



OWASP 2025
GLOBAL
AppSec

BARCELONA

CENTRE DE
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BARCELONA
MAY 26-30



Pluggable DevSecOps for free, using community resources

Spyros Gasteratos

The OWASP superpower

The world's best security resources: 200+ projects

- Maturity Standards, Controls frameworks
- Top 10s
- CheatSheets,
- Posture Management
- SBOMs, SCA
- WAFs



The drawback

- You can't focus on everything at the same time
- Each team needs to do one thing very well
- But this creates the Dreaded Silos
- Silos require expensive manual work to unify



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PRESENTATION TITLE
ON EVERYTHING ABOUT
APPLICATION SECURITY

Manually connecting silos?
Think again!



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PRESENTATION TITLE
ON EVERYTHING ABOUT
APPLICATION SECURITY

Let's Solve this
Because all of us are affected

Nice to meet you

- Spyros Gasteratos
 - OWASP Volunteer
 - OpenSource dev
 - Founder – smithy.security



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Itinerary

- Problem Breakdown
- Information Unification
 - SARIF
 - OCSF
- Execution Unification
 - Rules of translation
 - Orchestration
 - Taming the Chaos
 - Workflows
- Scenario
- Future ideas
- Questions

Breakdown


- Unify information
- Unify execution
- Translate business processes to automated execution

Unify Information

- A singular way of representing that “something” is related to AppSec
- Open Source standards to the rescue
- SARIF
- OCSF

SARIF (Static Analysis Results Interchange Format)

- Open Source Standard for SAST
- Pros:
 - Vendors Support – Github
 - Human and machine readable – JSON
 - Supports evidence and traces
- Cons:
 - support MOSTLY SAST vendors
 - weak schemas
 - vendor dialects
 - a lot of arbitrary data fields




OCSF (Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework)

- Security agnostic schemas
- Pros:
 - SAST++++
 - Schemas AND tools (JSON, Protobuf)
 - More expressive than SARIF
 - Extensible
- Cons:
 - Designed by committee
 - Tools STILL don't map the same way
 - Steep learning curve
 - Footgun



OCSF



Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework

▼ v1.3.0

Extensions

- ☐ Linux (1)
- ☐ v1.3.0
- ☐ Windows (2)
- ☐ v1.3.0

Profiles

- ☐ Cloud
- ☐ Container
- ☐ Data Classification
- ☐ Date/Time
- ☐ Host
- ☐ Linux Users
- ☐ Load Balancer
- ☐ Network Proxy
- ☐ OSINT
- ☐ Security Control

OCSF Schema

Categories

The OCSF categories organize event classes, each aligned with a specific domain or area of focus.

System Activity (1)	Findings (2)	Identity & Access Management (3)	Application Activity (6)	Remediation (7)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> File System Activity (1001) Kernel Extension Activity (1002) Kernel Activity (1003) Memory Activity (1004) Module Activity (1005) Scheduled Job Activity (1006) Process Activity (1007) Event Log Activity (1008) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security Finding (2001) Vulnerability Finding (2002) Compliance Finding (2003) Defect (2004) Incident (2005) Data Security (2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Authentication Activity (3001) Authorization Activity (3002) Account Activity (3003) Session Activity (3004) System Patch State (5004) File Query (5007) Folder Query (5008) Admin Group Query (5009) Job Query (5010) Module Query (5011) Network Connection Query (5012) Networks Query (5013) Peripheral Device Query (5014) Process Query (5015) Service Query (5016) User Session Query (5017) User Query (5018) Device Config State Change (5019) Software Inventory Info (5020) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Web Resources Activity (6001) Application Lifecycle (6002) API Activity (6003) Web Resource Access Activity (6004) Database Activity (6005) File Hosting Activity (6006) Scan Activity (6007) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remediation Activity (7001) File Remediation Activity (7002) Process Remediation Activity (7003) Network Remediation Activity (7004)

Categories

The OCSF categories organize event classes, each aligned with a specific domain or area of focus.

20+ categories/types!

Categories

Classes

Base Event

Dictionary

Objects

Resources

Search



Itinerary

- ~~Problem Breakdown~~
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 - ~~SARIF~~
 - ~~OCSF~~
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
OCSF is the Vocabulary – Where is the Grammar?

- **SMITHY** – SDK
- The only Open Source SDK for OCSF. – Golang – For now
- Plug n Play
- Focus on writing business logic
- Translate \$tool -> OCSF
- Advanced capabilities



Orchestration Challenges

- Running security tools reliably not trivial
- Leveraging common knowledge is hard
- Not straightforward feedback loops



Taming the Chaos

- **SMITHY** – Workflows
- The Open Source AppSec workflow engine
- Orchestrate and Normalize
- Enrich and Filter
- Report
- Component Reusability and Registry




Taming the Chaos

- Standardise tools execution and implementation
- Automatic instrumentation:
 - Metrics
 - Logs
 - Traces
 - panic handling
- Centralized AppSec Datalake

Not impacting on production CI pipelines

Workflows

- Define component execution order and configuration
- Configurable via yaml or CLI





Itinerary

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Scenario: Sole AppSec in new Org

- No team
- No budget
- Not doomed – just feed off the land – use existing resources and orchestrate

A complete AppSec programme

- Strategy
- Controls
- Observability
- Data Centralization and understanding
- Culture and Awareness

Strategy

- SAMM
- Lightweight
- Verbose enough with levels
- Easy to follow questionnaire
- Automated tracking? – Smithy

A complete AppSec programme

- ~~Strategy~~
- Controls
- Observability
- Data Centralization and understanding
- Culture and Awareness



Controls

- ASVS and/or DSOMM
- Checklist for secure design and automation
- How do we know who is failing ASVS controls?

A complete AppSec programme

- ~~Strategy~~
- ~~Controls~~
- **Observability**
 - Data Centralization and understanding
 - Culture and Awareness

Observability

- Running tools has never been easier
- DepScan, CDXGen, Syft and SAST or DAST
- Routing findings where they should live.
 - Jira/Linear
 - Slack/Discord
 - DefectDojo/Any ASPM out that door
 - Dependency Track

A complete AppSec programme

- ~~Strategy~~
- ~~Controls~~
- ~~Observability~~
- Data Centralization and understanding
- Culture and Awareness

Data Centralization and understanding

- Reprioritisation and false positives?
- Filters!

A complete AppSec programme

- ~~Strategy~~
- ~~Controls~~
- ~~Observability~~
- ~~Data Centralization and understanding~~
- Culture and Awareness

Culture and Awareness

- Custom Training
- Agile Advice

More automation ideas

- Threat modeling (semi-generated) STRIDE-GPT, Threat Dragon, or PyTM
- Run on events.

Pitfalls

- Not using open standards and SDKs
- Raw Data dumping in human - focused fields
- Not being strict about original tool info – less is more
- Relying only on AI mappings

Closing

- Standing on the shoulders of giants
- The community power – tools and resources waiting to be put together.
- If you publish code or docs, thank you.

To Recap

- Community resources FTW!
- Dirty Scripts and manual orchestration doesn't scale
- **Interoperability**: The only way to do security is Open Standards
- **Short Feedback loops**: Fast and flexible integrations
- Smithy can help you

Thank you for your attention and support

Slides:

Smithy – give us a star?: <https://github.com/smithy-security/smithy>



Thank you