

The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History

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CHAPTER

2 Al-Mustansir, Charles of Anjou, and the Struggle for the Central Mediterranean

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Abstract

Tunis and Sicily had entangled histories in the Middle Ages. This chapter explores how two powerful Mediterranean dynasts—Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily, and al-Mustansir, emir of Tunis—struggled to assert themselves in the Sicilian Straits in the mid-thirteenth century. While al-Mustansir wanted Sicilian grain to feed his people, Charles needed African gold to pay for the debts he had accumulated in conquering Sicily in 1266. The question remained how that strategic interdependence would work itself out: would Charles and al-Mustansir be partners, or would they wage a zero-sum struggle to control the central Mediterranean? When al-Mustansir sponsored an expeditionary force that landed on the coast of Sicily in the fall of 1267, it looked as if conflict would prevail. As it turned out, the landing was really the opening salvo in a negotiation that would extend throughout the course of the Tunis Crusade.

Keywords: Tunis, Sicily, al-Mustansir of Tunis, Angevin, Hafsid, Charles of Anjou, Hohenstaufen dynasty, mercenary, Almohad, Ibn Khaldun

Subject: European History, History of Religion, Medieval and Renaissance History (500 to 1500)

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Sciacca: September 1267

In the late summer of 1267, an expeditionary force prepared to launch from Tunis. It was led by Conrad Capece, the former Hohenstaufen military governor of Sicily, and Federico of Castile, a mercenary working for Hafsid Tunis who also happened to be the brother of the king of Castile. The Hohenstaufen loyalist and the glamorous exile assembled a motley crew—German soldiers, Tunisian archers, and a squad of Spanish mercenaries who called themselves the "knights of death"—crammed everyone on to two ships, and sailed for the south coast of Sicily.[1]

They landed near Sciacca, about 40 miles west of Agrigento, and messengers spread throughout the island announcing the imminent arrival of the young Hohenstaufen claimant Conradin. Hoping to snuff out the revolt before it could spread beyond Sciacca, Sicily's Angevin governor, Fulco of Puy-Richard, gathered his forces and set off in search of a decisive confrontation. He got the battle he wanted, but it did not go well for him. When some of Fulco's Sicilian soldiers deserted at a crucial moment, his remaining troops were exposed to attack from Federico of Castile and his "knights of death." They lived up to their name, at least in part. They killed as many of the Angevin soldiers as they could, but let the Sicilians escape so they could spread the word about the powerful army that had defeated the foreign occupiers and allowed the locals to go in peace. Within weeks of their landing, the insurgents from Tunis had spread the rebellion to every corner of the island. Only Palermo, Messina, and Syracuse, with their sizable Angevin garrisons, held out.[2]

p. 43 Louis IX of France had supported his brother's conquest of Sicily. The payoff was supposed to be access to a staging ground for the Holy Land crusade and military support from a newly empowered younger sibling. The uprising placed those plans in doubt. Before he could help the crusade, Charles would have to crush the Hohenstaufen once again. Just as importantly, he would have to deal with al-Mustansir, who was threatening Sicily from Tunis. The emir had signaled his unhappiness with regime change on the island by providing the Hohenstaufen exiles with refuge, a boat, archers, and several hundred mercenaries. He had also stopped paying a fee to access Sicily's wheat market. The relationship between Charles and al-Mustansir had begun badly: the progress of the crusade hinged on the resolution of their differences, whether by force or negotiated settlement.

Al-Mustansir

The Hohenstaufen rulers of Sicily had been strategic partners for the emir of Tunis. The Angevin conquest created a threatening dynamic for a Hafsid regime that relied on strong relationships with Mediterranean trading partners to hold onto power in Ifriqiya.[3] The Hafsid dynasty endured into the sixteenth century in what is today a good chunk of Tunisia and Algeria. Al-Mustansir, though, was just the second emir in this long Hafsid line. He was not an entirely self-made man, like Baybars. Nor had he conquered a kingdom for himself, like Charles. But his challenge was great nonetheless. He had to ensure the survival of a young dynasty whose position in the power dynamics of the central Maghreb was uncertain.[4]

Al-Mustansir's father Abu Zakariya Yahya had founded the dynasty in 1229 when he broke away from the
p. 44 Almohad empire, which had given a ↳ certain political coherence to the Maghreb since the mid-twelfth century. Abu Zakariya was actually a rebel in the name of tradition. He claimed to act out of loyalty to Almohad teachings. While the caliph in Marrakesh was distancing himself from traditional Almohad doctrine, Abu Zakariya founded his legitimacy on rigid adherence to it.[5] This legitimist stance allowed him to develop an initial constituency for his regime among the Berber Almohads who had come to Tunis from the western Maghreb in the mid-twelfth century. Soon, however, he had to reach out to new interest groups as he struggled to counteract challenges to his authority on two fronts. Externally, he had to contend with the expansionist aspirations of the other major North African powers that were emerging out of the breakup of the Almohad empire: the ʿAbd al-Wadids of Tlemcen and the Marinids of Fez. Internally, he encountered opposition from entrenched local interests, not least from prominent Almohad families that resented a former peer lording it over them. These families often found support from Arab Bedouin tribes in the south, most notably the Dawawida.[6] If al-Mustansir were to consolidate Hafsid power in Tunis, he would have to forge new alliances within and beyond his domains.

This reality was underscored for al-Mustansir shortly after he came to power in 1249, at the age of 20. He appointed as vizier Muhammad b. Abi Mahdi, a leading Almohad. The new vizier was determined to dominate the young emir and maintain Almohad control over the Hafsid state. When al-Mustansir tried to rule in his own name, Muhammad b. Abi Mahdi staged a coup with one of al-Mustansir's cousins. The plot failed, but not by much. The turning point came when the emir's supporters defeated the rebels in a pitched battle in a prayer hall (*musalla*) on the outskirts of Tunis. The vizier died during the fighting, his Hafsid front man was chased down and beheaded, and the homes of many prominent Almohads were pillaged and burned to the ground.[7]

After this close call, al-Mustansir recognized the need to diversify potential sources of support for his regime by reaching out to new interest groups. Rather than relying solely on the Almohads, he would build a
p. 45 network of alliances with neighboring powers to the south, west, and ↳ north. To begin with, al-Mustansir tried to boost his reputation in the eyes of potential rivals and negotiating partners by enhancing his prestige. He built a massive hunting park near Bizerte (about 40 miles north of Tunis), which he filled with wild animals that his entourage could hunt on horseback, sometimes with falcons. Even more intimately connected to the politics of grandeur that al-Mustansir promoted was a great pavilion he constructed in the front courtyard of the royal palace in Tunis. On religious holidays and during troop reviews, he would sit enthroned before the ceremonial entryway to the complex. Just outside the city, al-Mustansir cultivated an enormous pleasure garden called Abu Fihr. It was filled with fruit trees that produced olives, dates, lemons, oranges, myrtle, and jasmine. The centerpiece was a water feature emptying into a basin that looked as big "as the sea." The canal that ran down into it was impressive enough that the women of the court preferred racing each other in baskets through the waterway to quiet strolls along its banks.[8]

Al-Mustansir's most ambitious attempt to elevate his standing came in 1253, when he assumed the caliphal title *amir al-muʾminin* (commander of the believers) and adopted the regnal name al-Mustansir bi-llah (one who seeks victory through God). From emir to caliph was quite a (self) promotion, but the situation in the Islamic Mediterranean favored the move. The Marinids were pressing the Almohads in the western Maghreb, while the Mongols were threatening the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad. Five years later, the gambit would pay off with the wider recognition al-Mustansir craved. In 1258 a Sufi from Murcia named Abu Muhammad ʿAbd al-Haq b. Sibayn was living in Mecca under the protection of its governor, the *sharif* Abu Nami. Ibn Sibayn had sought out the sanctuary of the Kaʿba after his unorthodox theological views had got him in trouble with religious scholars in Tunis. He befriended Abu Nami and promoted the idea that Mecca should acknowledge al-Mustansir's sovereignty. This view gained traction when the Mongols sacked Baghdad and eliminated the Abbasid caliphate in February 1258. Shortly after this collective trauma for Sunni Islam, Ibn Sibayn wrote the letter that officially recognized al-Mustansir as the most important political and religious authority in the Islamic world.[9]

Al-Mustansir's exclusive hold on the title did not last long. In 1261, Baybars restored the Abbasid caliphate
p. 46 under his patronage in Cairo.[10] ↳ These competing claims to the caliphate would prove a source of tension between the two rulers. In any case, by the early 1260s al-Mustansir was complementing his prestige policy with pragmatic state building. To develop the administrative capacity of his government and provide a counterweight to the traditional Almohad preponderance, he brought Andalusis into court in such numbers that Ibn Khaldun could speak of a "crowd" of them surrounding the monarch. During the mid-thirteenth century, as the Christian monarchies of the Iberian Peninsula drove south, many elite Muslim men from al-Andalus found themselves deprived of careers when the *reconquista* swept away the regimes they served. Ibn Khaldun knew of what he spoke: he belonged to one of the many prominent Andalusi families that resettled in the Maghreb. As the heirs to a sophisticated cultural heritage, the immigrants from Iberia proved irresistible to North African dynasties looking for literate bureaucrats and courtiers. The Hafsids were no exception: Andalusis would go on to serve them for generations as chancery secretaries, treasury officials, provincial governors, judges, poets, religious scholars, and historians.[11]

The integration of Andalusi intellectuals into Hafsid administration and court culture was not seamless. Though valued for their scholarly and artistic accomplishments, they could not be seen to rival the emir's preeminence in these domains. Over the course of his reign, al-Mustansir would respond savagely to threats to his status as the cultural arbiter in Tunis. After the Andalusi poet and chancery official Ibn al-Abbar repeatedly criticized al-Mustansir's taste in verse during evening recitals, his room was searched and a poem was (conveniently) found that began:

> In Tunis a foolish tyrant reigns
> Who is wrongly called a caliph.

Ibn al-Abbar was duly arrested and executed as a traitor.[12] The Andalusi teacher and grammarian Ibn ʿAsfur met his end after he ventured a misjudged bit of banter while walking with the emir by the pool in the Abu Fihr pleasure garden. To al-Mustansir's remark that "Our majesty has become great this morning!" Ibn ʿAsfur replied, "Yes, thanks to us and our like!" Offended by this presumption, al-Mustansir had the grammarian thrown into the deep, cold water. He was able to struggle out after a while, but came down with
p. 47 a chill and died several days later.[13] Sometimes ↳ fulfilling but just as often confounding the expectations of the dynasts they served, Andalusis played an ambiguous role in medieval North African history.

Even with a strengthened bureaucracy in place, Hafsid control of the countryside was never complete. The Dawawida tribe especially, but also the Mirdas, Dabbab, Kuʿub, and Sadwikish, repeatedly challenged dynastic rule, sometimes in conjunction with a disaffected Almohad shaykh or Hafsid prince, at other times in temporary alliance with one another. With the countryside failing to provide dependable income to the government, al-Mustansir had to look outward for revenue. Taking advantage of Tunis's prime Mediterranean location, he gave Hafsid Ifriqiya a strong commercial orientation.

Situated about half way between Egypt and Morocco, Tunis was a popular stopping point for caravan traffic between the two regions. It was also a natural halt for east–west shipping. Sicily, a gateway to Europe, lay just 40 miles across the water and could be reached in a small boat. The narrowness of the Sicilian Straits gave Tunis the potential to control maritime traffic between the eastern and western Mediterranean, placing it in an excellent position to attract European merchants.

The Almohads had signed trade agreements with Genoa and Pisa in the twelfth century. After establishing his independence in 1229, Abu Zakariya expanded commercial opportunities for his subjects, building markets and merchant factories (*funduks*) for Muslim traders and signing trade deals with northern Mediterranean powers. A treaty with Marseille was in place by 1231, followed by agreements with Venice, Pisa, and Genoa over the next five years.[14]

Under al-Mustansir, the commercial orientation of Hafsid foreign policy became more pronounced. He renewed the trade agreements with Genoa, Venice, and Pisa, and extended the reach of Hafsid economic expansion beyond the Mediterranean basin. In 1257, envoys from the ruler of Kanem-Bornu in the Sudan initiated contact with al-Mustansir by sending him a giraffe, which caused a stir when it was paraded through Tunis. Several years later, the emir received an ambassador from King Haakon the Old of Norway. The two monarchs may have negotiated yet another commercial treaty for the expanding Tunisian economy.[15]

p. 48 These treaties aimed to promote trade and ensure that the Hafsid treasury profited from it. The Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani tells a story that illustrates this fiscal imperative. Villani says that al-Mustansir favored Pisan merchants over all others until one day he noticed a glimmer of gold nestled among a pile of Pisan silver coins. When he asked what it was, the Pisan merchants told him it was a florin, a gold coin that had just been minted in Florence for the first time. Duly impressed, al-Mustansir wanted to learn more about the city that could produce such a magnificent specimen. He tracked down a Florentine merchant, who filled his ears with the wonders of his hometown. Al-Mustansir offered to build a *funduk* and church for the Florentines if they would bring their business (and gold florins) to Tunis.[16]

The texts of the trade treaties help to fill in some of the details behind stories such as this. Hafsid fiscal concerns shine through the treaty agreed with Genoa in 1250. It called for Genoese merchants to pay 10 percent duty on imports and 5 percent on exports. An exception was made for wood, which due to its military value could be sold to the Hafsids and its allies duty free. The Genoese also had to carry out their transactions through Tunisian intermediaries, who charged fees for their services. Trade was restricted to specific commercial zones to ensure that customs duties and fees were not evaded. The first provision of the treaty of 1250 required Genoese merchants to trade "in those places in which [they] were accustomed to go for the sake of business." They were forbidden to travel elsewhere in Hafsid lands except "out of urgent necessity." In the case of shipwreck, for example, the survivors could come ashore to seek shelter, but they could not trade while they waited to be rescued.[17]

Among the Hafsid cities where European traders could legally conduct business were al-Mahdiya, Bijaya, Gabès, Sfax, and Tripoli. The most important commercial center was Tunis, where all the major European maritime powers established *funduks*. The Italian maritime republics vied with each other to see who could have the most elaborate amenities, which often included living quarters, a customs house, storage facilities, shops, taverns, chapels, cemeteries, and ovens. When Genoa asked if it could expand its *funduk*, Pisa asked if it could build a bigger one too, with a larger wall that would keep people from passing directly from the one complex to the other. The European merchants did in fact live cheek by jowl in Tunis. All the *funduks* were
p. 49 ↳ grouped together just outside the Bab al-Bahr (the "sea gate"), from which one exited the city to reach the main port on the lake of Tunis. This arrangement reflected not only merchant interest in staying close to the sea, but also Hafsid concern to monitor and tax their trading. Their *funduks*, in fact, belonged to the regime, and should not be confused with the foreign merchant colonies that would emerge in the early modern period.[18]

Economic expansion was essential to increasing the reach of the Hafsid state. Al-Mustansir relied on customs revenue to build his army. For him, military strength lay in diversity, not unity. Although Ibn Khaldun would later argue that '*asabiyya*, or group solidarity, was the key to success on the battlefield in North Africa, al-Mustansir viewed the concentration of power in the hands of any one group as a threat. His father had relied on Almohad Berber and Bedouin tribes to fight his battles. Al-Mustansir could not afford to abandon these traditional sources of support, but he could reduce his reliance on them by hiring paid troops as well. He found these professional soldiers in al-Andalus, southern Italy, and the kingdoms of Christian Spain.[19]

Al-Mustansir's mercenary guard first emerges into the historical light of day in the mid-1250s, when documents begin to refer to Guillem Moncada, a Catalan noble who served as its first commander (*qa'id* in the Arabic sources, *alcayt* in the Catalan). He arrived in Tunis at the head of seventy knights from the Crown of Aragon in 1257. The Hafsid treasury paid each knight monthly wages ranging from 45 to 90 silver

bezants, while the *qa'id* earned 2,000 to 3,000. We do not know how many knights served in the guard. But even if we assume a number no greater than the seventy whom Guillem Moncada brought with him in 1257, and combine that with the low end of the pay scale, we arrive at a hefty annual wage bill of 61,800 silver bezants for the Catalan contingent alone. The actual total was likely to have been higher because other Europeans, such as Enrique and Federico of Castile, also served in the guard.[20]

p. 50 The pay structure of the guard provided the Crown of Aragon with a cut of each Catalan-Aragonese knight's salary, presumably as compensation for permitting their absence from the realm. The crown took 15 silver bezants a month from each knight and up to 1,000 a month from the *qa'id*. Working from the same estimate of seventy knights, we find an impressive amount of hard cash flowing from Tunis to Barcelona: some 24,600 silver bezants a year.

These European fighting men provided al-Mustansir with military force that was independent of local networks of power. Unlike an Almohad or Bedouin shaykh, a mercenary captain was bound to the ruler alone, and the religious difference insured that however influential he might become, he could not actually supplant the ruler and take power himself. He could be the power behind the throne, but he could never be the power *on* it. Moreover, because European mercenaries retained ties with their home countries, they could serve as diplomatic intermediaries. In many ways, the mercenary guard opened up the Hafsid regime to external influences as never before. It brought European Christians into court, in close physical proximity to the ruler; it required diplomatic relations with the Crown of Aragon, because some of the soldiers were recruited through a contractual arrangement with King Jaume I; and it strained the treasury enough to ensure that al-Mustansir would continue promoting revenue-generating foreign trade.

The contacts al-Mustansir developed beyond his borders were essential to expanding Hafsid power within Ifriqiya. His regime's urban orientation, relatively feeble presence in the countryside, and only intermittent support from Almohad and Bedouin interests encouraged him to integrate into Mediterranean networks of interreligious exchange. As crucial as they were to the Hafsid dynastic project, these networks posed challenges of their own. Hafsid relations with Sicily, the dynasty's closest European neighbor, were especially important, and fraught.

Tunis and Sicily Before 1266

Ifriqiya and southern Italy had entangled histories in the Middle Ages. Initially, the links were political and demographic. The Aghlabids, a Sunni dynasty that ruled Ifriqiya in the name of the Abbasid caliphate, launched a slow conquest of Sicily in 827 that lasted for much of the ninth century.[21] A significant Muslim
p. 51 population put down roots there as a ↳ result, which added to the island's already high degree of ethno-religious diversity. In the 1060s, taking advantage of conflicts among the rulers of Agrigento, Catania, and Syracuse, Norman mercenary soldiers began their own protracted conquest of Sicily and the southern Italian mainland, which extended into the early 1090s. By 1130, the Normans had forged their holdings into the kingdom of Sicily, known as the *Regno* because it was the only monarchy of the medieval Italian Peninsula. Norman rule did not extinguish Sicily's religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity. Large Muslim communities continued to thrive there deep into the twelfth century, even as the Normans began to expand into Ifriqiya. After establishing tenuous control over Tripoli, al-Mahdiya, and Gabès, King Roger II of Sicily was hailed briefly as *malik Ifriqiya*: "king of Africa."[22]

Norman Africa disintegrated in the face of the Almohad conquest of Ifriqiya in 1160. The Almohads broke the direct political link between Sicily and North Africa, but they maintained diplomatic relations with the Normans and kept in place the economic ties that had been developing across the Sicilian Straits from the late tenth century onwards. The foundation of the economic relationship was an exchange of wheat and gold. Both regions had produced grain in antiquity. Sicily remained a breadbasket of the medieval Mediterranean, growing a hard variety of wheat that traveled well by sea. Yields were relatively high by thirteenth-century standards and Sicilian wheat found its way into not just bread but couscous, ship's biscuit, and pasta. Ifriqiya reduced its wheat production in the medieval period, for reasons that are still not clear. Traditionally, the reduction has been blamed on two tribes of Arab nomads—the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym—that entered Ifriqiya in the 1050s and are thought to have devastated Maghrebi agriculture through their raiding and plundering. Deprived of their accustomed supply, and confronted by widespread famine, the Zirid rulers of Tunisia are supposed to have had no choice but to turn to Sicily for grain. Although evidence for Ifriqiyan wheat production in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is sparse and

difficult to interpret, it seems likely that the impact of this nomadic incursion has been exaggerated. A more plausible reconstruction of Ifriqiyan–Sicilian economic relations would emphasize the development of an interdependent commercial zone in the central Mediterranean, featuring specialization and the production
p. 52 of cash crops for market rather than subsistence agriculture. As Sicily increased its wheat crop, it also ↳ produced silk, sugar, and cotton for export. Ifriqiya saw rapid urbanization, craft specialization, emerging leather production, and the development of alternate cash crops, particularly olive oil, and an uninterrupted flow of gold into the region from trans-Saharan trade. All this gave Ifriqiya the financial clout to buy wheat from Sicily and there are increasing signs of this practice from the late tenth century onward—in other words, from before the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym had arrived in Ifriqiya.[23]

Relations between Sicily and Ifriqiya remained close and contentious as the Hafsids supplanted the Almohads and the Normans made way for the Hohenstaufen in the early thirteenth century. Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen had ambitions to rule in Germany, northern and southern Italy, and the Holy Land. Despite these wide-ranging commitments, or rather precisely because of them, he regarded Ifriqiya as strategically vital. Ifriqiya was a market for Sicilian wheat, and Sicilian wheat was a source of funding for the Hohenstaufen war machine. As Frederick looked to finance his wars, he squeezed the Sicilian cash cow harder and harder. He increased the amount of his own land under wheat cultivation and sold the surplus abroad to his own profit. At the same time, he imposed export duties on whatever wheat was sold from private estates. Frederick had a strong fiscal incentive to maintain a stable economic partnership with Ifriqiya.[24]

In the early years of his reign, though, threats to that stability emerged. North African slavers increasingly looked to Sicily to capture the products of their trade. More importantly still, in the late twelfth century a Muslim revolt broke out against the Sicilian monarchy. Under increased pressure to convert to Christianity and resenting encroachment on their semi-autonomous holdings in western Sicily, many Muslim communities on the island took advantage of the rocky transition from Norman to Hohenstaufen rule to test the strength of the new regime. As the revolt dragged on, the rebels looked to Ifriqiya for arms, money, and
p. 53 soldiers. In addition ↳ to the economic dimension, relations with Ifriqiya were now bound up in a larger crisis of sovereignty in the *Regno*.[25]

In 1221, as Frederick looked to re-assert control over Sicily, he dispatched the imperial ambassador Vibald to Tunis. Vibald's negotiating partner was the Hafsid prince Abu Ishaq Ibrahim, who was serving as governor of the city for the Almohad caliph in Marrakesh. On August 5, 1221, Vibald and Abu Ishaq reached an agreement on a treaty of peace and commerce.[26] The agreement is notably even-handed. It called for free trade for ten years, ensuring Sicily access to its major export market and Tunis access to its main wheat supplier. It addressed Frederick's security concerns by taking measures against the Tunisian pirates who preyed on Sicilian shipping and supported the Muslim revolt on the island. At the same time, the treaty guaranteed secure navigation to Tunisian ships sailing between Ifriqiya and Egypt. Captives on both sides would be freed.

The treaty of 1221 marked a moment of equilibrium in Tunisian–Sicilian relations. Over the next two decades, the balance would shift slightly toward the Hohenstaufen. The Hafsids lost a source of leverage when Frederick II took drastic measures to suppress the Muslim revolt on Sicily. In 1223 he began to deport entire communities of Sicilian Muslims off the island, settling them in Lucera on the mainland. The expulsions would continue for years, resulting in the relocation of about 15,000 to 20,000 people. In the meantime, with the rebellion quashed, the Hafsids could no longer demonstrate their strength by destabilizing Hohenstaufen rule over Sicily. Another difficulty for the Hafsids was that Ifriqiya began to experience grain shortages in the 1230s. These shortages do not appear to have been long-standing. Abu Zakariya's commercial treaty with Venice in 1231 allowed Venetian merchants to export eight boatloads of wheat from Ifriqiya if their home city was experiencing a shortfall. It seems unlikely that exports on this scale would have been permitted during a famine. In 1236, the emir allowed the Genoese to export five boatloads if Genoa was lacking in foodstuffs. The smaller quantity could reflect Genoa's less favorable trading status compared to Venice, but it might also be the result of diminishing grain stocks in Tunis.[27]

p. 54 In the winter of 1239–40, as his military expenses in northern Italy mounted, Frederick began to supervise Sicilian trade with Tunis closely. He appointed a consul to manage the crown's affairs in Tunis, then ordered a Sicilian port official to buy grain for the crown and ship it to Tunis and other North African cities where demand was strong due to scarcity.[28] Until the crown's ships had embarked, no other merchants would be

allowed to export Sicilian wheat to the Maghreb. Around the same time, Nicola Spinola, the admiral of the Sicilian fleet, sold 50,000 *salme* of imperial grain in Ifriqiya.[29]

The "Tunisian Tribute"

As the Hohenstaufen stepped up grain imports to Tunis, Abu Zakariya may also have agreed to pay Frederick an annual fee. Great uncertainty surrounds this payment, which would become known in European sources as the Tunisian Tribute. The main problem is lack of evidence. The Tunis–Sicily treaty of 1221 does not mention any payments by the Hafsids to the Hohenstaufen. A southern French chronicler states that Abu Zakariya drew up a charter recording his commitment to pay tribute and that this document was lodged in the Hohenstaufen archive in Palermo.[30] This charter, if it ever existed, does not survive today. The only genuinely contemporary source for the tribute is the Sicilian chronicler Saba Malaspina. His description is precise. He calls it:

> an annual rent or tax, which [the king of Tunis] was supposed to pay annually to the king of Sicily, so that foodstuffs might be brought freely into Tunis and Arabs might be able to cross the Sicilian Sea securely when they wanted and the people of Barbary might not be vexed by Sicilian pirate attacks.[31]

Though Saba does not say when this annual payment started, his description of it fits well with the situation facing Abu Zakariya and Frederick II in 1239–40. Given Frederick's need for cash, his intervention into the Sicilian grain market, and his new position of strength in Sicily, he could have demanded a sweetener from
p. 55 Abu Zakariya to authorize large shipments of wheat to North Africa; and given the emir's reduced ability to ↳ cause mischief on the island, the importance of keeping the waters around Tunis open to maritime traffic, and a momentary but still urgent shortfall in grain stocks, he could have agreed to pay it.

Even so, this commitment did not make Abu Zakariya a tributary to Sicily in the modern sense of the term. Tributaries do not receive anything for the tribute they pay, except for the privilege of not being attacked. But the emir acquired access to the best wheat the central Mediterranean had to offer, at a time when Frederick was restricting its availability as he edged closer to monopolistic control of his prized product. Relief from pirate attacks, or at least legal grounds to compensation for them, was another benefit of the arrangement. Those who demand tribute also expect political compliance. Abu Zakariya, however, retained his independence. In the winter of 1239–40, Frederick's enterprising Admiral Spinola hatched a plan to attack Venetian and Genoese vessels as they returned from the Levant during the spring passage. Describing his idea to the emperor, he wondered what to do about the "king of Tunis," who continued to welcome Venetians and Genoese in his lands despite their status as Frederick's enemies. The emperor's response was measured. He would dispatch envoys to Tunis and the admiral should not take any action until they could offer a recommendation.[32] In Frederick's eyes, the Hafsids still had to be dealt with carefully.

Despite growing Hohenstaufen assertiveness, Tunis and Sicily remained bound in a relationship of mutual interdependence. Frederick's death in 1250 would place the Hafsid–Hohenstaufen partnership under strain. Frederick's son Conrad faced opposition to his succession in the kingdom of Sicily from the papacy and died in 1254. His half-brother Manfred succeeded him, first as regent for Conrad's young son Conradin and then as king of Sicily in his own name in 1258. Manfred and al-Mustansir maintained diplomatic relations, with Sicilian ambassadors visiting Tunis in 1265 and 1266.[33] The Angevin conquest of 1266, however, marked a break from the status quo: who was the new lord of Sicily, and how would he approach Tunis?

Charles of Anjou

Charles's background is incongruous. He was born into royalty, but his position in the family meant that at first he gained about as little from such a rank as one can imagine. He was the youngest child of King Louis
p. 56 VIII ↳ of France (r. 1223–6) and Queen Blanche of Castile (1188–1252). He may have been born posthumously. With at least four brothers in line for preferment ahead of him, he was pegged for a career in the church. His original given name, in fact, may have been Étienne, the popular choice among French aristocratic families at the time for sons destined for the cloth. If he later changed his name to Charles, in a nod to Charlemagne, it would be a clue to the scale of his worldly ambitions.[34]

Tall, olive complexioned, and with a long nose that would become an Angevin trademark, Charles projected an austere image to his contemporaries. He dressed and spoke plainly, just like his brother Louis IX. But while Louis could leaven his severity with warmth and humor, Charles was remembered as a bit of a cold fish. Tommaso of Pavia "heard a man from Paris say that even early in his youth he scarcely ever smiled." With a thirteen-year age gap between them, the brothers were not close.[35]

Even so, the first steps in Charles's remarkable rise owed a great deal to Louis's generosity. Departing from Capetian custom, Louis VIII had granted his younger sons sizable inheritances and made them princes of the realm. When an older brother died before taking up his *appanage*, Charles received it in his place. In August 1246, Louis IX granted Anjou and Maine to Charles, who had only just been knighted the previous May.[36]

The year 1246 was something of an *annus mirabilis* for Charles. The year before, Raymond Berenger, count of Provence, had died sonless. According to his will, the county was supposed to go to his youngest daughter, Beatrice.[37] Several prospective spouses for Beatrice soon presented themselves, but the executor of the will, Pope Innocent IV, agreed to Louis's proposal that Charles should marry her. While Innocent wanted Louis's
p. 57 support in deposing Frederick II, Louis hoped the marriage would consolidate the ↳ Capetian presence in southern France. On January 31, 1246, with an escort of soldiers on hand to discourage objections, Beatrice and Charles celebrated their wedding.[38]

Provence was a prize. One of its major cities was Marseille, a Mediterranean emporium that also hosted a naval arsenal. Provence produced many of the commodities that its merchants traded abroad, including grain, animal skins, honey, and wax. Most valuable of all was the salt that washed up at the mouth of the Rhône. Charles claimed a monopoly over it, much to Louis IX's displeasure. There was little Louis could do about it, though, because Provence was imperial territory and not under the lordship of the French crown.[39]

Provence was too valuable to be easily won. The dowager countess, Beatrice, still claimed rights in the county and struggled against Charles to maintain them. It took ten years for him to convince her to accept an indemnity to renounce her claims. The larger cities banded together against the new count as well. Marseille, for example, held out against him until 1257.[40]

Charles's hard-won mastery of Provence established him on the Mediterranean. Sicily offered something more: the chance for the last-born son of a king to become one in his own right. The particular kingdom he made his own was fabled for its wealth in the Middle Ages. The reality, though impressive, never quite lived up to the extravagant reputation. Sicily had strong economic potential, especially in agriculture, but it was not a wonderland flowing with milk and honey and could never have produced the inflated revenues that Charles seems to have expected. His increasingly frantic efforts to extract income from Sicilians provoked tensions that would explode in the Vespers revolt of 1282.[41]

Prosperous in its own right, Sicily also placed Charles at the center of the Mediterranean world. The kingdom gave him the potential to dominate the sea passages—and the commercial traffic that flowed through them—to the south, east, and west. Its location also offered an ideal base from which to launch campaigns of expansion. Charles was aware of the *Regno*'s strategic potential, but his ambitions were not
p. 58 imperial per se. In ↳ fact, the papacy had brought him into Italy as an anti-imperialist: he was supposed to drive the German empire out of the peninsula and as a condition of conquest he had agreed to papal suzerainty over his new holdings.[42] Above all, his aims were dynastic. Rather than reviving the western empire, his goal was to make Sicily the centerpiece of an agglomeration of lordships, territorial claims, and commercial relationships that would vault the Angevins into the first rank of Mediterranean powers.[43]

What made the kingdom of Sicily so appealing also made it dangerous. Because it stood at the center of things, it could be threatened from several directions. From the north, there were the maritime republics of Genoa, Venice, and Pisa. Each wanted to penetrate and, to the extent that it could, control the Sicilian market. Pisa was a particular challenge because of its historic ties to the Hohenstaufen and its ambitions on nearby Sardinia. In the north, too, pockets of pro-imperial (Ghibelline) sympathy continued to flourish after Manfred's defeat at Benevento. The premise behind papal support for the Angevin conquest of the south had been to prevent the Papal States from being enveloped by a single power. But given the strength of Ghibelline enclaves such as Siena and Pisa, Charles could not hope to bring the *Regno* under control without intervening in northern Italy. After some initial hesitation, Clement IV came around to this way of thinking. In 1268, he granted Charles extensive powers to lead the pro-papal (Guelf) cause in Tuscany.[44]

Another threat to Angevin Sicily lay to the west. The Crown of Aragon would prove to be Charles's greatest European rival in the western Mediterranean. It was a congeries of territories that encompassed Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia down to Murcia, the Balearic Islands, and some towns north of the Pyrenees, including Perpignan and Montpellier. It shared similarities with the Angevin realms: a monarch with a military reputation; a vibrant commercial economy; and close involvement with the Maghreb, especially Hafsid Ifriqiya. It was also linked by marriage to the remnants of Hohenstaufen opposition to Charles. In 1258, Manfred's daughter Constance of Sicily had become betrothed to Pere, the son and heir of King Jaume I of Aragon. The Tunis Crusade was an important episode in the rivalry between the houses of Anjou and Aragon, a conflict that would eventually mushroom into what David Abulafia has called a "Two Hundred Years' War."[45]

p. 59 The Crown of Aragon was a firm rival to Angevin interests in the western Mediterranean. To the east, the situation was more fluid. In 1261, Michael VIII Palaiologos, the Byzantine emperor in exile, had reconquered Constantinople from the heirs of the Latin Christian crusaders who had taken the city in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade. Michael VIII posed an immediate threat to the remaining Latin powers in the Aegean—the duchy of Athens and the principality of Achaia—and to the despotate of Epiros, a hold-out Greek state on the Adriatic coast, in what is now Albania and northern Greece. The future of these regimes mattered a great deal to Charles. They represented both a buffer against Byzantine encroachments westward and a base for Angevin expansion eastward. From a coastal stronghold such as Durazzo, the route along the *Via Egnatia*, the old Roman road to Constantinople, lay open.[46]

The kingdom of Sicily was central to Charles's ambitions and fears as a dynast. If he held on to it, he would have a springboard to future conquests; if he lost it, his Mediterranean holdings might implode. Over the long term, the best way to protect the kingdom would be to establish a perimeter of control around the *Regno* that incorporated Sardinia, the Adriatic coast, and North Africa. Before he could make headway on that goal, he would have to put down the revolt on Sicily that struck at the heart of his dynastic project.

Choices, Choices

Charles's invasion of Italy in 1266 brought momentary clarity to the peninsula's famously convoluted politics. For once, everyone would have to pick a side—Hohenstaufen or Angevin—and hope for the best. For some, family tradition or customary loyalties made the decision straightforward. For the outsiders—the adventurers, exiles, and mercenaries—the choice was much harder. Federico of Castile, as we have seen, had thrown his support behind the Hohenstaufen. Federico's brother and fellow exile Enrique, however, gambled on the Angevins, helping to bankroll Charles's campaign and fighting alongside him at the battle of Benevento. Even though Enrique of Castile came out on the winning side, he ended up disappointed with the result. Charles did not reward him for his role in the victory; nor did he even pay him back the money he
p. 60 owed. With no means ↳ of support in Italy, and still out of favor in Castile, Enrique went deeper into exile, joining his brother (and recent opponent in battle) in Tunis.[47]

From there, Enrique of Castile tried again to benefit from the Angevin conquest. He suggested to Charles that he could marry Helena of Epiros, King Manfred of Hohenstaufen's widow, who had fallen into Angevin custody after Benevento and who could claim Epiros as her inheritance. Given Epiros's strategic significance to the *Regno*, however, Charles was never likely to grant it to a Castilian adventurer, no matter how much money that adventurer had lent him in the past. Instead, Charles claimed Helena's inheritance for himself by right of conquest and appointed a captain-general to rule Corfu in his name.[48] Charles was equally unimpressed with Enrique's next proposal, which was that he become king of Sardinia. This was another strategically crucial island that Charles wanted to control directly, rather than through a potentially unreliable proxy.[49]

Twice rejected, Enrique of Castile sailed from Tunis to Sicily in the early spring of 1267 to take up his case directly with Charles of Anjou. Not long after Enrique left Tunis, Conrad Capece arrived there on an embassy from Conradin, who wanted to coordinate with al-Mustansir on a two-pronged invasion of the *Regno*.[50] The emir had a difficult decision to make. Allowing prominent Hohenstaufen exiles to serve in his palace guard was one thing; sponsoring a full-fledged attack on Angevin Sicily was quite another. Charles had recently banned Ghibelline Pisan merchants from trading in Sicily. The question was whether he would extend this embargo to other states harboring pro-Hohenstaufen sympathies, such as the Hafsid emirate.[51] If he did, the economic consequences for al-Mustansir and his subjects would be severe. An uprising on Sicily could topple

the Angevin regime while it was still fragile and restore the old Hohenstaufen order, which, if not wholly favorable to Hafsid interests, was at least established and predictable. Then again, the consequences of a failed revolt could be catastrophic. If Charles identified al-Mustansir as an instigator, he might seek out reprisals, even to the point of military action in the Maghreb.

p. 61 The benefits of foreign intervention also had to be weighed against potential risks to domestic stability. Since the coup that greeted his accession, al-Mustansir had faced several further challenges to his authority. In 1253 alone, he confronted three separate uprisings: a coup launched by his brother Abu Ishaq with the aid of the Dawawida Bedouin; a revolt in Qasantina (Constantine, Algeria) led by the Banu Nuʿman clan, Hintati Almohads who had governed the city for Abu Zakariya; and a Bedouin rebellion in the Zab inspired by the would-be messiah Abu Himara. Serious military resources were required to put these revolts down and a series of exemplary punishments and executions followed. The pattern of unrest continued into the 1260s, when the urban elite of Milyana took advantage of conflicts between the Hafsids and the ʿAbd al-Wadids in western Ifriqiya to make a bid for autonomy. Al-Mustansir had to send his brother Abu Hafs and Enrique of Castile to take Milyana by siege. Meanwhile, the Dawawida continued to fend off the emir's attempts to encroach on their hegemony over the countryside around Qasantina. After they recognized yet another Hafsid pretender, al-Mustansir's cousin Abu al-Qasim, as emir, al-Mustansir campaigned against them in 1265–6. Under their shaykh Shibl b. Musa, they withdrew south of al-Masila, prompting the emir to give up the pursuit. With their capacity to strike against him still intact, al-Mustansir needed to keep troops on hand in case the Dawawida rose again. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to send a large force to Sicily. As spring 1267 turned into summer, al-Mustansir deliberated, waiting for new developments that might prod him toward intervention or neutrality.[52]

Viterbo: Spring 1267

Enrique of Castile found himself in much the same predicament as the emir, uncertain whether to conciliate Charles or join his enemies. In April 1267, Enrique followed Charles up to Viterbo, where the popes kept a summer residence, for meetings with Clement IV. If Enrique hoped for a swift resolution of his difficulties, he was soon disappointed. He was not the only backer of the Sicilian conquest who was expecting compensation for his efforts. King Louis IX of France, having taken the cross for the Holy Land about a month before, sent two envoys to Viterbo to discuss his crusade with Charles and Clement. Henri of
p. 62 Constance, marshal of ↳ France, and Guillaume, archdeacon of Paris, brought with them a list of questions for Charles to answer about his role in the campaign.[53] The discussions lasted until early May, leaving Enrique of Castile to cool his heels.

Louis's envoys began by asking for Charles's general advice about the Holy Land passage: what seemed best to him for the honor of God and Christendom? What arrangements should be made for transporting the army? Then they urged him to take the cross, "for the sake of example and to deter enemies of the faith by the fame of his name." The envoys left open whether Charles would fulfill his vow by joining the crusade in person: the pope would help him decide closer to the time whether he should go overseas or remain in the *Regno*. If Charles stayed home, the ambassadors wondered, could he provide galleys and soldiers from the kingdom of Sicily? And what assistance could he offer Louis and his men? Could Louis export animals for slaughter, beasts of burden, warhorses, and packhorses from Sicily without paying the usual tolls?

After sharing this list of demands, the envoys raised issues that Louis had put on hold during the Sicilian campaign. Most of them had to do with unpaid debts: 8,000 marks that Louis had paid on Charles's behalf to settle a provision of Count Raymond Berenger of Provence's will; another 8,000 marks to help secure Charles's marriage to Beatrice of Provence; and 30,000 *livres* that Louis had loaned Charles during the Egyptian crusade. Louis complained about how much the marriages of his children, the knighthood of a son, and the crusade were costing him and begged Charles to bear in mind the "great good" that had come to him (thanks in no small part, it was left unsaid, to his brother's aid). Finally, there was the *gabelle*: Charles's monopoly on salt from the Rhône. Louis demanded a written response from Charles about what he saw as a gross violation of the rights of the French crown.[54]

As a cadet prince of the Capetian house, Charles had joined Louis's Egyptian crusade without complaint. Now that he was a king in his own right, he was not prepared to commit to the crusade so willingly. Following his meeting with Louis's envoys at Viterbo, he did not take the cross, offer help with transportation, supplies, or arms, or repay his debts. Like Enrique of Castile, Louis would have to wait.

It is often said that Charles refused to join his brother's crusade at first because he was fixated on conquering Byzantium. The details of the treaties he signed with the remaining Latin powers in the Greek East at ↳ Viterbo in the spring of 1267, however, suggest a less ambitious agenda. Charles remained focused on protecting the *Regno* and constructing a defensive perimeter around it.

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At the end of May 1267, he reached an agreement with Guillaume, prince of Achaia, a potential ally in the Adriatic. By the terms of the Treaty of Viterbo, the principality of Achaia became a kind of Angevin protectorate. In exchange for a promise to help defend his lands, Guillaume recognized Charles as his overlord, designated his daughter Isabelle as heir to the principality, and betrothed her to Charles's younger son, Philippe. If the couple did not produce offspring, Achaia would revert to Charles or his heir.[55] In the long term, this arrangement might eventually allow for Angevin expansion into the Greek East. The aim was probably not an immediate takeover: Guillaume would hold his lands for the rest of his life and Philippe of Anjou would have to predecease his father for Charles to become prince of Achaia in his own right. More immediately, the treaty would shore up the Latin presence on Byzantium's western frontiers and gain Charles military aid against the Hohenstaufen. The first concrete result of the Treaty of Viterbo, in fact, would be Prince Guillaume bringing soldiers to fight for Charles against Conradin in 1268.[56]

Since part of the agreement with Guillaume called for suzerainty over Achaia to pass from Baudouin II, the former Latin emperor of Constantinople, to Charles of Anjou, an additional treaty was required. Baudouin had been doing the rounds of European courts since losing Constantinople to Michael Palaiologos in 1261, trying to drum up support for a reconquest bid. To date, he had not found any takers. He would have to pay a high price for what Charles offered him in May 1267. Charles agreed to fund an expedition of 2,000 mounted soldiers, which would campaign in the east for one year, but would not set out until 1273 at the earliest. Charles might participate personally, or send a son in his place. Either way, he would receive one-third of any territory regained. The treaty also featured a marriage alliance similar to the one agreed with Guillaume of Achaia: Baudouin's heir Philippe would marry Charles's daughter Beatrice. If no children resulted from the union, Charles would obtain the rights to the Latin empire. Finally, the treaty gave him legal title, at least from a Latin Christian perspective, to the Adriatic buffer zone that he wanted to create beside the *Regno*. Baudouin also ceded him rights of ↳ lordship to the Albanian coastline from Durazzo to Corfu.[57] In return for a limited military commitment in the distant future (six years was a long time in the context of thirteenth-century lifespans), Charles placed his heirs, if not himself, in a position to benefit from the unlikely eventuality of a Latin reconquest of Constantinople.

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Guillaume of Achaia was barely holding on in Latin Greece; Baudouin II had already lost everything. For them, allying with Charles of Anjou was a last attempt to fend off a resurgent Byzantium. The leader of the Greek revival, Michael VIII Palaiologos, seemed to have a military edge over the remaining Latin powers of the Aegean, but that could change if the papacy decided to commit crusading resources to the region. There was little fear of that happening while the Hohenstaufen threat remained active. Now that Sicily was in Angevin hands, however, Clement IV might want to revive interest in winning Constantinople back for Latin Christendom. During its brief existence, the Latin empire had sheltered a Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy in a region that had long been in schism with the western church. Reconquering Constantinople would restore that state of affairs; it might also provide a focus for Charles's ambitions, distracting him from other projects that posed a risk to papal interests, such as establishing Angevin control over northern Italy.[58] As Charles met with Guillaume of Achaia and Baudouin II, Michael Palaiologos sent envoys to Viterbo to forestall a revival of papal crusading plans for Latin Greece. The envoys reminded Clement that there was another way to bring eastern Orthodoxy into the papal fold: negotiated church union. Clement responded positively to this appeal. Without attempting to restrain Guillaume of Achaia and Baudouin II in any way, he opened up a line of communication with the Byzantine emperor, urging him to return to the unity of the church and listing the articles of faith to which he must subscribe for that to happen.[59]

As these discussions went on, Enrique of Castile waited for his turn to come. In May 1267, he heard from Clement IV again, this time with an offer to mediate between him and Charles of Anjou. While Charles promised (again) to repay his debts, Clement proposed that Enrique marry a daughter of King Jaume I of Aragon.[60] Clement and Charles certainly would have been happy to see Enrique return to Spain. From there, it would be more difficult for him to nag them about unpaid debts and pursue various island kingdoms. But there was not much to recommend the idea from Enrique's point of view. He could not be certain that the marriage would go ahead, since Clement had not actually secured ↳ Jaume's consent to the plan. Moreover, Jaume had a fully functioning male heir, so the union would not bring Enrique particularly close to the throne of Aragon.

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Looking around for a better offer, Enrique found one in the pope's backyard. During much of the thirteenth century, Rome maintained a high degree of autonomy within the Papal States. The city often rose in revolt and the popes of that era became used to living in exile from the Apostolic See. The most important political office in the city was that of senator of Rome. Charles of Anjou had won election to the office in 1263, but Clement had forced him to resign it in the spring of 1266, shortly after the Sicilian conquest. This decision did not work out well for the pope, because it allowed the city's latent Ghibelline tendencies to blossom again. A fresh round of rebellions brought the senatorship to none other than Enrique of Castile. In July 1267, Enrique took up the office, as Runciman said, "with resentment in his heart."[61]

The *Regno* under Attack

The fox was now loose in the hen house. Enrique extended his authority into the countryside around Rome and launched strikes across the northern frontier of the *Regno*. Then he wrote to Conradin, pledging his support in verse that combined hatred for Charles with virulent anti-Judaism: "By God, let him die who has given death to me and who keeps my wealth in his power, like a Jew."[62] By the fall of 1267, the Hohenstaufen eagle was flying again above the walls of Rome.

While reaching out to Conradin, Enrique of Castile also reconciled with his brother Federico in Tunis. If al-Mustansir would allow Federico to launch an expedition against Sicily, the brothers could throw southern Italy into chaos. After hesitating for several months, al-Mustansir gave the go ahead. Charles and Clement's reversal of fortune in Rome may have convinced him that a Sicilian revolt could destabilize or perhaps even end Angevin rule in the central Mediterranean. Cautious in military matters, he did not commit to an overt
p. 66 Hafsid assault. Instead, he allowed Federico ↳ to take the lead and limited his role to supplying some soldiers, mostly European, and a boat. This would allow him to maintain plausible deniability should the insurgency fail. As Fulco of Puy-Richard fled from Federico and the knights of death in early October 1267, it looked as if al-Mustansir's gamble might pay off.

With Rome under Ghibelline control, and Sicily up in arms, Conradin made his move. He had left Bavaria in mid-September 1267 and by mid-October had reached Verona, a Ghibelline stronghold. He waited there for several months, allowing the insurgencies in the south to develop.[63] Charles was hoping to intercept Conradin in Lombardy before he could link up with his allies in Rome and Sicily. In February 1268, however, the Muslim colony of Lucera, founded by Emperor Frederick II in Apulia to house the Sicilian Muslim communities he had driven off the island in the 1220s, rose in revolt.[64] Many of the Muslim men of Lucera had earned a living fighting in an elite Hohenstaufen crossbow unit and their military reputation remained high. While Charles had left the suppression of the Sicilian uprising to lieutenants, he decided to deal personally with the rebel Muslim soldiers. In March 1268, he withdrew from Tuscany to put Lucera to siege. The path south, to Rome and the *Regno*, now lay open to Conradin.

After receiving a rapturous welcome in Rome from Enrique of Castile, Conradin drove southeast toward Apulia, where his support was strongest.[65] By the time he reached Carsoli, about 30 miles west of Avezzano, Charles had already lifted the siege of Lucera and brought his army to Ovindoli, from where he could guard the road that led into Apulia.[66]

The two armies met on August 23, 1268 on a plain between the villages of Albe and Magliano, about 7 miles east of Tagliacozzo, the town that would give the battle its name. A small stream that ran into the River Salto divided the two forces. Enrique of Castile was in command of the Hohenstaufen vanguard, which included the Castilian mercenaries he had brought with him from Tunis. They found a way across the stream and, with support from Galvano Lancia and his men, launched an assault on the main body of Charles's French troops that killed its commander, who was wearing Charles's coat when he fell. That commander, however, was actually Henri of Constance, marshal of France. Charles himself, with 1,000 armed horsemen,
p. 67 was still waiting in reserve, hidden from view ↳ behind a nearby hill. Charles watched as his French soldiers fled the battlefield, pursued by Enrique and Galvano. The only Hohenstaufen forces remaining in the plain were Conradin, his Bavarian relations, and his household knights. Believing that Charles was dead and that they had won the victory, they were stunned when Charles's reserve force charged forward from its hiding place. Conradin fled with a few followers toward Rome, while the rest were taken into captivity.

As Enrique of Castile chased the French troops along the road to Apulia, he looked back and realized that all was not as it should be on the battlefield behind him. He wheeled around for the final reckoning with

Charles that he craved. Enrique had not lost many men on his run through the battlefield into the road beyond. When Charles's military advisor, Érard of Valery, saw Enrique reverse course at the head of a large, well-armed corps, he recommended a tactic that he had seen the Mamluks use during his time leading the French regiment in Acre. Érard led his knights back toward the stream, as if to leave the field. Enrique's men charged toward him, but began to lose momentum as their horses tired. Érard's knights turned on Enrique in the classic conclusion to a Mamluk feigned retreat, seizing his horse and forcing him to run away, a humiliating end to his quest for revenge.[67]

In the aftermath of his victory at Tagliacozzo, Charles rounded up many of his leading Hohenstaufen opponents. Enrique of Castile was tracked down to a local convent and taken away to jail. As the brother of the king of Castile, he would be hard to execute without diplomatic repercussions. As the last legitimate Hohenstaufen, Conradin enjoyed no such protection. He had tried to return to Rome after the battle, but the gates were closed to him. The Romans knew which way the wind was blowing now. He reached the coast, looking for passage to Genoa, but was captured before he could set sail. After a short trial for treason, Charles had the 15-year-old beheaded in Naples on October 29, 1268.[68]

Conradin's death ended the Hohenstaufen push from the north, but the revolts in Sicily and Lucera continued. On August 27, 1269, after eighteen months of defiance, Lucera surrendered. Charles had the
p. 68 Christian residents killed but spared the lives of the Muslim soldiers, who ↳ retained their military value and would, just a year later, serve him on the Tunis Crusade.[69]

That left Sicily. Rumors that al-Mustansir was going to cross over to join the uprising there reached the Angevin justiciar of the island, who passed them along to Charles on the mainland. In response, Charles sent over more soldiers: 1,500 knights and "many archers and other fighters," according to a contemporary chronicler.[70] At the same time, he declared an amnesty for all towns on the island still opposing him and promised that rebels who wished to leave the island could do so without impediment.

One city that refused to submit was Augusta, which lies on the east coast of Sicily between Catania and Syracuse. In August 1269, Charles sent a squadron of eight galleys to attack Augusta and appointed Guillaume L'Étendard general-vicar of Sicily with orders to crush the rebellion once and for all. Several weeks later, the city fell to him by treachery. On Charles's orders, Guillaume had the entire population put to death.[71]

As Guillaume tightened the noose around Augusta, Charles kept an escape route open for some rebels. He renewed his amnesty call and offered special protection to foreigners who chose to flee Sicily. The target of this appeal seems to have been Federico of Castile and his knights of death. They took him up on the offer and returned to Tunis. Of the major rebel leaders, only Conrad Capece remained. As a former Hohenstaufen official on Sicily, he did not count as a foreigner and would not be spared if caught. With his dwindling band of followers, he was unable to prevent key coastal towns from going over to the Angevins: Augusta, Lentini, Agrigento, and even Sciacca, his original landing place and headquarters. He retreated to Centuripa, a stronghold far away from the sea. Betrayed by his own men, he was brought to Naples and beheaded with his brothers in the summer of 1270.[72]

The contrasting fates of Federico of Castile and Conrad Capece can be explained partly by their relationships to the Hohenstaufen insurgency. One was a Castilian adventurer with no prior connection to Sicily, while the other was a loyalist to the old regime. Other factors may also have played into Charles's willingness to allow Federico to escape back to Tunis. Hunting down and then executing a Castilian prince would have been
p. 69 diplomatically awkward. After Tagliacozzo, Charles ↳ had preferred to imprison rather than kill Federico's brother Enrique for the same reason. In Federico's case, however, Charles had gone further: he had actively encouraged his flight to Tunis. Once again, as with the Muslims of Lucera, Charles had shown leniency to an enemy of the faith, a man who had fought for Muslims and whom the contemporary chronicler Saba Malaspina could describe as "almost forgetful of the Christian religion," and differing "not at all from the Saracens in lifestyle and manners."[73] By facilitating his safe return to Tunis, Charles risked criticism for not combating Muslims and Muslim sympathizers. But this may have been a chance he was prepared to take, because he also knew that al-Mustansir would be happy to see the safe return of a valued member of his European mercenary guard.

Charles's approach to Tunis was shifting away from open conflict. By the summer of 1269, al-Mustansir was moving in the same direction. By what means we do not know, he let it be known to Charles that he was sending envoys to the *Regno*. On August 18, 1269, from the Angevin siege camp at Lucera, Charles instructed

his officials in Sicily to receive the Tunisian ambassadors honorably and provide them with all the supplies they might need during their stay on the island. In the document, he referred to al-Mustansir as the "king of Tunis" and described him as *devotus noster*, "our faithful one."[74]

For the past two years, the emir had been nothing of the sort. He had promoted an insurgency that had nearly robbed Charles of the centerpiece of his dynastic ambitions in the Mediterranean and had withheld money that Charles needed. To fund the conquest of Sicily, Charles had racked up enormous debts. Putting down the Hohenstaufen uprisings and the Hafsid proxy war had cost him an additional fortune on top of that. By the later stages of the siege of Lucera, Charles was so short of cash that he had to ask Clement IV for a postponement in paying part of the annual tribute he owed the Apostolic See as a condition of becoming a papal vassal for Sicily. The funding shortfall prompted heavy taxation on his new subjects, which in turn made them more receptive to appeals to restore the Hohenstaufen. These interlocking crises of sovereignty and fiscality compromised Charles's dealings with his own backers as well. The post-Benevento period might have looked different if he had simply been able to pay Enrique of Castile what he owed him. By linking up with the Hohenstaufen and withholding the "tribute," al-Mustansir had shown Charles that he had to be taken seriously.[75]

p. 70 While demonstrating his ability to destabilize Angevin rule, al-Mustansir had not overcommitted himself. Angevin officials were never sure how involved he was in the Sicilian revolt: Had he sent the expeditionary force to Sciacca? Was he coming in person? Was Federico of Castile a Hafsid agent, or was he acting on his own? Working through proxies and creating uncertainty about his intentions allowed al-Mustansir to present himself as a potential friend to Angevin Sicily after the insurgency failed. It also enabled Charles to accept Hafsid overtures without losing face. The reciprocal gestures of late summer 1269—the dispatch of the Hafsid embassy and Federico of Castile's unopposed flight from Sicily—laid the groundwork for rapprochement. For all the disruption caused by conquest and rebellion, the framework for an agreement remained in place. Charles wanted Tunisian gold, al-Mustansir wanted Sicilian wheat, and both wanted political stability and free-flowing commerce in the central Mediterranean.

In a vacuum, resolving these complementary interests might have been straightforward. The negotiations, however, would have to take place against the backdrop of a looming interreligious conflict. For two years, the battle for Syria had been on hold while the struggle for the central Mediterranean had played itself out. Louis had got nowhere when he tried to interest Charles in the Holy Land crusade at Viterbo in the spring of 1267; and rather than separate himself from the Christian Mediterranean and unite with Baybars's citadel of Islam, al-Mustansir had integrated Hafsid Tunisia into European networks to the point of collaborating with Bavarians, Tuscans, and Castilians on a military expedition. In the summer of 1269, however, just as Charles and al-Mustansir were turning from conflict to accommodation, the demands of holy war made themselves felt once again, with uncertain consequences for the future of interreligious collaboration between Tunis and Sicily.

Notes

1 The vicar of Sicily was a kind of provincial governor: see Émile Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954), p. 63; Karl Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins von Hohenstaufen* (Leipzig: Koehler Verlag, 1940; original edition 1894), p. 69.

2 Saba Malaspina, pp. 190–2; Bartolomeus of Neocastro, *Historia Sicula*, ed. Giuseppe Paladino, in *RIS*, vol. 13, part 3, p. 7; *Annales Placentini Gibellini*, ed. G. H. Pertz, in *MGH SS*, vol. 18, p. 530.

3 Essentially an Arabized version of "Africa," the old Roman province, Ifriqiya was the name given to a territory running from Tripoli in the east to Bijaya (Bougie) in the west and corresponding roughly to what we might think of today as a kind of "Greater Tunisia."

4 For the early Hafsids, see Rouighi, pp. 25–37; Maribel Fierro, "The Almohads (524–668/1130–1269) and the Hafsids (627–932/1229–1526)," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Michael Cook, 6 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 87–94; Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 103–43; Atallah Dhina, *Les états de l'Occident musulman aux XIIIe, XIVe et XV siècles: Institutions gouvernementales et administratives* (Algiers: Office des publications universitaires, 1984); Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 201–42; Charles-André Julien, *History of North Africa: From the Arab Conquest to 1830*, ed. and rev. Roger Le Tourneau, English trans. John Petrie, ed. C. C. Stewart (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 138–219; Brunschvig, vol. 1: pp. 1–70.

5 For the Almohad caliph al-Maʾmun's repudiation of the teachings of the Almohad founder, Ibn Tumart, see Michael Lower, "The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of Thirteenth-Century North Africa," *Speculum* 89 (2014): pp. 609–12.

6 Rouighi, pp. 34–5.
7 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 627–8 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 336–7); Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Zarkashi, *Tarikh al-dawlatayn al-muwahhidiyya wa-l-hafsiyya*, ed. Husayn Yaʿqubi (Tunis: Librairie El Atika, 1998), pp. 70–1; translated as *Chronique des Almohades et des Hafçides*, ed. and trans. Edmond Fagnan (Constantine: Imprimerie Adolphe Braham, 1895), pp. 44–5.
8 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 628–31 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 338–40); Paul Sebag, *Tunis: Histoire d'une ville* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), p. 133.
9 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 634–51 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 343–6); al-Zarkashi, *Tarikh al-dawlatayn*, p. 71 (*Chronique des Hafçides*, pp. 45–6, 51).
10 Thorau, pp. 111–14. For the scholarly debate over the nature and significance of this restored Abbasid caliphate under the aegis of the Mamluks, see Peter M. Holt, "Some Observations on the Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 47 (1984): pp. 501–7.
11 On Ibn Khaldun's family background, see Rouighi, pp. 152–6.
12 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 652–5 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 347–50).
13 Al-Zarkashi, *Tarikh al-dawlatayn*, pp. 82–3 (*Chronique des Hafçides*, pp. 53–4).
14 *Traités*, pp. 28, 31–5 (Pisa), 89–90 (Marseille), 108, 116–18 (Genoa), 196–9 (Venice); Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 128–9; Brunschvig, vol. 1: pp. 27–9; *L'Espagne catalane*, pp. 93–4.
15 *Traités*, pp. 43–7 (Pisa), 118–21 (Genoa), 199–202 (Venice); Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 652 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 346–7); Brunschvig, vol. 1: p. 50.
16 Giovanni Villani, *Istorie Fiorentine di Giovanni Villani*, ed. Achille Mauri (Milan: Nicoló Bettoni e comp., 1834), p. 92; Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, p. 130.
17 *Traités*, pp. 118–21.
18 Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, p. 129; Sebag, *Tunis*, p. 131.
19 For medieval European mercenaries in North African armies, see Michael Lower, "Medieval European Mercenaries in North Africa: The Value of Difference," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 14 (2016): pp. 108–10; Lower, "Christian Mercenaries in Muslim Lands: Their Status in Medieval Islamic and Canon Law," in *The Crusader World*, ed. Adrian Boas (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 419–33; Lower, "The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of Thirteenth-Century North Africa," *Speculum* 89 (2014): pp. 601–31; and Simon Barton, "Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, *c*.1100–1300," in *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence: Studies in Honour of Angus MacKay*, ed. Roger Collins (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 23–45.
20 Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, cancelleria reial, register 9, f. 15r.; *L'Espagne catalane*, pp. 102–3; Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: p. 652 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: p. 347).
21 Alex Metcalfe, *The Muslims of Medieval Sicily* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 10–41.
22 David Abulafia, "The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expeditions to Majorca and the Muslim Mediterranean," in *Anglo-Norman Studies VII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1984*, ed. R. Allen Brown (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1985), pp. 26–49.
23 David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 14–16; Abulafia, "The Crown and the Economy under Roger II and His Successors," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 37 (1983): pp. 3–5; Idris Hady-Roger, *La Bérberie orientale sous les Zirides* (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1962), p. 663; Michael Brett, "Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century AD," *Journal of African History* 10 (1969): pp. 348–53. In importing vital foodstuffs for cash, Tunis was very much like Genoa, which also outgrew its agricultural hinterland in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries and looked to international markets to make up the shortfall.
24 Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 214–25; James M. Powell, "Economy and Society in the Kingdom of Sicily under Frederick II: Recent Perspectives," in *Intellectual Life at the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen*, ed. William Tronzo (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1994), pp. 266–9; Powell, "Medieval Monarchy and Trade: The Economic Policy of Frederick II in the Kingdom of Sicily (A Survey)," *Studi Medievali* 3.3 (1962): p. 523.
25 Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 143–8; Metcalfe, *Muslims of Medieval Italy*, pp. 280–7; Brian Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c.1050–1614* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 122.
26 James M. Powell, "Genoese Policy and the Kingdom of Sicily 1220–1240," *Mediaeval Studies* 28 (1966): p. 347; *Traités*, pp. 153–5. Mas Latrie dates the agreement to 1231; I follow the 1221 date proposed by Brunschvig in his "Note sur un traité conclu entre Tunis et l'empereur Frédéric II," *Revue Tunisienne* 34 (1932): pp. 153–60.
27 Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 146–8; Metcalfe, *Muslims of Medieval Italy*, pp. 283–5; *Traités*, pp. 196–9, 116–18.
28 Brunschvig, vol. 1: pp. 35–6; *Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi*, ed. Jean L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols (Paris: Henri Plon, 1852–61), vol. 5: p. 793; Powell, "Economy and Society," p. 263.
29 Abulafia, *Frederick II*, p. 332; for the medieval North African wheat trade, see Rouighi, pp. 84–5.
30 *Majus chronicon Lemovicense*, in *RHGF*, vol. 21: p. 776.
31 Saba Malaspina, pp. 228–9.
32 *Traités*, pp. 155–6.
33 *RCA*, vol. 1: p. 107 (Lefevre, no. 3).
34 Jean Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship, and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (London: Longman, 1998), p. 10; Peter Herde, *Karl I von Anjou* (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1979), p. 25. Charles's birthdate and family position are uncertain. He may or may not have had an older brother born about a year before him named Étienne who died in childbirth. If he did, then he was likely born in early spring 1227 and given the name Charles; if he did not, he may

have been born about a year earlier, named Étienne, and then later changed his name to Charles, signaling his rejection of an ecclesiastical career.

35 David Abulafia, "Charles of Anjou Reassessed," *Journal of Medieval History* 26 (2000): p. 93; *Thomae Tusci gesta imperatorum et pontificum*, ed. E. Ehrenfeuchter, *MGH SS*, vol. 22: p. 524; quoted in Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, 21.

36 Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, p. 13; Herde, *Karl I von Anjou*, p. 29.

37 Raymond reasoned that his older daughters had received reward enough already through the favorable unions he had arranged for them. Eleanor had married Henry III, king of England, Sanchia had married Henry's younger brother Richard of Cornwall, and Marguerite had married Louis IX.

38 Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, p. 42; Léonard, *Angevins de Naples*, p. 47.

39 Georges Lesage, *Marseille angevine: Recherche sur son évolution administrative, économique et urbaine de la victoire de Charles d'Anjou à l'arrivée de Jeanne I (1264–1348)* (Paris: E. Boccard, 1950), pp. 104, 107; Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, pp. 41–55.

40 Léonard, *Angevins de Naples*, p. 48; Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, p. 47; Herde, *Karl I von Anjou*, pp. 29–33.

41 Modern assessments of Sicily's economic potential in the Middle Ages have varied. See Abulafia, "Crown and the Economy," pp. 1–2; Powell, "Economy and Society," pp. 264–5.

42 Abulafia, "Charles of Anjou Reassessed," p. 109.

43 Borghese offers an important reevaluation of Charles's Mediterranean ambitions.

44 Borghese, pp. 205–6; *Sicilian Vespers*, pp. 98–100.

45 David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, 1200–1500: The Struggle for Dominion* (London: Longman, 1997), p. xv.

46 Donald M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 12–13; Borghese, pp. 205–6.

47 *Sicilian Vespers*, p. 116; Herde, *Karl I von Anjou*, p. 51; Léonard, *Angevins de Naples*, p. 64.

48 *RCA*, vol. 1: p. 29, no. 15 (Lefevre, no. 1); Sternfeld, pp. 31–4; Borghese, p. 11.

49 *Registres de Clément IV*, no. 1165; David Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 235–52. In 1269, Charles would have his son Philip declared king of Sardinia.

50 Bartolomeus of Neocastro, *Historia Sicula*, p. 7; Saba Malaspina, p. 182; *Sicilian Vespers*, p. 120; Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins*, p. 189; Borghese, p. 31.

51 Sternfeld, p. 79.

52 Ibn Khaldun, vol. 6: pp. 631–4, 656–60 (*Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2: pp. 341–3, 352–7); Rouighi, pp. 34–5; Brunschvig, vol. 1: pp. 47–9.

53 Sternfeld, pp. 320–4 (appendix A, no. 5).

54 Sternfeld, pp. 320–4 (appendix A, no. 5).

55 Jean Longnon, "Le traité de Viterbe entre Charles Ier d'Anjou et Guillaume de Villehardouin, prince de Morée (24 Mai 1267)," in *Studi in onore di Riccardo Filangieri*, 3 vols (Naples: L'Arte Tipografica, 1959), vol. 1: pp. 307–14.

56 Borghese, p. 15.

57 *RCA*, vol. 1: pp. 94–6, no. 3.

58 Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, p. 93.

59 *Registres de Clément IV*, no. 1201.

60 *Registres de Clément IV*, no. 1199.

61 Saba Malaspina, p. 184; Walter Gross, *Die Revolution in der Stadt Rom 1219–1254* (Berlin: Ebering, 1934; reprinted Vaduz: Kraus Reprints, 1965), pp. 28–39; Daniel Waley, *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 134–45; Léonard, *Angevins de Naples*, p. 61; *Sicilian Vespers*, p. 116.

62 Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins*, pp. 149–55, 199; Léonard, *Angevins de Naples*, p. 65; *Le antiche rime volgari*, ed. Alessandro d'Ancona and Domenico Comparetti, 5 vols (Bologna: Presso Gaetano Romagnoli, 1875–88), vol. 2: pp. 305–7.

63 Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins*, pp. 169–89; *Sicilian Vespers*, p. 122.

64 Dunbabin, *Charles of Anjou*, p. 58; Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom*, p. 124.

65 Saba Malaspina, pp. 197–8; Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins*, pp. 211–62; *Sicilian Vespers*, p. 125.

66 Herde, *Karl I von Anjou*, pp. 58–9; *Sicilian Vespers*, pp. 126–7.

67 On the battle of Tagliacozzo, see Saba Malaspina, pp. 202–8; *Sicilian Vespers*, pp. 126–32; Herde, *Karl I von Anjou*, pp. 58–62; Herde, "Die Schlacht bei Tagliacozzo: Eine historisch-topographische Studie," *Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* 25 (1962): pp. 679–744; Herde, "Taktiken muslimischer Heere vom ersten Kreuzzug bis ʿAyn Djalut und ihre Einwirkung auf die Schlacht bei Tagliacozzo (1268)," in his *Studien zur Papst- und Reichsgeschichte, zur Geschichte des Mittelmeerraumes und zum kanonischen Recht im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann Verlag), pp. 443–68.

68 Saba Malaspina, pp. 209–15.

69 Borghese, p. 19; Sternfeld, p. 109; Léonard, *Angevins de Naples*, p. 72.

70 Sternfeld, pp. 325–6 (appendix A, no. 8): Charles of Anjou orders the justiciar of Bari to recover the goods of traitors who had supported Conradin in Monopoli, in Apulia; *RCA*, vol. 4: p. 175 (Lefevre, no. 9); *Annales Placentini Gibellini*, p. 530.

71 Sternfeld, p. 113; *RCA*, vol. 2: pp. 161–2, no. 630 (Lefevre, no. 28); *RCA*, vol. 5: p. 106, no. 31 (Lefevre, no. 33); Saba Malaspina, p. 219, fn. 187, 220.

72 Sternfeld, p. 114; *Annales Placentini Gibellini*, p. 547.

73 Saba Malaspina, p. 183.

74 *RCA*, vol. 2: p. 175, no. 692 (Lefevre, no. 29).

75 Michael Lower, "Louis IX, Charles of Anjou, and the Tunis Crusade of 1270," in *Crusades: Medieval Worlds in Conflict*, ed.

Thomas F. Madden, James L. Naus, and Vincent Ryan (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), p. 180; *Registres de Clément IV*, no. 719; Léon Cadier, *Essai sur l'administration du royaume de Sicile sous Charles I et Charles II d'Anjou* (Paris: Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 1891), pp. 10, 30–2.