

## CHAPTER 2

### The battle of ʿAyn Jālūt

Then when Kôtâz the Turk, who reigned in Egypt, heard that the King of Kings [Hülegü] had gone away . . . and that Kît Bôghâ alone with ten thousand men remained in Palestine, he collected the armies of Egypt and sallied forth and met the Tatars in battle in the plain of Baishân . . .

Bar Hebraeus<sup>1</sup>

### The Mongol invasion of Syria

At the beginning of AH 658 (the year commencing on 18 December 1259), Mongol troops under Hülegü, accompanied by Georgian, Armenian and Rūmī Seljuq contingents, crossed the Euphrates and took up position outside Aleppo.<sup>2</sup> Already at the end of the previous *hijrī* year a Mongol force had penetrated Syria, raided as far as Aleppo, inflicting a severe beating on a local force before withdrawing.<sup>3</sup> This time, however, the Mongols had more than a transitory raid in mind. Al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's governor, the venerable al-Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam Tūrānshāh (a son of Saladin), was called upon to surrender. His refusal led to the investment of the city on 2 Ṣafar/18 January. It was taken a week later, and was subjected to the usual slaughter and looting. The defenders of the citadel continued to resist and it took another month before it capitulated. Surprisingly enough, Hülegü let the defenders live, although the citadel itself was subsequently destroyed.<sup>4</sup> Thereupon Hülegü marched west-

<sup>1</sup> Tr. Budge, 437 (= Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 489).

<sup>2</sup> Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 149a, who also speaks of Persians; Kutubī, 20:214; Canard, "Arménie," 219, also cites Ibn Shaddād, *al-Aʿlāq al-khaṭira*, vol. 1, pt. 1: *Taʾrikk ḥalab*, ed. D. Sourdel (Damascus, 1953), 36; Cahen, *Syrie*, 705. On the Seljuq contingents, led by the joint sultans ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs and Rukn al-Dīn Qilich Arslan, see Ibn Bībī, 294–5 (= tr. Duda, 281); *Zubda*, fols. 35b–36a; Qalqashandī, 5:361.

<sup>3</sup> Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 148a–b; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, vol. 27 (Cairo, 1984):386; Kutubī, 20:215.

<sup>4</sup> For these dates and details of the siege itself, see Abū Shāma, *Dhayl ʿalā al-rawḍatayn* (Cairo, 1947), 203; Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fols. 149a–150a; Yūnīnī, 1:349; 2:312; Nuwayrī, 27:387–8; Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, vol. 1, pt. 1:36 (city taken on 10 Ṣafar). For different dates, see Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 171 (the city was taken at the end of Muḥarram; the citadel on 10 Ṣafar/26 January); and in his aftermath, Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 226b–227a; Maqrīzī, 1:422–3. Also cf.

ward and obtained the surrender of Ḥārim, which was still sacked for temporizing,<sup>5</sup> and then apparently returned to the neighborhood of Aleppo,<sup>6</sup> where he received delegations of notables from Hama and Homs who tendered the submission of their cities. The Ayyūbid ruler of Hama, al-Manṣūr Muḥammad, had already left his city to join al-Nāṣir Yūsuf at Damascus and eventually made his way to Egypt with his army.<sup>7</sup> Homs had been under the direct control of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. Al-Ashraf Mūsā, the former ruler of Homs who had long been secretly loyal to the Mongols, now came to Hülegü from Damascus in order to submit personally and received his old principality in return.<sup>8</sup>

Even before the taking of Aleppo's citadel, Hülegü had sent south a corps under one of his most trusted generals, Ketbugha.<sup>9</sup> Hülegü himself did not remain in Aleppo for long. Taking with him the vast majority of his army, he began to move eastward, leaving Ketbugha in charge,<sup>10</sup> along with those troops he had previously assigned to him.<sup>11</sup> It appears that Ketbugha's force numbered in the region of 10–12,000 troops, although the possibility of a larger number cannot be dismissed.<sup>12</sup>

Hülegü left Syria by the northeast, passing Sarūj some time in mid-spring

Qirtay, fols. 58b–59a (cited also in Ibn al-Furāt, fol. 231a), who writes that Aleppo was captured in Ṣafar, after a seven-day siege, and the citadel was taken after another seven days. For the Mongol view, see Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:67–9 (who says that the city was taken in Dhū 'l-ḥijja 657!). For the Mongol administration of the city, see *ibid.*, 69; Ibn al-Fuwaṭṭī, *al-Ḥawādiṭh al-jam'īa*, ed. M. Jawād (Baghdad, 1351/1232–3), 342.

<sup>5</sup> Abū 'l-Fidā', *al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh al-bashar* (Istanbul, 1286/1869–70), 3:212; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:69; Bar Hebraeus, 436 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 487).

<sup>6</sup> The Arabic and contemporary Persian sources are virtually unanimous that Hülegü stayed in north Syria. Only Maqrīzī, 1:423 claims that Hülegü subsequently advanced to Damascus; this sentence is not found in the parallel passage in Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 233a, and appears to be an unjustified extrapolation by Maqrīzī. Various Armenian sources write that Hülegü went to Damascus and Jerusalem: Kirakos, in E. Dulaurier, "Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens," *JA* 5 ser., 11 (1858):498; Grigor of Akanc' [Akner], "History of the Nation of the Archers," tr. and ed. R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye, *HJAS* 12 (1949):349; Step'anos Orbellian, in M. Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounnie* (St. Petersburg, 1860–4), 1:227, but this surely must be understood to mean that Mongol troops reached these cities.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fols. 150a, 151a–b. For the Mongol administration in Hama, see Nuwayrī, 27:388–9. <sup>8</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 150a.

<sup>9</sup> As seen above, the citadel of Aleppo was taken on 29 Ṣafar/14 February, while Ketbugha entered Damascus on the same date; see below, p. 30.

<sup>10</sup> Maqrīzī's statement (1:427) that Baydarā (= Baydar in Rashīd al-Dīn) was appointed co-governor with Ketbugha in Syria (Baydarā in Damascus, Ketbugha in Aleppo) is surely incorrect; see Amitai-Preiss, "Ayn Jālūt," 124–5.

<sup>11</sup> Nuwayrī, 27:390, explicitly states that Hülegü left Ketbugha in Syria with the same number of troops which he had originally sent with him to the south.

<sup>12</sup> These sources state that Ketbugha was left as commander and give the following numbers. 10,000: Bar Hebraeus, 1:436 (= Ibn al-'Ibrī, 489); Het'um, 173; *Faql*, fol. 55a, who states that Ketbugha commanded a *tūmen*, "that is to say, 10,000 men." 12,000: *Zubda*, fol. 37b; *Tuhfa*, 43; Nuwayrī, 27:390 (follows Baybars, *Zubda*). 20,000: Kirakos, tr. Dulaurier, 498; Vardan, in R.W. Thomson, "The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelc'i," *DOP* 43 (1989):218. For a discussion of these and other figures, and the reasoning behind the adoption of 10–12,000, see Amitai-Preiss, "Ayn Jālūt," 123–5. Cf. Smith, "Ayn Jālūt," 309–11.

658/1260<sup>13</sup> and then Akhlāt on 26 Jumādā II/7 June 1260,<sup>14</sup> and eventually established his camp in Azerbaijan, in the environs of Tabrīz.<sup>15</sup> Scholars have traditionally explained Hülegü's withdrawal from Syria as a response to the news of the death of Möngke Qa'an, Hülegü's brother (in August 1259), and the subsequent struggle over the succession.<sup>16</sup> There is certainly evidence for this suggestion. Rashīd al-Dīn connects Hülegü's withdrawal from Syria with the sorrow he felt at Möngke's death as well as the news of Arigh-böke's "rebellion," but does not hint at his plans.<sup>17</sup> It is possible that Hülegü thought himself a candidate for the throne,<sup>18</sup> but considering what appears to be a leisurely march from Syria, this seems unlikely. More probable in prompting Hülegü to set out eastward were reports which reached him of the struggle between the two other brothers, Arigh-böke and Qubilai, over the succession.<sup>19</sup>

Recently, an alternative explanation has been offered by Dr. Morgan: Hülegü withdrew because of the lack of adequate pasture land in Syria for his enormous army, mostly composed of cavalry.<sup>20</sup> The main basis for this suggestion is the letter sent by Hülegü to King Louis IX of France in 1262, in which it is claimed that the withdrawal of the majority of his forces from Syria was due to the lack of fodder and grazing there.<sup>21</sup> This would seem a reasonable explanation, although a certain amount of caution must be taken with excuses for failure: it was, after all, Hülegü's withdrawal that led to the defeat at ʿAyn Jālūt. Be that as it may, logistics may explain why Hülegü departed with a large portion of his army, but it does not explain why he withdrew with the overwhelming majority of his troops and left such a small force.

We must look elsewhere for the reason as it would seem that Syria's resources, at least those which interested the Mongols – fodder, grazing land

<sup>13</sup> It was in Sarūj, according to Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 3:504, that Hülegü interviewed and executed al-Kāmil Muḥammad, prince of Mayyāfāriqīn, which was captured on 23 Rabīʿ II/7 April; al-Kāmil's head was sent to Syria where it arrived on 27 Jumādā I/10 May; Abū Shāma, 205.

<sup>14</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:70.

<sup>15</sup> Boyle, "Il-Khāns," 351. For additional evidence that Hülegü was in Azerbaijan later in AH 658, see: Qirtay, fol. 66a–b; Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 488–9; ʿAynī, *Iqd al-jumān*, MS. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 2912, fol. 81a.

<sup>16</sup> Besides Prawer, *Histoire*, 2:431–2, see R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes*, tr. N. Walford (New Brunswick, 1970), 363; L. Kwanten, *Imperial Nomads* (Philadelphia, 1979), 159; Saunders, *Mongol Conquests*, 114. For a recent reformulation of this approach, see Fletcher, "Mongols," 47.

<sup>17</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 70–1; Rashīd al-Dīn's pro-Qubilai partisanship is revealed by his describing Arigh Böke's claim to the throne as a "rebellion" (*bulghaq*).

<sup>18</sup> Het'um, 172, cited in Jackson, "Dissolution," 230 n. 196. Nuwayrī, 27:390 (whence, evidently, ʿAynī, fol. 80a), writes that Hülegü returned to Qaraqorum to demand the Qa'ānate for himself.

<sup>19</sup> Jackson, "Dissolution," 230, who cites Ibn al-Amīd, 173; *Zubda*, fol. 37b. See also Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 224a; ʿAynī, fol. 80a.

<sup>20</sup> Morgan, "The Mongols in Syria," 231–3.

<sup>21</sup> P. Meyvaert, "An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France," *Viator* 11 (1980):258.

and water – were far from having been exhausted. Certainly the Mongols would have had little compunction about grazing their animals on farm lands during a campaign, using grain supplies and grazing lands belonging to local nomads. In addition, whole areas of Syria had yet to be touched.<sup>22</sup>

Two explanations suggest themselves. First, Hülegü may have felt that he needed most of his forces in Iran upon hearing of Möngke's death and the subsequent troubles. The usual explanation offered for Hülegü's movements is that he went to Azerbaijan to await upon developments in Inner Asia. Had this been the case, however, it seems likely he would have continued eastward, at least to Khurasān. From the vantage point of Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Syria were fairly much the same thing. It would seem that Hülegü went to Azerbaijan because he was concerned about something there. As Dr. Jackson has shown, Īlkhānid claims to that area appear to have been weak, and there is some evidence that the pasture lands in northwest Iran, at least, belonged to the Jochids by right.<sup>23</sup> The reaction of Berke, Khan of the Golden Horde, to this usurpation was as yet unknown. As Hülegü had now lost his protector, Möngke, it made sense to be at a possible trouble spot with the bulk of his army.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps the lion's share of Hülegü's army had been left in Iran all along, as Professor Smith has suggested.<sup>25</sup> Still, Hülegü might have thought that in the post-Möngke era, both he and more of his army should be nearer a potential trouble spot.

The second reason for Hülegü's leaving such a small force with Ketbugha appears to have been faulty intelligence: Hülegü simply underestimated the numbers, quality and willpower of his opponents in Egypt. He was perhaps misled here by Syrian captives. The attribution of this disinformation to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf,<sup>26</sup> however, is anachronistic, because – as will be shown below – al-Nāṣir reached Hülegü several months after the latter had withdrawn from Syria. In any event, Hülegü's decision to leave only 10–12,000 soldiers with Ketbugha was based on a misreading of the situation, and this was to have disastrous consequences for the Mongols.

Initially, Ketbugha did not have to worry about encountering any serious opposition in Syria: on 15 Ṣafar 658/31 January 1260 al-Nāṣir Yūsuf had fled in panic with his troops from his camp at Barza near Damascus upon hearing of the quick Mongol conquest of Aleppo, and headed towards Gaza. On his way south, al-Nāṣir stopped at Nablus for several days, leaving behind there a rearguard.<sup>27</sup> He then camped at Gaza for a while, where he met up with the

<sup>22</sup> See the discussion in ch. 10.

<sup>23</sup> Jackson, "Dissolution," 208–22; cf. Morgan, *Mongols*, 148–9. See ch. 4, pp. 78–9.

<sup>24</sup> This was suggested by both Canard, "Arménie," 222, and Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," 351.

<sup>25</sup> Smith, "Ayn Jālūt," 328.

<sup>26</sup> For al-Nāṣir's belittling of the Egyptian danger, see: *Zubda*, fols. 37b, 40a; Nuwayrī, 27:390; MS. 2m. fol. 105b. Cf. also the comment in Thorau, *Baybars*, 73 n. 56.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn al-Amīd, 172; Abū Shāma, 203; Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 150a–b; Abū 'l-Fida', 3:210; Kutubī, 20:222; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 232a–b; Maqrīzī, 1:423.

Shahrazūrī Kurds,<sup>28</sup> Türkmen, assorted deserters from his army and his brother al-Zāhir. Heading this ragtag force al-Nāṣir continued on to Qaṭyā. Instead of marching on to Cairo, however, al-Nāṣir’s fear of Qutuz got the better of him and he turned around and rode into the desert with a small entourage. Eventually he reached Birkat al-Zayzā’, some two days’ ride to the north of Karak, where he was captured by the Mongols. As for his army, they continued on to Cairo, where they were integrated into the Egyptian army. Among the new refugees was the Ayyūbid al-Manṣūr Muḥammad, prince of Hama.<sup>29</sup>

Ketbugha arrived in Damascus, according to Ibn Kathīr, at the end of Ṣafar 658 (14 February 1260). He had been preceded into the city by envoys of the Mongols who had been in al-Nāṣir Yūsuf’s camp at Barza when the latter had fled. These envoys had entered the city on 19 Ṣafar/4 February and established, albeit only in a formal manner, Mongol sovereignty. The local notables wisely decided to accept the inevitable and submitted of their own free will. This decision was reached with the help of al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī, who had long been busy undermining Muslim morale and trying to foster a pro-Mongol policy. Ketbugha decamped a few days later to Marj Barghūth, on the road south between Damascus and Jisr Ya‘qūb.<sup>30</sup> On 17 Rabī‘ 1/2 March 1260 Hülegü’s *nuwwāb* (representatives or governors) came to the city to set up a regular Mongol administration. These *nuwwāb* surely refer to the *shahna*<sup>31</sup> Il-Shiban and associates, who are also mentioned as arriving at Damascus around this time.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> For the coming of the Shahrazūrī Kurds, who fled from the Mongols previous to the taking of Baghdad, see Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 65; Ibn al-‘Amīd, 165; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 205a; Maqrīzī, 1:411. See also Ayalon, “Wafidiya,” 97; Thorau, *Baybars*, 62–3. For the Shahrazūr region from which these Kurds hailed, see W. Barthold, *An Historical Geography of Iran* (Princeton, 1984), 207–9.

<sup>29</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fols. 150b–151a, 154a–b; Ibn al-‘Amīd, 172, 174–5; Abū Shāma, 205; *Zubda*, fol. 37b; Kutubī, 20:223; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 233a, 237a–238a; Maqrīzī, 1:423, 427; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 352–3, 356–7; Thorau, *Baybars*, 68–9. The sources are not in complete agreement about al-Zāhir’s adventures and the exact circumstances of al-Nāṣir’s capture. On Birkat al-Zayzā’’s location, see: Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 144b; D. Krawulsky, *Īrān – Das Reich der Īlḥāne* (Wiesbaden, 1978), 596.

<sup>30</sup> The exact location of Marj Barghūth is not clear; see Maqrīzī, 1:585 n. 3.

<sup>31</sup> The *shahna* (or *shihna*, but see Lane, s.v. *sh-h-n*) was the senior Mongol official in a conquered city who oversaw the local administration. It is the equivalent of the Turkish *basqaq* and the Mongolian *darugha*(*chi*), and is also rendered by Arabic *nā’ib*; see A.K.S. Lambton, “Mongol Fiscal Administration in Persia,” *SI* 64 (1986):80 n. 2.

<sup>32</sup> Abū Shāma, 203; Ibn al-‘Amīd, 173; Ibn Kathīr, 13:219; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 233a, 234a–235a; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:70 (who writes of the arrival of an unnamed Mongol *shahna* and three Persian retainers – *nōkers*). There is some confusion about the date of Ketbugha’s arrival. Maqrīzī, 1:424, states that he came on 16 Rabī‘ 1/1 March, along with the *nuwwāb* of Hülegü; see also Humphreys, *Saladin*, 353; Thorau, *Baybars*, 68. But Abū Shāma and Ibn al-Furāt write respectively that on 17 or 16 Rabī‘ 1 only *nuwwāb* of Hülegü arrived, without any mention of Ketbugha. This is an example of Maqrīzī’s distortions of Ibn al-Furāt. For additional mention of Il-Shiban’s activities in Damascus, see Abū Shāma, 208–9; Nuwayrī, 27:389–90; Yūnīnī, 1:357, 363–3; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 234b (cf. editor’s

There is a singular report in *Gestes des Chiprois* that Ketbugha was accompanied into Damascus by Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch and King Het'um of Lesser Armenia, and that the former turned a mosque into a church and destroyed several others.<sup>33</sup> While this report certainly cannot be taken literally,<sup>34</sup> it may contain a grain of truth. Armenian troops were part of Ketbugha's force,<sup>35</sup> while some time during the Mongol occupation Bohemond visited Baalbek and even intended to ask Hülegü for possession of the town. The inhabitants were spared this ordeal by the Mongol defeat at 'Ayn Jālūt.<sup>36</sup> If this prince reached as far as Baalbek, it is most probable that he also passed through Damascus. All of this taken together, along with the information we have on the disestablishment of Islam as the official religion of the newly conquered territory and the pro-Christian sympathies of certain Mongol officers (including Ketbugha),<sup>37</sup> may have given rise to this story of Bohemond and Het'um.

It was around this time that al-Ashraf Mūsā returned to the scene. This prince, who had been secretly in contact with Hülegü for some time, had left Damascus to make his submission to the Khan the evening before al-Nāṣir Yūsuf left the city. Al-Ashraf Mūsā was well received at Aleppo by Hülegü and soon returned with both his old principality of Homs back (it had previously been taken away from him by al-Nāṣir) plus the vague title of ruler over all of Syria. What exactly this title meant is not clear, since power remained in the hands of the Mongols and their agents. But it evidently served their needs to have titular local leaders with whom, at least, they could consult on regional problems. Al-Yūnīnī adds that Hülegü also granted al-Ashraf an *iqṭā'* (revenues of a land assignment) large enough to maintain 100 horsemen, indicative of the extent of power that he really enjoyed.<sup>38</sup>

Early on, and perhaps even before he had entered Damascus, Ketbugha had dispatched a force south, whose mission appears to have included reconnaissance, looting and the striking of terror into the hearts of the local population. This force, either as one column or smaller separate parties, made a sweep through Palestine and Trans-Jordan, wreaking havoc and taking booty as it

insertion in Maqrīzī, 1:425); Baybars, *Zubda*, fol. 37b; Ghāzī b. al-Wāsiṭī, in R. Gottheil, "An Answer to the Dhimmis," *JAOS* 41 (1921):409–10. Ibn Bībī, 295 (tr. Duda, 281) says that 'Alā' al-Dīn [al-]Kāzī was appointed *shahna*, but according to the Arabic writers, he was just one of the associates of Il-Shiban. <sup>33</sup> *RHC, Ar.*, 2:751.

<sup>34</sup> Jackson, "Crisis," 486–7, and Thorau, *Baybars*, 68–9, doubt the veracity of this report.

<sup>35</sup> Kirakos, tr. Dulaurier, 498; G. Dédéyan (tr.), *La Chronique attribuée au Connétable Smbat* (Paris, 1980), 106; S. Der Nersessian, "The Armenian Chronicle of Constable Smpad or of the Royal Historian," *DOP* 13 (1959):160.

<sup>36</sup> Yūnīnī, 3:92–3; Ibn Kathīr, 13:269. See R. Irwin, "The Mamluk Conquest of the County of Tripoli," in Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement*, 246; cf. *idem*, *Middle East*, 31.

<sup>37</sup> Yūnīnī, 1:362–3; 2:34–5.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn al-'Amīd, 172–3; Ibn Shaddād, in A-M. Eddé, "La description de la Syrie du Nord de 'Izz al-Dīn ibn Šaddād," *BEO* 32–3 (1981–2):378; Nuwayrī, 27:289; MS. 2m, fol. 112b; Yūnīnī, 1:377; 2:312; Ibn Kathīr, 13:221; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 233a, 235a; Maqrīzī, 1:423, 425–6; cf. Humphreys, *Saladin*, 350–1.



went, finally reaching as far as Gaza and the area just north of Karak. In Palestine, Bayt Jibrīl/Jibrīn, Hebron, Ascalon, Jerusalem and Nablus are mentioned as targets of these raiders. Near the last mentioned town the Mongols came upon the rearguard left by al-Nāṣir Yūsuf and completely annihilated it before proceeding to enter the city proper and slaughtering many of its inhabitants. By Rabiʿ II 658/March-April 1260, the raiders returned to the Damascus area, bringing with them captives, livestock and other booty.<sup>39</sup>

Ketbugha's itinerary can be roughly established. As said above, he left Damascus after a few days and set up camp at Marj Barghūth to the south.<sup>40</sup> It was there that he apparently received a delegation from the Franks on the coast, who brought him presents out of fear that the Mongols wanted to attack their country.<sup>41</sup> In mid-Jumādā I/end of April, Ketbugha was back in Damascus, putting down the rebellion of the garrison there.<sup>42</sup> It is uncertain whether this was an actual rebellion or whether the garrison had actually never submitted. The former explanation seems more likely because it is doubtful that Ketbugha would have left Damascus with a recalcitrant force controlling the citadel. Having taken the citadel on 15 Jumādā I/28 April, he ordered its partial destruction. Ketbugha then moved west to Baalbek; the inhabitants had submitted, but there also the citadel's garrison had taken an independent attitude and hitherto had refused to surrender. A vigorous siege soon brought the defenders round, and they asked for an *amān* (guarantee of safety) which was granted. The citadel was subsequently destroyed.<sup>43</sup> From Baalbek, Ketbugha went on to the fortress of al-Ṣubayba in the Golan which was taken with the assistance of al-Saʿīd Ḥasan b. al-ʿAzīz ʿUthmān, its former ruler, whom Hülegü had released from al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's jail in al-Bira on the Euphrates. Al-Saʿīd had encouraged Hülegü to attack al-Nāṣir Yūsuf and was reinstated as ruler of al-Ṣubayba and Banias. Much to his later regret, al-Saʿīd became a most loyal supporter of the Mongol cause in Syria.<sup>44</sup>

From al-Ṣubayba, Ketbugha went to the fortress of ʿAjlūn which he put

<sup>39</sup> R. Amitai, "Mongol Raids into Palestine (AD 1260 and 1300)," *JRAS* 1987:236–42; on Ascalon, see Jackson, "Crisis," 491. Yūnīnī, 3:205, tells of how his brother and a companion went to Damascus to ransom Muslim prisoners taken in this raid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 173; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 235a; Maqrīzī, 1:425; Abū Shāma, 204.

<sup>41</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 38a; Nuwayrī, 27:390; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 235a (= *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders. Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa'l-Mulūk of Ibn al-Furāt*, tr. U. and M.C. Lyons, intro. and notes J.S.C. Riley-Smith [Cambridge, 1971], 1:50). These sources write only that Ketbugha went to the Marj. This may refer to the large plain east of Damascus (s.v. "Ghūṭa," *ET*<sup>2</sup>, 2:1105a), but given the sources mentioned in the previous note, it appears to be a shortened form of Marj Barghūth.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 174; Abū Shāma, 204; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 152b; Yūnīnī, 1:351–2; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 235b; Maqrīzī, 1:426.

<sup>43</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 152b; Yūnīnī, 1:354–5; 2:34 (cited by Ibn Kathīr, 13:227), who saw Ketbugha in his hometown of Baalbek. No date for the capture of Baalbek is given. For the Mongol administration of this city, see Yūnīnī, 1:353–4; 3:49–50.

<sup>44</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 154a; Abū 'l-Fidā', 3:213; Yūnīnī, 2:16–17. The last writer saw al-Saʿīd in Baalbek and wrote that his enthusiasm for the Mongols extended to his wearing of Mongol garb and hat.

under siege. He was spared the need of a lengthy investment by the appearance of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf early in Rajab/June 1260. As will be remembered, he had been captured at Birkat al-Zayzā' in the Trans-Jordan desert. Al-Nāṣir obliged his captors by fulfilling their request to order the surrender of 'Ajlūn. Whereupon, he was sent off to Hülegü, then somewhere east of the Euphrates. Al-Nāṣir was well received, but later was put to death when news of the defeat at 'Ayn Jālūt reached Hülegü.<sup>45</sup> After their capture, al-Şubayba and 'Ajlūn were then despoiled and destroyed as much as time and means allowed, as were other forts in Trans-Jordan over which the Mongols had gained possession: al-Şalt, Bosra and Şarkhad.<sup>46</sup> Their intention was thus to eliminate potential centers of rebellion and resistance.

Evidently some time during this campaign in the Golan and north Trans-Jordan, Ketbugha also made a quick advance to Safad, where the local Franks sent down supplies and built a giant tent for him.<sup>47</sup> It was also during this operation that a Mongol force was probably dispatched southward towards Gaza, in order – according to Ibn Wāṣil – to prevent the Egyptians from sending assistance to the Franks on the coast.<sup>48</sup> This was probably the advance guard (*yazak*) mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn in Gaza under the command of Baydar (Baydarā in the Arabic sources).<sup>49</sup> It would seem that this unit had the mission of watching developments in Egypt and preventing a surprise attack from that direction. This was to confront the Mamluk advance guard under Baybars in the upcoming summer. In spite of the presence of this force in Gaza and the Mongol raids throughout the country, there is no evidence of the establishment of a Mongol administration in Palestine as there was in central and northern Syria, with the exception of that of their client in Banias, al-Sa'īd Ḥasan. In fact, with the disintegration of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's kingdom, there seems to have been no real authority in Palestine, excluding the Frankish-held coast, in the months before 'Ayn Jālūt. Had the Mongol conquest gone on, however, certainly Palestine would have been more firmly integrated into the Mongol administrative system.

<sup>45</sup> Abū Shāma, 205; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 154b; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 237a–238a; Maqrīzī, 1:426–7. See also Humphreys, *Saladin*, 356–7. Ibn al-Shaddād, *al-A'lāq al-khaṭīra*, vol. 2, pt. 2, *Ta'rikh lubnān, al-urduunn wa-filasṭīn*, ed. S. Dahhān (Damascus, 1963):89–90, gives the date for the taking of 'Ajlūn as Rajab 658/June–July, but this must have been quite early in the month, because al-Nāṣir reached Damascus on 6 Rajab/17 June and was sent off to Hülegü on 14 Rajab/25 June; Abū Shāma, 206; Yūnīnī, 1:358–9. Ibn al-'Ibrī, 489, has al-Nāṣir coming to Hülegü at Jabal al-Taġh (= Ala Tagh, so it would seem) in Azerbaijan. For al-Nāṣir's death, see Thorau, *Baybars*, 86 n. 17.

<sup>46</sup> Abū Shāma, 206; Yūnīnī, 1:358; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 154a; 'Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār . . . mamālik miṣr wa'l-shām wa'l-hijāz wa'l-yaman*, ed. A. F. Sayyid (Cairo, 1985), 120.

<sup>47</sup> Dhahabī, *Ta'rikh al-islām*, MS. Bodleian Laud 305, fol. 252b; *ibid.*, MS. Aya Sofya 3015, fol. 222b. See below for the attitude of the Franks to the Mongols. This short hop to Safad may be the basis for the phrase in Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 154a: "Then the Mongols turned towards [or turned their attention towards] the Franks on the coast . . ."; cf. wording in Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, 237b (= ed. Lyons, 1:50). <sup>48</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 154a.

<sup>49</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Quatremère, 346–7; cf. ed. 'Alizādah, 3:73. For the identity of the commander of the Mongol force, see Amitai, "Mongol Raids," 250 n. 31.



The Mongols also obtained the submission of the ruler of Karak, al-Mughīth ʿUmar, or rather resubmission, since as has been seen al-Mughīth had officially tendered his submission to the Mongols many years before. Mongol raids to the north of Karak were evidently sufficient to convince al-Mughīth to submit when called to do so by a Mongol envoy. Al-Mughīth sent back with this envoy his son al-ʿAzīz. Hülegü in turn sent a *shahna* (commissioner) to watch over al-Mughīth. This official, however, never reached his destination. While stopping en route at Damascus, news arrived of the Mongol defeat at ʿAyn Jālūt, and he escaped with the local Mongol officials.<sup>50</sup>

Hülegü had left Ketbugha in Syria with a relatively small force, and we are told by sources close to the Mongols,<sup>51</sup> as well as by the Mamluk historian Baybars al-Manṣūrī,<sup>52</sup> that he was to guard the conquests and to garrison the country. Ibn al-ʿAmīd reports that, in addition to this mission, Ketbugha was to keep a watchful eye on the Franks of the coast.<sup>53</sup> Hülegü himself, in his letter to King Louis IX of France in 1262, writes that Ketbugha was ordered to reduce the Ismāʿīlī fortresses of northern Syria.<sup>54</sup>

There are a number of indications that in the near future Hülegü intended to renew the conquest in the direction of Egypt, by sending or personally leading a larger force; not the least of these are the general expansionist plans of the Mongols, which have been examined in chapter 1. As has also been seen, the further Hülegü penetrated into the Islamic world, the more explicit became his desire to conquer Syria and Egypt. In addition, it is reported that Hülegü promised al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, who had been brought before him somewhere in the environs of Azerbaijan, that he would make him ruler of Syria when the Mongols conquered Egypt.<sup>55</sup> Finally, some time during the months preceding

<sup>50</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 152b; Yūnīnī, 1:358; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 238b; Ibn Shaddād, *Aʿlāq*, 2, pt. 2:76, 242; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fols. 107a, 132b; Qirtay, fols. 65b–66a. See also Amitai, “Mongol Raids,” 238; L. Hambis, “La lettre mongole du gouverneur de Karak,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 15 (1962):143–6; R. Amitai-Preiss, “Hülegü and the Ayyūbid Lord of Transjordan,” *AEMA*, forthcoming.

<sup>51</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:70; Kirakos, tr. Dulaunier, 498; Vardan, tr. Thomson, 218. Mustawfī, 589, writes that Hülegü had ordered Ketbugha to “liberate” Syria and Egypt, but the veracity of this statement is brought into question by both the above evidence and the author adding that Hülegü was in Damascus when he received word of Möngke’s death and that it was from there that he gave this order. Şārim al-Dīn Özbek’s statement (in Levi della Vida [ed. and tr.], “L’Invasione dei Tartari in Siria nel 1260 nei ricordi di un testimone oculare,” *Orientalia* 4 (1935):365, from Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 241a–b; also cited, with differences in Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, ed. U. Haarmann [Freiburg-Cairo, 1971], 56–7) that Hülegü ordered Ketbugha (and Baydarā) to invade Egypt is also doubtful; see Amitai, “Mongol Raids,” 239–42; cf. Jackson, “Crisis,” 502–3.

<sup>52</sup> *Zubda*, fol. 37b (but cf. his *Tuhfa*, 43). This is cited by Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 239b, who does not name his source.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 173 (whence Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 235a, who does not name his source), who subsequently mentions Baydarā with Ketbugha. It is clear from the context that Baydarā is subordinate to Ketbugha, and certainly does not share a joint command with him.

<sup>54</sup> Meyvaert, “Letter,” 258.

<sup>55</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ʿAlizādah, 3:70; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 342–3; Bar Hebraeus, 437 (= Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 488–9); Baybars, *Zubda*, fol. 40a; Ibn Kathīr, 13:240; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 252a, writes that al-Nāṣir was given a *farmān* (royal order) for the rulership of both Syria and Egypt

‘Ayn Jālūt, Hülegü’s letter reached Sultan Qutuz in Egypt, unequivocally calling on the Mamluks to submit or face destruction (see below).<sup>56</sup>

### Mamluk countermeasures

Events in Egypt were in the meanwhile coming to a head. From the beginning of his reign, Qutuz had pursued an unequivocal anti-Mongol policy. He had used the need to resist the Mongols as the justification for his disposal of al-Manšūr ‘Alī b. Aybeg and his own accession to the throne (28 Dhū ‘l-qa‘da 657/16 November 1259). The story is told that Qutuz claimed that he was descended from the Khwārazm-shāh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad, and thus his emerging struggle with the Mongols also had an element of personal revenge in it.<sup>57</sup>

Qutuz’s resolve was certainly strengthened with the steady influx of troopers from Syria as al-Nāṣir’s army began to disintegrate in the late winter and spring of 658/1260. Of tremendous importance was the return of Baybars to the Mamluk fold, in spite of the old hatred occasioned by Qutuz’s role in the murder of Aqtay, former leader of the Baḥriyya regiment. This enmity had been exacerbated by the numerous raids and invasion attempts made into Egypt from Ayyūbid Syria under Baybars’s prodding and leadership. But now in the face of the Mongol threat, past differences were forgotten. Qutuz needed Baybars’s leadership abilities and his following of Bahrīs (whose ranks, however, must have been somewhat depleted by years of fighting as mercenaries and imprisonments). Baybars had clearly seen that his continued allegiance to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf or any other Ayyūbid prince in Syria had little to commend itself. After sending a trusted subordinate and obtaining an oath of safety, Baybars made his way to Egypt from Gaza, reaching it on 22 Rabī‘ I 658/7 March 1260, at the time when the Mongol raiders were harrying Palestine.<sup>58</sup>

The Mamluk sources contain stories of Baybars’s anti-Mongol resolve both before and after his return to Egypt. He had wanted to take three or four thousand horsemen to hold the fords of the Euphrates against the Mongols, but al-Nāṣir Yūsuf did not permit it.<sup>59</sup> During a discussion of the policy to be adopted towards the approaching Mongols, Baybars is credited with having both verbally rebuked and physically beaten al-Zayn al-Ḥāfiẓī, the main

(when it would be conquered). The sources do not tell us how this promise was to be reconciled with Hülegü’s earlier appointment of al-Ashraf Mūsā as governor of Syria.

<sup>56</sup> The Armenian historian Smpad (d. 1276) reports that Ketbugha may have jumped the gun by initiating an invasion with those troops under his command; Smpad, tr. Der Nersessian, 160 (= tr. Dédeyan, 106). This evidence is discussed in detail, and rejected, in Amitai, “Mongol Raids,” 239–42.

<sup>57</sup> Yūnīnī, 1:368; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:39–40: both cite Jazarī. This story is discussed by Irwin, *Middle East*, 32–3.

<sup>58</sup> Humphreys, *Saladin*, 345–8; A.A. Khowaiter, *Baibars the First* (London, 1978), 18–20; Thorau, *Baybars*, 65–6.

<sup>59</sup> *Rawd*, 61–2; Yūnīnī, 3:243; Kutubī, *Fawāt al-wafayāt* (Bulāq, 1299/1881–2), 1:86; Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfi bi’l-wafayāt*, ed. H. Ritter *et al.* (Wiesbaden, 1931), 10:332.

proponent of submission to Hülegü among al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's advisors.<sup>60</sup> After his return to Egypt, Baybars strengthened Qutuz's resolve and denigrated the might of the Mongols.<sup>61</sup> While there may be a large dose of post-Qutuz panegyric here, both intentional and otherwise, these reports seem to contain at least some truth. Rashīd al-Dīn, certainly no booster of Baybars, reports his major role in convincing Qutuz to go out and fight the Mongols.<sup>62</sup> And Baybars's vigorous anti-Mongol policy during his own sultanate hints at a similarly strong attitude beforehand.

Some time in 658/1260, probably towards the summer, Hülegü sent envoys to Qutuz bringing a letter calling on him to submit.<sup>63</sup> This letter, although couched in Islamic terms, and even containing verses from the Qur'ān, expresses the traditional Mongol world view: the Mongols have a heaven-given right to rule the world. All those who resist are rebels who will be destroyed. There is no possibility of escaping, so he is counseled to submit at once. The letter also specifically refers to Qutuz and disparages his mamluk origins: "He is of the race of mamluks who fled before our sword into this country, who enjoyed its comforts and then killed its rulers."<sup>64</sup>

The threats and insults, however, did not work, and Qutuz obtained the agreement of the amirs to execute the Mongol envoys; they were cut in half and their heads were displayed at Bāb al-Zuwayla in Cairo, and "these were the first Mongol heads to be hung [there]."<sup>65</sup> The Mamluks were now committed to a military confrontation with the Mongols.

Qutuz and his armies left Cairo for Ṣālihiyya, the staging area some 120 km to the north-east of Cairo, on 15 Sha'bān/26 July.<sup>66</sup> The regular Egyptian army had been swollen by the influx of refugee Syrian troops,<sup>67</sup> and assorted Türkmen, bedouins (*al-urbān*) and Shahrāzūriyya Kurds, who had also fled to Egypt.<sup>68</sup> Exact numbers for this combined force are not given in any of the Mamluk sources. The later Persian historian Waṣṣāf offers the figure of 12,000 men, but his source is unknown, and the possibility of pure imagination on his part should not be discounted.<sup>69</sup> This number, however, is not totally

<sup>60</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 220a–b; Maqrīzī, I:419 (s.a. 657).

<sup>61</sup> Yūnīnī, I:365; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 238b.

<sup>62</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:73.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Nuwayrī, 27:391; MS. 2m, fol. 131b, who writes that Ketbugha actually sent the envoys.

<sup>64</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, fol. 243b–244a, whence Maqrīzī, I:427–8; trans. of the latter in B. Lewis, *Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople* (New York, 1974), I:84–5. As mentioned in ch. I, this letter is based on the last of Hülegü's letters sent to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, although appropriate changes were made. Cf. the version in Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 3:71, which, although shorter and in Persian, conveys the same aggressive message.

<sup>65</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 244a; Maqrīzī, I:429.

<sup>66</sup> Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:49; Yūnīnī, I:365; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 244b; Maqrīzī, I:429.

<sup>67</sup> Among these was al-Manṣūr of Hama: Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 160a. Ibn Kathīr, 13:220, 226, says that the majority of the Syrian army entered Egypt; see also Ibn al-Ṣuqā'ī, 168.

<sup>68</sup> Ibn al-Amīd, 175; *Husn*, 30; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 244b (whence Maqrīzī, I:429, but he omits the Kurds). Cf. Abū Shāma, 207; *Zubda*, fol. 38b. For a further discussion of the composition of the army, see Amitai-Preiss, "'Ayn Jālūt,'" 126–7.

<sup>69</sup> Waṣṣāf, 47. This figure was cited by D'Ohsson, *Histoire*, 334. This in turn was misread by H.H. Howorth, *The History of the Mongols* (rpt., New York, 1965), 3:167, who gave the

unreasonable. We have figures of 10,000 and 12,000 horsemen for the Egyptian army under the last Ayyūbids.<sup>70</sup> These numbers, however, should be used with care, especially since the Mamluk army in Egypt surely underwent many changes in the first years of its existence, but they provide at least some idea of the size of this army. It is difficult to give even a rough estimation of the size of the total army under Qutuz's command, since there are no figures for the Syrian and auxiliary forces. On the other hand, some writers assert in a different context that at 'Ayn Jālūt the Muslim army was larger than that of their Mongol adversaries.<sup>71</sup> This claim makes sense if we accept the figure of 10–12,000 for the Mongols (see above), while the Mamluks may well have had a hard core of about 10,000 Egyptian troops, plus the additional forces mentioned above.<sup>72</sup>

Qutuz's troubles, however, were far from over. Having reached Ṣālihiyya, he was confronted with the amirs' unwillingness to advance into Syria. There is some indication that in order to get the amirs to mobilize and leave Cairo, Qutuz had at first agreed with them to wait for Ketbugha at Ṣālihiyya. But Qutuz certainly knew that a prolonged wait would bring about the weakening of their will to fight the Mongols, not particularly strong in any case. Through the use of religious exhortation, personal example and the judicious application of guilt feeling, he was able to cajole the amirs into following him into Syria. At one point, exasperated by the amirs' refusal to move, he is reported to have said, "I am going to fight the Mongols alone." The amirs, shamed by their cowardice, had no choice but to follow him.<sup>73</sup> In spite of the probable tendency of the sources to glorify Qutuz as the great holy warrior, there is little doubt that here, as elsewhere, Qutuz's personal example and resolute leadership were a major factor in the course of these events. Qutuz was certainly well served by a small group of close associates, and as has been seen Baybars – now reinstated among the senior amirs – was also pushing for a decisive and speedy advance into Syria.

It is perhaps not obvious why Qutuz decided to attack the Mongols in Syria rather than wait for them in Egypt. In fact, at first glance, the second option may have more to commend itself: Qutuz and his army would be waiting – rested and near their base – for a Mongol army which had just finished an

number of 120,000 [!]. This last figure was evidently the basis for that used in B. Lewis, "'Ayn Djālūt," *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 1:786; see Jackson in *BSOAS* 50 (1987):552.

<sup>70</sup> See ch. 3, p. 71.

<sup>71</sup> Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:68; Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī 'l-Faḍā'il, in E. Blochet, "Histoire des sultans mamlouks," *Patrologia Orientalis* 12, 14, 20 (1919–28):75 [of consecutive pagination].

<sup>72</sup> The question of Mamluk numbers is discussed in Amitai-Preiss, "'Ayn Jālūt," 127–9; cf. Thorau, "The Battle of 'Ayn Jālūt: A Re-examination," in Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement*, 236–7; Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," 311–13.

<sup>73</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 244a–245a, who quotes the now lost *Naẓm al-sulūk* by Shāfi' b. 'Alī and other, unnamed works, each giving a slightly different version of these events. Maqrīẓī, 1:429–30, presents an edited version of Ibn al-Furāt. As a result of his deletions, the original sense is not always faithfully conveyed, e.g., the bottom paragraph in Maqrīẓī, 1:429 (which continues on to p. 430) is actually the beginning of one account and the end of a second in Ibn al-Furāt, fol. 244a–b.

exhausting ride through the desert. In addition, it could always be hoped that the Mongols would not realize their threat to invade Egypt.

Other considerations, however, were to lead to another decision. First, Qutuz was aware that only a small part of the Mongol army was now in Syria, and thus he had an opportunity to confront the Mongols with some chance of success.<sup>74</sup> Qutuz may well have been aware of the psychological importance of a victory over the Mongols in strengthening both his own position and the morale of his army. Second, by moving into Syria, he was seizing the initiative from the Mongols, an important strategic consideration. Third, if he was defeated in Syria, there was a chance that he could withdraw back to Egypt to reorganize; a defeat in Egypt left him without a fallback position. Fourth, Qutuz knew his officers and troops too well. Perhaps he feared that with the approach of the Mongols many would either be paralyzed by fear or willing to "negotiate." Possibly the best way to preempt such defeatist attitudes was to adopt an aggressive mien and to try to inculcate it within the army.

Baybars's anti-Mongol resolve and the trust that Qutuz placed in him, at least for the time being, are indicated by his being given command over the Muslim vanguard. Baybars was ordered to move ahead in order to collect intelligence about the Mongols. Upon reaching Gaza, he found a Mongol forward force (*talī'a*), which fled upon seeing the Muslim army.<sup>75</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn writes that the Mongol advance force (*yazak*) was under an officer named Baydar (= Baydarā); on learning of the approach of the "Egyptians," Baydar sent to Ketbugha, then in Baalbek, who ordered him to stand fast until his arrival. This was to no avail, because Qutuz himself attacked Baydar and pursued him to the 'Āṣī River (*ab-i 'āṣī*).<sup>76</sup> Baybars's commanding of the Muslim force would understandably have remained unknown to Rashīd al-Dīn. The exact nature of the encounter at Gaza cannot be resolved one way or the other. As for the information about the River 'Āṣī, this would seem to refer in general to the eventual arrival of Muslim troops in the area of 'Ayn Jālūt, because Wādī or Nahr al-'Āṣī is a small riverbed that joins Nahr Jālūt (now Naḥal Ḥarōd) just north of Baysān (Beth Shean), after flowing in from the southwest.<sup>77</sup>

Qutuz soon reached Gaza with the bulk of the army and after a stopover of one day moved up the coast to Acre.<sup>78</sup> Faced with a large army in their

<sup>74</sup> The opportunity presented to the Mamluks was thus understood by both pro-Mongol and Mamluk writers: Bar Hebraeus, 437 (cited at the beginning of this chapter; = Ibn al-'Ibrī, 489); Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. 'Alizādah, 72; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 224a; Aynī, fol. 80a.

<sup>75</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 245a; cf. Maqrīzī, 1:430.

<sup>76</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Quatremère, 346–7; cf. ed. 'Alizādah, 3:73–4.

<sup>77</sup> F.-M. Abel, *Géographie de la Palestine* (Paris, 1933), vol. 1, Map no. IV (Basse-Galilée); C.R. Conder and H.H. Kitchen, *The Survey of Western Palestine: Memoirs of the Topography, Orography, Hydrography and Archaeology*, vol. 2 (London, 1882), 80, describes 'Ayn al-'Āṣī as the source for this stream. Krawulsky, *Irān*, 591, confuses this 'Āṣī with its better known namesake to the north, the Orontes in European languages, which originates near Baalbek.

<sup>78</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 245a (= ed. Lyons, 1:51); Maqrīzī, 1:430.

immediate vicinity, the Frankish leaders had no choice but to make a decision regarding the Mongols and the newly arrived Mamluks. They chose to remain neutral, with a tilt towards the closer Mamluks which expressed itself by the sending out of supplies to the Muslim camp. While there was little love lost between the Franks and Mamluks, Dr. Jackson has convincingly shown that the Franks were so apprehensive of the Mongols that they felt obliged to adopt such a policy. Certainly the bellicose letters and activities of the Mongols in Syria, including the sacking of Sidon, in the previous months would have done little to commend themselves to the Latin Christians. The leaders of Acre may have seen the possibility of the Mamluks saving them from the Mongols, at little cost to themselves. But to safeguard themselves in the case of a Mongol victory (a distinct possibility), they officially maintained their neutrality.<sup>79</sup> At this point, Bohemond VI's unreserved support for the Mongols was probably looked upon with disfavor by the leaders of Acre. The papal legate there was certainly displeased: he excommunicated Bohemond early in 1260.<sup>80</sup>

At Acre, Qutuz again took the opportunity to whip up the enthusiasm of the amirs, whose fear must have been increasing as the battle drew closer. Qutuz's speech contains two main motifs: the amirs must fight to protect their families and property (and by implication, the power they enjoyed in Egypt), and the need to defend Islam against the infidels. The speech was effective: the amirs wept and swore to each other to drive the Mongols out of the country. While still at Acre, Qutuz sent Baybars ahead again with the vanguard (*ṭalī'a* or *shālīsh*) and followed with the main part of the army.<sup>81</sup>

## The battle

Ketbugha was in the Biqā' Valley when he received word that the Mamluks had entered Syria and were making their way north. He gathered his troops who were scattered over the country, probably for both garrison and grazing purposes, and headed south.<sup>82</sup> Although a later writer speaks of Ketbugha's complacency at this time,<sup>83</sup> earlier Mamluk sources report that initially Ketbugha contemplated a withdrawal from Syria, as he was unsure of the wisdom of confronting the reinforced Egyptian army.<sup>84</sup> The apparent reasons

<sup>79</sup> Jackson, "Crisis," *passim*; see also the comments in J. Richard, "The Mongols and the Franks," *Journal of Asian History* 3 (1969):51–2; Thorau, *Baybars*, 69–70, 76.

<sup>80</sup> J. Richard, "Le début des relations entre la papauté et les Mongols de Perse," *JA* 237 (1949):293; B. Roberg, "Die Tartaren auf dem 2. Konzil von Lyon 1274," *Annuaire Historiae Conciliorum* 5 (1973):272.

<sup>81</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 245b (cf. Maqrīzī, 1:430); Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:49; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254a; *Husn*, 30.

<sup>82</sup> Yūnīnī, 1:360, 365; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:49; Kutubī, 20:226; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Quatremère, 3:346–7 (cf. ed. 'Alizadah, 73–4); Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 246a; Maqrīzī, 1:430. For details of Ketbugha's movement south, see Amitai-Preiss, "'Ayn Jālūt," 122–3.

<sup>83</sup> 'Aynī, fol. 80a.

<sup>84</sup> Yūnīnī, 1:360; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254a; Kutubī, 20:226 (all three versions repeat the same report); Ibn Kathīr, 13:227.



behind Ketbugha's hesitation were the relatively small number of soldiers at his disposal and his awareness of the strength of Qutuz's force. As has been seen, Ketbugha appears to have been left with about 10–12,000 troops. These, however, were not all Mongol horsemen, but included contingents from Georgia and Lesser Armenia; Smpad writes that the latter numbered 500 men.<sup>85</sup> These numbers were supplemented somewhat by local troops, formerly serving the Syrian Ayyūbids, as well as two Ayyūbid princes with their contingents: al-Ashraf Mūsā and al-Saʿīd Ḥasan.<sup>86</sup>

Moving south, Ketbugha took up position near ʿAyn Jālūt. There is little doubt that the Mongols were the first to arrive at the site and take up position: Baybars upon reaching a nearby hill found the Mongols camped (*nāzilin*) there.<sup>87</sup> This would cast doubts on the suggestion made by some scholars that the Mamluks arrived at the location first and set up an ambush.<sup>88</sup> ʿAyn Jālūt ("Goliath's Spring") is an all-year spring at the foot of the northwest corner of Mt. Gilboa, about 15 km north-northwest of Baysān, just west of the modern village of Gidʿōna. Today the spring is known as ʿAyn or Maʿyan Ḥarōd.<sup>89</sup> For the Mongols, this was a logical place to await the Mamluks. Along the northern foot of the Gilboa runs Wādī or Nahr Jālūt, which would have provided watering for the horses, and the adjacent valley offered both pasturage and good conditions for cavalry warfare. Other advantages are evident. The Mongols could exploit the proximity of the Gilboa to anchor their flank. It also offered an excellent vantage point, as did the nearby Hill of Moreh (Givʿat ha-Mōreh).<sup>90</sup>

Meanwhile, the Mamluks had departed from Acre. Baybars had been sent ahead with the vanguard, and the main body under Qutuz followed. At some point Baybars's force came into contact with Mongol troops and skirmishing commenced. There are reports that the vanguard under Baybars defeated their Mongol counterparts, but the exact nature and size of the latter is unknown. Meanwhile, Baybars sent word to Qutuz that contact with the enemy had been established.<sup>91</sup> The skirmishing must have been fairly wide-ranging, with Baybars alternately advancing and retreating. The claim by some sources, however, that Baybars actually enticed the Mongols to ʿAyn Jālūt,<sup>92</sup> can be

<sup>85</sup> Kirakos, tr. Dulaurier, 498; Smpad, tr. Dédéyan, 106. For another indication that first-rate Mongol troops did not constitute all of Ketbugha's force, see Amitai-Preiss, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 128–9.

<sup>86</sup> Ibn Shaddād, *Taʾrīkh*, 335–6; Amitai-Preiss, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 125–6, for a discussion of the Syrian troops serving Ketbugha.

<sup>87</sup> Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254a; *Rawḍ*, 64; *Tuhfa*, 43.

<sup>88</sup> Thorau, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 236–9, and P. Herde, "Taktiken muslimischer Heere von ersten Kreuzzug bis ʿAyn Djālūt (1260) und ihre Einwirkung auf die Schlacht bei Tagliacozzo (1268)," in W. Fischer and J. Schneider (eds.), *Das Heilige Land in Mittelalter* (Neustadt an der Aisch, 1982), 86.

<sup>89</sup> For this location in the Arabic sources and the identification of the medieval ʿAyn Jālūt with the biblical Maʿyan Ḥarōd, see Amitai-Preiss, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 132 nn. 59–60.

<sup>90</sup> See Smith, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 326; Amitai-Preiss, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 132–3.

<sup>91</sup> Ṣafadī, *Wāḥī*, 10:332; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 245b; cf. Maqrīzī, 1:430.

<sup>92</sup> Yūnīnī 1:366; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:49; Ibn al-Furāt, fol. 245b; Maqrīzī, 1:430. It is clear that these reports have a common source; cf. Thorau, "ʿAyn Jālūt," 238.

rejected, since – as has been seen – contemporary writers report that the Mongols were already there.

Having arrived at the scene, Baybars had gone up a hill (apparently either the Gilboa or the Hill of Moreh) and seen that the Mongols had already reached the spring below. They also noticed him and started up towards him. Realizing his perilous position, Baybars beat a hasty retreat back down, but not before sending word to Qutuz, who was one day's march away. Having succeeded in escaping the Mongol encirclement of the hill, Baybars withdrew, and was eventually joined by Qutuz with the main body of the Mamluk army.<sup>93</sup>

The battle was joined at the dawn of Friday, 25 Ramaḍān/3 September.<sup>94</sup> It appears that the Mamluk army rode in from the northwest (the direction of Acre) along the Jezreel Valley. The Mamluks encountered the Mongol army somewhere in the plain to the north and north-western vicinity of 'Ayn Jālūt, where the latter had already taken up position. That the battle was near the spring, but not actually at it, is hinted at by Ibn al-Furāt, who writes in one place that Qutuz initially took up position across from 'Ayn Jālūt.<sup>95</sup> It would seem that the armies were drawn up more or less from north to south, and since they each numbered ten thousand or more men, their lines must have been fairly wide-spread.<sup>96</sup>

The battle initially did not go well for the Mamluks. The Mongols responded to the Mamluk approach by attacking them. The extent of their attack is unknown but it must have at least included the Mongol Right, since the Mamluk Left was defeated and disintegrated. Qutuz was able to rally his troops and launch a counter-attack which shook the Mongols. The Mongols attacked a second time, and again the Mamluks were close to defeat. But Qutuz was not disconcerted, and he again rallied his troops – if the reports are to be believed – with several cries of “Oh Islam! (*wā-islāmāh*) *Yā Allāh*, help your servant Qutuz against the Mongols.” He then launched a frontal attack, which led to a Mamluk victory. It was probably at around this time that Ketbugha was killed, leading to the final disintegration of the Mongol army.<sup>97</sup>


<sup>93</sup> Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254a; *Rawḍ*, 64.

<sup>94</sup> Smpad, tr. Dédéyan, 106; Šarīm al-Dīn Özbek, in Ibn al-Furāt, fol. 247a (= Levi della Vida, “L’Invasione,” 366); whence Maqrīzī, 1:430. For the time of the battle, see Amitai-Preiss, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 133–6; cf. Herde, “Taktiken,” 86, and Thorau, *Baybars*, 77 and 86 n. 21.

<sup>95</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 245b–246a.

<sup>96</sup> For a detailed discussion of the position of the two armies, see Amitai-Preiss, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 134–8.

<sup>97</sup> This is a summary of a detailed reconstruction of the battle presented in Amitai-Preiss, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 138–43, based on the conflation of the following sources: Ibn al-Amīd, 174–5; Abū Shāma, 207; Ibn Waṣīl, MS. 1703, fol. 160a–b; Ibn al-Furāt, fols. 247a–248a (citing Šarīm al-Dīn Özbek [= Levi della Vida, “L’Invasione,” 366], Ibn Duqmaq, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir and unnamed eyewitnesses); Maqrīzī, 1:431 (who incorrectly summarizes Ibn al-Furāt); Yūnīnī, 1:361; 2:35; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:50, 57; Kutubī, 20:227; Ibn Kathīr, 13:225, 227; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 132a; Qirtay, fol. 66b; Ibn Taghri Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira* (rpt., Cairo, n.d.), 7:79; ‘Aynī, fol. 76b. Another source which has since become available to me is Ibn Duqmaq, 268–9. A completely different account is provided in Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 74–5; but see Amitai-Preiss, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 138–9; Thorau, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 237; Humphreys, *Saladin*, 470 n. 75.



**Plate 1. Battle of ʿAyn Jālūt: Jezreel Valley, as seen from the hill on which was found the village of Zarʿīn: (a) facing east (ʿAyn Jālūt is behind the ridge marked with an arrow); (b) facing north (Hill of Moreh is in the background) (photographs: Habie Schwarz)**

One contributing factor to the Mamluk victory was the timely desertion of al-Ashraf Mūsā, who was in the Mongol Left with his troops at the beginning of the fighting.<sup>98</sup>

After this defeat, the Mongols seem to have split up and fled in different directions. One group went up an unidentified nearby hill and attempted to make a stand. They were pursued by a force under Baybars which captured and killed most of them. Those who managed to escape were caught and slaughtered by local villagers.<sup>99</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn reports that some Mongol survivors sought refuge by hiding in fields of reeds in the area. This may be a reference to reed beds in either the Wādī Jālūt area or the environs of the Jordan River. These fugitives met their end, however, when the fields were set on fire by the Mamluks.<sup>100</sup> Al-Maqrīzī writes that at this stage the Mongols regrouped at Baysān and launched a counter-attack, which almost defeated the Mamluks until Qutuz was able to reorganize and launch the attack which decided the day.<sup>101</sup> This report, however, is an incorrect summary of a larger account of events as told by Ibn al-Furāt. The latter author only writes of two rounds of the same battle near ‘Ayn Jālūt; there was no second battle at Baysān, as al-Maqrīzī would have us believe.<sup>102</sup>

The number of Mongol dead must have been large: the *MS de Rothelin* gives the figure of 1500.<sup>103</sup> Al-‘Aynī writes that most of the Mongols were killed in the battle.<sup>104</sup> Šarīm al-Dīn Özbek’s claim that the entire Mongol army perished is surely exaggerated.<sup>105</sup> No figures for Mamluk casualties are given. The Mongol survivors fled north; among them was Baydar, formally commander of the Mongol advance guard at Gaza, who must have joined Ketbugha just before the battle.<sup>106</sup> The historian Het‘um writes that the Mongol survivors found refuge with the King Het‘um of Lesser Armenia.<sup>107</sup> The Mongol authorities in Damascus, along with several of their local cronies (al-Zayn al-Hāfiẓ is specifically mentioned), quickly left the city, although they were harried by local villagers, robbed and a number were killed.<sup>108</sup> The same happened in Hama and Aleppo.<sup>109</sup> Ketbugha’s camp, probably still in the Biqā‘, was captured along with his family.<sup>110</sup> Ibn al-‘Amīd writes that a number of Mongol women were captured, without mentioning specifically

<sup>98</sup> Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 131b; Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 161a; Abū ‘l-Fidā’, 3:214; Yūnīnī, 1:377; 2:312–13; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:57; Amitai-Preiss, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 139–40.

<sup>99</sup> Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 160b; Yūnīnī, 1:361; 2:35; Kutubī, 20:227; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 7:79; *Rawḍ*, 64–5. <sup>100</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:74–5. <sup>101</sup> Maqrīzī, 1:431.

<sup>102</sup> Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 247b–248a; see Amitai-Preiss, “‘Ayn Jālūt,” 142–3, for further discussion of this. <sup>103</sup> In *RHC, Occ.*, 2:638. <sup>104</sup> ‘Aynī, fol. 76a.

<sup>105</sup> Cited in Ibn al-Furāt, fol. 248a (= Levi della Vida, “L’Invasione,” 366).

<sup>106</sup> Ibn al-‘Amīd, 174; Ibn al-Šuqā‘ī, 50; cf. Qirtay, fol. 66b, who writes that Baydarā was killed in the battle; as the next chapter shows, he survived. <sup>107</sup> Het‘um, 175.

<sup>108</sup> Ibn al-‘Amīd, 174; Abū Shāma, 207; Yūnīnī, 1:366; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:51; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 132b; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 250a.

<sup>109</sup> Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 162b; Abū ‘l-Fidā’, 3:215; Šarīm al-Dīn, cited in Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 247b (= Levi della Vida, “L’Invasione,” 366); cf. Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Quatremère, 352 (cf. ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:76 and n. 6), who writes that the Mongol officials were massacred everywhere but in Damascus. <sup>110</sup> Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. ‘Alizādah, 3:76–7.

where. It seems, then, that at least some Mongol soldiers had their families with them.<sup>111</sup>

Qutuz dispatched a force under Baybars after the routed Mongols. Baybars chased them up through northern Syria, at Homs catching up with a group of them, along with their women and children, and dealing them another beating. There are also reports that Baybars met a fresh contingent of Mongols there, numbering 2000 troopers, which had been sent by Hülegü to reinforce Ketbugha.<sup>112</sup> Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir writes that Baybars reached as far as Ḥārim and Afāmiya, where the Mongol reinforcements were defeated.<sup>113</sup> Other writers state that Baybars reached as far as Aleppo before turning back to join the main Mamluk army, now camped at Damascus.<sup>114</sup>

At least to some extent the Mamluk victory can undoubtedly be attributed to the decisive leadership of two men, Qutuz and Baybars, particularly the former. As was seen above, it was Qutuz who dragged the recalcitrant amirs out of Egypt, and right up to the battle he constantly harangued them about the holy war and the need to drive out the Mongols. At the battle itself, he showed himself to be a cool-headed commander, and – if the reports are to be credited with some truth – he personally led the charge that decided the battle. Qutuz also had the insight to make his peace with Baybars, in spite of the longstanding feud between them and the apprehension he must have had about the future (justified by events). He delegated to Baybars the important responsibility during the campaign of commanding the vanguard and later put him in charge of the mopping up operations. Baybars's exact role during the battle proper is not known, although the sources mention his personal bravery in the fighting.<sup>115</sup> This is more than just panegyrics from a later period, although certainly Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir's account is greatly exaggerated: according to him Baybars won the battle almost single-handedly.<sup>116</sup> With regard to Baybars's bravery, at least, the Arabic sources are supported by the Frankish *Gestes des Chiprois*.<sup>117</sup> The courage of other Mamluk officers is also noted in the sources.<sup>118</sup>

Other reasons for the Mamluk victory were the timely desertion of al-Ashraf and his troops and the relatively larger size of the Mamluk army, composed to a large degree of highly trained mounted archers, who were ignited by a sense of mission and “no choice but to win” attitude that had been successfully instilled by Qutuz. Emphasis must be placed on the similarity of fighting methods of the Mamluks and Mongols: only an army composed of masses of mounted archers had a chance of standing up to and defeating the

<sup>111</sup> Ibn al-Amīd, 175; Ibn Taghri Birdī, 7:82.

<sup>112</sup> Abū Shāma, 209; *Zubda*, fol. 38b–39a; *Tuhfa*, 44; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:59–60; Ibn Kathīr, 13:221; Yūnīnī, 1:366; Kutubī, 20:228; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 251a; ʿAynī, fol. 76a. <sup>113</sup> *Rawḍ*, 65. <sup>114</sup> Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fols. 160b–161a; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254a.

<sup>115</sup> Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 132a; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 247b; Maqrīzī, 1:431.

<sup>116</sup> *Rawḍ*, 63–6. <sup>117</sup> In *RHC, Ar*, 2:753, cited in Thorau, “ʿAyn Jālūt,” 240 n. 24.

<sup>118</sup> Ibn Kathīr, 13:221, reports the valor of al-Manṣūr of Hama (see also Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 161a) and Aqtay al-Mustaʿrib, the *atabeg*, but does not mention Baybars.

Mongols. The reason for the similar fighting techniques of the two armies was the common origin of their troops – the Eurasian steppe, a fact discerned by several writers from the Mamluk Sultanate.<sup>119</sup> As Professor Ayalon has written: “In the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt, which had been fought out between the people of the same race, the infidels of yesterday had defeated the Muslims of to-morrow.”<sup>120</sup>

### In the aftermath of victory

After the fighting, Qutuz dealt with those Syrian Ayyūbid princes who had participated in the battle. Al-Manṣūr Muḥammad of Hama, who had been on the Mamluk side since the Mongol invasion, was rewarded by receiving his kingdom again, to which was added Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘mān and Ba‘rīn.<sup>121</sup> Al-Ashraf Mūsā, although he had earlier served the Mongols and had come on to the battlefield with them, had helped the Muslim cause by his timely desertion. His past actions were forgiven and he was confirmed in his old principality of Homs (returned to him by the Mongols).<sup>122</sup> It was obvious, however, that in both cases the continued rule of these two princes was dependent directly on their new Mamluk masters. A third Ayyūbid, al-Sa‘īd Ḥasan, ruler of Banias and al-Ṣubayba, was less fortunate. His overly exuberant partisanship of the Mongols had compromised him in Qutuz’s eyes. Other explanations offered by the sources are his refusal to respond to Qutuz’s secret messages before the battle (as al-Ashraf is recorded to have done), his fierce fighting during the battle and even his conversion to Christianity (this last accusation was probably mere slander). In spite of his request for a pardon, Qutuz had him summarily beheaded.<sup>123</sup>

Qutuz thereupon moved ahead to Damascus, reaching it on 30 Ramaḍān/8 September. Previously he had sent word to Damascus of the Mamluk victory, and later sent an amir to reestablish order. This officer put an end to the depredations against Christians, who were now paying the price of seven months of relative religious freedom. The local Muslims had found it a terrible

<sup>119</sup> See especially Abū Shāma, 208 (quoted by Yūnīnī, 1:367), who is cited at the beginning of this book; ‘Umarī, ed. Lech, 70–1, and as summarized by Ayalon, “Yāsa,” pt. C1, 122–3; Ibn Khaldūn, *Ibar*, 5:371; D. Ayalon, “The European Asiatic Steppe: A Major Reservoir of Power for the Islamic World,” *Proceedings of 25th Congress of Orientalists – Moscow, 1960* (Moscow, 1963), 2:49. For general lauding of the role played by the Turkish Mamluks at ‘Ayn Jālūt, see also: Qirtay, fol. 68b; *Tuhfa*, 44; *Zubda*, fol. 39a; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 249a; Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1702, fol. 359a–b; Ṣarīm al-Dīn, in Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 247b; ‘Aynī, fol. 76a. Some of these writers single out the role of the Bahriyya in particular. Cf. Ibn al-Dawādārī’s anti-Bahri remark, 8:60.

<sup>120</sup> Ayalon, “The European Asiatic Steppe,” 49.

<sup>121</sup> Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 161a; Ibn Kathīr, 13:221.

<sup>122</sup> Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 161a; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254a–b; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 251a; Maqrīzī, 1:433; Ibn al-Ṣuqā‘ī, 129.

<sup>123</sup> Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 161a; Abū Shāma, 207 (see MS. Br. Lib. Or. 1539, fol. 119b, for additional details); Ibn al-‘Amīd, 175; Yūnīnī, 2:16–7; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fol. 132a; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 8:51–2; Ibn Kathīr, 13:225; ‘Aynī, fol. 80a.



affront that the Christians were accorded equal status to them; the Christians for their part had exacerbated the situation by their assertive and even arrogant behavior towards the Muslims. With their Mongol protectors gone, churches were burnt, the stores and houses of Christians were looted and they were physically assaulted. In the general excitement, Jewish property was also attacked until it was remembered that the Jews had not offended the Muslims. In addition, Mongol sympathizers among the population were attacked and killed by angry mobs.<sup>124</sup>

Upon his entrance into Damascus, Qutuz completed his arrangements for the rule of Syria. Local collaborators were punished. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī, who had been instrumental in the capture of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, was executed.<sup>125</sup> Sanjar al-Ḥalabī was named governor of Damascus.<sup>126</sup> Qutuz appointed as governor of Aleppo a refugee prince from the Jazīra, al-Sa'īd (previously called al-Muẓaffar) 'Alā' al-Dīn b. Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', whose father had been the ruler of Mosul (607–57/1211–59) and had submitted to the Mongols. 'Alā' al-Dīn had been left the rulership over Sinjār by his father, but was found in Syria at this time, because earlier he had sent there to ask for assistance from al-Nāṣir Yūsuf against the Mongols. When the Syrian army went to Egypt, 'Alā' al-Dīn joined them and returned to Syria with the Mamluks in 658/1260. Qutuz had named him governor so he could correspond with his brothers, the rulers of Mosul and Jazīrat Ibn 'Umar who had succeeded their deceased father (d. 1259), and thus would receive information about the Mongols.<sup>127</sup> In addition, possibly Qutuz hoped that he would act as a counterweight to the amirs of the 'Azīziyya and Nāṣiriyya factions in Aleppo.

In spite of these appointments, Qutuz's control over much of Syria proper, let alone the border areas, was weak or even non-existent. There were Crusader possessions along the coast and in the north, and Bohemond VI of Antioch held decidedly pro-Mongol sympathies. During the Mongol occupation, he had received territories from Hülegü and had seized many districts on his borders.<sup>128</sup> In northern Syria, an independent Ismā'īlī entity had survived the Mongol conquest, Hülegü's declaration to Louis IX notwithstanding. During the Mongol occupation, the King of Lesser Armenia had gained control of several castles in the northern part of the province of Aleppo.<sup>129</sup>

In Aleppo itself, there were powerful groups of amirs whose loyalty was not

<sup>124</sup> Ibn al-'Amīd, 175–6; Abū Shāma, 208; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 161b; Yūnīnī, 1:361–2; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fols. 250a–251a; Maqrīzī, 1:432. See Ghāzī b. al-Wāṣiṭī, 407–10 for a contemporary account of Christian behavior in Damascus during the Mongol occupation.

<sup>125</sup> Ibn al-'Amīd, 176; Abū 'l-Fidā', 3:214–15; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fols. 254b; 'Aynī, fol. 76b–77a (cites Ibn Kathīr), who also tells of how al-Manṣūr punished collaborators when he returned to Hama.

<sup>126</sup> Ibn al-'Amīd, 176; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 254b; Ibn Wāṣil, fol. 162b.

<sup>127</sup> Ibn al-'Amīd, 176; Ibn Wāṣil, MS. 1703, fol. 162b; Yūnīnī, 1:370; Dhahabī, MS. Laud 305, fol. 255a; Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vatican, fol. 251a–b; Maqrīzī, 1:433; Abū 'l-Fidā', 3:216; 'Aynī, fol. 77a. D. Patton, *Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu'* (Seattle, 1991), 50–61, gives a good reconstruction of Lu'lu's relations with the Mongols; cf. *ibid.*, 71, for 'Alā' al-Dīn's arrival in Syria.

<sup>128</sup> *Rawd*, 300; Nuwayrī, MS. 2m, fols. 240a, 245b; Het'um, 2:171; Cahen, *Syrie*, 706–7.

<sup>129</sup> Het'um, 171; Cahen, *Syrie*, 75; Canard, "Arménie," 222.

a foregone conclusion. Likewise, several of the amirs appointed to governorships might have been looking for the first opportunity to throw off Egyptian sovereignty. The situation on both sides of the Euphrates was unclear, as was the extent of Mongol control over Iraq. Qutuz's hand, however, was greatly strengthened by the submission of Sharaf al-Dīn ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā of the Āl Faḍl, the leading family among the bedouin (*al-ʿarab* or *al-ʿurbān*) of northern Syria. Qutuz in turn appointed ʿĪsā commander of the bedouin (*amīr al-ʿarab*) and gave him as an *iqṭāʿ* Salamiyya, hitherto part of the province of Hama.<sup>130</sup> As will be seen in the subsequent chapter, this understanding with ʿĪsā was of major importance in securing the Euphrates frontier, along with the general security of northern Syria. ʿĪsā b. Muḥannā is not mentioned at all during the campaign that ended at ʿAyn Jālūt, and he came to Damascus only after Qutuz's victory became known.<sup>131</sup> Evidently, he had wanted to remain neutral until a clear winner emerged.

Qutuz was not to savor his victory for long. He cancelled a proposed trip to Aleppo and cut short his stay in Syria, because of the widening rift between him and Baybars. The Mamluk sources attribute this to Qutuz's refusal to fulfill his promise to Baybars to appoint him governor of Aleppo, although their animosity had a long history and it had only been papered over in the face of an imminent Mongol threat. With the danger temporarily removed, the tension returned. Qutuz set off for Egypt with his army. In the desert between al-ʿArīsh and Ṣālihiyya, he was murdered by a conspiracy of amirs, which included Baybars and was probably under his leadership. The exact circumstances of Qutuz's assassination and the subsequent events are still unclear, but the final result was that Baybars was proclaimed sultan.<sup>132</sup> Thus was inaugurated the period in which Mamluk power was consolidated and the foundations were laid for their successful struggle against the Īlkhānids.

The Mamluk victory at ʿAyn Jālūt was hailed by the Mamluk writers (see above) because Islam had been saved, the Mongols had been stopped and the myth of their invincibility had been destroyed.<sup>133</sup> In addition, the Mongol presence in Syria had been eliminated, and as a side effect the Mamluks were able to occupy most of non-Crusader Syria. In retrospect, however, we can see that this was merely an interim victory. The Mongol army at ʿAyn Jālūt was only a small part of the total Mongol forces, and it was only a question of time before the Mongol offensive was to be renewed.<sup>134</sup> Yet, for various reasons,

<sup>130</sup> Ibn Wāsil, MS. 1703, fol. 161a; Ibn Kathīr, 13:221; Maqrīzī, 1:433; Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿaṣr*, MS. Aya Sofya 2963, fol. 144a–b. See ch. 3 below. <sup>131</sup> Yūnīnī, 1:485.

<sup>132</sup> See Irwin, *Middle East*, 34, 37–8; Khowaiter, *Baibars*, 24–6; Thorau, *Baybars*, 79–85; Holt, "Three Biographies," 21–3, 26.

<sup>133</sup> Nuwayrī (MS. 2m, fol. 135a) and Yūnīnī (1:380; 2:28) mention that this was the first victory of anyone over the Mongols since that of the Khwārazm-shāh (i.e. Jalāl al-Dīn) at Parwān in 619/1221. On the latter battle, see Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," 318–19; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 441–2.

<sup>134</sup> See D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Transfer of the ʿAbbāsīd Caliphate from Baḡdād to Cairo," *Arabica* 7 (1960):59; *idem*, "Himṣ, Battle of," *EI*<sup>2</sup>, 3:402; Spuler, *Iran*, 52–3; Irwin, *Middle East*, 34; Morgan, *Mongols*, 156; Lewis, "ʿAyn Djalūt," 786; S. ʿĀshūr, *al-ʿAṣr al-mamlūkī fī miṣr waʾl-shām* (Cairo, 1965), 34–7. Cf. F.H. ʿĀshūr, *al-ʿAlāqāt*, 55–6.

no serious Mongol attempt to reconquer Syria and to exact revenge on the Mamluks was made for twenty-one years. This period was utilized by the Mamluks, and Baybars's important role can already be mentioned, in preparing themselves for the real test. It is to this interim but decisive period that we now turn.