: thanks to the restrictive practices of these associations, Mallorcan traders obtained a position of strength in the face of their closest competitors, from the Crown of Aragon and Italy. As these *ligas de mercaderia* became consolidated, they weakened the position of the Italian merchants – mainly Genoese and Pisans – who were operating in the lands of the Maghrib through the port of Mallorca and especially in the wool trade.

The composition of the cargo shipped to Mallorca

An examination of the entries recorded in the ledger shows that the principal interest of the traders who chartered the vessel was the import of wool; in the final analysis, this was the main commercial goal of the Hunayn league.

Wool had been one of the most plentiful products in the cargoes exported from the Maghrib since the twelfth century; Jaume Vivens Vives even defined the North African route as the ‘gold, slave and wool route’.⁸⁵ Subsequent research has added to this brief list,⁸⁶ but has confirmed the significance of wool as one of the products most frequently sought by European traders. Its production seems to have been concentrated in certain areas of the lands of the Ziyyanids and Marinids, which were identified some years ago by Federico Melis: the area between Rabat and Fez, from where wool was transported to Alcudia, the port of redistribution to Europe, and the regions adjoining the ports of Algiers, Mostaganem, and Hunayn.⁸⁷

The regulations decreed by the *Universitat de Mallorca* in 1346, two years after the journey studied here, enable us to confirm and expand on Melis’ observations.⁸⁸ These dispositions, which were valid for six months, noted that cargoes of Maghrib wool, in consignments of varying sizes, were arriving from almost all the ports of the Maghrib situated in an area that stretched from Mozemma to Collo, especially from Alcudia and Hunayn. The regulations stated that all the cargoes of wool embarked in these ports must be unloaded in Mallorca, with the exception of those from the easternmost area of Ifriqiya – Annaba and Tunis – while wool and other goods belonging to citizens of Mallorca were to be given preference for transportation in ships sailing to Alcudia, Togo, and Hunayn.

What were the reasons behind these regulations? For the moment the answer is unclear, though they may have been related to problems arising from competition from Italy, the principal consumer, together with the local industry, of the wool arriving in Mallorca from the Maghrib.

As Mario del Treppo has emphasized, it was the supply of wool that led Italian merchants to establish companies in the main economic centres of the Crown of Aragon.⁸⁹ The managers or partners of the companies established in the island negotiated the purchase of the wool production of Mallorca and also Menorca, which was renowned for its wool.⁹⁰ The Italian traders, especially the Tuscans and Genoese, were not interested only in the wool produced in the Balearic Islands; they were also keen to buy the North African wool brought to the port of Mallorca by the island's merchants.

By analysing the Genoese notarial registers, Georges Jehel has been able to show that in the second half of the thirteenth century the Maghrib was the principal source of wool supplies for the city's textile industry.⁹¹ Nevertheless, from the end of that century onwards, Genoa's only direct contacts were with Tunis and the eastern Maghrib, probably because of the political difficulties that was going through Ifriqiya. Where did the Genoese obtain the raw material needed for their industry? A high proportion probably came from the Mallorcan market,⁹² which was well supplied thanks to the contacts of its merchants in the main North African ports in the central area.

The case of Tuscany presents certain similarities. The trading operations carried out by Moneto Bonsignori, of San Miniato, the agent of the Pisan trader Giovanni Lorenzo Maningo, are a good example. This trader had acquired Mallorcan citizenship in 1371 and became a permanent resident. His ties with the Mallorcan mercantile framework provided him with direct knowledge of the arrival of North African cargoes, kept him up to date with market prices, and allowed him to finalize the purchase of large quantities of wool from the Maghrib, from Hunayn and Algiers, which he re-exported to Pisa together with other local wool or with wool from Valencia.⁹³ Some of this trader's operations were recorded in the register of the *Lou del pisans* for the period 1353–55 and demonstrate his preference for wool purchases.⁹⁴ The two registers preserved, for 1315–22 and 1353–55, record the payments made by Pisan merchants on goods that were both imported and re-exported; among the products re-exported to the Pisan markets, wool was predominant. The calculations made by Tito Antoni show that wool produced in the Maghrib, and above all that from Hunayn, was held in high esteem by Pisan traders.⁹⁵ However, this evidence only certifies the existence of this export trade, not its volume. We should bear in mind the existence of companies formed by Pisan and Mallorcan partners; this ploy allowed Pisan traders to elude the collectors of the *Lou* by hiding the true scale of their exports.

In contrast, the trading operations of the Genoese and Tuscans were limited by norms and procedures applied by the Mallorcan leagues. The Datini correspondence shows that the monopoly wielded by the leagues continued to be operative at the end of the fourteenth century. The contents of these letters reveal the failed attempts of the Datini Company's partners and agents in Mallorca to gain access to North African lands and the difficulties that they faced when it came to loading and shipping merchandise to the Maghrib because the Mallorcan traders refused to share their vessels.⁹⁶ The traders themselves recognized that it was the leagues that prevented them from sailing to North Africa.⁹⁷ According to Philippe Gourdin, they did not try to establish their own agents because of their unfamiliarity with the Maghrib and with the workings of North Africa;⁹⁸ this, combined with the impossibility of direct access via Mallorca, forced Francesco Datini to resort to other ways of gaining access to wool and other products, such as the use of intermediaries in North Africa.⁹⁹

In short, the stockpiling of wool production by associations of specialized merchants, as exemplified by the case of Hunayn, explains the lack of references to any direct purchases in the trading centres of the Maghrib negotiated from Mallorca itself by Italian traders; the Mallorcan associations' control of the means of transport ultimately prevented them from taking part in the wool trade.

In all probability Hunayn was the point of sale and exit port for foreign markets for the wool production of a surrounding area whose geographical limits we cannot define at present.¹⁰⁰ The amount produced must have been extremely high, considering that although a substantial proportion was for export to the European market, another part was for local consumption in the textile industries of the Ziyyanid urban centres. The limited information supplied by Leo Africanus, and repeated by Luis de Mármol y Carvajal, points to the existence of a cotton industry and *cloth* (or perhaps wool?) manufacture in Hunayn in the sixteenth century, in which 'almost all' the inhabitants were employed.¹⁰¹

In the capital, Tlemcen, locally produced wool supplied a thriving textile industry.¹⁰² Given the general absence of references to Ziyyanid cloth among the products exported by the merchants from European centres, among them the charterers of Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ship, we conclude that this was cloth for internal consumption distributed in the small towns around Tlemcen.

The Hunayn league negotiated the purchase of untreated wool on an almost exclusive basis. In the course of the almost 30 days that Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ship remained anchored in the port of Hunayn, nearly 1500 sacks were stowed on board – an exceptional amount. Examination of the days on which the loading of the ship took place and the amounts of wool taken on board suggest that loading was not continuous but cyclical, with quiet stretches of three days or so preceding periods of frenetic activity.¹⁰³

The same day as the ship arrived in Hunayn, 11 November, a few sacks were taken on board, probably at the same time as the goods brought on the outward journey were being unloaded. The silence of the subsequent days might well coincide with the continuation of the unloading process. Nevertheless, this would not explain the long periods of inactivity, sometimes lasting three days as just mentioned. The wool, produced in large amounts in the surrounding region,¹⁰⁴ was probably acquired through local merchants, and must have been stored in the *fondaco*, where the customs inspection took place, prior to its transfer to the port and loading on board.¹⁰⁵ Such large quantities of the raw material would have required ample storage space, which the *fondaco* may not have been able to provide. On the other hand, the massive purchase of raw material suggests that there must have been several supply points, which would explain why the merchandise arrived in the city of Hunayn in stages.

Taking into account the *modus operandi* of the Hunayn league,¹⁰⁶ the greater part of the operation, the 1496 sacks and 40 bales, would have been acquired collectively by the association or *comunitat*. The acquisitions must have been planned on the basis of prior commitments and the capital that had been forwarded, with individual purchases being strictly forbidden; they were subsequently divided among the members involved in shares proportional to their investments. A small group of 15 merchants out of the almost 100 traders involved stand out because they held more than 25 sacks, which represents more than half the cargo of wool (52%).

Joint acquisitions favoured the participation of traders making small purchases, even of a single sack, and explain the large number of investors. It is more difficult to account for the 26 sacks that are recorded as the property of the *comunitat*, in other words of the league itself, which in addition had its own identification mark – a red cross.¹⁰⁷ What was the aim of acquiring these sacks? It may have been to obtain profits to pay the salaries of

the league's shipping agents and other expenses arising from the acquisition of the wool. There is no record of the payment of salaries to the annually elected representatives, but it is likely that there was some form of remuneration. The lack of information at this stage of the research on possible economic contributions by the members makes this hypothesis quite feasible.

Together with this poor quality wool, certain traders decided to complete their shipments with sacks or bales of *anyines*¹⁰⁸ (30 *fays*), *matxi*¹⁰⁹ (two bales), *boldrons*¹¹⁰ (33 *fays*), or *mocona* wool¹¹¹ (nine sacks), even with some (five) bales of linen. Mordants such as rock alum (43 *fardes* or loads) or an anecdotal barrel of glaze¹¹² completed the range of raw materials aimed to cover the growing needs of a textile industry that was expanding in the mid-fourteenth century.

The wool from Hunayn that reached Mallorca, like all the wool coming from the Maghrib, was in part intended to supply the flourishing network of local Catalan industries. Towns and cities such as Lleida, Perpignan, Banyoles, Sant Joan de les Abadesses, Valls, Girona, Berga, Ripoll, Vic, Manresa, and Igualada developed major textile industries from the thirteenth century onwards, or even earlier in some cases.¹¹³ The Barcelona textile industry developed somewhat later, although in the course of the fourteenth century the sector was to achieve unusual prominence – not only in the production of wool, but also in cotton, linen, and hemp.¹¹⁴

Where did this industry obtain its raw materials? For the last decades of the century, Claude Carrère identifies the lands of Aragon, the Pyrenean area, the Maestrazgo, Sant Mateu, and Menorca as the principal areas supplying the Catalan industry with wool of medium and high quality.¹¹⁵ This wool was sufficient for supplying the looms of Catalonia since, if the offer fell, it was not due to a fall in production but rather an excessive increase in exports. In contrast the manufacture of luxury cloth depended on English imports.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless the Mallorcan written sources also confirm the import of Maghribi wool destined for Catalan textile centres. Palamós seems to have been one of the ports that redistributed wool from North Africa towards inland areas,¹¹⁷ a circumstance that is confirmed by a variety of sources mentioning its use on the looms of Berga in 1336.¹¹⁸

The case of Mallorca offers a different perspective. Antoni Riera's studies have revealed the lack of high quality wool produced on the island, but it was an important centre for the production of wool of average quality, which could then be exported to meet the widespread foreign demand. This meant that the development of the Mallorcan textile industry was clearly held back; Riera points out how wool and dyes from the Maghrib were unloaded almost every day in the port of Mallorca at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Despite these favourable factors, this industry developed considerably later on the island than in the mainland regions of the kingdom of Mallorca such as Perpignan and Montpellier, to the extent that the renewal of Mallorcan wool production took place at a later date and was the consequence not of private initiative but of royal intervention.¹¹⁹ It was not until the mid-fourteenth century that the cloth industry became sufficiently influential for attention to be paid to its exports.¹²⁰ For this reason it must be supposed that part of the Maghrib wool that arrived in Mallorca in the mid-fourteenth century, and more specifically that transported in Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ship, was intended to supply small workshops producing for the internal market whereas the other part, perhaps the greater part, was destined for re-export.

In the fourteenth century, North African wool was held in low esteem. According to the classification drawn up by Melis, Mallorcan and Menorcan wool were among the higher quality categories, far above wool from Maghrib.¹²¹ The data provided by Jacques Heers, although referring to the late fourteenth century (1395 to be more precise) offer

evidence of the lower quality of Maghrib wool and the low prices it fetched in Mallorcan markets. Whereas Mallorcan wool was sold at 6.10 *lliures* and wool from Valencia, Aragon, Catalonia, and Castile at 5.10 *lliures*, the different categories of North African wool varied between 3.10 and 3.15 *lliures* the *cantaro barbaresco* (a unit of about 50 kilograms)¹²² – prices around half those of the most highly regarded types. So how can the great demand for this wool be explained? The low price of the raw material together with the low cumulative costs of its production in comparison with those of higher quality wool made it possible to manufacture poor quality cloth, which could then be widely sold because of the ease with which it penetrated European markets.

The situation changed in the fifteenth century. David Abulafia reports that the acquisition of African wool was only of secondary importance at that time after the growth in production in Europe, because of the abandonment of a large amount of agricultural land and its conversion to pasture after the Black Death. The Crown of Aragon and Castile would eventually own large wool-producing areas with the result that the island of Mallorca's dependence on African wool fell noticeably.¹²³

Wax and leather, two of the products in greatest demand on European markets, appear in the cargo on Espaer and d'Olzinelles' ship, though some way behind wool. The league's fundamental interest in wool production is not enough to explain the small amount of leather on board in 1344; its limited presence may well have been related to the strict controls imposed by the Marinids. The treaty of 1339, signed between the ruler of Majorca and Abū'l Hasan for a theoretical period of 10 years, and therefore still valid until 1349, expressly forbade the export of leather of any kind.¹²⁴ The annexation of the Balearic Islands by the Crown of Aragon in 1343 annulled the treaty and with it the clauses referring to the export of leather, but it seems unlikely that this would have led to the liberalization of its export. Nonetheless, the conclusion of the War of the Straits and the subsequent signing of the provisional treaty in 1344 must have changed the atmosphere to some extent and may have brought about the concession of special licences, which would explain the inclusion of leather in the cargo of the ship studied here.

Finally, we should mention the presence in the cargo of relatively large amounts of wax, 96 *pans* (loaves), even though this amount is minimal compared with the rest of the cargo. Several merchants also loaded very small quantities of dates and spices – *nous de Xarch* (*nous d'eixarch*).

The strategies of the Mallorcan traders

The 1344 loading ledger we have discussed explains how a Barcelona ship which had sailed to the port of Hunayn was loaded with a bulky cargo, comprising mainly wool, but also other less frequently recorded goods, before setting sail again for Mallorca. The ship, captained by Arnau Espaer and Romeu d'Olzinelles, thereby covered one of the routes most commonly frequented by Mallorcan traders from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards. The business undertaking reveals some interesting features, regarding both the chronological framework in which it took place and the individuals taking part in the operation.

With the recent agreement ending the War of the Straits, trade with the ports of North Africa revived. In all probability, the conflict had not brought mercantile movements to a total standstill, but it must have caused a drastic reduction in commercial contacts with the North African ports. As a result, the news of the cessation of hostilities must have been received with relief by the Mallorcan traders, who would soon start planning their activities in the new climate of concord marked by the reopening of diplomatic contacts

between the Marinid sultanate and the Crown of Aragon. It should not be forgotten that the sultanate of Tlemcen and its principal port on the Mediterranean, Hunayn, had been under the control of the Marinids for several years.

The loading record shows that the ship was probably chartered by representatives of the Hunayn league, one of the associations of Mallorcan merchants possibly dating back to the early fourteenth century. The principal aim of this association was to obtain means of transport for its members on advantageous terms so as to mitigate the difficulties and costs arising from the individual negotiation of shipping contracts. To some extent, the association seems to have been seeking a monopoly or at least a highly preferential position in its commercial agreements. The league only admitted Mallorcan merchants as its associates; Italian traders were strictly forbidden. All its merchants (including those involved in the Hunayn shipment) were citizens of Mallorca. No Jewish traders appear among them either, since Jews were not admitted as full members until 1351, although their close relationship with the ports of North Africa is well known.

Nevertheless it is the practice of renting the whole ship, as well as the homogeneous nature of the cargo and the operations carried out on land, that most clearly point towards a collective intervention on the part of the associates. The concentration of resources enabled the consortium to act from a position of strength both when negotiating the purchase of raw material and when contracting the means of transport required. Such practices severely limited the competition of other traders; as a result the league came to exercise strict control over the areas of production as it effectively took over the wool export market in the port of Hunayn. In the mid-fourteenth century this control was particularly strong.

The size of the cargo, largely made up of almost 1500 sacks of wool, meant that a ship of considerable dimensions had to be chartered from Barcelona, with a crew of more than 80 and able to transport approximately 3000 *salmes* of wheat. The ship usually covered the route to Sicily and the ports of the eastern Mediterranean. The cargo was this large because of the decline in the supply caused by the military conflict of the preceding years, and because of the growing demands of the European textile industry.

Although Maghrib wool did not offer high quality, by way of compensation its low cost made it possible to produce cheap cloth that could be acquired by ample sectors of urban society. To a greater or lesser degree, almost all regions of North Africa supplied raw material, although there were several main production areas, whose export channels were the ports of Alcudia, Algiers, Mostaganem, and Hunayn. The presence of a substantial colony of Mallorcan (and also Valencian) merchants in Hunayn undoubtedly favoured a more efficient management of the wool supplies coming in from the surrounding areas of pasture. These circumstances converted the market of Mallorca into one of the best supplied wool markets of the Mediterranean.

The importance of wool explains the noticeable presence of Genoese, Pisan, Florentine, and Venetian traders in the city of Mallorca. Wool from Mallorca and Menorca, considered to be of excellent quality, together with large shipments of Maghrib wool that continuously flowed into the port of Mallorca, formed cargoes which were ultimately destined for the ports of Italy. In an attempt to lower costs, the Italian traders unsuccessfully sought direct access to the markets producing the raw material in North Africa. After the failure of these efforts, those agents interested in the products from the Maghrib were obliged to channel their interests through the centre and the fleets offered by the Mallorcas. As a result, associations of traders keen to sign shipping contracts emerged in the Mallorcan mercantile sector as an innovative attempt to stop foreign initiatives and to monopolize the profits of the trade with North Africa.

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Notes

1. Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*.
2. The 1133 treaty with Pisa was the first to be concluded by Italians with the Almoravids, Banti, “I trattati tra Pisa e Tunisi”; Jehel, *L’Italie et le Maghreb*; Constable, *Housing the Stranger*; Gourdin, *Tabarka*.
3. A recent synthesis about the Latin merchants’ involvement in Almohad economic centres is due to Abulafia, “Christian Merchants.”
4. Petti Balbi, “Las ciudades marítimas italianas.”
5. Through the calculation of figures for Genoese trade in the Maghrib between 1155 and 1290, G. Jehel has reached the conclusion that 98% of the trading operations and the capital invested involved the cities of Ceuta, Bejaia and Tunis (Jehel, *Les Génois en Méditerranée Occidentale*, 332).
6. The Pisans appear to have been the first to establish themselves in the Tunisian area. They are likely to have had *fondacos* as early as 1157 although the first documentary proof does not appear until the treaty of 1166 which makes the first mention of concession of a *fondaco*, in this case in Zawila, the commercial suburb (*faubourg*) of Mahdia (Brunschvig, *La Berbérie Orientale*; Jehel, *L’Italie et le Maghreb*, 107; Mansouri, “Consuls et Consulats,” 154–5; Gourdin, *Tabarka*, 105).
7. The treaty states that they were prohibited from trading or even disembarking in other lands of the Almohad empire, except for reasons of *force majeure*, such as a storm; they were forbidden to ‘conversare con alcuno degli abitanti’. The only exception to this was Almería, in the Iberian Peninsula, where they could acquire supplies and repair their ships in the case of necessity (Banti, “I trattati tra Pisa e Tunisi,” 52–3).
8. Florence did not become directly involved in North African trade until the fifteenth century.
9. These orientations have been demonstrated by Bono, “Le relazioni commerciali” and Brunschvig, *La Berbérie Orientale*. Jehel put forward the idea that the Almohad collapse was the cause of the shift in the interests of the Genoese. The subsequent disorders would explain why they withdrew from their former positions in Salé and Ceuta towards Tunis (Jehel, *L’Italie et le Maghreb*, 64). On the other hand, Chérif points to Catalan competition as the probable cause of the reduction (though not the disappearance) of Genoese trade (Chérif, *Ceuta*, 139).
10. B. Doumerc established the commencement of relations in 1231 when Pietro Dolfín signed a treaty of peace and commerce on behalf of the doge, Jacopo Tiepolo, with the sultan, Abu Zakariya Yahya, who had recently become independent from the Almohads. The treaty was to last for 40 years. According to Doumerc, the lengthy, close collaboration with Sultan al-Mustansir from 1271 onwards was decisive for Venice; the presence of Venetian traders in Tunisian cities increased considerably around this time (Doumerc, *Venise*, 15–21).
11. With regard to the engagement of traders from Catalonia and Aragon within North African markets during thirteenth century, see Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, and Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium*.
12. Khelifa, “Le port de Hünayn.”
13. For a synthesis of the causes put forward by historical studies in an attempt to explain this change in direction see López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 346–50.
14. The bibliography available is extensive. Manzano’s *La intervención de los benimerines* is particularly important. O’Callaghan’s recently published *The Gibraltar Crusade* is quite an interesting piece of research about the conflicts in the Strait of Gibraltar between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.
15. López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 65, note 31.
16. Dhina, *Le royaume abdelouadite*.
17. Abu Zakariya Yah’ia ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire des Beni Abd el-Wad*, I, 189.
18. Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire des Berbères*, IV, 220.
19. Circumstances that were made clear by Bouayed, “Le port de Hunayn,” 342.

20. These are the same military tactics that were used during the previous long siege of Tlemcen, between 1299 and 1307 (Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire des Berbères*, IV, 143).
21. Kably, *Société*, 98.
22. On the taxation charged on European trade in the sultanates of the Maghrib see López, “Mallorca y el Magreb”; López and Padilla, “La consolidación de una nueva estrategia.”
23. Bouayed, “Le port de Hunayn,” 332.
24. On 1 May according to Abd al-Rahman (*Histoire des berbères*, IV, 223): ‘Tlemcen fut pris d’assaut le 27 Ramadan 737 (1 mai 1337)’; on 2 May, according to Abu Zakariya (*Histoire des Beni Abd el Wad*, I, 189): ‘Le mercredi, vingt-huitième tour de ramad’ân de l’an 737 (2 mai 1337), les assiégeants pénétrèrent d’assaut dans la place.’
25. A recovery described in great detail by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun (*Histoire des Berbères*, IV, 276–80).
26. In fact, there are two ledgers referring to trading voyages carried out by this ship. The first, with no exact date – A[rxiu de la] C[atedral de] B[arcelona], L[legats de] L[libres] E [xtravagants]. C[òmptes de] p[articulars], ‘Quadern de carregar a Mallorca en la nau d’Arnau Espær i de Romeu d’Olzinelles 1339?’; published in Duran, “A propòsit d’una expedició comercial” – gives details of the loading of merchandise belonging to different traders that was to leave the port of Mallorca for the Maghrib port of Hunayn. The second, dated 1344 – ACB, LLE.Cp, ‘Quadern del carregat en la nau d’Arnau Espær i Romeu d’Olzinelles 1344’ – lists a series of cargoes that were to be transported on the same vessel on the homeward journey from Hunayn to Mallorca. This second register is the documentary basis for this research. In each of its entries the document records the goods belonging to the merchants who had rented the vessel, the quantities embarked, the dates when they were loaded, as well as the mark that identified the load of each trader.
27. López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 90–6.
28. The ledger clearly specifies that ‘comensan a caragar dijous a XI de nohembra ... del any de MCCCXLIIII’ (ACB, LLE.Cp, “Quadern del carregat,” fo. 1 r.) and the last date for embarking goods recorded is 8 December (for example, on the day Jaume Santapau embarked, Wednesday, various quantities of wool and ‘ayines’ (ibid., fo. 2 v.).
29. In the Crown of Aragon the number of parts or shares was usually 16, which gave rise to the term *setzenes* (sixteenths); but there might also be eight shares, in which case they were known as *octavas*, or four in the case of lesser vessels with a small crew, in which case the term *quarters* was used. On ship ownership, see Carrère, *Barcelone centre économique*, 202–12 and 215–19. See also the interesting analysis carried out by Coulon on the ownership of the vessels that covered the Barcelona-eastern Mediterranean route (Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d’Orient*, 158–65).
30. We know little of his private family life; in 1335 he married Blanca, the daughter of Pere de Valls from Barcelona (Arxiu del Castell de Vilassar de Dalt, 1-9-05 (D-5)); he was survived by his daughter and heir, Joana, who married Bernat Santcliment (Manca, “L’administració de la Sardenya catalana,” 85–6).
31. Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 147–8.
32. An account book for this society, which was transcribed by Madurell, has been preserved, “Contabilidad de una compañía.”
33. This figure is almost as large as the sums invested in contemporary Italian companies, Cuadrada and López, “A la Mediterrània medieval.”
34. The contributions of the three founding members as capital stock totalled 9820 *lliures*: 6000 *lliures* from the principal partner, Pere de Mitjavila, 2000 *lliures* from Arnau Espær, and the remainder, 1820 *lliures*, from Bernat de Puigmoradell (Madurell, “Contabilidad de una compañía,” 426; Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 148).
35. Esteve de Gerb, citizen of Barcelona; Arnau Llorenç, also from Barcelona; Ponç Malars and Francesc Margarit, both of Girona, and Bernat Ferrer, of Barcelona; their joint investments totalled 1870 *lliures* (Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 148–9).
36. They contributed a total of 6150 *lliures*. Among them were well-known businessmen from Girona and Banyoles, the hometown of the Mitjavilas, and family members, such as Jaume and Guillemó, sons of Joan de Mitjavila, from Valencia (Madurell, “Contabilidad de una compañía,” 426; Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 144, 149–50).
37. Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 153–65.

38. Ibid., 167–8.
39. Madurell, “Contabilidad de una compañía,” doc. 35, 426–8. Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d’Orient*, 240.
40. He was sent to Sicily as ambassador and to the court of the Mamluk sultans on several occasions (1327, 1345, and 1346). This close relationship enabled him to obtain safe conducts from Peter the Ceremonious (although only after paying considerable sums); he thus obtained a very favourable position in the trade with Alexandria, even enjoying a monopoly for a time. A description of these embassies can be found in Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 95–115, 229–36 and Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d’Orient*, 48, note 21, 98–9.
41. Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 171.
42. The only documentary references are two *comandas* negotiated by Bernat Ferrer, the factor in Cagliari, with Bernat Solzina and Guillem Olomar, in order to trade in Tunis and Annaba, respectively (Madurell, “Contabilidad de una compañía,” fo. 4 v., 436).
43. This company lasted until 1342 longer than the ‘principal’ one (Hurtado, *Els Mitjavila*, 182).
44. The economic power of Arnau Espaer leaves no room for doubt. In the same year, 1344, together with five more citizens of Barcelona, Arnau Destorrent, Joan Boil, Pere Oulomar, Arnau Sabastida, and Ramon Savall, he negotiated the collection of the revenue from Sardinia. His familiarity with Sardinia, acquired as a consequence of his trading involvement during the years in which the Mitjavila company had one of its centres of operation in Cagliari, must have influenced his decision to invest in the island. The choice of Espaer, together with Arnau Destorrent and Ramon de Guixars, as general administrators of Sardinia shows the confidence that the other investors placed in his knowledge and administrative capacity (Manca, “L’administració de la Sardenya catalana,” 7–9).
45. Madurell, “Contabilidad de una compañía,” fo. 154 r., 486; fo. 156 r., 489–90.
46. Coulon reports the issue of two licences for the same vessel and on dates very close to each other (20 June and 12 July 1341), in which the masters are recorded as, on the one hand, Pere de Mitjavila, and on the other Arnau Espaer and Romeu d’Olzinelles, in order to undertake a voyage to Cyprus (Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d’Orient*, 680).
47. Our interest focuses particularly on the account book of Jaume Tarascó (1340–48), since its entries cover the period in which the voyage to Hunayn was made (Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 358–443 and 937–1014).
48. Consequently its structure seems to represent a series of accounting notes that in many cases require one to hazard an interpretation; therefore the results cannot always be fully verified.
49. For example, among the entries in the account of Gaubert la Grialtrull or La Geltrú, owner of half a *setzena* of the ship, we read: ‘Ítem, li deg que partim de so que sobra de la nau com fo cramade de que partim per satsena LXXIII ll. XVI s. de que ve a la vostra part ... 36 ll. 18 s.’ The result of the liquidation is negative; in a subsequent note he points out ‘Deg en Gaubert la Guialtrull de comta pasat de la nau que finam los comtes com fo cremade en tras de XXXIII carters atrás [...] que así li u met en comte ... 99 ll. 14 s. 7 d’ (Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 982).
50. On one occasion he notes that he had been paid 9 *lliures* for four months’ salary, and on another he records the amount of 23 *lliures 5 sous* corresponding to his salary for 11 months and 19 days. ‘E axí deu-ma la nau a mi Jachme Tarasschon, esscrivà, de la nau de n’Arnau Espaher e d’en Romeu d’Oltçinelles’ (Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 481 and 980).
51. ‘Deu lo sanyor en Gaubert La Grialtrull que li vení, miga satsena de l’escrivania que yo Jacme Tarascó he an la nau de n’Arnau Sapyer e d’en Romeu d’Oltçinelles, II sacens axí con coste aspexade’ (Account book of Jaume Tarascó (1334–38), Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 890).
52. ‘Deu-ma en Gaubert la Grialtruue que li ve de la seu miga satsena de la nau d’en Arnau Espaher e d’en Romeu d’Oltçinelles, qui costa a raó de IIII^MDCCXXXI ll. e I s. XI d., abatudes C ll. que rehaben en Barsalona e, axí monta a lla vostra miga satsena ... 147 ll. 16 s. 11’ (Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 953).
53. Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 520–21.
54. At some point in 1346 or 1347, in Collioure, the ship had a crew of 82 members, made up of sailors (58), officers (21), masters (2) and the scribe (1) (Duran, “L’alimentació a les embarcacions comercials”).
55. On Joan Lombarda, see Coulon, “Ascensión, apogeo y caída.” Lombarda had close contacts with the Mitjavilas (Hurtado, *Llibre de deutes*, 395, 411, 414, 415, 442, 443, 461, 464 and

474). In 1347 a papal licence, later ratified by a royal licence, was granted to the *nau* Santa Eulalia to undertake a voyage to the Orient. This was surely Joan Lombarda's ship, which must have been captained by d'Olzinelles (Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d'Orient*, 831). In the autumn of 1356 Lombarda had a new Bayonne ship or cog called the Santa Eulalia. Coulon has documented at least five voyages to the Orient by this vessel between 1356 and 1361. Although Lombarda was named as the master, he does not seem to have personally commanded the ship, which was under the control of Romeu d'Olzinelles, accompanied by Arnau Roure or Berenguer Martí, perhaps, as Coulon suggests, representatives of a second owner (Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d'Orient*, 138, 162, 268, 690, 692 and 694).

56. López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 286–9.
57. Used for short voyages not only to the Maghrib but also to Menorca and Ibiza, the Catalan and Valencian coasts, Sicily, the Tyrrhenian coast and Seville, but hardly suitable for long distances. This fleet must have been extremely weak, as it had hardly any cogs, *tarides*, galleys or *naus*. This is the conclusion reached by Durliat and Pons on the basis of the analysis of the *Ancoratge* registers, preserved for the years 1321, 1324, 1330, 1332, and 1340 (Durliat and Pons, “Recerques sobre el moviment del port de Mallorca”).
58. An undertaking that could hardly have been carried out with the vessels available in the port of Mallorca. In contrast the cargo capacity of larger vessels would have been, according to the evidence available for the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, between 200 and 500 barrels – between 80 and 200 Moorsom tons – although in some cases they might have a capacity of 1600 barrels (640 Moorsom tons) according to the data provided by Feliu and Riera, “Activitats econòmiques,” 196–7.
59. In 1355 he is recorded as a member of the Almería league of merchants (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 474–5).
60. Identified as a merchant and citizen of Mallorca in a maritime loan contract. According to the clauses of the document, Gassó lent the sum of 37 *lliures*, 10 *sous* to Berenguer Baya, master of a *llenya de bandes* and also a citizen of Mallorca, to equip the vessel prior to the voyage that it was to make to Ibiza and Dellys before returning to Mallorca (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 489).
61. He contributed capital to two *comandas* negotiated in 1352, which were to be invested in a voyage with Hunayn as its final destination, with stops in Almería and Málaga (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 406).
62. In 1359 he affreighted *ad scar* Bernat Maimó and Bernat Mates equipped *llenya* to undertake the Mallorca–Ténès journey, a trip in which he also invested the sum of 16 *lliures*, 6 *sous* in a *comanda* entrusted to Bernat de Puigventós (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 408, 454).
63. A minority partner in the company of Tarill, Cayet & Coloma, in 1362 he was their agent in Algiers while the leading partner, Nicolau Tarill, managed the business from Mallorca and Pere Coloma supervised their Dellys base (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 432).
64. A few years before this journey to Hunayn, in 1341, Pasqual set up a society with mixed Barcelonan and Mallorcan capital, together with Guerau de Noguera, a citizen of Barcelona, and Pere de Lledó and Bartomeu Burrufó, like him merchants and citizens of Mallorca. The company's common property was administered by Pere and Ramon d'Olorda, hired as agents to supervise the company's business in Almería, Granada and Málaga, and occasionally in Hunayn (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 433).
65. Because of various debts contracted with the Mitjavila company he appears in their account books, where his links to the Mallorca market are specified (Madurell, “Contabilidad de una compañía,” 133–43).
66. A *regesta* of this appointment has been published by Maíz, *Actividades económicas y políticas*, vol. II, 383, doc. 769.
67. López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 471, nota 195.
68. ACB, LLE.Cp, “Quadern del carregat . . .,” fo. 5 v.
69. Tarragona had an agent in Hunayn, Pere Bonifaci, accused of loading a certain quantity of wool belonging to the association, on his own account, making use of Tarragona's distinctive sign (López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 472, nota 198).

70. These leagues have been analysed in López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 460–76; López, “Las asociaciones de fletadores.”
71. López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 435–82; López, “Para una historia de la navegación.”
72. ‘En l’any MCCCXLIII. / Avem aüt de nòlit ab axida del viatge de Hone an Malorque saguons que ha per manut als libra dels nòlits esscrit de ma mà de II cartes ffins en XIII cartes per manut de longa moneda ab I tru vell que avem vanut per I cot ... 1410 ll. 1 s. 8’ (*Llibre de comptes* de Jaume Tarascó (1340–48), Varela, “El control de los bienes,” 981).
73. The accounting entry described in the previous note is followed by the following observation: ‘Avem aüt de nòlit de Malorque ffins en Trapena e de Trapena ffins en Masina saguons que par per menut alls libra dels nòlit escrit de mà en XV carters de carlins DVI o. XV terins V grans / que a rahó de VI tarins X grans florins valen florins II mCCCCXXXI florins que a rahó XXV s. florí, monta ... 3038 ll. 2 s. 6’ (*Llibre de comptes* de Jaume Tarascó (1340–48), Varela, “El control de bienes,” 981).
74. The *salma* was a measure of capacity for dry products. In the case of the Sicilian *salma*, it is estimated to have been equivalent to 4.5 Barcelona *quarteres* (344,41 l.), in other words somewhat more than the capacity of a Catalan *salma*, which only held four *quarteres* (278,072 l.). The unit was used to measure the gross tonnage of a ship. Of course these values are not constant, and, as in other cases, there are enormous divergences between scholars when it comes to determining their equivalents, A. M. Alcover and F. de B. Moll, *D[iccionari] c[atalà]-v[alencià]-b[aleàric]*, <http://dcvb.iecat.net>.
75. Varela, “El control de bienes,” 413.
76. López, *Las asociaciones de fletadores mallorquines*, 97–9.
77. The declarations of one of the members of the association are revealing; in 1345, he defined it as *lige facte inter mercatores*, before the authorities of Mallorca, ‘lige facte inter mercatores critianos dicti loci de Hone super lanis emendis per ipsos in partibus barbaricis’, A[rchivo del] R[eino de] M[allorca], Ll[etres] C[omunes], 8, fo. 30 r.–v. (Mallorca, 11 octubre 1345).
78. On the participation of the Jewish community of Mallorca in the north African trade, see López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 327–46 and Maíz, *Los judíos de Baleares*.
79. ARM, *Extraordinaris*, 441, fo. 249 r.–266 r. (Mallorca, 11, octubre, 1345).
80. Some examples in López, *Las asociaciones de fletadores mallorquines*, 99, nota 26.
81. ARM, LLC, 8, fo. 30 r.–v. (Mallorca, 28, noviembre, 1345); López, *Las asociaciones de fletadores mallorquines*, 98, nota 23.
82. A *regesta* of this document has been published by Maíz, *Actividades económicas y políticas*, II, 371, doc. 755.
83. Ibid., 380, doc. 767.
84. Ibid., 383, doc. 769.
85. Vicens Vives, Suárez and Carrère, “La economía de los países de la Corona de Aragón,” 106.
86. Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, and López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*.
87. See the map published by Melis in “La lana della Spagna,” 248–9.
88. ARM, LLC, 7, fo. 94 r.–v. (Mallorca, 18, junio, 1346).
89. Treppo, *I mercanti catalani*, 287.
90. Menorcan wool was among the best in sud Europe: Melis, “La lana de l’Espanya,” 71.
91. Jehel, *Les Génois en Méditerranée*, 345.
92. Or from the Valencian market. Through an analysis of the notarial registers, the most recent research carried out by Soler shows a preference for wool from the ports of the Maghrib, especially Hunayn, in the cargoes arriving in Valencia (Soler, “Relaciones comerciales,” 140–1).
93. See the various examples of notarial contracts – shipping contracts, maritime loans – that demonstrate the Mallorca-Italy trade in wool from the Maghrib in López, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 550–1.
94. Analysed by Antoni, *I “partitari” maiorchini*.
95. Two hundred and twenty-two sacks and nine bales of Hunayn wool owned by Pisans were exported to Porto Pisano, together with 42 sacks of wool from Algiers and two from Collo. To these should be added 182 sacks and eight bales of *mocona* wool, almost certainly from the Maghrib. Even so, the main exports refer to Mallorcan wool, 2305 bales and 2377 sacks, with other smaller quantities of San Mateo wool, from Valencia, and also English produce (Antoni, *I “partitari” maiorchini*, 54).

96. Abulafia points out Datini's numerous trades with the Maghreb: only wax and leather to some extent, but not wool, seem to have attracted his investments, as we know from the carteggio produced by his correspondents in the island. Information contained in this correspondence shows a clear preference for Mallorcan, Menorcan, and Iberian wool, which was lower priced and had a higher quality than North African wool (Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium*, 216–31).
97. Houssaye, "Les efforts des compagnies Datini," 589–90.
98. Gourdin, "Les pays du Maghreb," 597.
99. Houssaye, "Les efforts des compagnies Datini," 583. This research is not concluded as Ingrid Houssaye's PhD thesis ("Réseaux et stratégies marchands") has not yet been published. The analysis from Datini's documentation carried out by this researcher will undoubtedly allow confirming or rectifying the appreciation obtained from the Mallorcan standpoint, which only bears in mind the perspective of local merchants.
100. Analysis of this question is complicated by the different interests of the Muslim and Christian documentation. As Valérian points out, the Arabic texts display no interest in either the sea or the Christians, while the European documents do not speak about events outside the port or about the inhabitants of these lands (Valérian, *Bougie*, 11).
101. 'Los habitantes de Hunayn eran en otro tiempo gente noble y distinguida y casi todos trabajaban el algodón y los tejidos', Juan León El Africano, *Descripción general del África*, 212; 'Y de esta causa estaba One muy rica y bien poblada y los moradores hazían ricas cotonias y lienços' (Mármol y Carvajal, *Descripción General de África*, fol. 174 v).
102. Lawless, "Tlemcen," 55.
103. The periods of inactivity invariably included Sunday. Hence, the first pause covered the 12, 13, and 14 November, while the second included 19, 20, and 21 November, which were Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. Nevertheless, the third period, 28, 29, and 30 of the same month, changed the days of the week, since these dates corresponded to Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, with loading starting again on the following day, 1 December.
104. At the end of the nineteenth century, wool continued to be the principal export of the region around Oran. In 1892, the summary of commercial traffic in the port of Oran reflects a minimum export of 2,558,667 kilos of wool *en masse*, according to the information given by the customs inspector, a quantity that places this raw material among Algeria's main exports, as it had been in the late Middle Ages ("Département et port d'Oran. Exportations et importations," *Société de Géographie de la province d'Oran*, tome XIII (1893), XXVII. Digital edition at <http://gallica.bnf.fr>).
105. As a general rule in the trading centres of the Maghrib it was possible to purchase and remove from the territory the equivalent to any goods imported free of any payment of duty (López and Padilla, "La consolidación de una nueva estrategia," 834). On fondacos and their function in Maghreb lands, see Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, 158–200.
106. In the following year, 1345, the members of the league themselves certified before the Mallorcan authorities that 'per nós en aquest loch de Hone sia feyta ordinacion en lo feyt de les lanes d'aquest any present que les havem feytes comunes totes aqueles qui són acostumades de comprar en aquest loch e encara hajam ordonat que negun no gos comprar o fer comprar a moro ni a juheu ni a crestià en neguna manera d'aquestes lanes ni portar-les en ninguna part sino per la dita comunitat ordenada...' (ARM, *Extraordinaris*, 441, fo. 249 r.–266 r. (Mallorca. 11, octubre, 1345)).
107. 'Item lane ab sayall de la creu vermella de la comonitat' (ACB, LLE.Cp, 'Quadern del carregat...', fo. 6 r.).
108. Skins or wool of lambs aged one year or less; perhaps the skin with the wool (Gual, *Vocabulario del comercio medieval*, 209–10; Gual, *El primer manual*, 219).
109. A type of material used for stuffing mattresses or *màrfegues* (Dcvb).
110. Skins or leather with wool and also fleeces (Gual, *Vocabulario*, 234; Gual, *El primer manual*, 224).
111. Only identifiable as a certain type of wool (Dcvb).
112. Pulverized juniper resin, known in Spanish as *grasa* (Dcvb); *grasa* o sandárac, gomorresina del enebro (Gual, *El primer manual*, 238) and in English as sandarach or sandarach.
113. Gual, "Para un mapa de la industria textil"; Gual, "Orígenes y expansión de la industria textil."

114. This chronological difference can be explained by the fact that in the second half of the thirteenth century Barcelona had become a leading commercial centre that received cloth from various other points – Flanders, France, or Occitania – the minority of which was destined for the local market, while the greater part was intended for re-export (Feliu and Riera, “Activitats econòmiques,” 155).
115. Carrère, *Barcelone centre économique*, I, 423–30.
116. Feliu and Riera, “Activitats econòmiques,” 165.
117. The transportation of Maghrib wool from Mallorca to Palamós is documented in 1336. On this port, see Ferrer, “Navegació, ports i comerç,” 125–6.
118. In that year, Pere de Noguera, his son, Berenguer de Noguera, and Pere de Vilosil, all inhabitants of Berga, filed an appeal before the King contesting the confiscation of certain amounts of Barbary wool, A[rchivo de la] C[orona de] A[ragón], C[ancillería], reg. 585, fo. 90 r. (Zaragoza. 25, abril, 1336).
119. Riera, *La Corona de Aragón y el reino de Mallorca*, 131–3.
120. Sevillano, “Artesanía textil,” 538–9.
121. Melis, “La llana de l'Espanya,” 73–4; Melis, “La situazione de la marina,” 117.
122. Heers, J. “Il commercio nel Mediterraneo,” 194.
123. Abulafia, “L'economia mercantile,” 1038–9.
124. Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix*, doc. VI, 192–5; Aguiló, “Tractat de pau entre el rey del Garb,” 317–18.

Notes on contributors

José Ignacio Padilla Lapuente was born in San Sebastian in 1953 and died in Barcelona in 2012. He held a PhD in Medieval History and was Professor at the University of Barcelona. His research focused on funerary archeology and landscape studies. In recent years he had directed his interests towards the Mediterranean world and the relations with the Maghreb.

María Dolores López Pérez has a PhD in Medieval History and is Professor at the University of Barcelona. She has dedicated her research to the medieval Mediterranean and especially the relationship between the Crown of Aragon and the Maghreb. At present she is Director of the Research Group ‘Medieval and Post-Medieval Archeology’, GRAMP-UB.

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