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The Splintered Aegean World

> In this calling [as a pirate], [Landolfo] fared considerably better than he had done as a trader: within a year he had taken and stripped so many Turkish ships that he had not merely recovered all he had lost in trade, but he had more than doubled his assets.
>
> Giovanni Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, II:4, written c.1351.[1]

In the passage above Giovanni Boccaccio tells the tale of the Amalfitan merchant Landolfo Rufolo, a story which encapsulates the splintered Aegean world of the fourteenth century. Landolfo, like many Italian merchants, had amassed great riches from trading in the eastern Mediterranean, but after losing his fortune he turned to piracy and redoubled his wealth by preying on Turkish vessels. Landolfo's luck, however, soon ran out when he fell victim to the hazards of the Aegean Sea: first he was forced to take shelter on a small island after a sirocco blew up, and then his vessel was seized by two Genoese merchant ships who had also sought shelter on the same island. As Boccaccio writes, 'Landolfo was taken on board one of the two stout merchantmen, while his vessel was stripped bare then scuttled, leaving the prisoner in nothing but his shirt'.

The story of Landolfo aptly demonstrates the insecurity of the Aegean, where the high concentration of islands and a mixture of competing peoples and states made the region notoriously difficult to police. Ships were vulnerable to attack and piratical raids were a constant threat to those living near the shore. The situation was compounded by the lack of a dominant power in the region, where Latins, Greeks and Turks all vied for control, but rarely enjoyed supremacy.[2] As Steven Epstein has commented, 'No other region of

[1] Giovanni Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, trans. G. Waldman, ed. J. Usher (Oxford, 1993), pp. 83–4 (II:4).

[2] On piracy in the Aegean, see M. Angold, 'Michael VIII Palaiologos and the Aegean', in *Liquid and Multiple: Individuals and Identities in the Thirteenth-Century Aegean*, ed. G. Saint-Guillain and D. Stathakopoulos (Paris, 2012), pp. 27–44; P. Charanis, 'Piracy in the Aegean during the reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus', *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves* 10 (1950), 127–36; G. Airaldi, 'Roger of Lauria's expedition to the Peloponnese', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 10 (1995), 14–23. In a wider Mediterranean context: C.R. Backman, 'Piracy', in *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, ed. P. Horden and S. Kinoshita (Chichester, 2014), pp. 172–83.

Europe or the Mediterranean became a cynosure of so many ethnicities in such a small place'.[3] It is within this land of maximum fragmentation, at a time when the tales of knights and hermits had been replaced by those of merchants and pirates, that the Latin powers would trade and ally with, but also struggle against, the Turkish and Greek peoples of the region.[4]

The Aegean Sea was politically and geographically fragmented, but also of enormous strategic importance. It is this combination that made control of the region such a great aspiration, but also so difficult to achieve. Without control of the Aegean, no state could establish itself as the supreme power in the north-eastern Mediterranean, as the Byzantines had done before 1204 and the Ottomans were to do after 1453.[5] It lay at the heart of the great trade routes extending from Egypt and Syria in the south, and from the kingdoms of Europe in the west. Ships travelling to the eastern Mediterranean sailed the main artery that ran along the southern coast of the Peloponnese, from where they took several routes through Aegean waters. Two of these proceeded to Constantinople and the lucrative markets of the Black Sea beyond; one along the northern shore via Negroponte and Thessalonica and another via Chios. Further routes ran via Crete and the southern Aegean to Asia Minor, while vessels making their way to Egypt commonly sailed from Crete to Cyprus and further east, or made their way across the Aegean to Rhodes and proceeded from there across the open sea, or along the southern shore of Asia Minor, to the Levant (see Map 3).[6]

The many islands in the Aegean also provided sailors with numerous

[3] S.A. Epstein, *Purity Lost: Transgressing Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1000–1400* (Baltimore, 2007), p. 110. See also the discussion of shifting identities and boundaries in J. Preiser-Kapeller, 'Liquid frontiers: A relational analysis of maritime Asia Minor as a religious contact zone in the thirteenth–fifteenth centuries', in *Islam and Christianity in Mediaeval Anatolia*, ed. A.C.S. Peacock, B. de Nicola and S.N. Yıldız (Ashgate, 2015), pp. 117–45.

[4] See the comments on Mediterranean literature by S. Kinoshita, 'Locating the eastern Mediterranean', in *Locating the Middle Ages: The Spaces and Places of Medieval Culture*, ed. J. Weiss and S. Salih (London, 2012), pp. 39–52, at p. 45.

[5] A useful introduction to the medieval Aegean is given by P. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500* (London, 1995); and also Epstein, *Purity Lost*, pp. 52–95, 110–15.

[6] For a discussion of Aegean trade within a wider Mediterranean context, see D. Jacoby, 'The economy of Latin Greece', in *A Companion to Latin Greece*, ed. N.I. Tsougarakis and P. Lock (Leiden, 2014), pp. 185–216, esp. 211–15. In regard to navigation, it should be noted that the main trunk routes were not the only ones used by sailors, especially those of smaller craft. For a recent study, see R. Gluzman, 'Between Venice and the Levant: Re-evaluating maritime routes from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century', *The Mariner's Mirror* 96 (2010), 264–94. This is a reappraisal of the traditional interpretation given by J.H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 12–24, 87–101 (see 97–99 for the Aegean); idem, 'The geographical conditions of galley navigation in the Mediterranean', in *The Age of the Galley: Mediterranean Oared Vessels Since Pre-Classical Times*, ed. R. Gardiner (London, 1995), pp. 206–16.

Figure 1. The coast of Asia Minor from Rhodes Town

ports of call and allowed for relatively easy navigation. In addition, the location of important harbour-cities along its shores, especially in Greece and Asia Minor, allowed access to the interiors of those lands and beyond.[7] To add to this, Asia Minor and the Aegean islands were sources of much natural wealth, such as alum from the Phokaia mines and mastic from Chios: goods which were exported to far-away markets in the east and west. The region was thus a hub of thriving local industry and an important economic centre in its own right.[8] The Aegean islands also gained heightened significance because of their proximity to one another and their strategic location. Rhodes and Chios, for example, were within eyesight of the Turkish coast. This allowed them to influence the passage of ships sailing to and from the nearby Anatolian ports, as well as command the trade routes running from Famagusta and Alexandria in the south to Constantinople and the Black Sea in the north (see Fig. 1).

[7] To give some context, medieval sources list almost 100 ports and landing places along the southern coast of Asia Minor alone: Preiser-Kapeller, 'Liquid frontiers', p. 117; H. Hellenkemper and F. Hild, *Lykien und Pamphylien* (Vienna, 2004), pp. 288–93.

[8] For more on inter-Aegean trade and commodities, see D. Jacoby, 'The eastern Mediterranean in the later Middle Ages: An island world?', in *Byzantines, Latins, and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1150*, ed. C Holmes, J. Harris and E. Russell (Oxford, 2012), pp. 93–117.

Byzantium and its Rivals after 1204

In the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, the Frankish principalities founded in the regions of Romania (*Ρωμανία*), that is the lands of the Byzantine empire before 1204, included the Latin empire of Constantinople, the kingdom of Thessalonica, the principality of Achaia, the duchy of Athens and Thebes, the duchy of the Archipelago (also called the duchy of Naxos), and several Venetian lordships in the Aegean.[9] The remaining Byzantine factions also formed their own successor states on the fringes of the empire, at Nicaea and Trebizond in Asia Minor, and at Epiros in north-eastern Greece. The Fourth Crusade therefore shattered the Byzantine empire, not just into fragments ruled by the victorious Latin powers, but also into parts governed by rival Greek claimants to the imperial throne. Even after the recovery of Constantinople by the emperor of Nicaea, Michael VIII Palaiologos, in 1261, the Byzantine emperors would never enjoy the benefits of a united empire as their predecessors had done. In fact, the restored empire became the vacuum in the Aegean world, which sucked in various outside powers who sought to establish, maintain or expand their influence in the region.

At the death of Michael VIII in 1282, the empire inherited by his son, Andronikos II Palaiologos, consisted of the western portion of Asia Minor, the southern areas of Thrace and Macedonia, a smattering of the Aegean islands, including Lesbos, Rhodes and Chios, and several important cities, including Thessalonica and the capital, Constantinople. Michael VIII had been able to recover part of the Peloponnese from the Latins and some territories from a weakened Bulgaria, but the majority of Greece was still under Frankish control and the northern borders were under threat from the rising power of Serbia. Moreover, Thessaly and Epiros were in the hands of the rival Angeli dynasty and the northern half of the Balkan peninsula remained under the control of the Serbs. Apart from a brief interlude in the early 1290s, Andronikos II was never able to assert control over the Balkans and as his reign progressed, he struggled to maintain his northern and western frontiers. The Serbs in particular were to become the dominant power in these regions and were soon able to penetrate more deeply into the old Byzantine territories. The weakness of the empire was further compounded by internal instability. Michael VIII had angered large portions of the populace by agreeing to the union of the Greek and Latin Churches at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274 and although Andronikos II had

[9] For the Fourth Crusade, see D.E. Queller and T.F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd edition (Philadelphia, 1997); M. Angold, *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context* (Harlow, 2003). For the Latin states in Romania, see R.L. Wolff, *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1976); Lock, *Franks in the Aegean*.

been careful to repudiate the union on his accession, many who opposed his father also opposed him. As the empire became increasingly enfeebled factions inevitably emerged which looked to other members of the Byzantine ruling elite, such as the emperor's grandson, the future Andronikos III, or even to outside rulers to protect their interests. Political and religious strife combined with economic and military weakness became a toxic formula which the restored empire was never able to sufficiently deal with.[10]

The situation was, however, even more dire on the empire's eastern frontier, where great swathes of territory were being lost to the Turks. The origins of the Turks will be dealt with in the next chapter, but for now it is worth recounting the vivid testimony that Byzantine sources give to the threat which they posed to the empire at this time. In a letter written at the turn of the fourteenth century, the patriarch of Constantinople urged Andronikos II to return to Constantinople from Thessalonica as soon as possible because of the impending threat from the Turks – 'the murderous Ishmaelites' – who he wrote were 'devouring the patrimony of Christ'.[11] By this time the first references to Turkish raids on Greek islands in the Aegean also appear. A striking account is given by the Greek historian George Pachymeres, who reported that many Turks had advanced from the interior of Asia Minor to the coastal regions, where they had forced the native inhabitants to flee. They then constructed vessels, with which they plundered the Cyclades and a number of other Aegean islands, including Chios, Samos, Karpathos and Rhodes. These assaults were so severe, lamented the author, that they deprived the islands of almost all their inhabitants and caused great suffering to those who remained on them and on the mainland. Even the regions of the interior were being devoured by the Turks like wildfire and every day new disasters were being announced to the emperor, who was unable to deal with one tragedy after another.[12] This bleak picture was corroborated by the Catalan chronicler Ramon Muntaner, who commented that in the winter of 1302/3 the Turks were launching regular raids against Chios

[10] For a background to the Byzantine successor states, the restored empire and its northern neighbours in this period, see M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261* (London, 1974); A.A.M. Bryer, *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos* (London, 1980); A.E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, MA, 1972); D.M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984); Idem, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 114–56; G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. J. Hussey, 2nd edition (London, 1968), pp. 478–98.

[11] Athanasios I, *The Correspondence of Athanasius I Patriarch of Constantinople: Letters to the Emperor Andronicus II, Members of the Imperial Family and Officials*, ed. and trans. A.-M.M. Talbot (Washington, 1975), pp. 2–5, doc. 1 (April 1299–October 1300).

[12] George Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, ed. A. Failler, trans. V. Laurent, 5 vols (Paris, 1984–1999), vol. 4, bk. 10, ch. 29, pp. 376–7.

and the neighbouring Greek islands.[13] The contemporary Venetian writer Marino Sanudo Torsello also grieved at the 'cruellest destruction' inflicted by the Turks on the eastern Aegean islands, which by this time were in a state of total devastation.[14] The Turkish advance was so swift that by c.1305 the important Byzantine city of Ephesos on the Aegean coast had fallen.[15]

The weakening of Byzantium up to this point, coupled with the events of 1204, led to the consolidation of various Latin states in the Aegean and Greece. The first to be discussed are those established by the Italian merchant republics. The Italians were a dominant force in the Aegean before the Fourth Crusade, but became even more influential afterwards as the expansion of commercial networks stimulated new levels of international trade and led to the settlement of Italian craftsmen in major centres throughout Romania.[16] The Genoese, as fierce rivals of the Venetians, had been traditional allies of the exiled Byzantine emperors, especially Michael VIII, whom they assisted in his struggle against the Latin empire. After the recovery of Constantinople, Michael rewarded the Genoese for their support by granting them permission to trade in the Black Sea, a measure which he also extended to the Venetians in the following years. This allowed Italian merchants direct access to the Mongol ports of the Golden Horde and the markets of Central Asia, the importance of which increased even more after the fall of Acre and the last Latin outposts on the Syrian coast to the Mamluks in 1291. The surrendering of Byzantine commercial independence to the Genoese and Venetians was a result of the fragile condition of the empire and meant that the long-term commercial ambitions of both maritime republics now centred on maintaining control of their Aegean outposts.[17] The two Italian powers began to consolidate their dominance over specific waterways and maritime spaces, and by the turn of the fourteenth century the Aegean had become divided along political lines which reflected the fierce rivalry of

[13] Ramon Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East: from the Chronicle of Ramon Muntaner*, trans. R. Hughes (Barcelona, 2006), p. 52.

[14] Marino Sanudo, 'Liber Secretorum', p. 29; English translation: *Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross*, trans. P. Lock (Farnham, 2011), p. 59. These comments are further backed up by archaeological evidence that attests to the widespread depopulation of the region at this time: Bintliff, *The Complete Archaeology of Greece*, pp. 429–31.

[15] There is some debate as to whether the city fell in 1304 or 1305 see A. Failler, 'Éphèse fut-elle prise en 1304 par les Turcs de Sasan?', *Revue des études byzantines* 54 (1996), 245–8. For more on Sasa, see Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 19–24.

[16] See, for example, Bintliff, *The Complete Archaeology of Greece*, p. 419.

[17] M. Balard, 'Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans in the fourteenth century', *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. M. Jones, 7 vols (Cambridge, 1995–2005), vol. 6, pp. 825–38, at pp. 825–6.

the republics, with the Venetians controlling regions in the west and the Genoese and their allies in the east of the sea.[18]

Venetian possessions included the large island of Crete on the southern border of the Aegean, parts of Euboea (Negroponte) off the eastern coast of Greece and the districts of Modon and Coron on the south-eastern tip of the Morea (the Peloponnese peninsula), as well as a scattering of other smaller islands and districts.[19] In addition, the Venetian Sanudo family ruled the duchy of the Archipelago, incorporating most of the Cyclades, although strictly speaking they were not vassals of Venice but of the Latin emperor.[20] These regions were extremely important for the defence and expansion of Venetian trade in the eastern Mediterranean, primarily because they offered protection and acted as staging posts for the merchant vessels plying the trade routes from Venice to Constantinople and Alexandria. Ships were often constructed by the government and leased out to private individuals. In the fourteenth century it was common for them to be organized into state convoys which set sail from the mother-city twice a year; one to Romania, the other to Cyprus, Syria, Palestine and Egypt.[21] In the context of the highly fragmented political situation in the Aegean, the extent of the Venetian possessions, coupled with the power of its maritime empire, meant that Venice wielded substantial influence in the region and committed great resources for the protection of its trade routes and outposts there. Crete, in particular, was the dominant island in the area and was the most prized of all Venetian colonies overseas. For this reason Venetian assistance in any crusade to the Aegean was highly valued, even if at times it conflicted with the Republic's commercial interests.[22]

[18] Jacoby, 'The economy of Latin Greece', pp. 208–11.

[19] The city of Euripos was called Negroponte by the Latins. It was the prominent city of the island of Euboea, which was divided into several lordships, some of which were ruled by the Venetians. For the purposes of this study 'Negroponte' will refer to the areas of Venetian-ruled Euboea. See Lock, *Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 150–1; D. Jacoby, 'La consolidation de la domination de Venise dans la ville de Négrepont (1205–1390): un aspect de sa politique coloniale', in *Bisanzio, Venezia e il mondo franco-greco (XIII-XV secolo)*, ed. C.A. Maltezou and P. Schreiner (Venice, 2002), pp. 151–89 (repr. in Idem, *Latins, Greeks and Muslims: Encounters in the Eastern Mediterranean, Tenth–Fifteenth Centuries*, Variorum Reprints (Farnham, 2009), IX).

[20] For the Sanudi dukes of the Archipelago, see Lock, *Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 146–9; Vionis, *A Crusader, Ottoman and Early Modern Aegean Archaeology*, pp. 35–6.

[21] See F.C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (London, 1973), pp. 68–78, 124–34; Idem, 'Venetian merchant galleys, 1300–1334: Private and communal operation', *Speculum* 38.2 (1963), 179–205.

[22] For a background to Venice in the Aegean, see Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*; Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, pp. 30–43; Lock, *Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 135–60; J.E. Dotson, 'Venice, Genoa and control of the seas in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', in *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, ed. J.B. Hattendorf and R.W. Unger (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 119–36, at pp. 119–28.

After the Genoese were granted access to the Black Sea by Michael VIII in 1261, they also established colonies at Pera opposite Constantinople and at Caffa in the Crimea. Moreover, sometime between 1267 and 1275 the prominent Genoese merchant family of the Zaccaria were given control over the towns of Old and New Phokaia (Eski and Yeni Foça), situated on the Asia Minor coast some 50 kilometres northwest of the Gulf of Smyrna, and granted permission to mine alum in the mountains nearby.[23] In the first decade of the fourteenth century, the family were then granted rulership of the eastern Aegean island of Chios cementing their control over the waterways running to and from the Phokaias. Genoese dominance in the Aegean was enhanced after victory over its great maritime rival Venice at Curzola in 1298 and by the turn of the century it is said that the Commune of Genoa was at its prime.[24] It is important to understand that the Genoese in the eastern Mediterranean often acted independently of the mother-city; the colonies were usually governed with limited interference from the doge and administration of the homeland. This contrasted with the local Venetian administrations in Romania, which often maintained close contact with the government back in Venice. In addition, the Genoese state did not operate a regular convoy system and the ships used by Genoese sailors and merchants were usually constructed and owned by private individuals.[25] The Genoese often acted alone or as vassals of other states, making it far harder to establish a definitive Genoese 'policy' towards events in the Aegean. Nevertheless, they did maintain some form of unity in the area and often shared common interests and, more importantly, common enemies, especially the Venetians.

In addition to the lands held by the two great maritime republics, the Byzantines were also forced to relinquish possessions in the Aegean to other

[23] On the Zaccaria, see M. Carr, 'Trade or Crusade? The Zaccaria of Chios and crusades against the Turks', in *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean*, ed. M. Carr and N.G. Chrissis (Farnham, 2014), pp. 115–34; P.P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island: 1346–1566*, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1958), vol. 1; L. Balletto, 'Les Génois à Phocée et à Chio du XIIIe au XIVe siècle', in *Byzance et le monde extérieur. Contacts, relations, échanges,* ed. M. Balard, E. Malamut and J.-M. Spieser (Paris, 2005), pp. 45–57; L. Gatto, 'Per la storia di Martino Zaccaria, signore di Chio', *Bullettino dell'Archivio Paleografico Italiano*, n.s., 2–3, part 1 (1956–7), 325–45, at 337–9; R. Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante* (Milan, 1933; repr. with introduction by Michel Balard, Genoa, 1996). Also of interest, although now very dated, is W. Miller, 'The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios, 1275–1329', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 31 (1911), 44–55.

[24] See the comments of B.Z. Kedar, *Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-Century Depression* (London, 1976), p. 5. For a background to the Genoese in the Aegean, see ibid., pp. 1–20; and also Balard, *La Romanie génoise*; S.A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528* (Chapel Hill, 1996), pp. 141–87.

[25] This point is emphasized in A. Agosto and A.M. Salone, *Mostra Documentaria Genova e Venezia tra i secoli XII e XIV* (Genoa, 1984), p. 9; Kedar, *Merchants in Crisis*, pp. 5–9; Lane, 'Venetian merchant galleys, 1300–1334', 179–80, 202–3; R. Lopez, 'Venice and Genoa: two styles, one success', *Diogenes* 71 (1970), 39–47.

Latin powers. These included Rhodes and several islands of the Dodecanese archipelago, which were seized by the Knights Hospitaller in c.1306–10.[26] The Hospitallers were a military-religious order with considerable wealth from western estates, whose ostensible reason for occupying Rhodes was to help defend Latin territories and to provide support for future crusading endeavours, be they against the Greeks and Turks in Romania, or against the Saracens in the Holy Land.[27] This *raison d'être*, combined with the strategic importance of the island, meant that the Hospitallers became a significant power in the Aegean and integral to crusading in the region, although they too became enmeshed in the rivalries and conflicts which characterized relations between the resident Latin powers.

In mainland Greece the Franks had held territories since the Fourth Crusade, but in the early fourteenth century another western power, the Catalans, emerged on the scene. The arrival of the Catalans in Romania can also be linked back to the inherent weakness of Byzantium in these years, especially the increasing reliance of the emperors on foreign mercenaries to defend their borders. The Catalans were employed in this way by Andronikos II to fight against the Turks in Asia Minor, but in 1305 they turned against their paymaster and in alliance with the Turks began ravaging the regions of Constantinople, Thrace and Macedonia, before marching into Thessaly.[28] In 1311, the Catalans then turned their attention from the Byzantines to the Franks of the Morea and seized the duchy of Athens, after killing Duke Walter I of Brienne at the battle of Cephissus. Until then Athens was technically a vassal state of the principality of the Achaia, which came under the suzerainty of the Angevin king of Naples, who at this point was Robert the Wise, along with his younger brothers Philip of Taranto and John of Gravina.[29] The Catalans had strong links to the rival Crown of Aragon and consequently posed a threat to Angevin and Brienne interests in

[26] The Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, pp. 66–7.

[27] Hospitaller Rhodes has been the focus of numerous studies by Anthony Luttrell, many of which can be found in five volumes of Variorum Reprints: *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West, 1291–1440: Collected Studies* (Aldershot, 1978); *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291–1440* (Aldershot, 1982); *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World* (Aldershot, 1992); *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces, 1306–1462* (Aldershot, 1999); *Studies on the Hospitallers after 1306: Rhodes and the West* (Aldershot, 2007).

[28] R.I. Burns, 'The Catalan Company and the European powers, 1305–1311', *Speculum* 29 (1954), 751–71; S. Kyriakidis, 'The employment of large groups of mercenaries in Byzantium in the period ca. 1290–1305 as viewed by the sources', *Byzantion* 79 (2009), 208–30, at 216–30. The most comprehensive treatment of the Catalans still remains that of Setton, although this is now very dated and at times erroneous: K.M. Setton, *The Catalan Domination of Athens: 1311–1388* (Cambridge, MA, 1948).

[29] For more on Frankish possessions in Greece during the fourteenth century, see Lock, *Franks in the Aegean*, pp. 68–108; P. Topping, 'The Morea, 1311–1364', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K.M. Setton, 6 vols (Madison, 1969–1989), vol. 3, pp. 104–40, at pp. 104–7.

the area. On the other hand this meant that they were no longer the natural enemies of the Byzantines and slowly their relationship with the emperor at Constantinople improved. The rulers of the Latin possessions in Greece were thus in regular conflict with the main Greek and Turkish protagonists in the region, with the result that their territories were also inextricably linked to crusading in the Aegean.[30]

Finally, although not Aegean states, it is worth commenting on the two kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia. They were closely linked to Byzantium and also played an important role in crusading in the region. Cyprus lay on the trade routes running from the Black Sea and western Europe to the Levant and was the furthest east of all Latin holdings in the Mediterranean. The position of the island had always allowed the Lusignan rulers to play an important role in the crusades and, as the Turks grew in strength, the Cypriot kings once again found themselves on the crusading frontier, this time in opposition to the Turcoman principalities of south-eastern Anatolia. Because of this, expeditions were regularly planned with the aim of providing aid to Cyprus, and the kings of the island became active participants in campaigns against the Turks, especially the naval leagues of the 1330s and 1340s.[31] Cilician Armenia, sandwiched between the Turks in Anatolia and the Mamluks in northern Syria, also occupied a strategic position in the East, with the city of Lajazzo (Ayas) constituting the last important Christian port on the Levantine coast after the fall of Acre. During the fourteenth century the position of the kingdom became progressively more perilous as the incursions of the Turks, Mamluks and Mongols increased. Consequently, Armenia began to feature heavily in crusade proposals, even though aid from western Europe was rarely forthcoming. In many instances plans to lend assistance to Cyprus and Cilician Armenia were combined with larger projects to liberate the Holy Land, but at times they were also linked to expeditions which had the objective of limiting Turkish expansion into the Aegean region.[32]

[30] D. Jacoby, 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305–1332): Un nouveau témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello', *Studia Medievali* 15.1 (1974), 217–61 (repr. in Idem, *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siècle: peuples, sociétés, économies*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1979), V); E.A. Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens and the beginning of Turkish expansion in the Aegean area', *Studia Medievali* 21.2 (1980), 821–38 (repr. in Idem, *Romania and the Turks, c.1300–1500* (London, 1985), V).

[31] For Cyprus, see N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus: 1313–1378* (Nicosia, 2010), pp. 97–179; P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades: 1191–1374* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 101–41; G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols (Cambridge, 1940–52), vol. 2, pp. 192–303.

[32] For Cilician Armenia, see M.-A. Chevalier, *Les ordres religieux-militaires en Arménie cilicienne: templiers, hospitaliers, teutoniques et Arméniens à l'époque des croisades* (Paris, 2009), esp. pp. 573–678; T.S.R. Boase 'The history of the kingdom', in *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, ed. T.S.R. Boase (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 1–33; A.T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers'

Western Hostility towards Byzantium after 1204

The Fourth Crusade shattered the Byzantine empire and also ushered in a period of crusading against the Greeks. At first this manifested itself in the form of campaigns to shore up the Latin empire and other states in Romania, but once Constantinople fell in 1261 plans were made to recover the city, sometimes as a preliminary to the eventual liberation of Jerusalem. The attitudes of the western powers towards Byzantium had a significant impact on the evolution of the idea of a crusade against the Turks which gradually came to the fore in the second and third decades of the fourteenth century. Therefore, before the emergence of an anti-Turkish crusade is discussed in the following chapters, it is first necessary to provide an overview of crusading against the Greeks from 1204.

Over the course of the thirteenth century, the Aegean region evolved into an active crusading frontier as the Franks, with the support of the papacy, struggled to preserve their territories against the exiled Greek claimants. As early as May 1205 Pope Innocent III granted the crusade indulgence to those who would help defend the Latin empire, followed by the launching of an unsuccessful expedition to Romania in 1207. His successor Honorius III increased these efforts, preaching crusades in 1217 and 1223, which in terms of the level of papal support equalled and at times even surpassed those being organized in the Baltic and southern France. Other campaigns followed under Pope Gregory IX, including a crusade against the Nicaean emperor John III Vatatzes. But despite these efforts the Latin empire became increasingly enfeebled until it was reduced chiefly to Constantinople and its environs.[33]

After Constantinople was captured by Michael VIII in 1261, crusades were then preached with the aim of restoring the Latin empire. Initially the impetus came from the powerful Angevin king of Naples and Sicily, Charles of Anjou, who was the brother of King Louis IX of France and also a claimant to territories in Greece. Michael VIII was, however, an astute diplomat who was able repeatedly to foil Angevin plans, despite the military weakness of his empire. The agreement with the papacy which led to the union of the Greek and Latin Churches in 1274 was one such measure, as was his role in helping foment the outbreak of the Sicilian Vespers in 1282. The war in Sicily developed into a wider confrontation between the

interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1271–1375', *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, ed. T.S.R. Boase (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 118–44.

[33] On crusades against the Byzantines in the thirteenth century, see the recent studies by N.G. Chrissis, in particular: *Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282* (Turnhout, 2012); 'New frontiers: Frankish Greece and the development of crusading in the early thirteenth century', in *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204–1453*, ed. M. Carr and N.G. Chrissis (Farnham, 2014), pp. 17–41.

Aragonese and Angevin royal houses into which many of the main players in Mediterranean Europe were drawn, including the Italian Ghibellines and the Sicilians in support of Aragon, and the papacy and the Capetian house of France on the side of the Angevins. The conflict would rumble on for the next twenty years. It distracted the western powers from a crusade against Byzantium, while also permanently fragmenting the Angevin hegemony in the central Mediterranean.[34]

The war over Sicily finally came to an end with the Peace of Caltabellotta in 1302, after which projects to re-establish the Latin empire of Constantinople were revived. Chief amongst these was a crusade planned by Charles of Valois, the younger brother of Philip IV of France, which dominated crusade planning during the pontificate of Clement V. Charles had married the titular Latin empress of Constantinople, Catherine of Courtenay, in 1301 and began preparing a campaign which would both recover Constantinople and also pave the way for a general passage to the Holy Land to be led by his brother Philip IV.[35] The preparations for this campaign reached an advanced stage. In 1304 and again in 1306 the full crusade indulgence was granted to participants and extensive church tithes were levied.[36] Then in 1307 a ban of excommunication was pronounced against Emperor Andronikos II and his supporters, who were condemned as schismatics and usurpers of the imperial throne.[37] In December 1306, Venice concluded a treaty with Charles, which stipulated that the crusader fleet was to depart from Brindisi within a year from March 1307.[38] Charles also gained assistance from the prince of Achaia, Philip of Taranto, who would use the crusade to shore up his newly acquired Angevin lands in Greece.[39] As well as this, in 1307 Charles sought to recruit local factions in the Aegean, such as the Catalan

[34] On the Sicilian Vespers, see S. Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1958); D.J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282: A Study Into Byzantine-Latin Relations* (Cambridge, MA, 1959), pp. 335–67; J. Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1998), pp. 99–113.

[35] Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 43–56; Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades: 1261–1354', pp. 42–5.

[36] *Le registre de Benoît XI*, docs 1006–7; Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 1, docs 243–7; vol. 2, docs 1755, 1758.

[37] Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 2, doc. 1759; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 163–8.

[38] For the treaty with Venice, see Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 1, doc. 248 (14 Jan 1306); *DVL*, vol. 1, doc. 27; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 204–7.

[39] Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 2, doc. 1604–5 (15 May 1307). Philip had led a campaign to consolidate his hold on Achaia in the summer of 1306: D.M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros 1267–1479: A Contribution to the History of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 59–61; Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 775 (letter 2); Roddy trans., p. 251 (letter 30).

Company, who by this point had turned against their erstwhile employer Andronikos II, and a number of Greek conspirators in Asia Minor, unhappy with the rule of the emperor.[40] In the same year Charles even managed to dispatch a small fleet under the command of the French knight Thibault of Cepoy to the Aegean to cement these alliances, but his actions ultimately proved fruitless.[41] Over the next few years the crusading project of Charles of Valois fell apart. The death of his wife Catherine of Courtenay in 1308 and the transfer of her claim to their daughter Catherine of Valois was a major setback, as were the constant delays in securing the funds needed to get the campaign underway. To add to this, support from the king of France began to waver as other events, such as the ongoing conflict with Flanders and the arrest of the Knights Templar (1307), took precedence.[42] Charles persuaded the Venetians to postpone the expedition until February 1310, but when he failed to make this new deadline, they concluded a peace treaty with the Byzantine government, effectively putting an end to the projected crusade.[43]

After the collapse of the crusade plans of Charles of Valois, attempts to recover Constantinople and launch a general expedition to the Holy Land were revived by Clement V at the Council of Vienne in 1311–12.[44] Here a new date was set for a crusade to liberate Jerusalem to be led by Philip IV, which would also be preceded by a preliminary campaign to protect the Angevin kingdom of Achaia from the incursions of the Greeks and Catalans and even to recover Constantinople itself. This was now to be commanded by Philip of Taranto, who it was agreed would marry Catherine of Valois in 1313 and thus inherit the claim to the Latin empire.[45] Although indulgences were issued and extensive church tithes decreed for these campaigns, neither Philip of Taranto, the French king nor the pope was able to get

[40] For the negotiations with the Catalans, see Ramon Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East*, pp. 102–4, 130–4; *DOC*, doc. 34, p. 42; Burns, 'The Catalan Company and the European powers', 751–71; Setton, *The Catalan Domination of Athens*, pp. 1–5; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 208–9. For the Greek conspirators, see Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 212–20; J.L. Boojamra, 'Athanasios of Constantinople: a study of Byzantine reactions to Latin religious infiltration', *Church History* 48.1 (1979), 27–48, at 38–9.

[41] According to Sanudo, this flotilla numbered thirteen vessels and sixty cavalry: Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo', 774–5 (letter 2); Roddy trans., pp. 250–1 (letter 30); Ramon Muntaner, *The Catalan Expedition to the East*, pp. 130–1.

[42] Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 233–5; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 179–84,

[43] Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 168; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 236–7.

[44] Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I to Vatican II*, vol. 1, pp. 333–401; S. Menache, *Clement V* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 112–18, 205–46, 279–305.

[45] Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 238–9.

the expedition off the ground.[46] The deaths in 1314 of both Clement V and Philip IV made sure of this. Even though the Valois and Angevin plans to recover Constantinople in the first decades of the fourteenth century proved to be ultimately unsuccessful, they were indicative of western perceptions of the Byzantines at this time. These in many ways mirrored the attitudes born in the thirteenth century, which justified crusading against the Greeks on the grounds that they were schismatics and centred on the defence or recovery of Latin lands from them in Romania. However, increasingly these campaigns became intertwined with French affairs, and consequently they suffered when domestic issues distracted the attention of the king of France away from a crusade.

During the pontificate of John XXII, crusade plans against the Byzantines were intermittently revived, but no expedition on the scale of that planned by Charles of Valois ever came close to materializing. The intensification of the wars in Italy and the rising tensions between the French and their neighbours in northern Europe, in particular, diverted attention and resources from a crusade to Constantinople.[47] Projects were still discussed in the courts of the French Kings Philip V and Charles IV, but John XXII proved to be far less generous with church taxation than his predecessor and these negotiations repeatedly broke down over problems of finance.[48] Increasingly crusade negotiations began to focus less on the idea of liberating the Holy Land by going by way of Constantinople and instead plans for a smaller and

[46] Clement V, *Regestum*, vol. 7, docs 7759–65, 7893, 8863–8, vol. 8, docs 8897–8, 8913–6, 9276; Tyerman, 'Sed nihil fecit?', pp. 170–1; Menache, *Clement V*, pp. 112–18; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 239–57.

[47] For Italy, see Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 84–6, 106–10, 250–1; P. Partner, *The Lands of St Peter: The Papal States in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance* (London, 1972), pp. 318–26; G. Mollat, *The Popes at Avignon: 1305–1378*, trans. J. Love (London, 1963), pp. 94–110; J. Leonhard, *Genua und die päpstliche Kurie in Avignon (1305 – 1378): politische und diplomatische Beziehungen im 14. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 2013), esp. pp. 79–160. For Northern Europe, see W.C. Jordan, *The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Princeton, 1996); D. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London, 1992), pp. 186–208; N. Housley, 'France, England and the "national crusade", 1302–86', in *France and the British Isles in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, ed. G. Jondorf and D.N. Dumville (Woodbridge, 1991), pp. 183–201, at pp. 186–8 (repr. in Idem, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2001), VII); P. Chaplais, *The War of Saint-Sardos (1323–1325): Gascon Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents* (London, 1954), pp. ix–xiii.

[48] See, for example, Tyerman, 'Sed nihil fecit?', pp. 170–81; C.J. Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319–20 and the crusade', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 57 (1984), 15–34 (repr. in Idem, *The Practices of Crusading: Image and Action from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Centuries*, Variorum Reprints (Farnham, 2013), II); N. Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations in 1322–3', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 48 (1980), 166–85 (repr. in Idem, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Variorum Reprints (Aldershot, 2001), XII); C.H. Taylor, 'French assemblies and subsidy in 1321', *Speculum* 43 (1968), 217–44.

more realistic *passagium particulare* to relieve Cyprus and Cilician Armenia began to take precedent.[49] In fact, from 1324 to 1327, (unsuccessful) negotiations for the union of the Greek and Latin Churches were undertaken at the behest of Andronikos II and the crusade theorist Marino Sanudo, who acted as an intermediary between the emperor, the pope and Charles IV of France.[50] However, while it is true that the 1320s became a period of diminishing western aggression towards the Byzantines, it was also a time in which the realization of any Franco-papal crusade project was severely hindered by external events, regardless of its target. It would therefore be misleading to interpret this decade as signifying a dramatic shift in Franco-papal perceptions of the Byzantines.[51] Apart from the short period of union negotiations, attitudes towards the emperor remained overwhelmingly hostile. For example, throughout the 1320s a series of smaller Angevin campaigns against the Greeks in the Morea were planned and launched which were sometimes awarded crusading privileges by the pope. Even in the early 1330s John XXII supported an Angevin-Brienne campaign to Greece and issued a number of bulls condemning the actions of the schismatic Greeks in the region.[52] This longstanding animosity towards the Byzantines would continue to influence papal policy in regard to a campaign in the Aegean, as will be discussed in the following chapters.

[49] As Laiou has suggested, very few of the Franco-papal crusade projects of the 1320s were focussed on Byzantium: Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 315–18.

[50] For more on these church union negotiations, see Chapter 5 (pp. 96–8) and also Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 308–29; Idem, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: the background to the anti-Turkish league of 1332–1334', *Speculum* 45 (1970), 374–92, at 381–3; G. Durrholder, *Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann XXII* (Strasbourg, 1913), pp. 30–57; J. Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400* (New Brunswick, 1979), pp. 191–2.

[51] This period of Byzantine-western relations is discussed in detail by: Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 308–29.

[52] The papal-Angevin campaigns in Greece are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (pp. 94–6).