



# ChipWhisperer

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**Bootcamp on Embedded Security and Trust (BEST 2025)** 



# **Overview**



- Side Channel Infrastructure
- ChipWhisperer Setup
- Trace collection using ChipWhisperer-Lite
- CPA Basics and implementation



# **Attack Model / Assumptions**



- Consider a device capable of implementing the cryptographic function
- The key is usually stored in the device and protected
- Modern cryptography is based on Kerckhoffs's assumption.
- Any data other than the key is Public
- Attacker only needs to extract the key



# **Attack Phases**



- Interaction phase: interact with the hardware system under attack and obtain the physical characteristics of the device
- Analysis phase: analyze the gathered information to recover the key




# **Side Channel Analysis Infrastructure**



Side-Channel attacks aim at side-channel inputs and outputs, bypassing the theoretical strength of cryptographic algorithms

**Power Consumption:** Logic circuits typically consume different amounts of power based on their input data



Time



# **Side Channel Analysis Infrastructure**




# **Electro-Magnetic:**


- Physically measure the electromagnetic emanations from an electronic device and use analytical methods and leakage models to steal information from the data.
- EM attacks are non-invasive
- This makes EM attacks powerful because they are easy for the attacker to perform. It only requires the use of a near-field probe and an oscilloscope.



# **Existing Side Channel Analysis Infrastructure**







#### **Process description:**

- The Target Device executes some cryptographic algorithm
- The radiations emanated by the target device is collected using the EM probe
- The EM feeds the signal to an oscilloscope via a pre-amplifier
- The data from the oscilloscope is further transferred on the host PC for further analysis






# Can we bring down these large setup into an integrated device?



# ChipWhisperer







# **Capture Boards**



#### Five capture side hardware devices:

- ChipWhisperer-Husky,
- ChipWhisperer-Husky-Plus,
- CW1200 ChipWhisperer-Pro (CWPro),
- CW1173 ChipWhisperer-Lite (CWLite), and
- CW1101 ChipWhisperer-Nano (CWNano)



# **ChipWhisperer-Lite**




- The ChipWhisperer-Lite typically comes with two main parts:
  - a multi-purpose power analysis capture instrument,
  - a target board
- Features, such as SMA connectors for trigger input and output, allowing for easy interfacing with lab equipment.
- Includes 8-bit Atmel XMEGA and 32-bit STM32F3 target devices



# **ChipWhisperer-Lite**






Handles **triggering** for side-channel and fault injection attacks.





**Universal target board** platform, providing power, clock, and trigger control for different target microcontrollers.








- It is the starting point for side-channel power analysis attacks when combined with a ChipWhisperer Capture solution.
- The CW308 puts all the standard requirements onto one board (such as power supplies, oscillators) to make super-simple target victim boards.






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## **CW308 Details**




#### The CW308 comes with the following parts

- CW308 Main Board
- CW308T-XMEGA Target Board (Atmel 8-bit microcontroller)
- CW308T-STM32F3 Target Board (ARM Cortex M3)
- CW308T Prototyping Boards (2.54mm prototyping board)
- NPCB-CW308T-STM32F Blank PCB (Fits STM32F0, F1, F2, F3, F4)
- Target Removal Tool
- 7.37 MHz crystal
- 8x jumper wires
- 30 cm SMA cable



#### **CW308 Details**








# **ChipWhisperer Capture**



#### The capture hardware provides

- power,
- serial communication,
- clock,
- shunt resistor monitoring,
- voltage fault injection capability.


Select devices (XMEGA, and STM32Fx) targets can be programmed from the ChipWhisperer, avoiding the need for an external programmer.





# **ChipWhisperer-Lite**







# Scope API



- Control the capture/glitch portion of the ChipWhisperer device.
- Create a scope object via the chipwhisperer.scope() function, which will connect to a ChipWhisperer device and return a scope object of the correct type

```
import chipwhisperer as cw
scope = cw.scope()
```

There are currently two types of scopes:

- OpenADC Scope (Lite, Pro, Husky)
- ChipWhisperer Nano Scope (Nano)



This function allows any type of scope to be created.

By default, the object created is based on the attached hardware (OpenADC for CWLite/CW1200, CWNano for CWNano)Scope Types:

scopes.OpenADC (Pro and Lite)

scopes.CWNano (Nano)

This class contains the public API for the OpenADC hardware, including the ChipWhisperer Lite. To connect to one of these devices

```
import chipwhisperer as cw
scope = cw.scope(scope_type=cw.scopes.OpenADC)
```

- scope.gain
- scope.adc
- scope.clock
- scope.io
- scope.trigger
- scope.glitch (Lite/Pro)
- scope.default\_setup
- scope.con
- scope.dis
- scope.arm
- scope.get\_last\_trace

Setup scope to begin capture/glitching when triggered.





#### **Scope Attributes**

#### scope.gain

Controls the gain (amplification) of the signal captured by the ADC.

#### scope.adc

- Represents the analog-to-digital converter (ADC) settings.
- Includes parameters like the sampling rate, offset, and triggering settings.

#### scope.clock

Handles clock settings for the target and glitch module.

#### scope.io

Manages I/O pins on the ChipWhisperer device.

#### scope.trigger

- Configures the trigger module, which determines when the scope starts capturing traces.
- Triggers can be based on rising edges, falling edges, or specific signal levels.

#### • scope.glitch

- Manages glitching settings, including width, offset, and trigger conditions.
- Used for voltage or clock glitching attacks.





#### **Scope Methods**

- scope.default\_setup()
  - Resets the scope to default settings.
- scope.con()
  - Connects to the ChipWhisperer hardware.
- scope.dis()
  - Disconnects from the ChipWhisperer hardware.
- scope.arm()
  - Arms the scope to start capturing power traces once a trigger event occurs.
- scope.get\_last\_trace()
  - Retrieves the last captured power trace after a successful capture.





scope.default\_setup()

# **Scope Default setup**

- Sets the scope gain to 45dB
- Sets the scope to capture 5000 samples
- Sets the scope offset to 0 (i.e., it will begin capturing as soon as it is triggered)
- Sets the scope trigger to rising edge
- Outputs a 7.37MHz clock to the target on HS2
- Clocks the scope ADC at 4\*7.37MHz. Note that this is synchronous to the target clock on HS2
- Assigns GPIO1 as serial RX (allowing data receiving from the target)
- Assigns GPIO2 as serial TX (allowing data transmission to the target)



# **Building and Uploading Firmware**



```
%%bash
cd ../firmware/mcu/simpleserial-base/
make PLATFORM= CRYPTO TARGET=NONE
```

make PLATFORM=CWLITEARM CRYPTO\_TARGET=TINYAES128C

// Uses TinyAES for encryption

## Attacking a target :

Get some firmware built and uploaded onto it.

 Fill in your platform, re-run the build command, and firmware should be successfully built.

PLATFORM=CW308 STM32F3



# **Communication with the Target**



Done through the SimpleSerial target object.

Grouped into two categories:

- Raw serial via target.read(), target.write(), target.flush(), etc.
- 2. SimpleSerial commands via target.simpleserial\_read(),
   target.simpleserial\_write(), target.simpleserial\_wait\_ack(), etc.

The firmware we uploaded uses the simpleserial protocol



# **Communication with the Target**



- SimpleSerial is a lightweight communication protocol used by ChipWhisperer to send and receive data between a host PC and a target device (XMEGA or STM32 microcontroller)
- Uses **UART** (serial communication) for data exchange
- HEX File Generated After Make Firmware
- Contains machine instructions for the microcontroller



# **Communication with the Target**



# **Encryption Application**

The encryption application provides a simple method to encrypt a plaintext into a ciphertext. The following operations are performed:

- Load encryption key with 'k' command (
   Eg: k2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c\n sets key to 2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c).
- Set input text to encryption module with 'p' command.
   Device encrypts input text, and toggles the I/O trigger line during the encryption operation.
- 3. The ciphertext is returned with the 'r' command.



# **Capturing Traces**



- Arm the ChipWhisperer with scope.arm()
  - It will begin capturing as soon as it is triggered
- scope.capture()
  - read back the captured power trace, blocking until either ChipWhisperer is done recording, or the scope times out.
- Read back the captured power trace with scope.get\_last\_trace()



# **Capturing Traces**



simpleserial\_base will trigger the ChipWhisperer when we send the 'p' command. Try capturing a trace now

```
scope.arm()
target.simpleserial_write('p', msg)
## fill in the rest...
```

#### ChipWhisperer also has a capture\_trace() convenience function that:

- 1. Optionally sends the 'k' command
- 2. Arms the scope
- 3. Sends the 'p' command
- 4. Captures the trace
- 5. Reads the return 'r' as response
- 6. Returns a Trace class that groups the trace data, 'p' message, the 'r' response, and the 'k' key.



## **Disconnect from the hardware**



```
scope.dis()
target.dis()
```



## **Useful Links**



https://rtfm.newae.com/Capture/ChipWhisperer-Lite/

https://www.newae.com/products/nae-cw1173

https://chipwhisperer.readthedocs.io/en/latest/windows-install.html

- Anaconda
- ARM GCC Compiler
- Visual Studio Code






# Let's try to capture some trace and perform Correlation Power Attack (CPA)



# **AES-128 Encryption**







# **Calculating the Hypothetical Power**



$s_0$	$S_4$	$S_8$	$S_{12}$	SubBytes and ShifRow
$s_1$	$S_5$	$S_9$	$s_{13}$	
$s_2$	$s_6$	$S_{10}$	$s_{14}$	7
$s_3$	87	$s_{11}$	$S_{15}$	

$\overset{S(S_0)}{\underset{\oplus}{\oplus}} c_0$	$\substack{S(S_4)\\ \oplus k_4=C_4}$	$\substack{S(S_8)\\ \oplus k_8 \equiv C_8}$	$\overset{S(S_{12})}{\oplus k_{12}} = C_{12}$
$\overset{S(S_{13})}{\oplus k_1}\overset{=}{=} C_1$	$\overset{S(S_1)}{\oplus k_5} = C_5$	$\underset{\oplus}{\overset{S(S_5)}{\oplus k_9}} \!\!\!=\!\! C_9$	$S(S_9) = C_{13}$
$\overset{S(S_{10})}{\underset{\oplus}{\oplus}} k_2 {=} C_2$	$\underset{\oplus}{\overset{S(S_{14})}{\oplus k_6} \stackrel{=}{=} C_6}$	$S(S_2) \\ \oplus k_{10} = C_{10}$	$S(S_6) \oplus k_{14} = C_{14}$
${}_{\oplus k_3=C_3}^{S(S_7)}$	$\underset{\oplus}{\overset{S(S_{11})}{\oplus k_7}} = C_7$	$S(S_{15}) \\ \oplus k_{11} = C_{11}$	$S(S_3) \oplus k_{15} = C_{15}$

Toggling in the registers measured by the Hamming Distance of the initial and final values.

RO	R4	RS	R12
RI	R5	R9	R13
R2	R6	R10	R14
R3	R7	R11	R15

R0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7
S0,C0	S1,C1	S2,C2	S3,C3	S4,C4	S5,C5	S6,C6	S7,C7
C0,K0	C5,K5	C10,K10	C15,K15	C4,K4	C9,K9	C14,K14	C3,K3

R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	R13	R14	R15
S8,C8	S9,C9	S10,C10	S11,C11	S12,C12	S13,C13	S14,C14	S15,C15
C8,K8	C13,K13	C2,K2	C7,K7	C12,K12	C1,K1	C6,K6	C11,K11



# **Computing the Correlation Matrix**




- Actual Power values for all the NSample encryptions are stored in the array trace[NSample][NPoint].
- Attacker first scans each column of this array and computes the average, and stores in meanTrace[NPoint].
- Likewise, the hypothetical power is stored in the array hPower[NSample][NKey].
- Attacker scans each column and stores in the array meanH[NKey]



### **Correlation Matrix**







$$C[i][j] = \frac{\Sigma_{k=0}^{NSample}(hPower[i][k] - meanH[i])(trace[j][k] - meanTrace[j])}{\Sigma_{k=0}^{NSample}(hPower[i][k] - meanH[i])^2\Sigma_{k=0}^{NSample}(trace[j][k] - meanTrace[j])^2}$$



#### **Correlation Matrix**











# **Fault Attack**






#### **Electromagnetic Fault Injection:**

 Emission of electromagnetic pulses on a specific location of the device can induce a fault.

### **Laser Fault Injection:**

- Emitting a laser pulse to a specific location of a device can cause a fault.
- The control of the attack is very high compared to the previous ones.
- This attack is invasive, since the packaging of the target chip must be at least partially removed (decapsulation).



#### Components in the setup:

- Arbitrary waveform generator: Keysight 81160A
- Constant-gain power amplifier: Teseq CBA 400M-260
- High-frequency near field H-probe: Rigol Near-field Probe 30MHz-3GHz
- XYZ table: Thorlabs SMC100



**EM** fault injection setup



EM Fault injection along with side channel observation setup





# Thank You