

Joint Publication 3-57



Joint Civil-Military Operations



02 April 2025

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, conduct, and assess civil-military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

- a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.
- b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.
- c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication takes precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance, or the Secretary of Defense has directed otherwise. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States unless they conflict with this guidance. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Director for Joint Force Development

Intentionally Blank

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-57
DATED 09 JULY 2018**

- Adds Chapter VI, “Future of Civil-Military Operations,” to identify potential key developments that may impact civil-military operations over the next 3 to 5 years and propose considerations for the joint force to respond.
- Updates the civil-military operations functions, and describes the relationship between the updated functions.
- Describes civil-military operations and planning considerations within the context of the competition continuum, rather than the obsolete conflict continuum.
- Removes associations, characterizations, and descriptions of civil-military operations within the context of other joint activities and operations.
- Describes civil-military operations within the context of the joint functions and articulates civil-military operations contributions and considerations for each joint function.
- Adds an appendix that details other United States departments and international organizations that support civil-military operations.
- Removes considerations specific to civil affairs throughout.
- Clarifies and updates text to conform to the doctrinal concepts, best practices, and terminology in Joint Publication 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, and Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*.
- Updates terms and definitions.

Summary of Changes

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vii
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	
• General.....	I-1
• Civil-Military Operations Across the Competition Continuum.....	I-2
• Civil-Military Operations and Levels of Warfare.....	I-3
• Civil-Military Operations and Unified Action.....	I-6
• Service Capabilities	I-7
CHAPTER II	
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS	
• General.....	II-1
• Civil-Military Operations Functions.....	II-1
• Civil-Military Integration.....	II-4
• Organizing for Civil-Military Operations.....	II-4
• Civil-Military Operations Cooperation Mechanisms.....	II-9
CHAPTER III	
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING	
• General.....	III-1
• Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations	III-3
• Civil-Military Operations in Joint Planning	III-10
CHAPTER IV	
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS—EXECUTION	
• General.....	IV-1
• Civil-Military Operations Synchronization	IV-1
• Civil-Military Operations Activities	IV-2
CHAPTER V	
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS—ASSESSMENT	
• General.....	V-1
• Operation Assessment during Civil-Military Operations	V-1
• Civil-Military Operations Trend Assessment	V-5
• Assessment Complexities in Civil-Military Operations	V-6
• Interagency Assessment Methods.....	V-8

Table of Contents

CHAPTER VI FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

• General.....	VI-1
• Challenges, Threats, and Trends	VI-1
• Objectives and Requirements	VI-3
• Techniques, Procedures, and Organization.....	VI-5

APPENDIX

A Other United States Departments and International Organizations in Support of Civil-Military Operations	A-1
B Civil Information Management	B-1
C References	C-1
D Administrative Instructions	D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Shortened Word Forms (Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms).....	GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions	GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Competition Continuum	I-3
I-2 Civil-Military Operations Activities at the Levels of Warfare.....	I-4
II-1 Civil-Military Operations Functions	II-2
II-2 Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center	II-7
V-1 Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle	V-2
V-2 Assessment Levels and Measures	V-3
V-3 Notional Assessment Relationships	V-4
V-4 Possible Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness for Civil-Military Operations.....	V-6
V-5 Quantitative versus Qualitative Assessment	V-7
B-1 Civil Information Management Process.....	B-3
B-2 Association Matrix Sample	B-7
B-3 Potential Partners in Civil Information Management	B-8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Overview

a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Joint Civil-Military Operations*, provides a comprehensive framework for planning, executing, and assessing civil-military operations. Additionally, JP 3-57 describes anticipated changes to the future operating environment and responses that may be necessary to ensure the effective conduct of civil-military operations in the future.

b. Civil-military operations involve activities conducted by the joint force that develop and enhance relations between military forces, local populations and institutions, and interorganizational partners to achieve unity of effort, accomplish operational objectives, and advance strategic interests.

2. Civil-Military Operations Functions

Civil-military operations functions include civil-military dialogue, civil-military alignment, and civil-military integration. These functions are broad categorizations required to effectively execute civil-military operations. Civil-military dialogue establishes the “why” of civil-military operations and sets the foundation for subsequent operations. Civil-military alignment involves coordinating and aligning military and civilian operations and activities to achieve unity of effort. Civil-military integration is the process of continually adjusting operations and activities resulting from civil-military dialogue and civil-military alignment to ensure that all parties have the right interactions to accomplish their objectives.

3. Civil-Military Operations Planning, Execution, and Assessment

Joint force commanders (JFCs) and staffs incorporate civil-military operations into joint plans, develop plans for civil-military operations and activities, and integrate mission partners into the planning process. The effective execution of civil-military operations requires civil-military integration with mission partners and an understanding of the operational environment. JFCs and staffs use assessments to measure the performance of civil-military activities and the effectiveness of civil-military integration toward desired effects, objectives, and outcomes. The JFC and staff continually monitor the operational environment and assess the progress of the operation toward the objective.

Executive Summary

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

"In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory."

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

1. General

a. Civil-military operations (CMO) are activities directed by joint force commanders (JFCs) to achieve operational objectives in the civil component of the operational environment (OE). CMO include activities performed by the joint force to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces, local populations and institutions, and interorganizational partners. JFCs direct these activities to integrate, align, and communicate military and civilian objectives, capabilities, and actions to achieve unity of effort, achieve operational objectives, and advance strategic interests. Conducting effective CMO may reduce friction between the joint force and the civil component of the OE, provide freedom of maneuver, set conditions for achieving JFC's objectives, and mitigate civilian harm and other detrimental effects of combat operations as required by law and policy.

(1) CMO are an inherent command responsibility executed in support of United States Government (USG) guidance and policy. While the JFC and staff focus on achieving operational objectives, the condition of and interaction with the civil component of the OE affects joint operations and their outcomes. The civil component of the OE comprises the systems, actors, and aspects that are civilian in nature and may affect joint operations or objectives. A JFC's staff plans to mitigate negative effects of military operations on the civil component, while enhancing effects that enable the JFC to achieve their objectives.

(2) JFCs direct CMO in support of military actions or operations and campaigning activities. JFCs conduct CMO across the competition continuum to achieve operational objectives (see Figure I-1).

b. **Strategic Implications of CMO.** JFCs align CMO capabilities and coordinate CMO with the activities of interorganizational partners to achieve desired operational objectives in support of strategic objectives. USG policy initiatives, national security directives, joint strategies, and military doctrine reflect a growing appreciation for the need to leverage more nonmilitary tools and more broadly consider nonmilitary instruments of national power, such as interagency partners (e.g., Department of State [DOS]) and the private sector, to build a more effective and balanced strategy. Failing to do so may result in the joint force achieving short-term victories but may undermine or complicate the achievement of long-term objectives.

c. **Unified Action and Unity of Effort.** Commanders coordinate or integrate joint operations and the forces under their control with the activities of allies, partners, other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort to promote unified action. Commanders exercise and conduct CMO to achieve joint objectives by coordinating and aligning military operations with mission-relevant civilian entities to expand unified action. Every organization has unique purposes and objectives. They vary in their ability to contribute toward shared or complementary objectives by degrees of authority, resources, and capabilities. CMO require continuous coordination with interagency partners such as the United States (US) embassy country team. This cooperation among components, supporting forces, the country team, and the host nation (HN) is particularly important during complex operations.

2. Civil-Military Operations Across the Competition Continuum

a. The competition continuum describes the conditions under which the United States interacts with actors, both state and non-state. CMO may be performed by any combination of military forces and may be conducted concurrently across the competition continuum at all levels of war (see Figure I-1).

(1) **CMO during Cooperation.** CMO in cooperation aim to build partner resilience or strengthen military planning and execution with allies. Examples of CMO in cooperation range from civic action programs to revision of plans and standard operating procedures with allies, to operations in support of other USG agencies.

(2) **CMO during Competition.** CMO in competition prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives while protecting US interests. Like cooperation, CMO in competition take a long-term view, and actions are codified in a combatant command (CCMD) campaign plan. Within these efforts, CMO contribute to strategic use of assurance. JFCs can assure allies and partners through positive interactions with their civil populations and by demonstrating US commitment to their strategic interests. By working through civilian partners, CMO in competition may include freedom of navigation patrols, analyzing the information environment, coordinating the development of information campaigns to mitigate the effects of adversarial information activities, and ensuring the United States remains the partner of choice.

(3) **CMO during Armed Conflict/War.** CMO during armed conflict/war are continuous, simultaneous to combat operations, and characterized by rapid transitions; therefore, the JFC's staff should plan for continuity with mission partners. CMO during armed conflict/war may include mitigating civilian harm and interference, dislocated civilians (DCs) operations, or military governance.

b. **Transition from Armed Conflict/War into the New Competition.** The period following the cessation of armed hostilities is critical to achieving long-term strategic objectives. CMO facilitate the transition to the new competition by working with the local




Figure I-1. Competition Continuum

population, interorganizational partners, and the HN to communicate and mitigate the effects of the transition. To this end, relationships with mission partners should be continually built and improved throughout the conduct of operations across competition continuum. Additionally, rehearsing and utilizing coordination mechanisms with mission partners may enable more effective relationships, interactions, and CMO during the transition to the new competition.

3. Civil-Military Operations and Levels of Warfare

a. **Levels of Warfare.** The three levels of warfare (strategic, operational, tactical) link tactical actions to the achievement of national objectives. There are no finite boundaries between levels. They are conceptual tools that help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. CMO may be applied at all levels of warfare. Actions at one level of warfare may affect the others both simultaneously and independently. See Figure I-2 for examples of CMO activities at each level of warfare.

b. CMO guidance should include higher headquarters' objectives in alignment with USG policy and guidance. Individuals and units conducting CMO should understand how tactical CMO actions may have strategic implications.

(1) JFCs plan and conduct CMO throughout the competition continuum to achieve operational objectives in support of strategic objectives.

Civil-Military Operations Activities at the Levels of Warfare

Strategic Level – Senior Civilian and Military Leaders and Combatant Commanders

- Analyze and integrate the military and civil components of the strategic and operational environments
- Coordinate and synchronize with national level civilian leaders, foreign and domestic
- Assist in developing civil-military operations strategy and policy
- Develop military plans that are synchronized and integrated with the plans of mission partners as appropriate

Operational Level – Combatant Commanders, Subordinate Joint Force Commanders, and Component Commanders

- Analyze dynamics of organizations in the regional operational environment
- Support United States Government-led and international humanitarian assistance efforts as directed
- Lead or support civil-military operations efforts with mission partners at the national level
- Plan, prepare, execute, and assess civil-military operations in conjunction with mission partners

Tactical Level – Commanders

- Execute civil-military operations
- Cooperate at local level with interorganizational partners and the local population
- Provide assessment of civil-military operations impacts

Figure I-2. Civil-Military Operations Activities at the Levels of Warfare

(2) Civilian and military organizations have differing perspectives, mandates, planning time horizons, and objectives. JFCs should recognize legitimate mandates and objectives of other entities, as well as the limitations of CMO that may make it operationally ineffective, undesirable, or impermissible for other entities to coordinate with the JFC. Some civilian entities may be resistant to CMO, fearing the possible effects of increased military involvement in civil matters. Others may officially object when they feel that CMO may compromise their neutrality or security.

(3) JFCs and their staffs should account for these differences early in planning and should seek to avoid friction, which may detract from positive effects and overall mission success. Relationship-building and unified action in planning and leadership are key.

(4) Recognizing that military and nonmilitary organizations use different decision-making processes and philosophies can help reduce friction among all

stakeholders and set conditions for shared understanding. Most civilian agencies do not organize themselves or make decisions within a military-like hierarchy. Civilian entities tend to be flatter in organizational structure and organized around narrowly defined functions or activities.

(5) Strategic

(a) At the strategic level, CMO focus on broader challenges that may be part of advancing and protecting USG initiatives and interests globally. Joint force planners should incorporate civil-military objectives and coordinate with interagency partners throughout all stages of the joint planning process. CMO are integrated into plans and operations through interagency coordination, multinational partnerships, and coordination with international organizations and NGOs.

(b) Commanders at echelon direct CMO throughout the operational area during armed conflict. The JFC exercises CMO to consolidate operational gains toward strategic objectives that support the desired solution to the conflict. The JFC oversees and directs subordinate commands to conduct operations, including CMO, to work toward this end.

(c) During certain contingency operations, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State integrate contingency plans and develop a general framework to coordinate operations.

(6) Operational

(a) At the operational level, the JFC's staff synchronizes and integrates CMO within joint operations. CMO activities and mission partners may vary throughout the conduct of one or multiple operations. Relationship building is crucial to partners as objectives may change. Properly planned and executed CMO coordinate the activities of the interagency, international organizations, and NGOs with joint force operations to achieve unity of effort. Joint force planners and interagency partners should identify civil-military objectives early in the planning process. The civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9), if established, assists the commander in understanding the civil component of the OE and how civil capabilities can be integrated to achieve unity of effort.

(b) CMO are integrated into plans and operations through cooperation mechanisms established by the command. As a part of the coordination mechanisms, the JFC's staff and mission partners agree upon assessment criteria. The J-9 uses these assessments to inform the joint functions, provide inputs to the common operational picture, and enable other staff entities to receive this civil information through centers, boards, and cells. Civil information relates to the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the OE that supports the situational awareness of the commander. The CMO directorate enables interorganizational cooperation through the sharing of pertinent information with the interagency, multinational partnerships, NGOs, international organizations, and local populations and

institutions to enable unity of effort and distribute resources effectively throughout the joint operations area (JOA) to support the commander's intent and objectives.

(7) **Tactical.** At the tactical level, CMO integrate and align activities between supported commanders, interorganizational partners, and the local civilian population. The goal is to facilitate military operations and achieve JFC objectives. Commanders may employ CMO at the tactical level to consolidate gains, reinforce local authority, and mitigate civilian harm and civilian interference in military operations. Typically, this coordination to build unity of effort at the tactical level is carried out by civil affairs (CA).

4. Civil-Military Operations and Unified Action

a. **Interagency Coordination.** JFCs enable unity of effort through collaboration and cooperation with interagency partners. Various USG agencies may assume the lead for a mission depending on the mission objectives and agency expertise. The JFC's staff may serve as, or support, the lead USG agency depending on the mission. Liaison officers are critical to integrating and coordinating efforts; the JFC may need to surge liaisons to various agencies as the mission requires. At CCMDs, DOS may have a liaison civilian team assigned. Below CCMD level, the JFC may need to exchange liaison officers with interagency counterparts to integrate and coordinate their efforts.

b. **Interorganizational Cooperation.** Outside of the USG, foreign governments, international organizations, NGOs, the private business sector, and civic groups exist that may become partners with a joint force. Depending on the country and mission, foreign governments or an international organization may be the lead coordinating organization. For example, during a major natural disaster where Department of Defense (DoD) assistance is requested, the HN is the overall lead, while DOS may be designated the USG lead to vet, validate, and approve assistance efforts among USG departments and agencies in the affected country.

(1) Integration with mission partners is challenged by a variety of issues. USG departments and agencies and other civilian organizations tend to be significantly smaller than DoD, leading to varying levels of capability and capacity to plan and execute at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. While liaisons are preferable, civilian organizations may not have the personnel to provide an extensive number of liaisons; thus, continuous civil-military dialogue and alternative coordinating mechanisms are paramount.

(a) **Interagency Partners.** While smaller than DoD and with various degrees of exposure to the military, these USG departments and agencies can be integrated into the joint planning process to support the achievement of military objectives.

(b) **United Nations (UN).** While respecting the humanitarian principles and with the need to maintain neutrality, specialized components of the UN (e.g., United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA] and the World Food Programme [WFP]) maintain specialists dedicated to humanitarian-military

interaction who are familiar with the military planning process and able to communicate the needs of the international community into military processes. These organizations have a flat command and control (C2) structure with awareness and decision-making authority retained at the most senior levels. Within the USG there is a primary interlocutor for this partner, normally DOS.

(c) **NGOs.** These organizations have a flat C2 structure with awareness and decision-making authority retained at the most senior level. These organizations normally have local continuity, having operated within the area for long periods of time and having access to areas and individuals that the USG, and particularly DoD, cannot obtain. While each organization applies a version of humanitarian principles and neutrality to its operations, this application varies by organization and mandate.

(2) Communication challenges exist in equipment and common operating systems compatibility. Information sharing may initially be limited to emails and physical interactions and products. Another distinct challenge is terminology. An example of this difference is the use of the term deconfliction. Within a military context, deconfliction may be used to describe the coordination of military movement to reduce the risk of harm or unintended consequences. However, for humanitarian organizations the term deconfliction is a specific reference to a notification that is sent to a government or armed group that details the specifics of a static location or convoy.

For additional information, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

c. **Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Fundamentals.** When operating under the control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, US joint forces may conduct CIMIC. There are key differences between CIMIC and CMO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization defines CIMIC as “a military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crises, and conflict.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization commanders integrate CIMIC with fires and maneuver to achieve cognitive and behavioral outcomes.

For additional information, see the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s CIMIC Handbook and Allied Joint Publication-3.19, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.

5. Service Capabilities

Each Service has the responsibility to establish its capabilities to support CMO.

a. **United States Army.** The United States Army, the Army Reserves, and the Army National Guard employ unique land-centric CMO capabilities. These capabilities include CA, engineers, military police, medical, military information support operations, special

operations, information, cyberspace, and space. JFCs integrate these capabilities into the CCMD campaign plan based on the global campaign plans. Coordination with HN is essential for access to the electromagnetic spectrum to conduct joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO). Joint mission planners determine the composition and force structure of the capabilities based on the objectives of the joint mission. These capabilities can be used through agreements with other countries, through status-of-forces agreements and other treaties that allow these forces to conduct military-to-military interaction and coordination during competition to provide access and enhanced relations between the USG and the specific country. Although not all-inclusive, these activities may include road construction, school refurbishments, infrastructure development assistance, and other requirements as established by the chief of mission.

(1) During armed conflict, these capabilities facilitate CMO that support the commander's operations plans. CA commands are assigned by rules of allocation to each echelon of command. These entities support the CMO directorate of a joint staff in planning, synchronizing, and integrating Army CMO capabilities into the joint operational plan.

(2) As consolidation of gains occurs, Army forces can execute governance operations and assist legitimate civilian authorities during the transition from armed conflict to the new competition. Army forces are integral to CMO planning, execution, and the achievement of the JFC's objectives.

b. **United States Marine Corps (USMC).** The USMC plans and conducts CMO across the competition continuum and all levels of warfare. The USMC employs influence Marines across the Service, enabling the JFC to understand and create effects within the information environment. Influence Marines exercise authorities in both military information support operations and CMO, as well as conduct information activities planning. Influence Marines can also deploy in support of staff planning. While influence Marines can fill both CMO and military information support operation capacities, they can only act under one authority at a time. Influence Marines are trained and equipped to fulfill all CA core tasks to conduct CMO.

(1) A dedicated CA structure is maintained within the Reserve Component, consisting of three civil affairs groups (CAGs), each commanded by a Reserve Component CA Marine colonel. Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commanders may request additional support from a CAG via their USMC component commanders. Marines from each expeditionary force's aligned CAG are prepared to deploy within days of a validated request, even if no Presidential reserve call-up is authorized. Additional volunteers may provide further support by Presidential reserve call-up of CAG elements for contingencies or by mobilization of entire CAGs.

(2) USMC CMO are typically centrally planned by the MAGTF staff for decentralized execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF has organic air, ground, C2, and logistic capabilities, providing the JFC with immediate and integrated CMO options. Operational maneuver from the sea, implementing ship-to-objective maneuver and sea-

based logistics, enables rapid execution of USMC CMO without the need to establish extensive infrastructure ashore. Regardless of size, USMC CA elements require support from the MAGTF in such areas as transportation, health support, supply, and messing.

c. **United States Navy.** While the United States Navy does not maintain CA, it possesses important CMO-related capabilities (e.g., transportation, health support, security forces, general engineering, communications).

d. **United States Coast Guard (USCG).** While the USCG does not maintain CMO-specific organizations, it can provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training to help an ally or partner country organize and establish their own coast guard or prepare for large-scale incident response. USCG forces routinely perform 11 statutory missions under different authorities that overlap or touch upon CMO functional areas: marine safety; search and rescue; aids to navigation; living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement); marine environmental protection; ice operations; ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other law enforcement (economic exclusive zone) and incident-response protocols. Additionally, many of the USCG's peer agencies are civilian and law enforcement, which gives the USCG much familiarity in reaching across the civil-military divide in ways useful to the JFC in conducting CMO. Many foreign entities desire this kind of nonmilitary assistance.

e. **United States Air Force.** The United States Air Force often assumes a supporting role in CMO as the preponderance of capability to build relationships with civil organizations resides with the land component. The Air Force's role in CMO may include transportation of military forces, equipment, and resources for foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), contingency operation of foreign airfields, airfield co-use during times of crisis and mass migration, repair of damaged airports for dual use, medical CMO, and advising on policies that impact collaboration with civilian organizations. The Air Force also supports CMO with synthetic aperture radar and imagery, airlift of people in noncombatant evacuations operations, and airfield management/operations after a foreign natural disaster. JFCs integrate Air Force assets as a force multiplier for CMO.

f. **United States Space Force.** Space Force supports CMO through operations in the space domain, including: the synchronization of satellite frequencies and bandwidth; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; missile warning; satellite communications; environmental monitoring; and providing space services and products to the joint force, USG departments and agencies, and NGOs.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER II

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS

“Our task is to ensure that American military superiority endures, and in combination with other elements of national power, is ready to protect Americans against sophisticated challenges to national security.”

**President Donald Trump
45th President of the United States 2017-2021**


1. General

CMO are the commander's responsibility. JFCs achieve unified action and accomplish the joint mission with a whole-of-government approach by integrating civil-military activities and capabilities from the Services with key individuals and organizations. CMO require a civil-military dialogue, establishing civil-military alignment, and civil-military integration (CMI) to be effective. Commanders should strive to coordinate and align assigned forces with civilian entities in ways that enable mission success.

2. Civil-Military Operations Functions

a. The functions of CMO are broad categorizations that are required to effectively execute CMO (see Figure II-1). The three CMO functions work together, as the accomplishment of one task leads to the next. Civil-military dialogue establishes the “why” CMO is conducted. After determining the why, JFCs and staffs cooperate with interorganizational and local mission partners to align the operations and activities of the military and civil components to achieve unity of effort. Once JFCs and staffs align their operations and activities with those of their mission partners, JFCs conduct CMI, which ensures that JFCs, their staffs, and mission partners have the right interactions to accomplish their objectives.

b. **Civil-Military Dialogue.** At the start of a military mission, military commanders work with their civilian counterparts to gain a shared understanding of the problem or problems they are facing. JFCs and their civilian counterparts should explain their understanding of the problem and articulate any assumptions they are making. One primary purpose of the civil-military dialogue is to refine the problem and communicate necessary assumptions. Effective dialogue identifies new considerations commanders should address, based on their civilian counterparts' perspectives. The JFCs and their civilian counterparts should clearly articulate their capabilities, the objectives these options can achieve, the costs and risks associated with each option, and how those options collectively address the problem or problems. As the civil-military dialogue matures, the specificity of civil-military dialogue typically increases as leaders build mutual trust and better understanding of each organization's contribution to unified action.

**Figure II-1. Civil-Military Operations Functions**

(1) The direction that is initially agreed upon can change rapidly due to changes to the OE. These rapid changes can be due to a crisis caused by environmental or man-made disasters, geopolitical upheaval, or other international events that were not predicted or addressed within the original strategic guidance that supported established global campaign plans. Military organizations should interact regularly with their civilian counterparts, applying a whole-of-government approach to campaign planning and execution. This dialogue enables and contributes greatly to unity of effort and the achievement of unified action.

(a) JFCs' staffs and their civilian counterparts should establish information-sharing agreements during civil-military dialogue. Interagency staff often have the appropriate clearances to view DoD information. The JFC's staff coordinates the appropriate means for sharing information with the interagency to enable the widest dissemination of information while accounting for operations security and information

security. Information sharing with other mission partners is more complicated as sharing information with those who do not have appropriate clearances, including nongovernment entities, may require release requests, declassification, or other actions to enable the distribution of information. The JFC's staff and their civilian counterparts should agree on the appropriate means to share information that ensures the widest dissemination of information while accounting for operations security and information security measures.

(b) The JFC and their civilian counterparts should discuss risks during the civil-military dialogue. The JFC should understand potential risks from their civilian counterparts' perspectives before beginning operations. The JFC's staff should analyze the impact of military operations on these risks and provide the JFC options when military operations affect civilian leader decision points.

(2) **Civil-Military Alignment.** The JFC's staff and its interorganizational partners should align their operations and activities through cooperation mechanisms. The JFC's staff should understand that civilian agencies' execution capacities are limited compared to the DoD. Many US agencies only provide oversight, making alignment with agency objectives noncontentious; however, the execution impacts of military operations may conflict with agency goals. For example, the joint force may have an objective to reduce the influence of an adversary. A joint operation accomplishes reducing the influence of an adversary and does so without inflaming local tensions that hinder DOS negotiations with the HN national government. In this manner, the JFC's staff should work through the conduct of operations with other agencies to ensure mission execution does not detract from mission partner efforts.

(3) Before initiating planning between organizations, the JFC's staff reviews guidance and instructions resulting from civil-military dialogue between senior leaders. The JFC seeks to understand the viewpoints of civilian counterparts, along with their organizations' capabilities, requirements for joint force support, planning time horizons, decision points, and willingness to assume risk. The JFC's staff determines the objective for a particular operation. An objective that is desirable for one organization may not be desirable for the military or vice versa.

(4) The JFC's staff also considers the sequencing of operations with civilian organizations. Civilian organizations may take a long-term approach as civilian organizations rarely expect quick results. The JFC's staff accounts for the different planning time horizons and understands that the conditions of the OE impact civilian organizations differently.

(5) The JFC's staff and civilian organizations may consolidate resources to achieve strategic objectives. Even though civilian organizations may have limited resources available, military forces may benefit from the employment of those resources, and their knowledge of the operational area and its inhabitants. The JFC's staff should understand in detail how the civilian organizations employ their resources, particularly for any activities that may impact a local population. The civil society may have capabilities and resources that can be leveraged and integrated with Service capabilities to enhance

joint operational planning and execution. These civilian capabilities and resources can reduce the burden on the military force's capabilities so that the military force can focus on the joint objectives.

3. Civil-Military Integration

CMI is a continuous process of adjusting operations and activities that result from civil-military dialogue and civil-military alignment. CMI is achieved through various coordination mechanisms such as a joint interagency coordination group, exchange of liaison officers, a civil-military working group, or a civil-military operations center (CMOC). Through each coordination mechanism, the JFC's staff may provide time during the working group, meetings, and boards for civilian organizations to discuss their activities in an operational area to create shared understanding. CMI can reduce friction within the JOA and enhance military operations to successfully achieve both the civilian and military objectives of a joint operation.

a. As operations are ongoing, liaisons are critical to providing real-time updates and explanations of an organization's plan. Liaisons may be able to discuss how their senior leader makes decisions, along with OE conditions that are unfavorable for their organization.

b. CMI is dependent on information collected from the civil component. Civilian agencies and organizations have access to additional information and understanding of political, social, and economic events far greater than the military. The JFC's staff conducts civil information management (CIM) by collecting, processing, and disseminating information from the civilian population, open-source data, civilian organizations, and government entities. Outputs of CIM feed the commander's and civilian partners' common operational picture, informing decisions.

4. Organizing for Civil-Military Operations

The JFC may establish formal cooperation mechanisms to facilitate CMO. The JFC traditionally organizes the staff through the J-9, which has experience collaborating with civilian organizations. If coordinating requirements surpass the staff's ability to facilitate CMO and no interorganizational mechanism exists, the JFC may establish a humanitarian operations center (HOC), humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), or CMOC. Each is designed to serve as a bridge between the JFC and interorganizational partners. JFCs leverage these organizations to understand and influence the civil component of the OE. This understanding includes civil considerations of a diverse set of variables related to political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.

a. **The J-9.** The J-9 (or other combatant commander [CCDR]-designated staff directorate or organization) is designed to assist in the pursuit of unified action by facilitating the integration of inter-organizational perspectives in planning, execution, and assessment. Successful interaction with interorganizational partners, which are most often not under US military command authority, depends on the establishment of cooperation

mechanisms and processes to build and share a common understanding of strategic-level guidance and the OE, develop relevant objectives, and harmonize required actions. The J-9 is the hub from which the JFC can facilitate unified action. The staff structure of the J-9 may vary based on the nature of the JFC's mission. For more information on the J-9, see JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*. The following is a list of some of the functions of the J-9:

- (1) Establishes civil-military relationships with:
 - (a) The interagency.
 - (b) International organizations.
 - (c) NGOs.
 - (d) Local population and institutions, including national civil defense authorities.
 - (2) Establishes civil information architecture and integrates civil information into operational planning and execution.
 - (3) Plans support for CMO.
 - (4) Integrates military and civilian organizations that influence operations or campaigns and seeks to promote and achieve unified action.
 - (5) Provides a conduit for sharing civil-military information.
 - (6) Supports analysis of the civil component of the OE and ensures incorporation of other civilian harm mitigation and response requirements into the planning, execution, and assessment of CMO supporting the JFC's mission.
 - (7) Coordinates support requests and activities.
 - (8) Compiles, analyzes, and disseminates relevant information.
 - (9) Performs analysis and evaluation that supports the commander's assessment.
 - (10) Integrates the plans and actions of Service capabilities that enable the joint force to achieve CMO objectives.
 - (11) Incorporates inputs and advice from the command advisor on women, peace, and security.
- b. **Theater CA Planning Team.** The theater CA planning team is assigned to the CCMDs. The J-9 (or other assigned staff organization) and theater CA planning team

develop, align, and integrate CMO plans, policies, programs, and operations in concert with theater-aligned CA, Service CMO capabilities, and interorganizational partners. These are integrated with and enhance the strategic plans, campaigns or operations, and theater security cooperation initiatives of the CCMD.

c. **CMOC.** The CMOC is a dedicated physical or virtual space for operational and tactical cooperation between the JFC and other interorganizational partners. The location should be distinct from the joint force operations center. Within the CMOC, CMO liaison elements build shared understanding, build an understanding of the civil component of the OE, align activities with relevant civilian organizations, and inform the commander and staff. A CMOC plans and facilitates the coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within the local population, the private sector, international organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other USG departments and agencies in support of the JFC. The CMOC is employed whenever CMO planning, coordination, synchronization, and integration are required to a degree that cannot be achieved by the organically assigned CMO staff. CMOCs can be established at every echelon, can be tailored to specific operations, and are often utilized from operational to tactical level. Commanders should be aware that a CMOC may not be the only or the preferred coordination mechanism for the HN agencies or international humanitarian actors. Participation in the CMOC by civilian agencies and humanitarian organizations is voluntary. Therefore, commanders should be prepared to leverage interagency partners to coordinate with civilian agencies and humanitarian actors as required.

d. **HOC.** The HOC is a senior international and interagency coordinating body designed to achieve unity of effort in large FHA operations. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistics requirements for NGOs, the UN, and international organizations; and coordinates the prioritization of military support to the lead federal agency. Because the HOC operates at the foreign national level, it consists of senior representatives from the HN, NGOs, international organizations, and other major organizations in the operation. US participation may include US embassy representatives, and CCMD liaison. HOCs are horizontally structured with no C2 authority. All members are responsible for their organizations or countries; however, the structure can be formal when led by the affected country or less formal when established by the UN.

e. **HACC.** The HACC is a temporary center established by the CCDR to facilitate planning and cooperation with interorganizational partners during an FHA operation. The HACC operates during the early planning and coordination stages of an FHA operation by providing the link between the CCDR and other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the CCDR, a CMO planner, appropriate USG advisors or liaisons, a public affairs officer, an NGO representative, and other agencies related to the civil component. Once a CMOC or HOC is established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through normal CCDR staff and crisis action organization (see Figure II-2).

Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center

	Establishing Authority	Function	Composition	Authority
Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)	Designated individual of affected country, United Nations, or United States Government (USG) departments and agencies.	Coordinates overall relief strategy at the national (country) level.	Representatives from: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Affected country• United Nations• United States embassy or consulate• Joint task force• Other nonmilitary agencies• Concerned parties (private sector)	Coordination
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center	Combatant commander	Assists with interagency coordination and planning at the strategic level. Normally is disestablished once a HOC or civil-military operations center (CMOC) is established.	Representatives from: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Combatant command• Nongovernmental organizations• Intergovernmental organizations• Regional organizations• Concerned parties (private sector)	Coordination
CMOC	Joint task force or component commander	Assists in collaboration at the operational level with military forces, USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental and international organizations, and regional organizations.	Representatives from: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Joint task force• Nongovernmental organizations• Intergovernmental organizations• Regional organizations• USG departments and agencies• Local government (host country)• Multinational forces• Other concerned parties (private sector)	Coordination

Figure II-2. Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center

f. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). The JCMOTF is a special-purpose task force made up of units from two or more Services. JFCs may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requirements and activities is beyond the organic capability of the JFC. The JCMOTF is flexible in size and composition. The JFC may establish a JCMOTF to accomplish a specific contingency mission with a civil-military nature, such as FHA, populace and resources control (PRC), support to civilian harm mitigation and response, or transitional military authority, or to provide CMO support to US or coalition military forces conducting military operations. Service component commanders and task force commanders are still responsible for accomplishing CMO

within their area of operations. When their need exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF assists in meeting the shortfall. A JCMOTF can:

- (1) Be a stand-alone joint task force (JTF) or a subordinate unit in a JTF.
 - (2) Assist JTF unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the CMO needs of their JOA.
 - (3) Provide linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the JOA through a CMOC.
 - (4) Advise the JTF commander on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or HN sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy or campaign and operational missions.
 - (5) Provide C2 or direction of the advisory, assessment, planning, or other assistance activities provided by US forces to the HN.
 - (6) Assist in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civilian links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
 - (7) Perform essential coordination or liaison with HN agencies; country teams; UN agencies; and deployed US multinational, HN military forces, and their supporting logistic organizations.
 - (8) Assist in the planning and conduct of operations in the information environment.
 - (9) Plan and conduct joint and combined CMO training exercises.
 - (10) Advise and assist in strengthening of civil infrastructures and services.
 - (11) Assess or identify HN support, or relief capabilities and funding requirements to the commander, supporting JTF commanders, the Services, and other responsible USG departments or agencies.
 - (12) Facilitate peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated or required transfers of authority, responsibilities, activities, and resources to other government agencies, international organizations, or HN responsibility.
 - (13) Identify demographic considerations via a demographic analysis.
- g. A JCMOTF should not be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF, have the primary responsibility for accomplishing all CMO in the JOA when subordinate to a JTF, eliminate the need for all units to train for CMO, or negate the need for all commanders in the JOA to plan and conduct CMO.

h. **CA.** CA have the capability to provide theater-level analysis of the civil component in coordination with the joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) and to develop operational-level civil input to the supported JFC. CA provide functional specialist capabilities to support the joint commander and staff in the planning and execution of CMO and civil-military activities that are integrated into the joint operation. A J-9 staff section plans and coordinates CMO through interaction with the operations directorate of a joint staff of the supported unit. Throughout the process, the plans officer in the CA staff integrates the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and HN sources into the JFC's common operational picture. The integration of CMO into the staff or working group is imperative.

5. Civil-Military Operations Cooperation Mechanisms

a. The JFC's staff establishes cooperation mechanisms to align and integrate civil information and civilian organization operations. Civilian organizations may provide information that enhances the joint interagency coordination group, which is a staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational partners.

For additional information on the joint interagency coordination group, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

b. **CMO Working Group.** Commanders establish CMO working groups to bring all the stakeholders in CMO together to focus and align their efforts in achieving their CMO priorities. In addition to the CMO working group, the CMO planners participate in JFC-designated information working groups; the intelligence fusion working group; the targeting board; and other boards, cells, and working groups relevant to the current operation. The composition of the CMO working group changes based on the level of command but the lead CMO planner should chair the group. Other members of this working group may include the following:

- (1) Director of the CMOC.
- (2) Subordinate Service representatives.
- (3) Subordinate CA unit representative.
- (4) Psychological operations representative.
- (5) Information representative.
- (6) Civilian harm mitigation and response representative.
- (7) Advisor on women, peace, and security.

- (8) Medical representative.
- (9) Engineer representative.
- (10) Provost marshal representative.
- (11) Staff judge advocate representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit's senior rule-of-law officer.
- (12) Chaplain or religious affairs noncommissioned officer.
- (13) Interagency representative, if applicable.
- (14) Political advisor, if applicable.
- (15) Public affairs officer.
- (16) The intelligence directorate of a joint staff, Army or Marine Corps component intelligence staff officer, or battalion or brigade targeting intelligence officer representative.
- (17) Operations directorate of a joint staff, Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer, or battalion or brigade current operations representative.
- (18) Logistics directorate of a joint staff, Army or Marine Corps component logistics staff officer, or logistics officer representative.
- (19) Resource management representative.
- (20) Service component liaison officer.
- (21) Subordinate liaison officer.
- (22) JEMSO cell representative.
- (23) Joint frequency management office representative.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

“Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how to implement strategic guidance: how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) within an acceptable level of risk.”

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning

1. General

a. **Purpose.** CCMD campaign plans translate strategic guidance into activities and operations, including CMO. CCDRs lead their staffs through joint planning to determine implementation within areas of responsibility: how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) within an acceptable level of risk. Planning should be responsive to strategic guidance established in the national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, and other strategic documents from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The staff assists the JFC by incorporating CMO into joint plans, developing plans for CMO and activities, and integrating mission partners into the planning process. CMO plans require additional consideration for whole-of-government strategic direction and agency strategy from across the USG, particularly DOS.

b. CMO in Campaign Planning Across the Competition Continuum

(1) **Cooperation.** CMO during cooperation simultaneously build relationships and support regional or global partnership through activities within the civil component of the OE. CMO in cooperation are planned in coordination with integrated country strategies, security cooperation plans, and other interagency plans. Examples of CMO include the State Partnership Program, FHA, military civic action, key leader engagements, subject matter expert exchanges, and activities in support of other government agencies.

(2) **Competition.** JFCs plan CMO in competition as a campaign activity to achieve relative advantage that supports operational objectives to achieve US strategic objectives. The JFC’s staff plans CMO in coordination with interagency partners, as competition objectives are often related to diplomatic, economic, and information objectives. As part of the civil-military alignment function, they also plan CMO in cooperation with non-USG interorganizational partners to address the civil component of the OE. For example, maritime forces may coordinate with HN fishing organizations, shipping businesses, or other foreign civilian maritime elements to maintain positive relations and retain access and basing.

(3) **Armed Conflict/War.** Commanders plan CMO for armed conflict to set conditions to achieve JFC objectives and to alleviate human suffering in accordance with

international humanitarian law (i.e., the law of armed conflict). JFCs use CMO to ensure and maintain access, mitigate adversary influence and advantage in the civil component of the OE, mitigate civilian harm, and minimize civilian interference with military operations. CMO planners in armed conflict should consider the effect of military operations on the civil component of the OE, and vice versa, including: the protection of populations, protected sites, and critical infrastructure; the potential displacement of civilians; civilian resources with military potential; continuity of essential services; humanitarian organizations and concurrent activities; and the capacity for trauma and other medical care. The conduct of military operations during armed conflict impacts the future economic and information conditions of the OE. The JFC's staff plans operations to account for the political, economic, and information conditions required for long-term strategic objectives.

(4) Transition from Armed Conflict into the New Competition. Joint forces plan and prepare for transition to the new competition to capitalize on operational success. Joint planners should account for the second- and third-order effects on the OE of transition to the new competition and be prepared to return to armed hostilities if required. Prior to the transition to the renewed competition, planners account for activities required to assist the local population in understanding the goal of military actions and how those actions benefit the population. Additionally, planners should account for the need to return to conflict, if necessary, as well as the continuing need to maintain security and conduct reconnaissance to preempt potential adversary attempts to regain the initiative while JFCs continue to consolidate gains.

c. Planning Select CMO Campaign Activities

(1) Planning CMO for Crises. CMO that occur during crises typically form a part of an interagency or international response to immediate natural or manmade threats on US persons, human life, or critical interest. Joint actions in these situations are typically planned in support of other agencies or in coordination with international organizations or multinational response. CMO planners assist the JFC in gaining a rapid situational understanding of the strategic guidance and directed mission objectives, the operational and information environments, interagency and partner authorities, roles and resources, risk, limitations and constraints, and available forces and resources. Planners use the same joint planning processes with considerations for the compressed timeline.

(2) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. Joint planners should work with the civil component and mission partners to determine requirements and capabilities that may support the deployment/redeployment of the joint force. Joint planners should understand the civilian transportation infrastructure, coordination necessary for transit, and existing agreements. The JFC continues civil-military dialogue to set conditions for future CMO.

For further information on joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, see JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

2. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

a. **Understanding the Civil Component of the OE.** JFC planners analyze the civil component to achieve a situational understanding of the OE. The civil component of the OE is a set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems, each influencing the other. The nature and interaction of these systems affect how the commander plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. Physical, informational, and human aspects help describe the interactions that take place during cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The civil component of the OE comprises those systems, power structures, and aspects that are explicitly civilian in nature and may directly or indirectly affect joint operations or objectives. Planners should remember to account for civilians within the operational area.

(1) CMO and joint operations across the competition continuum work with interagency and multinational mission partners to strengthen civil society, the rule of law, private enterprises, and government systems. CMO planners should also account for the multitude of international organizations and NGOs that may be engaged throughout the civil component of the OE to establish and strengthen these systems.

(2) During their civil-military dialogue, the JFC and staff, and their interorganizational counterparts, develop a shared systems understanding of the military and civil components of the OE to enable CMO planning and assessment. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff is the staff lead for this effort as part of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The systems analysis of the OE helps intelligence analysts and civil information managers describe and depict the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral civilian and military systems. The J-9 or theater CA planning team contributes to the analysis of the civil component of the OE by integrating civil information and knowledge with JIPOE.

(3) Forces conducting CMO can also provide information on the physical aspects of the civilian component of the OE. The persistent interaction and engagement between the joint force conducting CMO and civilians in the operational area can enable understanding of local government capacities, critical infrastructure, and hazards to either civilian populations or friendly forces. Hazards can include unexploded ordinance, infectious diseases, or the presence of toxic materials (e.g., toxic industrial chemicals or materials). This information can be collected from the local population or through observations of the joint force. This information can support joint force activities such as force protection, maneuver, civilian harm mitigation and response, and collateral damage estimates.

For more information about toxic hazards, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

See Appendix B, “Civil Information Management,” for detailed information on understanding the civil component of the OE.

b. The CMO Directorate. Although all members of a joint staff are responsible for developing CMO plans regarding their respective joint functions, the J-9 is often designated to assist the JFC in CMO and facilitate interagency cooperation in planning, execution, and assessment. However, another office, directorate, or section of a joint staff may be designated as the joint force headquarters CMO coordinating office. Civil information managers within the J-9 integrate civil information and knowledge into the joint planning process, enable interorganizational cooperation, and generate courses of action (COAs) options. The staff structure of the J-9, or other designated office responsible for CMO coordination, may vary based on the nature of the joint force command's mission and the specific headquarters designated as the JTF headquarters. For more information on the J-9, see JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*.

(1) The J-9 is traditionally the principal staff organization responsible for the integration of civil information into JIPOE and joint planning. The J-9 performs CIM and establishes the CIM architecture for the command. The directorate provides civil input to operational planning and targeting. The J-9 is responsible for annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and the development of annex V (Interorganizational/Interagency Coordination) in consultation with interagency partners.

(2) The J-9 plans and oversees the assessment of the civil component of the operational area, supporting the JFC's operational assessment approach. The J-9 supports other staff estimates with civil considerations. The J-9 accomplishes this through the conduct of and participation in coordinating boards, centers, and cells.

:

(3) The J-9 gathers input from all staff entities and relevant interorganizational partners, to be able to develop assessments of the civil component. Aspects of all joint functions contribute to understanding the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of civil components. For instance, air and maritime movement and logistics experts have an essential understanding of civilian port capacity, limitations, and constraints. Cross-functional assessments enable the commander to have the necessary understanding of civil and military components of the OE to determine COAs and their associated risks. Cross-functional assessments reduce friction in planning and execution. The directorate further enables the commander to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate all military and civilian resources and capabilities through unified action.

c. Joint Functions. The joint functions are those capabilities and activities that enable the JFC to integrate and direct joint operations. The CMO directorate informs each joint function with civil information relevant to respective assessments, tasks, and missions.

(1) **C2 Considerations.** CMO require significant unity of effort to align interorganizational capabilities and activities across military and nonmilitary mission partners. Mission partners may be unable to communicate with military staff and forces on military communication platforms. The joint staff should plan for structures and systems that enhance synchronization and information sharing and account for communication friction. Legal advisors should consider the span of applicable civil and

military authorities, agreements, policies, and laws when assisting the commander and staff in CMO planning.

(a) Information sharing in CMO allows the exchange of information with mission partners and should include an understanding of what information can be shared to facilitate unity of effort. Accordingly, information sharing requires not only close coordination with foreign disclosure officers and strict adherence to foreign disclosure guidelines but also knowledge of security classification guides and information security policy and procedures. The information management plan should provide explicit guidance for all forms of information sharing.

(b) Communication systems are vital to plan, execute, and sustain CMO. Communication with stakeholders can include secure and nonsecure modes using voice, data, and video teleconferencing through a combination of military and nonmilitary systems.

(c) **JEMSO.** The electromagnetic spectrum is a critical resource, and access is vital to CMO. JEMSO involves preserving friendly access to the electromagnetic spectrum while denying use to the adversary. Most HNs maintain strict control of spectrum management within their borders and access by US forces is not guaranteed. CMO require communication and network planners to collaborate with spectrum managers in the JFC's JEMSO cell to coordinate frequency allocation to military, government, nongovernmental, and private-sector users through established agreements with the HN. Military systems supporting CMO, including aircraft, weapon systems, sensors, and broadband communications systems, consume significant frequency resources in an already congested electromagnetic OE.

For more information on JEMSO, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

(d) Nonmilitary agencies may have their own communications networks, and the degree of sophistication varies. These may include commercial leased circuits and satellite services and high-frequency radio equipment. Commercial satellite services can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communications. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in CMO may require using unclassified communications means during an operation.

(2) **Movement and Maneuver Considerations.** CMO often incorporate the movement of military and nonmilitary resources, equipment, and personnel. Operations such as FHA, for example, may require the movement of nonmilitary resources on military platforms in support of other government agencies. When planning for combat and other operations, CMO planners should account for anticipated or required civilian movement within and across domains, including displaced civilians and commerce. Planners should account for the limitations, constraints, requirements, capabilities, and transitions across mission partners when developing comprehensive CMO movement and maneuver plans. Planners should also consider the perception created by using military

assets to transport personnel, aid, or materials, and how this changes the OE with respect to the neutrality or security of aid workers and neutral third parties.

(a) CMO normally rely on engineering support for the construction, repair, and maintenance of national, regional, and local infrastructure and essential services, including government facilities, water, sanitation, transportation, electricity, and fuel distribution. The engineering staff should integrate into CMO planning to align engineering planning with CMO objectives and provide engineering technical expertise. The JFC engineer staff can provide initial technical estimates of critical infrastructure and basic services necessary to sustain the population. They can also plan and coordinate follow-on infrastructure surveys as part of the overall civil reconnaissance (CR) plan to provide detailed descriptions of the condition of major services.

(b) **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Project Management.** Humanitarian and civil assistance, when properly managed, can improve conditions in the operational area through improved infrastructure.

(c) Status of forces is an important concern for CMO planners. Numerous legal issues should be resolved prior to deployment, including the following: HN criminal and civil jurisdiction, authority to conduct law enforcement activities, claims against the United States or US personnel, authority for US forces to carry arms and use force, force protection, entry and exit requirements, customs and tax liability, contracting authority, authority to provide health care without a local medical license, vehicle registration and licensing, communications support, facilities for US forces, contractor status (local, US, or other nationals), and authority to detain or arrest, as well as identifying, vetting, and other provisions for transferring custody. The staff judge advocate provides legal advice concerning status-of-forces considerations, including the provisions of current agreements, the need for additional agreements, and the procedures for obtaining agreements.

(d) Environmental issues are a growing concern, as military activities may create environmental impacts that affect the local population and should be accounted for. For example, destruction of facilities containing chemicals may have long-term impacts on the environment and force a local population to move, which may complicate the relationship between the local population and joint forces and impede the accomplishment of JFC objectives. Additionally, water and land uses, the preservation of protected species of animals, and carbon emissions may be governed by HN laws and regulations or by international agreements.

(e) Chaplains advise on the impact of military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in the JOA. Joint force planners incorporate chaplains, who provide insight into the religion, cultural sensitivities, and ideology held by mission partners and adversaries, in planning for CMO. Chaplains may also liaise with key civilian religious leaders and faith-based organizations, with the objective of fostering understanding and reconciliation.

(3) Fires Considerations. Fires include the use of capabilities in all domains to create lethal and nonlethal effects. Planners should determine the effects required to support CMO and generate options for action within the limitations of the operation. Planners should carefully account for potential secondary and tertiary effects of actions within the civil component that may support or detract from desired operational or strategic outcomes.

For additional information, see JP 3-09, Joint Fires.

(4) Information Considerations. Information activities are an essential component of successful CMO. CMO require shared understanding and the support of the local population and institutions, mission partners, and the broader audience. Planners should determine the appropriate and timely release of information and the target audience required to support CMO activities and objectives. CMO may require the support of influence activities to achieve objectives or counter adversarial activity. CMO and military information support operations can be mutually supporting if they are well coordinated but can inadvertently challenge one another if they are planned and executed independently. CMO supports battlespace awareness through the gathering and sharing of civil information. Since CMO inherently interfaces directly with the civil population, they can potentially provide the most current and relevant feedback on the impact of information activities and other operations.

(a) CMO contribute to assuring HN personnel, international organizations, NGOs, and the local population and institutions that US military intentions benefit the HN and the region. Operations in the information environment are military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences, influencing foreign relevant actors, and protecting friendly information. CMO may be used to achieve these activities.

(b) CMO is supported by:

1. Key Leader Engagement. By establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with key HN personnel, NGOs, and international organizations, CMO can potentially secure a more expedient and credible means of disseminating information and influencing behavior.

2. Informing populace of CMO activities and support.

3. Correcting misinformation/disinformation and countering information directed against HN civilian authorities by adversaries.

4. Providing information and participating in the CMO assessment.

5. Media coverage of CMO impacting perceptions of success or failure that may influence the commander's decision.

6. Public affairs coordinates releases to the media with all appropriate agencies to facilitate consistent and accurate information flow to audiences.

See JP 3-04, Information Operations in Joint Operations, and JP 3-61, Joint Public Affairs, for additional information.

(5) **Intelligence Considerations.** Planners rely on the intelligence produced in JIPOE to depict the human, informational, and physical factors of the JOA when planning for CMO. CMO are often conducted in a complex and interconnected OE of friendly, threat, and neutral actors, activities, and interests. CIM managers assist intelligence staff in the integration of civil information and knowledge into intelligence products and in the identification of information gaps and requirements.

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for additional information.

(6) **Protection Considerations.** In addition to planning for the protection of US military personnel, information, facilities, and equipment, CMO require the planned protection of civil considerations, including mission partners, critical infrastructure, civilian populations, and cultural heritage sites or property. Planners should anticipate requirements, agreements, constraints, and restraints, and account for partner and local protection assets and requirements. As part of those requirements, planners should also maintain an awareness and account for the difference in security concerns between the men and women of the local population.

(7) **Sustainment Considerations.** One purpose of CMO is often to mitigate joint force logistical requirements that exceed military means and authorities. Planners should consider all potential supply sources, including HN, commercial, multinational, and pre-positioned supplies. Logistics planners should identify CMO logistic requirements along with HN and theater support capabilities. Logistics planners should consider distribution points' proximity to major population centers to reduce impacts on civilians. Logistics and support infrastructure to sustain CMO are frequently underestimated. Therefore, the logistics concept of support should be closely tied to planning efforts.

(a) Planners should identify time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materiel handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks.

(b) Planners should identify support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and sea lines of communications. This also requires plans to deconflict civil and military transportation systems. Joint force planners should consider potential requirements to support nonmilitary personnel.

(c) Planning should include logistics support normally outside military logistics, such as support to the vulnerable civilian populace (e.g., women, children, the elderly). CMO often provide support to these categories of individuals, and joint force

planners should account for the proper administration of aid. Logistic planners should consider that culturally inappropriate foods, materials, and methods may have a detrimental impact on CMO or create a negative perception of the professionalism of US forces. Procurement of culturally appropriate foods and materials may require additional planning and coordination or use of contractors.

(d) Operational contract support enables current and future operations through support contracts. Most theater support contracts are awarded to local vendors and provide employment opportunities to local and national personnel and sustain the local economic base. Operational contract support and logistics planners carefully consider the impacts of excessive number of contracts or inflated costs to a local economy. If contracts are used, contract oversight requirements should be considered to ensure quality products and services are delivered and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by the contractors. Contracts, while an excellent tool to expand resources in a local area, may also disrupt the economic base. Additionally, social, political, and economic factors should be analyzed before selecting a foreign contractor. In areas where security is a challenge, intelligence-based vendor threat mitigation is a process of vetting to reduce the risk of inadvertently providing funds and resources to the enemy. Logistic planners and operational contract support should also identify the potential risk a contract may have on CMO. What may be good for forces support may not meet the needs of the civil-military aspects of the plan.

(e) CCDRs have numerous sources of funding that may be used to promote regional security and other US national security goals and can impact CMO. These include traditional CCDR activity funding; CCDR initiative funds; humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations, Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 401; emergency and extraordinary expenses, Title 10, USC, Section 127; and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid-funded activities, including humanitarian assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 2561; transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries, Title 10, USC, Section 402; foreign disaster assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 404; humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 407; and excess nonlethal supplies: availability for humanitarian relief purposes, domestic emergency assistance, and homeless veterans assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 2557. JFCs should consult with their servicing legal staff if there is any question about whether a particular source of funding may be lawfully used for a particular mission. Servicing legal staff offices should be consulted on these questions as far in advance as possible.

(f) The joint force may conduct CMO, supported by or in support of civilian harm mitigation and response efforts. Civilian harm can have specific political and cultural sensitivities. Logistic planners work with CA planners to maintain compliance with local and HN regulations. CMO planners provide the interface between local agencies and military assets to support appropriate response actions, including the removal of remains. The interface should include handling customs, location of storage facilities, burial sites, transportation options, and providing linguists.

3. Civil-Military Operations in Joint Planning

a. Operational Design

(1) Operational design is a tool the JFC and staff employ to understand the OE as a complex and interactive system. Operational design supports an understanding of the OE as an interacting system and produces an operational approach through the application of operational art. CMO requires planners pay special attention to the complexities of the civil component of the OE and their interrelationship with the strategic environment, adversarial interests, and desired operational outcomes.

(2) Methodology

(a) **Understand Strategic Direction and Guidance.** The commander and staff should analyze available sources of guidance, including written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other organizations that are interested in the situation, communication synchronization guidance, and higher headquarters' orders or estimates. The whole-of-government approach to CMO requires planners to understand the overarching policy of the United States and the nested relationship of strategic and operational military guidance.

(b) **Understand the Strategic Environment.** Planners analyze the strategic environment to understand the conditions that affect US national interests beyond the OE. An understanding of the strategic environment assists the joint staff in framing CMO and accounting for strategic interests, risk, and tensions within the civil component of the strategic environment relevant to the other elements of national power.

(3) **Understand the OE.** Joint planners assist the JFC in understanding, assessing, and describing the human, informational, and physical aspects of the OE. Civil information managers incorporate civil information and knowledge to assist the staff in understanding and accounting for the complexities of the civil component of the OE.

(4) **Define the Problem.** Joint planners assist the JFC by applying OE understanding to anticipate tensions in the transformation of current conditions and to determine opportunities and resolution requirements. CMO often involve problems with interconnected tensions throughout operational variables, which require a combination of military and nonmilitary solutions.

(5) **Identify Assumptions.** Commanders and staff identify the necessary assumptions against information and guidance gaps for successful planning. When planning for CMO, it may be necessary to assume the will, capabilities, and actions/reactions of mission partners and other civil actors throughout the OE.

(6) **Develop Operational Approach.** Commanders and staffs apply their understanding of the OE and the problem to develop an operational approach. Operational approaches may include lines of effort or operations that synchronize

activities and intermediate objectives. CMO can span the operational approach or serve as either a supporting line of effort/operations or supporting activity.

(a) When CMO are nationally directed activities or those of strategic interest, CMO may be the main effort or principal operations. For example, the JFC may choose or be directed to conduct CMO in response to a crisis. These circumstances typically carry elements of both urgency and importance. Such CMO typically require a high degree of interagency and multinational involvement in both planning and execution.

(b) CMO are most often incorporated into joint plans as supporting activities to campaigning and the various operations and activities of a JFC. These activities are typically incorporated within an approach under a line of effort toward a military objective.

(c) CMO may also describe a line of operations or effort within a broader operation. Commanders and staff create CMO lines of effort or operation within an operational approach to orient activities toward achieving favorable conditions of an operational objective.

(d) **Identify Decisions and Decision Points.** Commanders and staff account for the decisions that need to be made, when they will need to be made, and their associated risks to the mission, the force, and other military, interagency, or strategic objectives. The civil-military nature of CMO may depend upon key decisions outside of the commander's purview and may be associated with the transition between civil and military authority. The associated risks of CMO decisions or indecision may have implications beyond the mission itself.

(e) **Refine Operational Approach.** The commander adjusts the operational approach based on feedback from formal and informal discussions at all levels of command and other information. When planning CMO, this refinement should include considerations or conversations with mission partners and relevant multinational actors.

(f) **Develop Planning Guidance.** The commander provides a summary of the OE and the problem, along with a visualization of the operational approach, to the staff and to other partners. CMO planning guidance should indicate the required interorganizational involvement.

b. **The Joint Planning Process.** The joint planning process is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The CMO directorate collaborates with the staff to incorporate CMI into the joint planning process and facilitate interorganizational cooperation in CMO planning.

(1) **Joint Planning Process Steps**

(a) **Step 1—Planning Initiation.** Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. At this stage, the commander provides the staff with initial planning guidance. The staff reviews the commander’s operational approach and initial planning guidance, as well as staff estimates and JIPOE outputs. CMO planners identify external civil stakeholders and collaborators, determine CIM requirements, and gather and analyze civil information.

(b) **Step 2—Mission Analysis.** The joint staff gathers and analyzes strategic and operational guidance, JIPOE, and other relevant information. Planners identify tasks, centers of gravity, and commander’s critical information requirements; develop staff estimates and the mission statement; and refine the operational approach and the commander’s intent statement and planning guidance. CMO planners inform the mission analysis with the results of their civil-military dialogue with interorganizational partners. CIM managers develop a civil estimate, develop civil information requirements, and work closely with staff counterparts to integrate civil knowledge into all planning products. The integration of civil knowledge in mission analysis is critical to understanding multidimensional risk and identifying limitations, constraints, and opportunities among civilian mission partners and the civil component of the OE. In mission analysis, CMO planners account for the objectives, activities, and capabilities of the local population and institutions, civilian mission partners, and intergovernmental and other state and non-state actors within the JOA.

1. The JIPOE process includes integrating analysis, production, collection management, and target processes to shape decision making and enable operations. Planners should leverage experience and access to information and relationships enjoyed by defense attaché offices, security cooperation offices, and US embassy country teams to enhance their understanding of the OE. Continuous JIPOE analysis and properly tailored JIPOE products enhance OE understanding and enable the JFC to respond effectively.

For additional information on JIPOE, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

2. Civil information managers continuously develop civil knowledge through the processing of civil information to help commanders understand the civil component of the OE and plan for civilian capabilities. The CMO directorate establishes a JOA civil-military area study and other products to inform JIPOE. Analysis of the civil component is necessary for CMO planning to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in civil infrastructure, economy, governance, and the local population and institutions that can be leveraged to advance the joint mission and USG objectives. Oftentimes, mission partners may provide information that could deepen the JFC’s and staff’s understanding of the OE.

3. Commanders and CMO planners look beyond the traditional military construct in considering the impact of the human aspect on operations. A system

of systems approach should be taken to understand how various factors are interrelated. There is a variety of frameworks to aid the staff in doing so, including civil considerations of ASCOPE [areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events]; the operational variables within PMESII [political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information]; the instruments of national power in DIME [diplomatic, informational, military, economic]; and the mission variables of METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available]. These guides support the command in understanding how the human aspect of the environment can affect joint operations.

(c) **Step 3—COA Development.** Staffs develop multiple COAs to provide commanders with options to attain the military objective. CMO planners use their specific expertise to assist the staff in incorporating civil considerations, including the capabilities, resources, and activities of mission partners, HN, and the local population and institutions, into COAs. CMO planners facilitate interorganizational cooperation by incorporating civil-military alignment into COA development to integrate the actions and capabilities of civilian mission partners. They apply civil knowledge to enhance the staff's ability to account for impacts to and from the civil component.

(d) **Step 4—COA Analysis and Wargaming.** The commander and staff closely examine potential COAs to reveal details that determine COA validity and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each. CMO require the inclusion of a broad spectrum of green cell players in wargaming and analysis to account for mission partners and the complexity of the civil component of the JOA.

(e) **Step 5—COA Comparison.** The commander and staff select criteria to evaluate COAs independently, and then identify the COA that has the highest probability of mission success. In CMO planning, criteria should incorporate whole-of-government considerations relevant to the operation's strategic purpose and its interaction with the strategic environment.

(f) **Step 6—COA Approval.** The commander selects a COA by considering both personal analysis and the staff's recommendation, supported by analysis and wargaming results. The scope and purpose of certain CMO may require the commander to consider the input of mission partners or supported agencies in COA selection.

(g) **Step 7—Plan or Order Development.** The commander and staff collaborate with components and interorganizational partners to expand the approved COA and initial concept of operations into a detailed plan or operations order. The JFC guides plan development by issuing a planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. CMO plan development also accounts for interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational capabilities and requirements. CMO planners are responsible for the development of annex G (Civil-Military Operations).

(2) **CMO Orders Development.** Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) describes CMO in a plan or operations order. CMO require coordination among CA, logistical support, maneuver, health service support, military police, engineer, transportation, and special operations forces. CMO involve cross-cutting activities across staff sections and subordinate units. Annex G identifies, consolidates, and deconflicts the activities of the various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require significantly more details than discussed in annex G.

CHAPTER IV

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS—EXECUTION

“Contrary to what some believe, taking all reasonable and feasible precautions to protect civilians – and mitigating the resulting anger when we harm them – does not need to impede military operation.”

Patrick Leahy, United States Senator

1. General

The effective execution of CMO requires CMI with mission partners and an updated understanding of the OE. As CMO are executed, the JFC’s staff and their interorganizational partners continuously evaluate the conditions of the OE and mission partners’ capability to execute. CMO may be complex due to the number of operational variables that impact and are impacted by CMO. The JFC’s staff identify the desired effects in the operational area that enable the accomplishment of operational and strategic objectives. As the OE is impacted through executing CMO, the JFC’s staff may need to reassess the continued execution, adjustment, or transition of a civil-military operation.

2. Civil-Military Operations Synchronization

While executing CMO, an ongoing exchange of information should occur through the cooperation mechanisms that are established during planning. During fast-paced operations, a comprehensive understanding of the OE requires commanders to understand the civil and military aspects that impact the area assigned to the military forces. Commanders can gain insight into the civil component by participating in various CIMIC mechanisms. These mechanisms are established depending on the level and condition of the environment. Although each mechanism has its unique functions, they all have essentially the same purpose, that is, to provide a platform for day-to-day information exchange, coordination, and integration of capabilities between the military, intergovernmental organizations/NGOs, other mission partners, and the local population and institutions.

a. The JFC assumes risk for the joint force and the JFC’s staff understands how the execution of military operations may create risk for civil organizations. The joint force may execute an operation that creates unfavorable conditions for mission partners. As the joint force is executing missions, the JFC’s staff tracks conditions of the OE that may degrade the ability of mission partners to operate. Mission partners’ ability to operate may impact US long-term strategic objectives or prevent mission partners’ immediate ability to execute operations that support or complement US operations.

b. The JFC’s staff plans for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response with mission partners prior to execution initiation. During ongoing military operations, the JFC’s staff and mission partners adjust to unfavorable changes in the operational area through chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. The JFC’s staff and

mission partners use coordination mechanisms to rapidly craft a response. The alignment of the joint force and mission partners during consequence management may reduce negative impacts on future missions.

c. CIM is a six-step analytical process conducted by the J-9, or other designated directorate, that provides the commander, staff, and interorganizational partners a common operating picture of the civil component. CIM allows for integration within the competition continuum through interagency coordination. This in turn highlights the critical requirement of unity of effort/unified action to allow for proper execution and planning of CMO. Additionally, there are Service-specific requirements for information platforms that allow for sharing of collected information across the scope of interorganizational cooperation.

3. Civil-Military Operations Activities

a. **PRC.** PRC is normally a responsibility of HN civilian governments; however, in the absence of HN civilian authorities or agencies who are capable of PRC, US forces may implement PRC measures with the approval of US civilian leadership. Due to the sensitive nature of constricting a population's movement, PRC may be used in armed conflict when freedom of maneuver is required for the joint force to achieve their objectives. In counterinsurgency, PRC is also used to deny freedom of movement to insurgent forces and their supporting networks. In a permissive environment, joint forces implement PRC measures in support of an HN government.

(1) PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control.

(a) Populace control provides security to people, mobilizes human resources, denies personnel to the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, and voluntary resettlement. DC operations involve populace control that requires extensive planning and coordination among various military and civilian organizations. DCs are commonly referred to as displaced civilians by interorganizational partners.

(b) Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

(2) When executing PRC, the JFC's staff develops COAs for the treatment and disposition of civilians who may not want to follow the directions of JFC organizations. The JFC's staff accounts for other organizations that may wish to move within the area of operations. International organizations and NGOs may have the capability to provide basic life support to civilian populations, maintaining compliance with international humanitarian law when applicable or required.

b. **DC.** DC operations involve the movement of a civilian population from one location in a country to a different location or country. Civilian populations may move due to a natural or manmade disaster or armed conflict/war. The HN government is the lead for directing and aiding their population. In the event an HN government is unable, DOS or the international community usually assumes the lead for directing and aiding the civilians.

(1) In a permissive environment, the JFC organization supports the HN or other designated lead organization.

(2) In armed conflict/war, the JFC may assume control of DCs until an international organization or partner country assumes control of the DCs. JFCs provide guidance for addressing DCs in compliance with laws and international agreements, and to prevent challenges in the operational area.

c. **FHA.** FHA consists of DoD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. These activities are governed by various statutes and policies. FHA includes foreign disaster relief operations and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need and may also be conducted concurrently with other DoD support missions and activities such as DC support; security operations; international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response; Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid humanitarian assistance projects; the Denton Humanitarian Assistance Program; DoD humanitarian demining assistance; and DoD's humanitarian and civic assistance activities. FHA operations (including foreign disaster relief operations) are normally conducted in support of DOS. Foreign disaster relief operations, when using foreign military assets, are usually conducted by observing best practices and guidelines for civil-military humanitarian coordination.

For further detail concerning FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. For further detail concerning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

d. **Military Government.** When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to intervene militarily. For the JFC and staff, this may mean planning and executing operations within an environment of political ambiguity. When a joint force performs a forcible entry and defeats the enemy force, consequently deposing the local government and subsequently performing a military occupation, the joint force may establish civil control through the assertion of transitional military authority or establishment of military government.

(1) Some immediate requirements when occupying territory can be ensuring security by asserting transitional military authority within the area, providing for the local populace by restoring essential services and meeting humanitarian needs. The long-term goal may be to develop the following: local capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. As

a result, the potentially slow development process of government reconstruction may frustrate flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of land combat operations.

(2) The transition to a military government requires significant efforts from the JFC's staff. The transition sets conditions for a strategic success or failure. Understanding the HN and leaving the greatest amount of HN government in place may enable a smooth transition. Other agencies and organizations may have the capacity to assist in the transition to a military government. The JFC's staff integrates the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations prior to and during the transition period.

(3) The political transition can include transition to a US interim authority, a local authority, or an international organization. When transitioning to a US interim authority,

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, coalition forces did not completely occupy the territory of Iraq. As a matter of policy, the United States was not “occupying” Iraq ... it was “liberating” Iraq, which had significant implications for the design of the governance structure that was put in place. United States diplomat Paul Bremer was appointed as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Director for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, subsequently renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). As Director of the CPA, Mr. Bremer ruled by decree. Amongst his most notable actions was CPA Order #1, which outlawed the Baath party in all its forms, essentially eliminating Iraqi government institutions from the national to local level. The absence of a military government produced a political/security vacuum in the time between military victory (March 2003) and the establishment of an interim authority under Special Envoy Bremer (May 2003). The inability to enforce local laws allowed sectarian rivals to vie for political and civil control. This rivalry promoted sectarian civil strife between the former ruling Baathists and the majority Shiite population, resulting in a civil war. The CPA created the Iraqi Interim Governing Council in March 2004, coinciding with the drafting of an interim Constitution and Status of Forces agreement. Sectarian civil war continued as the majority Shiite government gained and assumed the reins of government. The CPA, along with the Interim Governing Council, transitioned authority to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004. Although the newly elected Iraqi government drafted a new constitution, the fractured government failed to adequately remedy the sectarian/political division amongst the populace. The Iraqi civil war continued later with Sunni-based Islamic State of Iraq and Syria occupying territory formerly part of Iraq, an Iraqi government seemingly content with maintaining its hold on Shiite dominated southeastern Iraq, and the Kurdish Regional Government continuing to function essentially as an autonomous region in northern Iraq. Even with changes in Iraqi government leadership, Sunni resistance continued, and the country remained fractured.

Various Sources

the military government provides support to DOS. Assistance may be required by the interim authority in a wide range of situations, such as military occupation, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian crises. Once a military government has transitioned authority to an interim authority, the military may remain to support the civil administration.

e. **Medical Civil-Military Operations (MCMO).** An assessment of total health support requirements for CMO comes from careful mission analysis, resource application, and an adequate survey of existing public health and medical care infrastructure. This assessment should then be coordinated within the theater health support community. Whenever applicable, MCMO planning should be coordinated with the appropriate USG country team and existing programming to avoid duplication of effort and increase positive effects in the HN. MCMO is performed by health support units directly. These activities should align with the overall JFC's CMO objectives. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, lists medical and other health interventions as primary tools to promote the security interests of the USG and the HN, enhance operational readiness skills of US military units, and promote USG foreign policy interests. There is significant DoD policy on humanitarian and civic assistance and FHA based on legal authority within Title 10, USC. Additionally, there are several funding sources for CA and medical forces to perform MCMO missions legally and effectively.

(1) MCMO can be employed across the competition continuum. MCMO include cooperative medical and veterinary military engagement activities; FHA; disease outbreak response in a permissive environment; health related CMO in competition below armed conflict; health-related activities during armed conflict, campaigns, and operations; and global health engagement activities incorporated into security cooperation planning, campaigns, and operations. Although the primary mission of health support is to enable force health protection, health support personnel may be tasked to conduct or support MCMO in activities that build HN or foreign nation capacity in the public health sector. These operations are often conducted in areas where social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, inadequate and unsafe food and water (as well as distribution problems), civil disturbances, general civil unrest, diseases, uncontrolled distribution of hazardous wastes and hazardous materials, and environmental extremes.

(2) In this environment, there may be several public health support activities appropriate for MCMO, including preventive medicine initiatives, personal sanitation and hygiene training, safe food and water preparation and handling, infant and childcare, preventive dental hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, veterinary services, and behavioral health surveillance and support. Additional efforts can include the development of logistic programs, continuing medical support education programs, medical intelligence and threat analysis, and assistance in upgrading and devising methods for supplying and sustaining existing HN medical infrastructure and facilities.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER V

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS—ASSESSMENT

“Act after having made assessments. The first who knows the measure of far and near wins—this is the rule of armed struggle.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

1. General

- a. Assessments provide the JFC and mission partners with critical informational outputs and updated analysis of the operation and OE that inform decision-making throughout planning and execution. JFCs and their staffs, along with interorganizational partners, should continually monitor the OE and assess the progress of the operation toward the objective. A continuous dialogue among those involved with CMO at all echelons provides the feedback the senior leadership needs to adapt operations to the current situation. Assessments assist commanders to manage risk and direct the operation toward the objective.
- b. During planning, the JFC and staff describe the current and desired conditions of the OE and identify the barriers that prevent the establishment of the desired conditions. The JFC and staff, in concert with their interorganizational counterparts, develop an assessment plan to focus and integrate information from various sources to reduce the uncertainty of their observations and conclusions about the OE. This information may be derived from mission partners, the HN government, subordinate commands, NGOs, and various intelligence sources (e.g., JIPOE).
- c. The accuracy and applicability of an assessment depends on the quality of the indicators and measures determined in the planning process. CMO assessment indicators require information that identifies changes in conditions within the OE related to operational objectives. Planners recommend assessment indicators in the critical information requirements. Collection managers orient intelligence collection and CR in support of assessment requirements. CMO planners should involve civilian experts to identify the proper indicators and standards within the civil component.
- d. The JFC and staff integrate mission partners in the development of the CMO assessment approach, as appropriate. Interorganizational counterparts may offer proven assessment methodologies and an understanding of the civil component indicators that require monitoring and evaluation.

2. Operation Assessment during Civil-Military Operations

- a. Determining the assessment approach to CMO is an integral part of the operational design and planning for a campaign or operation. The purpose of the assessment is to make operations more effective by identifying risks, opportunities, and necessary change and improvement to the operational approach. The development of the assessment approach

involves the entire staff and other sources, such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. The assessment cycle creates the opportunity for operational improvement through course correction, adaptation, and learning (Figure V-1).

b. CMO assessments measure the performance of civil-military activities and the effectiveness of CMI toward desired effects, objectives, and outcomes in the civil component of the JOA (see Figure V-2). JFCs use CMO assessments to inform decisions on course correction, branches or sequels, and activity adjustment or prioritization. JFCs communicate outputs through additional guidance and clarified intent in fragmentary orders, requests for support, or interorganizational cooperation mechanisms.

(1) The JFC, staff, and mission partners use assessment feedback to generate solutions through the application of combined capabilities. Comprehensive solutions promise greater effectiveness in meeting complex problems but require thorough





Figure V-1. Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle

**Figure V-2. Assessment Levels and Measures**

interorganizational cooperation, consideration for organizational authorities and resources, and synchronization of activities. The JFC and mission partners consider all resources available, including those organic and of the HN, international organizations, NGOs, and the broader USG.

(2) Identified change in the OE may drive critical decisions to change mission or transition, depending on the direction and extremity of change relative to risk, operational objectives, and strategic interest. The JFC leverages assessments to adjust activities and the application of joint capabilities.

For details on the assessment process, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

c. CMO planners work closely with intelligence staff to continuously update situational understanding. Together they gather and analyze civil data, identify information gaps and requirements, and integrate civil information and knowledge into JIPOE. CMO planners collaborate with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and collection managers to monitor indicators and answer civil information requirements. The JFC may also dedicate CA elements to collect civil information in support of CIM requirements. CA elements routinely collect data in support of civil information requirements and

assessments through CR and engagement. CA elements are trained to observe operational variables in the civil component of the OE and to engage with the spectrum of civilian subject matter experts and authorities.

d. In CMO, effects of specific actions may require a long time to appear. The JFC's staff plans for intermediate effects that may show that operations are creating a positive effect. The JFC's staff accounts for extraneous events not related to joint force operations that impact the desired effects.

e. The outputs of CMO assessments communicate the effectiveness of the operational approach toward desired objectives, describe risks involved in the accomplishment of the plan, and recommend necessary changes to the plan. Additionally, CMO assessments help the commander to report observations and conclusions about the impacts of CMO efforts and make recommendations to senior commanders or policy makers. Figure V-3 portrays the relationships among time, objectives, resources, and risk when conducting a CMO assessment.




Figure V-3. Notional Assessment Relationships

f. CMO Assessments

- (1) Deepen and share understanding of the civil component of the OE.
- (2) Depict interorganizational progress toward mission accomplishment.
- (3) Inform the JFC decisions and those of mission partners.
- (4) Identify activity outputs and qualify outcomes through:
 - (a) Tactical assessments that measure the performance quality of CMO activities and tasks and identify required improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures.
 - (b) CMO operational assessments that measure the effectiveness of CMI in creating the desired effects and achieving operational objectives. Operational assessments measure the change of preidentified indicators in the OE against a baseline assessment and standards that support the objective. Assessment outputs allow the JFC and mission partners to gauge the effectiveness of the current approach and adjust accordingly (see Figure V-4).

3. Civil-Military Operations Trend Assessment

- a. Operational indicators, derived from measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs), or other assessment models, identify the efficiency of CMO in achieving desired objectives. Indicators measure quantitative and qualitative changes or trends of the OE, resulting from or independent of CMO (see Figure V-5). Indicators contribute to the operational assessment and identify emergent requirements or trends from within the OE that impact the mission.
- b. The utility of a CMO assessment is contingent on its ability to detect and monitor trends. Trend analysis requires the establishment of an initial, pre-mission, or early baseline assessment of civil component indicators. Without a baseline indicator assessment, assessors are unable to measure change. Information provided by multiple civil and military capabilities interacting with indicators is a useful supplement to deliberate and iterative assessment activities. Collectively, the information provided from data pulls and from the joint force and its partners allows assessors to track and measure qualitative and quantitative change. CIM is a crucial element to CMO assessment, integrating and depicting the required multi-source civil information over time and space.
- c. The CMO staff assists the JFC by continuously or iteratively monitoring and analyzing indicator trends in the civil component of the OE and providing progress reports and an updated understanding of the OE. CMO assessment outputs inform the JFC and mission partners at key planned and unanticipated decision points. They demonstrate which CMO activities are effective, and which are ineffective, poorly executed, or counterproductive.

Possible Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness for Civil-Military Operations	
Measures of Performance	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Shape: foreign humanitarian assistance supplied, quick impact projects. ● Deter: levels of violent/disruptive events. ● Seize the Initiative: integration with host nation civil-military authorities, host nation government, integration with local populace. ● Dominate: decrease in hostilities, decrease in collateral damage/deaths, injuries. ● Legitimacy: foreign humanitarian assistance, restoration of services, repair/rebuilding projects. ● Enable Civil Authority: train/equip law enforcement and military, political elections, mentoring of government officials. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Shape: perception by host nation government and host nation populace, reduction of turmoil, return to pre-event levels. ● Deter: restoration of pre-event civil activities. ● Seize the Initiative: perception that host nation government and civil-military authorities are legitimate/credible and that United States Government intervention is welcome. ● Dominate: lower violent crime rate and deaths per capita. ● Legitimacy: self-sufficiency/stability at pre-event levels or better and restoration of essential services. ● Enable Civil Authority: self-sufficient/legitimate military and law enforcement, legitimate/unquestioned political elections, legitimate government.

Figure V-4. Possible Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness for Civil-Military Operations

d. Trend assessment outputs are essential to identifying operational risk and opportunities. They may identify emerging or unanticipated opportunities, problems, or dilemmas. Outputs may indicate minor or severe change in the security environment, humanitarian situation, or other factors affecting the CMO mission or national interest.

4. Assessment Complexities in Civil-Military Operations

a. CMO operational assessments differ from assessments of many other operations because success of the operation often relies on nonmilitary factors and factors outside of the joint force's direct control. This increases the focus on diplomatic, informational, and economic objectives, and on the civil component of the OE. As with other operations, the operational assessments link the performance of the joint force to the conditions of the current OE. Because the lines of effort and lines of operations within a joint force are interdependent, the impact of military actions can be difficult to isolate in the OE. Often,

Quantitative versus Qualitative Assessment		
	Measures of Performance	Measures of Effectiveness
Quantitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of wells drilled • Number of schools built • Inoculations given • Number of police stations manned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases of water-borne illness • Literacy rate (per/1000) • Malaria rate (per/1000) • Crime rate (%)
Qualitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integration with other government/nongovernment organization programs • Host nation perception of quality of work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sentiments of the host nation population as to health and safety • Police morale

Figure V-5. Quantitative versus Qualitative Assessment

this requires that the joint force determine progress toward these objectives to understand the relationships that exist between nonmilitary and military objectives.

(1) CMO often involve complex political and societal issues that may not lend themselves to quantifiable MOEs. Therefore, assessment staffs in CMO require skill sets in operationally relevant qualitative research analysis. This includes a degree of area knowledge specific to social science skill sets and an understanding of operational relevance. Mission partners and local NGOs may have expertise or experience that can be useful in assessing complex challenges.

(2) The JFC and staff, in concert with interorganizational counterparts, establish which assessment factors within the OE are important and ascertain the status of these factors regarding the CMO intermediate objectives. The complexity of CMO usually does not allow for uniform or quantifiable MOEs. Because no two operations and no two locations within a JOA are the same, all CMO are assessed on their own merits. The JFC and staff continually develop and enhance their understanding of the OE to identify the key factors particular to their operation.

For further information on assessment of complexity and interdependencies, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

b. Outputs of CMO assessment communicate the effectiveness of the CMO plan toward the objectives, describe risks involved in the success of the plan, and recommend necessary changes to the plan. CMO involves complex political and societal issues that may not lend themselves to easily quantifiable MOEs and MOPs; therefore, assessment staffs in CMO require skill in operationally relevant, qualitative

research analysis. This includes a degree of area knowledge specific to social science, economics, public administration, and governance. CMO assessments require supporting data and analysis (i.e., context) to justify ratings used in assessment products. In some cases, the objective may be too broad for progress to be assessed directly. In such cases, intermediate MOEs and MOPs (i.e., outcomes) may be useful to measure progress toward more limited but more measurable objectives to achieve acceptable intermediate outcomes. Particularly in complex environments and activities, MOPs and MOEs should be linked through theories of change that articulate how each step of the plan is expected to contribute to the next part, and ultimately to reaching the desired outcomes.

5. Interagency Assessment Methods

- a. The JFC should incorporate the interagency in the development and implementation of the assessment approach. This includes the understanding and integration, as feasible, of interagency perspective, methods, and capabilities into a whole-of-government assessment approach. Unified action in the assessment approach enables strategic assessment and the cohesive strategic communication of the JFC and interagency mission partners relevant to CMO outputs and effectiveness.
- b. The interagency assessment methodology can be described broadly as a cyclical process of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

(1) Assessment among other government agencies, such as DOS, refers to a process that resembles the JFC's incorporation of JIPOE and OE assessment into operational design. The interagency or organization continually assesses the evolving situation, departing from a baseline study and a theory of change. Theory of change development incorporates a projected causal effect between action and condition of the OE, much like operational design. Interagency assessment outputs identify emergent operational or intervention requirements and assist planners and implementers to update the theory of change and program design. The JFC and interagency partners may choose to employ interagency assessment teams in support of integrated CMO planning.

(2) Monitoring oversees the implementation of activities and assists an agency or organization in gauging the performance of its interventions and activities. Members of the interagency monitor the activities of their programs and those of their implementing partners, which may form part of the whole-of-government approach to CMO. Monitoring outputs allows the interagency to identify program shortfalls and best practices and to determine how to best calibrate programs or interventions in execution.

(3) Evaluation is a deliberate, preplanned, and coordinated activity, typically occurring midway in execution and at the conclusion of a programmed activity. The agency or its implementing partners may employ an objective third party to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs and activities. Evaluations provide detailed and

objective empirical evidence from predetermined indicators and measure their change from baseline data. Evaluation results enable interagency planners to determine future action and should be incorporated into the JFC's assessment of the CMO when applicable.

For further information on interagency assessment, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VI

FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

"The future depends on what you do today."

Mahatma Gandhi

1. General

This chapter identifies potentially key developments impacting the joint force, to better prepare and conduct CMO in the next 3 to 5 years. Foremost, the advent and proliferation of advanced technologies has enabled, and continues to enable, a more chaotic, complex, and competitive future operating environment. Changes throughout the OE will likely occur at a rapid rate, potentially leaving a gap in doctrine between what is and what may be. This chapter examines the future contributions of CMO to joint campaigns.

2. Challenges, Threats, and Trends

a. Challenges

(1) Increased Urbanization and Dense Populations. The large civilian population in dense urban areas increases the overall need for effective joint force CMO. CMO will increasingly need to address the risk of collateral damage, complicated by efforts to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and challenges in adhering to the principles of distinction and proportionality in the law of war. Adversaries are expected to leverage advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, drones, and encrypted communications to conduct more lethal and disruptive urban operations. Adversary technological advances require military forces to rapidly respond and adapt their capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Effective CMO in dense urban environments can be logically and politically complex to manage and require close coordination with a diverse array of civilian authorities, agencies, and NGOs. Additionally, the density of urban terrain, the presence of civilians, and the rapid pace of operations can overwhelm traditional military decision-making processes, necessitating new approaches to C2 to maintain situational awareness and make timely, informed decisions.

(2) Increased Misinformation and Disinformation. Misinformation and disinformation will shape the future information environment and can erode public trust in core institutions and the very notion of objective truth. Adversaries increasingly seek to degrade social cohesion by exacerbating tension around demographic characteristics. Polarization and information bubbles are expected to proliferate, as social media algorithms and people's biases toward confirming their views further fragment the information environment. Powerful actors, whether corporations, governments, or non-state actors, have incentives to maintain this state of information confusion, as they can profit from the resulting turmoil and uncertainty. Technological solutions alone will likely

be insufficient to address the challenges, as the problem is fundamentally a human one, requiring changes in design, execution, and behaviors to truly resolve the threats posed by the proliferation of false and misleading information.

(3) Migrations and Population Displacements. Migration patterns and displacement of populations caused by natural and man-made crises are changing globally. First is the projected increased migration from developing regions, especially in Africa, to more developed parts of the world. Second, impacts from droughts, natural disasters, and resource scarcity could displace large populations. Third, rapid urbanization will likely drive large-scale internal migration within countries, as people move from rural to urban areas to seek better opportunities. Fourth, demographic shifts and aging populations in developed economies may alter international migration patterns as these populations experience potential labor shortages. Fifth, population growth and migration will have different impacts on men and women, which will change norms, responsibilities, and vulnerabilities among the civilian population. Population growth and resource competition could heighten geopolitical tensions between countries, eliciting low-level, endemic, and protracted competition and conflict. Overall, these diverse migration drivers will likely change the OE and how the JFC prepares for, plans, and executes CMO.

(4) Competition for Scarce Resources. Resource shortages and competition for those resources can trigger crises and conflict. The joint force may need to support the USG lead federal agency requirements for cooperation and competition, such as for humanitarian assistance, to mitigate threats to US and partner-shared interests due to resource competition. In armed conflict, to the extent practicable, the military protects the population's access to essential resources such as food, water, and medical care, in addition to preventing their use or denial as a weapon of influence or war. For instance, JFCs may conduct operations focused on protecting critical infrastructure and civilians or collect evidence of atrocities committed against a civilian population in violation of the law of armed conflict. The principal challenge is the joint force's ability to facilitate resources control, while closely coordinating with civilian authorities and humanitarian organizations to ensure resources reach those in need and are not exploited for military purposes. This is particularly important for vulnerable groups within the population, such as children, women, the elderly, and DC. Ultimately, the role of resource control is to uphold the principles of international humanitarian law, which require parties to distinguish between combatants and civilians and to protect the latter from the effects of hostilities.

b. Threats

(1) Weakly Governed or Ungoverned Spaces. Weakly governed or ungoverned areas provide safe havens and operational freedom for transnational criminal organizations, insurgent groups, and other non-state actors to thrive. These adversaries exploit the lack of effective government control to conduct illicit activities, organize, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and expand their influence. This undermines regional security, fuels conflicts over scarce resources, and presents significant challenges for military and law enforcement efforts to maintain situational awareness and exert control, especially in complex urban environments where the presence of civilians

complicates operations. The JFC may need to operate in weakly governed or ungoverned spaces and should be prepared for the challenges of assisting as partners build resilience or conduct transitional governance.

(2) **Non-State Actors.** A major threat posed by non-state actors is their ability to blur the lines between state and non-state threats by embedding themselves within official government institutions and functions. This can take the form of infiltrating government agencies, co-opting critical public services, exploiting weak governance, corrupting local government, or leveraging state proxies to conduct their operations. As hybrids, these non-state groups leverage their position within the state apparatus to shape policies, access sensitive information, and leverage state resources for their own objectives. This blurring of boundaries makes them particularly challenging for JFCs to identify, target, and defeat using traditional security approaches, requiring enhanced intelligence, coordination, and whole-of-government strategies to address this complex and evolving threat.

c. Trends

(1) **Deglobalization.** The world is experiencing significant changes in the long-standing trend of globalization, with countries increasingly turning to protectionist measures such as imposing tariffs, export bans, domestic subsidies, investment restrictions, and a reordering of global markets to exploit both domestic needs and security concerns. This shift is being driven by factors like the global financial crisis, the United States-China trade war, and pandemics, as governments prioritize national security and economic self-reliance over the benefits of open trade. There is a growing sentiment that global supply chains have become fragile and interdependent, leading to calls for “decoupling” and reshoring of critical industries. These trends are further exacerbated by geopolitical rivalries that are fueling protectionist policies and technological competition that fragments the global economy. The impact of the fragmentation of globalization and protectionism is uneven, with sectors less globally integrated being more prone to trade barriers, while highly interconnected industries face increasing restrictions and restructuring. The JFC needs to be aware of the impacts of deglobalization as civilian supply chains are challenged and competition increases.

(2) **Governance.** Governments at all levels face a range of complex, interconnected challenges that may strain their ability to govern effectively. Cybersecurity threats, rapidly evolving citizen expectations, declining public trust, fiscal constraints, and the disruptive impact of technological changes all require governments to proactively adapt their operations, policies, and institutions. Failure to address these challenges risks further eroding public trust and the ability of governments to solve problems and deliver services. The JFC’s staff accounts for a partner’s challenges to governance while assisting in building resiliency.

3. Objectives and Requirements

a. Objectives

(1) Military Government Capabilities. The JFC should address governance challenges, particularly in the event of armed conflict/war. In the event of armed conflict/war, there is a high probability that the JFC will encounter ungoverned spaces as changes in political leaders' statuses occur. A political solution may take time to evolve, and the JFC should prepare for an interim governance solution prior to an acceptable political solution. The JFC conducts transitional governance to set conditions for preventing adversarial actors from gaining a foothold in the JFC's JOA. Transitional governance may take the form of asserting populace and resource controls and adjudication of grievances.

(2) Increased Training for Joint Staffs. JFCs can execute multiple tabletop and wargame exercises annually to prepare them and their staffs to operate across the competition continuum. To increase a joint staff's understanding of the conduct of CMO, JFCs can tailor greater scenario inputs for each exercise. The additional training opportunities enhance a joint staff's ability to analyze the civil component and assign assets in the execution of CMO.

b. Requirements

(1) Integration with Mission Partners. Mission partners are critical to the success of the US military. A deeper understanding and integration with mission partners is necessary over the coming years. CCMDs should look for ways to integrate partners into their operations and leverage partner capabilities and authorities to conduct operations. Mission partners may have the capability to conduct CMO in areas that USG may not. CCMDs should look toward mission partners to align objectives and use all resources available.

(2) Information Integration Through Technology. As technologies proliferate, the ability to share information with partners should increase. Technology increases should also include program compatibility between the interagency and DoD. Data sharing between the interagency and DoD should increase. JFCs may need to work with information managers on the interpretation of data.

(3) Future Requirements of CMO Directorate. In an increasingly chaotic, complex, and competitive environment across the local, regional, and global levels, the need for better-integrated CMO as part of joint operations is ever more critical to joint force success. The CMO directorate prepares for headquarters dispersal in the event of armed conflict/war. Potential dispersion of the headquarters requires the CMO directorate to evaluate communication means with partners and how to maintain coordination mechanisms. Throughout the competition continuum, CMO directorates should formally integrate a mission partner's common operating picture that enables a JFC to make operational decisions.

(4) Use of Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning to Analyze Opportunities and Threats in the Civil Component Impacting Joint Operations. Artificial intelligence/machine learning can integrate into programs of record to enable

staffs to focus their analysis across more, and more varied, data and data sets and reduce the time to arrive at practical options for execution. JFC planners should incorporate approved artificial intelligence/machine learning capabilities into their analysis of a variety of factors from across a host of social, economic, fiscal, diplomatic, and security data sets. JFC planners use this analysis to plan and execute more informed, more focused, and more proactive CMO across the continuum of competition in support of JFC's overall objectives supporting US and partner-shared interests.

4. Techniques, Procedures, and Organization

a. Across the Competition Continuum

(1) Integration Mechanisms within Communications Infrastructure with Mission Partners. Technology advances may necessitate a change in the communications platform integration for the planning and execution of CMO. Mission partners use a variety of communications platforms that can change. JFC planners account for the critical mission partner platforms and ensure the widest dissemination of information to create shared understanding. JFC elements may coordinate with civilian organizations that may not have classified means of communication. JFC elements account for the communication platform limitations for information sharing. JFCs should also plan to operate in a communications-degraded or communications-disrupted environment.

(2) Greater Integration of Mission Partners into Planning Processes. Mission partners may have capabilities that can complement DoD assets in the accomplishment of a mission. JFC planners account for capabilities, whether foreign military or civilian, that may augment a JFC's forces. JFC planners may need to incorporate mission partners earlier in the planning to develop a plan that appropriately synchronizes all assets.

(3) CMO during Irregular Warfare. Irregular warfare can expand the competitive space beyond traditional military capabilities to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will, rather than relying solely on direct confrontation. The joint force conducts irregular warfare activities across the competition continuum, which are not limited to special operations forces activities. Activities such as CMO are critical in leveraging the coordinated efforts of mission partners, which can enhance the credibility and effectiveness of a JFC's operations.

b. Campaigning and Competition

(1) Assisting Partners in Building Resiliency. The DoD depends on strong partners for effective integrated deterrence and, to this end, should assist partners to build their resiliency against natural and manmade stressors. The JFC examines a variety of factors that impact a partner's resiliency, which may include crisis response, managing narratives in the information environment, and government security institutions. The JFC uses a resiliency assessment framework that is published for the joint force. Based on the

resiliency assessment framework, the JFC can focus efforts on a partner's most critical areas to enhance the JFC's ability to prevent or prevail in armed conflict, if necessary.

(2) **Forward Presence.** The DoD postures forces worldwide to protect the interests of allies and partners. The JFC should consider using CMO to strengthen coordination mechanisms and understanding of partner capabilities. CMO may also be used to increase understanding of a particular region that is important for US strategic objectives. Conducting CMO with a forward presence force also increases our responsiveness to an adversary's actions in a region.

c. **Armed Conflict/War**

(1) **Governance Concepts.** In the event of armed conflict/war, the JFC should understand and apply current governance concepts that are aligned with the political goals of the conflict. With an increasing shift of power to people and a demand for accountability from governments, a JFC may face challenges in the event of a vacuum of governance. The JFC uses transitional governance to bridge between the control of an ungoverned space to an international politically accepted solution. The JFC accounts for the socio-cultural history and values of an ungoverned space in addition to the future governance concepts. The JFC plans for the ungoverned spaces to prevent adversarial elements from gaining control of rear areas and hindering JFC combat operations.

(2) **Changes to Rules of Allocation.** When assigning forces to conduct CMO, a JFC examines the population, socio-economic factors, and terrain for successful CMO. Traditional rules of allocation are inadequate when addressing CMO requirements. The JFC should consider weighting CMO forces toward terrain requiring significant CMO efforts and task organize appropriately.

APPENDIX A

OTHER UNITED STATES DEPARTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

The joint force collaborates with a multitude of civil organizations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. The joint force coordinates primarily with DOS in achieving strategic objectives overseas. During crises, civil organizations lead international responses to humanitarian situations. Each civil organization has its own capability and mission that may align with US objectives.

- a. DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency for the USG. DOS leads and coordinates international interaction and USG activities abroad. The chief of mission, normally an ambassador, is the President's personal representative and the primary USG authority in a foreign state. The chief of mission is responsible for the synchronization of all USG foreign activities under a unifying policy for that state. The chief of mission often retains principal authority in CMO, especially when DoD is in a supporting role.
- b. The UN provides an international framework through which subordinate organizations provide services throughout the competition continuum. If an HN is unable to coordinate an effective response in large disasters, the UNOCHA may set up a cluster system, which is a voluntary means by which aid organizations coordinate. While representation from governments can be allowed, particularly within a natural disaster setting, it is a choice for the UN to make. Where they do allow for those representatives, military liaisons are not normally required but may be appropriate if significant military assets are involved. As a JFC's staff plans to conduct CMO, it is possible that the JFC may interact with UN organizations.
- c. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees operates as the primary agency within the UN system responsible for protecting and supporting refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees possesses a range of capabilities aimed at addressing the humanitarian needs of displaced populations, focused on the provision of shelter, camp management, and protection concerns of beneficiaries. Its operations span various regions affected by conflict, persecution, and natural disasters, with a focus on ensuring the safety, dignity, and well-being of refugees. The joint force may interact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who runs refugee camps with the permission of an HN.
- d. UNOCHA serves as a coordination body within the UN system for humanitarian response efforts worldwide. UNOCHA possesses a diverse set of capabilities aimed at facilitating effective humanitarian action, including coordination, information management, advocacy, and resource mobilization. Operating in regions affected by conflict, natural disasters, and other emergencies, UNOCHA works to provide a coherent and coordinated response to humanitarian crises, mobilizing resources, facilitating access to affected populations, and advocating for the protection of civilians. UNOCHA serves as the secretariat for the humanitarian community and establishes the UN cluster system at the request of a host government.

e. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) delivers vital assistance and protection to children affected by emergencies. UNICEF provides essential services such as healthcare, nutrition, clean water, education, and protection to vulnerable children and their families. In the aftermath of disasters or conflicts, UNICEF establishes field offices and employs trained personnel to affected areas to meet the immediate and long-term needs of children amidst challenging and often hazardous conditions. UNICEF also plays a critical role in providing access to life-saving healthcare services for children and mothers, including vaccinations, treatment for malnutrition, and maternal and newborn care. UNICEF works to reunite separated families, provide psychosocial support to traumatized children, and strengthen child protection systems to prevent and respond to cases of abuse and exploitation.

f. The WFP is the largest humanitarian organization dedicated to combating global hunger and food insecurity. In regions afflicted by conflict or natural disaster, the WFP conducts food distributions to ensure that beneficiaries have access to food. WFP is the UN lead for the Logistics Cluster, Food Security Cluster, and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster. The WFP provides for the movement of humanitarian staff via the UN Humanitarian Air Service. The WFP maintains a dedicated capability to interact with the joint force to participate in planning and operations. The WFP may collaborate with the joint force to ensure efficient distribution of food aid and frequency management, deconfliction, and access. The WFP usually requests support from the joint force to provide logistical support, secure transportation routes, and access to vulnerable populations.

g. The International Organization for Migration is a part of the UN system that focuses on the safe migration of people globally. The International Organization for Migration focuses on internally DCs and specializes in the provision of shelter, camp management, and specific migration issues such as third-party repatriation, building government capacity to manage migration, and migrant documentation. The International Organization for Migration may assist the joint force in better addressing border management and counter-trafficking efforts.

APPENDIX B

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

“Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major – perhaps the major – stake in the worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control over access to and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor.”

Jean François Lyotard, 1984
French Philosopher
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge

1. Introduction

- a. The integration of civil information into intelligence and other joint functions greatly facilitates the JFC’s understanding of the OE, which encompasses the interrelationship between physical, informational, and human aspects of both civil and military components. Military operations and activities are interconnected with the civil component of the OE and contain an implicit requirement for extensive civil information for their successful planning and execution. Civil information is relevant data relating to the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the OE that supports the situational awareness of the JFC.
- b. CIM is a continuous process across the competition continuum, in which CMO planners or civil information managers assist the JFC to understand the civil component of the OE by integrating civil information into joint planning. Civil information managers gather and analyze civil data and integrate outputs with joint staff processes. Civil information managers share timely and relevant information with interagency and other mission partners to facilitate shared understanding and unity of effort. CR and other overt activities designed to gather civil information are not intelligence activities. However, civil information managers collaborate with intelligence personnel and other staff to fuse information into a common operating picture.

2. Concept

- a. CIM generates situational understanding through collection, processing, and analysis of data; the production of civil information; and civil information integration in joint planning and interorganizational cooperation. Civil information managers work with collection managers, CA, and other joint capabilities to gather data from across the OE. Civil information is derived from a variety of sources, including situation reports, infrastructure, institutional and systems assessments, surveys, civil and military engagement, and civilian and government websites. Civil information managers process and analyze data, account for assumptions, and produce civil information that informs CMO. All echelons conduct CIM as part of the information management process.

Successful CIM requires interorganizational cooperation and support from the joint force, including the staff and elements that interface with the civil component.

b. CIM provides decision makers with accessible analysis on the physical, informational, and human aspects of the civil component of the OE, including the rapidly evolving information environment. This understanding allows the JFC and mission partners to project effects on behavior and cognition. CIM directly contributes to unity of effort by consolidating the flow of civil information and enabling shared understanding across the interagency and mission partners.

c. Through persistent interaction and engagement with the civil component of the JOA, military personnel observe, record, and report mission-relevant data. CA; engineers; military police; advisors on women, peace and security; and other joint capabilities conduct CR and other deliberate assessments in support of civil information requirements. Interagency and other mission partners share assessment and other data. Civil information managers fuse these data points with other available data, and, through analysis and production, provide the JFC and staff with civil information outputs that are integrated into JIPOE and planning. Civil information managers integrate with joint planners to develop comprehensive COAs that can achieve the desired objectives within the civil component of the OE.

3. The Civil Information Management Process

a. CIM is a joint task, in which civil information managers gather and process data through analysis into relevant and timely civil information. There are six steps of the CIM process, as depicted in Figure B-1.

b. The CIM cell is composed of technical and functional experts capable of processing data from multiple sources and the information environment. CA officers and noncommissioned officers are specifically trained in CIM and equipped to lead the process and comprise the CIM cell. The integration of other relevant capabilities in the CIM cell facilitates a broader span of expertise and facilitates its integration with joint functions. The JFC should task elements to support the CIM processes' information requirements.

c. Various organizations at all levels use different databases and applications for CIM. CIM cells use the most complete databases and systems available to integrate civil information into the commander's operating picture and provide civil information to intelligence and other staff sections. The CMO directorate is responsible for accurate and timely civil information that is integrated into all other staff estimates and informs the joint functions. This ultimately aids in the synchronization, coordination, and integration of CMO and activities across the JOA to achieve unified action.

d. Civil information managers begin the CIM process in support of operational design and mission analysis. Mission analysis requires a broad span of civil information from strategic documents, interorganizational partners, the information environment, and a variety of sources describing the civil considerations of the OE. Civil information




Figure B-1. Civil Information Management Process

managers support joint planning and directly integrate civil information and an understanding of the civil component of the OE into JIPOE, operational design, and COA development. Civil information managers assist the JFC by working closely with liaisons and interorganizational cells to facilitate interorganizational cooperation and unity of effort in planning.

(1) Civil information managers gather data from available sources and create initial estimates and area studies and identify information gaps and civil information requirements to support joint planning. The initial civil estimate supports the development of the CIM plan, which guides the process and supports collection management throughout CMO.

(2) Civil information managers support the development of the JFC's assessment approach. Civil information managers with intelligence counterparts are responsible for assessing the civil component of the OE. CIM managers also support the CMO assessment plan by proposing and measuring MOPs and MOEs. The CIM cell produces an initial assessment of the civil component from available information and incorporates the output into the civil estimate and the civil-military annex. The initial estimate acts as the baseline for the CIM plan. It accounts for the physical, informational, and human aspects of the civil component of the JOA, including the relationships, actors, functions, and tensions among civilian mission partners, and relevant neutral and adversarial state and non-state entities. The ongoing assessment of the civil component and CMO activities provides decision makers with an understanding of the changing conditions of the OE and the effectiveness of CMO.

4. Collection

- a. Civil information managers work with collection managers to guide the collection of civil information in support of information requirements. The CIM cell supplements civil information collection by mining data from publicly available information within the information environment. The CMO directorate develops a collection plan in collaboration with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff and other Service capabilities to collect civil data. All services possess unique capabilities that can assist in the collection of civil data across the JOA. These capabilities may be the only method to accomplish the collection and may be tasked by the operations directorate of a joint staff to support collection requirements. CA and any military entity that interacts with the civil component collect and report civil information. Reporters of civil information maintain compliance with established standards for completeness, uniformity, accuracy, applicability, and timeliness. Civil information can be informed by intelligence, but as a rule, personnel conducting CR should distinguish themselves from intelligence personnel to maintain credibility with interorganizational partners. Civil information managers from the lowest echelon are responsible for horizontal, vertical, and interorganizational report distribution and for communicating and controlling civil information reporting standards throughout their organizations in accordance with established guidance.
- b. Although CIM deals primarily with unclassified information, its collation and analysis may change its classification. Civil information managers should take special care not to overclassify products and to make products, to the greatest extent possible, available to the HN and mission partners in support of unity of effort, transparency, and shared understanding. When specific civil information becomes operationalized or placed into joint operational planning it should be classified appropriately.
- c. The continual interaction between US forces conducting CMO and civilians in the JOA is a valuable source of civil information and should be recorded and reported accordingly. Key leader engagements and civil engagements should be deliberately planned with consideration for civil information requirements and reported through the CIM process.
- d. CR, civil engagement, and civil network development are key tasks that support the CIM process. CR is the planned observation of civil considerations (i.e., areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events). Civil engagement is a targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential contacts in a civil network that is designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect information. Civil network development is the planned and targeted action in which CA develop networks within the civil component of the OE to influence populations and manage local resources to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. CA is specifically trained to conduct CR, civil engagement, and civil network development, although it may be conducted by any intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability or element interacting with the civil component of the JOA. The CMO directorate develops a CR plan and CR, civil engagement, and civil network development

activities support the collection management. A CR plan accounts for the span of civil information requirements. Examples include:

- (1) Identified civil information gaps.
- (2) Critical infrastructure.
- (3) Government and civil society capabilities.
- (4) Vulnerabilities and human security considerations.
- (5) Narratives, trends, and influencers.
- (6) Civilian actors and interests, including:
 - (a) HN government officials.
 - (b) Religious leaders.
 - (c) Tribal, commercial, and private organizations.
 - (d) DCs.
 - (e) Legal and illegal immigrants.
 - (f) Infrastructure managers and workers.
 - (g) Local industry personnel.
 - (h) Medical and educational personnel.
 - (i) Local journalists and media affiliates.

For additional information on countering threat networks, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

5. Consolidate

Civil information managers consolidate and process data for future analysis. Processing is the extraction, organization, and storage of data for future use. Civil information managers utilize the joint staff's information management system and database to catalogue relevant civil data from available reports, assessments, and other data sources. By utilizing joint information management systems and databases, civil information managers make searchable civil data available to the entire staff and joint enterprise.

6. Analysis

- a. Civil information managers evaluate and integrate civil data with other knowledge and information to identify trends and predict outcomes, risk, and opportunities in CMO. The analysis of civil information may require additional civilian expertise from interorganizational partners or HN. The analysis of civil considerations identifies risk associated with civil vulnerabilities to malign influence, and opportunities for friendly influence activities, interorganizational cooperation, and transition. The analysis of civil information supports the JFC's decision making by informing situational understanding and operation and OE assessments.
- b. Civil information managers support intelligence analysis by providing civil data for analysis and interpreting information with civil knowledge and expertise. The CMO directorate collaborates with intelligence counterparts to fuse civil information with intelligence and other information in JIPOE.
- c. Civil information managers employ a variety of tools to assist in the analysis of data. An association matrix maps relationships between actors and activities and can be used both to understand relationships in the civil component of the OE and to account for CMO partner activities. (See Figure B-2.)

For additional information and additional methods of network analysis, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks; Army Techniques Publication 3-57.30, Civil Network Development and Engagement; Army Techniques Publication 5-0.6, Network Engagement; and Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-02A, Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging Networks.


7. Production

Civil information managers create deliberate products from civil information that align with and support JIPOE, operational design, joint planning, and operation assessment. These products include area studies, systems depictions of the civil component of the OE, geospatial overlays, estimates, and information requirements.

8. Information Sharing

- a. Information sharing is integral to unified action and unity of effort in CMO. Information sharing assists disparate partner agencies and organizations to achieve shared understanding, coordinate activities, and synchronize strategic communication. Information sharing involves more than routine distribution. It is a dedicated, cyclic process, integrated into the joint planning process that encourages a common understanding and unity of effort among all parties.

Association Matrix Sample



Legend

- known association
- suspected association

Figure B-2. Association Matrix Sample

(1) When appropriate, the JFCs and staffs should develop relationships and share information with the HN, the UN, and other government and nongovernment participants to create a shared understanding of the OE and to inform CIM and planning.

(2) The JFC should prioritize information sharing with mission partners, including interagency, HN, and applicable international organizations and NGOs, to enable shared understanding and unity of effort in CMO. Primary potential partners are shown in Figure B-3.

b. Civil information managers should anticipate the information needs of the mission partners, establish sharing mechanisms, and share available information as appropriate and authorized. Information sharing reduces redundancy and ensures the maximum effects through the synchronization of efforts. Mechanisms for sharing may vary, but the objective of shared understanding remains constant. Examples of information sharing include:

- (1) Developing a shared, interorganizational, common operational picture.
- (2) Establishing shared civil information databases.

Potential Partners in Civil Information Management

United States Government (USG), International Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) Interorganizational Coordination

USG Departments and Agencies

Primary Interlocutors

- Department of State
- National Security Council
- Department of the Treasury
- Department of Energy
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Interorganizational Partners

United Nations (UN)

- World Food Programme
- United Nations Children's Fund
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- World Health Organization
- UN Development Programme
- International Organization on Migration
- UN Women

Regional Organizations

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- European Union
- Organization of American States

NGOs

- World Vision
- Mercy Corps
- Norwegian Refugee Council
- Samaritan's Purse
- World Central Kitchen

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

- International Committee of the Red Cross
- International Federation of the Red Cross
- National Red Cross movements

Figure B-3. Potential Partners in Civil Information Management

- (3) Disseminating civil information products, updates, and reports.
- (4) Integrating with the joint planning, targeting, intelligence, and other staff processes.
- (5) Participating in interagency and interorganizational informational meetings and other forums.
 - c. Civil information sharing is critical for pursuing common objectives. Collaborative environments encourage information sharing between many different groups and

authorities working in parallel. Technology enables unclassified and classified collaboration, but social, institutional, cultural, and organizational attitudes or requirements may delay or prevent sharing. Access barriers, such as lack of access to computer networks or communications challenges, can also limit information sharing.

d. To overcome communication barriers, joint planners should determine information sharing requirements and provide appropriate disclosure guidance, classifications, and caveats required throughout the civil information lifecycle. This allows the staff to share data to the maximum extent allowed by US law and DoD policy. The JFC should recognize civil information sharing could be crucial to success. The JTF staff should balance the operations security analytic process to protect critical information with CIM to enable civil information sharing.

For more details concerning operations security, refer to JP 3-55, Joint Operations Security.

Appendix B

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX C REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-57 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General

- a. *CIMIC Handbook*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- b. Title 10, USC.
- c. Title 22, USC.

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. *Unified Command Plan*.
- b. DoD *Foreign Clearance Guide*.
- c. DoD *Foreign Clearance Manual*.
- d. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.
- e. DoDD 2311.01, *DoD Law of War Program*.
- f. DoDD 3000.03E, *DoD Executive Agent for Nonlethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy*.
- g. DoDD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*.
- h. DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- i. DoDD 3210.06, *Defense Grant and Agreement Regulatory System (DGARS)*.
- j. DoDD 3610.01, *Electromagnetic Spectrum Enterprise Policy*.
- k. DoDD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.
- l. DoDD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)*.
- m. DoDD 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*.
- n. DoDD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.
- o. DoDI 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*.

- p. DoDI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*.
- q. DoDI 3000.17, *Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response*.
- r. DoDI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*.
- s. DoDM 5200.01, Volumes 1-3, *DoD Information Security Program*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3207.01D, *Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action*.
- b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01E, *Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory*.
- c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01D, *Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program*.
- d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03B, *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*.
- e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support*.
- f. JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*.
- g. JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*.
- h. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- i. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*.
- j. JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*.
- k. JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*.
- l. JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*.
- m. JP 3-23, *Joint Peace Operations*.
- n. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.
- o. JP 3-09, *Joint Fires*.
- p. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.

- q. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*.
- r. JP 3-15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines in Joint Operations*.
- s. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- t. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.
- u. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- v. JP 3-25, *Joint Countering Threat Networks*.
- w. JP 3-26, *Joint Combating Terrorism*.
- x. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- y. JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*.
- z. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
- aa. JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.
- bb. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*.
- cc. JP 3-53, *Joint Military Information Support Operations*.
- dd. JP 3-55, *Joint Operations Security*.
- ee. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- ff. JP 3-68, *Joint Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- gg. JP 3-80, *Resource Management*.
- hh. JP 3-83, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*.
- ii. JP 3-84, *Legal Support*.
- jj. JP 3-85, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations*.
- kk. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- ll. JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*.
- mm. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
- nn. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*.

- oo. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
- pp. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
- qq. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications*.
- rr. *Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

4. Allied Joint Publication

Allied Joint Publication-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*.

5. United States Army Publications

- a. Army Regulation 195-2, *Criminal Investigation Activities*.
- b. Army Techniques Publication 3-57.30, *Civil Network Development and Engagement*.
- c. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.6, *Network Engagement*.
- d. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.
- e. FM 3-34, *Engineer Operations*.
- f. FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*.
- g. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

6. United States Marine Corps Publications

- a. Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-02A, *Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging Networks*.
- b. Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*.

7. United States Navy Publications

- a. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-02.14, *Naval Beach Group Operations*.
- b. NTTP 4-02.4, *Expeditionary Medical Facilities*.
- c. NTTP 4-02.6, *Hospital Ships*.
- d. Navy Tactical Reference Publication 4-04.2.1, *Doctrinal Reference for the Naval Construction Force*.

- e. Navy Warfare Publication 3-29, *Disaster Response Operations*.
- f. Navy Warfare Publication 4-04, *Navy Civil Engineering Operations*.

8. United States Special Operations Command Publications

- a. United States Special Operations Command Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement*.

- b. *Joint Civil Information Management Tactical Handbook*.

9. Multi-Service Publications

- a. Army Techniques Publication 3-22.40/Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10-10A/NTTP 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*.

- b. NTTP 3-10.1M/Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-34D, *Seabee Operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)*.

- c. FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-02, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX D ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, 09 July 2018.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program's (JLLP's) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DoD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing insights and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Insights and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the

Appendix D

development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

This publication is not for public release. It is available on demand to holders of a DoD common access card, and upon request to employees and contractors of the United States Government to include members and staff of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In the interest of furthering US national security and assisting allies and partners, foreign governments and international defense organizations desiring a copy of joint publications should make their request through their respective foreign liaison officer assigned to the Joint Staff (if applicable), the United States defense attaché or security assistance office in their country, or the appropriate United States combatant command. Requestors of joint doctrine should route their requisition to the Joint Staff J-7, Joint Education and Doctrine Division (js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil).

7. Printing and Distribution

a. This publication is not approved for public release. Any reproduction or distribution of this publication must be in line with the releasability statement above. This publication may be locally reproduced for use within combatant commands, Services, National Guard Bureau, Joint Staff, and combat support agencies; however, its distribution must align with the releasability statement above.

b. The Joint Staff does not print hard copies of JPs for distribution. An electronic version of this JP is available on:

- (1) NIPRNET Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (limited to .mil and .gov users with a DoD common access card) and
- (2) SIPRNET JEL+ at <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp>.

GLOSSARY

PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS (ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)

C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAG	civil affairs group (USMC)
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CIM	civil information management
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CMI	civil-military integration
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
CR	civil reconnaissance
DC	dislocated civilian
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DoDI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FM	field manual (USA)
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
HN	host nation
HOC	humanitarian operations center
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JEMSO	joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JFC	joint force commander
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force (USMC)
MCMO	medical civil-military operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NGO	nongovernmental organization

Glossary

NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OE	operational environment
PRC	populace and resources control
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WFP	World Food Programme (UN)

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. JP 3-57, *Joint Civil-Military Operations*, 04 April 2025, Active Terms and Definitions

civil affairs. Forces trained, equipped, and employed to understand, access, influence, and create effects within the civil component of the operational environment. Also called **CA**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

civil affairs operations. Those activities planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed by civil affairs in support of joint campaigns and operations to gain civil information and create effects within the civil component of the operational environment. Also called **CAO**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

civil information. Data relating to the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the operational environment that supports the situational awareness of the supported commander. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

civil information management. Process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated. Also called **CIM**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

civil-military operations. Activities of designated military forces that develop and enhance relations between military forces and local populations and institutions to achieve objectives within the civil component of the operational environment. Also called **CMO**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

civil-military operations center. An organization established by a joint force commander to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within local populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies. Also called **CMOC**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

civil reconnaissance. A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called **CR**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

host nation. A nation that allows forces to operate in or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

military government. The supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and local populations and institutions of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory, therefore substituting sovereign authority under rule of law


for the previously established government. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

provincial reconstruction team. A civil-military team that supports a host nation in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services at the local or regional level. Also called **PRT**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

2. Terms Removed from the DoD Dictionary

- **Supersession of JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, 09 July 2018:** civil-military team; evacuee; indigenous populations and institutions; joint civil-military operations task force; private sector

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-57** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

