

Joint Publication 3-0



Joint Campaigns and Operations



18 June 2022

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for joint campaigns and operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint campaigns and operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces of the United States in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the achievement of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



STUART B. MUNSCH
Vice Admiral, United States Navy
Director, Joint Force Development

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0
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- **Includes description of global integration and global campaigns.**
- **Includes discussion on campaigning.**
- **Integrates the competition continuum terminology.**
- **Incorporates current information on joint electromagnetic spectrum management operations.**
- **Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between this publication and Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.**
- **Updates the discussion on the information joint function consistent with JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*.**
- **Includes a discussion on the mission areas within the global campaign plans.**
- **Updates terms and definitions.**

Summary of Changes

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides an overview of the strategic environment and national security challenges.
 - Discusses the instruments of national power and the competition continuum, strategic direction, and the philosophy of global military integration.
 - Describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's role in global military integration.
 - Discusses unified action.
 - Discusses joint command through development of strategic art and operational art.
 - Describes the civil-military dialogue within the Department of Defense.
 - Presents the joint functions of command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.
 - Outlines how to organize and practice global integration.
 - Presents the competition continuum.
 - Discusses joint campaigns and operations in cooperation and adversarial competition.
 - Discusses joint campaigns and operations in armed conflict.
-

Fundamentals of Joint Campaigns and Operations

Introduction

The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services (from at least two Military Departments [MILDEPs]) in a single operation is through joint operations. Normally implemented within a broader campaign, joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or

attached, of two or more MILDEPs operating under a single joint force commander (JFC).

Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

The strategic environment consists of various national, international, and global interests and influences that affect the decisions of senior United States (US) civilian and military leaders concerning the employment of US instruments of national power. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and dynamic, requiring commanders to maintain surveillance of the operational environment (OE) and conduct military engagement with interagency and multinational partners. Threats present the joint force with situations that cut across multiple combatant commands' (CCMDs') areas of responsibility (AORs) and functional areas. These threats present themselves in the OE (land, maritime, air space, and cyberspace; the information environment [IE]; and electromagnetic operational environment [EMOE]). The strategic environment is fluid, with continually evolving alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will appear and what form they might take, the joint force should expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.

Instruments of National Power and the Competition Continuum

The instruments of national power are all the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. The instruments of national power are continuously active across the competition continuum. The ability of the United States to advance its national interests depends on how effectively the United States Government (USG) aligns and employs the instruments of national power within the competition continuum to achieve strategic objectives.

Strategic Direction

US federal law and policy provide the framework for strategic direction among the branches of government and their departments. Strategic direction, specific to DOD, is the strategy and intent of the President, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in pursuit of national interests. Strategic direction provides context, purpose, and tasks employing the instruments of national power.

The Philosophy of Global Military Integration

Global military integration enables SecDef, assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders (CCDRs), to make timely decisions and establish operational priorities and institutional choices across multiple geographic, organizational, and functional boundaries and time horizons. This process is necessary because of the challenges of today's strategic environment, the realities of limited joint force resources, and expanding requirements. As CCMDs address complexities of their OEs and requirements, SecDef prioritizes resources. Global military integration is additive to and reinforces the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Role in Global Military Integration

The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and 2017 UCP expanded the CJCS's responsibilities, to include serving a role in global military integration for the joint force (as codified in Title 10, United States Code [USC], Section 153). The CJCS provides advice for prioritization to the President and SecDef on the allocation and transfer of forces across CCMDs. As required by Title 10, USC, the CJCS provides the President and SecDef advice on ongoing joint force activities and the allocation and transfer of forces required to execute those activities. For global military integration, the CJCS assists in strategic planning and direction of the Armed Forces of the United States to ensure the effective employment and coherent pursuit of strategic objectives to integrate action across the worldwide campaigning effort, while balancing risks.

Unified Action

Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and alignment of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Participants can include multinational forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other interorganizational partners. The joint force integrates actions within DOD and seeks to align actions collaboratively outside the purview of DOD. Failure to achieve unified action can jeopardize mission accomplishment.

Fundamental Considerations

The framework of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare helps commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic objectives to campaigns and major operations and link their objectives to tactical operations. These levels help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands.

Echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often relate to a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective.

Strategic Uses of Military Force. The United States leverages all instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, DOD provides military capabilities to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from positions of strength. DOD has a supporting role when the military instrument of national power is not the main instrument for the strategy. Whether in a primary or supporting role, strategic uses of a military force include integrated assurance, both forms of coercion (deter and compel), and forcible action

Joint doctrine distinguishes between traditional warfare and irregular warfare (IW) but recognizes the strengths of employing them together in conjunction with appropriate information activities. All military activities (or inactivities) are inherently communicative and can affect behavior in the OE. Both traditional warfare and IW serve a fundamentally discrete purpose that drives different approaches to its conduct. In practice, conducting effective warfare requires creative, dynamic, and synergistic combinations of proper information integrated with traditional warfare and IW.

Joint Command

Introduction

Command is the authority a commander in the armed forces exercises lawfully over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively visualize, organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

Strategic Art

Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests. Strategic art and operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to strategic objectives and prioritizes resources. Operational art is the cognitive

approach by commanders and staffs to develop campaigns and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

Operational Art – In Planning and Execution

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is useful to the JFC in initial policy/strategy formulation and planning. The commander’s judgment, decision making, and adaptation to the changing OE may also draw upon operational art.

For planning, operational art provides a thought process to mitigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the problems at hand. Operational art promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staff to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency partners and other interorganizational participants when they determine objectives, establish priorities, and assign tasks to subordinate forces

In execution, operational art is making decisions before they are obvious or easy choices and adapting to the unfolding circumstances. Guided by imperfect information, commanders issue orders based on opaque circumstances, all the while anticipating the lag between the decision and its impact on the enemy and future friendly force operations and long before it is clear how those decisions will play out.

Operational Design

Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE. Additionally, operational design provides an iterative process that enables the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends, ways, means, and risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations.

Joint Planning

Joint planning consists of planning activities that help CCDRs and their subordinate commanders transform national objectives into actions that mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, and demobilize joint forces. It ties the employment of the Armed Forces of the United

States to the achievement of national objectives across the competition continuum. Based on understanding gained through the application of operational design, more detailed planning takes place within the steps of the joint planning process (JPP). JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and develop a plan or order.

Assessment

Assessment is a continuous and actionable process that measures the overall effectiveness of the joint force. The process involves monitoring and evaluating the current situation and progress toward the objectives. The results can help determine whether an activity contributes to the desired effects or progress toward an objective.

The Civil-Military Dialogue Within the Department of Defense

At the start of the civil-military dialogue, military commanders work with their civilian counterparts to gain a shared understanding to begin to identify the problem or problems they are facing. Commanders should explain their understanding of the problem and articulate the assumptions they are making. One primary goal of the civil-military dialogue is to confirm or refine the problem and necessary assumptions. Additionally, effective dialogue identifies new considerations commanders should address based on civilian leadership perspectives. The military leadership should clearly articulate what actions military capabilities are capable of performing, the objectives these options can achieve, the costs and risks associated with each option, and how those options address the problem or problems. As the civil-military dialogue matures, the specificity of civilian leadership guidance will typically increase.

Joint Functions

Introduction

There are seven joint functions common to joint operations: command and control (C2), information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Commanders leverage the capabilities of multiple joint functions during operations. The joint functions apply to all joint operations across the competition continuum and enable both traditional warfare and IW, but to different degrees, conditions, and standards, while employing different tactics, techniques, and procedures. The integration of activities across joint

functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all levels of command.

Command and Control

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses several tasks, including:

- Establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters (HQ).
- Command subordinate forces.
- Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and guidance.
- Establish command authorities among subordinate commanders.
- Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and designate operational areas (OAs).
- Prioritize and allocate resources.
- Manage risk and force protection.
- Communicate across the staff and joint force.
- Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and achieving objectives.
- Coordinate and control the employment of joint forces to create lethal and nonlethal effects (i.e., the use of intermediate force capabilities incorporating both lethal and nonlethal means) across the competition continuum.
- Coordinate, synchronize, and, when appropriate, integrate joint operations with the operations and activities of other participants.
- Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from a higher authority.

Information

The information function encompasses the management and application of information to support achievement of objectives; it is the deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired relevant actor behaviors and to support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the prevalent nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to preserve friendly information and leverage information and the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander's objectives.

The information joint function provides an intellectual framework to aid commanders in exerting one's influence through the timely generation, preservation, denial, or projection of information.

Intelligence

The intelligence function informs JFCs about adversary intentions, capabilities, centers of gravity (COGs), critical factors, vulnerabilities, and future COAs and helps commanders and staffs understand friendly, neutral, and threat networks. The joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process includes integrating analysis, production, collection management, and targeting processes to shape decision making and enable operations. Using the continuous JIPOE analysis process, properly tailored JIPOE products can enhance OE understanding and enable the JFC to act quickly and effectively. Intelligence activities and assessments also occur while defending the homeland within the guidelines of applicable regulations and laws. The intelligence joint function encompasses the joint intelligence process. The joint intelligence process consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence activities and operations:

- Planning and direction of intelligence activities.
- Collection.
- Processing and exploitation of collected exploitable material and other data to produce relevant information.
- Analysis of information and production of intelligence.
- Dissemination and integration of intelligence with plans and operations.
- Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality.

Movement and Maneuver

Movement and maneuver encompasses the disposition of joint forces to conduct operations by securing positional or informational advantages across the competition continuum and exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Movement is deploying forces or capabilities into an OA and relocating them within an OA without the expectation of contact with the enemy. Maneuver is the employment of forces for offensive and defensive purposes while in, or expecting, contact with the enemy. It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver function encompasses several tasks, including:

- Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and component force formations and capabilities by multiple means or modes throughout the OE.
- Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy or adversary.
- Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.
- Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. These actions include operations that employ obstacles (i.e., counter mobility), enforce sanctions and embargoes, and conduct blockades.
- Control significant areas; deny, expand, and manipulate access to information; and influence relevant populations relative to the objective whose access to possession or control provides either side an operational advantage.

Protection

Protection is all efforts to secure and defend the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given OA to maintain mission effectiveness. The protection function encompasses force protection, force health protection (FHP), and other protection activities.

Some tasks in the protection function include:

- Provide air, missile (including hypersonics), and space defense (including all space segments and counter-unmanned aircraft system operations).
- Provide physical security to protect forces, bases, joint security areas (JSAs), posts, infrastructure that enables power projection, and lines of communications (LOCs) (including contractors and US civilians accompanying the force).
- Protect friendly information. These activities include operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence, defense countermeasure operations, military deception in support of OPSEC, counter deception, and counterpropaganda.
- Conduct cyberspace security, cyberspace defense, and electromagnetic protection to protect information networks.

- Provide chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense to minimize CBRN attacks and incidents.
- Provide engineering and explosive ordnance disposal support for counter-improvised threat activities, such as counter-improvised explosive device activities.
- Identify and neutralize insider threats.
- Conduct detainee operations.
- Conduct medical, environmental, and occupational surveillance activities.
- Conduct law enforcement and criminal investigation activities to protect personnel and assets.
- The function focuses on force protection, which preserves the joint force's fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, and its bases; necessary infrastructure; and LOCs from an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Passive measures reduce the probability and minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile action without seeking the initiative. The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents is equally important. Finally, emergency management and response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to isolating events, accidents, health threats, and natural disasters.
- Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. FHP complements force protection efforts by promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the behavioral or physical well-being of Service members.
- As the JFC's mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass the protection of US noncombatants.

Sustainment

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services support to maintain operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment gives the JFC the means for freedom of action, endurance, and to extend operational reach. Sustainment enables the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The sustainment function includes tasks to:

- Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel and other energy requirements), arms, munitions, and equipment.
- Provide for maintenance of equipment.
- Coordinate and provide base operations support for forces, including field services; personnel services support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious support; postal support; morale, welfare, and recreational support; financial support; and legal services.
- Build and maintain contingency bases.
- Assess, repair, and maintain infrastructure.
- Acquire, manage, and distribute funds.
- Provide common-user logistics support to other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, other nations, and contractors as authorized by their contracts.
- Establish and coordinate movement services.
- Establish large-scale detention compounds and sustain enduring detainee operations.

Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

Understanding the Operational Environment

The joint force conducts joint campaigns and operations in a complex, volatile, security environment characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. National security threats are transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional. Since each threat presents unique challenges, the dilemmas caused by one event impact others, often with no regard for distance and time. As threats gain access to advanced capabilities and contest US advantages, competition and armed conflict are increasingly occurring across multiple AORs and throughout the physical domains (land, maritime, air, and space), the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. These realities have eroded the US competitive military advantage while global demand for the joint force continues to exceed resources.

Global Integration

Global integration enables DOD leadership to provide advice, make timely decisions, and inform operational priorities and institutional investment choices across CCMDS and multiple time horizons. Global integration requires a global perspective organized around and against priority challenges with global campaigns and a posture to execute contingency plans associated with each challenge. Within each global campaign plan (GCP), CCDRs use broad

mission areas to structure how CCMDs can execute each global campaign. Within each mission area of a global campaign, the joint force executes subordinate operations, activities, and investments to address specific aspects of the priority challenges. The result of integration is effective joint campaigns and operations employing cohesive military actions arranged across time and multiple AORs to achieve strategic objectives and balance strategic risk.

Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

CJCS Instruction 3110.01, *(U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*, [short title: JSCP], fulfills the CJCS's statutory responsibilities in Title 10, USC, Section 153, to assist the President and SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States. The JSCP provides the framework for military direction to the joint force, implementing and augmenting the President and SecDef's guidance found in the national security strategy, UCP, contingency planning guidance, and national defense strategy and in the CJCS's guidance in the national military strategy. The JSCP provides guidance for CCMDs, Services, the Joint Staff (JS), and DOD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans and establishes a common set of processes, products, roles, and responsibilities to globally integrate the operations, activities, and investments of the joint force. The CCDRs then operationalize and execute the campaign plan. The JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to integrate the joint force's global operations, activities, and investments across the competition continuum.

There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, functional campaign plans (FCPs), and combatant command campaign plans (CCPs).

- The JS develops and maintains the GCPs for SecDef approval. GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs.
- FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not bound geographically but require coordination across multiple CCMDs.
- The CCPs are the primary means through which the CCMDs collaboratively develop operations, activities, and investments within their UCP-assigned mission/AOR.

Global Campaigning

The joint force campaigns across the competition continuum. GCPs and CCPs encompass concurrent and related operations, activities, and investments to achieve operational-level objectives that support achievement of strategic objectives. In concert with other instruments of national power, these actions not only maintain or achieve strategic objectives but anticipate a future beyond those objectives. The actions include many Service component operations, joint operations, and continual alignment of military actions with interorganizational and multinational partners.

Global Campaign Considerations

When an emerging situation exceeds the scope, scale, or responsibility of a single CCDR or global campaign, the joint forces' senior leadership will determine an appropriate response, including the likely supported and supporting commanders, diagnosing the matter through the lens of the global campaign design considerations:

- Strategic analysis.
- Range of possible outcomes.
- Anticipate the consequences.
- Commander's vision.
- Operational direction.
- Campaign narrative.
- Follow-through and enduring efforts.
- Authorities.
- Alignment.
- Force architecture.

Operational and Strategic Objectives

While operational and strategic objectives are uniquely different, they must link with one another. In following the commander's vision throughout the process, forces arrange to achieve the operational objectives.

Strategic objectives are expressions of national interests. In practice, some strategic objectives are expressions of policy, not necessarily physical entities. The keys to achieving strategic objectives can exist thousands of miles from any particular challenge, in orbit around the Earth, reside as disaggregated sentiment spread across several continents, or within information activities. Effective global campaigning reaches beyond individual regions; otherwise, joint campaigns and operations address only symptoms.

The Joint Operation

Joint operation is a general term that describes military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other. Any single joint operation may be subordinate to a campaign or part of a larger campaign. A commander is responsible for the development and execution of an individual operation.

Phasing a Joint Operation

Phasing is a way to organize and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The phases are unique for each operation as a tool to integrate and synchronize related activities, in time and space within available resources, thereby enhancing C2 to improve flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Phases in a plan are distinct and sequential; however, activities often overlap between the phases.

Organizing Operational Areas

While the UCP assigns AORs, CCDRs and other JFCs designate smaller OAs (e.g., joint operations area [JOA] and area of operations) temporarily. OAs have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations unfold (the OA), the use of the term “domain” does not imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. The appropriate JFC specifies authorities and responsibilities within an OA. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands.

Linear and Nonlinear Operations

In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. In linear operations, emphasis is on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other friendly forces.

In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific effects on multiple decisive points.

Global Integration in Practice

Global integration includes the entire joint force’s actions, unfolding over different time horizons, and begins with the CJCS. In execution, the joint force campaigns to achieve operational-level objectives as described in the global

campaigns, CCDR campaigns, and standing execute orders. To oversee execution and gauge the degree of effective integration, the CJCS's JS regularly examines and collaborates with each coordinating authority's ongoing campaign activities throughout the year of execution.

The Global Campaign, Combatant Command Campaign, and Global Integration Framework

Title 10, USC, Section 153, directs the CJCS to prepare strategic plans, as required, and provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The CJCS provides advice on ongoing military operations and the allocation and transfer of forces among CCMDs. In performing this role in global integration, the CJCS is responsible for operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of the joint force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities. The CJCS, through the JSCP, assigns which sets of global challenges requires GCPs and global integration frameworks.

Global Effects Coordination

Global effects coordination focuses primarily on integration and synchronization across the CCMDs to help prioritize lethal and nonlethal global effects. The global effects coordination process seeks to improve situational awareness across CCMD theater and functional responsibilities; identify opportunities, tensions, and consequences of joint force action or inaction; and align CCMD global operations to generate desired effects.

Mission Areas and Enduring Requirements

The mission areas constitute the framework of global campaigns. Within the global campaigns, five mutually supporting mission areas describe the principal orientation and way the joint force operates and maneuvers across the competition continuum and around the globe—simultaneously in multiple regions with allies and partners, and, as necessary, across UCP-designated AORs and other military boundaries. The mission areas are:

- Deter strategic attack.
- Deter conventional attack.
- Assure allies and partners.
- Compete below the level of armed conflict (competition).
- Prepare/respond to threats.

Tailoring Headquarters and Forces

How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The JFC's mission and operational approach,

the principle of unity of command, and a mission command philosophy are guiding principles to organize the joint force for operations. JFCs can establish joint forces on a geographic or functional basis. JFCs may centralize selected functions within the joint force but should not reduce the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and special operations tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function as designed.

Partner Alignment

The US military cannot achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic objectives acting alone. Allies and partners are an important aspect of the global campaigns. In the conduct of military activities, the joint force may rely on partners to increase capacity, access unique capabilities and authorities, share intelligence, and extend operational reach to achieve objectives. However, many strategic challenges exist that military force cannot solve alone—especially in competition but also during post-combat consolidation and stabilization activities. Global integration uses a comprehensive approach, to include considerations of nonmilitary means to address these challenges and achieve operation-level objectives. Interorganizational partnerships are the sources of these means.

The Competition Continuum

Introduction

There are four core elements of competition: influence, advantage, and leverage form the common elements, which are fundamentally interrelated aspects through which a nation advances and protects the primary core element, its interests.

- Interests are qualities, principles, matters of self-preservation, and concepts that a nation or actor values and seeks to protect or achieve concerning other competitors. Interests are contextual and may include the maintenance of physical security, economic prosperity, continuity of government and culture at home, and value projection in the geopolitical environment, as well as emotional triggers (e.g., fear, honor, glory), and other drivers (e.g., virtual, cognitive) that animate action.
- Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct, indirect, or intangible ways. An actor can accumulate, spend, or lose influence.

- Advantage is superiority of position or condition. States may create an advantage by the accumulation of influence toward the desired effect or acceptable condition. Inherently relative, a state realizes advantage through the exercise of the instruments of national power.
- Leverage is the application of advantage gained to create an effect or exploit an opportunity. From a position of leverage, an actor is more capable of promoting and protecting its interests.

Competition Continuum Overview

The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, adversarial competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These descriptors refer to the relationship between the United States and another strategic actor (state or non-state) concerning a contested interest or set of specific policy objectives. This description allows for simultaneous interaction with the same strategic actor at different points along the competition continuum.

Elements of the Competition Continuum:

- **Cooperation.** Situations in which joint forces take actions with another strategic partner in pursuit of policy objectives.
- **Adversarial Competition.** Joint forces or multinational forces can take actions below armed conflict against a state or non-state adversary in pursuit of policy objectives in response to antagonistic and threatening behavior.
- **Armed Conflict/War.** Armed conflict/war occurs when a state directs its military forces to take actions against an enemy in hostilities or declared war.

Cooperation

Cooperation can be an enduring activity where the relationship with the ally or partner is in place and will continue for the foreseeable future. However, cooperation in specific areas with a partner whose overall relationship with the United States is neutral or even adversarial may be necessary.

Competition

Competition tends to occur over extended periods of time. In comparison to armed conflict, actions are often more indirect, risks are different, and the expenditure of resources less intense, thus allowing for a more protracted effort.

Armed Conflict/War

Armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale, scope, and totality. Joint forces integrate capabilities across CCMDs to conduct combat operations and defeat the enemy's capabilities, strategy, and will. However, even during periods of armed conflict, success depends on the effective conduct of ongoing cooperative and competitive activities.

The Competition Continuum and Deterrence

Integrated deterrence applies across the competition continuum, though in different fashions according to the situation. Deterrence applies to cooperation. US cooperation with various allies and partners can serve as a deterrent of aggression by others.

Deterrence in competition has a similar nuance and may be harder to judge. For instance, if an adversary supports a surrogate in a neighboring country, this is not proof that deterrence has failed. The adversary might have preferred to make an overt incursion but concluded the risks were too great. In that case, successful integrated deterrence of armed conflict led to competition.

During armed conflict, integrated deterrence continues and requires effort and consideration. In other instances, integrated deterrence must unfold over extended periods. The joint force seeks to deter a conventional attack against a partner or ally.

Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

Introduction

The joint force rarely operates unilaterally. In any significant campaign, cooperation is a feature of nearly every substantive military action. In an interconnected world, most major joint force activity includes some ramifications for competition with a global or regional rival or adversary. Cooperation and competition are perpetual. The joint force conducts cooperative activities with allies and partners and competitive activities to counter adversaries who seek to turn the competition to their advantage.

Global Integration of Cooperation and Competition

JFCs account for external considerations such as the desired conditions that cooperation should create the nature of the relevant relationships and the potential partner's willingness and capacity. Commanders also account for internal considerations such as the interests, objectives, and priorities of other contributing USG

departments and agencies; resource limitations; relevant statutory or policy restrictions on the amount, categories, and purposes of US security cooperation (SC) expenditure; and other policy on SC that is relevant to the specific situation. Just as in armed conflict, the employment of the military instrument of national power, in concert with interagency partner efforts, seeks to achieve operational objectives in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Considerations for Cooperation

Considerations for effective cooperative activities include:

- Identification of the conditions JFCs can create within the security environment that favor US interests.
- Recognition of the state and character of US partner relationships.
- Determination of our partners' propensity, likelihood, and capacity to act in a manner aligned with our interests.
- Conduct interest mapping with allies and partners over mutual concerns and opportunities.
- Comprehension of other USG departments and agencies' interests, objectives, and priorities with respect to the specific circumstance.
- Understanding the amount, scope, categories, and purposes of all the US foreign assistance funding Congress planned for the relevant area(s).
- Analysis of how the joint force can most aptly apply the existing authorities and resources to the specific area and issue.

Typical Cooperative Operations and Activities

Stabilization. Stabilization is an inherently cooperative endeavor that requires aligning USG efforts (e.g., diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense) to create conditions for local legitimate authorities and systems to manage unstable environments effectively. Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, and DOD cooperate to stabilize these fragile countries of strategic importance to the United States.

National Emergency Preparedness (Domestic Operations). Emergency preparedness consists of measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.

Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament. Commanders and staffs oversee activities of military personnel involved in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament activities.

Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is an aspect of protection and involves defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by Title 10, USC, Section 401. This assistance is in conjunction with military operations and exercises to fulfill unit training requirements while incidentally creating humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

Homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG's top responsibility and is a continuous, cooperative effort among all federal agencies, as well as state, tribal, and local government.

Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. When requested, DOD may provide support to federal, state, territory, tribal, insular areas, and local law enforcement reacting to civil disturbances, conducting border security and counterdrug missions, preparing for antiterrorism operations, and participating in other related law enforcement activities.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries outside the United States.

Recovery Operations. Recovery operations may search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human remains.

Responding to Crises

A crisis is an incident or emerging situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests. A crisis can develop rapidly and create a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that national leaders consider a commitment of military forces and resources. A crisis can

occur anywhere across the competition continuum and the response can include almost any type of joint operation.

***Adversarial Competition
Below Armed Conflict:
Foundation and Practice***

Adversarial competition surrounds a persistent and long-term struggle between actors seeking to achieve incompatible strategic objectives while avoiding armed conflict. In adversarial competition, nations or non-state actors apply their instruments of power over extended periods and throughout the OE to either initiate or counter malign or antagonistic behavior against their adversaries. The strategic purpose of these activities is to gain and sustain long-term comparative advantages (and mitigate disadvantages) indefinitely.

***Patterns of Coercion and
Determinants of Success***

The United States has used its military power in adversarial competition and in the competitions that always emerge after armed conflict. Most of these cases involved both a diplomatic and economic dimension implemented to influence the perceptions and behavior of foreign countries' political leaders. JFCs posture, maneuver, and employ military forces in discrete ways for specific objectives. JFCs recognize successful employment is different for each situation. Evaluating these discrete activities requires considering the full range of uses of the armed forces in adversarial competition. Understanding the adversarial mechanisms that ultimately drive a US response is equally important. Finally, JFCs understanding how the armed forces can maximize their unique role and what options can be most successful is key.

***Considerations for
Countering Coercion and
Malign Influence***

When directed, the joint force has traditionally exercised influence over key territories in conditions less than armed conflict to maintain and advance US national interests. Now, the situation can become more complex as threats have challenged the United States in orbital and cyberspace. Within enduring competitions, actors continually probe and seek to gain an advantage. Previous strategic guidance has directed military forces to counter these provocations on many occasions. The US and joint force experiences have exceeded the scope of most anecdotal coercion theories. For example, some situations include more than two actors that bear on the situation and its outcome. With the inclusion of multiple actors, an effective response requires a holistic framework where multiple power struggles may be in play concurrently. In the US experience, general deterrence is broad and continuous throughout the competition continuum.

Alternatively, the United States normally tailors its use of force to compel behavior short of war only in specific circumstances.

Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

Introduction

Armed conflict or war is a violent conflict between nations, state-like entities, or armed organizations. A nation with a central government or occupying power opposed by insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups engage in armed conflict. Additionally, armed groups that do not recognize national borders may fight wars in semiautonomous regions. The situation presented by an enemy often drives CCDRs to pursue a complex array of overlapping operational objectives across numerous AORs. Along with conventional forces, the enemy may employ coercion, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal activity, and information warfare to complicate operations. The enemy's campaign progresses throughout the OE. Joint campaigns and operations in armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale, tempo, and scope of capabilities. Prevailing against the enemy requires senior military and civilian leadership to transition the force's posture optimized for the global campaign to a disposition for joint warfighting.

Joint Force Preparation and Transition to Armed Conflict

Preparation. While commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict. In many cases, the preparations enhance bonds between multinational partners, increase understanding of the AOR, help ensure access when required, and strengthen the capability for future multinational operations. All these qualities can help deter armed conflict. As CCDRs compete for access and influence across their AORs, they simultaneously set conditions to avoid armed conflict and ensure the joint force postures to respond to adversary actions and execute operations. CCDRs' GCPs' "prepare/respond to threats" mission area provides considerations for setting the theater for armed conflict. Preparing multiple geographic theaters or regions for armed conflict requires investment in leadership, diplomacy, and long-term programming, which includes institutional planning, resources, and activities.

Transition to Armed Conflict

- **Remain vigilant and ready: recognition.** The joint force and interagency partners must remain ready to defeat an initial enemy offensive, overcome surprise, and recover from loss of initiative. The enemy can employ a mix of irregular, traditional, and informational activities that may not present a triggering event until their operation or campaign is well underway.
- **Establish command relationships.** Armed conflict may require multiple supported CCMDs quickly shifting main efforts between them. Command relationships have trade-offs, but proper balance is essential. When command relationships are less than optimal, they can create operational gaps and unnecessary risk.
- **Local Superiority.** Air and maritime commanders have a key role in the transition to armed conflict. By maintaining control of the air and sea in the transition to armed conflict, the JFC is able to set the conditions for successful engagements early in a conflict.

Other Transition Considerations

- **Littoral areas offer positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations.** Even when joint forces firmly establish ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with opportunities to gain leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea.
- **JFCs can operate from an HQ platform at sea. Transferring C2 from sea to shore** requires detailed planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force.
- **Special operations forces (SOF)-conventional forces integration.** The JFC, using SOF independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized capability to achieve objectives that might not otherwise be possible.
- **Stabilization activities.** Stabilization activities provide an opportunity to support objectives and create the conditions to achieve strategic- and operational-level objectives.
- **Protection Considerations.** The JFC may designate a JSA as the operational footprint expands to accommodate the forces required for armed conflict. The JSA should include key logistics nodes and infrastructure such as aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation.

- **Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents.** Without limiting boldness or initiative, JFCs should make every preparation and effort to reduce the potential for the killing or wounding of friendly and neutral personnel, damaging friendly and neutral property, and degrading friendly and neutral capabilities.
- **Logistics Support and Sustainment.** The scale of operational-level warfare traditionally requires significant logistics and sustainment support. CCDRs and subordinate commanders identify logistical and sustainment requirements and shortcomings for forces assigned and allocated to the theater.
- **Space Considerations.** Space is a contested environment where commanders anticipate and mitigate hostile actions that may affect friendly space operations and impact the ability to create effects from space.
- **Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO).** The joint force is critically dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for operations across all joint functions and throughout the OE. For example, modern C2 requires the operation of EMS-dependent sensing and communication systems, while advanced weapons rely on positioning, navigation, and timing information transmitted through the EMOE.
- **Cooperative Activities.** Activities before armed conflict may focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stabilization activities. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort; confirming the feasibility of pertinent objectives; and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Joint force stabilization activities may be a part of the USG's security sector assistance to restore security and infrastructure eventually.
- **Targeting.** As the CCDR and JFC define the JOA, establish a joint task force, and set the theater for potential armed conflict, they must refine or begin target identification, prioritization, and analysis per existing contingency plans, guidance, and the situation.
- **Informational Considerations.** Leveraging the IE to set conditions for success during armed conflict begins with the JFC and staff identifying relevant platforms for information dissemination in the OE.

Preparing the OE. JIPOE products facilitate the joint force in preparing the OE for operations. Conventional

forces conduct, promote, and anticipate enduring preparations and readiness based on JIPOE. The objectives may or may not be threat-specific. Of course, the responses are all scalable and employed in the context of the specific situation.

Considerations for Isolating a Peer Enemy. As guided by strategic direction, the United States and the joint force strive to isolate enemies by denying them access to allies and sanctuary. The purpose of isolation is to strip away as much of the enemy's external support or freedom of action as possible. However, peer enemies have strategic depth and global reach. A peer enemy will likely have strong influence within its periphery. Still, isolating an enemy is an important aspect of waging warfare at the strategic level. These actions can limit the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation and enable joint force freedom. CCDRs may support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.

Initial Response and Employing Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) and Flexible Response Options (FROs). The joint force executes FDOs and FROs to respond to situations by leveraging capabilities and options to counter coercion or disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or deceive as appropriate.

Protection. CCDRs and staff should consider introducing protection assets into the theater early and integrate with host nation (HN) defenses.

Preparation to Execution. The circumstances surrounding armed conflict rarely unfold as imagined. Regardless of how much time and effort went into anticipating, planning, and wargaming wartime scenarios, commanders recognize that the existing plan will likely need changes as the force transitions from competition to armed conflict.

Gain Operational Access. US forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating base in or near the conflict or using forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a base or support facility. CCDRs can introduce forces during cooperative activities such as SC, military engagement, establishing an expeditionary advance base,

or bilateral exercises. The CCDRs employ immediately available forces and request appropriate FROs.

Force Projection. Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of the international waters, international airspace, orbital space, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMS to gain operational access. The ability to freely maneuver to position and sustain our forces is vital to our national interests and those of our partner nations. US forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating base in or near the conflict or use forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a base or support facility.

Joint Warfighting – Offensives, Counteroffensives, and Transitions

The Enemy Offensive. Commanders posture forces and enabling capabilities of the force so they are able to survive the enemy's anticipated initial attack. This posture should have support from sustainment and replacement forces through HN and allied infrastructure and logistic support.

Attack Operational COGs and Supporting Structures. Essential to joint warfighting and prevailing in armed conflict, the JFCs attack the COGs prior to the enemy seizing their geographic objectives. As difficult as it may be, joint forces must attack the enemy's operational forces and critical infrastructure to degrade its capability, erode its will and commitment to fight, and disrupt the cohesion of its military.

Drive the Enemy to Culmination

- **Create Local Air and Maritime Freedom of Movement.** Achieving local air and maritime superiority allows joint forces to penetrate the enemy's antiaccess (A2)/area denial (AD) systems, secure a JSA or lodgment, and close the strategic and operational distance.
- **Disrupt Portions of Enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADSs) and A2/AD Systems.** JFCs, through their joint force air component commanders and joint force maritime component commanders, cannot achieve necessary air and maritime superiority without neutralizing some aspects of enemy A2/AD systems and IADSs.
- **Close the Strategic and Operational Distance.** Closing the strategic and operational distance requires

contesting enemy maneuver forces to deny their objectives and degrade enemy long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

- **Protect and Expand the JSA.** The JFC must exploit the advantages achieved by closing the strategic and operational distance to protect and expand the JSA. This exploitation enables the deployment and sustainment of expeditionary forces to support follow-on operations and secures operational access within the theater.

Counteroffensive. As soon as possible, the joint force must initiate offensive operations; when conducted in response to enemy attacks, they are referred to as counteroffensives.

Joint Warfighting — Integrating Capabilities and Synchronizing Action. Commanders must integrate the capabilities and synchronize the operations of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace forces, along with JEMSO, to defeat peer enemies. JFCs should consider intelligence collection, providing joint fire support, maneuvering to close with the enemy, and protecting the force, for example, as separate operations but complementary joint actions executed to create necessary effects against the enemy.

Transition and Adaptation. Commanders adapt continuously and transition as necessary as they anticipate the enemy's future actions. At some point during the joint force's initial offensive or counteroffensive, the attack will culminate or pause. This action will be by design or enemy response. Still, there should be no reason to believe the enemy will abandon their objectives after the first iteration of offensive-counteroffensive. Commanders expect to transition through multiple iterations where the side that adapts to the enemy and adjusts to the OE quicker realizes an advantage. Commanders know that on every occasion the United States has engaged in sustained armed conflict against a peer enemy; the joint force has had to change methods, organizations, and capabilities to succeed in the new environment. Until this adaptation occurred, the military could not bring effective force to bear against the enemy.

The Transition from Armed Conflict into the New Competition

Clear conclusion and finality to armed conflict can be elusive. To make a military victory meaningful, CCDRs take on the timeless challenge of translating the military success in the OE into enduring and favorable outcomes.

Operations, Activities, and Investments. To effectively campaign throughout the transition from armed conflict to competition, joint forces take specific actions that:

- Establish security from external threats.
- Execute governance over occupied territories to establish a military government in occupied territory (e.g., The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the law of war).
- Coerce adversaries from behaving in a malign or detrimental manner by rewarding appropriate behavior and imposing costs for malign or antagonistic behavior.
- Influence the perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, decision making, and behavior of adversaries' leadership, security forces, and civil society and other foreign audiences and inform domestic audiences to create desired psychological effects.
- Influence adversaries' risk assessments to reduce their willingness to engage in malign or antagonistic behavior.
- Counter or contest adversaries' operations, activities, and investments to deny or delay their operational success.
- Continually seek to gain and sustain long-term competitive advantages as the new adversarial competition will go on indefinitely or until the former combatants, now competitors, reach a mutually acceptable political settlement.
- Conduct security tasks to protect friendly forces, installation routes, critical infrastructure, populations, and actions within an assigned OA.
- Execute stabilization activities.
- Establish influence over local and regional audiences (as authorized). Commanders develop and communicate supporting and credible narratives to the intended population to assist them in understanding the overall goal of military actions and the benefits of those actions for the population.
- Establish, maintain, and sustain large-scale detention compounds and sustain enduring detainee operations.

- Execute peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations are coercive actions that orient on adversarial behaviors.

Joint Campaigns and Operations Against Violent Extremist Organizations

IW is a struggle among state or non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. The term **irregular** highlights the nontraditional methods that state and non-state actors incorporate through their actions, information efforts, activities, and operations to gain the broadest and most impactful influence and effects.

Violent extremist organizations (VEOs). VEOs include individual terrorists that align with a group, terrorist organizations, and ideologically driven groups that promote violence. A sound global approach for countering terrorism outlines a strategic vision built around an international effort. The aim orients on defeating violent extremism, which threatens the way of life for free and open societies and creating a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and their supporters.

Combating Terrorism (CbT). CbT involves actions to oppose terrorism from all threats. CbT encompasses antiterrorism, which are defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These actions include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces and counterterrorism, which are activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks.

Joint Campaigns and Operations Against VEOs. Successful campaigns and operations against VEOs require an integrated USG strategy that establishes relevant strategic objectives. A GCP for countering VEOs translates USG policy and strategy into a set of strategic- and operational-level military objectives necessary to establish the conditions necessary to achieve the desired strategic objective.

The Limited Contingency

Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US interests. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation with interorganizational participants. Commanders seek to integrate and execute within one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort.

The timing of the transition from planning and preparation to execution can change rapidly, as necessary.

Direct Action

Direct action entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments. Direct action employs military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, high-risk, or diplomatically and politically sensitive environments.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency consists of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.

An effective counterinsurgency operation utilizes all instruments of national power to integrate and synchronize political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities carried out by the HN. CCDRs also leverage applicable USG and multinational partners to create a holistic approach to resolve core grievances where able and for those irreconcilables remaining in the insurgency, weakening their cause for violence.

Global Integration and the Joint Force's Enduring Role in Competition

Arranging and accomplishing global integration's actions are essential. For the joint force to prevail against a peer enemy, it is imperative for JFCs to implement the directed prioritization of effort and integrate capabilities that work together to create advantages. If CCDRs are unsuccessful in executing these essential operations, then the war effort could face costly protraction, stalemate, or even worse. CCDRs achieve success by continually denying the enemy's objectives, attriting and dismantling enemy A2/AD defense networks, targeting C2 systems, and isolating the enemy's forces from their strategic infrastructure. Simultaneously, CCDRs continue protecting the force and accumulating combat power from across the globe. As the campaigns and major operations begin to create diplomatic and political leverage and advantage, national leaders can begin to either impose or negotiate a settlement.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for joint campaigns and operations.

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

- a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series and is a companion publication to joint doctrine's capstone JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, and JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*. It provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint campaigns and operations. It also informs interagency and multinational partners, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of fundamental principles that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. This publication describes fundamental keystone constructs—such as unified action and joint functions—that apply regardless of the nature or circumstances of a specific joint operation. This publication provides context not only for the joint operations series but also for other keystone doctrine publications that describe supporting functions and processes.
- b. The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services (from at least two Military Departments [MILDEPs]) in a single operation is through joint operations. Normally implemented within a broader campaign, joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more MILDEPs operating under a single JFC.
- c. The foundation of joint operations doctrine rests upon the principles of joint operations and the associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*. These principles and fundamentals apply to both traditional and irregular forms of warfare. Joint doctrine recognizes the utility of unity of command and the synergy created by the integration and synchronization of military operations in time, space, and purpose. Joint doctrine recognizes **the nine principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity)**. Experience gained in a variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations has reinforced the value of three additional principles (**restraint, resilience, and legitimacy**). Together, they comprise the **12 principles of joint operations**, see Appendix A, "Principles of Joint Operations."

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on traditional warfare, IW, and the instruments of national power.

- d. The Armed Forces of the United States—every military organization at all levels—are a team. Success depends on well-integrated command headquarters (HQ), supporting organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating Service components' capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force. The JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces to the mission.

e. Overview of Joint Campaigns and Operations

(1) The joint force continuously plans and conducts joint campaigns and operations to protect and promote the Nation's interests within a dynamic and complex environment. The ability to prevail in armed conflict against a variety of enemies is fundamental and joint warfighting remains paramount. Additionally, the joint force conducts joint campaigns and operations to limit adversary influence and counter coercive efforts seeking to undermine our interests without provoking armed conflict. Growing instability, the erosion of international norms, and the rise of near peers all suggest such adversarial competition below armed conflict (from this point forward "competition" will be used in this publication) will be increasingly prevalent in the future operational environment (OE). The joint force contributes to the maintenance and viability of the international system of cooperative alliances and partnerships. The benefits of pursuing mutual interests alongside allies and partners are powerful and priceless. For decades, these cooperative alliances have provided enduring strategic advantages against our adversaries.

(2) A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. The joint force campaigns by integrating and employing measures of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict to create the conditions and behaviors necessary to achieve United States (US) strategic objectives. In the most successful instances of the use of military force, our civilian and military leaders coordinate and align the military with other instruments of national power as part of a broad national effort. This effective blending of instruments of national power, in parallel with the coordinated and aligned efforts of allies and partners, is essential across the competition continuum.

(3) Joint warfighting includes major operations and campaigns involving large-scale combat. A major operation is a series of tactical actions conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. Major operations are a primary building block of a campaign. Campaigns are joint in nature; functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

2. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

a. The strategic environment consists of various national, international, and global interests and influences that affect the decisions of senior US civilian and military leaders concerning the employment of US instruments of national power. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and dynamic, requiring commanders to maintain surveillance of the OE and conduct military engagement with interagency and multinational partners. Threats present the joint force with situations that cut across multiple combatant commands' (CCMDs') areas of responsibility (AORs) and functional areas. These threats present themselves in the OE (land, maritime, air space, and cyberspace; the information environment [IE]; and electromagnetic operational environment [EMOE]). The strategic environment is fluid, with continually evolving alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge,

disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will appear and what form they might take, the joint force should expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.

b. Today's threats can increasingly synchronize and integrate direct military force and information activities and employ other instruments of national power to create combinations of lethal and nonlethal effects with greater sophistication while less constrained by geographic, functional, legal, or moral boundaries. Threats present these dilemmas in large part due to the nature of the modern IE. Technology that reaches across space and cyberspace characterize the instantaneous and persistent global reach of information and the critical dependency modern societies have on advanced information and communications technologies. A peer enemy has strategic depth and global reach. Armed conflict is inherently transregional as enemies' interests, influence, and capabilities extend beyond traditional and recognized international order and boundaries. Significant and emerging challenges include conventional armed conflict; attacks in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and employment. Additional challenges include terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), adversary information and influence activities, and proliferation of an adversary's exclusion zones (enforced) through antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD) capabilities. Long-range A2 capabilities may prevent or inhibit the joint force from entering an operational area (OA). If a force can overcome an enemy's A2 capabilities, additional AD capabilities can still limit a force's freedom of action.

c. The challenges may not be specific to any single AOR and can create problematic consequences for international security. Such an environment poses dilemmas for US decision makers; can result in uneven US and allied physical and informational responses; and may weaken US alliances that promote trade, economic development, and diplomatic agreements. A JFC's OE, which may encompass all enemy, friendly, and neutral factors relevant to a specific joint operation, can include actions directed against a variety of state and non-state actors, including insurgents, proxies, surrogates, warlords, criminals, and others. The joint force counters threat networks by continuous and simultaneous engagement at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Third-party entities and organizations may also affect achievement of strategic objectives, including the civilian population, host nation (HN) government, other political groups, international organizations, NGOs, and contractors from which everyone expects to draw support.

d. Enemies who attack the United States and overseas interests may use indirect and non-attributable methods. They will avoid secure and defensible targets and attack vulnerabilities. Targets may include US and partner nations' (PNs') lines of communications (LOCs), seaports, airports, staging areas, civilian populations, critical infrastructure, information centers, economic centers, historically and culturally significant landmarks, and military and police personnel and facilities. The joint force can counter these attacks with tailored operations and activities aligned with the efforts of interagency and international partners and organizations.

e. Advances in information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Developments in space and cyberspace provide the US military, allies, and partners the means to improve economic and physical security. However, they also provide adversaries with similar capabilities and increase access to open-source information and intelligence, the Department of Defense information network (DODIN), critical infrastructure and key resources, and an extensive propaganda platform with global reach.

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and the Defense Strategy Review for more information on the strategic security environment. Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for more information on interorganizational cooperation.

3. Instruments of National Power and the Competition Continuum

a. The instruments of national power are all the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. The instruments of national power are continuously active across the competition continuum. The ability of the United States to advance its national interests depends on how effectively the United States Government (USG) aligns and employs the instruments of national power within the competition continuum to achieve strategic objectives.

b. Whether in a primary or supporting role, the military can provide its strengths, assets, and capabilities in a range of strategic uses. As a significant part of the military instrument of national power, the joint force organizes efforts through cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Much of DOD's focus and effort is on deterrence through cooperation and competition, while remaining prepared for armed conflict. Through cooperation, DOD supports USG strategic objectives by developing security relationships; building allied and partner capacity and capability; enabling them to operate alongside US forces around the globe; and securing access in, over, and through allied and partner nations. As states and others seek to protect and advance their interests, they are in continual competition for influence, leverage, and advantage. Influence, advantage, and leverage accrue through the affiliation or alignment of relevant actors with the United States. It is people and their aggregate organizations through their decisions and behavior that enable or impede friendly freedom of action. The joint force may counter adversarial actions and malign influence through measures of persuasion and coercion. The United States employs military forces in a wide variety of activities and roles that vary in purpose, scale, risk, tempo, and intensity along the competition continuum (see Figure I-1). Cooperative and competitive activities comprise essential elements of global campaign plans (GCPs) and combatant command campaign plans (CCPs). The potential character of GCP and CCP campaign activities and their subordinate operations can begin with cooperative measures such as security cooperation (SC) and other military engagement activities. Campaigns and major operations can include cooperative to coercive measures such as exclusion zones, interception, enforcement of US and international economic sanctions, actions against irregular threats, and support to resistance. They may also include IW and traditional warfare. The military's role increases relative to the other instruments of national power as the need to compel or force a threat through military action increases.




Figure I-1. Competition Continuum

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on the instruments of national power. Refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information about a CCMD's role in SC. Refer to Chapter V, "The Competition Continuum," and JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on the competition continuum.

4. Strategic Direction

a. US federal law and policy provide the framework for strategic direction among the branches of government and their departments. Strategic direction, specific to DOD, is the strategy and intent of the President, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in pursuit of national interests. Strategic direction provides context, purpose, and tasks employing the instruments of national power. The specifics of strategic direction address long-term, emergent, and anticipatory issues or concerns that may quickly evolve due to rapidly changing circumstances. The Nation's leaders normally formulate strategic direction through lengthy and comprehensive dialogue that considers a great deal of input from initial joint planning. The actual direction may reside in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance, or senior leaders may communicate directly through other means. Strategic direction can change rapidly in response to changes in the global environment, whereas strategic guidance document revision is cyclical and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

b. In general, the President frames the Nation's strategic context by defining national interests and goals through strategic guidance documents like the national security strategy (NSS), Presidential directives, interim strategic guidance, and executive orders drafted by

and coordinated through the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council. Three Presidential strategic guidance documents provide broad strategic direction to DOD. They are the NSS, *Unified Command Plan* (UCP), and contingency planning guidance (CPG).

c. SecDef incorporates national strategic guidance and provides defense-wide strategic guidance to DOD components and the joint force primarily through the national defense strategy (NDS), the defense planning guidance (DPG), and the *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance* (GFMIG). The CJCS publishes the national military strategy (NMS) that provides strategic guidance and gives more specific, tailored, and prioritized objectives that guide joint planning and execution related to the national objectives. Campaign planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commanders (CCDRs), Service Chiefs, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and combat support agencies (CSAs) translate strategic direction into clear planning guidance, tailored force packages, operational-level objectives, and contingency plans.

For more information on campaign and contingency planning guidance, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

For more information on national strategic direction, refer to CJCSI 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs; JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force; the DPG; the GFMIG; and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) [short title: JSCP].

5. The Philosophy of Global Military Integration

a. Global military integration enables SecDef, assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs, to make timely decisions and establish operational priorities and institutional choices across multiple geographic, organizational, and functional boundaries and time horizons. This process is necessary because of the challenges of today's strategic environment, the realities of limited joint force resources, and expanding requirements. As CCMDs address complexities of their OEs and requirements, SecDef prioritizes resources. Global military integration is additive to and reinforces the UCP. Joint force decision making through an individual regional context can lead to myopic perspectives and sub-optimized employment of the joint force. Global military integration mitigates geographical and functional seams inherent in the division of responsibilities in the UCP. Joint force decision making through a multi-regional and functional context requires integration through a global perspective.

b. The proliferation of advanced technologies used during warfare has accelerated its speed, added to its complexity, and expanded its scope to encompass all aspects of the OE. These factors have eroded the United States' perceived competitive military advantage. Simultaneously, the global demand for joint forces continues to exceed capacity. To meet these challenges, the joint force must integrate at the right place, at the right time, with the right amount of force.

For more information on global military integration and the global integration process, see CJCSI 3050.01, Implementing Global Integration.

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Role in Global Military Integration

- a. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and 2017 UCP expanded the CJCS's responsibilities, to include serving a role in global military integration for the joint force (as codified in Title 10, United States Code [USC], Section 153). The CJCS provides advice for prioritization to the President and SecDef on the allocation and transfer of forces across CCMDs. As required by Title 10, USC, the CJCS provides the President and SecDef advice on ongoing joint force activities and the allocation and transfer of forces required to execute those activities. For global military integration, the CJCS assists in strategic planning and direction of the Armed Forces of the United States to ensure the effective employment and coherent pursuit of strategic objectives to integrate action across the worldwide campaigning effort, while balancing risks. CJCS advice supports informed SecDef decisions on CCMD resourcing necessary to achieve directed objectives and, where necessary, prioritizes resources. Subject to SecDef authority, direction, and established command relationships, the conduct of CCMD campaigns and operations is the sole purview of the CCDR. Global military integration balances demand across regions relative to the overall defense strategy and global campaign perspective. The CJCS provides advice to SecDef and the President on optimizing the force to achieve global military integration. The final decisions are made by civilian leadership.
- b. The NMS is the CJCS's central strategic guidance document. The NMS provides the strategic framework to prioritize the planning, resource allocation, and mitigation of risk. The guidance translates defense guidance into military strategy and assists SecDef in providing strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States. The NMS serves as the starting point for all other Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPP) actions.
- c. The CJCS also publishes the JSCP, the CJCS's primary strategic document, to guide and direct the preparation and integration of joint force campaign and contingency plans. It translates national security policy and strategic guidance into strategic objectives and guidance for the preparation and integration of global, CCMD, and functional campaign plans and their corresponding operational-level objectives. The JSCP tasks CCMDs, Services, the JS, and DOD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans. There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, functional campaign plans (FCPs), and CCPs. The contingency plans represent a branch of a campaign plan that is based on a hypothetical situation, for designated threats or a catastrophic event. The JSCP directs contingency planning at the global and CCMD level. The CJCS oversees joint force campaign and contingency planning and makes recommendations for global military integration of cross-CCP planning efforts. In execution, designated CCDRs serve as coordinating authorities to implement the GCPs and CCPs and plan the associated integrated contingency plans (ICPs). An ICP coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time and space to respond to a single contingency that spans CCMD geographic boundaries or functional responsibilities. For a crisis or transition to armed conflict, global integration frameworks (GIFs) integrate joint force actions, provide initial crisis options, and identify potential senior leadership decisions based on the global response to a priority

challenge. The decision may be to recommend implementing an ICP. ICPs differ from traditional contingency plans, as they require integration between the coordinating authority and collaborators across multiple regions, whereas previous contingency plans assumed regional challenges and a single supported command. Global military integration relies on a GCP's associated GIF and ICP to determine and synchronize the response to a global challenge by expanding the operations and authorities within a GCP or transitioning to one or more of the ICP family of contingency plans.

7. Unified Action

a. General

(1) Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and alignment of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Participants can include multinational forces, international organizations, NGOs, and other interorganizational partners. The joint force integrates actions within DOD and seeks to align actions collaboratively outside the purview of DOD. Failure to achieve unified action can jeopardize mission accomplishment.

(2) **Interorganizational partners** refers collectively to other USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; international organizations; foreign security forces and government agencies; NGOs; academia; entities of the private sector; nontraditional security entities (e.g., armed groups and their irregular forces, and private military companies); and foreign populations and groups that may be part of interorganizational cooperation.

For more information on interorganizational cooperation, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

(3) Unified action is a function of national strategic direction, the Constitution, federal law, and USG policy. Unified action is a broad government approach that focuses on coordination and cooperation of the US military and other interorganizational participants toward common objectives, even though the participants are not part of the same command or organization. The principle of unity of command enables commanders to understand the effective mechanisms to achieve military unity of effort.

(4) The United States Department of State (DOS) has a complementary approach, which defines unity of effort as a cooperative concept that refers to coordination and communication among USG organizations toward common goals for success. The basis for cooperation is the necessity of each department's efforts to work in harmony with the short- and long-range goals of the mission.

(5) The United States Department of Commerce plays a key role in the economic security of the Nation, which relates to national security. The Department of Commerce operates on multiple fronts to protect Americans and the US economy by enforcing trade laws and providing tools to thwart cybercrime. This makes the Department of Commerce a key department for interagency coordination.

b. The JFC's Role. Facilitating unity of effort with interorganizational partners is both challenging and mission-essential for JFCs. JFCs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions, since all the elements and actions that compose unified action are normally present at their level. However, subordinate JFCs and component commanders also align and synchronize their operations, activities, and investments directly with the operations of other military forces and interorganizational partners to promote unified action.

c. Multinational Participation in Unified Action. Joint forces should plan and execute campaigns and operations with partner forces, to include both uniformed personnel of a PN and irregular forces. Campaigns, major operations, and other operations may occur within the framework of an alliance or coalition led by the United States, or the joint force may act in a supporting role to a PN. Although individual nations may place greater emphasis on some objectives over others, the key is to find commonality within the objectives to promote unity of effort and make progress toward achieving the objectives. Cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships among counterparts may enable success. Language and communication differences, cultural diversity, historical animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies and multinational partners are factors that complicate the alignment and synchronization of activities during multinational operations. Likewise, differing national obligations derived from international treaties, agreements, and national legislation complicate multinational operations. Regardless of whether other members participate within their treaty or agreement obligations, the United States remains bound by treaties and agreements to which it is a party.

For more information on unified action concerning multinational participation, refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting. For more information on all aspects of multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-specific doctrine ratified by the United States, see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, and AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

d. Interorganizational Cooperation in Unified Action. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs often interact with a variety of interorganizational partners. This interaction varies according to the nature of the partner (e.g., capability, capacity, posture, authorities/national caveats) and the type and objectives of the operation. JFCs and planners consider the potential contributions of other agencies and determine which can best contribute to achieving specific objectives. Often, other interagency partners, primarily DOS, can facilitate a JFC's cooperation with PN agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. DOD may support other USG departments and agencies during operations; however, under US law, our military forces remain under the DOD command structure. Law or regulation, Presidential directive, policy, or agreement among or between agencies may prescribe federal lead-agency responsibility. Even when in a supporting role, the joint force will likely provide significant support to the lead agency because of its resources and well-established planning methods.

e. Interorganizational Alignment

(1) Military operations require civil-military alignment. The degree of alignment depends on the mission, objectives, organizations, governments, and people involved. Presidential directives guide participation by all USG departments and agencies and may influence decisions and actions by NGOs, academia, and private-sector organizations. Military commanders work with the other USG partners to promote unified action. Differences in policies, procedures, decision-making processes, terminology, and organizational cultures, as well as the nature and extent of resourcing across the various USG departments and agencies, often complicate and may initially create challenges to successful civil-military integration.

(2) Alignment, cooperation, and coordination between military forces and interorganizational partners may have less structure than military command and control (C2) arrangements. Some organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the USG, particularly those of the US military. Formal agreements, robust liaison, and information collection and sharing through interorganizational coordination and civil-military operations (CMO) facilitate common understanding and informed decision making. Information sharing with NGOs and the private sector may be more restrictive. Still, options such as the CCMD-level joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) and operational-level civil-military operations center (CMOC) are available to the JFCs to facilitate interorganizational coordination and civil information collection and sharing. DOD, in collaboration with federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, uses the structures and procedures provided by the *National Response Framework* (NRF) and the National Incident Management System to provide defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in response to disasters and civil disturbances within the United States and its territories. Specifically, United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command produce contingency plans to support domestic operations. Similar structures and processes incorporate the capabilities and interests of foreign partners and enable DOD to provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) outside the United States. In armed conflict, joint forces conduct CMO to interact with foreign governments and civil societies.

For more information on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation. For more information on CMO and the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For more information on DOD's coordination and involvement with other USG departments and agencies within the context of support to civil authorities, homeland security, and role within the NRF, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

8. Fundamental Considerations

a. Levels of Warfare

(1) **General.** The framework of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare helps commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic objectives to campaigns and major operations and link their objectives to tactical operations. These levels help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands. Echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often

relate to a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective.

(2) **Strategic Level.** In the context of national interests, strategy develops an idea or set of ideas associated with the employment of the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve strategic objectives. Considerations at the strategic level allow the President and SecDef, often in concert with leaders of other nations, to examine and account for an adversary's or enemy's strategies, as well as the OE's evolving circumstances. The President, aided by the NSC, establishes policy and strategic objectives through continuous iteration. In parallel, SecDef translates the emerging policy into guidance that facilitates joint planning. CCDRs participate in strategic discussions with the President and SecDef, usually with the CJCS. CCDRs also participate in strategic discussions with allies and multinational partners. Thus, the CCDR's strategy relates to both US national strategy and joint campaigns and operations within the AOR. This analysis informs the development of the strategic-level objectives, identifies obstacles to the achievement of these objectives, the associated narrative, required level of commitment, and the allocation of national resources to achieve those objectives. The strategy, derived from strategic direction and informed by planning, provides a framework for conducting campaigns and subordinate operations, activities, and investments at accepted levels of risk.

(3) **Operational Level.** At the operational level of warfare, JFCs identify and arrange objectives, operations, and forces to effectively conduct campaigns and major operations. The operational level of warfare links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. Effective campaigning requires achieving the operational-level objectives that link and lead to the strategic objectives. Operational objectives may be behavioral or territorial/conditional, but to achieve the strategic objectives, effective campaigning requires their deliberate identification and formulation. Military action at the operational level is normally a series of major operations oriented on operational objectives organized within a campaign. JFCs and component commanders use operational art to determine the purpose of military force; set goals, such as to strengthen the resolve, commitment, and resiliency of partners; persuade neutral parties to join the friendly forces' campaign; and convince adversaries to abandon or not engage in an armed struggle. Many factors affect relationships among military leaders at these levels. Service and functional component commanders of a joint force do not plan the actions of their forces in a vacuum; they and their staffs collaborate with the operational-level JFC to plan the joint operation. This collaboration facilitates the components of planning and execution. Likewise, the operational-level JFC and staff collaborate with the CCDR to frame strategic objectives, as well as tasks the CCDR may assign to the subordinate joint force.

(4) **Tactical Level.** Tactics are the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Tactics typically manifest themselves as individual operations. In armed conflict, tactics include planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities at the tactical level to achieve military objectives. An engagement can include a wide variety of noncombat tasks and activities between opposing forces, normally of short duration. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last

longer than engagements, involve larger forces, and have greater potential to affect the course of an operation.

For more information on the levels of warfare, see JP 1, Volume, 1, Joint Warfighting.

b. Strategic Uses of Military Force. The United States leverages all instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, DOD provides military capabilities to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from positions of strength. DOD has a supporting role when the military instrument of national power is not the main instrument for the strategy. When directed, or if the other instruments of national power prove insufficient, the military becomes the Nation's primary instrument. In either case, the military contribution is essential as it enables and reinforces the application of the other instruments of national power. Whether in a primary or supporting role, strategic uses of a military force include assurance, both forms of coercion (deter and compel), and forcible action (or force).

(1) **Assure** is using the military instrument of national power to demonstrate commitment and support to allies and partners. Assuring often takes the form of SC, combined exercises, and forward stationing of US forces.

(2) **Deter** is the prevention of undesired action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or the belief that the costs of action outweigh the perceived benefits.

(3) **Compel** is the more complicated form of coercion since it requires precise signaling and communication through actions. It is even more dependent than deterrence on an accurate assessment of the adversary's will. The United States often compels the threat for limited ends or objectives achievable without sustained violence, occupation, or regime change.

(4) **Force** is using pure military strength to achieve the objective directly by subduing the enemy and imposing the United States' will. Force does not depend on the enemy's decision not to comply—rather, the enemy's choice of noncompliance is what distinguishes forcible action from coercion.

For detailed discussion, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting.

c. Traditional Warfare and IW

(1) Joint doctrine distinguishes between traditional warfare and IW but recognizes the strengths of employing them together in conjunction with appropriate information activities. All military activities (or inactivities) are inherently communicative and can affect behavior in the OE. Both traditional warfare and IW serve a fundamentally discrete purpose that drives different approaches to its conduct. In practice, conducting effective warfare requires creative, dynamic, and synergistic combinations of proper information integrated with traditional warfare and IW.

(2) Traditional warfare is between two or more conventional forces in armed conflict. A nation-state's strategic purpose for conducting traditional warfare is to impose its will on an enemy government and avoid the imposition of the enemy government's will on itself and its citizens. The law of war regulates the resort to armed conflict; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in international and non-international conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent states. It is derived from the treaties and customary international law binding on the United States. Other purposes of the law of war are to facilitate restoration of peaceful conditions, assist military commanders in ensuring the disciplined and efficient use of military force, and preserve the professionalism and humanity of combatants.

(3) In traditional warfare, nation-states (and state-like entities capable of waging war) fight each other for various reasons to protect or advance their strategic interests. Campaigns in traditional warfare normally focus on an enemy's armed forces, their capabilities, and seizing key terrain, ultimately, to force their government to concede. In traditional warfare, enemies engage in combat against each other and employ a variety of similar functions and capabilities throughout the OE. In today's dynamic environment, adversaries are challenging traditional views of warfare, in ways that blur distinctions of traditional warfare and measures short of war.

(4) IW is a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. It normally involves the participation of non-state armed groups, state-controlled irregular forces, or nonmilitary entities. In IW, joint forces seek primarily to influence populations and affect legitimacy, credibility, and will of sponsors and their partners and opponents. IW often favors indirect approaches to competition and armed conflict. IW includes a broad scope of lethal and nonlethal activities to subvert, erode, or exhaust an enemy's power, influence, and will. IW may include support to resistance and the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, or surrogates, to achieve shared or complementary objectives. Partners and surrogates are distinct entities. In short, the JFC supports and cooperates with a partner, but one employs a surrogate. Use of irregular forces, including resistance fighters opposing a government or an occupying power, represent a form of IW. Additionally, IW requires operating in close and persistent collaboration with interagency, multinational, and other interorganizational partners to achieve unity of effort without unity of command. IW is dependent on the USG to reinforce the legitimacy, credibility, and effective governance of supported partners. In competition, the conduct of IW is persistent and long-term. Joint forces conduct IW in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments and denied areas. One key to success is a healthy relationship with the associated DOS chiefs of mission (COMs). Finally, IW includes the employment of indirect, unorthodox, and asymmetric approaches and non-overt actions.

(5) In accordance with (IAW) Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, IW requires the capabilities of the entire DOD, but it is not exclusive to special operations forces (SOF). DOD IW operations and activities include, but are not limited to:

(a) Unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization activities, countering threat networks (CTN) (which includes counter threat finance [CTF] and countering transnational criminal organizations), military information support operations (MISO), and civil affairs operations (CAO).

(b) Those military engagement activities (which includes aspects of SC programs, CMO, and interorganizational cooperation) that support IW.

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on traditional warfare and IW and the instruments of national power.

d. Integrating Information in Joint Operations. All military activities and operations have an inherent informational aspect, whether intended or not. The joint force can leverage the power of information as a means to support achievement of its objectives. The CCMD operational narrative and associated tactical sub-narratives targeted to specific relevant actors propagate via media and human social networks to create cognitive effects that may modify behavior in favor of JFC objectives. JFCs and their subordinate commanders integrate information into their joint campaigns and operations to forge perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors that reinforce the legitimacy of US actions while simultaneously challenging or undermining the perceived legitimacy of adversary and enemy actions. Commanders integrate information into all military actions to create favorable circumstances for friendly action, limit adversary and enemy actions, and minimize unintended consequences. The use of information is key to preparing the OE and understanding the political, social, cultural, and psychological drivers in a particular OA.

For detailed discussion on integrating information into joint operations, see JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

e. Joint Campaigns and Operations

(1) Joint campaigns and operations is a general phrase that includes all the different types of campaigns, such as GCPs, CCPs, and campaigns associated with military operations short of armed conflict and armed conflict. The phrase includes all categories of operations from limited contingency operations to major operations.

(2) In general, joint campaigns and operations pursue strategic objectives by arranging and achieving operational-level objectives clearly linked to strategic objectives. The operational design seeks to produce and translate operational success in support of those strategic objectives. Major operations are a series of tactical activities orienting on achieving operational-level objectives as a part of a campaign. In the context of armed conflict, major operations synchronize and integrate large-scale combat forces. On the other hand, major operations for cooperation and competition will probably not include combat.

(3) Individual joint operations focus on accomplishing specific military tasks. They are the building blocks of a greater campaign. Mission statements with one or two essential tasks drive the purpose of an individual operation. The operational design of any individual operation requires precision, control, detail, and focus. Individual operations make incremental progress toward operational-level objectives. Rarely does one operation singularly achieve an operational-level objective; rather, it links within a series of operations to achieve a strategic objective.

f. Operational and Strategic Objectives

(1) Operational and strategic objectives relate to one another but are uniquely different. Operational objectives can be to occupy territory, affect behavior, or change conditions. Robust policy and strategy can drive joint campaigns and operations that seek broad, transregional, or even global outcomes, requiring many parallel actions and diverse operational-level objectives. Successful campaign planning continuously interprets and predicts potential requirements that originate from the commander's vision to formulate guidance for the operational design. Planners build operational objectives based on reasoning. What emerges and matures is a coherent arrangement of prerequisite and intermediate operational requirements that provide focus and flexibility for military and military supported actions. Commanders arrange and maneuver forces to achieve the operational objectives. In execution, experience and assessment inform the JFCs' adaptation to failure and exploitation of success. JFCs' understanding drives revisions in prioritization to the operational objectives.

(2) Strategic objectives are based on strategic directions. The strategic objectives or policy represent what the nation values and describe the desired outcomes. However, policy and the value the nation assigns to the objective are rarely fixed but continually adapt. These values evolve as a function of the gravity of the interests and risks. Orienting on and pursuing these values requires a campaign approach, sophisticated organizing framework, a well-developed assessment process, and precise terminology. Successful joint campaigns and operations require careful development, pursuit, and achievement of operational objectives that link and lead to achieving the strategic objectives.

g. Global Military Integration and Overcoming Institutional and Operational Boundaries. Control measures and boundaries are necessary to delineate authorities, responsibilities, and relationships between commanders and forces. Commanders plan and exercise control measures to employ the unique qualities and advantages of their organizations in the right place and time. Additionally, commanders delineate boundaries and control measures, which are as situationally permissive as possible. A critical aspect of global military integration is simultaneously leveraging the strengths of institutional limits, operational boundaries, and coordination measures while overcoming their constraints.

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CHAPTER II

JOINT COMMAND

1. Introduction

- a. Command is the authority a commander in the armed forces exercises lawfully over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.
- b. While command authority stems from orders and other directives, the art of command resides in the commander's ability to use leadership to maximize performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, empathy, intuition, situational awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views helps commanders make insightful decisions in complex situations. Commanders and staff can develop many of these attributes over time through training, education, and experience. Joint training and joint doctrine enable the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decision making, and leadership. Effective commanders combine judgment, reason, and visualization with information management (IM), situational awareness, and a sound battle rhythm to facilitate decision making.

2. Strategic Art

Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests. Strategic art and operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to strategic objectives and prioritizes resources. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs to develop campaigns and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

a. The CCDR's Strategic Role

(1) Based on strategic direction, CCDRs implement the JSCP's directed campaigns and drive preparations for contingency plans. JSCP-directed campaign planning efforts are continually revised and subject to assigned, allocated, and apportioned force readiness constraints. CCMDs' strategies are nominally broad but concise statements of the CCDRs' long-term vision for their AOR, how they would support a CCDR in another AOR, or within the CCDR's global functions. The CPG and JSCP provide guidance for the CCDRs' strategies, campaigns, and operations. A prerequisite to preparing a CCP is the development of a strategic estimate containing factors and trends that influence the CCDRs' AOR or functional responsibilities. This estimate informs the relationship between ends, ways, means, and risks involved in the pursuit of JSCP-directed objectives within the campaign and drives preparations for follow-on actions.

(2) CCDRs continually pursue multiple strategic objectives described by the NDS and NMS. CCDRs also have a role in, and contribute to, achieving other CCMD's strategic objectives within the JSCP's GCPs and their associated contingency plans. Some strategic objectives are the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR. Other strategic objectives require a more balanced use of many or all instruments of national power, with CCDRs in support of other supported CCDRs or other USG departments and agencies. For example, DOS is the department primarily responsible for achieving strategic-level foreign policy goals and the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for securing the Nation from many threats we face. DOS is not resourced like DOD, nor do they have the same view of acceptable risk; this may leave DOD taking on DOS tasks that they view as not feasible or acceptable. Supporting CCDRs coordinate and synchronize their supporting plans with the supported commander's plan. Supported CCDRs provide planning guidance, assign missions and tasks, and organize forces and resources. CCDRs designate objectives, establish operational limitations, implement policies, and create the concept of operations (CONOPS) which integrate into plans and operation orders. In applying military power, CCDRs give authoritative direction in the use of assigned, attached, allocated, and supporting military forces. Military contributions are essential, as they enable and reinforce the application of the other instruments of national power. Supporting and supported CCDRs coordinate with each other across geographic boundaries and functional responsibilities to facilitate mission accomplishment within the capabilities of assigned, attached, allocated, and supporting military forces.

b. Joint Force Command

(1) A JFC's perspective of challenges in the OE is broad and comprehensive due to the interaction with USG civilian leaders; senior, peer, subordinate, and supporting commanders; and interorganizational partners. Clear commander's guidance and intent, enriched by the commander's experience and intuition, enable joint forces to achieve objectives. Employing the "art of war," which has been the commander's central historical command role, remains critical regardless of technological and informational improvements in control—the "science of war."

(2) Commanders interact with other leaders to build personal relationships and develop trust and confidence. Developing these associations is a conscious, collaborative act. Commanders build trust through words and actions and continue to reinforce it not only during operations but also during training, education, and exercises. Trust and confidence are essential to the joint force, interagency and multinational partners, interorganizational partners, and other stakeholders. Commanders may also interact with other political, societal, and economic leaders and other influential people who may impact joint campaigns and operations. This interaction supports mission accomplishment. The JFC emphasizes the importance of key leader engagement (KLE) to subordinate commanders and encourages them to extend the process to lower levels, based on mission requirements.

(3) Commanders provide subordinate commands adequate time to plan and prepare. They do so by issuing warning orders to subordinates at the earliest opportunity.

Collaborating with other commanders, agency leaders, and multinational partners helps develop a clear understanding of the commander's mission, intent, guidance, and priorities. Commanders can resolve issues that are beyond the staff's authority.

(4) Commanders collaborate with their seniors and peers to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and align ways and means to accomplish these objectives. Strategic guidance can be vague, and it is imperative that the commander interprets and clarifies guidance for the staff. While national leaders and CCDRs may have a broader perspective of the problem, subordinate JFCs and their component commanders often have a better understanding of the specific situation. Both perspectives are essential to a sound solution. During a commander's decision cycle, subordinate commanders should aggressively share their perspectives with senior leaders to resolve issues as early as possible.

(5) An essential skill of a JFC is the ability to integrate a components' forces with those of another component. Component missions should be mutually complementary and offer support to enhance each other's capabilities and mitigate vulnerabilities. Achieving this synergy requires more than just understanding the capabilities and limitations of each component. The JFC should also visualize operations holistically, identify the preconditions that enable each component to optimize its contribution, and then determine how the other components might help to produce them. The JFC assigns component missions from the perspective of joint effectiveness, without Service parochialism. Joint effectiveness also requires mutual trust among commanders that the missions assigned to components will be consistent with their capabilities and limitations. JFCs do not risk these capabilities for insufficient overall return. This perspective enables each component to enhance the capabilities and limit the vulnerabilities of the others.

(6) Successful commanders encourage the exchange of information and ideas throughout the staff to ensure decisions relate to the best understanding of the problem at hand, the existing situation, and available options to address the problem. Such exchanges promote critical reviews of assumptions; facilitate consideration of all aspects of the situation, including cultural issues; stimulate broad consideration of military and nonmilitary alternatives; and emphasize efforts to minimize organizational and human sources of error and bias.

3. Operational Art – In Planning and Execution

a. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is useful to the JFC in initial policy/strategy formulation and planning. The commander's judgment, decision making, and adaptation to the changing OE may also draw upon operational art.

b. **Policy and Strategy Formulation.** The joint force conducts joint campaigns and operations to achieve strategic objectives and further policy goals. Civil-military dialogue is essential to ensure campaigns link to strategic objectives. Commanders and joint

planners understand effective communication with national leaders and civilian national security professionals is necessary to build a common perspective. Insights from operational art and initial planning provide input to policy and strategy development. The planning, execution, and assessment involve an iterative and continual dialogue (see paragraph 7, “The Civil-Military Dialogue,” for further discussion).

c. Planning

- (1) For planning, operational art provides a thought process to mitigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the problems at hand. Operational art promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staff to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency partners and other interorganizational participants when they determine objectives, establish priorities, and assign tasks to subordinate forces. In planning, operational art facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, the integration of military operations with activities of other participants through the interagency process, thereby promoting unity of effort.
- (2) The foundation of operational art encompasses broad vision; the ability to anticipate; and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staffs organize their thoughts and envision the conditions necessary to accomplish the mission at hand. In planning, operational art informs the deployment and employment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
- (3) In operational-level planning, the commander plays a primary role. Commanders leverage their knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to focus effort and achieve success. Operational art helps commanders broaden perspectives, deepen understanding, and enable visualization. Through assessment, and informed by their own experiences, commanders continually compare similarities of the existing situation with earlier baselines, previous expectations, and history, to distinguish unique features and gauge progress to adapt solutions to each situation.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for the details of operational art and operational design.

d. Execution and Decision Making

- (1) In execution, operational art is making decisions before they are obvious or easy choices and adapting to the unfolding circumstances. Guided by imperfect information, commanders issue orders based on opaque circumstances, all the while anticipating the lag between the decision and its impact on the enemy and future friendly force operations and long before it is clear how those decisions will play out.
- (2) A commander’s ability to visualize the fight beyond the immediate situation and make decisions is one of the most important aspects of operational art. A commander orchestrates operational success by recognizing what each tactical achievement means to future operations and how follow-on actions contribute to strategic objectives. In

OPERATIONAL ART IN EXECUTION

During the Solomons campaign from August 1942 to February 1943, American commanders had to balance offensive, defensive, and sustainment actions to gain the initiative and maintain freedom of action for offensive military operations in the Pacific theater. Strategically, the Solomons campaign was an opportunity for the Allies to prevent the Japanese from interdicting the lines of communications between the United States and Australia. One challenge in interdicting Japanese reinforcement of its land forces on Guadalcanal was US commanders were operating at the limits of American operational reach. While strategic intelligence provided a general indicator of Japanese regional movements, US and Allied land and maritime commanders had periods of clarity and confusion regarding intelligence. Therefore, those commanders and their subordinates had to make decisions guided by incomplete, erroneous, and even contradictory information. Still, the American commanders proved better than their Japanese counterparts at making decisions based on imperfect intelligence.

Initially, the American commanders could not establish control of the region. Therefore, they made difficult choices to seize and hold advance force bases at Tulagi and Guadalcanal and gain maritime control around the Solomons Islands, while preserving enough combat power to posture the force for future operations. Achieving this balance required commanders to exercise judgment on when to accept and pursue engagement with the enemy based on theater-level considerations. The naval battles around the Solomons focused on preserving Allied lines of communications back to the homeland, and even when the outcomes were tactically costly, they still contributed to the larger campaign and attrited the Imperial Japanese Navy. Throughout the initial naval battles, the Americans controlled the seas by day, while the Japanese ruled the night. Over the course of the fight, American commanders adapted quicker to the situation and forced the Japanese naval and ground forces to culminate and withdraw. The maritime superiority and basing gained from those operations enabled US and Allied forces to interdict the Japanese forward naval bases at Rabaul and Truk. Achieving the campaign's operational-level objectives led to successful follow-on campaigns within the Pacific theater that placed the Japanese homeland at risk and eventually ended the war.

Joint History and Research Office (JHRO)

particular, the pursuit of tactical victory should occur within the context provided by those strategic objectives.

(3) In planning and execution, a commander's ability to think creatively, assess situations, and determine how to adapt enhances the ability to develop a sound conceptual approach and effectively wage joint operational-level warfare.

4. Operational Design

a. Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE. Additionally, operational design provides an iterative process that enables the commander's vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends, ways, means, and risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations. The operational design methodology helps the JFC and staff identify broad solutions for mission accomplishment. Additional considerations for GCPs and CCPs, which augment operational design, are strategic analysis/diagnosis, range of possible outcomes, the anticipation of consequences, and the commander's vision. Properly formulating achievable strategic objectives and a corresponding and logical array of operational-level objectives is essential.

b. Operational design works best when commanders encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems. To that end, the commander should empower organizational learning and develop methods to determine whether modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of an operation or campaign. As appropriate to the situation, planners should integrate key aspects of IW and operations in the information environment (OIE). This requires an assessment that challenges understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for the details of operational design.

5. Joint Planning

a. Planning translates guidance into plans or orders to initiate necessary joint force actions. JFCs plan for potential or actual threats or problems that may require a military response. The joint planning process (JPP) underpins planning at all levels and across the competition continuum. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to component and subordinate commands when they participate in joint operations. JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. Planning should begin with specified strategic objectives that provide a unifying purpose around which commanders can focus actions and resources. JPP aligns military activities and resources with achieving strategic objectives. It enables commanders to examine cost-benefit relationships, risks, and trade-offs to determine a preferred course of action (COA) to achieve those specific objectives.

b. Joint planning consists of planning activities that help CCDRs and their subordinate commanders transform national objectives into actions that mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, and demobilize joint forces. It ties the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States to the achievement of national objectives across the competition continuum. Based on understanding gained through the application of operational design, more detailed planning takes place within the steps of JPP. JPP is an orderly, analytical

set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and develop a plan or order.

c. **Key Planning Elements.** Commanders participate in planning to the greatest extent possible from early operational design through approval of the plan or order. Regardless of the commander's level of involvement, certain key planning elements require the commander's participation and decisions. These include the commander's planning guidance and operational approach.

(1) **Commander's Planning Guidance.** JFCs guide the joint force's actions throughout planning and execution. However, the staff and component commanders typically expect the JFC to issue initial guidance soon after receipt of a mission or tasks from higher authority and provide more detailed planning guidance after the JFC approves an operational approach. This guidance is an important input to subsequent mission analysis and often includes the commander's operational approach and vision statement. Commander's update their planning guidance based on mission analysis, additional insights into the OE, and as conditions change.

(2) **Operational Approach.** The operational approach is a commander's initial visualization and description of the broad actions the force must take to solve the overarching problem. It is the commander's visualization of how the operation or campaign should transform current conditions, which may include adversarial actions, into the desired conditions and behaviors—the way the commander wants the OE to look in the future. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the challenge facing the JFC, which forms the base of the commander's planning guidance and defines the command's narrative. For an operational approach with global implications, the CCDR will collaborate with other CCDRs. Then, the CCDR consults with the JS for integration and consultation with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once SecDef or the JFC approves the approach, it provides the basis to begin, continue, or complete detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach as the OE, objectives, or problem change.

For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(3) **Mission and Vision Statements of GCPs.** The CCDR and staff develop a restated mission statement that allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher HQ concurrence. During campaign planning, a single essential task is far too narrow for a coherent and comprehensive campaigning effort. A CCDR's global campaign may require a vision statement that articulates a broad array of requirements. A vision statement is an overarching set of ideas outlining a CCDR's vision for using military power with an OE aligned with the other instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. The approved mission statement contains the elements of the operation's purpose. The eventual CONOPS will specify how the joint force will accomplish the mission. The mission statement forms the basis for planning and includes the commander's planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the commander's estimate, and the CONOPS.

d. **Create Freedom of Action.** The JFC should not expect freedom of action and will often initially have to operate without it. JFCs have to maneuver to create it and commit forces to maintain freedom of action. Freedom of action in the OA may enhance acting beyond the OA. For example, operational reach, where the joint force can successfully employ military forces, can extend far beyond the limits of a JFC's authorities and capacity for logistics throughput. Consequently, the joint force protects LOCs to ensure freedom of action. Effective operational reach requires gaining and maintaining operational access in the face of enemy A2/AD capabilities and actions. Likewise, the C2 and intelligence functions depend on operations within the EMS, space, and cyberspace. JFCs should expect that an enemy's ability to operate effectively in the EMOEs, space, and cyberspace will greatly diminish the JFC's freedom of action. The JFC and staff should consider the efforts required to create specific intervals and places of minimum necessary levels of freedom of action from the outset of operations.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for more information on intelligence support and planning.

Refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, for more information on special operations planning. Refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on fires and joint fire support planning. Refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, for more information on cyberspace operations (CO).

Refer to JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations, for more information on space operations and planning.

Refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for more information on joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO)/EMS superiority. Refer to CJCSI 3162.02, Methodology for Combat Assessment, for more information. Refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other logistics-series publications, for more information on logistic planning.

6. Assessment

a. Assessment is a continuous and actionable process that measures the overall effectiveness of the joint force. The process involves monitoring and evaluating the current situation and progress toward the objectives. The results can help determine whether an activity contributes to the desired effects or progress toward an objective. Assessment occurs on two distinct planes. First, the JFC continuously evaluates the approach and what actions are necessary to succeed. Once the JFC determines the approach remains valid, then the JFC can assess all the supporting activities. If the approach is no longer valid or relevant, there is no reason to examine any of the supporting activities.

b. DOD and its components use a wide range of assessment tools and methods. Across the competition continuum, assessments gauge the military instrument of national power's capability to prepare for and respond to national security challenges. Senior military leaders assess campaigns and operations across the levels of warfare. At the

strategic level, the CJCS conducts deliberate and continuous assessments, such as the Annual Joint Assessment and the CJCS's Readiness System, respectively. Theater-strategic and operational-level assessments provide a methodology for joint commands and Services to adjust planning and execution to be more effective, match the dynamic OE, and better identify their risks and opportunities. At all levels, **staff estimates**, as part of the overall operations assessment process, evaluate factors in staff sections' functional areas (e.g., information, intelligence, and logistics). Staff estimates are a critical component of mission analysis that leads to plan development.

Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System; CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans; CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP); and CJCSI 3162.01, Methodology for Combat Assessment, for more information on CJCS and campaign assessments. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on staff estimates, integration of assessment during planning, and conducting operation assessment during execution.

c. **Operation assessment** refers specifically to the process the JFC and staff use during planning and execution to measure progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions or effects, and achieving objectives. Commanders continuously observe the OE and the progress of operations, activities, and investments; compare the results to their initial plan, understanding, and intent; and adjust planning and operations, activities, and investments based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key factors that can influence operations and provide the commander with the information to update the commander's understanding of the OE and assess progress toward the objectives. The fundamental aspects of assessment apply in all types of joint operations. However, commanders and staff may need to adjust the operation assessment process to fit the nature and requirements of a specific operation. In operations that do not include combat, assessments can be more complex.

d. The operation assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it. Throughout COA development, analysis, comparison, approval, and CONOPS finalization, the commander and staff devise the operation assessment plan and process to incorporate in the overall plan and order. They follow this process during plan development, refinement, adaptation, and execution. Key operation assessment indicators can be resident in the commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) process to provide timely support to the commander's planning and execution decisions.

e. There is no uniform method by which joint forces assign management responsibilities for the assessment. The chief of staff's role varies according to the commander's desires. Often, the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), assisted by the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and training and education directorate of a joint staff (J-7), develops the assessment plan during the planning process, while the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), assisted by the J-2 and J-7, coordinates assessment activities during execution. The assessment effort is a commander-led priority. Various elements of the JFC's staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and J-

5's future plans. Formalizing assessment roles and responsibilities in each command and leveraging expertise from across the staff is essential to an effective and efficient process.

f. During execution, assessments help commanders decide whether to revise their operations, activities, and investments to align current and future action with the campaign's objectives. By including assessment key indicators within the CCIRs, the staff can better advise the commander whether the original operational approach is still valid.


g. External influences can impact joint campaigns and operations. These influences can include the threat, interorganizational participants, the civilian population, neutral non-partner organizations, and other nations. Since assessment resources are limited, the commander should prioritize assessment activities. This perspective typically requires collaboration with interorganizational participants—preferably in a common and acceptable process—in the interest of unified action. Since most of these organizations are outside the JFC's authority, the JFC is responsible only for assessments of the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces. Nevertheless, the JFC should grant some joint force organizations authority to coordinate directly with organizations, such as DOS and other CCMDs, to facilitate effective alignment and synchronization of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as timely and effective assessments by participants not under the JFC's authority.

h. Operation Assessment and Levels of Warfare

(1) Interrelated and interdependent assessment occurs at all levels of warfare. Although each level of warfare may have a specific focus and a unique battle rhythm, they form a hierarchical structure through which operation assessments interact. Typically, assessments at the operational level concentrate on broader effects and objectives, while assessments at the tactical level primarily focus on tasks. Properly focused analysis and collection at each level of warfare reduces redundancy and enhances the effectiveness of the overall assessment.

(2) Operation assessment is most effective when supported and supporting actions and their assessments inform each other. As depicted in Figure II-1, each level of assessment should link with adjacent levels, both to provide a conduit for guidance and information. For instance, assessment plans at the tactical level should delineate how they link to or support operational-level assessments. Similarly, guidance from the operational-level JFC should specify the relationship and mechanisms that gather and synthesize tactical-level assessment data into the operational-level assessment.

(3) JFCs and their staffs should consider assessment methodology during planning, preparation, and execution. At all levels, commanders and staffs develop operation assessment indicators to track progress toward accomplishment. An optimal method for developing indicators is to identify key assessment indicators associated with tasks, effects, and objectives for inclusion in the assessment design. The most critical indicators of progress or regression should be in CCIRs to guide the collection and assessment activity. These indicators include measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and

**Figure II-1. Assessment Interaction**

measures of performance (MOPs). MOEs help answer the question, “Are we creating effect(s) or conditions in the OE that we desire?” MOPs help answer the question, “Are we accomplishing tasks to standard?”

(4) In armed conflict, the tactical-level assessment also uses MOEs and MOPs. Tactical tasks are often physical activities, but they can affect higher-level functions and systems. Tactical assessment may evaluate progress by the destruction of enemy forces; control of key terrain, peoples, or resources; and other tasks. Combat assessment evaluates the results of weapons engagement and the employment of capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal effects and, thus, provides data for joint fires and the joint targeting processes at all levels. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements that may result in a reattack recommendation: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment, and collateral damage assessment. Tactical-level results provide JFCs comprehensive, integrated information to link tactical actions to operational-level objectives. Assessment of tactical results helps commanders determine progress at the operational and strategic levels and can affect operational and strategic targeting and engagement decisions.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on operation assessment (e.g., integration of assessment design during the planning effort, roles and responsibilities, tenets of an effective assessment, the assessment process, and development and use of assessment indicators). Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on combat assessment.

7. The Civil-Military Dialogue Within the Department of Defense

- a. Effective civil-military dialogue is essential to ensure campaigns and operations link to national interests. Therefore, senior military leaders understand that communication with national leaders and civilian national security professionals is essential for a whole-of-government approach. Iterative and continual dialogue integrates different civilian and military perspectives that supports planning and execution.
- b. Civilian leadership will often want to maintain maximum flexibility as long as possible as the situation develops and understanding improves. Decisions are often contingent on information from senior military leaders about the expected duration, cost, and resource implications of the military plans. The civil-military relationship is by necessity and design an unequal dialogue. Senior military leaders and commanders have a unique responsibility and duty to provide information and options to civilian leaders and national security professionals before the actual strategic objectives mature.
- c. At the start of the civil-military dialogue, military commanders work with their civilian counterparts to gain a shared understanding to begin to identify the problem or problems they are facing. Commanders should explain their understanding of the problem and articulate the assumptions they are making. One primary goal of the civil-military dialogue is to confirm or refine the problem and necessary assumptions. Additionally, effective dialogue identifies new considerations commanders should address based on civilian leadership perspectives. The military leadership should clearly articulate what actions military capabilities are capable of performing, the objectives these options can achieve, the costs and risks associated with each option, and how those options address the problem or problems. As the civil-military dialogue matures, the specificity of civilian leadership guidance will typically increase.
- d. Commanders and joint planners should anticipate few opportunities and limited time to coordinate with civilian leadership. Commanders and their staffs should augment this communication by developing relationships with their civilian counterparts in other USG departments and agencies and participating fully in low- and mid-level interagency planning meetings. Information requests from civilian counterparts on the NSC Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or other USG departments and agencies may indicate the options or objectives civilian leadership is considering. Staff officers should use these conversations to enhance shared understanding. Commanders should encourage cooperation and coordination at lower levels when possible. Doing so helps identify and address issues before senior civilians and military leaders meet so they can focus their efforts on the most important planning considerations.

- e. When discussing options for initial action or revision of ongoing campaigns and operations with civilian leadership, military leaders understand that the policy may not always align with the anticipated level of commitment or acceptable risk. When discussing options for either employment or revision with civilian and senior military leadership, JFCs should determine risk based on what success may require and the assessment of the time and forces required. Other considerations include the likely costs, potential for escalation, likelihood of achieving strategic objectives, and, just as important, the enduring costs of success or failure.

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CHAPTER III

JOINT FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction

a. A joint function is a grouping of capabilities and activities that enable JFCs to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some tasks and systems could apply to more than one function.

b. There are seven joint functions common to joint operations: C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Commanders leverage the capabilities of multiple joint functions during operations. The joint functions apply to all joint operations across the competition continuum and enable both traditional warfare and IW, but to different degrees, conditions, and standards, while employing different tactics, techniques, and procedures. The integration of activities across joint functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all levels of command.

c. Joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the joint functions is essential to mission accomplishment. For example, joint fires can enhance the protection of a joint security area (JSA) by dispersing or disrupting enemy assets threatening the JSA. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service organizations, people, equipment, and technologies and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how the JFC uses military capabilities to perform tasks associated with each joint function. Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple joint functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task.

d. JFCs and interagency partners synchronize, coordinate, and align military operations with the activities of interorganizational participants to achieve unity of effort. Military forces support the USG lead agency, department, or organization, which is usually DOS for overseas operations and the Department of Homeland Security for domestic operations. The joint force may leverage commercial capabilities to execute joint functions. Commercial support has significant potential to support military operations. However, the risk associated with using commercial capabilities must be assessed and managed. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.74, *Defense Acquisition of Services*, recognizes commanders are responsible for the appropriate, efficient, and effective acquisition of contracted services by their organizations.

2. Command and Control

a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses several tasks, including:

- (1) Establish, organize, and operate a joint force HQ.

- (2) Command subordinate forces.
 - (3) Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and guidance.
 - (4) Establish command authorities among subordinate commanders.
 - (5) Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and designate OAs.
 - (6) Prioritize and allocate resources.
 - (7) Manage risk and force protection.
 - (8) Communicate across the staff and joint force.
 - (9) Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and achieving objectives.
 - (10) Coordinate and control the employment of joint forces to create lethal and nonlethal effects (i.e., the use of intermediate force capabilities incorporating both lethal and nonlethal means) across the competition continuum.
 - (11) Coordinate, synchronize, and, when appropriate, integrate joint operations with the operations and activities of other participants.
 - (12) Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from a higher authority.
- b. **Command** includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources lawfully to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. The C2 function supports the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. Timely and relevant intelligence enables commanders and national-level decision makers to make decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly and effectively than the enemy. These informed decisions reduce risk and enable the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations.
- c. **Command Authority.** JFCs exercise various command authorities (i.e., combatant command [command authority] {COCOM}, operational control [OPCON], and tactical control [TACON]) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned, allocated, and attached forces. Command relationship is a term that describes the relationships established through the designation of these authorities. JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*, provides details and summarizes each authority and their relationships (see Figure III-1). Unity of command among US forces is through the application of the various command relationships.
- (1) COCOM is the nontransferable command authority established by Title 10, USC, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified CCMDs unless

Command Relationships Synopsis

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

- Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relationships with Department of Defense agencies
- Directive authority for logistics

Operational control when delegated

- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans, priorities, and overall requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
- Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

Tactical control when delegated

Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

Support relationship when assigned

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization

Figure III-1. Command Relationships Synopsis

otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. COCOM is the authority of a CCDR, which they cannot delegate, to perform those functions of command over assigned forces. COCOM command functions include organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. A CCDR should exercise COCOM through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority works through subordinate JFCs and Service and functional component commanders. Where situations require changing the normal logistics process, the CCDRs' directive authority for logistics (DAFL) enables them to use the logistic capabilities of all forces assigned and attached to their commands as necessary to accomplish their mission. The CCDR exercises DAFL consistent with the limitations imposed by US law, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by SecDef or the CJCS.

(2) OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegable within the command. OPCON is command authority that commanders can exercise at any echelon at or below

the level of CCMD to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces. It involves organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally through subordinate JFCs and Service and functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of itself, include DAFL or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

(3) TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON is an authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces, made available for tasking. TACON limits a commander's authority to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the OA necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON provides enough authority for controlling and directing the application of forces or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Commanders may delegate TACON to subordinate commanders at any echelon at or below CCMD. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support or discipline (*Uniform Code of Military Justice* authority); the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless the establishing directive specifies otherwise. Except for SOF, functional component commanders typically exercise TACON over military capabilities or forces made available for tasking.

(4) **Support.** Establishing support relationships between components (as described in JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*) is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. The JFC can establish support relationships among all functional and Service component commanders, such as for the coordination of operations in depth involving the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Within a joint force, the JFC may designate more than one supported commander simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support for different missions, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may support a direct-action (DA) mission while simultaneously supporting a JFLCC for a raid. Similarly, a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) may be a supported commander for maritime missions while simultaneously supporting a JFACC to achieve control of the air throughout the OA.

(5) Other authorities granted to commanders, and subordinates as required, include administrative control, coordinating authority, directive authority for cyberspace operations (DACO), and direct liaison authorized.

JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force, outlines the specific details for each command relationship. See JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, for additional guidance on DACO.

(6) The perceived benefits of executing operations with joint forces do not occur naturally by virtue of established command relationships. The integration necessary for effective joint operations requires explicit effort that can increase operational complexity and require additional training and planning. Although effectiveness is typically more important than efficiency in joint operations, the JFC and component commanders determine when the potential benefits of joint integration cannot compensate for the additional complicating factors. Synergy is a means to greater operational effectiveness, not an end in itself. The principle of simplicity is always a key consideration.

d. **Control is inherent in command.** To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs identify and assess requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. For a commander, control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to support the mission and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control provides the means for commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations from any location, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the OA. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

e. The C2 function is commander-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision making at the lowest appropriate level. Although joint forces have grown accustomed to communicating freely without fear of jamming or interception, US enemies and adversaries are likely to use technological advances in space and cyberspace and vulnerabilities in the EMS to conduct cyberspace or electromagnetic (EM) attacks. Commanders should prepare to operate in an environment degraded by electromagnetic interference (EMI).

(1) **Mission Command.** If a commander loses reliable communications, mission command enables military operations to continue through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. Mission command empowers subordinate military commanders at all echelons who exercise disciplined initiative, act aggressively, and independently strive to accomplish the mission.

(2) **Mission-Type Orders.** Mission-type orders focus on the purpose of the operation rather than details of how to perform assigned tasks. Commanders delegate decisions to subordinates wherever possible, which minimizes detailed control and empowers subordinates' initiative to make decisions based on the commander's guidance rather than constant communications. Subordinates' understanding of the commander's intent at every level of command is essential to mission command.

f. **Area of Operations (AO) and Functional Considerations**

(1) **C2 in an AO.** The land and maritime force commanders are the supported commanders within their designated AOs. Through C2, JFLCCs and JFMCCs integrate and synchronize movement and maneuver with information, intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment in supporting activities and operations. To facilitate this integration and

synchronization, they have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.

(a) The JFC establishes priorities guiding and informing decisions and execution to synchronize efforts within and between the land, maritime, and SOF commanders' OAs. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC's overall joint air effort, while JFLCCs, JFMCCs, and JFSOCCs are the supported commanders for interdiction in their designated OAs.

(b) In coordination with JFLCCs and JFMCCs, other commanders tasked by the JFC to execute theater-wide or joint operations area (JOA)-wide operations have the latitude to plan and execute operations within land and maritime AOs. Commanders executing such operations within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation with the appropriate commander to avoid adverse effects and friendly fire incidents. If planned operations would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

For additional guidance on C2 of air, land, or maritime operations, refer to JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations.

(2) C2 of Joint Space Operations

(a) Commander, United States Space Command (CDRUSSPACECOM), is the supported commander for operations that ensure availability of space capabilities to the joint force. For these purposes, CDRUSSPACECOM exercises COCOM over forces assigned and retains or delegates authorities, as required.

(b) CDRUSSPACECOM, in concert with allies and partners, is responsible for planning and executing global space operations, activities, and missions. The Combined Space Operations Center executes C2 of assigned forces to achieve theater and global objectives. JFCs can request support using space support requests and via coordination with embedded joint integrated space teams (JISTs).

(c) On behalf of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), the Combined Space Operations Center exercises C2 of offensive and defensive space operations and provides a common operational picture (COP) to enable broad, shared awareness of the space critical information requirements; status of forces; space domain awareness; and the full range of military space activities arranged in time, space, and purpose.

(d) JISTs embed within CCMDs to assist the supported and supporting commanders in planning, integrating, synchronizing, coordinating, executing, and assessing space capabilities for the joint force.

For more information, see JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations.

(3) **C2 of Joint Air Operations.** The JFC normally designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. The JFC delegates the JFACC the authority necessary to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. The JFC may also establish support relationships between the JFACC and other components to facilitate operations. The JFACC conducts joint air operations IAW the JFC's intent and CONOPS. The JFC may designate the JFACC as the supported commander for strategic attack; air interdiction; personnel recovery (PR); and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (among other missions). The JFACC plans, coordinates, executes, and assesses these missions for the JFC. The JFC normally designates the JFACC as the area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace control authority (ACA) because the three functions are integral to one another. When appropriate, the JFC may designate a separate AADC or ACA. In joint operations with designated separate commanders, close coordination is essential for the unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire incidents, and deconfliction of joint air operations.

(a) **ACA. The JFC is responsible for airspace control within the OA but normally delegates the authority to the ACA.** The ACA plans, coordinates, and develops airspace control procedures and operates the airspace control system (ACS). The ACA does not have the authority to approve or disapprove specific operations. That authority is vested in operational commanders only. If the ACA and an affected commander are unable to agree on an airspace issue, they refer the issue to the JFC for resolution. The ACA establishes an ACS that is responsive to the JFC's needs, integrates the ACS with the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. The ACA develops the airspace control plan (ACP) and coordinates it with Service and functional component commanders. After JFC approval, the ACA distributes it to all airspace users and airspace control elements operating within the OA. A JFC-approved ACP and airspace control order (ACO) will express how the airspace will support mission accomplishment. The ACP establishes guidance for the development of the ACS and distribution of the ACO. The ACO implements the ACP. See JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*, and JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*, for more information.

(b) **AADC.** The AADC is responsible for defensive counterair (DCA) (which includes both air and missile threats) operations. The AADC identifies those volumes of airspace and control measures that support and enhance DCA operations, identifies required airspace management systems, establishes procedures for systems to operate within the airspace, and ensures they integrate into the ACS. The JFC may not have enough defensive capabilities to defend everything within an OA, so the JFC provides the AADC with inputs from the components, a prioritized critical asset list (CAL), and a defended asset list (DAL) for each phase of an operation. For air defense operations conducted in a large theater of operations, the AADC may recommend dividing the JOA into separate air defense regions. Each region would have its own regional air defense commander with responsibilities and decision-making authority for DCA operations within their region. See JP 3-01, *Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats*, for more information.

(4) **C2 of Joint Maritime Operations.** JFCs establish maritime AOs to achieve unity of command over the execution of maritime component operations involving the

interrelated employment of joint air, surface, and subsurface forces. The maritime AO should be of enough size to allow for movement, maneuver, and employment of weapons systems and effective use of joint warfighting capabilities and provide operational depth for sustainment and force protection. The JFMCC is the supported commander for operations within the JFC-designated maritime AO. The AADC normally establishes a congruent air defense region, covering the open ocean and littorals, with a regional air defense commander with the decision-making authority for counterair operations within the region. The maritime regional air defense commander and AADC coordinate to ensure the JFACC can accomplish theater-wide responsibilities assigned by the JFC.

(5) C2 of Joint CO

(a) Commanders conduct CO to create and maintain freedom of maneuver and action in cyberspace, achieve objectives, deny freedom of action to enemies, and enable other operational activities. Some of the capabilities the JFC may employ to enable CO include significant portions of JEMSO, C2, intelligence collection, and some space mission areas.

(b) The CCDR may organize a joint cyberspace center (JCC) with a staff capable of planning, synchronizing, and controlling CO in support of their assigned mission. Each CCMD supports subordinate JFCs through their CO supporting staff. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) establishes cyberspace operations-integrated planning elements (CO-IPEs) at each CCMD in direct support of the CCDR. Additionally, USCYBERCOM assigns a joint force HQ-cyberspace in general support of each CCMD to plan and synchronize the full spectrum of CO that support the CCMD's objectives. Clear command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective employment of cyberspace capabilities. Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), exercises DACO for security, operations, and defense of the DODIN, overseeing all actions with CCMDs' JCCs/cyberspace staffs, coordinated through their CO-IPEs to facilitate unity of effort and mission accomplishment. The CCMD JCC/CO planning staff coordinates and deconflicts their cyberspace missions with other operations, including nationally tasked actions that require cyberspace actions in the CCMD's AOR. The CCMD coordinates and integrates the use of cyberspace capabilities in the AOR and has primary responsibility for joint CO planning, to include determining CO-related requirements for their assigned missions.

(c) Leveraging USCYBERCOM capacity, through the CO-IPE, the CCMD integrates CO into plans, deconflicts and synchronizes supporting fires in cyberspace, prepares the OE, and conducts operational assessments and readiness functions. Additionally, in partnership with USCYBERCOM, the CCMD JCC/cyberspace staff coordinates CO regionally with interagency partners and allied participants, as necessary. They integrate command, planning, operations, intelligence, targeting, and readiness processes for creating effects in cyberspace through three CO missions: offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DODIN operations. The CCMD may have assigned or attached cyberspace forces, or cyberspace forces operating in direct or general support, either embedded or operating remotely.

CCMDs coordinate and deconflict with other CCMDs and USCYBERCOM when initiating cyberspace actions with possible effects in another CCMD's AOR.

For guidance on C2 of cyberspace forces, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

(d) DODIN Operations. The DODIN is the set of information capabilities and associated processes to collect, process, store, disseminate, and manage information on demand for warfighters, policymakers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone. The DODIN includes all of DOD's owned or leased cyberspace and is the platform from which all CO are conducted. CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander for global DODIN operations and synchronizes planning for other CO. USCYBERCOM directs security, operations, and defense of the DODIN through its subordinate Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN. The Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN commander exercises DACO when necessary to ensure the integrity of DOD cyberspace and maintain the lethality of the joint force. CDRUSCYBERCOM is a supporting commander for regional DODIN operations and provides DCO support to CCMDs, Services, DOD agencies, and when ordered, other USG departments and agencies and PNs impacted by threats in cyberspace.

For additional guidance on DODIN operations, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

(6) **C2 of JEMSO.** JEMSO are activities consisting of electromagnetic warfare (EW) and joint EMS management operations used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic environment (EME) to achieve the commander's objectives. The electromagnetic attack control authority (EACA) develops guidance to execute an electromagnetic attack (EA) on behalf of the JFC. JFCs should delegate EACA authority through the component commanders, down to the lowest level possible. When so authorized, the J-3 has primary staff responsibility to plan, coordinate, integrate, and monitor the execution of joint force EW operations.

For additional guidance on the communications and intelligence systems support and JEMSO, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

(7) **C2 of Joint Operations Conducted in Areas for which COMs have the USG Lead.** Joint operations frequently occur in areas (countries) for which COMs are the USG lead. When operating in these areas, joint forces are statutorily independent of COM authority. However, the COM has the final decision concerning US activity in a specific country. The very rare exception is when the President or SecDef directs otherwise. The CCMD, DOS regional and functional bureaus, and COMs normally share a common understanding of objectives and priorities. Interagency cooperation is most successful when the supported CCDR and COM operate with unity of effort to achieve common objectives. JFCs and staffs should coordinate their operations and activities with the relevant US missions, align their operations and activities with US mission country strategic plans, and keep the COM informed and involved.

(8) **C2 of Joint Operations Conducted in Denied Areas.** A denied area is an area under threat control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. However, SOF, cyberspace forces, space-based capabilities, and intelligence elements can operate successfully in denied areas. The C2 of these elements requires a C2 system that can function under restrictive measures. The supporting communications system must avoid detection, not merely to protect the content of the communications.

g. **C2 System.** JFCs exercise authority and direction through a C2 system, which consists of the facilities; equipment; communications; staff functions and procedures; and personnel essential to plan, monitor, and assess operations. An effective C2 system enables the JFC to maintain communication with higher, supporting, and subordinate commands to control all aspects of current operations while planning for future operations.

(1) The JFC's staff is the linchpin of the C2 system, since the JFC understands, plans, directs, and controls most aspects of operations through the staff's expertise and efforts.

(2) **Liaison** is an important aspect of C2. Commanders should exchange liaison teams or individuals between higher, supporting, and subordinate commands as much as possible. Liaison personnel generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander but can greatly promote understanding of the commander's intent at both the sending and receiving HQ; they should report early during joint planning. Liaison officers (LNOs), from supporting to supported commanders, are particularly essential in ensuring supporting units receive required guidance, communicating requirements for tasks, and coordinating supporting actions.

(3) **Control and Coordination Measures.** JFCs establish various maneuver and movement control, airspace coordination, fire support coordination, and communication measures. The intent of these control measures is greater effectiveness and safety.

For additional guidance on C2 of air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations. For additional guidance on control and coordination measures, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. See Military Standard-2525, Department of Defense Interface Standard Joint Military Symbology, for additional guidance on the use and discussion of graphic control measures and symbols for the joint force.

(4) **Communications and intelligence systems** provide communications, intelligence, targeting data, and threat warnings. These systems exist to support effective command across varying operational tempos by improving access to information and enhancing a common perspective of the OE in a timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and sustainable manner to all command levels. Communications and intelligence architecture planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications the intelligence joint function needs to collect, store, protect, process, exploit, and disseminate information at critical times. These communications and sensor systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations.

(a) **Communications System Planning.** The purpose of the joint communications system is to assist the JFC in C2 of military operations. Effective communications system planning is essential for effective C2 and integration and leveraging the fullest extent of the joint force's capabilities. The mission and structure of the joint force determine specific information flow and processing requirements. These requirements dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the communications system. Communications system planning should integrate and synchronize with joint planning. The JFC can apply capabilities at the critical time and place for mission success through effective communications system planning. Communications system planning should enable collaboration, knowledge sharing, IM, and information and intelligence sharing activities that are essential to assist the JFC. This collaboration includes considerations and, when appropriate, accommodation of communications links with relevant commanders and their C2. Interoperability, foreign disclosure authorities, information sharing, and communications security planning with these stakeholders is essential to ensure secure communications and protect sensitive information. Routine communications and backup systems do not always function, and civil authorities might have to rely on available military communications equipment. Communications system planning also considers the transition of US involvement and procedures to transfer communications system control to another agency, such as the United Nations (UN). Planning should consider that it may be necessary to leave some communications resources behind to continue support of the ongoing effort.

(b) Joint communications system management involves the employment and technical control of assigned communications systems. Communications system planning enables the planners to maintain an accurate and detailed status of the network down to the modular level. The situation and mission drive the essential elements of the communications system, the C2 organization, and location of forces available to the JFC. Specific command relationships and the organization of units and staff drive the interconnecting communications methods and means. The communications system supports and provides the assured flow of information to and from commanders at all levels.

(c) During execution, communications system planners ensure the organization's communications network can facilitate a rapid, unconstrained flow of information from its source through intermediate collection and processing nodes to the user. Typically, the combined system provides voice, data, and video communications transmitted through radio frequency and cyberspace. Building the communications system to support the JFC requires knowledge of the joint force organization, the commander's CONOPS, communications available, and concepts of employment. The ability to command, control, and communicate with globally deployed forces is a key enabler for protecting US national interests; therefore, communications systems are key targets for adversaries. Thus, it is essential to consider risk and mitigation measures when developing the plan. Key planning considerations include protecting the DODIN, which requires cyberspace security and cyberspace defense actions to protect, detect, respond to, restore, and react to shield and preserve information and information systems. A related consideration is to ensure the aggregation of data within the communications systems does

not compile information that raises it to a higher level of security than the system provides (e.g., classified information on an unclassified system).

(d) In execution, the communications system is the primary means through which intelligence flows to the JFC and throughout the OE. Communications system planning should be done in close coordination with the intelligence community (IC) to identify specialized equipment and dissemination requirements for some types of information.

(e) **Homeland Security and Defense Communications System Planning.** DOD contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense (HD), and DSCA. The disparity of communications systems, use of allocated bandwidth (both civilian and military), and limited system interoperability hinder the capability of collaborative incident management and response in the United States. Commanders and communications system planners should conduct detailed planning and analysis to determine US-based communications system requirements in support of federal, state, and local agencies.

(f) DOD intelligence component capabilities, resources, and personnel may not be used for intelligence activities other than foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (CI), unless SecDef specifically approves that use. Also, requests for direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are separate approval processes to ensure compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act. When approved, the use of intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities focuses on incident awareness and assessment. All incident awareness and assessment support within the United States are subject to USG intelligence oversight regulations and DODD 5240.01, *DOD Intelligence Activities*.

h. CCIRs

(1) CCIRs are elements of information the commander identifies as critical to timely and effective decision making. CCIRs focus IM and help the commander assess the OE and identify decision points during operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. The CCIR list is normally short, so the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. But the CCIR list is not static; JFCs, primarily through operation assessment, add, delete, adjust, and update CCIRs throughout planning and execution based on the information they need to make decisions. At a minimum, commanders should review and update CCIRs throughout execution.

(2) **Categories.** Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) constitute the total list of CCIRs.

(a) **PIRs.** Commanders designate PIRs to focus available capacity for collection and analysis of intelligence on the enemy, adversary, neutral, and potential friendly actors, as well as relevant environmental factors in the OE, to provide the intelligence required for decision making. All staff sections can recommend potential PIRs that may support the JFC's decision-making process. However, the J-2 consolidates the

staff's recommended PIRs to the commander. The J-2 continuously updates PIRs in synchronization with the commander's decision points. PIRs are subject to periodic review to ensure they support execution and adaptation based on the OE and before execution and transition to ensure the PIRs remain relevant to the commander's anticipated decision points.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for more information on PIRs.

(b) **FFIRs** focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend FFIRs that meet the JFC's guidance. The J-5 typically consolidates FFIR nominations and provides staff recommendations to the commander during planning and execution. JFC-approved FFIRs are automatically CCIRs.

i. **Battle Rhythm.** The HQ battle rhythm is its daily operations cycle of briefings, meetings, and report requirements. A stable battle rhythm facilitates effective decision making, efficient staff actions, and useful management of information within the HQ and with higher, supporting, and subordinate HQs. The commander and staff should develop a battle rhythm that minimizes meeting requirements while providing venues for command and staff interaction internal to the joint force HQ and subordinate commands. Joint and component HQ's battle rhythms should synchronize to operations in multiple time zones and the battle rhythms of higher, subordinate, supporting, and adjacent commands. The periodic information requirements and decision cycles of higher and supported HQs, especially those with which information-system interoperability is minimal, receive key consideration in the setting of each HQ's battle rhythm. Other factors such as planning, decision making, and operating cycles (i.e., intelligence collection, targeting, and joint air tasking cycle) influence the battle rhythm. The CCMD staff synchronizes meetings of the staff organizations. The chief of staff normally manages and continually assesses the joint force HQ's battle rhythm. When coordinating with other USG departments and agencies, as well as multinational and domestic partners, the joint force HQ should consider that those organizations often have limited capabilities, capacities, and restricted access to some information.

For additional guidance on battle rhythm and other joint HQ management processes, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

j. **Building Shared Understanding.** Unified and synchronized actions, narratives, and messaging are the most important products of the C2 function because they guide the force toward objectives and mission accomplishment. Commanders and staff require not only information to make these decisions but also the knowledge and shared understanding that aid in the wisdom essential to sound decision making. Building shared understanding results from the effective exercise of leadership and the ability to influence and inspire others. To build a shared understanding, commanders provide vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. These collaborative processes and products vary across joint commands based on the commander's needs and preferences. Refer to paragraph 3,

“Information,” for a discussion of these and other activities as they relate to the processes of facilitating shared understanding.

k. Risk Management

(1) Risk management is a function of command and a key planning consideration that focuses on designing, implementing, and monitoring risk decisions. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources; accept, avoid, or mitigate (reduce or transfer) unnecessary risk; identify feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist; and develop valid COAs. Risk management is the process to identify and assess hazards arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in making informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success. The commander determines the level of risk that is acceptable for aspects of operations and should state this determination in the commander’s intent. Understanding risk is one of the key outputs of mission analysis and should be a topic at every successive step in JPP. The assessment of risk to mission includes an overall risk to mission analysis (e.g., low, medium, high, or extremely high), along with multiple criteria (e.g., authorities and permissions; policy; forces, basing, and agreements; resources; dependency on commercial support and organic capabilities; PN contributions; other USG support; and critical commercial capabilities). To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their mission or OA.

(2) Commanders at all levels use judgment to manage risk based upon the mission, time, and other resources available. They approach risk management at the appropriate application level, normally using a deliberate approach that is analytically based and uses planning time efficiently. The joint risk analysis methodology described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*, provides a consistent, standardized way to analyze and manage risk. Figure III-2 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.

(3) Risk management does not inhibit a commander’s flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether, dictate a go/no-go decision to take a specific action, sanction or justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for standard operating procedures (SOPs). Risk management is relevant for all joint campaigns and operations and their branches and sequels and at all levels of command across the competition continuum. To mitigate risk, commanders may take a variety of actions, such as changing the CONOPS, changing the plan for employment of fires, executing a branch to the original plan, or employing countermeasures.

(4) Safety preserves military power. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, education, and training lessen that risk. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety planning factors could include




Figure III-2. Risk Management Process

geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, identification of uncharted or uncleared minefields, and special equipment hazards.

(5) Operational contract support (OCS) may be used across many functional areas to augment military forces. JFCs requiring these activities should assess and mitigate risk associated with use of commercial capabilities.

For additional guidance on risk management, refer to CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.

For additional insight on risk associated with commercial support, refer to the CJCS Risk Assessment on Commercial Support 2018 and 2019, available at <https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/ocs/SitePages/Reporting.aspx>.

3. Information

a. The elevation of information as a joint function impacts all operations and signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within today's complex OE.

b. The information function encompasses the management and application of information to support achievement of objectives; it is the deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired relevant actor behaviors and to support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the prevalent nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to preserve friendly information and leverage information and the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander's objectives. The information joint function provides an intellectual framework to aid commanders in exerting one's influence through the timely generation, preservation, denial, or projection of information.

c. All military activities have an informational aspect since most military activities are observable in the IE. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage in the OE; failing to leverage those aspects in a timely manner may cede this advantage to an adversary or enemy. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities can support achieving operational and strategic objectives. The information function also encompasses the use of friendly information to influence foreign audiences and affect the legitimacy, credibility, and influence of the USG, joint force, allies, and partners. Additionally, JFCs use friendly information to counter, discredit, and render irrelevant the disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda of other actors.

d. The information joint function helps commanders and their staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application across the competition continuum, to include its role in supporting human and automated decision making. Information planners should consider coordination activities not only within the information joint function but also among all other joint functions. The information joint function organizes the tasks required to manage and apply information during all activities and operations. The three tasks of the information joint function stress the requirement to incorporate information as a foundational element during the planning and conduct of all operations.

For more detailed discussion, see JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

e. **Joint Force Capabilities, Operations, and Activities for Leveraging Information.** In addition to planning all operations to derive benefit from the inherent informational aspects of physical actions and influence relevant actors, the JFC also has additional means with which to leverage information in support of objectives. Leveraging information involves the generation and use of information through tasks to inform relevant actors; influence relevant actors; and/or attack information, information systems, and information networks. Planning for OIE provides the means for the integrated employment of military information. The JFC uses various forces, operations, and activities to reinforce the actions of assigned or attached forces, support lines of operation (LOOs) or lines of

effort (LOEs), or as the primary activity in an LOE to drive the behavior of selected target audiences or decision makers.

(1) KLE. Most operations require commanders and other leaders to conduct KLE with key local and regional leaders to affect their attitudes, gain their support, and cultivate them as sources of information. Building relationships to the point of effective military engagement and influence usually takes time. An organic or reliable indigenous language, regional expertise, and cultural capability are critical for the successful conduct and management of KLEs. Commanders can find it difficult to identify key leaders, develop messages, establish dialogue, and determine other ways and means of delivery, especially in societies where interpersonal relationships are paramount. Interaction opportunities with friendly and neutral leaders could include face-to-face meetings, town meetings, and community events. Understanding and recognizing cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, cognitive bias, and appropriate communication methods is essential. The J-2's joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process should identify key friendly, neutral, and threat leaders who are not in the commander's sphere of influence. The entire staff should identify leaders relative to their functional areas. Leaders can include a broad range of individuals, including those in nontraditional leadership roles. Special care should be taken to consider the leadership roles women may hold in the community.

(2) Public Affairs (PA). Enemies and adversaries will make determined efforts to discredit US military efforts. PA contributes to the achievement of military objectives by truthfully informing US domestic and international audiences about US military operations. PA ensures the clear communication of CCMD and joint force messaging supports the strategic narrative and counters adverse disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda. PA accomplishes this through the dissemination of accurate information that is as transparent as possible without violating laws or policy. PA also supports operations security (OPSEC) by ensuring information is appropriate for public release by working with the OPSEC planners and program managers to prevent premature or inadvertent public release of information damaging to OPSEC. Additionally, PA works closely with other operational planners to integrate PA capabilities into OIE and educate the force on current disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda threats. Also, PA builds understanding with the media on the implications of premature release of operational information or the inadvertent release of classified or sensitive information identified in CCIRs.

(a) With the speed of modern communication and the tempo of military operations, competing sources can rapidly proliferate information about joint force activities. Regardless of the means or speed of dissemination, information can be incomplete, lack important context, and be intentionally biased or factually incorrect. PA supports C2 efforts and capabilities by maintaining timely and appropriate messaging over approved joint communication platforms.

(b) PA support is important throughout planning, execution, and assessment. Public affairs officers (PAOs) carefully consider objectives to determine how JFCs should

leverage PA and other communication capabilities in conjunction with other capabilities in current and future operations. PAOs identify public information and visual information requirements, as well as the means to acquire and move those products promptly. PA provides input during planning, to include developing public communication COAs that can ultimately shape relevant actor perceptions and behavior; identifying constraints, restraints, and potential intended and unintended consequences of planned actions; providing an understanding of the nature of information flow in varying cultural contexts; and developing and interpreting measures and indicators of effectiveness. Supporting communication plans emphasize higher HQ guidance, narratives, and messages; identify the communication problem or opportunity; segment key audiences; and define communication objectives. Communication plans include measurable objectives to achieve these goals and communication activities appropriate to the situation and desired outcome. Throughout planning and operations, the PAO normally leads CCMD and JFC narrative development and synchronization with operations, activities, and investments using the communication synchronization process and supports staff alignment of strategic and operational narrative with tactical-level actions and messaging. JFCs can use the communication synchronization process to coordinate and synchronize operational narrative, themes, messages, images, and actions (i.e., planning, deployments, operations). It aligns communication between and among key USG and partner stakeholders who are invested in the objectives determined in the operation or campaign plan with broader national strategic narrative. Communication synchronization focuses USG efforts to understand and communicate operations, actions, and investments across all levels of command to reduce friction between actions and narrative (say-do gap). The communication synchronization process is inherent in the information joint function and associated staff activities during the planning and conduct of operations.

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(3) CMO. CMO facilitates unified action in joint campaigns and operations. They are activities that establish, maintain, influence, and exploit relationships between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions. Effective CMO results in the integration of military and other instruments of national power to achieve commander's objectives and US interests.

(a) CMO usually include governmental organizations, NGOs, and allies and partners in OAs. The range of CMO activities includes military government; support to civil administration; populace and resources control; FHA; foreign assistance; and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriation.

(b) CAO are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed through civil reconnaissance, network analysis, and network engagement to support, influence, or leverage populations, governments, and other institutions. Their purpose is to expose malign influence, counter coercion and subversion, and impose costs through conventional and unconventional activities. Civil affairs units and personnel are the joint force functional specialists who conduct CAO. Civil affairs integrate civilian considerations and

capabilities into US military operations and military considerations and capabilities into the operations of interorganizational partners. Civil affairs help organize and sustain unified action in IW with interagency partners as well as key allies and partners. Civil affairs augment DOD and USG stabilization and governance efforts across the competition continuum.

For additional guidance on CMO and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

(4) Military Deception (MILDEC). Commanders conduct MILDEC to mislead enemy decision makers and commanders and cause them to take or not take specific actions. The intent is to cause enemy commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their intelligence collection assets; and fail to employ their combat or support units effectively. As executed by JFCs, MILDEC targets enemy leaders and decision makers through the manipulation of their intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. MILDEC depends on intelligence to identify deception targets, assist in developing credible stories, identify and orient on appropriate receivers (i.e., the readers of the story), and assess the effectiveness of the deception effort. Deception requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and their decision-making processes. During the formulation of the CONOPS, planners determine how the JFC wants the enemy to act at critical points in the operation. Those desired enemy actions then become the MILDEC objective. MILDEC focuses on causing the enemy to act in a desired manner, not simply to mislead them in their thinking.

DECEPTION AT NORMANDY

The Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France on 6 June 1944 was a massive operation to land almost 133,000 soldiers in heavily defended territory. To create the best possible chance of success, the Allies initiated and implemented an elaborate deception scheme named BODYGUARD beginning a year earlier. The aim of the Allies' deception was to reinforce the belief among those in the German high command that the main Allied landings would be in the Pas-de-Calais, across the Strait of Dover, not Normandy, where the invasion would begin. If successful, the result would leave German forces poorly postured to counterattack the invasion. Over the previous three years, the British had practiced and refined their deception methods. At the outset of Operation BODYGUARD, they recognized the foundation of all such operations was to support and encourage the enemy's expectations. To be effective, the deception had to reinforce what the enemy wanted to believe. Furthermore, the deception scheme had to ensure the information reached the highest levels of German command. Operation QUICKSILVER was a major component of the plan. The key element of Operation QUICKSILVER series was the creation in German minds of a

fictitious United States 1st Army Group (FUSAG) commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton. The Allies simulated all manner of operations, including fake troop movements in England and Scotland, as well as placement of fake trucks, tanks, and other materiel. Intelligence units staged communiqus, orders, wireless transmissions and press conferences to support the appearance of serious military preparations. Since the Germans knew and feared Patton as a commander, his leadership of the effort enhanced its acceptance by German authorities. Intercepted communications between Germany and Japan confirmed that Operation QUICKSILVER was successfully diverting German attention and resources. To strengthen the illusion of the FUSAG preparing to embark, the Allies assembled and deployed dummy landing craft in harbors and estuaries around the south-east England, centered on Dover. These decoys were convincing when viewed from a long distance and the air.

The Allies were assisted in this deception by two important factors. The first of these was ULTRA – the codename for the intelligence received from British intelligence where a crack team of codebreakers had successfully broken the German secret coding system ENIGMA. The Germans, convinced the Allies could not break the ENIGMA code, remained unaware of this fact. Their consequent vulnerability allowed Allies to check the success of any information or misinformation they planted by intercepting and reading the decoded responses. The second factor was Allied control of several double agents by British intelligence. Their nuanced direction of these agents had the Germans completely unaware that their situational awareness, behavior, and operational decision making were being constantly manipulated. The effectiveness of this operation yielded tangible benefits to Allied troops as they secured a foothold in France in June of 1944. The most noteworthy success of Operation BODYGUARD, and especially Operation QUICKSILVER, was demonstrated by the German High Command's belief in the existence of FUSAG, weeks after the D-Day landings. As a result, the Germans kept vital units away from the main fighting front in Normandy, because they were still expecting a second, larger invasion in the Calais area.

Various Sources

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(5) MISO

(a) MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning and ultimately induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. MISO may use all means of communication, distribution, and message delivery as appropriate.

(b) MISO have strategic, operational, and tactical applications and are a critical informational/influence capability employed as a part of OIE across the competition continuum. The conduct of MISO is an inherent responsibility of all JFCs within their respective OAs to shape the OE in support of their assigned missions and integrate into military operations as appropriate. Whether acting separately or as part of a larger military operation, MISO planners and associated organizations have primary responsibility to advise supported military commanders on MISO-related matters. This advice includes the psychological effect and impact of military and MISO-specific actions. The advice also includes clarifying the authority for development, production, distribution, and dissemination of all products intended to influence approved foreign audiences. The JFC secures the required authorities for MISO and seeks adjustments as necessary, delegating the authorities down to the lowest level possible to ensure the prompt execution of MISO integration and unity of effort.

(c) All DOD activities that constitute MISO, regardless of the organization conducting those activities, must adhere to the parameters of an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-approved MISO Program or SecDef-approved order. In cooperation and competition, MISO conducted outside an area of ongoing hostilities involving Armed Forces of the United States is coordinated with the COM for each country where a targeted audience can be reasonably expected to be affected. The concurrence of the COM is a prerequisite to execution of MISO programs and activities in such areas, except when directed by SecDef; where MISO is to be executed in multiple countries such that coordination with all relevant COMs is impractical; when MISO is to be executed in countries where no US diplomatic mission exists, MISO programs are coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency and a relevant DOS regional bureau(s); or when targeting audiences in international waters or airspace.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations. MISO support to the non-US military is described in DODI O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(6) OPSEC

(a) OPSEC uses a process to preserve friendly essential secrecy by identifying, controlling, and protecting critical information and indicators that would allow enemies and adversaries to identify and exploit friendly vulnerabilities. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce vulnerabilities of the US and multinational forces to enemy and adversary exploitation, and it applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces. Even when there may be no clearly defined threat, US military operations should be safeguarded. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility that coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

(b) The effective integration, coordination, and application of other joint functions are critical components in the execution of OPSEC. Because a specified task is

“to protect our own” information, OPSEC planners require complete situational awareness regarding friendly activities to facilitate the safeguarding of critical information and indicators. This kind of situational awareness exists within the joint force where a wide range of planners work in concert to protect friendly information, information networks, and systems. OPSEC practices should balance the responsibility to account to the American public with the need to protect critical information and indicators. The need to practice OPSEC should not be an excuse to deny noncritical information to the public.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01, Joint Operations Security, and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(7) Signature Management. Signature management encompasses JFC actions to adjust, modify, or manipulate signatures—the observable aspects of administrative, technical, and physical joint force activities. JFCs oversee signature management in concert with OPSEC to protect friendly force information, information networks, and systems and to deliberately affect relevant actor decision making and behavior. Contracting and host-nation support (HNS) should be approached in a manner that protects controlled unclassified information and other sensitive information.

(8) EW. EW encompasses offensive and defensive military action to secure and maintain freedom of action in the EMOE for friendly forces while exploiting or denying it to enemies and adversaries. EW is an enabler for other activities that communicate or maneuver through the EMOE, such as MISO, PA, or CO.

For additional guidance on EW, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

(9) Combat Camera (COMCAM). Imagery is one of the most powerful tools available for informing internal and domestic audiences and for influencing foreign audiences. COMCAM forces provide imagery capability to the JFC across the competition continuum. COMCAM imagery supports capabilities that use imagery for their products and efforts, including MISO, MILDEC, PA, and CMO. It provides critical operational documentation to support JFC decision making, sensitive site exploitation, legal and evidentiary requirements, and imagery for BDA/MOE analysis. Additionally, COMCAM supports operational documentation and imagery to counter disinformation and support narrative development during FHA operations and noncombatant evacuation operations.

(10) Historians. Historical reading and understanding are vital tools for commanders. Maintaining a command history is a command responsibility. Historical knowledge provides commanders the opportunity to learn through others’ experiences. Military historians deployed into combat provide real-time support to commander decisions, spark critical imagination and adaptation necessary for command leadership, and complete critical documentation for future lessons on military operations. This documentation may include a collection of operational records (e.g., plans, orders, assessments, and correspondence), written narrative records of significant events, and oral history interviews of participants in ongoing operations.

(11) Space Operations. The cornerstone responsibilities of military space forces are to preserve freedom of action, enable joint lethality and effectiveness, and provide national leadership with independent military operations. Space operations support joint operations throughout the OE by providing space offensive and defensive operations; space-based surveillance and reconnaissance; missile warning; environmental monitoring; satellite communications; space domain awareness; space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); spacelift; satellite operations; and nuclear detonation detection. Space operations integrate offensive and defensive actions to achieve and maintain freedom of action in space. The joint force integrates military space operations as part of joint operations and defends critical space assets. As necessary, space operations deny enemies and adversaries benefits from their space capabilities. USSPACECOM provides combat power by fully integrating offensive and defensive space operations. This integration and synchronization of space capabilities and operations enable USSPACECOM, as part of the joint force, to deter and, if necessary, defeat enemy aggression.

For additional guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations, and United States Space Force's Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower, Doctrine for Space Forces.

(12) Special Technical Operations (STO). Commanders should deconflict and synchronize other activities with STO. STO action officers at CCMD or Service component HQs can provide military and civilian leadership with detailed information related to STO and its contribution to joint force operations.

For additional guidance on STO, see CJCSI 3120.08, (U) Joint Special Technical Operations.

(13) CO. CO employ cyberspace capabilities to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Most DOD CO are routine uses of cyberspace to complete assigned tasks but not necessarily one of the three CO missions. These uses include actions like e-mail or researching information using the Internet. These activities do not require special authorities for DOD personnel; however, they are the source of most vulnerabilities to the DODIN when cybersecurity policies are not followed. The Cyber Mission Force and other cyberspace forces conduct specific OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations missions. OCO missions leverage adversary and enemy reliance on information, information technology, and data to project power in and through cyberspace and can include cyberspace attack actions (i.e., fires in cyberspace) when authorized. Refer to paragraph 7, "Protection," for additional discussion of DCO and DODIN operations.

For additional guidance on all CO missions, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, and for additional specific guidance on DODIN operations, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

f. Information Use Across the Competition Continuum

(1) Cooperative use of information. During day-to-day activities, the joint force integrates information in SC and FHA activities by:

(a) Assuring and maintaining allies, widening/publicizing combined exercises and other PN cooperation activities, encouraging neutral actors that the joint force is the partner of choice or that they should remain neutral, and reminding partners of benefits to maintain their support.

(b) Informing enemies and adversaries of benefits to friendly multinational force membership and collective defense, informing enemies and adversaries that the joint force is committed to its allies and security agreements, and concealing investment priorities and costs.

(2) Competitive use of information. During competition, the joint force conducts activities against state or non-state actors with incompatible interests that are below the level of armed conflict. Competition can include military operations such as CO, special operations, demonstrations of force, CTF, and ISR and often depends on the ability to leverage the power of information through OIE. Expect additional time to coordinate and obtain approval from DOD or other USG departments and agencies to use information due to increased risk. Specific information tasks may include:

(a) Informing allies and partners of malign influence and antagonistic behavior.

(b) Declassifying and sharing images that reveal or confirm enemy or adversarial behavior, recommending allies and partners communicate to relevant audiences within their areas of influence, and educating the joint force and allies about online disinformation activities to build understanding and resilience against propaganda.

(c) Influencing adversary's audiences to prevent escalation to armed conflict by demonstrating joint force resolve, strength, and commitment, as well as the costs and expectations of response actions.

(d) Targeting adversarial information, networks, and systems by temporarily denying communication or Internet access, disrupting jamming of Internet access to its internal population, and partnering with private-sector communication companies to remove inappropriate enemy and adversarial recruiting and fundraising advertisements.

(3) Use of information in armed conflict. In addition to the above tasks, the joint force can use information defensively or offensively. JFCs can employ information as independent activities, integrated with joint force physical actions, or in support of other instruments of national power. Many of these information activities require additional authorities as they present larger strategic risks or risks to the joint force, though capabilities like PA, which has the preponderance of public communication resources and rarely requires additional authorities in armed conflict.

(a) Defensive purposes. Basic defense activities include protecting data and communications, movements, and locations of critical capabilities and activities. PA can assist in countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. MILDEC can help mask strengths, magnify feints, and distract attention to false locations. DCO can defeat specific threats that attempt to bypass or breach cyberspace security measures. EW can protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the EMS. The management of EM signatures can mask friendly movements and confuse enemy intelligence collectors. Finally, well-coordinated communication and messaging activities not only minimize OPSEC violations but also increase the consistency and alignment of joint force words, actions, and images. Conflicting messages or remaining silent allows adversaries and enemies to exploit or monopolize the media and propagate their agenda.

(b) Offensive purposes. Offensive information activities decrease enemy and adversary effectiveness, increase ally and partner support and effectiveness, and reduce interference from neutral audiences.

g. Exploit Informational Weaknesses of the Threat

(1) Communicate and provide images. JFCs expose illegal or malign activities to international and enemy civilian audiences such as enemy human rights abuses, reveal funding sources of enemies or adversaries, and demonstrate other actions inconsistent with the law of war and the treaties and customary international law embodied in these principles.

(2) Expose enemy decisions to their populaces that result in significant loss to their resources, lives, and treasures.

(3) Increase exploitation of adversary rifts, beliefs, or perceptions by publicizing enemy tactical failures, poor equipment readiness, inconsistent logistics, enemy surrenders, populace skepticism, and other internal vulnerabilities that distract enemy leadership.

(4) Manipulate enemy messaging to confuse their supporters, allies, and partners.

(5) Conduct OCO to deny use or confidence in enemy communication networks, information systems, or weapon systems.

(6) Disseminate messages to relevant enemy audiences to create or increase ambiguity.

(7) Conduct MILDEC in support of friendly attacks to mislead adversaries or foreign intelligence about friendly attack capabilities, locations, methods, and timing.

(8) Conduct physical movements or fires that support MILDEC by targeting adversary communication, information, or weapon systems in support of feints,

demonstrations, or ruses to create perceptions that a targeted area is a primary maneuver objective.

- (9) Destroy or nullify selected adversary intelligence collection capabilities.
- (10) Conduct an EA to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the EMS via the employment of systems or weapons that use EM energy (e.g., jamming in the form of EM disruption, degradation, denial, and deception).
- (11) Employ systems or weapons that use radiated EM energy (to include directed energy [DE]) as their primary disruptive or destructive mechanism.
- (12) Conduct signature management to support OPSEC, MILDEC, and offensive or defensive activities.
- (13) Disseminate information that can reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and help to reduce military and civilian casualties.
- (14) Recommend targets and provide support to enable USG departments and agencies to increase economic pressure activities. Examples include freezing enemy finance support, exposing threat finance transactions, exposing illegal arms trading, and exposing third-party financial and resource support to enemy activities.
- (15) Conduct KLEs with international media, allied counterparts, and other third-party communicators that echo the joint force narrative.
- (16) Avoid targeting and messaging of cultural locations or issues that unite enemy leadership and its citizens.
- (17) Anticipate setbacks and opportunities by synchronizing and preapproving senior leader response messages.

h. Key Considerations

- (1) Intelligence Support to the Information Joint Function. Intelligence is critical to the effectiveness of information activities. Intelligence facilitates understanding the interrelationship of the informational, physical, and human aspects within the OE and the IE. By providing a society-centric, sociocultural understanding of the OE, intelligence can greatly assist the planning, integration, execution, and assessment of information activities to create desired effects. Intelligence in support of information activities may require longer lead times to establish behavior baselines for human decision making.
- (2) Information in the Targeting Process. Planners integrate information activities and capabilities into the targeting process during planning and execution to create and synchronize effects in support of objectives. Many information activities and capabilities have interagency coordination requirements. Targeting approval levels may

increase the time required to plan, coordinate, and execute the process. Other USG departments and agencies lack trained personnel and procedures to satisfy interagency planning, execution, and assessment requirements. Fully analyzing and developing target sets for nonlethal action may also increase coordination time required. Some information activities such as STO may be compartmentalized. However, effective integration of information activities and capabilities in the targeting process results in an improved understanding of the entire joint and multinational force and increased opportunities to achieve JFC objectives.

(3) Legal Considerations. US military activities, including OIE, must always be in compliance with US laws and policies. Planners deal with diverse and complex legal considerations. Legal interpretations can occasionally differ, given the complexity of technologies involved, the significance of legal interests potentially affected, and the challenges inherent for laws and policies to keep pace with the technological changes and implementation. Policies are regularly added, amended, and rescinded to provide clarity. As a result, legal restraints and constraints on information activities are dynamic. Multinational considerations further complicate them since each nation has its laws, policies, and processes for approving plans.

(4) The complexity of the IE. The JFC will not be the only voice in the IE. Individuals, nongovernmental groups, or non-state actors can have outsize effects on JFC operations due to the rapid and comprehensive (i.e., multiple media formats) nature of traditional media and social media services. Consequently, the JFC's information plan should include social media services engagement as a form of information dissemination, along with traditional media outlets.

(5) Leveraging relevant actors and the media they use to communicate is vital to establishing legitimacy, credibility, and influence. During mission analysis, the JFC and staff should identify relevant nonmilitary actors (e.g., indigenous formal and informal leaders and influencers) and their respective influences on the OE. Identifying and cultivating relevant actors and the media they use to communicate allows the joint force to develop ways to leverage their influence to accomplish the joint force mission. JFCs and staff should confirm or deny assumptions on relevant actors made during mission analysis through CMO, military engagement, and network engagement.

(6) Proactive Communication Planning. The nature of the IE enables relevant actors to receive and react to information in the OE before JFCs can react. Some relevant actors create and leverage information to cause reactions. This reality leaves little time for the joint force to craft and disseminate communication to respond. Instead of constantly reacting to each negative or positive information event to gain an advantage in the IE, commanders ensure the proactive development and dissemination of information in line with communication plans. Additionally, the JFC needs to delegate information release decisions to the lowest possible level to enable timely action in the IE.

4. Intelligence

a. Understanding the OE is fundamental to joint operations. The intelligence function informs JFCs about adversary intentions, capabilities, centers of gravity (COGs), critical factors, vulnerabilities, and future COAs and helps commanders and staffs understand friendly, neutral, and threat networks. The JIPOE process includes integrating analysis, production, collection management, and targeting processes to shape decision making and enable operations. Using the continuous JIPOE analysis process, properly tailored JIPOE products can enhance OE understanding and enable the JFC to act quickly and effectively. Intelligence activities and assessments also occur while defending the homeland within the guidelines of applicable regulations and laws. The intelligence joint function encompasses the joint intelligence process. The joint intelligence process consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence activities and operations:

- (1) Planning and direction of intelligence activities.
- (2) Collection.
- (3) Processing and exploitation of collected exploitable material and other data to produce relevant information.
- (4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence.
- (5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with plans and operations.
- (6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality.

b. JIPOE products support operational design. Throughout execution, tailored, continuous JIPOE products capture the dynamic OE to facilitate risk management. Joint forces may suffer health threats such as disease (infectious and noninfectious) and injuries (combat, noncombat, or environmental hazards) that limit operational functions and adversely affect combat power. Medical intelligence preparation of the operational environment (MIPOE) products help decision makers devise protection measures to mitigate these threats.

For more information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. For further information on MIPOE, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. For additional information on the intelligence analytic process and analytic standards, including expressions of likelihood or probability, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

c. **Understanding the Human, Physical, and Inherent Informational Aspects of Military Operations.** Intelligence is critical to the JFC's ability to leverage information to affect behavior. People and organizations other than the enemy may positively or negatively affect the friendly mission. These actors may include the civilian populace, the HN government, potential opposition leaders, and diasporas. Other relevant actors may include international organizations, non-state actors, religious leaders, and NGOs. By first

identifying the relevant actors and learning as much as possible about them and their interrelationships, the JFC can develop an approach that facilitates decision making regarding relevant actors' desired behavior (active or passive). Sociocultural analysis and the development of identity intelligence (I2) enable a better understanding of the relevant actors. Individuals may fit into more than one category of actor. For example, a tribal leader may work as a district governor or religious leader, while also working behind the scenes to provide financial and material support to an insurgency.

d. IC Collaboration

(1) JFCs use assigned and attached intelligence forces and coordinate with supporting IC capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture, analyze the OE, and anticipate future adversary or enemy action. These supporting capabilities include CSAs (e.g., National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), national intelligence agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency), and Service intelligence centers. National intelligence support may provide the J-2 opportunity to integrate national intelligence capabilities into a comprehensive intelligence effort designed to support the joint force. Through the intelligence planning process, the J-2 integrates these supporting capabilities through the National Intelligence Support Plan with the efforts of the assigned and attached intelligence forces. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC's intelligence requirements.

For additional guidance on the intelligence planning process, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning.

(2) As situations emerge that potentially require military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs focus intelligence efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the evolving situation. They look for specific warning intelligence of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

For additional guidance on intelligence support to JIPOE, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Responsibilities. JFCs and their component commanders are the key participants in planning and conducting intelligence tasks. Commanders are more than just consumers of intelligence. They integrate intelligence into their plans and operations. They also distribute intelligence and information to subordinate commands and, when appropriate, to authorized participants through established protocols and systems. Commanders establish operational and intelligence requirements and continuous feedback to ensure optimum intelligence support for planning and operations. This interface

supports the commander and operational planning and execution. It also mitigates surprise, assists friendly deception efforts, and enables joint operation assessment.

(2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Surveillance and reconnaissance support information collection throughout the OE. These activities focus on planned collection requirements but are also sufficiently flexible to respond to time-sensitive and emerging requirements. Commanders also require near real time surveillance that focuses on specific targets and supports guidance and intent. ISR includes activities in cyberspace to gather intelligence or information to support future operations. ISR activities require appropriate deconfliction of capabilities.

(3) Collection Capabilities. JIPOE is the means through which the intelligence analyst manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and staff gain an understanding of the complex and interconnected OE. To address knowledge gaps identified through the JIPOE process, JFCs require continuous data and information collection. Collection capabilities enable intelligence analysts to develop and apply appropriate analytical strategies to gain the knowledge necessary to define and understand the OE. To obtain and derive information and intelligence, all-source intelligence analysts rely on a variety of collection, including surveillance and reconnaissance activities. Intelligence collection disciplines are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, threats, opportunities, and events. Intelligence collection disciplines include CI, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, intelligence collection in cyberspace, and technical intelligence.

(4) I2. I2 fuses identity attributes (e.g., biographical, biological, behavioral, and reputational information related to individuals) and other information and intelligence associated with those attributes, collected across multiple activities, sources, and methods, to identify, assess, and characterize threat actors and networks, their capabilities and capacity, COGs, objectives, intent, and potential COAs. Identity attributes of individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest are gathered through identity tasks. Regional and global trends have placed greater requirements on the JFC to recognize and differentiate one person from another to support the joint functions, particularly the protection and intelligence functions. I2 activities contribute to the exploitation of collected information and subsequent all-source analysis that enables the joint force to protect and control relevant populations. I2 products, such as biometric watch lists and persons of interest overlays, assist US forces, the HN, and PNs to positively identify, track, characterize, and disrupt threat actors.

For additional guidance on the intelligence joint function and intelligence disciplines, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

5. Fires

a. Fires is the use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target or objects of influence IAW US and international law. Joint fires are delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated

action to produce desired results in support of a common objective. This function encompasses the fires associated with several tasks, missions, and processes, including:

(1) Conduct Joint Targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering command objectives, operational requirements, available capabilities, and rules of engagement (ROE).

(2) Provide Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, airspace, space, cyberspace, the EMS, and key waters and to influence populations.

(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats. This task integrates offensive and defensive operations and capabilities to achieve and maintain freedom of action and force protection. These operations destroy or negate enemy manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.

(4) Interdict Hostile Capabilities. Interdiction during armed conflict diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys a threat's surface capabilities before being used effectively against friendly forces or otherwise achieving their objectives.

(5) Conduct Strategic Attack. This task includes offensive action against foreign military, political, and economic targets to create effects against a high-payoff target.

(6) Assess the Results of Employing Fires. This task assesses the effectiveness of fires and their contribution to achieving of the objective.

b. **Key Considerations.** Employing fires in conjunction with other activities, such as information activities, to create desired effects is a particularly important factor in maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment. The following are key considerations associated with the above tasks:

(1) Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of joint fires to actions and tasks at the component, subordinate joint force, CCMD, and national level. Commanders and their staffs consider strategic- and operational-level objectives, the potential for friendly fire incidents and other undesired fires effects, and operational limitations (e.g., constraints and restraints) when making targeting decisions. Commanders should consider the impact on all systems in the OE during this process. Successful integration of engagement options (e.g., cyberspace, EW, information, nonlethal weapons, DE, and other intermediate force capabilities) to integrate nonlethal effects into the targeting process is often important to mission accomplishment. Commanders assess available engagement options and employ them as appropriate.

(a) Oversight. JFCs may task their staff to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a

JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, the JTCB should include representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to link target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects to the JFC's objectives. JTCB participants should ensure all components and applicable staff elements coordinate and synchronize targeting efforts with intelligence and operations.

For additional information on the intelligence analytic process and analytic standards, including expressions of likelihood or probability, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

(b) Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority. The JFC is responsible for all aspects of the targeting process and may conduct joint targeting at the joint force HQ level or assign the deputy JFC or component commander to chair the JTCB. When the JFC does not delegate targeting authority and does not establish a JTCB, the JFC performs this task at the joint force HQ. The JFC may approve the formation of a joint fires element to provide recommendations to the J-3 and the JFC. Subordinate commands are part of the JTCB. The JTCB chair should possess or have access to adequate C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, joint planning expertise, appropriate intelligence, and legal support.

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(c) Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air apportionment is part of the targeting process. The JFACC uses air apportionment to ensure the weight of joint force air effort is consistent with the JFC's intent and objectives. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC recommends air apportionment to the JFC, who makes the air apportionment decision. The JFACC's rationale for the recommendation may include priority or percentage of effort based on the JFC's CONOPS, specific tasks for which air assets are essential, and other factors such as the component commanders' joint fires requirements. Following the JFC's air apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made available.

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

(2) Joint fire support may include aircraft; naval surface fire support; artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles; cyberspace attack; offensive and defensive space operations; EA; and messaging to create lethal and nonlethal effects.

(3) Close air support is a critical element of joint fire support that requires detailed planning, coordination, and training of ground and supporting air forces for safe and effective execution. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the supported force are essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. For more information on close air support, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

(4) Countering Air and Missile Threats

(a) The JFC counters air and missile threats to help create friendly freedom of action, provide protection, and deny the enemy freedom of action. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations to achieve and maintain the JFC's desired degrees of control in the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. The counterair mission is inherently a joint and interdependent endeavor. Each component of the joint force contributes capabilities necessary for mission success. Also, Service capability and force structure development reflect a purposeful reliance on all components to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and interdependent nature, all components of the joint force normally conduct operations in support of the counterair mission. The JFC normally designates an AADC and a JFACC to enhance the unity of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution for countering air and missile threats.

(b) Offensive counterair (OCA) operations are the preferred method of countering air and missile threats. OCA typically seeks to operate in enemy airspace and destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures as close to their sources as possible before and after launch. OCA includes attack operations, fighter sweep, fighter escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses. DCA normally attempts to degrade, neutralize, or defeat enemy air and missile attacks attempting to penetrate friendly airspace. Both OCA and DCA may also ensure access and freedom of action in international airspace. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, artillery, ground forces, special operations, cyberspace attack, and EA. Joint forces must be capable of countering the air and missile threats during all operations.

(c) Control of the Air. Enemies will contest control of the air. Air superiority is the degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Air supremacy is the degree of control of the air wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the OA using air and missile threats. The joint force may have to fight for and maintain every aspect of freedom of action in the air. Commanders prevent enemy air and missile threats from effectively interfering with operations, thus facilitating freedom of action and movement. Commanders should not assume they have control of the air. In the air, the degree of control can range from no control to parity, where neither opponent can claim any level of control over the other, to local air superiority, a dangerous situation that can quickly turn against the joint force, to air supremacy over the entire OA. Control of the air may vary over time. It is important to remember that the degree of control of the air can be bounded and limited in both duration and geography (temporally, horizontally, and vertically), local or defined, in the context of an entire theater. The desired degree of control is at the direction of the JFC and based on the JFC's CONOPS. Therefore, it is a priority objective of the JFACC and joint air operations. Commanders should not expect air supremacy or superiority against a capable enemy. Counterair operations occur throughout campaigns and major operations to produce the desired degree of control of the air at the times and places chosen by the JFC.

(d) Integrating Air and Missile Defense. While joint combat focuses on operations within one or more OAs, threats to joint forces can come from well outside assigned JOAs, even outside a CCMD's AOR. An enemy's missiles, hypersonics, and long-range aircraft can pose significant challenges that require integrating defensive capabilities from both within and beyond a CCMD's AOR. The CCMD integrates air and missile defense capabilities and activities within the theater. In support, SecDef establishes command relationships for global missile defense, strategic attack, global strike, and other cross-AOR operations. Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), conducts global missile defense operations in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies; advocates for and assesses missile defense capabilities; and ensures continuity of operations (COOP), as required. The intended result is the integration of OCA attack operations, DCA operations, and other capabilities as required to create the JFC's desired effects.

Refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats, for additional guidance on countering air and missile threats, and JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for discussion of control of the air.

(5) Interdiction

(a) Interdiction operations during armed conflict include actions that divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or to achieve enemy objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. The JFC plans and synchronizes the overall interdiction effort in the assigned JOA. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort; however, the JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC are the supported commanders for interdiction within their OAs.

(b) Many elements of the joint force can conduct interdiction operations. Air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission.

(c) In competition, air and maritime interception operations can be part of a coercive measure to change or modify an adversary's behavior. Joint fires through interdiction can create tactical and operational advantages for the joint force, with corresponding adverse effects on the enemy. Interdiction can have broad operational effects, but joint fires executed closer to joint forces can have more immediate effects. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon fires and surface maneuvers, depending on the situation.

Refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for more guidance on joint interdiction operations.

(6) Strategic Attack. A strategic attack (nuclear or nonnuclear) is a JFC offensive action against a target, whether military or other, selected to achieve a strategic objective. Strategic attacks usually target enemy strategic COGs or other strategic targets. These attacks may be lethal or nonlethal. The purpose is to weaken the enemy's ability or will to

"The air attacks were the most effective message. The soldiers who did see the leaflets and then saw the air attacks knew the leaflets were true. They believed the message after that, if they were still alive. Overall, they had a terrible effect on us. I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces. When my division pulled back across the Diyala Bridge, of the more than 500 armored vehicles assigned to me before the war, I was able to get fifty or so across the bridge. Most were destroyed or abandoned on the east side of the Diyala River."

Source: *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A view of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*, Kevin M. Woods with Michael R. Pese, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G Lacey Project interview of Abd Al-Karim Jasim Nafus Al-Majid, Commander, Al Nida Armored Division, 21 November 2003

engage or continue an undesirable activity. As directed by the President or SecDef, a strategic attack can be an independent action or part of a campaign or major operation. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct strategic attacks.

(7) Global Strike

(a) A global strike is the capability to rapidly plan and execute attacks on any location, limited in duration and scope, to create precise lethal and nonlethal effects against enemy assets. Global strike missions employ capabilities against a wide variety of targets.

(b) The UCP assigns CDRUSSTRATCOM the responsibility for global strike. CDRUSSTRATCOM plans global strike in full partnership with appropriate CCDRs. The CJCS or SecDef determines supporting and supported command relationships for execution. In some circumstances, United States Strategic Command may collaborate and support another CCMD for global strike planning and execution.

(8) Limiting Collateral Effects. Collateral damage and other collateral effects are unintentional or incidental effects to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets based on the circumstances existing at the time. Causing collateral effects does not violate the law of war so long as the damage or other effect is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. The law of war recognizes that civilian casualties and civilian harm are unfortunate and tragic, but unavoidable, consequences of armed conflict. Under the law of war, balancing military necessity with collateral damage is central to the principle of proportionality. Limiting collateral effects is often an operational or strategic imperative and will not only reduce impacts to the civilian environment and civilian claims but may also better support friendly and HN actions to influence the population and promote operational success. Commanders conduct collateral damage assessment during targeting. These assessments are especially important when considering strikes against targets with potential for second- and third-order effects, such as WMD storage and production targets.

(9) Joint force capabilities can create nonlethal effects. Some capabilities can produce nonlethal effects that limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and reduce exploitation opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda. They may also reduce the number of casualties associated with excessive use of force, limit reconstruction costs, and maintain the goodwill of the local populace. Some capabilities are nonlethal by design and include blunt impact and warning munitions, acoustic and optical warning devices, and vehicle and vessel stopping systems.

(a) Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace attack actions create various direct denial effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) or manipulation that leads to denial that appears in the physical domains.

(b) EA. EA involves the use of EM energy, DE, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capability. EA can be against a computer when the attack occurs through the EMS. Integration and synchronization of EA with maneuver, C2, and other joint fires are essential. EW is a component of JEMSO used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the EME to achieve the commander's objectives. EW can be a primary capability or used to facilitate OIE through the targeting process.

For additional guidance on cyberspace attack, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

For additional guidance on EA and JEMSO, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

For additional guidance on JEMSO, refer to CJCSI 3320.01, (U) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO).

(c) MISO. MISO actions and messages can generate effects that gain support for JFC objectives; reduce the will of the enemy, adversary, and sympathizer; and decrease the combat effectiveness of enemy forces. MISO are effective throughout the competition continuum. JFCs and their component commanders are the key players in fully integrating MISO into their plans and operations. MISO require unique budget, attribution, and authorities that are coordinated and approved prior to employment. Commanders carefully review and approve MISO programs that comply with mission-tailored, product approval guidelines from national-level authorities. An approved program does not necessarily constitute authority to execute a mission. Commanders obtain required authorities through a MISO-specific execute order (EXORD) or as a task specified in an EXORD for an operation.

For more information on planning programs and conducting MISO, refer to CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations. MISO support to the non-US military is in DODI O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

(d) Nonlethal Weapons as Intermediate Force Capabilities. Nonlethal weapons can provide intermediate force capabilities to fill the gap between mere presence and lethal effects. Nonlethal weapons are weapons, devices, and munitions that incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and equipment. Planners should consider nonlethal weapons to enhance mission effectiveness; facilitate lethal engagements by resolving complex situations and isolating the threat; reduce risk to joint forces; and mitigate collateral damage, including civilian casualties.

For additional guidance on nonlethal weapons, refer to DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy; and the US Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program Executive Agent's Planning Guidance: Intermediate Force Capabilities Bridging the Gap Between Presence and Lethality.

6. Movement and Maneuver

a. This function encompasses the disposition of joint forces to conduct operations by securing positional or informational advantages across the competition continuum and exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Movement is deploying forces or capabilities into an OA and relocating them within an OA without the expectation of contact with the enemy. Maneuver is the employment of forces for offensive and defensive purposes while in, or expecting, contact with the enemy. It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver function encompasses several tasks, including:

- (1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and component force formations and capabilities by multiple means or modes throughout the OE.
- (2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy or adversary.
- (3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.
- (4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. These actions include operations that employ obstacles (i.e., counter mobility), enforce sanctions and embargoes, and conduct blockades.
- (5) Control significant areas; deny, expand, and manipulate access to information; and influence relevant populations relative to the objective whose access to possession or control provides either side an operational advantage.

b. Movement to Extend and Maintain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward or even multinational forces specifically for the task at hand, can position within operational reach of enemy or adversary COGs, critical factors, or decisive points. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ its military capabilities. At other times, mobilization and deployment processes can begin the movement of reinforcing forces from the continental United States (CONUS) or other theaters to address any unfavorable balance of forces at the appropriate time and place.

(2) JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces and whether to recommend the formation and movement of multinational forces, taking into consideration A2/AD threats, which can prevent or deny the deployment of friendly forces. At times, the movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times, its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces may deter or provoke adversary or enemy aggression or threats, depending on the adversary's or enemy's perception and cost-benefit analysis.

Refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for more information on the deployment process.

(3) The use of SOF can extend a joint force's operational reach into sensitive and denied areas. When conducting clandestine operations, JFCs consider not only how to penetrate hostile or unfriendly A2/AD systems but also how to mitigate the risk of their detection and public exposure.

c. Maneuver is the employment of forces to gain a position of advantage with respect to the enemy. The maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC's mission accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, create psychological effects, and generate physical momentum. Maneuver may also enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at a disadvantage. The goal of maneuver is to render an enemy incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (i.e., their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) by moving to the point of advantage to close with and destroy enemy forces, capability, and will. Commanders may achieve this advantage by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, airspace, EMS, urban areas, key waters, critical assets, and LOCs through air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace maneuver.

(2) There are multiple ways to gain a positional advantage. An amphibious force with aircraft, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of an enemy's COG, has the positional advantage. In like manner, land and air expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy's COG and have the means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have a positional

advantage. Seeking a positional advantage facilitates freedom of action. See Chapter VII, “Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict.”

(3) At all levels of warfare, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

(a) At the strategic level, deploying forces to an OA is a form of maneuver if such movements seek to gain a positional advantage. This maneuver places forces in the best position to deter enemy actions (e.g., flexible deterrent options [FDOs]), defend against aggression, or initiate armed conflict.

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in a position of operational reach from which to achieve operational objectives. The enemy may use AD actions to impede friendly operations when A2 actions fail. The objective of an operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.

(c) At the tactical level, maneuver is a means by which component commanders employ their forces in combination with the other joint functions to gain an informational or positional advantage with respect to the enemy.

(4) Force posture (forces, footprints, and agreements) affects operational reach and is an essential movement- and maneuver-related consideration. Force posture is a day-to-day movement and maneuver activity that CCMDs, in conjunction with OSD and DOS, can conduct as part of their global campaign to counter adversary actions without armed conflict to achieve national objectives. Force posture includes organic capabilities and commercial capabilities (infrastructure, services, and associated personnel). Force posture is also the starting position from which planners determine additional basing requirements to support specific contingency plans and potential and relevant responses to an array of anticipated crises. These requirements directly support the development of operational LOCs and LOOs and affect the combat power and other capabilities a joint force can generate. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of temporary contingency bases underwrite the ability of the joint force to project power by shielding its components from enemy action and protecting critical factors such as sortie or resupply rates. Incomplete planning for contingency base operations can unnecessarily increase the sustainment requirements of the joint force, leading to unanticipated risk. Political and diplomatic considerations, including authorizations to transit and overfly adjacent countries, can often affect basing decisions. US force basing options span the range from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing that accelerates the deployment and employment of maritime forces independent of infrastructure ashore.

(5) JFCs should consider various ways and means to help maneuver forces gain a positional advantage. Specifically, combat engineers provide mobility by breaching

obstacles, while simultaneously countering the mobility of enemy forces by emplacing obstacles and minimizing the effects of enemy actions on friendly forces. In addition to embassy country teams, COMs work with nations in and around the JOA to ensure overflight and transit authorizations are granted to enhance freedom of movement.

For additional guidance on posture planning, refer to DODI 3000.12, Management of US Global Defense Posture (GDP), and CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

7. Protection

a. Protection is all efforts to secure and defend the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given OA to maintain mission effectiveness. The protection function encompasses force protection, force health protection (FHP), and other protection activities.

b. The protection function includes a wide-ranging list of operations, tasks, and activities required to protect the force. Some tasks in the protection function include:

(1) Provide air, missile (including hypersonics), and space defense (including all space segments and counter-unmanned aircraft system [UAS] operations).

(2) Provide physical security to protect forces, bases, JSAs, posts, infrastructure that enables power projection, and LOCs (including contractors and US civilians accompanying the force).

(3) Protect friendly information. These activities include OPSEC, CI, defense countermeasure operations, MILDEC in support of OPSEC, counter deception, and counterpropaganda.

(4) Conduct cyberspace security, cyberspace defense, and electromagnetic protection (EP) to protect information networks.

(5) Provide CBRN defense to minimize CBRN attacks and incidents.

(6) Provide engineering and explosive ordnance disposal support for counter-improvised threat activities, such as counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) activities.

(7) Identify and neutralize insider threats.

(8) Conduct detainee operations.

(9) Conduct medical, environmental, and occupational surveillance activities.

(10) Conduct law enforcement and criminal investigation activities to protect personnel and assets.

(11) The function focuses on force protection, which preserves the joint force's fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, and its bases; necessary infrastructure; and LOCs from an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Passive measures reduce the probability and minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile action without seeking the initiative. The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents is equally important. Finally, emergency management and response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to isolating events, accidents, health threats, and natural disasters.

(12) Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. FHP complements force protection efforts by promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the behavioral or physical well-being of Service members.

(13) As the JFC's mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass the protection of US noncombatants.

c. Protection considerations affect the planning of all joint campaigns and operations. For cooperation and competition, commanders and their staffs consider protection measures commensurate with potential risks, even in a permissive environment. Risk to the joint force may include a wide range of threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises, environmental threats and hazards, and space and cyberspace threats. In armed conflict, campaigns and major operations involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy. Commanders typically require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both planning and execution. Continuous research and access to accurate, detailed information about the OE, along with realistic training, can enhance protection activities.

d. Force protection is preventive measures taken to prevent or mitigate enemy and insider threat actions against DOD personnel (to include family members and certain contractor personnel), resources, facilities, and critical information. Developing and demonstrating resilience (e.g., redundancy, alternatives, rapid recovery) may provide a deterrent effect and reduce the need for protection during a crisis—both for organic and partner capabilities. These actions preserve the force's fighting potential for critical employment time and place and incorporate integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures that enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection includes the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures commensurate with the level of risk. Intelligence sources provide information regarding an enemy or adversary's capabilities against personnel and resources, as well as information regarding force protection considerations. Foreign and domestic LEAs can contribute to force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime and by sharing information on criminal and terrorist organizations. I2 can identify threat networks in the

OA, enhancing the commander's ability to establish effective antiterrorism programs, screening and vetting activities that mitigate vendor threats, and promoting lasting relationships with the HN and local population.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Security. Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs. Physical security includes physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process determines vulnerabilities to known threats; applies appropriate deterrent, control, and denial safeguarding techniques and measures; and responds to changing conditions. Functions in physical security include facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol operations, special land and maritime security areas, and other physical security operations like military working dog operations, CI, or emergency and disaster response support. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off areas, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(2) DCA. DCA supports protection using both active and passive air, air, missile, and UASs defense measures.

(a) Active air and missile defense include all direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air, UASs, and missile threats against friendly forces and assets.

(b) Passive air and missile defense include all measures, other than active air and missile defense, taken to minimize, mitigate, or recover from the consequences of attack aircraft and missiles, reducing the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets.

(3) Global Missile Defense. Global missile defense encompasses operations that affect more than one CCMD and requires synchronization among the affected commands to coordinate effective allocation, deployment, and employment of capabilities necessary to deter and prevent attacks, destroy enemy missiles, or nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an attack.

For additional guidance on countering air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats.

(4) OPSEC denies the adversary or enemy the information needed to assess friendly capabilities and intentions correctly and is vital to enabling the protection of the force by ensuring essential secrecy of joint operations. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces to successful adversary or enemy exploitation of critical information. The OPSEC process subsequently analyzes friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities to:

(a) Identify those actions that adversary or enemy intelligence systems may observe.

(b) Determine what specific indications adversaries or enemies could collect, analyze, and interpret to derive critical information in time to be useful.

(c) As requiring activities develop and source requirements beyond the organic force, assess the operational value of the information and potential need to protect it.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01, Joint Operations Security, and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(5) DODIN operations missions are covered by standing orders to secure and operate DOD's cyberspace, including global terrestrial networks, satellite communications, tactical wireless networks, information technology embedded in weapon systems and critical infrastructure, and standalone systems. This security is established based upon national and DOD cybersecurity policies and integrated layers of technology, training, and personnel actions that make the DODIN less vulnerable to threats in cyberspace, including insider threats.

For additional guidance on cybersecurity, refer to DODI 8500.01, Cybersecurity.

(6) DCO include actions internal and external to the protected cyberspace to preserve friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, and net-centric capabilities by hunting, monitoring, analyzing, detecting, and responding to ongoing or imminent malicious cyberspace activity. When authorized, USCYBERCOM's cyberspace protection teams conduct DCO internal defensive measures missions inside non-DODIN cyberspace, including USG networks, US critical infrastructure, and the systems of allies and PNs.

(7) Defensive Use of EW. EP is the division of EW involving action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the EMS that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Defensive EA activities use the EMS to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment. Examples include self-protection and force protection measures such as the use of expendables; jammers; towed decoys; DE infrared countermeasures systems; radio-controlled, small UASs; and radio-controlled C-IED systems.

Refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for further guidance.

(8) PR. PR missions use military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel. There are five PR tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate) necessary to achieve complete and coordinated recovery of US military personnel, DOD civilians, DOD contractor personnel, and others designated by the President or SecDef. JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint, and multinational partner capabilities available when planning and executing PR missions.

Refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, for further guidance on PR.

(9) CBRN Defense. CBRN defense focuses on assessing CBRN threats and hazards (contamination), protecting individuals and units from CBRN hazards, and mitigating effects to personnel and equipment to restore operational capability. Even when an enemy does not possess CBRN material or WMD, access to materials such as radiation sources and toxic industrial materials is a significant planning consideration.

For additional guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

(10) Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. These programs also include personal security and defensive measures to protect Service members, high-risk personnel, civilian employees, family members, DOD facilities, information, and equipment.

Refer to JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism, for additional guidance on antiterrorism.

(11) Combat identification (CID) is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the OE to support an engagement decision. CID supports force protection and enhances operations by helping minimize friendly fire incidents and collateral damage. The CID process complements the identification process to support application of weapons, resources, or other military operations.

(a) Depending on operational requirements, CID characterizations may concern only “friend,” “enemy/hostile,” “neutral,” or “unknown” and may be in terms of a level of confidence in such characterization. In some situations, additional characterizations may be necessary, including, class, type, nationality, and mission configuration. When applied with CCDR’s ROE, CID characterizations enable engagement decisions for the employment of fires.

(b) Early during planning, the staff develops CID procedures that are consistent with ROE and that do not interfere with the ability of a unit or individual to

engage enemy forces. When developing the JFC's CID procedures, important considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants.

Refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for additional guidance on CID.

(12) Critical infrastructure protection programs support the identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities to defense critical infrastructure, which includes DOD and non-DOD domestic and foreign infrastructure essential to plan, mobilize, deploy, execute, and sustain US military operations globally. Coordination between DOD entities and other USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, tribal, and local governments; the private sector; and equivalent foreign entities is key to protecting these critical assets. Commanders remediate and mitigate vulnerabilities found in defense critical infrastructure based on risk management decisions made by responsible authorities. These vulnerability mitigation decisions should use all available program areas, including antiterrorism, MILDEC, OPSEC, and force protection (e.g., promoting resilience).

For further guidance on critical infrastructure protection, refer to DODI 3020.45, Mission Assurance (MA) Construct.

(13) CI counters or neutralizes foreign intelligence collection efforts through collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis, production, and technical services and support. CI is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.

For further guidance on CI missions, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

(14) C-IED. C-IED activities reduce casualties and damage caused by improvised explosive devices. Improvised explosive devices are a type of weapon that can include common material or activities adapted for military or criminal use. C-IED activities include measures to neutralize the infrastructure supporting the production and employment of IEDs. These measures can include developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter the improvised threat and the technical and forensic exploitation to obtain information to support targeting, improve force protection, identify material sourcing, and classify different weapon signatures.

For further guidance on C-IED, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks, and JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

(15) Countering Small UASs. Small UAS platforms pervade today's battlefields, greatly adding to the complexity of the present-day OE. Small UASs, when adapted from commercial uses or otherwise modified, can be an improvised threat. Often originally designed for both hobby and commercial purposes, both state and non-state actors are employing small UASs as force multipliers to create a multitude of effects with constantly evolving technology and tactics. They can provide enemies increased surveillance and

standoff or penetrating attack capabilities. Joint force planners should understand how to utilize material and nonmaterial means to construct a layered defense to mitigate small UAS threats. This should be done in a synchronized and in-depth manner and should address both risks of small UAS observation and targeting, as well as mitigating effects of weaponized small UASs. Additional considerations include how terrain, the environment, EMI, and enemy capabilities might degrade a counter-UAS capability.

For more information on countering small UASs, refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats, and Army Techniques Publication 3-01.15/Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10-10B/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-01.8/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile Defense.

(16) Identify and Neutralize Insider Threats. Insider threats (sometimes referred to as “blue-on-blue,” “green-on-blue,” or “inside-the-wire” threats) may include active shooters, bombers, spies, and other threats embedded within or working with US forces. These threats are typically persons with authorized access who use that access to commit, wittingly or unwittingly, a variety of illicit actions against friendly force personnel, equipment, facilities, and information. Countering these threats involves coordinating and sharing information among security, CO personnel, CI, law enforcement, and other personnel and staff. I2 and all-source analysis support the identification of insider threats. The joint force security coordinator establishes procedures to counter insider threats across the joint force.

For further guidance on countering insider threats, see JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. For more information on I2 activities, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

f. FHP complements force protection efforts and includes all measures taken by the JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of DOD personnel. These capabilities enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. FHP functions include casualty prevention, preventive medicine, health surveillance, combat and operational stress control, preventive dentistry, vision readiness, hearing conservation, laboratory services, and veterinary services. The JFC is responsible for allocating adequate capabilities to identify health threats and implement appropriate FHP measures. Health threats are a composite of ongoing or potential hostile actions; occupational, environmental, geographical, and meteorological conditions; diseases (infectious and noninfectious); and the employment of CBRN weapons or agents that reduce the effectiveness of military forces. A robust health surveillance system is essential to FHP measures. Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk; identifying and assessing hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate exposures; and monitoring and reporting battle injury, disease, and nonbattle injury trends and other health outcomes. Health surveillance includes veterinary services. Occupational and environmental health surveillance enhances the joint force’s ability to limit combat and operational stress casualties and all categories of injuries, including

combat and operational stress, those related to exposure to CBRN, and/or explosive hazards. Joint forces may operate in remote and austere locations beyond the operational reach of the standard Military Health System. These forces require FHP and health service support from medical personnel to provide routine health care and treat injuries and illnesses for extended periods prior to medical evacuation. They may also have to rely on foreign military or civilian health systems indigenous to their OA.

Refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for further guidance on FHP.

g. **Protection of Civilians.** In general, persons who are neither associated with an armed force nor otherwise engaged in hostilities are civilians and have protected status under the law of war.

(1) It is US policy that members of the DOD components comply with the law of war during armed conflict, however characterized. In all other military operations, military members of the DOD components will continue to act consistent with the law of war's fundamental principles and rules. Such compliance includes taking measures to protect civilians. In addition, the accountability, credibility, and legitimacy of a joint operation; the success of the overarching mission; and the achievement of US strategic objectives depends on the joint forces' ability to minimize harm to civilians in the course of their own operations and, potentially, their ability to mitigate harm to arising from the actions of other parties. Strategic objectives often involve strengthening security, stability, and civilian well-being.

(2) Protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission or a supporting task. Protection of civilians from deliberate attack as a strategic or operational imperative is distinct from the legal obligations of US forces to minimize harm to civilians during the conduct of operations. Effective protection of civilians depends on a command climate that emphasizes its importance and commanders who can make timely and appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground. Joint forces' planning must have in place ROE that account for protection of civilians.

(3) Civilian casualty mitigation directly affects the success of the overall mission. Even tactical actions can have strategic and second-order effects. Minimizing and addressing civilian casualty incidents support strategic imperatives and are also at the heart of the profession of arms. Failure to minimize civilian casualties can undermine national policy objectives and the mission of joint forces while assisting the enemy. Civilian casualties can incite increased opposition to joint forces. Focused attention on civilian casualty mitigation can be an important investment to maintain legitimacy and accomplish the mission.

(4) JFCs designate a civilian harm mitigation and response officer to coordinate and integrate civilian harm mitigation and response considerations into planning, operations, assessments, exercises, and training. The civilian harm mitigation and response officer is involved in JPP to identify risks posed to the civilian populace when executing military operations, and may work closely with the civilian harm assessment

cell. The civilian harm mitigation and response officer also participates as a member of the JTCB and other JFC battle rhythm working groups, such as the civilian harm mitigation and response working groups, as required.

See Department of Defense Law of War Manual regarding obligations for the protection of civilians.

8. Sustainment

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services support to maintain operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment gives the JFC the means for freedom of action and endurance and to extend operational reach. Sustainment enables the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The sustainment function includes tasks to:

- (1) Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel and other energy requirements), arms, munitions, and equipment.
- (2) Provide for maintenance of equipment.
- (3) Coordinate and provide base operations support for forces, including field services; personnel services support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious support (RS); postal support; morale, welfare, and recreational support; financial support; and legal services.
- (4) Build and maintain contingency bases.
- (5) Assess, repair, and maintain infrastructure.
- (6) Acquire, manage, and distribute funds.
- (7) Provide common-user logistics support to other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, other nations, and contractors as authorized by their contracts.
- (8) Establish and coordinate movement services.
- (9) Establish large-scale detention compounds and sustain enduring detainee operations.

b. JFCs should identify sustainment capabilities during planning. Sustainment should be a priority consideration for the timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Sustainment provides JFCs with the flexibility to develop branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts. Given mission objectives and adversary threats, the ultimate goal is to execute a feasible, supportable, and efficient CONOPS that takes into account the threat and defense of logistical forces. Before developing contingency plans, CCMDs develop a theater logistics analysis, theater logistics overview, and distribution plan to

provide detailed mobility and distribution analysis to ensure enough capacity or planned enhanced capability is available to support the CCP.

c. **Logistics** is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and equipment to support the JFC's CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an enemy is a function of the nation's capability and capacity to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and equipment to the point of application. Logistics covers the following core functions: supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, joint health services, logistic services, engineering, and OCS. In association with these functions, logistics includes aspects of military operations that deal with:

- (1) Materiel acquisition, receipt, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition.
- (2) In-transit visibility and asset visibility.
- (3) Common-user logistics support to other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, other nations, and contractors as authorized by their contracts.
- (4) Overseeing logistic services (food, water, and ice; contingency basing; and hygiene).
- (5) OCS (contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management).
- (6) Disposal operations.
- (7) Engineering support (combat engineering, general engineering, geospatial engineering).
- (8) Facility and infrastructure acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition.
- (9) The supervision of infrastructure assessment, repairs, and maintenance.
- (10) Detention compounds (establish and sustain large scale to support enduring detainee operations).
- (11) HNS.
- (12) Personnel movement, including patient movement, evacuation, and hospitalization.

d. **Personnel services** are sustainment functions provided to personnel rather than to systems and equipment. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel during joint operations. Thorough planning and comprehensive personnel management enable the JFC to identify and recommend allocating the right forces to achieve objectives.

For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For further guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. For further guidance on legal support, refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support. For further guidance on religious affairs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, and Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. For further guidance on financial management support, refer to JP 3-80, Resource Management. For further guidance on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

e. **Key Considerations**

(1) **Employment of Logistic Forces.** For some operations, logistic forces may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles and in nonstandard tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or be the only forces deployed. Logistic forces may also continue to support other military personnel and civilians after the departure of combat forces. Such cases require that they be familiar with and adhere to applicable status-of-forces agreements and acquisition and cross-service agreements to which the United States is a party. Given the potential complexity of OEs and the specialized nature and unique authorities required, logistic forces familiarize themselves with and adhere to legal, regulatory, and diplomatic/political restraints governing US involvement in operations such as FHA.

(2) **Protection.** Logistics forces, like all other forces, are capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces. However, the JFC should view combat and logistics forces as a unit with a seamless mission and objective and balance the allocation of security resources accordingly in support of the JFC's mission.

(3) **Facilities.** JFCs should plan for the early acquisition (leasing) of real estate and facilities and bases for temporary occupancy or if the HN provides inadequate or no property. Early acquisition of facilities can be critical to the flow of forces. The use of automated planning tools can help forecast construction labor, machinery, and equipment requirements in support of the JFC's contingency basing plan.

(4) **Environmental Considerations.** Environmental considerations are broader than just the protection of the environment and environmental stewardship. They also include continuously integrating the FHP, CMO, and other more operationally focused environmental considerations that affect US military forces and objectives. Military operations do not generally focus on environmental compliance and environmental protection. While complete protection of the environment is not always possible due to

competition with threats to the mission, JFCs protect the environment in which US military forces operate to the greatest extent. Commanders comply with the command guidance on environmental considerations specified in the plan or order and included in unit SOPs. Environmental considerations link directly to risk management and the safety and health of Service members. Commanders should clearly and accurately communicate all significant risks of deploying DOD personnel to the chain of command. Environmental considerations, risk management, and health risk communication are enabling elements for the commander and an essential part of military planning, training, and operations. While complete protection of the environment during military operations may not always be possible, careful planning should address environmental considerations in joint operations, including legal aspects.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to DODI 4715.19, Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations; DODI 4715.22, Environmental Management Policy for Contingency Locations; JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(5) Operational Energy. Operational energy resources like bulk fuel and electricity coupled with renewable energy resources provide power to the joint force during the conduct of operations. The availability of renewable and rechargeable energy resources enables the joint force to operate in austere and contested environments. Furthermore, the efficient management of operational energy resources may increase the operational reach, sustainability, and availability of combat forces for a variety of missions.

(6) Nonstandard Logistics. Nonstandard logistics supports joint operations beyond the capabilities, authorities, and/or operational reach of standard logistics organizations. Joint forces may require nonstandard logistics when they are operating in austere and remote locations, or in a clandestine mode, or providing logistic support to foreign irregular forces. Logisticians providing such support remain cognizant of standard logistics principles, such as supply chain management, but they adapt existing tactics, techniques, and procedures, or develop new ones, to meet the operational requirements of the supported forces. These operational requirements may include higher levels of OPSEC; procurement, manufacture, or maintenance of locally available materiel; and nonstandard contracting, storage, funding, and distribution mechanisms.

(7) Joint Health Services. Joint health service support includes all support and services performed, provided, and arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of military personnel. Joint health service support also includes casualty care, which encompasses a number of health service support functions that occur at all levels of command: casualty management, patient movement, medical treatment (organic and area support), medical evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, blood management, and health information management. Joint health services also include the management of health service resources, such as human resources, funding, and facilities. CCDRs are responsible for joint health services of forces assigned or attached to their command and should establish joint health services policies and programs. When supporting stabilization, efforts should support development and

restoration of local medical capabilities and services. Commanders should avoid providing care as a replacement for or as a supplement to local capabilities whenever possible.

(a) Actions to obtain health threat information begin before deployment and continue as forces deploy. Disease and injuries can quickly diminish combat effectiveness and have a greater impact on operations when the forces employed are small and dispersed.

(b) The early introduction of preventive medicine and veterinary services personnel or units and public health measures into the theater helps protect US forces from diseases and nonbattle injuries. It also permits a thorough assessment of the health threat to and operational requirements of the mission. Operational public health support includes education and training on personal hygiene and field sanitation, personal protective measures, epidemiological investigations, immunization programs, pest management, and inspection of water sources and supplies. For maximum effectiveness, public health support should be provided to as many personnel as possible within the OA. Public health support to US forces and unified action partners also includes analyzing the complexities of epidemiologic interactions between disease-causing organisms, their reservoirs, and hosts in different geographic, climatologic, and cultural settings. In addition to US forces, preventive medicine should include multinational forces, HN civilians, and dislocated civilians to the greatest feasible extent. JFCs and joint force surgeons shall identify legal constraints unique to the OE and intended recipient of services. The JFC and staff should review issues such as eligibility of beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies and human resources, and provisions of legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater.

(c) Medical and rehabilitative care provides essential care in the OA and rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing the quality of care. It encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury through rehabilitative care.

For further guidance on health services, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. For further guidance on procedures for deployment health activities, refer to DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

(8) **HNS.** JFCs interact with the HN government to establish procedures to request support and negotiate support terms. Logistic planners should analyze the HN economic capacity to supplement the logistic support to the US or multinational forces and identify and limit adverse effects on the HN economy. Accordingly, early mission analysis should identify distribution requirements. The JFC should collaborate with the HN government on analysis for support infrastructure regarding anticipated needs. The systems analysis should evaluate airfields, seaports, rail and road networks, and energy infrastructure, particularly in underdeveloped countries where their status is questionable. Delaying this systems analysis can diminish the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support forces may build or improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate follow-on force closure, as well as the delivery of humanitarian cargo.

(9) **OCS.** Logistics support can occur through contracts with commercial entities inside and outside the OA. Most joint operations require a level of contracted support.

Certain contracted items or services could be essential to deploying, sustaining, and redeploying joint forces effectively. OCS is the process of planning and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. OCS is a multi-faceted joint activity executed by the CCMD and subordinate JFCs through boards, centers, working groups, and associated lead Service or joint theater support contracting-related activities. It includes the ability to plan, orchestrate, and synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management.

For further information on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

For more details, see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

(10) Disposal Operations. Disposal of equipment, parts, and other materials, as well as all waste streams generated by military forces, needs to be a consideration throughout planning and operations. Inadequate understanding and application of disposal regulations, policies, and procedures may result in adversaries obtaining items to use against US forces, allies, and the public. It may also result in negative consequences for the health of military forces and local populace, the local environment, operational readiness and effectiveness, and disposal costs. Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services provide support to CCDR's component commands with reutilization, demilitarization, and disposal of equipment, property, materials, and hazardous waste. Component commands are responsible for the proper, safe, and legal disposal of all other waste streams, such as medical/biological waste, human waste, refuse, and radioactive items, IAW DOD, Service, and theater-specific directives and procedures. Commanders can be legally and financially culpable for disposal and remediation costs if disposal operations violate US law or international law. Commanders follow regulations such as DOD or Service directives, or theater-specific procedures, to avoid harm to personnel, the public, and the environment, to the extent practicable.

(11) Legal Support. Legal support is important across all joint functions. Many decisions and actions have potential legal implications. The JFC's staff judge advocate (SJA) and command legal advisors provide the full spectrum of legal support during all joint operations through direct and reachback capabilities. A key member of the JFC's personal staff, the SJA provides legal advice regarding the laws, regulations, policies, treaties, and agreements that affect joint operations. Legal advisors actively participate in the planning process from mission analysis to execution, an essential function given the complexity of the OE. Legal advisors also advise on fiscal activities, international law, and many other factors that can affect operations, including identifying legal issues that affect operational limitations. Further, the JFC should integrate HN legal personnel into the legal command staff as soon as practical to obtain guidance on unique HN legal practices and customs.

Refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support, for more detailed information and guidance on legal support.

(12) **Religious Affairs.** The JOA requires both the provision of RS and advisement of the impact of religion upon operations, morale, and ethics. The JFC's RS team provides required capabilities directly and virtually. As a member of the JFC's personal staff, the chaplain advises the commander on morals, ethics, and religion as they pertain to the OE and the joint force.

For more information on religious affairs, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, and Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

(13) **Financial Management.** Financial management encompasses resource management and financial support. The joint force comptroller provides the elements of finance operations. Resource management normally consists of costing functions and leveraging fund sources. Finance operations provide funds to contract and limited pay support. The joint force comptroller's management of these elements provides the JFC with many capabilities, from contracting and banking support to cost capturing and fund control. Financial management support for contracting, subsistence, billeting, transportation, communications, labor, and a myriad of other supplies and services, particularly in austere environments, can enable mission accomplishment.

Refer to JP 3-80, Resource Management, for more detailed information and guidance on financial management support.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING AND PRACTICING GLOBAL INTEGRATION

1. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. The joint force campaigns in a complex, volatile, security environment characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. National security threats are transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional. Since each threat presents unique challenges, the dilemmas caused by one event impact others, often with no regard for distance and time. As threats gain access to advanced capabilities and contest US advantages, competition and armed conflict are increasingly occurring across multiple AORs and throughout the physical domains (land, maritime, air, and space), the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. These realities have eroded the US competitive military advantage while global demand for the joint force continues to exceed resources.

b. As adversaries enhance their ability to compete at levels below armed conflict, they become more adept at opposing US security goals by using nonmilitary means and manipulating popular perceptions. For example, our adversaries are using commercial capabilities to gain strategic advantage and compete below armed conflict. Adversarial use of these capabilities, such as controlling key physical infrastructure and cyberspace infrastructure, can limit US flexibility, limit freedom of maneuver, and erode US influence. Adversaries can present increasingly complex challenges by operating across regions, domains, and functions in which the United States was once unchallenged. This shift, along with adversaries' increasing willingness to employ coercive measures that remain below the threshold of armed conflict, has resulted in a contested international order, challenges to established norms, and alternative views of reality. This situation underlines the importance of activities in the IE. To remain vigilant, civilian and military leaders must understand political and cultural drivers behind competing for strategic narratives to provide early warnings, as well as to gain an overall sense of the competition surrounding US interests.

c. The joint force exercises multifunctional integration across Service components to protect and enable each other's unique capabilities (involving C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) to maximize outcomes. Commanders integrate the joint functional attributes and expertise from across all the CCMDs to achieve unity of effort.

d. **Aspects of the OE.** Physical, informational, and human aspects help describe the interactions that take place in an environment of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Physical aspects reflect and influence critical elements of group identity and frame how groups and communities form. Informational aspects reflect and influence how populations interact and communicate with each other and among themselves. Human aspects drive behavior and actions in a particular way. Understanding the interplay between the physical, informational, and human aspects provides a unified view of the OE.

(1) Physical Aspects. Beyond just the physical terrain, these reflect how the material characteristics of the OE, both natural and manufactured, create constraints on and


freedoms for the people and information systems that operate in it. They are critical elements of group identity and frame how ethnic groupings and communities form. Additionally, physical aspects enhance or inhibit how people exchange information.

(2) Informational Aspects. Informational aspects reflect the ways individuals, information systems, and groups communicate and exchange information within the OE. An observer uses these features and details of activities to interpret and assign meaning. They include (but are not limited to) timing, platforms, location, and duration. Informational aspects derived from sensory inputs that are physical in nature are generally more impactful. All campaigns' operations, activities, and investments create effects in the IE. Such inherent informational aspects or effects of military actions occur whether the joint force intends to create them. Simply because something can be done does not mean that it should be done. In the strategic environment, CCDRs consider how to use operations, actions, and investments to pursue policy aims while maximizing positive effects.

(3) Human Aspects. All actions create effects in the IE as people perceive actions and respond to them based on their individual or group perceptions. For this reason, understanding, anticipating, and influencing human behavior through nonlethal means may provide desirable alternatives to lethal options. Human aspects influence how people perceive, process, and act upon information by affecting how the human mind applies meaning to information. They reflect the worldview through which relevant actors perceive situations, identify appropriate behaviors, and make decisions, as well as how they interact with each other and their environment. Social, cultural, linguistic, and psychological elements interact with the information and physical environments to evolve this worldview and shape human behavior. Actions that are legal and appropriate for their primary purpose may result in provocative and inappropriate unintended effects in the human dimension.

e. A Systems Perspective

(1) The OE is a set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the other (see Figure IV-1). The nature and interaction of these systems affect how the commander plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. The JFC's international partners and other civilian participants regularly focus on systems other than the military, so the JFC and staff should understand these systems and how military operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other systems can help or hinder the JFC's mission. A shared understanding among stakeholders involved in the operation can influence actions beyond the JFC's directive authority and promote a unified approach to achieve objectives. For example, global corporations maintain global presence, unique capabilities, and influence throughout the OE. DOD must often compete with interagency partners, multinational forces, NGOs, the local populace, civil commerce, and enemy and/or adversaries for commercial capacity. Commercial capabilities are also vulnerable to enemy and/or adversary disruption as well as market factors.



(2) Understanding sociopolitical systems within an OE and how the systems interact and change increases the JFC's knowledge of actions within a system and can explain causal links between actions and effects. Planners develop and leverage the perspective of competitors within these systems that influence the OE. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources of warning intelligence and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, enemy, and neutral systems, while identifying critical nodes and vulnerabilities. A networked approach enables success in confronting problem sets and

addressing them comprehensively. Understanding competitors and how they relate to each other helps identify potential levers to influence their behavior.

(3) An understanding of the OE builds through cross-functional participation. The joint force staff collaborates with various intelligence organizations, USG departments and agencies, local partners, and nongovernmental entities. The JFC should consider the best way to manage or support this cross-functional effort, typically led by the J-2 through the JIPOE process. A variety of factors, including planning time available, affect the fidelity of a systems perspective.

(4) Network analysis and network engagement can build upon a systems perspective by providing additional understanding of relationships among actors, particularly in OEs or when dealing with networked threat environments. Network engagement can provide a framework for understanding the interrelationships and motivations of groups and networks. Network analysis also facilitates identification of significant information that might otherwise go unnoticed. This insight can include uncovering unrecognized positions of power within related groups, accounting for structure and organization, finding individuals or nodes who are critical, avoiding cognitive bias, and facilitating measuring change over time. It can also help identify primary and secondary impacts across networks and can help synchronize interactions, engagement, and targeting across mission areas to avoid or minimize conflicts. Once the JFC identifies the networks in the OE and understands their interrelationships, functions, motivations, and vulnerabilities, the commander can tailor the force to apply the most effective tools to engage neutral networks and counter the threat.

For further guidance on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning. For additional information on network engagement, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

2. Global Integration

a. Global integration enables DOD leadership to provide advice, make timely decisions, and inform operational priorities and institutional investment choices across CCMDs and multiple time horizons. Global integration requires a global perspective organized around and against priority challenges with global campaigns and a posture to execute contingency plans associated with each challenge. Within each GCP, CCDRs use broad mission areas to structure how CCMDs can execute each global campaign. Within each mission area of a global campaign, the joint force executes subordinate operations, activities, and investments to address specific aspects of the priority challenges. The result of integration is effective joint campaigns and operations employing cohesive military actions arranged across time and multiple AORs to achieve strategic objectives and balance strategic risk.

b. Competition between great powers encompasses the physical domains, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. This approach is necessary to address the threats that comprise the contemporary strategic environment. Competition manifested by malign influence and antagonistic behaviors has emerged as a central challenge to the joint

force. Achieving strategic objectives requires the joint force to execute actions with a global perspective, integrate joint functions across geographic boundaries and all domains, and align the campaigning effort with interagency, multinational, and other interorganizational partners. Campaigning is how the joint force integrates and balances across time and AORs to achieve the objectives of military strategy within acceptable risk. Global campaign planning occurs at the JS and CCMD levels. Global campaigns occur across the competition continuum.

c. GCPs are identified in the JSCP and based on strategic guidance. The global campaigns address the priority challenges identified in the national strategy. They integrate joint force actions across geographic AOR boundaries and global missions. The CJCS also addresses specific functional and regional challenges that span across geographic boundaries, the physical domains, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. GCPs address threats and challenges requiring coordination across multiple CCMDs.

d. The joint force most often operates between peace and war. The competition continuum (discussed further in Chapter V, “The Competition Continuum”) is a series of overlapping states of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict to distinguish strategic relationships between actors. In practice, commanders spend most of the time executing campaign requirements within the cooperation and competition portions of the competition continuum. Accomplishing global integration requires the joint force to employ a top-down, CJCS-led approach that integrates planning, prioritizes resources, mitigates risk, and assesses joint force progress toward strategic objectives for SecDef.

e. The joint force can achieve global integration when the following conditions are met:

(1) Civilian and military leaders make timely decisions at the speed required to outpace adversaries. Decision making requires a common intelligence picture and a shared understanding of global force posture to see operations in real time; identify opportunities to seize the initiative; and identify trade-offs, risk, and opportunity costs. Automation, preplanned responses, and mission command are essential to act at the required speed of relevance.

(2) Civilian and military leaders coordinate and nest military actions within a whole-of-government approach and include our allies and PNs in global campaigns. In an environment where requirements exceed inventory, force posture must reinforce our strength, agility, and resilience across regions and throughout the OE. Once committed, civilian and military leaders must rapidly confront enemies and adversaries, understand global tradeoffs across CCMDs, and communicate risk with a global vice regional perspective.

f. The CJCS provides clear options with acceptable global risk in the form of military advice to SecDef that prioritizes GCPs and CCPs. SecDef gains an understanding of risk through this process as guidance is prepared.

g. The practice of global integration continuously informs decision making across planning, force management and employment, and force development and design. Achieving global integration requires the combination of the Services and CCMDs to provide precise and timely global military solutions in support of national policy objectives. A comprehensive body of assessments provides a firm analytical foundation for this process.

h. Adversaries compete with increased efforts short of armed conflict, violating the principle of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and blurring the lines between civil and military goals. The joint force anticipates the adversary's actions and leverages multiple CCMDs' support.

i. Global Force Management (GFM) and Dynamic Force Employment Framework

(1) The GFM process aligns force apportionment, assignment, allocation, and readiness methodologies in support of strategic guidance and force availability. This strategic guidance validates CCDR requirements and allocates accordingly. These requirements include forces identified for contingency campaigns and necessary to support the execution of the global campaigns.

(2) The GFM process provides insight into the global posture of forces and the availability of forces and capabilities for plans and operations. This insight provides senior decision makers with a construct to assess impacts and risks associated with proposed changes to posture and employment. GFM balances current demands with readiness recovery to enable the force to execute contingency campaigns and improve performance through force development. CCMDs execute their corresponding campaigns based on the forces allocated through GFM. Additionally, contractors may comprise a portion of the deployed force. They are not part of the GFM processes and do not report readiness. It is essential to integrate them in planning and risk assessments as required by DODI 3000.12, *Management of US Global Defense Posture (GDP)*. Commercial capabilities (infrastructure, services, and associated personnel) align with organic posture elements (footprint, agreements, and forces) and may enable or optimize each element.

(3) Global and contingency campaigns use current posture and force levels due to the long timeline required to make posture adjustments. Force posture incorporates expected future risk, campaign requirements, and force design. Optimizing posture requires incorporating appropriate future scenario development that accounts for both observed and anticipated shifts in friendly, partner, and adversary capabilities.

(4) The CJCS directs the JS to manage the JS's global integration process; coordinate dynamic force employment; and enable oversight, review, and refinement of the enduring global campaigns during execution. Dynamic force employment is one of DOD's force employment initiatives for competition with primary threat challengers to assure allies, counter coercive gradualism, and deter armed conflict. The joint force plans and executes dynamic force employment in the context of ongoing global campaigns.

Civilian and military leaders seek to execute dynamic force employment to take advantage of strategic opportunities. These opportunities recognize chances or DAs to change the strategic environment in the United States' favor in terms of influence, position, or leverage. The potential gain or achievement offered by the strategic opportunity might require additional resources; a change of force disposition; a change of narrative, theme, or message; or a change to the joint force's task and purpose. Operationally, dynamic force employment presents a global and all-domain challenge to an adversary. An effective dynamic force employment activity may have the strategic effect of establishing initiative, complicating or changing adversarial decision making relative to a specific contested interest, demonstrating strategic agility and flexibility, or inducing strategic or operational tempo. CCDRs employ forces in combination with strategic messaging, cyberspace, space, and special access capabilities to compete globally.

(5) Dynamic Force Employment Cycle

(a) Iterations of dynamic force employment within a GCP have emerging cycles. Successful iterations of dynamic force employment have patterns where CCDRs begin by continuously observing the environment in the context of evaluating their campaign's progress. CCDRs and staff determine the emerging trends relative to the current state of their campaigns and principal narratives. They also identify what unforeseen activities have emerged. Civilian and military leaders then decide what narratives and objectives need adjustment or reinforcement. Next, CCDRs determine opportunities to advance campaign objectives, reinforce narratives, and gain or maintain relative advantage through agile joint campaigns and operations. In the initial formulation of dynamic force employment, CCDRs consider these questions:

1. Why is this circumstance an opportunity (cost/benefit)?
2. How will exploiting it reinforce narratives and advance objectives?
3. Will exploiting this opportunity improve US strategic or operational leverage?
4. What is the potential intelligence loss/gain?
5. What limitations should we conceal/reveal?
6. What are the (opportunity) risks in doing/not doing it?

(b) CCDRs then consider military options in context with other instruments of national power. They identify ways/means to exploit the opportunity (e.g., COAs). Then CCDRs determine if dynamic force employment is the optimal choice. CCDRs should decide how the dynamic force employment nests in their campaign by explaining the implications to the overall campaign strategy. Next, they determine the forces, capabilities, authorities, and support required for execution, collection, and assessment. CCDRs identify the required forces beyond currently assigned and allocated forces and the

required support. Then CCDRs choose the best COA. On many occasions, CCDRs request force augmentation as required. In refining the request, CCDRs should ask these questions:

1. How long does the commander need the force to create the effect?
 2. How will the CCMD employ the force?
 3. What are the key indicators and collection requirements?
 4. How will the CCDR know that the dynamic force employment did or did not work? (Metrics to assess success.)
 5. What are the anticipated adversary reactions/responses? What are the options to modify or reinforce the dynamic force employment?
- (c) Upon approval, the CCDR makes the necessary preparations to employ the force and implement appropriate messaging. During execution of the dynamic force employment, CCDRs ensure all necessary mechanisms are in place and aligned. Once in transition, the CCDRs continue to observe the “new” environment. They determine what has changed due to the action in the context of what the CCDR anticipated. Next, CCDRs determine if the operation was successful (MOPs/MOEs). Finally, CCDRs decide how to follow through on the dynamic force employment’s impact on the OE.

3. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

a. The JSCP fulfills the CJCS’s statutory responsibilities in Title 10, USC, Section 153, to assist the President and SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States. The JSCP provides the framework for military direction to the joint force, implementing and augmenting the President’s and SecDef’s guidance found in the NSS, UCP, CPG, and NDS, and in the CJCS’s guidance in the NMS. The JSCP provides guidance for CCMDs, Services, the JS, and DOD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans and establishes a common set of processes, products, roles, and responsibilities to globally integrate the operations, activities, and investments of the joint force. The CCDRs then operationalize and execute the campaign plan. The JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to integrate the joint force’s global operations, activities, and investments across the competition continuum.

b. There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, FCPs, and CCPs.

(1) GCPs are an integral part of the revised JSPS. The JS develops and maintains the GCPs for SecDef approval. GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. The JSCP identifies GCPs based on guidance in the NDS and NMS. GCPs are the centerpiece of global integration and form the base of the JSCP.

(2) FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are unbound geographically but require coordination across multiple CCMDs. The CJCS directs FCP planning through the JSCP or a planning order to CCMDs.

(3) The CCPs are the primary means through which the CCMDs collaboratively develop operations, activities, and investments within their UCP-assigned mission/AOR. CCMDs' execution of CCPs orient on functional/theater objectives in support of objectives directed by GCPs and, as applicable, FCPs.

c. The JSCP integrates the global campaigns by balancing capabilities between campaign and contingency plans for resources and risks. This balancing effort ensures global campaigns and their associated contingencies link with each other. The JSCP also directs contingency planning consistent with the CPG. It expands on the CPG with specific objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP directs, and the CJCS further integrates, contingency plans within an ICP. Additionally, the JSCP delineates support plans to foster joint force collaboration and coordination across time and space. The coordinating authority assigns a joint force organization as a collaborator that supports integrated planning. Where campaign plans support enduring requirements, contingency plans support operations that react to crisis scenarios, hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions. Campaign and contingency plans are not prepared or executed in isolation from each other. Campaign plans develop the integrated deterrence, assurance, and support activities that attempt to prevent contingencies from happening and establish conditions to respond should deterrence fail.

4. Global Campaigning

a. The joint force campaigns across the competition continuum. GCPs and CCPs encompass concurrent and related operations, activities, and investments to achieve operational-level objectives that support achievement of strategic objectives. In concert with other instruments of national power, these actions not only maintain or achieve strategic objectives but also anticipate a future beyond those objectives. The actions include many Service component operations, joint operations, and continual alignment of military actions with interorganizational and multinational partners.

b. Policy drives campaigning to pursue strategic objectives that are broad, transregional, and global, requiring many more parallel actions and substantially more diverse operational-level objectives. Campaigning is the result of strategic discussion, policy, and operational-level planning and execution. An effective and continual civilian-military dialogue guides the process, ensuring integration between military operations within DOD and alignment with other USG departments and agencies. Campaigning in pursuit of GCP and CCP objectives occurs over many years. The President and SecDef determine when GCPs or CCPs require revision.

c. Across the competition continuum, cooperation can require the employment of numerous smaller military and nonmilitary efforts implemented and adjusted over long

durations. For competition, success can require efforts to accomplish an array of diverse activities across numerous OAs to gain influence, advantage, and leverage.

d. For global campaigning, success may be measured in the prevention of armed conflict. However, success in armed conflict may require an overlapping series of campaigns characterized with multiple iterations of enemy and friendly offensives, counteroffensives, and transitions. Throughout armed conflict, commanders have to confront and endure surprise and failure. In the aftermath of armed conflict, senior military and civilian officials may direct joint forces to enforce the resulting military success through a continued occupation of seized territory. JFCs continue supporting efforts to ensure enemy compliance and maintain the strategic objectives after the transition of an area to civil authority.

5. Global Campaign Considerations

a. Global campaigning requires additional considerations. While the elements of operational design remain valid for all planning, this discussion elaborates on the issue of global campaigns as enduring efforts that require an expanded perspective and array of considerations.

b. Collectively, the array of considerations run throughout planning, execution, assessment, and refinement. These considerations facilitate the link between the strategy and the implementation and conduct of global campaign or required changes. These considerations orient on outcomes beyond just military success, while recognizing that national guidance continually evolves and that definitive conclusion and finality are rare in most circumstances involving global campaign efforts.

c. These considerations for global campaigns may inform and enable effective application of joint force capabilities beyond the context of a battle and strengthen the alignment between instruments of national power. Determining favorable ends requires a deep understanding of the strategic environment and shifting circumstances. The joint force cannot succeed without a complete understanding of the adversary and all the relevant actors. An inadequate understanding can lead to an incorrect or even flawed approach. Additionally, when an emerging situation exceeds the scope, scale, or responsibility of a single CCDR or global campaign, the joint forces' senior leadership will determine an appropriate response, including the likely supported and supporting commanders, diagnosing the matter through the lens of the global campaign design considerations.

(1) **Strategic Analysis.** JFCs and staff develop and make decisions by fully understanding the perspective of the adversary, reason for their actions, comprehensive recognition of all their capabilities, actions that could convince them to change their behavior, and the fundamental stakes and value that the United States assigns to the set of contested interests. A complete analysis requires identifying the root causes, incentives, and aspirations behind threat actions. This comprehension provides insight and appreciation for the threat's decision making. The diagnosis helps mitigate cognitive bias and avoid mirror-imaging, or the mistake of substituting their calculus with ours. This analysis is necessary to formulate and implement a long-term competitive strategy to

maintain an advantage, apply or counter coercion, and, if necessary, wage warfare. An effective global campaign requires understanding what an adversary is doing and why they are doing it. The analysis includes an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of various actors, involving a long-term and comprehensive assessment. Assessments inform senior decision makers responsible for long-range national security planning and frame the state of the competition by identifying key long-term trends and major asymmetries of the competition. Additionally, the assessment provides insight to the operational concepts and strategies of the United States in contrast to adversaries, allies and partners, and other international actors that are relevant to the competition. Effective competition and contingency planning requires a deep and accurate perspective of a competitor's decision-making process, doctrine, and capabilities in the context of strengths and weaknesses relative to the joint force.

(2) Range of Possible Outcomes. Successful global campaigns require the joint force to maintain and continually update an appraisal of a range of possible outcomes for cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The complexity of a contested environment makes it likely that, in most cases, these evaluations will span a range of alternative futures, each with a mix of favorable and unfavorable outcomes. In complex environments, monitoring, evaluating, and learning how different approaches' interactions may unfold are critical to understanding the longer-term and broader impacts of actions and activities. Considerations of criteria that run throughout planning, execution, and refinement include:

- (a) Whether a valuable and attainable outcome exists that exceeds the long-term opportunity costs.
- (b) Whether failure would yield a tolerable condition, an armistice, or an otherwise new but unstable and unfavorable regional or global homeostasis.
- (c) Whether the nation can financially afford to embark upon the type of operations required and for the necessary duration.
- (d) Can the effort succeed if pursued under the worst foreseeable circumstances?

(3) Anticipate the Consequences. While anticipation is key to effective planning, successful global campaigns require the joint force to maintain and continually update a realistic appraisal of the potential consequences. The appraisal includes recognizing the risks incurred across other regions and interests, the inherent fragility and sustainability of any gains we hope to realize, and re-characterized competitions that would almost certainly emerge as a result of success. Additionally, the appraisal should recognize how greater influence or strategic advantage in competition or, in the case of armed conflict, "victory" and successful follow-through, might reshape the strategic environment in unforeseen or unprecedented ways. Fundamental to global integration is a continuous joint force assessment regarding the aggregate threat, policy refinements, posture, ongoing activities, readiness, and prioritization. For any change of a CCDR's GCP or CCP, there is likely a cost and shift of risk.

(4) **Commander's Vision.** An overarching vision enables commanders and staff to arrange military operations, activities, and actions so that they produce the desired conditions, behaviors, and outcomes. An effective global campaign organizes around the visualization of **what** is required to achieve the objectives and **why** it should succeed in the face of uncertain reality. In complex environments, while past experiences and expert opinion often provide the best starting points, ultimately the linkages between cause and effect cannot be fully known. Initial assumptions may need validation through understanding the results of activities and actions in that specific environment. The results might change as underlying variables shift as a result of changes in the environment over time. Thus, commanders re-assess and revalidate the initial logic of the approach as the campaign progresses. These insights enable the campaign to account for all the adversary's foundational factors driving their decisions. Overall, the commander's visualization should provide conviction and confidence for the approach. JFCs having well-developed relationships with other military advisors and policymakers are in the best position to maintain the campaign's relevance.

(5) **Operational Direction.** Successful global campaigns are a function of commanders planning and directing relevant subordinate operations and activities. This direction requires a comprehensive vision of the **conditions** and **behaviors** the joint force must create and enables them to achieve strategic objectives. As an aspect of policy formulation, the JFC envisions what CONOPS is necessary to reach those outcomes. This context provides input in the formulation of the corresponding operational-level objectives.

(6) **Campaign Narrative.** As part of a global campaign, the CCDRs develop nested narratives that reflect strategic objectives and target threats. These narratives influence perceptions, behaviors, and, ideally, undermine and delegitimize adversary narratives. Consequently, JFCs should avoid taking actions running contradictory to the narrative. An effective narrative removes ambiguity and clarifies the US position, providing a more compelling and believable alternative to the adversary's narrative. In practice, the use of force should support and reinforce the desired narrative, not replace it.

(7) **Follow-Through and Enduring Efforts.** To translate military success into acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes, JFCs and staffs develop and implement a long-term approach that focuses the global campaign over time and appreciates the difference between cumulative military achievement and overall policy success. Historically, the joint force has contributed toward both, or neither would have occurred. The CJCS and CCDRs ensure the global campaign continues, just in different forms. In many cases, these interests and influences are regional or at least external to previous competition or armed conflict.

(8) **Authorities.** Policy enables the effective complementary employment of the various instruments of national power. CCDRs understand how and when policy enables successful global campaigns but must contend with tensions between policy aims and the authority to pursue objectives. CCDRs continually advocate for the necessary authority and permissions to achieve the objectives. More times than not, objectives are broad, while the authorities to pursue those objectives are narrow or limited. The discussion surrounding authorities helps CCDRs crystalize the opportunity costs of pursuing desired

objectives. Commanders and staffs should collaborate with other USG departments and agencies as many necessary authorities reside outside DOD. JFCs do not assume that, with an EXORD, all necessary authorities and permissions naturally follow. JFCs identify required authorities and permissions throughout global campaign design, implementation, and refinement. JFCs describe the risk to achieving the strategic objectives should any portion of authorities be withheld.

(9) **Alignment.** The USG's ability to achieve strategic objectives depends on employing the instruments of national power in effective combinations for all possible situations. In practice, departmental and organizational boundaries often make full integration of the instruments of national power an unachievable expectation. A more realistic goal is to align efforts across departments, which, in most cases, is enough. The nature of alignment varies with the situation. At the President's direction, interorganizational cooperation aligns military power with other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. They also identify how military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other to achieve national security objectives.

(10) **Resourcing.** Successful global campaigns require synchronized, prioritized, and deconflicted resourcing. The CJCS, CCDRs, and OSD align the resourcing with the campaign plan. The perspective of resourcing should be clear about the costs to achieve success and the opportunity costs to maintain any favorable outcome. With many competing demands for resources, this is difficult at any given time. Over extended periods of competition or protracted warfare, determining sustainable resourcing is even more challenging. Nonetheless, achieving sustainable strategic outcomes requires a sustainable level of resource effort. No JFC has unlimited resources available to do with as they please, especially in the multinational realm. Rather, DOD and other nations make forces available, and JFCs must coherently put them together. The resources, including people, equipment, facilities, and time, have a major impact on the design of the global campaign.

(11) **Force Architecture.** Effective global campaigns require a force architecture that enables the necessary C2 of joint forces. Whatever the nature and the scale of the problem, an optimized operational architecture should enable each contributing component to play an effective role. A sound force architecture leverages the full range of skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment of the joint force's leadership, as well as the full suite of capabilities toward appropriate individual operations within the global campaign's design. Fundamentals include proper authority delegated to the appropriate commanders to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among subordinate organizations. A JFC may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force to avoid reducing subordinate commanders' versatility, responsiveness, and initiative.

6. Operational and Strategic Objectives

a. While operational and strategic objectives are uniquely different, they must link with one another. Successful campaign planning continuously interprets and predicts potential requirements that originate from the commander's vision to formulate guidance

for operational design. In following the commander's vision throughout the process, forces arrange to achieve the operational objectives. However, rapid adaptation to failure or exploitation of success may drive numerous revisions and changes in prioritization of operational objectives. Operational progress may temporarily constrain enemy actions; complicate their choices; and shrink their relevant influence, relationships, capability, and credibility.

- b. Strategic objectives are expressions of national interests. In practice, some strategic objectives are expressions of policy, not necessarily physical entities. The keys to achieving strategic objectives can exist thousands of miles from any particular challenge, in orbit around the Earth, reside as disaggregated sentiment spread across several continents, or within information activities. Effective global campaigning reaches beyond individual regions; otherwise, joint campaigns and operations address only symptoms.
- c. As global campaigns include more than one strategic objective, these objectives may require prioritization across the USG. Orienting on these objectives requires an interorganizational approach, an organized framework, and precise terminology.

7. The Joint Operation

a. Joint operation is a general term that describes military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other. Any single joint operation may be subordinate to a campaign or part of a larger campaign. A commander is responsible for the development and execution of an individual operation. Most individual operations are a sum of tactical actions designed to accomplish essential tasks leading to military objectives. Individual operations are typically sequential and unfold by phases or branches as crafted by a commander. A commander may design any number of phases to support mission execution. The phasing of discrete operations remains an important organizational tool. When individual operations conclude or terminate, commanders transition to the next operation or activity as appropriate. The accomplishments of a single operation rarely equate to the entirety of an operational objective or produce a strategic objective or policy outcome.

b. Successful individual operations incrementally advance toward operational-level objectives. What matters in these individual operations is the ability to adapt to certain circumstances by executing branches and sequels.

8. Phasing a Joint Operation

a. Phasing is a way to organize and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The phases are unique for each operation as a tool to integrate and synchronize related activities, in time and space within available resources, thereby enhancing C2 to improve flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Phases in a plan are distinct and sequential; however, activities often overlap between the phases. Within the phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. For example, the JFLCC or a subordinate commander might have the following operations inside a single phase of a

higher HQ: deploy, forcible entry, and defend the beachhead. One caution for commanders is to avoid the tendency of forcing the actual OE and the situation it presents to fit previously planned phases as circumstances unfold that can make the most brilliant set of phases irrelevant. For example, planned phasing associated with the prelude or run-up to armed conflict can artificially assume the situation presented by the adversary, the force flow, the US national decision making, and the logic of the phases will all match, align, and unfold together. In reality, these may not align, and adherence to the phases can disrupt, constrain, and even set back the strategic discussion and policy formulation. Operationally, arbitrary phases can artificially separate capabilities that must work together. What matters in execution is adapting to the actual changes in the OE and enemy actions.

(1) During planning, the JFC establishes the conditions, objectives, and transitions from one phase to another. Additionally, JFCs plan sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases often identify transitions in focus or main effort, enabling the joint force to synchronize efforts. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy and operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

(2) A CCP may encompass all operations and activities for which the CCDR is responsible, from relatively small-scale SC activities, deterrence activities, and actions leading to transition to armed conflict and execution of large-scale combat operations. However, use of the groups of activities for the purpose of phasing applies only to planning and executing individual operations, whether small-scale contingencies or large-scale combat operations that support the CCP. The groups of military activities associated with phases can serve as a frame of reference that facilitates common understanding among interagency partners, multinational partners, and supporting commanders of how a JFC intends to execute a specific joint operation and progress during execution.

(3) **Considerations for a Joint Operation.** Most individual, large-scale joint operations share certain activities or actions. There are general groups of military activities that may typically occur in preparation for and during a single, large-scale joint operation.

(a) Shaping activities are usually ongoing and may continue during and after the operation. The purpose of shaping activities is to help set the conditions for successful execution of the operation. Shaping operations and activities vary in magnitude, time, intensity, and forces as the operation progresses by phase. At various points in time, each specific group might characterize the main effort of the joint force. Some joint operations below the level of large-scale combat will have distinguishable groups of activity. However, JFCs may compress or not use some activities entirely according to the nature of the operation. For example, the deployment of forces associated with seizing the initiative may have a deterrent effect sufficient to dissuade an enemy from conducting further operations, returning the OE to a more stable state. Shaping activities may include long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, SC, and deterrence actions to assure partners, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Shaping activities drawn from a fundamental understanding of the OE help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor, adversary, and enemy actions that may challenge country and regional stability. Knowledge gained and assessment of these activities

provide a deeper, and common, understanding of the OE. Intelligence activities inform planning, execution, and assessment, and improve the JFC's understanding of the OE. Shaping activities may occur through other interorganizational participants (e.g., USG departments and agencies, PNs), with DOD in a supporting role. The joint community, in concert with multinational and interagency partners, must maintain and exercise strong regional partnerships to ensure the operational access that enables mission success. For example, obtaining and maintaining rights of navigation and overflight help ensure global reach and rapid projection of military power.

(b) Successful deterrence prevents an enemy's or adversary's undesirable actions because the threat perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of acting. Commanders weight deterrent actions toward protection and security activities characterized by preparatory actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. A number of FDOs, flexible response options (FROs), and force enhancements could be implemented to support deterrence. The nature of these options varies according to the nature of the threat (e.g., traditional or irregular, state or non-state), the threat's actions, US strategic objectives, and other factors. Once a crisis is definitive, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of intelligence collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC's CONOPS. CCDRs continue to conduct military engagement with multinational partners to maintain access to areas, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Many deterrent actions build on SC activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

(c) JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive activities at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy's initial aggression and to deny the enemy its initial objectives. Operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

(d) These actions focus on controlling the OE and in armed conflict breaking the enemy's will to resist. Joint force options include attacking weaknesses at the leading edge of the enemy's defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces back and striking in-depth to threaten the integrity of the enemy's A2/AD systems, offensive weapons, force projection capabilities, and defensive systems. Operations can range from large-scale combat to various stabilization actions depending on the nature of the enemy.

(e) These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained operations to stabilization activities. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent is to help restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may have the lead during

part or all of this period, but the JFC will typically provide significant supporting capabilities and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance (i.e., military government) and integrate the efforts of other supporting interagency and multinational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations on the ability to transfer authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity.

(f) Joint force support to civil governance typically characterizes enabling civil authority actions and activities. The commander provides this support by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to govern and administer the services and other needs of the population. The objective is typically reached during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. CCMD involvement with other nations and other USG departments and agencies beyond the end of the joint operation, such as CMO, lower-level stabilization activities, and FHA, may be required to achieve national objectives.

For more information on stabilization activities, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities.

(4) Transitions

(a) During execution, a transition marks a change between phases or between ongoing operations and execution of a branch or sequel. This shift in focus by the joint force often is accompanied by changes in command or support relationships and priorities of effort. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution. The activities that are prevalent during a given phase rarely align with neatly definable break or end points. Commanders identify the need to move into another phase by assessing that a set of objectives has been achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change for the joint force. Thus, the transition to a new phase is usually driven by events rather than time. An example is the shift from sustained combat operations to stabilization activities to enable civil authority. Through continuous assessment, the staff measures progress toward planned transitions so that the force prepares for and executes them.

(b) An operation's planned phases are conceptually distinct in time and purpose from one another but must build upon or toward each other. The phases should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the operation. Each phase should have a set of starting conditions that define the initiation of the phase and satisfactory conditions that mark a transition to the next phase. In planning, the ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. In execution, commanders rarely experience this uniformly.

(c) Sometimes, the situation facing the JFC will change unexpectedly and without apparent correlation to a planned transition. The JFC may choose to shift operations to address unanticipated critical changes. The JFC must recognize fundamental changes in the situation and respond quickly and smoothly. Failure to do so can cause the joint force to lose momentum, miss important opportunities, experience setbacks, or fail to

accomplish the mission. Conversely, successful transitions enable the joint force to maintain the initiative and quickly and efficiently garner favorable results. The JFC should anticipate transformations, as well as plan shifts, during operations.

Refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, for additional information on phasing UW operations. Refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information on SC's role in helping set conditions for successful theater operations.

b. Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stabilization Activities

(1) Combat missions and tasks can vary widely depending on context of the operation and the objective. Most combat operations will require the commander to balance offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities. This is particularly evident in a large-scale operation, where combat can occur during several phases and stabilization activities may occur throughout the operation.

(2) In armed conflict, campaigns and major operations involve large-scale combat operations that normally include offensive and defensive components (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, countering air and missile threats, DCO, base defense). Although defense may be the stronger form, offense is normally decisive in combat. To achieve military objectives quickly and efficiently, JFCs normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations. Nevertheless, during a sustained offensive, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Accordingly, certain defensive measures and protection activities (e.g., OPSEC) are required throughout each joint operation phase. Joint forces at all levels should be capable of rapid transition between offense and defense and vice versa. The relationship between offense and defense is a complementary one.

(3) Commanders conduct stabilization activities to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. To achieve objectives, JFCs integrate and synchronize stabilization activities with offense and defense, as necessary, during the phases of an operation. Stabilization activities support USG stabilization efforts and contribute to USG initiatives to build partnerships. These initiatives set the conditions to interact with partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. The JFC will likely conduct stabilization activities in coordination with or in support of interorganizational participants, the private sector, or indigenous populations and institutions. Stabilization activities are conducted outside the United States.

For further guidance on stabilization activities, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities. For further guidance on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

(4) Balance and Simultaneity

(a) Commanders strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously throughout the OA. The challenge of balance and simultaneity affects all operations involving combat, particularly within campaigns, due to their scope. Consequently, JFCs often concentrate in some areas or on specific functions and require economy of force in others. However, plans for campaigns and major operations will normally exhibit a balance between offense, defense, and stabilization activities in various phases. Planning for stabilization activities should begin when joint planning begins.

(b) If the focus of the CCMD's ongoing campaign is on prevention and preparation, any stabilization activities in the JFC's proposed OA might continue, and offense and defense activities may be limited or absent. Defensive activities might be limited to providing an increased level of security. A similar balance applies to deterrence activities, whether conducted as part of the CCP or on initiation of an operation plan (OPLAN) since the intent is to limit escalation in the OA. A JFC might begin to limit stabilization activities if an enemy's or adversary's potential hostile actions are imminent. While conducting primarily offense or defense activities, the focus is destroying the enemy, while stabilization activities may diminish or increase in more secure areas of the OA. As the joint force achieves objectives and hostile acts abate, the focus shifts to actions to stabilize the OA and enable civil authority or establish a temporary military government if required. Stabilization activities increase or resume in proportion to the decrease in the enemy's hostile intent.

(c) Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to assumption of responsibility by civil authority should begin during plan development and continue throughout a joint operation. An unnecessarily narrow focus on planning offensive and defensive operations may threaten stabilization and enabling civil authority efforts, thus negatively affecting joint operation momentum. Even during sustained combat operations, the joint force should establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as areas are occupied, bypassed, or returned to civilian control. Planning for FHA should be coordinated through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (if it has mission presence) and shared with the senior development advisor to the CCDR to avoid duplication of effort in the HN.

9. Organizing Operational Areas

a. **General.** While the UCP assigns AORs, CCDRs and other JFCs designate smaller OAs (e.g., JOA and AO) temporarily. OAs have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations unfold (the OA), the use of the term "domain" does not imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. The appropriate JFC specifies authorities and responsibilities within an OA. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of an OA and types of forces employed depend on the scope and nature of the mission. Every type of OA has an associated area of interest

(AOI) and area(s) of influence. Understanding the relationship between the AOI, area of influence, and the assigned OA helps commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and execution.

(1) An **AOI** includes the area of influence and adjacent areas and extends into hostile territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. An AOI focuses intelligence support for monitoring activities pertinent to the OA that may affect operations. The commander may describe the AOI graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure.

(2) An **area of influence** is a geographic area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and includes the assigned OA. The extent of a subordinate command's area of influence is one factor the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate's OA. Understanding the command's area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation that could require the force to employ capabilities outside the assigned OA. The commander can describe the area of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure for maneuver or fire support.

b. **CCMD-Level Areas.** When warranted, the President, SecDef, or CCDRs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation (see Figure IV-2). CCDRs can elect to control operations directly in these OAs or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose while remaining focused on the broader AOR. Operations that span CCMD boundaries may expose gaps in C2. DOD uses a mix of formal and informal processes to synchronize actions between AORs.

(1) **AOR.** An AOR is a geographical area established by the UCP within which a CCDR has the authority to plan for and conduct operations. CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish approved missions. CCDRs must coordinate cross-AOR operations among the affected CCMDs.

(2) **Theater of War.** The President, SecDef, or CCDR establishes a theater of war, which is a geographic area for campaigns and major operations involving combat. The United States establishes a theater of war when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for C2, sustainment, protection, or mutual support. A theater of war may not encompass a CCDR's entire AOR but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.

(3) **Theater of Operations.** A theater of operations is an OA defined by the CCDR for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope and scale of the operation or campaign exceeds what a JOA can normally accommodate. More than one joint force HQ can exist in a theater of operations. A CCDR may establish one or more theaters of operations. Different





Figure IV-2. Operational Areas within a Theater

theaters will normally focus on different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war but is large enough to allow for operations in-depth and over extended periods. Theaters of operations are normally associated with campaigns and major operations and may cross the boundary of two or more AORs.

c. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, or for specialized activities, the commander can establish the following OAs.

(1) **JOA.** A JOA is an area of land, sea, airspace, and cyberspace defined by a CCDR or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a commander, joint task force [CJTF]) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations have a limited scope and geographic area or when operations cross the boundaries of AORs or cover geography between two theaters (see Figure IV-3).

(2) **Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA).** A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of SOF to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discreet DA mission or may be

**Figure IV-3. Typical Operational Areas**

extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of UW operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations. The JFSOCC is the supported commander within the JSOA.

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

(3) Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). An AOA is normally established by the JFC or JFMCC for amphibious operations. The AOA is an area specifically for amphibious force operations. This area should be of adequate size to accomplish the amphibious force's mission and must provide enough area for conducting necessary maritime, air, and land operations.

For additional guidance on AOAs, refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

(4) AO. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass their entire OA but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions (to include a designated amount of airspace) and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other

component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and achieve unity of effort.

d. Contiguous and Noncontiguous OAs

(1) OAs may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure IV-4). When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When OAs are noncontiguous, subordinate commands do not share a boundary. The higher HQ retains responsibility for the unassigned portion of its OA.

(2) In some operations, a Service or functional component (typically the land component) could have such a large OA that the component's subordinate units operate in a noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond mutually supporting range of each other. In these cases, the JFC should consider options whereby joint capabilities are allocated at the level and placed under the control of units that can employ them most effectively.

e. Considerations When Assuming Responsibility for an OA. The establishing commander should activate an assigned OA at a specified date and time based on mission and situation considerations addressed during COA analysis and wargaming. Common considerations include C2, the IE, intelligence requirements, communications support, protection, security, LOCs, terrain management, movement control, airspace control, surveillance, reconnaissance, air and missile defense, PR, targeting and fires, interorganizational coordination, and environmental issues.

10. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

a. **In linear operations**, each commander directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. In linear operations, emphasis is on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and the massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods. A linear OA organization may be best for some operations. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or adequate forces. Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations enable commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more efficiently.

b. **In nonlinear operations**, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific effects on multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize operations along multiple LOOs from selected bases (ashore or afloat). In nonlinear operations, sustaining functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or aerial delivery. Noncombatants,




Figure IV-4. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

civilians, and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful judgment in clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and shock among enemy forces and commanders. The joint forces orient more on their assigned objectives (e.g., destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. For protection, individual forces rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the communications, intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

(1) During **nonlinear offensive operations**, attacking forces must focus offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum-essential combat power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility to respond where needed. JFCs may dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and base defense. Vulnerability increases as operations extend, and attacking forces operate over a larger OA. Linkup operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require extensive

planning and preparation. The potential for friendly fire incidents increases with the fluid nature of the nonlinear OA and the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces.

(2) During **nonlinear defensive operations**, defenders focus on destroying enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFCs intent and maintain a COP. Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some subordinates may conduct area defenses. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining large areas. Although less challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment security will still be a test. Securing sustainment operations and infrastructure may require the allocation of combat forces to protect LOCs and other high-risk functions or bases. The JFC must establish clear command relationships to properly account for the added challenges to base, base cluster, and LOC security.

c. AOs and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

(1) **General.** JFCs consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they conduct operational design. They choose the combination that fits the OE and the purpose of the operation. Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations creates the four combinations in Figure IV-5.

(2) **Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs.** Linear operations in contiguous AOs (upper left-hand pane in Figure IV-5) typify sustained offensive and defensive operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces. The contiguous areas and continuous forward line of own troops focus on combat power and protect sustainment functions.

(3) **Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs.** The upper right-hand pane of Figure IV-5 depicts a JFC's OA with subordinate component commanders conducting linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for that portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders' AOs.

(4) **Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs.** The lower left-hand pane in Figure IV-5 illustrates the JFC's entire assigned OA divided into subordinate AOs. Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear operations within their AOs. This combination is typically associated with stabilization activities and DSCA.

(5) **Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs.** The lower right-hand pane of Figure IV-5 depicts a JFC's OA with subordinate component commanders conducting nonlinear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for that portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders' AOs.




Figure IV-5. Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

11. Global Integration in Practice

- Global integration includes the entire joint force's actions, unfolding over different time horizons, and begins with the CJCS. In execution, the joint force campaigns to achieve operational-level objectives as described in the global campaigns, CCDR

campaigns, and standing EXORDs. To oversee execution and gauge the degree of effective integration, the CJCS's JS regularly examines and collaborates with each coordinating authority's ongoing campaign activities throughout the year of execution. Refinement and adjustment of global campaigns are typical and normal. One important aspect of global integration is to assess, understand, and evaluate the impact of how a proposed change in an effort, force, or direction for one part of the overall global campaign will cascade across the force. This evaluation includes not only impacts to ongoing operations for other global campaigns but also across the planning and force development time horizons. Assessing all the global campaigns enables senior military leadership to determine the validity and utility of the current guidance and overall strategy. The regular interactions between the CJCS's JS and the coordinating authority can lead to refinements within the execution year and provide input to annual assessments and considerations for future planning.

b. Global integration provides an opportunity to adjust, revise, and reinforce individual operations, activities, and investments without modifying plans. Throughout execution, senior military and civilian leaders use global integration to modify ongoing campaign efforts across the globe. Global integration enables CCDRs to recommend shifts in direction and effort for global campaigns by connecting annual campaign assessments with force allocation planning and weave together operational and institutional considerations such as investment choices. Each CCMDs' annual campaign assessment, CCDRs' feedback, intelligence communities' forecasts, and the JSPS assessments inform readiness programming and investment choices for future force development and employment.

12. The Global Campaign, Combatant Command Campaign, and Global Integration Framework

a. Title 10, USC, Section 153, directs the CJCS to prepare strategic plans, as required, and provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The CJCS provides advice on ongoing military operations and the allocation and transfer of forces among CCMDs. In performing this role in global integration, the CJCS is responsible for operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of the joint force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities. The CJCS, through the JSCP, assigns which sets of global challenges require GCPs and GIFs.

(1) GCPs. GCPs globally integrate the activities of the joint force to campaign against the priority challenges. GCPs contain linkages to key contingency plans, identify responsibilities, define objectives, and assign tasks. The CCDR, with the preponderance of responsibility for a GCP, generally serves as the coordinating authority.

(2) Coordinating Authority. To integrate CCMD planning for the global campaigns, the CJCS, in fulfilling the responsibilities relating to global integration, assigns a coordinating authority. A coordinating authority is generally a CCDR. The JSCP assigns the CCMD with oversight over a GCP and the role of coordinating authority, which provides collaborative authority to integrate planning from other CCMDs, CSAs, Services, USG departments and agencies, allies, and partners, as the designated lead for the problem

set. The CCDR has the preponderance of responsibility aligned to a problem set. The CCDR can direct collaborative planning but does not receive additional command authority beyond that already assigned in the UCP or other foundational documents. A coordinating authority does not have the authority to compel agreement or direct resource allocation between CCMDs or Services.

For more information, see JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force; CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

b. Executing the Global Campaign

(1) GCPs are integrated plans that address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. As problem-focused plans, GCPs look across CCMD seams and simultaneously provide direction to the CCDRs and military advice to SecDef. In execution, the GCPs are the focal point for integrated assessment and resource decisions regarding prioritization, posture, capabilities, risk, and risk mitigation measures.

(2) A coordinating authority performs three key functions: planning, assessing, and recommending approaches to develop integrated plans. Coordinating authorities use collaborative forums to support these functions and ensure multiple supported CCDRs' equities are accounted for in global campaigns (see CJCSI 3100.01, *Joint Strategic Planning System*).

(3) A collaborator is a joint force organization assigned in the JSCP to support integrated planning. The collaborator works with the coordinating authority to develop and assess the viability of globally integrated plans from their organization's perspective. CCPs are the centerpiece of the CCMDs' planning construct and operationalize the JSCP. CCPs incorporate intermediate objectives and tasks assigned to the CCMD from the GCPs and FCPs and support plan linkages, contingency plan linkages, and prioritization and risks in balancing the requirements placed on the CCMD. CCPs focus the command's enduring activities such as ongoing operations, military engagement, SC, deterrence, posture, basing, and other cooperative and competitive activities. CCPs organize and align operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCMD's objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theater or functional areas. CCDRs identify the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMDs, prioritize objectives, and commit those resources to create a favorable security environment within the OE and support the national strategic objectives. CCDRs evaluate the commitment of resources and make recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts associated with executing the command's missions.

(4) Joint Campaigns and Operations in Contingencies

(a) The joint force implements contingency plans in response to changes in the strategic environment. Contingency plans build and expand the global, functional, regional, or CCMD campaigns already in execution. The Presidentially approved CPG

direct contingency plans address designated threats, potentially catastrophic events, and contingent scenarios that can threaten one or more national interests and warrant military response options. This guidance provides the basis for CCMD contingency plans and global war planning.

(b) The JS develops GIFs to facilitate CJCS advice to SecDef and the President on global risks, trade-offs, and opportunity costs across and within campaigns during an emerging situation. A GIF provides considerations for modifications to a particular GCP, as well as analysis associated with the joint force's ability to meet global requirements for a crisis or transition to armed conflict. GIFs also identify potential President or SecDef decisions required to execute the global response to a priority challenge. These decisions may include expanded actions within a GCP, risk mitigation options, reallocation and escalation management decisions, and actions to preserve options. GIFs also identify potential President or SecDef decisions required to execute a global response to a priority challenge.

(c) CCDRs prepare contingency plans to address anticipated situations. At execution, CCDRs will likely have to modify plans to respond to the actual conditions at the time. If an approved contingency plan closely resembles the emergent scenario, CCDRs and their staff can refine or adapt it as necessary for execution. During a contingency response and activation of an ICP, enduring campaigns continue in modified form to account for changes in the OE and address resource allocation.

(d) After the contingency passes, the force transitions to face new competitive challenges or re-characterized competitions and international conditions. Post-contingency circumstances may require civilian and military leadership to reevaluate existing strategies and campaigns to sustain new strategic conditions and objectives.

1. Contingency planning builds upon and expands the GCPs or FCPs already in execution to address designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions. Contingency planning efforts are directed in the UCP, CPG, and JSCP, or by the CCDR. The UCP, CPG, and JSCP guide the development of plans to address potential threats that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that warrant military operations. Contingency plans account for the possibility that campaign activities could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or respond to a natural disaster. An ICP coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time and space to respond to a single contingency, which is in contrast to previous AOR-specific scenarios.

2. If the contingency plan is associated with a GIF, initial planning has been conducted to identify the requirements to reallocate and reassigned forces across the globe to meet the crisis or contingency execution requirements, including the impact of executing the crisis or contingency on ongoing GCPs and FCPs. Even with this preparation, all CCDRs and their planners must reassess the risk associated with cessation of ongoing campaigning activities and ensure the CJCS is informed of changes in the assessment.

c. **Readiness Reviews.** Readiness reviews are detailed assessments of global implications for the joint force in the event of contingency plan execution. Readiness reviews begin with an examination of threats, threat capabilities, and likely enemy COAs. A readiness review then analyzes the family of plans related to the designated contingency plan to identify friendly resource requirements, potential shortfalls in readiness, resources, and capabilities. The review also identifies ongoing operations and makes potential recommendations for changes to ongoing operations and campaign plans to meet the contingency plan requirements. The output of a readiness review is the GIF that identifies priorities across the joint force while in conflict and outlines decisions required by the President and SecDef for execution.

13. Global Effects Coordination

a. Armed conflict against peer competitors requires simultaneous supporting-supported relationships between multiple CCDRs. Global effects coordination employs global capabilities synchronized in time and tempo across multiple geographic regions to achieve campaign objectives. A global coordination process to ensure a global perspective; an appreciation of out-of-AOR threats; and the capability to coordinate and integrate global capabilities, fires, operations, and information can facilitate global effects. The outputs of global effects coordination among CCMDs via global battle rhythm working groups feed the best military advice to the CJCS.

b. Global effects coordination focuses primarily on integration and synchronization across the CCMDs to help prioritize lethal and nonlethal global effects. The global effects coordination process seeks to improve situational awareness across CCMD theater and functional responsibilities; identify opportunities, tensions, and consequences of joint force action or inaction; and align CCMD global operations to generate desired effects. To meet global campaign objectives and provide coordination of global effects, CCMDs synchronize and deconflict diverse capabilities of the joint force across the globe through multi-CCMD coordination working groups. Globally integrated planning and detailed coordination are required to integrate and synchronize global effects. SecDef-designated supported and supporting CCMD relationships define the roles and responsibilities for global effects planning and execution. The supported CCDRs provide fire support requirements for their AOR and/or missions to the supporting CCDRs. The supporting CCDRs, given their unique capabilities and expertise with those systems, may have competing views and objectives of the most effective use and tempo of those limited resources. Although the supported and supporting CCDRs may see the situation in a similar fashion, each CCDR may have different perspectives, high-payoff targets, and global fires requirements. The global effects coordination process enables CCMDs to continually assess the multiple supported CCMDs' high-payoff target and global fires requests in the context of evolving situations and make recommendations to the CCDRs and, when necessary, the CJCS and SecDef, as the most effective employment of globally integrated fires. The recommendations for global effects seek to optimize effectiveness of fire support and mitigate risk to friendly forces and functions in the supported commands' AORs, as well as risk to HD, strategic deterrence, and defense of national interests.

- c. Establishing global fire support requirements and synchronizing fire support actions are cross-CCMD and cross-boundary efforts, requiring a great deal of collaboration, close coordination, and information sharing. Effective cross-functional collaboration occurs through appropriate organizational processes that organize into elements, functional boards, and planning teams composed of representatives from across the CCMDs. Some degree of synchronization is necessary at the operational level to align actions and desired effects.
- d. Commanders and their planners should identify desired lethal and nonlethal effects early in the targeting and planning processes, and continuously thereafter. A clear understanding of the problem, planning guidance, commander's intent, and the operational framework provide the necessary direction for the coherent integration of effects at the operational level, while appropriately leaving synchronization and detailed execution to subordinate tactical units.
- e. Global battle rhythm working groups are key to providing global situational awareness across the OEs to all CCMDs to facilitate global integration of operations at the lowest echelon possible. The global battle rhythm meetings enable CCMD operations staffs to understand multiple, supported CCMD priorities. Staffs make recommendations for synchronizing operations across the globe that span multiple AORs and all domains. A common set of inputs for these working groups to integrate global effects includes who is requesting the effects support, who is providing the effects support, what are the desired effects, what are the consequences of action/inaction, and any unresolvable tensions.

f. The Use of Information

(1) Advances in information technology and the ease with which people and automated systems access and use information contribute to today's threats becoming increasingly sophisticated and dangerous. Within the OE, specific factors affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning, act upon, and judge impacted from information. The IE is the aggregate of these social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors. The IE is not distinct from any OE. It is an intellectual framework to help identify, understand, and describe how those often-intangible factors may affect the employment of forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. The informational factors that bear on the decisions of a commander are part of a commander's OE, just as the factors of the physical domains, cyberspace, and the EMS that affect the employment of forces and bear on the decisions of a commander are part of a commander's OE. The joint force leverages its understanding of the IE and the inherent informational aspects of military activities; improves the use of information to support decision making; counters adverse disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda; and synchronizes and unifies efforts across joint functions to create effects in the IE.

(2) **Understanding the IE.** Understanding the IE is critical to global integration because information affects the OE at a faster pace than ever. The IE is more complex, and threats are more global. Understanding adversarial perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors toward their global influence objectives will help address the problem. The joint

force improves its ability to conduct globally integrated operations by understanding the relevant audiences. These audiences impact joint force outcomes. Understanding what information drives those audiences' behaviors is essential.

(a) Information capabilities and activities often require knowledge of adversaries that is not common to traditional intelligence analysis and productions. OIE require answers to questions such as: Which audiences are affecting joint force objectives and why? Which audiences share joint force goals and objectives? What themes and messages created under the base narrative or tactical narrative might help specific audiences understand the threat they face from an adversary or threat? What information is being concealed by autocratic leaders from their internal audiences, and why? Analysis of influential audiences and the information and motivations that drive their beliefs and behavior adds a deeper understanding of current intelligence reporting.

(b) Advances in today's IE enable more options to monitor, analyze, assess, and share information. Technologies that store and share large amounts of data facilitate observation and measurement of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes on social media. Information systems leave electronic signatures that indicate movement and other behavior. Automated intelligence can improve the ability to measure effectiveness by assessing the IE.

(3) **Leverage.** This section will provide considerations for how the joint force leverages, integrates, and uses information throughout the competition continuum not already discussed in Chapter III, "Joint Functions," paragraph 3. "Information." The joint force must gain and maintain an advantage against global threats that effectively mislead internal and external audiences and penetrate and disrupt friendly C2 networks and information systems. The JFC counters these threats with communication to these same audiences through messages, images, and actions. These activities are the sequence of actions that use information to affect the perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant actor behavior.

(a) The JFC and staff use operational design by developing options and COAs with select information capabilities and activities early, obtaining authorities and execution pre-approval early, then arranging them in time, space, and purpose to achieve desired objectives.

(b) Information sharing is key to unity of effort and to success. Sharing information requires time, resources, and approvals. When executed better than the adversary, information sharing is a combat multiplier and can lead to decision advantages. Communication synchronization depends on information sharing. The process of aligning our operations and communication is increasingly important for media-savvy audiences looking for opportunities to de-legitimize the joint force.

(c) Risks also vary when using information (i.e., risks to OPSEC, risk of mistakenly disseminating false information, risk of narratives reaching unintended or insufficiently understood audiences, and risk of unknown second- and third-order consequences of physical attacks on networks and systems).

(4) Competitive use of information may require JFCs to deny and degrade adversaries' mobility and access. JFCs employ identity activities and leverage collected identity information to inform global operations, HD, national screening, and vetting activities with interagency partners.

g. **Support to Human and Automated Decision Making.** The joint force seeks to gain and maintain an information advantage throughout the competition continuum. Facilitating the use of all available data to accelerate decision cycles by leveraging artificial intelligence, predictive analytics, information fusion, autonomous systems, and other data models that are consistent with DOD policy. Interoperability between modern information systems and legacy platforms enable the ability to share with allies, partners, and the private sector.

h. Today's technology requires a fundamental shift to treat information and data as a critical resource that enables the joint force to exploit an improved understanding of friendly forces, neutrals, the environment, and adversaries. The force must train and exercise decision making in information-degraded environments. With a shared situational understanding of relevant actors and their interconnections, commanders and their staffs will have better and faster human and machine-aided decision making.

14. Mission Areas and Enduring Requirements

a. Introduction

(1) The mission areas constitute the framework of global campaigns. Within the global campaigns, five mutually supporting mission areas describe the principal orientation and way the joint force operates and maneuvers across the competition continuum and around the globe—simultaneously in multiple regions with allies and partners and, as necessary, across UCP-designated AORs and other military boundaries. The mission areas are:

- (a) Deter strategic attack.
- (b) Deter conventional attack.
- (c) Assure allies and partners.
- (d) Compete below the level of armed conflict (competition).
- (e) Prepare/respond to threats.

(2) The mission areas within the global campaign entail coherent groupings of interrelated operational-level objectives, each with its own associated and multiple LOEs, tasks, and the many associated individual joint and Service component operations.

b. **Deter Strategic Attack Mission Area.** Deterring strategic attack is the highest defense priority of the United States. There is no conceptual or operational starting or

stopping point for strategic deterrence—it is perpetual. Deterring nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attack of any scale, either regionally or against the United States itself, is an essential and continuous aspect of global campaigns. The primary purpose of US strategic deterrence is to prevent a nuclear attack on the United States, but this mission area also includes dissuading strategic space, cyberspace, and EMS attacks. The deter strategic attack mission orients on dissuading adversaries from conducting attacks that result in strategic effects, particularly on the homeland. An adversary can create strategic effects with weapons such as nuclear, chemical, biological, space-based, cyberspace, or even conventional weapons, particularly on the homeland. Aligning and exercising all instruments of national power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries integrate their strategic military capabilities, expanding the range of potential challenges. This alignment is particularly true regarding threats from potential adversaries of limited nuclear escalation and non-nuclear strategic attack. Achieving the objectives within this mission area relies on creating the adversary's perception that the costs a response would impose far outweigh the anticipated benefits of conducting a strategic attack. To be effective, the operations and activities associated with deterring strategic attack must impact an adversary's decision making. Considering social, cultural, linguistic, and psychological factors is essential to avoid mirror-imaging, understand an adversary's actual perspective, and thereby arrive at a true understanding of the deterrence potential of friendly operations, activities, and investments. Neutrals and even friendlies may also be deterred from undesired operations, activities, and investments. Regardless of the ebb and flow of competition and uncertainty, the joint force must maintain a credible ability to respond to a strategic attack and impose unacceptable costs on the adversary. The joint force's pursuit of the objectives within this mission area is open-ended and enduring. The operations continue unabated through competition to armed conflict and the transitions between the two. All actions and operations against nuclear-armed adversaries require evaluation to address the risk of strategic deterrence failure.

c. Deter Conventional Attack Mission Area

(1) Deterring adversaries from territorial aggression and traditional warfare through the threat of denial or punishment is a long-standing central theme of joint force responsibilities. The objectives, operations, activities, and investments associated with the deter conventional attack mission area are usually passive but credible and overt in their signal to keep an adversary from both miscalculating and acting on their ambitions. The intent of the objectives within the deter conventional attack mission area is to prevent an adversary from considering armed conflict through the posturing of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. The actions and signals purposefully place the initiative on an adversary to take the first actions. Through the posture, maneuver, and activities with this mission area, national and military leadership may communicate and convince adversaries that an attack is so unlikely to succeed that it is not even worth the attempt, which is deterrence through denial. Senior leadership can also convince adversaries that the effort required to accomplish its goals would be so costly there would be no real victory or advantageous outcome, also known as deterrence through perceived costs. In either case, the traditional assumption is US actions short of war can influence a rational adversary to maintain the status quo. Senior military and civilian leaders orient

the operations and activities within the mission area toward security and preparatory measures to protect US and allied interests and to indicate the capability and intent to deny the enemy's purpose for aggression. Effectively executing the tasks and messaging in this mission area discourages an enemy from initiating action. Commanders can greatly enhance the prospects for success in their choice and implementation of deterrence objectives if they view the escalatory events and their own reactive behavior from an empathetic perspective of the opponents' calculation of costs, benefits, and risks.

(2) Once an adversary decides and commits to pursuing objectives through armed conflict, then there may not be an opportunity for deterrence. Adversaries make decisions knowing full well the risks of war with the United States. If there is an opportunity to avert armed conflict after the enemy commits to initiating war, then that opportunity will likely have a very small window of time.

d. Assure Allies and Partners Mission Area. The operations, activities, and investments within the assure mission area orient activities to develop and strengthen partnerships. These partnerships encourage and enable allies and partners to defend their sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity, and participate in multinational military operations in support of mutually beneficial outcomes. By working together with allies and partners, CCDRs create strength and momentum toward the long-term advancement of our interests. The assure mission area objectives seek to link our capabilities and interests with allies' and partners' complementary capabilities and forces along with their unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve joint force understanding of the OE. CCDRs seek to expand upon these opportunities. When addressing a situation deemed as a mutual interest, allies and partners can maneuver along with US formations, provide access to position, and operate within the necessary areas/regions. The assure mission area supports maintaining an optimal basing and logistics system, which is foundational for global sustainment and reach. Operating and exercising with allies demonstrates our cooperative commitment and promotes a level of interoperability across the competition continuum. Together, these efforts enable key nations to establish or maintain their sovereignty and domestic policies. Effectively assuring allies and partners minimizes the probability of dramatic shifts in their policy, such as turning to an adversary for their security partner of choice, miscalculating unilaterally, or overreacting to a common adversary's encroachment or provocation. The assure mission area's objectives and efforts seek to share responsibilities with like-minded allies and partners, resist authoritarian expansionism through competition, contest radical ideologies, and conduct combined joint warfighting in armed conflict. Maintaining and developing partnerships around the globe based on shared interests reinforce regional coalitions and military cooperation. Successful execution of the efforts within the assure mission area provides allies and partners with a clear and consistent message of alliance and coalition commitment and confidence and capability to face external threats.

e. Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict Mission Area (Adversarial Competition). US strategic rivals want to shape a world consistent with authoritarian views and seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions. These adversaries strive to avoid war and accomplish their objectives at an acceptable level of

risk and a relatively low opportunity cost. Their actions manifest themselves as territorial encroachments, infringements of sovereignty, and violations of the rule of law that favor the adversary's interests. In some cases, these encroachments seek to influence and control the internal domestic policy decisions of another country without having to seize or occupy parts of it. With appropriate authorization, JFCs can counter adversarial actions and malign influence through demonstration, strengthening and reinforcing allies and partners, global repositioning of forces, air and maritime interception operations, establishing exclusion zones, enforcing sanctions, supporting resistance partners, employing surrogate forces, and ensuring compliance with treaties. This mission area is not deterrence re-imagined, nor is it preparation or prelude to armed conflict. Adversarial competition is its own unique, challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, advantage, and leverage, where many aspects of malign influence and antagonistic behavior are undeterable. Within all the global campaigns, the compete below the level of armed conflict mission area's objectives seek to proactively limit, counter, or even de-construct these coercive encroachments and their harmful effects. In adversarial competition, JFCs maneuver to contest and counter coercion and adversaries' use of malign and/or antagonistic operations, activities, and investments that encroach on matters of sovereignty or fall outside of international law and norms. Through competition, revisionist powers and rogue regimes use coercive and subversive measures such as corruption, predatory economic practices, disinformation and propaganda, political and socioeconomic subversion, annexing foreign territory, and deniable military force to change the environment in their favor. These nuanced approaches are deliberate alternatives to armed conflict. Activities associated with competition provide an alternative approach without armed conflict for countering our adversaries' use of malign and/or antagonistic activities intended to degrade US legitimacy, credibility, influence, economic power, and national security. Senior military leaders recognize these approaches and alternative uses of force short of war, to include working with the DOS and other USG departments and agencies in a concerted and coordinated effort to effectively compete.

f. Prepare for/Respond to Threats Mission Area. Responding to threats may involve the maneuver and application of military force against a threat to eliminate their cause or motivation. The objectives and corresponding tasks and operations within the respond to threats mission area promote enduring preparations, readiness, and adaptability. The responses are all scalable and employed in the context of the specific situation. The objectives may not be adversary-specific. This mission area also includes responding to the hostile actions of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and other irregular threats. JFCs may encourage and enable allies and partners to take leading roles against irregular threats, with US forces in a supporting role. Within the global campaign, episodic or brief uses of violent measures may be adequate. If not, then guided by the GIF and strategic guidance, the CCDR can expand or recharacterize activities across all the mission areas. The guidance may be for the CCDR to transition to one or more of the problem set's contingency plans. When one global campaign transitions to a family of contingency plans, not only does the coordinating authority re-characterize the efforts across its mission areas but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs may recommend modifications to all the global campaigns. When a committed enemy threatens our national security with regard to little else, then the United States can use military force to destroy the enemy's activity,

capabilities, or seize territory. Joint forces can disrupt the sources of power, which give the enemy the will to continue to pursue their objectives. Additionally, joint forces can attack the enemy's strategic decision-making process. When the joint force engages an enemy in armed conflict, there are three basic methods to prevail. The three methods are exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation. Rarely employed in isolation from the others, exhaustion is the erosion of the enemy's will, attrition is the process of gradually reducing their strength or effectiveness, and annihilation is the complete destruction of the enemy's means. Against a capable and determined enemy, the joint force should not expect any of these methods to be easy, fast, or inexpensive. The joint force should not expect military victory to be a foregone conclusion.

g. Additional Considerations

(1) Successful integrated deterrence, whether strategic or conventional attack, relies upon similar logic, but the stakes are different. Both mission areas depend on several critical functions. The first function is national leaders and commanders maintain real-time awareness of adversaries that can conduct strategic attacks. This situational awareness includes detailed insight into their intentions and interests, especially their importance. Second, it requires a clear understanding and identification of the preliminary and interim adversarial decisions leading to the use of strategic capabilities. Third, deterrence requires developing and maintaining an understanding of an adversary's calculations regarding the alternative actions, as well as its perception of the deterrent threat's credibility and cost. Fourth, it requires the capability to influence some of the inputs to the adversary's values and perceptions relevant to their decision making. Fifth, deterrence requires an understanding of the limits on the adversary's cost-benefit analysis. These limits change over time and vary among those potential adversaries who possess the capabilities of strategic attack. As such, some adversaries are difficult to influence, given the nature of their decision-making process or expectations of anticipated outcomes, the opportunity costs of their actions, and their analysis of the costs denial or punishment threatened by deterrence.

(2) If an emerging situation exceeds the existing authorities and resources of one of the global campaigns, the joint force senior leadership (Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs) analyzes the problem. Before determining and recommending an appropriate response, the senior joint leadership diagnoses the situation. The considerations include determining the range of possible outcomes and likely long-term consequences. As senior military leaders come to their conclusions, they begin to form a globally integrated approach, which includes the best uses of all the joint force.

15. Tailoring Headquarters and Forces

a. Organizing the Joint Force

(1) How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The JFC's mission and operational approach, the principle of unity of command, and a mission command philosophy are guiding principles to organize the joint force for operations. JFCs can establish joint forces on a geographic or functional

basis. JFCs may centralize selected functions within the joint force but should not reduce the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and special operations tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function as designed. However, against a peer enemy, the intended function may be insufficient, irrelevant, or obsolete. All Service components contribute distinct capabilities to joint operations that enable joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service's capabilities to maximize their complementary and reinforcing effects. The degree of interdependence varies with specific circumstances. When JFCs organize their forces, they should also consider the degree of interoperability among Service components, with multinational forces and other potential participants. Complex or unclear command relationships are counterproductive to the synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are essential. Similarly, JFCs conducting domestic operations should consider overlapping responsibilities and interoperability issues among the Active Component and Reserve Component forces.

(2) Understanding the OE

(a) The JFC's OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the IE [which includes cyberspace]); EMOE; and other variables such as political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems that may be present in the OE. The OE includes enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the OE helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect the joint task force (JTF) mission accomplishment.

(b) The JFC and staff can benefit from a comprehensive perspective of the systems in the OE relevant to the mission and operation at hand. JIPOE is an analytic process yielding tailored products that can assist the JFC in gaining a greater understanding of the OE. Developing a systems view can promote a common understanding of the OE among the joint force and other participating entities, thereby facilitating unified action. A systems perspective of the OE strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding systems, their interaction with each other, and how systems' relationships will change over time is key. This understanding increases the JFC's knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. A commonly shared dynamic visual representation and associated Global Command and Control System-Joint data management tools can help integrate and manage relevant data sources. This common reference helps the commander and staff analyze COGs, critical vulnerabilities, critical capabilities, and decisive points. Identifying decisive points helps commanders determine LOOs and LOEs, refine objectives and desired and undesired effects, and provide planning guidance for the operational approach.

(c) The JFC will face increasingly complex environments characterized by a wide variety of participants, enemies using combinations of traditional warfare and IW, adversaries with capabilities to influence information, information flow, and global interconnected relationships. The JIPOE products for an OE will assist the commander in understanding and navigating the complex environment. This broader, more inclusive approach to understanding the environment will assist in determining CCIRs and the operation or campaign assessment activity.

For further information on the OE and systems perspective, refer to the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) **Physical Areas.** The fundamental physical area in the OE is the JFC's assigned OA. This term encompasses more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which joint forces conduct military operations. OAs include such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, AOA, JSOA, and AO.

(2) **Physical Factors.** The JFC and staff must consider many factors, to include terrain (including urban settings), population, weather, topography, hydrology, EMS, and other environmental conditions in the OA; distances associated with the deployment to the OA and employment of joint capabilities; the location of and access to bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; the physical results of armed conflicts; and both friendly and enemy forces and other capabilities. Combinations of these factors affect operations and sustainment. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products help the JFC determine the most advantageous time and location to conduct operations.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

(3) **Urban Areas.** Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with man-made construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban areas, however, is not the infrastructure but the density of civilians. For example, industrial areas and port facilities often are collocated with highly populated areas, creating the opportunity for accidental or deliberate release of toxic industrial materials, which could impact military operations. During military operations in an urban environment, joint forces may not focus only on destruction of enemy forces but may also be required to take steps necessary to protect and support civilians and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for survival. As such, ROE may be more restrictive than for other types of operations. When planning for operations in an urban environment, the JFC and staff should consider the impact of military operations on civilians, to include their culture, values, and infrastructure, thereby viewing the urban area as a dynamic and

complex system—not solely as terrain. This insight implies the joint force should be capable of understanding the specific urban environment; sensing, locating, and isolating the enemy among civilians; and applying combat power precisely and discriminately.

(4) **Littoral Areas.** The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to maritime superiority. Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project power, fires, and forces to achieve the JFC's objectives. These operations facilitate the entry and movement of other elements of the joint force through the seizure of an enemy's port, naval base, or airbase. Friendly access and freedom of maneuver within the littorals depend on the enemy's A2/AD actions and capabilities, such as the use of long-range fires and mines. The ability to avoid detection and maneuver to evade can be reduced in the littorals due to the proximity to enemy sensors and the lack of maneuver space, thus increasing risk. Depending on the situation, mine warfare may be critical to control of the littoral areas.

(5) **Orbital Areas.** The space domain contains numerous physical hazards and presents a dynamic and hostile environment. Earth's atmosphere extends well above the lower threshold for sustained orbital flight, expanding and contracting based on changes in solar activity. Space was once a sanctuary from attack, but the emergence, advanced development, and proliferation of a wide range of demonstrated counterspace weapons by adversaries have reversed this paradigm. Today, threats can contest the United States in space, like any other part of the OE, due to the increasing threat to orbiting assets by adversary weapons systems.

c. **Cultural, Political, and Socioeconomic Factors.** The JFC and staff should identify human factors and gain a deep understanding of the cultural, political, and economic factors that may impact operations. These include:

(1) Cultural factors. These factors encompass the ethnic and religious aspects of the populations within the OE. JFCs should understand how segregated or integrated these groups are with each other. These factors should include the location of important religious sites; physical and living cultural icons; and cultural controversies between regions, ethnic groups, and religious groups. These factors include religious beliefs and sectarian ideologies that motivate indigenous groups and influence their perceptions of the root causes of their struggles.

(2) Political issues. These issues include major local and regional political issues, to include existing or potential separatist or secessionist issues, historical ethnic or religious animosities, wealth disparity, and cultural conflicts.

(3) Economic factors. These factors include historical, legal, and illicit trade routes; food and water distribution channels; the condition of economic assets in the OE; and the conditions of road, rail, and water transportation networks. Economic factors may include the location and condition of local industries, farmlands, crops, access to markets,

SPACE AS AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Spacecraft operating beyond the protection of Earth's magnetosphere are not impacted by atmospheric drag but are exposed to solar wind. Originating from the sun, solar wind presents a constant barrage of radiation and charged particles capable of severely damaging a spacecraft's physical and electrical components. Space debris poses a further risk to human activity in space. As the concentration of space debris grows, debris-generating collisions become more prevalent, further jeopardizing orbital flight safety and compromising the utility of the space domain. There is no forward edge of the battle area behind which military spacecraft can reconstitute and recover. Spacecraft remain in orbit through all terrestrial circumstance where they are potentially at risk from adversary counterspace capabilities and the hostile space environment.

Various Sources

and sources and distributions of wealth. Other factors are matters that impact the health and welfare perceptions of the local population.

(4) Sociocultural factors. Human factors and conditions are the foundation of sociocultural analysis. Sociocultural analysis enables understanding of the threat's cultural nuances, to include age, sex, ethnic mix, religion, and other social factors present in the OE.

For more information on sociocultural analysis, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

d. IE. The IE comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, informational, technical, and physical attributes that impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, and world view. The IE also includes technical systems and their use of data. The IE is a factor analyzed for its effect on a commander's OE or OA. The OA may be comprised of one or more commands. The JFC and staff consider the effects of all physical and informational activities within their OE. Additionally, the JFC and staff consider time and space factors of the operation or campaign on the operational and IEs to determine what is, or is not, relevant at any given time and any given location.

(1) Information is pervasive throughout the OE and inseparable from military activities. As competitors, adversaries, and enemies have become increasingly capable and emboldened, they create political, social, and military advantages that exceed their formerly assessed combat power. To address these complex challenges successfully, commanders, planners, and operators must be competent warfighters in both the OE and IE. The skill sets required to achieve success in either and both environments are co-dependent and require understanding of the interrelationship of the informational, physical, and human aspects within the OE and the IE. Informational aspects reflect the way individuals, information systems, and groups communicate and exchange information. Physical aspects are the material characteristics of the environment that create limitations

on and freedoms for the people and information systems that operate in it. Finally, human perceptions frame the OE. Understanding the interplay between the informational, physical, and human aspects provides a unified view of the OE.

(2) Cyberspace has a global reach that permeates all of the physical domains. It consists of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace, which reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries—much of it residing outside of US control—and integrates with the operation of critical infrastructures and the conduct of commerce, governance, and national security. When commanders plan and organize for operations, they should consider their critical dependencies on information and cyberspace, including factors such as degradations to confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information and information systems.

(3) Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish the JFC's objectives, deny freedom of action to enemies and adversaries, and enable other operational activities. CO rely on links and nodes in the physical domains and perform functions in cyberspace and the physical domains. Similarly, activities in the physical domains can create effects in and through cyberspace by affecting the EMS or the physical infrastructure.

For more information on CO and the IE, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

e. **EMS.** The EMS is a maneuver space consisting of all frequencies of EM radiation (oscillating electric and magnetic fields characterized by frequency and wavelength). The EMS organizes by frequency bands, based on certain physical characteristics. The EMS includes radio waves, microwaves, infrared radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, and gamma rays. Over the last few decades, advances in EMS technologies have led to an exponential increase in civil, commercial, and military EMS-enabled and dependent capabilities. This proliferation, coupled with the US military's heavy reliance on the EMS and the low entry costs for adversaries, poses significant military challenges to the JFC. JEMSO help achieve success, and EMS parity is essential to all joint operations.

For more information on the EMS and JEMSO operations, see JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

f. **Joint Force Organizational Options**

(1) CCMDs. A CCMD is a unified or specified command with a broad, continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Unified commands conduct broad, continuing missions requiring execution by significant forces of two or more MILDEPs to achieve national objectives or other criteria found in JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*; and Volume 2, *The Joint Force*. Specified commands are normally composed of forces from one MILDEP but may include units and staff representation from other MILDEPs. The UCP establishes missions, responsibilities, and

geographic AORs and functions to CCMDs. CCMDs have the authority to employ forces within their commands to carry out assigned missions. They act as the coordinating authority for planning and the supported commander in executing these missions. They may simultaneously be a supporting commander to other CCDRs for planning and executing the other CCDR's missions. In addition, United States Special Operations Command serves as SOF joint force provider and USCYBERCOM is a joint force provider for cyberspace forces. United States Transportation Command serves as joint force provider for mobility forces and joint enabling capabilities. USSPACECOM is a joint force provider for space operations.

(2) Subordinate Unified Commands. When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands to conduct operations continually IAW the criteria set forth for unified commands. DOD may establish a subordinate unified command on a geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities as those of the commanders of unified commands. They exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally of attached forces in the assigned operational or functional area.

(3) JTFs. A JTF is a joint force constituted and designated by SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing CJTF, to accomplish missions with specific objectives, which do not require centralized control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR. CCDRs may establish JTFs on a geographical area or functional basis. CCDRs can also establish JTFs based on a security challenge that focuses on specific threats that cross AOR boundaries or multiple noncontiguous geographic areas. The proper authority stands down a JTF when the JTF achieves the assigned objectives or receives a change of mission. A joint task force-state (JTF-State) may also establish under the C2 of their respective governor. This JTF-State will normally be a subordinate element under a National Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state.

(4) There are several ways to form a JTF HQ. Normally, a CCMD may employ a Service component HQ or one of the Service component's existing subordinate HQs (e.g., Army corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet, or Marine expeditionary force) as the core of a JTF HQ and then augment that core with personnel and capabilities primarily from the Services comprising the JTF and selected joint enablers. Also, the theater special operations command (TSOC) or a subordinate SOF HQ with the C2 capability can form the foundation for a JTF HQ. CCDRs verify the readiness of assigned Service HQ staff to establish, organize, and operate as a JTF-capable HQ. JTF HQ basing depends on the JTF mission, OE, and available capabilities and support. A JTF HQ can be land- or sea-based, with transitions between both basing options. CCDRs normally assign a JOA to a JTF. JTFs must be able to integrate effectively with USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and indigenous and regional stakeholders. When direct participation by USG departments and agencies other than DOD is significant, the task force (TF) establishing authority may designate it as a joint interagency TF. The designation typically occurs when the other interagency partners have primacy and legal authority, and the JFC provides supporting capabilities, such as FHA and DSCA.

g. Forming and training the joint force HQ and task organizing the joint force can be challenging, particularly in escalatory and reactive situations. Joint forces must quickly adjust both operations and organization in response to planned operational transitions or unexpected situational transitions. Similarly, the JFC's mission will affect the echelon at which joint capabilities are best employed. Advances in areas ranging from communications and information sharing to munitions effectiveness make it possible to synchronize lower echelons of command in some situations without the risks and inefficiencies associated with fragmenting the assets themselves. JFCs should exploit such opportunities.

For further guidance on the formation and employment of a JTF HQ, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

h. **Component Options.** CCDRs and subordinate unified commanders conduct either single-Service or joint operations to accomplish a mission. All JFCs may conduct operations through their Service component commanders, lower-echelon Service force commanders, and functional component commanders. Further, functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

i. **Service Components.** Regardless of the organization and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, personnel support, training, sustainment, and Service intelligence operations. Conducting operations through Service components can provide certain advantages up to a point, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. This arrangement can be appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, with a relatively narrow scope of operations, dictate organizational integrity of Service components. While sustainment remains a Service responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics lead Service, or DOD agency responsibilities.

j. **Functional Components.** The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service closely relate to objectives, and unity of command is a primary consideration. For example, functionally oriented components are useful when the scope of operations is large and the JFC's attention divides between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally specific. Functionally oriented components are useful when the scope of the campaign's subordinate operations is broad. Functional component commands are subordinate components of a joint force. Except for the joint force special operations component and joint special operations TF, functional components do not constitute a joint force with a JFC's authorities and responsibilities, even when composed of forces from two or more MILDEPs.

k. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. The JFC will normally designate the Service component commander who has the preponderance of forces and the ability to exercise C2 over them as the functional component commander. However, the JFC considers the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and C2 capabilities when selecting a commander. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationship between Service component commanders and the JFC.

l. The functional component commander's staff composition should reflect the command's composition, so the staff has the required expertise to help the commander effectively employ the component's forces. Functional component staffs require advanced planning, certification, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination and support. Individual augmentees fill staff billets and when the commander forms the functional component staff for exercises and actual operations. The number of staff personnel should be appropriate for the mission and nature of the operation. The staff structure should be flexible enough to add or delete personnel and capabilities in changing conditions without losing effectiveness.

m. The JFC designates forces and military capabilities that will be available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s). JFCs may also establish a support relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS, and the JFC may alter their authority and responsibilities during an operation.

n. **Combinations.** JFCs often organize their joint forces with a combination of Service and functional components. For example, joint forces organized with Service components normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC, while their conventional air forces are organized under a JFACC. The JFC designates the authorities and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS.

o. SOF Employment Options

(1) JFCs use SOF independently, with conventional force support (since USC limits SOF combat support and combat service support) or integrated with conventional forces. SOF provides strategic options for national leaders and the CCMDs. In execution, SOF works through a global network that fully integrates military, interagency, and international partners. SOF is most effective when special operations integrate into the plan, and the execution of special operations is through proper SOF C2 elements employed intact.

(2) Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDR USSOCOM), synchronizes the planning of special operations and provides SOF to support persistent, networked, and distributed CCMD operations to protect and advance national interests.

(3) CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM of all SOF. CCDRs exercise OPCON of their supporting TSOCs and most often exercise OPCON of SOF deployed in their AORs. The establishing directive will define the command relationships between the special operations commands and JTF/TF commanders. A TSOC commander can be the JTF commander.

For more information on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. For joint HQ augmentation options, there are various options available to augment a joint HQ that is forming for joint operations. See JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, for more information.

p. Organizing the Joint Force HQ. Joint force HQs include those for unified, subordinate unified, and specified commands and JTFs. While each HQ organizes to accommodate the nature of the JFC's OA, mission, tasks, and preferences, all generally follow a traditional functional staff alignment (i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications). The primary staff functional areas are also generally consistent with those at Service component HQs, which facilitate higher, lower, and lateral cross-command staff coordination and collaboration. Some HQs may combine functions under a staff principal, while other HQs may add staff principals. Based on the mission and other factors, some joint HQs may have additional primary staff organizations focused on areas such as engineering, force structure, resource, assessment, and CMO.

16. Partner Alignment

a. The US military cannot achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic objectives acting alone. Allies and partners are an important aspect of the global campaigns. In the conduct of military activities, the joint force may rely on partners to increase capacity, access unique capabilities and authorities, share intelligence, and extend operational reach to achieve objectives. However, many strategic challenges exist that military force cannot solve alone—especially in competition but also during post-combat consolidation and stabilization activities. Global integration uses a comprehensive approach, to include considerations of nonmilitary means to address these challenges and achieve operation-level objectives. Interorganizational partnerships are the sources of these means. The term “by, with, and through” describes how the joint force achieves military objectives alongside allies and partners. The partners may operate independently, with other allies and partners cooperating in the same OE, and indirectly, and often non-overtly, through bilateral support to and cooperation with resistance partners, and unilaterally by employing surrogates operating under the direction and control of the JFC.

b. Collaborating with partners can increase the capability and capacity of the joint force and partners to achieve the JFC's objectives. Partnering is often a response to a problem, crisis, or opportunity that individual countries cannot respond to or address on their own. Furthermore, problems that are complex can motivate partnering to further understanding and collective problem solving. Successful partnering and collective action can change the direction of a complex, uncertain, and evolving situation. Partners are especially important in identifying and influencing HN attitudes toward friendly forces and

threats. Partners can have information, intelligence, or established relationships that are essential to mission accomplishment.

c. Effective partnering achieves unity of effort. This partnering can include the ability to conduct operations and activities. Partnering can increase the effectiveness of interagency partners, international partners, and relations with HN groups who can provide assistance. The ability to leverage established relationships with domestic and foreign institutions, countries, or populations is often essential to the joint force accomplishing assigned missions. Partnering can potentially foster innovations by linking partners who may approach problems differently. Partnerships can also allow for greater responsiveness and flexibility, as partners may have greater authority or autonomy to respond to certain issues or quicker decision-making processes. This is enabled through sharing information, communications, and trust-based ownership of the problem. Best practices are shared among partners, and efforts should be made to identify shortfalls early and ensure accountability across partners.

d. The understanding and analysis of partners and friendly networks can be as important as it is for threats. While successful collaboration may not be sufficient to ensure success, lack of it can often ensure failure. It is essential to understand how partners assess threats (or the threat networks) and how they may prioritize them in the context of any other threats. This mapping may minimize cognitive bias, provide assessments of overlap, and reveal divergence of interests up front.

e. DOD facilitates and supports the participation of essential partners by embedding liaison elements to strengthen relationships, improve communication and information flow, and accelerate decision making. Beyond the USG, the joint force aligns efforts with allies and partners by developing common tactical, operational, and strategic approaches; conducting regular combined training and exercises; and assigning liaisons who are culturally astute and fluent in the partner's language. A commander's training and education reinforces a culture of collaboration. Training and education provide methods for building partnerships, absent the authority to compel teamwork. Partnership with the private sector is particularly important for CO, logistic support, and transportation. Partner alignment builds a common understanding and trust that facilitates global integration. Commercial support to operations can provide significant capability but may also pose inherent risk. Commercial capabilities support all layers of the global campaign such as compete below the level of armed conflict, surge forces, defeat adversary aggression, and defend the homeland. JFCs should not expect assured access to commercial capabilities as the commercial sector is competitive and congested. Commanders using commercial support must assess and mitigate risk accordingly.

f. **Resilience.** Enemy capabilities have increased the need for a resilient joint force. The joint force achieves resiliency through iterations of experience, training, and education. Examples include professional military education and development, force protection measures, depth, exchangeability, interoperability, and dispersal so that a single attack cannot disable it. Depth provides the ability to replace capacity and capability with reserves and the industrial base to produce new assets. Exchangeability is substituting an

asset for a lost one. JFCs employ multifunctional units and equipment. These units are modular and scalable, which increases exchangeability and operational flexibility. Dispersal eliminates vulnerability to a single point of failure. These considerations extend to the commercial infrastructure on which the joint force heavily depends, at home and abroad.

g. Force protection includes hardening physical barriers against attack and virtual barriers to protect against malicious cyberspace activity, EM pulse, and other disruptions.

CHAPTER V

THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

1. Introduction

a. Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. As state and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their interests, they continually compete over incompatible aims. The Cold War was a clear example of the many facets of international competition. Rather than engaging in direct armed conflict with the other, each state fought through and with surrogates as an indirect means to achieve their strategic objectives. Yet, the two superpowers also cooperated, such as when both backed actions in the UN Security Council. Just as competitors can cooperate, friendly states can compete. Within an alliance, individual nations naturally seek to tilt policy in the direction most advantageous for their interests. Diplomats, trade representatives, and other members of the USG who regularly interact with foreign counterparts intuitively recognize that any strategic relationship mixes elements of both competition and cooperation. In general, competition is the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, advantage, and leverage necessary to advance and protect their respective interests. Competition is continuous because the conditions that define an acceptable state are constantly changing. Success requires perpetual adaptation in the application of all instruments of national power. There are four core elements of competition. The primary element is a nation's interests and the interrelated aspects are influence, advantage, and leverage through which a nation advances and protects its interests.

(1) Interests are qualities, principles, matters of self-preservation, and concepts that a nation or actor values and seeks to protect or achieve concerning other competitors. Interests are contextual and may include the maintenance of physical security, economic prosperity, continuity of government and culture at home, and value projection in the geopolitical environment, as well as emotional triggers (e.g., fear, honor, glory), and other drivers (e.g., virtual, cognitive) that animate action. Campaigning and interagency actions support a strategy framed by national interests that enables the USG to identify adversaries, threats, and opportunities to promote and protect those interests. An interest-led orientation, including understanding adversary interests more thoroughly, is the cornerstone of a comprehensive approach to competition.

(2) Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct, indirect, or intangible ways. An actor can accumulate, spend, or lose influence. JFCs require informed assessments about the degrees of influence over another actor's understanding, locus of power, populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and other strategic matters.

(3) Advantage is superiority of position or condition. States may create an advantage by the accumulation of influence toward the desired effect or acceptable condition. Inherently relative, a state realizes advantage through the exercise of the instruments of national power. An advantage may be comprised of physical or virtual aspects (e.g., technology, geographic access, resources, and arsenal inventories) as well as more nebulous, cognitive elements (e.g., initiative, momentum, morale, and skill).

Commanders establish advantage partially through activities generating recognizable qualitative or quantitative competitive advantage, such as during the Cold War strategic arms race.

(4) Leverage is the application of advantage gained to create an effect or exploit an opportunity. From a position of leverage, an actor is more capable of promoting and protecting its interests. Leverage also involves applying deep understanding of other actors and the strategic environment to increase the likelihood and scope of success.

b. Many aspects of strategic competition between the United States and other major powers take form through nonmilitary and noncoercive activities. Competitors are seeking influence and control over developments both within their regions and within peripheries. To do this, they can implement strategies of co-optation and attraction as they are often more effective than coercion. These actions may present or appear to be altruistic but always serve the initiator's interests, even when the recipient benefits. Moreover, some activities provide leverage in both categories—a form of attraction that can become coercive if necessary. The core US strategy in the Cold War reflects this complex mixture of approaches. In its most fundamental aspects, it was attractive. The United States offered access to an economic market, including the leading economies of the world, a powerful source of cultural appeal, democratic values, and other factors that created a gravitational effect for countries pursuing their economic and political self-interest.

c. A comprehensive approach to competition recognizes the importance of noncoercive strategies in gaining a competitive advantage. Targeting only a rival's coercive activities is not enough. If a peer competitor has success with attractive measures, it will rarely need to apply coercive measures. Successful competition requires clear strategies and tools optimized to oppose the attractive aspects of an adversary's approach as well as counter their coercive measures and intimidation.

ATTRACTION: A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

A traditional message is that association with the United States and our alliances and trade agreements offer a far more attractive option for a nation's security and prosperity. Attraction can be a powerful message and an effective approach. Currently, the United States faces competitors that are doing their best to create a version of the same attractive strategy. Their core approach to competition is through economic means, using the magnet of their markets and the trading relationships and more targeted benefits of their foreign direct investments and foreign aid. Adversaries can turn these same tools into coercive means through economic sanctions and hostile information campaigns. A preferred approach is one of assurance, persuasion, attraction, and mutual benefit rather than coercion, subversion, or intimidation.

Various Sources

d. The current OE requires a more nuanced consideration than a simple peace and war binary model. Strategic competitors, operating below the threshold of armed conflict, employ a mixture of instruments of national power to achieve significant strategic advantages. They act in a manner calculated not only to avoid triggering a legal right to respond by force but to attract and persuade other states to align with their interests. Civilian and military leadership need to recognize and understand how to describe and participate in this competitive OE effectively.

2. Competition Continuum Overview

a. The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. These descriptors refer to the relationship between the United States and another strategic actor (state or non-state) concerning a set of specific policy objectives. This description allows for simultaneous interaction with the same strategic actor at different points along the competition continuum. For instance, the United States might be in a state of competition with a strategic competitor regarding some interests, such as freedom of navigation in disputed areas, and cooperation in others, such as counter-piracy. By providing a lexicon to describe this complexity, the competition continuum facilitates shared understanding, both within DOD and with the interagency partners who often have a leading role. The lexicon enables better and more precise communication, planning, and decision making.

b. Elements of the Competition Continuum

(1) **Cooperation.** Situations in which joint forces take actions with another strategic partner in pursuit of policy objectives. Cooperation does not preclude some element of competition or even armed conflict when their objectives are not in complete alignment. Within cooperation, joint force actions may include SC activities, multinational training and exercises, information sharing, personnel exchange programs, and other military engagement activities. Military cooperation may also occur in the form of multinational operations and activities during armed conflict or competition.

(2) **Competition.** Competition is when joint forces or multinational forces take actions outside of armed conflict against a state or non-state adversary in pursuit of policy objectives, but neither seeks armed conflict. These actions are typically nonviolent and conducted under greater legal or policy constraints than in armed conflict but can include lethal and nonlethal actions by the joint force or sponsorship of surrogates or partners. Competition does not preclude some cooperation in other areas. Competition may include diplomatic and economic activities, political subversion, intelligence and CI activities, CO, OIE, special operations, and other nonviolent or intermediate force activities to achieve mutually incompatible objectives while seeking to avoid armed conflict. Joint force actions may include combinations of offense, defense, and stabilization activities; SC activities; MISO; freedom of navigation exercises; and other nonviolent military engagement activities. Competition does not preclude armed conflict or cooperation in other areas. Concurrent with competition, state or non-state forces may engage in forms of armed conflict (e.g., external support of an insurgency, COIN, or resistance movement).

(3) **Armed Conflict/War.** Armed conflict/war occurs when military forces take actions against an enemy in hostilities or declared war. International law distinguishes armed conflict from disturbances (e.g., riots, violent protests) by the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties.

c. The competition continuum describes, from the joint force perspective, the environment in which the United States applies the instruments of national power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve objectives. In practice, all instruments of national power should function together as an interrelated and integrated whole.

d. Cooperation, competition, and armed conflict can, and often do, occur simultaneously. Cooperation is a feature of nearly every significant military action because the joint force rarely operates unilaterally in any significant operation or campaign. In an interconnected world, there are few circumstances in which a major joint force activity does not have some ramifications for competition with at least one of the US's global or regional rivals. Cooperation and competition are always occurring, and the presence or absence of armed conflict is normally the only variable element. In either case, the joint force will be conducting cooperative activities with partners and competitive activities below armed conflict to counter adversaries who are seeking to turn the competition or conflict to their advantage. The joint force is never solely in cooperation but instead campaigns through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives.

e. **Description of Key Terms**

(1) **Cooperation**

(a) Collaborate Selectively. Cooperate with a partner (who is often a competitor elsewhere) to achieve a specific objective.

(b) Maintain. Sustain an open-ended cooperative relationship with an ally or partner and secure bilateral advantage but without a significant increase in resources or commitment.

(c) Advance. Establish and improve an open-ended cooperative relationship with an ally or partner by significantly increasing resources or commitment.

(2) **Competition**

(a) Counter. Proactively challenge and prevent the competitor from achieving incompatible objectives, without causing an escalation to armed conflict.

(b) Enhance. Actively seek to achieve strategic objectives; improve relative strategic or military advantage.

(c) Contest. Maintain relative strategic or military advantage to ensure the competitor achieves no further gains; only seek to improve the US advantage, when possible, with existing resources and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests elsewhere.

(d) Limit. Minimize the adversary's gains. Achieve the best possible strategic objective within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser objective entails the risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.

(3) Armed Conflict

(a) Defeat. Create a temporary condition where the enemy cannot achieve its operational-level objectives due to loss of capability or will.

(b) Deny. Frustrate the strategic objectives of the enemy.

(c) Degrade. To the greatest extent possible, reduce the enemy's ability and will, within resource constraints and acceptable risk.

(d) Disrupt. Temporarily interrupt the enemy's activities or the effectiveness of enemy organizations.

3. Cooperation

a. Cooperation can be an enduring activity where the relationship with the ally or partner is in place and will continue for the foreseeable future. However, cooperation in specific areas with a partner whose overall relationship with the United States is neutral or even adversarial may be necessary. Cooperative activities can take many forms, like counterpiracy activities, capability and capacity building through security force assistance (SFA) or conducting multinational operations in armed conflict. The common thread is that joint campaigns and operations through cooperation are purposeful activities to achieve or maintain policy objectives.

b. Joint campaigns and operations during cooperation require productive relationships. A partnership is unlikely to reach its potential if the joint force approaches military engagement as discrete events rather than as part of a deliberate, continuous process. Commanders and staffs develop an understanding of the OE, a realistic appraisal of the partners' objectives, and the nature of the partners' relationship with the United States to derive a range of feasible and productive military and nonmilitary options that lead to sustainable and acceptable outcomes. If done well, the resulting relationships can yield immediate tactical and operational benefits as well as enduring benefits, such as the increased commitment of a foreign military to the rule of law or greater willingness to assist US efforts. Though the immediate benefits of cooperative relationships are not always apparent, history demonstrates that long-term relationships can pay dividends in unanticipated ways.

c. Cooperation aids efforts in competition and armed conflict by integrating the contributions of partners and allies. Cooperation is not subordinate to competition. If credible, these actions reassure the partner of US capability and intentions, making the partner more likely to deepen the cooperation. This can lead to increased intelligence sharing, allowing greater US presence, or more closely integrating its air defenses into a regional network. If cooperation creates a more favorable situation in the region, then it counters the adversary's pursuit of their objectives. Simply put, cooperation is the US asymmetric response to competition. Rather than exchanging like-for-like responses with adversaries that operate under fewer restrictions on their actions, cooperation exploits the joint forces' competitive advantages as a partner of choice.

4. Competition

a. Competition tends to occur over extended periods of time. In comparison to armed conflict, actions are often more indirect, risks are different, and the expenditure of resources less intense, thus allowing for a more protracted effort. Generally, successful competition requires an appropriate alignment and blend of multiple instruments of national power. As an inherently constrained and measured approach, coercion is not generally used by competitors requiring quick results. For the joint force to successfully campaign through competition, it may adopt a similar long-term approach but one nuanced and flexible enough to react to rapid changes in the strategic environment. These competing demands create challenges for commanders and staffs who work through processes to employ military forces that operate on different, and often stringent, time horizons. The JFCs identify and request authorities and permissions for actions, activities, additional access, sharing information, and coordination with interorganizational partners. JFCs maneuver to set conditions to enable the maximum range of options to accommodate and respond to changing political and diplomatic situations.

b. The methods employed in competition will vary with the situation, but successful action will feature several characteristics. First, the joint force begins with the best possible understanding of the relevant actors and how they will perceive the action. Second, the joint force and its partners should conduct a broad array of activities: dynamic force employment, establish access to critical areas, forward position units, establish an appropriate and timely presence, organize exercises, share intelligence, prepare the OE for a response to a contingency, and conduct OIE, to include efforts to counter and undermine the adversary's narrative. Third, the joint force and its partners ensure the creative and flexible conduct of activities within a fluid situation. Fourth, the joint force conducts continual assessment of the adversary's intentions and capabilities, as these aspects will change over time. To have tangible effects on an adversary's behavior, it is essential to have a deep understanding of their perceptions and decision making. Additionally, the joint force facilitates the close alignment of diplomatic, informational, and military efforts. Finally, in comparison to armed conflict, competition can use indirect rather than direct use of military power.

c. The enduring nature of competition poses unique challenges for the consolidation of strategic objectives. Local successes rarely mean the end of the larger competition and few gains are reliably permanent. In this context, consolidation is an ongoing effort to

protect and advance national interests and position the joint force for the next evolution of competition.

d. Competition reflects a choice by the USG to pursue policy objectives while constraining military actions, so they remain short of armed conflict. Though this competition will typically be against an adversary that has also resolved to compete below armed conflict, the two competitors will rarely be equal in willingness to commit resources and accept risk. This policy asymmetry is a defining feature of competition below armed conflict. When the United States is more committed than the adversary, the joint force seeks to translate the operational advantage of greater resources and risk acceptance to achieve strategic objectives. When the adversary is willing to exert greater effort than the United States, the joint force seeks the best possible outcome under the circumstances.

5. Armed Conflict/War

a. Armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale, scope, and totality. Joint forces integrate capabilities across CCMDs to conduct combat operations and defeat the enemy's capabilities, strategy, and will. However, even during periods of armed conflict, success depends on the effective conduct of ongoing cooperative and competitive activities. Commanders and staff recognize the interrelated nature of these various elements. Civilian and military leaders should regard these elements as an integrated effort. In some instances, this might mean adopting what would normally be a suboptimal military COA in relation to armed conflict to bolster the US position within a cooperative relationship with an ally or concerning a third-party competitor.

b. The joint force should also campaign in armed conflict with a long-term view toward the transition period following the end of the main period of armed conflict. Rarely do wars cease with an immediate and complete end of armed conflict. Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions, so it is often impossible to return to a pre-conflict state. Destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a new order. Thus, the joint force might fight in an armed conflict against enemy combatants who become guerrillas, warlords, or criminal militias. Global or regional competitors can then exploit these conditions by supporting these groups as partners or surrogates to continue the armed conflict. Therefore, the immediate "post-war" period still requires the joint force to campaign through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Violent, chaotic transitions are more difficult when significant resources withdraw and redeploy because perceptions of an idealistic "peace" has returned. Another significant complication is that ongoing military activities may be essential to maintaining an acceptable security situation but may support the activities of other USG departments or agencies or interorganizational partners.

6. The Competition Continuum and Deterrence

a. Deterrence applies across the competition continuum, though in different fashions according to the situation. Deterrence applies to cooperation. US cooperation with various

allies and partners can serve as a deterrent of aggression by others. This cooperation ideally serves to deter subversion, coercion, or open aggression against the United States and potentially against others within the partnership or network through an understanding or perception of the potential negative implications of their actions.

b. Deterrence in competition has a similar nuance and may be harder to judge. For instance, if an adversary supports a surrogate in a neighboring country, this is not proof that deterrence has failed. The adversary might have preferred to make an overt incursion but concluded the risks were too great. In that case, successful integrated deterrence of armed conflict led to competition. Perhaps the adversary might have employed surrogates or partners, but successful intelligence and SC between the United States and an ally caused them to conclude such operations would be fruitless, so they confined their actions to propaganda to discredit the United States. Once again, the act of competition may be the result of successful deterrence rather than its failure. In addition, as with armed conflict, the joint force can deter future actions in competition below armed conflict by effectively responding to current challenges. If the United States' counter to an adversary's use of surrogates or partners drives failure, then other adversaries might not resort to similar methods in the future.

c. During armed conflict, integrated deterrence continues and requires effort and consideration. In other instances, integrated deterrence must unfold over extended periods. The joint force seeks to deter a conventional attack against a partner or ally. However, even if that occurs, it is still possible to deter the attacker from expanding the war geographically (by attacking US installations elsewhere) or using certain forms of weapons (e.g., WMD). In some cases, deterrence may fail because an adversary miscalculates the United States' will or capability. If the adversary's actions stall or collapse, the deterrence might influence future adversaries from taking similar risks.

CHAPTER VI

JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS IN COOPERATION AND ADVERSARIAL COMPETITION

1. Introduction

- a. The joint force rarely operates unilaterally. In any significant campaign, cooperation is a feature of nearly every substantive military action. In an interconnected world, most major joint force activity includes some ramifications for competition with a global or regional rival or adversary. Cooperation and competition are perpetual. The joint force conducts cooperative activities with allies and partners and competitive activities to counter adversaries who seek to turn the competition to their advantage. Competition between states is the natural order and may not always have adversarial or malign characteristics. Many aspects of strategic competition between the United States and other major powers can be attractive and noncoercive activities. As competitors seek to influence and control developments both within their regions and periphery, proposals of collaboration and attraction are often more effective than coercion. No matter how rewarding the offer seems, these actions are not altruistic and serve the initiator's interests. In many cases, these overtures provide leverage that can become coercive, such as threats to decrease aid or to reduce trade. A comprehensive approach to competition should account for the importance of noncoercive strategies in gaining a competitive advantage. Targeting only an adversary's coercive activities is not enough. Successful cooperation and competition require clear strategies and tools optimized to increase resilience, influence, advantage, and leverage while countering adversaries' strategies of appeal and coercion. The role of the joint force in cooperation and competition may be to support USG efforts to compete successfully. The joint force's primary responsibility is to achieve operational objectives that establish conditions that enable other USG departments and agencies to achieve strategic objectives.
- b. Cooperative elements of global campaigns are typically enduring activities without discrete start or endpoints. Cooperation may entail some combination of strengthening ties with an ally or partner and advancing a broader theater or global strategy. The joint force typically consolidates gains in cooperation through sustained military engagement with partners. In some cases, however, limited or selective interaction might be either necessary or preferable. JFCs should apply best practices as broadly applicable, even as the statutory and policy guidance governing SC continues to evolve.
- c. Competition arises when one actor chooses to challenge the status quo or existing norms while another chooses to resist. The intensity with which either chooses to press the competition will often change in response to their perceptions of the other's intent and will. Thus, a rigid, pre-determined course of military action will often be unsuitable for competition, which can drive rapid shifts in the OE. These shifts create numerous challenges for the joint force as establishing the necessary conditions for employing military forces—administrative and logistical preparations. Effective actions in competition include the granting of appropriate authorities and orders, securing access,

coordination with interorganizational partners, and securing and executing funds, which requires considerable time.

2. Global Integration of Cooperation and Competition

a. JFCs account for external considerations such as the desired conditions that cooperation should create the nature of the relevant relationships and the potential partner's willingness and capacity. Commanders also account for internal considerations such as the interests, objectives, and priorities of other contributing USG departments and agencies; resource limitations; relevant statutory or policy restrictions on the amount, categories, and purposes of US SC expenditure; and other policy on SC that is relevant to the specific situation. Just as in armed conflict, the employment of the military instrument of national power, in concert with interagency partner efforts, seeks to achieve operational objectives in pursuit of strategic objectives. The duration is important because the most productive cooperative relationships take time to build and are unlikely to reach their potential if conducted as a series of episodic or discrete events.

b. As the force campaigns through cooperation, military leaders and planners understand and assess the character of the US relationship with each partner. In practice, bilateral relations are complex and include many subordinate elements. As they span many different activities, these relationships may be multifaceted. For instance, with a smaller, developing country, intelligence agencies might have a deliberately distant relationship, while the Air Force might have a limited relationship based on partner capacity. In contrast, the Army might have an extensive relationship due to partner contributions to international efforts aligned with the United States.

c. Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of international waters, international airspace, orbital space, and cyberspace. Cooperation helps assure allies and maintain operational access despite changing US overseas defense posture and the growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. A CCMD can promote favorable conditions across the globe by aligning interests and pursuing mutual objectives. Relevant CCMD activities include KLEs, such as bilateral and multinational exercises, and missions to train, advise, and equip foreign forces to improve their capability, capacity, and national institutions. Negotiations to secure basing and transit rights can help establish relationships and formalize support agreements. The use of grants and contracts to improve relationships can enhance resiliency, cooperative planning conferences, and multinational plans.

(1) Assessment of CCPs adds to DOD's depth of understanding of an environment; a partner's viewpoint of that OE; and where the United States, allies, and partners have common interests. This understanding allows the United States to use the relationships effectively across the OE. These initiatives help advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.

(2) Partnerships can enhance the USG understanding of an adversary's capabilities and intent. In the best case, the USG and PNs cooperative action can avert the rise and diminish the risk of armed conflict.

3. Considerations for Cooperation

a. Cooperation enables and reinforces adversarial competition and armed conflict by integrating the contributions of partners and allies. When, in discussion with allies and partners, commanders identify mutual concerns and opportunities to pursue beneficial pursuits between states surrounding a specific interest or set of interests and adjust details for implementation. JFCs leverage the interrelations of different groups and organizations and their impact on relevant cooperative activities within a broader political, economic, and cultural context. JFCs determine a cooperative approach and identify the most effective tools and how best to employ those tools to support mutual concerns. As situations continue to evolve, so do the discussion and adaptation of mutual concerns between states. Cooperation enables competition and armed conflict. Particularly where an adversary seeks to overturn the existing security order, efforts to limit or counter these actions are more effective through cooperation with partners that seek to build resilience against subversion and capacity to resist coercion and deter violent attack. Through cooperative measures, the joint force ensures the continuance of mutual pursuits with established allies or supports the initiation of new partnerships. In this role, commanders do not seek to coerce an adversary or intervene in a situation in any martial way. The joint force's presence and a JFC's maneuver and actions are a signal to adversaries. Presence for cooperation seeks to reduce the likelihood of a crisis and mitigate the consequences if one occurs. In cooperation, joint force employment should not represent a show of support to one partner over other cooperative partners. Through cooperation, the joint force symbolizes and manifests a desire or willingness to obtain, strengthen, or solidify a relationship. The degree and tempo of individual operations, activities, and investments with a specific state represent the relationship's level of maturity. These cooperative relationships have unique qualities and provide great value. Just as important, cooperative arrangements provide essential contributions in adversarial competition below armed conflict and armed conflict for both the United States and the partner.

b. Cooperative activities include a broad scope of military engagement and SC activities within the CCP. Cooperation may also involve FHA and CMO. United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command may cooperate with federal, state, and interorganizational authorities while performing DSCA. These activities generally occur continuously in a CCMD's AOR in parallel with other ongoing operations. In many instances, the military cooperates to support efforts of interagency partners and international organizations to achieve broader USG objectives. Military engagement and SC activities usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities aligned with the efforts of interorganizational participants. The joint force executes these activities as part of a CCP and country plan objectives.

c. Cooperation includes mutually beneficial relationships with strategic partners with similar or compatible interests. Although interests will rarely be in complete alignment, fundamentally cooperative relations are strategically important for the United States because they underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to ensure access, enable burden sharing, and deter conflict. In cooperation, the joint force works conscientiously and purposefully with others to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Efforts intended to strengthen ties and improve the security capabilities of allies and

partners support objectives of the GCPs and CCPs. Considerations for effective cooperative activities include:

- (1) Identification of the conditions JFCs can create within the security environment that favor US interests.
- (2) Recognition of the state and character of US partner relationships.
- (3) Determination of our partners' propensity, likelihood, and capacity to act in a manner aligned with our interests.
- (4) Conduct interest mapping with allies and partners over mutual concerns and opportunities.
- (5) Comprehension of other USG departments and agencies' interests, objectives, and priorities with respect to the specific circumstance.
- (6) Understanding the amount, scope, categories, and purposes of all the US foreign assistance funding Congress planned for the relevant area(s).
- (7) Analysis of how the joint force can most aptly apply the existing authorities and resources to the specific area and issue.
 - d. There is nothing routine concerning cooperation. The environment is dynamic and demands critical understanding and constant reassessment of the targets, objectives, and the results of cooperative efforts. These considerations enable JFCs to organize a campaign in these conditions and run throughout preparation, execution, and assessment. They underpin and characterize proactive methods and measures. A detailed description of each consideration follows.
 - (1) Identify Future Conditions. Commanders identify the required future conditions that favor US interests. Additionally, commanders develop expectations for cooperation with allies and partners. Purposes for cooperation are usually in the context of seeking favorable and beneficial conditions of a specific security environment. These are:
 - (a) Cooperate selectively. When cooperation may be transactional, commanders critically assess the objective of the cooperation and the conditions under which the United States chooses to cooperate. Cooperation can be to maintain a broader relationship, transactionally targeted toward the maintenance of a critical US objective or a combination where the interests of partners may diverge with the sole aim of achieving US objectives when the maintenance of a larger relationship with the partner is not desirable or worthwhile.

(b) Maintain. Cooperate to maintain relationships and secure bilateral advantage but without a significant increase in resources or commitment unless strictly in accord with overriding US interests.

(c) Advance. Expand cooperative activities most appropriately (e.g., building partner capacity, increasing interoperability, and expanding joint force access) to achieve US objectives while also enabling or advancing partner interests.

(2) Recognizing the Character of Current Relationships. In addition to determining the desired condition, military leaders and planners will normally exercise long-standing or emerging relationships to pursue those conditions. Many relationships are mature and enduring, while others are nascent or merely transactional. Recognizing the state or character of those relationships relative to the United States and the preferred condition is key. At other times, the United States realizes it does not have the necessary relationship to address a certain interest, and therefore, must establish one.

(3) State of Partners' National Power and Propensities. CCDRs determine whether a partner's propensity has a strong tendency to take action that aligns with US interests. CCDRs establish expectations based on a partner's similar interests. This propensity may be a function of a state's control over its sovereignty and the capacity of its governing institutions. The propensity ranges from a well-established state to a fragile state with little to no functioning institutions and whose sovereignty is under duress from both internal and external influences.

(4) Identify Mutual Concerns. JFCs conduct interest mapping with allies and partners over mutual concerns and opportunities. Interest mapping is recognizing mutual concerns and beneficial pursuits between states surrounding a specific interest or set of interests. Successful mapping aids JFCs in negotiating and adjusting details for implementation. Military and civilian leaders focus on the interrelations of different groups and organizations and their impact on relevant cooperative activities. Interest mapping considers the competing priorities of allies and partners that may override their mutual interest with the joint force and recognize likely situations when and where this might occur. Interest mapping informs the cooperative approach and identifies the most effective tools and how best to employ those tools. As situations continually evolve, commanders should consider interest mapping as a continuous aspect of execution and assessment.

(5) Understand and align with other USG Departments and Agencies' Interests. Other USG departments and agencies will have direct or indirect interests, objectives, and priorities concerning the objectives. The integration of activities across the interagency partners is a normal occurrence. The key is being able to understand and appreciate other USG priorities, objectives, and their associated activities that may well have a bearing on the joint force's desired outcomes. For greater cooperation, the joint force may assure an ally or partner, enhance interoperability to meet mutually agreed upon security objectives, collectively deter an adversary, or even prepare for conflict.

(6) Understanding US Foreign Assistance Funding. The United States provides foreign assistance in response to global needs, assists people overseas struggling to build a

better life, and makes the world safer. Commanders comprehend where the United States is committing foreign assistance funding and effort in a manner or region that affects regional security situations. Foreign assistance is aid given by the United States to other countries to support global cooperation, security, and development efforts and, when necessary, provide humanitarian response and relief. The joint force has a role in implementing or maintaining the conditions to implement these programs effectively. In simpler terms, foreign assistance is the unilateral transfers of US resources (funds, goods, and services) by the USG to or for the benefit of foreign entities (including international and regional organizations) without any reciprocal payment or transfer of resources from the foreign entities. Foreign assistance is not merely funds or commodities; it also includes the provision of technical assistance, capacity building, training, education, and other services, as well as the direct costs required to implement foreign assistance. JFCs understand the DOD SC guidelines and determine which of these applies to the circumstance and the condition the joint force will pursue. These areas contract and expand over time. Current guidance outlines these focus areas, but the USG can revise these at any time. Typical and historical programs for cooperation are:

- (a) Capacity building.
- (b) Operational capacity and capability building.
- (c) Human capacity and human capital development.
- (d) Institutional capacity and security sector reform (SSR).
- (e) Support for institutional capacity and civil-sector capacity building.
- (f) Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization.
- (g) Facilitating access and relationships.
- (h) Gaining operational access and global freedom of action.
- (i) Intelligence and information sharing.
- (j) Assurance and regional confidence building.
- (k) International armaments cooperation.
- (l) International suasion and collaboration.

(7) Apply Existing Authorities and Resources to Specific Situations. CCDRs analyze how best to apply existing authorities and resources toward specific GCP and CCP objectives, enabling the joint force to organize the essential and optimal capabilities to foster favorable conditions, leverage initiative to take advantage of opportunities, anticipate and preclude deteriorating conditions, and respond to malign influences or

dramatic shifts to international order. As such, joint force efforts can, over time, help inoculate against and build resilience within these environments to detrimental consequences.

e. Military Engagement

(1) Military engagement is the deliberate contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies. The purpose is to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs across the competition continuum. DOD engages its interorganizational partners as a component of national engagement efforts among individuals and/or elements of the USG to interact with foreign partners to protect and advance shared or complementary strategic interests. In addition to supporting CCPs, DOD military engagement supports national-level engagement strategies and plans. It also aligns with the engagement plans and programs of DOS, USAID, and other USG departments and agencies.

(2) Military engagement includes SC, CMO, and other interactions with foreign security forces (FSF), institutions, populations, and other relevant foreign actors; interagency partners and US domestic civilian authorities and populations; international organizations and NGOs; and the private sector. Military engagement activities usually involve coordinating, synchronizing, or integrating a combination of military forces and capabilities with the efforts of interorganizational partners.

(3) CCMDs seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This military engagement increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions. If armed conflict is unavoidable, long-term military engagement may enable a more informed USG to face any conflict with stronger alliances or coalitions.

f. SC

(1) SC encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments that promote specific US security interests. JFCs use SC to develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense, facilitate multinational operations, and provide US forces with routine and contingency access to allied and PNs.

(2) SC typically occurs within USG security sector assistance (SSA) with allies and partners. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, establishes DOS as the lead integrator for all interagency assistance provided to a PN. SSA requires DOD to coordinate its SC policies, programs, and activities with DOS and other USG representatives to ensure unity of effort toward US strategic objectives. SSR, by contrast, is a comprehensive set of programs and activities that an ally or partner undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice in its security sector. When

assisting an ally or partner that is carrying out SSR, the USG views this support as SSA. Hence, SC is DOD's contribution to USG SSA efforts.

For more information on SSA and SSR, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

(3) SC is a key element of cooperative activities and communication synchronization at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Throughout the competition continuum, the joint force relies on allies and partners to apply their capabilities, provide access, or promote US interests. DOD brings about these outcomes through SC activities that include military engagements and developmental activities (organize, train, equip, build, and advise), as well as by administering various SC and security assistance (SA) programs that enable these activities. SC activities and the programs that support them are reinforcing and complementary, which CCDRs employ at all points along the competition continuum.

(a) Military Engagements. Joint forces conduct military engagements with FSF and their supporting institutions to improve relationships, interoperability, and decision making at the appropriate levels; military engagements also include joint force interactions with interagency or other stakeholders to enable SC.

(b) Developmental Activities. These activities occur in cooperation with FSF—from the ministerial/department level down to the tactical unit level.

1. SFA. SFA is the set of DOD SC activities that support the development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their supporting institutions, whether of a PN or an international organization (e.g., regional security organization), in support of US objectives.

2. Institutional Capacity Building (ICB). ICB comprises SC activities typically conducted at the department, staff/Service HQ, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the strategic and operational aspects of the security institution. ICB is development that improves the FSF's ability to plan, develop, fund, acquire, man, employ, and sustain capabilities that can address shared challenges that are of mutual benefit to the United States and the ally or partner.

(c) Enabling SC Programs (to include SA programs).

1. SC programs represent an established joint process or plan allowed by authorization or appropriation, or group of authorizations and appropriations, which enable the use of DOD components in support of objectives. These programs include defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchanges, combined exercises and training, train-and-equip/provision defense articles, and operational support, as well as defense ICB.

2. SA is a group of programs that provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to foreign

allies and partners to advance national policies and objectives. SA programs are funded and authorized through DOS and administered by DOD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

(d) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The primary purpose of CWMD is to enable PNs to plan and build indigenous capabilities that deter WMD threats and incidents, conduct operational preparation of the environment, and response preparation. JFCs orient CWMD efforts toward the three areas of preventing acquisition, containing and reducing threats, and preparing to respond to a crisis. The JFCs' efforts include activities conducted across the USG to counter efforts to coerce or attack the United States, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

For more information, see JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(e) Counterdrug (CD) Operations. CD operations provide DOD support to LEAs to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. DOD supports federal, state, and local LEAs. JFCs provide support to CD operations. JFCs follow specific DOD authorities that pertain to CD activities and operations contained in Title 10, USC, Sections 124 and 371-382. Discussion of similar authorities can be found in DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

(4) SC Execution

(a) CCDRs' orders initiate execution of the CCP, which includes the country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans and supporting components' plans. The order may not authorize the entire execution of all SC activities. Collaborative planning among the security cooperation organization (SCO), PN, DOD component(s), OSD, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DOS regional and functional bureaus, COMs, and CCMD results in the timely release of authorities and orders for synchronized execution of the approved and funded SC activities throughout a CCMD's AOR. Effective monitoring provides situational awareness of the status and progress of SC activities. Evaluation is a systematic process that analyzes the overall effectiveness of investing USG resources into building a partner's capacity or capability. Preparation and site surveys require authorities and funds for execution such as deployment, movement, sustainment, protection, C2, and other preparations months before the actual SC activities begin with the PN.

1. Campaign orders and supporting fragmentary orders issued by CCDRs or a component commander can update or adjust the execution of a CCP and its supporting component plans. CCMDs work with the other DOD components which provide forces, funds, and other resources, in coordination with the SCO and Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The CCMDs provide necessary direction, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and, when possible, any adjustments to the planned SC activities.

The COM, JFC, and component commanders normally use the SCO as a point of contact for coordinating with the PN representatives before direct coordination between the United States and PN participants. The supported and supporting JFCs and component commanders ensure a chain of command with appropriate command relationships and reporting procedures. Once granted direct liaison authority by the CCMD through the component commands, the forces executing SC activities will normally work directly with the PN and SCO, keeping their parent and Service HQ informed. At the tactical level, forces plan and execute SC under the coordination authority of the SCOs, which will coordinate with the supported CCMD and keep the COM and country team informed. Forces will likely provide situation reports to and through their units and higher HQ to the component command HQ and the supporting CCMD, as required. Socium is the mandated system of record for SC and is a tool for collaborative planning, executing, evaluating, and assessing of SC activities.

2. The CCMD, DOS regional and functional bureaus, and COMs normally share a common understanding of objectives and priorities, but they have institutional perspectives on how to do things. The COM has the final decision concerning US activity in a specific country. The COM focuses primarily on the PN, while the CCMD focuses on the AOR; coordination for the planning and execution of SC activities must consider a balance of these perspectives and interests. The CCMD should coordinate SC efforts, to include planning and execution timelines, at least annually among the country teams with the SCOs, the component commands, PNs, and others who may contribute to SC-related activities (e.g., allies and international organizations).

3. Implementing organizations execute SC activities under the direction of the component command plans in support of the CCP objectives. Implementing organizations may be individuals or any component element or combination of elements of a joint force—military forces from the Active Component or Reserve Component, USG civilians, and contractors. While implementing organizations may plan and coordinate their activities with the component command HQ and the CCMD, they will normally work directly with the SCO during execution.

(b) Services

1. The Services' Title 10, USC, responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and resource Service component commands enable and support the conduct of SC activities. The Services support their Service component commands' execution of SC activities in support of CCMD objectives based on the available Service capabilities and resources. The CCMD should work together with service components in establishing the objectives and priorities of the CCP. These activities include senior leader defense contacts and familiarization, foreign participation or attendance at Service schools, cooperative research and development programs, foreign comparative testing, and equipping activities.

2. Various Service-to-Service memoranda of understanding and memoranda of agreement govern, inform, or shape Service SC activities with PNs. These include agreements governing exchange for LNOs, charters for Service-led staff talks, or

other activities. Service SC activities may follow established timelines known years in advance, such as recurring Service-to-Service staff talks, or may present more extemporaneously, such as official office calls, port visits, or Service chief or senior leader attendance at trade shows or regional conferences.

3. Campaign support plans (CSPs) may be developed by the Services, NGB, and DOD agencies that integrate the appropriate USG activities and programs, describe how they will support the CCMD campaigns, and articulate institutional or component-specific guidance. A Service CSP further explains how the Service, according to Title 10, USC, organizes, trains, and equips forces to support CCMD objectives, maintain readiness, and execute SC activities. Service CSPs are coordinated with CCMDs through the Service component commands and address topics such as exercises, readiness, interoperability, and capabilities development, as they may impact the CCPs. Service execution of SC is important to shape, build, train, and equip forces capable of operating in coalition environments, as needed, to augment CCDR efforts.

4. Services should coordinate with the CCMDs for the theater SC activities, as well as with their respective Service component commands.

(c) CCMDs. Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their staffs continually use the operation assessment activities of **monitor**, **evaluate**, **recommend**, and **direct** to inform decision making at appropriate levels. The planning initiation step of joint planning coincides with an operation assessment, which provides a process to measure the effectiveness of SC activities and establishes continuity through execution. This provides the opportunity for correction and adaptation during planning and execution. CCDRs may collaborate with interorganizational stakeholders such as DOS country teams, to include allies and partners during any aspect of the operation assessment. The operation assessment enables the implementation of DOD policy for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of SC activities. At the same time, the component commands do the same with their supporting plans. However, once resourced, execution of specific SC activities occurs as planned unless a circumstance unfolds that affect US forces and the PN, precluding completion of those SC activities. SC activities normally take place through bilateral agreements that constitute binding legal obligations for both the USG and PN. As a result, any deviation from the terms of a bilateral agreement likely requires the consent of both governments. Consequently, major changes are unlikely during the execution of a specific SC activity. The absence of a governing bilateral agreement may result in several fiscal years of SC activities undergoing various stages of planning, programming, budgeting, and assessment during any given calendar year.

For more information on the harmonization of the operation assessment and AM&E policy, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

1. Monitor. CCMDs work with a variety of stakeholders, including allies and partners, to observe and analyze indicators of performance or effectiveness and conditions in the OE that affect those indicators. Monitoring begins with knowing the baseline of each indicator. As a matter of policy, CCMDs conduct initial assessments of

existing PN conditions that typically precede SC activities that involve the development of an FSF. These conditions include capability gaps, absorptive capacity, political stability, and other opportunities and risks. Initial assessments provide a baseline against which to monitor SC activities to inform requirements, resources, and program planning. In some cases, a CCDR establishes the target (to be state) of an indicator that is necessary for improving performance and effectiveness of an FSF or creating a desired condition in the OE.

2. Evaluate. The evaluate task is principally a CCDR function but can occur at any level. CCMDs use indicators to judge progress of SC activities toward desired conditions and determine why the current degree of progress exists. A single SC activity rarely achieves a strategic objective in isolation, and it is often difficult to determine the extent to which a specific DOD activity influences a PN. SC generally requires multiple activities, executed over time, to achieve strategic objectives.

3. Recommend. Based on evaluations, CCDRs integrate relevant SC information to inform decision making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, which includes informing interorganizational stakeholders, such as DOS or allies and partners.

4. Direct. This task is inherent to the authority of CCDRs to organize and employ joint forces as deemed necessary to accomplish assigned tasks and missions. Based on the results of CCMD assessment, the outcomes of a combined assessment with an ally or partner, or from strategic guidance and direction, a CCDR may direct changes to SC plans or activities in the AOR.

For more information on monitoring, evaluating, recommending, and directing during the planning and execution of SC activities, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

(d) Service Component Commands

1. Depending on the resources available, the DOD components, in collaboration with the CCMD and PN, decide which activities to conduct in the following year and which activities to modify, postpone, or cancel. Modifications may involve combining activities or reducing the scale or scope of the original activity. Examples include combining a United States Air Force exercise with a United States Navy exercise or turning a face-to-face seminar into a virtual meeting. Component planners need to document how the gap between the resources they requested and the resources they received affected the country plan and, specifically, the achievement of component objectives.

2. The next step is executing the SC activity. The primary role of the component planner is to ensure appropriate tasking of activities to organizations within the component and appropriate coordination of activities with organizations outside of the executing component/agency. Early coordination of the SC activity during planning helps facilitate coordination during execution. With the activities properly assigned and

coordinated, the component planner monitors the execution and can help deconflict activities, as necessary. Many components and most SCOs maintain a calendar to help them keep track of activities and other important events in their countries. For example, Socium can document, track, and synchronize SC events and activities.

g. Other Considerations for Cooperative Operations and Activities

(1) Interagency, International, and Nongovernmental Organizations and HN Coordination. JFCs work with interorganizational and HN authorities to plan and conduct military engagement, SC, and deterrence operations and activities. Liaison organizations such as a JIACG can promote interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. Consensus building improves each agency's understanding of the capabilities and limitations, as well as any constraints of partner agencies. Establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation promotes the unity of effort.

For further discussion on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

(2) Information Sharing. NGOs and international organizations, by their nature, become familiar with the culture, language, sensitivities, and status of the populace, as well as the infrastructure in a region. This information is valuable to commanders and staffs, who may not have physical access or the most current information. NGOs and international organizations may also need information from commanders and staff concerning hazards in the OE and on local populace humanitarian needs. However, these organizations typically hold neutrality as a fundamental principle and often as the basis for the security in operating in hostile environments. Many NGOs and international organizations will resist any perception of serving as sources of intelligence, even if the information sought is completely benign, and they may be hesitant to associate with the military. Discreet coordination can sometimes alleviate these concerns. JFCs may elect to establish mechanisms like a CMOC, or a similar organization, to coordinate activities and facilitate information sharing. Sometimes information can flow through third parties, such as the UN or PN institutions. International organizations and NGOs are more likely to participate if they perceive that mutual sharing of information aids their work and is not a threat to their neutrality. USAID, when it has a mission presence in-country, usually has the strongest network of contacts and information on international organizations. CCMDs should consult NGOs and local partners. However, NGOs and local partners may not be perfect sources of information. USAID missions require sharing their country development cooperation strategies with CCMDs, and conversely, CCMDs share their CCPs with USAID missions in their AOR to enhance collaboration.

(3) Cultural Awareness. Military support and operations intended to support an HN should build an in-depth understanding of the HN's cultural, social, economic, and political realities. The JFC may augment Service-language and cultural awareness training and tailor supplemental training to the JOA and mission. Also, intelligence products and military engagement actions continuously update cultural, social, economic, and political information. The beliefs, perceptions, lifestyles, and economic underpinnings of the

society, among other considerations, influence the OE and may affect planning and execution. Further, it is important to monitor perceptions and reactions of populations in the areas of influence and AOI, as these factors also affect current and future operations, activities, and planning. SC activities will likely impact nations throughout a region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring nations and hostility toward the United States may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing rivals may perceive the action as upsetting the regional balance or favoritism. While such factors do not dictate US policy, CCMDs should account for these ramifications.

(4) **Building Partnership Capacity (BPC).** BPC programs encompass SC and SA activities funded with USG appropriations. JFCs administer these programs as cases within the foreign military sales infrastructure. These programs may provide defense articles and/or services to other USG departments and agencies under the authority of the Economy Act of 1932 or other transfer authorities. The purpose of building the capacity of PN security forces is to enhance their capability to conduct CT, CD, and COIN operations or to support US military operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs. BPC with PNs is frequently associated with supporting allies and partners to reach one or more shared objectives. BPC should be part of the planning process to ensure that the readiness and capabilities of friendly networks can appropriately address a crisis or an emerging threat network with minimal shortfalls. The goals of BPC include working to develop improved information sharing, which can include standardized reporting, collection data, lexicons, data exchange, terminology, common intelligence and operational pictures, and common operating standards to improve interoperability. BPC to counter threats can enable PNs to conduct more effective operations with reduced or no joint force assistance. Building long-term and self-sustaining PN capacities is critical to counter threats on an enduring basis. Partner capabilities that are not sustained present the risk of the threat adapting and then seizing the opportunity to re-assert itself once the PN capabilities are reduced.

(5) **Women.** Engaging women as key stakeholders in the OA is necessary for gaining a comprehensive understanding of human aspects of the OE. Importantly, HN women are not a homogenous group. Their behavior, decision making, and participation depend upon their culture and identity, intersecting characteristics that can be further examined through sociocultural analysis. This analysis yields information that informs tailored engagements with different women in the OE as individuals, organizations, and participants in formal and informal systems. When women engage as a key stakeholder group, the commander and staff gain information on the human security needs of the HN civilian population, and specifically the distinct security needs of women. Notably, civil-military relations should revolve around positive, often mutually supportive, relationships with nonmilitary stakeholders.

4. Typical Cooperative Operations and Activities

a. **Stabilization.** Stabilization is an inherently cooperative endeavor that requires aligning USG efforts (e.g., diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense) to create conditions for local legitimate authorities and systems to manage unstable environments effectively. DOS, USAID, and DOD cooperate to stabilize these fragile

countries of strategic importance to the United States. DOS is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts. USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-security US stabilization assistance. DOD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities.

(1) To the extent authorized by law, DOD plans and conducts stabilization in support of mission partners across the competition continuum to counter subversion, prevent and mitigate conflict, and consolidate military gains to achieve objectives. DOD emphasizes small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization that works with and through local and other external partners to achieve strategic objectives.

(2) DOD's core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the conflict-affected population.

(a) When required to achieve US stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DOD will reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts. Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

(b) If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DOD will lead USG stabilization efforts in extreme situations until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.

(3) Although stabilization is distinct from FHA, DOD FHA activities may complement USG stabilization efforts.

For further information on defense support to stabilization, refer to DODD 3000.05, Stabilization, and JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities.

b. National Emergency Preparedness (Domestic Operations). Emergency preparedness consists of measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. National-level emergency preparedness encompasses those planning activities such as continuity capabilities, undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a designated national security emergency.

(1) Continuity capability refers to the ability of DOD to continue to perform its mission-essential functions, through COOP and continuity of government programs, to preserve the current form of government and the continued performance of the national essential functions under all conditions. Leadership, staff, communications, and facilities are the pillars of a continuity capability.

(2) COOP ensures continuous conduct of essential functions, tasks, or duties by USG departments and agencies, or other organizations necessary, to accomplish a military action or mission supporting the strategy. Continuity capabilities include the authorities and duties of a commander and the supporting functions of staff and others under the authority and direction of the commander. If the President directs additional support, DOD may task the joint force additional missions relating to emergency preparedness.

(3) Continuity of government involves a coordinated effort within each USG branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue national essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency.

c. **Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament.** Commanders and staffs oversee activities of military personnel involved in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament activities. These activities include verifying arms control treaties, seizing and securing WMD, and escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials. Commanders and staffs seek to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; conduct and host site inspections; participate in military data exchanges; implement armament reductions; or dismantle, destroy, or dispose of weapons and hazardous material.

(1) Arms control generally refers to those bilateral and multilateral treaties in which states agree to reduce the numbers, types, performance characteristics, proliferation, testing, or other aspects of certain categories of weapons. The goals of arms control are generally to reduce the likelihood, consequences, and the costs of preparing for armed conflict. A state could also seek to take advantage of technological advances in new weapon system areas, facilitate sources and methods of intelligence gathering, or negate a potential adversary's first strike capabilities.

(2) Nonproliferation includes the use of military capabilities in conjunction with a whole-of-government effort. JFCs act within a nation's legal authorities to deter and prevent the acquisition of WMD. JFCs and partners conduct nonproliferation by dissuading or impeding access and distribution of sensitive technologies, material, and expertise by state and non-state actors. Usually, the UN establishes sanctions through UN Security Council resolutions. However, states may view the need to unilaterally, or in concert, sanction certain military equipment as essential to their national interests.

(3) Disarmament is one of three elements in a program designed to bring peace in conflict zones. This program is called disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). DDR is the process that contributes to security and stability during and after conflict by removing weapons from the hands of state and non-state combatants. It also takes the combatants out of military structures and helps them integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. It often contains details about the reduction of a military establishment's aggregate capabilities such as numbers of weapons and forces to a specified limit set by international agreement. Although disarmament always involves the reduction of military forces or weapons, arms control does not. Arms control agreements sometimes allow for the increase of weapons by one or more parties to a treaty. Disarmament requires a high degree of trust (permissive OE), and disarmament operations are unlikely between hostile nations.

d. Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is an aspect of protection and involves defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Antiterrorism programs form the foundation to combat terrorism. The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign nations under Title 22, USC (Chapter 32, Part VIII, Antiterrorism Assistance).

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

e. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by Title 10, USC, Section 401. This assistance is in conjunction with military operations and exercises to fulfill unit training requirements while incidentally creating humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs encompass planned activities in the following categories:

- (1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
- (2) Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.
- (3) Well, drilling, and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- (4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

f. HD and DSCA. Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG's top responsibility and is a continuous, cooperative effort among all federal agencies, as well as state, tribal, and local government. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in many respects, accomplish two missions—HD and DSCA. HD is the protection of US sovereign territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agencies, to defend against external threats and aggression. However, against internal threats, DOD may be in support of another USG department or agency. When ordered to conduct HD operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with other government agencies. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security. These include invasion, cyberspace attack, attack in space, and air and missile attacks. Support to HD provided by the NG will be IAW DODD 3160.01, *Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard*.

(1) DSCA is the support provided by US federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD components, and NG forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status) respond to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic

emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events. For DSCA operations, DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. The majority of DSCA operations are IAW the NRF, which establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. Within a state, the governor is the key decision maker and commands the state's NG forces when they are not in federal Title 10, USC, status. When the governor mobilizes the NG, it will most often be under state active duty when supporting civil authorities.

(2) Other DSCA operations can include CD activities, support to national special security events, and support to civilian law enforcement IAW specific DOD policies and US law. Commanders and staffs consider the legal and policy limits on intelligence activities in support of LEAs; intelligence activities involving US citizens; and intelligence oversight regulations, policies, and executive orders.

(3) PPD-8, *National Preparedness*, describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats and hazards posing the greatest risk to the security of the United States. National preparedness is a shared responsibility of our whole community. The national preparedness goal describes what it means for the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats, hazards, disasters, and emergencies. These threats and risks include events such as natural disasters, disease pandemics, chemical spills and other human-made hazards, terrorist attacks, and cyberspace attacks. In addition to stating the goal, PPD-8 describes Title 32, USC, core capabilities that address the greatest risks to the Nation.

(4) Commander, United States Northern Command, and Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. These responsibilities include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within their assigned AORs, as directed by the President or SecDef. However, DOD support to HD is global and is a responsibility of all CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward regions outside US territories, the objective is to detect and deter threats to the homeland before they arise and to defeat these threats as early as possible when so directed. Identity activities help identify threats and limit their mobility and access across the OE and transnationally.

For more information on DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and for detailed guidance on DSCA, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

For more information on NG support, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); DODI 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and Chief, National Guard Bureau Instruction 3000.04, National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations.

For detailed guidance on HD, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

g. Support to Civilian LEAs. When requested, DOD may provide support to federal, state, territory, tribal, insular areas, and local law enforcement organizations reacting to civil disturbances, conducting border security and CD missions, preparing for antiterrorism operations, and participating in other related law enforcement activities. The requested support must be consistent with the limits Congress placed on military support to law enforcement through the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws. Unless specifically authorized by law, no DOD personnel in a Title 10, USC, status will become involved in direct civilian law enforcement activities, including, but not limited to, search, seizure, arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, surveillance, pursuit, interrogation, investigation, evidence collection, security functions, traffic or crowd control, or similar activities, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the President, Constitution, or act of Congress.

(1) Countering transnational organized crime (which includes CD operations) encompasses the actions taken by a government, international organization, or armed group to detect, identify, expose, disrupt, degrade, and neutralize designated criminal networks to mitigate their adverse effects on the strategic interests of the party taking the actions.

(2) Support for CD operations is in subparagraph 9.j.(11), “Support for CD Operations.”

For further guidance on DOD support to civilian LEAs, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations; JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks; and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

h. FHA. FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries outside the United States. These operations are different from foreign assistance primarily because they occur on short notice as a contingency operation to provide aid in a specific scenario or similar events rather than as more deliberate foreign assistance programs to promote long-term stability. DOS or the COM is responsible for confirming the HN’s declaration of a foreign disaster or situation that requires FHA. FHA provided by US forces generally has a limit in scope and duration. Actions supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for assisting. DOD assists when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to respond effectively.

For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

i. Recovery Operations. Recovery operations may search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human remains. For example, JTF FULL ACCOUNTING had the mission to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans listed as missing or prisoners of war from all past wars and conflicts. Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning to execute.

Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt, depending on whether the OE is hostile, uncertain, or permissive.

5. Responding to Crises

a. A crisis is an incident or emerging situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests. A crisis can develop rapidly and create a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that national leaders consider a commitment of military forces and resources. A crisis can occur anywhere across the competition continuum and the response can include almost any type of joint operation. The response may evolve into a limited contingency operation or even expand into large-scale combat operations. The joint force may respond to a crisis such as international and national humanitarian and natural disasters, deteriorating situations involving the safety of US citizens, or threats to allies or vital interests. JFCs may respond with lethal or nonlethal force as applicable and in compliance with ROE. In responding to a crisis generated by an adversary's provocations, the joint force may deploy forces to establish exclusion zones, enforce UN Security Council resolutions, or conduct strikes to respond to the adversary's behavior.

b. Where along the competition continuum the crisis occurs has little bearing on the scope, scale, or duration of a response to crisis. For example, FHA can employ considerable resources and can continue for many months. Countering adversarial behavior during competition below armed conflict can unfold on a massive scale. The joint force's contribution to the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were part of national mobilizations. The joint force's deployments and changes in posture were clear evidence of the US commitment, narrative, and strategic guidance. Successful crisis response involves the ability to deploy the joint force rapidly with required capabilities. If ordered by the President or SecDef, JFCs have the capability to conduct offensive operations with lethal or nonlethal force. Readiness is the key to a credible crisis response.

c. With proper authorization, the joint force may respond to a crisis with types of lethal force normally associated with armed conflict. These strikes are typically punitive in nature, and actions address a previous action. In circumstances where OEs are rapidly becoming fragile, when armed conflict is imminent, or adversary-supported irregular forces threaten a nation's sovereignty or regional stability, US forces may intervene to bolster internal defense, conduct offensive or defensive operations, or support stabilization efforts. A prompt crisis response may preclude escalation of the situation. Effective early intervention can also deny an enemy time to set conditions in their favor and achieve their objectives. Overall, the joint force can respond to a crisis in a broad or specific manner with a wide range of capabilities.

6. Adversarial Competition Below Armed Conflict: Foundation and Practice

a. Introduction

(1) Adversarial competition surrounds a persistent and long-term struggle between actors seeking to achieve incompatible strategic objectives while avoiding armed

conflict. In adversarial competition, nations or non-state actors apply their instruments of power over extended periods and throughout the OE to either initiate or counter malign or antagonistic behavior against their adversaries. The strategic purpose of these activities is to gain and sustain long-term comparative advantages (and mitigate disadvantages) indefinitely.

(2) A nation that competes successfully sets the terms of differing international pursuits to advance its own interests. A nation's successful competitive action drives others to do more of what it wants, at the times of its choosing, in the manner it prefers. The most successful competitor achieves objectives without invading, occupying, or destroying their adversaries but rather by subordinating, minimizing, and influencing their choices and decisions. Exercising international leadership is thus the risk, cost, and reward of successful competition. Competition is the work of establishing rules, attracting and convincing as many actors to adhere to them as much of the time as possible, incentivizing compliance, and penalizing defiance, so the rules remain intact. The prize is in the system's structural privileging of that nation's interests over those of others. This prioritization can incorporate the nature, type, and activities of multinational regimes and institutions but might be less formal. The nation's preferred prioritization can be evident in recognized norms without legal or organizational form, in loosely associated but common patterns of behavior, and in the simple requirement of considering how the dominant state will perceive and address a specific action relative to a contested interest.

(3) Some states may not accept this prioritization or follow the rules set by a competitor in the absence of a good reason. Other states may agree because they find the rules attractive, suit their interests, or align with their values. For all other nations or states, to be compelling and durable, the rules' structure must promise and deliver adequate benefit for good behavior or adequate consequence for noncompliance. This promise means that the rule-setting competitor must have the legitimacy, credibility, capability, and the will to give and to take away benefits and equities, as required, to assert and enforce standards and expectations upon other states.

(4) In adversarial competition, the joint force is primarily concerned with long-term strategies and programs, attraction, influence, and, when directed, the restrained use of force to counter coercion. The United States has experience with all these aspects of competition. Military institutional procurement programs focus on attaining and maintaining a credible force by fielding capabilities that provide relative advantages for extended periods. Concurrently, employing force in competition orients on maintaining and modifying other actors' behaviors without resorting to armed conflict. Adversarial competition is its own unique, challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, advantage, and leverage, where many aspects of malign influence and antagonistic behavior are simply undeterable.

(5) The United States has a history of confronting adversaries and reinforcing allies and partners by blending the instruments of national power to change adversarial behavior. An effective use of the military instrument of national power within a broader foreign policy does not always require armed conflict to protect strategic interests. The United States depends on the military's ability to control waters, territory, air space,

THE CONSTANT OF COMPETITION

In the mid-1990s, successive editions of the United States' national security strategy (NSS) discarded the hard-earned appreciation and philosophy of countering communist expansionism accumulated throughout the course of the Cold War. In fact, these NSS(s) essentially declared that returning to great power competition and spheres of influence were not in the United States' interest. The reality today is that great-power competition is back and it has gathered concern and worry across the national security community. One of the foundational premises of almost all theories seeking to explain why countries act toward each other as they do is that, although much can be achieved by cooperating, the international environment is inherently competitive when differing values or interests clash. Competition among nations is a constant and nations perpetually strive to gain influence, leverage, and advantage. Sometimes these contests unfold in ways that are direct and obvious cases of confrontation and brinksmanship. Other situations emerge as nuanced encroachments over diplomatic norms and standards, human rights, environmental considerations, trade, core values, and the rule of law. To complicate matters, nations can wrap and disguise their measures in plausible denial. Above all, the strategic purpose of a rules-based international system is to establish and enforce rules and norms on these competitions.

Various Sources

cyberspace, orbital space, and influence people under conditions other than armed conflict to help to maintain economic and political freedoms. Enemies and adversaries continually probe the United States and its allies, seeking to modify norms and gain influence. Military forces support policy objectives through demonstration, regional repositioning, air and maritime interception operations, global deployments, establishing exclusion zones, enforcing sanctions, supporting resistance partners, employing surrogate forces, and ensuring compliance with treaties. JFCs recognize these circumstances where the joint force must contribute and coherently campaign to advance and protect US interests.

b. Foundation

(1) Coercion is a broad concept that encompasses two distinct forms of intimidation: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo before an adversary shifts policy or takes undesired actions. Compellence seeks to modify behavior or persuade an adversary to desist an ongoing behavior, cease an action they have begun, or do something they would rather not do. While deterrence constitutes groupings of passive threats and activities to keep an adversary from encroaching, compelling behavior requires active measures to drive an adversary out of a position previously established and maintained through an encroachment. Compelling behavior typically requires more than just rhetoric. Coercing a change in behavior centers on the action, not simply a threat or signal.

(2) In calculating the efficacy or viability of coercion, whether deterring or compelling behavior, a state requires a detailed understanding of an adversary's determination, stake in the interest at hand, strengths, and vulnerabilities. A competitor state's analysis of coercive options demands a careful knowledge of the adversary's value system. Coercing behavior works by manipulating anticipated values and costs, and it is the adversary's perception of the values and costs that matters. JFCs should realize the fundamental considerations of coercing behavior.

(a) **Developing an Accurate Understanding.** States make calculations based on an understanding of the adversary and all the influences, motivations, capabilities, and long-term interests driving their decision making and behavior. Senior civilian and military leaders seek to know what an adversary deems vital and how much pressure they will endure before parting with it. Indeed, coercion can enable even a weak country to gain a more favorable outcome than a stronger state. A lack of understanding of the adversary's values and goals and a corresponding lack of understanding of what motivates its decision makers reduces the likelihood of coercive success from the outset.

COMPELLING BEHAVIOR WITH DEGREES OF FORCE

Compelling behavior through coercive measures can occur through three modes. First, a state can coerce through threats or an amplified narrative regarding a contested interest without employing force. This mode does not have a high success rate. However, in 1970 after discovering the Soviet navy was establishing a submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, the United States exposed and threatened the Soviets to the degree that they abandoned the project. Second, a state can use force short of armed conflict. The best example is the Cuban Missile Crises in 1962, where the US changes in force posture and missions helped convince the Soviets to remove its nuclear weapons from Cuba voluntarily. Third, the employment of measured violent force. An example is where in 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces attacked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to achieve a set of limited objectives. NATO was not seeking to depose President Slobodan Milosevic or occupy Serbia. NATO's objective was for Serbian forces to cease their violent retribution against the Kosovo Liberation Army. For compellence, the point is the choice of compliance remains with the adversary. In each of the three cases, the adversary may not have liked the choices, but the United States (and its Allies) imposed costs with restraint, leaving the decision up to the adversary. Alternatively, when using forcible action, a state no longer cares what the enemy chooses to do. The state does what it can and takes the necessary action to make the enemy succumb to its will. These necessary actions may include combinations of attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation.

Various Sources

(b) **Formulating the Demand.** The clarity in what a state seeks to achieve through coercion or protection against an encroachment and what CCDRs can provide is essential, as it ultimately forms the objective. First, broad threats regarding the contested interest are counterproductive. Scoping enables policymakers and military commanders to formulate and choose from multiple, viable approaches. Second, clarity and consistency in a state's demands help persuade the adversary of the strength of purpose, especially when the commitment of force aligns and reinforces the narrative. Alternatively, nonspecific demands decrease the likelihood of coercive success. Vague or unclear narratives increase the likelihood of misinterpretation, confusion, and the inadvertent defiance of unintentional escalation. Unclear demands can suggest the state's policy position is not firm but malleable under the pressure of intentional defiance. This lack of presenting clear and consistent objectives severely constrains the possibilities for productive bargaining with the adversary.

(c) **Determining Asymmetry of Interest.** As important as a state's perceptions of its stakes might be, recognizing the two-sided nature of motivation within the competition is essential. An asymmetry exists when the United States or its competitors are willing to sacrifice far more to succeed or are simply unwilling to bear the costs of driving their adversary from an established position or modifying an antagonistic behavior. An asymmetry of interest held or created by one of the actors may favor or drive a particular approach. Asymmetry may allow one side to keep the benefit at a relatively low opportunity cost. Of course, the competitor's relative motivation plays an important role in determining the outcome of coercive action. The state's approach is more likely to be successful if it is more motivated than the adversary regarding the interest at stake. What is critical is that the adversary believes the United States is more motivated to achieve its objective. In some cases, the nature of the circumstance tends to scope and fix the two sides' relative motivation. The state's senior civilian and military leaders carefully assess both sides' relative interests and recognize an asymmetry of interests where one actor values the object more than the other.

(d) **Formulating Credible Resolve.** To succeed, a state must demonstrate a heightened level of commitment, especially when there are no apparent crises or urgent matters. In many cases, there is a military aspect that serves or supports the coercive effort. The motivation must be strong and accompany the acceptance of the costs and risks inherent in steadfastly pursuing or countering coercion. When a state's national leadership makes key decisions, articulation and perception of the depth of national interest involved is essential. Secondly, the adversary must perceive the state's decisions and actions as unwavering commitment. Projecting sentiments or behaviors that raise the adversary's questions and skepticism about the state's commitment can be counterproductive. Presenting and communicating strong motivation to eliminate the threat should be obvious from the beginning. In many cases, a state must take added risk to communicate the strength of their commitment by placing forces in harm's way and potentially deploying additional forces later to reinforce both the perception of resolve and the original forces placed at risk.

(e) Determining Aversion to Escalation. The state can increase the scale of its coercive actions if the initial activities and communications arouse fear of escalation. This creation of fear is particularly effective if the adversary perceives the consequences would lead to less acceptable circumstances than complying with the state's demands. However, the adversary may fear the competitor state's coercive action more than armed conflict. The state's coercive measures, once enacted, may constitute an escalation of itself that the adversary finds unacceptable. The adversary may not regard one of their options or choices as compliance with the state's demands. Counter to the state's intentions, the adversary may see escalation as preferable to acquiescing and abandoning their foreign policy pursuits. The adversary may see their options as limited to circumnavigating the competitor's coercive mechanism or going to war. In some cases, determining an adversary's aversion or affinity to escalation is more complex than a choice between compliance or war. Developing this understanding is a function of many variables, such as past experiences of both competitors, internal domestic pressure, and external support structures. The calculation of the adversary's aversion or preference for armed conflict requires a fingertip feel and expertise in their decision making.

(f) Crafting and Ensuring a Settlement. Specific demands by the state are important, but they may not suffice. In some cases, the state must formulate specific terms for resolution of the circumstances. The joint forces' strategic uses of military force give equal emphasis to the credibility of assurance that the coercive action will cease or that the United States will abstain from carrying out the threat if the adversary complies with the demand. The parties must agree and establish procedures for instituting these terms and verifying their implementation. Specifying the terms of settlement in advance of formal agreement can be of major importance to the adversary. The adversary may want precise settlement terms to safeguard against the possibility that the state has a broader interpretation of the proposed resolution. For agreement and compliance, the adversary will need convincing that the state will not renew pressure and push for even greater concessions after the initial agreement. The adversary who contemplates succumbing to coercive diplomacy may need specific and reliable assurances that the state will carry out its part of the agreement.

KNOWING THE ADVERSARY: AVERSION OR PREFERENCE FOR ESCALATION?

By 1941, the Japanese determined that despite the many risks involved, continuing to seek alternative sources of raw materials at the expense of other states and waging war was preferable to modifying their behavior. The Japanese decided that attacking the United States and other Western powers in the Pacific was more acceptable than curtailing their expansionist ambitions in China because of the suffocating oil embargo. Japan's motivation to expand its sphere of influence was more powerful than avoiding armed conflict.

Various Sources

(g) **Follow Through.** The interaction and competition between a state and its adversary can continue indefinitely. While resolving an episode of coercion may require a great deal of the CCDRs' effort, energy, and commitment, it is likely just a single event in a continuing interactive relationship. The JFCs continually protect and monitor the advantages created and norms reestablished as these accomplishments are fragile and temporary. On the other hand, the adversary will quickly seek to pursue another facet of influence, point of leverage, or advantage. For adversarial competition, there are no permanent achievements or finality in inoculating a state's sovereignty and sociopolitical systems against all the measures and encroachments available to a committed adversary.

7. Patterns of Coercion and Determinants of Success

a. The Known Patterns

(1) **Introduction.** The United States has used its military power in adversarial competition and in the competitions that always emerge after armed conflict. Most of these cases involved both a diplomatic and economic dimension implemented to influence the perceptions and behavior of foreign countries' political leaders. JFCs posture, maneuver, and employ military forces in discrete ways for specific objectives. JFCs recognize successful employment is different for each situation. Evaluating these discrete activities requires considering the full range of uses of the armed forces in adversarial competition. Understanding the adversarial mechanisms that ultimately drive a US response is equally important. Finally, JFCs understand how the armed forces can maximize their unique role and what options can be most successful.

(2) **Estimating Adversary's Resolve Is Challenging.** One aspect of developing and implementing a coercive approach is estimating an adversary's resolve. Resolve refers to the strength of an adversary's will to prevail, and comparative resolve refers to whose will, the adversary's or the state's, is the stronger. Before a circumstance emerges, CCDRs can never know for certain whether their resolve is stronger than the adversary. Indeed, this discovery of will is the function of the confrontation, produced and revealed by the resort to coercive action to test the relative strength of each party's resolve. Estimating comparative resolve attempts to determine who cares more about the objectives. Making a solid estimation is a delicate assignment and easy to get wrong. JIPOE is critical in making an accurate estimation. As making decisions based on an accurate understanding is essential, determining resolve is a serious pursuit of the IC. Even with an accurate estimate, there is no guarantee the parties' comparative resolve will remain constant, as the competition will evolve. Resolve is not static once interaction between the competitors unfolds; commitments can change, often initially toward greater firmness. Typically, adversaries entrench as the contest gets underway to see how strongly the United States cares. When an adversary employs aspects of limited force, both sides are likely to harden their positions even more. Finally, the interaction can have an inherent dynamic toward escalation before the circumstances level out because neither party will either admit complicity or acquiesce at the first offer.

(3) **Coercing Behavior Is Difficult.** Developing a sound appreciation of an adversary's resolve and ability to resist is essential, but JFCs recognize that coercing an

adversary to choose an acceptable behavior is difficult. JFCs know it is intrinsically more difficult to get an adversary to change its behavior than to maintain and accept the status quo. Compelling successfully requires that the adversary alter a highlighted behavior that is evident to the affected parties as a response to the United States' declared initiative. In contrast, deterrent threats are easier for the adversary to pretend to ignore or to comply without great loss of face. In deterrent situations, the adversary can claim plausible deniability, maintaining that it did not intend to change its behavior in the first place, or it can simply appear to ignore deterrent threats while not changing its behavior. In changing behavior, one barrier to success is that it usually requires the adversary's overt submission. An adversary can resist coercive attempts in imaginative and unexpected ways even when the state has substantial leverage. The state can find the difference between the application of force and the achievement of the objective, anything but direct, linear, and mechanical. In practice, coercing behavior instead of imposing an outcome requires a favorable decision by the adversary, thus making the next step of the contest a function of the adversary's decision making. The adversary loses standing and a sense of honor when under pressure; it reverses a policy to which it has committed its prestige and devoted resources compared with when it simply persists in the same behavior. Finally, coercing behavior entrails the passions of the adversary. Due to the external humiliation inflicted upon the adversary, elicited passions can produce effects antithetical to the state's objectives. These emotional responses can cause the state to mobilize domestic support for the adversary's government. The risk and irony being the adversary becomes less susceptible to coercion. This risk is part of a complex OE, and convincing or leveraging an adversary to make choices favorable to the state is the essence of competition and art of countering coercion. The deliberate decision by an adversary to cease an antagonistic behavior or policy characterizes and distinguishes successful coercion from more direct use of power, such as forcible action.

(4) Long-Term Credibility, Legitimacy, and Power Are the Actual Stakes

(a) Coercing an adversary's behavior and choice is normally more than a matter of one-time acquiescence for the adversary. Accepting a demand is difficult, as the adversary must worry about the effects of a failed confrontation on its internal and external credibility and its power stakes. An adversary's perception of its legitimacy and credibility concerning its reputation, power stakes, and capabilities are difficult to discern, but the adversary contemplates all these considerations in its decision to stand firm or give way to a competitor state. The adversary's deliberation of credibility and legitimacy make compromise difficult and acquiescence demanding because the compromise may involve long-term national issues and consequences. The adversary may see any capitulation as a sign of weakness, which could encourage its rival to demand a long series of concessions and take more aggressive action. Actions in the present set precedent and expectations for the future. The adversary can never ignore how its reactions to pressures from others will affect its reputation regarding legitimacy and credibility.

(b) Perceptions of power now and in the future are equally at stake. Giving way to the United States may come with an opportunity cost to an adversary's relative strength. If, in deciding to accept the state's demands, the adversary perceives its range of future choices can significantly diminish, its natural incentives will be to stand firm.

Acquiescing to a competitor presents more than a discrete issue for the adversary because a capitulation undercuts both its reputation for resolve and its ability to stand firm in the future.

(5) Encroachments Are Vulnerable to Information. An adversarial encroachment is a manifestation of coercive intent that breaks laws, violates treaties, and trespasses upon matters of sovereignty. These actions can be intimidating but vulnerable to a state's manipulation and exploitation of information, regardless of the adversary's narrative's sophistication and method. These vulnerabilities have several facets. An encroachment creates victims or "net losers." Information can create sympathy for the victims, expose the adversary's actions and delegitimize their narrative. Additionally, information can dilute the adversary's commitment, cast doubt on whether the coercion will succeed, steer the adversary's power base's perceptions, provide a voice to the disaffected, and articulate a better alternative for the future. The adversary's competitive pursuit serves their interests, of course, but one opportunity cost of implementation and initial success is it creates a set of net losers or victims. In the context of the encroachment, these victims may be geographically dislocated or isolated but likely have a broader ethnic or religious constituency and connection with a larger regional or even global community of interest.

(a) JFCs use information to create sympathy and supporting sentiment from a broader community. JFCs recognize that sentiment can cascade across regions and boundaries and create international pressure against the adversary's policy and actions. JFCs use of information highlights the injustice and perpetually keeps the topic in the global media's headlines across the victims' associated communities. Ultimately, this helps alienate and isolate the adversaries from the rest of the world. This isolation can ultimately constrain the adversary's other foreign and domestic policy objectives as well as economic opportunities.

(b) Information activities can create separation between the adversary leadership's power base and the general population regarding the adversary's coercion and subversion. In most cases, the association between the general population and a nation's leadership is indirect but influential. Over time, the separation provides influence and requires unanticipated effort and resources to manage the coercive policy.

(c) Information can segregate the adversary's decision makers who generated the encroachment from their base of support. The regime's power base has many interests and equity at stake in the adversary regime's success and viability. Information can convince the power base the regime's endeavor puts their interests at risk. Once convinced of the risk, the power base's influence will begin to pressure the regime to modify its behavior regarding the coercion.

(d) Information activities can create doubt in the mind of the adversary's decision makers, as to the encroachments' viability and efficacy. Regarding the victimized population, information provides a global voice and platform to the disaffected persons and solidifies and advances the perception of illegitimacy, injustice, and grievance. Providing a voice to the disaffected group is another form of exposure. Information does more than

merely counter the adversaries' narrative; it also provides a more compelling alternative vision for the future.

(6) Adversaries Seek to Counter the Coercive Measures

(a) As the state employs coercive measures, the adversary will likely seek to counter the move. If the adversary believes it can foil or significantly mitigate these measures it will respond through counter-coercion techniques. The adversary can implement these actions using any form or combination of national power and may signal that the adversary is not likely to give way easily. Rather than simply seeking to minimize the effect of the competitor's coercive threats, an adversary may try to impose additional costs on that state. The adversary can escalate militarily or attempt to drive a diplomatic wedge between nations aligned against it. The adversary's reasoning is that it can convince the state to back down and withdraw its imposition. An assessment of the United States' approach should focus on the perceived costs the action creates. In examining a coercive interaction as a continual and dynamic exchange, the United States' assessment should consider the adversary's ability to neutralize those costs, or at least its perception that it can, as well as the effect of other threats bearing down on the adversary at any point in time.

(b) The state prepares for the adversary's likely counter-coercion methods to undermine the coercive measure once it begins. If the adversary adapts and responds in kind; both actors will likely persist in their responses, pouring more into their respective efforts. In short, the dynamics of crisis behavior take over, and the confrontation can escalate from threats and exemplary uses to armed conflict. Thus, when an adversary believes that it possesses effective counter-coercion techniques, it will not immediately respond to the state's threats or actual use of force short of war. Matters become even more vexing in situations where the adversary does not reveal its counter-coercion methods for fear that doing so will negate their effectiveness. Foreknowledge does not necessarily undermine the adversary's counter-coercion capabilities. There are often strong incentives to make such measures known ahead of time if doing so will deter the state from undertaking such actions.

(7) States Can Fail to Understand the Competition's Context and Means

(a) USG leaders and JFCs recognize that knowing the adversary is essential but anticipating how the use of force affects adversary behavior is more demanding. How effectively the state diplomatically and informationally shapes the international landscape is an essential consideration of forming a viable approach and indicator of how well joint force activity might influence an adversary's choices. Considering the military, diplomatic, and informational efforts as distinct and separate makes for easy but flawed calculations of success or failure. Civilian and military leaders avoid trying to determine success in narrow terms of the quantity of military force used and when. Instead, they examine and anticipate the likelihood of success in how the multiple instruments of national power work together and why. A tenuous assumption is that the greater

demonstration of force overall, especially sooner in the confrontation, actually sends a stronger signal of US resolve. Absent a broad diplomatic effort, this may not be valid.

(b) A second consideration is whether less force ultimately can be effective overall. A third consideration for a state is whether it can avoid the risk of violence entirely, and if not, then at least minimize the risk of armed conflict and still achieve its objectives.

(c) A key disconnect can occur when a state fails to recognize a mismatch of interests with an adversary. The state may have only modest interests regarding a contested issue, while the adversary's perceptions may be that the issue is existential. These examples serve as a reminder that messages filter through the actor's strategic culture; domestic political culture; and their leadership's temperament, experiences, and predispositions. Messaging is inherently vulnerable to misinterpretation. The likelihood of success decreases when an adversary perceives the state's principal narrative is inconsistent or lacks specific demands.

(d) JFCs know success begins with recognizing how any military approach inextricably links with the nation's ability to create the international and domestic political conditions to signal resolve. Just as importantly, JFCs link these conditions to the military approach. Together, the international diplomatic efforts, domestic consultation, and sound approach send a strong signal of commitment, resolve, and willingness to accept costs as well as impose them.

(8) Adversaries Can Employ Surrogates. Adversaries often employ surrogates in adversarial competition to indirectly achieve their objectives when direct involvement is infeasible, inappropriate, or unacceptable. The adversary will work indirectly through its agent, or surrogate, to achieve an objective in pursuit of the principal's interests. A surrogate works or acts on behalf of, and in the direction of, the principal to accomplish tasks the principal cannot perform or chooses not to perform. The principal-surrogate relationship is dynamic because the principal and surrogate typically cooperate not as a partnership with shared objectives but for divergent reasons. This divergence often generates problems associated with agency and risk sharing. Problems occur when ulterior objectives of the principal and surrogate come into conflict with one another. Risk-sharing problems occur when one party wants the other party to accept more risk than the other party is willing to accept. Changes in strategic and military risk affect the relationship differently, depending on the relationship's strength and character. The unacceptable strategic risk may cause the principal to sever the relationship with the surrogate, or unacceptable operational risk may cause the surrogate to sever the relationship with the principal.

(9) Multiple States and Multiple Adversaries Complicate Coercion. Coercion becomes even more demanding in situations in which more than a pair of states compete against each other. Often, a multinational force is united in their overall view of a needed response against an adversary, but members may disagree over the approach to achieve their shared objectives. Sometimes the multinational force will even disagree on the objective itself. This is where commanders can leverage interest mapping. If either is

the case, then the multinational force members with the most power or stake relative to the circumstance will have to exert energy to keep other members united in their effort. The multinational force must balance the actions required to hold the multinational force together and to counter the adversary's coercive action. On the other hand, the joint force may find that countering the coercive action is infeasible without the multinational force. Likewise, a multinational force of adversaries can face similar difficulties. However, if several adversaries are present, it becomes more difficult to design actions that counter all their activities. Sometimes steps that coerce one of the parties can encourage the other adversaries to resist. Other times it may be necessary to favor one of the adversaries to induce the others to cooperate. Success in these types of situations requires finesse, diplomacy, patience, compromise, and often, duplicity.

b. Determinants of Success

(1) The United States can align appropriate instruments of national power, demonstrate effectively the extent of its commitment to policy objectives, and make believable the tacit and overt threats of military force. Typically, the United States assesses situations, takes counsel of collective wisdom, and endeavors to use all available foreign policy tools to reinforce its credibility and convince adversaries of its resolve. However, other states have attempted to convince an adversary of its resolve without the benefit of information about whether the chosen tools are the right ones, for use in the right ways, in the right combinations, or at the right times. These other state's leaders likely made choices based on many inputs and advice, and perhaps, intuition. Subjective assessments of risks, resource constraints, and ethical considerations, which seem outwardly reasonable, do not always speak how best to create positive coercive effects. In these circumstances, the result can be an inadvertent use of foreign policy tools at times and in combinations that work at cross-purposes, muddle communications, and provide inadequate context to the characteristics and values of the adversary.

(2) When the adversary understands the state's position, their choices of submission, defiance, or something in-between are a function of its calculation of the costs, benefits, and risks of the set of actions available. When the adversary does not accurately understand the state's position or commitment, the action or inaction distorts the state's calculation of the probabilities of the adversary choosing further defiance or capitulation. This distortion makes it much harder to predict what the adversary will do and, after the fact, to understand why it did so. An adversary's defiance, for example, may certainly be by design, or it may be unintentional if it did not understand what the state is demanding or what the state was threatening. In practice, when its demands are highly specific, the state has a greater likelihood of success than when its demands are vague. At the very least, clarity minimizes the adversaries' potential to misunderstand the state's preferences and so to behave defiantly by accident. At the very most, a lack of clarity might suggest to the adversary that the state's position is not mature, much less firm. A state's ambiguity may be due to a lack of internal political consensus or apprehension that the public is not prepared to support a military intervention. This perception of a tenuous and weak commitment may encourage the adversary to continue the encroachment, pressure the state through noncompliance, or exploit other possible vulnerabilities.

COERCIVE ACTION IN HISTORY

In many cases, the United States has successfully applied coercive action to advance and protect its interests. Three major examples follow. In each case, the adversaries were capable and even the preeminent great powers of the era. There are many cases where the United States has prevailed.

- a. During the Civil War, President Lincoln sidelined Great Britain and France from trading with the Confederacy through a deft combination of international law, information, and widening the Civil War's aims.
- b. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States convinced the Soviets to remove their nuclear weapons from the western hemisphere in exchange for a similar compromise within the Soviet sphere.
- c. Over the decade of the 1980s, the United States cooperated with a diverse set of states, each with little in common with one another to sponsor and support a surrogate, the Afghan rebels, to frustrate and disrupt the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

Various Source

(3) In many cases of US efforts at coercing behavior or countering an adversary's coercive action, the joint force operates in a supporting role to enable, protect, and provide credibility to other instruments of national power. In adversarial competition, civilian and military leaders rarely employ military efforts by themselves. When military force does not underpin other instruments of national power, these tools can be just as irrelevant or ineffective. The United States' most effective pursuits in countering coercion include actions that weave together informational, economic, diplomatic, and military efforts. When coercive action includes military force, JFCs must consider and recommend how to organize around the adversaries' coercive mechanism and their associated decision making. Along with demonstrating the commitment and resolve to prevail, the combination of tools and measures implemented together with military force that provide the highest probabilities for success are:

(a) Lead with a deliberate narrative that discredits the adversary's narrative and articulates the importance and significance of the event or circumstance relative to US values and interests. Once the narrative establishes intent, it can credibly levy highly specific demands compared with when the interests are unclear and demands are diffused or weak. Vague and nonspecific demands decrease the likelihood of coercive success. This decrease in the likelihood of success may be because unclear demands increase the likelihood of misinterpretation, confusion, and, therefore, inadvertent defiance. Even worse, they suggest the state's policy position is not firm but potentially moveable under the pressure of intentional defiance.

(b) Determine the objectives and decisions for implementation based on a sound, accurate understanding of why the adversary is behaving in a malign or antagonistic manner. A sophisticated diagnosis and estimate of the adversary should drive the decision making and approach. A poor understanding of what is motivating the adversary decision maker's behavior reduces the likelihood of coercive success. When implementing policy and military support of the action, commanders often must begin with incomplete knowledge about possible outcomes. It may be that only through US and joint force interaction with the adversary increases the knowledge increase surrounding a circumstance. JFCs cannot predict perfectly what they can achieve in advance; however, commitment to sound diagnosis is essential. Sometimes, JFCs can accumulate more information only through maneuver and action. Many key aspects of information can only become known in the process of the coercive act, where the United States attempts to get the most out of a situation. In setting objectives, the opportunities for and risks to success will wax and wane throughout the coercive event, and commanders should expect the policy guidance to evolve. As the situation dictates modifications to the approach and its expectations, a state must counter tendencies to steer toward an overly conservative approach and avoid a reluctance to push for relevant gains against seemingly difficult odds. The state should resist the tendency to pursue only objectives that seem highly feasible and likely achievable. The risk is that minimalist objectives may be achievable but irrelevant. The risk of timid and cautious action can portray a lack of commitment and conviction and may miss cultural-specific signals. In the end, the state compels through the manipulation of anticipated costs, and it is the target's perception of costs that matters.

(c) Create leverage and solidarity with like-minded multinational partners to build commitments and overt effort where and when possible, to leverage treaties and other diplomatic efforts. Solidarity can also be a function of legitimacy, which is an important factor in both exposing and countering an adversary's unwanted behavior.

(d) Project military forces from outside the theater to address the adversary's unacceptable behavior. Attempting to solve the problem with only in-theater forces often provides a reduced probability of success. Moving in forces from outside the theater of contest significantly increases the likelihood of success, as it is a good indicator of resolve. This characteristic is true regardless of other factors, such as the level of forces permanently assigned or already deployed in the region at the time. Experience shows that moving forces from outside the AOR into the contested region has a positive effect regardless of the composition of those forces. This dynamic global employment gives policymakers considerable flexibility when designing force packages for coercive operations.

(e) Create a sense of asymmetry in the joint force's favor or strive to reduce or equalize the asymmetric advantage in motivation over the contested interest. In some situations, the state may create an asymmetry of motivation in its favor in four ways. First, the United States should demand the adversary do what is essential to qualify as no longer threatening its vital interests. Second, the state should balance that demand to avoid making demands that encroach upon the adversary's vital interests. Third, the state should offer incentives that reduce the adversary's motivation to resist the demands and make it easier to comply. Fourth, to increase the probability of success, the state should craft demands that allow the adversary to maintain a perception of status and legitimacy while

giving in. Effective commanders try to use all four levers to create an asymmetry of motivation in their favor. The success of coercive threats depends upon an understanding of how mixing these influences creates this type of leverage.

(f) Align the military actions against values and interests of higher priority to the adversary than the values and interests in the dispute. In coercing behavior, success depends on making the costs of nonperformance undesirable enough to convince the adversary to adjust. Telegraphing to the adversary the intended military action is not compromising but necessary. The uncertainty and vagueness about the nature and extent of potential costs are not reinforcing and can be counterproductive. The misperception of an adversary's motives and incentives can negatively affect our ability to manipulate its cost-benefit analysis. When the state does not target important interests, the costs of defiance are acceptable to the adversary. This miscalculation can result in failure, prolonging the coercive exchange until the state modifies the approach and shifts the adversary's calculation of the balance of costs or worse, an unnecessary escalation to armed conflict.

(g) Leverage information effectively for situational awareness and efficiency. An adversarial encroachment is usually vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation of information, regardless of the adversary actions' level of sophistication and methods of employment. These vulnerabilities have several facets. Information can create sympathy for the victims, expose and discredit the adversary's actions and delegitimize their narrative. Furthermore, information can also dilute the adversary's commitment, cast doubt on whether the coercion will succeed, steer the adversary's power base's perceptions, provide a voice to the disaffected, and articulate a better alternative for the future.

(h) Build, leverage, and sustain networks of interorganizational partners to add diplomatic, economic, and military weight to coercive or defensive demands. The participation of NATO Allies and regional partners in a military coalition is far preferable to undertaking a coercive or defensive military action unilaterally. The key to success is an accurate assessment of partner authorities, capabilities, posture, limitations, and will.

(i) Ensure continuity and consolidation for follow-on missions. Effective follow-through of joint force success against an adversary does not normally lead to the conclusion of the overall competition. Following through on the gains and adjusting to the setbacks is a fundamental requirement. The result may change the overall character of the competition. JFCs should anticipate the continual ebbs and flows of adversarial competition over time. Joint forces capitalize on success by consolidating the gains. As no accomplishment in competition has permanence, commanders ensure continuity of effort through activities to secure and protect the coercive action's success and maintain the behaviors and conditions to perpetuate the advantage or interest. Consolidating gains is an integral part of succeeding in competition and winning in armed conflict.

8. Considerations for Countering Coercion and Malign Influence

a. When directed, the joint force has traditionally exercised influence over key territories in conditions less than armed conflict to maintain and advance US national

interests. Now, the situation can become more complex as threats have challenged the United States in orbital and cyberspace. Within enduring competitions, actors continually probe and seek to gain an advantage. Previous strategic guidance has directed military forces to counter these provocations on many occasions. The US and joint force experiences have exceeded the scope of most anecdotal coercion theories. For example, some situations include more than two actors that bear on the situation and its outcome. With the inclusion of multiple actors, an effective response requires a holistic framework where multiple power struggles may be in play concurrently. In the US experience, general deterrence is broad and continuous throughout the competition continuum. Alternatively, the United States normally tailors its use of force to compel behavior short of war only in specific circumstances.

b. The impact of the use of military force in these circumstances reinforces and empowers current narratives, expands and leverages existing treaties and partnerships, and provides credibility and teeth to other elements of national and allied power. In almost every case, the joint force provides the backbone and connective tissue to bring to bear other instruments of national power effectively. Civilian leaders have depended upon the joint force in the wake of military victory to determine, create, and enforce a new and preferred international landscape. When militaries do not effectively enable this political leverage, abstract but real and powerful forces, previously unforeseen, dormant, or sidelined, emerge and bring to bear new and expanded political stakes and circumstances. In these cases, there is no readily apparent finality or conclusion for the military.

c. When the existing character of relations between two nations regarding a specific contested interest is hostile, nations can call upon armed forces to coerce behavior. Nations use military force in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to present a threat to an adversary to:

(1) Deter the adversary from taking an undesired action or from stopping or preventing a desired action. There may be actors that are currently not complicit in or supportive of the antagonistic behavior but that could make the situation far worse or complicated. The joint force may contribute to actions that ensure those actors remain neutral or not involved.

(2) Compel the adversary to do or to stop doing an action. Armed forces are used to organize around the problem by providing support to a neutral actor(s) or potential ally.

(3) Assure or reinforce other relevant actors so they will continue positive behavior or begin to make positive contributions. Another aspect of assurance is in signaling that compliance by the adversary will not lead to further demands.

(4) Induce a hesitant actor to either initiate positive contributions or refrain from harmful behavior. Policy formulation should consider, and JFCs account for, all the actors involved that can substantially bear on the situation.

d. Regardless of the circumstance, joint forces can coerce behaviors either directly or indirectly. Direct use of military force occurs when the activities orient on an adversary

without intermediaries. Sometimes, JFCs compel behavior indirectly through partners. In these cases, the joint force does not confront the primary adversary with action; only the adversary's allies feel pressure directly. JFCs can coerce an adversary indirectly to the degree that they are concerned with their client's well-being if they find the US action credible. For example, the United States deployed a Marine expeditionary brigade to Thailand in 1962 to induce the Soviet Union and China to compel their indigenous Laotian surrogates to change their antagonistic behavior.

e. Civilian leaders can use the joint force indirectly to achieve strategic objectives. In such instances, the signaling to the adversary may include changes in the disposition of military units. While these actions may demonstrate US concern to all parties, US civilian leaders may make no specific attempt to communicate the relationship between the military activity and the desired behavior of an adversary within the circumstance. Success requires the adversary to anticipate, observe, or otherwise become aware of the military activity.

f. Precipitation of Coercion

(1) Coercive circumstances begin to unfold when an actor disrupts an established framework of relations among several nations or an internal domestic political configuration, by injecting sentiment, attitudes, or overt action that is unexpected or at least unwelcome. Once the actor or adversary identifies an opportunity or vulnerability, they pursue and exploit it through unattributable, nuanced, or overt coercive measures, while violating principles of sovereignty. The adversary leverages ambiguity and deliberately blurs truth from fiction. These encroachments may manifest themselves as a domestic upheaval, a new departure in a major power's foreign policy, or perhaps an unexpected armed clash between the military units of hostile states. Regardless of the cause, the encroachment often creates uncertainties and a distinct and pervasive psychological unease among interested parties. The adversary's objectives can be subtle or surprising—modest or bold.

(2) The choices made by foreign decision makers have their own domestic and external limitations. As a group of variables, the perceptions, sources of motivation, strength of commitment to an interest, and many other influences significantly impact those decisions. Although a state might want to clearly signal a willing or imminent threat of the use of force, a foreign leader may perceive only a weak commitment. Domestic considerations and internal pressure may drive an adversary to act against their better judgment. Different scenarios present different degrees of difficulty. The degree of success of the joint force and other US policy efforts depends upon how effectively the designed effort penetrates the complex and layered set of variables driving an adversary's decision making.

(3) In implementing a mechanism to counter the adversaries' advances, JFCs must consider how to organize against the adversaries' decision-making mechanisms. One method is to identify all the actions and behaviors needed to confront the encroachment. These fall largely into two categories. First, the behaviors that the joint force's efforts need to ensure, and second, the behaviors the joint force must change. For example, for any

single problem set, there are probably several behaviors the joint force needs to help continue and several behaviors commanders will need to stop.

g. Determining the Approach and Objectives for a Specific Interest/Adversarial Behavior

(1) In developing an approach, national leaders will likely have to consider and decide five questions. The first is what to demand of the adversary regarding curtailment of the encroachment. The second is how to create a sense of necessity for the adversary to comply with the demand. The third is how to determine what measures will be effective against the adversary's existing encroachment and convey relevant and increasing costs for continued noncompliance. Fourth, how the US and joint force will recognize whether the implemented approach is working. Fifth and finally, how to communicate an assurance of settlement when the adversary complies. Together, these five decisions lead to formulating a demand that is credible and potent enough in the adversary's mind that they choose compliance rather than noncompliance and its consequences. The more far-reaching the demand on the adversary, the stronger its motivation to resist and the more difficult the task of the coercive diplomacy. The point is in striving to know the adversary and avoiding the tendency to mirror-image how we might react given a reversal of roles.

(2) Depending on the answers the policymakers provide, there will be different variants of the approach. There are three major variants and JFCs can provide essential contributions for each. The first is the ultimatum, which is a deadline that the state gives for compliance, backed by actions associated with denial or imposing costs for noncompliance. The second is gradualism, which pushes for compliance backed only with the threat of incremental increases of military force over time. The third type of approach is through experimentation. Initially, this may be a minimalist approach that may not have a substantive opportunity cost but likely lack mechanisms for both creating a sense of urgency for compliance and a clear threat of military force for noncompliance. Only on rare occasions will an adversary respond to incentives or promises of beneficial overtures.

(3) The purposes of these different approaches are typically:

(a) **Denial** approaches seek to change an adversary's behavior by thwarting its approach or denying implementation. Denial focuses on the actual conduct or implementation of the encroachment. Denial confronts the actual coercive mechanism to undercut its effectiveness, seeking to stalemate these forces rather than bring outright military victory over them. A successful denial approach is one that prevents the adversary from achieving their objectives with its approach.

(b) **Forfeiture** or cost-imposing approaches seek to change an adversary's behavior by raising the costs of its continued antagonistic behavior. Forfeiture imposes costs, either directly to the adversary's power base or population, or pressures assets that are important for the population's or to the leadership's values or quality of life. A successful approach is one that causes the adversary to give way, not because the competitor thwarts the military approach but because the opportunity costs of continuing

are too great or the impact on the adversary's internal structures or population has become too negative.

(c) **Risk-based** approaches seek to change an adversary's behavior by raising the probability that it will suffer increasing costs in the future if it fails to comply. Risk means escalation and threatens greater costs to the adversary's valued power base and key assets.

1. A successful risk-based approach causes the adversary to acquiesce because it becomes convinced the costs it will suffer from looming coercive action are not worth the objectives it seeks. To the extent force produces risk, coercive action can be inherently difficult to pull off because risk-based approaches are inherently complex. Risk-based approaches can be successful to the extent that they create, in the adversary's mind, the fear that future military actions will be sufficiently costly that the adversary changes its behavior. However, costs suffered from coercive measures in the present carry more influence than the potential costs imagined from coercion in the future.

2. JFCs should calculate and conceive risk as anticipated future costs. Imagined future opportunity costs hurt less than present costs. Based on the circumstances, JFCs may apply a risk-based approach incrementally, gradually ratcheting up the costs. However, this can produce contrary effects. Especially if the adversary has time to adapt its tactics to reduce the damage, adjust to the costs, and mobilize domestic opinion against the United States—all of which make the adversary better able to tolerate the imposed costs. Finally, a coercive risk approach is less effective when the state only threatens or severely limits the action against the adversary.

3. For similar reasons, denial approaches are difficult to execute with coercive diplomacy. After all, it is hard to inflict much damage with coercive diplomacy: the limited use of force produces only limited results. Delivering limited military actions is not likely to cause an adversary that cares deeply about its objectives to change course. Similarly, the threat to deny is not actual denial, and limited use of force can produce only limited denial. Strictly speaking, coercive diplomacy cannot employ denial in the sense that it cannot use enough force to stalemate an adversary. Through limited military action, the joint force can, if it chooses, undercut the effectiveness of the adversary's encroachment but without making it stop.

4. Whether the state intends to employ its military power to manipulate risk, impose costs, or execute denial, all three goals can be difficult to achieve with only limited employment of military force. For the state, it expects its threats and measures signal firm resolve to escalate the use of force unless the adversary bends. However, the adversary, especially a highly motivated one, can just as easily perceive the threats and limited use of force as signaling weakness. A demonstration of determination can actually appear as an unwillingness or inability to employ large forces or engage in armed conflict. Threats and limited use of force are not unequivocal in their meaning; the adversary can interpret either firmness or weakness in resolve, depending upon their perspective and gathered information.

(4) Regional partners may welcome an imminent change in US policy or overt indications of enforcing an existing one because the US action protects or advances their national interests. In these instances, these partners may be willing participants. The challenge and opportunity are to create solidarity regarding the interests at stake with multiple like-minded actors. This unity requires precisely aligning a common view of the encroachment, the combined interests of countering the adversary, and the individual efforts and goals between the United States and all the participants. Other actors may be inclined toward or favor the interests of the adversary. Their involvement or participation can complicate the situation, increase the effort the United States has to exert, and reduce the probability of success. In these instances, the joint force and interdepartmental leaders take measures to ensure these actors refrain from action that supports the adversary. These aspects of the effort may be heavy-handed and even coercive. The efforts must sideline these potentially harmful actors and incentivize them to at least remain neutral. Together, these actions prepare the international framework that favors the United States and isolates the adversary.

(a) Successful coercion causes the adversary to choose to change or modify its behaviors. For example, a nation may initially take a neutral position or seek to remain uninvolved. However, that nation's participation may be essential to the CCDR's campaign design and maneuver, such as providing essential access, basing, or overflight permissions, as well as denying those to the adversary. The United States may well have to provide cooperative incentives, many being military, such as SC investments. These incentives are another aspect of isolating the adversary and its encroachment.

(b) Next, the national leadership can direct departmental, agency, and joint force actions to organize around and against the adversary's encroachment with the intent of coercing a change in that behavior and then rolling back its gains through a mix of activities and measures. Senior military leaders form and apply discrete mixes against specific actors and narrow, but relevant, aspects of the overall circumstance. Across regions, the campaign design may require numerous, precise applications of blended US powers to pursue and achieve the operational-level behavioral objectives, either reinforcing or compelling action. In most cases, these contested interests are transregional and require contributions of several CCMDs. For example, one CCMD may have to initiate and align efforts to maintain solidarity and assure two or three partners and take action to keep an unhelpful actor on the sidelines. Another CCMD may work with partners to facilitate a behavior necessary for success with irregular and conventional force. At the same time, a third CCMD focuses on multiple forms of military force to compel alongside other coercive diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to compel the adversary to acquiesce to US demands. A fourth CCMD's actual contribution may be establishing an exclusion zone, interdicting LOCs, or supporting a violent surrogate.

(c) When countering an adversary's coercive actions, JFCs should account for specific friendly and adversary behaviors: those that should continue and those that should change. The approach must organize around the problem and contested interest(s) by employing combinations of activities and measures toward multiple instances of the desired behaviors. The campaign design and execution may have to present and leverage unique combinations of US national power. For each necessary behavior, the campaign

should employ actions and measures consisting of diplomatic incentives or pressures, irregular and traditional warfare, and economic measures that promote or constrain a competitor. The combination of actions and measure can be rich with incentives; light pressures for hesitant, but needed, contributors; and a full and complex array of strong pressures aimed at the adversary. The importance of making decisions and choices based on understanding the adversary's perspective and developing a causal link between action and behavior for each actor is essential. These incentives and light pressures must resonate and impact all the involved parties' perception of options and subsequent decision making.

(d) Finally, policy guidance will likely drive the operational objectives. Initially, the level of effort may be minimal. The policy intentions and corresponding military approach may only seek to limit the adversary's actions. Based on the evolving situation, this level of effort and the goals may scale up or down. Of course, the joint force's actions toward coercing a single antagonistic behavior by a single actor occurs within global integration's systematic decision making and recommendation process. Potential policy goals include counter, enhance, contest, and limit. These can change rapidly throughout the GCP or CCP.

1. Counter. Proactively challenge and prevent the adversary from achieving incompatible objectives without causing an escalation to armed conflict but seeking to roll back the adversary's gains and coerce the adversary to abandon the behavior and policy.

2. Enhance. Actively seek to achieve strategic objectives; improve relative strategic or military advantage.

3. Contest. Maintain relative strategic or military advantage to ensure the adversary achieves no further gains; only seek to improve the US advantage as much as possible with existing resources and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests elsewhere.

4. Limit. Minimize the adversary's gains. Achieve the best possible strategic objective within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser objective entails the risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.

h. Joint Operations, Tasks, and Investments in Adversarial Competition. The clearest signal of US commitment is the deployment and employment of military forces in response to the unacceptable behavior of an adversary. The most effective means of communicating to an adversary the seriousness of US intent is the visible commitment of resources: spending the money required to project power, accepting the opportunity costs of not using capabilities in other ways, and putting military assets and Service members in potentially dangerous environments. When the principal narrative makes clear the United States values the object and stakes surrounding the contested interest, the decision to move forces from outside the region into the AOR is an effective signal of US resolve. This type of signaling is effective for many situations, across many types and sizes of deployments, despite differences in the size and longevity of any prior permanent presence. Cost is a

good indicator of value, and vulnerability is a good indicator of commitment. The United States has considerable flexibility in selecting which combinations of air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace forces to use when it wishes to demonstrate its resolve. The types of joint operations associated with adversarial competition include:

(1) **Sanction Enforcement** is any operation that employs coercive measures to control the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. Maritime interception operations can be efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations, such as those in support of the UN Security Council or other legitimate sanctioning body's resolutions, and prevent the transport of restricted goods. The strategic objective is to compel a nation or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the operational objective focuses on establishing a selective barrier that allows only authorized goods to enter or exit. Depending on the terrain, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of forces operating in multiple domains across AORs. Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications interoperability.

(2) **Establishing/Enforcing Exclusion Zones.** A sanctioning body establishes an exclusion zone to prohibit specified activities in a specific area. With appropriate authorization and subject to law and policy, joint forces may monitor and enforce exclusion zones for breaches or flagrant violations of international law regarding the conduct of nations, treaty compliance, protection or safety of civilians, or force protection. There are different types of exclusion zones that the JFC can establish. These zones can emanate from the air, on the water, or the land. An exclusion zone's purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face the continued imposition of sanctions, or signal a credible threat of the use of force. Such measures can be resolutions by the UN or mandates by another international body of which the United States is a member, although the United States may unilaterally impose them (e.g., Cuban Missile Crisis Oct 1962, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in August 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March 1993 to December 1995).

(3) **Interdiction.** In adversarial competition, with proper authorization, interdiction can include activities to support law enforcement and divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy with lawful authority, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and money. For example, joint forces have much experience in conducting air and maritime interception operations in support of a wide range of UN Security Council resolutions. Additionally, Title 10, USC, and state NG military forces also provide DSRA to USG departments or agencies responsible for domestic law enforcement interdiction activities when requested and approved by SecDef or the President.

(4) **Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping.** Peace enforcement operations (PEO) and peacekeeping operations (PKO) are important coercive actions that orient on adversarial behaviors. They are important tools and can make significant contributions in adversarial competition. PEO and PKO can be multiagency and multinational operations. PEO and PKO can provide a humanitarian response or coerce a cessation of violent actions.

They can involve all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain armed conflict, force a change in antagonistic behavior, create an environment of reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate the transition from fragile to effective governance. For the joint force, this typically includes PKO, PEO, and deterrence. JFCs conduct PKO or PEO in conjunction with various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts to achieve strategic objectives. JFCs tailor PKO/PEO to each situation and may support diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PKO/PEO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the negotiation process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.

For additional guidance on peace operations, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

(5) Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. Freedom of navigation operations protect US navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas, against excessive maritime claims. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right accorded by international law.

(a) International law recognizes that a coastal nation may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner it can exercise sovereignty over its land territory, subject to the right of “innocent” passage, which permits ships to pass continuously and expeditiously through another nation’s territorial waters. The passage is “innocent” if it is not prejudicial to the stability, good order, or security of the coastal nation. All ships and aircraft enjoy complete freedom of movement and operation on and over the high seas, subject only to the requirement to have due regard for the rights of other nations and safe conduct and operation of other ships and aircraft.

(b) Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in a measured legal response, appropriate to the situation. The International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the UN, codifies the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly use of international airspace.

(6) Freedom of Overflight. Space is the only physical domain that allows a globally persistent and legal overflight of any location on the Earth. This global persistence is achieved by combining the high-altitude perspective of space with the enduring longevity of spacecraft, and an international legal regime affords unique opportunities for military power. Orbital flight extends LOCs into the most desolate and remote OAs. Joint forces at every echelon capitalize on this capability to share information beyond their line-of-sight, synchronizing global power projection. Space operations can overcome denied area access in that space-based ISR provides the foundational intelligence to analyze adversary capabilities, COAs, and intent to deliver predictive intelligence for space domain awareness and JFC decision making. With this positional advantage, military forces can

monitor and begin response to contingencies around the world before establishing an in-theater footprint.

(7) **Protection of Shipping.** When necessary, US forces protect US-flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in the United States or foreign vessels), and US property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. This protection may extend to foreign-flag vessels under international law and with the consent of the flag state (such as Operation EARNEST WILL, in which Kuwaiti ships reflagged under the US flag in 1987). Actions to protect shipping include coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermeasures, and environmental defense, in addition to operations on the high seas, including escort duties and area operations. JFCs may decide to execute these operations individually or in combination. Protection of shipping, which is a critical element in the fight against piracy, requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, subsurface units, sensors, weapons, and a command structure both ashore and afloat with a logistic base.

(8) **Show of Force.** Commanders conduct show of force operations to demonstrate the US resolve. They involve the appearance of a credible military force to attempt to modify a specific actor's behavior or defuse a situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests. These operations also underscore US commitment to our multinational partners.

(a) The United States deploys forces abroad to lend credibility to its promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. SecDef may order a show of force to bolster and reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military but often serve both diplomatic and military purposes. These operations may influence other governments or political-military organizations to change or modify antagonistic behavior or refrain from belligerent acts.

(b) Diplomatic concerns influence a show of force operation, and as such, military forces are often under significant legal and diplomatic constraints and restraints. The military force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a wide scope of military forces, including joint US or multinational forces. Forces conducting a show of force operation are also capable of FDOs, FROs, and transitioning to humanitarian response or limited contingency activities.

(9) Joint Campaigns and Operations Against Irregular Threats

(a) **Irregular Threats.** Adversaries may use irregular approaches indirectly through surrogates to gain the advantage over a targeted government or international audiences and organizations. These adversaries balance the appropriate level of resistance and violence, striving for substantive effects while avoiding armed conflict by design. In this context, irregular threats challenge and compete against US and partner interests and others in the international community by threatening stability, norms, and the rule of law.

1. Irregular threats employ techniques of resistance, influence, and violence against vulnerable US allies and partners while purposefully avoiding armed conflict with the United States. Irregular threats can promote both nonviolent and violent resistance among the populations they aim to influence. Irregular threats use many forms of unlawful violence or threats of violence to further a variety of political, social, criminal, economic, and religious ideologies. Terrorists threaten the national power, sovereignty, and interests of the United States and our allies. The JFC should expect an array of actions and activities that challenge USG policy, counter-information efforts to erode legitimacy, and influence local groups and populations to protest US intervention. Irregular threats often avoid conflict and war with the USG but will utilize violence to counter US influence and policy. Increasingly, nation-state adversaries employ traditional and irregular strategies or work through surrogates or partners to compete against US policy and wield influence. Non-state actors primarily employ irregular strategies to achieve the same results through aggressive competition activities and violent opposition to US interests. Irregular threats operate clandestinely to avoid detection, foster and promote deniability, or blur and veil encroachments of norms and laws to create political and legal dilemmas for the USG and joint force.

2. An adversary's use of irregular threats can frustrate and contest US policy and the joint force actions. Irregular threats can engage and operate across the competition continuum, from cooperation through armed conflict. Irregular threats include surrogates, mercenaries, insurgents, subjugated or disenfranchised supporters, and criminal networks that support smuggling, illicit trafficking, and finance networks. These threats often operate in weak, failing, or failed states, illicitly around the world and nation-states that sponsor threats or provide sanctuary.

(b) Considerations for Campaigning Against Irregular Threats

1. Design campaigns around US, allies, and partner interests.

CCDRs evaluate threats and opportunities by how they impact the United States, our allies, and our partners' interests. CCDRs advance and protect US interests by translating them into operational objectives within the GCPs mission areas and CCPs. CCDRs promote the interests of intergovernmental partners and allies through coordination and integrating strategies, plans, and actions to increase the probability of success. JFCs identify mutual concerns, interests, and goals. JFCs characterize how actors threaten those interests or efforts to exploit opportunities for advancing the US, allied, and partner interests relative to the actor. JFCs orient objectives on maintaining or creating an environment more favorable to shared interests. As the JFC visualizes a favorable or acceptable environment, one critical element for influence is an objective focused on the population and measures of the effects of information activities. JFCs consider allied and partner interests, especially where they align and inform the development of coalitions and shared responsibilities. This type of approach is a challenge for the joint force in balancing requirements between US global and theater interests. This balancing requires a coordinated prioritization process to manage potential constrained resources and capability.

2. Employ irregular and unorthodox methods. Irregular and unorthodox methods do not follow past practices or traditions of military activities or actions. When the threat applies irregular or asymmetrical methods against the United States or allies, they are attempting to thwart and challenge traditional approaches to competition, stability, and security. The JFC can implement an irregular or nontraditional approach to challenge the actions of the adversary and frustrate their plans and goals. Employing nontraditional methods against irregular threats includes countering their surreptitious movements, revealing or exposing their concealment in sanctuaries, refuting and opposing their information narrative or efforts, and, on rare occasion, violent actions. Employing irregular and nontraditional methods can frustrate the threat's ability to identify or anticipate the JFC's plans and degrade the threat's efforts to counter future US military activities. Plan for the development of operational infrastructure early in the campaign to support future actions and the flexibility to employ multiple capabilities against the adversary. In areas at risk without operational infrastructure, JFCs coordinate with multinational partners and allies to expand opportunities through their assistance and influence. During competition, subject to proper authorization, SOF may focus on employing unorthodox methods to influence local conditions, enhance integrated deterrence, or provide the JFC with risk-sensitive offensive options to advance US interests short of armed conflict.

3. Exploit asymmetries and leverage indirect approaches.

Campaigns should incorporate a strategic and operational understanding of asymmetries that exist between US and adversaries' interests, strategies, cultures, postures, capabilities, and relationships. This analysis will illuminate adversary strengths, vulnerabilities, decisions, and red lines to help identify cost- or risk-sensitive opportunities to build advantage and create dilemmas. One tool for the JFC is to develop understanding through the preparation and ongoing assessment of the OE. A campaign plan can direct efforts against the threat's asymmetries through sequencing joint force actions and activities to frustrate or stall the operational momentum of the adversary.

4. Coordinate information to influence both globally and locally.

Information is a powerful tool that can garner global support for US and partner efforts, build trust and address concerns for legitimacy, and influence local opinion against the adversary and counter its propaganda. The campaign should integrate the employment of credible global messaging and counter-messaging capability that is iterative; is repeatable; and promotes cross-CCMD, interorganizational, and multinational coordination to leverage overwhelming influence against the adversary. The JFC's information approach should promote legitimacy through activities directed against those areas and populations where irregular threats leverage economic, ideological, and logistical support. The JFC analyzes the OE to identify US resource requirements and areas where populations may be vulnerable to radicalization to support violence and terror. The JFC anticipates an adversary's operations and activities, while counter-messaging continuously throughout the campaign to frustrate the adversary's ability to influence opinion or increase support. JFCs integrate information fluency to strengthen the joint force advantage through knowledge of the joint force information capabilities and those information capabilities of its enemies and adversaries. Commanders assess the effectiveness of targeted influence

efforts to plan future information actions and can modify or continue future efforts depending on the assessment results.

5. Conduct global campaigning. Actions against irregular threats should reflect the relationship of SOF and conventional forces with the joint force to achieve an optimized effort through multifunctional capabilities employed throughout the OE. The two integral aspects of this method are how SOF and other forces enable the core joint warfighting functions. Irregular threats require expanded interorganizational cooperation, combined with efforts to create powerful influence at the right time and place. CCDRs integrate campaigns by coordinating with other collaborating CCMDs and recommending sequencing USG actions and activities throughout the competition continuum, emphasizing cooperation and adversarial competition. A globally integrated force campaigns across multiple theaters against irregular threats. As the joint force campaigns in cooperation, success requires a partner-building methodology that contests threat networks through prioritizing how and when to assist allies and partners. The CCDR and staff plan to maintain those current partners with mutual interests affected by irregular threats and advance selected partners in capability, interoperability, and desired US access. During competition, the JFC envisions how to improve the US and allies' strategic position, contest adversary gains, and employ actions to impose costs and create dilemmas for the irregular threats and their sponsors.

(c) Operations and Activities for Countering Irregular Threats

1. FID. FID is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a foreign government or international organization in any of the programs and activities undertaken by an HN government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other irregular threats to its internal security and the strategic interests of the sponsoring party.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

2. CTN. CTN is a subset of network engagement. CTN consists of the aggregation of activities across the DOD and USG departments and agencies that identifies and neutralizes, degrades, disrupts, or defeats designated threat networks. Irregular threats use licit and illicit networks to increase their operational reach and conduct, direct, support, and inspire malign activities directed against the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. In cooperation with interagency, intergovernmental, and foreign partner law enforcement and intelligence organizations, the joint force conducts CTN activities to dismantle these threat networks. CTF is a component of CTN. CTF encompasses activities conducted to degrade, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary's ability to affect US interests negatively. Joint forces conduct CTF activities to interdict the clandestine transfer and storage of funds to finance malign activities.

For additional guidance on CTN, network engagement and CTF activities, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

(10) Support to Resistance Partners/Insurgency

(a) Support to resistance is a USG policy option to support a foreign resistance movement that offers an alternative to a direct US military intervention or formal political engagement in a conflict. The USG may determine to support the resistance in various situations and under many different conditions. Once USG sponsorship is determined, the resistance becomes a partner where the USG shares policy and resistance goals. Resistance activities can remain nonviolent in the early stages and progress to violence to coerce or disrupt the oppressive government or occupying power's behavior if it does not change or adapt.

(b) A resistance partner has mutually established agreements with the USG to cooperate for some specified time in pursuit of specific objectives. A resistance partner acts on their own accord. They are not subordinates under formal command. A surrogate is someone who acts on behalf of another. A surrogate is an employee or subordinate that a friendly force commands and controls and whose actions the friendly force bears some legal and moral responsibility. While the terms surrogate and proxy are terms of international relations taxonomy as a policy perspective, such usage does not obviate the importance of the proper distinction for UW regarding support to resistance partners versus employment of surrogates. JFCs emphasize that decision makers' and practitioners' expectations of "control" over a resistance partner is not a guarantee.

(c) The United States may support insurgencies that oppose oppressive regimes or resistance movements that oppose an occupying power. The United States coordinates this support with its allies and partners. US military support in this manner is through UW. UW is an effort by the USG to enable an indigenous resistance movement or insurgency in denied areas. UW can enable resistance movements to disrupt, coerce, or overthrow a hostile government or occupying power through auxiliary, underground, and guerrilla elements to protect or advance US interests. SOF are well-suited to conduct UW but require joint, interagency, and multinational support to be successful. Within SOF, United States Army Special Operations Command is CDRUSSOCOM's lead proponent for UW and Army Special Forces are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on UW capabilities. Conventional forces have functional specialties that also may contribute to or enable the UW mission.

(d) US forces may sponsor and support resistance forces providing logistic and training support, as they did for the Mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In certain circumstances, the United States can provide direct combat support, such as support to European and Chinese resistance movements in World War II, the NATO support to Kosovo separatist insurgents in 1999, and the insurgent Afghanistan Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban in 2001-2002.

(e) UW is activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Joint forces support friendly insurgent and resistance organizations opposing a government or

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As an adversary, Iranian surrogates throughout the Shia Crescent are an example of this type of relationship. Iran uses cultural ties. Generally, the Shiite branch of Islam, seeks to build strong-bonded surrogates throughout the Middle East. Today, Iran's most notable surrogates are Lebanon's Hezbollah and Iraq's Kata'ib Hezbollah. However, Iran also supports Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas throughout the Middle East, and Shia militia groups in Syria and Iraq. The tight cultural bond between principal and agent results in a strong principal-surrogate relationship resilient to high levels of risk.

Various Sources

occupying power hostile to US national interests. In adversarial competition, USG UW efforts will normally be clandestine and US personnel may be restricted from operating in the targeted country. Instead, they may operate from outside the OA to assist partner forces.

For further guidance on UW, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

(11) **Support for CD Operations.** The joint force supports federal, state, and local LEAs in their effort to disrupt the illicit transport and transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. Specific DOD authorities that pertain to CD operations are in Title 10, USC, Sections 124 and 271-284. Discussion of similar authorities is in DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

CHAPTER VII

JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS IN ARMED CONFLICT

SECTION I

1. Introduction

- a. Armed conflict or war is a violent conflict between nations, state-like entities, or armed organizations. A nation with a central government or occupying power opposed by insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups engage in armed conflict. Additionally, armed groups that do not recognize national borders may fight wars in semiautonomous regions. The situation presented by an enemy often drives CCDRs' conduct of joint warfighting to pursue a complex array of overlapping operational objectives across numerous AORs. Along with conventional forces, the enemy may employ coercion, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal activity, and information warfare to complicate operations. Joint campaigns and operations in armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale, tempo, and scope of capabilities. Prevailing against the enemy requires senior military and civilian leadership to transition the force's posture optimized for the global campaign to a disposition for joint warfighting. Additionally, commanders integrate capabilities from across the CCMDs to conduct joint warfighting and defeat the enemy's will, strategy, and capabilities. CCDRs synchronize their campaigns' operations and activities with other CCDRs over time and across multiple AORs. Success requires JFCs to adapt continually based on evolving situations and opportunities presented by the enemy.
- b. The transition to armed conflict presents a significant challenge for the joint force. The CCDRs prepare for rapid transition from global campaigning to campaigns that include large-scale combat operations. The transition often requires assessment and reallocation of forces across the globe. As the situation evolves, JFCs expand their efforts to prevent aggression alongside allies and partners. This will likely increase as multinational forces begin operating against the common enemy. CCDRs may expand their competitive activities to neutralize irregular threats and coerce other adversaries from supporting the enemy. Joint warfighting often requires multiple supported commands operating together in numerous AORs and across all domains. Against a peer enemy, unity of effort may be more important than unity of command. Warfare against a peer enemy may not be the purview of a single JTF operating in one JOA. Success requires the CCMDs to cooperate through integrated and mutually supporting campaigns executed across multiple AORs and functions based on strategic direction from the President and SecDef. Effective joint warfighting requires joint forces to avoid and survive the enemy's strengths and employ capabilities through cycles of offensives, counteroffensives, and transitions. CCDRs seek to avoid protracted periods of inconclusive warfare or stalemate. At some point, CCDRs conduct counteroffensive operations to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy militarily through attrition, exhaustion, or annihilation. CCDRs either impose or help negotiate a settlement, but the wartime effort will be far from over. Defeating the enemy militarily is necessary, but insufficient to achieve strategic objectives. Influencing the enemy's behaviors and establishing conditions for strategic objectives typically requires CCDRs to continue campaigning long past the cessation of sustained hostilities.

Throughout the aftermath and consequences of armed conflict, JFCs recognize the opportunities to cooperate with new partners and necessity to counter coercion in the new and re-characterized competitions. These competitions can emerge and complicate the United States' vision for the future. JFCs maintain preparedness to employ force short of war or occasional episodes of violent action to secure and perpetuate the gains after the cessation of hostilities.

c. **The Challenges of Armed Conflict.** The most demanding scenario is an attack on the United States homeland. Another challenge may begin with the enemy's miscalculation regarding the commitment of the United States to defend another nation. When a significant asymmetry of interest or commitment exists, such as fighting within the enemy's sphere of influence, the enemy will likely endure a great deal of hardship and casualties before modifying their ambition and actions. One daunting challenge the joint force could face would be to absorb an initial enemy offensive on another continent, protect other threatened forces and infrastructure, commit additional forces from across the globe, and simultaneously secure the US homeland. As difficult as this scenario may seem, the joint force would be fighting with only forward and initial response forces. Those forces would have to deny the enemy offensive's initial operational-level objectives and transition to the counteroffensive at the first opportunity. A counteroffensive is an attack made in response to an enemy, typically on a large scale or for a prolonged period. JFCs initiate counteroffensives with forces previously in a defensive or deterrence posture. The JFCs orient on establishing the initiative and disrupting the enemy offensive. Then, JFCs aim on controlling or seizing areas or terrain and creating a cycle of deterioration that can force the enemy to abandon their objectives or even lead to their disintegration.

d. JFCs of forward forces avoid the enemy's strengths and maneuver to attack vulnerabilities to defeat the enemy. As the counteroffensive progresses, JFCs continually transition and adapt to the situation and the enemy's reactions for as long as required to defeat their capability and will to wage armed conflict. This offensive-counteroffensive-transition cycle is demanding and may repeat itself many times throughout the conflict and before a cessation of hostilities. The joint force has a tradition of persevering through the initial enemy assault, then projecting and sustaining substantial combat forces across the globe to fight the enemy close to their geographic periphery. Adaptation to dynamic change in the OE is essential. Military institutions can fail to anticipate the changing character of warfare because new information and experiences that should prompt reconsideration of methods and organizations are not compelling enough. Cultural ideas about warfighting can serve as barriers to adaptation and remain intact even after costly interactions with the enemy make the requirement to change obvious. The French failure to anticipate and adjust to the German blitzkrieg is a classic example. JFCs expect and anticipate all this as today's joint force would have to overcome significant challenges to prevail in armed conflict against a peer enemy.

e. **Global Integration Enables Multiple Supported and Supporting CCMDs.** In armed conflict, CCDRs integrate the full range of capabilities and expertise through multiple supported and supporting CCMDs in multiple AORs. The foundation of US joint warfighting capability is the joint force's ability to integrate capabilities throughout the OE

to create military advantages. The joint force campaigns as a globally integrated force, not as individual CCMDs. CCDRs conduct operations by using common approaches. Globally integrated C2 and responsiveness increases the ability for JFCs to successfully integrate many capabilities to improve the effectiveness of campaigns and major operations.

f. JFCs synchronize forces and effects to defeat the enemy's initial offensive and then seek to penetrate the enemy's layered defenses, first with nonlethal and then lethal capabilities to disrupt the redundancy and resilience of the enemy's confederated systems. JFCs can then establish limited freedom of maneuver to consistently bring to bear combat power against the enemy for longer durations. Afterward, JFCs begin to exploit the advantages to defeat the enemy's capabilities and will. In waging warfare, JFCs adapt continuously to the enemy and the dilemmas they present. Timely adaptation is essential to effective joint warfighting. While this may appear straightforward, JFCs do not expect to initially have freedom of maneuver, control over where and when the fight occurs, complete influence over the fight's tempo, or uncontested force deployments and sustainment. To successfully defeat the enemy, JFCs ensure joint forces:

(1) **Forward-deployed survive the enemy's initial attack.** Commanders protect and conserve the fighting and enabling capabilities of the force. Forward-positioned forces may have to quickly transition to armed conflict and survive the concentrated assault. These forces must deny the enemy their objectives and protect infrastructure and LOCs. Forward-deployed forces include other capabilities such as basing, operating locations, and logistic networks, which must continue to perform their missions even under heavy and sustained enemy attacks. Allied and HN infrastructure, logistic support, and contracted support are key to force projection and sustainment of the force.

(2) **Prioritize joint warfighting across multiple AORs and all domains.** An operational approach that focuses on a single region or alternates among domains allows the enemy to adapt or react and is unlikely to overwhelm its capacity. JFCs prepare and employ measures of traditional warfare and IW along with the use of information activities and expertise from multiple CCMDs. These measures will include enabling activities such as OCO, space operations, deception events, and EW. JFCs may converge complementary effects from across all domains at decisive points to create temporary avenues of approach and assailable flanks in the enemy's attack. Leveraging joint synergy enables the joint force to isolate critical enemy elements and create local overmatch. Joint forces then maneuver through these temporary breaches in the enemy's defenses and attack to disrupt the enemy offensive.

(3) **Defeat enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting systems.** Joint forces reduce the effectiveness of enemy long-range surveillance and reconnaissance by employing deception and dispersion measures. An enemy's national-level ISR collects targeting information on fixed sites, detects predictable friendly patterns of operations, and monitors changes to friendly force posture. The enemy depends upon its space-based ISR in cyberspace, SOF sympathizers, open-source collection, ground-

based signal intercept platforms, and the communications networks that link these sensors to their HQs. The enemy maintains these capabilities at the national and regional levels. Together, these systems enable long-range strikes and attacks with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, cyberspace attack capabilities, and SOF. Joint forces develop intelligence and targeting data to attack not only the enemy's command, control, communications, computing, and ISR infrastructure but also the links that enable their associated kill chains. Once degraded, commanders identify and exploit specific vulnerabilities of the enemy's sensors and networks to continue to deny the enemy's intelligence and training capabilities. Identification and exploitation of these vulnerabilities enable joint forces to attrit the enemy's protection past the point of enemy re-organization. Finally, practicing OPSEC by identifying and controlling publicly available information and operational indicators defeats the enemies' open-source collection efforts that provide the pieces of the puzzle for intelligence users to derive our intent.

(4) **Disrupt C2 systems.** Joint forces exploit weaknesses in the enemy's C2 systems, facilities, and logistics to isolate the enemy for two reasons. The first is to disrupt them and make it easier to attack. The second is to disrupt the enemy's ability to attack (e.g., execute fires, move forces). JFCs employ joint fires (e.g., interdiction, strategic attack) and information activities (e.g., OCO and EW) to affect enemy C2 and information systems. The purpose of attacking the enemy's C2 and information systems is to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the enemy's decision-making processes. The objectives include casting doubt in the adversary's mind.

(5) **Defeat elements of A2/AD systems.** Peer enemies protect their forces and capabilities with redundant A2/AD capabilities to prevent the joint force from gaining operational access and closing with their formations. These systems safeguard their operational forces and critical infrastructure. Even if these systems fail to deter the United States from intervening, they are valuable and provide an advantage. These systems would at least disrupt, degrade, and delay any US response for long enough that the enemy could seize its objectives before the United States and its allies and partners respond effectively. Additionally, the enemy's deployment of these systems seeks to create the perception that the necessary effort and cost of defeating these capabilities outweigh the benefit of intervening. To prevent the enemy from achieving their objective, JFCs identify and defeat the necessary nodes of the enemy's A2/AD systems. JFCs recognize defeating an enemy's A2/AD systems is key, but it is only a prerequisite. After defeating necessary aspects of the enemies' A2/AD capabilities, JFCs attack critical enemy vulnerabilities to disrupt their warfighting capabilities.

(6) **Attack operational COGs and critical vulnerabilities and capabilities.** The joint force attacks COGs prior to the enemy achieving their operational objectives. Against peer enemies, JFCs do not assume the joint force can control the tempo at all times or has the capability to establish superiority in any domain for lengthy time intervals. JFCs target the enemy's operational forces and critical infrastructure as soon as possible to degrade its capability, erode their will and commitment to fight, and disrupt the cohesion of their military. Penetrating A2 systems is necessary but is only an enabling step. The

purpose of penetrating the layers of enemy A2 capabilities and attriting redundant AD systems is to attack and defeat the enemy's operational capabilities or other COGs.

(7) **Maintain freedom of action in space.** More than most nations, the United States relies on space-based capabilities to project and employ power on a global scale. Threats may seek to deceive, disrupt, degrade, destroy, or deny access to space-based capabilities to gain an advantage at the outset of conflict. Adversaries are developing, testing, and fielding capabilities to deny the US advantages gained from space systems. Space capabilities provide JFCs ISR data, missile warning, satellite communications, and PNT, in addition to several other critical capabilities. These space systems consist of three related segments: terrestrial, link, and orbit, which are all vulnerable to attack. Enemies can gain an advantage using conventional and unconventional forces, DE weapons, cyberspace attack, or a combination to attack one or more of the space segments. The loss of any segment will degrade the joint force's technological advantages, adding friction to operations. The challenge increases because ground, space, and link segments cut across multiple AORs. To retain freedom of action in space, JFCs understand the capabilities and vulnerabilities of space-based systems and how these systems synchronize and integrate with the rest of the joint force.

(8) **Continue to campaign after the cessation of hostilities.** Campaigns that achieve war objectives require a great deal of effort and continuity long past military victory or cessation of hostilities. In most cases, the continuing effort goes on for years, even decades. JFCs do not view armed conflict's aftermath as something distinct from armed conflict. The consequences of even the most successful examples of joint warfighting are enduring and inseparable from armed conflict. As much as strategy, plans, and institutional concepts seek to define and orient on a moment of clear conclusion, commanders know that the situation that follows war could be volatile, success can be fragile, and completion is often illusory. Successful campaigning is more a long series of informed and deliberate transitions and adjustments. How effectively the joint force consolidates gains determines, in large part, how enduring the overall results of all campaigns and major operations will be and the duration and cost of attaining them. Failure to effectively consolidate gains and react to the enemy's continuing pursuits reduces options for senior military leaders and policymakers and contributes to inconclusive long-term results.

2. Joint Force Preparation and Transition to Armed Conflict

a. **Preparation.** While commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict. In many cases, the preparations enhance bonds between multinational partners, increase understanding of the AOR, help ensure access when required, and strengthen the capability for future multinational operations. All these qualities can help deter armed conflict. As CCDRs compete for access and influence across their AORs, they simultaneously set conditions to avoid armed conflict and ensure the joint force postures to respond to adversary actions and execute operations. CCDRs' GCPs' "prepare/respond to threats" mission area provides considerations for setting the theater for armed conflict. Preparing multiple geographic theaters or regions for armed conflict requires investment in leadership, diplomacy, and

long-term programming, which includes institutional planning, resources, and activities. JFCs consider how these investments will enable arriving forces, maintain operational access to key infrastructure, provide logistics and contractor support, maintain awareness and disseminate intelligence, and protect an expanding operational posture.

(1) Organizing and Training Forces. Leadership in organizing and training of forces to conduct armed conflict is foundational. CCMDs, JTFs, and components should exercise their wartime missions and roles frequently IAW their joint mission-essential task list (JMETL). JFCs certify their subordinate organizations, leaders, and staff. Staff should train for planning, preparing, and controlling joint and multinational operations. The composition of joint force staffs should reflect the assembled force. The reason is to ensure JFCs employing joint forces have a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. When possible, CCMDs and their staff should invite non-DOD agencies to participate in training to facilitate a common understanding and build a working relationship before actual execution. Commanders must continue to refine interactions with interagency partners they work with most often and develop common procedures to improve interoperability. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-based forces with multiple tasks, commanders should make maximum use of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be from the CCDR's JMETL.

(2) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI). When possible, the commander and staff may incorporate theater-specific or operationally relevant training into JRSOI. This training provides an opportunity for forces that may not operate together on a recurring basis to familiarize and establish SOPs. In situations with multiple partners, a multiple partner environment familiarization is critical to enhancing interoperability. JRSOI activities frequently leverage commercial capabilities. The joint force deconflicts requirements with partners to promote access to infrastructure and ensure sufficient capacity.

(3) Train Forces. Leaders should exercise JTFs and components for large-scale combat operations regularly. Equally important, leaders design multinational exercises to enhance interoperability between disparate forces. CCDRs and JFCs should develop robust, operational-level, multinational exercise programs. Multinational exercises are key components within developmental activities of SC and can inform ICB efforts.

(4) Rehearsals. Rehearsals provide an opportunity to learn, understand, and practice a plan or parts of the plan before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and sustainment actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation, visualize the plan, and identify possible friction points. This process orients joint and multinational forces to surroundings and other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinates to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the plan. The commander's staff must coordinate changes throughout the chain of command to prevent errors in integration and synchronization. HQs at the tactical level often conduct rehearsals involving the participation of maneuver forces positioned on terrain (physically or virtually) that mirror the OE. HQs at the operational level rehearse key aspects of a plan

using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse all aspects of armed conflict, JFCs should identify essential elements for rehearsal.

(5) Establishing and Maintaining Operational Access. JFCs establish operational access for the most demanding wartime scenarios by establishing and maintaining freedom of action in all domains. The state or level of operational access is usually a work in progress. Maintaining the existing level of operational access to key infrastructure, logistics, and communications nodes is the greatest priority for the CCDR and JFC before the initiation of armed conflict. Access to commercial capabilities is not assured. The joint force competes with partners, civil use, and adversaries for commercial capabilities

(6) Conditions. An essential step in setting the theater's conditions for armed conflict involves organizing assigned and allocated forces for employment. Clear command relationships between current and projected units are essential. CCDRs expect the relationships between supporting and supported commands may change based on evolving situations.

b. Transition to Armed Conflict

(1) **Remain vigilant and ready: recognition.** The joint force and interagency partners must remain ready to defeat an initial enemy offensive, overcome surprise, and recover from loss of initiative. The enemy can employ a mix of irregular, traditional, and informational activities that may not present a triggering event until their operation or campaign is well underway. An enemy may leverage nonmilitary aspects of power and covert, clandestine, and coercive activities to confound assumptions of warning intelligence. If successful, the enemy may achieve its initial objectives without resorting to armed conflict and tilt the probability of overall success in their favor. JFCs continually fight for and collect relevant intelligence and focus on clear indications to determine whether an attack is imminent or underway. JFCs could simultaneously have to combat forms of enemy IW measures and counter misinformation, propaganda, and deception, and determining when to transition to armed conflict is essential.

(2) **Establish command relationships.** Armed conflict may require multiple supported CCMDs quickly shifting main efforts between them. Command relationships have trade-offs, but proper balance is essential. When command relationships are less than optimal, they can create operational gaps and unnecessary risk. CCDRs organize forces to implement strategic direction and pursue campaign objectives. JFCs should provide direction and guidance to subordinate commanders and establish command relationships to enable an effective span of control, responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and protection. CCDRs direct C2 architectures for their component commanders and supporting organizations. The CCDRs' subordinate organizations' C2 provide for unity of command and flexibility. JFCs have full authority, within established directives, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs task-organize their forces and generally allow Service, SOF, and cyberspace tactical and operational units

to function as they were designed and organized. However, initial C2 designs and purposes may prove incomplete or insufficient and commanders should expect to adapt.

(3) **Local Superiority.** Air and maritime commanders have a key role in the transition to armed conflict. By maintaining control of the air and sea in the transition to armed conflict, the JFC is able to set the conditions for successful engagements early in a conflict. In particular, the JFACC has significant roles in the ACA and AADC.

(4) Other Considerations

(a) **Littoral areas offer positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations.** Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with opportunities to gain leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. JFCs can gain and maintain the initiative through the ability to project fires and employ forces from sea-based forces. Maritime forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas and rapidly generate combat power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Maritime forces' relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these forces where they can strike enemy forces.

(b) **JFCs can operate from an HQ platform at sea.** Depending on the nature of the joint operation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC or JFACC. A sea base provides JFCs with the ability to C2 forces and conduct select functions and tasks at sea without dependence on infrastructure ashore.

(c) **Transferring C2 from sea to shore** requires detailed planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of commanders and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force HQ. The new joint force HQ may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old HQ, or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in stages. Another technique is for the JFC to use the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new HQ is fully prepared. However the transition occurs, staff should develop checklists to address the C2 requirements and timing of the transfer.

(d) **SOF-conventional force integration.** The JFC, using SOF independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized capability to achieve objectives that might not otherwise be possible. The integration enables the JFC to take the fullest advantage of conventional and SOF core competencies. SOF provide an array of C2 options that enable effective mission command throughout the competition continuum, which spans daily activities supporting a GCP, competitive activities against adversaries, and conflict. Special operations commanders also provide liaison to component commands to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict SOF and conventional force operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force LNOs is essential to enhance situational awareness and reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents.

(e) **Stabilization activities.** Stabilization activities provide an opportunity to support objectives and create the conditions to achieve strategic- and operational-level objectives. Allies and partners may offer support. Stabilization activities can take place during all military operations, in contested spaces and conflict-affected areas. The largest benefits to the USG from stabilization activities accrue before conflict in contested spaces and potentially prevent conflict. In armed conflict, stabilization activities occur in liberated and occupied territories and in conflict-affected friendly areas. JFCs plan and prepare for a stabilization level of effort appropriate for the circumstances. Stabilization efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced people. The joint force will lead USG stabilization efforts in combat areas until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to civil authorities. Civil affairs can coordinate stabilization projects and humanitarian assistance to support military and strategic objectives as funding and policy permit. Civil affairs gather and integrate information on civil considerations such as various elements of the local populace, their potential vulnerabilities, and humanitarian needs in support of the JFC's planning and decision making. Civil affairs conduct engagements with government, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations to coordinate and deconflict US stabilization efforts. MISO used to influence the behavior of approved foreign target audiences in support of operational-level objectives can ease the situation encountered when armed conflict transitions to competition. In coordination with interorganizational participants, the JFC must arrange for necessary financial support of these operations well in advance. Additionally, OCS can leverage contracts to help build the local economy, promote goodwill with the local populace, and contribute to long-term HN economic growth and stability. But it requires active participation and ownership of requirements from concept to creation of effects.

For more information, see JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities, and DODD 3000.05, Stabilization.

(f) **Protection Considerations.** The JFC may designate a JSA as the operational footprint expands to accommodate the forces required for armed conflict. The JSA should include key logistics nodes and infrastructure such as aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation. Additionally, a JSA should provide JRSOI facilities, sustainment bases, and life support facilities for the US and multinational forces. The JSA activities should seek to protect the force from the threat of long-range enemy fires and special purpose forces. The JFC may assign a joint security coordinator (JSC) to manage the overall security of the JSA. The JSC may need to leverage PN or HN assets and capabilities to aid in securing the JSA.

(g) **Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents.** Without limiting boldness or initiative, JFCs should make every preparation and effort to reduce the potential for the killing or wounding of friendly and neutral personnel, damaging friendly and neutral property, and degrading friendly and neutral capabilities. Airspace control and air defense are no less critical than the focus on ground-based friendly fire. Commanders should be aware of situations that increase the risk of friendly fire incidents and institute appropriate preventive measures. The primary mechanisms for reducing friendly fire incidents are

command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners, SOPs, training and exercises, technology solutions, rehearsals, effective CID, and enhanced awareness of the OE. CCMDs should consult with USAID when it has a mission presence to determine locations of friendly international organizations, NGOs, and local partners operating in the targeted area to avoid friendly fire incidents.

(h) **Logistics Support and Sustainment.** The scale of operational-level warfare traditionally requires significant logistics and sustainment support. CCDRs and subordinate commanders identify logistical and sustainment requirements and shortcomings for forces assigned and allocated to the theater. This identification includes planning for the sustainment needs of multinational partners. The sustainment demands of armed conflict may exceed the capacity of DOD, and CCDRs may need to utilize contractors and multinational partners to sustain the force. As such, commanders and staffs should review and update contracts as early as possible in the planning cycle to ensure resources are available as forces enter the theater. The CCDR and JFC must also review applicable acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) as they coordinate with PNs to support the joint force. An ACSA is an agreement that allows US forces to exchange the most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment, with countries or international organizations. If existing ACSAs are insufficient, the CCDR may work with interagency staff or mission partners to update existing or draft new agreements. Finally, CCMDs should review, inspect, and prepare DOD prepositioned stocks for use, with shortcomings or deficiencies addressed through the J-4 [logistics directorate of a joint staff] to the JS as appropriate. JFCs must maintain access to OAs where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing, the resiliency of combat power after enemy action, freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and multinational force nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater LOCs. Supporting CCDRs can greatly enhance maintaining intertheater LOCs.

(i) **Space Considerations.** Space is a contested environment where commanders anticipate and mitigate hostile actions that may affect friendly space operations and impact the ability to create effects from space. Commanders should also anticipate enemy and adversary use of commercial space capabilities. CCDRs may request CDRUSSPACECOM assistance in integrating space forces, capabilities, and considerations in preparation for armed conflict. Due to the limited resources in space, coordination between CCDRs is critical to deconflict the competing requirements in various AORs. Integrating space operations into the campaign is essential as they provide essential capabilities to JFCs (e.g., PNT, ISR, missile warning, and communications). Space operations can also negate some enemy or adversary advantages gained from their access to space. Space operations require robust planning and skilled employment to synchronize and integrate space operations effectively within the campaign. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the CCDRs to request space support early in the planning process to allow USSPACECOM to deconflict competing requirements. Space capabilities help shape the OE in a variety of ways, including providing intelligence and communications necessary to keep commanders and leaders informed worldwide. JFCs and their

components should request space support as early in the planning process as possible to ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. Timely planning helps ensure the effective and efficient use of limited space assets.

For further guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations.

(j) **JEMSO.** The joint force is critically dependent on the EMS for operations across all joint functions and throughout the OE. For example, modern C2 requires the operation of EMS-dependent sensing and communication systems, while advanced weapons rely on PNT information transmitted through the EMOE. The joint force should strive for local EMS superiority before executing joint operations, but it should not be an expectation. EMS superiority is the degree of dominance in the EMS that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference while affecting an enemy's ability to do the same. Against capable enemies, EMS superiority is difficult and temporary. Achieving EMS parity and short intervals of superiority is achievable but complicated by increasing joint EMS-use requirements, EME congestion, and proliferation of EMS threats. Joint forces execute JEMSO, facilitated by EM battle management, to achieve the necessary unity of effort for EMS opportunity.

For further information on EMS/JEMSO, see JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

(k) **Cooperative Activities.** Activities before armed conflict may focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stabilization activities. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort; confirming the feasibility of pertinent objectives; and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Joint force stabilization activities may be a part of the USG's SSA to restore security and infrastructure eventually. Stabilization activities can also provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the OA to dissuade further adversary actions and help gain and maintain access and future success.

(l) **Targeting.** As the CCDR and JFC define the JOA, establish a JTF, and set the theater for potential armed conflict, they must refine or begin target identification, prioritization, and analysis per existing contingency plans, guidance, and the situation. Given the complexities, scale, and scope of armed conflict, target identification and prioritization cannot wait until combat has commenced. Updating or drafting a joint integrated priority collection list will facilitate the rapid development of a joint integrated priority target list and will aid in prioritizing collection assets across the theater. These early efforts should seek to identify the enemy's COG, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. Target development may focus on the enemy's C2 mechanisms, A2/AD capabilities, or their sustainment infrastructure.

(m) **Informational Considerations.** Leveraging the IE to set conditions for success during armed conflict begins with the JFC and staff identifying relevant platforms for information dissemination in the OE. Also, JFCs identify the essential information the

force must protect to ensure mission success. The staff should identify key information outlets in the OE and then establish relationships with these entities. Before initiating armed conflict, JFCs may use these key information outlets to facilitate civil IM operations to mitigate the effects of combat on the civilian population and enable joint operations. Early considerations for planners for capabilities such as CMO, PA, and MISO may include reducing the adversary's will to fight and identifying and directing civilians to potential shelters, evacuation routes, medical treatment facilities, and humanitarian aid centers. Identifying and obscuring indicators or the aspects of transition (e.g., timing, methods, and locations) maintains surprise and protects future operations.

c. Preparing the OE

(1) JIPOE products facilitate the joint force in preparing the OE for operations. Conventional forces conduct, promote, and anticipate enduring preparations and readiness based on JIPOE. The objectives may or may not be threat-specific. Of course, the responses are all scalable and employed in the context of the specific situation.

(2) Special Operations. SOF may contribute to preparing the environment by creating conditions that mitigate risk and facilitate successful operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide operational leverage by gathering critical information; undermining an enemy's will or capacity to wage war; and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US and multinational forces, indigenous resistance organizations, and employed surrogate forces. CDRUSSOCOM synchronizes planning for global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. In coordination with CCMDs and the supported JFC, CDRUSSOCOM plans and executes or synchronizes the execution of activities related to preparing the OE or provides SOF to other CCMDs.

For further guidance on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

(3) Cooperative Activities. In the transition to armed conflict, commanders prepare to employ SC activities to reinforce and restore partner capacity. On the other hand, cooperative stability activities may play a different role in armed conflict and the subsequent competition against an enemy. Assumptions based on recent experiences in stabilizing and reconstituting a defeated force may prove inadequate in waging armed conflict against a different enemy. Planning and execution of SC operations conducted before the commencement of hostilities can help establish a sound foundation for the resilience of allied nations and PNs.

d. Considerations for Isolating a Peer Enemy

(1) As guided by strategic direction, the United States and the joint force strive to isolate enemies by denying them access to allies and sanctuary. The purpose of isolation is to strip away as much of the enemy's external support or freedom of action as possible. Isolating an enemy is an important aspect of waging warfare at the strategic level. These actions can limit the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation and enable joint force freedom. CCDRs may support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. US senior civilian leaders accomplish isolation of an enemy through narrative, diplomacy, and multinational coalitions, alliances, and partnerships. However, peer enemies have strategic depth and global reach. The issue is that a peer enemy can match the United States' informational, economic, and diplomatic influence. These enemies can intertwine with adjacent nations and enjoy more levers of relevant influence than the United States does. In either case, peer enemies have a variety of economic and diplomatic tools to offset US and multinational nonmilitary strengths. First, a peer enemy is likely a member of the UN Security Council, giving them veto power over any attempt by the United States or other members of the UN Security Council to invoke the powers of the forum to address and delegitimize their actions. While hurdles in the UN might not directly constrain US actions, they dilute legitimacy and excuse states that wish to remain on the fence during a conflict. Second, capable enemies maintain deep economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties with states on their periphery, which they could use to deny US forces access and overflight. In leveraging these advantages, a peer enemy could use various incentives and punitive measures to induce or coerce regional states to stay on the sidelines, delegitimize US actions, or even support their operations. A lack of support from these key states might call into question the willingness of the United States to intervene in regional disputes. The United States may use economic coercion such as sanctions, trade embargoes, or exclusion zones to pressure the enemy. The cost of this coercion could also fall on the US economy and economies of key US allies and partners. These facts do not invalidate such an approach, but they may significantly complicate and reduce the effort's potential impact, as other states may avoid aligning with the United States. For example, an enemy could threaten to curtail energy exports to susceptible peripheral states. Such a strategy may not stop a US-led intervention, but it would weaken the multinational force and raise the costs of intervening.

(2) Often possessing the most robust presence and resources within a given theater, the CCDRs can maneuver and uniquely position the force to assure allies or partners and influence nonaligned governments. As such, the CCDR or JFC may be the primary leader for creating new partnerships and influencing existing ones. These relationships are often necessary to enable nonmilitary measures such as economic sanctions and informational support to campaigns. In this capacity, the CCDR or JFC performs an integrating function across the instruments of national power. These relationships may prove critical by providing access, basing, and support requirements to commence armed conflict.

(3) Joint forces also seek to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be successful in using information and the physical interdiction of LOCs or denying resources affecting the enemy's ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the

enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

(4) Rather than enjoying a significant asymmetric advantage in strategic information, the United States might be at a relative disadvantage. While this disadvantage may have a direct impact on the force, the indirect impact may be larger and more challenging. By targeting the governments and populations of allies and partners in the multinational force, an enemy's aggressive information activities could deny US forces access or support. The solutions to many of these nonmilitary aspects of power may lie outside the military sphere. Nevertheless, the transition to armed conflict should proceed with the assumption that the main challenge is bringing our absolute advantage across all instruments of national power to bear through a whole-of-government strategy. Isolating an enemy is not a given, but it is a worthwhile pursuit. The impact is that in some scenarios, the isolation effort will place an added burden on JFCs.

e. **Initial Response and Employing FDOs and FROs.** The joint force executes FDOs and FROs to respond to situations by leveraging capabilities and options to counter coercion or disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or deceive as appropriate. Both provide the ability to escalate or de-escalate based on continuous assessment of an adversary's actions and reactions. CCDRs employ FDOs to prevent the situation from worsening and allow for de-escalation. Whereas FROs are generally reactive and punitive. However, in heightened situations where armed conflict with an adversary is possible, the leaders do not expect that an individual or single response options will influence the adversary or resolve the situation. Rather, supporting CCDRs use multiple and flexible options to influence the adversary and provide additional protection and joint combat power to the supported CCDR.

(1) FDOs. FDOs can be extemporaneous or preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions tailored to help resolve an issue without armed conflict. CCDRs use both military and nonmilitary FDOs to dissuade an adversary before an anticipated crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a contingency. Senior military and civilian leadership develop FDOs from across each instrument of national power, but they are most effective when used in combination. FDOs should provide the ability for both sides to de-escalate while establishing conditions that allow the United States to escalate if required.

(a) Military FDOs. CCDRs can initiate FDOs before or after unambiguous warning of adversarial actions. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally require an economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase the risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. CCDRs seek to optimize the timing, efficiency, and effectiveness of military FDOs. They can rapidly improve the military balance in the OA, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, MISO, and protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Commanders should avoid measures resulting in undesired effects such as eliciting a violent and destabilizing response. An adversary may perceive that friendly military FDOs as preparation for an attack. FDOs should identify the opportunity cost and expected reaction from both allies and partners and the adversary to conduct risk analysis and make informed decisions.

(b) Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions the United States takes to try to dissuade an enemy or adversary from initiating hostilities. Senior military and civilian leadership coordinate and synchronize military and nonmilitary FDOs to present a consistent message. In some situations, commercial support may provide support to a nonmilitary FDO. Alternatively, ad hoc identification of requirements for commercial support, at the point of need, will limit value to tactical forces support, increase cost, and create risks for adversary exploitation. Military leaders may align their efforts with nonmilitary partners to degrade an enemy's alliances, partnerships, and sources of support, while safeguarding and strengthening those that enable the friendly effort.

(2) FROs. Military and civilian leadership use FROs to respond to an enemy's action. The purpose of a FRO is to preempt, respond to, or prepare for additional attacks against US interests and signal US resolve. Military and civilian leaders develop FROs to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects, congruent with national security policy objectives. A FRO can be various military capabilities available to the President and SecDef, with actions appropriate and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction to any threat or attack.

(3) CCDRs can employ response activities with capabilities from across the force to present unique challenges and opportunities to influence the enemy through military FDOs.

For further guidance on planning FDOs and FROs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(a) Maritime Considerations. Maritime FROs and access to key littoral areas are often critical in the transition to armed conflict. Positioning forces off a belligerent's coast can have a powerful deterrent effect while simultaneously offering the national command authority a variety of FROs. CCDRs can also rapidly scale back maritime operations without high cost as the situation de-escalates. Examples of potential maritime operations include show-of-force actions, airborne ISR operations, multinational exercises, and increased active protection measures.

(b) Land Considerations. FROs conducted with land forces present the greatest resolve and commitment; however, deploying and sustaining an expeditionary land force not only exposes that force to risk but also incurs the greatest cost. These operations generally require access, basing, and sustainment arrangements with HNs and partners, making them contingent on diplomatic agreements. Because of this, these FROs may not always be available or may prove too unresponsive to create the desired effect. Commanders must also consider the unintended consequences of deploying a land force into a volatile region. However, multinational exercises and rehearsals are often necessary.

(c) Air Considerations. Like maritime FROs, air FROs offer rapid and responsive ways to position the force to transition to armed conflict and communicate US intent. Given the joint force's global reach, these FROs may be the only way of demonstrating US resolve and commitment in highly contested or denied areas. However, like other FROs, air operations may be contingent on overflight permissions and support

agreements with other nations, making them difficult in some situations. They also offer the greatest risk of misinterpretation and may inadvertently escalate a situation beyond the desired threshold.

(d) Information Considerations. A defining feature of the security environment is how competitors, adversaries, and enemies use information to compete to gain relative advantage over the joint force. JFCs execute a communication strategy that facilitates the transition to armed conflict within the strategic context and supports the USG's policy aims, overarching narrative, and objectives. Key to this transition is the joint force's ability to maneuver in the IE through the integrated employment of informational capabilities in concert with other LOOs and LOEs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and enemies. The joint force looks for opportunities to mass informational effects at decisive times and places. Although targeted at specific audiences, planners should recognize that all joint force activities produce inherent informational aspects that shape the perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of various audiences and relevant actor behavior. Leveraging information expands the JFC's range of options. These options include the ability to operate in environments where the use of lethal force is not appropriate or authorized. Commanders can use information to communicate and reinforce the intent and capabilities of joint force activities, enhance the psychological effects of physical force, and avoid or mitigate any undesired psychological effects of physical force. Commanders at all levels should deconflict messaging. The JFC combats the enemy's narrative by providing a viable alternative narrative that dispels misinformation or rumors and contributes to shaping the OE for continued friendly operations. To the wider audience, OIE should build credibility through transparency, demonstrating consistency in actions and messages.

(e) Cyberspace Considerations. The pace of CO requires significant collaboration during preparation and constant vigilance after initiation for effective coordination and deconfliction throughout the OE. Keys to this synchronization are maintaining cyberspace situational awareness and assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including the protection posture of the DODIN, changes from normal network configuration, or observed indications of malicious cyberspace activity. The timing of planned CO should be determined based on a realistic assessment of their ability to create effects and support operations throughout the OE. This may require the use of cyberspace capabilities earlier than the use of other types of capabilities. Planners and operators should also understand how other operations within the OE may impact CO. For example, the joint force uses fire support coordination measures in air, land, and maritime operations to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. CO deconfliction and coordination efforts with other operations should include similar measures.

(f) Space-based Intelligence Considerations. Space-based intelligence collection synchronizes and integrates sensors, assets, and systems for gathering data and information on an object or in an AOI on a persistent, event-driven, or scheduled basis. Intelligence collection managers conduct space-based ISR tasking and collection to ensure the effective operations of high-demand assets. These tasks include warning (to include

ballistic missile activity), targeting analysis, threat capability assessment, space domain awareness, BDA, and characterization of the OE. Space assets are capable of collecting diverse information that supports military, diplomatic, and economic intelligence. Space-based collection platforms, delivering globally persistent and legal overflight of any location on Earth, increase the probability of attributing nefarious activities. While space-based systems may be able to provide worldwide coverage, the demands on individual space-based systems may exceed their capacity and their associated orbital characteristics may limit the ability to meet operational requirements.

f. **Protection.** CCDRs and staff should consider introducing protection assets into the theater early and integrate with HN defenses. The additional protection assets enable expanding the JSA and mitigate the threat of enemy actions.

g. **Preparation to Execution.** The circumstances surrounding armed conflict rarely unfold as imagined. Regardless of how much time and effort went into anticipating, planning, and wargaming wartime scenarios, commanders recognize that the existing plan will likely need changes as the force transitions from competition to armed conflict. The context of the decision to employ military force will often be significantly different from the original planning guidance or assumptions. Planning provides a significant head start prior to orders to deploy the military. Assessments should recognize the nuance and reality of the problem if required and inform the applicability of, or necessary modifications to, the plan in response to changes in the environment.

(1) Effective preparation enables transition. During planning, an integrated staff effort ensures the plan is a team effort and shares the knowledge gained across the staff. Integrated staff work assists in identifying changes in the environment and guidance, speeding transition to execution.

(2) Detailed planning provides an analysis of the threat. The knowledge and understanding gained enable a well-trained staff to quickly identify the difference between their plan and current conditions and make recommendations based on their prior work.

(3) Detailed concept plans (CONPLANS) or OPLANs (Level 3 or 4) may require more significant changes due to their specificity. Forces identified in the plan may not be available, assumptions may be invalid, and policy decisions (and the decision timeline) may change or not support the original concept. The extra time spent on analysis provides a deeper understanding of the deploying forces' OE, threats, and technical issues.

(4) Less-detailed plans (Level 1 or 2) may be more readily adaptable to execution due to their generality. However, they may require significantly more analysis to provide the detail required to enable decisions at the strategic level and ensure the plan's relevance for the problem at hand.

(5) Exercises, Rehearsals, and Transition Drills. Actions and measures preparing the commanders and staff certify subordinate units, increase the situational awareness of

subordinate commanders and the staff, and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.

(6) Plan Implementation. Military plans and orders should be prepared to facilitate implementation and transition to execution. For plan implementation, the following products and activities must occur:

(a) Confirm assumptions. Analyze the current OE and establish as fact any assumptions made during plan development.

(b) Model the TPFDD to confirm mobility force sourcing and transportation feasibility assessment. Validate that force and mobility resources used during plan development are currently available. Many critical capabilities reside in the reserve components (e.g., port opening), so planners need to know the mobilization authorities as they relate to deployment timelines. As reserve units deactivate due to force structure changes, CCMD staffs must revalidate TPFDD requirements.

(c) Establish execution timings. JFCs must set timelines to initiate operations to enable synchronization of execution.

(d) Conduct execution sourcing with assigned forces. If force requirements exceed the capability and capacity of assigned forces, submit an emergent request for forces through the GFM process which facilitates a risk-informed SecDef decision to allocate forces IAW the current CJCSM 3130.06, *Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*, and GFMIG. Develop new assumptions, if required.

(e) Issue necessary orders and authorities for execution. The CJCS issues orders implementing the directions of the President or SecDef to conduct military operations. CCDRs subsequently issue their orders directing the activities of subordinate commanders.

(f) The decision for execution resides with civilian administration officials based on senior military officials presenting and examining a range of options in response to a developing crisis or actions by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather than a specific directive to execute a specific CONPLAN or OPLAN.

1. If an existing plan is appropriate, the commander and staff should review and update the plan.

2. If no existing plan meets the guidance, the commander and staff initiate and conduct planning. Often, the commander and staff have conducted some previous analysis of the OE, which will speed the planning process.

h. **Types of Transition.** There are three likely circumstances for transitioning from competition to armed conflict.

(1) Contingency Plan Execution

(a) Contingency plans typically address a demanding, anticipated scenario. If an approved contingency plan closely resembles the emergent scenario, leaders can refine or adapt that plan as necessary for execution.

(b) The planning team should be a key participant in updating the plan for the current (given) conditions. Being a participant enables the command to make effective use of the understanding gained by the staff during the planning process. The operations team should be the co-lead for the plan update to ensure they understand the decision processes and reasoning used in the development of the operational approach and COAs. The understanding will speed plan updates, ease the transition, and minimize the time required to revisit the issues that arose during the initial plan development.

(c) GIF. When the contingency plans are associated with a GIF, initial planning identifies decisions the SecDef may have to make, including requirements to reallocate and reassign forces. These forces may reposition from across the globe to meet the contingency execution requirements. The reallocation will impact executing the contingency plan along with the ongoing GCPs. Even with this preparation, all CCDRs and their planners must assess the risk associated with changes to ongoing global campaign activities and ensure the DOD senior military and civilian leadership recognizes the opportunity costs. The CJCS, in his role in global integration, recommends to SecDef and the President any changes to ongoing operations, activities, and investments and prepares orders directing the movement of forces.

(2) Planning to Execution. CCDRs and staffs conduct planning when an emergent situation arises. The planning team analyzes approved contingency plans with like scenarios to determine if an existing plan applies. If a contingency plan is appropriate to the situation, SecDef can direct execution and tailor unique authorizations through an EXORD or fragmentary order to initiate movement. In a contingency, planning usually transitions rapidly to execution, so there is a limited deviation between the plan and initial execution. CCDRs assist the planning through their planning expertise and knowledge gained in other situations and from the OE during similar planning efforts.

(3) During execution, commanders often must consider updating the operational approach. Significant events can drive changes to the understanding of the OE and problem, validation or invalidation of assumptions made during planning, identifying (through continuous assessment process) that the tactical actions are not resulting in the expected effects, and changes in the conditions of the environment. The commander may determine one of three ways ahead:

(a) The current contingency plan is adequate, with either no change or minor change; the existing operational approach remains feasible.

(b) The contingency plan's mission and objectives are sound, but the operational approach is no longer feasible or acceptable—the situation requires a new operational approach.

(c) When the mission and objectives are no longer valid, CCDRs require a new operational approach to support further detailed planning.

(4) An assessment could cause the JFC to shift the focus of the operation, which the JFC would initiate with a new visualization manifested through new planning guidance for an adjusted operation or campaign plan.

i. Gain Operational Access

(1) US forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating base in or near the conflict or using forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a base or support facility. CCDRs can introduce forces during cooperative activities such as SC, military engagement, establishing an expeditionary advance base, or bilateral exercises. The CCDRs employ immediately available forces and request appropriate FROs. When these forces and actions are not enough, additional forces may ensue and deploy and integrate from across the globe. Consequently, the CCDR sequences, enables, and protects the deployment of these additional forces. A peer enemy may affect the deployment of combat and logistic forces from bases to ports of embarkation. The CCDR may have to adjust the TPFDD to meet a changing OE. The enemy will likely contest deployment of forces from across the globe and oppose entry to the OA.

(2) JFCs may have to rely on strategic attack, global strike, interdiction, and maritime fires to set conditions for joint forcible entry operations. Gaining operational access in contested or denied environments may require JFCs to seize and defend lodgment areas by amphibious, airborne, or air assault forces. The purpose of the access is to establish initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of follow-on forces and material into the theater. As such, the JFC must analyze and adjust the TPFDD accordingly to ensure enabling assets, such as port opening, engineer, and specialized logistics units, are available to exploit these initial seizures. However, these operations rest on neutralizing long-range enemy fires to provide the time and space necessary to gain operational access. Joint forcible entry operations require a versatile mix of forces organized to operate in a high-threat environment. When these forces and actions are inadequate, follow-on strikes and the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater and the use of multinational forces may be necessary.

j. Force Projection

(1) Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of the international waters, international airspace, orbital space, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMS to gain operational access. The ability to freely maneuver to position and sustain our forces is vital to our national interests and those of our PNs. US

forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating base in or near the conflict or use forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a base or support facility.

(2) For example, the ability to generate enough combat power through long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the absence of timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations may require a forcible entry capability. In other cases, CCDRs and staffs can project force rapidly by forcible entry operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, amphibious forces' seizure and defense of lodgment areas would then serve as initial entry points for additional follow-on forces. Both efforts demand a versatile mix of forces to respond quickly.

(3) During force projection, JFCs protect US forces and ports of debarkation. JFCs should introduce forces in a manner that provides security for rapid force buildup. Early entry forces should deploy with necessary organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats. Early entry forces should also include a deployable joint C2 capability to rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

(4) JRSOI occurs in the OA and comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and supplies into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. Forces are vulnerable during JRSOI, so planning must include force protection requirements.

For further information on JRSOI, refer to JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

k. While access operations focus on enabling access to the OA, entry operations focus on actions within the OA. Joint forces conduct entry operations for various purposes, including to defeat threats to the access and use of portions of the OE; to control, defeat, disable, and dispose of specific WMD threats; to assist populations and groups; to establish a lodgment; and to conduct other limited-duration missions.

l. Entry operations may be unopposed or opposed. Unopposed entry operations often, but not always, follow unopposed access. These circumstances generally allow orderly deployment into the OA in preparation for follow-on operations. Forcible entry is a joint operation to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at the enemy COGs and open new avenues for other military operations.

(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy's capability to respond. Commanders employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelms the enemy before they have time to

react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat of any enemy reaction and facilitates follow-on operations if required.

(2) Forcible entry is normally complex and risky and should be as simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination, innovation, and flexibility. All the participants understand the schemes of maneuver and coordination between the various forces. JFCs tailor echeloned forces for the mission and to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When JFCs decide to combine airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, unity of command is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of the preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence capabilities to move with the forward elements.

(3) JFCs prepare the forcible entry force to transition to follow-on operations immediately and should plan accordingly. Joint forcible entry actions occur in both singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing forward presence, preparing the OA, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access, receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting offensive operations.

(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the enemy and ease forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. The actions, themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if MILDEC is to be believable.

(5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, establish, or modify conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry, such as seizing airfields or conducting surveillance of landing zones or amphibious landing sites. They may conduct special reconnaissance and DA well beyond the lodgment to identify, interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force.

(6) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but JFCs must not let them become such an overriding concern that it jeopardizes the forcible entry operation. JFCs must carefully balance the introduction of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment, as well as forces required to transition to follow-on operations.

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

3. Joint Warfighting – Offensives, Counteroffensives, and Transitions

a. The Enemy Offensive

(1) Commanders posture forces and their enabling capabilities so they are able to survive the enemy's anticipated initial attack. This posture should have support from sustainment and replacement forces through HN and allied infrastructure and logistic support. Forward forces and survivable infrastructure cast doubt on the viability of the enemy's approach. Enemy A2 capabilities limit the joint force's flexibility to initiate the offensive but can interdict forces entering an OA. Enemy A2 systems provide multiple layers of stand-off defenses that seek to deny the joint force access to the JOA. Therefore, the joint forces' successful penetration of the initial layer of A2 systems is just a first step. Initial penetration requires the joint forces to create temporary geographic and temporal avenues of approach to attack a series of high pay-off vulnerable A2 enabling capabilities, such as C2 and intelligence capabilities. The challenge for JFCs is the enemy's A2 enabling intelligence, and collection systems may be a confederated network of both military and civilian aviation, maritime, cyberspace, and space systems. Civilian systems may include civil aviation traffic control networks and other dual-use capabilities. They can pose threats to the joint force. Friendly civilian airports and seaports will most likely be the first areas an enemy will target. The enemy will simultaneously employ a full range of capabilities to achieve its objectives.

(2) Attack operational COGs and supporting structures. Essential to joint warfighting and prevailing in armed conflict, the JFCs attack the COGs prior to the enemy seizing their geographic objectives. Engaging and defeating multiple operational COGs are challenges the joint force should expect. Enemies protect these COGs with redundant integrated air defense systems (IADSs) and long-range fires to prevent the joint force from attacking operational COGs. As difficult as it may be, joint forces must attack the enemy's operational forces and critical infrastructure to degrade its capability, erode its will and commitment to fight, and disrupt the cohesion of its military. Penetrating A2 systems and networks is necessary but is not an end to itself. The purpose of penetrating the layers of enemy A2 capabilities and attrit redundant AD systems is to attack to defeat the enemy's offensive and initiate the counteroffensive as soon as possible. JFCs prepare the force to defeat an enemy's strategy and plans by striking and suppressing key enabling nodes and operational COGs, while withstanding the first strike and continue fighting effectively.

b. Drive the Enemy to Culmination

(1) **Create Local Air and Maritime Freedom of Movement.** Achieving local air and maritime superiority allows joint forces to penetrate the enemy's A2/AD systems, secure a JSA or lodgment, and close the strategic and operational distance. Control of the air is a critical enabler because it allows joint forces freedom from attack and freedom to maneuver. JFCs employ complementary weapon systems and sensors to achieve air and maritime superiority using both defensive and offensive

(2) **Disrupt Portions of Enemy IADSs and A2/AD Systems.** JFCs, through their JFACCs and JFMCCs, cannot achieve necessary air and maritime superiority without

neutralizing some aspects of enemy A2/AD systems and IADSs. Early in the transition to armed conflict, CCDRs employ joint fires throughout multiple AORs to begin neutralizing the enemy's multi-layered standoff capabilities. The joint force accomplishes this by receiving targeting information for high-priority enemy long-range systems from orbital space, high-altitude surveillance or low-observable air platforms, and cyberspace, enabling rapid strikes to eliminate critical A2/AD capabilities and IADS assets. Joint fires may originate from multiple platforms to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas and prevent their effective response.

(a) In armed conflict, superiority within any portion of the OE is by no means a certainty. JFCs expect to spend effort and resources to create sufficient times and areas of local and temporary superiority.

(b) Land forces must move as quickly as possible into an area to prevent the enemy from inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. The rapid deployment and employment of land forces (with support of other components) is essential.

(c) Space operations and capabilities must support creating freedom of action. Achieving space superiority sets the conditions to prevail in armed conflict by enabling a JFC's freedom of action. To win against increasingly capable threats, USSPACECOM provides combat power by fully integrating offensive and defensive operations alongside our longstanding allies and partners. USSPACECOM conducts offensive space and counter-space operations to deny the enemy its primary means of long-range surveillance. Proactively countering enemy space surveillance is particularly important during the transition to armed conflict as the large number of targets spread throughout the JOA may exceed the enemy's strategic reconnaissance capabilities. There are threats that can contest the joint force in the space domain. These threats will seek to prevent our unfettered access to space and deny our freedom of action with their capabilities. Cyberspace attacks, antisatellite weapons, rapidly developing laser technology, and other new technologies can place US assets and forces at risk. Terrestrial forces that rely on space platforms for a variety of critical support may become vulnerable if the enemy interrupts or destroys vital space systems. Effectively countering the enemy's space-based ISR capabilities causes the enemy to either accept more risk with strategic reconnaissance assets or shift to commercial space surveillance. The JFC can exploit both actions. During armed conflict, a CCMD may be a supported command, with USSPACECOM in a supporting role providing requested regional effects in and from space. However, USSPACECOM will continue to be the supported command for space operations across the rest of the globe. The protection and continuity of US, allied, and partner space activities is critical to terrestrial operations. Ensuring temporary periods of space superiority is critical to denying a threat's prohibitive interference with JFC access to communications, environmental monitoring, PNT, strategic and theater missile warning, and intelligence collection assets. CDRUSSPACECOM plans and executes global space operations activities and missions as directed and in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, DOD agencies, allies, and partners. All other CCMDs should coordinate desired

space effects with CDRUSSPACECOM by providing temporal and spatial requirements for the creation of those effects.

(d) OIE (which includes CO) are vital in defeating A2/AD capabilities. OIE degrades the enemy's C2 while enabling the joint force to maximize friendly C2 capabilities. Information also enables the JFC to understand the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and future actions. Additionally, OIE can influence foreign attitudes and perceptions of the operation.

(e) **JEMSO.** Commanders employ EA capabilities, including DE, to disrupt, degrade, and destroy targeted enemy personnel, facilities, or equipment. Key targets that enable and protect enemy offensive operations are sensors and C2 nodes because their destruction strongly influences the enemy's perceptions and ability to coordinate actions. Additionally, enemy space and cyberspace assets are potential targets. EW, through EM support, enables destruction by providing actionable target locations and/or information. Just as important, commanders employ DE weapons, devices, and countermeasures to incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel; or determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the EMS. Commanders integrate radio frequency countermeasures that employ technology to impair the effectiveness of enemy activity (e.g., precision-guided or radio-controlled weapons, communications equipment, and sensor systems). Furthermore, JEMSO facilitate joint force C2 while simultaneously denying EMS access to enemies. This facilitates efforts to dictate operational tempo in support of commander's objectives. Based upon accurate, timely, and shared understanding of the EMOE, coordinated operational-level JEMSO can more effectively target enemies while minimizing mutual interference of friendly and neutral systems within a congested and contested EMS.

For more information on JEMSO, see JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

(3) **Close the Strategic and Operational Distance.** Closing the strategic and operational distance requires contesting enemy maneuver forces to deny their objectives and degrade enemy long-range ISR capabilities. As the joint force achieves all-domain parity and degrades enemy ISR, the JFC must capitalize on these gains by closing the strategic and operational distance. Closing the strategic and operational distance negates the enemy's multi-layered standoff and facilitates the introduction of additional forces into the theater. Mitigating the enemy's standoff capabilities enables freedom of action and sets conditions for the suppression of enemy air and maritime defenses and denial of enemy A2/AD systems and long-range fires.

(a) **Neutralize Enemy Long-Range Fires.** Enemy long-range fires present a direct threat and can interdict joint forces from gaining and maintaining operational access. The JFC must leverage ISR and long-range joint fires to identify and destroy enemy intermediate and short-range ballistic missiles, long-range rocket artillery, and cruise missiles. Attacking long-range enemy fires requires resilience in C2 across all components, provided through redundant means of communication, flexible command

relationships, and control measures designed to withstand degraded communications. The JFC may also rely on SOF to identify and neutralize key elements of the enemy's integrated fires complex. SOF may operate deep beyond the range of conventional forces to conduct DA, special reconnaissance, intelligence operations, target identification, and airspace control to coordinate joint fires.

(b) Leverage Accurate and Precise Intelligence. Identifying and neutralizing long-range enemy fires is not possible without current and accurate ISR to enable targeting. In a denied, disconnected, intermittent, or limited environment, the JFC and staff must develop a layered ISR plan, which accounts for the enemy's ability to contest friendly ISR in various domains, times, and locations. The ISR plan should leverage capabilities across the joint force to ensure redundancy and provide component commanders an accurate COP and common intelligence picture.

(c) Contest Enemy Maneuver to Deny Objectives. The JFC must contest the enemy attack by immediately imposing losses on the enemy to delay its objectives and prevent its consolidation of gains. Through reconnaissance, prepared defenses with forward-positioned forces, JFCs delay the enemy's arrival of follow-on forces. The JFCs employ joint fires, deception activities, and CO to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas and prevent the massing of lethal effects on the joint force.

c. **Protect and Expand the JSA.** The JFC must exploit the advantages achieved by closing the strategic and operational distance to protect and expand the JSA. This exploitation enables the deployment and sustainment of expeditionary forces to support follow-on operations and secures operational access within the theater. The JFC and the JSC protect and expand the JSA through dispersion and deception operations and by hardening key nodes and infrastructure.

(1) Dispersion. Expanding the JSA protects the joint force by dispersing assembly areas, sustainment bases, and prepositioned stocks that remain within the range of long-range enemy fires and A2/AD systems. The JFC can use the enlarged JSA to conduct JRSOI of expeditionary forces arriving in theater at multiple points and can then disperse these forces to multiple assembly areas. Dispersion and expansion in joint forcible entry operations can open additional LOOs or initial entry points within the theater. By appearing operationally unpredictable, JFCs' joint forcible entry operations present the enemy with multiple dilemmas.

(2) Deception Operations. Although employed throughout the OA, the JFC and JSC protect the JSA by developing a deception plan that conceals the JSA's footprint. The deception plan should employ multiple means to present a combination of real, false, and exaggerated capabilities throughout the OE. Deception operations intend to mislead the enemy's ISR capabilities or assessments to identify the JSA's actual footprint and capabilities.

(3) Protect Key Nodes and Infrastructure. As additional assets arrive in theater, the JFC and JSC, using the CAL/DAL, protect critical nodes and infrastructure across the

JSA. This protection can include local/HN resources that the joint force/HN will use, which may include private, commercial, and government property. The JSC protects these key assets and locations from long-range enemy fires, special-purpose forces, and A2/AD systems in concert with the AADC. However, they balance this enhanced protection with the need to rapidly field or issue equipment and supplies to arriving units. JFCs ensure protection measures do not impede combat demands.

(4) C2. Controlled littoral areas often offer the best position from which to C2 the early stages of joint operations, especially in JOAs with limited or poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Depending on the situation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC. Initially, the operation may be primarily maritime, but commanders should prepare the command structure to shift that command ashore if the operation shifts landward IAW the JFC's CONOPS. In denied or contested environments, maritime or littoral areas may be the only option for JFCs to establish and conduct C2. However, as the joint force gains operational access in the land OA, the JFC may need to transition C2 from ship to shore.

(5) Protection. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint/multinational force at the onset of armed conflicts. Further, HN infrastructure and logistic support are key to force projection and sustainment and critical to protection. JFCs counter the enemy's fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and fires by using various physical and informational measures. OPSEC and MILDEC are key elements of this effort. Protection includes activities to gain air, space, maritime, and EMS parity. Protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment also contribute significantly to force protection at the onset of armed conflicts.

d. Counteroffensive

(1) Synchronizing and integrating joint functions. As soon as possible, JFCs initiate offensive operations; when conducted in response to enemy attacks, they are referred to as counteroffensives. Counteroffensives are broad cycles of iterative attacks conducted to defeat and destroy attacking enemy forces. The counteroffensive may seek to penetrate enemy formations; seize terrain; or control geographic areas, resources, and population centers, but the primary orientation is on the enemy. Against a capable and adaptive enemy, an offensive or counteroffensive is the most direct and sure means to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve operational-level objectives. Executing an offensive or counteroffensive compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing weakness the entire attacking joint force can exploit. A successful counteroffensive or offensive can place tremendous pressure on the enemy forces, creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration. Long-range joint fires and capabilities unique to Service components, including land- and maritime-based missiles and strike aircraft, should provide cross-boundary offensive action to protect and enable continuous attacks. Protection remains critical and includes certain defensive measures to continue throughout the duration of the counteroffensive. Counteroffensives (and offensives) can include flanking attacks and envelopments, leading to a penetration(s). Successful

counteroffensives create and sustain penetrations and transition to exploitations and pursuits. Effective exploitation can begin to fracture the enemy's coherence and ability to respond but only temporarily. Successful counteroffensives can force the enemy to abandon their objectives or even lead to their defeat. JFCs recognize that defeating an enemy is a temporary condition where the enemy force cannot achieve its operational-level objectives due to loss of capability or will. JFCs achieve these conditions through combinations of successful tactical and operational-level actions against an enemy. During this transient period, the enemy cannot significantly interfere with the actions of a friendly force. JFCs recognize defeating an enemy is not an end unto itself but provides the opportunity to continue to pursue strategic objectives that extend far beyond the battlefield.

(2) During a counteroffensive within a specific theater, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional forces, SOF, information, orbital space, and cyberspace capabilities. Over time, the JFC may prioritize one LOE or LOO over others. As the situation unfolds and the enemy reacts, the JFC will likely shift prioritization. Regardless of the prioritization or designation of a main effort, other operations must continue simultaneously to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action, or informational advantage. Shifting some operations as appropriate while executing other concurrent missions can degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion. When joint operations prevent the enemy from concentrating forces, JFCs can isolate critical capabilities. At other times, JFCs can take actions to cause the enemy to concentrate their forces, facilitating the attack by friendly forces. Regardless of the shifting priorities, JFCs must orient joint warfighting on enemy COGs. In attacking enemy COGs, JFCs should time their actions to coincide with actions of other operations of the joint force and vice versa to degrade not only the enemy's capabilities but also their conviction to continue to wage war. The integration of the joint functions supports all military operations.

e. Joint Warfighting - Integrating Capabilities and Synchronizing Action

(1) Commanders must integrate the capabilities and synchronize the operations of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace forces, along with JEMSO, to defeat peer enemies. JFCs should consider intelligence collection, providing joint fire support, maneuvering to close with the enemy, and protecting the force, for example, as separate operations but complementary joint actions executed to create necessary effects against the enemy. Potential enemy responses to integrated and synchronized joint warfighting can create multiple dilemmas. If the enemy attempts to counter the capabilities of intelligence or maneuver, enemy forces may expose themselves to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such losses from joint fires, enemy forces may not be able to evade intelligence or counter the maneuver. All components can conduct intelligence collection, maneuver, and employ fires to close with enemy forces, interdict enemy capability before, and protect the force from enemy attack. The synergy assists commanders in conducting joint operations by integrating and synchronizing all joint functions and unique capabilities from across the force.

(2) The JFC's objectives, intent, and priorities reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements enable subordinates to fully exploit the military potential

of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviates such friction. As an example, JOA-wide requirements for cyberspace, space, and airborne ISR support will often exceed the means available, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. The JFACC will have to balance priorities for protection and counter-air with delivering joint fires. Commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing joint functions within their OAs should prosecute the JFC priorities and work to synchronize and balance operations with commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and JOA-wide functions. JFCs can effectively synchronize efforts across the JOA through the CONOPS and clear statements of intent for JOA-wide operations conducted in concert with joint operations specific to an OA. In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to achieving objectives. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to identify requirements and apply capabilities to meet them. JFCs must exercise command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

(3) Within the JOA, all joint force component operations must contribute to the achievement of the JFC's objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish OAs for subordinate commands. Integration and synchronization of intelligence, joint fire support, and maneuver are essential to successful armed conflict. Synchronization and integration of the joint functions are critical within the land or maritime AOs, especially when JFCs task other component commanders to execute JOA-wide functions.

(a) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize the execution of land and maritime operations. The JFC bases the size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs on the operational requirements. Within these AOs, the JFC designates the land and maritime commanders as the supported commander for integrating and synchronizing maneuver, fires, and other joint functions and capabilities. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the CONOPS, which includes the target priority, effects, and timing for combat operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land and maritime commander, commanders designated as the supported commander for a theater/JOA-wide responsibility have latitude in planning and executing JFC prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO. If theater or JOA-wide operations would have adverse effects within a land or maritime AO, then the commander conducting those operations must adjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

(b) Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operations. The battlefield framework for armed conflict is usually either contiguous or noncontiguous. Contiguous operations are those where subordinate forces' AOs share one or more common boundaries, and a forward line helps identify friendly forces. Noncontiguous operations are those where one or more of the JFC's subordinate forces' AOs do not share a common boundary. JFCs conduct simultaneous operations from multiple bases or base clusters, either ashore or afloat.

1. In contiguous operations, the JFLCC or the land component commander emphasizes maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. This relative positioning of forces enhances security and facilitates the massing of forces. Also inherent in contiguous operations is the security of the JSA, especially LOCs between support bases and fighting forces.

2. In noncontiguous operations, joint forces with AOs that often do not share a common boundary orient more on assigned objectives (e.g., destroying an enemy force, seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves, forces operating in a noncontiguous framework rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than mass. Noncontiguous operations place a premium on C2, mobility, and nonstandard means for sustainment.

(c) The land or maritime component commander's intent and CONOPS should clearly state how joint functions will enable or enhance their operation in the AO. Once adjacent commanders understand the concept, other commanders with JOA-wide responsibilities can normally plan and execute operations with only that coordination required with the land or maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander should provide commanders with cross JOA responsibilities as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their specific function within the AO. For example, joint fires with a near-term effect on air, land, and maritime operations normally support maneuver. Successful operations in the aggregate may depend on successful interdiction; for instance, to isolate a battle or weaken the enemy force before it is within direct fire contact or indirect fires range of friendly forces.

(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral AOs often require additional coordination among the maritime commander and other commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some maritime operations, such as antisubmarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that other commanders of an AO or JOA-wide function maintain communication with the maritime commander. As in all operations, a lack of close coordination among commanders in maritime AOs can result in friendly fire incidents and failed missions. The same principle applies concerning air component mining operations in the land or maritime AOs.

(4) Land, maritime, and special operations commanders may use joint fires to attack targets with the support of commanders with JOA-wide missions. Target nomination procedures should include through which land or maritime force commanders can specifically identify emerging targets that could affect planned or ongoing operations that they are unable to engage with organic assets. Commanders with JOA-wide missions depend upon the AO-specific commanders to support the JOA-wide efforts—sometimes by action within their AOs and sometimes by support to adjacent commanders. Special operations, land, or maritime commanders employ the capabilities of one another through cross-boundary actions. Commanders may identify these targets individually or by category, specified geographically, or tied to the desired effect or period. The JFACC considers interdiction target priorities within the land, maritime, or special operations OAs

along with theater and JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air apportionment decision. The JFACC uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and execute the theater- and JOA-wide air interdiction effort. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to and allow JFCs to give priority to targets supporting air, land, or maritime commanders' operations.

(5) Effective coordination of intelligence, maneuver, and joint fires supports defeating critical portions of the enemy A2/AD systems' coverage, maneuver forces, C2 networks, and integrated fires complex. The JFC relies on both airborne ISR and information to identify high-value targets within the JOA and then maneuvers forces to seize key terrain, isolate enemy forces, stimulate the enemy's mid-range or short-range fires systems, or force the enemy to reposition. These operations expose the enemy to additional intelligence, maneuver, and fires efforts. The result of synchronization and effective employment is to increase freedom of movement.

(6) Converging intelligence, maneuver, fires, EW, and deception, the JFC can isolate and defeat enemy forces by massing the fires to create lethal and nonlethal effects. Success is a result of creating the right effect at critical times and locations. The JFCs concentrate effects at enemy LOCs, sustainment, reserves, and enablers to further isolate enemy forces. The result is an enemy force that is isolated and vulnerable to sustained attack by joint forces. The JFC then exploits the freedom of action to defeat the enemy's operational COG or fix and destroy remaining forces.

(7) Sustainment and Operational Reach. Campaigns and major operations in armed conflict place great demands on intertheater and intratheater logistics and sustainment systems. Prolonged combat has the potential to exhaust sustainment reserves within theater, thereby restricting the JFC's freedom of action and operational reach. To avoid this, the JFC and staff must plan for the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support to enable prolonged combat until operations are successful or the CCDR revises the objectives. Unique to armed conflict, the JFC and staff must also plan for reconstitution operations as forces and equipment availability drops. Sustainment plays a pivotal role in both offensive and defensive operations; however, the demands on personnel replacement, Class III (e.g., petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and Class V (e.g., ammunition) will be more severe during offensive operations. As with achieving air and maritime superiority, sustainment provides JFCs with the flexibility and operational reach to develop required branches and sequels as the operation evolves.

(8) CWMD. JFCs should prepare to conduct activities to curtail the development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD. When planning or executing operations and activities to counter WMD, JFCs coordinate and cooperate with not only other USG departments and agencies but also local, tribal, and state organizations, in addition to multinational partners. With numerous stakeholders in the CWMD mission area, it is critical JFCs understand and consider the capabilities and responsibilities of various interorganizational partners when defining command relationships and coordinating interorganizational activities. Operations to counter WMD may require the formation of a functional JTF for that purpose.

(9) Stabilization activities provide security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. If no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then JFCs and their staffs resource essential stabilization tasks. When demand for resources exceeds the JFC's capability, higher-level joint commanders should provide additional resources. JFCs at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct essential stabilization tasks and what risk they can accept in accomplishment of the tasks.

For more information, see JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities, and DODD 3000.05, Stabilization.

(10) IAW the law of war, detention operations involve the detainment of certain categories of persons, to include prisoners of war and civilian internees. These operations control the movement and activities of a specific population for reasons of security, safety, or intelligence gathering. The Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for detainee operations and long-term confinement. Detention operations may also include supporting HN correction reform.

(a) During armed conflict, enemy units, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may fall capture to US forces. The numbers involved may place a tremendous burden on friendly forces as they divert tactical units to handle detainees. The term detainee includes any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of DOD personnel.

(b) Detainee operations is a broad term that encompasses the capture, initial detention, screening, transportation, treatment, protection, housing, transfer, and release of the wide range of persons categorized as detainees. Actions at the point of capture, custody, and beyond can directly affect mission success and could have a lasting impact on the pursuit of strategic objectives.

(c) International law requires the safe and humane treatment of detainees. Commanders ensure all detainees are treated humanely and with respect for their dignity, IAW applicable US law, policy, and the law of war. Failure to conduct detainee operations humanely and lawfully can result in significant adverse strategic impacts for the joint force.

For more information, see DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program; DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program; and CJCSI 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

f. Transition and Adaptation

(1) Commanders adapt continuously and transition as necessary as they anticipate the enemy's future actions. At some point during the joint force's initial offensive or counteroffensive, the attack will culminate or pause. This action will be by design or enemy response. Still, there should be no reason to believe the enemy will abandon their objectives after the first iteration of offensive-counteroffensive. Commanders expect to transition through multiple iterations where the side that adapts to the enemy and adjusts to the OE quicker realizes an advantage. Commanders know that

on every occasion the United States has engaged in sustained armed conflict against a peer enemy; the joint force has had to change warfighting methods, organizations, and capabilities to succeed in the new environment. Until this adaptation occurred, the military could not bring effective force to bear against the enemy. Essential to joint warfighting, adaptation is identifying and taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by enemy actions, recognizing chance combinations of circumstances to prevail or taking necessary action to prevent stalemate, protraction, or failure. Commanders recognize the difference between the anticipated enemy method of warfare with the actual manifestation and adjust to reality. JFCs may not be able to anticipate environmental changes perfectly or predict the precise actions of an enemy, but the pursuit is continuous. Every campaign presents unforeseen challenges or circumstances. Joint leaders and military organizations must be able to adjust to warfighting challenges in a timely manner to effectively exploit, or seize, opportunities presented by the enemy's lapses in anticipation. One of the most powerful expressions of operational art is the ability to adapt to new and changed circumstances. Observations and interactions will likely include changes to specific tactics, techniques, and procedures as well. Military leadership should consider this required transformation while waging armed conflict, not as a phenomenon, but a normal characteristic and necessary aspect of warfare. The side that adapts its warfighting concepts and capabilities more quickly and effectively once conflict begins will have a decided advantage.

(2) Commanders who understand the results of recent actions and adapt the quickest will gain the advantage for follow-on actions. The important aspects of adapting are in preparing for the threat's reaction, adjusting to the most recent battle, consolidating the gains, and transitioning to follow-on offensive or other appropriate action. The initial assumptions may have been insufficient; therefore, JFCs adjust their CONOPS with branches to meet the enemy and situation. These advantages accumulate across the OE and commanders maintain awareness of how they interact to support their scheme of maneuver. At some point, JFCs may drive the enemy to a cessation of hostilities, but the conflict may not be over; therefore, JFCs create and implement sequels.

(3) As the joint force continues to campaign, JFCs begin to impose their will through some combination of exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation as diplomats seek to negotiate a settlement. Regardless, JFCs maintain a long-term view toward the transition following armed conflict. Rarely do wars end with a cessation of armed conflict. Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions to a point where it is often impossible to return to the previous international order. Armed conflict's destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking to retain, reestablish, or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a new order. Global or regional competitors can then exploit these conditions by supporting these groups as resistance partners or surrogates to continue to pursue their objectives in other ways. The transition period requires the joint force to campaign through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.

4. The Transition from Armed Conflict into the New Competition

a. Introduction

(1) Clear conclusion and finality to armed conflict can be elusive. To make a military victory meaningful, CCDRs take on the timeless challenge of translating the military success in the OE into enduring and favorable outcomes. There is no strict rulebook for translating military achievement into favorable strategic objectives. Still, there are recognizable patterns for navigating the difficulties. Regardless of the impetus of the transition away from armed conflict toward new opportunities for cooperation and challenges for competition, CCDRs must ensure continuity of effort long after the cessation of hostilities to achieve and perpetuate the strategic objectives. To successfully transition from armed conflict to address and influence the new competition, CCDRs must avoid characterizing the continuing effort as merely a minimalist endeavor. Successful transition requires a mindset, posture, and readiness to continue offensive operations, if necessary. JFCs continue to orient on the enemy and new adversaries.

(2) As a function of the cessation of armed conflict with an enemy, the United States may impose terms, negotiate a settlement, or accept nothing short of regime change. Forcing an imposed settlement may occur through the selective destruction of critical functions or assets, such as C2, infrastructure, or otherwise making the enemy unable to resist the US will and resolve. Even for limited objectives, this can be by the threat of or actual occupation of a portion of an enemy's land, resources, or people. Second, a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions convinces an enemy that yielding will be less painful than continuing to resist. In addition to imposed and negotiated settlement, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission of armed conflict, not a reconciliation. In effect, it provides a way to gain time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. Senior military and civilian leaders must weigh the efficacy of an armistice or truce against the potential damage done by relieving pressure on the threat. Whether the United States imposes or negotiates a settlement, or the warring parties merely reach an armistice, the CCDRs' continuity of effort will have different characterizations depending on the situation. For example, in the case of an imposed settlement, the joint force will likely have to maintain an offensive-like posture and coercive action while communicating both compellence and deterrence type threats. CCDRs maintain a similar mindset for an armistice, which in many cases may endure but evolve into a contentious cease-fire. In a negotiated settlement, over time, the joint force may be able to transition to a more defensive posture; however, continuing to confront the enemy may require maintaining significant combat forces forward. Even when the war's objectives only constitute a minor adjustment to the international order, success requires a great deal of effort, persistence, and legitimacy. In the case of regime change, only a comprehensive, long-term effort and committed follow-through can deliver strategic objectives. For each of these impositions, new competitions will emerge and challenge all operational and strategic accomplishments; the joint force cannot simply walk away or expect any level of permanence. JFCs should expect the moment that the joint force ceases protecting the wartime gains, enemies, and adversaries alike will begin to probe, assault, and undo the hard-won achievements.

(3) Consolidating and maintaining gains is an integral part of succeeding in armed conflict. Consolidating gains is not a phase, it is continuous during the conduct of operations. For joint warfighting, JFCs see it as essential to retaining the initiative over enemies and adversaries. Success requires a continuing opportunity cost of military effort. Any notion of completeness or resolution suggested by a military victory can be completely irrelevant. CCDRs anticipate the magnitude and attributes of effort required to achieve the appropriate measures of success, translate success into national policy outcomes, and prepare for future repercussions. Recognizing that no success is permanent, JFCs view consolidating gains as making temporary operational success enduring to the degree possible and setting the conditions for a stable and sustainable environment. JFCs know consolidating gains is an integral part of prevailing in armed conflict.

(4) Joint forces deliberately plan and prepare for the transition to capitalize on operational success. Planning considerations can include changes to the task organization and the additional assets required. These assets may include engineers, military police, civil affairs, and medical support, especially those assets required for the potential increase in stabilization tasks. In some instances, JFCs lead the integrating and synchronizing activities. In other situations, the joint force will be in support. The CCDRs' capability and capacity enable the conduct of critical activities associated with consolidating gains.

(5) When leading and directing actions during the transition, commanders establish and sustain security throughout the transition. Joint forces conduct continuous reconnaissance and, if necessary, gain or maintain contact with the enemy to defeat or preempt enemy action and retain the initiative. Consolidating gains may include eliminating or neutralizing isolated or bypassed threat forces to increase area security and protect LOCs. Commanders must ensure forces organize and prepare to confront enemy forces while simultaneously consolidating gains. Commanders maintain communication with the population to assist in understanding the overall goal of military actions and how those actions benefit the population. Psychological operations forces, PA, civil affairs forces, CMO, and COMCAM can assist in this effort.

(6) JFCs should understand that activities for consolidating gains may occur over a significant time. Gradually, JFCs shift emphasis from ensuring the defeat of remaining threat forces to measures that address the needs of the urban population and manage their perceptions. This shift could allow the responsibility to shift from joint forces to organizations such as local governing groups, interorganizational groups, or interagency partners. There may be interim transitions during consolidating gains when joint forces may transition various tasks to another military force that task-organizes to sustain consolidating gains or to a civilian agency to conduct various tasks. If joint forces occupy territory and governmental institutions are dysfunctional, belligerent, or nonexistent, commanders may organize and execute governance operations. Over time, overall control of the joint force may transfer responsibility to an interim civilian government or a form of reconstituted government.

(7) During the transition, JFCs are responsible for accomplishing both the minimum-essential stabilization tasks and the joint primary stabilization tasks.

Commanders must quickly ensure the provision of minimum-essential stabilization tasks of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Once conditions allow, these tasks are a legal responsibility of joint forces. However, commanders may not need to have joint forces conduct all essential tasks if a military unit or appropriate civilian organizations exist that can adequately conduct those tasks. For example, there may be enough civilian or military governance in place to ensure the population has adequate food and medical care. However, joint forces will continue consolidating gains by conducting the joint force's primary stabilization tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support economic and infrastructure development. The tasks associated with primary stabilization tasks will evolve. The military will continue to establish civil security through the conduct of SFA.

b. Operations, Activities, and Investments

(1) To effectively campaign throughout the transition from armed conflict to competition, joint forces take specific actions that:

(a) Establish security from external threats. These threats include the previous enemy combatant. Commanders use coercive force to allow a transition to occur without disruption from previous or nascent threats. To demonstrate and communicate these threats, the joint force may maintain a posture and overt orientation on continuing the offensive, if necessary. Commanders maintain and employ the necessary capabilities to defeat all potential forms of enemy resistance as a fundamental part of any operational approach seeking to achieve enduring strategic objectives.

(b) Execute governance over occupied territories to establish a military government in occupied territory (e.g., The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the law of war). The execution of military governance has proven an inescapable, crucial aspect of warfare that senior military and civilian leaders must consider. JFCs plan and prepare for the execution of military governance before, during, and after armed conflicts. As required, joint forces implement organizational and command structures to enable leaders to conduct the governance operations that can inevitably become their responsibility and necessary to link military actions to strategic objectives. This type of planning deserves the same level of preparation as waging armed conflict as it is an essential aspect—a leadership failure to prepare results in the type of ad hoc approach that characterized previous US experiences. Although difficult, it may be necessary for US forces to establish a military government in the absence of governing entities by providing support to civil administration or asserting transitional military authority. Various international agreements outline the US obligations to take all measures in its power to restore public order and safety while respecting the laws and governments in the occupied territories.

(c) Coerce adversaries from behaving in a malign or detrimental manner by rewarding appropriate behavior and imposing costs for malign or antagonistic behavior.

(d) Influence the perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, decision making, and behavior of adversaries' leadership, security forces, and civil society and other foreign audiences and inform domestic audiences to create desired psychological effects.

(e) Influence adversaries' risk assessments to reduce their willingness to engage in malign or antagonistic behavior.

(f) Counter or contest adversaries' operations, activities, and investments to deny or delay their operational success.

(g) Continually seek to gain and sustain long-term competitive advantages as the new adversarial competition will go on indefinitely or until the former combatants, now competitors reach a mutually acceptable political settlement. Commanders must recognize that former combatants do not always arrive at mutual settlements.

(h) Conduct security tasks to protect friendly forces, installation routes, critical infrastructure, populations, and actions within an assigned OA.

(i) Execute stabilization activities. Against the enemy, stabilization efforts surrounding infrastructure reconstruction will likely go toward allies and partners in need. In occupied territory, forces first conduct minimum-essential stabilization tasks, then provide essential governmental services, emergency, and humanitarian relief IAW the law of war.

(j) Establish influence over local and regional audiences (as authorized). Commanders develop and communicate supporting and credible narratives to the intended population to assist them in understanding the overall goal of military actions and the benefits of those actions for the population.

(k) Establish, maintain, and sustain large-scale detention compounds and sustain enduring detainee operations.

(l) Execute PEO. PEO and PKO are coercive actions that orient on adversarial behaviors. In at least one theater or JOA, the transition from armed conflict to competition may involve ongoing operations that have a significant combat component, including COIN operations, antiterrorism, and countering adversarial competition. As the campaign continues, some operations may include a large stabilization component that is essentially a PEO mission. PEO provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN populace. Joint force coercive and persuasive measures establish the conditions that enable PEO to succeed. PEO promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction and an environment favorable to US interests.

(2) After protecting vulnerable states from external influences and threats, reestablishing internal stability can increase in priority. In many cases, stabilization effort must help capitalize on the direct effects of other types of military operations. Integrating stabilization activities into the execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended

consequences, helps translates short-term gains into enduring progress, and provides a bridge linking operational objectives with broader strategic goals. Maintaining or reestablishing stability in friendly nations and occupied territories in the aftermath of armed conflict is often integral to the overall campaign's pursuit of strategic objectives. In reconstituting the capacity of partners to protect themselves from hostile foreign influence, JFCs must contain adversarial states and follow through armed conflict against a hostile regime, achieving strategic objectives.

(3) Legal issues may require commanders to account for and provide for the protection and well-being of the civilian populations in the area they control for extended periods. Generally, the responsibility for providing for people's basic needs rests with the government institutions of the occupied territories. When not possible, military forces may need to provide necessary levels of civil security and restoration of essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the HN is able. These actions provide minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. JFCs should make every effort to ensure that if no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then the military forces under their control conduct these actions.

(4) JFCs must continually assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these stabilization tasks and what risk they can accept. If unable to resource these stabilization tasks, then JFCs should seek additional capabilities or capacities, including leveraging the capabilities and resources of interorganizational stakeholders to achieve the objectives.

SECTION II

5. Joint Campaigns and Operations Against Violent Extremist Organizations

a. **Introduction.** IW is a struggle among state or non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. The term **irregular** highlights the nontraditional methods that state and non-state actors incorporate through their actions, information efforts, activities, and operations to gain the broadest and most impactful influence and effects. Nontraditional methods coalesce political ideology, propaganda, nonviolent, and violent efforts to establish or promote regional and international sympathies and garner legitimacy for their actions. They strive to create dilemmas, influence targeted groups, or coerce leaders through various means other than the use of military dominance. These nontraditional methods, often used by weaker adversaries such as non-state actors, can disrupt, influence, or neutralize a more capable military or the security forces of a recognized political authority.

b. **VEOs.** VEOs include individual terrorists that align with a group, terrorist organizations, and ideologically driven groups that promote violence. A sound global approach for countering terrorism outlines a strategic vision built around an international effort. The aim orients on defeating violent extremism, which threatens the way of life for free and open societies and creating a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and their supporters. VEOs challenge the joint force by promoting their ideology transregionally across CCMD boundaries, responsibilities, and functional seams. VEOs

conduct activities transregionally and in the OE to disrupt US and international interests to cultivate legitimacy, credibility, sympathy, and influence to achieve their strategic objectives. VEOs employ violent methods, but they also conduct competitive activities and messaging to gain sympathies for their ideology and challenge or discredit their enemies' legitimacy, credibility, and influence.

c. **Combating Terrorism (CbT).** CbT involves actions to oppose terrorism from all threats. CbT encompasses antiterrorism, which is defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These actions include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces and CT, which are activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks. CbT activities include operations to render terrorists incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. CT is primarily a special operations core activity, which includes DAs against terrorist networks, indirect actions to influence global and regional environments, making them inhospitable to terrorist networks. Normally, CT operations require specially trained and equipped personnel capable of swift and effective action. IAW DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, CT is a DOD activity or operation associated with IW. However, terrorists also operate during large-scale traditional combat, forcing commanders to integrate CT with these operations. Enemies using irregular methods often will use terrorist tactics to wage prolonged operations to break the will to fight and influence relevant populations. At the same time, terrorists and insurgents also seek to bolster their legitimacy and credibility with those same populations. CbT efforts should include all instruments of national power to undermine enemy power, will, credibility, and legitimacy, thereby diminishing its ability to influence the relevant population. COIN operations can become much more extensive than a limited contingency and may involve major operations.

For further details concerning CbT and special operations, refer to JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism, and JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. For US policy on CT, refer to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America.

For more information on IW, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and for more information on threat networks or VEOs, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks, and JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

d. **Understanding the Contemporary Environment.** Radicalism, extremism, and the associated violence they foster have become commonplace and a globally persistent condition. Radicalization and extremism are trends that can frustrate US strategy, policy, and DOD security efforts but also are precursors to violence and conflict. Commanders and planners anticipate when joint forces transition from armed conflict to competition. As the transition unfolds, VEOs may continue to resort to coercion and violence to exploit a newly formed transitional government's fragility. The JFC also anticipates enemy trends that either surge or reduce extremist behavior and activities incorporating violence and conflict. The JFC assesses the OE before, during, and after campaign development, identifying trends and informing operational approaches and supporting efforts. The JFC leverages unified action through interorganizational cooperation with international

organizations and HN partners for the US, multinational, and HN security actions. Friendly information efforts coalesce and transmit the USG and international condemnation to counter threat trends. The JFC analyzes and assesses the OE influenced by urbanization, demographic insecurity, and competition for diminishing resources. The leaders of the VEO will promote civil unrest through the expansion of ideological radicalization and fuel extremism to encourage violence. JFCs and their staff must assess VEO motives, means, and innovations to understand and address extremism trends:

- (1) VEOs will continue to operate during armed conflict. They may increase the tempo and scope of their activities to exploit the root causes of the armed conflict. These activities can force JFCs to divert resources to the CT mission and integrate CT with traditional warfare activities and operations against an enemy cooperating with VEOs.
- (2) Enemies using irregular methods often will use terrorist tactics to wage prolonged operations to break the US political will and influence relevant populations. At the same time, terrorists and insurgents also seek to bolster their legitimacy and credibility with those same populations. Therefore, CT efforts should include the application of all instruments of national power to the struggle for legitimacy, credibility, and influence.
- (3) Antagonize, induce, and exploit existing grievances to mobilize support for violent change.
- (4) Find, influence, and mobilize populations locally, regionally, and globally.
- (5) Spread information and disinformation to elicit tacit and active support or acceptance of their views and actions.
- (6) Conduct, direct, support, or inspire a mix of lethal and nonlethal actions to achieve physical and psychological objectives, gain notoriety, garner attention, sustain, increase their base, finance and advance their cause.

e. Joint Campaigns and Operations Against VEOs. Successful campaigns and operations against VEOs require an integrated USG strategy that establishes relevant strategic objectives. A GCP for countering VEOs translates USG policy and strategy into a set of strategic- and operational-level military objectives necessary to establish the conditions necessary to achieve the desired strategic objective. Planning involves identifying strategic and operational objectives and developing supporting LOEs and LOOs that achieve operational-level objectives. The CJCS and coordinating authority integrate and synchronize transregional campaigns and operations to ensure unity of effort with other CCDRs, affected COMs, and other interorganizational partners. The CCP requires a more extensive framework than those employed for tactical operations, particularly in situations where the United States is in long-term competition with global or transregional adversaries. The CCDR coordinates transregional and theater activities that clearly understand the OE and wield greater influence over affected populations. The assessment of the OE informs campaign development, and continuous monitoring leads to adapting the operational approach against identified VEOs. Campaigns can include

aggressive and lethal actions against the threat itself while incorporating less aggressive activities against supporting cultural groups, sympathetic local and international populations, or a nation-state threat sponsor.

f. Address threats globally, transregionally, and over time. VEOs operate from sanctuaries, move, and conduct actions surreptitiously while employing information and disinformation. A global campaign approach requires an agile and more capable (synchronized lethal and nonlethal) force to support a requesting CCDR with a full spectrum of options. A CCP may require the CCDR to employ forces and functional capabilities for each region synchronized with information activities to ensure the appropriate impact across different populations and relevant actors. The distribution and activities of the joint force should reflect a comprehensive understanding of campaign objectives with implementing forces employed in time and space. The OE is subject to influence by transregional or global features that enable the movement of VEOs. A campaign may incorporate supporting plans that promote the long-term development of human and operational infrastructure to support competition activities, challenge the threat's agility, and impede a potential escalation to violence.

For more information on VEO, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

6. The Limited Contingency

a. Introduction. CCDRs tailor and conduct operations within a limited contingency to achieve a specific objective. Limited contingency operations have a unique and typically narrow scope, scale, and focus. Under the authoritative direction of the CCDR, a subordinate command or JFC may execute a limited contingency as a stand-alone operation or reflect the initial effort of an expanding or greater, more complex effort.

b. Limited Contingency Operations

(1) CCDRs prepare for various responses to situations that require military actions, activities, and operations. Through competition, commanders seek to improve positions of advantage to counter adversary and enemy actions or activities or to impose costs. Additionally, commanders create dilemmas for our adversaries, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies as directed by an appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US interests. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation with interorganizational participants. Commanders seek to integrate and execute within one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort. The timing of the transition from planning and preparation to execution can change rapidly, as necessary.

(2) When contentious situations develop, and the President or SecDef directs action, CCDRs respond. If internal forces within a nation create threats to sovereignty or regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability. Prompt deployment of necessary forces can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention can also deny an enemy time to set conditions in their favor

and achieve their objectives. Deploying a credible force is one step in countering coercion or responding to aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Successfully countering coercion involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force can conduct offensive operations. Additionally, the perception that the national leadership is willing to employ that force and deploy more forces if necessary is critical.

(3) Two important aspects of limited contingency operations stand out. CCDRs must provide an initial focus for the effort but remain vigilant of the evolving circumstances. First, understanding the purpose of the use of force and objective helps avoid actions that have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, such as compelling compliance in peace enforcement, for subordinate commanders to make decisions that have significant implications. Second, commanders remain aware of changes in the operational situation and at the strategic level that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious, much less directed. Commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may eventually lead to disconnects between evolving strategic objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes within implied strategic direction may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military efforts.

(4) Strategic direction and the evolving OE may require JFCs to simultaneously maintain and prepare capabilities for limited contingency operations and support other joint campaigns and operations. JFCs recognize these operations will vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of limited contingency operations may lend itself to using small elements like SOF in coordination, preferably in concert with allies and PNs. Initially, SOF may lead these operations as an economy of force measure to enable continuity of effort.

7. Direct Action

a. **DA.** DA entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments. DA employs military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, high-risk, or diplomatically and politically sensitive environments. DA differs from other offensive actions in the level of diplomatic or political risk, the operational techniques employed, and the degree of precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. JFCs may take DA through raids, ambushes, or other direct assault tactics; standoff attacks by fire from the air, land, or maritime forces; provision of terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; independent sabotage; and special anti-ship operations or maritime interception operations.

(1) SOF conducting DA usually withdraw from the planned objective area as quickly as possible to limit the operation's scope and duration. DA can provide specific and often time-sensitive results at operational and strategic levels of warfare.

(2) SOF may conduct DA independently or as part of a larger joint operation or campaign. Although normally considered close combat, DA also includes precision marksmanship and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. JFCs

employ standoff attacks when the target can be damaged or destroyed from a distance. SOF employs close combat tactics and techniques when the mission requires precise or discriminate use of force.

(3) DA missions may also involve locating and capturing or seizing selected high-value targets or materiel in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. These missions usually result from situations involving diplomatic and political sensitivity or military criticality of the enemy personnel or materiel exfiltrated from remote or hostile environments.

(4) DA supports PR (including unconventional and nonconventional assisted recovery) by use of dedicated land combat elements, unconventional techniques, precise intelligence on isolated personnel, and indigenous resistance or surrogate assistance.

(5) Maritime DA can include across-the-beach operations; near-simultaneous, underway, nighttime ship boarding; underwater attack against ships or other targets; harbor attack; and gas and oil platform assault.

b. Strikes and Raids

(1) **Strikes** are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or capability. Consistent with the requirements of international law, strikes may compel offending nations or groups to desist or prevent those nations or groups from launching attacks. Strikes may punish offending nations or groups, uphold international law, or prevent those nations or groups from launching attacks. Although often tactical concerning the ways and means used and duration of the operation, strikes can help achieve objectives.

(2) **Raids** are operations to seize an area temporarily, usually through forcible entry, to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy an objective or capability. Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

8. Counterinsurgency

a. Introduction

(1) COIN consists of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. When the United States conducts COIN, it refers to US military personal taking the lead in COIN operations. When US forces support an HN or PN, and the HN/PN are in the lead, our support falls under the FID category. While many commanders may not embrace the possibility of waging a future COIN campaign, history has shown repeatedly the folly of abandoning the hard-learned lessons of COIN, in favor of traditional state on state warfare. JFCs are aware they may have to face large-scale combat operations and COIN activities or operations simultaneously. Therefore, the joint operation maintains this capability and prepares the force appropriately.

(2) Insurgencies are the most common form of conflict around the world and often are transnational, not isolated to one state. An insurgency is a political-military struggle by a predominantly indigenous group or movement designed to weaken, subvert, or displace the control of an established government. Insurgencies have always been and are currently a reality within the contemporary OE. Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to create or exacerbate core grievances of a segment of a population, which can result in political strife and instability. Some groups can exploit these grievances to gain political advantage. Some transnational criminals or terrorists with radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat. Insurgents will typically solicit or offer external support or sanctuary from state or non-state actors.

For more information on COIN, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

(3) An effective COIN operation utilizes all instruments of national power to integrate and synchronize political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities carried out by the HN. CCDRs also leverage applicable USG and multinational partners to create a holistic approach to resolve core grievances where able and for those irreconcilables remaining in the insurgency, weakening their cause for violence.

(4) The United States could get involved in a COIN operation or campaign in two common ways. The first is at the request of a PN faced with an insurgency, which it cannot control. The second way is after a major conventional conflict whereby the United States disestablishes the standing government of a threat nation and assumes the role of reestablishing a new government and security. In this case, the JFC should prepare for an insurgency from disgruntled former regime members. The joint force can also conduct a COIN operation through foreign assistance and SC activities to prevent or disrupt insurgent threats. SC activities, which include SA, are a part of CCPs. DOD may conduct SC activities in conjunction with a contingency plan involving a PN in a limited contingency. The FID program is an important USG tool to fight insurgencies. Where a friendly nation appears vulnerable to an insurgency, many times it is in the best interest of the USG to help it mitigate that insurgency. In these cases, the USG can support the affected HN's internal defense and development strategy and program through FID efforts.

For more information on COIN, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency. For more information about SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation. For more information on FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

b. Approach to COIN

(1) COIN Strategy. The JFC and staff develop a population-centric COIN strategy focused on the root causes of the armed insurgency. To develop an effective COIN strategy, the JFC must have a comprehensive understanding of the armed conflict from the perspectives of the insurgents, other armed groups, and the indigenous populations. The strategy must align US interests against the interests of the population

the joint force is defending from the insurgency. COIN seeks to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence and isolate the insurgents physically, psychologically, politically, socially, and economically from the indigenous population. Ultimately, the indigenous population will determine whether to provide its loyalty and support to the insurgents or to the United States and its indigenous partners. All efforts are to address the perceived and actual political imbalance the insurgent leadership has exploited. The USG never intends to conduct COIN indefinitely but rather desires to transition responsibility to a legitimate and credible HN government as soon as the situation allows. The HN will require long-term USG support to sustain COIN successes and attain and maintain an acceptable strategic situation or condition.

(2) COIN Mindset. COIN focuses on the protection of the population and addressing the core grievances of both the insurgents and the population from which they draw support and recruits. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to gain or maintain control or influence over the population's support through political, psychological, and economic methods.

9. Global Integration and the Joint Force's Enduring Role in Competition

a. Arranging and accomplishing global integration's actions are essential. For the joint force to prevail against a peer enemy, it is imperative for JFCs to implement the directed prioritization of effort and integrate capabilities that work together to create advantages. If CCDRs are unsuccessful in executing these essential operations, then the war effort could face costly protraction, stalemate, or even worse. CCDRs achieve success by continually denying the enemy's objectives, attriting and dismantling enemy A2/AD defense networks, targeting C2 systems, and isolating the enemy's forces from their strategic infrastructure. Simultaneously, CCDRs continue protecting the force and accumulating combat power from across the globe. As the campaigns and major operations begin to create diplomatic and political leverage and advantage, national leaders can begin to either impose or negotiate a settlement.

b. CCDRs translate military success into acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes. CCDRs expect the transition to a new competition to occur over extended periods and implement long-term approaches that maintain their campaigns' focus over time. These activities might have to be successful across several AORs and multiple JOAs. Regarding results, whether in circumstances of cooperation, competition, or armed conflict, CCDRs assess results with a cumulative perspective and as decisive when it achieves policy's overarching objectives and provides a footing to accommodate future circumstances. CCDRs effectively guide and influence the competition while creating and enabling the necessary behaviors and conditions to achieve and maintain the strategic objectives. CCDRs continue to guide a stable diplomatic/political situation and an expanding network of like-minded allies and partners on terms that are compatible with and promote US interests. If not, then the war and war's objectives were meaningless. Maintaining this favorable situation within the new competition likely requires a continuing opportunity cost of an enduring military effort. At some point, the United States will likely normalize relations for the political and military affairs of the states previously involved in armed conflict to another authority (e.g., UN

observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or NATO). This normalization will probably occur after an extended period of establishing and protecting a new international dynamic. Normalizing relations can occur quickly but will likely occur in stages as it may include situations across multiple theaters. Either way, the joint force will continue to campaign and prepare for future circumstances.

APPENDIX A

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

The principles are relevant to how the Armed Forces of the United States use combat power across the competition continuum. Classic military study of war traditionally involved nine basic principles, collectively and classically known as the principles of war. While the basic nature of war is immutable, the conduct of warfare continues to evolve, and the methods of warfare will vary based on the situation. Experience in both traditional warfare and IW identifies three additional principles, restraint, resilience, and legitimacy, that together with the principles of war comprise the 12 principles of joint operations. The principles do not apply equally in all circumstances. Most principles, if not all, are relevant in combat. Some principles, such as offensive, maneuver, and surprise, may not apply in some situations like FHA. However, principles such as the unity of command, objective, and legitimacy are important in all situations.

2. Traditional Principles of War

a. Objective

(1) The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct military action toward a clearly defined and achievable goal.

(2) The purpose of using military power is to achieve strategic objectives. Achieving strategic objectives frequently involves the destruction of the enemies' capabilities and their will to fight. The objectives not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of military action. Ultimately, each action must contribute to achieving strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

(3) Changes to strategic objectives may occur because national and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in national objectives necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, the achievement of the operational objectives may no longer support the strategic objectives, legitimacy undermined, and force security compromised.

b. Offensive

(1) The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

(2) Offensive action is the most effective and determinant way to achieve a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are how a military force seizes and exploits the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving meaningful objectives. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of warfare.

(3) Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or regain the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

c. Mass

(1) The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce results.

(2) To achieve mass, JFCs integrate and synchronize where they can have a forceful effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects of combat power (lethal and nonlethal), rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources. The joint force maneuvers to mass effects in competitive spaces (i.e., land, maritime, air, and space domains; as well as in the IE, which includes cyberspace; and the EMS) to gain and maintain advantage relative to a competitor, adversary, or enemy. Maneuver and mass are complementary and mutually supporting principles designed to concentrate the effects of overwhelming power at the decisive place and time.

d. Maneuver

(1) The purpose of maneuver is to place an adversary or enemy in a position of disadvantage.

(2) Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to competitor, adversary, or enemy actions to secure or retain a positional and/or informational advantage, usually to deliver—or threaten the delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus protects the friendly force. It contributes materially and psychologically in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

e. Economy of Force

(1) The purpose of an economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power (lethal and nonlethal) on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts.

(2) Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces IAW the commander's intent and mission requirements. The measured allocation of available combat power for tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is to achieve mass at the decisive point and time. Although the principle of economy of force suggests the use of force, it also recommends guarding against overkill. This is particularly relevant when excessive force can diminish the legitimacy and support for an operation—an inherent informational aspect of military activities.

f. Unity of Command

(1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

(2) Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of command may not be possible during coordination with multinational and interagency partners, but the requirement for unity of effort is paramount. Unity of effort—the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—is the product of successful unified action.

g. Security

(1) The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage.

(2) Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces, the population, or other critical priorities. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine enhance security. Risk is inherent in military action. The application of this principle includes risk management, not undue caution.

h. Surprise

(1) The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place where the enemy is unprepared.

(2) Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

i. Simplicity

(1) The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability of success in execution by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

(2) Simplicity contributes to successful action. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity, a common lexicon, and clarity of expression greatly

Appendix A

facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, fog of war, and complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in modern operations.

3. Additional Principles of Joint Operations

a. Restraint

(1) The purpose of restraint is to prevent the excessive use of force.

(2) A single act could cause significant military and diplomatic/political consequences, so the judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the military necessities of the operation, and the pursuit of the objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party. Nonlethal weapons provide intermediate force, which is an active measure that enables mission success through the creation of proportionate nonlethal effects allowing for effective action consistent with the principle of restraint.

b. Resilience

(1) Resilience is a characteristic of an individual, organization, process, or system that gives it the ability to withstand and recover from disruptions from internal and external factors. For individuals, this quality presents as the ability to adapt to difficult or challenging operational experiences, especially through the mental, emotional, and behavioral flexibility and adjustment to internal and external demands of experiences and pressures created by demanding OEs.

(2) Similarly, resilient organizations exhibit the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to incremental changes and or sudden disruptions to survive and adapt to new environments. Individuals and organizations institute resilience in their processes and systems by ensuring they have can anticipate, cope, adapt, and recover from challenges and disruptions. Commanders work to instill this quality in their force and build institutional and individual endurance that enables the joint force to recover from the inevitable losses or setbacks caused by the trials encountered during joint campaigns and operations.

c. Legitimacy

(1) The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority.

(2) Legitimacy, which can be a key factor, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of relevant actors, stakeholders, and other interested audiences. These audiences will include our national leadership and domestic population, governments, and civilian populations in the OA and nations and organizations around the world.

(3) Committed forces sustain the legitimacy and cooperation of the host government, where applicable. Commanders balance security actions of the joint force with perceptions of legitimacy. Commanders consider all actions as potentially competing requirements. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation and to perceptions of fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, protecting civilians, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy. The consistent integration of operations, actions, words, and images will support the commander's ability to establish and maintain necessary credibility, legitimacy, and trust with relevant actors.

(4) Another aspect is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government through the perception of the populace that it governs. FHA and CMO help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government. When the populace perceives the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate, especially when coupled with successful efforts to build the capability and capacity of the supported government's institutions. In a situation where perceptions of government legitimacy do not exist, leaders must use extreme caution to avoid inadvertently legitimizing individuals and organizations whose agendas may be counterproductive to the HN and US strategic objectives.

Appendix A

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APPENDIX B REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-0 considers the following primary references:

1. General

- a. Title 10, USC.
- b. *2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
- c. *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, March 2021.
- d. (U) *2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*.
- e. (U) *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018*.
- f. *Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- g. *The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy*.
- h. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*.
- i. *National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America*.
- j. *National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel of the United States of America*.
- k. *National Response Framework*.
- l. *Unified Command Plan*.
- m. *FY 2023-FY 2027 Defense Planning Guidance*.
- n. Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*.
- o. National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, *Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees*.
- p. *UN Charter*.
- q. Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*.
- r. *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance FY 2019-2020*.

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- b. *Defense Space Strategy.*
- c. *Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy: A Call to Action.*
- d. DODD 2310.01, *DOD Detainee Program.*
- e. DODD 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program.*
- f. DODD 3000.03E, *DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.*
- g. DODD 3000.05, *Stabilization.*
- h. DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW).*
- i. DODD 3002.01, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.*
- j. DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).*
- k. DODD 3160.01, *Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard.*
- l. DODD 5205.02E, *DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program.*
- m. DODD 5240.01, *DOD Intelligence Activities.*
- n. DODI 3000.12, *Management of US Global Defense Posture (GDP).*
- o. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS).*
- p. DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.*
- q. DODI 3025.22, *The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.*
- r. DODI 4715.19, *Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations.*
- s. DODI 4715.22, *Environmental Management Policy for Contingency Locations.*
- t. DODI 5000.74, *Defense Acquisition of Services.*
- u. DODI 6490.03, *Deployment Health.*
- v. DODI 8500.01, *Cybersecurity.*

w. DOD Manual 5240-01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. CJCSI 3100.01, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.
- b. CJCSI 3110.01K, (U) *2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*.
- c. CJCSI 3110.05F, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.
- d. CJCSI 3120.08D, (U) *Joint Special Technical Operations*.
- e. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.
- f. CJCSI 3126.01A, *Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing*.
- g. CJCSI 3141.01F, *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*.
- h. CJCSI 3150.25G, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.
- i. CJCSI 3162.02, *Methodology for Combat Assessment*.
- j. CJCSI 3213.01D, *Joint Operations Security*.
- k. CJCSI 3320.01D, (U) *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)*.
- l. CJCSI 3500.01J, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- m. CJCSI 5715.01C, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs*.
- n. CJCSI 5810.01D, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*.
- o. CJCSM 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*.
- p. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*.
- q. CJCSM 3122.05, *Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)-Information Systems (IS) Governance*.
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- t. CJCSM 3150.03D, *Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports*.
- u. CJCSM 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support*.
- v. JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*.
- w. JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*.
- x. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.
- y. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- z. JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*.
- aa. JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.
- bb. JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*.
- cc. JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*.
- dd. JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*.
- ee. JP 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities*.
- ff. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.
- gg. JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*.
- hh. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.
- ii. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.
- jj. JP 3-09.3, *Close Air Support*.
- kk. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.
- ll. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*.
- mm. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.
- nn. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- oo. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*.
- pp. JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*.

- qq. JP 3-14, *Joint Space Operations*.
- rr. JP 3-15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Activities*.
- ss. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- tt. JP 3-18, *Joint Forcible Entry Operations*.
- uu. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.
- vv. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- ww. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
- xx. JP 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*.
- yy. JP 3-26, *Joint Combating Terrorism*.
- zz. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- aaa. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- bbb. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- ccc. JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*.
- ddd. JP 3-31, *Joint Land Operations*.
- eee. JP 3-32, *Joint Maritime Operations*.
- fff. JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*.
- ggg. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
- hhh. JP 3-36, *Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations*.
- iii. JP 3-40, *Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- jjj. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*.
- kkk. JP 3-42, *Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal*.
- lll. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- mmm. JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*.
- nnn. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.

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ooo. JP 3-59, *Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations*.

ppp. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*.

qqq. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.

rrr. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

sss. JP 3-85, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations*.

ttt. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

uuu. JP 4-09, *Distribution Operations*.

vvv. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.

www. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

xxx. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

4. Allied Joint Publications

a. AJP-01(D), *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

b. AJP-3(C), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

5. Multi-Service Publications

a. Army Techniques Publication 3-22.40 (Field Manual 3-22.40)/Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10-10A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*.

b. Army Techniques Publication 3-01.15/Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10-10B/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-01.8/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.31, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile Defense*.

c. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.38B/Marine Corps Order 3500.26A/Commandant Instruction M3500.1B, *Universal Naval Task List [UNTL]*.

d. Chief, National Guard Bureau Instruction 3000.04, *National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations*.

e. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-07.11M/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.3/Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.04, *Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Operations*.

f. Navy Warfare Publication 3-07/Commandant Instruction M3120.11/Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02, *Maritime Stability Operations*.

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APPENDIX C ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Scott T. Kendrick, Integrated Operations Division, Future Operations (J-35), Joint Staff Directorate for Operations (J-3); Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Scott Kendrick, Integrated Operations Division, Future Operations (J-35), Joint Staff Directorate for Operations (J-3); Mr. John Gniadek, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch, Joint Staff J-7; and LtCol Matthew T. James, Joint Doctrine Branch, Joint Staff J-7. Mr. Johnny R. Raney, United States Marine Corps, is also recognized for his invaluable contributions throughout the revision cycle of this publication.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of observations, best practices, and lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing insights and lessons learned derived from operations, exercises, war games, and other events. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Insights and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Web site can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <https://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

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APPENDIX D
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT ALL-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

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GLOSSARY

PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS (ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)

A2	antiaccess
AADC	area air defense commander
ACA	airspace control authority
ACO	airspace control order
ACP	airspace control plan
ACS	airspace control system
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AD	area denial
AJP	Allied joint publication
AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
AO	area of operations
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
BDA	battle damage assessment
BPC	building partnership capacity
C2	command and control
CAL	critical asset list
CAO	civil affairs operations
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CbT	combating terrorism
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CCP	combatant command campaign plan
CD	counterdrug
CDRUSCYBERCOM	Commander, United States Cyber Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSPACECOM	Commander, United States Space Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM	Commander, United States Strategic Command
CI	counterintelligence
CID	combat identification
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CMO	civil-military operation
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CO	cyberspace operations

Glossary

COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
CO-IPE	cyberspace operations-integrated planning element
COM	chief of mission
COMCAM	combat camera
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
COOP	continuity of operations
COP	common operational picture
CPG	contingency planning guidance
CSA	combat support agency
CSP	campaign support plan
CT	counterterrorism
CTF	counter threat finance
CTN	countering threat networks
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DA	direct action
DACO	directive authority for cyberspace operations
DAFL	directive authority for logistics
DAL	defended asset list
DCA	defensive counterair
DCO	defensive cyberspace operations
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DE	directed energy
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODIN	Department of Defense information network
DOS	Department of State
DPG	defense planning guidance
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EA	electromagnetic attack
EACA	electromagnetic attack control authority
EM	electromagnetic
EME	electromagnetic environment
EMI	electromagnetic interference
EMOE	electromagnetic operational environment
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EP	electromagnetic protection
EW	electromagnetic warfare
EXORD	execute order

FCP	functional campaign plan
FDO	flexible deterrent option
FFIR	friendly force information requirement
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FID	foreign internal defense
FRO	flexible response option
FSF	foreign security forces
GCP	global campaign plan
GFM	global force management
GFMIG	Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
GIF	global integration framework
HD	homeland defense
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
I2	identity intelligence
IADS	integrated air defense system
IAW	in accordance with
IC	intelligence community
ICB	institutional capacity building
ICP	integrated contingency plan
IE	information environment
IM	information management
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW	irregular warfare
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-7	training and education directorate of a joint staff
JCC	joint cyberspace center
JEMSO	joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

Glossary

JIST	joint integrated space team
JMETL	joint mission-essential task list
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPP	joint planning process
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JS	Joint Staff
JSA	joint security area
JSC	joint security coordinator
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JTF-State	joint task force-state
KLE	key leader engagement
LEA	law enforcement agency
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
LOE	line of effort
LOO	line of operation
MILDEC	military deception
MILDEP	Military Department
MIPOE	medical intelligence preparation of the operational environment
MISO	military information support operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	national defense strategy
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMS	national military strategy
NRF	National Response Framework
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	national security strategy
OA	operational area
OCA	offensive counterair
OCO	offensive cyberspace operations
OCS	operational contract support
OE	operational environment

OIE	operations in the information environment
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PEO	peace enforcement operations
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PN	partner nation
PNT	positioning, navigation, and timing
PPD	Presidential policy directive
PR	personnel recovery
ROE	rules of engagement
RS	religious support
SA	security assistance
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation organization
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standard operating procedure
SSA	security sector assistance
SSR	security sector reform
STO	special technical operations
TACON	tactical control
TF	task force
TPFDD	timed-phased force and deployment data
TSOC	theater special operations command
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
USG	United States Government
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
UW	unconventional warfare

Glossary

VEO violent extremist organization

WMD weapons of mass destruction

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, 18 June 2022, Active Terms and Definitions

activity. 1. A unit, organization, or installation performing a function or mission. 2. A function, mission, action, or collection of actions. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

air apportionment. The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

antiaccess. Action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area. Also called **A2**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area denial. Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force's freedom of action within an operational area. Also called **AD**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area of influence. An area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory. Also called **AOI**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area of operations. An operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called **AO**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or "agents." (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of fires. Also called **BDA**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

campaigning. The persistent conduct of related operations, activities, and investments that align military actions with the other instruments of national power, supporting global integration across the competition continuum in pursuit of strategic objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

combat power. The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

commander's critical information requirement. Specific information identified by the commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making. Also called **CCIR**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

commander's intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of an operation and the desired objectives and military end state. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

common operational picture. A single, identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

condition. 1. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual operates and that may affect performance. 2. A physical or behavioral state of a system that is necessary for the achievement of an objective. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. Also called **COOP**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1, Vol 2) 2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth, a map, or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both) have been or will be determined. (JP 2-0) 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 3-0) 4. In intelligence usage, an indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or material. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 2-0)

crisis. An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

cyberspace operations. The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Also called **CO.** (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

deterrence. The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

economy of force. The employment and distribution of forces to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

engagement. 1. An attack against an air or missile threat. (JP 3-01) 2. A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

exclusion zone. A defined area, established by a sanctioning body, where specific activities are prohibited. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign country. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Also called **FSCM.** (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

force projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater in response to requirements for military operations. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (including family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Also called **FP**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

foreign assistance. Support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

freedom of navigation operations. Actions conducted to protect United States navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called **FFIR**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

hostile environment. An operational environment where the freedom of movement is contested. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

information management. The function of managing an organization's information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations. Also called **IM**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

interagency coordination. The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

interoperability. 1. The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0) 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 6-0)

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to create desired effects in support of a common objective. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist the joint force in creating effects and achieving objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and

made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions. Also called **JFACC**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions. Also called **JFLCC**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions. Also called **JFMCC**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and made-available-for-tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions. Also called **JFSOCC**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint function. A grouping of capabilities and activities that enable joint force commanders to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint operations. Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint operations area. The airspace, land area, and maritime area defined by a combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander directs military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also called **JOA**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. Also called **JSOA**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, that connects any two or more routes. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

major operation. A series of tactical actions conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

military engagement. Contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

military intervention. The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

mission. 1. The essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action. (JP 3-0) 2. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-30)

mission area. In campaign planning and execution, a grouping of related operational-level objectives within a campaign structure that may include multiple lines of effort, tactical tasks, individual operations and activities, and investments. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

neutral. In combat and combat support operations, an identity applied to a track whose characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

neutrality. In international law, the attitude of impartiality during periods of war adopted by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized by the belligerent, which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerent. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-36) 2. In communications and computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP 6-0) 3. An element of a network that represents a person, place, or physical object. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a military mission. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational access. The ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of responsibility and joint operations area) of locations for the conduct of military operations. Also called **OA**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational environment. The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called **OE**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational level of warfare. The level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

permissive environment. Uncontested conditions in which joint forces have freedom of movement. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

protection. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force, when necessary, for the protection of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens (whether embarked in United States or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

raid. An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment or destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

risk management. The process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called **RM**. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

sanction enforcement. Operations that employ coercive measures to control the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

show of force. An operation planned to demonstrate United States resolve that involves increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or national objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

stabilization activities. Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

strategic attack. An offensive action against a target—whether military, political, economic, or other—that is specifically selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

strategic level of warfare. The level of warfare at which a nation determines national or multinational guidance, develops strategic objectives, then develops and commits national resources to achieve those objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

strategy. An idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned. 2. In the context of joint planning, the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander, and who is responsible for ensuring the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides actions and other directed support to a supported commander. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements that form a unified whole. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

tactical level of warfare. The level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military objectives. (A DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

theater of war. Defined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the combatant commander as the area of air, land, and sea that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of campaigns and major operations involving combat. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

uncertain environment. A condition in which the joint force's freedom of movement may be contested. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

unity of command. The direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

weapon system. A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency. (DoD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)


2. Terms Removed from the DoD Dictionary

- **Supersession of JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018:** alliance; combatant command chaplain; command chaplain; exercise; full-spectrum superiority; joint force chaplain; maneuver; neutralize; religious affairs; religious discrimination; termination criteria; theater strategy

Glossary

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-0** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

