The SWIID and the Political Consequences of Economic Inequality

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The Standardized World Income Inequality Database

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- Next steps

The Problem with Inequality Data: Quantity vs. Quality

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 - Harmonization (e.g., treatment of non-monetary income)

A Tradeoff



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
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
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- But crudely reducing these differences to constants means any comparisons are extremely dubious


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All the Ginis with adjustments



Actually comparable data



Constructing the SWIID: The Logic

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 - Error terms in the models—the residual incomparability—is incorporated as uncertainty

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
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
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
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- 8. Inform with estimates from surrounding country-years using a weighted moving-average smoother (with exceptions)


Assessing the SWIID




Predicting the LIS









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Do you see more?!?!?

The SWIID

Problem? Problems?!?

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Relative Power Theory

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
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
How would we know?

TABLE 2 Effects of Inequality on Political Engagement by Income Quintile


Dependent Variable	Poorest Quintile Estimate (Std. Error)	Second Quintile Estimate (Std. Error)	Median Quintile Estimate (Std. Error)	Fourth Quintile Estimate (Std. Error)	Richest Quintile Estimate (Std. Error)
Political Discussion	-7.139* (2.220)	-6.160* (2.172)	-5.181* (2.156)	-4.201* (2.175)	-3.222 (2.226)
Electoral Participation	-4.873* (2.010)	-4.415* (1.978)	-3.957* (1.914)	-3.498* (1.914)	-3.040 (1.979)

^{*}p < .05






Political Engagement




Solt (2015)


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
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
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Ritter & Solt (2016)




Political Attitudes: Authoritarianism




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


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
Solt, Habel, & Grant (2012)

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
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
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
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Political Attitudes Meritocracy



Solt, Hu, Hudson, Song, & Yu (2016)


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Income

Solt, Hu, Hudson, Song, & Yu (2016)

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Conclusions

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Thank you!

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