


# Securing Your Node.js & Single Page Apps




[bit.ly/jsssecurity](http://bit.ly/jsssecurity)



@mark\_stuart



@mstuart



How are you  
using JavaScript?

So, why security?



Followed by Microsoft Channel 9



Troy Hunt @troyhunt · 27 Mar 2010

Ouch! Glaringly obvious **XSS** vulnerability in **PayPal**. Just what you want from a financial transaction merchant <http://bit.ly/dDpRmL>

Expand



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More



Followed by [Jesper Jurcenoks](#) and 1 other



**Egor Homakov** @homakov · Jan 7

Paypal's express checkout has exact same **vulnerability** (token fixation)  
OAuth1 had a while ago: [hueniverse.com/2009/04/explai...](http://hueniverse.com/2009/04/explai...) Will not be fixed.

[Expand](#)



Reply



Retweet



Favorite

More



**rguru** @sicurezza3 · Apr 15

Under the microscope: The bug that caught **PayPal** with its pants down  
[theresister.co.uk/2013/04/15/pay...](http://theresister.co.uk/2013/04/15/pay...) #paypal #vulnerability #sqlinjection

[Expand](#)

Reply Retweet Favorite More

Not just PayPal,  
but your company too.



**MBSL\_Security\_Alert** @MBSL\_Security



LinkedIn - LinkedIn has fixed 4 XSS issues that could have allowed attackers to steal users' credentials

[infosecurity-us.com/view/34787/lin...](http://infosecurity-us.com/view/34787/lin...)



**devilok** @devilok

"#Yahoo! Gets Hit By Nasty #XSS Flaw In Comments" [buff.ly/1ICTSFs](http://buff.ly/1ICTSFs)





**Dylan Irzi** @Dylan\_irzi11

4/7/14

Stored XSS vulnerability in @googledrive - pwnrules.com/google-drive-s.... ... //@RaafatSEC

# The scoop on security

Same vulnerabilities.

Nothing new.



ok cya.

Same vulnerabilities.  
Different beast.


# Node

# Rule #1



# Know what you require()


npm has ~80,000 modules



Really great developer  
ecosystem, except...

Anyone can publish anything

# Rule #2



# Node is still JavaScript


Client-side vulnerabilities  
**still exist** on the server-side

# Eval is still evil



# Rule #3

Do not run as root



Running as root is **wreckless**

If you're compromised,  
terrible things could happen

# Steal SSH keys or configs

Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files

Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files Execute  
binaries

Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files Execute  
binaries Cause server to hang

Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files Execute  
binaries Cause server to hang  
**Tamper with routes**

**Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files Execute  
binaries Cause server to hang  
Tamper with routes Inject XSS**

Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files Execute  
binaries Cause server to hang  
Tamper with routes Inject XSS  
Steal session data

Steal SSH keys or configs  
Read/write files Execute  
binaries Cause server to hang  
Tamper with routes Inject XSS  
Steal session data Crash server

Ok, so if not root, then what?

# Create a user for node


Create a user for node  
with restricted permissions

Create a user for node  
with restricted permissions

(plenty of docs out there)

## Rule #4

Use good security defaults



Node is a set of  
**barebones** modules

HTTP

TLS/SSL

Process

OS

UDP

URL

DNS

Path

File System

Crypto

Buffer

Express is a  
barebones framework

Express does very  
little to secure your app

But, that's okay!

... drum roll ...



# krakenjs

Give your node.js express apps some extra arms

# Enterprise-grade

# Express



# Lusca

App Security module for Express



```
var express = require("express"),  
app = express(),  
lusca = require("lusca");
```

```
app.use(lusca.csrf());
app.use(lusca.csp({ /* ... */ }));
app.use(lusca.hsts({ maxAge: 31536000 }));
app.use(lusca.xframe('SAMEORIGIN'));
app.use(lusca.p3p('ABCDEF'));
app.use(lusca.xssProtection(true));
```

Pardon the interruption

CSR

# CSRF

.....

Trick victim's browser into  
making malicious requests

# CSRF

.....


All you need is a valid cookie

# CSRF

.....




User



yoursite.com

# CSRF

.....



User



hackedsite.com

# CSRF

• • • • •

```
<form name="someHiddenForm" action="http://yoursite.com/webapps/  
transferFunds">  
    <input type="hidden" name="amount" value="500.00" />  
    <input type="hidden" name="recipient" value="hacker@hacker.com" />  
</form>  
  
<script>document.forms.someHiddenForm.submit();</script>
```

# CSRF


.....



User

hackedsite.com

yoursite.com



# CSRF



It's a simple HTTP request.

# CSRF

.....

If only we had a way to ensure  
requests were legitimate...

lusca.csrf();

```
IUSCA.csrf();
```

.....

# Token synchronizer pattern

`|usca.csrf();`

.....

1. Creates a **random token**

(using some crazy crypto libraries)

```
|usca.csrf();
```

```
.....
```

2. Adds token to res.locals

IUSCA.csrf();

.....

### 3. Dump token on the page

```
<input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="{{_csrf}}"/>
```

```
IUSCA.csrf();
```

```
.....
```

4. Send token with every  
POST, PUT, DELETE request

IUSCA.csrf();

.....

```
$ajaxPrefilter(function(options, _, xhr) {  
    if (!xhr.crossDomain) {  
        xhr.setRequestHeader('X-CSRF-Token', csrfToken);  
    }  
});
```

```
IUSCA.csrf();
```

```
.....
```

5. Verify token is correct,  
otherwise return 403.

CSP

CSP is really awesome.

**It's basically a whitelist.**

# Content-Security-Policy:

```
default-src 'self' https://*.your-cdn.com;  
script-src 'self' https://*.your-cdn.com;  
img-src https://*.your-cdn.com data:;  
object-src 'self';  
font-src 'self' https://*.googlefonts.com;  
connect-src ...  
frame-src ...  
style-src ...  
media-src ...
```

Console

Search Emulation Rendering



<top frame>



✖ Refused to load the script '<http://hacker.com/keylogger.js>'  
because it violates the following Content Security Policy  
directive: "script-src 'self' https://\*.your-cdn.com".

[edit:1](#)

lusca.csp({ /\* ... \*/});

```
lusca.csp({
  "default-src": "'self' https://*.your-cdn.com",
  "script-src": "'self' https://*.your-cdn.com",
  ".img-src": "https://*.your-cdn.com data:",
  "font-src": "'self'",
  "report-uri": "https://mysite.com/cspReporter"
});
```

“report-uri”: “<https://mysite.com/cspReporter>”

Iusca.hsts();

lusca.hsts();

.....

Ensures HTTPS traffic

lusca.hsts();

.....

Helps prevent MITM attacks

IUSCa.xframe();

```
lusca.xframe();
```

.....

Prevent others from loading  
your app in an iframe

✖ Refused to display '<https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/home>' in a frame because it set 'X-Frame-Options' to 'SAMEORIGIN'.



```
app.use(lusca.p3p());
```

```
app.use(lusca.xssProtection());
```

```
app.use(lusca.csrf());
app.use(lusca.csp({ /* ... */ }));
app.use(lusca.hsts({ maxAge: 31536000 }));
app.use(lusca.xframe('SAMEORIGIN'));
app.use(lusca.p3p('ABCDEF'));
app.use(lusca.xssProtection(true));
```

Okay, now where were we?

# HTTPOnly cookies

# HTTPOnly cookies

• • • •

## Prevents session hijacking

# HTTPOnly cookies

.....

```
app.use(express.session({  
  secret: '0m6!s3cr3t',  
  cookie: { httpOnly: true, secure: true },  
}));
```

# HTTPOnly cookies

• • • • •

Set-Cookie:


**connect.sid=%3AbzLqvcp7DnQJMaLAPmJ7p;  
Path=/; Expires=Wed, 21 May 2014 18:26:44 GMT;  
HttpOnly**

➤ **document.cookie**



# Rule #5

Handle errors, or crash.



Wed, 21 May 2014 18:49:00 GMT

uncaughtException Object #<Object> has no method 'forEach'

TypeError: Object #<Object> has no method 'forEach'

at module.exports.fetchSettings (/Users/marstuart/oddjob/helpers.js:174:18)

Process finished with exit code 1

Basically, a DOS attack

Catch them or restart

# Rule #6



# Scan for vulnerable modules



# Node Security Project

<http://nodesecurity.io>

Audit all modules in npm

# Contribute patches

# 2014

## [qs Denial-of-Service Extended Event Loop Blocking](#)

Aug 6 2014 09:10:23 GMT-0800 (PST)

qs

Vulnerable: <1.0.0

Patched: >= 1.x

## [Crumb CORS Token Disclosure](#)

Mon Aug 1 2014 09:40:57 GMT-0700 (PST)

crumb

Vulnerable: <3.0.0

Patched: >=3.0.0

## [hapi File descriptor leak can cause DoS vulnerability](#)

Feb 14 2014 09:33:48 GMT-0800 (PST)

hapi

Vulnerable: 2.0.x || 2.1.x

Patched: >= 2.2.x

## [hapi.js rosetta-flash jsonp vulnerability](#)

Tue Jul 08 2014 09:33:48 GMT-0800 (PST)

hapi

Vulnerable: < 6.1.0

Patched: >= 6.1.0

## [libyaml - heap-based buffer overflow when parsing YAML tags](#)

libyaml

Vulnerable: <0.2.3

**Educate others**

```
npm install grunt-nsp-package --save-dev
```

```
grunt validate-package
```


Running "validate-package" task

/Users/marstuart/8ballUI/package.json

<u>&gt;&gt; Name</u>	<u>Installed</u>	<u>Patched</u>	<u>Vulnerable Dependency</u>	<u>Advisory URL</u>
<u>&gt;&gt; hapi</u>	<u>2.0.0</u>	<u>&gt;= 2.2.x</u>		<u><a href="http://goo.gl/ExsXn3">http://goo.gl/ExsXn3</a></u>

**Warning:** known vulnerable modules found Use --force to continue.

**Aborted due to warnings.**



# ESLint

Define custom rules

Security can be automated

Make it a part of your CI

# Rule #7



# Update your dependencies

August 6th, just 1 week ago..

# DoS attack with qs

qs is a query string parser

```
qs.parse('a=c');
```

```
// {a: 'c'}
```

```
qs.parse('a=c');
```

```
// {a: 'c'}
```

```
qs.parse('a[1]=c&a[0]=b');
```

```
// {a: ['b', 'c']}
```

```
qs.parse('foo[0][10000000]=ba');
```

FATAL ERROR: JS Allocation failed -

process out of memory

Abort trap: 6

qs is used by lots of  
popular modules

express

express hapi

express hapi  
restify

express hapi  
restify body-parser

express hapi  
restify body-parser  
restler

express hapi  
restify body-parser  
restler superagent

The problem is...

Most of us are using express

Just pass  
foo[0][10000000]=ba  
as your user agent

Or... pass  
foo[0][10000000]=ba  
as a *query string* param

And you can crash the server

And you can crash the server

FATAL ERROR: JS Allocation failed -  
process out of memory

Good news!

It's been patched

Although you're probably  
running an old version

Update your dependencies

# Add a badge to your README

 README.md

# 8Ball - PayPal Consumer Website

**dependencies** up to date    **devDependencies** out of date

Extensive documentation including best practices can be found in the [8ball Wiki](#).

## Getting the project started locally

1. `npm install`

# ALANSHAW - DAVID 3.1.0

dependencies out of date

Node.js module that tells you when your project npm dependencies are out of date.

DEPENDENCIES

DEVDEPENDENCIES

LIST

TREE

4 Dependencies total

2 Up to date

0 Pinned, out of date

2 Out of date

DEPENDENCY	REQUIRED	STABLE	LATEST	STATUS
async	!	~0.2.9	0.9.0	0.9.0
npm		~1.4.4	1.4.10	1.4.10
optimist		~0.6.0	0.6.1	0.6.1
semver	!	~2.2.1	2.3.0	2.3.0

4 Dependencies total

2 Up to date

0 Pinned, out of date

2 Out of date

```

```



# david-dm.org


Let's recap...

1. Know what you `require()`
2. Node is `still` JavaScript
3. Do not run as `root`
3. Use good `security defaults`
4. Security can be `automated`, too!

client-side JS

# Rule #1

Escape everything.



# Content injection

XSS sucks. It's everywhere.

```
<script src="http://hacker.com/session-hijacker.js"></script>
```

```
<script src="http://hacker.com/session-hijacker.js"></script>
```



```
&lt;script src='http://hacker.com/  
sessionhijacker.js'&gt;&lt;/script&gt;
```

```
"<script src="http://hacker.com/session-hijacker.js"><script>"
```

User input and  
backend data

Don't trust  
backend services  
to escape properly

Persistent or  
Stored XSS



PUT /account/edit

{ firstName: '<script>...' }



yoursite.com



GET /addressBook



yoursite.com



GET /addressBook



yoursite.com

# Case Study: TweetDeck worm

# TweetDeck worm

• • • • •



\*andy @derGeruhn · Jun 11

```
<script  
class="xss">$('.xss').parents().eq(1).fi  
nd('a').eq(1).click(); $('[data-  
action=retweet'].click(); alert('XSS in  
Tweetdeck')</script> ❤
```



76K

11K

...

# TweetDeck worm



 Retweeted by \*andy

 **TweetDeck** @TweetDeck · Jun 11

We've temporarily taken TweetDeck services down to assess today's earlier security issue. We'll update when services are back up.

  7.2K  907 

# TweetDeck worm

• • • • •

## Just one tweet.

# TweetDeck worm

.....

Just two months ago.

... So how do I escape?

# DOMPurify and Google Caja

# DOMPurify

.....

```
<script src="dompurify.js"></script>
```

```
var clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty);
```

# Plain ol' JavaScript

# DOMPurify

.....

```
require(['dompurify'], function(DOMPurify) {  
  var clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty);  
});
```

# RequireJS / AMD

# DOMPurify



# Node?

# DOMPurify

.....

## Node?

# Coming soon!

# Rule #2



Know your templating library.

Use it properly.

# Underscore templates

```
<input type="text" name="zipCode" value="<%zipCode%>" />
```

```
<input type="text" name="zipCode" value="<%-zipCode%>" />
```

# Dust.js templates

```
{@if cond="{cardType} === 'VISA'"}  
  <li class="visa"></li>  
{/if}
```

```
{@if cond="{zipCode} === {defaultZipCode}"}
<li class="default"></li>
{/if}
```


```
{
  "zipCode": "\\",
  "defaultZipCode": ");process.exit();//"
}
```



Your server crashed.

# Rule #3

Upgrade your front-end  
dependencies.



# Retire.js

jQuery <1.9.0

jQuery Mobile <1.0.1

Backbone <0.5.0

Angular <1.2.0

Handlebars <1.0.0

YUI <3.9.2

Ember <1.3.2

Mustache <0.3.1

easyXDM <2.4.19

```
npm install grunt-retire --save-dev
```

```
grunt retire
```

**Running "retire:jsPath" (retire) task**

```
>> test-files/jquery-1.6.js
>> ↳ jquery 1.6 has known vulnerabilities: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-4969
```

```
>> Aborted due to warnings.
```


# Automate it!

C'mon, it's 1 line.


# Rules of Thumb

No matter what you do,  
someone will **always**  
find a way in


But, you'll get 80% there  
if you...




Choose libraries with  
good security defaults.



Sanitize data coming in  
and going out.



# Update your dependencies!



# Automate security, too.

ok.

Ok. so,

Ok. so, listen...

Node is awesome.

It's enterprise ready.

We just need to write  
better, more secure apps.

thanks!



We're hiring!

# mark stuart



@mark\_stuart



@mstuart

# Links

<https://github.com/nodesecurity/grunt-nsp-package>

<https://github.com/bekk/grunt-retire>

<https://nodesecurity.io/>

<http://krakenjs.com/>

<https://github.com/krakenjs/lusca>

<https://github.com/evilpacket/helmet>

<https://david-dm.org/>

<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site>