

# *EU Contract Networks*

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
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*27 Nov 2023*



## *Agenda*

1. *Background*
2. *Dataset*
3. *Networks Over Time*
4. *Comparison with Empirical Models*
5. *Link Prediction*
6. *Conclusion*




# *Background*

# Corruption in public procurement

- **Corruption** = “deliberate restriction of open and fair access to public resources for the benefit of connected actors” (Wachs, Fazekas and Kertesz, 2019, p. 45)



Source: European Commission (2022), European Council (2022)




# Corruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective by Wachs, Fazekas and Kertesz

- Corruption is traditionally measured via surveys (often flawed)
- For each contract, use single bidding rate as proxy for corruption risk
  - 0 if there was competition
  - 1 if there was no competition



## Single bidding rate correlated with survey-based measures of corruption



Note: TICPI stands for Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, WB CoC stands for World Bank's Control of Corruption Index, European Qual. Gov Index stands for the Quality of Government Institute's European Quality of Government Index and V-dem Corruption Index stands for Varieties of Democracy's Corruption Index.  
Source: Wachs, Fazekas and Kertesz (2019)


# *Dataset*




## ***Dataset: EU procurement contract networks (2008-2016)***

- *4M+ public contracts (2008-2016)*
- *Bipartite networks of public institutions (“buyers/issuers”) and firms (“suppliers/winners”)*

***26 EU countries (excl. LU, MT, HR) + UK + NO***






***Single-bid rates used as a proxy for corruption***



## Case Studies: Ireland & Slovakia

- *Ireland and Slovakia*
  - *Similar population sizes (IE – 4.6M, SK- 5.4M in 2012)*
- *2012 – Year Selection*
  - *Middle of dataset (2008-2016)*
- *Significant difference in single-bidder rates*
- *Closeness of CPI scores from Transparency International*



2012	Country	CPI Score	SB Rank
	Ireland	69	1
	Slovakia	46	25



## Summary Statistics


Country	# Contracts	# Winners	# Issuers	<K> Winners	<K> Issuers
Ireland	2,713	1,587	208	1.7	13.1
Slovakia	2,654	1,068	344	2.4	8.1

- *While Ireland and Slovakia have a similar number of contracts, Slovakia has 33% fewer winners despite having 65% more public institutions.*
- *Additionally, the average degree for firms is lower in Ireland than in Slovakia, and the average degree for public institutions is higher in Ireland than in Slovakia.*

## Network Properties


### *On the Left: Bipartite network structure Ireland 2012*

- Red nodes – issuers of contracts
- Blue nodes – winners of contracts



### *On the Right: Slovakia 2012 in spring layout*

- Gray nodes are issuers of contracts.
- White nodes are winners of contracts.
- The weight of the edges (thickness) indicates the log count of contracts between the issuers and winners.
- The color of the edges represents the share of single-bid contracts among these connections; the more red an edge is, the higher the proportion of single-bid contracts.




# *Networks Over Time*




# *Ireland*


IE\_2008




IE\_2009




IE\_2010




IE\_2011




IE\_2012




IE\_2013




IE\_2014



IE\_2015



IE\_2016









# Slovakia


SK\_2008




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
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
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
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
SK\_2013




SK\_2014



SK\_2015



SK\_2016




# *Comparison with Empirical Models*


# Degree Distributions

*Comparing our degree distribution to the degree distribution of the Barabási–Albert model*

Degree Distribution - Ireland 2012



Degree Distribution - Fake Ireland (Bipartite BA)





- *Both networks are scale-free*
- *Similar distribution, but greater range on x-axis*
  - *All winners can work with all issuers in simulation... no specialization*



# Degree Distributions




*Comparing our degree distribution to the degree distribution of the Barabási–Albert model*



# Inverse Percolations





## Comparing inverse percolations in the EU Network with the Albert Barabasi Model

- *Assessing the robustness of the Network*
- *Random Networks:*
  - *A randomly picked node is likely to have an average degree of the network  $\langle k \rangle$*
  - *Doesn't matter which edge you remove first*
  - *There's a finite fraction of nodes at which we lose the Giant Component*
- *Scale Free (AB) Network:*
  - *No  $\langle k \rangle$*
  - *Large # of Nodes with small  $k$*
  - *Small # of Nodes with large  $k$  (Hubs)*
  - *A randomly removed edge is more likely to be a node with smaller  $k$*
  - *More robust against random failures but are not tolerant to a coordinated attack*





# Inverse Percolations

*Comparing inverse percolations in the EU Network with the Albert Barabasi Model*



*Similar results seen for Slovakia in 2010 as well*

# Average Path lengths and Clustering Coefficients




- Small number of Avg. path length signifies a more interconnected network. It takes a smaller number of 'hops' on average to reach from one node to another
- Lower Clustering Coefficient signifies nodes are connected to the overall network rather than being more connected to their own clusters

# Block Models

## *Limitations of the Albert Barabasi model and the use of Stochastic Block Model*

- *As we know, the Albert Barabasi model does a good job in reproducing percolations, small world, short paths and hubs but not a great job at identifying assortative behaviour (communities)*
- *We therefore look at the Stochastic Block model*
- *On the Right:*
  - *Each color corresponds to a different block or community identified by the blockmodel algorithm.*
  - *Nodes with the same color belong to the same block*
  - *Winners have a greater number of communities in general*
- *More of an inferential/descriptive model rather than an explanatory one.*



# *A more explanatory community detection*

## *Hungarian procurement market*

- *The 2014 Hungarian procurement market. Plotted the largest connected component of the network,*
- *Filtering out nodes involved in less than three contracts for the sake of visualization.*
- *Nodes are buyers and suppliers of contracts*
- *Each edge represents that the buyers and suppliers have a contract.*
- *Edges are colored red if the single-bidding rate on the edge exceeds the average rate of single bidding that year.*
- *Single bidding is significantly overrepresented among the edges in the top left cluster.*





# *Link Prediction*



## ***Link Prediction***

- *Given that a firm wins a contract from two public institutions AND another firm wins a contract from one of those two public institutions, what is the probability that the second firm will also win a contract from the other public institution?*
- *Robins-Alexander clustering coefficient provides an answer by measuring the tendency for local clustering in bipartite networks.*
- *The greater the Robins-Alexander clustering coefficient, the more local correlations in a market.*
- *R-A clustering coefficients:*
  - *Ireland: 0.03*
  - *Slovakia: 0.09*

# *Conclusion*

## Conclusion

- *Public procurement markets are scale-free networks*
- *However, Albert-Barabasi model may not be the best fit*
- *Limitations*
  - *Analysis is not industry-specific*
  - *Do not account for contract value*
  - *Haven't accounted for spillover effect between countries*
  - *Seasonality not captured in annual data*
  - *Single-bidding rate is not a flawless method*
- *Network science does not replace traditional survey methods, but supplements them*



# *References*

## References

- Wachs, J., Fazekas, M., & Kertész, J. (2020). "Corruption Risk in Contracting Markets: A Network Science Perspective." *International Journal of Data Science and Analytics*, pp. 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41060-019-00204-1>.
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